Limits on reelection of municipal authorities and access to other positionsLímites a la reelección de autoridades municipales y acceso a otros cargos

VI. On the alleged procedural defects

• i)Arguments of the parties.

The plaintiff Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza indicates that article 97 of our Magna Carta precludes the approval of electoral reforms during the restricted period (plazo de veda) stipulated therein, since it does not distinguish between national and municipal elections. He considers that a contrary position would imply a modification of the text by way of interpretation.

The plaintiff Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes argues that the procedure followed by the Legislative Assembly for the approval of the law contravenes constitutional article 97, inasmuch as, during the processing of legislative file 21.810, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) issued a negative opinion and objected to the approval of the bill. He asserts that, on March 29, 2022, after the optional legislative consultation before the Constitutional Chamber was completed, the legislative plenary approved the bill in second debate despite the opposition of the TSE and the date of the national elections. He explains that the TSE considered two reasons for objecting to the bill: “first, that the bill generates a hollowing out of the human right to be elected by preventing officials with two terms in the same popularly elected position in the municipal regime from being able to aspire to other popularly elected positions within the same municipal regime, especially, for the association I represent, those who hold mayoralties (alcaldías) and administrator offices (intendencias); and second, that within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law bills with which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.” He questions the opinion (dictamen) no. 2022-006119 issued at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, by this Chamber and notes that he dissents from the opinion rendered therein regarding the absence of a procedural defect. He states that the final part of constitutional article 97 is not subject to interpretation; therefore, as the prohibition contained therein is mandatory, the Legislative Assembly could not approve the bill in question in second debate. He adds that in the aforementioned opinion, constitutional electoral norms were interpreted, which falls within the exclusive competence of the TSE in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 102 of the Fundamental Law. He mentions that the procedural defect is as follows: “it was approved in second debate, ignoring the fact that there is an objection to it by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, an objection that was based on two aspects, on the merits by limiting the election to other positions of popularly elected authorities within the municipal regime and non-retroactivity (sic) of the norms, and on the other hand, that the norm was approved given that it is within the period of prohibition established by article 97 of the Political Constitution, a norm that is clear and does not allow any interpretation whatsoever, and if any interpretation had to be made, this corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and not to the Constitutional Chamber, given that it is exclusively electoral matter.” The plaintiffs Wilber Quirós Palma and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales indicate that the district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito) are governed by the second paragraph of article 172 of the Political Constitution, which was transgressed. They maintain that with the modification introduced by the law, the re-election was modified, but not through the channel provided for by the Magna Carta. They argue that the special law already exists and cannot be modified by the questioned norm.

• ii)Considerations of the Chamber.

Regarding the above, this Court observes that the questions of unconstitutionality based on procedural defects are grounded on two articles of the Fundamental Law, 97 and the second paragraph of 172. These norms stipulate:

“ARTICLE 97.- For the discussion and approval of bills related to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of its total membership shall be required. Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into law the bills on such matters with respect to which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.

(…)

ARTICLE 172.- Each district shall be represented before the municipality by a proprietary trustee (síndico propietario) and an alternate with voice but no vote.

For the administration of the interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases the municipalities may create district municipal councils, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be composed following the same procedures of popular election used to form the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of all the deputies, shall establish the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, operation, and financing.” As for the procedural defect regarding constitutional article 97, the Chamber ruled by majority in the optional legislative consultation of constitutionality concerning the bill ‘Reform of article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite re-election of local authorities).’ Specifically, in opinion no. 2022006119 issued at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, it was decided:

“IV.- ON THE PROCEDURAL DEFECTS CONSULTED (drafted by Justice Castillo Víquez).- The consultants consider that a procedural defect could have been incurred with the approval of this bill, in contravention of the provisions of the last sentence of article 97 of the Political Constitution. They indicate that there is a formal pronouncement by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal opposing the vote. That Tribunal, through official letter TSE-0199-2022 of January 20, 2022, indicated: “by reason of the hollowing out of the human right to be elected, by preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same position from being able to aspire to other popularly elected positions, this Tribunal, in the terms and with the scope of constitutional article 97, objects to the bill processed in file 21.810.” The consulting deputies consider that the application of article 97 cannot be literal or understood from a formal interpretation, because the reality of the constituent legislator at the time understood elections as a single moment every four years and therefore the limitation was general and absolute, given that the legislation that affected one of the levels of eligible officials applied to all of them, and current circumstances are different. They add that this was the reason they approved the bill in first debate, confident that its approval does not affect the electoral process that took place on February 6 in any way, as it had no relation to any municipal authority. Therefore, they ask: Is the prohibition established in article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is that concerning the national sphere?

In the original design of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, its will was that the three elections, i.e.: presidential, legislative, and municipal, be held on a single day. Indeed, it opted for the elections for President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic (constitutional article 133), members of the Legislative Branch (constitutional article 107), and municipal council members (constitutional article 171) to be held on the same day. On this matter, the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, number 75, indicate the following:

“Deputy Leiva clarified that he believed that within thirty days the Tribunal could not scrutinize all votes cast, including the votes for the election of the Municipalities. He suggested that this task could be left in the hands of the Electoral Boards. Representative Facio agreed to modify the motion, but leaving in the hands of the Tribunal the recount of all votes cast in any popular election.

Representatives Pinto and Arroyo opposed not setting a precise date for the Tribunal to make the declaration of the election of President and Vice-Presidents. It is necessary that this term be determined in the Constitution itself. Deputy Facio presented this other formula, which was approved: ‘To make, within thirty days following the date of voting, the definitive declaration of the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic, and within the term determined by law, that of the other officials cited in paragraph 6 [now 7] of this article’. (The bold text does not correspond to the original).

However, by law—upon the entry into force of the Electoral Code, article 310—municipal elections were separated from presidential and legislative elections, the former being moved to the mid-point of the constitutional term. This modification of the system—moving from a single or concentrated model to a dual one—requires an interpretation of constitutional article 97 in light of this new reality. When it involved three elections on the same day, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the bill had the effect of suspending the power to legislate in the specific case—during the six months prior to and four months following the election—; if the opinion was rendered (sic) outside that period, the power to legislate was burdened. The situation has changed radically at present, where there are separate elections between the presidential and deputy elections and the municipal elections. In this context, article 97 must be interpreted to mean that the objection to the bill must refer to the respective election, in which case, if a bill refers to municipal elections and it is not within the electoral period for electing municipal authorities, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of burdening it, that is, once the second debate is finished, for its approval in the final vote, the bill would require a qualified majority of two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Assembly. If not, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text, expanding the restricted period (plazo de veda)—from ten months or twelve months if there is a second round in the presidential elections to twenty-two months—, which is, clearly, contrary to the constitutional text. It is for this reason that, in this specific case, there is no procedural defect due to the fact that the Legislative Assembly approved the consulted bill in first debate. Moreover, there is even a conceptual error in what is consulted, since, according to this Court’s reiterated jurisprudence, in the hypothetical case that we were under the prohibition of constitutional article 97, the Legislative Assembly is authorized by the Constitution’s Law and by the norms of the Parliamentary Statute to approve a bill in first debate on which there is an objection by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; what it could not do is approve it in the final vote after concluding the second debate. Ergo, based on the foregoing, the procedural defect is dismissed.” Based on what was stated above (ut supra), in relation to article 97 of the Political Constitution, this Court dismisses the indicated procedural defect, since there are no novel arguments or elements that warrant changing the opinion already rendered. Rather, what is observed is a disagreement with the Chamber’s position in the legislative consultation on the bill; however, the action pathway is not designed for that, but for questioning the unconstitutionality of norms by action or omission. In any case, as recorded in the transcribed opinion, the existing dual electoral system of Costa Rica (national and municipal elections on different dates) requires the updated interpretation of that constitutional norm, in the sense that, for it to fulfill its purpose, the bills objected to by the TSE (for the purpose of preventing approval) must necessarily affect the respective election (national or municipal).

Hence, since the challenged law deals with the municipal regime and, furthermore, the alleged impossibility of approval is based on the holding of the national election, this Court dismisses the transgression of the restricted period stipulated in constitutional article 97. Precisely, the questioned law, apart from not affecting the national elections, also does not evidence concrete effects on democracy, the right to vote, electoral justice, the integrity of the electoral process, or other matters inherent to the constitutional function of the TSE.

Furthermore, the prerogative of the TSE to dissent from certain bills on electoral matters (as part of the law-making process) must not be confused with its function of interpreting, in an exclusive and binding manner, the constitutional provisions relating to such sphere (paragraph 3 of article 102 of the Magna Carta). In this regard, it is incumbent upon the Chamber to exercise constitutionality control over norms of any nature (articles 10 of the Political Constitution and 2, subparagraph b, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) and to review defects in the law-making process (article 73, subparagraph c, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Hence, this Constitutional Court is competent to determine whether the TSE's opposition in question entails preventing the approval of the law. On this point, the Chamber does not perceive any substantial impact on the constitutional function of the TSE, nor any risk to its independence or the country's institutional framework, so the final part of article 97 of the Political Constitution is not transgressed in the sub lite case. Indeed, in the hearing granted in this unconstitutionality action, the TSE did not specify any defect in that sense.

With respect to the second paragraph of article 172 of the Magna Carta, although the constituent provided for the issuance of a special norm approved by a qualified majority for regulating the conditions under which district municipal councils may be created, as well as their structure, operation, and financing, it is no less true that, taking into account the arguments of the plaintiff, this Court does not certify a contradiction between Law 10183 and the cited constitutional norm. Similarly, Law No. 8173 entitled ‘General Law of District Municipal Councils’ (Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito) does not prevent the legislator from issuing a general regulation on the re-election of the authorities of the municipal regime, including district municipal councils, as both norms serve different purposes. In any case, article 172 itself establishes that district municipal councils “shall be composed following the same procedures of popular election used to form the municipalities.” Consequently, the alleged procedural defects are dismissed.

VII. On the alleged unconstitutionalities on the merits

VII.1. On the alleged unconstitutionality of the substantive part of the law.

• i)Arguments of the parties.

The plaintiff Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza accuses that the challenged law transgresses constitutional article 33, as it created “an odious discrimination directed at certain particular individuals,” which is violative of the principles of equality, reasonableness, proportionality, and political and individual freedom. He states that legislative discretion does not allow for the public condemnation of more than 40 innocent mayors through a norm that lacks the basic or minimum characteristics “of being general and abstract,” but is instead drafted to “cause an effect on some people only, to the detriment of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and equality.” He argues that the sole motivation for processing and approving the law is to “avoid the abuse of power by Mayors who held several terms in which the citizens re-elected them.” He asserts that a kind of generalized social condemnation was made against every mayor with two or more terms. He considers the constitutional principle of innocence transgressed with respect to mayors who are not linked to investigations of possible corruption crimes. He mentions that the constituent did not regulate the re-election of local authorities, because “the political and social control was evidently greater due to the proximity to the population that would elect them or not.” He notes that the impairment of the principle of equality is confirmed by several causes, among them “that all Costa Rican citizens who meet the requirements can be elected Mayors from the enactment of the Law, except those who were already in office and had been re-elected when this norm did not exist.” He adds that “the violation of the principle of equality is accentuated when the rest of the popularly elected authorities can access the rest of the positions of this nature, except the Mayors, male and female, who could not access any popularly appointed position, even if it is not that of Mayor, thus verifying the casuistic, personalized, political, and unjust characteristic of the challenged norm.” He mentions that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in ruling no. TSE-0199-2022 of January 20, 2022, ordered: “The restrictions on re-elected officials (so they cannot opt for another position in the municipality) would make it impossible for those citizens to participate in internal party contests in order to later be nominated for popularly elected positions other than the one they hold. In other terms, no matter how much they belong to a political group and meet the legal nomination requirements, by reason of the public function they perform—ad initio—such officials will not be able to compete even in the internal processes in which nominations are contested... Such an impact on the essential core of the right occurs precisely because not only is re-election being limited, but also, as an effect of the application of the norm, a total suspension of the citizen's prerogative to contend for political positions would occur.” In addition, he considers articles 169 and 171 of the Political Constitution transgressed, since, in his opinion, only in the Magna Carta can electoral limitations or restrictions be established for those who have been or could be popularly elected. He argues that the Fundamental Law, in the case of municipal authorities, did not set restrictions; therefore, with the challenged law, an implicit reform of the higher norm occurs without complying with the constitutional procedures. He notes that it does not correspond to a legal norm to restrict or delimit the political rights constitutionally enshrined. He asserts that it is articles 107 and 132 of the Political Constitution that have sufficient authority to constrain, limit, or condition the right to re-election, a situation that the constituent did not envision for local authorities, because the political and social control was evidently greater due to the proximity to the population that would elect them or not. He states that modifying the foregoing would imply a necessary change at the level of the constitutional norms, since it is these that determine the term of appointment, as well as the fundamental conditions and limitations; thus, the law transgresses articles 169 and 171 of the same body of laws (eiusdem), which establish the aspects related to the election of mayors and council members. Likewise, he considers article 7 of the same body of laws transgressed, since international treaties protect political rights, especially article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to the right to vote and be freely elected. He considers that the restriction to public office can only occur through two means: a general and abstract norm that respects the principles of equality and proportionality and pursues a legitimate aim, or, a final judicial sanctioning ruling. He adds that, in the case presented, the Legislative Assembly exceeded its limits by designing a third way that “substitutes the judicial procedures and sanctioning powers inherent to the Judicial Branch.” The plaintiff Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considers that the questioned regulation transgresses constitutional article 33. He points out that, of the popularly elected positions, those of the municipal regime represent the largest number (mayoralties, deputy mayoralties, council memberships and their alternates, trusteeships and their alternates, administrator offices, deputy administrator offices, and district council memberships and their alternates). He accuses that the sole article transgresses the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since, after two consecutive terms in office, it imposes an eight-year prohibition on holding a position within the municipal regime. He considers that such an eight-year period is unreasonable and disproportionate, as it violates, in addition to constitutional jurisprudence, “paragraphs 1 c) and 2” of the American Convention on Human Rights, since, without any justification, it limits access under equal conditions for persons holding a mayoralty. He adds that a situation is also being regulated that limits the rights of persons against the exceptions imposed by article 23, paragraph 2, of the same body of laws. He deems such a temporal limitation for those holding a mayoralty to be unreasonable and disproportionate, since this is the only one of all the popularly elected positions in the country that can be removed through a recall plebiscite (referéndum revocatorio) (article 19 of the Municipal Code). He indicates that the principle of proportionality is transgressed by establishing more burdensome limitations and conditions for the election to the mayoralty than for other popularly elected positions in the same municipal regime and in both the Legislative and Executive branches. Likewise, he argues that the second paragraph of the sole article of Law 10183 imposes a limitation on persons holding popularly elected positions in municipal mayoralties, which transgresses subparagraphs b and c of article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights. He maintains that voting and having the possibility of being elected is a political right, as is having access to general equal conditions to popularly elected positions. He argues that the problem presented by the norm is that, in the case of mayors who complete eight years in the position, they have an immediate legal prohibition preventing them from participating in any other popularly elected position within the municipal regime, which transgresses the right to passive suffrage contemplated in the referenced convention, since these are different positions. He states that none of the exceptions to article 23 mentioned allows limiting the right to passive suffrage for having held other popularly elected positions. He argues that the Chamber, in vote no. 2003-02771, considers the right to election to be a fundamental one. He maintains that the same prohibition applies to persons holding the positions of administrator office. He maintains that the questioned norm does not conform to the exceptions stipulated in paragraph 2 of article 23 mentioned above. He asserts that the limitation for those holding mayoralties and administrator offices harms their rights.

The plaintiffs Wilber Quirós Palma and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales maintain that the reform was a response to a campaign to discredit the local regime, orchestrated by the press. They state that the approved scheme is seriously incongruent and does not represent a lawful exercise of legislative discretion. They add that mayors are prohibited, after two consecutive terms, from holding any popularly elected municipal office, but vice mayors are only prohibited from holding the same office or that of council member or trustee; that is, they are allowed to run for mayor, administrator, or deputy administrator and for council member of a district municipal council. They consider that the foregoing constitutes a senseless discrimination. They argue that, according to the temporary provision, executive officials cannot run for any popularly elected position in the next two elections, but deputy executives or council members (not including council members of the district municipal councils) have a restriction only regarding the same position; that is, an unjustified difference occurs. They explain that, according to article 107 of the Political Constitution, deputies cannot be re-elected consecutively; however, council members and district council members are restricted from the possibility for two terms, which creates discrimination and inevitably forces them to abandon the local political career. They consider that the limitations regulated in the questioned law have no basis in article 23.2 of the convention mentioned above (ut supra), which contains the exhaustive grounds for restricting political rights. Furthermore, they claim that the law intentionally diminishes the current content of the right to re-election. They argue that the Chamber considered that the “possibility of re-election in public office” is a human right, derived from the fundamental right to be elected. They state that, in accordance with the above, such a right cannot be diminished by the legislator, not even through constitutional reform. They mention that, if a norm provides for popular election and does not contemplate limitations regarding re-election, then the latter cannot be provided for. They consider it irrelevant that the unlimited right to re-election was conferred by law, since it is a fundamental right. They consider that this right cannot be reduced except by a Constituent Assembly.

• ii)Considerations of the Chamber.

ii.1. Analysis of political-electoral rights in light of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court).

Before ruling on the merits regarding the questions of constitutionality, it is necessary to examine the ACHR and the jurisprudence of the IACHR Court in relation to political-electoral rights, which are regulated by article 23 of the ACHR as follows:

“Article 23. Political Rights 1. All citizens shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:

All citizens shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:

• a)to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the electors, and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of their country.

2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph exclusively on grounds of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or conviction by a competent court in criminal proceedings." Thus, the CADH, on the one hand, contemplates specific examples of political-electoral rights, and, on the other, provides guidance on how to regulate them in a valid manner, which entails restricting them.

The starting point is to understand that "the effective exercise of political rights constitutes an end in itself and, at the same time, a fundamental means that democratic societies have to guarantee the other human rights provided for in the Convention and that their holders, that is, citizens, must not only (sic) enjoy rights, but also 'opportunities.' This latter term implies the obligation to guarantee through positive measures that every person who is formally a holder of political rights has the real opportunity to exercise them." (Yatama vs. Nicaragua, judgment of 23 June 2005).

Specifically regarding the exercise of a popularly elected public office, it must be noted that political rights are not absolute.

From this perspective, the Corte IDH in Yatama vs. Nicaragua attempts a kind of "reasonableness test" to weigh the legal viability of any restriction. Thus, besides explicitly resorting to the principles of legality and equality—the requirements to participate in an electoral contest and the corresponding procedure must be defined by law and be non-discriminatory—it affirms that limitations must "be based on reasonable criteria, serve a useful and timely purpose that makes it necessary to satisfy a compelling public interest, and be proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is most proportional to the pursued purpose must be chosen." In relation to this type of analysis, drawing on German jurisprudence, the Sala Constitucional has also developed a similar test or protocol to assess the reasonableness of a measure:

"In this regard, the Chamber considers that the challenged measure is in accordance with the principle of reasonableness. The latter is composed of the following components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought by the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve that objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that even if a measure is suitable and necessary, it will be unreasonable if it injures the essential content of another fundamental right, if it empties it of content." (Judgment No. 2013001276 of 14:50 hours on 29 January 2013, reiterated in Judgments Nos. 2017011793 of 16:41 hours on 26 July 2017, 2019007035 of 9:20 hours on 26 April 2019, and 2020022295 of 9:15 hours on 20 November 2020, among many others).

Now, in Castañeda Gutman vs. México (judgment of 6 August 2008), the parameters for the regulation of political rights are developed with greater precision by the Corte IDH.

First, regarding numeral 23.1 of the CADH, the Corte IDH specifies that, correlatively to the rights and opportunities of citizens in the matter, the State is subject to the "obligation to do, to carry out certain actions or conduct, to adopt measures, which derive from the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction (Article 1.1 of the Convention) and from the general obligation to adopt measures in domestic law (Article 2 of the Convention)." In this regard, it specifies:

"157. This positive obligation consists in the design of a system that allows representatives to be elected to conduct public affairs. Indeed, for political rights to be exercised, the law necessarily must establish regulations that go beyond those related to certain limits of the State to restrict those rights, established in Article 23.2 of the Convention. States must organize electoral systems and establish a complex number of conditions and formalities to make possible the exercise of the right to vote and to be voted for." That is, numeral 23.1 not only contemplates rights and opportunities in favor of the citizen but concomitantly imposes obligations on the State for the purpose of configuring a system for election to public office, which is inherently characterized by a complex number of conditions and formalities, required to enable the effective and efficient exercise of the rights to vote and to be voted for.

With a view to the elaboration of such a legal-positive filigree, the restriction factors established in numeral 23.2 fall short; they are only part of the normative framework, since there are legally plausible limits beyond such regulation. In this sense, the judicial organ of the Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) emphatically rules: "it is not possible to apply to the electoral system established in a State only the limitations of paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the American Convention." By virtue of the foregoing, the corresponding hermeneutic conditions and guidelines must be developed for the purpose of configuring the restrictions in accordance with the CADH.

The Chamber starts from the premise that the normative 'ought-to-be' is insufficient, since the efficacy and effectiveness of any right requires, as already indicated, a complex institutional, economic, and human apparatus that functions on the plane of reality. In short, an 'ought-to-be' without 'reality' is inane.

The Corte IDH states in Castañeda Gutman: "if there are no electoral codes or laws, voter registries, political parties, means of propaganda and mobilization, voting centers, electoral boards, dates and deadlines for the exercise of suffrage, this (sic) simply cannot be exercised, by its very nature; just as the right to judicial protection cannot be exercised without the courts that grant it and the procedural rules that discipline and make it possible." Additionally, the Corte IDH postulates that the CADH does not opt for a particular electoral system; quite the contrary, it admits a diversity of options, only subject to their compatibility with the rights protected by it. The same direction has guided the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights.

At this point, the Corte IDH modulates the consequences of Yatama, emphasizing that in that case, the cultural qualities of the members of an indigenous community and the imposition of a form of organization—within the framework of a municipal election—totally alien to such parameters prevailed, which resulted in a violation of the conventional right to be elected.

Thus, in Castañeda Gutman, the Corte IDH comes to confirm that the general rule is the plausibility of various restrictions and different models of the electoral system, provided that fundamental rights are not violated, for which purposes it specifies a series of concrete guidelines.

It begins by reiterating that restrictions on electoral rights can only be established by law.

Immediately thereafter, it evokes certain elements characteristic of a test of reasonableness and proportionality.

Thus, it alludes to the purpose of the restrictive measure, insofar as its cause must be appropriate in light of the CADH.

Within this approach, it highlights the case where the purpose is the safeguarding of some fundamental right, such as public order or health (according to numerals 12.3, 13.2.b, and 15 eiusdem, among others). Furthermore, it refers to another group of restrictions: those that are rather linked to legitimate general purposes (for example, "the freedoms of other persons" or "the just requirements of the common good, in a democratic society," both in numeral 32 eiusdem).

Now, properly, conventional numeral 23 does not expressly regulate either the legitimate causes or the permitted purposes for which the law may regulate political rights. Indeed, that norm "is limited to establishing certain aspects or reasons (civil or mental capacity, age, among others) based on which political rights may be regulated in relation to their holders, but it does not explicitly determine the purposes, nor the specific restrictions that will necessarily have to be imposed when designing an electoral system, such as residency requirements, electoral districts, and others. However, the legitimate purposes that the restrictions must pursue derive from the obligations arising from Article 23.1 of the Convention ..." (Castañeda Gutman).

In this way, the aforementioned aspect linked to the objective of a regulation or measure corresponds to the 'legitimacy' element of the type of reasonableness and proportionality test developed by the Chamber, in accordance with what was defined ut supra.

Immediately thereafter, in Castañeda Gutman, the Corte IDH clarifies that the demonstration of a purpose permitted by the CADH does not per se imply the reasonableness of the measure, since it must also respond to the factor of "necessity in a democratic society." It articulates this latter factor in this way:

"184. In order to evaluate whether the restrictive measure under examination meets this last requirement, the Court must assess whether it: a) satisfies a pressing social need, that is, is oriented to satisfy a compelling public interest; b) is the one that least restricts the protected right; and c) closely adjusts to the achievement of the legitimate objective." Regarding the 'pressing social need,' it again evokes the 'legitimacy' element of the reasonableness test of this Chamber, insofar as the provision is directed at seeking a solution to such a question, that is, it involves a legitimate end, which inexorably must be present. Likewise, the Court maintains that among several legitimate measures, the one that least restricts the affected fundamental right must be chosen; this is identical to the 'necessity' element of the constitutional test of the Chamber. Finally, when the Corte IDH refers to the requirement that the determination must closely adjust to the achievement of a legitimate objective, there is a denoted correspondence with the 'suitability' element of the reasonableness test of the Sala Constitucional, based on which the questioned state measure must be apt to achieve the intended objective. Only in relation to the element of the reasonableness test of the Chamber, 'proportionality in the strict sense' (according to which a provision may be legitimate, suitable, and necessary, but still unreasonable when its application lacerates the essential core of a fundamental right), is no direct concordance noted with the reasonableness examination developed by the Corte IDH.

As a corollary of the foregoing, in the examination of the reasonableness of a measure or provision, the criteria and guidelines cited supra must be applied, which are related to the principles of legality and equality, the pursuit of a legitimate end, the existence of a pressing social urgency, the suitability, and the necessity of the measure (clearly applied in Argüelles and others vs. Argentina, judgment of 20 November 2014), to which the element of proportionality in the strict sense must be added.

ii.2. On legislative discretion and the principle of free configuration of the legislator.

In Judgment No. 2003-05090 of 14:44 hours on 11 June 2003, the Chamber clearly outlines the principle of free configuration of the legislator, also called 'free legislative design' or 'legislative discretion.' Thus, this Tribunal indicates that the Parliamentary Power, in the exercise of the materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract character—that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1 of the Constitución Política)—enjoys broad freedom to normatively develop the constitutional program set by the constituent power.

Within such a context, the principle of free configuration of the legislator is addressed by this Tribunal in this manner: "This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, faced with a certain need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of law it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation. In this way, the legislator may create public organs, assign them functions or competences, develop various institutions, or regulate reality, as it deems timely and convenient for a specific historical, social, economic, or political juncture. Evidently, legislative discretion is much broader than administrative discretion, since the legislative function cannot be reduced to the simple execution of the Constitution." However, the "freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles—among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence issued by this Tribunal for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since, in such matters, the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, being (sic) that, in contrast, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects." (See also resolutions No. 2013011499 of 16:00 hours on 28 August 2013, No. 2013011706 of 11:44 hours on 30 August 2013, and No. 2020015542 of 11:40 hours on 19 August 2020, among others).

In the same direction set forth, the Tribunal Constitucional, in Judgment No. 2018019511 of 21:45 hours on 23 November 2018, affirms that this broad freedom to shape the social, economic, and political reality enjoyed by deputies in the exercise of legislative power (which, according to numerals 105 and 121, subsection 1 of the Ley Fundamental, resides originally in the People and is constitutionally delegated to the Asamblea Legislativa due to its character as a representative political body), can only be subject to "the limits established by the constituent power and, in general, the block of constitutionality, so that in order to avoid an undue limitation of the freedom of legislative configuration, any provision establishing a condition or limit that aggravates it must be interpreted in its fair and reasonable terms, to facilitate its exercise." However, it must be noted that, in Judgment No. 2018000230 of 10:40 hours on 10 January 2018, the Sala Constitucional rejected "that, irremediably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since said situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm on the matter (verbigracia in environmental matters) or when the matter demands them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness" (verbigracia, in application of the principle of objectification of environmental protection—Judgments No. 2005014293 of 14:52 hours on 19 October 2005, No. 2012012716 of 16:01 hours on 12 September 2012, and No. 2021024147 of 9:15 hours on 27 October 2021—).

Likewise, it is worth noting that legislative discretion in the exercise of derived constituent power is also subject to certain procedural, temporal, and substantial limits (see resolutions No. 2005015094 of 15:00 hours on 2 November 2005, No. 2013006118 of 16:22 hours on 30 April 2013, and No. 2019013270 of 16:50 hours on 17 July 2019).

As a corollary of the foregoing, in the exercise of the legislative power, the deputy enjoys extensive discretion, subject only to observance of the block of constitutionality.

ii.3. On the alleged unconstitutionalities in relation to the establishment of limits on the reelection of those occupying popularly elected positions in the municipal regime; the prohibition for alcaldes and vicealcaldes reelected for two consecutive terms from running for other popularly elected positions in the municipal regime; and the accused unreasonableness and disproportionality of the eight-year term to run for reelection.

First, this Tribunal considers that the conditions for the election of the office of alcaldes, in principle, are covered by the free configuration of the legislator, unless other constitutional norms or principles are violated.

Numeral 169 of the Constitución Política establishes:

"ARTICLE 169.- The administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be in charge of the Municipal Government, formed by a deliberative body, composed of municipal council members (regidores municipales) of popular election, and an executive official to be designated by law." Thus, providing for or limiting the reelection of that executive official is a discussion of a political nature properly to be developed in the Asamblea Legislativa by constitutional provision. Concerning this point, the Chamber, in Judgment No. 2012009226 of 14:30 hours on 17 July 2012, defined:

"(...) this Tribunal does not consider that the challenged norms violate the Constitution in any way, by establishing the election of the Alcalde and his substitute by popular elections, since the Constituent Power itself delegated to the law the mechanism to devise for their appointment (...)."

Regarding the aspects delegated by the constituent power to the legislator in electoral matters, the Chamber resolved in Judgment No. 1994002128 of 14:51 hours on 3 May 1994:

"... in matters not regulated, but indeed delegated to the legislator by the Constitution, the latter may establish conditions of real or apparent inequality when its exceptions are absolutely and clearly justified by reason of other constitutional principles or values and, above all, of the rights and freedoms of the human person. Consequently, the exceptions, limitations, requirements, or impediments that will govern in electoral matters, defined by the legislator based on the responsibility delegated by the Constitution itself, must be supported by objective reasons and clearly motivated by the requirements inherent to the electoral system and the exercise of the office. In other words, restrictions that strengthen the democratic system and electoral processes may be admitted, even when a person or a group suffers the limited consequence of that (sic) regulation." Additionally, regarding the municipal council, that numeral 169 only establishes that the council members (regidores) must be popularly elected.

On the other hand, concerning other municipal positions of popular election, the Carta Magna provides:

"ARTICLE 171.- The municipal council members (Regidores Municipales) shall be elected for four years and shall perform their duties obligatorily.

The law shall determine the number of Regidores and the manner in which they shall act. However, the Municipalities of the central cantons of provinces shall be composed of no fewer than five proprietary Regidores and an equal number of alternates.

The Municipalities shall be installed on the first of May of the corresponding year.

Transitory (Article 171). - The Regidores Municipales who are elected in the elections of February nineteen sixty-two shall exercise their positions from the first of July nineteen sixty-two until the thirtieth of April nineteen sixty-six.

(Thus reformed by subsection 2 of Ley N°2741 of 12 May 1961) ARTICLE 172.- Each district shall be represented before the municipality by a proprietary district representative (síndico propietario) and an alternate with voice but without vote.

For the administration of interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases, the municipalities may create district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito), as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same procedures of popular election used to form the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of all deputies, shall establish the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing.

(Thus reformed by Article 1 of Ley N° 8105 of 31 May 2001)." Thus, our Ley Fundamental specifically regulates the election of certain positions at the municipal level, in which restrictions on their appointment were not foreseen; however, this does not mean that such limitations can only be established through constitutional precepts. The fact that the Constitución Política has indeed established express prohibitions for national popularly elected positions (Articles 107 and 132 regarding deputies and the president and vice-presidents of the Republic) does not exclude the possibility of exercising the legislative prerogative regarding municipal positions of popular election. In fact, as has been developed throughout this judgment, the legislator has the power to modify aspects of the electoral system regarding the election and reelection of positions in the municipal regime, as long as it does not contravene the Law of the Constitution or empty fundamental rights of their content. Regarding municipal council members (regidores municipales), district representatives (síndicos), district intendants (intendentes), vice-intendants (viceintendentes), and district council members (concejales municipales de distrito), although there is no express delegation from the constituent power to the legislator regarding the conditions of their designation, the limitations established by the substantive part of Law No. 10183 do not empty the right to be elected of its content but, in the terms provided, form part of the free configuration of the legislator and its discretion. In that sense, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones itself, when responding to the hearing granted by the Chamber, stated: "the thesis of this Constitutional Body, sustained for several decades, is that there is no obstacle for the legislator to limit the successive reelection of municipal positions; such regulation constitutes a political decision whose assessment—as to convenience and timeliness—is exclusive to the legislator." Additionally, even though it is alleged that indefinite and successive reelection cannot be worsened because it is a human right, it is no less true that whoever has been reelected to the same position has already exercised that right and, furthermore, as stated ut supra, it can be legitimately limited and regulated. In that sense, there is no right to the immutability of the legal system, besides the fact that the legislator has the power to validly impose new conditions on reelection to positions of the municipal regime, as long as they apply to the future and are not contrary to the block of constitutionality. Ergo, the Chamber does not consider that the change from a municipal electoral system that contemplated successive and indefinite reelection to another that only permits one consecutive reelection becomes contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

Note that, although numeral 23 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos provides that the law must regulate the exercise of the right to vote and to be elected "exclusively on grounds of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or conviction by a competent court in criminal proceedings," conventional jurisprudence has established that this is not an exhaustive or closed list, but rather that each State may develop particularities in its design of the electoral system. Therefore, it is procedente for the Costa Rican legislator to impose other limitations that respect that international instrument and the block of constitutionality. That is, each country may define restrictions on the right to vote (in its active and passive aspects) within that legal framework.

Now, it must be analyzed whether the prohibition for alcaldes and vicealcaldes reelected for two consecutive terms from running for other popularly elected positions in the municipal regime is unconstitutional or not. It is worth reiterating that the requirements or limitations for running for popularly elected positions in the municipal regime are a priori covered by the principle of free configuration of the legislator, unless they violate constitutional norms or principles, or the so-called pétreas norms. Precisely, these political decisions are properly to be discussed in the Asamblea Legislativa to define their timeliness and convenience, with full respect for the principle of separation of powers, the democratic regime of a State of Law such as the Costa Rican one, and, in general, the Law of the Constitution.

In the specific case, the sole article of the challenged law limits, for eight years, participation in other public positions of popular election for anyone who has held the position of alcalde or alcaldesa for two consecutive terms. The same situation occurs with vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas, as they are prohibited from holding new positions as regidores or síndicos for the same term.

As indicated supra, following Yatama vs. Nicaragua (judgment of 23 June 2005) and Castañeda Gutman vs. México (judgment of 6 August 2008), as well as the jurisprudence of this Chamber, the control of constitutionality and conventionality of restrictions on political rights—in the case at hand, the right to passive suffrage—as a minimum comprises these parameters: the principles of legality and equality, the pursuit of a constitutionally or conventionally permitted end, the existence of a pressing social need, the suitability and necessity of the measure, and the analysis of proportionality in the strict sense, all of which is in consonance with the scope and limits of the principle of free configuration of the legislator.

The referred restriction that is the object of the sub iudice, on the one hand, is regulated by law (reform to Article 14 of the Código Municipal); on the other, it stems from treatment that is certainly differentiated but not unjustified, given that it seeks to address purposes of constitutional and conventional relevance, and, specifically, a pressing social need, as explained infra. In determining which ends to achieve or what to consider a pressing social need, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration.

Thus, the presentation of the bill challenged here referred to a preliminary report of the Electoral Mission of the OEA, issued after the elections held on 2 February 2020. Such delegation was composed of 11 electoral experts from 6 nations of the region, who had arrived in the country on the 25th of the previous month. In that document, the Mission stated: "... there is no absolute human right to hold office, and the rights to vote and be elected can be regulated." (see http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf), which was widely disseminated by various media outlets (https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/oea-recomienda-a-costa-rica-limitar-la-reeleccion/OVR5GIP5T5CYXG3DVH4GH36P44/story/, https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/politica/mision-de-oea-reitera-necesidad-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes/, https://observador.cr/pusc-y-nueva-republica-trataran-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes-oea-lo-recomienda/, https://www.diarioextra.com/Noticia/detalle/410346/oea-jala-orejas-a-costa-rica-por-reeleccion-de-alcaldes, https://www.elmundo.cr/municipales/alcaldes-apoyaran-proyecto-de-ley-que-limita-su-reeleccion/).

Then, in the final version (https://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=421-1219-28-0), it is emphasized that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), in two reports issued following a consultation made by the Secretary General of the OAS regarding limits on re-election, concluded “that there is no absolute human right to hold office, and that the rights to vote and be elected may be regulated. Review the current legislation, recalling once again that, while continuity in public policies is valuable, alternation constitutes a fundamental pillar of the democratic system.” (Report on Term Limits Part II - Members of Parliament, Part III - Locally Elected Representatives and Locally Elected Executive Officials. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), March 18, 2019).

Likewise, regarding the regulation of the figure of re-election in municipal elections, the Mission recommended: “Review the current legislation, recalling once again that, while continuity in public policies is valuable, alternation constitutes a fundamental pillar of the democratic system.” In line with such affirmation, the law under sub lite rather coincides with the principle of alternation of power in the exercise of popularly elected offices and seeks real equality in the praxis of the fundamental right to passive suffrage in the electoral processes of the municipal regime.

Note that the Political Constitution, precisely, in relation to popularly elected offices, opts to prevent consecutive re-election for deputies, president, and vice-president of the Republic (numerals 107, 132, 134 of the Fundamental Law), which does not occur when it comes to other types of appointments of constitutional relevance but which are not by popular election, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic, magistrates of the Judicial Branch and of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (ordinals 183, 101 and 158, eiusdem). Here, the design of the State by the original constituent becomes relevant, as well as its immutable values and norms, since they constitute the fundamental pillars and foundations upon which the balances among the Public Powers are based and the pillars of the Republic are preserved.

In accordance with the foregoing, the restriction at issue, on the one hand, is supported by legitimate ends, and, on the other, is founded on data and arguments sufficiently plausible to sustain what conventional jurisprudence has termed an ‘imperative social need’. We reiterate that, in this area, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration, so that, in principle, it is not for the constitutional judge to define what an ‘imperative social need’ is; on the contrary, the judge is compelled to apply self-restraint and not to interfere in a purely political question, unless there were a violation of a fundamental right, which is not appreciated in the sub examine.

The reasoning set forth, which serves to rule out an unjustified unequal treatment, likewise becomes useful to affirm that the law fully satisfies the element of ‘purpose’ of the reasonableness and proportionality test, since it concerns a legitimate purpose.

As for the element of ‘suitability’ —that is, the ability of the questioned measure to effectively achieve the intended objective— prima facie it is observed that the aforementioned restriction complies with it, since it is useful for limiting indefinite re-election in popularly elected municipal offices, which favors alternation in power.

Concerning the element of ‘necessity’ —that is, the possibility that less harmful options exist for the political right to passive suffrage (it should not be confused with the notion of ‘imperative social need’)— a violation of this factor is not perceived either. As read in the statement of legislative intent for the legislative bill of the challenged norm, the deputies state the purpose of trying to prevent a particular position of influence in a municipal office, after two consecutive periods, from conferring an undue advantage over other candidacies in a process of popular suffrage in the municipal regime. Given this, the only way in which the Chamber could proceed to assess a transgression of the “necessity” element is if the claimant parties at least proposed options in a grounded manner within the specific framework of a reasonableness test, in which case constitutional review would be applied in pursuit of a balance between legislative discretion and the inexorable safeguarding of fundamental rights.

Regarding the requirement of ‘proportionality in the strict sense’, any violation is likewise ruled out, since, as developed ut supra, an emptying of the content of the right to passive suffrage is not verified, but only the exercise of the legislator’s free configuration regarding the limitation thereof.

In this sense, according to the jurisprudential line of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the formulated restrictions do not affect the essential content of said right, since they are not indefinite, but are subject to a reasonable restriction period (two periods from the conclusion of the second consecutive period), in order to achieve the legitimate purposes pursued, as explained above.

Thus, this Constitutional Chamber considers that limiting consecutive re-election to one term and the impediment to occupy other offices for two periods from the conclusion of the second consecutive term (eight years) are not overtly unreasonable or disproportionate. Rather, such restriction is legitimate because it concerns a valid purpose in light of the legal system; it evidences a necessary and suitable relationship between the means and the objective pursued by the law (limiting the indefinite re-election of local authorities), and, furthermore, it denotes proportionality in the strict sense between the means provided and their ends, without any emptying of the essential content of any fundamental right being evident. For purposes of having a parameter of constitutionality, eight years is the same period established for presidential re-election in Article 132, clause 1 of the Political Constitution. In any case, the claimant parties also did not present arguments that would lead the Chamber to declare any unconstitutionality in that sense.

Furthermore, given that the restriction operates within the framework of an election process for municipal offices, the extension of its effects to other positions also of popular suffrage within the municipal regime, but different from the one the affected person had been holding, stems from the same premise: consecutive exercise for two periods in a popularly elected municipal office confers an advantage that it is plausible to restrict according to the principle of alternation in power. This is a reasonable alternative that only the legislator is concerned with weighing, so it resides exclusively in the realm of legislative discretion, that is, the definition in this regard carries with it the political responsibility of the deputies.

Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the extension of the impossibility of being elected to other positions in the municipal regime stems from the same premise: the consecutive exercise for two periods in a popularly elected municipal office confers an advantage that it is appropriate to restrict based on the principle of alternation in power. Hence, the provisions adopted by the legislator constitute a reasonable alternative that falls within the framework of their weighing and discretion; therefore, it is not for the Chamber to affect this area.

ii.4. In conclusion, on the terms set forth in the unconstitutionality actions, any transgression of the principles of equality; reasonableness and proportionality; freedom; and innocence; as well as of numerals 169 and 171 of the Political Constitution and ordinal 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is ruled out.

VII.2. On the alleged unconstitutionality of the transitory provision.

• i)Arguments of the parties.

The claimant Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza mentions that Article 34 of the Political Constitution contemplates the principle of non-retroactivity of legal norms; however, he considers that a differentiated condition is created for those holding “a determined office” that applies to them into the past. He argues that the new rule directed at all citizens sets the possibility of election for no more than two consecutive terms; however, a special situation was created for those who had been serving in the office consecutively in the past. He accuses the transitory provision of failing to comply with the principles and the technical drafting that a legal norm must have, since it was drawn up to harm a little more than 40 democratically elected officials through the free suffrage of the citizenry, as a kind of ‘vendetta or social reaction’ fueled by some mass media outlets following the start of the judicial investigation known as the Diamante case, which analyzes the possible commission of acts of corruption by some municipal authorities. He asserts that the presumption of influence peddling and abuse of power, as well as the social condemnation for acts of alleged corruption, do not justify the restriction on the re-election of municipal offices; therefore, the reform lacks a legitimate purpose and an adequate determination of the imperative social need, as required for the norm to be in harmony with our Constitution. In addition, he considers numerals 35, 39, and 40 of the Political Constitution transgressed, since the transitory provision established a public sanction directed especially at those holding the condition of reelected proprietary alcaldes, for reasons of a political and media character exacerbated by the scandal known as the ‘Diamante case’ in the context of an electoral campaign. He considers the principle of proportionality of every State action toward the community as a whole to be transgressed. He mentions that the foregoing confirms the absence of the legitimate purpose and imperative social need of the approved reform. He explains that the same irrationality of the challenged norm would imply taking a conjuncture of public scandal at the start of a judicial investigation to formulate a transitory norm that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself suggests is unconstitutional for leaving the right to be elected completely without content. Certainly, access to public offices is not an absolute right, since, according to Articles 21.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 23.1.c of the American Convention on Human Rights, it can be regulated in a general manner; however, it cannot be emptied of content by a specific transitory norm, since such conventional principles expressly consolidate that every person has the right of access to popularly elected offices under conditions of equality, superior norms that the challenged law transgresses with absolute clarity despite having a lower rank, which at the same time violates the parameter of reasonableness and proportionality.

The claimant Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considers that the first paragraph of the sole transitory provision grants retroactive effect to Law No. 10,183 to the detriment of numeral 34 of the Magna Carta. He reproaches that popularly elected municipal authorities are restricted from the possibility of being reelected based on the periods served before the entry into force of the law. He affirms that the second paragraph of the transitory provision makes a difference between elective offices of the municipal regime, because it prohibits alcaldes and intendentes from aspiring for 8 years after the expiration of the second period to other popularly elected offices within that same regime, while the other offices are only prohibited from being reelected to the office they held, meaning they can participate even consecutively. He mentions that the foregoing disproportionately affects those holding alcaldía and intendencia offices, and also harms the right to passive vote. He considers that the transitory provision should have provided that the counting of terms would begin to run from the period of appointment at the time of the law's entry into force. He admits that it is the legislator's power to regulate the re-election of popularly elected offices in the municipal regime, but clarifies that his position is not that indefinite re-election be maintained, but rather that the limitation in question should not apply except from the publication of the law and regarding subsequent periods. He states that the norm prohibits persons who are intendentes and complete two periods of appointment from aspiring to another popularly elected office in the municipal regime. He argues that even though the norm is not so clear, the transitory provision does indicate explicitly: “Persons currently serving as alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes, or intendentas, and who have already been elected to their offices for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to again hold any popularly elected office in the municipal regime.” The claimants Wilber Quirós Palma and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales consider that the transitory provision violates the principle of non-retroactivity. They argue that the current popularly elected officials obtained such condition without future restrictions and with the possibility of pursuing a local political career. They consider that any regulation must have effects only for the future. They add that the transitory provision is only admissible insofar as it is congruent with the main norm. They state that the non-retroactivity of the norm would imply that the officials holding office could only be elected for two more consecutive periods. They reproach that the transitory provision does not regulate pending situations from the main norm. They mention that the retroactive effect of the norm seems more like a sanction that responds to the context of the reform and the pressures to end the local political career. They argue that, according to the transitory provision, executive officials cannot run for any popularly elected office in the next two elections, but vice-executive officials or regidores (not including council members of the district municipal councils) have a restriction only regarding the same office; that is, an unjustified difference arises.

• ii)Considerations of the Chamber.

ii.1) On the alleged transgression of the principle of non-retroactivity and the impact on a determined group of persons.

In the transitory norm of the questioned law, the legislator regulated the situation of persons who, at the moment of the law's entry into force, have been holding popularly elected offices in the municipal regime for at least two consecutive periods.

Regarding the principle of non-retroactivity and the entry into force of norms, numerals 34 and 129 of the Political Constitution establish:

“ARTICLE 34. No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, or of their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated juridical situations.

(...)

ARTICLE 129.- Laws are obligatory and take effect from the day they designate; in the absence of this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette.

(...).” Now, according to the principle of free configuration of the legislator, the Legislative Assembly may validly regulate the conditions of election and re-election of positions in the municipal regime subject to popular vote, provided that the block of constitutionality is not transgressed. Consequently, in the sub examine there is no friction of constitutionality whatsoever, because, based on the premise that the fundamental right to passive suffrage is not absolute, it is clear that the mere fact that, at a given moment, a person holds a popularly elected office in the municipal regime does not confer upon them either a subjective right or a consolidated juridical situation that exempts them from the legal-positive modifications to the electoral system that occur while they are holding office and have not formally initiated the corresponding electoral process. The person in such a situation holds a mere expectation of a right to participate in a future electoral process according to certain rules; such expectation, by virtue of its juridical nature, is subject to all the contingencies and variations of legislation that are timely approved in accordance with the constitutional framework.” Precisely, as reasoned supra, there is no right to the immutability of the legal system, and both the right to be elected and the right to re-election can be legitimately limited. In this case, in line with the reasoning set forth in the preceding recitals, neither the restriction on running for a third consecutive term in the same office nor the eight-year period for being eligible for it again empties the content of the right to political participation. In fact, once such period has elapsed, the person has the possibility of running again. Ergo, it is not a matter of the retroactive application of the norm, but of the implementation of a change in the electoral system regarding the re-election of popularly elected offices in the municipal regime. The claimant parties cannot expect that the new rules do not apply to those who are holding office consecutively for two terms; rather, not only is the period for which they were elected being respected, but, it is reiterated, they have the possibility of participating, under equal conditions, once the temporary restriction ends. Thus, the transitory norm regulates future municipal elections concerning the situation of those who, at the moment of the norm's entry into force, have at least two consecutive elections. Ergo, any transgression of the principle of non-retroactivity is ruled out.

In addition, even though one of the parties mentioned that the transitory provision fails to comply with the principles and the technical drafting of legal norms, no development susceptible of being analyzed in this action is perceived. The same situation occurs regarding the alleged violation of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, since it was only indicated that all persons have the right to access public offices under conditions of equality. Furthermore, regarding the norms of the international instruments mentioned, no arguments developed in a precise and duly substantiated manner are observed from the claimant parties. In any case, the Chamber already addressed supra the power and limits of the legislator regarding the regulation of the election and re-election of offices in the municipal regime.

On the other hand, the accused impact on more than 40 democratically elected officials, as well as the questions related to the context in which the law was promoted, the presumption of the commission of crimes by municipal authorities, and the supposed punitive nature of the impossibility of re-election are insufficient to support the alleged unconstitutionality of the challenged transitory norm. Regarding these allegations, this Tribunal considers that, regardless of the factual or political context that motivated the issuance of the law, the Legislative Assembly, in general, has the power to impose limitations on the re-election of popularly elected offices in the municipal regime, without this constituting a priori a sanction against those currently holding the offices, nor presuming the existence of crimes. By modifying the electoral system regarding the re-election of determined offices in question, it is evident that some previously elected persons will experience a variation in the conditions of participation in future municipal elections. This does not imply, however, an illegitimate impact on their fundamental rights, but only a variation in the design and the requirements for access to such public offices. In this sense, it is reiterated, the requirements or limitations for opting for popularly elected offices in the municipal regime prima facie are subject to the free configuration of the legislator, unless constitutional norms or principles are contravened, including the so-called ‘immutable norms.’ These political decisions are appropriate to be discussed in the Legislative Assembly, a democratic scenario where their opportunity and convenience are defined, with full respect for the principle of separation of powers, for the republican regime of a State of Law such as the Costa Rican one, and for the Law of the Constitution.

ii.2) On the alleged prohibition against intendentes and intendentas from aspiring for 8 years, after the expiration of the second period, to other popularly elected offices within that same regime. Regarding this allegation, the Chamber already endorsed the restriction for a period of eight years for opting for other positions in the municipal regime different from the one held by the official; however, in the specific case of its extension to intendentes and intendentas by means of the transitory norm, no development susceptible of being analyzed in this action is perceived. In that sense, only that grievance was mentioned, so a precise and duly substantiated argumentative development on the part of the claimants regarding the alleged unconstitutionality is missing.

CO05/23 ... See more Citations of Legislation and Doctrine Related Judgments Content of Interest:

Content type: Majority vote Branch of Law: 6. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION LAW ANNOTATED WITH JURISPRUDENCE Topic: 075- Prior matter pending resolution in judicial or administrative venue Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

ARTICLE 75 OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION LAW. “…II.- On the admissibility of the action. The unconstitutionality action is a process subject to certain formalities, which must be observed so that the Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. Precisely, numeral 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the admissibility requirements for the unconstitutionality action. Firstly, it requires a prior matter pending resolution, either in judicial or administrative venue (in the procedure to exhaust it), in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. The second and third paragraphs contemplate cases in which, exceptionally, the prior matter is not required, such as the inexistence of an individual and direct injury due to the nature of the matter, the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when the action is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Solicitor General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, or the Defender of the Inhabitants.

In this regard, although the claimant parties base their standing on various arguments related to the right to elect and be elected in the municipal regime, as well as on their personal conditions, the offices they hold, and the groups they represent, it is no less true that the Chamber has recognized the existence of diffuse interests in this type of issue, since it relates to the democratic system in general. For example, in judgment No. 2012-001966 of 9:32 a.m. on February 17, 2012, this Tribunal stated:

“The right to elect and be elected to publicly elected offices, as political rights, have not only the nature of being able to affect a specific citizen, but of affecting the democratic system in general, which is based on the periodic renewal of its political structures as one of its postulates, through the popular election of different offices, so it has that dual nature that makes it diffuse and therefore directly challengeable, by way of exception (…).” Ergo, the Chamber endorses the standing of the claimant party in the sub iudice based on the second paragraph of ordinal 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law…” CO05/23 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content type: Majority vote Branch of Law: 8. IACHR JURISPRUDENCE Topic: JUDGMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER - IACHR Subtopics:

Contentious case.

CONTENTIOUS CASE. YATAMA VS. NICARAGUA. “…From this perspective, the IACHR in Yatama vs. Nicaragua rehearses a kind of ‘reasonableness test’ in order to weigh the legal viability of any restriction. Thus, besides explicitly resorting to the principles of legality and equality —the requirements for participating in an electoral contest and the corresponding procedure must be defined by law and not be discriminatory—, it affirms that limitations must ‘be based on reasonable criteria, serve a useful and timely purpose that makes it necessary to satisfy an imperative public interest, and be proportionate to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and bears greater proportionality with the purpose pursued must be chosen.’…” CO05/23 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content type: Majority vote Branch of Law: 8. IACHR JURISPRUDENCE Topic: JUDGMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER - IACHR Subtopics:

Contentious case.

CONTENTIOUS CASE CASTAÑEDA GUTMAN VS. MEXICO. “…Castañeda Gutman vs. Mexico (judgment of August 6, 2008) develops with greater precision the parameters for regulating political rights by the IACHR.

Firstly, regarding numeral 23.1 of the ACHR, the IACHR specifies that, correlative to the rights and opportunities of citizens in the matter, the State is imposed the ‘obligation to do, to carry out certain actions or behaviors, to adopt measures, which derive from the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the human rights of persons subject to their jurisdiction (Article 1.1 of the Convention) and from the general obligation to adopt measures in domestic law (Article 2 of the Convention).’…” CO05/23 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content type: Majority vote Branch of Law: 1. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION WITH JURISPRUDENCE Topic: 132- Presidential re-election Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

Topic: 107- Term of appointments and re-election of deputies Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

ARTICLE 132 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. “…our Fundamental Law specifically regulates the election of determined offices at the municipal level, in which restrictions on their appointments were not provided for; however, this does not mean that such limitations can only be established through constitutional precepts. The fact that the Political Constitution has indeed established express prohibitions on nationally elected popular offices (Articles 107 and 132 regarding deputies and president and vice-presidents of the Republic) does not exclude the possibility of exercising the legislative prerogative regarding popularly elected municipal offices. In fact, as has been developed throughout this judgment, the legislator has the power to modify aspects of the electoral system regarding the election and re-election of offices of the municipal regime, provided that it does not contravene the Law of the Constitution nor empty fundamental rights of their content. Regarding municipal regidores, síndicos, intendentes, viceintendentes, and district municipal council members, although there is no express delegation from the constituent to the legislator regarding the conditions of their designation, the limitations established by the substantive part of Law No. 10183 do not empty the right to be elected of its content, but rather, in the terms provided, they form part of the free configuration of the legislator and their discretion…” CO05/23 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content type: Separate note Branch of Law: 3. MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW Topic: ELECTORAL Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

VIII.- Different reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal concerning the alleged violation of Article 97 of the Political Constitution. In relation to numeral 97 eiusdem, in opinion No. 2022006119 of 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, which resolved the optional legislative consultation of constitutionality on the bill ‘Reform to Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite re-election of local authorities)’, I set forth my position in this sense:

“V.- NOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL.- As recorded by the majority vote, which the undersigned subscribes, for the period of six months before and four months after the holding of a popular election, during which the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law bills objected to by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal-TSE- (Article 97 of the Fundamental Law) to apply, the challenge must be related to the type of corresponding electoral process. That is, if the objection concerns a specific aspect of a municipal election, the aforementioned period applies only, precisely, to an electoral process of that nature; the same ratio iuris operates when it is a national election.

Nonetheless, it is overlooked that there may be matters relating to electoral subject matter that are not directly linked to the municipal or national nature of an election, but rather refer to electoral jurisdiction in general (for instance, if it were proposed to alter the composition of the TSE or the method of electing the magistrates), in which case the aforementioned deadline would apply with respect to any type of electoral process.” Thus, certainly, the deadlines set forth in Article 97 of the Magna Carta apply according to the type of electoral process (national or municipal) that is affected by a specific law. However, as I indicated in my particular reasoning transcribed ut supra, a legal norm can also affect electoral subject matter not linked to the national or municipal quality of an electoral process, but rather concerning electoral jurisdiction in general (for instance, if it were proposed to alter the composition of the TSE or the method of electing the magistrates). In this latter case, the deadlines provided in the aforementioned article would apply equally, that is, without the municipal or national character of the respective electoral process being relevant. CO05/23 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content Type: Dissenting Vote Branch of Law: 3. MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY CONTROL Topic: ELECTORAL Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

Dissenting vote of Magistrate Cruz Castro and Magistrate Jara Velásquez, drafted by the former.

We dissent from the majority opinion, issuing a particular vote, because we consider that Law No. 10183, called the "Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities," which reforms Article 14 of the Municipal Code, contains procedural and substantive defects.

Unconstitutionality due to procedural defect.- Lack of consultation with the TSE (Article 97 of the Constitution) We consider that Law No. 10183 of April 5, 2022, called the "Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities," contains a procedural defect in its approval, referring to the violation of the provisions of Article 97 of the Constitution.

In the same sense as indicated by Magistrate Cruz in the resolution that decided the facultative consultation of this law (vote No. 2022-006119), we consider that the indicated procedural defect exists, as it contravenes the prohibitions and limitations imposed by the prohibition period (periodo de veda) established in Article 97 of the Constitution. Let us recall that this constitutional norm provides:

"Art. 97. For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE); to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members shall be required. Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into laws those bills on said matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) has expressed its disagreement" (Emphasis not from the original).

In this case, it is indisputable that the law in question refers to electoral subject matter, as it affects the regulation and restriction of certain cases of reelection in municipal elections. Furthermore, one cannot distinguish where the Political Constitution does not; therefore, it is improper to claim that Article 97 of the Constitution refers only to national elections and not to municipal ones. Clearly, such a norm refers to "the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters" without distinguishing types of elections. Likewise, it is evident that the TSE has expressed its disagreement with this bill. Thus, we consider that the provisions established by Article 97 are applicable according to the following arguments:

· The Legislative Assembly may depart from the opinion of the TSE; but to do so, it will require the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members, provided it is not within the legislative prohibition period.

· In any case, that qualified vote does not have the power to disregard the prohibition period, according to which: within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not convert into laws bills on said matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) has expressed its disagreement.

The political parties that act in Parliament are important actors in all types of elections; for this reason, we consider that the constitutional prohibition is healthy. Such a constitutional prohibition prevents political actors from being able to change the electoral rules in any type of election. Distinguishing between municipal elections and national elections is an artificial distinction. The impact of electoral struggles and the porosity of parties are sufficient reasons to prevent the rules of electoral contests, whether local or national, from being modified during the electoral period. Electoral history demonstrates the volatility and conflict that this subject matter contains; for this reason, the constitutional text is categorical, very clear. Any popular election prevents the variation of the electoral rules. On the other hand, the constitutional text contains a "particular veto" of the Electoral Tribunal, as no electoral modification may be introduced, in the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, on matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) has expressed its disagreement. This is precisely what occurred in this case. The majority vote ignores that there is a qualified intervention of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which does not depend only on the period of exclusion of legislative power, but rather that the Tribunal has a qualified competence that cannot be ignored by the legislative power or by this constitutional instance. The weakening of the powers of the Electoral Tribunal is not a good sign, because it is not possible to ignore history, as the strengthening of electoral jurisdiction was one of the most important political claims after the violent events of forty-eight.

Given that the national elections were held on February 6, 2022, the aforementioned prohibition period would cover from August 6, 2021. It is evident that the first debate was held within the prohibited period in question, as it took place on January 25, 2022. Furthermore, it was done regarding a reform to which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was opposed. Based on the arguments presented, we consider that the indicated procedural defect exists, as it contravenes the prohibitions and limitations imposed during the prohibition period (periodo de veda) provided for in Article 97 of the Constitution.

Unconstitutionality due to substantive defects.- In this regard, for the reasons indicated, we consider that the following aspects of the challenged norms are unconstitutional:

"(…) They may not hold any popularly elected office in the municipal regime until two terms have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended. Vice-mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas) may also be continuously reelected only once and may not hold the same office nor that of council members (regidores) or district councilors (síndicos), until two terms have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended.

Council members (personas regidoras), district councilors (síndicas), intendants (intendentes), vice-intendants (viceintendentes), municipal district councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) under Law 8173, General Law of Municipal District Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those holding any alternate positions, (…) may not hold the same office or its alternate position until two terms have elapsed since their second term ended.

Sole Transitory Provision: Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), intendants (intendentes or intendentas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to again hold any popularly elected office in the municipal regime.

Persons currently serving as vice-mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), vice-intendants (viceintendentes and viceintendentas), proprietary and alternate council members (regidores and regidoras), proprietary and alternate district councilors (síndicos and síndicas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to again hold the same popularly elected office in the municipal regime; however, they may hold other municipal offices in accordance with this law." As observed, the underlined parts refer to the impossibility (for a period of eight years) of a person who has held a popularly elected office in the municipal regime from being able to hold ANOTHER popularly elected municipal office. Such impossibility, restriction, or temporary prohibition (veda temporal) refers to the exercise of the right of access to public office. Regarding the right of access to public office, there is extensive international regulation:

· Article 21.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "…Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country…".

· Article 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: "Every person having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections...".

· Article 23.1.c of the American Convention on Human Rights: "1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: … c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country…".

In our Political Constitution, such a right derives from Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution. The fundamental right of access to public office is the right of every person to be a candidate and to have access to perform public functions. It is undeniable that, like any other fundamental right, it may be subject to limitations, provided, of course, that they comply with the principle of legal reserve, and also that such limitations do not lead to a complete emptying of the right or constitute unreasonable or disproportionate limitations. Among the valid limitations, in general, one can mention the regime of incompatibilities or sanctions of temporary disqualification. The latter as a consequence of a serious offense, following due process, and provided that the sanction imposed is to guarantee correct and efficient administration. Now, if one analyzes it carefully, it is verified that the challenged norms unreasonably restrict the right of access to public office, as what is intended is to prohibit, for a period of 8 years, a person who has already held a popularly elected office in the municipal regime from being able to hold another popularly elected municipal office. Note that this goes beyond the limits on reelection, as it seeks to impose a temporary prohibition on having access to a popularly elected office different from the one already held. This clearly overflows the basic principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

From our minority and dissenting perspective, we agree with the same conclusion reached by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in the sense of considering that the norm in question imposes an emptying of the right of access to popularly elected offices in the municipal regime, without meeting the parameter of reasonableness. This is because said norm implies an exclusion period during which a municipal official cannot run for another popularly elected municipal office, without this being a consequence of some committed offense. Clearly, the concern about corruption cannot serve as a generic basis for the generalized restriction of the right of access to public office. The unreasonableness and disproportion are clearly seen in this assumption, applying it to another similar prohibition: imposing that the limitation on presidential reelection should also include the impossibility of being elected deputy by virtue of having been President of the Republic. It is clearly appreciated that when the prohibition expands to other offices, it becomes unreasonable. Note that it is not about the right to assume an office per se, but rather that a popular election has taken place and the electorate has expressed itself in favor of having said official in another office. We consider that nothing would prevent a person who has previously held a popularly elected office from being able to hold another office again, within the same municipal regime, if the electorate has so decided. As indicated by the TSE in its response to the legislative consultation resolved on the bill that gave rise to this law, it is not legitimate for a State to prevent passive suffrage (the right to be elected) by reason of having held a specific position -different from the one sought- in the two immediately preceding terms. Thus, it is indicated: "Such an affectation of the essential core of the right occurs precisely because… a total suspension of the citizen prerogative to contend for public office would occur as an effect of applying the norm. (…) On the other hand, it cannot be lost sight of that the changes made in the text of the bill make it inconsistent, as the explanatory memorandum develops why the proponents consider it legitimate and necessary to limit reelection, but it does not allude to the need to restrict any other type of candidacy (…) the original proposal was not to establish a prohibition as intense as the one that, via motions, was incorporated." The fact that a person who has held a popularly elected office can run for another office is not, per se, a source of corruption or an illegitimate "modus vivendi." It cannot be ignored that it is about taking advantage of the experience of a person who has already held similar positions and whom the citizens have elected. The aim to prevent the concentration of power does not justify the introduction of rules that cut off, without any basis, passive suffrage. Limitations that seek to avoid concentrations of power cannot restrict fundamental rights without basis. This measure appears unreasonable or disproportionate.

As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated regarding political rights, Article 23 enshrines the right to participate, to vote and be elected, and the right to have access to public functions. Thus, it protects both the right of the candidate and the right of the voters:

"The first paragraph of Article 23 of the Convention recognizes to all citizens the rights: a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of their country. Similarly, the American Declaration recognizes the right to 'take part in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, genuine, periodic and free.' Taking the foregoing into account, this Court has indicated that the rights recognized have an individual and a collective dimension, as they protect both those persons who participate as candidates and their voters." (ADVISORY OPINION OC-28/21 OF JUNE 7, 2021) Now, regarding the admissible limitations on political rights, it has been indicated that political rights are not absolute and may be subject to limitations. However, such limitations must comply with the principle of legal reserve and the principle of reasonableness (necessity and proportionality). The IACHR has stated:

"Its regulation must observe the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society. Observance of the principle of legality requires the State to precisely define, by means of a law, the requirements for citizens to participate in an electoral contest, and to clearly stipulate the electoral procedure that precedes the elections. According to Article 23.2 of the Convention, the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article can be regulated exclusively for the reasons established in that paragraph. The restriction must be provided for by law, not be discriminatory, based on reasonable criteria, serve a useful and timely purpose making it necessary to satisfy an imperative public interest, and be proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is most proportional to the pursued purpose must be chosen." Clearly, in the challenged law, there is no reasonable basis, nor does it serve a useful and timely purpose that makes the exclusion of a fundamental right necessary, nor is it understood what the public interest is, nor is it proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is most proportional to the pursued purpose must be chosen. These requirements are not met in this case. The situation would be different if the prohibition (interdicción) on holding another popularly elected office stemmed from a declared disqualification, as in that case, there would be a reasonable justification. More recently, regarding restrictions, the IACHR has specified two types of admissible restrictions: those of a general nature imposed by law and restrictions resulting from a particular sanction:

"(…) this Court notes that Article 23.2 establishes two assumptions. The first assumption refers to restrictions of a general nature that may be established by law (age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity), while the second assumption refers to restrictions on political rights imposed by means of a sanction on a particular person (conviction, by a competent judge, in criminal proceedings). From the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, it follows that the interpretation of the term 'exclusively' included in Article 23.2 will depend on whether it concerns general (first assumption) or particular (second assumption) restrictions on political rights. (ADVISORY OPINION OC-28/21 OF JUNE 7, 2021) Following the cited precedent, restrictions on fundamental rights must be provided for in law in a formal and material sense (principle of legal reserve), pursue a legitimate aim, and meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality. Aspects that are not fulfilled by the consulted bill, as it is not understood how the temporary prohibition (veda temporal) on holding public office is a suitable, necessary, or proportional measure. Furthermore, even if the requirement of legal reserve is met, it is questionable whether a restriction of this type should be through a constitutional reform. On the other hand, it is clear that the ordinary legislator is not free in its actions but is constrained by the constitutional framework, as in this case would be the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. It is therefore not applicable in this case to argue in favor of the principle of free configuration of the legislator or legislative discretion. Within a constitutional State of Law, it is not admissible to recognize unrestricted powers or competences to any Branch of the Republic. As indicated in the majority vote, the freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since its limit is the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality comprised of the constitutional precepts and customs, values, and principles, among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), non-discrimination, due process and defense of this nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases stand out. The limits on legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since in such matters the extent, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, whereas, in contrast, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects. (See also resolutions Nos. 2013-011499 of 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 2013, 2013-011706 of 11:44 a.m. on August 30, 2013, and 2020-015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020, among others). Now, even if such free configuration of the legislator might suffice to admit the imposition of limits on reelection, we consider that it is not sufficient to admit election to other offices. It is evident that this extension is, by all lights, irrational or disproportionate. Unlike what is considered in the majority vote, where it is indicated that "It is worth reiterating that the requirements or limitations for running for popularly elected offices in the municipal regime are a priori covered by the principle of free configuration of the legislator, unless they break constitutional norms or principles or the so-called entrenched rules (normas pétreas)," we consider that, based on the pro libertatis and pro homine principle, the rule should always be the exercise of the fundamental right and the establishment of restrictions on such rights should be carefully examined. Starting from the opposite reasoning seems to us a disregard of the constitutional framework. Of course, no human or fundamental right exists in an absolute form, but the restriction on such rights is also not absolute but must be subject to limits. We do not find support in the justification that the majority vote finds when it indicates that the restriction in question is based on legitimate aims and is founded on sufficiently plausible data and arguments. This is because we consider that the restrictive measure in question does not pass the test of reasonableness; we do not consider that it is a necessary, suitable, or proportional measure. On the contrary, it affects the essential content of the right to passive suffrage.

All of the foregoing also applies to the unconstitutionality of the transitory provision, because furthermore, the restriction applies to the future offices of those who currently hold popularly elected positions in the municipal sphere. Thus, the restriction is imposed with "names and surnames" on the current municipal representatives. In the transitory norm of the challenged law, the legislator regulated the situation of persons who, at the time of the law's entry into force, are holding popularly elected offices in the municipal regime for at least two consecutive terms. Therefore, said persons were unaware -because it did not exist- of such a prohibition (veda) when they assumed office. The person in that situation also holds the right of access to public office that allows them to participate in a future electoral process.

Unlike the majority opinion, we consider that it is not a minor issue to consider that the norm in question may affect the right to passive suffrage of more than 40 democratically elected officials, and may have operated as a "sanction without due process" given the sanctioning nature of this measure that imposes a prohibition on holding any other popularly elected municipal office. This in addition to the possibility of being faced with a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of norms and Article 34 of the Constitution.

Thus, we consider that the entire norm in question is unconstitutional because it contains a substantive defect by emptying the content of the right of access to popularly elected offices in the municipal regime. We believe that in this case, the limits on legislative power are exceeded; it is not possible to extend the prohibition on passive suffrage (interdicción al sufragio pasivo) regarding an office that the person on whom the prohibition is imposed has not held. There cannot be an expansive effect of the limitations of a fundamental right.

Based on the arguments presented, we consider that the substantive norms consulted are unreasonable and disproportionate; and furthermore, regarding the transitory provision, as we stated, it violates the guarantee of the principle of non-retroactivity of norms. The consulted norms contain provisions that harm the right to passive suffrage.

Fernando Cruz C. Rosibel Jara V.

Magistrate Magistrate CO05/23 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content Type: Dissenting Vote Branch of Law: 3. MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY CONTROL Topic: ELECTORAL Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

Res. No. 2022-029648 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS The undersigned magistrate, with the customary respect, dissents and declares the unconstitutionality action well-founded due to the existence of an essential defect in the approval procedure of Law No. 10183 of April 05, 2022, Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities. This is due to an infringement of the provisions of Article 97 in relation to Article 102, subsection 3), both of the Political Constitution.

Given the existence of a procedural defect that invalidates the reform, I refrain from ruling on the grievances on the merits.

1.- Regarding the precedents of this Chamber First of all, it is appropriate to note that the issue of the reelection of mayors has been submitted to this Tribunal for consideration on two recent occasions.

In case file No. 22-001848-0007-CO, the legislative consultation of constitutionality concerning the bill for the approval of the "Reform to Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities)," processed under legislative file No. 21.810, was heard. In the advisory opinion in question, I dissented, considering that, in reality, the legislators did not raise a genuine doubt of constitutionality. I made the following considerations:

"The operative part of this opinion states:

'Magistrate Garro Vargas dissents regarding the alleged procedural defect raised and considers that it is unevictable, as the consultation does not properly present a questioning, but rather a defense against the position of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) regarding the scope of Article 97 of the Political Constitution.' To illustrate my thesis, it suffices to refer to the very statements of the consulting legislators, who, far from invoking reasoned doubts or objections regarding the constitutionality of the procedure given to the bill, seek to shield it from the questions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). In this regard, the following is indicated:

'From a formal, rigid, and strict interpretation of the norm, we have three possible implications related to the legislative procedure: first, we accept the Tribunal's recommendation in the unrestricted and absolute sense of the right to be elected and maintain the "revolving door" where popularly elected municipal officials can "jump" every eight years (after successive reelection) to other also popularly elected positions, and thereby limit the political participation of other citizens, and furthermore, promote ad perpetuam positions in local governments; second, we do not vote on the bill that has the endorsement of a large majority of deputies who represent the citizen will; or, third, we bequeath to the incoming Legislative Assembly, whose composition and intention we do not know, the decision on a proposal that by all lights seeks to strengthen democracy.' From their reasoning –against the argumentation made by the TSE– the legislators themselves propose three scenarios they qualify as negative: 1) accepting the TSE's recommendation, which results in the limitation of citizens' political participation and the promotion of ad perpetuam positions; 2) not voting on the bill, which, as they themselves acknowledge, 'has the endorsement of a large majority of deputies' who represent the citizen will; and 3) bequeathing the bill to a new composition of the Legislative Assembly with the danger that it may not be finalized, warning that it is a proposal that 'by all lights seeks to strengthen democracy.' Next, they make a historical review of the regulation of municipal elections and national elections, to illustrate their thesis –which they consider to be the appropriate interpretation of Article 97 of the Political Constitution– and only subsequently raise a consultation to this Chamber. In this regard, the consultation document textually states the following:

'What is the objective of this review?

Demonstrate that the application of Article 97 cannot be literal nor understood from a formal interpretation, because the reality of the constituent legislator at the time of drafting the rule in question understood elections as a single moment every four years and therefore the limitation was general and absolute, given that the legislation that involved one of the levels of eligible officials applied to all of them and the current circumstances are different.

What we wish to denote before the honorable Court is that the interpretation of this article must be material and teleological, from the content of the rule, from its ultimate purpose, and with the approval of this bill in its first debate process, the dynamics of the municipal elections to be held in February 2024, that is, within 24 months, are not being affected. That was the reason why we approved the bill in first debate, certain that its approval in no way affects the election process to be held on February 6 of this year, in which the Presidency of the Republic and the deputies to the Legislative Assembly will be elected, and in no way, any municipal authority.

Therefore, considering the scope and the intention of the constituent persons to avoid transformations of the electoral system in times close to the elections, in this particular case where the proposed legal modification relates solely and exclusively to the municipal regime, whose electoral period is not active, given that the electoral call in which we find ourselves relates to the Government of the Republic and the Legislative Assembly, the municipal regime is entirely excluded, therefore the question related to the legislative process arises: Is the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is that relating to the national sphere? (The highlighted text does not correspond to the original).

From a detailed reading of the brief itself signed by the consulting legislators, it is evident that the entire argument does not aim to substantiate a doubt about the procedure followed to approve the bill they promote, but rather to defend both the bill and that procedure against the opinion formally submitted by the TSE within the framework of the parliamentary iter. The only question properly speaking in that section regarding the alleged procedural defect is the one at the end, but all the argumentation preceding it has no vestige of doubt or objection regarding the process given to the bill, but, quite the contrary, reveals the conviction that "its approval in no way affects the election process" carried out last February 6.

By virtue of such verification, I consider that the consultation must be declared unevacuable, in light of the provisions of Art. 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states the following:

"Art. 99. Except in the case of the mandatory consultation provided for in subsection a) of Article 96, the consultation shall be formulated in a reasoned brief, with an expression of the questioned aspects of the bill, as well as the reasons for which there are doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality". (The highlighted text does not correspond to the original).

As can be deduced from the content of said numeral, for the legislative consultation to be admissible, the reasons for which there are doubts or objections of constitutionality must be clearly expressed. And this is precisely what is lacking here, since from the cited excerpts –and from the entire document– it can be noted that the legislators do not question a particular process regarding which they have concrete doubts of constitutionality. Rather, they show disagreement with the institutional position of the TSE (see in identical sense the recent advisory opinion which, through opinion No. 2872-2022, unanimously signed by this Chamber, with almost the same composition, declared unevacuable the optional consultation of constitutionality processed in file No. 21-025530-0007-CO).

Consequently, I consider that regarding the alleged procedural defect, the consultants only state the question, without arguing why they believe it merits raising the issue to this Chamber. On the contrary, their arguments seek to justify what was done. Therefore, it can well be affirmed that, by not containing an objection of constitutionality, the legislative consultation is inadmissible and unevacuable." From the above, it follows that I issued a dissenting vote understanding that the consultation was unevacuable, and therefore I did not pronounce on Article 97 of the Political Constitution.

A couple of months later, the Constitutional Chamber resolved the action known in file No. 19-000892-0007-CO through judgment No. 2022-016947. In said resolution, the Chamber, by majority, considered that the omission questioned in that process –i.e., the omission to include limits on the successive and indefinite reelection of municipal mayors– had been resolved by the legislator through the amendment to Article 14 of the Municipal Code. In the referred file, I declared the action without merit with other considerations, which in summary are the following:

"From the careful review of the brief filing the action of unconstitutionality, it is clearly evident that the plaintiff questioned Art. 14 of the Municipal Code –in force at the time of filing the action– because it implicitly authorized the 'successive and indefinite' reelection of municipal authorities. In their view, this possibility has harmful consequences regarding the performance of the democratic system, alternation in the exercise of power, the right to be elected and to elect under equal conditions, and is lacking in reasonableness. Therefore, it is necessary to specify that the object of the action is not the reelection per se of municipal servants, but the successive and indefinite reelection, which –in the plaintiff's judgment– derived from what was regulated in Art. 14 of the Municipal Code, which provided, in relevant part, the following:

'All popularly elected positions at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, by means of general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will occupy the Presidency and the Vice-Presidencies of the Republic and those who will make up the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take office on May 1st of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected.' The majority of the Chamber maintains that, in view of the fact that the Legislative Branch –in the exercise of its constitutional powers– issued the amendment to Art. 14 of the Municipal Code, the unconstitutional omission that was reproached has been remedied, and therefore it understands that the action lacks current interest and orders its dismissal. In this regard, it is appropriate to make several clarifications.

First, although it is true that new rules were introduced for aspiring to reelection in municipal positions, successive reelection has not been suppressed, since the current rule still allows it, as in relevant part it indicates the following:

(…)

It is clear that the legislator introduced rules and conditions for aspiring to popularly elected municipal positions, but successive reelection continues to be authorized, so it does not appear that the amendment fully responds to what was sought in this action.

Secondly, it should be noted that the majority judgment makes the following consideration: 'the unconstitutional omission that is reproached in this process to Article 14 of the Municipal Code –according to which municipal mayals could be successively and indefinitely reelected– does not exist.' On this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that this Chamber, when referring to the constitutionality control of unconstitutional omissions, has stated the following (see judgments numbers 2005-5649, 2018-009819, and 2021-3853) (…). Based on what was indicated by the Chamber, I consider that in the specific case, the conditions for assessing an alleged unconstitutionality by omission are not met, since the Political Constitution does not establish an express mandate on the form of election or reelection of members of the municipal government." 2.- Regarding what was reported by the Attorney General's Office and my decision in the specific case In the present matter, after examining the arguments raised, I agree with what was reported by the Attorney General's Office (PGR). Said instance made the following statements:

"III. REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 97 OF THE CONSTITUTION Within action 22-8424-0007-CO, it is alleged that the approval process of Law 10183 is in violation of the provisions of Article 97 of the Political Constitution, given that during the legislative process the Supreme Electoral Tribunal provided a negative opinion on the bill and that within the six months prior and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into laws the bills on which said electoral body has expressed disagreement.

Due to its importance, we proceed to quote constitutional Article 97 which states:

'ARTICLE 97.- For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members shall be required. Within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into laws the bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.' As observed, the indicated article establishes two different scenarios. First, it requires that any law relating to electoral matters, which has opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly, and, second, it prohibits –in an absolute manner– the Assembly from approving a bill that has the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal if it is within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election.

To address the claim raised in this action, the following relevant facts of the legislative process carried out for the approval of Law 10183 must be taken into consideration:

• a)Bill 21810, which served as the antecedent to Law 10,183 of April 5, 2022, was introduced into the legislative stream on February 18, 2020 (see legislative file); b) By official letter AL-DSDI-OFI-0005-2022 of January 11, 2022, the Legislative Assembly mandatorily consulted the updated bill to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folio 728 of the legislative file); c) By official letter TSE-0199 of January 20, 2022, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal objected to the bill considering it contrary to the right to be elected, insofar as it prohibits officials with two consecutive terms in the same position from aspiring to other popularly elected positions of the municipal regime. Said official letter stated: '… this Tribunal, in the terms and with the scope of constitutional Article 97, objects to the bill being processed in file No. 21.810. Such objection would be lifted if the legislators modify the bill so that, according to the spirit of the proposal, consecutive reelection is limited to a single time (maximum two continuous terms in the same position), without prohibiting the possibility of opting, at the end of the second term, for another popularly elected position. Respectfully, it is recalled that "Within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (…) convert into laws the bills (…) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement" (constitutional numeral 97). FINAL AGREEMENT.' (folios 1063 to 1072 of the legislative file); d) In extraordinary session number 45 of December 23, 2021, the Legislative Plenary approved Bill 21810 in first debate, with a vote of 46 votes in favor (folios 551 to 600 and 604 of the bill); e) In extraordinary session No. 46 of January 5, 2022, the discussion of Bill No. 21.810 began in second debate, where a motion of order was approved to revert to first debate and the discussion was suspended so that it would occupy the first place in the first debates in the following session (folio 650).
• f)Through ordinary session No. 85 of January 11, 2022, of the Legislative Plenary, the discussion in the first debate process of Bill No. 21.810 began (folio 702). In extraordinary session No. 053 of January 25, 2022, the discussion continued in first debate of the bill in question and it was approved in first debate by 40 votes in favor (folio 1082-1112).
• g)On January 27, 2022, several deputies of the Legislative Assembly filed an optional consultation of constitutionality, processed under file number 22-001848-0007-CO (folios 1143 to 1162 of the legislative file); h) The Constitutional Chamber evacuated the consultation through vote 2022-006119 at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, considering that there were no procedural defects and declaring the consultation unevacuable regarding the substantive defects alleged; i) In ordinary session 105 of March 29, 2022, the Legislative Plenary approved Bill 21.810 in second debate with 48 votes in favor, without accepting the observations made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folios 1367 and 1372).

As is evident from the facts described, since it was a bill relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly consulted the Supreme Electoral Tribunal during its processing, an institution that partially opposed the legislative initiative, considering it contrary to the parameters of constitutionality and conventionality given the restriction established on municipal officials with two consecutive terms in office, to opt for other popularly elected positions (folio 1068 of the legislative file). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the bill was approved without taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, since the finally approved law maintained the restriction indicated by the electoral body (a restriction to which we referred in our previous report).

If the first scenario described in constitutional Article 97 is taken as a parameter, it is clear that there is no procedural infraction whatsoever, since the bill was approved in first debate by 40 votes and, in second debate, by 48 votes. This shows that even with the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Legislative Assembly surpassed the constitutional majority to depart from said opposition.

The doubt arises in this case with the second scenario contemplated in numeral 97 of the Constitution, which absolutely prohibits the Legislative Assembly from approving bills on electoral matters if it is within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, when there is opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

As observed, the bill was approved in first debate on January 25, 2022, less than a month before the national elections held in February 2022, and in second debate on March 29, 2022, less than a month before the second round of the national elections.

The discussion arises then, whether, given the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Legislative Assembly could approve the law, given the electoral moment in which we found ourselves. (…)

Without prejudice to the conflict of competencies that has been maintained between the Constitutional Chamber and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal over time, it has been the criterion of this advisory body that as long as we are faced with interpretations of constitutional or legal norms of an electoral nature (which do not constitute jurisprudence), the body that must exercise that competence exclusively and excludently is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, because the Constituent Power was clear in recognizing that power in Articles 99 and 102 subsection 3 of the Constitution.

(…)

That position, in our view, presents the inconvenience not only that the Chamber attributed to itself the interpretation or updating of a constitutional norm of an electoral nature (Article 97) that –in principle– corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, but also that the Chamber made said interpretation in accordance with a norm of legal rank (Electoral Code), ignoring the will of the Constituent Power embodied in Articles 97, 99, and 102 subsection 3 of the Constitution, even though the electoral regime changed after the entry into force of the Electoral Code. Likewise, it is clear that the rules contained in the bill that served as the precursor to Law 10183 were of an electoral nature, so the TSE's opposition to the bill being voted on was binding on the Legislative Assembly.

In other words, it is our view that during the legislative process, the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal should have prevailed, because it is that body that is exclusively responsible for the interpretation of electoral norms and we were in the middle of a popular election. Note that at no time did that electoral tribunal consider during the legislative process that the bill could be approved because the election underway was not a municipal one, but, on the contrary, it indicated to the legislator that it could only approve it if it complied with the recommendations it was making to the bill, something that was not done by the Legislative Assembly (see legislative records already cited).

We also believe that the fact that a legal norm refers to a municipal election and that the elections in progress were national in nature did not overcome the prohibition established in constitutional numeral 97, because under that thesis the legislator could create new obligations in electoral matters, without considering whether the Supreme Electoral Tribunal can or cannot face them, being in the midst of the complex logistics of an election, whatever its nature. Hence, precisely for this reason, it is up to the TSE to determine whether a bill –on electoral matters– can or cannot be approved during the months prior and subsequent to the election being held, especially because only said body can assess budgetary, logistical, and technical aspects relating to the organization of the suffrage and its material possibility of attending, at the same time, any legal norms dictated by the Legislative Assembly on electoral matters, whether of municipal or national scope." (The highlighted text does not correspond to the original).

In my view, the PGR is correct in the sense that, in light of the literal wording of the provisions of Article 102 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, it corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) to interpret exclusively and bindingly the constitutional and legal provisions referring to electoral matters.

In the case at hand (sub lite), as was accredited from the sequence explained, the TSE objected to the bill and made the legislators see that "Within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (…) convert into laws the bills (…) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement." Despite said disagreement, the Legislative Assembly approved the bill during a period of national elections, given that the TSE determined, in accordance with its constitutional competence to interpret constitutional norms on electoral matters, that the referred bill could not become law during the period in question. I consider that the Legislative Assembly, by overlooking the TSE's opposition and its competence to interpret constitutional norms on electoral matters, incurred an essential defect in the parliamentary procedure that invalidated it.

In this regard, it should be added that I am not pronouncing on what the appropriate interpretation of the second part of Article 97 of the Political Constitution is, but rather I recognize that, in light of constitutional Article 102 subsection 3), it was exclusively up to the TSE to carry out the interpretation of the aforementioned numeral (supra cited).

3.- Background that reflects my position on the competences of the TSE What has been stated in this dissenting vote is consistent with my position regarding the constitutional competences of the TSE.

For example, I recently concurred with the Plenary of this Chamber when resolving the unconstitutionality action No. 21-0000897-0007-CO through judgment No. 2022-027955 in which the interpretation powers of the TSE were precisely underlined. In relevant part, the following was stated:

"After evaluating the arguments, the Chamber believes that the questioned article (ordinal) has a programmatic content, aimed at providing legal certainty in the exercise of the powers that fall exclusively to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, but without affecting their content. As can be deduced from its literal wording, the purpose of the rule is for the TSE to carry out, within six months following the entry into force of the law, the organization and direction tasks, in order for the suffrage to be subsequently held for the election of the members of the district council and trustees (síndicos) of the district of Cabeceras. Such activity –organization and direction– differs from that understood by the plaintiff (holding early elections). In other words, given that the holding of local elections entails the reconciliation of numerous factual and legal elements (definition of the electoral roll, internal work of political parties, political propaganda, political debt, respect for electoral timelines, respect for the prohibition of Law No. 6068 to modify the administrative territorial division during electoral periods, etc.), the rule aims for the TSE to exercise its powers of organization and direction during those months, for the purpose of providing legal certainty and determining the manner of proceeding to hold the respective elections. Indeed, unlike what is alleged in this action, the questioned regulations do not invade the constitutional powers of the TSE because the mandate under examination does not impose the holding of elections within the period of six months following the entry into force of the law, but rather, in congruence with what is stipulated by electoral regulations, specifies that the TSE must undertake the corresponding actions to carry out the call for said democratic process. However, it is clear that, in order of the exclusive and excludent powers of that Electoral Tribunal, it is that body that must define the specificities of that process, within this, the dates for holding the elections and other details characteristic of those popular designation activities that present a special complexity in their organization and holding. On the other hand, regarding this type of regulation, the Chamber highlights that our legal system contains similar provisions regarding municipal elections, for example:

'Article 19. — By motion presented before the Council, which must be signed by at least one-third of the total number of council members (regidores) and approved by a minimum of three-quarters of the sitting council members, a plebiscite shall be called for the electors of the respective canton to decide whether or not to remove the municipal mayor. Such a decision may not be vetoed.

The votes necessary to remove the municipal mayor must total at least two-thirds of those cast in the plebiscite, which may not be less than ten percent (10%) of the total electors registered in the canton.

The plebiscite shall be held using the electoral roll of the respective canton, with the cut-off of the month prior to the final approval of the agreement referred to in the first paragraph of this article.

If the result of the consultation is the removal of the official, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall replace the full mayor (alcalde propietario), in accordance with Article 14 of this code, for the remainder of the term.

If both municipal deputy mayors are removed or resign, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal must call new elections in the respective canton, within a maximum period of six months, and the appointment shall be for the remainder of the term. While the election is held, the president of the council shall assume, as an additional duty, the position of municipal mayor, with all the powers granted by this Code.' (The underline is added. Municipal Code).

'ARTICLE 147.- Call to elections The call to elections shall be made by the TSE four months before the date on which they are to be held.

The TSE shall call extraordinary partial elections to fill vacancies in municipalities that become disintegrated, as well as in the case of Article 19 of the Municipal Code.' (Electoral Code) The Chamber highlights that the TSE is able to systematically interpret the questioned regulations with the purpose of harmonizing them with the rest of the legal system, ensuring the validity of the constitutional and electoral principles that govern the matter, as it has done on other occasions (for example, resolution No. 405-E8-2008 at 7:20 a.m. on February 8, 2008). It falls to the TSE both the interpretation of those regulations and the exercise of the powers constitutionally and legally assigned to it. Indeed, the Chamber notes within the legislative file that the TSE tacitly acknowledges the need to reconcile the rule with the rest of the legal system to determine when the elections could be held:

'As mentioned above, the effectiveness of this project, should it be approved by the Executive Branch itself prior to December 2, 2018, as constitutionally appropriate, would be –as of right (de pleno derecho)– deferred to the moment when the respective municipal authorities are elected, which will occur at the next municipal elections to be held on the first Sunday of February of the year 2020, otherwise, if it were to enter into force during the mentioned prohibited period, its effectiveness would be deferred as of right to the next electoral process, i.e., February 2024, in both cases, at which time this Tribunal will organize and direct, in accordance with (sic) its constitutional powers, the election of the full and alternate members of the district council (consejo) and the respective trustees of the district of Cabeceras.' (Folio 149 of the legislative file of Law 9868, available at http://www.asamblea.go.cr/) It is noted that this opinion was expressed regarding the original wording of the bill. However, it must be emphasized that the questioned rule was already incorporated in the original version of the bill, specifically, its Article 3.

In conclusion, the Chamber does not find constitutional friction in the questioned article, as it is not determined to be in direct confrontation with the electoral timelines provided for in numerals 171 and 172 of the Constitution, nor that it disregards the constitutional powers of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. On the contrary, the cited article records that said Tribunal, through the exercise of its powers of organization and direction, must provide legal certainty regarding the holding of elections in that district." This position, that of respecting the scope of competence of the TSE regarding the interpretation of constitutional and legal norms referring to electoral matters, is consistent with what I have maintained on other occasions, especially regarding the consultations of constitutionality on the Public Employment bill (see advisory opinions No. 2021-017098 and No. 2872-2022). Furthermore, this thesis is not contradictory to what I maintained regarding the horizontal parity of legislators (judgment No. 2015-016070) and the popularly elected positions that are municipal (admissibility resolution No. 2019-011633), as can be deduced from a careful study of both resolutions.

4.- Conclusion As a corollary to the foregoing considerations, I issue a dissenting vote upon finding that in the present case (sub lite) an infraction of the legislative procedure process was incurred due to the non-observance of the provisions of Article 102 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution.

Since a defect is established that invalidates the law's approval process, as I have stated, I deem it unnecessary to rule on the substantive arguments.

CO05/23 ... See more San José, at nine thirty on the fourteenth of December, two thousand twenty-two.

Action of unconstitutionality processed in case file no. 22-008383-0007-CO filed by GERARDO OVIEDO ESPINOZA, of legal age, married, public accountant, resident of Santa Ana de San José, identity card no. 1-0590-0475, acting personally and in his capacity as mayor of Santa Ana and president of the Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José (FEMETROM), legal entity identification no. 3-007-397237; against the sole transitory provision and the substantive part of law no. 10.183 entitled: “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales,” to which were accumulated actions nos. 22-008424-0007-CO brought by HORACIO MARTÍN ALVARADO BOGANTES, in his capacity as president and general attorney-in-fact of the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), and 22-010888-0007-CO filed by WILBER QUIRÓS PALMA, acting personally and in his capacity as president of the Federación de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, as well as by MARVIN GUSTAVO CASTILLO MORALES, acting personally.

Whereas:

1.- By brief received in the Chamber on April 20, 2022, the plaintiff Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza files an action of unconstitutionality in his condition as voter, mayor of Santa Ana, and president of FEMETROM, pursuant to article II of ordinary session 191 of April 20, 2022, against the sole transitory provision and the substantive part of law no. 10.183 entitled “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales,” approved on April 5, 2022, and published in La Gaceta no. 73 of April 8, 2022. He mentions that the challenged regulation infringes numerals 7, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 93, and 169 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of equality and political freedom; proportionality; reasonableness; non-retroactivity of norms; Social and Democratic Rule of Law; and international treaties, especially ordinal 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights. He specifically mentions these transgressions: “1.- Article 33, which establishes the principle of equality before the Law, because the norm created an odious discrimination directed at certain particular persons, which violates the most basic principles of equality, reasonableness, proportionality, and political and individual freedom. 2.- Article 34, which establishes the principle of non-retroactivity of legal norms, since it refers to some citizens who hold a specific office and creates a differentiated condition for us, applicable to the past exercise of our functions. That is, it separated from the new rule directed at all citizens that limits them to not being elected more than twice consecutively from its approval, to constitute a special situation for those of us who exercised this public office consecutively in the past. 3.- Articles 35, 39, and 40 of the Political Constitution because, with the challenged transitory provision, a public sanction was established directed especially at certain authorities who hold the status of reelected incumbent Mayors, for a political and media-driven reason, exacerbated by a scandal known as the Diamante case in the context of an electoral campaign, with eventual repercussions on the electoral results, thereby also violating article 97 of our Magna Carta, which does not distinguish between national and municipal elections. The foregoing violates the principle of proportionality of every State action before the community as a whole. This confirms the absence of the legitimate purpose and compelling social necessity of the approved reform. 4.- Articles 169 and 171, since it is uniquely the Political Constitution that can establish a condition of electoral limitation or restriction on those who have been elected or could be popularly elected, as occurs with the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic or the esteemed Deputies, which our Magna Carta clearly, precisely, and expressly establishes these limitations in articles 107 and 132, but for the case of municipal authorities, the Constitution did not and does not establish any limitation, thus an implicit reform to our superior norm is occurring, without complying with constitutional procedures, which results in an evident defect of form and procedure, with the approval of the challenged norm, to the detriment of the citizen political rights enshrined in article 93 of that superior body of norms. In this sense, it is not appropriate for a rule of legal character to restrict or delimit the constitutionally enshrined political rights on a matter as profoundly complex as the one approved. 5.- Article 7 of the Constitution because there are International Treaties adopted by the country that protect the political rights violated by the questioned norm, as we will set forth below, all in relation to subparagraph d) of article 73 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, especially article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, regarding the right to vote and to be freely elected.” He argues that the existence of a collective and diffuse interest that justifies challenging the norm through constitutional means is obvious, since due to the nature of the matter, there is not only an individual and direct injury, but the issue refers to the organization and political representation of the highest interest of a democratic, free, and sovereign State, making it unnecessary to resort to a prior process of exhausting administrative remedies. He adds that resolution no. 2022006119 did not address the merits of the matter, but only referred to the non-existence of the procedural defects consulted by the legislators. In the substantiation section, he sets forth the constitutional articles and principles violated by law no. 10.183: “1.- Evidently, national States can regulate political rights by legal means, but that discretion is not absolute, as it has the limits that the Political Constitution, the general principles, and the International Treaties impose, particularly the jurisprudence that nourishes all these norms, especially that which has enshrined the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The principle of free configuration of the legislator grants the Legislative Assembly sufficient discretion to issue norms that regulate political freedoms, among others, including the possibility of limiting the reelection of Mayors and other municipal authorities, provided that this finds a basis in the Political Constitution. But this discretion is exercised through norms of a general and abstract character, laws in the formal and material sense enacted in accordance with the procedures established in our Legal System, especially those contained in the Political Constitution itself. The unconstitutionality of the challenged norm consists of the fact that said Transitory provision does not comply with the principles and technical drafting that it must possess as a legal norm, because it was drafted to affect a little over forty officials democratically elected by the free suffrage of the citizenry, as a kind of vendetta or social reaction fueled by some mass media outlets, following the initiation of a judicial investigation known as the Diamante case, which analyzes the possible commission of acts of corruption by some municipal authorities. The presumption of influence peddling, abuse of power, social condemnation for acts of alleged corruption, cannot be justifications for approving the restriction on the reelection of municipal offices; therefore, the reform lacks a legitimate purpose and an adequate determination of compelling social necessity, as is required for the norm to be in harmony with our Constitution. 2.- The margin of maneuver of legislative discretion does not reach such an extreme as to interfere in the political campaign, publicly condemning more than 40 Mayors who are innocent, with a norm that does not have the basic or minimum characteristics of being general and abstract, but is drafted to cause an effect on certain persons only, to the detriment of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and equality. All the media and the records of the Legislative Assembly attest that the sole motivation for processing and approving this Law and its Transitory provision is to prevent the abuse of power by Mayors who held several terms in which the citizenry reelected them. A kind of generalized social condemnation was carried out against any official who, being Mayor, had two or more terms in which the population placed its trust by reelecting him or her. The foregoing not only constitutes a lack of respect for the Legal System, where the constitutional principle of innocence has been outraged once again, but it also affects the rest of the Mayors who have nothing to do with the investigation of possible acts of corruption publicly indicated. It suffices to see the statements in all the media by the esteemed legislators of all Political Fractions, in the context of the social questioning that might signify not voting for this reform in the face of an imminent electoral process. We do not consider it necessary to present evidence of this national atmosphere, where the entire citizenry witnessed it almost daily during the final months of the national electoral campaign, nor that the majority of the reelected Mayors belong to the Political Party of one of the contenders in the struggle for the office of President of the Republic. Our claim is not for the honorable Constitutional Court to interfere in matters of political connotation, but to contextualize the reality of the case before us, which is a gross violation of constitutional norms and principles, motivated by a revanchist and punitive political reaction directed at certain specific persons. As constitutional jurisprudence has reiterated, “the freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality made up of constitutional precepts and customs, values, and principles — among which the principles of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of this nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion are usually more intense when it involves the legal regulation of fundamental rights, because in such matters, the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, whereas, in contrast, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects.” (Resolutions 05099 of 2003, 011499, 011706 of 2013, resolution 019511 of 2018, and 015542 of 2020). As an illustrious Magistrate opportunely and clearly indicated: “The fact that a person who has held a popular office can run for another office does not per se constitute corruption or an illegitimate ‘modus vivendi.’ It cannot be ignored that it involves taking advantage of the experience of a person who has already held similar offices, and whom the municipal citizens have elected. In order to prevent the concentration of power, rules cannot be introduced that sever, without any basis, passive suffrage. Limitations on the concentration of power cannot restrict, without foundation, fundamental rights.” 3.- The block of constitutionality must be observed when the Legislative Power exercises its normative discretion, and this superior normative framework implies procedural, formal, and substantive limitations, as is the case that the limitations on reelection for authorities popularly elected to the Executive and Legislative Powers are found in the Magna Carta, as these are absolutely sensitive matters for political equilibrium, governability, and social peace. Thus, it is articles 107 and 132 of the Constitution that have sufficient authority to constrain, limit, or condition the right to reelection, a situation that the constituent power did not establish for local authorities, on the grounds that the political and social control was evidently greater due to the proximity to the population that would elect them or not. Modifying the foregoing would imply a necessary change at the level of constitutional norms, since these are what determine the term of appointment, as well as the fundamental conditions and limitations; therefore, the Sole Transitory provision and the Law in general are violative of articles 169 and 171 of the Constitution, which establish the rules of the game for the election of council members (regidores) and Mayors, and which are being seriously violated. 4.- The impairment of the principle of equality and the principle of non-retroactivity of the norm is confirmed by several causes, among which it stands out that all Costa Rican citizens who meet the requirements can be elected Mayors from the enactment of the Law, except those who were already in office and had been reelected when this norm did not exist; moreover, the violation of the principle of equality is accentuated when the rest of the popularly elected authorities can access the other offices of this nature, except the Mayors, who cannot access any popularly elected office, even if it is not that of Mayor, thereby verifying the casuistic, personalized, political, and unjust characteristic of the challenged norm. The norm of non-reelection for more than two terms must apply equally to all citizens from its enactment, not towards the past, because that implies directing the Law at specific persons for specific reasons, within an electoral context, where the Law adopted effectively affected one specific candidate and benefited another whose political party does not possess any locally elected representative because it is a new political group. This same irrationality would imply, for example, that a legislator could not opt to be a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, a situation that the esteemed legislators could not conceive for themselves, but they could take advantage of a context of public scandal upon the initiation of a judicial investigation to formulate a transitory norm that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself suggests is unconstitutional, for completely emptying the right to be elected of its content. The Constitution prohibits approving this type of electoral reforms during a blackout period, without distinguishing whether they are national or local elections; arguing otherwise would be to establish a modification to the Political Constitution by way of interpretation, for which the defect of nullity of the procedure is more than evident. 5.- The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in its resolution TSE-0199-2022 of January 20 of this year, just days before the national election, indicated: “The restrictions on reelected officials (so that they cannot opt for another office in the municipality) would make it impossible for those citizens to access internal party contests in order to subsequently be nominated for popularly elected offices other than the one they hold. In other terms, no matter how much they belong to a political group and meet the legal nomination requirements, due to the public function they perform —ad initio— such public servants will not be able to compete even in the internal processes where nominations are contested… Such an affectation of the essential core of the right occurs precisely because not only is reelection being limited, but, as an effect of the application of the norm, there would also be a total suspension of the citizen’s prerogative to contend for political offices.” What is furthermore more than evident is that, if this is true for the rest of the municipal officials, it would also be true for the Mayors, which confirms that having excluded only these leaders, and not the rest, violates the constitutional principles of legality, equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. We are not facing the discussion of whether reelection constitutes a fundamental right, a subjective right, or an acquired right; we are facing the violation of superior constitutional and conventional norms, which do not prevent the regulation and limitation of reelection but do indicate limits on how to do so, through a general, abstract norm, not retroactive or directed at particular persons, as was the case at hand: “the persons currently serving as mayors…,” being a matter exclusively of constitutional regulation, as exemplified by the case of the Deputies and the President of the Republic, regulated, as appropriate, constitutionally. 6.- There exists a non-absolute right of access to public office, which, pursuant to article 21.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and article 23.1.c of the American Convention on Human Rights, can be generally regulated but not emptied of its content through a specific transitory norm, since such conventional principles expressly and clearly consolidate that every person has the right of access to popularly elected offices under conditions of equality, superior norms that the challenged norm clearly violates despite having an inferior character, failing to meet the parameter of reasonableness and proportionality of the norm. The restriction on public office can only occur via two avenues: a general and abstract norm that respects the principles of equality and proportionality and pursues a legitimate purpose, or a final, firm judicial sanction. In the case at hand, the esteemed legislators exceeded their limits, designing a very dangerous third avenue, combining a new power that attributes nonexistent faculties and substitutes the procedures and sanctioning attributions proper to the Judicial Power.” He requests: “to declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm and especially of the Sole Transitory provision, after transferring this action to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for whatever corresponds under the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.” 2.- By resolution at 5:41 p.m. on April 28, 2022, the Presidency of the Chamber ordered the plaintiff: “within the third day, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying processing of the action in case of non-compliance, you must: provide certification of your appointment as mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Ana.” 3.- By brief received in the Chamber on May 4, 2022, the plaintiff attaches the certification of his appointment as mayor of Santa Ana.

4.- By resolution at 8:27 a.m. on May 9, 2022, the Presidency of the Chamber admitted the action of unconstitutionality filed by the plaintiff in his personal capacity, as mayor of Santa Ana, and as president of FEMETROM, against the sole transitory provision and the substantive part of law no. 10.183 entitled “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales.” Furthermore, it granted a hearing to the Attorney General of the Republic, the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the President of the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica. Likewise, it ordered: “This action is admitted for meeting the requirements referred to in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in its articles 73 to 79. Regarding his standing, in this specific case, the plaintiff states that ‘Being a matter of the principles of political organization and representation enshrined and regulated in the Political Constitution itself, as permitted by the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the existence of a collective and diffuse interest that justifies challenging the norm through constitutional means is obvious….’ Nevertheless, upon studying the brief filing the action, it is considered that the plaintiff holds direct standing, since he refers to being in the presence of electoral values, specifically, regarding the exercise of passive suffrage, that is, the right to be elected to a public office, which has been admitted as a diffuse interest in jurisprudential precedents of this Court; for example, in judgment no. 2011-010833 of 2:31 p.m. on August 12, 2011, it was ordered that ‘… dealing with electoral matter and the right of all citizens to elect and be elected, the existence of a diffuse interest for the filing of this action must be recognized, and, as such, the due standing of the plaintiff for its presentation’ (in a similar sense, see judgments no. 7383-97 of 3:48 p.m. on November 4, 1997, no. 7384-97 of 3:51 p.m. on November 4, 1997, no. 2002-08867 of 2:55 p.m. on September 11, 2002, and no. 000456-2007 of 2:50 p.m. on January 17, 2007, among others). Let a notice on the filing of the action be published three consecutive times in the Boletín Judicial. REGARDING THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ADMISSION OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. Certainly, pursuant to article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the “bodies that exhaust the administrative channel must be warned that this lawsuit has been filed, so that in the processes or proceedings where the application of the law, decree, provision, agreement, or resolution is discussed, a final resolution shall not be issued either while the Chamber has not made a ruling on the case.” However, in the specific case, the application of ordinal 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction would enervate the application of the norm and consequently impede the holding of the next electoral process. For the foregoing reasons, in application of ordinal 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is necessary to modulate the suspensive effect of article 81 of that normative body, expressly indicating that the issuance of any final resolution, whether in an internal, administrative, or electoral venue, is not suspended. Within the fifteen days following the first publication of said notice, those who appear as parties in matters pending as of the date of filing of this action, in which the application of what is challenged is discussed, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear in order to contribute regarding its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter of interest to them (…).” 5.- The notices referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in editions nos. 95, 96, and 97 of the Boletín Judicial dated May 24, 25, and 26, 2022, respectively.

6.- By brief added to the digital file on May 25, 2022, Magda Inés Rojas Chaves appears, in her capacity as Deputy Attorney General of the Republic. She states the following: “II. REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the assumptions that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article. These latter regulate the direct action of unconstitutionality, since they allow the filing of the action without the need for a prior matter, when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Defender of the Inhabitants. In this case, in the order admitting the action, the Presidency of the Chamber considered that we are in the presence of a diffuse interest, which this advisory body considers is in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber on this matter and empowers whomever invokes it to directly file the action of unconstitutionality (in this regard, resolutions numbers 2000-07818 of 4:45 p.m. on September 5, 2000, and 2012-1966 of 9:32 a.m. on February 17, 2012). In this respect, Judgment No. 2012-1966 stated: ‘The right to elect and be elected to positions of popular election, as political rights, not only have the nature of potentially affecting a specific male or female citizen, but also of affecting the democratic system in general, which is based on the periodic renewal of its political structures as one of its postulates, through the popular election of different positions, such that it has that dual nature that makes it diffuse and therefore directly challengeable, by way of exception, according to the cited regulations and jurisprudence.’ (The emphasis is not from the original). Based on the foregoing, in this case, the plaintiff has standing to file the action of unconstitutionality, regardless of the office he holds as municipal mayor and president of the Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José (FEMETROM). III. ON THE MERITS Analyzing the challenged norm and the arguments presented by the plaintiff, we consider that the substantive discussion of this action of unconstitutionality should be summarized as the analysis of three issues: the limit imposed by the challenged norm on reelection in the municipal sphere; the prohibition established for certain municipal officials from holding other offices once their second term has expired; and the transitory norm, regarding whether or not it produces a retroactive application of the prohibition established in the norm. A) ON THE LIMIT ON THE REELECTION OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS BY ELECTION. Law 10183 of April 5, 2022, is a reform of the provisions of article 14 of the Municipal Code, Law 7794 of April 30, 1998, which limited the indefinite reelection of local authorities. Said reform states in its substantive part: ‘SOLE ARTICLE- The fifth paragraph of article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, is amended. The text is as follows: ( … ) All offices of popular election at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the presidency and vice presidencies of the Republic and those who will make up the Legislative Assembly are elected. They will take possession of their offices on the 1st day of May of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected. Mayors may be reelected consecutively only once. They may not hold any office of popular election of the municipal regime, until two terms have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended. Deputy mayors may also be reelected consecutively only once and may not hold the same office or that of council members (regidores) or district council members (síndicos), until two terms have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended. Council members (regidores), district council members (síndicos), district intendants, deputy district intendants, municipal district council members of Law 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, of December 7, 2001, as well as those holding any of the substitute positions, may be reelected consecutively only once and may not hold the same office or its substitute position until two terms have elapsed since their second term ended.’ As can be observed, the challenged norm changed the reelection system for municipal authorities, since previously it was permitted indefinitely, whereas now it is only permitted once. Furthermore, the norm limits the possibility of holding different offices within the municipal regime, until two terms have elapsed from the end of the second term. If Legislative Bill 21810, which served as the basis for Law 10183, is analyzed, the legislative proposal was presented with the purpose of protecting the principle of alternation of power in the exercise of public office, allowing other persons to access municipal offices under equal conditions, and preventing the abuses and arbitrariness associated with the perpetuation in power of high-level positions in local government (statement of motives). Likewise, the legislative bill was based on the preliminary report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission, which was composed of 11 electoral experts from 6 countries in the region, who arrived in the country as of January 25, 2020, to conduct a detailed analysis on topics such as: electoral organization, electoral technology, political financing, electoral justice, and political participation of women, and also to observe the different perspectives on the municipal election in our country.

In that report, the delegation referred to the limits on reelection at the local level, concluding that: "...there is no absolute human right to hold office, and that the rights to vote and be elected may be regulated"[1] Under that understanding, it is appropriate to first make a reference to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber regarding the aforementioned principle of alternation in power enshrined in article 9 of the Political Constitution and which is stated as one of the foundations of the challenged law. In this regard, the Chamber has indicated: "X.- ON ALTERNATION IN POWER. Another of the constitutional principles alleged to have been infringed is that of alternation in power, as the plaintiff association believes that a system should be provided for in which eligible positions are occupied alternately by all the groups that vie for them. In this regard, a warning is made that the doctrinal concept of this principle, characteristic of republican systems or regimes, has a different meaning from that considered by the plaintiff, as it implies the real and effective possibility that public offices be occupied temporarily according to the periods previously established in the Political Constitution or in the law. That is, the periodic renewal of public offices through free elections, from which the elements of legitimacy and political control stand out, as the participation of the citizenry in its entirety is required –for Presidential elections, deputies, council members (regidores), district trustees (síndicos), and the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal)- or fractioned - in the case of the integration of collegiate bodies of public entities, such as, for example, the Superior Council of Education, the University Council, the Board of Directors of ICAFE, etc.-. Therefore, alternation in Power requires a democratic regime that allows for real and equitable competition among political parties or groups, sectors, or associations –as in this case-, such that real equality of opportunity is assumed, from which no sector, group, or candidate can be privileged. In any case, it should be noted that rotation in power is only possible if there is an express rule to that effect, so that in its absence, the electoral body elects the representative…. It must be remembered that the principle of alternation in power does not presuppose the rotation of the eligible position among the various groups, parties, or sectors that participate in an electoral process -in this case, the educators' associations-, but rather the existence of election processes based on the democratic principle, that is, on the calling of free, multi-party, and secret elections. Reason for which it cannot be considered that an infringement of this principle has occurred, given that Executive Decree number 11 itself establishes the subjection to such principles in subsection e) of article 1. Likewise, it must be considered that far from breaking the principle of equality, the same regulations are applied to all associations. In any case, it must be considered that the condition of being the association with the largest number of members is relative and changing over time, such that an infringement of the principle of equality cannot be claimed either, as no specific educators' association is favored. Contrary to what was estimated by the promoter, the Chamber considers that a solution such as the one proposed by the plaintiff association, that is, giving greater value to 'minority' associations, so that they can obtain a greater number of votes and their representative joins CONESUP, constitutes a break with the aforementioned constitutional principles of representativeness, citizen participation, alternation, and equality; whereby it is considered that the plaintiffs' claim rather undermines these principles. For these reasons, the action must be declared without merit in all its aspects." (Judgment No. 2003-03475 of 8:56 a.m. on May 2, 2003. The underlining is not from the original) In accordance with the transcribed judgment, the principle under comment does not require rotation, nor that persons necessarily must take turns successively in certain popularly elected positions. This was reiterated in judgment No. 20091632 of 11:23 a.m. on February 6, 2009, which indicates: "III.- ON ALTERNABILITY (…) the principle of alternability implies guaranteeing the presence of all the collectivities that participate in an election process, in this case, the professional associations, in order to guarantee a participatory, free, democratic, and secret procedure. Based on the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that, from the facts recorded in the case file, it can be deduced that the respondent Federation informed all the Boards of Directors of the Professional Associations about the election process for the different positions to be filled, likewise, it was requested that the candidates must be present on the day of the election to be known by the different representatives of the Professional Associations. The rotation of Professional Associations in the elected positions before public institutions is not an intrinsic element of the principle of alternability, since what is actually intended is that the election be conducted in such a way that all the Associations belonging to the Federation can participate freely and secretly. Under this approach, the reproach raised is unfounded." (The underlining is not from the original). In light of these criteria of the Chamber, what is relevant for the guarantee of alternation in municipal government to be considered fulfilled is not the rotation of the eligible position among the various parties or persons participating in the electoral contest, nor limiting the successive reelection of municipal authorities to a specific period of time, but rather the effective existence of election processes based on the democratic principle, that is, on the calling of free, multi-party, and secret elections. Notwithstanding this, we must point out that the Constitutional Chamber has also accepted a principle of free configuration by the legislator to design the manner in which the appointment of mayors and their substitutes will be carried out. It must be remembered that constitutional article 169 did not conceive the position of mayor as a popularly elected position, but rather delegated the regulation of their appointment to the ordinary legislator, thereby reaffirming their freedom of configuration to determine the requirements or conditions for selecting them. On this point, judgment No. 2012-9226 of 2:30 p.m. on July 17, 2012, stated: "V.- In conclusion, this Tribunal does not consider that the challenged norms harm the Constitution in any way by establishing the election of the Mayor and their substitute through popular elections, given that the Constituent members themselves delegated to the law the mechanism to be devised for their appointment, without the fact that it has been arranged in this manner altering the essential executive function that was entrusted to them and without detriment to the powers given to the district trustees (síndicos). Furthermore, the popular election strengthens the democratic constitutional principles of our country and summons the population to exercise its sovereignty and to be more participative when deciding who will not only make the most transcendental decisions of their community, but also execute them, as far as municipalities are concerned. All of which imposes a great responsibility in the exercise of the position, which may even be revoked by their own electors." (The underlining is not from the original). Starting from the above, we must indicate that modifying the conditions of election of the mayor at the municipal level is a matter of opportunity and convenience, typical of the parliamentary debate and the political interplay of the forces represented in the Legislative Assembly, a space which, par excellence in a democratic regime, must weigh the pros and cons in favor of one model or another. Consequently, we do not consider that the challenged norm is contrary to the Law of the Constitution, with regard to the establishment of a limit for the reelection of the mayor (alcalde, alcaldesa), vice-mayor (vicealcalde, vicealcaldesa). The same interpretation should apply to the district administrator (intendente or intendenta), given the existing parallelism with the figure of the mayor at the district level. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we consider that the case of the other popularly elected municipal officials deserves a separate analysis. Unlike other popularly elected public offices in which the Political Constitution expressly prohibits successive reelection, such as the case of deputies and the President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic (articles 107 and 132, respectively), regarding said positions at the municipal level, constitutional articles 169, 171, and 172 do not establish a similar restriction for being appointed. This, one might think, evidences the will of the Constituent power not to limit reelection in these cases. Consequently, the limitation established in relation to officials who by constitutional provision are subject to popular election could be considered a violation of the political right to elect and be elected to public office which, as the Chamber has recognized on multiple occasions, is a fundamental right and, therefore, any limitation on the right must be interpreted restrictively. Due to the foregoing, it is our criterion that the Constituent power only left a margin of free configuration for the appointment and consequent reelection of mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas) and their substitutes, but not for the case of the other popularly elected positions at the municipal level, where there is no express prohibition for their reelection, as indeed occurs with other appointments of that nature. Therefore, any intention in that sense would require a constitutional reform. B) ANALYSIS OF THE PROHIBITION ESTABLISHED IN THE CHALLENGED NORM The challenged norm establishes that mayors (alcaldes and alcaldesas) who are reelected and serve the two maximum periods authorized in the norm, may not hold any popularly elected office of the municipal regime, until two periods have elapsed from the end of their second consecutive period. In the case of vice-mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas), it prohibits them from holding the same office or that of council members (regidores) or district trustees (síndicos), until two periods have elapsed from the end of their second consecutive period. And for council members (personas regidoras), district trustees (síndicas), district administrators (intendentes), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes), and municipal district councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) of Law 8173, it prohibits them from holding the same office or its substituteship until two periods have elapsed from the end of their second period. As observed, the prohibition established for council members (personas regidoras), district trustees (síndicas), district administrators (intendentes), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes), and municipal district councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) against holding the same office after two consecutive periods, is related to the prohibition of indefinite reelection established in the norm, on which we have already ruled in the preceding section. Nevertheless, in the case of mayors (alcaldes and alcaldesas), the challenged norm not only prohibits their reelection after two periods in the office of mayor (alcalde or alcaldesa), but also, additionally, imposes a prohibition on them from holding any other popularly elected office until two periods have elapsed from the end of their reelection period. In the case of vice-mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas), they are also prohibited from holding the office of council members (regidores) or district trustees (síndicos). Said prohibition was not initially contemplated when the bill was presented, as the originally proposed norm stated, in what is relevant: "All popularly elected offices at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the Presidency and the Vice-Presidencies of the Republic and those who will make up the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take possession of their offices on the 1st of May of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected to the same position, successively, for one period, without prejudice to their right to be elected to any of the other offices under the same conditions. (…)" (statement of grounds for bill 21810). As observed, initially the legislative proposal imposed a limit on reelection to the same office, but expressly permitted the right to hold any of the other offices of the municipal regime. It was during the legislative process that the prohibition established in the challenged norm was incorporated, which prevents the mayor (alcalde and alcaldesa) from holding other public offices of the municipal regime, once the second appointment period has expired, a prohibition that remains in the challenged norm for two consecutive periods, i.e., eight years. Likewise, vice-mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas) are prohibited from holding the office of council members (regidores) or district trustees (síndicos) for the same period. On this point, we must point out that the regime of ineligibilities (inhabilidades) or disqualifications from running (inelegibilidades) constitutes one of the legally legitimate limitations for access to public office; however, although the legislator has a broad margin of normative configuration with a view to determining who aspires to public office, the truth is that the definition of the facts constituting the grounds for ineligibility or disqualification from running is subordinated to the constitutional values, principles, and rights that govern public office, without ignoring that they must be reasonable and proportionate. The Attorney General's Office has recognized that there are sanction-based ineligibilities or disqualifications and requirement-based ineligibilities or disqualifications.[2] The first group is directly related to the exercise of the sanctioning power of the State and the temporary impossibility of re-entry into public office; that is, once a conduct considered reprehensible is committed, the State –criminally or administratively- imposes the corresponding sanction and adds an ineligibility that prevents the sanctioned person from temporarily exercising a specific activity, thus fulfilling different purposes of general interest. The second group is related to the protection of rights, principles, and constitutional values, such as morality, impartiality, efficiency, transparency, the general interest, professional secrecy, probity, among other foundations. Therefore, specific requirements or conditions are established to ensure the suitability and probity of whoever aspires to enter a public office and thus avoid even undue interference in the management of public affairs. In this case, there is no relationship with the existence of faults or sanctions. In the case of the challenged norm, we are facing the second commented case, since the prohibition established in the norm is not related to the imposition of a sanction, but creates an ineligibility to hold public office. We do not observe, however, an objective reason that justifies such ineligibility, since for the mere fact that the official has been in a municipal office for two consecutive periods, they are prevented from holding different offices without any justification, which appears to violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, in addition to the right to hold public office. While vice-mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), council members (personas regidoras), district trustees (síndicas), district administrators (intendentes), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes), and municipal district councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) are not prohibited from running for the office of mayor (alcalde or alcaldesa), in the case of the mayor (alcalde and alcaldesa), the imposed prohibition is qualified, as they absolutely cannot hold any position at the municipal level for a period of eight years, becoming an ineligibility that has no objective justification. Similarly, vice-mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas) are also prohibited from holding the office of council members (regidores) or district trustees (síndicos). It must be remembered that article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil, Political, and Cultural Rights, recognize the freedom of citizens to be elected and that their participation in public affairs be guaranteed, it being understood that the law must regulate the exercise of those rights and opportunities "exclusively on grounds of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings" in the terms set forth in the aforementioned article 23. In the same vein, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has referred to fundamental political rights, indicating: "Fundamental political rights encompass a wide range of powers that, jointly with political duties, define citizenship (article 90 of the Constitution). Within that category are comprised, among others, the right to suffrage both active and passive -to elect and be elected- (art. 93 and following of the Constitution and 23 paragraph 1.b of the American Convention on Human Rights), the right to form political parties (art. 98 of the Constitution), the right to assemble 'to discuss political matters and examine the conduct of public officials' (art. 26 ibid), the right to have access, under conditions of equality, to public functions (art. 23 paragraph 1.c of the cited Convention), and the generic right of political participation, understood as the possibility of 'participating in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives' (art. 23 paragraph 1.a of the same international treaty). This last right, which involves all the previous ones, also manifests, for example, in the citizen prerogative to intervene in the decision of matters submitted to a referendum, but also in that of attending the sessions of the legislative and deliberative bodies at the national (Legislative Assembly) and local (municipal councils) level, which for that reason are public by nature. Political participation consists of the exercise of the political rights established in the Political Constitution and in the International Legal Instruments on Human Rights of which the Costa Rican State is a part and, therefore, are protectable.[3] From the above, it follows that, although the State may impose regulations and/or limitations on passive suffrage or the right to be elected, these must be implemented under criteria of proportionality, reasonableness, and in application of the pro homine and good faith principles that govern international treaties, to guarantee and ensure the effective exercise of these rights. This Attorney General's Office does not find that the prohibition established in the challenged norm is based on an objective reason that justifies the limitation on the right of every person to hold public office, since it is not a sanction nor does it protect a superior legal interest, given that access to a municipal public office that is even different from the one originally held is generally prevented. We must also remember that the electoral and municipal legal systems establish other norms that serve as a guarantee so that a municipal official does not illegitimately benefit from the position they hold to obtain a different position in the following period. In this regard, article 157 f) of the Municipal Code prohibits municipal servants from: "f) During electoral processes, engaging in partisan political activity in the performance of their duties and during the work day; as well as violating the neutrality norms established by the Electoral Code" (the underlining is not from the original). Then, letter d) of its article 18 establishes as an automatic cause for the loss of the credential of the municipal mayor, incurring in any of the causes provided in article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (No. 7428 of September 7, 1994), which establishes: "Article 73-Cancellation of credential. The commission of a serious fault by a council member (regidor) or district trustee (síndico), principal or substitute, against the norms of the oversight and control system of the Public Treasury contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms related to public funds; or incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, as generators of administrative liability, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender acted in the exercise of their office or on the occasion of it. When the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials. Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as those provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, shall be a cause for cancellation of the credential of a council member or district trustee, principal or substitute. The competent judicial authority shall, ex officio, make the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal." (The underlining is not from the original). As observed, the breach of the principles of probity, impartiality, objectivity, the violation of the regime of incompatibilities or prohibitions during the exercise of office, or receiving donations, would give room for the imposition of sanctions. Additionally, article 146 of the Electoral Code (Law No. 8765 of August 19, 2009), prohibits all public employees and officials from using their office to benefit a specific candidate or political party. Consequently, the cited provisions are aimed at preventing any municipal authority from using their office and the human and economic resources of the territorial corporation for the purpose of obtaining a position of advantage over the rest of the participants in the electoral contest, and therefore the prohibitions established in the challenged norm are not objectively justified. C) ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITORY NORM Finally, the plaintiff requests the unconstitutionality of the transitory norm of Law 10183, which establishes the following: "Single Transitory Provision- Persons who currently serve as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), district administrators (intendentes or intendentas), and have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait until two periods have elapsed before being able to hold any popularly elected office of the municipal regime again. Persons who currently serve as vice-mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes and viceintendentas), council members (regidores and regidoras) principals and substitutes, district trustees (síndicos and síndicas) principals and substitutes, and have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait until two periods have elapsed before being able to hold the same popularly elected office of the municipal regime again; however, they may hold other municipal offices in accordance with this law." (The bold print is not part of the original) As can be inferred from the cited text, the legislator established a transitory norm for the purpose of regulating the situation of officials currently appointed to municipal positions, especially those who, at the time the norm came into effect, had already been reelected for two consecutive periods. On this point, we must note that article 129 of the Constitution establishes the moment when a law begins to have effect, indicating: "ARTICLE 129.- Laws are obligatory and take effect from the day they designate; in the absence of this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial). (…)" Likewise, the Civil Code establishes: "ARTICLE 7- Laws shall enter into force ten days after their complete and correct publication in the official gazette 'La Gaceta', if they do not provide otherwise. However, if the error or defect comprises only one or some of the norms of a law, the other provisions of the latter shall have full validity, independently of the subsequent publication that may be made, provided they are norms with their own value that would have been applied in that manner." (Thus reformed by Law No. 7020 of January 6, 1986, article 1) According to the provisions of these norms, laws shall enter into force from the date they themselves designate or, failing that, ten days after their publication. Consequently, it is a power of the legislator, within their scope of discretion, to determine the moment from which a legal norm of statutory rank will enter into force[4]; however, the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity constitutes a limit to the law and, therefore, the legislator could not provide for the retroactivity of laws to the detriment of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations.[5] In this regard, the Chamber indicated in judgment No. 5941-97 of 7:00 p.m. on September 23, 1997: "The retroactivity referred to in article 34 of the Political Constitution is that which intends to interfere with acquired rights and consolidated legal situations born prior to the enactment of the law, that is, those with characteristics of validity and efficacy perfected under the rule of other regulations, so that their effects and consequences cannot be varied by new provisions, except if they entail benefit for the interested parties." Therefore, retroactivity will exist when the effects of the law are carried back to an initial moment prior to the perfection of the act creating the norm and, consequently, it is not possible to resolve with new legal norms legal situations that arose prior to its validity. For the reasons stated, we consider that the challenged transitory norm carries back the substantive effects of the law, in violation of the provisions of constitutional numeral 34, since it considers two appointment periods prior to the validity of the norm to prohibit the officials who currently hold municipal positions from running for a different office in the municipal entity. This prevents officials reelected prior to the norm from running again, carrying back the legal effects of a norm that did not exist at the time of their reelection. Therefore, we consider that the second reelection period must be counted from the publication of the norm, otherwise there would be a retroactive effect in violation of subjective rights and consolidated legal situations, an effect that is contrary to the Law of the Constitution. IV. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing considerations, the Attorney General's Office considers that the plaintiff is qualified to file the present action of unconstitutionality. As to the merits, it is considered that the provisions of Law No. 10183 are partially unconstitutional. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that the substantive part of said law and its transitory provision must be annulled, except as it states the following: "Mayoresses or mayors may be continuously reelected only once... Vice-mayors may also be continuously reelected only once… Persons who are… district administrators (intendentes), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes)…, as well as those who hold any of the substitute positions, may be continuously reelected only once and may not hold the same office or its substituteship until two periods have elapsed from the end of their second period." We consider that the rest of the law must be annulled. In the manner set forth, the hearing granted is hereby answered." 7.- By writing incorporated into the digital case file on May 30, 2022, Eugenia María Zamora Chavarría appears, in her capacity as president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. She states the following: "II.- RELEVANT BACKGROUND The Legislative Assembly -from 2005 to date- has consulted this Magistracy, in compliance with the provisions of article 97 of the Political Constitution, on at least six bills in which, in some way and through modifications to article 14 of the Municipal Code, an attempt was made to establish limits on reelection in the various positions of local government; in those hearings it was replied that this topic is left to legislative discretion. For example, in session No. 92-2016 of October 4, 2016, this Tribunal, regarding bill No. 19.896, indicated: 'This project, as indicated in its statement of grounds and its articles, seeks -through the reform of two articles of the Municipal Code (14 and 148) and the addition of one more (149 bis)- to incorporate into the municipal regulations specific actions so that in municipal electoral processes 'the inadmissible intrusion of clientelism and corruption in the management of local public funds' is avoided.' To that end, it is proposed to limit the successive reelection of the mayor (alcalde) and vice-mayors (vicealcaldes) to only one term; that they request, in the event they aspire to reelection or to any other popularly elected office, a leave of absence without pay (permiso sin goce de salario) from the calling of the election until election day, and, furthermore, it is proposed as a solution for the case in which all of those officials run for some popularly elected position, that the substitute to assume the mayor's office be chosen from among the directors of the municipal administration. Likewise, a prohibition is established to prevent—six months before the election—municipal officials from promoting investments and works that deviate from the historical trend, along with the corresponding sanction. This Electoral Authority, after analyzing the aforementioned proposal, does not observe any obstacle, from a constitutional standpoint, regarding: 1) limiting the reelection of the office of mayor and vice-mayors to no more than one successive term; this is an aspect that must be provided for by law and, furthermore, constitutes a political decision whose assessment—regarding advisability and timing—is the exclusive purview of the legislator, as this Tribunal has noted on other occasions (official letters no. 4851-TSE-2005 of August 4, 2005, and TSE-1396-2015 of August 4, 2015)” (the underlining does not belong to the original). In a similar vein, this Tribunal, in the processing of the unconstitutionality action brought by Mr. Alex Solís Fallas against the indefinite and successive reelection of local authorities (judicial file no. 19-0008920007-CO), stated: “… the institution of reelection is not, per se, contrary to the Law of the Constitution. As a logical consequence of the aforementioned precedent of the Constitutional Chamber [referring to ruling No. 2003-02771], which as an antecedent is binding erga omnes by express legal provision (numeral 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it follows that if the possibility of submitting one's own name again to continue in the elective office currently being held (or that, at some point, has been held) is a human right, then it could not, in turn, violate the parameter of constitutional legitimacy, insofar as it incorporates—as is well known—International Human Rights Law. Now then, the Venice Commission, in its 'Report on Term Limits. Part I – Presidents,' takes a different stance from the one outlined in the preceding paragraphs, by considering that reelection is an 'autonomous clause linked to the right to political participation and the right to stand for elections' (paragraph 85), without it being possible to consider it a human right, unless 'a theoretical, international, or constitutional foundation exists for recognizing it' as such (paragraph 85). Precisely, our country falls within this exception: the Constitutional Chamber, by attributing, in the indicated ruling No. 2003-02771, the character of a human right to the repeatedly mentioned institution, generated the recognition to which the forum of European experts alludes, and it must be held as such. Bear in mind, moreover, that there is still no specific pronouncement from any supranational instance binding us on this matter. Thus, the discussion must focus on whether the manner in which reelection is provided for municipal offices (successive and indefinite) contravenes the referred constitutional block or not, since its existence, even within the conventional framework, is not illegitimate. That said, it is pertinent to affirm from the outset that, like any right and as indicated in the background section, reelection admits reasonable limitations on its exercise through the enactment of a law in the formal and material sense, with the legislator being responsible for deciding, within the constitutional framework, what the modulations to that right shall be.” (the highlighting does not belong to the original) (official letter No. TSE-0784-2019 of April 10, 2019, sent to the Constitutional Chamber as a response to the hearing granted in file No. 19-000892-0007CO). According to the foregoing, the thesis of this Constitutional Body, sustained for several decades, is that there is no obstacle for the legislator to limit the successive reelection of municipal offices; such regulation constitutes a political decision whose assessment—regarding advisability and timing—is the exclusive purview of the legislator. III.- ON THE MERITS OF THE ACTION BROUGHT Mr. Oviedo Espinoza, in his initial filing brief, distributes the arguments of the “Grounds” section into six points which, for greater clarity of exposition, will be addressed independently. a) The interested party, in points 1 and 2 of the referred segment, questions that the challenged law is a disproportionate and illegitimate reaction to the disclosure—in media outlets—of the alleged corruption case denominated by the judicial authorities as the “Caso Diamante”; in fact, in section 3 of the “Constitutional Norms and Principles Infringed by the Challenged Norm” part of the initial document, it is indicated that the transitory norm is “a public sanction directed especially at some authorities of us who hold the status of incumbent reelected Mayors” (folio 3 of the initial filing brief). That specificity, in the opinion of the petitioner, constitutes a violation of the principles of innocence, equality, and the abstraction and generality of norms. In legal systems of the Romano-Germanic (continental) tradition, such as ours, the written source (the law in its broad sense) occupies the privileged place when it comes to regulating behaviors; in that sense, generality, abstraction, and a vocation for permanence are three of the attributes required of laws. However, these characteristics do not preclude that norms, being a political product as they are, respond to specific social episodes and conjunctures. The concept of the “material source” of the law refers to the socioeconomic, cultural, and contextual aspects that drove the taking of the legislative decision, on the understanding that positivized Law is an instrument placed at the service of collective interests and the resolution of societal conflicts. In other words, a norm is rarely enacted without some situation occurring domestically or internationally that, in the view of the proponents, justifies undertaking an initiative to legally regulate the ongoing phenomenon in one sense or another. The existence of social factors that trigger the parliamentary procedure and even lead to the approval of specific laws is not, per se, contrary to the Law of the Constitution; the creation of norms precisely responds to collective demands and concrete states of necessity, just as occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic: during 2020, laws were approved to address the health emergency situation the country was experiencing. Now then, this sociologically mediated genesis does not exempt the product (the law itself) from complying with certain technical-legal requirements, such as the criteria of formal and material validity. Regarding the petitioner's arguments, it is precisely alleged that the challenged law has specific addressees and, in any case, that it constitutes a direct sanction against reelection-seeking mayors who have had nothing to do with the cited “Caso Diamante”. In the opinion of this Bench, Mr. Oviedo Espinoza confuses an ineligibility condition with a sanction. The constitutional framer or the legislator, as applicable, may establish scenarios in which a person is not eligible for a given public office, without this constituting—in itself—a punishment. It is clear that those who will be in the fact situation normatively provided for will be a specific group of citizens, but that does not imply that a corrective measure is being imposed on them as a result of a harmful act to the detriment of collective or individual interests, which are basic characteristics of a punitive act. It is not unusual for the legal system to establish such conditions, since, for example, the constitutional framer provided that a person wishing to register as a candidate for the Presidency or Vice Presidency of the Republic cannot have served, in the twelve months prior to the election, as a Minister of State (subsection 4 of numeral 132), without this being able to be considered a sanction for those holding a ministerial portfolio, or a specific norm because the heads of the executive branches are a concrete number of officials who can be easily determined. In a similar vein, it must be kept in mind that the norm, precisely because it is general and abstract, will apply to all persons who meet the provided factual hypothesis, even to those who, while not currently in office, accumulate—in the future—more than two terms as mayor, even if their service occurs in a time period temporally distanced from the judicial investigation through which, according to the petitioner, locally elected municipal officials currently in the position are being “punished.” As indicated in prior paragraphs, the Legislative Assembly has been discussing for almost two decades—in different bills—the relevance of limiting the successive reelection of municipal servants, and especially of mayors; this reform, which corresponds to one in the design of the political and electoral systems, would be impossible to implement if the petitioner's thesis were followed, since there will always be citizens in office with intentions of being reelected to the position against whom the modification could be understood to be carried out, an argument that would render petrified a subject matter that is not so. In sum, this Constitutional Body concludes that Law No. 10,183 is not, in itself, a punitive action against specific persons and that it does meet the parameters of generality and abstraction that must be fulfilled by norms issued by the Legislative Branch. In that sense, it is deemed that the petitioner's argument is not admissible. b) In the initial filing brief, it is argued that there is a constitutional reservation regarding the limitation of the right to reelection of municipal authorities, since those offices are enunciated in Articles 169 and 171 of the Supreme Norm (point 3 of the “Grounds” section of the initial brief). The territorial decentralization of the State and the design of local governments are provided for in Title XII of the Political Constitution, norms that refer to the fact that the municipalities shall be in charge of a deliberative body composed of popularly elected council members (regidores municipales) (municipal council, concejo municipal) and an executive official whom the law shall designate (mayor); however, the constitutional framer did not specify what the requirements, impediments, and conditions of ineligibility for accessing such posts would be (take into consideration that the cited executive official, prior to the 2002 elections, was not popularly elected; the Constitution does not establish that such an official must have that form of appointment). This lack of development of the subject matter under commentary in the fundamental political text must be understood as a delegation for ordinary law to regulate such circumstances; in other words, although the positions of mayor and council members are constitutional creations, their powers, requirements to be fulfilled if one wishes to access them, and other specificities are matters left to the legislative function. Along these lines, the Constitutional Chamber, in ruling No. 2128-94 of 2:51 p.m. on May 3, 1994, stated: “… in matters not regulated, but delegated to the legislator by the Constitution, the latter may establish conditions of real or apparent inequality when its exceptions are absolutely and clearly justified on the grounds of other constitutional principles or values and, above all, of the rights and freedoms of the human person. Consequently, the exceptions, limitations, requirements, or impediments that shall govern in electoral matters, defined by the legislator based on the responsibility delegated by the Constitution itself, must be supported by objective reasons clearly motivated by the requirements inherent to the electoral system and the exercise of office. In other words, restrictions that strengthen the democratic system and electoral processes may be admitted, even when a person or a group suffers the limited consequence of such regulation”. This Tribunal, in light of the foregoing, has deemed that it falls to the legislator to define, respecting the Law of the Constitution, what the conditions of ineligibility for accessing municipal offices shall be, a category within which the limitation on successive reelection is included; that is, this is a matter that is left to legislative discretion. Consequently, it is deemed that this argument is also not admissible, so the action must be dismissed on this point. c) In sections 4 and 6, the petitioner sets forth why, in his opinion, the norm has a retroactive application to the detriment of his fundamental rights and those of the current mayors who have more than two terms in their positions. However, for the reasons to be set forth, this Tribunal understands that the alleged violation does not occur. The right to political participation guarantees that citizens have the opportunity to attempt to access positions within the internal structures of political groups, as well as to eventually form part of the candidate lists, without that possibility being able to be truncated by aspects other than those allowed by Conventional Law. It is clear that the referred prerogative does not imply a right to the office or to be elected to it; rather, it ensures the possibility to form part of the group of people who contest it. Under that logic, the aspiration to continue in a position does not imply the automatic renewal of the mandate for an additional term. Candidacies for popularly elected offices must come from contested, free, and democratic internal party processes, in which the members, provided they meet the requirements of the legal system (which includes statutory requirements), may propose their names so that their fellow party members, and ultimately the superior assembly (as the highest representative authority), decide who the nominated person shall be. It is in this dynamic that the democratic principle and the right to political participation are operationalized, with no further restrictions than those legitimately authorized by the Law of the Constitution. In fact, the electoral jurisprudence—over time—has been deepening the democratic ideal and its application to the designation of candidates by political groups for municipal elections. On that subject, it has been made clear that, if the party opted—in its bylaws—for its cantonal structure to make the nominations, the superior assembly could ratify or not the proposed person, but if it did not accept the recommendation, it had to return the matter to the territorial body for a new nomination. This measure prevents persons who did not compete internally within the group for a nomination from being appointed in a surprise manner by the superior body, which would constitute an unacceptable impact on the loyalty of the competition that must prevail in party processes, in light of the constitutional imperative of internal democracy (Article 98). That being so, the limitation of successive reelection to two mandates does not constitute, in itself, a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity; the fundamental right to reelection (qualified as such by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 2003-02771), like any prerogative of that nature, admits restrictions, and, in this case, it is understood that the restriction on submitting one's name for a third mandate is a proportional measure that does not empty the right of its content and that, furthermore, responds to a measure to ensure other constitutionally legitimate aims such as the rotation of governing cadres and the creation of conditions for new citizens to become involved in political decision-making posts, just as the American Convention on Human Rights (sic) seeks. A citizen who has been in a representative post for two or more consecutive terms has been able to exercise his or her right to reelection and could even return to it after a lapse of 8 years from the conclusion of his or her second mandate, if he or she enjoys the favor of his or her fellow party members (to achieve the nomination) and, subsequently, of the electorate. Being currently in the exercise of a popularly elected office does not imply that the new rules of the electoral system cannot be applied to that officeholder until he or she breaks ties with his or her representative post, inasmuch as that would entail deferring the effects of the law to a future, uncertain event personalized to the situation of a specific subject, which would frustrate, in the specific case, the aim pursued by the regulation, as expressed by the legislator in the statement of purposes (exposición de motivos) of the bill that was presented, it is worth saying, in February 2020. It is important to insist that the possibility of attempting to stay in office is the right protected in the case of reelection, since the official with intentions of remaining in the post, as indicated, must overcome the internal dynamics to be included on the slate and, subsequently, must enjoy the electoral favor of his or her fellow citizens, all events that are uncertain and subject to the popular will of the respective electoral bodies. These specificities mean that the principle of non-retroactivity, as a manifestation of Legal Certainty, must be modulated and not interpreted extensively. The limitation imposed by the law is not a hollowing out of the right to reelection, but is merely a way of regulating it; in that sense, the legislator could not have stipulated that current mayors—with more than two mandates—must conclude their duties immediately or that they could not resubmit their names to the electorate in the future, since such provisions would indeed be an illegitimate retroactive application. However, restricting them from running again in the next two immediate elections is a reasonable modulation considering that, at the time the new legislation entered into force, the local authorities have only an expectation of continuing in their posts, since not even their respective political groups have validated such aspirations. Consequently, this Bench does not consider that there is a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity of the law. d) Mr. Oviedo Espinoza, in point 5 of the grounds, adopts the constitutionality objection raised by this Tribunal in its response to the hearing granted by the Legislative Assembly during the processing of Bill No. 21,810 (now enacted into the challenged law). Concretely, it is challenged that Law No. 10,183 impedes a person who has remained in the same elective municipal office—for two consecutive terms—from running, in the immediate elections following the conclusion of his or her second mandate, for another office of the local government. This Constitutional Body, as it pointed out to the legislative body, considers that the norm has a defect of constitutionality, by totally restricting passive suffrage (sufragio pasivo) to reelection-seeking officials. Specifically, this Tribunal, in its opportunity, indicated: “… the restriction that officials with two consecutive terms in office cannot opt for other popularly elected positions contravenes the constitutional and conventional parameters. The human right to political participation implies, among other things, that citizens may elect their governors but, at the same time, that they may run for the various offices that make up the structure of the State. This possibility of submitting one's name to the Electoral College is not unrestricted, because the American Convention on Human Rights (sic) indicates that domestic legal systems may regulate the exercise of such prerogative for 'reasons of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or conviction by a competent court' (Article 23). In the Costa Rican case, legislation has established, among other conditions for accessing local government, electoral domicile in the constituency where the office is to be served for a specific period (among others, numeral 15, 22.e, and 56 of the Código Municipal), not having political rights suspended by a judgment, and being Costa Rican (ordinals 15.a and 22.a of the referred normative body); however, it would not be legitimate for a State to impede passive suffrage (the right to be elected) by reason of having occupied a specific office—different from the one aspired to—in the two immediate prior terms. The restrictions on reelected officials (so they cannot opt for another office in the municipality) would make it impossible for those citizens to access internal party contests in order to subsequently be nominated for popularly elected offices different from the one they hold. In other terms, no matter how much they belong to a political group and meet the legal requirements for nomination, by reason of the public function they perform—ab initio—such servants could not compete even in the internal processes in which nominations are disputed. Such an impact on the essential core of the right occurs precisely because not only is reelection being limited; a total suspension of the citizen prerogative to contend for political office would also be occurring, as an effect of applying the norm. Observe that herein lies the substantial difference between that bill that would prohibit dual candidacy and this initiative: in the former, competing for two offices simultaneously is prevented, but the right to do so for one is maintained (it does not absolutely prohibit candidacy), while in this legislative file, the possibility of making up a list of candidates is completely blocked. On the other hand, it cannot be lost sight of that the changes made to the text of the bill render it unconnected, inasmuch as the statement of purposes develops why the proponents consider it legitimate and necessary to limit reelection, but does not allude to the need to restrict any other type of candidacy; in fact, the contrary is maintained. Specifically, in the cited preamble of the proposal, the legislators themselves state that “… it is essential to modify the final paragraph of Article 14 of the aforementioned Código Municipal to limit the exercise of the same municipal office to a maximum of determined terms, without this implying the impossibility of running and eventually being elected, as of the immediately following term, for some other popularly elected position with the same limitations.” (underlining and highlighting do not belong to the original). Along these lines, the title of the bill is 'Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities,' without mention being made of the absolute restriction that some servants would have, after being reelected, to present themselves as candidates for other popularly elected municipal offices. Certainly, the name of a law need not account for its entire content; nonetheless, in this case, it evidences how the original proposal was not to establish a prohibition as intense as the one that, via motions, was incorporated. That particularity compromises the principle of congruency, in the understanding indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República in its pronouncement OJ-049-2018 of May 31, 2018 (reiterated in OJ 059-2018 of July 18 of that year): “Thus, it is clear that the content of the Bill is much broader than its title denotes, as it is notorious, again, that the initiative does not propose a mere reform of the Sistema de Banca de Desarrollo Law but would also entail a substantive modification of the competencies of the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje. Hence, it must be specified that good legislative technique requires that there be congruency between the title of the Law and its content. In this order of ideas, the specialized literature on Legislative Technique in Costa Rica has highlighted that congruency between the title of the Law and its content has 2 functions of the greatest importance: a. It helps determine the content and scope of the object of the Law and, therefore, indirectly allows serving as a basis for permitting or not amendments or modifications to a bill, and b. It facilitates linking a content to the bill or allows determining, in the opposite case, that it is a matter foreign to it. In this regard, it is opportune to cite what was written by MUÑOZ QUESADA: 'To some extent, the title can help determine the content and scope of the object of the law and, indirectly, serve as a basis for permitting or not substantial amendments or modifications to a bill. The title also facilitates the linking of related content or content that is completely foreign to the object of the bill. Therefore, it is admissible that the title must reflect the content, the object, or the subject matter of the text; and to that extent it constitutes an important element not only for the identification of the bill, but also for determining the object of the bill.' (MUÑOZ QUESADA, HUGO ALFONSO et alt. ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUE. Legislative Assembly, San José, 1996, p. 82). Ergo, it must be reiterated that the title of the present Bill—which reads thus 'Reform of Law No. 8634, Development Banking System, of April 23, 2008, and its Reforms'—does not congruently denote its content, since, as has been explained, it would additionally entail a substantial reform of the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje. That is to say, the Bill could have a legislative technique problem, which could eventually lead to procedural errors when admitting or not motions for amendments presented by the deputies. In any case, it must be recalled that, by virtue of the provisions of Article 11 of the Constitution in relation to numeral 121 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, the legislative procedure is subject to a principle of transparency, by virtue of which the citizenry has the right to know the relevant information regarding the Bills being discussed in Congress. It is then understood that congruency between the title of bills and their content is essential so that citizens can, in effect, know what it is intended to debate through a particular Bill.” This Tribunal reiterates that establishing conditions to limit reelection in municipal offices corresponds to Parliament in the exercise of its legislative discretion; however, in the bill now being examined, a hollowing out of the human right to be elected is generated. If, for example, a person serves as mayor and is elected (immediately after his or her second term) as council member (regidora), then it would not be a case of reelection but rather an election to a different post.” In light of the foregoing, this Bench accedes to the ground identified as number 5 in the initial filing brief (folio 11 of that document), especially since such an objection of constitutionality was raised by this Electoral Authority during the processing of the respective bill. IV.- CONCLUSION In accordance with the considerations previously set forth, the TSE considers it important to indicate the following conclusions: • It falls to the legislator to define, respecting the Law of the Constitution, what the conditions of ineligibility for accessing municipal offices shall be, a category within which the limitation on successive reelection is included. • Law No. 10,183 is not, in itself, a punitive action against specific persons, and it does meet the parameters of generality and abstraction that must be fulfilled by norms issued by the Legislative Branch. • The constitutional framer did not specify what the requirements, impediments, and conditions of ineligibility for accessing popularly elected municipal offices would be; this lack of development of the subject matter must be understood as a constitutional delegation for ordinary law to regulate such circumstances. • Restricting current municipal authorities, with more than two terms in office, from running again in the next two immediate elections is a reasonable modulation, considering that, at the time the new legislation enters into force, the local officeholders have only an expectation of continuing in their posts, since not even their respective political groups have validated such aspirations, and therefore the principle of non-retroactivity of the law is not violated. • Law No. 10,183 produces a hollowing out of the human right to be elected insofar as it prevents officials with two consecutive terms in one office from opting for other popularly elected positions in the immediate following elections.

V.- PRAYER FOR RELIEF. The TSE requests that the action filed be partially granted, solely with respect to the impediment preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same office from being able to run for other popularly elected positions." 8.- By brief filed in the digital case file on May 31, 2022, Rodrigo Arias Sánchez appears in his capacity as president of the Legislative Assembly. He states the following: "I.- PROCESSING OF THE LAW. Law 10183, Reform of Article 14 of Law 7794; Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, (Law limiting the indefinite reelection of local authorities). It was processed under file No. 21810; this bill was introduced on February 18, 2020, and published on March 2, 2020, in La Gaceta No. 11, Supplement No. 33. It was assigned for study to the Special Permanent Commission on Municipal Affairs and Participatory Local Development. It was submitted for consultation to the Municipalities, the District Municipal Councils, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The bill received an affirmative committee report on October 13, 2021. It was approved in First Debate on January 25, 2022, and in Second Debate on March 29, 2022; finally, the law was signed (sancionada) by the Executive Branch on April 5, 2022, and published in Supplement 73 of La Gaceta No. 68 on April 8, 2022. II. REGARDING THE CHALLENGES. The plaintiff alleges that the enacted law is contrary to Articles 7, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 93, 169, and 171 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the principles of equality, political freedom, proportionality, reasonableness, non-retroactivity of norms, and to principles inherent to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, and to others contained in international treaties, especially Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights. This Presidency will proceed to argue each of the challenged aspects: 1.- Regarding the allegation of violation of the principles of equality, reasonableness, proportionality, and political and individual freedom. It lacks foundation, and therefore the plaintiff's allegations regarding the alleged violation of the principles of equality, reasonableness, proportionality, and political and individual freedom in the Transitory Provision or in the substantive part of Law No. 10183, 'Reform of Article 14 of Law 7794; Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, (Law limiting the indefinite reelection of local authorities),' are rejected. The challenged law establishes temporal limitations for candidacy in certain municipal popularly elected positions. These limitations are absolutely reasonable and conform to the constitutional framework. The challenged law indicates that mayors (alcaldes or alcaldesas) may be continuously reelected only once. It indicates that they may not hold any popularly elected position within the municipal regime until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. That is, it establishes limits on successive reelection. A similar restriction is established for deputy mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas), who may also be continuously reelected only once and may not hold the same position or that of council members (regidores) or district councilors (síndicos) until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. In the same vein, for council members (personas regidoras), district councilors (personas síndicas), district mayors (intendentes), deputy district mayors (viceintendentes), district municipal councilors (concejales municipales de distrito), and for those holding alternate positions, it establishes that they may be continuously reelected only once and may not hold the same position or its alternateship until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second term. The approved reforms are consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, which states that the Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, based on alternation (alternativo), and responsible. Alternation (alternancia), as the Constitutional Court has correctly noted, is a constitutional principle that implies the real and effective possibility that public offices are held temporarily, according to the periods previously established in the Political Constitution or in the law. It is thus that the periodic renewal of popularly elected public offices materializes, through free elections, and in this system, the elements of legitimacy and political control are highlighted, as the participation of all citizens is required—in their ability to participate in the elections for President, deputies (diputados), council members (regidores), district councilors (síndicos), and the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal). Even this staggered renewal of cadres of senior officials is also present in the case of the integration of collegiate bodies of public entities. Alternation in power requires a democratic regime that allows real and equitable competition among political parties or groups, sectors, or associations to participate effectively. Alternation in power does not presuppose the rotation of positions among the various groups, parties, or sectors participating in an electoral process, but rather the existence of election processes based on the democratic principle, that is, on the calling of free, multi-party, and secret elections. This reform does not nullify, render meaningless, or make impossible the exercise of the fundamental right to be elected (the concept of passive suffrage). The manner and cases in which the law stipulates reelection for municipal offices do not contradict the constitutional framework. Additionally, it must be considered that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has clearly stated that: '...reelection admits reasonable limitations on its exercise through the enactment of a law in the formal and material sense, the legislator being responsible for deciding, within the constitutional framework, what the modulations of that right will be.' (TSE-0784-2019 of April 10, 2019, sent to the Constitutional Chamber in response to the hearing granted in case file No. 19-000892-0007CO). The right to vote and to be elected are not absolute rights. They can be subject to limitations with objective, proportionate, and reasonable justification, limits that must be equal for all and that States may legitimately establish to regulate the exercise and enjoyment of political rights. 2.- Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of legal norms. Law 10183 states that it is effective from its publication. And it contains a single transitory provision that states the following: Sole Transitory Provision—Individuals currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), district mayors (intendentes or intendentas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to again hold any popularly elected position within the municipal regime. // Individuals currently serving as deputy mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), deputy district mayors (viceintendentes and viceintendentas), regular and alternate council members (regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes), regular and alternate district councilors (síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to again hold the same popularly elected position within the municipal regime; however, they may hold other municipal positions in accordance with this law. Transitory norms are temporary provisions created to facilitate the transition from the repealed or amended legislation (which has a series of existing situations as of the effective date of a law) to the new law. Transitory norms have a momentary or temporary validity; they allow the adjustment between old and new legal provisions to give certainty to citizens regarding how their conditions have changed and for the necessary accommodations to be made; they are secondary norms because they act as complements to the principal norms in the new legislation. In the case at hand, the transitory norm is applicable to those currently holding the offices referred to in the reform. The norm does not nullify or make impossible the exercise of the fundamental right to be elected (the concept of passive suffrage). The manner and cases in which the law stipulates reelection for municipal offices are not contrary to the constitutional framework. Therefore, it is not correct to state that a retroactive application of the norm is taking place to the detriment of any citizen. What this norm does is resolve potential inter-temporal conflicts arising from the derogatory effect of the law itself. It is applicable to all citizens in equal conditions, as the law should not extend beyond the moment it ceases to exist. 3.- Regarding the alleged violation of Articles 38, 39, and 40 of the Political Constitution. The claimed violation of Articles 38, 39, and 40 of the Political Constitution by the plaintiffs is rejected, because in no case has the Legislative Assembly usurped functions proper to other branches, nor has it exceeded its legislative or political control powers; it is not acceptable to consider that the drafting of a law constitutes a penalty for any person or group. The formulation of the law is an exclusive power of the Legislative Assembly, which, in forming its will, evaluates aspects of necessity, convenience, or opportunity, within the framework of respect for the legal system, the Rule of Law, and the principles and values of our nation, and with absolute respect for the rights of citizens, and very especially, regarding the political participation of individuals in the various elected offices. 4.- Regarding the alleged violation of Articles 169 and 171 of the Political Constitution. As the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has noted.[6], the ordinary legislator may redefine or change what they deem opportune or convenient in the system governing municipal elections, as long as the legislative decisions are reasonable and proportionate. In drafting this law, the Legislative Assembly has been respectful of the municipal interests and local services of the various cantons, and it is not acceptable to consider that it disrespects or violates the interests of municipal governments, nor the composition of municipal governments and their deliberative bodies composed of various popularly elected positions. Likewise, municipal autonomy is respected, given that the bill was submitted for consultation to all municipalities. There is no interference in municipal powers; rather, the will expressed in the creation of this law considers them within a framework of respect for the interests of municipal corporations. 5.- Regarding the alleged violation of Article 7 of the Political Constitution. The alleged violation of Article 7 of the Magna Carta is rejected, which states that the Legislative Assembly has disregarded the hierarchy of international treaties or disrespected any human right established in international instruments or treaties. The right to vote and to be elected has not been affected through what is provided in this norm; although the legislature decides to give different treatment to the various elected positions, this differentiation responds precisely to the fact that they are different positions with different responsibilities, so the principle of equality is not being affected, nor is the right to run for office being unreasonably or indiscriminately limited; furthermore, the imposed limitation is temporary. On the other hand, if the Constitutional Court considers that the legislature should reconsider or reassess some aspect regarding the differentiation or exclusion of positions as regulated in the newly enacted law, the object of this action, that does not imply per se an unconstitutionality of the norm. It is clear that the intention of the legislature was at no time to empty the electoral participation right of any citizen. On the contrary, it is about enforcing respect for municipal autonomy and the interests and local services of those corporations. III:-PRAYER FOR RELIEF. In accordance with the report rendered, it is requested that the unconstitutionality action be dismissed." 9.- By resolution 2022012518 of 9:20 a.m. on June 1, 2022, issued in case file 22-008424-0007-CO, the full Chamber resolved: "Unconstitutionality action brought by the ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE ALCALDÍAS E INTENDENCIAS DE COSTA RICA, legal ID number 3-002-658100, represented by its President and unlimited general attorney-in-fact HORACIO MARTÍN ALVARADO BOGANTES, of legal age, single, holder of a Master's degree in Planning and Human Development, identity card number 4-024-0551, against the Sole Article and the Sole Transitory Provision of Law No. 10.183, 'Law Reforming Article 14 of Law 7795, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998.' Whereas: 1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 1:19 p.m. on April 21, 2022, the representative of the ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE ALCALDÍAS E INTENDENCIAS DE COSTA RICA (hereinafter ANAI) requests that the unconstitutionality of the Sole Article and the Sole Transitory Provision of Law No. 10.183 be declared. He states, first, that the approval procedure by the Legislative Assembly is challenged, which, in his opinion, harms Article 97 of the Political Constitution. This is due to the fact that, when the bill was submitted for consultation to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the latter provided a negative opinion regarding its content. First, it indicated that said bill creates a hollowing out of the human right to be elected by preventing officials with two terms in the same popularly elected position within the municipal regime from being able to run for other positions of that nature within the same regime, especially those holding mayoralties (alcaldías) and district mayoralties (intendencias). Second, that within the six months prior to and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law bills on which the T.S.E. has expressed disagreement. On this last aspect, the Constitutional Chamber ruled in decision No. 2022006119 of 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, and, in substance, indicated that Article 97 must be interpreted to mean that the objection to the bill must relate to the respective election, in which case, if a bill refers to municipal elections and the electoral period for electing municipal authorities is not underway, the T.S.E.'s objection would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of aggravating it, requiring a qualified majority of two-thirds for its approval. The plaintiff considers that the latter part of Article 97 is not subject to any interpretation and its content is clear. Furthermore, in the referenced decision, the Constitutional Chamber interprets constitutional electoral norms, when this task corresponds exclusively to the T.S.E., in accordance with Article 102, subsection 3 of the Political Constitution. On this aspect, he cites, in support of his thesis, the dissenting opinion of Magistrate Castillo Víquez in decision No. 2022-6119. Starting from paragraph 2 of the Sole Article of Law 10.183, a limitation is established for persons holding the position of Mayor (Alcaldes). This limitation is unconstitutional as it harms both Article 23, subsections b) and c) of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) ratified by Costa Rica through Law 4534 of January 23, 1970, and Article 33 of the Political Constitution. It is a political right both to vote and to have the possibility of being elected in periodic electoral processes, as well as to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of the country, that is, to popularly elected positions. However, the provision under discussion imposes a legal prohibition on mayors (alcaldes and alcaldesas) that prevents them from participating in any other popularly elected position within the municipal regime, which violates the right to passive suffrage indicated by the A.C.H.R. This regulatory body governs the right of political rights, but none of the exceptions it proposes contemplates the possibility of limiting the right to passive suffrage. Regarding what the Constitutional Chamber has said in relation to political rights, he cites decision No. 2003-2771. The same prohibition applies in relation to persons currently holding the positions of district mayor (intendentes). In this case, the norm prohibits district mayors (personas intendentes) who complete two terms of appointment from running for a popularly elected position within the following eight years. This limitation is repeated, although not as clearly, in the Sole Transitory Provision. The Law establishes an odious discrimination among the various popularly elected positions, as it prohibits a Mayor (Alcalde/sa) or District Mayor (Intendente/a) from again running for a position within the Municipal Regime for the 8 years following the end of their second election term, while for other popularly elected positions in local governments, they are only prohibited, for the 8 years following the end of their second term, from holding the same position, but they may, even consecutively, run for other popularly elected positions different from the one to which they were elected in a Municipality. This constitutes a violation of the principle of equality. The representative of the plaintiff Association states that the challenged norms also harm the principle of non-retroactivity of the law. Attempting, as the challenged law does, to apply the reelection restriction to popularly elected authorities by counting terms served prior to the entry into force of the Law, is contrary to Constitutional Law, as it would be giving a retroactive effect to the norm. The first paragraph of the Sole Transitory Provision of the challenged Law is irrational and disproportionate. Periods of appointment during which the law was not yet in force should not be counted for the purposes of the prohibition. This retroactive application of the law generates a clear detriment to the members of ANAI, as any limitation on a right must take effect from the norm's entry into force and not in relation to consolidated legal situations such as appointments to popularly elected positions in the municipal regime. When a norm is reformed, that modification must have effects for the future, that is, from the publication of the norm in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. However, in this case, the challenged transitory provision attempts to create a rule limiting election terms by counting those that ANAI associates already have at the time of the law's publication. Finally, he considers that the content of the challenged norms harms the principle of reasonableness and proportionality. The public sector where there are the most popularly elected positions is the municipal one. By contrast, among other positions of this nature, the President of the Republic has an eight-year prohibition on reelection (Article 132, subsec. 1 of the Political Constitution); vice presidents can be candidates for President of the Republic or be reelected, as long as they have not held the office in the twelve months prior to the election (Article 132, subsec. 1 of the Political Constitution). As for deputies (diputados), they cannot be consecutively reelected, but they may run for deputy after only one four-year term has elapsed (Article 107 of the Political Constitution). In the case of Mayoralties (Alcaldías), the law provides an 8-year prohibition from again holding a popularly elected position within the municipal regime, after having been elected for two consecutive terms. This is an unreasonable and disproportionate period that harms the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber in relation to these principles, as well as Article 23 of the A.C.H.R., subsections 1 c) and 2. The temporal limitation imposed on persons holding a municipal mayoralty is also unreasonable and disproportionate, as it is the only position where citizens have the possibility of removing the office holder through a recall referendum (plebiscito revocatorio), in accordance with Article 19 of the Municipal Code. Likewise, the principle of proportionality is violated by imposing more burdensome limitations and conditions on the elected position of municipal mayor than on other positions within the municipal regime and in relation to other elected positions in the executive and legislative branches. 2.- For purposes of legal standing, he states that it derives from Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, insofar as they appear in defense of the corporate interests of the affiliated members of the association he represents, whose purpose is the defense of the interests of the collective it represents (Mayoralties and District Mayoralties of the country), insofar as the regulation violates the constitutional rights of the ANAI collective. 3.- The plaintiff requests, as a precautionary measure, that the transitory norm (paragraph 1) be ordered not to be applied until the Chamber resolves this action on the merits. He considers that the appearance of a sound legal basis in this matter is more than evident, which justifies the requested suspension. 4.- By resolution of 3:49 p.m. on May 13, the plaintiff was requested to provide a copy of the Association's Bylaws. The order was complied with within the legal term. Article 4 indicates that one of the purposes of the Association is '(...) mutual support and defense of the rights and guarantees of Local Governments in general, of the Municipal Mayoralties and District Mayoralties and of the administrative structures of the Municipalities in particular (...)' 5.- Pending before this same Chamber is unconstitutionality action number 22008383-0007-CO, in which the same provisions that are the subject of challenge in the sub examine are challenged. Magistrate Castillo Víquez writes the draft; and, Considering: I.- Article 84 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that if, after the action is filed and before the publication of the corresponding notice, other unconstitutionality actions are filed against the same law, decree, provision, agreement, or resolution, those actions shall be accumulated to the first and deemed as an amplification. Actions of this nature filed by the parties to the suspended cases shall also be accumulated if filed within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice. Based on the foregoing and given the evident connection between the facts raised in this matter and those discussed in case file number 22-008383-0007-CO being processed before this Chamber, and in order to avoid contradictory resolutions that could affect the rights and interests of the involved parties, it is ordered at this time to accumulate this file to the cited one. II.- CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE REQUESTED PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. The plaintiff's representative requests, as a precautionary measure, that the transitory norm (first paragraph) be ordered not to be applied until the Chamber resolves this unconstitutionality action on the merits. In his view, the danger in the delay in resolving the matter would cause serious harm to the current mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas) and district mayors (intendentes), who would not be able to participate in the election process for the years 2024-2026. In relation to what has been stated, the party is referred to the provisions of the resolution of 8:27 a.m. on May 9, issued in case file No. 22-008383-0007-CO, to which this action is being accumulated, and which expressly stated: 'REGARDING THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ADMISSION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. Certainly, pursuant to Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the "bodies that exhaust the administrative channel must be warned that said claim has been filed, so that in the processes or procedures in which the application of the law, decree, provision, agreement, or resolution is discussed, no final resolution is issued either until the Chamber has made the ruling on the case." However, in this specific case, the application of section 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction would enervate the application of the norm and consequently would prevent the holding of the next electoral process. Based on the foregoing, in application of section 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is necessary to modulate the suspensive effect of Article 81 of that regulatory body, expressly indicating that the issuance of any final resolution is not suspended, whether in internal, administrative, or electoral venues.' (...) Therefore: Let this action be accumulated to the one processed under case file number 22-008383-0007CO before this Chamber." In relation to the foregoing, the brief filing the unconstitutionality action brought by Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes, in his capacity as president of the ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE ALCALDÍAS E INTENDENCIAS DE COSTA RICA, contains the following arguments: "REGARDING LEGAL STANDING TO SUE. The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction states that \"No prior pending case shall be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole.\" Regarding the non-existence of an individual or direct injury, the Constitutional Chamber, in resolution 2001-09390 of 2:52 p.m. on September 19, 2001, stated: \"The text in question provides that it proceeds when 'Due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct injury,' meaning, when due to that same nature, the injury is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly.\" (emphasis not in original) In the case of ANAI, this is an association formed under the Law of Associations, number 218, and whose main objective is the defense of the interests of the collective it represents (all mayoralties and district mayoralties of the country), it being the case that what is regulated by the Law accused of being unconstitutional violates the constitutional rights of the ANAI collective. Likewise, ANAI has standing to bring the unconstitutionality action, based on the second exception established by section 75 already mentioned, that is, that the challenged norm violates diffuse interests, since, as will be established further on, we are facing a clear violation of electoral rights, as established by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 2001-09390, already mentioned: \"However, according to the new classification made in the judgment number referred to in the previous Considering (number 8239-2000), electoral matters would no longer be conceptualized as a typical diffuse interest, but rather as a national interest, insofar as it is a matter that is not circumscribed only to a group of people not formally organized, but to the national community as a whole; insofar as this matter encompasses the rights to be elected to positions of popular representation or to hold public offices in general, as well as the right to freely elect one's governors, thereby making evident its general impact, given the magnitude of the rights relating to suffrage. In the case under study, the aim is to defend the political participation rights of minority parties, precisely regarding the counting system for determining positions for deputies and municipal council members; which is of evident national interest, whereby the plaintiff is legitimated to bring this action, without requiring the existence of a pending case to resolve, pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.\" Based on the foregoing, ANAI possesses the necessary standing to bring this unconstitutionality action, both due to the violation of the collective's constitutional rights and due to the violation of a national interest represented by the electoral matter regulated by the norm objected to herein. REGARDING THE NORM CHALLENGED AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This action challenges the constitutionality of the approval procedure by the Legislative Assembly, as well as the constitutionality of the Sole Article and the Sole Transitory Provision of Law number 10.183, Law REFORMING ARTICLE 14 OF LAW 7794, MUNICIPAL CODE, OF APRIL 30, 1998 (LAW LIMITING THE INDEFINITE REELECTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES), published in Supplement 73 of La Gaceta 68, of April 8, 2022, and effective as of April 8, 2022, which literally states: \"SOLE ARTICLE- The fifth paragraph of Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, is hereby reformed.

All popularly elected municipal offices contemplated by the legal system shall be elected by popular vote, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will occupy the presidency and vice-presidencies of the Republic and those who will make up the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take office on May 1 of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected. Mayors (alcaldesas o alcaldes) may be consecutively reelected only once. They may not hold any popularly elected office within the municipal regime until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. Deputy mayors (vicealcaldes y vicealcaldesas) may also be consecutively reelected only once and may not hold the same office or that of council member (regidores) or district council member (síndicos) until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. Council members (personas regidoras), district council members (síndicas), district administrators (intendentes), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes), municipal district council members (concejales municipales de distrito) under Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, of December 7, 2001, as well as those holding any alternate positions (cargos de suplencias), may be consecutively reelected only once and may not hold the same office or its alternate position until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second term. Sole Transitory Provision: Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), district administrators (intendentes or intendentas), and who have already been elected to their offices for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to hold any popularly elected office within the municipal regime again. Persons currently serving as deputy mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes and viceintendentas), incumbent and alternate council members (regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes), incumbent and alternate district council members (síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes), and who have already been elected to their offices for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to hold the same popularly elected office within the municipal regime again; however, they may hold other municipal positions in accordance with this law." 1- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY DUE TO VIOLATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE FOR ENACTING NORMS THAT REGULATE ELECTORAL MATTERS: Regarding this aspect, I consider that the procedure followed by the Legislative Assembly for the approval of the Law that is the object of this action violates Article 97 of our Political Constitution, which states: "For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones); to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total membership shall be required. Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, enact into law bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has expressed its disagreement." (bold and italics not in original). Article 97 of the Constitution is considered violated by the Legislative Assembly, because when the bill, file 21,810, was submitted for consultation to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), it issued a negative opinion, that is, it expressed its objection to the eventual approval of said bill, in the terms in which it was drafted. The Chamber must take into consideration the following background of the bill: "a) The plenary of the Legislative Assembly considered bill number 21,810, entitled REFORM OF ARTICLE 14 OF LEY 7794, CÓDIGO MUNICIPAL, OF APRIL 30, 1998 (LAW LIMITING THE INDEFINITE REELECTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES), and in extraordinary session number 53 of January 25, 2022, it approved the aforementioned bill in the first debate, with a vote of 40 votes in favor. b) Through official communication AL-DSDI-OFl-0005-2022 of January 11, 2022, the Secretary of the Legislative Directorate forwarded the updated text of bill 21,810, approved in the first debate, to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) for mandatory consultation. c) Through official communication TSE-0199-2022, dated January 20, 2022, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) communicated to the Secretary of the Legislative Directorate the agreement reached by said Tribunal in article five of ordinary session No. 6-2022, held on January 20, 2022, the conclusion of which indicates: "With regard to the limitations on the reelection of local authorities, the initiative involves a matter subject to the discretion of the Legislative Assembly. However, because the proposal generates a hollowing out (vaciamiento) of the human right to be elected, by preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same office from aspiring to other popularly elected positions, this Tribunal, in the terms and within the scope of Article 97 of the Constitution, objects to the bill being processed in file No. 21,810. Such objection would be lifted if the legislators modify the bill so that, according to the spirit of the proposal, consecutive reelection is limited to a single time (a maximum of two continuous terms in the same office), without prohibiting the possibility of opting, after the second term, for another popularly elected position. Respectfully, it is recalled that 'Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (...) enact into law bills (...) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has expressed its disagreement' (Article 97 of the Constitution). FINAL AGREEMENT."" (bold and italics not in original). d) On January 27, 2022, several deputies submitted to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) an optional consultation on the constitutionality of the reform to Article 14 of the Código Municipal processed under file 21,810, in which they questioned potential procedural defects (vicios de forma), regarding whether the bill could be approved on these dates (2022 national election), given that there is an objection by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) and whether there is a violation of Article 97 of the Constitution, since it is not a period of municipal elections, and substantive defects (vicios de fondo), in that they question the potential existence of a hollowing out (vaciamiento) of the human right to be elected and a potential violation of the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity of norms. e) By means of ruling 2022-006119, at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, notified to the Legislative Assembly on March 23, 2022, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) determined: "As for the procedural defects, by majority vote the consultation on the constitutionality of the bill 'Reform of Article 14 of the Código Municipal and its reforms, Ley no 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities)', processed in legislative file number 21,810, is evacuated in the sense that there are no procedural defects... As for the substantive defects, by majority vote, the consultation on constitutionality is declared unevacuable...”. f) That the legislative plenary, in the ordinary session held on Tuesday, March 29, 2022, approved bill 21,810 in the second debate, without changing the wording of the bill and ignoring the orders of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones). g) That on April 5, 2022, the President of the Republic proceeded to sign the Law and ordered its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. It can be seen that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), establishes two specific situations for which it objects to the bill, first, that the bill generates a hollowing out (vaciamiento) of the human right to be elected by preventing officials with two terms in the same popularly elected position in the municipal regime from being able to aspire to other popularly elected positions within the same municipal regime, in particular, for the association I represent, those who occupy mayoral offices (alcaldías) and district administrations (intendencias) and; second, that within the six months prior and four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot enact into law bills regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has expressed its disagreement. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), when analyzing in its ruling 2022-006119, at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, the issue of the procedural defect in the approval of the bill, stated: "...In the original design of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, their will was that the three elections be held on a single day, that is: presidential, legislative, and municipal. Indeed, it opted for the elections for president and vice presidents of the Republic (constitutional article 133), the members of the Legislative Branch (constitutional article 107), and the municipal council members (regidores municipales) (constitutional article 171) to be held on the same day... However, by law—upon the entry into force of the Código Electoral, article 110—municipal elections were separated from presidential and legislative elections, moving the former to midterm period. This modification of the system—going from a single or concentrated model to a dual one—requires an interpretation of constitutional article 97 in light of this new reality. When it involved three elections on a single day, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) to the bill had the effect of suspending the power to legislate for the specific case—during the six months prior and four following the election—; if the opinion was issued outside that period, the power to legislate was aggravated. The situation has changed radically today, in which there are separate elections between the presidential and legislative elections and the municipal elections. In this juncture, article 97 must be interpreted in the sense that the objection to the bill must refer to the respective election, in which case if a bill refers to municipal elections and it is not within the electoral period for electing municipal authorities, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of aggravating it, that is, once the second debate is concluded, in the final vote the bill, for its approval, would require the qualified majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly. Otherwise, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text by extending the prohibition period—from ten months or twelve months if there is a second round in the presidential election to twenty-two months—which is, quite clearly, contrary to the constitutional text. It is for this reason that, in the specific case, there is no procedural defect due to the fact that the Legislative Assembly approved the consulted bill in the first debate. Moreover, there is even a conceptual error in the consultation, since, according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Tribunal, in the hypothetical case that we were under the assumption of the prohibition of Article 97 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly is authorized by the Law of the Constitution and by the norms of the Parliamentary Statute to approve a bill in the first debate on which there is an objection from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones); what it could not do is approve it in the final vote after the conclusion of the second debate. Ergo, based on the foregoing, the procedural defect is dismissed..." I do not share the Chamber's position on the non-existence of a procedural defect, which was issued in the aforementioned consultation on Constitutionality. The final part of constitutional article 97 is not subject to any interpretation, since it clearly states that "Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, enact into law bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has expressed its disagreement." (bold, italics, and underline not in original). In the case of the law accused of being unconstitutional, the Legislative Assembly, by approving the bill in the second debate, ignored the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the said prohibition being mandatory. Furthermore, the Chamber, in the aforementioned ruling, proceeds to issue an interpretation of constitutional electoral norms, when this is an exclusive matter of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones). See that article 102, subsection 3 of the Political Constitution clearly states that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has among its functions to "Interpret exclusively and bindingly the constitutional and legal provisions referring to electoral matters." (bold and italics not in original). It is for the foregoing that there exists a clear violation of the legislative procedure in the approval of Ley 10.183, because there is an objection made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) in official communication TSE-0199-2022, dated January 20, 2022, which prevented said approval. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself, in rulings such as numbers 0557-98, 2277-92, 3194-92, 0034-97, 0034-98, and 3718-97, has stated: "This Chamber, on repeated occasions, has stated that in the case of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), in electoral matters, its subjective administrative acts, its autonomous regulatory provisions, and its jurisdictional resolutions are not challengeable before the constitutional jurisdiction —in the so-called 'electoral litigation' (contencioso electoral), which corresponds exclusively to it—; although norms, even electoral ones, of a legislative or executive nature—subject to the control of Constitutionality provided for by articles 10 of the Constitution and 73 and following of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—are challengeable, as well as, where appropriate, unwritten norms originating from its precedents or jurisprudence—article 3 of the same regulatory body—." (bold, italics, and underline not in original). For the reasons stated, there is an evident defect in the procedure for approving the Law that is the object of this action, since it was approved in the second debate, omitting the fact that there is an objection to it by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), an objection that was on two aspects, on the substance by limiting the election to other popularly elected positions within the municipal regime and the non-retroactivity of norms, and on the other hand, that the norm be approved given that it is within the prohibition period established by article 97 of the Political Constitution, a norm that is clear and does not permit any interpretation and, if interpretation must be made, this corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) and not to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), given that it is an exclusive electoral matter. On this point, it is worth recalling what was stated by Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro in his dissenting vote in resolution 2022-006119, at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, who indicates: "In this case, it is unobjectionable that the bill in question refers to electoral matters, as it affects the regulation and restriction of certain reelection assumptions in municipal elections. Furthermore, one cannot distinguish where the Political Constitution does not, therefore it is inappropriate to affirm that constitutional article 97 in question refers only to national elections and not to municipal ones. Clearly, such norm refers to 'the discussion and approval of bills relating to' 'electoral matters' without distinguishing types of elections. Likewise, it is evident that the TSE has expressed its disagreement with this bill. Thus, I consider that the provisions of article 97 in question are applicable regarding the following: -The Legislative Assembly may depart from the opinion of the TSE; but to do so it will require the vote of two-thirds of the total membership, provided it is not within the period of legislative prohibition. -In any case, that qualified vote has no power to disregard the prohibition period, according to which: within the six months prior to and the four following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not enact into law bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has expressed its disagreement. The political parties acting in parliament are important actors in all types of elections; for this reason, I consider the constitutional prohibition to be healthy. It prevents political actors from being able to vary the electoral rules in any type of election. Distinguishing between municipal elections and national elections is an artificial distinction. The incidence of electoral struggles and the porosity of the parties are sufficient reasons to prevent the rules of electoral contests, whether local or national, from being modified during the electoral period. Electoral history evidences the volatility and conflict that this matter contains; for this reason, the constitutional text is categorical and very clear. Any popular election prevents the variation of electoral rules..." (italics not in original).

2- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS, VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO STAND FOR ELECTION (DERECHO AL VOTO PASIVO): Starting from the second paragraph of the sole article of Ley 10.183, a limitation is established for persons holding the popularly elected office of Municipal Mayor (Alcaldía Municipal) by stating: "They may not hold any popularly elected office within the municipal regime until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. Deputy mayors (vicealcaldes y vicealcaldesas) may also be consecutively reelected only once and may not hold the same office or that of council member (regidores) or district council member (síndicos) until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. Council members (personas regidoras), district council members (síndicas), district administrators (intendentes), deputy district administrators (viceintendentes), municipal district council members (concejales municipales de distrito) under Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, of December 7, 2001, as well as those holding any alternate positions (cargos de suplencias), may be consecutively reelected only once and may not hold the same office or its alternate position until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second term." We consider that the norm, in what is indicated, is unconstitutional, as it violates both article 23, subsections b) and c), of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) ratified by Costa Rica through Ley 4534 of February 23, 1970, as well as article 33 of the Political Constitution. Precisely, subsections b) and c) of the American Convention on Human Rights state, regarding the political rights of citizens: "1- Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters, and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country. 2- The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings." (bold, underline, and italics not in original). In sum, it is a political right both to vote and to have the possibility of being elected in periodic electoral processes, as well as to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of the country, in this case, access to popularly elected positions. The problem that arises with the challenged norm is that, in the case of mayors (alcaldes u alcaldesas) who complete eight years in office, a legal prohibition is immediately imposed on them that prevents them from participating in any other popularly elected position within the municipal regime, which quite clearly is unconstitutional because it violates the right to stand for election (derecho al voto pasivo) established by the American Convention on Human Rights, since we are in the presence of completely different popularly elected offices. Article 23 of the American Convention itself states in its subsection 2 that it is possible, through a Law, to regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in subsection I of article 23 of the same convention, but that regulation shall be exclusively for reasons of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent judge in criminal proceedings. None of the exceptions that allow limiting these rights contemplates the possibility of limiting the right to stand for election (derecho al voto pasivo) (the possibility of being elected to a popularly elected office) for having held other popularly elected offices. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in ruling 2003-02771, at 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, referred to fundamental human rights and political rights in the following manner: "VI. ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. The relevant doctrine for the substance of the matter is set forth below, with the purpose of building a referential framework to resolve the actions filed. A. FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. The Rule of Law was born, according to history and Western legal doctrine, as a compromise formula that implied combining a broad group of fundamental rights with a series of formal and material guarantees, all within a Constitution that enshrined the division of powers and the principles of legitimacy and legality. This sum of ideas aimed to avoid potential arbitrariness coming from state institutions. Thus, the primacy of a central group of norms that characterize the Constitution as a superior legal order rests on (i) its character as a direct expression of the general will and (ii) its enunciation of fundamental human rights and public freedoms. The 'democratic principle,' expressed in the idea of popular sovereignty, is a legal response to the problem of political legitimacy, both on the material and formal planes. On the material plane, because (a) it establishes the constitutional legitimacy of the fundamental right to political participation of citizens, (b) it obliges state institutions to respect fundamental rights, and (c) it establishes social recognition of the diversity of initiatives and values of all individuals; and on the formal plane, because it represents at the same time a formula for rational articulation of the political process and, again, an express limitation on state power—whether it be a manifestation of the executive, legislative, judicial, electoral, or municipal function—. The principle of popular sovereignty manifests itself as the main limiting condition on the actions of state institutions and is aimed at ensuring that any exercise of power by any State organ respects its prior popular legitimacy and the criterion of the people, expressed through the original constituent power. It is on the foregoing that the legal-political transcendence of having inserted fundamental rights into the Constitution is based, which in turn constitute a strong and essential component for the configuration of the Rule of Law. Examples of fundamental rights are those belonging to the citizen—citizenship, nationality—; personal freedom—personal liberty, religion and conscience, residence, contracting, choice of economic activity, among others—; legal equality between persons; the right to private property; and those that allow persons access to jurisdictional control. Thus, Western legal thought has declared it non-negotiable that fundamental rights constitute the principal guarantee for citizens that the legal and political systems, as a whole, in a Rule of Law State, are oriented toward the respect and promotion of the human person, toward human development, and toward a constant expansion of public freedoms. Likewise, fundamental rights have an important legitimizing function for constitutional forms, as they constitute the preconditions of consensus upon which democratic society has been built. In other words, their function is to systematize the objective axiological content of the democratic order to which most citizens have given their consent, and also to establish the subjection of state institutions to such principles. Fundamental rights, in the constitutional order, hold a double dimension; they are subjective rights and they are objective rights. On the one hand, they are subjective, that is, rights of individuals, not only as rights of citizens in the strict sense, but insofar as they guarantee freedom in the sphere of democratic coexistence. On the other hand, they are essential elements of the objective legal order, in that this order is configured as the framework for just and peaceful human coexistence. Due to their importance, the Constitution has provided specially reinforced normative instruments aimed at preventing the alteration of their content or the limitation of their scope by any state institution: constitutional guarantees. From the foregoing argument, it follows that the mutation or limitation of the status of fundamental rights does not imply a mere partial amputation of the Constitution, but entails the full substitution of the Constitution and disrespect for the popular will. All of the above explains why, since the first Costa Rican constitutions, the principle of 'rigidity' was enshrined, that is, the inalterability of the catalog of fundamental rights and public or citizen freedoms. The principle of rigidity, which as a principle of reservation of original power will be analyzed later, besides establishing an impenetrable frontier for legislative and executive activity regarding the sphere of fundamental rights, also reaches, as a constitutional guarantee, what are called 'fundamental political decisions,' which are those resolutions of society that are determinative of a constitutional principle and which represent a historically enduring form of social feeling and thinking. The two most important decisions a society faces are the choice of its economic model and that of its political system (part of the doctrine considers that, at bottom, this is a single decision). Within the political system, society opts for a form of electing its representatives and governors and for the requirements that a person must meet to be elected to a public office: both, experts agree overwhelmingly, are fundamental political decisions. The source from which we draw, constitutional jurisprudence, has agreed that the reform of fundamental political decisions corresponds exclusively to the people as sovereign, through the competence delegated to national constituent assemblies, elected for this purpose and representative of the general popular will. These clauses are modifiable, but the only subject authorized to reform them is the constituent power." (Bold and italics not in original). In the same Chamber ruling, 2003-02771, reference is made to the right of election as a fundamental right, stating: "D. THE RIGHT OF ELECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT. Historically, sovereignty has been the a priori instrument to justify and legitimize state power, the latter understood as superiority over any other force that operates within the State's sphere and that is exercised by the various social groups that make up the human element of the political organization. State power must, however, always respect the popular will manifested through the decisions of the original constituent assemblies. Freedom-participation constitutes a sphere of individual autonomy that grants the individual the possibility of acting or participating in the political and social spheres, according to his own will, as long as he respects the special norms of each activity. The ownership of that right, in terms of its exercise, and by imposition of the dominant political idea in current society, corresponds to the human group that makes up the State, which exercises it directly, or through its representatives who comprise it, on the original plane, the constituent power, and on the derived plane, the government and the legislators. Political rights are aimed at citizens to enable them to participate in the expression of national sovereignty: the right to vote in elections and referendums, the right to be elected (derecho de elegibilidad), the right to join a political party, etc.

These are the rights that enable the citizen to participate in public affairs and in the political structuring of the community of which they form a part. The exercise of these rights within the state sphere, far from placing the elected citizen in a position of distance, separation, or opposition to that State, serves to enable them to take part in the articulation and political planning of the society of which they are a member. They are rights intended for citizens to enable their participation in the expression of national sovereignty; their primary purpose is to prevent the State (through any of its functions—executive, legislative, judicial, electoral, or municipal) from invading or attacking certain attributes of the human being. Thus, they presuppose: a passive or negative attitude of the State, an abstention on its part, directed at respecting, not impeding, and guaranteeing the free and non-discriminatory enjoyment of those rights. They are therefore rights exercised to affirm and confirm the sovereign power of the people over the State, and they provide their holders, the citizens, with means and guarantees to defend themselves against the arbitrary exercise of public power. Precisely through the recognition and exercise of political freedoms, the participation of individuals in the power process operates, and since democracy is a form of collective decision-making, such exercise is, in turn, the essence of the democratic principle. The difference between civil liberties and political liberties does not reside in their nature, but in the purpose to which their exercise responds. One of the various public legal freedoms to which we refer in this section consists of the right of citizens to political participation; its analysis always leads to the study of the concept of popular sovereignty, since this is the source and sole legitimization of political power. It is the people who articulate it through their representatives—constituent deputies, the President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic, deputies to the Legislative Assembly, and municipal mayors—and entrust them with the exercise of such power on a provisional basis. Political participation freedoms are intended for nationals of legal age and are encapsulated in the fundamental right of citizenship, which may be suspended only by judicially declared interdiction and by a sentence imposing the penalty of suspension of political rights. There is no other restriction of the right, and political power can never arbitrarily limit it. For certain public offices, the original Constituent Power decided upon a minimum age that exceeds the boundary of civil majority, but maintained its prohibition against public authorities restricting this public legal freedom. The right to elect, as a political right, also constitutes a human right of the first order, and therefore, is a fundamental right... In fact, even though the partial reform in question was enacted later, this was subsequently confirmed with the signing of the American Convention on Human Rights, which in Article 23 establishes: "1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities... b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the electors, ..."; and which admits no greater limitations than the following: "2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings." From this last paragraph of the Convention on Human Rights, the sole reasons for which restrictions may be established on the exercise of the rights declared therein are clearly derived. Reelection, as derived from the historically subscribed popular will, establishes the possibility for the citizen to freely choose their governors, so that by amending the Constitution to the detriment of the sovereignty of the people, and to the erosion of their fundamental rights, what occurred in this case was the imposition of more limitations than those already existing on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or sentencing. On the other hand, Costa Rica signed this Convention without any reservation, accepting the exercise of such rights in the greatest possible freedom, assuming as the only limitations those deriving from paragraph 2 of Article 23. Should the manner in which the Legislative Assembly suppressed this right be unconstitutional, it would imply that its restoration must be subject to the corresponding procedure.” The same unconstitutional prohibition occurs with respect to the persons who currently hold the offices of Subprefect (Intendencia), since the challenged rule states in relation to them: "Aldermen (regidores), síndicos, Subprefects (intendentes), Deputy Subprefects (viceintendentes), district municipal councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) of Law 8173, General Law of District Municipal Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those who hold any of the alternate positions, may be reelected continuously for a single term and may not occupy the same position or its alternate position until two periods have elapsed since the end of their second period." In this case, the rule prohibits Subprefects (intendentes) who complete two appointment periods from seeking, within the subsequent eight years, another popularly elected office in the municipal regime. Even though the wording of the sole article is not as clear, in the sole transitory provision, it is clearly established by stating: "Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), Subprefects (intendentes, intendentas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to once again occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime." It is evident that the challenged rule also imposes a totally unconstitutional limitation on persons holding Subprefect (Intendencia) offices by establishing an express prohibition against being able to seek other elected offices of the municipal regime, different from the one they currently occupy, which violates the passive voting right they hold under the protection of Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, especially since the rule challenged as unconstitutional does not conform to the regulatory exceptions established by paragraph 2 of said Article 23, because the regulations that may be imposed by Law regarding the possibility of seeking a public office (different from the one currently occupied) only refer to matters of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings. The foregoing, both for the case of persons holding mayoral offices and for persons holding Subprefect (Intendencia) offices, results in a clear violation of the electoral rights that they have as Costa Rican citizens in full exercise of their rights, and therefore, the action of unconstitutionality must be granted for violation of the political rights of our associates in ANAI, and its annulment must proceed for being contrary to the law of the Constitution. It is also considered that the challenged regulation violates Article 33 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that "Every person is equal before the law and no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be practiced." Of the popularly elected offices existing in our country, those of the municipal regime are the ones with the greatest number, since in the Executive Branch there are only the President and Vice-Presidents, in the Legislative Branch only the deputies, while in the municipal regime there are mayoral offices, deputy mayoral offices, aldermanic offices and their alternates, síndico offices and their alternates, Subprefect (Intendencia) offices, Deputy Subprefect (Viceintendencia) offices, and district councilor offices and their alternates. By establishing a prohibition so that persons who occupy the offices of Mayor (Alcaldía) or Subprefect (Intendencia) for 8 years cannot seek other popularly elected offices, it violates the principle of equality, since the same rule states that for the other popularly elected offices in the municipal regime, specifically in the second paragraph of the Sole Transitory Provision of the challenged rule: "Persons currently serving as deputy mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), Deputy Subprefects (viceintendentes, viceintendentas), proprietary and alternate aldermen (regidores y regidoras), proprietary and alternate síndicos, and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to once again occupy the same popularly elected office of the municipal regime; however, they may occupy other municipal offices in accordance with this law." As can be seen, the rule makes an odious differentiation between popularly elected offices of the Municipal Regime, because it prohibits a Mayor (Alcalde/sa) or Subprefect (Intendente/a) from seeking, within the 8 years following the expiration of their second election period, any other popularly elected office within the Municipal Regime, while for the other popularly elected offices in Local Governments, it only prohibits them, in the 8 years following the expiration of their second period, from occupying the same popularly elected office, but, it permits them, even consecutively, to seek other popularly elected offices different from the one to which they were elected in a Municipality. The violation of the principle of equality committed in the drafting of the challenged rule is clear, and therefore, the wording of the rule must be annulled for being contrary to the law of the Constitution. 3- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS, VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS: The first paragraph of the Sole Transitory Provision of the challenged Law establishes the following: "Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), Subprefects (intendentes, intendentas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to once again occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime." That which is regulated by said transitory provision is unconstitutional since it seeks to give retroactive effect to Law 10183, which came into effect on April 8, 2022, in contravention of the mandate of Article 34 of the Political Constitution, which states: "No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, or of their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations." To seek, as the challenged Law does, to apply the reelection restriction to popularly elected municipal authorities by counting the periods served prior to the entry into force of the Law is contrary to the law of the Constitution, because it would be giving the rule a retroactive effect. The Constitutional Chamber, in judgment 2765-1997 of 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997, indicated that the guarantee of non-retroactivity, shares with other fundamental rights and freedoms, a material and not merely formal character, by stating: "... the principle of non-retroactivity, like the others relating to fundamental rights or freedoms, is not only formal but also and above all material, so that it is violated not only when a new rule or the reform of a previous one illegitimately alters acquired rights or situations consolidated under the protection of said previous rule, but also when the effects, the interpretation, or the application of the latter produces unreasonable or disproportionate harm to the holder of the right or situation that it itself enshrines." In the case under study, it is evident that the retroactive application made by the aforementioned Sole Transitory Provision, to the detriment of the persons currently occupying Mayoral and Subprefect offices, is contrary to the law of the Constitution, in that it would be producing a totally disproportionate harm to the current popularly elected municipal authorities (Mayoral and Subprefect offices), since if they currently hold two consecutive periods in office, they cannot seek, again, for said popularly elected office, nor for any other popularly elected office within the Municipal Regime. In proper drafting of the rule, what it should have indicated in its transitory provision is that, for the counting of the prohibition periods against holding the same popularly elected office, it will be taken into consideration starting from the appointment period held at the time of the Law's entry into force. As can be seen, the first paragraph of the Sole Transitory Provision of the challenged Law is unconstitutional because applying the Law retroactively, to the detriment of the rights of current Mayoral and Subprefect officeholders, is irrational and disproportionate. This aspect is closely related to the issue of the right to passive voting, in that, if the Law were applied retroactively, a very onerous condition would be imposed on current Mayoral and Subprefect officeholders, by seeking to add, for prohibition purposes, appointment periods where the Law was not in force, which is contrary to the law of the Constitution and therefore, said transitory provision must be annulled. The Constitution prohibits giving retroactive effect to laws when this retroactivity produces harm to a person, affects their acquired patrimonial rights, or consolidated legal situations. In the present case, according to what is regulated by the aforementioned Transitory Provision, the rule establishes a retroactive application of the same, since previous appointment periods are counted, when the Law was not in force, which generates a clear harm to the members of ANAI, because any limitation on a right such as passive voting must be from the rule's entry into force and not in relation to consolidated legal situations such as appointments to popularly elected offices, in the municipal regime, that ANAI associates may have had. In judgment of the Constitutional Chamber number 2021-3276, it states regarding the non-retroactivity of laws: "In this case, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal order cannot have the consequence of subtracting the already acquired asset or right from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual presupposition had occurred prior to the legal reform, the (advantageous, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal order,' that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist of the fact that, once born into legal life, the rule that connects the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent rule; what it means is that—as explained—if the conditioning premise has been produced, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the empire of the previous rule from arising. This is so because, it was said, what is relevant is that the state of affairs that the person enjoyed was already defined in terms of its elements and its effects, even if these are still being produced or have not even begun to be produced. In this way, what the person has a right to is the consequence, not the rule." Also in vote 202100838, of 11:15 a.m. on April 28, 2021, the Constitutional Chamber indicated regarding the non-retroactivity of laws: "As is easily concluded, if laws take effect once they are published in the official gazette or from the date they indicate, it is not possible to make them retroactive against acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations, not even laws that repeal others." When a rule modifies another existing rule, the modification must have effects for the future, that is, from the publication of the rule in the official gazette La Gaceta, but in the present case, the challenged transitory provision seeks to generate a rule limiting election periods, counting those that ANAI's associates already have at the time of the Law's publication, which is blatantly contrary to what is established in Article 34 of the Political Constitution, and the Chamber must so declare. It is clarified that the position is not one of maintaining indefinite reelection of popularly elected offices in the Municipal Regime, an aspect which is clearly a power of the legislator to regulate, but the truth of the matter is that the limitation rule must apply from the publication of the Law and to the popularly elected periods that occur after the rule's entry into force (April 8, 2022), without counting, as the challenged Transitory Provision seeks to do, previous periods where the rule of the game established by the Law was different. 4- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS, VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS AND PROPORTIONALITY: Article 1 of the challenged Law states: "Mayors (alcaldesas or alcaldes) may be reelected continuously for a single term. They may not occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime, until two periods have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive period." It also states: "The persons..., Subprefects (intendentes), ... of Law 8173, General Law of District Municipal Councils, of December 7, 2001, may be reelected continuously for a single term and may not occupy the same position or its alternate position until two periods have elapsed since the end of their second period." (bold not in original). In the same vein, the Sole Transitory Provision of said Law states regarding persons currently holding the office of Mayor (Alcaldía): "Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), Subprefects (intendentes, intendentas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to once again occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime." (bold and underlining not in original). In Costa Rica, popularly elected offices exist only in the Executive Branch for the President and Vice-Presidents, in the Legislative Branch for the deputies, and finally in the Municipal Regime, which is where most popularly elected offices exist, since the following must be appointed: Mayoral offices, Deputy Mayoral offices, proprietary and alternate Aldermanic offices, proprietary and alternate Síndico offices, proprietary and alternate District Councilor offices, Subprefect offices, Deputy Subprefect offices, and proprietary and alternate District Municipal Councilors. Of the popularly elected offices, in the case of the President of the Republic, there is an 8-year prohibition on reelection (Article 132, paragraph I of the Political Constitution), while for the vice-presidents, they may be candidates for president of the Republic or be reelected, provided they have not held the office within the 12 months prior to the election (Article 132, paragraph 1 of the Political Constitution). In the case of deputies, they cannot be reelected consecutively, but they may seek to become deputies again after the lapse of just one four-year period (Article 107 of the Political Constitution). In the specific case of the Mayoral offices, both Article 1 and the Sole Transitory Provision of Law 10183 establish an 8-year prohibition against once again occupying a popularly elected office within the Municipal Regime, following two consecutive elected terms. Regarding the limitation on occupying other offices, the legal basis was already established in the preceding lines; regarding the temporal limitation imposed by said Law on persons who have already held the mayoral office, this is unreasonable and disproportionate. The Constitutional Chamber has developed the Principle of Reasonableness of Laws, in rulings such as 2000-01920, of 3:27 p.m. on March 1, 2000, where it states: "III.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS AS A PARAMETER OF CONSTITUTIONALITY... Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality in the following terms: 'The Law of the Constitution, composed of both Constitutional Norms and Principles, and those of international law, and particularly those of its instruments on human rights, as the primary foundations of all positive legal order, transmit to it its own logical structure and axiological sense, based on values even prior to the legislative texts themselves, which are in turn the source of any normative system inherent to a society organized under the concepts of the Rule of Law, the constitutional regime, Democracy, and Liberty, in such a way that any rule or act that violates those values or principles—among them, those of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are by definition criteria of constitutionality—or that leads to absurd, seriously harmful, gravely unjust situations, or dead ends for individuals or for the State, cannot be constitutionally valid' (judgment number 3495-92, of 2:30 p.m. on November 19, 1992). In that same sense, in judgment number 1420-91, of 9:00 a.m. on June 24, 1991, it was indicated: '... Indeed, the principle of reasonableness implies that the State can limit or restrict the abusive exercise of the right, but it must do so in such a way that the legal rule is adequate in all its elements—such as the motive and the aim it pursues—with the objective sense contemplated in the Constitution. This means that there must be proportionality between the legal rule adopted and the aim it pursues, referring to the imperative need for the law to satisfy the legal common sense of the community, expressed in the values that the same Constitution enshrines.'" (bold and underlining not in original). It is considered that the eight-year limitation period imposed by the Law on those who hold a popularly elected office in a municipal mayoralty is totally unreasonable and disproportionate, since it violates said jurisprudence, as well as Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights in its paragraphs 1(c) and 2, because the limitation unjustifiably impedes access under conditions of equality for persons who hold a mayoralty to public functions within the municipal regime, in addition to regulating a situation that limits rights and opportunities for persons, contrary to the exceptions imposed by the same Article 23, paragraph 2, of said Convention. The temporal limitation imposed on persons who hold a municipal mayoralty is also unreasonable and disproportionate, given that this office is the only one among all popularly elected offices existing in the country where the people (residents of the respective canton) have the possibility of removing the person who holds the mayoral office, through a recall plebiscite, all according to the provisions of Article 19 of the Municipal Code, which, in relevant part, states: "Upon a motion filed before the Council, which must be signed by at least one-third of the total number of aldermen and approved by a minimum of three-quarters of the sitting aldermen, the electors of the respective canton shall be summoned to a plebiscite, where it will be decided whether or not to remove the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal). This decision may not be vetoed." Note that the rule even prevents the person holding the mayoralty from exercising the right to veto the agreement to call a plebiscite. Likewise, the principle of proportionality is violated by imposing limitations and conditions more burdensome on the popularly elected office of the municipal mayor than those applicable to other popularly elected offices within the same municipal regime and in relation to other popularly elected offices of the executive branch and the legislative branch. For the reasons stated, the requested unconstitutionality must be granted and it must be declared that both Article 1 and the Sole Transitory Provision of Law 10183 violate the principle of proportionality and reasonableness, developed by the Constitutional Chamber as parameters of constitutionality of laws. (...) CLAIM Based on the foregoing, I request that Law number 10183, Law REFORMING ARTICLE 14 OF LAW 7794, MUNICIPAL CODE, OF APRIL 30, 1998 (LAW THAT LIMITS THE INDEFINITE REELECTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES), published in Supplement 73 to the official gazette La Gaceta number 68, of April 8, 2022, and effective as of April 8, 2022, be declared unconstitutional, due to the defects and violation of the norms indicated in this action of Unconstitutionality. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE The party processes for the election of candidates for popularly elected offices within the municipal regime, for the period 2024-2028, in the different political parties, begin between May and June of 2023, which, for the current authorities who have two appointment periods, should the application of the rule be maintained, would mean they would be vetoed from participating in said internal processes. If the unconstitutionality of the rule is declared in the terms stated, its effects would be retroactive to the date of the Law's promulgation, but, certainly, grave and irreparable harm would already have been caused to the persons currently holding mayoral and Subprefect offices, given that, if they have two consecutive appointment periods, they could not participate in the next electoral process, violating their right to passive voting. It must be taken into consideration, for the purposes of this petition, that there is a complete legal basis to determine the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule. Faced with this situation, I request the Chamber, under the protection of Article 82 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, that, as a precautionary measure, the application of the transitory rule (first paragraph) be suspended until the Chamber resolves on the merits the present action of unconstitutionality. It must be considered that the danger in delay is evident, since by the time the filed action is resolved, grave harm will already have been caused to the current Mayors (Alcaldes, Alcaldesas) and Subprefects (Intendentes, Intendentas), who will not be able to participate in the election process for 2024-2028. In the same way, the appearance of sound legal right is more than evident in the present case, which further justifies the requested suspension. REQUEST FOR A HEARING. We request, under the protection of Article 10 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, that at the appropriate procedural moment we be granted an oral hearing to present conclusions before the judgment." 10.- By means of ruling 2022013084 of 9:30 a.m. on June 8, 2022, issued in file 22-010888-0007-CO, the full Chamber ordered: "Action of unconstitutionality brought by Wilber Quirós Palma, adult, married, builder, resident of Tucurrique, identity card number 3-254-246, Subprefect (intendente) of the District Municipal Council of Tucurrique, personally and in his capacity as president of the Federation of District Municipal Councils, and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales, adult, married, resident of Cervantes, identity card number 3377-830, Subprefect (intendente) of the District Municipal Council of Cervantes, personally, against Law No. 10183, Law Reforming Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998. Whereas: 1.- By written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:40 a.m. on May 19, 2022, the plaintiffs request that Law No. 10183, Law Reforming Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, be declared unconstitutional. The plaintiffs indicate that the new Law introduces the prohibition of unlimited reelection, regarding local popularly elected offices. It includes a transitory provision that affects executives and councilors currently serving and who have been consecutively reelected, who will not be able to participate in the next elections of February 2024. Alternates to the executive, aldermen, and síndicos, who are in a second consecutive period, are permitted to be reelected to another local office, which is not permitted for local executives (mayors and Subprefects). They claim that it is a restrictive regulation that has no direct basis in the Constitution and radically innovates the legal system. They allege a violation of the principle of non-discrimination of human rights. They assert that Law No. 10183, reforming Article 14 of the Municipal Code, including its sole transitory provision, clearly diminishes the current content of the right to reelection. Moreover, that was the intention. Since vote no.

In decision 2003-2771, this Chamber held that the possibility of reelection in public office was a human right, derived from the fundamental right to be elected. Consequently, and in accordance with International Human Rights Law, it cannot be diminished by the legislator, not even through constitutional amendment, much less by ordinary law. The right to reelection in local office is a fundamental right by its substance and is not weakened by the fact that it was conferred by ordinary law. From the norm that provides for the popular election of the office, if it does not contain limitations regarding reelection, then none exist. For these purposes, it is irrelevant that the right to unlimited reelection was conferred by ordinary law, since, in any case, it is a fundamental right. If it is conferred without limit, it cannot be reduced, except by the Constituent Assembly. During the legislative process, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (of. TSE-0199-2022 of January 20) itself warned that the bill implied a "hollowing out of the human right to be elected." This was noted by the very specialized body governing electoral matters, which is the relevant body here (something that Magistrate Cruz Castro considered "unobjectionable," vote 2022-006119). It should be remembered that this Chamber deemed a constitutional reform regarding presidential reelection unlawful. Here, we are not even facing a constitutional reform, but a simple legal reform, in a matter (diminishment of the content of a human right) where the Legislative Assembly lacks competence altogether. They further allege a violation of the requirement for a reinforced special law, in the case of officials of the district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito). In the case of such councils, the provisions of Article 172.2 of the Constitution apply, a norm violated here. According to said numeral, the mentioned councils "shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to constitute the municipalities." According to constitutional numeral 169, the members of the local government are the council members (concejales) and the executive official. The same section 172.2 prescribes that the "structure" and "functioning" of the district municipal councils shall be regulated by "a special law approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies." This law was enacted: No. 8173-01, amended by No. 9208-14. Articles 6 and 7 regulate the popular election of the council members and the members of the mayor's offices (intendencias). The indefinite reelection of the Municipal Code was applied to them. The referral to the code is to the one then in force. With the modification of the article, their status (regarding reelection) was changed, but not via a special law, the only route provided for by the Constitution, because reelection is a matter of "structure" and "functioning." The reform to the Municipal Code, through the law being challenged, directly regulates the status of the elective officials of the district municipal councils, which constitutionally cannot be done, because the organization of these requires a special law, which already exists. They affirm that the foregoing does not undermine their arguments that human rights are being reduced via an ordinary law anyway, which is impermissible. They allege violation of the principles of reasonableness and equality. These are principles exhaustively set forth by this Chamber, the former implicit in the Constitution and the latter explicit (Article 33). They complement each other, in that unequal treatment is a sign of unreasonableness. Given that there was truly no due study or care in the reform, which responded more to a campaign of discrediting the local regime, orchestrated basically by the press, the approved scheme is seriously incongruent and does not represent a lawful exercise of legislative discretion. Mayors (alcaldes) are prohibited, after two consecutive terms, from holding any municipal office of popular election, while vice mayors (vicealcaldes) are only prohibited from holding the same office, or that of council member (regidores) or district trustee (síndicos), from which they are permitted to run for mayor, and district mayor (intendentes) or vice district mayor and council member of a district municipal council. They allege this is a senseless discrimination. According to the Transitory Provision (referred to current officials who repeat election), if they are Executives, they cannot run as candidates for any office of popular election in the next two elections. In the cases of vice-Executives or council members (which does not include the council members of the district municipal councils), the restriction is only to the same type of position, which establishes a totally unjustified difference. They point out that the issue can also be approached from another perspective. It is traditional to compare the local structure with the national one. According to Article 107 of the Constitution, deputies cannot be consecutively reelected. Council members and council members of the district municipal councils are restricted from the possibility of new elections for two terms after completing two consecutive terms, which creates serious discrimination, a manifestly unequal treatment, without the slightest justification. Two terms of separation inevitably force the abandonment of a local political career. They allege that the discriminations noted do not even have support in Article 23.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (sic), which establishes the exhaustive grounds that could justify restrictions regarding political rights. A norm that is consequently violated. Unlimited reelection cannot in any case be considered perverse per se. A local political career is not perverse per se and, on the contrary, represents a democratic opportunity to develop political leaders. If reelections in fact occur (and even with different parties), it is because the people value the work of the executives and council members when it is good. They also allege an infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity, embodied in Article 34 of the Political Constitution. They clarify that this grievance (sic) refers to the cited Transitory Provision. The reform creates a new general regime that incorporates restrictions previously nonexistent. This entails that the current popularly elected servants were elected without having restrictions in the future, which has allowed them (precisely those reelected) to formulate a local political career project. It is not intended to assert that the legislator, in the use of its discretion, is inhibited from regulating the matter otherwise. But it is elementary that any regulation must have effects only for the future. The Transitory Provision is only admissible insofar as it is congruent with the principal norm. Insofar as the latter governs for the future, it implies that the restriction introduced will be applied from now on. That is, the official may only be consecutively elected for two more terms, after which the ban enters. This ban would then apply only to those elected twice after the reform has already entered into force. The Transitory Provision actually does not regulate any pending situation that the principal norm has not already left regulated. The current situation was governed by a forceful norm in force. The reform seeks a new regime, which must then enter as such. From now on, the rules are different. From now on, those who register as candidates know what they are getting into, that is, a regime that does not allow the development of a political career. But the new regime cannot produce effects into the past, reaching those already legally elected and in office. They claim that the retroactive effect achieved by the Transitory Provision seems more like a sanction, which perfectly responds to the context in which the reform was given, to the indulgence of the pressures exerted to end the local political career, the ultimate goal of the reform. They indicate, finally, that they endorse all the arguments set forth in the actions on the same subject filed by ANAI and by FEMETROM. They insist that the reform responded more to the pressures of the moment than to the need to solve a problem. As it stands, it ends the local political career, which, logically assessed, has been a useful alternative for democracy and for local development. The current Constitution has very clear guidelines regarding the strengthening of the local regime. The legislator cannot disregard the political program enshrined at the highest level. 2.- For purposes of supporting their standing, the petitioners state that the aforementioned Federation defends the general interests of the district municipal councils and they, individually, are directly interested in the issue of reelection, that is, directly affected by the challenged law, which moreover is self-applicable. It must be added that the interests in this electoral field are "national," as this Chamber has taught. 3.- The petitioners request that an urgent immediate precautionary measure be ordered. They state that the interim measure (medida cautelar) that must operate by operation of law from Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction will clearly lead to nothing in this case. The officials of the district municipal councils affected by the reform, should this action be admitted, will obtain nothing even if the action is resolved on the merits and favorably to their interests, given the normal de facto timeframes that follow. They indicate that there are local elections in less than two years and that, by that time, according to the law being challenged, many will be unable to register. Hence, if an attempt were made to protect the situation of the affected officials, only two possibilities remain: either the Action is resolved quickly, or the effects of the reform are suspended until the Chamber defines the matter. They indicate that human rights are at stake that directly and immediately affect our democratic system. The issue has been contaminated by cases of alleged local corruption, apart from the fact that it is public and notorious a media process of demonization of "municipalism," a movement in which these reelections that the reform restricts and which frustrate the real possibility of a local political career are intended to be included. 4.- Pending before this same Chamber is unconstitutionality action number 22008383-0007-CO, in which the same provisions that are the subject of challenge in the sub examine are challenged. In that matter, the first publication, referred to in Article 84 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, was made on May 24, 2022. Drawn up by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, Considering: I.- ON THE CONSOLIDATION (ACUMULACIÓN) OF THIS ACTION TO THE ONE BEING PROCESSED IN CASE FILE No. 22-008383-0007-CO. Article 84 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that if after an action is filed and before the publication of the respective notice, other actions of unconstitutionality are filed against the same law, decree, provision, agreement, or resolution, those actions shall be consolidated to the first and deemed an amplification. Actions filed in that capacity by the parties in suspended proceedings shall also be consolidated if filed within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice. For the foregoing reasons and given the evident connection that exists between the objections raised in this matter and those discussed in case file 22 008383-0007-CO, which is being processed before this Chamber, and in order to avoid contradictory resolutions that could affect the rights and interests of the involved parties, it is ordered in this act to consolidate this case file to the cited one. II.- CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE REQUESTED INTERIM MEASURE. The petitioners request that, as an interim measure (medida cautelar), it be ordered not to apply the challenged norm until the Chamber resolves the present action of unconstitutionality on the merits. In their judgment, the danger in the delay in resolving the matter would cause serious harm to the officials of the district municipal councils affected by the reform. Regarding what has been stated, the parties are referred to the provisions of the resolution at 8:27 a.m. on May 9, issued in case file No. 22-008383-0007-CO, to which this action is being consolidated and in which it was expressly stated: "REGARDING THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ADMISSION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. Certainly, according to Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the 'organs that exhaust the administrative channel must be warned that said lawsuit has been filed, so that in the processes or procedures in which the application of the law, decree, provision, agreement, or resolution is discussed, no final resolution is issued either while the Chamber has not made the pronouncement of the case.' However, in this specific case, the application of section 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction would nullify the application of the norm and consequently prevent the holding of the next electoral process. Therefore, in application of section 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is necessary to modulate the suspensive effect of Article 81 of that normative body, expressly stating that the issuance of any final resolution is not suspended, whether in internal, administrative, or electoral venues." Therefore: Let this action be consolidated to the one being processed before this Chamber under case file number 22-008383-0007CO." Regarding the foregoing, the brief filing the unconstitutionality action brought by Wilber Quirós Palma, district mayor (intendente) of the District Municipal Council of Tucurrique, personally and in his capacity as president of the Federation of District Municipal Councils, and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales, district mayor of the District Municipal Council of Cervantes, in a personal capacity, contains the following arguments: "We appear, the first on behalf of said Federation and personally, and the second personally, to bring an Action of Unconstitutionality against the cited Law 10183, as will be detailed below. This Action is brought under Articles 73 et seq. of the LJC. The undersigned Federation defends the general interests of the District Municipal Councils, and those of us who subscribe individually are directly interested in the issue of reelection, that is, directly affected by the challenged law, which, moreover, is self-applicable. It must be added that the interests in this electoral field are 'national,' as this Chamber has taught. We request admission and suggest that a hearing on the merits be granted to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, given that we are dealing with electoral matters specific to that body. CHALLENGED REGULATIONS This concerns Law 10183 of April 5, 2022, which reforms Article 14 of the Municipal Code. The new Law introduces the prohibition of unlimited reelection for local popular election positions. It includes a Transitory Provision that affects Executives and council members currently serving and who have been consecutively reelected, who will be unable to participate in the upcoming elections of February 2024. For Executive substitutes and for council members (regidores) and district trustees (síndicos) who are in a second consecutive term, it allows them to be reelected to another local position, which is not permitted to local Executives (mayors (alcaldes) and district mayors (intendentes)). It is a restrictive regulation that has no direct basis in the Constitution and radically innovates the legal order. REQUEST FOR URGENT IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE The interim measure that must operate by operation of law from Article 81 of the LJC will clearly lead to nothing in this case. The officials of the CMDs affected by the reform, should this Action be admitted, will obtain nothing even if the Action is resolved on the merits and favorably to their interests, given the normal de facto timeframes that follow. It should be recalled that there are local elections in less than two years and that, by that time, according to the Law being challenged, many will be unable to register. Hence, if an attempt were made to protect the situation of the affected officials, only two possibilities remain: either the Action is resolved quickly, or the effects of the reform are suspended until the Chamber defines the matter. Human Rights are at stake that directly and immediately affect our democratic system. Unfortunately, the issue has been contaminated with cases of alleged local corruption, apart from the fact that a media process of demonization of 'municipalism' is public and notorious, a movement in which these reelections that the reform restricts and which frustrate the real possibility of a local political career are intended to be included. VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DIMINUTION (sic) OF HUMAN RIGHTS Law 10183, reforming paragraph 5 of Article 14 of the Municipal Code, including its sole Transitory Provision, clearly diminishes the current content of the right to reelection. Moreover, that was the intention. Since decision 2003-2771, this Chamber has held that the possibility of reelection in public office is a human right, derived from the fundamental right to be elected. Consequently, and in accordance with the Law of Human Rights, it cannot be diminished by the legislator, not even through constitutional amendment, much less by ordinary law. The right to reelection in local office is a fundamental right by its substance and is not weakened by the fact that it was conferred by ordinary law. Conferred expressly, because in truth, from the norm that provides for the popular election of the office, if it does not contain limitations regarding reelection, then none exist. For these purposes, it is irrelevant that the right to unlimited reelection was conferred by ordinary law, since, in any case, it is a fundamental right. The issue, however, is that once conferred without limit, it cannot be reduced, except by the Constituent Assembly. During the legislative process, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself (ref. TSE-0199-2022, dated January 20) warned that the bill implied a 'hollowing out of the human right to be elected.' This was noted by the very specialized body governing electoral matters, which is the relevant body here (something that Magistrate Cruz Castro considered 'unobjectionable,' vote 2022-006119). It should be remembered that this Chamber deemed a constitutional reform regarding presidential reelection unlawful. Here, we are not even facing a constitutional reform, but a simple legal reform, in a matter (diminishment of the content of a human right) where the Legislative Assembly lacks competence altogether. VIOLATION OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR A REINFORCED SPECIAL LAW, IN THE CASE OF OFFICIALS OF DISTRICT MUNICIPAL COUNCILS. In the case of the CMDs, the provisions of Article 172.2 of the Constitution apply, a norm violated here. According to said article, the CMDs 'shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to constitute the municipalities.' According to 169 idem, the members of the local government are the council members (concejales) and the executive official. The same 172.2 prescribes that the 'structure' and 'functioning' of the CMDs shall be regulated by 'a special law approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies.' This law was enacted (No. 8173-01, amended by No. 9208-14). Arts. 6 and 7 regulate the popular election of the council members and of the members of the mayor's offices (intendencias). The indefinite reelection of the Municipal Code was applied to them. The referral to the Code is to the one then in force. With the modification of the article, their status (regarding reelection) is changed, but not via a special law, the only route provided for by the Constitution, because reelection is a matter of 'structure' and 'functioning.' The reform to the Municipal Code, through the law we challenge, directly regulates the status of the elective officials of the CMDs, which constitutionally cannot be done, because the organization of the CMDs requires a special law, which already exists. The foregoing, of course, does not undermine our arguments that human rights are being reduced via an ordinary law anyway, which is impermissible. VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLENESS AND EQUALITY These are principles exhaustively set forth by this Chamber, the former implicit in the Constitution and the latter explicit (Art. 33). They complement each other, in that unequal treatment is a sign of unreasonableness. Given that there was truly no due study or care in the reform, which responded more to a campaign of discrediting the local regime, orchestrated basically by the press, the approved scheme is seriously incongruent and does not represent a lawful exercise of legislative discretion. Mayors (alcaldes) are prohibited, after two consecutive terms, from holding any municipal office of popular election, while vice mayors (vicealcaldes) are only prohibited from holding the same office, or that of council member (regidores) or district trustee (síndicos), from which they are permitted to run for mayor, and district mayor (intendentes) or vice district mayor and council member of a CMD. It is a senseless discrimination. According to the Transitory Provision (referred to current officials who repeat election), if they are Executives, they cannot run as candidates for any office of popular election in the next two elections. In the cases of vice-Executives or council members (which does not include the council members of the CMDs), the restriction is only to the same type of position, which establishes a totally unjustified difference. The issue can also be approached from another perspective. It is traditional to compare the local structure with the national one. According to 107 C.P., deputies cannot be consecutively reelected. Council members and council members of the CMDs are restricted from the possibility of new elections for two terms after completing two consecutive terms, which creates serious discrimination, a manifestly unequal treatment, without the slightest justification. Two terms of separation inevitably force the abandonment of a local political career. The discriminations noted do not even have support in 23.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (sic), which indicates the exhaustive grounds that could justify restrictions regarding political rights, a norm that is consequently violated, which we charge. Unlimited reelection cannot in any case be considered perverse per se; a local political career is not perverse per se and, on the contrary, represents a democratic opportunity to develop political leaders. If reelections in fact occur (and even with different parties), it is because the people value the work of the Executives and council members when it is good. VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY Principle embodied in 34 C.P., violated here. This grievance (sic) refers to the cited Transitory Provision. The reform creates a new general regime that incorporates restrictions previously nonexistent. This entails that the current popularly elected servants were elected without having restrictions in the future, which has allowed them (precisely those reelected) to formulate a local political career project. It is not intended to assert that the legislator, in the use of its discretion in these cases, is inhibited from regulating the matter otherwise (which we admit without prejudice to what was argued above). But it is elementary that any regulation must have effects only for the future. The Transitory Provision is only admissible insofar as it is congruent with the principal norm. Insofar as the latter governs for the future, it implies that the restriction introduced will be applied from now on. That is, the official may only be consecutively elected for two more terms, after which the ban enters. This ban would then apply only to those elected twice after the reform has already entered into force. The Transitory Provision actually does not regulate any pending situation that the principal norm has not already left regulated. The current situation was governed by a forceful norm in force. The reform seeks a new regime, which must then enter as such. From now on, the rules are different. From now on, those who register as candidates know what they are getting into, that is, a regime that does not allow the development of a political career. But the new regime cannot produce effects into the past, reaching those already legally elected and in office. The retroactive effect achieved by the Transitory Provision seems more like a sanction, which perfectly responds to the context in which the reform was given, to the indulgence of the pressures exerted to end the local political career, the ultimate goal of the reform. We fully endorse the arguments set forth in the Actions on the subject filed by ANAI and by FEMETROM. We request the due process and expect a prompt resolution, given the impact that is occurring and could be left without remedy. We insist that the reform responded more to the pressures of the moment than to the need to solve a problem. As it stands, it ends the local political career, which, logically assessed, has been a useful alternative for our democracy and for local development. The current Constitution has very clear guidelines regarding the strengthening of the local regime. The legislator cannot disregard the political program enshrined at the highest level.

11.- By resolution at 12:16 p.m. on June 17, 2022, the Presidency of the Chamber ordered: "Let this unconstitutionality action 22-008383-0007-CO be deemed amplified in the terms set forth in actions 22-008424-0007-CO and 22-10888-0007-CO consolidated thereto, in the sense that Law No. 10.183, "Reform of Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998 (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities)", is also challenged on the grounds that it is contrary to Articles 97 and 102 of the Political Constitution. The norms are challenged insofar as: 1) in the consolidated action No. 22-008424-0007-CO, the approval procedure by the Legislative Assembly is questioned, which, in its view, injures Article 97 of the Political Constitution. This is because, when the bill was consulted with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it provided a negative opinion regarding its content. In the first place, it indicated that said bill generates a hollowing out of the human right to be elected by preventing officials with two terms in the same office of popular election in the municipal regime from being able to aspire to other offices of that nature within the same regime, especially those holding mayor's offices (alcaldías) and district mayor's offices (intendencias). Secondly, that within the six months prior and four months subsequent to the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law bills on which the T.S.E. has expressed disagreement. On this last aspect, the Constitutional Chamber ruled in vote No. 2022-006119 at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, and, in substantive terms, indicated that Article 97 must be interpreted to mean that the objection to the bill must be related to the respective election, in which case, if a bill refers to municipal elections and we are not in the electoral period for electing municipal authorities, the T.S.E.'s objection would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of aggravating it, requiring a qualified majority of two-thirds for its approval. The petitioner considers that the final part of Article 97 is not subject to any interpretation and its content is clear. On the other hand, in the referenced vote, the Constitutional Chamber makes interpretations of constitutional electoral norms, when this task corresponds exclusively to the T.S.E., in accordance with Article 102, subsection 3 of the Political Constitution. On this aspect, it cites, in support of its thesis, the dissenting vote of Magistrate Castillo Víquez in vote No. 2022-6119. 2) In the consolidated action No. 22-10888-0007-CO, it is further alleged a violation of the requirement for a reinforced special law, in the case of officials of the district municipal councils. In the case of such councils, the provisions of Article 172.2 of the Constitution apply. According to said numeral, the mentioned councils 'shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to constitute the municipalities.' According to constitutional numeral 169, the members of the local government are the council members (concejales) and the executive official. The same section 172.2 prescribes that the 'structure' and 'functioning' of the district municipal councils shall be regulated by 'a special law approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies.' This law was enacted: No. 8173-01, amended by No. 9208-14. Articles 6 and 7 regulate the popular election of the council members and of the members of the mayor's offices (intendencias). The indefinite reelection of the Municipal Code was applied to them. The referral to the code is to the one then in force. With the modification of the article, their status (regarding reelection) was changed, but not via a special law, the only route provided for by the Constitution, because reelection is a matter of 'structure' and 'functioning.' The reform to the Municipal Code, through the law being challenged, directly regulates the status of the elective officials of the district municipal councils, which constitutionally cannot be done, because the organization of these requires a special law, which already exists. They affirm that the foregoing does not undermine their arguments that human rights are being reduced via an ordinary law anyway, which is impermissible.

They also allege a violation of the principles of reasonableness and equality, given that there was truly no due study or care in the reform, which responded more to a campaign to discredit the local regime, orchestrated basically by the press; the approved scheme is seriously incongruent and does not represent a lawful exercise of legislative discretion. Mayors are prohibited, after two consecutive terms, from holding any municipal office of popular election, while vice mayors are only prohibited from holding the same office, or that of council members (regidores) or district trustees (síndicos), meaning they are allowed to run for mayor, and for district intendant (intendente) or vice intendant, and for council members of a district municipal council (concejales de un concejo municipal de distrito). They claim that this is senseless discrimination. According to the Transitory Provision (referred to the current officials who repeat election), if they are Executives, they may not stand as candidates for any popularly elected position in the next two elections. In the cases of vice-executives or council members (which does not include the council members of district municipal councils), the restriction is only to the same type of position, which establishes a totally unjustified difference. They point out that the issue can also be approached from another perspective. It is traditional to compare the local structure with the national one. According to Article 107 of the Constitution, deputies may not be consecutively reelected. Council members and council members of district municipal councils are restricted from the possibility of new elections for two periods, after completing two consecutive periods, which creates serious discrimination, a blatant unequal treatment, without the slightest justification. Two periods of separation inevitably force the abandonment of a local political career. Regarding this expansion, a fifteen-day hearing is granted to the Attorney General of the Republic, the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), and the President of the Legislative Assembly. (...) Notify with a copy of the filings initiating accumulated actions numbers 22-008424-0007-CO and 22-10888-0007-CO." 12.- By filing incorporated into the digital case file on July 7, 2022, Magda Inés Rojas Chaves appears, in her capacity as Deputy Attorney General of the Republic. She states the following: "I. PURPOSE OF THE EXPANSION OF THE ACTION First, we must point out that, when the unconstitutionality action processed under case file number 22-8383-0007-CO was admitted, this advisory body ruled on the substantive arguments raised against the provisions in the substantive part of Law 10,183 of April 5, 2022 and its transitory provision. Therefore, regarding the substantive claims raised in unconstitutionality actions 22-8424-0007CO and 22-10888-0007-CO, accumulated to said action, we refer the Chamber to our previous report, as they involve the same claims. Given this, this new report we are submitting will be limited to the new issues raised in unconstitutionality actions 22-8424-0007-CO and 22-10888-0007-CO which, in our view, refer solely to procedure claims in the approval of Law 10183. Based on this, we will rule on the following points: a) Alleged violation of the provisions of Article 97 of the Political Constitution, given that during the legislative process the Supreme Electoral Tribunal provided a negative opinion on the bill and that within the six months prior and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law those bills on which said electoral body has expressed disagreement; b) Alleged violation of the provisions of numeral 172.2 of the Constitution, because in the case of district municipal councils, their structure and functioning can only be regulated by “a special law approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies”. It is considered that Law 10183 does not have that condition, as it is a general and not special law, which already exists. II. ON STANDING Unconstitutionality action 22-8424-0007-CO was filed by the National Association of Mayoralties and Intendancies of Costa Rica (Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica) and action number 22-10888-0007CO, by the District Intendant of the District Municipal Council of Tucurrique (who is also the President of the Federation of District Municipal Councils) and the District Intendant of the District Municipal Council of Cervantes. Regardless of the positions held by the aforementioned claimants, it must be reiterated, as we pointed out in our previous report, that the Constitutional Chamber has accepted the existence of diffuse interests when it comes to the defense of political-electoral rights, specifically the right to elect and be elected. Therefore, we consider that there are no standing problems in the accumulated actions, since the provisions of numeral 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) are complied with. III. ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 97 OF THE CONSTITUTION. Within action 22-8424-0007-CO, it is alleged that the approval process of Law 10183 is in violation of the provisions of Article 97 of the Political Constitution, given that during the legislative process the Supreme Electoral Tribunal provided a negative opinion on the bill and that within the six months prior and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law those bills on which said electoral body has expressed disagreement. Due to its importance, we proceed to cite Article 97 of the Constitution, which states: “ARTICLE 97.- For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total number of its members shall be required. Within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into laws those bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.” As can be seen, the indicated article establishes two different scenarios. First, it requires that any law related to electoral matters, which has opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly and, second, it prohibits –absolutely– the Assembly from approving a bill that has the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal if it is within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election. To address the claim raised in this action, the following relevant facts of the legislative process carried out for the approval of Law 10183 must be taken into consideration: a) Bill 21810, which served as antecedent to Law 10,183 of April 5, 2022, was submitted to the legislative process on February 18, 2020 (see legislative file); b) By official letter AL-DSDI-OFI-0005-2022 of January 11, 2022, the Legislative Assembly mandatorily consulted the updated bill with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folio 728 of the legislative file); c) By official letter TSE-0199 of January 20, 2022, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal objected to the bill considering it contrary to the right to be elected, insofar as it prohibits officials with two consecutive periods in the same position from aspiring to other popularly elected positions in the municipal regime. Said official letter stated: “… this Tribunal, in the terms and with the scope of Article 97 of the Constitution, objects to the bill being processed in file No. 21.810. Such objection would be lifted if the legislators modify the bill so that, according to the spirit of the proposal, consecutive reelection is limited to a single time (maximum two continuous periods in the same position), without prohibiting the possibility of opting, at the end of the second term, for another position of popular election. Respectfully, it is recalled that “Within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (…) convert into laws the bills (…) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement” (constitutional numeral 97). FINAL AGREEMENT.” (folios 1063 to 1072 of the legislative file); d) In extraordinary session number 45 of December 23, 2021, the Legislative Plenary approved bill 21810 in first debate, with a vote of 46 votes in favor (folios 551 to 600 and 604 of the bill); e) In extraordinary session No. 46 of January 5, 2022, the discussion of Bill No. 21.810 began in second debate, where a motion of order was approved to return it to first debate and the discussion was suspended so that it would occupy the first place in the first debates in the following session (folio 650). f) Through ordinary session No. 85 of January 11, 2022, of the Legislative Plenary, the discussion began in the first debate process of Bill No. 21.810 (folio 702). In extraordinary session No. 053 of January 25, 2022, the discussion continued in first debate of the bill in question and it was approved in first debate by 40 votes in favor (folio 1082-1112). g) On January 27, 2022, several deputies of the Legislative Assembly filed an optional consultation of constitutionality, processed under case file number 22-001848-0007-CO (folios 1143 to 1162 of the legislative file); h) The Constitutional Chamber resolved the consultation through vote 2022-006119 at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, deeming that there were no procedural defects and declaring the consultation unresolvable regarding the alleged substantive defects; i) In ordinary session 105 of March 29, 2022, the Legislative Plenary approved bill 21.810 in second debate with 48 votes in favor, without accepting the observations made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folios 1367 and 1372). As is evident from the described facts, because it was a bill relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly consulted it with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal during its processing, an institution that partially opposed the legislative initiative, considering it contrary to the parameter of constitutionality and conventionality given the restriction established for municipal officials with two consecutive periods in the position, to opt for other positions of popular election (folio 1068 of the legislative file). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the bill was approved without taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, since the law finally approved maintained the restriction pointed out by the electoral body (a restriction on which we commented in our previous report). If the first scenario described in Article 97 of the Constitution is taken as a parameter, it is clear that there is no procedural infraction whatsoever, since the bill was approved in first debate by 40 votes and, in second debate, by 48 votes. This shows that even with the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Legislative Assembly exceeded the constitutional majority to depart from said opposition. The doubt arises in this case with the second scenario contemplated in numeral 97 of the Constitution, which prevents the Legislative Assembly absolutely from approving bills on electoral matters if it is within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, when there is opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. As can be seen, the bill was approved in first debate on January 25, 2022, less than a month before the national elections held in February 2022, and in second debate on March 29, 2022, less than a month before the second round of the national elections. The discussion then arises as to whether, given the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Legislative Assembly could approve the law, given the electoral moment we were in. Before addressing the claim raised, we must point out, as we have done on other occasions, that the delimitation of competencies between the Constitutional Chamber and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in electoral matters has not been peaceful, especially when we are facing constitutional control and, especially, with regard to interpretations of constitutional and legal norms on electoral matters. In ruling No. 5379-97 at 2:36 p.m. on September 5, 1997, the Constitutional Chamber had already stated that even though it is not its responsibility to hear acts related to electoral matters, it must analyze norms, including electoral ones subject to constitutional control, based on the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution and 73 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Despite this, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, through its jurisprudence, recognized its competence to perform functions of constitutional controller in specific cases, even disapplying statutory norms of political parties considering them contrary to the Law of the Constitution (resolutions 1669 at 9:30 a.m. on August 24, 1999, 393-E-2000 at 1:15 p.m. on March 15, 2000, 1328-E-2001 at eight hours and forty minutes on June 26, 2001, No. 859-E-2001 at 3:30 p.m. on April 17, 2001, No. 4102-E1-2013 at 10:15 a.m. on September 16, 2013, among others). This competence was partially denied by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling 2016-017376 at 11:41 a.m. on November twenty-third, two thousand sixteen, in which it reserved for itself the analysis of the constitutionality of electoral norms, except when there are precedents or jurisprudence of the Chamber itself that can serve as a parameter for the Tribunal to disapply a norm for reasons of constitutionality with inter partes effects. In ruling 15-016070 at 11:30 a.m. on October 14, 2015, the majority of the Chamber expanded its competence, determining that, additionally, it can exercise constitutional control not only over electoral norms, but also in relation to (sic) the jurisprudence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in electoral matters. Despite said criterion issued in 2015, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal subsequently held a position contrary to the Chamber, by considering that “the interpretative exercises of the TSE, in the exercise of the electoral function, are exempt from the constitutional control entrusted to the Constitutional Chamber, both with regard to isolated resolutions and the jurisprudence resulting from it.” (resolution 3603-E8-2016) (The bold text is not from the original). Without prejudice to the conflict of competencies that has persisted over time between the Constitutional Chamber and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it has been the criterion of this advisory body that as long as we are facing interpretations of constitutional or legal norms of an electoral nature (that do not constitute jurisprudence), the body that must exercise that competence exclusively and excludably is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, because the Constituent Assembly was clear in recognizing that attribution in articles 99 and 102 subsection 3 of the Constitution. In some cases, the Constitutional Chamber has endorsed this thesis (see for example ruling 2018-003423 at 9:50 a.m. on March two, two thousand eighteen, where an action against an interpretive resolution is dismissed outright), but the truth is that its position has not been uniform. This position we have held, that the position of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal should prevail when it involves an interpretation of an electoral norm, is of importance for this case, because as established in the facts section, said constitutional body pronounced negatively during the legislative process on the bill that served as the prelude to Law 10183 and which clearly constitutes an electoral norm. Additionally, said constitutional body warned the Legislative Assembly that “Respectfully, it is recalled that “Within the six months prior and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (…) convert into laws the bills (…) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement” (constitutional numeral 97). FINAL AGREEMENT.” (folios 1063 to 1072 of the legislative file); Despite this, the Constitutional Chamber during the legislative process resolved a facultative consultation of constitutionality interpreting the provisions of Article 97 of the Constitution, a norm of an eminently electoral nature, to reject the binding nature of the criterion issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal during the legislative process to the Legislative Assembly. We refer specifically to vote 2022006119 at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, in which the Chamber interpreted the provisions of Article 97 of the Constitution, indicating that, because Law 10183 is a norm aimed at municipal elections, there was no impediment to approving it during a national election, despite the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. It indicated, in what is relevant, in the cited vote: “In the original design of the Constituent Assembly of 1949, its will was that the three elections be held on a single day, that is: the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections. Indeed, it opted for the elections for president and vice presidents of the Republic (Article 133 of the Constitution), the members of the Legislative Branch (constitutional numeral 107), and the municipal council members (Article 171 of the Constitution), to be held on the same day. (…) However, by law –entry into force of the Electoral Code, Article 310– the municipal elections were separated from the presidential and legislative ones, moving the former to the mid-constitutional term. This modification of the system –moving from a single or concentrated model to a dual one– imposes an interpretation of constitutional numeral 97 in the face of this new reality. When it involved three elections on the same day, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the bill had the effect of suspending the power to legislate for the specific case during the six months prior and four months after the election; if the criterion was issued outside that period, the power to legislate was aggravated. The situation has changed radically at present, in which there are separate elections between the presidential and deputy elections and the municipal ones. In this situation, numeral 97 must be interpreted in the sense that the objection of the bill must refer to the respective election, in which case if a bill refers to municipal elections and we are not in the electoral period to elect the municipal authorities, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of aggravating it, that is, once the second debate is concluded, in the final vote the bill for its approval will require the qualified majority of two-thirds of the entirety of the members of the Legislative Assembly. If it were not so, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text of extending the prohibition period –from ten months or twelve months if there is a second round in the presidential elections to twenty-two months–, which is, clearly, contrary to the constitutional text. It is for this reason that, in the specific case, there is no procedural defect due to the fact that the Legislative Assembly approved the consulted bill in first debate. Moreover, there is even a conceptual error in what was consulted, since, in accordance with the reiterated jurisprudence of this Tribunal, in the hypothetical case that we were in the assumption of the prohibition of Article 97 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly is authorized by the Law of the Constitution and by the norms of the Parliamentary Statute to approve a bill in first debate on which there is an objection from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; what it could not do is approve it in the final vote after concluding the second debate. Ergo, based on the foregoing, the procedural defect is ruled out.” As is evident from the above, the Chamber considered that the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not suspend the vote of the Legislative Assembly, because the bill that served as the prelude to Law 10183 was directed at municipal elections and those that were in process were national in nature. Therefore, the Chamber considered that the bill only needed to be approved by an aggravated majority of the Legislative Assembly. Said position, in our view, has the drawback not only that the Chamber attributed to itself the interpretation or updating of a constitutional norm of an electoral nature (Article 97) that –in principle– corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, but also that the Chamber carried out said interpretation in accordance with a norm of legal rank (Electoral Code), ignoring the will of the Constituent Assembly enshrined in Articles 97, 99, and 102 subsection 3 of the Constitution, even though the electoral regime changed as of the entry into force of the Electoral Code. Likewise, it is clear that the norms contained in the bill that served as the prelude to Law 10183 were electoral in nature, so the TSE's opposition to the bill being voted on was binding on the Legislative Assembly. In other words, it is our view that during the legislative process, the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal should have prevailed, because it is that body that exclusively corresponds to the interpretation of electoral norms, and we were in the middle of a popular election. Note that at no time did that electoral tribunal consider during the legislative process that the bill could be approved because a municipal election was not the one underway, but rather, on the contrary, it indicated to the legislator that it could only approve it if it complied with the recommendations it was making to the bill, something that was not done by the Legislative Assembly (see already cited legislative records). We also consider that the fact that a legal norm refers to a municipal election and that the elections in process were national in nature, did not overcome the prohibition established in constitutional numeral 97, because under that thesis the legislator could create new obligations in electoral matters, without considering whether the Supreme Electoral Tribunal can or cannot face them, being in the middle of the complex logistics of an election, whatever its nature. Hence, precisely for this reason, it corresponds to the TSE to determine whether a bill –on electoral matters– can or cannot be approved during the months prior and after the election being held, especially because only said body can assess budgetary, logistical, and technical aspects relating to the organization of the suffrage and its material possibility of attending, at the same time, to any legal norms that the Legislative Assembly may enact in electoral matters, whether of municipal or national scope. Therefore, although we respect the position of the Constitutional Chamber, we consider that, in this case, the alleged violation of the legislative procedure did indeed occur. IV. ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 172.2 OF THE CONSTITUTION. The second procedure claim raised in unconstitutionality action 22-10888-0007-CO, accumulated to 22-8383-0007-CO, is the alleged violation of the provisions of numeral 172.2 of the Constitution, because the claimants consider that, in the case of district municipal councils, their structure and functioning can only be regulated by “a special law approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies”, a nature that Law 10183 does not fulfill, because it is a general law. In this regard, what is established by Article 172.2 of the Constitution must be cited: “ARTICLE 172.- Each district shall be represented before the municipality by a proprietary trustee (síndico propietario) and an alternate with voice but without vote. For the administration of interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases the municipalities may create district municipal councils, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to form the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies, shall establish the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing. (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 8105 of May 31, 2001)” As is evident from the cited article, the Constituent Assembly considered that the creation, structure, functioning, and financing of district municipal councils must be regulated by a special law, approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies. Precisely based on this norm, the claimants deem the existence of a procedural defect upon the approval of Law 10183, because they consider that it is general and not special in nature. To address the claim raised by the claimants, what is meant by “special law” must first be defined, which has been addressed both in the doctrine and in the administrative jurisprudence of this Attorney General's Office. "The term special law is usually used to designate that norm which subtracts part of the regulated matter or factual situation from another and provides it with a different regulation. The notion of special law denotes a tendency towards concreteness or singularization in the regulation of factual situations or, put succinctly, the existence of norms that represent an exception with respect to others of a more general scope. The ultimate characteristic of special law consists, then, in that, if it did not exist, its factual situation would automatically be included in the broader scope of the general law." (L, DIEZ-PICAZO: La derogación de las leyes, Civitas, Madrid, 1990, p. 345.) In legal opinion C-007-2003 of January 16, 2003, this advisory body referred to the difference between general and special norms, indicating in what is relevant: "As has been highlighted by doctrine and jurisprudence, the criterion of specialty is a relational criterion, in the sense that no norm is special by itself, but rather is so in comparison with another. The "special" norm constitutes an exception with respect to what is provided by another of a more general scope. This prevents the factual situation regulated by the norm from being included in the broader scope of the general law: ‘From its very definition, the relativity of the concept of special law emerges. This concept is relative, first of all, due to its relational nature: a norm cannot be intrinsically special, but must be so by comparison with another norm. Generality and specialty are not essential and absolute traits of norms. They are, rather, gradations of their scope of regulation, which, as such, only acquire meaning when they are compared with the scopes of regulation of other norms. But what is more: if specialty lies in specifying a factual situation based on a broader one, it is evident that a norm, special with respect to another, can in turn be general with respect to a third, and so on successively. Specialty, as a relational characteristic of norms, is susceptible –as if it were a system of concentric circles– of being reproduced indefinitely, as the normative provisions of the legal system differentiate and become more specific.’ L, DIEZ-PICAZO: La derogación de las leyes, Civitas, Madrid, 1990, p. 345." As is evident from the previous development, a norm can only be special when it is compared with another norm of a general nature precisely because of the matter regulated in one and the other, but they are not mutually exclusive. In other words, the issuance of a special law does not prevent the existence of other more general laws on the same matter, because what changes in one or another is its scope of regulation. The principle of specialty has also been established as a criterion of normative interpretation, which serves to resolve antinomies, making the special law prevail over the general one, but without this meaning that both norms cannot coexist. This principle does not suppose that in the face of the existence of a general norm and a special one, the former is repealed, but rather, as Villar Palasí points out, the simultaneous validity of both norms persists, even though the special one will be applied preferentially to the general law in the cases contemplated in the former (José Luis Villar Palasi: Derecho Administrativo, Universidad de Madrid, 1968, p. 479 and following).

For the foregoing, the argument of the plaintiffs is technically imprecise in considering that Law 10183 is unconstitutional because it is a general law and that the district councils can only be regulated through a special law. It should be recalled that the intention of Law 10183 is to regulate reelection in all positions within the municipal sphere and has a purpose very different from the General Law of District Municipal Councils, No. 8173 of December 7, 2001, which is the one that regulates the creation, structure, functioning, and financing of district municipal councils under the terms required in constitutional provision 172.2. Thus, the existence of Law 8173, which can be considered special in nature, does not bar the legislator's power to issue more general legislation such as that contained in Law 10183, which, furthermore, is intended to regulate different matters even though it encompasses district municipal councils. Consequently, we consider that there is also no procedural defect for the reasons raised by the plaintiffs and that the action should be dismissed regarding this claim as it is rather a claim of legality. V. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, the Office of the Attorney General considers that the plaintiffs of the accumulated actions 22-8424-0007-CO and 22-10888-0007-CO have sufficient standing. Regarding the alleged procedural defects, we consider that there is a procedural defect for the violation of the provisions of Article 97 of the Constitution. Regarding the alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172.2 of the Constitution, we consider that the action should be dismissed. Notwithstanding the above, regarding the merits of the action, we reiterate our opinion set forth in the previous report. Therefore, we reiterate that the provisions of Law No. 10183 are partially unconstitutional and that the substantive part of Law 10183 and its transitory provision must be annulled, except for what states the following: “Mayoresses or mayors may be continuously reelected only once... Vice-mayors and vice-mayoresses may also be continuously reelected only once… The persons… district intendants (intendentes), deputy district intendants (viceintendentes)…, as well as those who occupy any of the alternate positions, may be continuously reelected only once and may not occupy the same position or its alternate position until two periods have elapsed since their second period ended.” The rest of the law, we consider, is unconstitutional on the merits. In the manner set forth, the extended hearing granted is hereby discharged.” 13.- By document incorporated into the digital case file on July 8, 2022, Max Alberto Esquivel Faerrón appears, in his capacity as acting president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. He states the following: “I.- OBJECT OF THE ACTIONS FILED The petitioners, in essence, bring the actions seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of Law No. 10,183 and, especially, its single transitory provision, a norm which, in relevant part, states: “Persons currently serving as mayors, mayoresses, district intendants (intendentes), or district intendants (intendentas), and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to again occupy any popularly elected position within the municipal regime”. II.- ON THE MERITS OF THE ACTIONS FILED The plaintiffs, in their briefs, raise several constitutional objections which, for greater clarity of exposition, will be addressed independently, indicating –in each section– to which of the actions they belong. a) Alleged defect in the legislative process (action filed by ANAI). Mr. Alvarado Bogantes states that the Legislative Assembly converted bill No. 21,810 into the challenged law, despite this Tribunal, under the terms of Article 97 of the Constitution, having objected to it. According to the petitioner, the cited provision of the fundamental political text is precise in indicating that initiatives with which this Electoral Body has disagreed cannot be converted into law within the six months prior to and four months following an election, a clause that was not respected: the TSE opposed the bill in ordinary session No. 6-2022 of January 20, 2022 (less than one month before the presidential elections), and therefore, according to the filing brief, there was an absolute prohibition that prevented the legislator from approving this proposed legislation (lege ferenda) in a second debate. It is alleged that it is not appropriate to interpret that the cited impossibility of legislating on electoral matters objected to by the TSE only applies if the content of the initiative is related to the ongoing electoral process, as the constitutional framers made no such distinction. This Tribunal, after a review of the digital case file of the cited bill, confirms that the Legislative Assembly acted according to the guidelines provided by the Constitutional Chamber in the resolution that heard the optional consultation raised by several legislators as part of the legislative process for the law under analysis. Specifically, in advisory opinion No. 2022-006119 of 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, the constitutional judges stated: “In this situation, provision 97 must be interpreted to mean that the objection to the bill must refer to the respective election, in which case, if a bill refers to municipal elections and the electoral period for electing municipal authorities is not underway, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of aggravating it; that is, once the second debate has concluded, the bill would require, for its approval in the final vote, a qualified majority of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly. Otherwise, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text by extending the prohibition period –from ten months, or twelve months if there is a runoff in the presidential elections, to twenty-two months–, which is, clearly, contrary to the constitutional text. It is for this reason that, in the present case, there is no procedural defect due to the fact that the Legislative Assembly approved the consulted bill in a first debate.” In accordance with the foregoing, on the questioned point, the legislators' actions adhered to the opinion of the Constitutional Court, which is why we refrain from making any statement on this matter. b) Of the alleged violation of the right to passive suffrage (right to be elected) (point 2 of ANAI's brief). ANAI considers, in this argument, that the right to passive suffrage (derecho al sufragio pasivo) is completely emptied of content by preventing mayors who have been in office for more than two periods from running, in the following elections, for any other popularly elected position. Additionally, it is argued that the American Convention on Human Rights does not expressly list, as one of the reasons for limiting political rights, having previously held elected positions (this reasoning is also present in the section “violation of the principles of reasonableness and equality” of the brief filed by Messrs. Quirós Palma and Castillo Morales). This Magistracy, as noted in the response to the hearing granted regarding the initial action in the case file, considers that, indeed, the prohibition on a re-electionist mayor from running for another position contravenes the Law of the Constitution. Consequently, on this point, it refers to that response in which, in relevant part, it was stated: “This Constitutional Body, as it made clear to the legislative body, considers that the norm has a defect of constitutionality by completely restricting passive suffrage (derecho al sufragio pasivo) for re-electionist officials. Specifically, this Tribunal, in its opportunity, stated: ‘… the restriction that officials with two consecutive periods in office cannot opt for other popularly elected positions contravenes both constitutional and conventional parameters. The human right of political participation implies, among other things, that citizens can choose their governors, but also that they can run for the various positions that make up the structure of the State. This possibility of submitting one’s name to the Electoral College is not unrestricted, as the American Convention on Human Rights [sic] indicates that national legal systems may regulate the exercise of such prerogative for “reasons of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or conviction by a competent court” (Article 23). In the Costa Rican case, legislation has established, among other conditions for accessing local government, the requirement of electoral domicile in the constituency where one intends to serve for a specific period (among others, provisions 15, 22.e, and 56 of the Municipal Code), not having political rights suspended by a sentence, and being Costa Rican (provisions 15.a and 22.a of the referenced regulatory body); however, it would not be legitimate for a State to impede passive suffrage (derecho al sufragio pasivo) (the right to be elected) on the grounds of having occupied a specific position –different from the one aspired to– in the two immediately preceding periods. The restrictions on reelected officials (so they cannot opt for another position in the municipality) would make it impossible for those citizens to participate in internal party contests in order to later be nominated for popularly elected positions other than the one they occupy. In other words, no matter how much they belong to a political group and meet the legal nomination requirements, due to the public function they perform –ab initio– such public servants could not even compete in the internal processes where nominations are contested. Such an impact on the essential core of the right occurs precisely because not only is reelection being limited, but the application of the norm would also result in a total suspension of the citizen’s prerogative to contend for political offices. Note that this is where the substantial difference lies between the bill that would prohibit dual nomination and this initiative: in the former, competing for two positions simultaneously is prevented, but the right to do so for one is maintained (it does not absolutely prohibit candidacy), whereas in this legislative case file, the possibility of forming part of a slate of candidates is completely blocked. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the changes made to the text of the bill render it disjointed, as the statement of motives develops why the proponents consider it legitimate and necessary to limit reelection, but does not mention that any other type of candidacy must be restricted; in fact, it argues the opposite. Specifically, in the cited preamble of the proposal, the legislators themselves state that “… it is essential to modify the final paragraph of Article 14 of the aforementioned Municipal Code to limit the exercise of the same municipal position to a maximum determined number of periods, without this implying the impossibility of running and eventually being elected, as of the immediately following period, to some other popularly elected position with the same limitations.” (underline and highlighting are not original). In this line, the bill’s title is “Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities,” without any mention being made of the absolute restriction that some public servants would have, after being reelected, to present themselves as candidates for other municipal positions of popular election. Certainly, the name of the law does not have to account for all its content; however, in this case, it demonstrates how the original proposal was not to establish a prohibition as intense as the one that was incorporated via motions. This particularity compromises the principle of congruence, in the understanding of the opinion issued by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in its pronouncement OJ-049-2018 of May 31, 2018 (reiterated in OJ-059-2018 of July 18 of that year): “Thus, it is clear that the content of the Bill is much broader than its title suggests, as it is evident, once again, that the initiative does not propose a mere amendment to the Law of the Development Banking System but would also entail a substantive modification of the powers of the National Learning Institute (Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje). It must then be specified that good legislative drafting technique requires congruence between the title of the Law and its content. In this regard, specialized literature on the subject of Legislative Drafting Technique in Costa Rica has highlighted that congruence between the Law’s title and its content has 2 functions of the utmost importance: a. It helps determine the content and scope of the Law’s object and, therefore, indirectly, serves as a basis for allowing or disallowing amendments or modifications to a bill, and b. It facilitates linking content to the bill or allows determining, to the contrary, that it deals with a matter extraneous to it. In this respect, it is appropriate to cite what was written by MUÑOZ QUESADA: ‘To some extent, the title can help determine the content and scope of the law’s object and, indirectly, serve as a basis for allowing or disallowing substantial amendments or modifications to a bill. The title also facilitates the linking of related content or content entirely extraneous to the bill’s object. Therefore, it is admissible that the title must reflect the content, object, or subject matter of the text; and to that extent, it constitutes an important element not only for identifying the bill but also for determining the bill’s object.’ (MUÑOZ QUESADA, HUGO ALFONSO et al. ELEMENTOS DE TÉCNICA LEGISLATIVA. Legislative Assembly, San José, 1996, p. 82) Ergo, it must be reiterated that the title of the present Bill –which reads as follows: “Amendment to Law No. 8634, Development Banking System, of April 23, 2008, and its amendments”– does not congruently reflect its content, since, as has been explained, this would also entail a substantial amendment to the National Learning Institute (Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje). That is to say, the Bill could have a legislative drafting technique problem, which could eventually lead to procedural errors when admitting or rejecting amendment motions presented by the deputies. In any case, it must be recalled that, under the provisions of Article 11 of the Constitution in relation to provision 121 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, the legislative procedure is subject to a principle of transparency, by virtue of which citizens have the right to know relevant information regarding the Bills discussed in Congress. It is therefore understood that congruence between the title of the bills and their content is essential so that citizens can, in effect, know what is intended to be debated through a particular Bill.” This Tribunal reiterates that establishing conditions to limit reelection in municipal positions corresponds to Parliament in the exercise of its legislative discretion; however, in the bill now under consideration, the human right to be elected is emptied of content. If, for example, a person serves as mayor and is elected (immediately after their second period) as a council member, then it would not be a reelection but rather an election to a different position.’ (official communication of this Tribunal No. TSE-1242-2022 of May 24, 2002, incorporated into the case file of this action of unconstitutionality).” Notwithstanding the foregoing, where this Tribunal does disagree is with the stance that political rights can only be limited by the grounds exhaustively listed in paragraph 2 of provision 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, since the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has expressly dismissed that literalist reading of the norm. In the judgment on the merits of the case Castañeda Gutman vs. Mexico (issued on August 6, 2008), the referenced hemispheric Court clarified that there is no single type or model of electoral system for all the member countries of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, but rather that the American Convention, in the cited provision 23, sets forth some minimum requirements that every State must meet for its electoral framework to pass a conventionality test; once those requirements are met (which represent a floor or indispensable conditions), it is valid for each legal system to provide additional limitations. The protection body of the Americas, in the precedent under discussion, insisted that the reading of Article 23 repeatedly mentioned must be global and could not be interpreted in isolation or by decontextualizing its parts; furthermore, the inter-American judges noted that it is valid for each State to define the limitations on the right to vote and to be voted for, provided that such restrictions are not disproportionate, unreasonable, and do not violate the right to equality. Thus, that regional court specified: “The provision that indicates the grounds on which the use of the rights in paragraph 1 can be restricted has the sole purpose –in light of the Convention as a whole and its essential principles– of preventing the possibility of discrimination against individuals in the exercise of their political rights. Likewise, it is evident that these grounds refer to the enabling conditions that the law may impose for the exercise of political rights, and the restrictions based on those criteria are common in national electoral legislation, which provide for the establishment of minimum ages for voting and being voted for, certain ties to the electoral district where the right is exercised, among other regulations. Provided they are not disproportionate or unreasonable, these are limits that the States may legitimately establish to regulate the exercise and enjoyment of political rights and that refer to certain requirements that the holders of political rights must fulfill in order to exercise them. […] 161. As can be deduced from the foregoing, the Court holds that it is not possible to apply to the electoral system established in a State only the limitations of paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the American Convention.” Consequently, the limitation on the right to political participation on the grounds of restricting reelection is not unconventional; what is contrary to the international Human Rights parameter is that, as previously indicated, the candidacy for positions other than the one held for more than two periods is absolutely prohibited. c) Claim regarding the violation of the principle of non-retroactivity (grounds developed in both briefs). The plaintiffs consider that the law violates the principle of non-retroactivity by providing –in its transitory provision– that the restrictions on reelection will apply to those currently holding their elected positions for the second consecutive time. This Tribunal, in the response to action No. 22-008383-0007-CO (filed by the Mayor of Santa Ana), had the opportunity to address the alleged unconstitutionality due to retroactive application of the new rules. In that sense, it is appropriate to reiterate the stance that has already been expressed on the matter. “The right to political participation guarantees that citizens have the opportunity to try to access positions within the internal structures of political groups, as well as to eventually be included on candidate lists, without that possibility being truncated by aspects other than those authorized by Conventional Law. It is clear that the referenced prerogative does not imply a right to the position or to being elected to it; rather, it ensures that one can be part of the group of people who contest it. In this logic, the aspiration to continue in a position does not imply the automatic renewal of the mandate for an additional period. Candidacies for popularly elected positions must derive from contested, free, and democratic internal party processes, in which the members, provided they meet the requirements of the legal system (which includes statutory requirements), can submit their names so that their fellow party members, and ultimately the superior assembly (as the highest representative authority), decide who will be the nominated person. It is within this dynamic that the democratic principle and the right to political participation can be operationalized without more limitations than those legitimately authorized by the Law of the Constitution. In fact, electoral jurisprudence has, over time, been deepening the democratic ideal and its application to the designation of candidates by political groups for municipal elections. On this topic, it has been made clear that, if the party opted –in its bylaws– for its cantonal structure to make the nominations, the superior assembly could ratify or reject the proposed person, but if it did not accept the recommendation, it had to return the matter to the territorial body for a new nomination. This measure prevents people who did not compete internally within the group for a nomination from being appointed unexpectedly by the superior body, which would entail an unacceptable impact on the loyalty of the competition that must prevail in party processes, in light of the constitutional imperative of internal democracy (Article 98). Thus, the limitation of successive reelection to two terms does not, in itself, represent a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity; the fundamental right to reelection (qualified as such by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 2003-02771), like any prerogative of such nature, allows for restrictions and, in this case, it is understood that the restriction on submitting one's name for a third term is a proportional measure that does not empty the right of content and that, moreover, responds to a measure to ensure other constitutionally legitimate objectives such as the rotation of government personnel and the creation of conditions for new citizens to become involved in political decision-making positions, as intended by the American Convention on Human Rights [sic]. A citizen who has served for two or more consecutive periods in a representative position has been able to exercise their right to reelection and could even return to it after the lapse of 8 years from the conclusion of their second term, if they enjoy the favor of their fellow party members (to achieve the nomination) and, later, of the electoral college. Being currently in the exercise of a popularly elected position does not imply that the new rules of the electoral system cannot be applied to that officeholder until they sever ties with their representative position, as this would mean deferring the law's effects to a future, uncertain event personalized to the situation of a specific subject, which would frustrate, in the present case, the purpose pursued by the regulation, as expressed by the legislator in the statement of motives of the bill that was presented, it should be said, in February 2020. It is important to insist that the possibility of seeking permanence in office is the right protected when dealing with reelection, since the official with intentions of remaining in the position, as stated, must overcome internal dynamics to be included on the ballot and, subsequently, must enjoy the electoral favor of their fellow citizens, all of which are uncertain events subject to the popular will of the respective electoral colleges. These specific characteristics mean that the principle of non-retroactivity, as a manifestation of Legal Certainty, must be modulated and not interpreted extensively. The limitation imposed by the law is not an emptying of the right to reelection, but is only a way of regulating it; in that sense, the legislator could not have stated that current mayors -with more than two terms- had to conclude their functions immediately or that they could not submit their names to the electorate in the future, as such provisions would indeed be an illegitimate retroactive application. However, restricting them from running again in the two immediately following elections is a reasonable modulation considering that, at the time the new legislation enters into force, local authorities only have an expectation of continuing in their positions, since not even their respective political groups have validated such aspirations. Consequently, this Magistracy does not consider that there is a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity of the law.” (highlighting not original). d) Alleged violation of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and equality (briefs of both actions). ANAI’s representative, in point 4 of his filing brief, argues that the challenged norm violates the principles of proportionality and reasonableness by preventing current mayors and district intendants (intendentes) with more than two periods in the same position from running for these and any other local government positions in the 2024 and 2028 elections. In the plaintiff's opinion, the eight-year waiting period is disproportionate. In this Electoral Authority’s opinion, the argument raised is not admissible. As noted in the response to the mandatory consultation that the Legislative Assembly conducted within the legislative process for the respective bill (pages 1064 to 1073 of the legislative file), this Tribunal considers that establishing conditions to limit the reelection of municipal officials corresponds to Parliament in the exercise of its legislative discretion, a prerogative that includes, of course, setting the periods a citizen must wait before running again for a position they have occupied in the past. That said, such restrictions cannot include, as has been insisted, an absolute prohibition on running for other representative positions. On the other hand, Messrs. Quirós Palma and Castillo Morales claim that the principle of equality is violated because a differentiated clause is established for mayors and district intendants (intendentes) that does not apply to the rest of the municipal public servants. On multiple occasions, this Constitutional Body has indicated that establishing the conditions for ineligibility to access municipal positions is a matter that is also subject to legislative discretion. Consequently, it is not illegitimate, per se, to establish different requirements and limitations for accessing positions that are inherently different in their functions and responsibilities; the legislative policy might be, for example, that some public servants can pursue a political career in certain bodies (which occurs mainly in deliberative bodies), but that in others, alternation in the exercise of power is privileged, through clauses that limit reelection to that specific type of position. The defect of the challenged law is not that it provides different treatment for mayors and district intendants (intendentes) compared to the rest of the positions served in local governments (that disparity could be legitimate and be supported by objective parameters); rather, the unconstitutionality arises because that treatment empties the right to be elected of content, by preventing the executive officials of the cantons and of the district municipal councils from running for other types of positions. e) On the necessary special law to limit reelection in the District Municipal Councils. Messrs. Quirós Palma and Castillo Morales consider that the reelection of district intendants (intendentes) cannot be limited through the amendment to Article 14 of the Municipal Code introduced by the law being challenged; in their opinion, as the Political Constitution requires a special law for regulating the structure and functioning of the District Municipal Councils, only that type of legislation (a special one) can vary the eligibility conditions for those serving representative positions in said bodies. The territorial decentralization of the State and the design of local governments are provided for in Title XII of the Political Constitution, norms that refer to the fact that the municipalities shall be in charge of a deliberative body composed of municipal council members of popular election (municipal council) and an executive official designated by law (mayor); in addition, the constitutional framers established that “the municipalities may create district municipal councils” whose “structure, functioning, and financing” shall be developed by a special law (Article 172). However, the constitutional text did not specify the requirements, impediments, and conditions for ineligibility for accessing the positions of these district municipal councils. This lack of development of the subject matter under discussion must be understood as a delegation for ordinary law to regulate such circumstances; in other words, although these district bodies are constitutionally provided for, their powers, requirements to be met if one wishes to access them, and other specificities are matters subject to the legislative task.

On that line, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment no. 2128-94 of 14:51 hours on May 3, 1994, specified: “… in matters not regulated, but delegated to the legislator by the Constitution, the latter may establish conditions of real or apparent inequality when its exceptions are absolutely and clearly justified on the basis of other constitutional principles or values and, above all, the rights and freedoms of the human person. Consequently, the exceptions, limitations, requirements or impediments that will govern in electoral matters, defined by the legislator based on the responsibility delegated by the Constitution itself, must be based on objective reasons clearly motivated by the requirements inherent to the electoral system and the exercise of the office. In other words, restrictions that strengthen the democratic system and electoral processes may be admitted, even when a person or a group suffers the limited consequence of that regulation.” In compliance with the constitutional mandate to develop the structure of the Municipal District Councils (Concejos Municipales de Distrito), the legislator enacted Law No. 8173, which establishes that the creation of those bodies corresponds to the municipal council (concejo municipal) of the respective canton and that they will be composed of a deliberative body (municipal district councilors, concejales municipales de distrito) and an executive officer (the district intendant, intendente), who will be subject to the election rules (including requirements and impediments) of the aldermen (regidores) and the mayor (alcalde), as applicable (articles 3, 6 and 7). The special law for the aforementioned district bodies incorporated a normative referral to the Municipal Code regarding the eligibility conditions for those seeking to be elected as municipal district councilors and district intendants, in such a way that no constitutional precept is observed to be breached by providing for the limitation on re-election —in such positions— within the general regulatory framework of local governments. As can be deduced from the literal text of Article 172 of the Constitution, what must be provided for in a special law is the architecture of the municipal district councils (as is indeed the case in Law No. 8173), but the remaining aspects, such as the characteristics that aspiring candidates for those positions must meet, may well be regulated in another type of law, provided that statutory instrument has such character in a formal and material sense. III.- CONCLUSION In accordance with the considerations previously set forth, the TSE considers it important to note the following conclusions: • The Legislative Assembly approved, during an electoral period, Law No. 10,183, despite the objection of this Tribunal; however, the voting in the second debate was based on a criterion of the Constitutional Chamber, which is why this Electoral Authority omits referring to the procedural defect invoked in the action filed by ANAI. • Political rights may not only be limited by the grounds exhaustively listed in paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has expressly dismissed that literalist reading of the norm. • It is for the legislator to define, respecting the Law of the Constitution, the conditions of ineligibility for accessing municipal positions, a category within which the limitation on successive re-election is included. • Restricting current municipal authorities with more than two terms in office from running again in the two immediately following elections constitutes a reasonable modulation, considering that, at the time the new legislation entered into force, local officials have only an expectation of continuing in their posts, since not even their respective political groups have validated such aspirations; therefore, the principle of non-retroactivity of the law is not violated. • Establishing conditions to limit the re-election of municipal officials corresponds to Parliament in the exercise of its legislative discretion, a prerogative that includes, of course, setting the periods that a citizen must wait to run again for a position they have held in the past. • It is not unconstitutional to provide for the prohibition of re-election for district intendancies (intendencias) in the Municipal Code. • It is not illegitimate, per se, to establish different requirements and limitations for accessing positions that are inherently distinct in functions and responsibilities. • Law No. 10,183 produces a hollowing out of the human right to be elected insofar as it prevents officials with two consecutive terms in one position from being able to run for other popularly elected posts in the immediately following elections. IV.- CLAIM The TSE requests that the filed actions be partially granted, that is, only with respect to the impediment that prevents officials with two consecutive terms in the same position from running for other popularly elected posts.” 14.- By means of a document incorporated into the digital case file on July 8, 2022, Rodrigo Arias Sánchez appears, in his capacity as president of the Legislative Assembly. He states the following: “I.- PROCESSING OF THE LAW Law 10183, Reform of Article 14 of Law 7794; Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, (Law that limits the indefinite re-election of local authorities). It was processed under case file No. 21810. This bill was initiated on February 18, 2020, and published on March 2, 2020, in La Gaceta No. 11, Supplement No. 33. It was assigned for study to the Permanent Special Commission on Municipal Affairs and Participatory Local Development. It was consulted with the Municipalities and Municipal District Councils and with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The bill received an Affirmative Report on October 13, 2021. It was approved in First Debate on January 25, 2022, and in Second Debate on March 29, 2022; finally, the law was sanctioned by the Executive Branch on April 5, 2022, and published in Supplement 73 to La Gaceta No. 68 of April 8, 2022. II. REGARDING THE QUESTIONS This Presidency will now refer to each of the aspects questioned: 1.- Violation of Article 97 of the Political Constitution by considering it unclear and not admitting interpretation, except, due to the subject matter it deals with, that of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. We disagree with the plaintiffs, for the reasons set forth below: The plaintiffs allege that the procedure by which Law 10183 was approved violates Article 97 of the Political Constitution, considering that the final part of that article is not subject to any interpretation, that its content is not clear, and that the Constitutional Chamber, when ruling on the processing of the bill that became Law 10083, made interpretations that did not correspond to it, since, the plaintiffs state, the interpretation of constitutional electoral norms corresponds exclusively to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Article 102.3 of the Political Constitution. Article 102.- The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has the following functions: (…) 3) To interpret exclusively and bindingly the constitutional and legal provisions referring to electoral matters;…” For its part, Article 97 of the Political Constitution states: “Article 97.- For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of its total membership shall be required. Within six months before and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into laws those bills concerning said matters on which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed its disagreement.” Pursuant to the transcribed Article 97, the Legislative Assembly, when discussing and approving bills referring to electoral matters, must conduct a mandatory consultation of the initiative with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. If the Tribunal does not agree with the bill and objects to it, the Assembly, in order to approve it, requires a qualified majority of the votes, that is, the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the total membership. Furthermore, Article 97 of the Constitution states that the Assembly may not, within six months before and four months after popular elections, approve as laws electoral bills with which the Tribunal disagrees. During the processing of the bill (now Law 10183), a consultation was made with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which expressed its disagreement with it. However, the Legislative Assembly converted it into Law, this because, after an optional consultation with the Constitutional Chamber, the latter, in Resolution No. 2022-006119 of March 16, 2022, indicated that Article 97 must be interpreted to mean that the objection to the bill refers to the municipal elections, so the T.S.E.'s objection would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of making it more stringent. The Chamber considered what is stated in Article 150 of the Electoral Code, regarding the date on which elections will be held, and in relation to municipal elections, it states: (…) Municipal elections to elect aldermen (regidores), district council members (síndicos), mayors (alcaldes) and district intendants (intendentes), members of district councils (concejos de distrito) and of the municipal district councils, with their respective substitutes, shall be held on the first Sunday of February two years after the election for president, vice presidents, and deputies to the Legislative Assembly. In relation to Article 97, the Constitutional Chamber stated: ARTICLE 97 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. “…This modification of the system —moving from a single or concentrated model to a dual one— imposes an interpretation of constitutional Article 97 in light of this new reality. When it involved three elections on the same day, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's objection to the bill had the effect of suspending the power to legislate for the specific case —during the six months before and four after the election—; if the opinion was issued outside that period, the power to legislate was made more stringent. The situation has changed radically at present, where there are separate elections for the presidential and deputy elections and the municipal elections. In this situation, Article 97 must be interpreted to mean that the objection to the bill must be related to the respective election, in which case, if a bill refers to municipal elections and the electoral period for electing municipal authorities is not in effect, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's objection would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of making it more stringent, that is, once the second debate is concluded, in the final vote, the bill, for its approval, would require the qualified majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly. Otherwise, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's objection would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text by extending the prohibition period —from ten months or twelve months if there is a runoff presidential election to twenty-two months—, which is, by all accounts, contrary to the constitutional text…”. The plaintiffs allege that the Constitutional Tribunal should not, or cannot, interpret Article 97 because it is an electoral matter, because the interpretation of this matter belongs exclusively to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. While interpretation in electoral matters is the exclusive competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, if one is in the presence of a matter of constitutional review, in which the aim is to guarantee the supremacy of the constitutional norm and the block of constitutionality, that matter falls to the Constitutional Chamber to resolve. This is because, in the case of Costa Rica, the model of constitutional review is centralized, that is, it falls within the exclusive competence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. The participation of the Constitutional Chamber in the law-making process, through prior constitutional review, is to prevent unconstitutional norms from arising in legal life, and it is the Constitutional Chamber which, strictly speaking, has the exclusive function of exercising constitutional review, a competence established exclusively for the Judicial Branch since 1887 and for the Constitutional Chamber since 1989. (Judgment number 201015048 of fourteen hours and forty minutes on September eighth, two thousand ten). As a corollary to the foregoing, as stated by the Constitutional Chamber when referring to Article 102, subsection 2 of the Political Constitution, it respects the competences of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (the interpretation of electoral matters), but the Constitutional Chamber has its own competences of constitutional review: ARTICLE 102 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. “… II.- On constitutional review in electoral matters. Regarding the foregoing statements, this Chamber must reiterate that the issue of the delimitation of competences between the Constitutional Chamber and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in electoral matters is complex, since the Constituent Power chose to maintain two bodies with constitutional competences in the matter. In some cases, the Political Constitution itself clearly indicates in which cases the Chamber may act —even in electoral matters— and in others, the standard is delimited by law. In the case of electoral matters, the Political Constitution of 1949 established a special constitutional scope in favor of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Thus, it has recognized in Article 9 a rank and independence vis-à-vis the other Powers of the State in the exercise of its function, which is the exclusive and independent oversight of the organization, direction, and supervision of acts related to suffrage, as well as the other functions attributed to it by the Constitution and the law. For its part, Article 102, subsection 3) establishes as one of the Tribunal's functions 'to interpret exclusively and bindingly the constitutional and legal provisions related to electoral matters.' The Constituent Power deliberately created a special jurisdiction for electoral matters as a whole, excluding the Supreme Electoral Tribunal from any control, oversight, or tutelage by the other Powers of the State. The aforementioned powers indeed deliberately establish a special jurisdiction for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, but not an 'exclusivity' in 'electoral matters,' because regarding the constitutionality of norms in general, the Constitutional Chamber retains —by express provision of Article 10 of the Constitution— the exclusivity of annulling norms it deems contrary to the Constitution, a power it also exercises in electoral matters...” “… III.- Just as the Constitutional Chamber is constitutionally precluded from affecting the exercise of the constitutional competences of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it is also true that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has the same restriction with respect to the exercise of the competences of other State bodies, such as the Constitutional Chamber, even in electoral matters. In the case of constitutional review, the constitutionally provided remedy to eliminate a norm from the legal system is of two types: a) modification, reform, or repeal by the legislator; or b) annulment by the body responsible for exercising constitutional review in the strict sense, a competence established exclusively for the Judicial Branch since 1887 and for the Constitutional Chamber since 1989. (Judgment number 2010-15048 of fourteen hours and forty minutes on September eight, two thousand ten). By virtue of the foregoing, the sua sponte interpretation made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of the challenged norm, when resolving the electoral amparo remedy filed by the plaintiff Argüello Mora through vote number 3782-E1-2013, by which 'the statutory norm was disapplied for the specific case,' is in no way an impediment for the Constitutional Chamber to analyze its constitutionality and, in this way, decide —as corresponds to it according to the Political Constitution— on the possible affectation of fundamental rights, exercising its competences to guarantee their protection, should it so consider…” Judgment 010199-19 Consequently, in the exercise of the Constitutional Chamber's exclusive competence of constitutional review, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's attribution of interpreting electoral matters ceases to be exclusive, given that the Chamber is the one that defines which of the possible interpretations of the norm best conforms to the constitutional text and the block of constitutionality. The foregoing analysis leads us to reject the plaintiffs' allegations that the Constitutional Chamber should not have interpreted Article 97 of the Political Constitution. 2.- Regarding the allegation that the reforms made in Law 10183, by including the Municipal District Councils, should have been made in the special Law that regulates them and not through a reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code. The plaintiffs' arguments are not shared for the following reasons: First, the municipal authority positions chosen through popular election are the following: - The mayors (alcaldes) of each canton, as well as a vice mayor and a third position of substitute mayor or second vice mayor. - The district council members (síndicos propietarios) and council members (concejales propietarios) and their substitutes in each of the country's districts, who make up the District Councils (Concejos de Distrito). - The aldermen (regidores) who make up the Municipal Councils of the municipalities, both proprietary and substitute members. Their number varies according to the population of the canton they govern. - The district intendants (intendentes) of districts that are very remote or islands. Next, the current Article 14 of the Municipal Code is transcribed. It can be observed that Law 10083 modified that article and established certain limitations regarding the re-election of some positions: “Article 14.- The executive official indicated in Article 169 of the Political Constitution shall be called the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal).// There shall be two municipal vice mayors: a first vice mayor and a second vice mayor. The first vice mayor shall carry out the administrative and operational functions assigned by the mayor; furthermore, shall substitute, by operation of law, the municipal mayor in their temporary and permanent absences, with the same responsibilities and competences as the mayor during the substitution period.// In cases where the first vice mayor cannot substitute the mayor, in their temporary and permanent absences, the second vice mayor shall substitute the mayor, by operation of law, with the same responsibilities and competences as the mayor during the substitution period.// In the municipal district councils, the executive official indicated in Article 7 of Law No. 8173 is the district intendant (intendente distrital), who shall have the same powers as the municipal mayor. Additionally, there shall be a district vice intendant (vice intendente distrital), who shall carry out the administrative and operational functions assigned by the titular intendant; they shall also substitute, by operation of law, the district intendant in their temporary and permanent absences, with the same responsibilities and competences as the latter during the substitution period.// All popularly elected positions at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the presidency and vice presidencies of the Republic and those who will make up the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take office on May 1st of the same year of their election, for a period of four years and may be re-elected.// The female or male mayors may be re-elected continuously only once. They may not hold any popularly elected position in the municipal regime until two terms have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended. The vice mayors may also be re-elected continuously only once and may not hold the same position or that of aldermen or district council members until two terms have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended.// The persons holding the positions of aldermen, district council members, district intendants, vice intendants, municipal district councilors under Law 8173, General Law of Municipal District Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those occupying any of the substitute positions, may be re-elected continuously only once and may not hold the same position or its substitute position until two terms have elapsed since their second term ended.” Upon a correct reading of Article 172 of the Political Constitution, it can be determined that the intent of this article refers to the Municipal District Councils. Although the norm mentions a special law, it means that this special law regulates the conditions under which the Municipal District Councils may be created, their structure, and functioning. Regarding the election of their members, the constitutional norm refers to the procedure used by the municipalities. Let us see: ARTICLE 172.- Each district shall be represented before the municipality by a district council member (síndico propietario) and a substitute with voice but no vote. For the administration of the interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases, the municipalities may create municipal district councils, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to form the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total deputies, shall establish the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing.” (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 8105 of May 31, 2001) The transcribed constitutional norm is clear as to its objective: for the integration of the Municipal District Councils, the same popular election procedures used to form the municipalities must be followed. Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, regulates the matter of the appointment term and re-election of the popularly elected positions of the municipalities. Therefore, the novel aspects regarding re-election that were proposed in Law 10183 were indeed correctly located in the reform to Article 14 of the Municipal Code. It should be added that it is the Municipal Code, in its Article 55, that refers to the integration of the Municipal District Councils, a norm that in turn refers to Article 14 of that same Code: “Article 55. - The District Councils shall be composed of five proprietary members; one of them shall be the district council member (síndico propietario) referred to in Article 172 of the Political Constitution and five substitutes, one of whom shall be the substitute district council member (síndico suplente) established in the aforementioned constitutional article. The substitutes shall substitute for the proprietary members of their same political party, in cases of temporary or occasional absence and shall be called for that purpose by the President of the Council, from among those present and according to the order of election. The members of the District Council shall be popularly elected for four years, simultaneously with the election of municipal mayors, as provided in Article 14 of this code, and by the same election procedure for deputies and municipal aldermen established in the Electoral Code…” The creation of the Municipal District Councils receives differentiated treatment from, on the other hand, the election procedures for the members that make them up. Article 2 of Law 8173, General Law of Municipal District Councils, regulates how the creation of those Municipal Councils is carried out, which is done by a vote of two-thirds of the total Council of the canton, at the request of a number of residents of the District established by law, and is submitted to a popular referendum, which must have the support of 15% of the voters registered in the canton. Law 8173 regulates the functioning and structure of the Municipal District Councils. In terms of election, on the other hand, the constitutional norm (Article 172) opted for the integration of those councils to be done following the same popular election procedures used to form the municipalities; for that reason, the reforms regarding re-election were made in the Municipal Code, because it is this normative body that regulates everything related to the election of municipal positions. The Law of Municipal Councils (Law No. 8173), in Articles 6 and 7, regarding the councilors and proprietary and substitute intendants, states that they shall be governed under the same conditions of duties and powers as other positions that are systematized in the Municipal Code: Article 6°-The municipal district councils shall be composed, as collegiate bodies, of five proprietary councilors and their respective substitutes, all residents of the district; they shall be popularly elected on the same date as the election of the district council members (síndicos) and for an equal term. Likewise, both the proprietary and substitute councilors shall be governed under the same conditions and shall have equal duties and powers as the municipal aldermen...” “Article 7.- The executive body of the municipal district councils shall be the Intendancy, whose head shall also be popularly elected, on the same date, for an equal term, under the same conditions and with equal duties and powers as the municipal mayor.” The foregoing analysis allows us to arrive at the conclusion of the mistake in what was argued by the plaintiffs, that the changes made to Article 14 of the Municipal Code by Law No. 10083 should have been made in Law 8173, General Law of Municipal District Councils, an argument that must be rejected. 3. Regarding the allegation of reduction of human rights and affectation of the principles of reasonableness, equality, and non-discrimination by Law 10083. The arguments that maintain that Law 10083 produces a reduction of human rights and affects the principles of reasonableness and equality, as well as non-discrimination, lack reasoning: First of all, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal already indicated in official communication No. TSE0784-2019 of April 10, 2019, sent to the Constitutional Chamber in response to the hearing granted in case file No. 19-000892-007-CO, in the following sense: “…like any right, re-election admits reasonable limitations on its exercise through the enactment of a law in the formal and material sense, with it being up to the legislator to decide, within the constitutional framework, what the modulations to that right will be...”. The territorial decentralization of the State and the design of local governments are provided for in Title XII of the Political Constitution, norms that determine that the municipalities shall be in charge of a deliberative body composed of popularly elected municipal aldermen (municipal council, concejo municipal) and of an executive official to be designated by law (mayor, Art. 169). However, the constituent power did not specify what the requirements, impediments, and conditions of ineligibility would be for accessing municipal elected positions. Before 2002, the position of mayor was not popularly elected. The regulation of the powers and requirements for accessing those positions, as well as other specifications, are understood to be delegated to the legislative function. In judgment No. 2128-94 of May 3, 1994, it specifies the following: “…matters not regulated, but delegated to the legislator by the Constitution, the latter may establish conditions of real or apparent inequality when its exceptions are absolutely and clearly justified on the basis of other constitutional principles or values and, above all, the rights and freedoms of the human person. Consequently, the exceptions, limitations, requirements or impediments that will govern in electoral matters, defined by the legislator based on the responsibility delegated by the Constitution itself, must be based on objective reasons clearly motivated by the requirements inherent to the electoral system and the exercise of the office. In other words, restrictions that strengthen the democratic system and electoral processes may be admitted, even when a person or a group suffers the limited consequence of that regulation…”. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has considered that it is up to the legislator to define, respecting the Law of the Constitution, what the conditions of ineligibility for accessing municipal positions will be, a category within which the limitation on successive re-election is included; that is, this is a matter left to legislative discretion.

Similarly, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has indicated that: "...the limitation of successive reelection to two terms does not in itself constitute a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity; the fundamental right to reelection (so qualified by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment 203-02771), like any prerogative of such nature, admits restrictions, and, in this case, it is understood that the restriction on nominating one's name for a third term is a proportional measure that does not empty the right of content and that, furthermore, responds to a measure to ensure other constitutionally legitimate purposes such as the rotation of government cadres and the creation of conditions for new citizens to become involved in political decision-making positions, as intended by the American Convention on Human Rights." Although this law establishes temporal limitations on the positions for which one may run in municipal popular election posts, these limitations are reasonable and conform to the block of constitutionality. The approved reforms are consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, which states that the Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternating, and responsible. Alternation, as the Constitutional Court has rightly pointed out, is a constitutional principle that implies the real and effective possibility that public offices be occupied temporarily according to the periods previously established in the Political Constitution or in the law. That is, the periodic renewal of public offices through free elections, from which the elements of legitimacy and political control stand out, as citizen participation is required in its entirety – for Presidential elections, for deputies, council members (regidores), district councilors (síndicos), and the municipal mayor – or fractionally – in the case of the integration of collegiate bodies of public entities; alternation in Power requires a democratic regime that allows genuine and equitable competition among political parties or groups, sectors, or associations. Alternation in power does not presuppose the rotation of the elected position among the various groups, parties, or sectors participating in an electoral process, but rather the existence of election processes grounded in the democratic principle, that is, in the calling of free, multi-party, and secret elections. Additionally, it must be considered that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has clearly indicated that: "...reelection admits reasonable limitations on its exercise through the enactment of a law in a formal and material sense, with the legislator responsible for deciding, within the constitutional framework, what the modulations to that right will be." (TSE-0784-2019 of April 10, 2019, sent to the Constitutional Chamber as a response to the hearing granted in file No. 19-000892-0007CO). As the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República)[7] has indicated, the ordinary legislator may redefine or change whatever it deems appropriate or convenient regarding the system governing municipal elections, provided the legislative decisions are reasonable and proportional. This reform does not annul, render nugatory, or make impossible the exercise of the fundamental right to be elected (the figure of passive vote). The manner and cases in which the law stipulates reelection for municipal offices do not contravene the block of constitutionality. Nor are the provisions of Law 10083 unconstitutional for establishing temporary impediments preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same office from running for other popular election posts; firstly, because it is a reasonable modulation that the legislator considered necessary to make, and secondly, because the restrictions established do not represent discrimination; they are equal for all. In that sense, the principle of equality permits differentiations, and the distinct limitations respond to the inherent differences of the municipal popular election offices, and therefore, they do not constitute arbitrary differentiations. In accordance with the foregoing, the Constitutional Court is requested to reject the allegations made by the plaintiffs on this point. 4. Regarding the allegation that the law is a response to a campaign to discredit local council members. The enactment of laws may be a response to a series of diverse social, economic, and cultural factors and circumstances, whether to resolve conflicts or provide solutions to specific national or international situations. However, the plaintiffs' assertion, which is rejected in all its extremes, invoking for the benefit of their interests the thesis that Law 10083 is a response to a campaign to discredit local council members, is clearly unfounded. This assertion lacks support. Law 10083, from its origin, at the time of its presentation as a bill, as can be seen in its statement of reasons, as well as during the course of its discussion, never intended to constitute a sanction of any kind, much less a discrediting campaign. It is on record that at all times parliament acted within the parameters of its exclusive function of legislating, creating, and reforming laws. It did not act, nor did it intend to act, in the exercise of political control, for which it has its own distinct functions, operating in a different dimension, using different means, and having different effects. And of course, under no circumstances would the Legislative Assembly use the formulation of a law with the purpose of affecting any citizen; quite the contrary, Parliament seeks to create spaces for discussion, analysis, and definition of political wills, for the betterment of society and with absolute respect for the block of constitutionality, with special attention to the respect of principles such as the democratic principle, reasonableness, fundamental rights, and human rights, ultimately human dignity. For this reason, the Constitutional Court is requested to reject an unfounded argument of this type. III.- PETITION (PETITORIA) In accordance with the report rendered, it is requested that the action of unconstitutionality be rejected." 15.- By a written submission incorporated into the digital file on September 20, 2022, Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza appears. He states the following: "Both the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal have extensively addressed the clear violation of constitutionality generated by the form and substance in which the Sole Transitional Provision of Law 10,183 was approved, constituted as a political reaction in the context of an electoral struggle and a presumed corruption scandal, instrumenting it as a public and political sanction against those of us who had been favored on several occasions in our capacity as Mayors (Alcaldes), disrespecting the prohibition against carrying out this type of reforms within the 6 months prior to an election and creating an odious inequality, excluded by the Political Constitution, of doubling the number of prohibition years for not being reelected, for municipal representatives, compared to the representatives elected at the national level, whether Deputies, President or Vice Presidents of the Republic. In my capacity as Mayor and President of a municipal associative entity, which comprises representatives from approximately 17 different Political Parties, both national and local, we suffer political, personal, and social uncertainty, faced with the imminent obligation to develop our internal electoral processes, of cantonal, provincial, and national district assemblies, of not knowing whether we will be able to participate in the next elections, due to the gross sanction of which thousands of honest Costa Rican political representatives were victims, whose only sin was having received the trust of the suffrage of Costa Rican citizens. The internal processes of the political parties will have to begin very soon, and this prohibition is being used not only to undermine our personal aspirations but has also created great social anxiety and uncertainty and would represent one of the strongest blows suffered by our political democracy in recent times. For the foregoing, and given the urgency to begin the internal electoral processes of the various political groups, we vigorously and respectfully request the Justices, men and women, to accept the extensive and clear technical considerations outlined both by the legal advisory body of the Republic and by the Supreme Tribunal that sustains the exclusive constitutional competence in electoral matters, declaring the challenged Sole Transitional Provision unconstitutional." 16.- By a written submission incorporated into the digital file on November 23, 2022, Justice Jorge Araya García files a recusal (inhibitoria).

17.- By resolution of 10:16 a.m. on November 24, 2022, the Presidency of the Chamber removed Justice Araya García from the case and ordered this situation to be communicated to the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice for his substitution.

18.- By draw 10808, the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice selected substitute Justice Rosibel Jara Velásquez to substitute Justice Jorge Araya García.

19.- By a written submission incorporated into the digital file on November 23, 2022, Heriberto Cubero Morera appears, in his capacity as president with powers of unlimited general agent (apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma) of ANAI. He states the following: "With the utmost respect and given that the internal processes of the different political parties, for the purpose of nominating candidates for popular election posts within the Municipal Regime, begin in February of the year 2023, under the protection of Article 41 of the Political Constitution, we request that the present action of unconstitutionality be given prompt dispatch. Consideration must be given to the fact that, if the action is upheld and the substantive resolution is issued after the start of the internal party processes, the current municipal authorities who have two terms of appointment would be seriously affected in their rights to participate in this next municipal electoral process, making their participation impossible." 20.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by section 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

21.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Justice Rueda Leal, with the exception of Considerando V, which is drafted by Justice Castillo Víquez; and, Considering (Considerando):

I.- Preliminary matter. This Court prioritized the resolution of this action of unconstitutionality by virtue of the imminence of the municipal electoral processes and for reasons of legal certainty for persons with aspirations for both active and passive participation.

II.- On the admissibility of the action. The action of unconstitutionality is a process subject to certain formalities that must be observed so that the Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. Precisely, section 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) regulates the admissibility requirements for the action of unconstitutionality. In the first place, it requires a prior pending matter to be resolved, whether in judicial or administrative proceedings (in the procedure to exhaust it), in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. The second and third paragraphs contemplate scenarios in which, exceptionally, the prior matter is not required, such as the nonexistence of an individual and direct injury due to the nature of the matter, the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when the action is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), or the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).

In this regard, although the plaintiff parties base their standing on various arguments related to the right to elect and be elected in the municipal regime, as well as on their personal conditions, the positions they hold, and the groups they represent, it is no less true that the Chamber has recognized the existence of diffuse interests in this type of issue, since it relates to the democratic system in general. For example, in judgment no. 2012-001966 of 9:32 a.m. on February 17, 2012, this Court stated:

"The right to elect and be elected to popular election posts, as political rights, have not only the nature of being able to affect a specific citizen, but also of affecting the democratic system in general, which is based on the periodic renewal of its political structures as one of its postulates, through the popular election of different posts, such that it has that dual nature that makes it diffuse and therefore directly challengeable, by way of exception (...)." Ergo, the Chamber upholds the standing of the plaintiff party in the sub iudice based on the second paragraph of section 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

III.- Object of the action. In the sub examine, the constitutionality of the substantive part and the sole transitional provision of Law No. 10183 of April 5, 2022, called 'Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities' (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales) is questioned. On one hand, two procedural defects are alleged: a) violation of Article 97 of the Constitution and b) transgression of the second paragraph of section 172 of the Constitution. On the other hand, regarding the merits, it is claimed that the impediment to reelection for two consecutive periods in municipal election offices (including terms prior to the norm's effectiveness) transgresses Articles 7, 33, 34, 39, 40, 93, 169, and 171 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of equality and political freedom; proportionality; reasonableness; non-retroactivity (irretroactividad); the Social and Democratic Rule of Law; and section 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

IV.- On the challenged norms. Law No. 10,183 of April 5, 2022, called 'Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities' (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales) and whose constitutionality is questioned, contains these norms:

"SOLE ARTICLE- The fifth paragraph of Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, is reformed. The text is as follows:

(...)

All popular election posts at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the presidency and vice-presidencies of the Republic and those who will comprise the Legislative Assembly are elected.

They shall take office on May 1st of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected.

Mayors (alcaldesas or alcaldes) may be continuously reelected only once. They may not hold any popular election post of the municipal regime until two periods have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended. Vice Mayors (vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas) may also be continuously reelected only once and may not hold the same post or that of council member or district councilor (síndicos) until two periods have elapsed since their second consecutive term ended.

Council members (personas regidoras), district councilors (síndicas), district intendants (intendentes), vice intendants, district municipal councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) of Law 8173, General Law of District Municipal Councils (Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito), of December 7, 2001, as well as those who hold any of the alternate posts, may be continuously reelected only once and may not hold the same post or its alternate post until two periods have elapsed since their second term ended.

Sole Transitional Provision (Transitorio Único)- Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), intendants or intendants (intendentes or intendentas), and who have already been elected to their posts for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before they may again hold any popular election post of the municipal regime.

Persons currently serving as vice mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), vice intendants, property and alternate council members (regidores and regidoras propietarios y suplentes), property and alternate district councilors (síndicos and síndicas propietarias y suplentes), and who have already been elected to their posts for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before they may again hold the same popular election post of the municipal regime; however, they may hold other municipal posts in accordance with this law." V.- On the consultation of constitutionality resolved in relation to legislative file No. 21.810. This Court, in opinion No. 2022006119 of 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, resolved the optional legislative consultation of constitutionality formulated regarding the bill 'Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities)', processed under legislative file No. 21.810. On that occasion, it was resolved:

"II.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE CONSULTATION. - The Deputies consult on the bill for the “Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities)”, which is processed under legislative file number 21.810. Three aspects are raised. In this regard, this Chamber observes that what is consulted is posed as questions. Thus, it is consulted:

• A)Procedural violation: The consulting Deputies indicate that the intention of the Constituent Assembly, regarding the restrictions of Article 97 of the Constitution, was to avoid transformations of the electoral system in times close to elections. In this specific case, the proposed modification relates solely and exclusively to the municipal regime, whose electoral period is not active, given that the electoral call currently in effect relates to the Government of the Republic and the Legislative Assembly, completely excluding the municipal regime; therefore, a doubt arises related to the legislative process: Is the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is that relating to the national sphere?
• B)Violations on the merits: The consulting Deputies consider that the bill in question:

1. Violates the human right to political participation.- The consulting Deputies mention the argument of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, when consulted on this bill, to the effect that the proposal creates an emptying of the human right to be elected by preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same office from aspiring to other popular election posts. Therefore, they indicate that it is necessary to resolve the conclusion outlined by the TSE regarding the emptying of the human right to be elected, by preventing them from seeking a popular election municipal post, opting for immediate election to a different post within the same municipal regime, since it implies a total suspension of the citizen's prerogative to aspire to public office.

2. Violates the principle of non-retroactivity (irretroactividad) of the law: The consulting Deputies consider that the sole transitional provision violates Article 34 of the Constitution, in that it prevents the current municipal authorities elected by popular vote, who have already served two or more consecutive periods in the same office, from being able to run for the same office again in the 2024 election.

It is further clarified that the text this Chamber has before it to examine the consulted norm is the "Final Draft (Redacción Final)" dated January 26, 2022.

III.- IN GENERAL ON THE CONSULTED BILL AND THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED.- The bill for the approval of the “Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities)”, which is processed under legislative file number 21.810, followed, in general, the following legislative procedure:

• a)On February 18, 2020, several deputies introduce the bill “Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code, and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998” (law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities), which is processed under legislative file No. 21.810 (see folios 1-13).
• a)On February 18, 2020, file No. 21.810 was sent to the Permanent Special Commission on Municipal Affairs and Participatory Local Development (Comisión Permanente Especial de Asuntos Municipales y Desarrollo Local Participativo) (folio 31).
• b)On March 2, 2020, the bill was published in La Gaceta No. 41 of Alcance No. 33.
• c)On June 13, 2020, the Head of the Legislative Commissions Area sends bill No. 21.810 for mandatory consultation to the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. On that same date, the mandatory consultations were sent to all the Municipalities of the country (folio 46-77, 83).
• d)On June 16, 2020, via official document TSE-1098-2020, the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal communicates the agreement adopted in the sixth article of the ordinary session No. 58-2020 held on June 16, 2020, by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, where it indicates that the TSE does not object to the bill in question (folio 78-82).
• e)On October 13, 2021, the Permanent Special Commission on Municipal Affairs and Participatory Local Development (Comisión Permanente Especial de Asuntos Municipales y Desarrollo Local Participativo) proceeds to render the Affirmative Majority Opinion (Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría) (folio 300-307).
• f)On November 18, 2021, via official document AL-DEST-IJU-279-2021, the Legal Report on file No. 21.810 is submitted (folio 312).
• g)On November 22, 2021, the first debate discussion of bill No. 21.810 begins (folio 331).
• h)In extraordinary session No. 45 of December 23, 2012, it was approved in the first debate, with 46 votes in favor and one against (folio 600).
• i)In extraordinary session No. 46 of January 5, 2022, the discussion of bill No. 21.810 in the second debate began, where a procedural motion was approved to return it to the first debate, and the discussion was suspended so that it would occupy the first place of the first debates in the following session (folio 650).
• j)In ordinary session No. 85 of January 11, 2022, of the Legislative Plenary, the discussion in the first debate process of bill No. 21.810 begins (folio 702). In extraordinary session No. 053 of January 25, 2022, the discussion in the first debate of the bill in question continued, and it WAS APPROVED IN THE FIRST DEBATE by 40 votes in favor (folio 1082-1112).
• k)On January 11, 2020, the Acting Director of the Secretariat of the Board of Directors sends the updated text of bill No. 21.810 for mandatory consultation to the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. On that same date, the mandatory consultations were sent to all the Municipalities of the country (folio 721 and 731 onwards, 1038).
• l)On January 12, 2022, the Acting Director of the Secretariat of the Board of Directors sends the updated text of bill No. 21.810 for publication (folio 724).
• m)On January 20, 2022, via official document TSE-0199-2022, the Presiding Justice of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal communicates to the Acting Director of the Department Secretariat of the Board of Directors the agreement adopted in the fifth article of the ordinary session No. 6-2022 held on January 20, 2022, by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, where it indicates: “… this Tribunal, in the terms and with the scope of Article 97 of the Constitution, objects to the bill processed under file No. 21.810. This objection would be lifted if the legislators modify the bill so that, according to the spirit of the proposal, consecutive reelection is limited to a single time (maximum two continuous periods in the same office), without prohibiting the possibility of running, at the end of the second term, for another popular election post. Respectfully, it is recalled that 'Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (...) convert into law the bills (...) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement' (section 97 of the Constitution). FIRM AGREEMENT.” (folio 1063-1072).

From the above, it is observed that bill No. 21.810 followed, in general, the established legislative procedure. It was duly presented, sent to Commission for its opinion, published, consulted, a technical report was rendered, and it was discussed in the Legislative Plenary in the first debate. It is noted that the initial bill was subsequently varied, as observed in the attached table, and also that it was initially voted on in the first debate in December 2021, but the process was retracted, and then voted on in the first debate in January 2022. Likewise, the TSE responded to the consultation on the first version of the bill indicating it had no objection. Then, upon consultation of the updated text, the TSE raised its objection.

Current Municipal Code Bill No. 21.810 (initial version) Bill No. 21.810 (approved version) Article 14.- The municipal executive official indicated in Article 169 of the Political Constitution is called municipal mayor (alcalde municipal). There shall be two municipal vice mayors: a first vice mayor (vicealcalde primero) and a second vice mayor (vicealcalde segundo). The first vice mayor shall carry out the administrative and operational functions assigned by the titular mayor; furthermore, they shall substitute, by full right, the municipal mayor in their temporary and definitive absences, with the same responsibilities and powers as the latter during the substitution period.

In cases where the first vice mayor cannot substitute the mayor in their temporary and definitive absences, the second vice mayor shall substitute the mayor, by full right, with the same responsibilities and powers as the latter during the substitution period.

In the district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito), the executive official indicated in Article 7 of Law No. 8173 is the district intendant (intendente distrital), who shall have the same powers as the municipal mayor. Additionally, there shall be a district vice intendant (viceintendente distrital), who shall carry out the administrative and operational functions assigned by the titular intendant; they shall also substitute, by full right, the district intendant in their temporary and definitive absences, with the same responsibilities and powers as the latter during the substitution period.

All popular election posts at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the Presidency and the Vice-Presidencies of the Republic and those who will comprise the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take office on May 1st of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected.

SOLE ARTICLE- The final paragraph of Article 14 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794, of April 30, 1998, and its reforms, is reformed as follows:

(...)

All popular election posts at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the Presidency and the Vice-Presidencies of the Republic and those who will comprise the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take office on May 1st of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected in the same post, successively, for one period, without detriment to their right to be elected to any of the other posts under equal conditions.

All popular election posts at the municipal level may be reelected in a non-successive manner, and the same rules of the preceding paragraph shall apply.

SOLE ARTICLE- The fifth paragraph of Article 14 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, is reformed. The text is as follows:

(...)

All popular election posts at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the presidency and the vice-presidencies of the Republic and those who will comprise the Legislative Assembly are elected.

They shall take office on May 1st of the same year of their election, for a period of four years and may be reelected.

Mayors (alcaldesas o alcaldes) may be reelected consecutively only once. They may not hold any popularly elected office of the municipal regime until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. Deputy mayors (vicealcaldes y vicealcaldesas) may also be reelected consecutively only once and may not hold the same office or that of council members (regidores) or district trustees (síndicos) until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term.

Council members (personas regidoras), district trustees (síndicas), district mayors (intendentes), deputy district mayors (viceintendentes), district municipal councilors (concejales municipales de distrito) under Law 8173, General Law of District Municipal Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those holding any alternate positions (cargos de suplencias), may be reelected consecutively only once and may not hold the same office or its alternate position until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second term.

Sole Transitory Provision: Persons currently serving as mayors (alcaldes, alcaldesas), district mayors (intendentes o intendentas) who have already been elected to their offices for at least two consecutive terms must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to hold any popularly elected position within the municipal regime again.

Persons currently serving as deputy mayors (vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas), deputy district mayors (viceintendentes y viceintendentas), proprietary and alternate council members (regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes), proprietary and alternate district trustees (síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes), who have already been elected to their offices for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to hold the same popularly elected position within the municipal regime again; however, they may hold other municipal positions in accordance with this law.

The statement of purpose for the initial bill indicates that its objective is to limit the indefinite reelection of mayors and local authorities. Subsequently, it is noted that the approved text, in addition to limiting indefinite reelection, proceeds to establish certain rules to limit the positions that mayors, deputy mayors, council members, district trustees, district mayors, deputy district mayors, district municipal councilors, and those holding any alternate positions may later access. A transitory provision is established that covers persons currently serving in those positions.

IV.- REGARDING THE CONSULTED PROCEDURAL DEFECTS (drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez).- The consulting parties consider that a procedural defect may have been incurred with the approval of this bill, contravening what is established in the last sentence of Article 97 of the Political Constitution. They indicate that there is a formal pronouncement from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal opposing the vote. That Tribunal, through official communication TSE-0199-2022 of January 20, 2022, indicated: "due to the hollowing out of the human right to be elected, by preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same office from aspiring to other popularly elected positions, this Tribunal, in the terms and with the scope of Article 97 of the Constitution, objects to the bill being processed under file 21.810." The consulting deputies consider that the application of Article 97 cannot be literal nor understood from a formal interpretation, because the reality of the constituent legislator at the time understood elections as a single moment every four years, and therefore the limitation was general and absolute, given that the legislation affecting one level of eligible officials applied to all of them, and current circumstances are different. They add that this was the reason why they approved the bill in the first debate, confident that its approval does not affect the electoral process held on February 6th at all, since it had no relation to any municipal authority. Therefore, they ask: Is the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is related to the national sphere?

In the original design of the Constituent of 1949, the intention was that the three elections—presidential, legislative, and municipal—be held on a single day. Indeed, it was decided that elections for the President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic (Article 133 of the Constitution), members of the Legislative Branch (Article 107 of the Constitution), and municipal council members (Article 171 of the Constitution) would be held on the same day. On this matter, Minutes number 75 of the National Constituent Assembly indicate the following:

"Deputy Leiva clarified that he estimated that in thirty days the Tribunal would not be able to scrutinize all the votes cast, including the suffrage for the election of the Municipalities. He suggested that this task could be left in the hands of the Electoral Boards. Representative Facio accepted modifying the motion, but leaving the counting of all votes cast in any popular election in the hands of the Tribunal.

Representatives Pinto and Arroyo opposed not setting a precise date for the Tribunal to make the declaration of the election of President and Vice-Presidents. It is necessary that such term be determined in the Constitution itself. Deputy Facio presented this other formula, which was approved: 'To make, within thirty days following the date of the vote, the definitive declaration of the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic, and within the term determined by law, that of the other officials cited in subparagraph 6 [now 7] of this article'." (The bold does not correspond to the original).

Now then, by law—the entry into force of the Electoral Code, Article 310—municipal elections were separated from the presidential and legislative ones, transferring the former to the mid-constitutional term. This modification of the system—moving from a single or concentrated model to a dual one—imposes an interpretation of constitutional article 97 in light of this new reality. When there were three elections on a single day, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's objection to a bill had the effect of suspending the power to legislate for the specific case—during the six months before and four months after the election—; if the opinion was issued outside that period, the power to legislate was aggravated. The situation has changed radically at present, in which there are separate elections between presidential and deputy elections and municipal ones. In this situation, article 97 must be interpreted in the sense that the objection to the bill must refer to the respective election, in which case, if a bill refers to municipal elections and the electoral period for electing municipal authorities is not active, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's objection would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, only of aggravating it; that is, after the second debate is concluded, in the final vote, the bill will require a qualified majority of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly for its approval. If this were not the case, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's objection would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text by extending the prohibition period—from ten months or twelve months if there is a presidential runoff to twenty-two months—, which is clearly contrary to the constitutional text. It is for this reason that, in the specific case, there is no procedural defect due to the fact that the Legislative Assembly approved the consulted bill in the first debate. Furthermore, there is even a conceptual error in the matter consulted, since, according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Tribunal, in the hypothetical case that we were in the circumstance of the prohibition under Article 97 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly is authorized by Constitutional Law and by the norms of the Parliamentary Statute to approve a bill in the first debate for which there is an objection from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; what it could not do is approve it in the final vote after the conclusion of the second debate. Ergo, based on the foregoing, the procedural defect is dismissed.

V.- NOTE BY JUDGE RUEDA LEAL.- As stated in the majority vote, which the undersigned subscribes to, for the period of six months before and four months after the holding of a popular election to apply—during which the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law bills objected to by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) (Article 97 of the Fundamental Law)—the objection must refer to the corresponding type of electoral process. That is, if the objection concerns a specific aspect of a municipal election, the aforementioned period applies only, precisely, to an electoral process of that nature; the same ratio iuris operates when dealing with a national election. However, it is overlooked that there may be matters related to electoral issues that are not directly linked to the municipal or national nature of an election but refer to the electoral jurisdiction in general (for example, if it were proposed to vary the composition of the TSE or the way in which magistrates are elected), in which case the period in question would apply with respect to any kind of electoral process.

VI.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE CRUZ CASTRO.- In this regard, it is pertinent to cite Article 97 of the Constitution:

"Art. 97. For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total members will be required. Within the six months before and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into law bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement" (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

In this case, it is indisputable that the bill in question refers to electoral matters, as it affects the regulation and restriction of certain reelection scenarios in municipal elections. Moreover, one cannot distinguish where the Political Constitution does not; therefore, it is improper to assert that the constitutional article 97 in question refers only to national elections and not to municipal ones. Clearly, this norm refers to "the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters" without distinguishing types of elections. Likewise, it is evident that the TSE has expressed disagreement with this bill. Thus, I consider that the provisions of Article 97 in question are applicable regarding the following:

The Legislative Assembly may depart from the opinion of the TSE; but to do so, it will require the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members, provided it is not within the legislative prohibition period. In any case, that qualified vote does not have the power to disregard the prohibition period, according to which: within the six months before and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not convert into law bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.

The political parties that act in the parliament are important actors in all types of elections; for this reason, I consider that the constitutional prohibition is salutary. It prevents political actors from varying electoral rules in any type of election. Distinguishing between municipal elections and national elections is an artificial distinction. The incidence of electoral struggles and the porosity of parties are sufficient reasons to prevent the rules of electoral contests, whether local or national, from being modified during the electoral period. Electoral history evidences the volatility and conflict inherent in this matter; for this reason, the constitutional text is emphatic, very clear. Any popular election prevents the variation of electoral rules. On the other hand, the constitutional text contains a "particular veto" by the Electoral Tribunal, as no electoral modification may be introduced, in the six months before and the four months after the holding of a popular election, on matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement. This is precisely what happened in this case. The majority vote ignores that there is a qualified intervention by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which does not depend solely on the period of exclusion of the legislative power, but rather that the Tribunal has a qualified competence that cannot be ignored by the legislative power or by this constitutional body. The weakening of the powers of the Electoral Tribunal is not a good symptom; history cannot be ignored, as it was one of the most important political vindications after the violent events of forty-eight.

Given that the national elections were held on February 6, 2022, the aforementioned prohibition period would cover from August 6, 2021. It is evident that the first debate took place on January 25, 2022; it was clearly held within the prohibition period in question. Furthermore, it was on a reform to which the Tribunal was opposed. Based on the arguments presented, I consider that the indicated procedural defect exists, as it contravenes the prohibitions and limitations imposed by the prohibition period established in Article 97 of the Constitution.

VII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE GARRO VARGAS.- The operative part of this opinion states:

"Judge Garro Vargas dissents regarding the alleged procedural defect raised and considers it cannot be addressed, as the consultation does not properly present a question but rather a defense against the position of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal regarding the scope of Art. 97 of the Political Constitution." To illustrate my thesis, it suffices to refer to the very statements of the consulting legislators, who, far from invoking reasoned doubts or objections regarding the constitutionality of the procedure given to the bill, seek to shield it against the questions raised by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). In this regard, the following is indicated:

"From a formal, rigid, and strict interpretation of the norm, we have three possible implications related to the legislative procedure: first, we accept the Tribunal's recommendation in the unrestricted and absolute sense of the right to be elected and maintain the 'revolving door' where popularly elected municipal officials can 'jump' every eight years (after a successive reelection) to other positions also of popular election, thereby limiting the political participation of other citizens and, additionally, promoting ad perpetuam positions in local governments; second, we do not vote on the bill that has the endorsement of a large majority of deputies who represent the citizens' will, or; third, we bequeath to the incoming Legislative Assembly, whose composition and intentions we do not know, the decision on a proposal that clearly aims to strengthen democracy." From their reasoning—in response to the argument made by the TSE—the legislators themselves pose three scenarios they describe as negative: 1) accepting the TSE's recommendation, which results in the limitation of citizens' political participation and the promotion of ad perpetuam positions; 2) not voting on the bill, which, as they themselves acknowledge, "has the endorsement of a large majority of deputies" who represent the citizens' will; and 3) bequeathing the bill to a new composition of the Legislative Assembly with the danger that it may not be realized, warning that it is a proposal that "clearly aims to strengthen democracy." Subsequently, they conduct a historical review of the regulation of municipal and national elections to illustrate their thesis—which they consider the appropriate interpretation of Art. 97 of the Political Constitution—and only afterwards do they pose a question to this Chamber. In this regard, the consultation brief states textually as follows:

"What is the objective of this review? To demonstrate that the application of Article 97 cannot be literal nor understood from a formal interpretation, because the reality of the constituent legislator at the time of drafting the norm in question understood elections as a single moment every four years, and therefore the limitation was general and absolute, given that the legislation affecting one level of eligible officials applied to all of them, and current circumstances are different.

What we wish to denote before the honorable Tribunal is that the interpretation of this article must be material and teleological, based on the content of the norm, its ultimate purpose, and that the approval of this bill in its first debate stage is not affecting the dynamics of the municipal elections to be held in February 2024, that is, in 24 months. That was the reason why we approved the bill in the first debate, confident that its approval does not affect the electoral process to be held on February 6th of this year—in which the Presidency of the Republic and deputies to the Legislative Assembly will be elected—in any way, nor any municipal authority.

Therefore, considering the scope and intention of the constituent persons to avoid transformations of the electoral system in periods close to elections, in this particular case where the proposed legal modification is exclusively and solely relative to the municipal regime, whose electoral period is not active, given that the electoral event we are currently in is relative to the Government of the Republic and the Legislative Assembly, the municipal regime is excluded in its entirety; therefore, the doubt related to the legislative procedure arises: Is the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is relative to the national sphere?" (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

From a detailed reading of the brief itself signed by the consulting legislators, it is clear that all the argumentation is not aimed at substantiating a doubt about the procedure followed to approve the bill they promote, but rather at defending both the bill and that procedure against the opinion formally submitted by the TSE within the framework of the parliamentary iter. The only question, strictly speaking, of that section regarding the alleged procedural defect is the one at the end, but all the argumentation preceding it contains no vestige of doubt or objection regarding the process given to the bill; on the very contrary, it demonstrates the conviction that "its approval does not affect the electoral process at all" held on February 6th.

By virtue of such finding, I consider that the consultation must be declared impossible to address, in light of the provisions of Art. 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states:

"Art. 99. Except in the case of the mandatory consultation provided for in subparagraph a) of Article 96, the consultation must be formulated in a reasoned brief, expressing the questioned aspects of the bill, as well as the reasons for which there were doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality." (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

As is evident from the content of said provision, for a legislative consultation to be admissible, the reasons for which there are doubts or objections of constitutionality must be clearly expressed. And this is precisely what is lacking here, since from the cited excerpts—and from the entire brief—it can be observed that the legislators do not question a particular procedure regarding which they have specific doubts of constitutionality. Rather, they show disagreement with the institutional position of the TSE (see, in identical sense, the recent advisory opinion that, through Opinion No. 2872-2022, unanimously issued by this Chamber, with almost the same membership, declared the optional consultation of constitutionality processed under file No. 21-025530-0007-CO impossible to address).

Consequently, I consider that regarding the alleged procedural defect, the consulting parties merely state the question, without arguing why they believe the matter merits being raised before this Chamber. On the contrary, their allegations seek to justify what was done. Therefore, it can well be affirmed that, as it contains no objection of constitutionality, the legislative consultation is inadmissible and impossible to address.

VIII.- REGARDING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING THE CONSULTATION ON THE ALLEGED SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS (drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez).- Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes:

"Article 99. Except in the case of the mandatory consultation provided for in subparagraph a) of Article 96, the consultation must be formulated in a reasoned brief, expressing the questioned aspects of the bill, as well as the reasons for which there were doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality." Pursuant to the provisions of said article, this Chamber, in Ruling No. 2012-009253, specified that:

"the filing brief must express the articles of the bill whose constitutionality is questioned or consulted, and clearly state the reasons why it is considered that a norm of the bill may be unconstitutional, otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible—see, in this regard, judgments numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643." In that same ruling, it added the following:

"'in the case of optional legislative consultations, the competence of the Constitutional Chamber originates from the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators'—judgment 2001-12459—, so that if such arguments do not exist as such, or when the consulting deputies themselves state that they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the norms or bills consulted, it would be improper for the Chamber to issue any opinion, as it would be in situations that transcend the Chamber's competencies regarding legislative consultations of constitutionality—judgment 2002-3460—." In the sub judice case, the consulting deputies request that this Chamber rule on an "alleged hollowing out of the human right to passive political participation" due to the reform proposed under legislative file No. 21.810. However, from reading the consultation brief, it can be verified that the consulting deputies do not formulate, much less develop, effective objections or concerns regarding the constitutionality of the bill; on the contrary, what they set forth throughout said brief are their different arguments or justifications in favor of the intended reform, and, in reality, what they seek is for the Chamber to confirm that this position is correct, in light of the observations made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on this point. The consulting deputies also request that this Tribunal rule on an alleged infringement of Article 34 of the Political Constitution, based on the provisions of the sole transitory provision of the bill. Regarding this aspect, the consulting deputies do not formulate or justify any specific reason that would cause them to doubt the constitutionality of such transitory provision. The consulting deputies limit themselves to pointing out that "Another issue that has been considered, in the broad discussion that this bill generated within the Legislative Assembly, has to do with the content of the transitory norm of the bill, in relation to the principle of non-retroactivity of the law." However, after this statement, the consulting parties confine themselves to setting forth and arguing the reasons why they believe there would be no infringement of constitutional Article 34. In short, in the sub lite case, far from raising duly reasoned doubts of constitutionality, as required by the cited Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, what the consulting deputies seek is for this Chamber to endorse their position in defense of the bill's content. This is improper, as this Chamber has resolved in similar cases. In this regard, Ruling No. 2020-013837 can be cited, in which this Tribunal resolved the following:

"It must be considered that Article 99 provides that 'the consultation must be formulated in a reasoned brief, expressing the questioned aspects of the bill, as well as the reasons for which there were doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality'; an aspect not fulfilled by the filing brief for this legislative consultation, as what they request in each of their arguments is that this Tribunal endorse whether the analysis carried out by the Assembly conforms or not to the Political Constitution, which does not constitute reasons for doubt or objections of constitutionality.

(...)

A corollary of the above, regarding legislative consultation No. 20-06822-0007-CO, consolidated with this file, it must be declared impossible to address, having failed to comply with the requirements established in Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, regarding the proper presentation and reasoning of the doubts of constitutionality that the consulting parties might have concerning the legislative file under study.

(…)

Regarding File No. 20-006822-0007-CO, the consultation is unanimously declared impossible to address, inasmuch as the consulting deputies omit to formulate any doubt or objection of constitutionality in the terms of Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction." Considerations applicable to the present case. As a corollary of the above, the consultation formulated is impossible to address with respect to the alleged substantive defects of the bill.

IX.- NOTE BY JUDGE GARRO VARGAS.- Regarding the substantive defects, I have agreed with the majority of the Chamber in the sense that "the consulting deputies do not formulate, much less develop, effective objections or concerns regarding the constitutionality of the bill; on the contrary, what they set forth throughout said brief are their different arguments or justifications in favor of the intended reform, and, in reality, what they seek is for the Chamber to confirm that this position is correct" and, furthermore, that "the consulting deputies do not formulate or justify any specific reason that would cause them to doubt the constitutionality of such transitory provision." Regarding the first defect, there is no allusion whatsoever to the reasons why they believe it is appropriate to question the constitutionality of the norm that provides that those who have held the office of mayor for two consecutive terms will be prevented from running for a popularly elected office in the municipal regime. When referring to the second defect, concerning the transitory provision, they transcribe Article 34 of the Political Constitution and pose the question, but then do not argue or develop why such regulation might be unconstitutional. In both cases, it should be highlighted that the provisions of Art. 99 of the LJC are again not complied with, this time specifically regarding the obligation for "the consultation to be formulated in a reasoned brief." Finally, it should be added that this line of reasoning is consistent with the one I set forth previously, when I served as an alternate judge:

"2. However, I consider that—as drafted and presented—the consultation falls short of what is prescribed by Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which establishes: the optional consultation 'must be formulated in a reasoned brief, expressing the questioned aspects of the bill, as well as the reasons for which there were doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality.' 3. Indeed, from reading the present consultation, it is evident that it lacks the due reasoning that substantiates the objections it presents. The reasons why the bill under examination harms the principle of equality and the autonomy of the CCSS are not put forward, nor why its content being drafted as a transitory provision could be unconstitutional.

4. By virtue of the aforementioned Article 99, it is not for this Chamber to guess what the consulting parties wished to express about the potential constitutional violations that, if approved, the norm could entail, either by itself or through its immediate or foreseeable effects. It falls to this tribunal to adhere to what is contained in the text of the consultation.

Certainly, this [the consultation] is accompanied by the legislative file, but the logic of such a requirement is not for the Chamber to substitute for the consultants in the elaboration of their arguments, but rather to corroborate the various aspects of the consultation that have their basis in said file." (Note to resolution 2015-015927).

In the same vein I have pronounced myself, as a proprietary magistrate, in other dissenting votes. For example, the dissenting vote to opinion No. 2872-2022, regarding the consultation processed in file No. 21-25092 and the dissenting vote to opinion No. 21-17098, regarding the consultation processed in file No. 21-12714, both presented by the Supreme Court of Justice, which I considered answerable except on those aspects in which there was no substantiation of the questions posed.

Therefore, being consistent with my decision-making line and with the normative plexus that governs this Court, it is appropriate to declare the legislative consultation unanswerable also as to its merits.

X.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL.- 1) Conventional jurisprudential development.

I begin by examining the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court H.R.) regarding political-electoral rights, specifically, as is of interest for the resolution of the sub lite.

Article 23 of the ACHR regulates political rights:

"Article 23. Political Rights 1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:

• a)to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters, and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of his country.

2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings." In this way, the ACHR, on the one hand, contemplates concrete examples of political-electoral rights, and, on the other hand, provides guidance on how to regulate them in a valid manner, which entails restricting them.

The starting point consists of understanding that "the effective exercise of political rights constitutes an end in itself and, at the same time, a fundamental means that democratic societies have to guarantee the other human rights provided for in the Convention and that their holders, that is, citizens, must not only (sic) enjoy rights, but also 'opportunities.' This latter term implies the obligation to guarantee with positive measures that every person who is formally a holder of political rights has the real opportunity to exercise them." (Yatama vs. Nicaragua, judgment of June 23, 2005).

Properly regarding the exercise of a public office by popular election, in the first place, it must be taken into account that political rights are not absolute.

In that sense, the I/A Court H.R. tests in Yatama vs. Nicaragua a kind of "reasonableness test" to weigh the legal viability of some restriction. Thus, besides explicitly resorting to the principles of legality and equality—the requirements to participate in an electoral contest and the corresponding procedure must be defined by law and be non-discriminatory—it affirms that limitations must "be based on reasonable criteria, attend to a useful and timely purpose that makes it necessary to satisfy an imperative public interest, and be proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is most proportional to the pursued purpose must be chosen." I make the parenthesis that, in relation to this type of analysis, turning to German jurisprudence, this Constitutional Court has also elaborated a similar test or protocol to assess the reasonableness of a measure:

"In this sense, the Chamber considers that the challenged measure is in accordance with the principle of reasonableness. The latter is composed of the following components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought by the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned State measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that even if a measure is suitable and necessary, it will be unreasonable if it injures the essential content of another fundamental right, if it empties it of content." (Judgment No. 2013001276 of 2:50 p.m. on January 29, 2013, reiterated in judgments Nos. 2017011793 of 4:41 p.m. on July 26, 2017, 2019007035 of 9:20 a.m. on April 26, 2019, and 2020022295 of 9:15 a.m. on November 20, 2020, among many others).

Continuing with the conventional evolution, in Castañeda Gutman vs. México (judgment of August 6, 2008), the parameters for the regulation of political rights are developed with greater precision.

In the first place, regarding Article 23.1 of the ACHR, the I/A Court H.R. specifies that, correlative to the rights and opportunities of citizens in this matter, the State is imposed the "obligation to do, to carry out certain actions or conduct, to adopt measures, which derive from the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction (Article 1.1 of the Convention) and from the general obligation to adopt measures in domestic law (Article 2 of the Convention)." In this sense, it specifies:

"157. This positive obligation consists of designing a system that allows representatives to be elected to conduct public affairs. Indeed, for political rights to be exercisable, the law necessarily has to establish regulations that go beyond those related to certain State limits to restrict those rights, established in Article 23.2 of the Convention. States must organize electoral systems and establish a complex number of conditions and formalities so that the exercise of the right to vote and to be voted is possible." That is, Article 23.1 not only contemplates rights and opportunities in favor of the citizen but concomitantly imposes obligations on the State with the purpose of configuring a system for the election to public offices, which is per se characterized by a complex number of conditions and formalities, required to enable the effective and efficacious exercise of the rights to vote and to be voted.

With a view to the elaboration of such legal-positive filigree, the restriction factors established in Article 23.2 fall short; they are only part of the normative framework, since there are legally plausible limits beyond such regulation. In that sense, the judicial organ of the Organization of American States (OAS) categorically rules: "it is not possible to apply only the limitations of paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the American Convention to the electoral system established in a State." What conditions must be met and what hermeneutic guidelines must be followed for the purpose of configuring such restrictions in accordance with the ACHR?

To answer this, I start from the premise that the normative "ought-to-be" is insufficient, since the efficacy and effectiveness of any right requires, as already indicated, a complex institutional, economic, and human apparatus that functions in the plane of reality. In summary, an "ought-to-be" without "reality" is inane.

The I/A Court H.R. says: "if there are no electoral codes or laws, voter registers, political parties, means of propaganda and mobilization, voting centers, polling stations, dates and deadlines for the exercise of suffrage, it simply cannot be exercised, by its very nature; in the same way that the right to judicial protection cannot be exercised without the existence of the courts that grant it and the procedural rules that discipline it and make it possible." In addition, the I/A Court H.R. postulates that the ACHR does not opt for a particular electoral system; quite the contrary, it admits a diversity of options, only subject to their compatibility with the rights sheltered by it. The same direction has guided the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights.

At this point, the I/A Court H.R. modulates the consequences of Yatama, emphasizing that, in the latter case, the cultural qualities of the members of an indigenous community and the imposition of a form of organization—in the framework of a municipal election—totally alien to such parameters prevailed, resulting in a violation of the conventional right to be elected.

In this way, in Castañeda Gutman, the I/A Court H.R. comes to confirm that the general rule is the plausibility of diverse restrictions and different models of electoral systems, provided that fundamental rights are not violated, for whose effects it specifies certain guidelines.

It begins by reiterating that restrictions on electoral rights can only be instituted by law.

Immediately, it evokes certain elements inherent to a test of reasonableness and proportionality.

Thus, it alludes to the purpose of the restrictive measure, insofar as its cause must be appropriate in light of the ACHR.

Within this approach, the case where the purpose is the safeguarding of some fundamental right stands out, such as public order or public health (according to Articles 12.3, 13.2.b, and 15 eiusdem, among others). In addition, it refers to another group of restrictions: those that are rather linked to legitimate general purposes (for example, "the rights of others" or "the just demands of the general welfare in a democratic society," both in Article 32 eiusdem).

Now, properly, the conventional Article 23 does not explicitly regulate the legitimate causes or the permitted purposes for which the law may regulate political rights. Indeed, that norm "limits itself to establishing certain aspects or reasons (civil or mental capacity, age, among others) based on which political rights can be regulated in relation to their holders, but does not explicitly determine the purposes, nor the specific restrictions that will necessarily have to be imposed when designing an electoral system, such as residency requirements, electoral districts, and others. However, the legitimate purposes that the restrictions must pursue are derived from the obligations that arise from Article 23.1 of the Convention …" (Castañeda Gutman).

In this way, the aforementioned aspect linked to the objective of a regulation or measure corresponds to the "legitimacy" element of the type of reasonableness and proportionality test developed by the Chamber, in accordance with what was defined supra.

Immediately, in Castañeda Gutman, the I/A Court H.R. clarifies that the demonstration of an end permitted by the ACHR does not imply per se the reasonableness of the measure, since it must also respond to the "necessity in a democratic society" factor. It dissects the latter as follows:

"184. In order to evaluate whether the restrictive measure under examination meets this last requirement, the Court must assess whether it: a) satisfies an imperative social need, that is, it is oriented to satisfy an imperative public interest; b) is the one that least restricts the protected right; and c) closely adjusts to the achievement of the legitimate objective." Concerning the "imperative social need," it again evokes the "legitimacy" element of the Constitutional Court's reasonableness test, insofar as the provision is aimed at procuring a solution to such a question, that is, it concerns a legitimate end, which inexorably must be present. Likewise, the Court holds that, among several legitimate measures, the one that least restricts the affected fundamental right must be chosen; this is identical to the "necessity" element of the Chamber's constitutional test. Finally, when the I/A Court H.R. refers to the requirement that the determination closely conforms to the achievement of a legitimate objective, a denoted correspondence is presented with the "suitability" element of the Constitutional Court's reasonableness test, based on which the questioned state measure must be apt to achieve the intended objective. Only in relation to the element of the Chamber's reasonableness test, "proportionality in the strict sense" (according to which a provision may be legitimate, suitable, and necessary, but still unreasonable when its application lacerates the essential core of a fundamental right), is no direct concordance noted with the reasonableness examination developed by the I/A Court H.R.

Corollary of the foregoing, in examining the reasonableness of a measure or provision against a conventional norm, I consider it appropriate to apply the criteria and guidelines of the I/A Court H.R., which refer to the principles of legality and equality, the pursuit of an end permitted by the ACHR, the existence of an imperative social need, the suitability, and the necessity of the measure (clearly applied in Argüelles and others vs. Argentina, judgment of November 20, 2014), to which I add the element of proportionality in the strict sense, developed in the reasonableness test of national jurisprudence.

• 2)Principle of free configuration of the legislator.

In judgment No. 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, the Chamber clearly delineates the principle of free configuration of the legislator, also called "free legislative design" or "legislative discretion." Thus, this Court points out that the Parliamentary Power, in the exercise of the materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1 of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom to normatively develop the constitutional program set by the constituent power.

In this context, the principle of free configuration of the legislator is addressed in this manner: "That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the normative matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this organ has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or Rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation. In that way, the legislator can create public organs, assign them functions or competencies, develop diverse institutions, or regulate reality, as it deems opportune and convenient for a specific historical, social, economic, or political juncture. Evidently, legislative discretion is much broader than administrative discretion, given that the legislative function cannot be reduced to the simple execution of the Constitution." However, the "freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles—among which proportionality, interdiction of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it concerns the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since in such a matter, the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are in discussion, it being (sic) that, in opposition, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects." (See also resolutions Nos. 2013011499 of 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 2013, 2013011706 of 11:44 a.m. on August 30, 2013, and 2020015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020, among others).

In the same direction set forth, the Constitutional Court affirms in judgment No. 2018019511 of 9:45 p.m. on November 23, 2018, that this broad freedom to shape social, economic, and political reality enjoyed by the deputies in the exercise of the legislative power (which according to Articles 105 and 121, subsection 1° of the Fundamental Law resides originally in the people and is constitutionally delegated to the Legislative Assembly due to its character as a representative political organ), can only be subject to "the limits established by the constituent and, in general, the block of constitutionality, so that to avoid an undue limitation of the freedom of legislative configuration, any provision that establishes a condition or limit that aggravates it must be interpreted in its just and reasonable terms, to facilitate its exercise." However, it must be noted that, in judgment No. 2018000230 of 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018, the Constitutional Court rejected "that, irremediably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative organ, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties lacking democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands it, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness" (for example, in application of the principle of objectivization of environmental protection—judgments Nos. 2005014293 of 2:52 p.m. on October 19, 2005, 2012012716 of 4:01 p.m. on September 12, 2012, and 2021024147 of 9:15 a.m. on October 27, 2021—).

Likewise, it is worth noting that legislative discretion in the exercise of the derived constituent power is equally subject to certain procedural, temporal, and substantial limits (see resolutions Nos. 2005015094 of 3:00 p.m. on November 2, 2005, 2013006118 of 4:22 p.m. on April 30, 2013, and 2019013270 of 4:50 p.m. on July 17, 2019).

Corollary of the foregoing, in the exercise of the legislative power, the deputy enjoys extensive discretion, subject only to the observance of the block of constitutionality.

• 3)Doubts of constitutionality on the merits.

The consultants transcribe this criterion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), expressed in official communication No. TSE-0199-2022 of January 20, 2022:

"The restrictions on reelected officials (so that they cannot opt for another office in the municipality) would make it impossible for those citizens to access internal party contests in order to, later, be nominated for popularly elected offices other than the one they hold. In other words, no matter that they belong to a political group and meet the legal requirements for nomination, by reason of the public function they perform—ab initio—such officials could not compete even in the internal processes in which nominations are contested.

Such affectation to the essential core of the right occurs precisely because it is not only limiting reelection, but also, as an effect of the application of the norm, a total suspension of the citizen prerogative to contend for political offices would be occurring." (The underlining is from the original).

Based on what was transcribed, the consultants state:

"For all the foregoing, it is necessary to resolve the conclusion outlined by the TSE, regarding the emptying of the human right to be elected, by preventing persons who hold a municipal popularly elected office from opting for the election immediately, in a different office within the same municipal regime, given that it implies a total suspension of the citizen prerogative to aspire to public offices." Regarding the answerability of this aspect, according to Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the consultation of constitutionality requires, among other aspects, that the reasons for which doubts or objections of constitutionality are held be specified.

Concerning this point, it is evident and notorious that the appellants formulate a clear doubt of constitutionality, which arises precisely from the above-cited position of the TSE, that is, it is substantiated and argued. The uncertainty this generates is by no means minor, given the particular relevance of the constitutional organ specialized in electoral matters. Indeed, even though the consultants disagree with the cited criterion, it is no less true that they expressly state: "However, in light of what was indicated by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in communication TSE-0199-2022, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the restriction… violates fundamental rights." Ergo, the sub examine does comprise a manifest doubt of constitutionality, a reason for which, contrary to the Majority, I consider the consultation answerable, although, of course, only as to what was explicitly argued by the consulting deputies.

In this regard, I dismiss any unconstitutionality in the terms in which the consulting persons formulate this action, that is, specifically regarding the doubt generated from the part of communication No. TSE-0199-2022 that was specifically transcribed.

In the first place, the interrogating point relates, as already noted, to preventing a person holding a municipal popularly elected office from opting for the election immediately in a different office within the same regime, given that it implies a total suspension of the citizen prerogative to aspire to public offices.

Having examined the text of the project of this consultation, three scenarios are observed:

• 1)The female mayors or the male mayors may be reelected continuously for a single time. They may not occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime, until two periods have elapsed since their second consecutive period concluded.
• 2)The male vice-mayors and the female vice-mayors may also be reelected continuously for a single time and may not occupy the same office nor that of council member (regidor (a)) or district trustee (síndico (a)), until two periods have elapsed since their second consecutive period concluded.
• 3)Council members (personas regidoras), district trustees (síndicas), district mayors (intendentes), district vice-mayors (viceintendentes), municipal district councilors of Law 8173, General Law of Municipal District Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those occupying any of the alternate positions, may be reelected continuously for a single time and may not occupy the same office or its alternate position until two periods have elapsed since their second period concluded.

Regarding this specific point (the restriction on being elected to a different office within the same municipal regime), the female mayors and the male mayors are affected regarding every popularly elected post in that regime, while the male vice-mayors and the female vice-mayors in relation to the offices of council member (regidor) or district trustee (síndico). Regarding council members (personas regidoras), district trustees (síndicas), district mayors (intendentes), district vice-mayors (viceintendentes), municipal district councilors, and their alternates, there is also incidence, given that the principal position and the alternate position signify distinct posts.

As I indicated supra, following Yatama vs. Nicaragua (judgment of June 23, 2005) and Castañeda Gutman vs. México (judgment of August 6, 2008), as well as the jurisprudence of this Chamber, the control of constitutionality and conventionality of restrictions on political rights—in the specific case, the right to passive suffrage—as a minimum comprises these parameters: the principles of legality and equality, the pursuit of a constitutionally or conventionally permitted end, the existence of an imperative social need, the suitability and the necessity of the measure, and the analysis of proportionality in the strict sense, all of which in accordance with the scope and limits of the principle of free configuration of the legislator.

Regarding the principles of legality and equality, I consider they suffer no impairment whatsoever. The referred restriction, on the one hand, is regulated by law (amendment to Article 14 of the Municipal Code); on the other hand, it stems from a certainly differentiated but not unjustified treatment, given that it seeks to address ends of constitutional and conventional relevance, and, concretely, an imperative social need, as I explain infra. In determining which ends to achieve or what to consider as an imperative social need, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration.

Thus, in the presentation of the project in question, reference is made to a preliminary report of the Electoral Mission of the OAS, following the elections held on February 2, 2020. Such delegation was composed, as recorded in the aforementioned document, of 11 electoral experts from 6 countries of the region, who had arrived in the country on the 25th of the previous month.

In that document, the Mission pointed out: "… there is no absolute human right to hold office, and that the rights to vote and be elected can be regulated." (see http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf), which was widely disseminated by various media outlets (https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/oea-recomienda-a-costa-rica-limitar-la-reeleccion/OVR5GIP5T5CYXG3DVH4GH36P44/story/, https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/politica/mision-de-oea-reitera-necesidad-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes/, https://observador.cr/pusc-y-nueva-republica-trataran-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes-oea-lo-recomienda/ , https://www.diarioextra.com/Noticia/detalle/410346/oea-jala-orejas-a-costa-rica-por-reeleccion-de-alcaldes, https://www.elmundo.cr/municipales/alcaldes-apoyaran-proyecto-de-ley-que-limita-su-reeleccion/ ).

Later, in the final version (https://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=421-1219-28-0), it is underlined that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), in two reports issued following a consultation carried out by the OAS Secretary General regarding the limits to reelection, concluded "that there is no absolute human right to hold office, and that the rights to vote and be elected can be regulated. Review the legislation in force, recalling again that, although continuity in public policies is valuable, alternation constitutes a fundamental pillar of the democratic system." (Report on Term Limits Part II - Members of Parliament, Part III - Representatives elected at local level and executive officials elected at local level. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), March 18, 2019).

Likewise, regarding the regulation of the figure of reelection in municipal elections, the Mission recommended:

"Review the legislation in force, recalling again that, although continuity in public policies is valuable, alternation constitutes a fundamental pillar of the democratic system." In consonance with such affirmation, the proposed regulation object of the sub iudice rather coincides with the principle of alternation of power in the exercise of popularly elected offices and seeks real equality in the praxis of the fundamental right to passive suffrage in the electoral processes of the municipal regime.

Note that the Political Constitution, precisely, in relation to popularly elected offices, opts to prevent consecutive reelection regarding deputies, president, and vice-president of the Republic (Articles 107, 132, 134 of the Fundamental Law), which does not occur when it involves another type of appointments of constitutional relevance, but which are not by popular election, such as Comptroller General of the Republic, magistrates of the Judicial Power, and of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Articles 183, 101, and 158, eiusdem).

The proposing deputies even justify the project based on the results of the municipal elections and other sources.

In accordance with the foregoing, the restriction in question, on the one hand, relies on legitimate ends, and, on the other hand, is based on data and arguments sufficiently plausible to sustain what conventional jurisprudence has termed an "imperative social need." I reiterate that, in this area, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration, such that, as a matter of principle, it is not for the constitutional judge to define what constitutes an "imperative social need"; on the contrary, the judge is compelled to exercise self-restraint and not intervene in a purely political matter, unless there were a violation of a fundamental right, which in the case at hand, at least at this time and based on the reasoning of this specific consultation, I fail to perceive.

The reasoning set forth, which serves to rule out unjustified unequal treatment, also becomes useful for affirming that Legislative Bill No. 21.810 fully satisfies the "purpose" element of the reasonableness and proportionality test, since it involves a legitimate purpose.

As for the "suitability" element, prima facie it is observed that the cited restriction fulfills it, since it is useful for limiting indefinite reelection in popularly elected municipal positions, which promotes alternation in power.

Concerning the "necessity" element, that is, the possibility of the existence of less harmful options to the political right to passive suffrage (not to be confused with the notion of "imperative social need"), I do not observe that the consultation raises any alternative that would support an injury to this factor. As can be read in the bill's statement of motives, the proposing deputies seek to prevent a particular position of influence in a municipal office, after two consecutive terms, from conferring an undue advantage over other candidacies in a popular suffrage process within the municipal regime. Given this, the only way this Chamber could proceed to assess a transgression of the "necessity" element is if the petitioning party at least proposed alternatives or if these could be inferred from the evidence provided in the case file (which does not occur in the present instance), in which case constitutional review would be applied, seeking a balance between legislative discretion and the inexorable safeguarding of fundamental rights.

Finally, regarding the requirement of "proportionality in the strict sense," there is also no violation whatsoever, since, in the terms developed in the bill, I do not find an emptying of content to the detriment of the right to passive suffrage.

Regardless of the discussion of whether reelection is a human right or not, even assuming that it is, the fact is that it is not absolute, that is, it may be subject to reasonable restrictions.

In this regard, and following the jurisprudential line of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in my opinion, the limitations formulated do not affect the essential content of said right, since they are not indefinite but rather subject to a reasonable restriction period (two terms after the end of the second consecutive term), in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with what was explained above.

Furthermore, given that the restriction operates within the framework of an election process for municipal positions, the extension of its effects to other positions also of popular suffrage within the municipal regime, but different from the one the affected person had been occupying, rests on the same premise: consecutive exercise of a popularly elected municipal position for two terms confers an advantage that it is plausible to restrict according to the principle of alternation in power. This is a reasonable alternative that is solely the province of the legislator to weigh, such that, under the terms of this bill, its approval or rejection is not a decision that falls within the constitutional jurisdiction but rather resides exclusively in the realm of legislative discretion, that is, the definition in this regard carries with it the political responsibility of the deputies.

Lastly, the petitioners raise the doubt as to whether Article 34 of the Magna Carta is violated by the transitory provision under consultation, when it stipulates that current municipal authorities elected by popular suffrage, who have already served two or more consecutive terms in the same position, may not seek the same position again in the 2024 election.

As with the other aspect consulted on the merits, I consider that this point can be addressed.

Despite the fact that the formulation of the consultation is certainly, in part, couched in arguments that rather affirm the constitutionality of said provision, it is no less true that, as literally expressed, the petitioners "are faced with the question of whether the content of the transitory provision consulted regarding Legislative File No. 21.810, by establishing that current municipal authorities elected by popular election, who have already served two or more consecutive terms in the same position, may not seek the same position again in the 2024 election, violates Article 34 of the Political Constitution." In this manner, they formulate a reasonable doubt of constitutionality, even describing the harmful conduct and citing the affected provision of the Fundamental Law, an approach which, in my judgment, suffices to justify addressing the sub examine, given that, I reiterate, Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction contemplates the consultation of constitutionality for both objections and mere doubts of constitutionality.

Now, regarding the merits, I consider that no constitutional conflict exists, because, based on the premise that the fundamental right to passive suffrage is not absolute, it is clear that the mere fact that, at a given moment, a person occupies a popularly elected position in the municipal regime does not confer upon them either a subjective right or a consolidated legal situation that exempts them from positive-legal modifications to the electoral system that occur while they are holding the office and the corresponding electoral process has not formally begun. The person in such a situation holds a mere expectation of a right to participate in a future electoral process according to certain rules; this expectation, by virtue of its legal nature, is subject to all contingencies and variations of legislation that are duly approved in accordance with the constitutional framework.

XI.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE CRUZ CASTRO.- The petitioning deputies submit two substantive issues to this Chamber for consultation:

To prevent, for a period of eight years, a person who has held a popularly elected municipal position from immediately seeking a different position within the same municipal regime. To apply the preceding restriction to current municipal authorities.

As can be observed, the consultation is not regarding the limitation on indefinite reelection at the municipal level (an issue which is, in any case, the subject of unconstitutionality action No. 2019-00892-0007-CO and is pending resolution), but rather regarding these other two issues. The petitioners indicate that a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the restriction that officials with two consecutive terms in office may not seek other popularly elected municipal positions violates fundamental rights. The foregoing, particularly based on what was stated by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in its response to the mandatory consultation when it indicated: "Such an affectation to the essential core of the right occurs precisely because it is not only limiting reelection, but would also result, as an effect of applying the rule, in a total suspension of the citizen's prerogative to contend for political office." Furthermore, regarding the Transitory Provision, they indicate that the question arises as to whether the content of this provision, by establishing that current municipal authorities elected by popular election, who have already served two or more consecutive terms in the same position, may not seek the same position again in the 2024 election, violates Article 34 of the Political Constitution. The provisions, as the electoral Tribunal rightly points out, exceed criteria of reasonableness and proportionality regarding the citizen's right to be elected.

In this regard, for the reasons stated, I consider the following provisions to be unconstitutional:

"(...) They may not hold any popularly elected position within the municipal regime, until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term. Vice-mayors may also be reelected continuously only once and may not hold the same position, nor that of council member or district councilor, until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second consecutive term.

Council members, district councilors, intendants, vice-intendants, municipal district councilors under Law 8173, General Law on Municipal District Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those holding any alternate positions, (...) may not hold the same position or its alternate position until two terms have elapsed since the end of their second term.

Single Transitory Provision: Persons currently serving as mayors or intendants, and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to hold any popularly elected position within the municipal regime again.

Persons currently serving as vice-mayors, vice-intendants, proprietary and alternate council members, proprietary and alternate district councilors, and who have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive terms, must wait for two terms to elapse before being able to hold the same popularly elected position within the municipal regime again; however, they may hold other municipal positions in accordance with this law." These provisions of the bill under consultation irrationally restrict the right of access to public office, because what is intended is to prohibit, for a period of 8 years, a person who has already held a popularly elected position within the municipal regime from holding another popularly elected municipal position. It should be noted that this goes beyond limits on reelection, as it seeks to impose a temporary ban on accessing any popularly elected position, even one different from the one previously held. Basic principles of reasonableness and proportionality are thus exceeded. Regarding the justification for such a measure, the petitioning deputies themselves state the following:

"... our intention as legislators is precisely to limit what we have called the 'revolving door,' understood as the dynamic by which some popularly elected municipal officials serve two terms as mayors, then submit their name for a vote and are elected as vice-mayors or council members, and after those two terms, are elected again as mayors, making a modus vivendi of exercising the municipal function in any of the positions. // It is precisely this situation that was intended to be avoided with this reform, and therefore, after multiple negotiations involving members of all the political parties represented in the Legislative Assembly, we established an eight-year 'waiting period' before they may submit themselves to popular scrutiny again, (...)." Regarding the right of access to public office, there is extensive international regulation: Article 21.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("...Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country..."), Article 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (every person having legal capacity has the right to participate in the government of his country and to take part in popular elections), and more recently, Article 23.1.c of the American Convention on Human Rights: "1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: ... c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country...". In our Political Constitution, this right derives from Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution. The fundamental right of access to public office is the right of every person to run for and accede to positions within the public service. As for popularly elected positions, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has particular competencies (see ruling No. 2006-008493). It is undeniable that, like any other fundamental right, it can be subject to limitations, provided, of course, that they comply with the principle of legal reservation, and also that such limitations do not lead to an absolute emptying of the right. Among the constitutional limitations, in general, one can mention the system of incompatibilities or temporary disqualification sanctions. The latter are a consequence of a serious fault, due process, and the corresponding sanction, imposed to guarantee correct and efficient administration. Applying all of the foregoing to the case under examination, from my minority and dissenting perspective, I concur with the same conclusion reached by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in the sense of considering that the regulations in question impose an emptying of the right of access to popularly elected positions within the municipal regime, without meeting the parameter of reasonableness. This is because said regulations involve an exclusion period during which a former municipal official cannot seek another popularly elected municipal position, without this being the consequence of any committed fault. Clearly, a concern about corruption cannot serve as a generic basis for the generalized restriction of the right of access to public office. The unreasonableness and disproportionality can be clearly seen in this example: assuming that the limitation on presidential reelection also included the impossibility of being elected as a deputy because of having been President of the Republic. The prohibition that extends to other positions is truly unreasonable. It should be noted that it is not about the right to assume a position per se, but rather that a popular election has taken place and the electorate has expressed its will in favor of having said official in another position. Nothing would prevent a person who has previously held a popularly elected position from being able to hold another position within the same municipal regime if the electorate has so decided. As the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) indicates in its response to the consultation, it would not be legitimate for a State to impede passive suffrage (the right to be elected) on the grounds of having held a specific position—different from the one aspired to—in the two immediately preceding terms. Thus, it states: "Such an affectation to the essential core of the right occurs precisely because... it would result, as an effect of applying the rule, in a total suspension of the citizen's prerogative to contend for public office. (...) On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the changes made to the text of the bill render it disconnected, insofar as the statement of motives explains why the proponents consider it legitimate and necessary to limit reelection, but makes no allusion to the need to restrict any other type of candidacy (...) the original proposal was not to establish as intense a prohibition as the one incorporated through motions." The fact that a person who has held a popular office can run for another position is not per se corruption or an illegitimate "modus vivendi." It cannot be ignored that it is a matter of leveraging the experience of a person who has already held similar positions and whom the municipality's residents have elected. In order to prevent the concentration of power, rules cannot be introduced that sever passive suffrage without any basis. Limitations on the concentration of power cannot restrict fundamental rights without foundation.

As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated regarding political rights, Article 23 enshrines the right to participate, to vote and be elected, and the right to have access to public functions. Thus, both the right of the candidate and the right of the electors are protected:

"The first paragraph of Article 23 of the Convention recognizes the rights of all citizens: a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters, and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of their country. Similarly, the American Declaration recognizes the right to take 'part in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to participate in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, genuine, periodic and free.' Taking the foregoing into account, this Court has indicated that the rights recognized have an individual and a collective dimension, since they protect both those persons who participate as candidates and their electors." (ADVISORY OPINION OC-28/21 OF JUNE 7, 2021) Now, regarding admissible limitations on political rights, it has been indicated that political rights are not absolute and can be subject to limitations. However, such limitations must comply with the principle of legal reservation and the principle of reasonableness (necessity and proportionality). The Inter-American Court has stated:

"Its regulation must observe the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality in a democratic society. Observance of the principle of legality requires the State to define precisely, by means of a law, the requirements for citizens to participate in the electoral contest, and to clearly stipulate the electoral procedure that precedes the elections. According to Article 23.2 of the Convention, the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in paragraph 1 of said article may be regulated exclusively for the reasons established in that paragraph. The restriction must be provided for by law, not be discriminatory, be based on reasonable criteria, serve a useful and timely purpose that makes it necessary to satisfy a compelling public interest, and be proportional to that objective. When several options exist to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is more proportionate to the purpose pursued must be chosen." Clearly, in the case of the bill under consultation, there is no reasonable basis, nor does it serve a useful and timely purpose that makes the exclusion of a fundamental right necessary, nor is it understood what the public interest is, nor is it proportional to that objective. When several options exist to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is more proportionate to the purpose pursued must be chosen. These requirements are not met in this case. The situation would be different if the prohibition against holding another popularly elected position stemmed from a declared disqualification, because in that case, there would be reasonable justification. More recently, regarding restrictions, the Inter-American Court has specified two types of admissible restrictions: those of a general nature imposed by law and those resulting from a particular sanction:

"(...) this Court notes that Article 23.2 establishes two scenarios. The first scenario refers to the general restrictions that the law may establish (age, nationality, residence, language, instruction, civil or mental capacity), while the second scenario refers to the restrictions on political rights imposed by way of a sanction on a specific person (conviction, by a competent judge, in criminal proceedings). It follows from this Tribunal's jurisprudence that the interpretation of the term 'exclusively' included in Article 23.2 will depend on whether it involves general (first scenario) or particular (second scenario) restrictions on political rights." (ADVISORY OPINION OC-28/21 OF JUNE 7, 2021)

Following the cited precedent, restrictions on fundamental rights must be provided for by law in the formal and material sense (principle of legal reservation), pursue a legitimate aim, and meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality. These aspects are not met by the bill under consultation, as it is not understood how the temporary ban on holding public office is a suitable, necessary, or proportional measure.

All of the foregoing also applies to the unconstitutionality of the transitory provision, because the constitutional problem is not resolved by applying the regulation prospectively; rather, it contains fundamental defects due to the emptying of the right of access to public office. Therefore, I consider that all the regulations in question, including the transitory provision, are unconstitutional because they contain a substantive defect in that they empty the content of the right of access to popularly elected positions within the municipal regime. I believe that in this case, the limits on the legislative power are exceeded; it is not possible to extend the interdiction on passive suffrage to a position not held by the person upon whom the prohibition is imposed. There can be no expansive effect on the limitations of a fundamental right.

By reason of the arguments set forth, I consider that the substantive provisions consulted are unreasonable and disproportionate; regarding the transitory provision, as I have stated, it infringes the guarantee of the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. The consulted provisions contain stipulations that harm the right to passive suffrage.

XII.- IN CONCLUSION.- 1) Regarding procedural defects, by majority, the consultation of constitutionality of the bill "Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its amendments, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, and its amendments (Law Limiting the Indefinite Reelection of Local Authorities)," processed in legislative file number 21.810, is addressed in the sense that there are no procedural defects. 2) Regarding substantive defects, by majority, the consultation of constitutionality is declared incapable of being addressed." VI.- Regarding the alleged defects of a procedural nature.

• i)Arguments of the parties.

The plaintiff Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza states that Article 97 of our Magna Carta prevents the approval of electoral reforms during the prohibition period stipulated therein, as it does not distinguish between national and municipal elections. He believes that a contrary position would imply a modification of the text by way of interpretation.

The plaintiff Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes argues that the procedure followed by the Legislative Assembly for the approval of the law transgresses Article 97 of the Constitution, because, during the processing of legislative file 21.810, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal issued a negative opinion and objected to the approval of the bill. He asserts that, on March 29, 2022, after the optional legislative consultation to the Constitutional Chamber was addressed, the legislative plenary approved the bill in a second reading debate despite the opposition of the TSE and the date of the national elections. He explains that the TSE contemplated two grounds for objecting to the bill: "first, that the bill of law leads to an emptying of the human right to be elected by preventing officials with two terms in the same popularly elected position within the municipal regime from aspiring to other popularly elected positions within the same municipal regime, especially, for the association I represent, those holding mayoralties and intendancies) and; second, that within six months before and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into laws those bills of law on which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement." He questions the ruling No. 2022-006119 of 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, of this Chamber and states that he disagrees with the opinion expressed therein regarding the non-existence of a procedural defect. He states that the final part of Article 97 of the Constitution is not subject to interpretation; thus, the prohibition contemplated therein being mandatory, the Legislative Assembly could not approve the bill in question in a second reading debate. He adds that the aforementioned ruling interpreted constitutional electoral norms, which is the exclusive competence of the TSE according to subsection 3 of Article 102 of the Fundamental Law. He mentions that the procedural defect is the following: "it was approved in a second reading debate, overlooking the fact that there is an objection to it by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, an objection which was on two grounds: on the merits, for limiting the election to other positions of popularly elected authorities within the municipal regime and for the non-retroactivity of the norms, and on the other hand, for approving the measure given that the prohibition period established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution is in force, a norm that is clear and does not permit any interpretation, and if an interpretation were necessary, it corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and not the Constitutional Chamber, given that it is an exclusively electoral matter." The plaintiffs Wilber Quirós Palma and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales state that municipal district councils are governed by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Political Constitution, which was transgressed. They argue that the amendment made by the law modified reelection, but not through the means provided for by the Magna Carta. They contend that the special law already exists and cannot be modified by the challenged norm.

• ii)Considerations of the Chamber.

Regarding the foregoing, this Tribunal observes that the challenges of unconstitutionality for procedural defects are based on two provisions of the Fundamental Law, Article 97 and the second paragraph of Article 172. These provisions stipulate:

"ARTICLE 97.- For the discussion and approval of law bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly shall consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, a vote of two-thirds of the total membership shall be required. Within six months prior to and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly shall not, however, convert into laws those bills on said matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.

(...)

ARTICLE 172.- Each district shall be represented before the municipality by a proprietary district councilor and an alternate with voice but no vote.

For the administration of interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases, the municipalities may create municipal district councils, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to constitute the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies, shall set the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing." Regarding the procedural defect referred to Article 97 of the Constitution, the Chamber ruled by majority in the optional legislative consultation of constitutionality regarding the bill 'Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its amendments, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, and its amendments (Law Limiting the Indefinite Reelection of Local Authorities).' Specifically, ruling No. 2022006119 of 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, ordered:

"IV.- ON THE PROCEDURAL DEFECTS CONSULTED (written by Magistrate Castillo Víquez).- The petitioners consider that a procedural defect may have been incurred with the approval of this bill, contrary to the provisions of the last sentence of Article 97 of the Political Constitution. They state that there is a formal pronouncement by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal opposing the vote. That Tribunal, through official communication TSE-0199-2022 of January 20, 2022, stated: 'by reason of the emptying of the human right to be elected, by preventing officials with two consecutive terms in the same position from seeking other popularly elected positions, this Tribunal, under the terms and within the scope of Article 97 of the Constitution, objects to the bill processed in file 21.810.' The petitioning deputies consider that the application of Article 97 cannot be literal nor understood from a formal interpretation, because the reality of the constituent legislator at the time understood elections as a single moment every four years, and therefore the limitation was general and absolute, given that legislation affecting one of the levels of eligible officials applied to all, and the current circumstances are different. They add that this was the reason they approved the bill in the first debate, confident that its approval in no way affects the electoral process that took place on February 6, as it had no relation to any municipal authority.

Therefore, they ask: Is the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is the one relating to the national sphere?

In the original design of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, its will was that the three elections be held on a single day, that is: the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections. Indeed, it opted for the elections for president and vice presidents of the Republic (constitutional Article 133), the members of the Legislative Power (constitutional numeral 107), and the municipal council members (constitutional Article 171) to be held on the same day. On this matter, the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, number 75, indicate the following:

"Representative Leiva clarified that he estimated that in thirty days the Tribunal would not be able to scrutinize all the votes cast, including the ballots for the election of the Municipalities. He suggested that this task could be left in the hands of the electoral Boards. Representative Facio accepted modifying the motion, but leaving the counting of all votes cast in any popular election in the hands of the Tribunal.

Representatives Pinto and Arroyo opposed not setting a precise date for the Tribunal to make the declaration of the election of the President and Vice-Presidents. It is necessary that this term be determined in the Constitution itself. Representative Facio presented this other formula, which was approved: ‘To make, within the thirty days following the date of the vote, the definitive declaration of the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic, and within the term determined by law, that of the other officials cited in subsection 6 [today 7] of this article.’" (The bold text does not correspond to the original).

Now then, by law—entry into force of the Electoral Code, Article 310—the municipal elections were separated from the presidential and legislative elections, moving the former to the mid-point of the constitutional term. This modification of the system—moving from a single or concentrated model to a dual one—requires an interpretation of constitutional numeral 97 in light of this new reality. When it was a matter of three elections on a single day, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the bill of law had the effect of suspending the power to legislate for the specific case—during the six months before and four months after the election—; if the opinion was issued outside that period, the power to legislate was aggravated. The situation has changed radically today, in which there are separate elections for the presidential and legislative branches and the municipal ones. In this situation, numeral 97 must be interpreted in the sense that the objection to the bill of law must refer to the respective election, in which case if a bill of law refers to municipal elections and it is not the electoral period for electing municipal authorities, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would not have the effect of temporarily suspending the power to legislate, but only of aggravating it, that is, once the second debate is concluded, in the final vote the bill of law for its approval will require the qualified majority of two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Assembly. If it were not so, the objection of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would have an effect contrary to the constitutional text by extending the prohibition period—from ten months or twelve months if there is a runoff in the presidential elections to twenty-two months—, which is, by all lights, contrary to the constitutional text. It is for this reason that, in this specific case, there is no procedural defect due to the fact that the Legislative Assembly approved the consulted bill of law in the first debate. Moreover, there is even a conceptual error in what was consulted, since, in accordance with the reiterated case law of this Tribunal, in the hypothetical case that we were within the assumption of the prohibition of constitutional Article 97, the Legislative Assembly is authorized by the Law of the Constitution and by the norms of the Parliamentary Statute to approve a bill of law in the first debate on which there is an objection from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; what it could not do is approve it in the final vote after concluding the second debate. Ergo, based on the foregoing, the procedural defect is dismissed." Based on what was stated ut supra, in relation to numeral 97 of the Political Constitution, this Tribunal dismisses the procedural defect pointed out, given that there are no arguments or novel elements that warrant changing the opinion already issued. Rather, what is observed is a nonconformity with the position of the Chamber in the legislative consultation of the bill of law; however, this action is not provided for that purpose, but rather to question the unconstitutionality of norms by action or omission. In any case, as was recorded in the transcribed opinion, Costa Rica's current dual electoral system (national and municipal elections on different dates) requires the updated interpretation of that constitutional norm, in the sense that, in order for it to fulfill its purpose, the legislative bills objected to by the TSE (for the purpose of preventing approval) must necessarily affect the respective election (national or municipal).

Hence, since the challenged law deals with the municipal regime and, furthermore, the alleged impossibility of approval is based on the holding of the national election, this Tribunal dismisses the transgression of the prohibition period stipulated in constitutional numeral 97. Precisely, the questioned law, besides not affecting the national elections, also does not evidence concrete impacts on democracy, the right to vote, electoral justice, the integrity of the electoral process, or other matters inherent to the constitutional function of the TSE.

Furthermore, the prerogative of the TSE to dissent from certain bills on electoral matters (as part of the law-making process) should not be confused with its function of interpreting, in an exclusive and binding manner, the constitutional provisions referring to such area (Article 102 subsection 3 of the Magna Carta). In this regard, the Chamber is responsible for exercising constitutional control over norms of any nature (ordinals 10 of the Political Constitution and 2 subsection b of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) and reviewing defects in the law-making process (numeral 73 subsection c of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Hence, this Constitutional Tribunal is competent to determine whether the TSE's opposition in question results in preventing the approval of the law. On this point, the Chamber does not perceive any substantial impact on the constitutional function of the TSE, nor any risk to its independence or the country's institutional framework, and therefore the final part of Article 97 of the Political Constitution is not transgressed in the sub lite. Indeed, in the hearing granted in this unconstitutionality action, the TSE did not specify any defect in that sense.

Regarding the second paragraph of ordinal 172 of the Magna Carta, although the constituent assembly provided for the issuance of a special norm approved by a qualified majority for the regulation of the conditions under which district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito) may be created, as well as their structure, operation, and financing, it is no less true that, taking into consideration the arguments of the claimant party, this Tribunal does not accredit a contradiction between Law 10183 and the cited constitutional norm. Likewise, Law No. 8173 called ‘Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito’ does not prevent the legislator from issuing a general regulation on the reelection of authorities within the municipal regime, including district municipal councils, as both norms serve different purposes. In any case, ordinal 172 itself establishes that district municipal councils "shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to form the municipalities." Consequently, the alleged procedural defects are dismissed.

VII.- Regarding the alleged unconstitutionalities on the merits.

VII.1. Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the substantive part of the law.

• i)Allegations of the parties.

The claimant Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza contends that the challenged law transgresses constitutional Article 33, as it created "an odious discrimination directed towards some particular persons," which violates the principles of equality, reasonableness, proportionality, and political and individual freedom. He states that legislative discretion does not permit the public condemnation of more than 40 innocent mayors through a norm that lacks the basic or minimum characteristics "of being general and abstract," but is rather drafted to "cause an effect on some persons only, to the detriment of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and equality." He argues that the sole motivation for processing and approving the law is "to prevent the abuse of power by Mayors who had several terms in which the citizenry reelected them." He asserts that a kind of generalized social condemnation occurred for every mayor with two or more terms. He considers the constitutional principle of innocence transgressed regarding those mayors who are not linked to investigations of possible corruption offenses. He mentions that the constituent assembly did not regulate the reelection of local authorities because "social political control was evidently greater due to the proximity to the population that would elect them or not." He adds that the impairment to the principle of equality is confirmed by several causes, among them "that all Costa Rican citizens who meet the requirements can be elected Mayors from the enactment of the Law, except those who already were and who had been reelected when this norm did not exist." He adds that "the violation of the principle of equality is accentuated when the rest of the popularly elected authorities can access the other positions of this nature, except the Mayors, who could not access any position of popular appointment, even if it is not that of Mayor, thus verifying the casuistic, personalized, political, and unjust characteristic of the challenged norm." He mentions that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in resolution No. TSE-0199-2022 of January 20, 2022, ordered: “The restrictions on reelected officials (so that they cannot opt for another position in the municipality) would make it impossible for those citizens to access internal party contests in order to, later, be nominated for popular election positions other than the one they hold. In other terms, no matter how much they belong to a group and meet the legal requirements for nomination, by reason of the public function they perform—ad initio—such servants may not compete even in the internal processes where nominations are disputed... Such impact on the essential core of the right occurs precisely because not only is reelection being limited, but a total suspension of the citizen prerogative to contend for political positions would also be occurring, as an effect of applying the norm.” In addition, he considers numerals 169 and 171 of the Political Constitution transgressed, since, in his opinion, only the Magna Carta can establish electoral limitations or restrictions on those who have been elected or could be popularly elected. He argues that the Fundamental Law, in the case of municipal authorities, did not set restrictions, and therefore, with the challenged law, an implicit reform to the superior norm occurs without complying with constitutional procedures. He states that it is not appropriate for a legal norm to restrict or limit political rights enshrined constitutionally. He asserts that it is Articles 107 and 132 of the Political Constitution that have the sufficient power to constrain, limit, or condition the right to reelection, a situation that the constituent assembly did not contemplate for local authorities, because social political control was evidently greater due to the proximity to the population that would elect them or not. He states that modifying the foregoing would imply a necessary change at the level of constitutional norms, since it is these that determine the term of appointment, as well as the fundamental conditions and limitations; in this way, the law transgresses Articles 169 and 171 eiusdem which establish the aspects related to the election of mayors and council members. Likewise, he considers numeral 7 eiusdem transgressed, since international treaties protect political rights, especially ordinal 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, regarding the right to vote and be elected freely. He estimates that restriction on holding public office can only occur through two avenues: a general and abstract norm that respects the principles of equality and proportionality and pursues a legitimate aim, or else, a final binding judicial sanctioning judgment. He adds that, in this case, the Legislative Assembly exceeded its limits by designing a third avenue that "substitutes the Judicial Power's own sanctioning procedures and powers." The claimant Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considers that the questioned regulation transgresses constitutional numeral 33. He indicates that, of the popular election positions, those of the municipal regime represent the greatest quantity (mayoralties, vice-mayoralties, council member seats and their alternates, district trustee seats (sindicaturas) and their alternates, intendancies (intendencias), vice-intendancies, and district councillorships (concejalías de distrito) and their alternates). He accuses that the sole article transgresses the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since, after two consecutive terms of office, it imposes an eight-year prohibition on holding a position within the municipal regime. He considers that such an eight-year period is unreasonable and disproportionate, as it violates, besides constitutional case law, "subsections 1 c) and 2" of the American Convention on Human Rights, since, without any justification, it limits access under equal conditions to persons holding a mayoralty. He adds that it also regulates a situation that limits the rights of persons contrary to the exceptions imposed by Article 23 subsection 2) eiusdem. He considers such a temporal limitation unreasonable and disproportionate for those holding a mayoralty, since that is the only position of all the popular election positions in the country that can be removed through a recall plebiscite (ordinal 19 of the Municipal Code). He indicates that the principle of proportionality is transgressed by establishing more onerous limitations and conditions for the election of a mayoralty than for other popular election positions within the same municipal regime and the Legislative and Executive Powers. Likewise, he argues that the second paragraph of the sole article of Law 10183 imposes a limitation on persons holding popular election positions in the municipal mayoralties, which transgresses subsections b and c of Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights. He maintains that voting and having the possibility of being elected is a political right, as well as having access under general conditions of equality to popular election positions. He argues that the problem presented by the norm is that, in the case of mayors who serve eight years in the position, they have an immediate legal prohibition that prevents them from participating in any other popular election position within the municipal regime, which transgresses the right to passive vote contemplated in the referenced convention, since these are different positions. He states that none of the exceptions to the mentioned numeral 23 allows limiting the right to passive vote for having held other popular election positions. He argues that the Chamber, in ruling No. 2003-02771, considers the right to election a fundamental one. He maintains that the same prohibition applies to persons holding the positions of intendancy (intendencia). He maintains that the questioned norm does not conform to the exceptions established in subsection 2 of the aforementioned ordinal 23. He asserts that the limitation for those holding mayoralties and intendancies harms their rights.

The claimants Wilber Quirós Palma and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales maintain that the reform responded to a campaign of discrediting the local regime, orchestrated by the press. They state that the approved scheme is seriously incongruent and does not represent a lawful exercise of legislative discretion. They add that mayors are prohibited, after two consecutive terms, from holding any municipal popular election position, but vice-mayors are only prohibited from holding the same position or that of council member or district trustee; that is, they are allowed to run for mayor, intendant, or vice-intendant and for councillor of a district municipal council. They consider that the foregoing constitutes senseless discrimination. They argue that, according to the transitory provision, executive officials cannot run for any popular election position in the next two elections, but vice-executives or council members (not including councillors of district municipal councils) have restrictions only regarding the same position; that is, an unjustified difference arises. They explain that, according to Article 107 of the Political Constitution, legislators cannot be consecutively reelected; however, the possibility is restricted for council members and district councillors for two terms, which creates discrimination and inevitably forces them to abandon their local political career. They consider that the limitations regulated in the questioned law have no basis in numeral 23.2 of the convention mentioned ut supra, which contemplates the exhaustive grounds for restricting political rights. Likewise, they allege that the law intentionally worsens the current content of the right to reelection. They argue that the Chamber considered the “possibility of reelection in public positions” a human right, derived from the fundamental right to be elected. They state that, according to the foregoing, such right cannot be diminished by the legislator not even by constitutional reform. They mention that, if a norm provides for popular election and does not contemplate limitations regarding reelection, then the latter cannot be established. They consider it irrelevant that the unlimited right to reelection was conferred by law, since it is a fundamental right. They consider that this right cannot be reduced except by a Constituent Assembly.

• ii)Considerations of the Chamber.

ii.1. Analysis regarding political-electoral rights in light of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court).

Before resolving the constitutionality challenges on the merits, it is necessary to examine the ACHR and the case law of the IACHR Court in relation to political-electoral rights, which are regulated by numeral 23 of the ACHR as follows:

“Article 23. Political Rights 1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:

• a)to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the electors, and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of his country.

2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.” In this way, the ACHR, on the one hand, contemplates concrete examples of political-electoral rights, and, on the other, provides guidance on how to regulate them in a valid manner, which entails restricting them.

The starting point consists of understanding that “the effective exercise of political rights constitutes an end in itself and, at the same time, a fundamental means that democratic societies have to guarantee the other human rights provided for in the Convention and that their holders, that is, citizens, must not only enjoy rights, but also ‘opportunities.’ This last term implies the obligation to guarantee with positive measures that every person who is formally a holder of political rights has the real opportunity to exercise them.” (Yatama vs. Nicaragua, judgment of June 23, 2005).

Properly regarding the exercise of a popular election public office, it must be noted that political rights are not absolute.

From this perspective, the IACHR Court in Yatama vs. Nicaragua tests a kind of “reasonableness test” to weigh the legal viability of a restriction. Thus, besides explicitly resorting to the principles of legality and equality—the requirements for participating in an electoral contest and the corresponding procedure must be defined by law and not be discriminatory—, it affirms that limitations must “be based on reasonable criteria, attend to a useful and timely purpose that makes it necessary to satisfy an imperative public interest, and be proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that restricts the protected right the least and is most proportional to the purpose pursued should be chosen.” In relation to this type of analysis, drawing on German jurisprudence, the Constitutional Chamber has also developed a similar test or protocol to assess the reasonableness of a measure:

“In this sense, the Chamber considers that the challenged measure conforms to the principle of reasonableness. The latter is composed of the following components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective intended by the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that affects the legal sphere of the person the least; and proportionality in the strict sense dictates that although a measure is suitable and necessary, it will be unreasonable if it harms the essential content of another fundamental right, if it empties it of content.” (Judgment No. 2013001276 of 14:50 hours of January 29, 2013, reiterated in judgments Nos. 2017011793 of 16:41 hours of July 26, 2017, 2019007035 of 9:20 hours of April 26, 2019, and 2020022295 of 9:15 hours of November 20, 2020, among many others).

Now, in Castañeda Gutman vs. Mexico (judgment of August 6, 2008), the parameters for the regulation of political rights are developed with greater precision by the IACHR Court.

Firstly, regarding numeral 23.1 of the ACHR, the IACHR Court specifies that, correlatively to the rights and opportunities of citizens on the matter, the State is imposed the “obligation to do, to carry out certain actions or conducts, to adopt measures, that derive from the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction (Article 1.1 of the Convention) and from the general obligation to adopt measures in domestic law (Article 2 of the Convention).” In this sense, it states concretely:

“157. This positive obligation consists of the design of a system that allows representatives to be elected to conduct public affairs. Indeed, for political rights to be exercised, the law necessarily has to establish regulations that go beyond those related to certain limits on the State to restrict those rights, established in Article 23.2 of the Convention. States must organize electoral systems and establish a complex number of conditions and formalities to make possible the exercise of the right to vote and to be voted for.” That is, numeral 23.1 not only contemplates rights and opportunities in favor of the citizen, but concomitantly imposes obligations on the State for the purpose of configuring a system for election to public offices, which in itself is characterized by a complex number of conditions and formalities required to enable the efficacious and effective exercise of the rights to vote and to be voted for.

With a view to the elaboration of such a legal-positive filigree, the restriction factors established in ordinal 23.2 fall short; they are only part of the normative framework, since there are legally plausible limits beyond such regulation. In this sense, the judicial organ of the Organization of American States (OAS) emphatically rules: “it is not possible to apply to the electoral system established in a State only the limitations of paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the American Convention.” By virtue of the foregoing, the corresponding hermeneutical conditions and guidelines must be developed for the purpose of configuring restrictions in accordance with the ACHR.

The Chamber starts from the premise that the normative ought-to-be is insufficient, since the efficacy and effectiveness of any right requires, as already indicated, a complex institutional, economic, and human apparatus that functions in the plane of reality. In summary, an ‘ought-to-be’ without ‘reality’ is inane.

The IACHR Court states in Castañeda Gutman: “if there are no electoral codes or laws, voter rolls, political parties, means of propaganda and mobilization, voting centers, electoral boards, dates and deadlines for the exercise of suffrage, it simply cannot be exercised, by its very nature; in the same way that the right to judicial protection cannot be exercised without the existence of the courts that grant it and the procedural norms that discipline and make it possible.” In addition, the IACHR Court postulates that the ACHR does not opt for a particular electoral system; quite the contrary, it admits a diversity of options, only subject to their compatibility with the rights protected by it. The same guideline has guided the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights.

At this point, the IACHR Court modulates the consequences of Yatama, emphasizing that in that case the cultural qualities of the members of an indigenous community and the imposition of a form of organization—in the framework of a municipal election—totally alien to such parameters prevailed, resulting in an injury to the conventional right to be elected.

Thus, in Castañeda Gutman, the IACHR Court comes to confirm that the general rule is the plausibility of diverse restrictions and different models of electoral systems, provided that fundamental rights are not violated, for which purpose it specifies a series of concrete guidelines.

It begins by reiterating that restrictions on electoral rights can only be instituted by law.

Immediately afterward, it evokes certain elements inherent to a test of reasonableness and proportionality.

Thus, it refers to the purpose of the restrictive measure, insofar as its cause must be proper in light of the ACHR.

Within this approach, it highlights the case where the purpose is the safeguarding of some fundamental right, such as public order or health (according to numerals 12.3, 13.2.b, and 15 eiusdem, among others). In addition, it makes reference to another group of restrictions: those that are rather linked to general legitimate aims (for example, “the rights of others” or “the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society,” both in ordinal 32 eiusdem).

Now, properly, conventional numeral 23 does not explicitly regulate the legitimate causes or the permitted aims for which the law may regulate political rights. Indeed, that norm “limits itself to establishing certain aspects or reasons (civil or mental capacity, age, among others) based on which political rights may be regulated in relation to their holders, but it does not explicitly determine the aims, nor the specific restrictions that will necessarily have to be imposed when designing an electoral system, such as residency requirements, electoral districts, and others.

Nonetheless, the legitimate purposes that restrictions must pursue derive from the obligations arising from Article 23.1 of the Convention …” (Castañeda Gutman).

Thus, the aforementioned aspect linked to the objective of a regulation or measure corresponds to the ‘legitimacy’ element of the type of reasonableness and proportionality test developed by this Chamber, as defined *ut supra*.

Next, in Castañeda Gutman, the IACHR Court clarifies that demonstrating an end permitted by the ACHR does not *per se* imply the reasonableness of the measure, since it must also respond to the factor of “necessity in a democratic society.” The latter is articulated as follows:

“184. In order to evaluate whether the restrictive measure under review meets this last requirement, the Court must assess whether it: a) satisfies a pressing social need, that is, is aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest; b) is the one that least restricts the protected right; and c) is closely tailored to achieving the legitimate objective.” Regarding the ‘pressing social need’, it again evokes the ‘legitimacy’ element of this Chamber’s reasonableness test, insofar as the provision is aimed at seeking a solution to such a question, that is, it is a legitimate end, which inexorably must be present. Likewise, the Court holds that among several legitimate measures, the one that least restricts the affected fundamental right must be chosen; this is identical to the ‘necessity’ element of this Chamber’s constitutional test. Finally, when the IACHR Court refers to the requirement that the determination be closely tailored to achieving a legitimate objective, there is a denoted correspondence with the ‘suitability (idoneidad)’ element of the Constitutional Chamber’s reasonableness test, based on which the challenged state measure must be apt to achieve the intended objective. Only in relation to the element of the Chamber’s reasonableness test of ‘proportionality in the strict sense’ (according to which a provision can be legitimate, suitable, and necessary, yet still unreasonable, when its application lacerates the essential core of a fundamental right), is no direct concordance observed with the reasonableness examination developed by the IACHR Court.

As a corollary to the foregoing, in examining the reasonableness of a measure or provision, the criteria and guidelines cited above must be applied, which refer to the principles of legality and equality, the pursuit of a legitimate end, the existence of a pressing social need, the suitability and necessity of the measure (clearly applied in Argüelles et al. vs. Argentina, judgment of November 20, 2014), to which the element of proportionality in the strict sense must be added.

ii.2. Regarding legislative discretion and the principle of the legislator's free configuration.

In judgment No. 2003-05090 of 14:44 hours of June 11, 2003, the Chamber clearly outlines the principle of the legislator's free configuration, also called ‘free legislative design’ or ‘legislative discretion.’ Thus, this Court indicates that the Parliamentary Power, in the exercise of the materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature —that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1 of the Political Constitution)— enjoys broad freedom to normatively develop the constitutional program established by the constituent power.

Within such context, this Court addresses the principle of the legislator's free configuration in this manner: “That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, in the face of a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation. In this way, the legislator can create public bodies, assign them functions or competencies, develop various institutions, or regulate reality, as it deems opportune and convenient for a specific historical, social, economic, or political juncture. Evidently, legislative discretion is much broader than administrative discretion, since the legislative function cannot be reduced to the simple execution of the Constitution.” However, the “freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality comprised of constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles —among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since in such matters, the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, whereas, in contrast, such limits are laxer in merely organizational aspects.” (See also resolutions No. 2013011499 of 16:00 hours of August 28, 2013, 2013011706 of 11:44 hours of August 30, 2013, and 2020015542 of 11:40 hours of August 19, 2020, among others).

In the same stated direction, the Constitutional Court, in judgment No. 2018019511 of 21:45 hours of November 23, 2018, affirms that this broad freedom to shape social, economic, and political reality enjoyed by deputies in the exercise of legislative power (which according to articles 105 and 121, subsection 1 of the Fundamental Law resides originally in the People and is constitutionally delegated to the Legislative Assembly due to its nature as a representative political body), can only be subject to “the limits established by the constituent and, in general, the block of constitutionality, so that to avoid an undue limitation of the freedom of legislative configuration, any provision establishing a condition or limit that aggravates it must be interpreted in its just and reasonable terms, to facilitate its exercise.” Nevertheless, it must be noted that, in judgment No. 2018000230 of 10:40 hours of January 10, 2018, the Constitutional Chamber rejected “that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretionary power of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule in this regard (for example, in environmental matters) or when the matter requires it, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness” (for example, in application of the principle of objectification of environmental protection —judgments No. 2005014293 of 14:52 hours of October 19, 2005, 2012012716 of 16:01 hours of September 12, 2012, and 2021024147 of 9:15 hours of October 27, 2021—).

Likewise, it is worth noting that legislative discretion in the exercise of derived constituent power is equally subject to certain procedural, temporal, and substantial limits (see resolutions No. 2005015094 of 15:00 hours of November 2, 2005, 2013006118 of 16:22 hours of April 30, 2013, and 2019013270 of 16:50 hours of July 17, 2019).

As a corollary to the foregoing, in the exercise of legislative power, the deputy enjoys extensive discretion, subject only to observance of the block of constitutionality.

ii.3. Regarding the alleged unconstitutionalities in relation to the establishment of limits on the reelection of those holding popularly elected office in the municipal regime; the prohibition on opting for other popularly elected offices in the municipal regime for mayors and vice-mayors reelected for two consecutive terms; and the alleged unreasonableness and disproportionality of the eight-year term to opt for reelection.

In the first place, this Court considers that the conditions for the election of mayoral positions are, in principle, covered by the free configuration of the legislator, unless other constitutional norms or principles are harmed.

Article 169 of the Political Constitution establishes:

“ARTICLE 169.- The administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be in charge of the Municipal Government, formed by a deliberative body, composed of municipal councilors elected by popular vote, and by an executive official designated by law.” Thus, providing for or limiting the reelection of that executive official is a discussion of a political nature appropriate to be developed in the Legislative Assembly by constitutional mandate. Concerning this point, the Chamber, in judgment No. 2012009226 of 14:30 hours of July 17, 2012, defined:

“(…) this Court does not consider that the challenged norms harm the Constitution in any way by establishing the election of the Mayor and their substitute through popular elections, since the Constituents themselves delegated to the law the mechanism to devise for their appointment (…).” Regarding aspects delegated by the constituent to the legislator in electoral matters, the Chamber resolved in judgment No. 1994002128 of 14:51 hours of May 3, 1994:

“… in matters not regulated, but delegated to the legislator by the Constitution, the latter may establish conditions of real or apparent inequality when its exceptions are absolutely and clearly justified by reason of other constitutional principles or values and, above all, of the rights and freedoms of the human person. Consequently, the exceptions, limitations, requirements, or impediments that will govern in electoral matters, defined by the legislator based on the responsibility delegated by the Constitution itself, must be supported by objective reasons clearly motivated by the requirements inherent to the electoral system and the exercise of the office. In other words, restrictions that strengthen the democratic system and electoral processes may be admitted, even if a person or group suffers the limited consequence of that regulation.” In addition, regarding the municipal council, said article 169 only establishes that the councilors must be elected by popular vote.

On the other hand, concerning other municipal offices of popular election, the Magna Carta provides:

“ARTICLE 171.- Municipal Councilors shall be elected for four years and shall perform their duties obligatorily.

The law shall determine the number of Councilors and the manner in which they shall act. However, the Municipalities of the central cantons of provinces shall be composed of no fewer than five Proprietary Councilors and an equal number of substitutes.

The Municipalities shall be installed on the first day of May of the corresponding year.

Transitional (Article 171). - The Municipal Councilors elected in the elections of February nineteen sixty-two shall exercise their offices from the first of July of nineteen sixty-two until the thirtieth of April of nineteen sixty-six.

(Thus amended by subsection 2 of Law No. 2741 of May 12, 1961) ARTICLE 172.- Each district shall be represented before the municipality by a proprietary district syndic and a substitute with voice but no vote.

For the administration of interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases the municipalities may create municipal district councils, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same procedures of popular election used to form the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies, shall establish the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing.

(Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 8105 of May 31, 2001).” Thus, our Fundamental Law specifically regulates the election of certain positions at the municipal level, for which restrictions on their appointments were not foreseen; however, this does not mean that such limitations can only be established through constitutional precepts. The fact that the Political Constitution has indeed instituted express prohibitions for national positions of popular election (Articles 107 and 132 regarding deputies and the president and vice-presidents of the Republic) does not exclude the possibility of exercising the legislative prerogative concerning municipal positions of popular election. In fact, as has been developed throughout this judgment, the legislator has the power to modify aspects of the electoral system regarding the election and reelection of positions in the municipal regime, provided it does not contravene the Law of the Constitution nor render fundamental rights void of content. Regarding municipal councilors, district syndics, district mayors (intendentes), deputy district mayors, and municipal district councilors, although there is no express delegation from the constituent to the legislator regarding the conditions of their designation, the limitations established by the substantive part of Law No. 10183 do not render void of content the right to be elected, but rather, in the terms provided, they form part of the legislator's free configuration and its discretionary power. In this sense, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself, when responding to the hearing granted by the Chamber, stated: “the thesis of this Constitutional Body, held for several decades, is that there is no obstacle for the legislator to limit the successive reelection of municipal positions; such regulation constitutes a political decision whose assessment —regarding convenience and opportunity— is exclusive to the legislator.” In addition, even if it is alleged that indefinite and successive reelection cannot be worsened because it is a human right, it is no less true that a person who has been reelected in the same office has already exercised that right and, moreover, as stated *ut supra*, it can be legitimately limited and regulated. In this sense, there is no right to the immutability of the legal system, besides the fact that the legislator has the power to validly impose new conditions on reelection to offices in the municipal regime, insofar as they apply prospectively and are not contrary to the block of constitutionality. Therefore, the Chamber does not consider that changing from a municipal electoral system that contemplated successive and indefinite reelection to another that only allows one consecutive reelection becomes contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

It should be noted that, although Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes that the law must regulate the exercise of the right to vote and be elected “exclusively for reasons of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity, or conviction by a competent judge in criminal proceedings,” conventional jurisprudence has established that this is not a exhaustive or closed list, but rather that each State may develop particularities in its electoral system design. Therefore, it is permissible for the Costa Rican legislator to impose other limitations that respect said international instrument and the block of constitutionality. That is, each country can define restrictions on the right to vote (in its active and passive aspects) within that legal framework.

Now, it must be analyzed whether the prohibition on opting for other popularly elected offices in the municipal regime is unconstitutional or not for mayors and vice-mayors reelected for two consecutive terms. It must be reiterated that the requirements or limitations to run for popularly elected offices in the municipal regime are *a priori* covered by the principle of the legislator's free configuration, unless they breach constitutional norms or principles or the so-called unamendable constitutional norms (normas pétreas). Precisely, these political decisions are suitable for discussion in the Legislative Assembly to define their opportunity and convenience, with full respect for the principle of separation of powers, the democratic regime of a Rule of Law State like Costa Rica, and in general the Law of the Constitution.

In the specific case, the single article of the challenged law limits for eight years the participation in other popularly elected public offices of anyone who has held the office of mayor for two consecutive terms. The same situation applies to vice-mayors, as they are prohibited from holding new offices as councilors or syndics for the same period.

As indicated *supra*, following Yatama vs. Nicaragua (judgment of June 23, 2005) and Castañeda Gutman vs. Mexico (judgment of August 6, 2008), as well as the jurisprudence of this Chamber, the constitutionality and conventionality control of restrictions on political rights —in this case, the right to stand for election (sufragio pasivo)— at a minimum comprises these parameters: the principles of legality and equality, the pursuit of a constitutionally or conventionally permitted end, the existence of a pressing social need, the suitability and necessity of the measure, and the analysis of proportionality in the strict sense, all in accordance with the scope and limits of the principle of free legislative configuration.

The aforementioned restriction that is the subject of the *sub iudice*, on the one hand, is regulated by law (amendment to Article 14 of the Municipal Code); on the other, it stems from a certainly differentiated but not unjustified treatment, given that it seeks to address ends of constitutional and conventional relevance, and, specifically, a pressing social need, as explained *infra*. In determining which ends to pursue or what to consider as a pressing social need, the legislator enjoys a broad freedom of configuration.

Thus, in the presentation of the bill for the law challenged here, reference was made to a preliminary report from the OAS Electoral Mission, issued after the elections held on February 2, 2020. This delegation was composed of 11 electoral experts from 6 nations of the region, who had arrived in the country on the 25th of the previous month. In that document, the Mission stated: “… there is no absolute human right to hold office, and that the rights to vote and be elected can be regulated.” (see http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf), which was widely disseminated by various media outlets (https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/oea-recomienda-a-costa-rica-limitar-la-reeleccion/OVR5GIP5T5CYXG3DVH4GH36P44/story/, https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/politica/mision-de-oea-reitera-necesidad-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes/, https://observador.cr/pusc-y-nueva-republica-trataran-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes-oea-lo-recomienda/, https://www.diarioextra.com/Noticia/detalle/410346/oea-jala-orejas-a-costa-rica-por-reeleccion-de-alcaldes, https://www.elmundo.cr/municipales/alcaldes-apoyaran-proyecto-de-ley-que-limita-su-reeleccion/ ). Later, in the final version ( https://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=421-1219-28-0 ), it is emphasized that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), in two reports issued based on a consultation made by the Secretary General of the OAS regarding limits on reelection, concluded “that there is no absolute human right to hold office, and that the rights to vote and be elected can be regulated. Review the current legislation, recalling again that, while continuity in public policies is valuable, alternation constitutes a fundamental pillar of the democratic system.” (Report on Limits to Reelection Part II - Members of Parliament, Part III - Locally Elected Representatives and Locally Elected Executive Officials. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), March 18, 2019).

Likewise, regarding the regulation of the figure of reelection in municipal elections, the Mission recommended: “Review the current legislation, recalling again that, while continuity in public policies is valuable, alternation constitutes a fundamental pillar of the democratic system.” In line with such a statement, the law that is the subject of the *sub lite* actually coincides with the principle of alternation of power in the exercise of popularly elected offices and seeks real equality in the practice of the fundamental right to stand for election (sufragio pasivo) in the electoral processes of the municipal regime.

Note that the Political Constitution, precisely concerning popularly elected offices, chooses to prevent consecutive reelection for deputies, the president, and the vice-president of the Republic (Articles 107, 132, 134 of the Fundamental Law), which does not occur for other types of appointments of constitutional relevance but which are not of popular election, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic, justices of the Judicial Branch, and of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Articles 183, 101, and 158, *eiusdem*). Here, the design of the State by the original constituent becomes relevant, as well as its values and unamendable norms, since they constitute the fundamental pillars and foundations on which the balances among the Public Powers rest and the pillars of the Republic are preserved.

In accordance with the foregoing, the restriction in question, on the one hand, is supported by legitimate ends, and, on the other, is founded on data and arguments sufficiently plausible to sustain what conventional jurisprudence has termed a ‘pressing social need.’ We reiterate that, in this area, the legislator enjoys a broad freedom of configuration, so that, in principle, it is not the constitutional judge's role to define what a ‘pressing social need’ is; on the contrary, the judge is compelled to apply self-restraint and not to interfere in a purely political question, unless there were a breach of a fundamental right, which is not appreciated in the *sub examine*.

The reasoning set forth, which serves to rule out unjustified unequal treatment, is also useful for affirming that the law fully satisfies the ‘purpose (finalidad)’ element of the reasonableness and proportionality test, since it deals with a legitimate purpose.

Regarding the ‘suitability (idoneidad)’ element —that is, that the challenged measure is apt to effectively achieve the intended objective— *prima facie*, it is observed that the cited restriction meets it, since it is useful for limiting indefinite reelection in municipal offices of popular election, which favors alternation in power.

Concerning the ‘necessity (necesidad)’ element —that is, the possibility that there are options less harmful to the political right to stand for election (this should not be confused with the notion of ‘pressing social need’)— no injury to this factor is observed either. As read in the statement of legislative intent (exposición de motivos) of the bill for the challenged norm, the deputies adduce the purpose of trying to prevent a particular position of influence in a municipal office, after two consecutive terms, from conferring an undue advantage over other candidacies in a popular suffrage process within the municipal regime. Given this, the only way the Chamber could assess a transgression of the “necessity” element is if the petitioning parties at least proposed options in a substantiated manner within the specific framework of a reasonableness test, in which case constitutional review would be applied in pursuit of a balance between legislative discretion and the inexorable safeguarding of fundamental rights.

Regarding the requirement of ‘proportionality in the strict sense’, any violation is also ruled out, since, as developed *ut supra*, a nullification of the content of the right to stand for election is not verified, but only the exercise of the legislator's free configuration regarding its limitation.

In this sense, according to the jurisprudential line of the IACHR Court, the restrictions formulated do not affect the essential content of this right, since they are not indefinite, but are subject to a reasonable restriction period (two terms from the end of the second consecutive term), in order to achieve the legitimate purposes pursued, as explained above.

Thus, this Constitutional Court considers that limiting consecutive reelection to once and the impediment to holding other offices for two terms from the end of the second consecutive term (eight years) are not openly unreasonable or disproportionate. Rather, such a restriction is legitimate because it deals with a valid purpose in light of the legal system; it shows a necessary and suitable relationship between the means and the object pursued by the law (limiting the indefinite reelection of local authorities), and, furthermore, it denotes proportionality in the strict sense between the means provided and their ends, without any nullification of the essential content of any fundamental right being evident. For the purpose of having a parameter of constitutionality, eight years is the same period established for presidential reelection in Article 132, subsection 1 of the Political Constitution. In any case, the petitioning parties did not present arguments that would lead the Chamber to declare any unconstitutionality in this regard.

Moreover, since the restriction operates within the framework of an election process for municipal offices, the extension of its effects to other positions equally subject to popular suffrage within the municipal regime but different from the one the affected person had been holding stems from the same premise: consecutive exercise for two terms in a popularly elected municipal office confers an advantage that it is plausible to restrict according to the principle of alternation in power. This is a reasonable alternative that only pertains for the legislator to weigh, so that it exclusively resides in the realm of legislative discretion; that is, the definition in this respect carries with it the political responsibility of the deputies.

Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the extension of the impossibility of being elected to other positions in the municipal regime stems from the same premise: consecutive exercise for two terms in a popularly elected municipal office confers an advantage that it is permissible to restrict based on the principle of alternation in power. Hence, the provisions adopted by the legislator constitute a reasonable alternative that falls within the framework of their weighing and discretion, so it is not appropriate for the Chamber to intervene in this area.

ii.4. In conclusion, under the terms raised in the unconstitutionality challenges, any transgression of the principles of equality; reasonableness and proportionality; freedom; and innocence; as well as of Articles 169 and 171 of the Political Constitution and Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is ruled out.

VII.2. Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the transitory provision.

• i)Arguments of the parties.

The plaintiff Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza mentions that Article 34 of the Political Constitution contemplates the principle of non-retroactivity of legal norms; however, he considers that a differentiated condition is created for those holding “a specific office” that applies to them toward the past. He argues that the new rule directed at all citizens sets the possibility of election to no more than two consecutive times; however, a special situation was created for those who were performing the office consecutively in the past. He accuses that the transitory provision fails to comply with the principles and the technical wording that it should have as a legal norm, since it was drafted to harm slightly more than 40 democratically elected officials by the free suffrage of the citizenry, as a sort of ‘vendetta or social reaction’ fueled by some mass media outlets since the start of the judicial investigation known as the Diamante case, which examines the possible commission of acts of corruption by some municipal authorities. He asserts that the presumption of influence peddling and abuse of power, as well as social condemnation for acts of alleged corruption, do not justify the restriction on the reelection of municipal offices; therefore, the amendment lacks a legitimate purpose and an adequate determination of a pressing social need, as required for the norm to be in harmony with our Constitution.

Additionally, they consider Articles 35, 39, and 40 of the Political Constitution to have been violated, since the transitory provision established a public sanction aimed especially at those who hold the status of re-elected proprietary mayors, for political and media reasons exacerbated by the scandal known as the 'Diamante case' in the context of an electoral campaign. They consider the principle of proportionality of all State action vis-à-vis the community as a whole to have been violated. They mention that the foregoing confirms the absence of a compelling social purpose and necessity for the approved reform. They explain that the very irrationality of the challenged rule would imply taking a juncture of public scandal at the start of a judicial investigation to formulate a transitory rule that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself insinuates is unconstitutional for completely emptying the right to be elected of its content. Certainly, access to public office is not an absolute right, since, according to Articles 21.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 23.1.c of the American Convention on Human Rights, it can be regulated in a general manner; however, it cannot be emptied of its content by a specific transitory rule, for such conventional principles expressly consolidate that every person has the right of access to popularly elected office under conditions of equality, superior norms that the challenged law transgresses with absolute clarity despite having a lower rank, which at the same time violates the parameter of reasonableness and proportionality.

The claimant Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considers that the first paragraph of the sole transitory provision gives retroactive effect to Law No. 10,183 to the detriment of Article 34 of the Magna Carta. He reproaches that popularly elected municipal authorities are restricted from the possibility of being re-elected based on periods served before the law's entry into force. He affirms that the second paragraph of the transitory provision creates a difference among elected positions within the municipal regime, because it prohibits mayors and district intendants from aspiring to other popularly elected offices within that same regime for 8 years after the expiration of the second period, while other positions are only prohibited from being re-elected to the position they held, meaning they can participate even consecutively. He mentions that the foregoing disproportionately affects those who occupy mayoral and district intendant positions, as well as injuring the right to passive suffrage. He considers that the transitory provision should have stipulated that the counting of terms would begin to apply from the appointment period at the time of the law's entry into force. He admits that it is the legislature's power to regulate the re-election of popularly elected positions in the municipal regime, but clarifies that his position is not that indefinite re-election be maintained, but rather that the limitation in question should only apply from the publication of the law onward and concerning subsequent periods. He refers that the rule prohibits district intendants who complete two appointment periods from aspiring to another popularly elected office in the municipal regime. He argues that even though the rule is not very clear, the transitory provision does explicitly state: "Persons who currently serve as alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes, or intendentas, and have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to again occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime." The claimants Wilber Quirós Palma and Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales consider that the transitory provision violates the principle of non-retroactivity. They argue that the current popularly elected servants obtained such condition without future restrictions and with the possibility of pursuing a local political career. They consider that all regulation should only have prospective effects. They add that the transitory provision is only admissible insofar as it is congruent with the main rule. They refer that the non-retroactivity of the rule would imply that officials exercising the office could only be elected for two more consecutive periods. They reproach that the transitory provision does not regulate pending situations from the main rule. They mention that the retroactive effect of the rule seems more like a sanction responding to the context of the reform and to pressures to end local political careers. They argue that, according to the transitory provision, executive officials cannot run for any popularly elected office in the next two elections, but vice-executives or council members (regidores) (not including council members of district municipal councils (concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito)) have a restriction only regarding the same position; that is, an unjustified difference arises.

• ii)Considerations of the Chamber.

ii.1) Regarding the alleged transgression of the principle of non-retroactivity and the impact on a specific group of persons.

In the transitory norm of the challenged law, the legislature regulated the situation of persons who, at the time of the law's entry into force, are occupying popularly elected positions in the municipal regime for at least two consecutive periods.

Regarding the principle of non-retroactivity and the entry into force of norms, Articles 34 and 129 of the Political Constitution establish:

"ARTICLE 34. No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, or of their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations.

(…)

ARTICLE 129.- Laws are binding and take effect from the day they designate; in the absence of this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette.

(…)." Now, according to the principle of the legislature’s free configuration, the Legislative Assembly can validly regulate the conditions of election and re-election for positions in the municipal regime subject to popular vote, provided the block of constitutionality is not transgressed. Consequently, in the sub examine there is no constitutional friction whatsoever, because, based on the premise that the fundamental right to passive suffrage is not absolute, it is clear that the mere fact that, at a given moment, a person occupies a popularly elected office in the municipal regime does not confer upon them either a subjective right or a consolidated legal situation that exempts them from the legal-positive modifications to the electoral system that occur while they are exercising the office and have not formally initiated the corresponding electoral process. The person in such a situation holds a mere expectation of a right to participate in a future electoral process according to specific rules; such an expectation, by virtue of its legal nature, is subject to all the contingencies and variations of legislation that are duly approved in accordance with the constitutional framework." Precisely, as reasoned supra, there is no right to the immutability of the legal system, and both the right to be elected and the right to re-election can be legitimately limited. In this case, in line with the reasoning set forth in the preceding considerandos, neither the restriction on running for a third consecutive term in the same office nor the eight-year period for again opting for it empties the right to political participation of its content. In fact, once such period has elapsed, the person has the possibility of running again. Therefore, it is not a matter of the retroactive application of the norm, but rather the implementation of a change in the electoral system regarding the re-election of popularly elected offices in the municipal regime. The claimant parties cannot claim that the new rules do not apply to those who are exercising the office consecutively for two terms; rather, not only is the period for which they were elected being respected, but, it is reiterated, they have the possibility of participating, under equal conditions, once the temporary restriction ends. Thus, the transitory norm regulates future municipal elections regarding the situation of those who, at the time of the norm's entry into force, have at least two consecutive elections. Therefore, any transgression of the principle of non-retroactivity is dismissed.

In addition, even though one of the parties mentioned that the transitory provision fails to comply with the principles and the technical drafting of legal norms, no development susceptible to being analyzed in this action is appreciated. The same situation occurs with respect to the alleged violation of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, since it was only indicated that all persons have the right of access to public office under conditions of equality. Furthermore, regarding the norms of the international instruments mentioned, no arguments developed in a precise and duly substantiated manner by the claimant parties are observed. In any case, the Chamber already addressed supra the power and the limits of the legislature regarding the regulation of the election and re-election of offices in the municipal regime.

On the other hand, the alleged impact on more than 40 democratically elected officials, as well as the questions relating to the context in which the law was promoted, the presumption of the commission of crimes by municipal authorities, and the supposed punitive nature of the impossibility of re-election are insufficient to support the intended unconstitutionality of the challenged transitory norm. Regarding such allegations, this Tribunal considers that, regardless of the factual or political context that motivated the enactment of the law, the Legislative Assembly, in general, has the power to impose limitations on the re-election of popularly elected offices in the municipal regime, without this constituting a priori a sanction on those who are occupying the positions, nor presuming the existence of crimes. Upon modifying the electoral system regarding the re-election of specific offices in question, it is evident that some previously elected persons will experience a variation in the conditions of participation in future municipal elections. This does not imply, however, an illegitimate impact on their fundamental rights, but solely a variation in the design and the requirements for access to such public offices. In this sense, it is reiterated, the requirements or limitations for opting for popularly elected offices in the municipal regime are prima facie subject to the legislature's free configuration, unless constitutional norms or principles are contravened, including the so-called 'petrine norms' (normas pétreas). These political decisions are proper to be discussed in the Legislative Assembly, a democratic scenario in which their timeliness and convenience are defined, with full respect for the principle of separation of powers, the republican regime of a Rule-of-Law State such as the Costa Rican one, and the Law of the Constitution.

ii.2) Regarding the alleged prohibition on intendentes and intendentas from aspiring for 8 years, after the expiration of the second period, to other popularly elected offices within that same regime. Regarding this allegation, the Chamber already endorsed the restriction for a period of eight years for opting for other positions of the municipal regime different from the one held by the official; however, in the specific case of its extension to intendentes and intendentas by means of the transitory norm, no development susceptible to being analyzed in this action is appreciated. In that sense, only that grievance was mentioned, therefore a precise and duly substantiated argumentative development by the claimants based on the alleged unconstitutionality is lacking.

VIII.- Different reasons of Judge Rueda Leal regarding the alleged violation of Article 97 of the Political Constitution. In relation to Article 97 eiusdem, in opinion No. 2022006119 of 1:15 p.m. of March 16, 2022, which resolved the optional legislative consultation of constitutionality regarding the bill 'Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits indefinite re-election of local authorities)', I recorded my position in this sense:

"V.- NOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA LEAL.- As the majority vote, which the undersigned subscribes to, records, for the period of six months before and four months after the holding of a popular election, during which the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law bills objected to by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal – TSE – (Article 97 of the Fundamental Law) to apply, the objection must refer to the corresponding type of electoral process. That is, if the objection concerns a specific aspect of a municipal election, the aforementioned period applies only, precisely, to an electoral process of that nature; the same ratio iuris operates when it involves a national election. However, it is overlooked that there may be matters relating to electoral matters that are not directly linked to the municipal or national nature of an election, but rather refer to the electoral jurisdiction in general (for example, if it were proposed to vary the composition of the TSE or the way of electing the judges (personas magistradas)), in which case the period in question would apply with respect to any kind of electoral process." Thus, certainly, the periods contemplated in Article 97 of the Magna Carta apply according to the type of electoral process (national or municipal) that is affected by a particular law. However, as I indicated in my individual reasoning transcribed ut supra, a legal regulation can also influence electoral matters not linked to the national or municipal quality of an electoral process, but concerning the electoral jurisdiction in general (for example, if it were proposed to vary the composition of the TSE or the method of electing the judges (personas magistradas)). In this latter case, the periods provided in the aforementioned article would apply equally, that is, without the municipal or national character of the respective electoral process being relevant.

IX.- Documentation provided to the case file. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or device produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this pronouncement. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judiciary", approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Judicial Bulletin Number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 of May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Therefore:

Regarding procedural defects, by majority, the action is declared without merit for the alleged violation of Articles 97 and 172, second paragraph, of the Political Constitution. Judge Rueda Leal gives different reasons regarding Article 97 eiusdem.

Judge Cruz Castro and Judge Jara Velásquez jointly partially dissent and declare the action with merit for a procedural defect only for the alleged violation of Article 97 of the Political Constitution.

Judge Garro Vargas dissents and declares the action of unconstitutionality with merit for the existence of an essential procedural defect in the approval of Law No. 10183 of April 5, 2022, Law that limits indefinite re-election of local authorities, due to an infraction of the provisions of Article 97 in relation to Article 102, subsection 3), both of the Political Constitution.

Regarding substantive defects, by majority, the action is declared without merit. Judge Cruz Castro and Judge Jara Velásquez jointly dissent and declare the action with merit on this point.

Judge Garro Vargas omits pronouncement regarding the substantive grievances.

Let this pronouncement be notified to the claimant parties, the Attorney General of the Republic, the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the President of the Legislative Assembly.

Fernando Castillo V. President Fernando Cruz C. Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Anamari Garro V.

José Roberto Garita N. Rosibel Jara V.

Dissenting vote of Judge Cruz Castro and Judge Jara Velásquez, with drafting by the former.

We separate ourselves from the majority criterion, issuing a particular vote, because we consider that Law No. 10183, called “Law that limits indefinite re-election of local authorities,” which reforms Article 14 of the Municipal Code, contains procedural and substantive defects.

Unconstitutionality due to a procedural defect.- Lack of consultation with the TSE (Article 97 of the Constitution) We consider that Law No. 10183 of April 5, 2022, called “Law that limits indefinite re-election of local authorities” contains a procedural defect in its approval, referring to the violation of the provisions of Art. 97 of the Constitution.

In the same sense as Judge Cruz indicated in the resolution that decided the optional consultation of this law (vote No. 2022-006119), we consider that the indicated procedural defect exists, because the prohibitions and limitations imposed by the prohibition period established in Article 97 of the Constitution are contravened. Let us remember that this constitutional rule provides:

“Art. 97. For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members shall be required. Within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into law the bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

In this case, it is undeniable that the law in question refers to electoral matters, because it affects the regulation and restriction of certain re-election scenarios in municipal elections. Furthermore, one cannot distinguish where the Political Constitution does not, therefore it is improper to affirm that Article 97 of the Constitution refers only to national elections and not to municipal ones. Clearly, such norm refers to “the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters” without distinguishing types of elections. Likewise, it is evident that the TSE has expressed disagreement with this bill. So then, we consider that the provisions established by Article 97 are applicable according to the following arguments:

The Legislative Assembly may depart from the TSE’s opinion; but for this, it will need the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members, provided it is not within the legislative prohibition period. In any case, that qualified vote does not have the virtue of disregarding the prohibition period, according to which: within the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not convert into law bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.

The political parties that act in Parliament are important actors in all types of elections; for this reason, we consider the constitutional prohibition to be healthy. Such constitutional prohibition prevents political actors from varying the electoral rules in any type of election. Distinguishing between municipal elections and national elections is an artificial distinction. The impact of electoral struggles and the porosity of the parties are sufficient reasons to prevent the rules of electoral contests, whether local or national, from being modified during the electoral period. Electoral history evidences the volatility and conflict inherent in this matter; for this reason, the constitutional text is emphatic, very clear. Any popular election prevents the variation of electoral rules. On the other hand, the constitutional text contains a “particular veto” of the Electoral Tribunal, because no electoral modification may be introduced in the six months prior to and the four months following the holding of a popular election, on matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement. This is precisely what occurred in this case. The majority vote ignores that there is a qualified intervention of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which does not depend only on the period of exclusion of legislative power, but also on the Tribunal having a qualified competence that cannot be ignored by the legislative power nor by this constitutional instance. The weakening of the powers of the Electoral Tribunal is not a good symptom, because history cannot be ignored, as the strengthening of the electoral jurisdiction was one of the most important political vindications after the violent events of forty-eight.

Given that the national elections were held on February 6, 2022, the aforementioned prohibition period would cover from August 6, 2021. It is evident that the first debate was held within the prohibited period in question because it took place on January 25, 2022. Furthermore, it was conducted regarding a reform that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal opposed. By reason of the arguments set forth, we consider that the indicated procedural defect exists, because the prohibitions and limitations imposed during the prohibition period foreseen in Article 97 of the Constitution are contravened.

Unconstitutionality due to substantive defects.- In this regard, for the reasons indicated, we consider that the following aspects of the challenged norms are unconstitutional:

“(…) They may not occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime until two periods have elapsed from the conclusion of their second consecutive period. Vicealcaldes and vicealcaldesas may also be re-elected continuously only once and may not occupy the same office nor that of regidores or síndicos, until two periods have elapsed from the conclusion of their second consecutive period.

Persons who are regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, district municipal council members (concejales municipales de distrito) of Law 8173, General Law of District Municipal Councils, of December 7, 2001, as well as those who occupy any of the alternate (suplencias) positions, (…) may not occupy the same office or its alternate position until two periods have elapsed from the conclusion of their second period.

Sole Transitory: Persons who currently serve as alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes or intendentas, and have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to again occupy any popularly elected office of the municipal regime.

Persons who currently serve as vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes and viceintendentas, proprietary and alternate regidores and regidoras, proprietary and alternate síndicos and síndicas, and have already been elected to their positions for at least two consecutive periods, must wait for two periods to elapse before being able to again occupy the same popularly elected office of the municipal regime; however, they may occupy other municipal offices in accordance with this law.” As observed, the underlined portions refer to the impossibility (for a period of eight years) of a person who has held a popularly elected office in the municipal regime from being able to hold ANOTHER popularly elected municipal office. Such impossibility, restriction, or temporary prohibition refers to the exercise of the right of access to public office. Regarding the right of access to public office, there is ample international regulation:

Article 21.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “…Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country…”. Article 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: “Every person has the right to participate in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections…”. Article 23.1.c of the American Convention on Human Rights: “1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: … c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country…”.

In our Political Constitution, such right is derived from Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution. The fundamental right of access to public office is the right of every person to run for and access positions within the public service. It is undeniable that, like any other fundamental right, it may be subject to limitations, clearly, provided they comply with the principle of legal reservation, but also that such limitations do not lead to an absolute emptying of the right or imply unreasonable or disproportionate limitations. Among the valid limitations, in general, the regime of incompatibilities or temporary disqualification sanctions can be mentioned. The latter as a consequence of a serious fault, after due process, and where the sanction imposed is to guarantee correct and efficient administration. Now, if one carefully analyzes, it is verified that the challenged norms unreasonably restrict the right of access to public office, because what is intended is to prohibit, for 8 years, a person who has already held a popularly elected office of the municipal regime from being able to hold another popularly elected municipal office. Note that this goes beyond the limits on re-election, because it aims to impose a temporary prohibition on being able to access a popularly elected office, different from the one already held. With this, the basic principles of reasonableness and proportionality are clearly exceeded.

From our minority and dissenting perspective, we agree with the same conclusion reached by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in the sense of considering that the regulation in question imposes an emptying of the right of access to popularly elected offices in the municipal regime, without meeting the parameter of reasonableness. This is because said regulation implies an exclusion period during which a municipal official cannot opt for another popularly elected municipal office, without this being a consequence of some fault committed. Clearly, the concern about corruption cannot serve as a generic basis for a generalized restriction of the right of access to public office. The unreasonableness and disproportion are well appreciated in this scenario, by applying it to another similar prohibition: imposing that the limitation on presidential re-election also include the impossibility of being elected as a deputy (diputado) due to having been President of the Republic. It is clearly appreciated when the prohibition expands to other offices, it becomes unreasonable. Note that it is not about the right to assume an office per se, but that a popular election has mediated and the electorate has expressed itself in favor of having said official in another office. We consider that nothing would prevent a person who has previously held a popularly elected office from being able to again occupy another office, within the same municipal regime, if the electorate has so decided. As the TSE indicates in its response to the legislative consultation resolved on the bill that gave rise to this law, it is not legitimate for a State to impede passive suffrage (right to be elected) due to having held a specific position – different from the one aspired to – in the two immediately preceding periods. It is thus stated: “Such impact on the essential core of the right occurs precisely because… a total suspension of the citizen's prerogative to contend for public office would result, as an effect of the application of the rule. (…) On the other hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that the changes made to the text of the bill make it disjointed, insofar as the statement of motives develops why the proponents consider it legitimate and necessary to limit re-election, but it does not allude to the need to restrict any other type of candidacy (…) the original proposal was not to establish a prohibition as intense as the one that, via motions, was incorporated.” The fact that a person who has held a popularly elected office may run for another position is not, per se, a source of corruption or an illegitimate “modus vivendi.” It cannot be ignored that this involves leveraging the experience of a person who has already held similar offices and whom the citizens have elected. The aim of preventing the concentration of power does not justify the introduction of rules that curtail passive suffrage without any basis. Limitations intended to prevent concentrations of power cannot restrict fundamental rights without foundation. This measure appears unreasonable or disproportionate.

As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated regarding political rights, Article 23 enshrines the right to participate, to vote and be elected, and the right to have access to public functions. This protects both the right of the candidate and the right of the voters:

“The first paragraph of Article 23 of the Convention recognizes the rights of all citizens: a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the electors, and c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public functions of their country. Similarly, the American Declaration recognizes the right to take “part in the government of their country, directly or through their representatives, and to participate in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be genuine, periodic and free.” Taking the foregoing into account, this Court has indicated that the recognized rights have an individual and a collective dimension, as they protect both those persons who participate as candidates and their electors.” (ADVISORY OPINION OC-28/21 OF JUNE 7, 2021) Now, regarding the permissible limitations on political rights, it has been indicated that political rights are not absolute and may be subject to limitations. However, such limitations must comply with the principle of legal reservation and the principle of reasonableness (necessity and proportionality). The Inter-American Court has stated:

“Its regulation must observe the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality in a democratic society. Observance of the principle of legality requires that the State define precisely, by means of a law, the requirements for citizens to participate in the electoral contest, and that it clearly stipulate the electoral procedure preceding the elections. According to Article 23.2 of the Convention, the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in paragraph 1 of said article may be regulated exclusively for the reasons established in that paragraph. The restriction must be provided for by law, not be discriminatory, be based on reasonable criteria, serve a useful and timely purpose that makes it necessary to satisfy a compelling public interest, and be proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is more proportional to the purpose pursued must be chosen.” Clearly, in the law under challenge, there is no reasonable basis, nor does it serve a useful and timely purpose that makes the exclusion of a fundamental right necessary, nor is it understood what the public interest is, nor is it proportional to that objective. When there are several options to achieve that end, the one that least restricts the protected right and is more proportional to the purpose pursued must be chosen. These requirements are not met in this case. The situation would be different if the prohibition on holding another popularly elected office stemmed from a declared disqualification, because in that case, there would be reasonable justification. More recently, regarding restrictions, the Inter-American Court has specified two types of permissible restrictions: those of a general nature imposed by law and restrictions resulting from a particular sanction:

“(…) this Court notes that Article 23.2 establishes two scenarios. The first scenario refers to restrictions of a general nature that the law may establish (age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil or mental capacity), while the second scenario refers to restrictions on political rights imposed by way of a sanction on a particular person (conviction, by a competent judge, in criminal proceedings). It follows from this Court’s jurisprudence that the interpretation of the term ‘exclusively’ included in Article 23.2 will depend on whether it concerns general (first scenario) or particular (second scenario) restrictions on political rights. (ADVISORY OPINION OC-28/21 OF JUNE 7, 2021) Following the cited precedent, restrictions on fundamental rights must be provided for by law in a formal and material sense (principle of legal reservation), pursue a legitimate aim, and comply with the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality. These aspects are not met by the bill under consultation, as it is not understood how the temporal prohibition on holding public office is a suitable, necessary, or proportional measure. Furthermore, even if the legal reservation requirement were met, it is questionable whether a restriction of this type should be enacted through a constitutional amendment. On the other hand, it is clear that the ordinary legislator is not free in its actions but is constrained by the constitutional framework, as would be the case here, with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The argument in favor of the principle of free configuration of the legislator or legislative discretion does not apply in this case. Within a constitutional Rule of Law State, it is inadmissible to recognize unrestricted powers or competencies to any Branch of the Republic. As indicated in the majority vote, the freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it is limited by the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality comprised of constitutional precepts and customs, values, and principles, among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process and defense of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases stand out. The limits on legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since, in such matters, it is the extension, content, and scope of the liberties of the human person that are under discussion, whereas, in contrast, such limits are more lax in purely organizational aspects. (See also resolutions nos. 2013-011499 of 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 2013, 2013-011706 of 11:44 a.m. on August 30, 2013, and 2020-015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020, among others). Now, while such free configuration of the legislator may suffice to admit the imposition of limits on reelection, we believe it does not suffice to admit election to other offices. It is evident that this extension is, by all accounts, irrational or disproportionate. Unlike what is considered in the majority vote, where it is indicated that “It bears reiterating that the requirements or limitations for opting for popularly elected offices in the municipal regime are a priori covered by the principle of free configuration of the legislator, unless they violate constitutional norms or principles or what are known as entrenched clauses,” we believe that, based on the pro libertatis and pro homine principle, the rule must always be the exercise of the fundamental right, and the establishment of restrictions on such rights must be carefully examined. Starting from the opposite reasoning seems to us a disregard of the constitutional framework. It is clear that no human or fundamental right exists in an absolute manner, but the restriction on such rights is also not absolute; rather, it must be subject to limits. We find no basis in the justification found by the majority vote when it indicates that the restriction in question is supported by legitimate aims and is founded on sufficiently plausible data and arguments. This is because we believe that the restrictive measure in question does not pass the reasonableness test; we do not consider it a necessary, suitable, or proportional measure. Quite the contrary, it affects the essential content of the right to passive suffrage.

All of the foregoing also applies to the unconstitutionality of the transitional provision, because, additionally, the restriction applies to the future offices of those currently serving in popularly elected positions in the municipal sphere. Thus, the restriction is imposed with “names and surnames” for the current municipal representatives. In the transitional provision of the law under challenge, the legislator regulated the situation of persons who, at the time the law enters into force, have been occupying popularly elected offices in the municipal regime for at least two consecutive periods. Therefore, those persons were unaware—because it did not exist—of such a prohibition when they assumed office. The person in such a situation also holds the right of access to public office, which allows them to participate in a future electoral process.

Unlike the majority opinion, we believe it is not a minor issue to consider that the regulations in question could affect the right to passive suffrage of more than 40 democratically elected public officials and may have operated as a “sanction without due process” given the punitive nature of this measure that imposes a prohibition on holding any other popularly elected municipal office. This is in addition to the possibility of facing a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of laws and of Article 34 of the Constitution.

Thus, we believe that all the regulations in question are unconstitutional because they contain a substantive defect by emptying the right of access to popularly elected offices in the municipal regime of its content. We estimate that in this case, the limits on legislative power are exceeded; it is not possible to extend the prohibition on passive suffrage with respect to an office that the person upon whom the prohibition is imposed has not held. There cannot be an expansive effect of the limitations on a fundamental right.

Based on the arguments presented, we believe that the substantive provisions under consultation are unreasonable and disproportionate; and furthermore, regarding the transitional provision, as stated, it violates the guarantee of the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. The provisions under consultation contain stipulations that harm the right to passive suffrage.

Fernando Cruz C. Rosibel Jara V. Magistrate Magistrate Res. No. 2022-029648 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS The undersigned magistrate, with the customary respect, dissents and declares the unconstitutionality action admissible due to an essential defect in the procedure for the approval of Law No. 10183 of April 5, 2022, Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities. This is due to an infringement of the provisions of Article 97 in relation to Article 102, paragraph 3), both of the Political Constitution.

Since there is a procedural defect that invalidates the reform, I refrain from ruling on the substantive grievances.

1.- On the precedents of this Chamber First, it should be noted that the issue of the reelection of mayors has been submitted to this Court on two recent occasions.

In case file No. 22-001848-0007-CO, the legislative consultation on constitutionality was heard regarding the draft approval of the “Reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code and its reforms, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998 and its reforms (Law that limits the indefinite reelection of local authorities),” which was processed under legislative file No. 21.810. In the advisory opinion in question, I dissented, considering that, in reality, the legislators did not raise a genuine question of constitutionality. I made the following considerations:

“The operative part of this opinion states: ‘Magistrate Garro Vargas dissents with respect to the alleged procedural defect raised and considers that it is unevacuable, as the consultation does not properly present a question but a defense against the position of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal regarding the scope of Article 97 of the Political Constitution.’ To illustrate my thesis, it suffices to refer to the very statements of the consulting legislators, who, far from invoking reasoned doubts or objections of constitutionality regarding the procedure given to the bill, seek to shield it from the objections of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). In this regard, the following is stated:

‘From a formal, rigid, and strict interpretation of the norm, we have three possible implications related to the legislative process: first, we accept the Tribunal’s recommendation in the unrestricted and absolute sense of the right to be elected and maintain the “revolving door” where popularly elected municipal officials can “jump” every eight years (after successive reelection) to other also popularly elected positions, and thereby limit the political participation of other citizens, and in addition, promote ad perpetuam positions in local governments; second, we do not vote on the bill that has the endorsement of the vast majority of deputies who represent the popular will; or third, we bequeath to the incoming Legislative Assembly, whose composition and intentions we do not know, the decision on a proposal that by all accounts aims to strengthen democracy.’ Based on their reasoning—facing the arguments made by the TSE—the legislators themselves propose three scenarios they deem negative: 1) accepting the TSE’s recommendation, which results in limiting citizens’ political participation and promoting ad perpetuam positions; 2) not voting on the bill, which, as they themselves acknowledge, ‘has the endorsement of the vast majority of deputies’ who represent the popular will; and 3) bequeathing the bill to a new composition of the Legislative Assembly with the danger that it may not be realized, warning that it is a proposal that ‘by all accounts aims to strengthen democracy.’ They then provide a historical overview of the regulation of municipal elections and national elections to illustrate their thesis—which they consider to be the appropriate interpretation of Article 97 of the Political Constitution—and only subsequently pose a question to this Chamber. In this regard, the consultation brief literally states the following:

‘What is the purpose of this overview? To demonstrate that the application of Article 97 cannot be literal nor understood from a formal interpretation, because the reality of the constituent legislator at the time of drafting the norm in question understood elections as a single moment every four years, and therefore, the limitation was general and absolute, given that the legislation that applied to one level of eligible officials applied to all, and current circumstances are different.

What we wish to point out before the honorable Court is that the interpretation of this article must be material and teleological, based on the content of the norm, on its ultimate purpose, and with the approval of this bill in its first debate process, the dynamics of the municipal elections to be held in February 2024, that is, within 24 months, are not being affected. That was the reason we approved the bill in the first debate, certain that its approval in no way affects the electoral process to be held on February 6 of this year, in which the Presidency of the Republic and deputies to the Legislative Assembly will be elected, and in no way any municipal authority.

Therefore, considering the scope and intention of the constituent persons to avoid transformations of the electoral system in periods close to elections, in this particular case where the proposed legal modification relates solely and exclusively to the municipal regime, whose electoral period is not active, given that the electoral call in which we find ourselves relates to the Government of the Republic and the Legislative Assembly, the municipal regime is entirely excluded, therefore the doubt related to the legislative process arises: Is the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Political Constitution applicable to modifications related to the municipal regime when the active electoral period is that relating to the national sphere?’ (Emphasis not in the original).

From a detailed reading of the brief itself signed by the consulting legislators, it is clear that all the argumentation is not aimed at substantiating a doubt about the procedure followed to approve the bill they promote, but rather at defending both the bill and that procedure against the criterion formally submitted by the TSE within the framework of the parliamentary iter. The only actual question in that section relating to the alleged procedural defect is the one at the end, but all the argumentation preceding it shows no trace of doubt or objection about the procedure given to the bill but, quite the contrary, demonstrates the conviction that ‘its approval in no way affects the electoral process’ held on February 6.

Based on such a finding, I consider that the consultation must be declared unevacuable, in light of the provisions of Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states the following:

‘Art. 99. Except in the case of the mandatory consultation provided for in subsection a) of Article 96, the consultation must be formulated in a reasoned brief, with an expression of the aspects of the bill under question, as well as the reasons why doubts or objections exist regarding its constitutionality.’ (Emphasis not in the original).

As follows from the content of that provision, for a legislative consultation to be admissible, the reasons why there are doubts or objections of constitutionality must be clearly stated. And this is precisely what is lacking here, since from the cited excerpts—and from the entire brief—it can be seen that the legislators do not question a particular procedure regarding which specific doubts of constitutionality exist. Rather, they express disagreement with the institutional position of the TSE (see, in the same vein, the recent advisory opinion which, through opinion No. 2872-2022, signed unanimously by this Chamber, with nearly the same composition, declared the optional consultation on constitutionality processed under case file No. 21-025530-0007-CO unevacuable).

Consequently, I consider that regarding the alleged procedural defect, the consulting parties merely state the question, without arguing why they believe it warrants bringing the matter before this Chamber. On the contrary, their arguments seek to justify what was done. Therefore, it can well be stated that, lacking an objection of constitutionality, the legislative consultation is inadmissible and unevacuable.” It follows from the foregoing that I dissented, understanding that the consultation was unevacuable, and therefore I did not rule on Article 97 of the Political Constitution.

A couple of months later, the Constitutional Chamber resolved the action known under case file No. 19-000892-0007-CO through judgment No. 2022-016947. In that ruling, the Chamber, by majority, held that the omission challenged in that proceeding—namely, the omission to include limits on the successive and indefinite reelection of municipal mayors—had been remedied by the legislator through the reform of Article 14 of the Municipal Code. In the referenced case file, I declared the action without merit but with other considerations, which are summarized as follows:

‘From a careful review of the brief filing the unconstitutionality action, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner challenged Article 14 of the Municipal Code—in force at the time the action was filed—because it implicitly authorized the “successive and indefinite” reelection of municipal authorities. In their view, this possibility has harmful consequences regarding the performance of the democratic system, the alternation in the exercise of power, the right to be elected and to elect under conditions of equality, and is lacking in reasonableness. Therefore, it is necessary to specify that the object of the action is not the reelection per se of municipal officials, but rather the successive and indefinite reelection, which—in the petitioner’s judgment—derived from the provisions of Article 14 of the Municipal Code, which stated, as relevant, the following:

“All popularly elected offices at the municipal level contemplated by the legal system shall be popularly elected, through general elections to be held on the first Sunday of February, two years after the national elections in which the persons who will hold the Presidency and Vice Presidencies of the Republic and those who will make up the Legislative Assembly are elected. They shall take possession of their offices on the 1st day of May of the same year of their election, for a period of four years, and may be reelected.” The majority of the Chamber holds that, given that the Legislative Branch—in the exercise of its constitutional powers—issued the reform to Article 14 of the Municipal Code, the unconstitutional omission being reproached has been remedied, and therefore, it understands that the action lacks current interest and orders its dismissal. In this regard, several clarifications should be made.

First, while it is true that new rules were introduced to run for reelection in municipal positions, successive reelection has not been abolished, as the current norm still permits it, since as relevant it indicates the following:

(…)

It is plain that the legislator introduced rules and conditions for running for popularly elected municipal offices, but successive reelection continues to be authorized, so the reform does not appear to fully respond to what was sought in this action.

Second, it should be noted that the majority judgment makes the following consideration: “the unconstitutional omission that is reproached in this proceeding to Article 14 of the Municipal Code—according to which municipal mayors could be reelected successively and indefinitely—does not exist.” On this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that this Chamber, when referring to the constitutional review of unconstitutional omissions, has stated the following (see judgments numbers 2005-5649, 2018-009819, and 2021-3853) (…) Based on what was indicated by the Chamber, I believe that in the specific case, the conditions for evaluating an alleged unconstitutionality by omission are not met, since the Political Constitution does not establish an express mandate on the manner of election or reelection of members of the municipal government.’ 2.- On the information provided by the Attorney General’s Office and my decision in the specific case In the present matter, after examining the arguments raised, I concur with the information provided by the Attorney General’s Office (PGR). Said body made the following statements:

‘III. ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 97 OF THE CONSTITUTION Within action 22-8424-0007-CO, it is alleged that the approval process of Law 10183 violates the provisions of Article 97 of the Political Constitution, given that during the legislative process, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal provided a negative opinion on the bill, and that within the six months prior to and four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly cannot convert into law the bills on which said electoral body has expressed disagreement.

Given its importance, we proceed to cite Article 97 of the Constitution, which states:

“ARTICLE 97.- For the discussion and approval of bills relating to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; to depart from its opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members shall be required. Within the six months prior to and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not, however, convert into law the bills on such matters regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement.” As observed, the indicated article establishes two different scenarios. First, it requires that any law relating to electoral matters that faces opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly, and second, it absolutely prohibits the Assembly from approving a bill that faces opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal if it is within the six months prior to and the four months after the holding of a popular election.

To address the claim raised in the present action, the following relevant facts of the legislative process carried out for the approval of Law 10183 must be considered:

• a)Bill 21810, which served as the antecedent to Law 10,183 of April 5, 2022, was introduced into the legislative process on February 18, 2020 (see legislative file); b) By official communication AL-DSDI-OFI-0005-2022 of January 11, 2022, the Legislative Assembly mandatorily consulted the updated bill with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folio 728 of the legislative file); c) By official communication TSE-0199 of January 20, 2022, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal objected to the bill, considering it contrary to the right to be elected, insofar as it prohibits officials with two consecutive terms in the same office from running for other popularly elected positions in the municipal regime. In said communication, it stated: “… this Tribunal, under the terms and with the scope of Article 97 of the Constitution, objects to the bill being processed under file No. 21.810. Such objection would be lifted if the legislators amend the bill so that, according to the spirit of the proposal, consecutive reelection is limited to a single time (maximum two consecutive terms in the same office), without prohibiting the possibility of running, after the second term, for another popularly elected office. Respectfully, it is recalled that ‘Within the six months prior to and the four months after the holding of a popular election, the Legislative Assembly may not (…) convert into law the bills (…) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has expressed disagreement’ (Article 97 of the Constitution). FINAL AGREEMENT.” (folios 1063 to 1072 of the legislative file); d) In extraordinary session number 45 of December 23, 2021, the Legislative Plenary approved Bill 21810 in the first debate, with a vote of 46 in favor (folios 551 to 600 and 604 of the bill); e) In extraordinary session No. 46 of January 5, 2022, the discussion of Bill No. 21.810 began in the second debate, where a procedural motion was approved to return it to the first debate, and the discussion was suspended so that it would occupy the first place in the first debates in the next session (folio 650).
• f)Through ordinary session No. 85 of January 11, 2022, of the Legislative Plenary, the discussion began in the first debate process of Bill No. 21.810 (folio 702).

In extraordinary session No. 053 of January 25, 2022, the discussion of the bill in question continued in the first debate (primer debate) and it was approved in the first debate (primer debate) by 40 votes in favor (folios 1082-1112).

• g)On January 27, 2022, several deputies of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) filed an optional consultation of constitutionality (consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad), processed under file number 22-001848-0007-CO (folios 1143 to 1162 of the legislative file); h) The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) resolved the consultation via vote 2022-006119 at 1:15 p.m. on March 16, 2022, finding that there were no procedural defects and declaring the consultation unevacuable (inevacuable) regarding the substantive defects alleged; i) In ordinary session 105 of March 29, 2022, the Legislative Plenary (Plenario Legislativo) approved bill 21.810 in the second debate (segundo debate) with 48 votes in favor, without accepting the observations made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) (folios 1367 and 1372).

As is evident from the facts described, because the bill relates to electoral matters, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) consulted the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) during its processing, an institution that partially opposed the legislative initiative, considering it contrary to the constitutional and conventional parameter due to the restriction established for municipal officials with two consecutive terms in office, preventing them from seeking other elected office (folio 1068 of the legislative file). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the bill was approved without taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), since the law as finally approved maintained the restriction noted by the electoral body (a restriction to which we referred in our prior report).

If the first scenario described in Article 97 of the Constitution is taken as a parameter, it is clear that no procedural infringement exists, since the bill was approved in the first debate (primer debate) by 40 votes and, in the second debate (segundo debate), by 48 votes. This demonstrates that even with the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) exceeded the constitutional majority to depart from said opposition.

The doubt arises in this case with the second scenario contemplated in Article 97 of the Constitution, which absolutely prevents the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) from approving bills on electoral matters if it is within the six months before and the four months after the holding of an election (elección popular), when there is opposition from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones).

As can be observed, the bill was approved in the first debate (primer debate) on January 25, 2022, less than a month before the national elections held in February 2022, and in the second debate (segundo debate) on March 29, 2022, less than a month before the second round of the national elections.

The discussion then arises as to whether, in light of the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) could approve the law, given the electoral moment in which we found ourselves. (...)

Notwithstanding the jurisdictional conflict that has persisted over time between the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), this advisory body has held the view that as long as we are facing interpretations of constitutional or legal provisions of an electoral nature (which do not constitute jurisprudence), the body that must exercise this competence exclusively and excludingly is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), because the framers of the Constitution (Constituyente) were clear in recognizing that power in Articles 99 and 102, subsection 3 of the Constitution.

(...)

Said position, in our view, presents the drawback not only that the Chamber (Sala) arrogated to itself the interpretation or updating of a constitutional provision of an electoral nature (Article 97) that –in principle– corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), but also that the Chamber (Sala) carried out said interpretation in accordance with a provision of legal rank (Electoral Code, Código Electoral), disregarding the will of the framers of the Constitution (Constituyente) enshrined in Articles 97, 99, and 102, subsection 3 of the Constitution, even though the electoral regime changed upon the entry into force of the Electoral Code (Código Electoral). Likewise, it is clear that the provisions contained in the bill that served as the precursor to Law 10183 were of an electoral nature, so the opposition of the TSE to the bill being voted on bound the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa).

In other words, it is our view that during the legislative process, the opposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) should have prevailed, since it is that body which has the exclusive authority to interpret electoral provisions and we were in the midst of an election (elección popular). Note that at no time did that electoral tribunal consider during the legislative process that the bill could be approved because the election underway was not a municipal one; rather, on the contrary, it indicated to the legislator that it could only approve it if it complied with the recommendations it was making on the bill, which was not done by the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) (see legislative records already cited).

We also believe that the fact that a legal provision refers to a municipal election and that the elections in process were national in nature did not overcome the prohibition established in Article 97 of the Constitution, because under that thesis the legislator could create new obligations in electoral matters, without considering whether the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) can or cannot address them while in the midst of the complex logistics of an election, whatever its nature. Hence, precisely for this reason, it falls to the TSE to determine whether a bill—in electoral matters—can or cannot be approved during the months before and after the election being held, especially because only said body can assess budgetary, logistical, and technical aspects related to the organization of the vote (sufragio) and its material capacity to simultaneously address any legal provisions that the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) may issue in electoral matters, whether of municipal or national scope.” (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

In my view, the PGR is correct in the sense that, in light of the literal wording of Article 102, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, it falls to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) (TSE) to interpret exclusively and bindingly the constitutional and legal provisions referring to electoral matters.

In the case at hand (sub lite), as demonstrated from the sequence explained, the TSE objected to the bill and made the legislators see that “Within the six months before and the four after the holding of an election (elección popular), the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) may not (…) convert into laws those bills (…) regarding which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) has expressed disagreement.” Despite said disagreement, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) approved the bill during a national election period, given that the TSE determined, pursuant to its constitutional competence to interpret constitutional provisions in electoral matters, that the referenced bill could not become law during the mentioned period. I consider that the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), by overlooking the opposition of the TSE and its competence to interpret constitutional provisions in electoral matters, incurred an essential defect in the parliamentary procedure that invalidated it.

In this regard, it should be added that I am not pronouncing on what the appropriate interpretation of the second part of Article 97 of the Political Constitution is, but rather I recognize that, in light of Article 102, subsection 3) of the Constitution, it fell exclusively to the TSE to perform the interpretation of the aforementioned article.

3.- Background reflecting my position on the competencies of the TSE What has been stated in this dissenting vote (voto salvado) is consistent with my position regarding the constitutional competencies of the TSE.

For example, I recently concurred with the Full Court (Pleno) of this Chamber (Sala) when resolving the unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) No. 21-0000897-0007-CO via judgment No. 2022-027955, in which the interpretative competencies of the TSE were precisely underscored. In relevant part, the following was stated:

“After evaluating the arguments, the Chamber (Sala) finds that the challenged article has a programmatic content, intended to provide legal certainty in the exercise of the powers that belong exclusively to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), but without affecting their content. As derived from its literal wording, the purpose of the provision is for the TSE to carry out, within six months following the law's entry into force, the tasks of organization and direction, so that the vote (sufragio) for the election of the members of the district council (concejo de distrito) and district trustees (síndicos) of the district of Cabeceras may be held subsequently. Such activity—organization and direction—differs from what the petitioner understood (conducting early elections). In other words, seeing that the holding of local elections entails the reconciliation of numerous factual and legal elements (definition of the electoral roll, internal labor of political parties, political propaganda, political debt, respect for electoral timelines, respect for the prohibition of Law No. 6068 against modifying the administrative territorial division during electoral periods, etc.), the provision seeks for the TSE to exercise its powers of organization and direction in those months, for the purpose of providing legal certainty and determining the manner of proceeding to hold the respective elections. Indeed, unlike what is alleged in this action, the challenged legislation does not invade the constitutional competencies of the TSE because the mandate under examination does not impose the holding of elections within the six-month period following the law's entry into force, but rather, in congruence with what is established by electoral legislation, it specifies that the TSE must undertake the corresponding actions to materialize the call for said democratic process. However, it is clear that, in order of the exclusive and excludable competencies of that Electoral Tribunal, it is that instance which must define the specifics of that procedure, including dates for holding the elections and other details typical of those popular designation activities that present special complexity in their organization and holding. On the other hand, regarding this type of legislation, the Chamber (Sala) highlights that our legal system contains similar provisions regarding municipal elections, for example:

“Artículo 19. — By a motion presented before the Council (Concejo), which must be signed by at least one-third of the total number of council members (regidores) and approved by at least three-quarters of the integral council members (regidores), the electors of the respective canton shall be convened to a plebiscite, where it shall be decided whether or not to remove the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal). Such decision shall not be subject to veto.

The votes necessary to remove the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal) must total at least two-thirds of those cast in the plebiscite, which may not be less than ten percent (10%) of the total number of registered electors in the canton.

The plebiscite shall be conducted with the electoral roll of the respective canton, with the cutoff as of the month prior to the final approval of the agreement referenced in the first paragraph of this article.

If the result of the consultation is the removal of the official, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) shall reinstate the sitting mayor (alcalde propietario), according to Article 14 of this code, for the remainder of the term.

If both deputy municipal mayors (vicealcaldes municipales) are removed or resign, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) must call new elections in the respective canton, within a maximum period of six months, and the appointment shall be for the remainder of the term. While the election is taking place, the president of the council (concejo) shall assume, as an additional duty, the position of municipal mayor (alcalde municipal), with all the powers granted by this Code.” (Underlining is added. Municipal Code, Código Municipal).

“ARTÍCULO 147.- Call to elections The call to elections shall be made by the TSE four months before the date on which these are to be held.

The TSE shall call extraordinary partial elections to fill the vacancies of municipalities that become disintegrated, as well as in the scenario of Article 19 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal).” (Electoral Code, Código Electoral) The Chamber (Sala) highlights that the TSE is in a position to interpret the challenged legislation systematically for the purpose of harmonizing it with the rest of the legal system, ensuring the validity of the constitutional and electoral principles that govern the matter, as it has done on other occasions (for example, resolution No. 405-E8-2008 at 7:20 a.m. on February 8, 2008). It falls to the TSE both the interpretation of that legislation and the exercise of the powers constitutionally and legally assigned to it. Indeed, the Chamber (Sala) notes within the legislative file that the TSE tacitly recognizes the need to reconcile the provision with the rest of the legal system to determine when the elections could be held:

“As mentioned previously, the effectiveness of this bill, should it be approved by the Executive Branch itself prior to December 2, 2018, as constitutionally corresponds, would be—by operation of law—deferred until the moment when the respective municipal authorities are elected, which will happen in the next municipal elections to be held on the first Sunday of February of the year 2020; otherwise, should it come into effect in the aforementioned prohibited period, its effectiveness would be deferred by operation of law until the following electoral process, i.e., February 2024; in both cases, at which time this Tribunal will organize and direct, according to (sic) its constitutional faculties, the election of the full and alternate members of the district council (consejo de distrito) and the respective district trustees (síndicos) of the district of Cabeceras.” (Folio 149 of the legislative file for Law 9868, available at http://www.asamblea.go.cr/) It is noted that such opinion was rendered regarding the original wording of the bill. However, it must be emphasized that the challenged provision was already incorporated into the original version of the bill, specifically, its Article 3.

In conclusion, the Chamber (Sala) finds no conflicts of constitutionality in the challenged article, as it is not determined that it is in direct confrontation with the electoral timelines provided for in Articles 171 and 172 of the Constitution, nor that it disregards the constitutional powers of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones). On the contrary, the cited article states that this Tribunal, through the exercise of its powers of organization and direction, must provide legal certainty regarding the holding of elections in that district.” This position, that of respecting the jurisdictional scope of the TSE regarding the interpretation of constitutional and legal provisions referring to electoral matters, is consistent with what I have maintained on other occasions, especially concerning the consultations of constitutionality on the Public Employment bill (proyecto de ley de Empleo Público) (see advisory opinions No. 2021-017098 and No. 2872-2022). Moreover, this thesis is not contradictory to what I maintained regarding the horizontal parity of legislators (judgment No. 2015-016070) and elected municipal office (resolution on admissibility No. 2019-011633), as can be deduced from a careful study of both resolutions.

4.- Conclusion Corollary to the foregoing considerations, I dissent (salvo el voto) upon finding that in the case at hand (sub lite) an infringement of the legislative procedure was incurred due to the non-observance of what is established in Article 102, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution.

Having demonstrated a defect that invalidates the law's approval procedure, as I have stated, I deem it unnecessary to rule on the substantive claims.

Anamari Garro V.

Magistrate [1] http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf (page 10) [2] Opinion C-388-2020 of October 5, 2020 [3] TSE Resolution, No. 370-E1-2008 at 1:45 p.m. on February 5, 2008 [4] Opinion C-191-2000 of August 22, 2000 and resolution No. 6378-94 at 4:27 p.m. on November 1, 1994, Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) [5] Opinions C-357-2003 of November 13, 2003 and C-178-2007 of June 5, 2007.

[6] Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), Report on Constitutional File No. 19-0008920007-CO of May 3, 2019.

[7] Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), Report on Constitutional File No. 19-0008920007-CO of May 3, 2019.

Observations of CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL) voted by ballot Classification prepared by the CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL) of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial). Its reproduction and/or distribution for a fee is prohibited.

It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 08-05-2026 17:25:48.

Sala Constitucional Clase de asunto: Acción de inconstitucionalidad Control constitucional: Sentencia desestimatoria Analizado por: SALA CONSTITUCIONAL Sentencia con Voto Salvado Sentencia con nota separada Sentencias Relacionadas Sentencias del mismo expediente Contenido de Interés:

Temas Estrategicos: Constitución Política Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 3. ASUNTOS DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Tema: ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

Tema: ELECTORAL Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

Tema: MUNICIPALIDAD.

Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

MUNICIPALIDAD. REELECCIÓN DE ALCALDES Sentencia: 029648-22 de 14 de diciembre de 2022 Tipo de asunto: Acción de inconstitucionalidad Norma impugnada: Transitorio único de la Ley No. 10.183 que reforma el artículo 14 del Código de Municipalidad Parte dispositiva: En cuanto a los vicios de procedimiento, por mayoría se declara sin lugar la acción por la alegada violación a los artículos 97 y 172 párrafo segundo de la Constitución Política. El magistrado Rueda Leal da razones diferentes en cuanto al artículo 97 eiusdem. El magistrado Cruz Castro y la magistrada Jara Velásquez de manera conjunta salvan parcialmente el voto y declaran con lugar la acción por un vicio de procedimiento solo por la alegada violación al artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. La magistrada Garro Vargas salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad por existir un vicio esencial de procedimiento en la aprobación de la ley n.°10183 del 05 de abril de 2022, Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales, por infracción a lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 en relación con el artículo 102 inciso 3), ambos de la Constitución Política. En cuanto a los vicios de fondo, por mayoría se declara sin lugar la acción. El magistrado Cruz Castro y la magistrada Jara Velásquez salvan el voto de manera conjunta y declaran con lugar la acción en este extremo. La magistrada Garro Vargas omite pronunciamiento respecto de los agravios por el fondo. Notifíquese este pronunciamiento a las partes accionantes, al procurador general de la República, al presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y al presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa.

VI.-Sobre los acusados vicios de naturaleza procedimental.

• i)Alegatos de las partes.

El accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza indica que el artículo 97 de nuestra Carta Magna impide aprobar reformas electorales durante el plazo de veda ahí estipulado, toda vez que este no distingue entre elecciones nacionales y municipales. Considera que una posición contraria implicaría una modificación del texto por vía de interpretación.

El accionante Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes argumenta que el procedimiento seguido por la Asamblea Legislativa para la aprobación de la ley transgrede el numeral 97 constitucional, por cuanto, en el trámite del expediente legislativo 21.810, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones emitió criterio negativo y objetó la aprobación del proyecto de ley. Asevera que, el 29 de marzo de 2022, luego de la evacuación de la consulta legislativa facultativa ante la Sala Constitucional, el plenario legislativo aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley pese a la oposición del TSE y la fecha de las elecciones nacionales. Expone que el TSE contempló dos motivos para objetar el proyecto: “primero, que el proyecto de Ley genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo al impedir que funcionarios con dos periodos en un mismo puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal, no puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular dentro del mismo régimen municipal, en especial, para asociación que represento, a quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias) y; segundo, que dentro de los seis meses y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de Ley en los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se haya mostrado en desacuerdo.” Cuestiona el dictamen nro. 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022 de esta Sala y señala que disiente del criterio ahí vertido en cuanto a la inexistencia de un vicio de procedimiento. Manifiesta que la parte final del ordinal 97 constitucional no está sujeta a interpretación; de este modo, al ser obligatoria la prohibición ahí contemplada, la Asamblea Legislativa no podía aprobar en segundo debate el proyecto de marras. Agrega que en el dictamen mencionado se interpretaron normas constitucionales electorales, lo que es competencia exclusiva del TSE de acuerdo con el inciso 3 del artículo 102 de la Ley Fundamental. Menciona que el vicio en el procedimiento es el siguiente: “se aprobó en segundo debate, omitiendo que existe una objeción a la misma por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, objeción que fue en dos aspectos, por el fondo al limitar la elección en otros puestos autoridades de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal e irretroactivad (sic) de las normas y por otra parte, que se apruebe la norma dado que se está dentro del plazo de prohibición que establece el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, norma que es clara y no permite interpretación alguna y de tener que hacer una interpretación, esta corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y no a la Sala Constitucional, dado que es materia exclusiva electoral.” Los accionantes Wilber Quirós Palma y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales indican que los concejos municipales de distrito se rigen por el párrafo segundo del numeral 172 de la Constitución Política, que resultó transgredido. Sostienen que con la modificación operada por la ley se modificó la reelección, pero no a través de la vía prevista por la Carta Magna. Aducen que la ley especial ya existe y no puede ser modificada por la norma cuestionada.

• ii)Consideraciones de la Sala.

Atinente a lo anterior, este Tribunal observa que los cuestionamientos de inconstitucionalidad por vicios en el procedimiento se sustentan en dos ordinales de la Ley Fundamental, el 97 y el 172 párrafo segundo. Tales normas estatuyen:

“ARTÍCULO 97.- Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.

(…)

ARTÍCULO 172.- Cada distrito estará representado ante la municipalidad por un síndico propietario y un suplente con voz pero sin voto.

Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación.” En cuanto al vicio procedimental referido al numeral 97 constitucional, por mayoría se pronunció la Sala en la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad relativa al proyecto ‘Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales).’ Concretamente, en el dictamen nro. 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022 se dispuso:

“IV.- SOBRE LOS VICIOS DE PROCEDIMIENTO CONSULTADOS (redacta el magistrado Castillo Víquez).- Los consultantes consideran que se pudo haber incurrido en un vicio de procedimiento con la aprobación de este proyecto de ley, en contraposición a lo establecido en la última oración del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. Indican que existe un pronunciamiento formal del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones oponiéndose a la votación. Ese Tribunal, por medio del oficio TSE-0199-2022 del 20 de enero del 2022 indicó: “en razón del vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo, al impedir que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular, este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente 21.810.” Consideran los diputados consultantes que, la aplicación del artículo 97 no puede ser literal ni entendida desde una interpretación formal, porque la realidad del legislador constituyente al momento entendía las elecciones como un solo momento cada cuatrienio y por lo tanto la limitación era general y absoluta, dado que la legislación que implicara a uno de los niveles de funcionarios elegibles, les aplicaba a todos y las circunstancias actuales son distintas. Agregan que, esa fue la razón por la que aprobaron en primer debate el proyecto de ley, seguros de que su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones que se realizó el 6 de febrero pues no tenía relación con alguna autoridad municipal. Por lo tanto, preguntan: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?

En el diseño original del Constituyente de 1949 su voluntad fue que en un solo día se realizaran las tres elecciones, sea: las presidenciales, legislativas y municipales. En efecto, se decantó porque las elecciones para presidente y vicepresidentes de la República (artículo 133 constitucional), los miembros del Poder Legislativo (numeral 107 constitucional) y los regidores municipales (artículo 171 constitucional), se realizaran el mismo día. Sobre el particular, las Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, número 75, indican lo siguiente:

“El Diputado Leiva aclaró que estimaba que en treinta días el Tribunal no podrá escrutar todos los votos emitidos, incluyendo los sufragios para la elección de las Municipalidades. Sugirió que esta tarea podría quedar en manos de las Juntas electorales. El Representante Facio aceptó modificar la moción, pero dejando en manos del Tribunal el recuento de todos los votos emitidos en cualquier elección popular.

Los Representantes Pinto y Arroyo se opusieron a que no se fijara al Tribunal una fecha precisa para hacer la declaratoria de la elección de Presidente y Vice-Presidentes. Es necesario que ese plazo se determine en la propia Constitución. El Diputado Facio presentó esta otra fórmula, la cual fue aprobada: ‘Hacer dentro de los treinta días siguientes a la fecha de la votación, la declaratoria definitiva de la elección de Presidente y Vice-Presidentes de la República, y dentro del plazo que la ley determine, la de los demás funcionarios citados en el inciso 6 [hoy 7] de este artículo”. (Las negritas no corresponden al original).

Ahora bien, mediante ley -entrada en vigencia del Código Electoral, artículo 310-, se separaron las elecciones municipales de las presidenciales y legislativas, trasladándose las primeras para el medio periodo constitucional. Esta modificación del sistema -pasar de un modelo único o concentrado a uno dual- impone una interpretación del numeral 97 constitucional de cara a esta nueva realidad. Cuando se trataba de tres elecciones en un mismo día, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al proyecto de ley tenía el efecto de suspender la potestad de legislar para el caso concreto -durante los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la elección-; si el criterio se vertida (sic) fuera de ese periodo, se agravaba la potestad de legislar. La situación ha cambiado radicalmente en la actualidad, en la que hay elecciones separadas entre las presidenciales y diputadiles y las municipales. En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto de ley hace referencia las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría el efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente de agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional de ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional. Es por esta razón, de que, en el caso concreto, no existe ningún vicio de procedimiento por hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya aprobado en primer debate el proyecto de ley consultado. Más aún, incluso hay un error de concepto en lo consultado, toda vez que, conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el hipotético caso de que estuviéramos en el supuesto de la prohibición del 97 constitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa está autorizada por el Derecho de la Constitución y por las normas del Estatuto Parlamentario a aprobar un proyecto de ley en primer debate en el que hay una objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; lo que si no podría hacer es aprobarlo en la votación definitiva después de concluido el segundo debate. Ergo, con fundamento en lo anterior, se descarta el vicio de procedimiento.” Con base en lo expuesto ut supra, en relación con el numeral 97 de la Constitución Política, este Tribunal descarta el vicio procedimental apuntado, toda vez que no constan argumentos ni elementos novedosos que ameriten cambiar el criterio ya vertido. Más bien, lo que se observa es una inconformidad con la posición de la Sala en la consulta legislativa del proyecto de ley; empero, la vía de la acción no está prevista para ello, sino para cuestionar la inconstitucionalidad de las normas por acción u omisión. En todo caso, tal como se consignó en el dictamen transcrito, el sistema electoral dual vigente de Costa Rica (elecciones nacionales y municipales en fechas distintas), impone la interpretación actualizada de esa norma constitucional, en el sentido de que, para que cumpla su cometido, los proyectos legislativos objetados por el TSE (a los efectos de impedir aprobación) necesariamente deben incidir en la respectiva elección (nacional o municipal).

De ahí que, como la ley impugnada versa sobre el régimen municipal y, además, la alegada imposibilidad de aprobación se sustenta en la celebración de la elección nacional, este Tribunal descarta la transgresión al plazo de veda estipulado en el numeral 97 constitucional. Precisamente, la ley cuestionada, amén de no incidir en las elecciones nacionales, tampoco evidencia afectaciones concretas a la democracia, el derecho al voto, la justicia electoral, la integridad del proceso electoral ni a otras materias propias de la función constitucional del TSE.

Por lo demás, la prerrogativa del TSE de disentir de ciertos proyectos sobre materia electoral (como parte del proceso de formación de la ley) no debe confundirse con su función de interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales referidas a tal ámbito (artículo 102 inciso 3 de la Carta Magna). Al respecto, a la Sala le atañe ejercer control de constitucionalidad sobre las normas de cualquier naturaleza (ordinales 10 de la Constitución Política y 2 inciso b de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) y revisar los vicios en el proceso de formación de la ley (numeral 73 inciso c de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). De ahí que este Tribunal Constitucional sea competente para determinar si la oposición del TSE en cuestión acarrea impedir la aprobación de la ley. Sobre este punto, la Sala no aprecia alguna afectación sustancial a la función constitucional del TSE, ni algún riesgo a su independencia o la institucionalidad del país, por lo que la parte final del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política no resulta transgredida en el sub lite. Incluso, en la audiencia otorgada en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, el TSE no especificó vicio alguno en tal sentido.

Con respecto al párrafo segundo del ordinal 172 de la Carta Magna, si bien el constituyente previó la emisión de una norma especial aprobada con mayoría calificada para la regulación de las condiciones en que pueden ser creados los concejos municipales de distrito, así como su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación, no menos cierto es que, tomando en consideración los argumentos de la parte accionante, este Tribunal no acredita una contradicción entre la ley 10183 y la citada norma constitucional. De igual forma, la ley nro. 8173 denominada ‘Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito’ no impide al legislador emitir una regulación general sobre la reelección de las autoridades del régimen municipal, incluidos los concejos municipales de distrito, pues ambas normas responden a finalidades distintas. En todo caso, el propio numeral 172 establece que los concejos municipales de distrito “se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades.” En consecuencia, se descartan los vicios procedimentales alegados.

VII.- Sobre las acusadas inconstitucionalidades por el fondo.

VII.1. Sobre la alegada inconstitucionalidad de la parte sustantiva de la ley.

i)Alegatos de las partes.

El accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza acusa que la ley impugnada transgrede el artículo 33 constitucional, pues creó “una discriminación odiosa dirigida hacia algunas personas en particular”, lo que resulta violatorio de los principios de igualdad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y libertad política e individual. Refiere que la discrecionalidad legislativa no permite la condena pública de más de 40 alcaldes inocentes a través de una norma que carece de las características básicas o mínimas “de general y abstracta”, sino que está redactada para “causar un efecto en algunas personas únicamente, en detrimento de los principios de proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e igualdad.” Arguye que la única motivación para tramitar y aprobar la ley es “evitar el abuso de poder de los Alcaldes que poseían varios periodos en que la ciudadanía los reelegía.” Asevera que se dio una especie de condenatoria social generalizada a todo alcalde con dos o más periodos. Considera transgredido el principio constitucional de inocencia en cuanto a los alcaldes que no están vinculados con las investigaciones de posibles delitos de corrupción. Menciona que el constituyente no reguló la reelección de las autoridades locales, porque “el control político social era evidentemente mayor por la cercanía a la población que los elegiría o no.” Acota que el menoscabo al principio de igualdad se confirma por varias causas, entre ellas “que todos los ciudadanos costarricenses que cumplan con los requisitos pueden ser electos Alcaldes a partir de la promulgación de la Ley, excepto los que ya estaban y que se habían reelegido cuando esta norma no existía.” Añade que “la violación al principio de igualdad de acentúa cuando el resto de autoridades electas popularmente sí pueden acceder al resto de cargos de esta naturaleza, excepto los Alcaldes y las Alcaldesas, que no podrían acceder a ningún cargo de nombramiento popular, aunque no sea el de Alcalde, verificando así, la característica casuística, personalizada, política e injusta de la norma impugnada.” Menciona que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la resolución nro. TSE-0199-2022 de 20 de enero de 2022, dispuso: “Las restricciones de los funcionarios reelegidos (para que no puedan optar por otro cargo en la municipalidad) imposibilitarían que esos ciudadanos puedan acceder a contiendas partidarias internas en aras de, luego, ser postulados para cargos de elección popular distintos al que ocupan. En otros términos, por más que pertenezcan a una agrupación y cumplan con los requisitos legales de postulación, en razón de la función pública que desempeñan -ad initio- tales servidores no podrán competir ni siquiera en los procesos internos en los que se disputan las nominaciones... Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos.” En adición, estima transgredidos los numerales 169 y 171 de la Constitución Política, ya que, según su criterio, solo en la Carta Magna se pueden establecer limitaciones o restricciones electorales a quienes han sido electos o podrían ser electos popularmente. Arguye que la Ley Fundamental, en el caso de las autoridades municipales, no fijó restricciones, por lo que, con la ley impugnada, se da una reforma implícita a la norma superior sin cumplir los trámites constitucionales. Acota que no corresponde a una norma legal restringir o delimitar los derechos políticos consagrados constitucionalmente. Asevera que son los artículos 107 y 132 de la Constitución Política los que tienen la facultad suficiente para constreñir, limitar o condicionar el derecho a la reelección, situación que el constituyente no contempló para las autoridades locales, por cuanto el control político social era evidentemente mayor por la cercanía a la población que los elegiría o no. Refiere que modificar lo anterior implicaría un cambio necesario a nivel de las normas constitucionales, pues son estas las que determinan el plazo del nombramiento, así como las condiciones y limitaciones fundamentales; de esta forma, la ley transgrede los artículos 169 y 171 eiusdem que establecen los aspectos relacionados con la elección de alcaldes y regidores. De igual forma, estima transgredido el numeral 7 eiusdem, ya que los tratados internacionales protegen derechos políticos, especialmente el ordinal 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en relación con el derecho de votar y ser electo en forma libre. Estima que la restricción al cargo público solamente puede darse por dos vías: una norma general y abstracta que respete los principios de igualdad y proporcionalidad y persiga un fin legítimo, o bien, una sentencia firme judicial sancionatoria. Añade que, en el caso expuesto, la Asamblea Legislativa excedió sus límites al diseñar una tercera vía que “sustituye los procedimientos y las atribuciones sancionatorias propias del Poder Judicial.” El accionante Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considera que la normativa cuestionada transgrede el numeral 33 constitucional. Señala que, de los puestos de elección popular, los del régimen municipal representan la mayor cantidad (alcaldías, vicealcaldías, regidurías y sus suplencias, sindicaturas y sus suplencias, intendencias, viceintendencias y concejalías de distrito y sus suplencias). Acusa que el artículo único transgrede los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, ya que, luego de dos periodos consecutivos de mandato, impone una prohibición de ocho años para ocupar un cargo dentro del régimen municipal. Considera que tal periodo de ocho años es irrazonable y desproporcionado, pues viola, amén de la jurisprudencia constitucional, los “incisos 1 c) y 2” de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos , toda vez que, sin justificación alguna, limita el acceso en condiciones de igualdad a las personas que ocupen una alcaldía. Añade que también se norma una situación que limita derechos de las personas en contra de las excepciones que impone el artículo 23 inciso 2) eiusdem. Estima irrazonable y desproporcionada tal limitación temporal para quienes ocupen la alcaldía, ya que ese es el único de todos los puestos de elección popular del país que puede ser destituido a través de un plebiscito revocatorio (ordinal 19 del Código Municipal). Indica que se transgrede el principio de proporcionalidad al instaurarse limitaciones y condiciones más gravosas a la elección de la alcaldía que a otros puestos de elección popular del mismo régimen municipal y de los poderes tanto Legislativo como Ejecutivo. Asimismo, arguye que el párrafo segundo del artículo único de la ley 10183 impone una limitación para las personas que ocupen puestos de elección popular en las alcaldías municipales, lo cual transgrede los incisos b y c del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Sostiene que votar y tener la posibilidad de ser electo es un derecho político, así como tener acceso a condiciones generales de igualdad a los puestos de elección popular. Arguye que el problema que presenta la norma es que, en el caso de los alcaldes y las alcaldesas que cumplan ocho años en el puesto, tienen una prohibición legal inmediata que les impide participar en cualquier otro puesto de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal, lo que transgrede el derecho al voto pasivo contemplado en la convención referida, ya que se trata de puestos diferentes. Manifiesta que ninguna de las excepciones al numeral 23 mencionado permite limitar el derecho al voto pasivo por haber ocupado otros puestos de elecciones popular. Arguye que la Sala, en el voto nro. 2003-02771, considera al derecho de elección como uno fundamental. Sostiene que la misma prohibición aplica para las personas que ocupan los puestos de intendencia. Sostiene que la norma cuestionada no se ajusta a las excepciones estatuidas en el inciso 2 del ordinal 23 antedicho. Asevera que la limitación para quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias lesiona sus derechos.

Los accionantes Wilber Quirós Palma y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales sostienen que la reforma respondió a una campaña de desacreditación del régimen local, orquestada por la prensa. Refieren que el esquema aprobado resulta gravemente incongruente y no representa un ejercicio lícito de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Añaden que se prohíbe a los alcaldes, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, ocupar algún cargo municipal de elección popular, pero a los vicealcaldes solo se les prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo o el de regidores o síndicos; es decir, sí se les permite postularse a alcaldes, intendentes o viceintendentes y a concejales de un concejo municipal de distrito. Estiman que lo anterior constituye una discriminación sin sentido. Arguyen que, según el transitorio, los funcionarios ejecutivos no pueden postularse en algún puesto de elección popular en las próximas dos elecciones, pero los viceejecutivos o regidores (sin incluir a los concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito) tienen restricción solo en cuanto al mismo puesto; es decir, se da una diferencia injustificada. Explican que, según el artículo 107 de la Constitución Política, los diputados no pueden ser reelectos consecutivamente; empero, a los regidores y concejales se les restringe la posibilidad por dos periodos, lo que crea discriminación y obliga inevitablemente a abandonar la carrera política local. Consideran que las limitaciones reguladas en la ley cuestionada no tienen sustento en el numeral 23.2 de la convención mencionada ut supra¸ que contempla los motivos taxativos para restringir los derechos políticos. Asimismo, alegan que la ley desmejora intencionalmente el contenido actual del derecho a la reelección. Arguyen que la Sala consideró que la “posibilidad de reelección en los cargos públicos” es un derecho humano, derivado del derecho fundamental a ser elegido. Refieren que, de acuerdo con lo anterior, tal derecho no puede ser disminuido por el legislador ni siquiera mediante reforma constitucional. Mencionan que, si una norma dispone la elección popular y no contempla limitaciones en cuanto a la reelección, entonces estas últimas no se pueden disponer. Consideran irrelevante que se hubiese conferido por ley el derecho ilimitado a la reelección, ya que es un derecho fundamental. Estiman que este derecho no puede ser reducido salvo por una Asamblea Constituyente.

ii)Consideraciones de la Sala.

ii.1. Análisis sobre los derechos político-electorales a la luz de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (CADH) y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Corte IDH).

Previo a resolver por el fondo los cuestionamientos de constitucionalidad, es necesario examinar la CADH y la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH en relación con los derechos político-electorales, que son regulados por el numeral 23 de la CADH así:

“Artículo 23. Derechos Políticos 1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades:

• a)de participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos; b) de votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país.

2. La ley puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a que se refiere el inciso anterior, exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal.” De este modo, la CADH, por un lado, contempla ejemplos concretos de derechos político-electorales, y, por otro, orienta acerca de cómo reglamentarlos de manera válida, lo que comporta restringirlos.

El punto de partida consiste en comprender que “el ejercicio efectivo de los derechos políticos constituye un fin en sí mismo y, a la vez, un medio fundamental que las sociedades democráticas tienen para garantizar los demás derechos humanos previstos en la Convención y que sus titulares, es decir, los ciudadanos, no sólo (sic) deben gozar de derechos, sino también de “oportunidades”. Este último término implica la obligación de garantizar con medidas positivas que toda persona que formalmente sea titular de derechos políticos tenga la oportunidad real para ejercerlos”. (Yatama vs. Nicaragua, sentencia de 23 de junio de 2005).

Propiamente en lo atinente al ejercicio de un cargo público de elección popular, se debe advertir que los derechos políticos no son absolutos.

Bajo esta perspectiva, la Corte IDH ensaya en Yatama vs. Nicaragua una especie de “test de razonabilidad” a fin de ponderar la viabilidad jurídica de alguna restricción. Así, amén de explícitamente acudir a los principios de legalidad e igualdad -los requerimientos para participar en una contienda electoral y el procedimiento correspondiente deben estar definidos por ley y no ser discriminatorios-, afirma que las limitaciones deben “basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.” En relación con este tipo de análisis, acudiendo a la jurisprudencia alemana, la Sala Constitucional también ha elaborado un test o protocolo similar para valorar la razonabilidad de una medida:

“En tal sentido, la Sala considera que la medida impugnada se encuentra acorde al principio de razonabilidad. Este último está compuesto por los siguientes componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, la autoridad competente debe elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aunque una medida sea idónea y necesaria, será irrazonables si lesiona el contenido esencial de otro derecho fundamental, si lo vacía de contenido.” (Sentencia nro. 2013001276 de las 14:50 horas del 29 de enero de 2013, reiterada en las sentencias nros. 2017011793 de las 16:41 horas de 26 de julio de 2017, 2019007035 de las 9:20 horas del 26 de abril de 2019 y 2020022295 de las 9:15 horas 20 de noviembre de 2020, entre muchas otras).

Ahora, en Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008) se desarrollan con mayor precisión los parámetros de regulación de los derechos políticos por parte de la Corte IDH.

Primeramente, en cuanto al numeral 23.1 de la CADH, la Corte IDH precisa que, de manera correlativa a los derechos y oportunidades de los ciudadanos en la materia, al Estado se le impone la “obligación de hacer, de realizar ciertas acciones o conductas, de adoptar medidas, que se derivan de la obligación de garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos humanos de las personas sujetas a su jurisdicción (artículo 1.1 de la Convención) y de la obligación general de adoptar medidas en el derecho interno (artículo 2 de la Convención).” En tal sentido, concreta:

“157. Esta obligación positiva consiste en el diseño de un sistema que permita que se elijan representantes para que conduzcan los asuntos públicos. En efecto, para que los derechos políticos puedan ser ejercidos, la ley necesariamente tiene que establecer regulaciones que van más allá de aquellas que se relacionan con ciertos límites del Estado para restringir esos derechos, establecidos en el artículo 23.2 de la Convención. Los Estados deben organizar los sistemas electorales y establecer un complejo número de condiciones y formalidades para que sea posible el ejercicio del derecho a votar y ser votado.” Es decir, el numeral 23.1 no solo contempla derechos y oportunidades a favor del ciudadano, sino que de manera concomitante impone obligaciones al Estado con el propósito de configurar un sistema para la elección a cargos públicos, que de suyo se caracteriza por un complejo número de condiciones y formalidades, requeridas para posibilitar el ejercicio eficaz y efectivo de los derechos a votar y a ser votado.

Con miras a la elaboración de semejante filigrana jurídico-positiva, los factores de restricción estatuidos en el ordinal 23.2 se quedan cortos; ellos son solo parte del entramado normativo, puesto que hay límites jurídicamente plausibles allende de tal regulación. En tal sentido, de forma contundente sentencia el órgano judicial de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA): “no es posible aplicar al sistema electoral que se establezca en un Estado solamente las limitaciones del párrafo 2 del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana.” En virtud de lo anterior, se deben desarrollar las condiciones y pautas hermenéuticas correspondientes a los efectos de configurar las restricciones conforme a la CADH.

La Sala parte de la premisa de que el deber ser normativo es insuficiente, toda vez que la eficacia y efectividad de cualquier derecho precisa, como ya se indicó, de un complejo aparato institucional, económico y humano que funcione en el plano de la realidad. En resumen, un ‘deber ser’ sin ‘realidad’ es inane.

Dice la Corte IDH en Castañeda Gutman: “si no hay códigos o leyes electorales, registros de electores, partidos políticos, medios de propaganda y movilización, centros de votación, juntas electorales, fechas y plazos para el ejercicio del sufragio, éste (sic) sencillamente no se puede ejercer, por su misma naturaleza; de igual manera que no puede ejercerse el derecho a la protección judicial sin que existan los tribunales que la otorguen y las normas procesales que la disciplinen y hagan posible.” En adición, la Corte IDH postula, que la CADH no se decanta por un sistema electoral en particular; todo lo contrario, admite diversidad de opciones, solo sujetas a su compatibilidad para con los derechos cobijados por aquella. Igual norte ha guiado al Comité de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas y al Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.

En este punto, la Corte IDH modula las consecuencias de Yatama, haciendo énfasis en que en aquel primaron las cualidades culturales de los miembros de una comunidad indígena y la imposición de una forma de organización -en el marco de una elección municipal- totalmente ajena a tales parámetros, de lo que resultó una lesión al derecho convencional a ser electo.

De este modo, en Castañeda Gutman, la Corte IDH viene a confirmar que la regla general es la plausibilidad de diversas restricciones y distintos modelos de sistema electoral, siempre que no se violen los derechos fundamentales, para cuyos efectos especifica una serie de pautas concretas.

Comienza por reiterar que las restricciones a los derechos electorales solo se pueden instituir por ley.

Acto seguido evoca ciertos elementos propios de un test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Así, alude al fin de la medida restrictiva, en tanto su causa debe ser procedente a la luz de la CADH.

Dentro de este planteamiento, destaca el caso en que el propósito sea el resguardo de algún derecho fundamental, tal como el orden o la salud pública (según los numerales 12.3, 13.2.b y 15 eiusdem, entre otros). Por añadidura, hace referencia a otro grupo de restricciones: aquellas que más bien se enlazan con finalidades generales legítimas (por ejemplo, “las libertades de las demás personas” o “las justas exigencias del bien común, en una sociedad democrática”, ambas en el ordinal 32 eiusdem).

Ahora, propiamente, el numeral 23 convencional no regula de forma explícita ni las causas legítimas ni las finalidades permitidas, por las cuales la ley puede regular los derechos políticos. En efecto, esa norma “se limita a establecer ciertos aspectos o razones (capacidad civil o mental, edad, entre otros) con base en los cuales los derechos políticos pueden ser regulados en relación con los titulares de ellos, pero no determina de manera explícita las finalidades, ni las restricciones específicas que necesariamente habrá que imponer al diseñar un sistema electoral, tales como requisitos de residencia, distritos electorales y otros. Sin embargo, las finalidades legítimas que las restricciones deben perseguir se derivan de las obligaciones que se desprenden del artículo 23.1 de la Convención …” (Castañeda Gutman).

De esta forma, el mencionado aspecto ligado al objetivo de una regulación o medida corresponde al elemento ‘legitimidad’ del tipo de test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad desarrollado por la Sala, de acuerdo con lo definido ut supra.

Acto seguido, en Castañeda Gutman, la Corte IDH aclara que la demostración de un fin permitido por la CADH no implica per se la razonabilidad de la medida, pues esta también debe responder al factor “necesidad en una sociedad democrática.” Este último lo articula de esta forma:

“184. Con el fin de evaluar si la medida restrictiva bajo examen cumple con este último requisito la Corte debe valorar si la misma: a) satisface una necesidad social imperiosa, esto es, está orientada a satisfacer un interés público imperativo; b) es la que restringe en menor grado el derecho protegido; y c) se ajusta estrechamente al logro del objetivo legítimo.” Concerniente a la ‘necesidad social imperiosa’, de nuevo evoca el elemento ‘legitimidad’ del test de razonabilidad de esta Sala, en tanto la disposición va dirigida a procurar una solución a tal cuestión, es decir, se trata de un fin legítimo, que inexorablemente debe estar presente. Asimismo, la Corte sostiene que entre varias medidas legítimas se debe escoger aquella que restrinja en menor grado el derecho fundamental afectado; esto es idéntico al elemento ‘necesidad’ del test constitucional de la Sala. Por último, cuando la Corte IDH refiere el requisito de que la determinación se ajuste estrechamente al logro de un objetivo legítimo, se presenta una denotada correspondencia con el elemento ‘idoneidad’ del test de razonabilidad de la Sala Constitucional, con base en el cual la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar el objetivo pretendido. Solo en relación con el elemento del test de razonabilidad de la Sala ‘proporcionalidad en sentido estricto’ (según el cual una disposición puede ser legítima, idónea y necesaria, pero aun así irrazonable, cuando su aplicación lacera el núcleo esencial de un derecho fundamental), no se advierte alguna concordancia directa con el examen de razonabilidad desarrollado por la Corte IDH.

Corolario de lo anterior, en el examen de la razonabilidad de una medida o disposición se deben aplicar los criterios y pautas supracitados, que se encuentran referidos a los principios de legalidad e igualdad, la búsqueda de un fin legítimo, la existencia de una urgencia social imperiosa, la idoneidad y la necesidad de la medida (con claridad aplicados en Argüelles y otros vs. Argentina, sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2014), a lo que hay que agregar el elemento de la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto.

ii.2. Sobre la discrecionalidad legislativa y el principio de libre configuración del legislador.

En la sentencia nro. 2003-05090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, la Sala delinea con claridad al principio de libre configuración del legislador, también denominado ‘libre diseño legislativo’ o ‘discrecionalidad legislativa’. Así, este Tribunal señala, que el Poder Parlamentario, en el ejercicio de la función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto -esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121 inciso 1º de la Constitución Política)- goza de una amplia libertad para desarrollar normativamente el programa constitucional fijado por el poder constituyente.

Dentro de tal contexto, el principio de libre configuración del legislador lo aborda este Tribunal de esta manera: “Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa. De esa forma, el legislador puede crear órganos públicos, asignarles funciones o competencias, desarrollar diversas instituciones o normar la realidad, según lo estime oportuno y conveniente para una coyuntura histórica, social, económica o política determinada. Evidentemente, la discrecionalidad legislativa es mucho más amplia que la administrativa, puesto que, la función legislativa no se puede reconducir a la simple ejecución de la Constitución.” Sin embargo, la “libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, puesto que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo (sic) que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales.” (Ver también las resoluciones nros. 2013011499 de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 2013, 2013011706 de las 11:44 horas del 30 de agosto de 2013 y 2020015542 de las 11:40 horas del 19 de agosto de 2020, entre otras).

En la misma dirección expuesta, el Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia nro. 2018019511 de las 21:45 horas del 23 de noviembre de 2018, afirma que esa amplia libertad de conformación de la realidad social, económica y política de que gozan las personas diputadas en el ejercicio de la potestad legislativa (que según los ordinales 105 y 121 inciso 1° de la Ley Fundamental reside originariamente en el Pueblo y es constitucionalmente delegada en la Asamblea Legislativa por su carácter de órgano político representativo), solo puede estar sometida a “los límites que establece el constituyente y, en general, el bloque de constitucionalidad, de modo que para evitar una limitación indebida de la libertad de configuración legislativa, cualquier disposición que establezca una condición o límite que la agrave debe ser interpretada en sus justos y razonables términos, para facilitar su ejercicio.” No obstante, se debe advertir que, en la sentencia nro. 2018000230 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de enero de 2018, la Sala Constitucional rechazó “que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad” (verbigracia, en aplicación del principio de objetivación de la tutela ambiental -sentencias nros. 2005014293-de las 14:52 horas del 19 de octubre de 2005, 2012012716 de las 16:01 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2012 y 2021024147 de las 9:15 horas del 27 de octubre de 2021-).

Asimismo, vale anotar que la discrecionalidad legislativa en el ejercicio del poder constituyente derivado de igual forma se encuentra sometida a ciertos límites procedimentales, temporales y sustanciales (ver resoluciones nros. 2005015094 de las 15:00 horas de 2 de noviembre de 2005, 2013006118 de las 16:22 horas de 30 de abril de 2013 y 2019013270 de las 16:50 horas del 17 de julio de 2019).

Corolario de lo anterior, en el ejercicio de la potestad legisladora, la persona diputada goza de una extensa discrecionalidad, sujeta solo a la observancia al bloque de constitucionalidad.

ii.3. Sobre las inconstitucionalidades alegadas en relación con el establecimiento de límites a la reelección de quienes ocupen el cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal; la prohibición de optar por otros cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal para los alcaldes y vicealcaldes reelectos por dos periodos consecutivos; y la acusada irrazonabilidad y desproporcionalidad del plazo de ocho años para optar por la reelección.

En primer lugar, este Tribunal considera que las condiciones de elección de los cargos de alcaldes, en principio, están cubiertas por la libre configuración del legislador, salvo que se lesionen otras normas o principios constitucionales.

El numeral 169 de la Constitución Política establece:

“ARTÍCULO 169.- La administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón, estará a cargo del Gobierno Municipal, formado de un cuerpo deliberante, integrado por regidores municipales de elección popular, y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designará la ley.” Así, disponer o limitar la reelección de ese funcionario ejecutivo es una discusión de naturaleza política propia de desarrollarse en la Asamblea Legislativa por disposición constitucional. Concerniente al punto, la Sala, en la sentencia nro. 2012009226 de las 14:30 horas de 17 de julio de 2012, definió:

“(…) no considera este Tribunal que las normas impugnadas lesionen de modo alguno la Constitución, al establecer la elección del Alcalde y su sustituto por elecciones populares, toda vez que los mismos Constituyentes delegaron en la ley el mecanismo a idear para su nombramiento (…).” En cuanto a los aspectos delegados por el constituyente al legislador en materia electoral, la Sala resolvió en la sentencia nro.1994002128 de las 14:51 horas de 3 de mayo de 1994:

“… en materias no reguladas, pero sí delegadas en el legislador por la Constitución, este puede establecer condiciones de desigualdad real o aparente cuando sus excepciones están absoluta y claramente justificadas en razón de otros principios o valores constitucionales y sobre todo, de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. En consecuencia, las excepciones, limitaciones, requisitos o impedimentos que regirán en materia electoral, definidos por el legislador en función de la responsabilidad delegada por la propia Constitución, deben sustentarse en razones objetivas y claramente motivadas por los requerimientos propios del sistema electoral y del ejercicio del cargo. En otras palabras, pueden admitirse las restricciones que fortalezcan el sistema democrático y los procesos electorales, aun cuando una persona o un grupo sufra la limitada consecuencia de aquélla (sic) reglamentación.” En adición, en cuanto al concejo municipal, tal numeral 169 únicamente establece que los regidores deben ser electos de forma popular.

Por otra parte, atinente a otros cargos municipales de elección popular, la Carta Magna dispone:

“ARTÍCULO 171.-Los regidores Municipales serán elegidos por cuatro años y desempeñarán sus cargos obligatoriamente.

La ley determinará el número de Regidores y la forma en que actuarán. Sin embargo, las Municipalidades de los cantones centrales de provincias estarán integradas por no menos de cinco Regidores propietarios e igual número de suplentes.

Las Municipalidades se instalarán el primero de mayo del año correspondiente .

Transitorio (artículo 171). -Los Regidores Municipales que resulten electos en las elecciones de febrero de mil novecientos sesenta y dos, ejercerán sus cargos desde el primero de julio de mil novecientos sesenta y dos hasta el treinta de abril de mil novecientos sesenta y seis.

(Así reformado mediante el inciso 2 de la Ley N°2741 del 12 de mayo de 1961) ARTÍCULO 172.- Cada distrito estará representado ante la municipalidad por un síndico propietario y un suplente con voz pero sin voto.

Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación.

(Así reformado por el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8105 de 31 de mayo del 2001).” Así, nuestra Ley Fundamental regula específicamente la elección de determinados cargos a nivel municipal, en los que no se preveían restricciones a sus nombramientos; no obstante, ello no quiere decir que tales limitaciones solo puedan establecerse a través de preceptos constitucionales. El hecho de que la Constitución Política sí haya instaurado prohibiciones expresas en cargos nacionales de elección popular (artículos 107 y 132 con respecto a los diputados y presidente y vicepresidentes de la República), no excluye la posibilidad de ejercer la prerrogativa legislativa en lo relativo a puestos municipales de elección popular. De hecho, tal y como se ha desarrollado a lo largo de esta sentencia, el legislador tiene la potestad de modificar aspectos del sistema electoral en cuanto a la elección y reelección de puestos del régimen municipal, siempre y cuando no contraríe el Derecho de la Constitución ni vacíe de contenido los derechos fundamentales. En cuanto a los regidores municipales, síndicos, intendentes, viceintendentes y concejales municipales de distrito, si bien no existe una delegación expresa del constituyente al legislador en cuanto a las condiciones de su designación, las limitaciones establecidas por la parte sustantiva de la ley nro. 10183 no vacían de contenido el derecho a ser electo, sino que, en los términos dispuestos, forman parte de la libre configuración del legislador y su discrecionalidad. En ese sentido, el propio Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, al contestar la audiencia otorgada por la Sala, señaló: “la tesis de este Órgano Constitucional, sostenida desde hace varios lustros, es que no hay un obstáculo para que el legislador limite la reelección sucesiva de los cargos municipales; tal regulación constituye una decisión política cuya valoración -en cuanto a la conveniencia y oportunidad- es exclusiva del legislador.” En adición, aun cuando se alega que la reelección indefinida y sucesiva no puede venir a ser desmejorada por tratarse de un derecho humano, no menos cierto es que, quien ha sido reelecto en un mismo cargo, ya ha ejercido tal derecho y, además, tal como se consignó ut supra, este puede ser limitado y regulado de forma legítima. En ese sentido, no hay un derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento jurídico, amén de que el legislador tiene la potestad de imponer válidamente nuevas condiciones a la reelección en cargos del régimen municipal, en tanto se apliquen a futuro y no sean contrarios al bloque de constitucionalidad. Ergo, la Sala no estima que el cambio de un sistema electoral municipal que contemplaba la reelección sucesiva e indefinida, a otro que solo permite una reelección consecutiva, devenga contrario al Derecho de la Constitución.

Nótese que, si bien el numeral 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos estatuye que la ley debe reglamentar el ejercicio del derecho de votar y ser elegido “exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal”, la jurisprudencia convencional ha establecido que no se trata de una lista taxativa o cerrada, sino que cada Estado puede desarrollar particularidades en su diseño del sistema electoral. Por ello, resulta procedente que el legislador costarricense imponga otras limitaciones que respeten tal instrumento internacional y el bloque de constitucionalidad. Es decir, cada país puede definir restricciones al derecho al voto (en su vertiente activa y pasiva) dentro de ese marco jurídico.

Ahora, debe analizarse si es inconstitucional o no la prohibición de optar por otros cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal para los alcaldes y vicealcaldes reelectos por dos periodos consecutivos. Cabe reiterar que los requisitos o limitaciones para optar por cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal a priori están cobijados por el principio de libre configuración del legislador, salvo que quebranten normas o principios constitucionales o las denominadas normas pétreas. Precisamente, estas decisiones políticas son propias de discutirse en la Asamblea Legislativa para definir su oportunidad y conveniencia, con pleno respeto al principio de separación de poderes, al régimen democrático de un Estado de Derecho como el costarricense, y en general al Derecho de la Constitución.

En el caso concreto, el artículo único de la ley impugnada limita por ocho años la participación en otros puestos públicos de elección popular, a quien haya ocupado el cargo de alcalde o alcaldesa por dos periodos consecutivos. Igual situación ocurre con los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas, pues se les prohíbe ocupar nuevos cargos como regidores o síndicos por el mismo plazo.

Como se indicó supra, siguiendo a Yatama vs. Nicaragua (sentencia de 23 de junio de 2005) y Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008), así como a la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, el control de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad de las restricciones a los derechos políticos -en la especie, el derecho al sufragio pasivo- como mínimo comprende estos parámetros: los principios de legalidad e igualdad, la búsqueda de un fin constitucional o convencionalmente permitido, la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa, la idoneidad y la necesidad de la medida, y el análisis de proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, todo lo cual en consonancia con los alcances y límites del principio de libre configuración del legislador.

La referida restricción objeto del sub iudice, por un lado, se regula mediante ley (reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal); por otro, parte de un trato ciertamente diferenciado mas no injustificado, dado que procura atender fines de relevancia constitucional y convencional, y, en concreto, una necesidad social imperiosa, como se explica infra. En la determinación de qué fines alcanzar o qué considerar como necesidad social imperiosa, la persona legisladora goza de una amplia libertad de configuración.

Así, en la presentación del proyecto de la ley aquí cuestionada se hizo referencia a un informe preliminar de la Misión Electoral de la OEA, emitido tras las elecciones celebradas el 2 de febrero de 2020. Tal delegación estuvo integrada por 11 expertos electorales de 6 naciones de la región, quienes habían llegado al país el 25 del mes anterior. En tal documento, la Misión señaló: “… no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados.” (ver http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf), lo que fue ampliamente divulgado por varios medios (https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/oea-recomienda-a-costa-rica-limitar-la-reeleccion/OVR5GIP5T5CYXG3DVH4GH36P44/story/, https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/politica/mision-de-oea-reitera-necesidad-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes/, https://observador.cr/pusc-y-nueva-republica-trataran-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes-oea-lo-recomienda/, https://www.diarioextra.com/Noticia/detalle/410346/oea-jala-orejas-a-costa-rica-por-reeleccion-de-alcaldes, https://www.elmundo.cr/municipales/alcaldes-apoyaran-proyecto-de-ley-que-limita-su-reeleccion/ ). Luego, ya en la versión final ( https://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=421-1219-28-0 ) se subraya, que la Comisión Europea para la Democracia a través del Derecho (Comisión de Venecia) en dos informes emitidos a partir de una consulta realizada por el secretario general de la OEA, tocante a los límites a la reelección, concluyó “que no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados. Revisar la legislación vigente, recordando nuevamente que, si bien la continuidad en las políticas públicas es valiosa, la alternancia constituye un pilar fundamental del sistema democrático.” (Informe sobre los límites a la reelección Parte II - Miembros del Parlamento, Parte III - Representantes elegidos a nivel local y funcionarios ejecutivos elegidos a nivel local. Comisión Europea para la Democracia a través del Derecho (Comisión de Venecia), 18 de marzo de 2019).

Asimismo, sobre la regulación de la figura de la reelección en las elecciones municipales, la Misión recomendó: “Revisar la legislación vigente, recordando nuevamente que, si bien la continuidad en las políticas públicas es valiosa, la alternancia constituye un pilar fundamental del sistema democrático.” En consonancia con tal afirmación, la ley objeto del sub lite más bien coincide con el principio de alternancia del poder en el ejercicio de los cargos de elección popular y procura la igualdad real en la praxis del derecho fundamental al sufragio pasivo en los procesos eleccionarios del régimen municipal.

Nótese que la Constitución Política, justamente, en relación con los cargos de elección popular, opta por impedir la reelección consecutiva en cuanto a diputados, presidente y vicepresidente de la República (numerales 107, 132, 134 de la Ley Fundamental), lo que no ocurre cuando se trata de otro tipo de nombramientos de relevancia constitucional, pero que no son de elección popular, como contralor general de la República, magistrados del Poder Judicial y del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (ordinales 183, 101 y 158, eiusdem). Aquí se vuelve relevante el diseño del Estado por parte del constituyente originario, así como sus valores y normas pétreas, ya que constituyen los pilares fundamentales y cimientos en los cuales se basan los equilibrios entre los Poderes Pública y se preservan los pilares de la República.

De acuerdo con lo anterior, la restricción de marras, por un lado, se apoya en fines legítimos, y, por otro, se funda en datos y argumentos suficientemente plausibles como para sustentar lo que la jurisprudencia convencional ha denominado como una ‘necesidad social imperiosa’. Reiteramos que, en este ámbito, el legislador goza de una amplia libertad de configuración, de modo que, en tesis de principio, al juez constitucional no le corresponde definir qué es una ‘necesidad social imperiosa’; por el contrario, se encuentra conminado a aplicar autocontención y no inmiscuirse en una cuestión netamente política, salvo que se diere un quebranto a un derecho fundamental, lo que no se llega a apreciar en el sub examine.

El razonamiento expuesto, que sirve para descartar un trato desigual injustificado, de la misma forma deviene útil para afirmar que la ley satisface plenamente el elemento ‘finalidad’ del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda vez que se trata de un propósito legítimo.

En cuanto al elemento ‘idoneidad’ -es decir que la medida cuestionada sea apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido- prima facie se observa que la citada restricción lo cumple, toda vez que resulta útil para limitar la reelección indefinida en los cargos municipales de elección popular, lo que favorece la alternancia en el poder.

Concerniente al elemento ‘necesidad’ -esto es, la posibilidad de que existan opciones menos lesivas del derecho político al sufragio pasivo (no se debe confundir con la noción ‘necesidad social imperiosa’)- tampoco se advierte una lesión a tal factor. Como se lee en la exposición de motivos del proyecto legislativo de la norma impugnada, las diputadas y los diputados aducen la finalidad de tratar de evitar que una particular posición de influencia en un cargo municipal, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, confiera una ventaja indebida frente a otras candidaturas en un proceso de sufragio popular en el régimen municipal. Ante esto, la única forma en que la Sala podría entrar a valorar una transgresión al elemento “necesidad” es si las partes accionantes al menos propusieran opciones de manera fundada en el marco específico de un test de razonabilidad, en cuyo caso el control de constitucionalidad vendría a ser aplicado en procura de un balance entre la discrecionalidad legislativa y la inexorable salvaguardia a los derechos fundamentales.

Atinente al requerimiento de la ‘proporcionalidad en sentido estricto’, de igual modo se descarta alguna vulneración, toda vez que, tal como se desarrolló ut supra, no se constata un vaciamiento de contenido del derecho al sufragio pasivo, sino únicamente el ejercicio de la libre configuración del legislador en cuanto a la limitación a aquel.

En tal sentido, conforme la línea jurisprudencial de la Corte IDH, las restricciones formuladas no llegan a afectar el contenido esencial de tal derecho, toda vez que no son indefinidas, sino que están sometidas a un plazo de restricción razonable (dos periodos desde que finalizó el segundo periodo consecutivo), en aras de alcanzar los propósitos legítimos que se persiguen, de acuerdo con lo explicado líneas arriba.

Así, este Tribunal Constitucional considera que el limitar la reelección consecutiva a una vez y el impedimento de ocupar otros cargos por dos periodos desde que finalizó el segundo mandato consecutivo (ocho años) no resultan abiertamente irrazonables ni desproporcionados. Más bien, tal restricción es legítima por tratarse de una finalidad válida a la luz del ordenamiento jurídico; evidencia una relación necesaria e idónea entre los medios y el objeto que persigue la ley (limitar la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales), y, además, denota una proporcionalidad en sentido estricto entre los medios dispuestos y sus fines, sin que conste algún vaciamiento al contenido esencial de algún derecho fundamental. A efectos de contar con un parámetro de constitucionalidad, ocho años es el mismo plazo establecido para la reelección presidencial en el artículo 132 inciso 1 de la Constitución Política. En todo caso, las partes accionantes tampoco expusieron argumentos que lleven a la Sala a declarar alguna inconstitucionalidad en ese sentido.

Además, dado que la restricción opera dentro del marco de un proceso de elección a cargos municipales, la extensión de sus efectos a otros puestos igualmente de sufragio popular dentro del régimen municipal, pero distintos al que venía ocupando la persona afectada, parte de una misma premisa: el ejercicio consecutivo en dos periodos en un cargo municipal de elección popular confiere una ventaja que resulta plausible restringir según el principio de alternancia en el poder. Esta es una alternativa razonable que únicamente atañe ponderar a la persona legisladora, de manera que exclusivamente reside en el ámbito de discrecionalidad legislativa, esto es, la definición al respecto lleva aneja la responsabilidad política de las personas diputadas.

Con base en lo anterior, se concluye que la extensión de la imposibilidad de ser electo en otros puestos del régimen municipal parte de una misma premisa: el ejercicio consecutivo en dos periodos en un cargo municipal de elección popular confiere una ventaja que resulta procedente restringir con sustento en el principio de alternancia en el poder. De ahí que las disposiciones adoptadas por el legislador constituyen una alternativa razonable que se encuentra dentro del marco de su ponderación y discrecionalidad, por lo que no le corresponde a la Sala incidir en tal ámbito.

ii.4. En conclusión, en los términos planteados en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, se descarta alguna transgresión a los principios de igualdad; razonabilidad y proporcionalidad; libertad; e inocencia; así como a los numerales 169 y 171 de la Constitución Política y al ordinal 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

VII.2. Sobre la acusada inconstitucionalidad del transitorio.

• i)Argumentos de las partes.

El accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza menciona que el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política contempla el principio de irretroactividad de las normas jurídicas; sin embargo, considera que a quienes ostentan “un cargo determinado” se les crea una condición diferenciada que les aplica hacia el pasado. Aduce que la nueva regla dirigida a toda la ciudadanía fija la posibilidad de elección en no más de dos veces consecutivas; empero, se creó una situación especial para quienes se encontraban desempeñando el cargo en el pasado de forma seguida. Acusa que el transitorio incumple los principios y la redacción técnica que debe tener como norma jurídica, pues se elaboró para perjudicar a un poco más de 40 funcionarios electos democráticamente por el sufragio libre de la ciudadanía, como una especie de ‘vendetta o reacción social’ alimentada por algunos medios de comunicación colectiva a partir del inicio de la investigación judicial conocida como el caso Diamante, que analiza la posible comisión de actos de corrupción de algunas autoridades municipales. Asevera que la presunción de tráfico de influencias y de abuso de poder, así como la condena social por actos de supuesta corrupción no justifican la restricción a la reelección de los cargos municipales; por ello, la reforma carece de finalidad legítima y una adecuada determinación de la necesidad social imperiosa, como se requiere para que la norma esté en armonía con nuestra Constitución. En adición, considera transgredidos los numerales 35, 39 y 40 de la Constitución Política, ya que el transitorio estableció una sanción pública dirigida especialmente a quienes ostentan la condición de alcaldes propietarios reelectos, por razones de carácter político y mediático exacerbada por el escándalo conocido como ‘caso Diamante’ en el contexto de una campaña electoral. Considera transgredido el principio de proporcionalidad de toda acción del Estado frente a la colectividad como un todo. Menciona que lo expuesto confirma la ausencia de la finalidad y necesidad social imperiosa de la reforma aprobada. Explica que la misma irracionalidad de la norma impugnada implicaría tomar una coyuntura de escándalo público al iniciarse una investigación judicial, para formular una norma transitoria que el propio Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones insinúa inconstitucional por dejar del todo sin contenido al derecho a ser elegido. Ciertamente, el acceso a cargos públicos no es un derecho absoluto, pues, según los artículos 21.2 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 20 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y 23.1.c de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, puede ser normado de forma general; empero, no puede ser vaciado de contenido mediante una norma transitoria específica, pues tales principios convencionales consolidan expresamente, que toda persona tiene derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en condiciones de igualdad, normas superiores que la ley impugnada transgrede con absoluta claridad a pesar de tener un carácter inferior, lo que a la vez vulnera el parámetro de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

El accionante Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considera que el párrafo primero del transitorio único otorga efecto retroactivo a la ley nro. 10.183 en detrimento del numeral 34 de la Carta Magna. Reprocha que a las autoridades municipales de elección popular se les restrinja la posibilidad de reelegirse con base en los periodos ejercidos antes de la entrada en vigor de la ley. Afirma que el párrafo segundo del transitorio hace una diferencia entre los puestos de elección del régimen municipal, pues prohíbe a los alcaldes e intendentes aspirar durante 8 años luego del vencimiento del segundo periodo a otros cargos de elección popular dentro de ese mismo régimen, mientras que a los demás puestos solo se les prohíbe reelegirse en el puesto que ocuparon, es decir, pueden participar incluso de forma consecutiva. Menciona que lo anterior afecta de forma desproporcionada a quienes ocupan puestos de alcaldías e intendencias, así como lesiona el derecho al voto pasivo. Considera que el transitorio tuvo que haber dispuesto que el conteo de plazos comenzaría a regir a partir del periodo del nombramiento al momento de entrada en vigencia de la ley. Admite que es potestad del legislador regular la reelección de los puestos de elección popular en el régimen municipal, pero clarifica que su posición no es la de que se mantenga la reelección indefinida, mas sí la de que la limitación en cuestión no deba aplicar sino a partir de la publicación de la ley y sobre los periodos posteriores. Refiere que la norma prohíbe a las personas intendentas que cumplan dos periodos de nombramiento, aspirar a otro puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Aduce que aun cuando la norma no es tan clara, en el transitorio sí se indica de manera explícita: “Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.” Los accionantes Wilber Quirós Palma y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales consideran que el transitorio viola el principio de irretroactividad. Aduce que los actuales servidores electos popularmente obtuvieron tal condición sin restricciones a futuro y con la posibilidad de efectuar carrera política local. Consideran que toda regulación debe tener efectos solo a futuro. Añaden que el transitorio solo es admisible en tanto sea congruente con la norma principal. Refieren que la irretroactividad de la norma implicaría que los funcionarios que ejercen el cargo solo puedan ser electos por dos periodos consecutivos más. Reprochan que el transitorio no regula situaciones pendientes de la norma principal. Mencionan que el efecto retroactivo de la norma parece más una sanción que responde al contexto de la reforma y a las presiones para acabar con la carrera política local. Arguyen que, según el transitorio, los funcionarios ejecutivos no pueden postularse en algún puesto de elección popular en las próximas dos elecciones, pero los viceejecutivos o regidores (sin incluir a los concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito) tienen restricción solo en cuanto al mismo puesto; es decir, se da una diferencia injustificada.

ii)Consideraciones de la Sala.

ii.1) Sobre la alegada transgresión al principio de irretroactividad y la afectación a un grupo determinado de personas.

En la norma transitoria de la ley cuestionada, el legislador reguló la situación de las personas que, al momento de entrada en vigor de la ley, se encuentren ocupando cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal por al menos dos periodos consecutivos.

Atinente al principio de irretroactividad y la entrada en vigor de las normas, los numerales 34 y 129 de la Constitución Política establecen:

“ARTÍCULO 34. A ninguna ley se le dará efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de persona alguna, o de sus derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas.

(…)

ARTÍCULO 129.- Las leyes son obligatorias y surten efectos desde el día que ellas designen; a falta de este requisito, diez días después de su publicación en el Diario Oficial.

(…).” Ahora, de acuerdo con el principio de libre configuración del legislador, la Asamblea Legislativa puede regular válidamente las condiciones de elección y reelección de los puestos del régimen municipal sometidos al voto popular, siempre y cuando no se transgreda el bloque de constitucionalidad. Por consiguiente, en el sub examine no existe roce de constitucionalidad alguno, porque, a partir de la premisa de que el derecho fundamental al sufragio pasivo no es absoluto, está claro que el solo hecho de que, en un determinado momento, una persona ocupe un cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal no le confiere a ella ni un derecho subjetivo ni una situación jurídica consolidada, que la exima de las modificaciones jurídico-positivas al sistema electoral que se den, mientras se encuentra ejerciendo el cargo y formalmente no ha iniciado el proceso electoral correspondiente. La persona en tal situación ostenta una mera expectativa de derecho a participar en un proceso eleccionario futuro conforme a determinadas reglas; tal expectativa, merced a su naturaleza jurídica, está sujeta a todas las contingencias y variaciones de legislación que oportunamente se aprueben de acuerdo con el marco constitucional.” Precisamente, tal y como se razonó supra, no hay derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento jurídico y tanto el derecho a ser electo como el derecho a la reelección pueden ser limitados de forma legítima. En este caso, en línea con el razonamiento expuesto en los considerandos anteriores, ni la restricción a postularse para un tercer mandato consecutivo en el mismo cargo ni el plazo de ocho años para volver a optar por este vacían de contenido el derecho a la participación política. De hecho, una vez transcurrido tal periodo, la persona tiene la posibilidad de postularse otra vez. Ergo, no se trata de la aplicación retroactiva de la norma, sino de la implementación de un cambio en el sistema electoral sobre la reelección de cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Las partes accionantes no pueden pretender que las nuevas reglas no apliquen a quienes están ejerciendo el cargo de forma consecutiva por dos mandatos; más bien, no solo se les está respetando el periodo por el cual fueron electos, sino que, se reitera, tienen la posibilidad de participar, en igualdad de condiciones, una vez finalizada la restricción temporal. Así, la norma transitoria regula las elecciones municipales futuras en lo concerniente a la situación de quienes, al momento de entrada en vigor de la norma, tienen al menos dos elecciones consecutivas. Ergo, se descarta alguna transgresión al principio de irretroactividad.

En adición, aun cuando una de las partes mencionó que el transitorio incumple los principios y la redacción técnica de las normas jurídicas, no se aprecia algún desarrollo susceptible de ser analizado en esta acción. Igual situación se da con respecto a la alegada vulneración al principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, pues únicamente se indicó que todas las personas tienen derecho de acceso a los cargos públicos en condiciones de igualdad. Además, en lo relativo a las normas de los instrumentos internacionales mencionados no se observan argumentos desarrollados de forma precisa y debidamente sustentada por las partes accionantes. En todo caso, ya la Sala abordó supra la potestad y los límites del legislador en cuanto a la regulación de la elección y reelección de cargos en el régimen municipal.

Por otra parte, la acusada afectación a más de 40 personas funcionarias electas democráticamente, así como los cuestionamientos relativos al contexto en que se promovió la ley, la presunción de la comisión de delitos por parte de las autoridades municipales y la supuesta naturaleza sancionatoria de la imposibilidad de la reelección son insuficientes para sustentar la pretendida inconstitucionalidad de la norma transitoria impugnada. Acerca de tales alegatos, este Tribunal considera que, con independencia del contexto fáctico o político que motivó el dictado de la ley, la Asamblea Legislativa, en general, tiene la potestad de dictar limitaciones a la reelección de cargos electos popularmente en el régimen municipal, sin que esto constituya a priori una sanción a quienes se encuentren ocupando los puestos, ni tampoco presuma la existencia de delitos. Al modificarse el sistema electoral en cuanto a la reelección de determinados cargos en cuestión es evidente que algunas personas previamente electas van a experimentar una variación en las condiciones de participación en las elecciones municipales futuras. Esto no implica, sin embargo, una afectación ilegítima a sus derechos fundamentales, sino únicamente una variación en el diseño y los requisitos de acceso a tales puestos públicos. En este sentido, se reitera, los requisitos o limitaciones para optar por cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal prima facie están sujetos a la libre configuración del legislador, salvo que se contravengan normas o principios constitucionales, incluyendo las denominadas ‘normas pétreas’. Estas decisiones políticas son propias de discutirse en la Asamblea Legislativa, escenario democrático en el que se define su oportunidad y conveniencia, con pleno respeto al principio de separación de poderes, al régimen republicano de un Estado de Derecho como el costarricense, y al Derecho de la Constitución.

ii.2) Sobre la acusada prohibición a los intendentes e intendentas de aspirar durante 8 años, luego del vencimiento del segundo periodo, a otros cargos de elección popular dentro de ese mismo régimen. En cuanto a este alegato, la Sala, ya avaló la restricción por un periodo de ocho años para optar por otros puestos del régimen municipal distintos al ocupado por la persona funcionaria; sin embargo, en el caso específico de su extensión a los intendentes e intendentas por medio de la norma transitoria, no se aprecia algún desarrollo susceptible de ser analizado en esta acción. En ese sentido, únicamente se mencionó ese agravio, por lo que se echa de menos un desarrollo argumentativo preciso y debidamente sustentado por parte de los accionantes en función de la alegada inconstitucionalidad.

CO05/23 ... Ver más Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Sentencias Relacionadas Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 075- Asunto previo en vía judicial o administrativa pendiente de resolución Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

ARTÍCULO 75 DE LA LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL. “…II.-Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso sujeto a ciertas formalidades, que deben observarse a efectos de que la Sala válidamente pueda conocer el fondo de la impugnación. Justamente, el numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En primer término, exige un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial o administrativa (en el procedimiento para agotarla), en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Los párrafos segundo y tercero contemplan supuestos, en los que de manera excepcional no se exige el asunto previo, tales como la inexistencia de una lesión individual y directa por la naturaleza del asunto, la defensa de intereses difusos o colectivos, o cuando la acción es formulada directamente por el contralor general de la República, el procurador general de la República, el fiscal general de la República o el defensor de los Habitantes.

Al respecto, si bien las partes accionantes sustentan su legitimación en diversos argumentos afines con el derecho a elegir y ser electo en el régimen municipal, así como en sus condiciones personales, en los cargos que ocupan y en las agrupaciones que representan, no menos cierto es que la Sala ha reconocido la existencia de intereses difusos en este tipo de temas, ya que guarda relación con el sistema democrático en general. Verbigracia, en la sentencia nro. 2012-001966 de las 9:32 horas de 17 de febrero de 2012, este Tribunal señaló:

“El derecho a elegir y ser electo en puestos de elección popular, como derechos políticos, tienen no sólo la naturaleza de poder afectar a un ciudadano o ciudadana en concreto, sino de afectar al sistema democrático en general, que se basa en la renovación periódica de sus estructuras políticas como uno de sus postulados, por medio de la elección popular de distintos puestos, de modo que tiene esa doble naturaleza que lo hace difuso y por lo tanto impugnable directamente, por vía de excepción (…).” Ergo, la Sala avala la legitimación de la parte accionante en el sub iudice con base en el párrafo segundo del ordinal 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional…” CO05/23 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 8. JURISPRUDENCIA CIDH Tema: SENTENCIAS SALA CONSTITUCIONAL - CORTE IDH Subtemas:

Caso contencioso.

CASO CONTENCIOSO. YATAMA VS. NICARAGUA. “…Bajo esta perspectiva, la Corte IDH ensaya en Yatama vs. Nicaragua una especie de “test de razonabilidad” a fin de ponderar la viabilidad jurídica de alguna restricción. Así, amén de explícitamente acudir a los principios de legalidad e igualdad -los requerimientos para participar en una contienda electoral y el procedimiento correspondiente deben estar definidos por ley y no ser discriminatorios-, afirma que las limitaciones deben “basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.”…” CO05/23 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 8. JURISPRUDENCIA CIDH Tema: SENTENCIAS SALA CONSTITUCIONAL - CORTE IDH Subtemas:

Caso contencioso.

CASO CONTENCIOSO CASTAÑEDA GUTMAN VS. MÉXICO. “…Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008) se desarrollan con mayor precisión los parámetros de regulación de los derechos políticos por parte de la Corte IDH.

Primeramente, en cuanto al numeral 23.1 de la CADH, la Corte IDH precisa que, de manera correlativa a los derechos y oportunidades de los ciudadanos en la materia, al Estado se le impone la “obligación de hacer, de realizar ciertas acciones o conductas, de adoptar medidas, que se derivan de la obligación de garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos humanos de las personas sujetas a su jurisdicción (artículo 1.1 de la Convención) y de la obligación general de adoptar medidas en el derecho interno (artículo 2 de la Convención).”…” CO05/23 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 1. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 132- Reelección presidencial Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

Tema: 107- Plazo de nombramientos y reelección de diputados Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

ARTÍCULO 132 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. “…nuestra Ley Fundamental regula específicamente la elección de determinados cargos a nivel municipal, en los que no se preveían restricciones a sus nombramientos; no obstante, ello no quiere decir que tales limitaciones solo puedan establecerse a través de preceptos constitucionales. El hecho de que la Constitución Política sí haya instaurado prohibiciones expresas en cargos nacionales de elección popular (artículos 107 y 132 con respecto a los diputados y presidente y vicepresidentes de la República), no excluye la posibilidad de ejercer la prerrogativa legislativa en lo relativo a puestos municipales de elección popular. De hecho, tal y como se ha desarrollado a lo largo de esta sentencia, el legislador tiene la potestad de modificar aspectos del sistema electoral en cuanto a la elección y reelección de puestos del régimen municipal, siempre y cuando no contraríe el Derecho de la Constitución ni vacíe de contenido los derechos fundamentales. En cuanto a los regidores municipales, síndicos, intendentes, viceintendentes y concejales municipales de distrito, si bien no existe una delegación expresa del constituyente al legislador en cuanto a las condiciones de su designación, las limitaciones establecidas por la parte sustantiva de la ley nro. 10183 no vacían de contenido el derecho a ser electo, sino que, en los términos dispuestos, forman parte de la libre configuración del legislador y su discrecionalidad…” CO05/23 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Nota separada Rama del Derecho: 3. ASUNTOS DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Tema: ELECTORAL Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

VIII.- Razones diferentes del magistrado Rueda Leal en cuanto a la alegada violación al artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. En relación con el numeral 97 eiusdem, en el dictamen nro. 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022, que evacuó la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto ‘Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)’, consigné mi posición en este sentido:

“V.- NOTA DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL.-Como consigna el voto de mayoría, que el infrascrito suscribe, para que aplique el plazo de los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, durante el cual la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en ley los proyectos objetados por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones-TSE-(artículo 97 de la Ley Fundamental), el cuestionamiento debe estar referido al tipo de proceso eleccionario correspondiente. Es decir, si la objeción atañe a un aspecto específico de una elección municipal, el plazo antedicho aplica solo, precisamente, a un proceso electoral de esa naturaleza; misma ratio iuris opera cuando se trata de una elección nacional. No obstante, se pasa por alto que puede haber asuntos relativos a materia electoral que no estén directamente vinculados a la naturaleza municipal o nacional de una elección, sino que se refieran a la jurisdicción electoral en general (verbigracia, si se propusiere variar la conformación del TSE o la forma de elegir las personas magistradas), caso en el cual el plazo de marras aplicaría respecto de cualquier clase de proceso electoral”.

Así, ciertamente, los plazos contemplados en el ordinal 97 de la Carta Magna aplican según el tipo de proceso electoral (nacional o municipal) que se vea afectado por determinada ley. Sin embargo, como indiqué en mi razonamiento particular transcrito ut supra, también una normativa legal puede incidir en materia electoral no vinculada con la cualidad nacional o municipal de un proceso electoral, sino concerniente a la jurisdicción electoral en general (verbigracia, si se propusiere variar la conformación del TSE o el modo de elegir a las personas magistradas). En este último caso, los plazos dispuestos en el numeral antedicho aplicarían por igual, es decir, sin que sea relevante el carácter municipal o nacional del proceso electoral respectivo. CO05/23 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto salvado Rama del Derecho: 3. ASUNTOS DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Tema: ELECTORAL Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

Voto salvado del magistrado Cruz Castro y la magistrada Jara Velásquez, con redacción del primero.

Nos separamos del criterio mayoritario, dictando un voto particular, porque consideramos que la Ley n°10183 denominada “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales”, que reforma el artículo 14 del Código Municipal contiene vicios de procedimiento y de fondo.

Inconstitucionalidad por vicio de procedimiento.- Falta de consulta al TSE (artículo 97 Constitucional) Consideramos que la ley nro. 10183 del 5 de abril de 2022, denominada “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales” contiene un vicio de procedimiento en su aprobación, referido a la violación a lo dispuesto en el art.97 Constitucional.

En el mismo sentido que lo indicó el Magistrado Cruz en la resolución que resolvió la consulta facultativa de esta ley (voto n°2022-006119), consideramos que existe el vicio de procedimiento señalado, pues se contraviene las prohibiciones y limitaciones impuestas por el periodo de veda establecido en el artículo 97 constitucional. Recordemos que dispone tal norma constitucional:

“Art. 97. Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En este caso, resulta inobjetable que la ley en cuestión se refiere a materia electoral, pues incide en la regulación y restricción de ciertos supuestos de reelección en las elecciones municipales. Además, no se puede distinguir donde la Constitución Política no lo hace, por ello resulta improcedente afirmar que el artículo 97 constitucional se refiere sólo a las elecciones nacionales y no a las municipales. Claramente tal norma hace referencia a “la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales” sin distinguir tipos de elecciones. Asimismo, resulta evidente que el TSE se ha manifestado en desacuerdo con este proyecto de ley. Así entonces, consideramos que resulta aplicable lo establecido por el artículo 97 conforme a los siguientes argumentos:

· La Asamblea Legislativa puede apartarse de la opinión del TSE; pero para ello necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros, siempre no esté dentro del período de veda legislativa.

· En todo caso, esa votación calificada no tiene la virtud de desconocer el periodo de veda, conforme al cual: dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.

Los partidos políticos que actúan en el Parlamento son importantes actores en todo tipo de elecciones, por esta razón consideramos que la prohibición constitucional es saludable. Tal prohibición constitucional impide que los actores políticos puedan variar las reglas electorales en cualquier tipo de elección. Distinguir entre elecciones municipales y elecciones nacionales, es una distinción artificial. La incidencia de las luchas electorales y la porosidad de los partidos, son razones suficientes para impedir que las reglas de contiendas electorales, sean locales o nacionales, se modifiquen durante el período electoral. La historia electoral evidencia la volatibilidad y conflictividad que contiene esta materia, por esta razón el texto constitucional es tajante, muy claro. Cualquier elección popular impide la variación de las reglas electorales. Por otra parte, el texto constitucional contiene un “veto particular” del Tribunal Electoral, pues no puede introducirse ninguna modificación electoral, en los seis meses anteriores y en los cuatro posteriores de la celebración de una elección popular, en materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo. Esto es precisamente lo que ocurrió en este caso. El voto de mayoría ignora que existe una intervención calificada del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, que no depende sólo del período de exclusión de la potestad legislativa, sino que el Tribunal tiene una competencia calificada, que no puede ser ignorada por el poder legislativo ni por esta instancia constitucional. No es buen síntoma el debilitamiento de las potestades del Tribunal electoral, porque no es posible desconocer la historia, pues el fortalecimiento de la jurisdicción electoral fue una de las reivindicaciones políticas más importantes después de los hechos violentos del cuarenta y ocho.

Dado que las elecciones nacionales se realizaron el 06 de febrero del 2022, el periodo de veda mencionado cubriría desde el 06 de agosto del 2021. Es evidente que el primer debate se celebró dentro del periodo vedado en cuestión pues se llevó a cabo el 25 de enero 2022. Además, se hizo respecto de una reforma a la que se opuso el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. En razón de los argumentos expuestos, consideramos que existe el vicio de procedimiento señalado, pues se contravienen las prohibiciones y limitaciones impuestas durante el periodo de veda previsto en el artículo 97 constitucional.

Inconstitucionalidad por vicios de fondo.- Al respecto, por las razones que se indican, consideramos que los siguientes aspectos de las normas cuestionadas, resultan inconstitucionales:

“(…) No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.

Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, (…) no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.

Transitorio Único: Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.

Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley.” Como se observa, las partes subrayadas se refieren a la imposibilidad (por un lapso de ocho años) de que quien ha ocupado un cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal, pueda ocupar OTRO cargo de elección popular municipal. Tal imposibilidad, restricción o veda temporal, se refiere al ejercicio del derecho de acceso a cargos públicos. Sobre el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos se tiene amplia normativa internacional:

· El artículo 21.2 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos: “…Toda persona tiene derecho de acceso, en condiciones de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país…”.

· El artículo 20 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del hombre: “toda persona tiene el derecho de formar parte del gobierno de su país y de participar en las elecciones populares”.

· El artículo 23.1.c de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos: “1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades: … c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país…”.

En nuestra Constitución Política, tal derecho se deriva de los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales. El derecho fundamental de acceso a cargos públicos es el derecho de toda persona a postularse y acceder a desempeñar cargos dentro de la función pública. Es indudable que, como cualquier otro derecho fundamental, puede estar sujeto a limitaciones, claro está, siempre y cuando cumplan con el principio de reserva legal, pero además, que dichas limitaciones no lleven a un vaciamiento absoluto del derecho o que supongan limitaciones irrazonables o desproporcionadas. Entre las limitaciones válidas, en general, se puede mencionar el régimen de incompatibilidades o las sanciones de inhabilitación temporal. Estas últimas como consecuencia de una falta grave, previo un debido proceso y de que la sanción impuesta sea para garantizar la correcta y eficiente administración. Ahora bien, si se analiza detenidamente, se constata que las normas impugnadas restringen de manera irrazonable el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos, pues lo que se pretende es prohibir, por espacio de 8 años, que quien ya ha ocupado un cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, pueda ocupar otro cargo municipal de elección popular. Nótese que ello va más allá de los límites a la reelección, pues se pretende ponerle una prohibición temporal para poder tener acceso a un cargo de elección popular, distinto del que ya ha ocupado. Con ello, claramente se desbordan los principios básicos de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Desde nuestra perspectiva minoritaria y disidente, coincidimos con la misma conclusión a la que llega el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en el sentido de considerar que la normativa en cuestión impone un vaciamiento del derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal, sin cumplir con el parámetro de razonabilidad. Ello por cuanto dicha normativa supone un plazo de exclusión, durante el cual, un funcionario municipal no puede optar por otro cargo municipal de elección popular, sin que ello sea consecuencia de alguna falta cometida. Claramente la preocupación por la corrupción no puede servir de fundamento genérico para la restricción generalizada del derecho de acceso a cargos públicos. La irrazonabilidad y la desproporción se aprecia muy bien en este supuesto, aplicándolo a otra prohibición similar: imponer que la limitación a la reelección presidencial, incluyera también la imposibilidad de ser electo diputado por el hecho de haber sido Presidente de la República. Claramente se aprecia cuando la prohibición se expande a otros cargos, resulta irrazonable. Nótese que no se trata del derecho de asumir un cargo per se, sino que ha mediado una elección popular y el electorado se ha manifestado a favor de tener a dicho funcionario en otro cargo. Consideramos que nada obstaría para que una persona que ya antes ha ejercido un cargo de elección popular, pueda volver a ocupar otro cargo, dentro del mismo régimen municipal, si el electorado así lo ha decidido. Tal como lo indica el TSE en su respuesta a la consulta legislativa resuelta sobre el proyecto que dio origen a esta ley, no es legítimo que un Estado impida el sufragio pasivo (derecho a ser electo) en razón de haber ocupado un puesto específico -distinto al que se aspiraría- en los dos períodos inmediatos anteriores. Así se indica: “Tal afectación al núcleo esencial derecho se produce justamente porque… se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos públicos. (…) De otra parte, no puede perderse de vista que los cambios operados en el texto del proyecto lo convierten en inconexo, en tanto la exposición de motivos desarrolla porqué los promoventes consideran legítimo y necesario limitar la reelección, pero no se alude a que debe restringirse cualquier otro tipo de postulación (…) la propuesta original no era la de establecer una prohibición tan intensa como la que, vía mociones, se incorporó.”. El hecho que una persona que ha ocupado un puesto de elección popular se pueda postular para otro cargo, no resulta, per se, fuente de corrupción ni un “modus vivendi” ilegítimo. No puede ignorarse que se trata de aprovechar la experiencia de una persona que ya ha ocupado cargos similares y que los munícipes han elegido. En función de impedir la concentración de poder, no justicia la introducción de reglas que cercenan, sin ningún sustento, el sufragio pasivo. Las limitaciones que pretenden evitar concentraciones de poder, no pueden restringir, sin fundamento, derechos fundamentales. Esta medida luce irrazonable o desproporcionada.

Tal como lo ha indicado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en cuanto a los derechos políticos, el artículo 23 consagra el derecho de participar, de votar y ser elegido y el derecho de tener acceso a funciones públicas. Así se protege tanto el derecho del candidato como el derecho de los electores:

“El párrafo primero del artículo 23 de la Convención reconoce a todos los ciudadanos los derechos: a) a participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos; b) a votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) a tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a funciones públicas de su país. De forma similar, la Declaración Americana reconoce el derecho a tomar “parte en el gobierno de su país, directamente o por medio de sus representantes, y de participar en las elecciones populares, que serán de voto secreto, genuinas, periódicas y libres”. Tomando en cuenta lo anterior, esta Corte ha señalado que los derechos reconocidos tienen una dimensión individual y colectiva, pues protegen tanto aquellas personas que participen como candidatos como a sus electores.” (OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-28/21 DE 7 DE JUNIO DE 2021) Ahora bien, en cuanto a las limitaciones admisibles a los derechos políticos, se ha indicado que los derechos políticos no son absolutos y pueden estar sujetos a limitaciones. Sin embargo, tales limitaciones deben cumplir con el principio de reserva legal y el principio de razonabilidad (necesidad y proporcionalidad). Así ha dicho la Corte IDH:

“Su reglamentación debe observar los principios de legalidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en una sociedad democrática. La observancia del principio de legalidad exige que el Estado defina de manera precisa, mediante una ley, los requisitos para que los ciudadanos puedan participar en la contienda electoral, y que estipule claramente el procedimiento electoral que antecede a las elecciones. De acuerdo al artículo 23.2 de la Convención se puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a las que se refiere el inciso 1 de dicho artículo, exclusivamente por las razones establecidas en ese inciso. La restricción debe encontrase prevista en una ley, no ser discriminatoria, basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.” Claramente en la ley cuestionada no existe base razonable, ni se atiende un propósito útil y oportuno que torne necesaria la exclusión de un derecho fundamental, ni se entiende cuál es el interés público, ni tampoco es proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue. Estos requisitos no se cumplen en este caso. Distinto sería la situación si la interdicción para ocupar otro cargo de elección popular provenga de una inhabilitación declarada, pues en ese caso, existiría justificación razonable. Más recientemente, en cuanto a las restricciones, la Corte IDH ha precisado dos tipos de restricciones admisibles, las de carácter general impuestas por ley y las restricciones producto de una sanción particular:

“(…) esta Corte advierte que el artículo 23.2 establece dos supuestos. El primer supuesto se refiere a las restricciones de carácter general que puede establecer la ley (edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental), mientras que el segundo supuesto se refiere a las restricciones a los derechos políticos impuestas por vía de una sanción a una persona en particular (condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal). De la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal se desprende que la interpretación del término “exclusivamente” incluido en el artículo 23.2 dependerá de si se trata de restricciones a los derechos políticos generales (primer supuesto) o particulares (segundo supuesto). (OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-28/21 DE 7 DE JUNIO DE 2021) Siguiendo el precedente citado, las restricciones a derechos fundamentales deben estar previstas en ley en sentido formal y material (principio de reserva legal), perseguir un fin legítimo y cumplir con los requisitos de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad. Aspectos que no son cumplidos por el proyecto consultado, pues no se entiende cómo la veda temporal para ocupar cargos públicos sea una medida idónea, necesaria ni proporcional. Además, aún cuando se cumpla con el requisito de reserva legal, cabe cuestionarse si una restricción de este tipo debería ser por medio de una reforma constitucional. Por otro lado, resulta claro que el legislador ordinario no es libre en su accionar, sino que está constreñido por el marco constitucional, como lo sería en este caso, los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. No aplica entonces en este caso argumentar a favor del principio de libre configuración del legislador o la discrecionalidad legislativa. Dentro de un Estado constitucional de Derecho, no es admisible reconocer potestades o competencias irrestrictas a ningún Poder de la República. Tal como se indica en el voto de mayoría, la libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, puesto que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales. (Ver también las resoluciones nros. 2013-011499 de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 2013, 2013-011706 de las 11:44 horas del 30 de agosto de 2013 y 2020-015542 de las 11:40 horas del 19 de agosto de 2020, entre otras). Ahora bien, si bien tal libre configuración del legislador pueda alcanzar para admitir la imposición de límites a la reelección, consideramos que no alcanza para admitir la elección en otros cargos. Es evidente que esa extensión resulta, a todas luces, irracional o desproporcionada. A diferencia de lo que se considera en el voto de mayoría, donde se indica que “Cabe reiterar que los requisitos o limitaciones para optar por cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal a priori están cobijados por el principio de libre configuración del legislador, salvo que quebranten normas o principios constitucionales o las denominadas normas pétreas.”, consideramos que, con base en el principio pro libertatis y pro homine, la regla siempre debe ser el ejercicio del derecho fundamental y examinarse, cuidosamente, el establecimiento de restricciones a tales derechos. Partir del razonamiento contrario nos parece un desconocimiento del marco constitucional. Claro que no existe ningún derecho humano o fundamental de forma absoluta, pero la restricción a tales derechos tampoco es absoluta, sino que debe estar sujeta a límites. No encontramos asidero en la justificación que encuentra el voto de mayoría cuando indica que la restricción de marras se apoya en fines legítimos y se funda en datos y argumentos suficientemente plausibles. Ello por cuanto, consideramos que la medida restrictiva en cuestión no pasa el test de razonabilidad, no consideramos que sea una medida necesaria, ni idónea, ni tampoco proporcional. Sino que por el contrario, afectan el contenido esencial del derecho al sufragio pasivo.

Todo lo dicho aplica también para la inconstitucionalidad del transitorio, pues además, la restricción se aplica para los cargos futuros de quienes actualmente se desempeñan en puestos de elección popular en el ámbito municipal. Con lo cual, la restricción se impone con “nombres y apellidos” para los actuales representantes municipales. En la norma transitoria de la ley cuestionada, el legislador reguló la situación de las personas que, al momento de entrada en vigor de la ley, se encuentren ocupando cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal por al menos dos periodos consecutivos. Así entonces, dichas personas desconocían -porque no existía- de tal veda cuando asumieron el cargo. La persona en tal situación ostenta también el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos que le permite participar en un proceso eleccionario futuro.

A diferencia del criterio de mayoría, consideramos que, no es una cuestión menor el considerar que, la normativa en cuestión puede afectar el derecho al sufragio pasivo de más de 40 personas funcionarias electas democráticamente, y puede haber operado como una “sanción sin debido proceso” ante la naturaleza sancionatoria de esta medida que impone una prohibición para ocupar cualquier otro cargo municipal de elección popular. Ello además de poder estar frente a una violación al principio de irretroactividad de las normas y del artículo 34 Constitucional.

Así entonces, consideramos que toda la normativa en cuestión resulta inconstitucional porque contiene un vicio de fondo al vaciar de contenido el derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Estimamos que en este caso se exceden los límites al poder legislativo; no es posible extender la interdicción al sufragio pasivo respecto de un cargo que no ha ocupado a quien se impone la prohibición. No puede existir un efecto expansivo de las limitaciones de un derecho fundamental.

En razón de los argumentos expuestos, estimamos que las normas de fondo consultadas son irrazonables y desproporcionadas; y además, respecto del transitorio, como lo expresamos, conculca la garantía del principio de irretroactividad de las normas. Las normas consultadas contienen previsiones que lesionan el derecho al sufragio pasivo.

Fernando Cruz C. Rosibel Jara V.

Magistrado Magistrada CO05/23 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto salvado Rama del Derecho: 3. ASUNTOS DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Tema: ELECTORAL Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

Res. n.°2022-029648 VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS La suscrita magistrada, con el respeto acostumbrado, salvo el voto y declaro con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad por existir un vicio esencial en el procedimiento de aprobación de la ley n.°10183 del 05 de abril de 2022, Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales. Esto por infracción a lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 en relación con el artículo 102 inciso 3), ambos de la Constitución Política.

Al existir un vicio de procedimiento que invalida la reforma, omito pronunciamiento respecto de los agravios por el fondo.

1.- Sobre los precedentes de esta Sala En primer lugar, corresponde advertir que el planteamiento de la reelección de los alcaldes se ha sometido a conocimiento de este Tribunal en dos ocasiones recientes.

En el expediente n.°22-001848-0007-CO se conoció la consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad referente al proyecto de aprobación de la “Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.°7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)”, que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo n.°21.810. En la opinión consultiva en cuestión salvé mi voto al estimar que, en realidad, los legisladores no plantearon una verdadera duda de constitucionalidad. Realicé las siguientes consideraciones:

“En la parte resolutiva de este dictamen se consigna:

“La magistrada Garro Vargas salva el voto respecto del supuesto vicio de procedimiento planteado y considera que es inevacuable, pues la consulta no presenta propiamente un cuestionamiento, sino una defensa ante la posición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en relación con el alcance del art. 97 de la Constitución Política”.

Para ilustrar mi tesis basta hacer referencia a las propias manifestaciones de los legisladores consultantes, quienes lejos de invocar dudas u objeciones razonadas de constitucionalidad del trámite dado al proyecto de ley, pretenden blindarlo frente a los cuestionamientos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE). Al respecto, se indica lo siguiente:

“Desde una interpretación formal, rígida y estricta de la norma tenemos tres posibles implicaciones relacionadas con el trámite legislativo: la primera, acogemos la recomendación del Tribunal en el sentido irrestricto y absoluto del derecho a ser electo y mantenemos "la puerta giratoria" en donde los funcionarios municipales de elección popular, pueden "saltar" cada ocho años (luego de una reelección sucesiva) a otros puestos también de elección popular, y con ello limitamos la participación política de otros ciudadanos, y además, promovemos los puestos ad perpetuam en los gobiernos locales; la segunda, no votamos el proyecto de ley que cuenta con el aval de gran mayoría de diputados y diputadas que representamos la voluntad ciudadana o; la tercera, le heredamos a la Asamblea Legislativa entrante, cuya composición e intención no conocemos, la decisión sobre una propuesta que a todas luces pretende fortalecer la democracia”.

De su razonamiento ?frente a la argumentación realizada por el TSE? los propios legisladores plantean tres escenarios que califican como negativos: 1) acoger la recomendación del TSE, lo que trae como consecuencia la limitación a la participación política de los ciudadanos y la promoción de puestos ad perpetuam; 2) no votar el proyecto, el cual, según ellos mismos reconocen “cuenta con el aval de la gran mayoría de diputados y diputadas” que representan la voluntad ciudadana; y 3) le heredan el proyecto a una nueva conformación de la Asamblea Legislativa con el peligro de que no se logre concretar, advirtiendo que es una propuesta que “a todas luces pretende fortalecer la democracia”.

Seguidamente realizan una reseña histórica sobre la regulación de las elecciones municipales y de las elecciones nacionales, para ilustrar su tesis ?la que consideran es la apropiada interpretación del art. 97 de la Constitución Política? y solamente de seguido plantean una consulta a esta Sala. Al respecto, el escrito de la consulta indica textualmente lo siguiente:

“¿Cuál es el objetivo de esta reseña? Evidenciar que la aplicación del artículo 97 no puede ser literal ni entendida desde una interpretación formal, porque la realidad del legislador constituyente al momento de redactar la norma en cuestión entendía las elecciones como un solo momento cada cuatrienio y por lo tanto la limitación era general y absoluta, dado que la legislación que implicara a uno de los niveles de funcionarios elegibles, les aplicaba a todos y las circunstancias actuales son distintas.

Lo que queremos denotar ante el honorable Tribunal, es que la interpretación de este artículo debe ser material y teleológica, desde el contenido de la norma, desde su fin último y con la aprobación de este proyecto de ley en su trámite de primer debate, no se está afectando la dinámica de las elecciones municipales que se celebrarán en febrero del año 2024, es decir, dentro de 24 meses. Esa fue la razón por la que aprobamos en primer debate el proyecto de ley, seguros de que su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones que se realizará el 6 de febrero de este año, en el que se elegirá la Presidencia de la República y los diputados a la Asamblea Legislativa, de ninguna forma, alguna autoridad municipal.

Por lo anterior, considerando los alcances y la intención de las personas constituyentes de evitar transformaciones del sistema electoral en épocas cercanas a los comicios, en este caso en particular donde la modificación jurídica propuesta es relativa única y exclusivamente para el régimen municipal, cuyo periodo electoral no se encuentra activo, siendo que el llamado electoral en el que nos encontramos es relativo al Gobierno de la República y la Asamblea Legislativa, queda excluido el régimen municipal en su totalidad, por lo tanto surge la duda relacionada con el trámite legislativo: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

A partir de una detallada lectura del propio memorial suscrito por los legisladores consultantes, se aprecia que toda la argumentación no tiene por objeto fundamentar una duda sobre el procedimiento seguido para aprobar el proyecto que ellos impulsan, sino defender tanto el proyecto como ese procedimiento frente al criterio formalmente remitido por el TSE en el marco del iter parlamentario. La única pregunta propiamente dicha de ese epígrafe relativo al presunto vicio de procedimiento es la que está al final, pero toda la argumentación que la antecede no tiene ningún vestigio de duda u objeción sobre el trámite brindado al proyecto de ley, sino, muy por el contrario, pone de manifiesto el convencimiento de que “su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones” llevado a cabo el pasado 6 de febrero.

En virtud de tal constatación, considero que la consulta debe ser declarada inevacuable, a la luz de lo dispuesto en el art. 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que señala lo siguiente:

"Art. 99. Salvo que se trate de la consulta forzosa prevista en el inciso a) del artículo 96, la consulta deberá formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieren dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Como se desprende del contenido de dicho numeral, para que la consulta legislativa sea admisible se deben expresar con claridad los motivos por los cuales se tienen dudas u objeciones de constitucionalidad. Y esto es precisamente lo que aquí se echa en falta, puesto que de los extractos citados –y del entero escrito– se puede advertir que los legisladores no cuestionan un trámite en particular respecto del que se tengan dudas concretas de constitucionalidad. Más bien, se muestran disconformes con la postura institucional del TSE (ver en idéntico sentido la reciente opinión consultiva que, mediante el dictamen n°.2872-2022, suscrito unánimemente por esta Sala, con casi igual integración, declaró inevacuable la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad tramitada en el expediente n.°21-025530-0007-CO).

En consecuencia, considero que en lo relativo al presunto vicio de procedimiento los consultantes sólo enuncian la pregunta, sin argumentar el por qué estiman que amerita plantear la cuestión a esta Sala. Por el contrario, sus alegatos buscan justificar lo actuado. Por eso, bien se puede afirmar que, al no contener una objeción de constitucionalidad, la consulta legislativa es inadmisible e inevacuable”.

De lo anterior se desprende que salvé el voto entendiendo que la consulta era inevacuable, por lo que no me pronuncié sobre el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política.

Un par de meses después, la Sala Constitucional resolvió la acción conocida en el expediente n.°19-000892-0007-CO mediante la sentencia n.°2022-016947. En dicha resolución, la Sala, por mayoría, estimó que la omisión cuestionada en ese proceso ?sea la omisión de incluir límites a la reelección sucesiva e indefinida de los alcaldes municipales? había sido solventada por el legislador mediante la reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal. En el referido expediente, declaré sin lugar la acción con otras consideraciones, que en resumen son las siguientes:

“De la atenta revisión del libelo de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad se desprende con suma claridad que el accionante cuestionaba el art. 14 del Código Municipal ?vigente al momento de la interposición de la acción? porque autorizaba implícitamente la reelección “sucesiva e indefinida” de las autoridades municipales. En su criterio esa posibilidad tiene nocivas consecuencias respecto del desempeño del sistema democrático, de la alternabilidad en el ejercicio del poder, del derecho a ser electo y de elegir en condiciones de igualdad, y es falto de razonabilidad. Entonces, es necesario precisar que el objeto de la acción no es la reelección per se de los servidores municipales, sino la reelección sucesiva e indefinida, que ?a juicio del accionante? se derivaba de lo regulado en el art. 14 del Código Municipal, que disponía en lo conducente lo siguiente:

“Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la Presidencia y las Vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años, y podrán ser reelegidos”.

La mayoría de la Sala sostiene que, en vista de que el Poder Legislativo ?en el ejercicio de sus atribuciones constitucionales? emitió la reforma al art. 14 del Código Municipal, ya se procedió a suplir la omisión inconstitucional que se reprochaba y por lo que entiende que la acción carece de interés actual y ordena desestimarla. Al respecto, conviene realizar varias precisiones.

En primer lugar, si bien es cierto se introdujeron nuevas reglas para aspirar a la reelección en los puestos municipales, no se ha suprimido la reelección sucesiva, ya que la norma actual aún lo permite, pues en lo que interesa indica lo siguiente:

(…)

Es palmario que el legislador introdujo reglas y condiciones para aspirar a los cargos municipales de elección popular, pero se sigue autorizando la reelección sucesiva, por lo que no parece que la reforma responda plenamente a lo pretendido en esta acción.

En segundo término, cabe señalar que la sentencia de mayoría hace la siguiente consideración “la omisión inconstitucional que se reprocha en este proceso al artículo 14 del Código Municipal ?según la cual los alcaldes municipales podían reelegirse sucesiva e indefinidamente? no existe”. Sobre este punto es necesario tener presente que esta Sala, al hacer referencia al control de constitucionalidad de las omisiones inconstitucionales, ha dicho lo siguiente (ver sentencias números 2005-5649, 2018-009819 y 2021-3853) (…) A partir de lo indicado por la Sala, considero que en el caso concreto no se cumplen las condiciones para valorar una supuesta inconstitucionalidad por omisión, puesto que la Constitución Política no establece un mandato expreso sobre la forma de elección o reelección de los miembros del gobierno municipal”.

2.- Sobre lo informado por la Procuraduría General de la República y mi decisión en el caso concreto En el presente asunto, luego de examinar los alegatos planteados, coincido con lo informado por la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR). Dicha instancia realizó las siguientes manifestaciones:

“III. SOBRE LA SUPUESTA VIOLACIÓN DE LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 97 CONSTITUCIONAL Dentro de la acción 22-8424-0007-CO, se alega que el trámite de aprobación de la Ley 10183 resulta violatorio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, dado que durante el trámite legislativo el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones brindó un criterio negativo sobre el proyecto de ley y que dentro de los seis meses previos y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de ley en los cuales se haya mostrado en desacuerdo dicho órgano electoral.

Por su importancia, procedemos a citar el artículo 97 constitucional que señala:

“ARTÍCULO 97.- Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.” Como se observa, el artículo indicado establece dos supuestos diferentes. En primer lugar, exige que cualquier ley relativa a la materia electoral, que cuente con oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sea aprobada por dos terceras partes del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa y, en segundo lugar, prohíbe –de manera absoluta- que la Asamblea apruebe un proyecto de ley que cuente con la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones si se está dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular.

Para referirnos al reclamo que se plantea en la presente acción, deben tomarse en consideración los siguientes hechos de relevancia del trámite legislativo llevado a cabo para la aprobación de la ley 10183:

• a)El proyecto de ley 21810, que sirvió de antecedente a la Ley 10.183 del 5 de abril de 2022, fue presentado en la corriente legislativa el 18 de febrero de 2020 (ver expediente legislativo); b) Mediante oficio AL-DSDI-OFI-0005-2022 del 11 de enero de 2022, la Asamblea Legislativa consultó de manera preceptiva el proyecto de ley actualizado al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folio 728 del expediente legislativo); c) Por oficio TSE-0199 del 20 de enero de 2022, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, objetó el proyecto de ley por considerarlo contrario al derecho a ser electo, en cuanto prohíbe que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular del régimen municipal. En dicho oficio se señaló: “… este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente n°21.810. Tal objeción se levantaría si los legisladores modifican el proyecto para que, según el espíritu de la propuesta, se limite la reelección consecutiva a una única vez (máximo dos períodos continuos en el mismo cargo), sin que se prohíba la posibilidad de optar, al cabo del segundo mandato, por otro puesto de elección popular. Respetuosamente, se recuerda que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (numeral 97 constitucional). ACUERDO FIRME.” (folios 1063 al 1072 del expediente legislativo); d) En la sesión extraordinaria número 45 del 23 de diciembre de 2021, el Plenario Legislativo aprobó en primer debate el proyecto de ley 21810, con una votación de 46 votos a favor (folios 551 a 600 y 604 del proyecto de ley); e) En sesión extraordinaria N°46 del 05 de enero del 2022, se inició la discusión del proyecto N°21.810 en segundo debate, donde se aprobó una moción de orden para retrotraer a primer debate y se suspendió la discusión para que ocupara el primer lugar de los primeros debates en sesión siguiente (folio 650).
• f)Mediante sesión ordinaria N°85 del 11 de enero del 2022 del Plenario Legislativo, inició la discusión en el trámite de primer debate del proyecto N°21.810 (folio 702). En sesión extraordinaria N°053 del 25 de enero del 2022 se continuó la discusión en primer debate del proyecto en cuestión y se aprobó en primer debate por 40 votos a favor (folio 1082-1112).
• g)El 27 de enero de 2022, varios diputados y diputadas de la Asamblea Legislativa presentaron una consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, tramitada bajo el número de expediente 22-001848-0007-CO (folios 1143 a 1162 del expediente legislativo); h) La Sala Constitucional evacuó la consulta mediante el voto 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022, estimando que no existían vicios de procedimiento y declarando la consulta inevacuable en cuanto a los vicios de fondo alegados; i) En sesión ordinaria 105 del 29 de marzo de 2022, el Plenario Legislativo aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley 21.810 con 48 votos a favor, sin acoger las observaciones hechas por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folios 1367 y 1372).

Como se desprende de los hechos descritos, por tratarse de un proyecto de ley relativo a la materia electoral, la Asamblea Legislativa lo consultó al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones durante su tramitación, institución que se opuso parcialmente a la iniciativa legislativa, al considerarla contraria al parámetro de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad dada la restricción establecida a los funcionarios municipales con dos periodos consecutivos en el cargo, para optar por otros puestos de elección popular (folio 1068 del expediente legislativo). No obstante lo anterior, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado sin que se tomaran en consideración las observaciones del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues la ley finalmente aprobada mantuvo la restricción señalada por el órgano electoral (restricción sobre la cual nos referimos en nuestro informe previo).

Si se toma como parámetro el primer supuesto descrito en el artículo 97 constitucional, es claro que no existe infracción de procedimiento alguna, pues el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate por 40 votos y, en segundo debate, por 48 votos. Esto evidencia que aun con la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Asamblea Legislativa superó la mayoría constitucional para apartarse de dicha oposición.

La duda se genera en este caso con el segundo supuesto contemplado en el numeral 97 de la Constitución, que impide a la Asamblea Legislativa de manera absoluta, aprobar proyectos de ley de materia electoral si se está dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, cuando existe oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

Como se observa, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate en fecha 25 de enero de 2022, a menos de un mes de las elecciones nacionales realizadas en febrero de 2022 y, en segundo debate el 29 de marzo de 2022, a menos de un mes de la segunda ronda de las elecciones nacionales.

Se plantea la discusión entonces si, ante la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Asamblea Legislativa podía aprobar la ley, dado el momento electoral en que nos encontrábamos. (…)

Sin perjuicio del conflicto de competencias que se ha mantenido entre la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en el tiempo, ha sido criterio de este órgano asesor que en el tanto estemos frente a interpretaciones de normas constitucionales o legales de naturaleza electoral (que no constituyan jurisprudencia), quien debe ejercer esa competencia de manera exclusiva y excluyente es el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues el Constituyente fue claro en reconocerle esa atribución en los artículos 99 y 102 inciso 3 constitucionales.

(…)

Dicha posición, en nuestro criterio, presenta el inconveniente no sólo de que la Sala se atribuyó la interpretación o actualización de una norma constitucional de naturaleza electoral (artículo 97) que –en principio- corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sino que, además, la Sala realizó dicha interpretación conforme a una norma de rango legal (Código Electoral), desconociendo la voluntad del Constituyente plasmada en los artículos 97, 99 y 102 inciso 3 de la Constitución, aun cuando el régimen electoral cambiara a partir de la vigencia del Código Electoral. Asimismo, es claro que las normas contenidas en el proyecto de ley que sirvió de antesala a la Ley 10183, eran de naturaleza electoral, por lo que la oposición del TSE para que el proyecto se votara vinculaba a la Asamblea Legislativa.

En otras palabras, es nuestro criterio que durante el trámite legislativo debió prevalecer la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues es a dicho órgano al que le corresponde de manera exclusiva la interpretación de las normas electorales y nos encontrábamos en medio de una elección popular. Nótese que en ningún momento ese tribunal electoral consideró durante el trámite legislativo que el proyecto de ley podía aprobarse por no tratarse de una elección municipal la que estaba en curso, sino que, por el contrario, indicó al legislador que únicamente podía aprobarlo si acataba las recomendaciones que estaba haciendo al proyecto de ley, cosa que no se hizo por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver actas legislativas ya citadas).

Estimamos, además, que el hecho de que una norma legal se refiera a una elección de carácter municipal y que las elecciones en trámite fueran de carácter nacional, no superaba la prohibición establecida en el numeral 97 constitucional, pues bajo esa tesis el legislador podría crear nuevas obligaciones en materia electoral, sin considerar si el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones puede o no hacerles frente, estando en medio de la compleja logística de una elección, sea cual sea su naturaleza. De ahí que precisamente por ello, corresponde al TSE determinar si un proyecto de ley -en materia electoral- puede o no aprobarse durante los meses previos y posteriores a la elección que se está realizando, especialmente porque sólo dicho órgano puede valorar aspectos presupuestarios, logísticos y técnicos relativos a la organización del sufragio y su posibilidad material de atender al mismo tiempo, eventuales normas legales que dicte la Asamblea Legislativa en materia electoral, sean de alcance municipal o nacional”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En mi criterio, lleva razón la PGR en el sentido que a la luz de la literalidad de lo dispuesto en el artículo 102 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política le corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE) interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales y legales referentes a la materia electoral.

En el sub lite, según se acreditó de la secuencia explicada, el TSE objetó el proyecto de ley y les hizo ver a los legisladores que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo”. Pese a dicho desacuerdo, la Asamblea Legislativa aprobó el proyecto de ley en período de elecciones nacionales, siendo que el TSE estimó, conforme a su competencia constitucional de interpretar las normas constitucionales en materia electoral, que el referido proyecto de ley no podría convertirse en ley durante el período en mención. Considero que la Asamblea Legislativa, al pasar por alto la oposición del TSE y su competencia de interpretar las normas constitucionales en materia electoral, incurrió en un vicio esencial del procedimiento parlamentario que lo invalidó.

Al respecto, cabe agregar que no me estoy pronunciando sobre cuál es la interpretación apropiada de la segunda parte del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, sino que reconozco que, a la luz del artículo 102 inciso 3) constitucional, le correspondía exclusivamente al TSE realizar la interpretación del numeral supra citado.

3.- Antecedentes que reflejan mi posición sobre las competencias del TSE Lo dicho en el presente voto salvado es coincidente con mi posición en relación con las competencias constitucionales del TSE.

Por ejemplo, recientemente concurrí con el Pleno de esta Sala al resolver la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.°21-0000897-0007-CO mediante la sentencia n.°2022-027955 en la que se subrayaron justamente las competencias de interpretación del TSE. En lo conducente, se dijo lo siguiente:

“Luego de valorar los argumentos, la Sala estima que el ordinal cuestionado tiene un contenido programático, tendente a brindar seguridad jurídica en el ejercicio de las potestades que competen al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de manera exclusiva, pero sin afectar el contenido de las mismas. Según se desprende de su literalidad, el propósito de la norma es que el TSE realice, dentro de los seis meses siguientes a la vigencia de la ley, las labores de organización y dirección, con el fin de que se celebre -posteriormente- el sufragio para la elección de los miembros del concejo de distrito y síndicos del distrito de Cabeceras. Tal actividad -organización y dirección- difiere de la entendida por el accionante (efectuar elecciones anticipadas). En otras palabras, visto que la celebración de elecciones locales conlleva la conciliación de numerosos elementos fácticos y jurídicos (definición del padrón electoral, labor interna de partidos políticos, propaganda política, deuda política, respeto a los tiempos electorales, respeto a la prohibición de la ley nro. 6068 de modificar la división territorial administrativa en tiempos electorales, etc.), la norma procura que el TSE ejerza sus potestades de organización y dirección en esos meses, a los efectos de brindar seguridad jurídica y determinar la manera de proceder para celebrar las elecciones respectivas. En efecto, a diferencia de lo que se aduce en esta acción, la normativa cuestionada no invade las competencias constitucionales del TSE pues el mandato bajo examen no impone la celebración de las elecciones dentro del plazo de seis meses posterior a la entrada en vigor de la ley, sino que, en congruencia con lo estatuido por la normativa electoral, precisa que el TSE debe emprender las acciones correspondientes para concretar la convocatoria de dicho proceso democrático. Empero, es claro que, en orden a las competencias exclusivas y excluyentes de ese Tribunal Electoral, es dicha instancia quien debe definir las especificidades de ese trámite, dentro de esto, fechas de realización de los comicios y demás detalles propios de esas actividades de designación popular que presentan una especial complejidad en su organización y celebración. Por otra parte, en cuanto a este tipo de normativa, la Sala destaca que nuestro ordenamiento jurídico contiene disposiciones similares en materia de elecciones municipales, verbigracia:

“Artículo 19. — Por moción presentada ante el Concejo, que deberá ser firmada al menos por la tercera parte del total de los regidores y aprobada por el mínimo de tres cuartas partes de los regidores integrantes, se convocará a los electores del cantón respectivo a un plebiscito, donde se decidirá destituir o no al alcalde municipal. Tal decisión no podrá ser vetada.

Los votos necesarios para destituir al alcalde municipal, deberán sumar al menos dos tercios de los emitidos en el plebiscito, el cual no podrá ser inferior al diez por ciento (10%) del total de los electores inscritos en el cantón.

El plebiscito se efectuará con el padrón electoral del respectivo cantón, con el corte del mes anterior al de la aprobación en firme del acuerdo referido en el párrafo primero de este artículo.

Si el resultado de la consulta fuere la destitución del funcionario, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones repondrá al alcalde propietario, según el artículo 14 de este código, por el resto del período.

Si ambos vicealcaldes municipales son destituidos o renuncien, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones deberá convocar a nuevas elecciones en el cantón respectivo, en un plazo máximo de seis meses, y el nombramiento será por el resto del período. Mientras se realiza la elección, el presidente del concejo asumirá, como recargo, el puesto de alcalde municipal, con todas las atribuciones que le otorga este Código.” (El subrayado es agregado. Código Municipal).

“ARTÍCULO 147.- Convocatoria a elecciones La convocatoria a elecciones la hará el TSE cuatro meses antes de la fecha en que han de celebrarse estas.

El TSE convocará a elecciones parciales extraordinarias para llenar las vacantes de las municipalidades que lleguen a desintegrarse, así como en el supuesto del artículo 19 del Código Municipal.” (Código Electoral) La Sala destaca que el TSE se encuentra en la posibilidad de interpretar sistemáticamente la normativa cuestionada con el propósito de armonizarla con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico, velando por la vigencia de los principios constitucionales y electorales que rigen la materia, como lo ha efectuado en otras oportunidades (por ejemplo, la resolución nro. 405-E8-2008 de las 7:20 horas del 8 de febrero de 2008). Corresponde al TSE tanto la interpretación de esa normativa como el ejercicio de las potestades que le han sido asignadas constitucional y legalmente. Incluso, la Sala nota dentro del expediente legislativo que el TSE reconoce tácitamente la necesidad de conciliar la norma con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico para determinar cuándo podrían efectuarse las elecciones:

“Conforme se mencionó anteriormente, la eficacia de este proyecto en caso de ser aprobado por el propio Poder Ejecutivo con anterioridad al 2 de diciembre de 2018, como constitucionalmente corresponde, quedaría -de pleno derecho- diferida para el momento en que se elijan las respectivas autoridades municipales, lo que sucederá en las próximas elecciones municipales a celebrarse el primer domingo de febrero del año 2020, caso contrario, de entrar a regir en el mencionado período de veda, su eficacia quedaría de pleno derecho diferida para el siguiente proceso electoral, sea, febrero de 2024, en ambos casos, momento en el cual este Tribunal organizará y dirigirá de acuerdo a (sic) sus facultades constitucionales la elección de los miembros propietarios y suplentes el consejo (sic) de distrito y los respectivos síndicos del distrito de Cabeceras.” (Folio 149 del expediente legislativo de la ley 9868, disponible en http://www.asamblea.go.cr/) Se acota que tal opinión fue vertida con respecto a la redacción original del proyecto de ley. Sin embargo, se debe enfatizar que la norma cuestionada ya se encontraba incorporada en la versión primigenia del proyecto, en concreto, su artículo 3.

En conclusión, la Sala no encuentra roces de constitucionalidad en el ordinal cuestionado, pues no se determina que él se encuentre en confrontación directa con los tiempos electorales, previstos en los numerales 171 y 172 de la Constitución, ni que desconozca las potestades constitucionales del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Por el contrario, el citado artículo consigna que ese Tribunal, mediante el ejercicio de sus potestades de organización y dirección, deberá brindar seguridad jurídica en relación con la celebración de las elecciones en ese distrito”.

Esta postura, la de respetar el ámbito competencial del TSE en lo relativo a la interpretación de las normas constitucionales y legales referentes a materia electoral, es conteste con lo que he sostenido en otras oportunidades, especialmente en lo que atañe a las consultas de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto de ley de Empleo Público (ver las opiniones consultivas n.°2021-017098 y n.°2872-2022). Por lo demás, esta tesis no es contradictoria con lo que sostuve en lo referente a la paridad horizontal de los legisladores (sentencia n.°2015-016070) y a los puestos de elección popular que son municipales (resolución de admisibilidad n.°2019-011633), tal como puede deducirse del atento estudio de ambas resoluciones.

4.- Conclusión Corolario de las anteriores consideraciones, salvo el voto al encontrar que en el sub lite se incurrió en una infracción al trámite del procedimiento legislativo por la inobservancia a lo establecido en el artículo 102 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política.

Al acreditarse un vicio que invalida el trámite de aprobación de la ley, como he dicho, estimo innecesario pronunciarme sobre los alegatos de fondo.

CO05/23 ... Ver más Res. Nº 2022029648 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas y treinta minutos del catorce de diciembre de dos mil veintidós.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad que se tramita en el expediente nro. 22-008383-0007-CO interpuesta por GERARDO OVIEDO ESPINOZA, mayor, casado, contador público, vecino de Santa Ana de San José, cédula de identidad nro. 1-0590-0475, en calidad personal y en su condición de alcalde de Santa Ana y presidente de la Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José (FEMETROM), cédula de persona jurídica nro. 3-007-397237; contra el transitorio único y la parte sustantiva de la ley nro. 10.183 denominada: “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales”, a la cual se le acumularon las acciones nros. 22-008424-0007-CO promovida por HORACIO MARTÍN ALVARADO BOGANTES, en su condición de presidente y apoderado generalísimo de la Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), y 22-010888-0007-CO formulada por WILBER QUIRÓS PALMA, en calidad personal y en su condición de presidente de la Federación de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, así como por MARVIN GUSTAVO CASTILLO MORALES, en su condición personal.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Sala el 20 de abril de 2022, el accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza interpone acción de inconstitucionalidad en su condición de elector, alcalde de Santa Ana y presidente de FEMETROM, conforme al artículo II de la sesión ordinaria 191 del 20 de abril de 2022, en contra del transitorio único y la parte sustantiva de la ley nro. 10.183 denominada “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales”, aprobada el 5 de abril de 2022 y publicada en La Gaceta nro. 73 de 8 de abril de 2022. Menciona que la normativa impugnada infringe los numerales 7, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 93 y 169 de la Constitución Política, así como los principios de igualdad y libertad política; proporcionalidad; razonabilidad; irretroactividad de las normas; Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho; y los tratados internacionales, en especial el ordinal 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Menciona puntualmente estas transgresiones: “1.- El artículo 33 que establece el principio de igualdad ante la Ley, por cuanto la norma creó una discriminación odiosa dirigida hacia algunas personas en particular, lo cual resulta violatorio de los principios más básicos de igualdad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y libertad política e individual. 2.- El artículo 34 que establece el principio de irretroactividad de las normas jurídicas, pues se refiere a algunos ciudadanos que ostentamos un cargo determinado y crea una condición diferenciada para nosotros, aplicable hacia el pasado ejercicio de nuestras funciones. O sea, se separó de la nueva regla dirigida a todo ciudadano que los limita a no ser electos más de dos veces consecutivas a partir de su aprobación, para constituir una situación especial para quienes ejercemos este cargo público en el pasado de manera consecutiva. 3.- Los artículos 35, 39 y 40 de la Constitución Política por cuanto, con el transitorio impugnado se estableció una sanción pública dirigida especialmente a algunas autoridades que ostentamos la condición de Alcaldes propietarios reelectos, por una razón de carácter político y mediático, exacerbada por un escándalo conocido como el caso Diamante en el contexto de una campaña electoral, con eventuales repercusiones en los resultados electorales, con lo cual se violenta además el artículo 97 de nuestra Carta Magna, que no distingue entre las elecciones nacionales y las municipales. Lo anterior violenta el principio de proporcionalidad de toda acción del Estado frente a la colectividad como un todo. Lo anterior confirma la ausencia de la finalidad y necesidad social imperiosa de la reforma aprobada. 4.- Los artículos 169 y 171 por cuanto es la Constitución Política únicamente la que puede establecer una condición de limitación o restricción electoral a quienes han sido electos o podrían ser electos popularmente, tal cual ocurre con el Presidente y Vicepresidentes de la República o los señores Diputados, que nuestra Carta Magna en forma clara, precisa y expresa establece estas limitaciones en los artículos 107 y 132, pero para el caso de las autoridades municipales la Constitución no estableció ni establece ninguna limitante, con lo cual se está dando una reforma implícita a nuestra norma superior, sin cumplir con los trámites constitucionales, con lo cual existe un evidente vicio de forma y de procedimiento, con la aprobación de la norma impugnada, en detrimento de los derechos políticos ciudadanos consagrados en el artículo 93 de ese cuerpo superior de normas. En este sentido no corresponde a una norma de carácter legal restringir o delimitar los derechos políticos consagrados constitucionalmente en un tema tan profundamente complejo como el aprobado. 5.- El artículo 7 de la Constitución por cuanto existen Tratados Internacionales adoptados por el país que protegen los derechos políticos vulnerados con la norma cuestionada, tal cual lo expondremos adelante, todo en relación con el inciso d) del artículo 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, especialmente el artículo 23 de la Convención Americana Sobre (sic) los (sic) Derechos Humanos, sobre el derecho de votar y ser electo en forma libre.” Aduce que es obvia la existencia de un interés colectivo y difuso que justifica impugnar la norma en la vía constitucional, ya que por la naturaleza del asunto no existe solamente una lesión individual y directa, sino que el tema se refiere a la organización y representación política del mayor interés de un Estado democrático, libre y soberano, con lo cual se hace innecesario recurrir a un proceso previo al agotamiento de la vía administrativa. Añade que la resolución nro. 2022006119 no entró a conocer el fondo del asunto, sino que únicamente se refirió a la inexistencia de los vicios de procedimiento consultados por las personas legisladoras. En el apartado de fundamentación expone los artículos y principios constitucionales transgredidos por la ley nro. 10.183:“1.- Evidentemente los Estados nacionales pueden regular por la vía legal los derechos políticos, pero esa discrecionalidad no es absoluta, pues posee los límites que la Constitución Política, los principios generales y los Tratados Internacionales impongan, particularmente la jurisprudencia que alimenta todas estas normas. , en especialmente aquella que ha consagrado los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. El principio de libre configuración del legislador le otorga a la Asamblea Legislativa la discrecionalidad suficiente para dictar normas que regulen las libertades políticas entre otras, incluyendo la posibilidad de que se limite la reelección de los Alcaldes y otras autoridades municipales, siempre y cuando ello encuentre asidero en la Constitución Política. Pero esta discrecionalidad se ejerce a través de normas de carácter general y abstracto, leyes en sentido formal y material dictadas conforme los procedimientos establecidos en nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, especialmente las contenidas en la propia Constitución Política. La inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada consiste en que dicho Transitorio no cumple con los principios y redacción técnica que debe poseer como norma jurídica, pues se redactó para afectar a un poco más de cuarenta funcionarios electos democráticamente por el sufragio libre de la ciudadanía, como una especie de vendetta o reacción social alimentada por algunos medios de comunicación colectiva, a partir del inicio de una investigación judicial conocida como el caso Diamante, que analiza la posible comisión de actos de corrupción de algunas autoridades municipales. La presunción de tráfico de influencias, abuso de poder, la condena social por actos de supuesta corrupción, no pueden ser justificaciones para aprobar la restricción en la reelección de los cargos municipales, por lo tanto la reforma carece de finalidad legítima y de una adecuada determinación de la necesidad social imperiosa, como se requiere para que la norma posea armonía con nuestra Constitución. 2.- El margen de maniobra de la discrecionalidad legislativa no lleva a tal extremo de inmiscuirse en la campaña política, condenando públicamente a más de 40 Alcaldes que somos inocentes, con una norma que no tiene las características básicas o mínimas de general y abstracta, sino que está redactada para causar un efecto en algunas personas únicamente, en detrimento de los principios de proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e igualdad. Todos los medios de comunicación y las actas de la Asamblea Legislativa dan cuenta de que la única motivación para tramitar y aprobar esta Ley y su Transitorio es evitar el abuso de poder de los Alcaldes que poseían varios periodos en que la ciudadanía los reelegía. Se realizó una especie de condenatoria social generalizada a todo funcionario que, siendo Alcalde, tuviera dos o más periodos en que la población depositaba su confianza al reelegirlo. Lo anterior no solamente constituye una falta de respeto para el Ordenamiento Jurídico, donde el principio constitucional de inocencia ha sido ultrajado nuevamente, sino que además se afecta al resto de Alcaldes que no tenemos nada que ver con la investigación de posibles actos de corrupción señalados públicamente. Basta ver las declaraciones en todos los medios de comunicación de los señores legisladores de todas las Fracciones Políticas, en el contexto del cuestionamiento social que podría significar no votar esta reforma frente a un proceso electoral inminente. No consideramos necesario presentar pruebas de este ambiente nacional, donde toda la ciudadanía contempló casi diariamente durante los últimos meses de la campaña electoral nacional, ni de que la mayoría de los Alcaldes reelectos pertenecemos al Partido Político de uno de los contendientes en la lucha por el cargo de Presidente de la República. Nuestra pretensión no es que el honorable Tribunal Constitucional se inmiscuya en asuntos de connotación política, sino contextualizar la realidad del caso que tenemos al frente que es un quebrando grosero a las normas y principios constitucionales, motivados en una reacción política revanchista y sancionatoria dirigida hacia algunas personas en especial. Tal cual lo ha reiterado la jurisprudencia constitucional "la libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios —dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, pues que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo (sic) que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales." (Resoluciones 05099 del 2003, 011499, 011706 todas del 2013, la resolución 019511 del año 2018 y 015542 del 2020). Como lo indicó en su oportunidad claramente un ilustre Magistrado: "El hecho que una persona que ha ocupado un cargo popular se pueda postular para otro cargo, no resulta per se corrupción ni un "modus vivendi" ilegítimo. No puede ignorarse que se trata de aprovechar la experiencia de una persona que ya ha ocupado cargos similares, y que los munícipes han elegido. En función de impedir la concentración de poder, no pueden introducirse reglas que cercenan, sin ningún sustento, el sufragio pasivo. Las limitaciones a las concentraciones de poder no pueden restringir, sin fundamento, derechos fundamentales. " 3.- El bloque de constitucionalidad debe observarse cuando el Poder Legislativo ejerce su discrecionalidad normativa y este marco normativo superior implica limitaciones de procedimiento, de forma y sustantivos, como es el caso de que las limitantes para no reelegirse por parte de las autoridades electas popularmente al Poder Ejecutivo y Legislativo, que se encuentran en la carta magna, por tratarse de temas absolutamente sensibles para el equilibrio político, la gobernabilidad y la paz social. De esta manera son los artículos 107 y 132 de la Constitución los que tienen la facultad suficiente para constreñir, liminar (sic) o condicionar el derecho a la reelección, situación que el constituyente no estableció para las autoridades locales, en razón de que el control político social era evidentemente mayor por la cercanía a la población que los elegiría o no. Modificar lo anterior implicaría un cambio necesario a nivel de las normas constitucionales, pues son estas las que determinan el plazo del nombramiento, así como las condiciones y limitaciones fundamentales, por ello es el que Transitorio Único y la Ley en general son violatorias de los artículos 169 y 171 de la Constitución que determinan las reglas del juego de la elección de regidores y Alcaldes y que están siendo vulnerados gravemente. 4.- El menoscabo al principio de igualdad y de irretroactividad de la norma se confirma por varias causas, entre las que destaca que todos los ciudadanos costarricenses que cumplan con los requisitos pueden ser electos Alcaldes a partir de la promulgación de la Ley, excepto los que ya estaban y que se habían reelegido cuando esta norma no existía, pero además, la violación al principio de igualdad de acentúa cuando el resto de autoridades electas popularmente si pueden acceder al resto de cargos de esta naturaleza, excepto los Alcaldes y las Alcaldesas, que no podrían acceder a ningún cargo de nombramiento popular, aunque no sea el de Alcalde, verificando así, la característica casuística, personalizada, política e injusta de la norma impugnada. La norma de la no reelección por más de dos periodos debe regir por igual para todos los ciudadanos a partir de su promulgación, no hacia el pasado, pues ello implica dirigir la Ley hacia personas específicas por razones específicas, dentro de una coyuntura electoral, donde la Ley adoptada efectivamente afectaba un candidato específico y beneficiaba a otro cuyo partido político no posee ningún representante local electo popularmente por tratarse de una agrupación política nueva. Esta misma irracionalidad implicaría por ejemplo que un legislador no podría optar a ser candidato a la Presidencia de la República, situación que los señores legisladores no podrían pensar para sí mismos, pero sí pudieron tomar una coyuntura de escándalo público al iniciarse una investigación judicial, para formular una norma transitoria que el mismo Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones insinúa inconstitucional, por dejar totalmente sin contenido el derecho a ser elegido. La Constitución impide aprobar este tipo de reformas electorales durante un plazo de veda, sin distinguir si son elecciones nacionales o locales, argumentar lo contrario sería establecer una modificación a la Constitución Política por la vía de la interpretación, por lo cual el vicio de nulidad del procedimiento es más que evidente. 5.- El Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en su resolución TSE-0199-2022 del 20 de enero del presente año, faltando pocos días para la elección nacional, indico: "Las restricciones de los funcionarios reelegidos (para que no puedan optar por otro cargo en la municipalidad) imposibilitarían que esos ciudadanos puedan acceder a contiendas partidarias internas en aras de, luego, ser postulados para cargos de elección popular distintos al que ocupan. En otros términos, por más que pertenezcan a una agrupación y cumplan con los requisitos legales de postulación, en razón de la función pública que desempeñan —ad initio- tales servidores no podrán competir ni siquiera en los procesos internos en los que se disputan las nominaciones... Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos. " Lo que además resulta más que evidente es que, si esto es cierto para el resto de funcionarios municipales, también lo sería para los Alcaldes, con lo cual se confirma que haber excluido nada más a estos jerarcas, no al resto, violenta los principios constitucionales de legalidad, igualdad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. No estamos frente a la discusión de si la reelección constituye un derecho fundamental, un derecho subjetivo o un derecho adquirido, estamos frente al quebranto de normas superiores constitucionales y convencionales, que no impiden que se regule y limite la reelección, pero si le indica límites a la forma de cómo hacerlo, mediante una norma general, abstracta, no retroactiva o dirigida a algunas personas en particular, como fue el caso en exposición: "las personas que actualmente se desempeñan como alcaldes, alcaldesas....", siendo materia exclusiva de regulación constitucional, como los ejemplifica el caso de los Diputados y el Presidente de la República, regulados como corresponde, constitucionalmente. 6.- Existe un derecho no absoluto de acceso a los cargos públicos, que conforme al artículo 21.2 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, el artículo 20 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y el artículo 23.1.c de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, puede ser normado en forma general, pero no vaciado de contenido mediante una norma transitoria específica, pues tales principios convencionales consolidan expresa y claramente que toda persona tiene derecho de acceso a los cargos de elección popular en condiciones de igualdad, normas superiores que la norma impugnada transgrede claramente a pesar de tener un carácter inferior, incumpliendo el parámetro de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la norma. La restricción al cargo público solamente puede darse por dos vías, una norma general y abstracta que respete los principios de igualdad y proporcionalidad y que persiga un fin legítimo, o una sentencia firme judicial sancionatoria. En el caso expuesto los señores legisladores excedieron sus límites, diseñando una muy peligrosa tercera vía, conjugando una nueva competencia que se atribuye poderes inexistentes y sustituye los procedimientos y las atribuciones sancionatorias propias del Poder Judicial.” Solicita: “declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada y especialmente del Transitorio Único, previo traslado de esta acción a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones para lo que corresponda conforme la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.” 2.- Mediante resolución de las 17:41 horas de 28 de abril de 2022, la Presidencia de la Sala previno al accionante: “dentro de tercero día, contado a partir del siguiente a la notificación de esta resolución y bajo apercibimiento de denegarle el trámite a la acción en caso de incumplimiento, deberá: aportar certificación de su nombramiento como alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana.” 3.- Por escrito recibido en la Sala el 4 de mayo de 2022, el accionante adjunta la certificación de su nombramiento como alcalde de Santa Ana.

4.-Mediante resolución de las 8:27 horas de 9 de mayo de 2022, la Presidencia de la Sala dio curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada el accionante en su condición personal, alcalde de Santa Ana y presidente de FEMETROM, en contra del transitorio único y la parte sustantiva de la ley nro. 10.183 denominada “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales.” Además, confirió audiencia a al procurador general de la República, presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica. Asimismo, dispuso: “Esta acción se admite por reunir los requisitos a que se refiere la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en sus artículos 73 a 79. En cuanto a su legitimación, en este caso concreto, la parte accionante manifiesta que “Tratándose de los principios de la organización y representación política consagrada y normada en la propia Constitución Política, tal como lo permite el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, es obvia la existencia de un interés colectivo y difuso que justifica impugnar la norma en la vía constitucional….” No obstante, a partir del estudio del escrito de interposición de la acción, se estima que el accionante ostenta legitimación directa, toda vez que hace referencia a que se está frente a valores electorales, específicamente, en cuanto al ejercicio del sufragio pasivo, sea el derecho a ser elegido en un cargo público, lo cual ha sido admitido como un interés difuso en antecedentes jurisprudenciales de este Tribunal; por ejemplo, en la sentencia n.° 2011-010833 de las 14:31 horas del 12 de agosto de 2011, se dispuso que “… tratándose de materia electoral y en derecho de toda la ciudadanía de elegir y ser electos, debe reconocerse la existencia de un interés difuso para el planteamiento de esta acción, y, como tal, la debida legitimación del accionante para su presentación" (en similar sentido, véanse las sentencias n.° 7383-97 de las 15:48 horas del 4 de noviembre de 1997, n.° 7384-97 de las 15:51 horas de 4 de noviembre de 1997, n.° 2002-08867 de las 14:55 horas del 11 de setiembre de 2002 y n.° 000456-2007 de las 14:50 horas del 17 de enero de 2007, entre otras). Publíquese por tres veces consecutivas un aviso en el Boletín Judicial sobre la interposición de la acción. RESPECTO DE LOS EFECTOS JURÍDICOS DE LA ADMISIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Ciertamente, a tenor del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se debe advertir a los “órganos que agotan la vía administrativa que esa demanda, ha sido establecida, a efecto de que en los procesos o procedimientos en que se discuta la aplicación de la ley, decreto, disposición, acuerdo o resolución, tampoco se dicte resolución final mientras la Sala no haya hecho el pronunciamiento del caso.” Empero, en el caso concreto, la aplicación del ordinal 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional enervaría la aplicación de la norma y consiguientemente impediría la realización del próximo proceso electoral. Por lo expuesto, en aplicación del ordinal 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se impone modular el efecto suspensivo del artículo 81 de ese cuerpo normativo, indicándose, expresamente, que no se suspende el dictado de ninguna resolución final, ya sea en sede interna, administrativa o electoral. Dentro de los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del citado aviso, podrán apersonarse quienes figuren como partes en asuntos pendientes a la fecha de interposición de esta acción, en los que se discuta la aplicación de lo impugnado o aquellos con interés legítimo, a fin de coadyuvar en cuanto a su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interese (…).” 5.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en las ediciones nros. 95, 96 y 97 de los días 24, 25 y 26 de mayo de 2022 del Boletín Judicial respectivamente.

6.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 25 de mayo de 2022, se apersona Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, en su condición procuradora general adjunta de la República. Expone lo siguiente: “II. ACERCA DE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo. Estos últimos regulan la acción directa de inconstitucionalidad, por cuanto permiten la interposición de la acción sin necesidad de la existencia del asunto previo, cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En este caso, en el auto de curso de la acción, la presidencia de la Sala consideró que estamos ante la presencia de un interés difuso, lo cual considera este órgano asesor es acorde con la jurisprudencia emitida por la Sala Constitucional en esta materia y faculta a quien lo invoque a plantear directamente la acción de inconstitucionalidad (al respecto, las resoluciones números 2000-07818 de las 16:45 horas del 5 de setiembre del 2000 y 2012-1966 de las 9:32 horas del 17 de febrero de 2012). Al respecto, en la sentencia N.° 2012-1966 se señaló: “El derecho a elegir y ser electo en puestos de elección popular, como derechos políticos, tienen no sólo la naturaleza de poder afectar a un ciudadano o ciudadana en concreto, sino de afectar al sistema democrático en general, que se basa en la renovación periódica de sus estructuras políticas como uno de sus postulados, por medio de la elección popular de distintos puestos, de modo que tiene esa doble naturaleza que lo hace difuso y por lo tanto impugnable directamente, por vía de excepción, según la normativa y jurisprudencia citada.” (El destacado no es del original). Partiendo de lo anterior, en este caso el accionante está legitimado para plantear la acción de inconstitucionalidad, con independencia del cargo que ocupa como alcalde municipal y presidente de la Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José (FEMETROM). III. SOBRE EL FONDO Analizando la norma impugnada y los argumentos presentados por el accionante, estimamos que la discusión de fondo de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad debe resumirse al análisis de tres temas: el límite que impone la norma impugnada a la reelección en el ámbito municipal; la prohibición que se establece para ciertos funcionarios municipales de ocupar otros cargos una vez vencido su segundo periodo y; la norma transitoria, en cuanto a si produce o no una aplicación retroactiva de la prohibición establecida en la norma. A) SOBRE EL LÍMITE EN LA REELECCIÓN DE LOS FUNCIONARIOS DE ELECCIÓN MUNICIPAL. La Ley 10183 del 5 de abril de 2022, es una reforma de lo dispuesto en el artículo 14 del Código Municipal, Ley 7794 del 30 de abril de 1998, que limitó la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales. Señala dicha reforma en su parte sustantiva: “ARTICULO ÚNICO- Se reforma el quinto párrafo del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998. El texto es el siguiente: ( ... ) Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la presidencia y las vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1 º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años y podrán ser reelegidos. Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.” Como se observa, la norma impugnada cambió el sistema de reelección de las autoridades municipales, pues con anterioridad se permitía de manera indefinida, mientras que, ahora, únicamente se permite por una única vez. Además, la norma limita la posibilidad de ocupar cargos diferentes dentro del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos periodos a partir de que finalice el segundo. Si se analiza el proyecto de ley 21810 que sirvió de base a la Ley 10183, la propuesta legislativa se planteó con la finalidad de proteger el principio de alternancia del poder en el ejercicio de los cargos públicos, permitir a otras personas acceder a cargos municipales en igualdad de condiciones y prevenir los abusos y arbitrariedades que se asocian a la perpetuación en el poder de los altos puestos del gobierno local (exposición de motivos). Asimismo, el proyecto de ley se basó en el informe preliminar de la Misión de Observadores Electorales de la OEA, que estuvo integrada por 11 expertos electorales de 6 países de la región, quienes llegaron al país a desde el 25 de enero de 2020 para realizar un análisis detallado en temas como: organización electoral, tecnología electoral, financiamiento político, justicia electoral y participación política de las mujeres, y observar además las distintas perspectivas sobre la elección municipal en nuestro país. En dicho informe, la delegación se refirió a los límites de la reelección a nivel local, concluyendo que: “…no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados”[1] Bajo ese entendido, conviene hacer primero una referencia a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en relación con el citado principio de alternabilidad en el poder que consagra el artículo 9 de la Constitución Política y que se enuncia como uno de los fundamentos de la ley impugnada. Al respecto, la Sala ha indicado: “X.- DE LA ALTERNANCIA EN EL PODER. Otro de los principios constitucionales alegados infringidos, es el de la alternatividad en el poder, por estimar la asociación accionante que, debería de preverse un sistema en el que los puestos elegibles se ocupen en forma alternativa por todos los grupos que luchan por los mismos. Al respecto, se hace la advertencia de que el concepto doctrinario de este principio propio de los sistemas o regímenes republicanos, tiene un significado diverso del considerado por la accionante, en tanto implica la posibilidad real y efectiva de que los cargos públicos se ocupen temporalmente conforme a los períodos previamente fijados en la Constitución Política o en la ley. Esto es, la renovación periódica de los puestos públicos por medio de elecciones libres, de donde resaltan los elementos de legitimidad y control político, al ser requerida la participación de la ciudadanía en su totalidad –para las elecciones Presidenciales, de los diputados, regidores, síndicos y el alcalde municipal - o fraccionada - en caso de la integración de órganos colegiados de entidades públicas, como lo serían, por ejemplo, del Consejo Superior de Educación, el Consejo Universitario, la Junta Directiva del ICAFE, etc.-. Por ello, la alternancia en el Poder requiere de un régimen democrático que permita la competencia real y equitativa de los partidos políticos o de los grupos, sectores o asociaciones –como en este caso-, de manera que se supone una igualdad real de oportunidades, de donde no puede privilegiarse ningún sector, grupo o candidato. En todo caso, debe advertirse que la rotación en el poder sólo es posible si media una norma expresa al efecto, de manera que en ausencia de ella, el cuerpo electoral elige al representante…. Debe recordarse que el principio de alternancia en el poder no presupone la rotación del puesto elegible entre los diversos grupos, partidos o sectores que participen en un proceso electoral -en este caso, las asociaciones de educadores-, sino más bien la existencia de procesos de elección sustentados en el principio democrático, esto es, en la convocatoria de elecciones libres y pluripartidistas, y en forma secreta. Motivo por el cual no puede estimarse que se da la infracción de este principio, toda vez que el mismo Decreto Ejecutivo número 11, establece la sujeción a tales principios en el inciso e) del artículo 1°. Asimismo, debe considerarse que lejos de quebrantarse el principio de igualdad, por cuanto a todas las asociaciones se les aplica la misma normativa. En todo caso, debe considerarse que la condición de asociación con mayor número de asociados es relativa y cambiante en el tiempo, de manera que tampoco puede estimarse la infracción del principio de igualdad, por cuanto no se favorece a una asociación de educadores en específico. Contrario a lo estimado por la promovente, la Sala estima que una solución como la planteada por la asociación accionante, sea la de darle mayor valor a las asociaciones "minoritarias", a fin de que puedan obtener una mayor cantidad de votos y que su representante integre el CONESUP, constituye un quiebre de los principios constitucionales señalados del de representatividad, participación ciudadana, alternancia e igualdad; con lo cual, se considera que la pretensión de los accionantes más bien socava estos principios. Por tales motivos, es que la acción debe declararse sin lugar, en todos sus extremos.” (Sentencia n.°2003-03475 de las 8:56 horas del 2 de mayo del 2003. El subrayado no es del original) De conformidad con la sentencia transcrita, el principio de comentario no exige la rotación, ni que necesariamente las personas deban turnarse sucesivamente de determinados cargos de elección popular. Esto fue reiterado en la sentencia N.° 20091632 de las 11:23 horas del 6 de febrero del 2009, que indica: “III.- SOBRE LA ALTERNABILIDAD (…) el principio de alternabilidad implica garantizar la presencia de todas las colectividades que participen en un proceso de elección, en este caso, los colegios profesionales, a fin que se garantice un procedimiento participativo, libre, democrático y secreto. A partir de lo expuesto, este Tribunal considera que, de los hechos que constan en autos, se desprende que la Federación recurrida informó a todas las Juntas Directivas de los Colegios Profesionales sobre el proceso de elección de los diferentes puestos a elegir, asimismo, se solicitó que los candidatos debían estar presentes el día de la elección para ser conocidos por los distintos representantes de los Colegios Profesionales. La rotación de los Colegios Profesionales en los puestos de elección ante las instituciones públicas, no es un elemento intrínseco del principio de alternabilidad, pues en realidad lo que se pretende es que la elección sea realizada de forma tal que todos los Colegios pertenecientes a la Federación puedan participar de forma libre y secreta. Bajo esta tesitura, el reproche planteado resulta improcedente.” (El subrayado no es del original). A la luz de dichos criterios de la Sala, lo relevante para que se pueda tener por cumplida la garantía de alternabilidad en el gobierno municipal no es la rotación del puesto elegible entre los diversos partidos o personas que participen en la contienda electoral, ni limitar la reelección sucesiva de las autoridades municipales a un periodo determinado de tiempo, sino más bien la existencia efectiva de procesos de elección sustentados en el principio democrático, es decir, en la convocatoria de elecciones libres, pluripartidistas y en forma secreta. Sin perjuicio de ello, debemos señalar que la Sala Constitucional también ha aceptado un principio de libre configuración del legislador para diseñar la forma en que se realizará el nombramiento de los alcaldes y sus sustitutos. Debe recordarse que el artículo 169 constitucional no concibió el puesto de alcalde como un puesto de elección popular, sino que delegó la regulación de su nombramiento al legislador ordinario, con lo que se reafirma su libertad de configuración para determinar los requisitos o condiciones para escogerlo. Sobre el particular, la sentencia N.° 2012-9226 de las 14:30 horas del 17 de julio del 2012, señaló: “V.- En conclusión, no considera este Tribunal que las normas impugnadas lesionen de modo alguno la Constitución, al establecer la elección del Alcalde y su sustituto por elecciones populares, toda vez que los mismos Constituyentes delegaron en la ley el mecanismo a idear para su nombramiento, sin que el hecho de que se haya dispuesto de esta manera alterara la función esencial ejecutora que le fue encomendada y sin detrimento de las potestades dadas a los síndicos. Más aún, la elección popular afianza los principios constitucionales democráticos de nuestro país y convoca a la población a ejercer su soberanía y a ser más participativo al decidir quiénes, no solo tomarán las decisiones más trascendentales de su comunidad, sino que las ejecutará, en cuanto a los municipios se refiere. Todo lo cual impone, una gran responsabilidad en el ejercicio del cargo, que incluso puede serle revocado por sus mismos electores.” (El subrayado no es del original). Partiendo de lo anterior, debemos indicar que resulta un tema de oportunidad y conveniencia, modificar las condiciones de elección del alcalde a nivel municipal, propio del debate parlamentario y del juego político de las fuerzas representadas en la Asamblea Legislativa, espacio que, por excelencia en un régimen democrático, debe sopesar los pros y contras en favor de un modelo u otro. Consecuentemente, no estimamos que la norma impugnada resulte contraria al Derecho de la Constitución, en lo que respecta al establecimiento de un límite para la reelección del alcalde, alcaldesa, vicealcalde o vicealcaldesa. La misma interpretación debería ser de aplicación al intendente o intendenta, dado el paralelismo existente con la figura del alcalde en el ámbito distrital. Sin perjuicio de lo indicado, estimamos que el caso de los demás funcionarios municipales de elección popular, merece un análisis separado. A diferencia de los otros cargos públicos de elección popular en los que la Constitución Política, de forma expresa, prohíbe la reelección sucesiva, caso de los diputados y del presidente y vicepresidentes de la República (artículos 107 y 132, respectivamente), tratándose de dichos puestos en el ámbito municipal, los artículos 169, 171 y 172 constitucionales, no establecen una restricción similar para ser nombrados. Esto, podría pensarse, evidencia la voluntad del Constituyente de no limitar la reelección en estos supuestos. En consecuencia, la limitación que se establece con relación a los funcionarios que por disposición constitucional son de elección popular, podría considerarse violatoria del derecho político de elegir y ser electo en cargos públicos que, como lo ha reconocido la Sala en múltiples oportunidades, es un derecho fundamental y, por tanto, cualquier limitación al derecho debe ser interpretada de manera restrictiva. Por lo anterior, es nuestro criterio que el Constituyente únicamente dejó un margen de libre configuración para el nombramiento y consecuente reelección de los alcaldes, alcaldesas y sus sustitutos, no así en el caso de los demás puestos de elección popular en el ámbito municipal, donde no existe una prohibición expresa para su reelección, como sí ocurre con otros nombramientos de esa naturaleza. Por tanto, cualquier intención en ese sentido requeriría una reforma constitucional. B) ANÁLISIS DE LA PROHIBICIÓN ESTABLECIDA EN LA NORMA IMPUGNADA La norma impugnada establece que los alcaldes y las alcaldesas que sean reelegidos y cumplan los dos periodos máximos autorizados en la norma, no pueden ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos periodos desde que finalizó el segundo periodo consecutivo. Para el caso de los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo o el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Y a las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes y concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período. Como se observa, la prohibición establecida para las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes y concejales municipales de distrito de ocupar el mismo cargo luego de dos periodos consecutivos, lleva relación con la prohibición de reelección indefinida establecida en la norma, sobre lo cual ya nos pronunciamos en el apartado anterior. No obstante ello, en el caso de los alcaldes y las alcaldesas, la norma impugnada no sólo prohíbe su reelección luego de dos periodos en el cargo de alcalde o alcaldesa, sino que, adicionalmente, les impone una prohibición de ocupar cualquier otro puesto de elección popular hasta tanto no transcurran dos periodos desde que terminó su periodo de reelección. En el caso de los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas, también se les prohíbe ocupar el cargo de regidores o síndicos. Dicha prohibición no fue contemplada inicialmente al presentarse el proyecto de ley, pues la norma originalmente propuesta señalaba en lo que interesa: “Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la Presidencia y las Vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años, y podrán ser reelegidos en el mismo puesto, de forma sucesiva, por un período, sin menoscabo de su derecho para ser electos en cualquiera de los otros cargos en iguales condiciones. (…)” (exposición de motivos del proyecto de ley 21810). Como se observa, inicialmente la propuesta legislativa imponía el límite a la reelección en un mismo cargo, pero permitía expresamente el derecho de ocupar cualquiera de los otros cargos del régimen municipal. Fue durante el trámite legislativo que se incorporó la prohibición establecida en la norma impugnada, que impide al alcalde y alcaldesa ocupar otros cargos públicos del régimen municipal, una vez vencido el segundo periodo de nombramiento, prohibición que se mantiene en la norma impugnada por dos periodos consecutivos, sea ocho años. Asimismo, se prohíbe a los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas, ocupar el cargo de regidores o síndicos por el mismo periodo. Sobre el particular, debemos señalar que el régimen de inhabilidades o inelegibilidades constituye una de las limitantes jurídicamente legítimas para el acceso a cargos públicos, sin embargo, si bien el legislador cuenta con un amplio margen de configuración normativa con miras a determinar quienes aspiran a la función pública, lo cierto es que la definición de los hechos configuradores de las causales de inhabilidad o de inelegibilidad está subordinada a los valores, principios y derechos constitucionales que regentan la función pública, sin obviar que deben ser razonables y proporcionadas. La Procuraduría ha reconocido que existen inhabilidades o inelegibilidades sanción e inhabilidades o inelegibilidades requisito.[2] El primer grupo está directamente relacionado con el ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora del Estado y la imposibilidad temporal de reingreso a la función pública; es decir, cometida una conducta que se considere reprochable, el Estado –penal o administrativamente- impone la sanción correspondiente y adiciona una inhabilitación que impide al sancionado ejercer temporalmente determinada actividad, cumpliendo así diferentes finalidades de interés general. El segundo grupo está relacionado con la protección de derechos, principios y valores constitucionales, como la moralidad, la imparcialidad, la eficiencia, la transparencia, el interés general, el sigilo profesional, la probidad, entre otros fundamentos. Por tanto, se establecen requisitos o condiciones específicas para asegurar la idoneidad y probidad de quien aspira a ingresar a un cargo público y así evitar incluso injerencias indebidas en la gestión de los asuntos públicos. En este supuesto no existe una relación con la existencia de faltas o sanciones. En el caso de la norma impugnada, estamos frente al segundo supuesto comentado, pues la prohibición establecida en la norma no guarda relación con la imposición de una sanción, pero crea una inhabilitación para ocupar cargos públicos. No observamos, sin embargo, una razón objetiva que justifique tal inhabilitación, pues por el solo hecho de que el funcionario haya estado dos periodos consecutivos en un cargo del ámbito municipal, se le impide ocupar otros cargos diferentes sin justificación alguna, lo cual parece violatorio de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, además, del derecho a ocupar un cargo público. Si bien a los vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes y concejales municipales de distrito no se les prohíbe optar por el cargo de alcalde o alcaldesa, en el caso del alcalde y de la alcaldesa, la prohibición que se impone es calificada, pues del todo no pueden ocupar ningún puesto del ámbito municipal por un periodo de ocho años, convirtiéndose en una inhabilitación que no tiene justificación objetiva. De igual forma a los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas, también se les prohíbe ocupar el cargo de regidores o síndicos. Debe recordarse que el artículo 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, párrafos 1 y 2, así como el artículo 2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles, Políticos y Culturales, reconocen la libertad de los ciudadanos para ser electos y que se garantice su participación de los asuntos públicos, siendo que la ley debe normar el ejercicio de esos derechos y oportunidades “exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal” en los términos dispuestos por el artículo 23 señalado. En la misma línea, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se ha referido a los derechos fundamentales de carácter político, indicando: “Los derechos fundamentales de carácter político abarcan una amplia gama de poderes que, conjuntamente con los deberes políticos, definen la ciudadanía (artículo 90 constitucional). Dentro de esa categoría están comprendidos, entre otros, el derecho al sufragio tanto activo como pasivo ‑elegir y ser electo‑ (art. 93 y siguientes de la Constitución y 23 inciso 1.b de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), el de agruparse en partidos políticos (art. 98 constitucional), el de reunirse “para discutir asuntos políticos y examinar la conducta de los funcionarios”(art. 26 ibid), el de tener acceso, en condiciones de igualdad, a las funciones públicas (art. 23 inciso 1.c de la citada Convención) y el derecho genérico de participación política, entendido como la posibilidad de “participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos” (art. 23 inciso 1.a del mismo tratado internacional). Este último derecho, que involucra a todos los anteriores, también se manifiesta, por ejemplo, en la prerrogativa ciudadana de intervenir en la decisión de asuntos sometidos a referéndum, pero asimismo en la de acudir a las sesiones de los órganos legislativos y deliberantes a nivel nacional (Asamblea Legislativa) y local (concejos municipales), que por esa razón son por naturaleza públicas. La participación política consiste en el ejercicio de los derechos políticos establecidos en la Constitución Política y en los Instrumentos Jurídicos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos de los que forma parte el Estado costarricense y, por ende, amparables.[3] De lo anterior deriva que, si bien el Estado puede imponer regulaciones y/o limitaciones al sufragio pasivo o derecho a ser elegido, éstas deben ser implementadas bajo criterios de proporcionalidad, razonabilidad y en aplicación de los principios pro homine y de buena fe que rigen los tratados internacionales, para garantizar y asegurar el ejercicio efectivo de estos derechos. No encuentra esta Procuraduría que la prohibición implantada en la norma impugnada esté fundamentada en una razón objetiva que justifique la limitación al derecho de toda persona a ocupar un cargo público, pues no se trata de una sanción ni tampoco protege un bien jurídico superior, dado que se impide de manera general el acceso a un cargo público municipal que es incluso distinto al originalmente ocupado. Debemos recordar, además, que el ordenamiento jurídico electoral y el municipal establecen otras normas que sirven de garantía para que un funcionario municipal no se beneficie ilegítimamente del puesto que ocupa para obtener en el periodo siguiente otro puesto diferente. Al respecto, el artículo 157 f) del Código Municipal prohíbe a los servidores municipales: “f) Durante los procesos electorales, ejercer actividad política partidaria en el desempeño de sus funciones y durante la jornada laboral; así como violar las normas de neutralidad que estatuye el Código Electoral” (el subrayado no es del original). Luego, la letra d), de su artículo 18 establece como una causal automática de pérdida de la credencial del alcalde municipal, el incurrir en alguna de las causales previstas en el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (n.°7428 del 7 de setiembre de 1994), que establece: "Artículo 73-Cancelación de credencial. Será causa para la cancelación de la respectiva credencial, la comisión de una falta grave por parte de un regidor o síndico, propietario o suplente, contra las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización y control de la Hacienda Pública contemplado en esta Ley, y contra cualesquiera otras normas relativas a los fondos públicos; o al incurrir en alguno de los actos previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, como generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa. Esto se aplicará cuando el infractor haya actuado en el ejercicio de su cargo o con motivo de él. Cuando la falta grave sea cometida en virtud de un acuerdo del concejo municipal, los regidores que, con su voto afirmativo, hayan aprobado dicho acuerdo, incurrirán en la misma causal de cancelación de sus credenciales. Asimismo, será causal de cancelación de la credencial de regidor o de síndico, propietario o suplente, la condena penal firme por delitos contra la propiedad, contra la buena fe en los negocios y contra los deberes de la función pública, así como por los previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública. La autoridad judicial competente efectuará, de oficio, la comunicación respectiva al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones." (El subrayado no es del original). Como se observa, el incumplimiento de los principios de probidad, imparcialidad, objetividad, la violación del régimen de incompatibilidades o prohibiciones durante el ejercicio del cargo, o recibir donaciones, daría margen para la imposición de sanciones. Adicionalmente, el artículo 146 del Código Electoral (Ley N.°8765 del 19 de agosto del 2009), prohíbe a todo empleado y funcionario público el usar su cargo para beneficiar a un determinado candidato o partido político. Consecuentemente, las disposiciones citadas van dirigidas a evitar que cualquier autoridad municipal utilice su cargo y los recursos humanos y económicos de la corporación territorial con el propósito de obtener una situación de ventaja sobre el resto de participantes de la contienda electoral, por lo que las prohibiciones establecidas en la norma impugnada no se justifican de manera objetiva. C) ANÁLISIS DE LA NORMA TRANSITORIA Finalmente, el accionante solicita la inconstitucionalidad de la norma transitoria de la Ley 10183, que establece lo siguiente: “Transitorio Único- Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal. Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley.” (La negrita no forma parte del original) Como se desprende de la redacción citada, el legislador estableció una norma transitoria para efectos de regular la situación de los funcionarios actualmente nombrados en los puestos del ámbito municipal, especialmente de aquellos que, al periodo de entrada en vigencia de la norma, ya habían sido reelegidos por dos periodos consecutivos. Sobre el particular, debemos señalar que el artículo 129 de la Constitución establece el momento en que una ley empieza a surtir sus efectos, indicando: “ARTÍCULO 129.- Las leyes son obligatorias y surten efectos desde el día que ellas designen; a falta de este requisito, diez días después de su publicación en el Diario Oficial. (…)” Asimismo, el Código Civil establece: “ARTÍCULO 7º- Las leyes entrarán en vigor diez días después de su completa y correcta publicación en el diario oficial "La Gaceta", si en ellas no se dispone otra cosa. Sin embargo, si el error o defecto comprendiere sólo alguna a algunas de las normas de una ley, las demás disposiciones de ésta tendrán plena validez, independientemente de la posterior publicación que se haga, siempre que se trate de normas con valor propio que se hubieren aplicado de esa manera.” (Así reformado por Ley Nº 7020 de 6 de enero de 1986, artículo 1º) Según lo dispuesto en dichas normas, las leyes entrarán en vigencia desde la fecha que ellas mismas designen o, en su defecto, diez días después de su publicación. Consecuentemente, es una potestad del legislador, dentro de su ámbito de discrecionalidad, determinar el momento a partir del cual entrará en vigencia una disposición de rango legal[4], sin embargo, el principio constitucional de irretroactividad constituye un límite a la ley y, por ende, al legislador no podría disponer la retroactividad de las leyes en perjuicio de derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas.[5] Al respecto, la Sala indicó en la sentencia N.° 5941-97 de las 19:00 horas del 23 de setiembre de 1997: “La retroactividad a que hace alusión el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política es la que pretende interferir con derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas nacidas con anterioridad a la promulgación de la ley, o sea, aquellas con características de validez y eficacia perfeccionadas bajo el imperio de otras regulaciones, de forma que sus efectos y consecuencias no pueden ser variadas por nuevas disposiciones, excepto si conllevan beneficio para los interesados”. Por tanto, existirá retroactividad cuando los efectos de la ley se retrotraen a un momento inicial anterior al perfeccionamiento del acto creador de la norma y, por tanto, no es posible resolver con normas jurídicas nuevas, situaciones jurídicas que surgieron con anterioridad a su vigencia. Por las razones indicadas, estimamos que la norma transitoria impugnada retrotrae los efectos sustantivos de la ley, en violación de lo dispuesto en el numeral 34 constitucional, pues considera dos periodos de nombramiento anteriores a la vigencia de la norma, para prohibir a los funcionarios que ocupan actualmente los puestos municipales, optar por un cargo distinto en el ente municipal. Esto impide que los funcionarios reelegidos con anterioridad a la norma, se vuelvan a postular, retrotrayendo los efectos jurídicos de una norma que no existía para el momento de su reelección. Por tanto, estimamos que el segundo periodo de reelección debe contabilizarse a partir de la publicación de la norma, pues de lo contrario, se estaría dando un efecto retroactivo en violación de derechos subjetivos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, efecto, que resulta contrario al Derecho de la Constitución. IV. CONCLUSIÓN En vista de las anteriores consideraciones, la Procuraduría estima que el accionante se encuentra legitimado para interponer la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. En cuanto al fondo, se estima que resulta parcialmente inconstitucional lo dispuesto en la Ley N.°10183. Por lo anterior, consideramos que debe anularse la parte sustantiva de dicha ley y su transitorio, salvo en lo que señala lo siguiente: “Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez... Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez… Las personas… intendentes, viceintendentes…, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.” El resto de la ley, estimamos, debe anularse. En la forma expuesta se deja evacuada la audiencia otorgada.” 7.-Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 30 de mayo de 2022, se apersona Eugenia María Zamora Chavarría, en su condición de presidenta del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Expone lo siguiente: “II.- ANTECEDENTES DE RELEVANCIA La Asamblea Legislativa -del año 2005 a la fecha- ha consultado a esta Magistratura, en atención a lo preceptuado en el ordinal 97 de la Constitución Política, al menos seis proyectos de ley en los que, de alguna forma y por intermedio de modificaciones al artículo 14 del Código Municipal, se pretendía establecer límites a la reelección en los diversos puestos del gobierno local; en esas audiencias se contestó que ese tópico está librado a la discrecionalidad legislativa. Por ejemplo, en la sesión n.º 92-2016 del 4 de octubre de 2016, este Tribunal, sobre el proyecto de ley n.º 19.896, indicó: “Este proyecto, conforme a lo indicado en su exposición de motivos y en su articulado, procura -mediante la reforma de dos artículos del Código Municipal (14 y 148) y la adición de uno más (149 bis)- incorporar en la normativa municipal acciones específicas para que en los procesos electorales municipales se evite “la intromisión inadmisible del clientelismo y la corrupción en el manejo de las arcas públicas locales”. Para tal fin, se propone limitar la reelección sucesiva del alcalde y los vicealcaldes a solo un periodo; que soliciten, en caso de aspirar a la reelección o a cualquier otro cargo de elección popular, un permiso sin goce de salario desde la convocatoria hasta el día de la elección y, además, se plantea como solución para el caso de que todos esos funcionarios se postulen para algún puesto de elección popular que el sustituto para asumir el cargo de alcalde se escoja de entre los directores de la administración municipal. De igual manera, se establece una prohibición para impedir que -seis meses antes de la elección- los funcionarios municipales promuevan inversiones y obras que se salgan de la tendencia histórica, así como la correspondiente sanción. Esta Autoridad Electoral, luego de analizar la referida propuesta, no observa que exista obstáculo, desde el punto de vista constitucional, en cuanto a: 1) que se limite la reelección del cargo del alcalde y sus vicealcaldes a no más de un periodo sucesivo; esto es un aspecto que debe estar previsto en la ley y, además, constituye una decisión política cuya valoración -en cuanto a la conveniencia y oportunidad- es exclusiva del legislador, tal y como lo ha hecho ver este Tribunal en otras oportunidades (oficios n.° 4851-TSE-2005 del 4 de agosto de 2005 y TSE-1396-2015 del 4 de agosto de 2015)” (el subrayado no pertenece al original). En similar sentido, este Tribunal, en el trámite de la acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por el señor Alex Solís Fallas contra la reelección indefinida y sucesiva de las autoridades locales (expediente judicial n.° 19-0008920007-CO), manifestó: “… el instituto de la reelección no resulta, per se, contrario al Derecho de la Constitución. Como consecuencia lógica del citado precedente de la Sala Constitucional [referido a la sentencia n.º 2003-02771], que como antecedente es vinculante erga omnes por disposición legal expresa (numeral 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), se tiene que si la posibilidad de someter nuevamente el propio nombre para continuar en el cargo de elección que se viene desempeñando (o que, en algún momento, se ha desempeñado) es un derecho humano, entonces este no podría ser, a su vez, violatorio del parámetro de legitimidad constitucional, en tanto a este incorpora –como es sabido– el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. Ahora bien, la Comisión de Venecia, en su “Informe sobre los límites a la reelección. Parte I-Presidentes”, tiene una postura diversa a la reseñada en los párrafos anteriores, al considerar que la reelección es una “cláusula autónoma vinculada al derecho de participación política y al derecho de postularse en elecciones” (párrafo 85), sin que pueda considerársele un derecho humano, salvo que “exista un fundamento teórico, internacional o constitucional para reconocerla” como tal (párrafo 85). Precisamente, en el supuesto de excepción se encuentra nuestro país: la Sala Constitucional al atribuir, en la indicada sentencia n.° 2003-02771, el carácter de derecho humano al instituto de repetida mención, generó el reconocimiento al que hace alusión el foro de expertos europeos, debiéndose tener como tal. Téngase presente, además, que aún no existe un pronunciamiento específico de alguna instancia supranacional que nos vincule en punto a este tema. De esa suerte, la discusión debe centrarse acerca de si la forma en que está prevista la reelección para los cargos municipales (sucesiva e indefinida) contraría o no el referido bloque de constitucionalidad, ya que su existencia, incluso en el marco convencional, no resulta ilegítima. Eso sí, desde ya conviene afirmar que, como todo derecho y según se indicó en el apartado de antecedentes, la reelección admite limitaciones razonables a su ejercicio mediante la promulgación de una ley en sentido formal y material, correspondiéndole al legislador decidir, dentro del marco constitucional, cuáles serán las modulaciones a ese derecho.” (el resaltado no pertenece al original) (oficio n.º TSE-0784-2019 del 10 de abril de 2019, remitido a la Sala Constitucional como respuesta a la audiencia conferida en el expediente n.º 19-000892-0007CO). De acuerdo con lo expuesto, la tesis de este Órgano Constitucional, sostenida desde hace varios lustros, es que no hay un obstáculo para que el legislador limite la reelección sucesiva de los cargos municipales; tal regulación constituye una decisión política cuya valoración -en cuanto a la conveniencia y oportunidad- es exclusiva del legislador. III.- SOBRE EL FONDO DE LA ACCIÓN PLANTEADA El señor Oviedo Espinoza, en el escrito de interposición, distribuye los argumentos del apartado “Fundamentación” en seis puntos que, para una mayor claridad expositiva, se abordarán de forma independiente. a) El interesado, en los puntos 1 y 2 del referido segmento, cuestiona que la ley impugnada es una reacción desproporcionada e ilegítima a la divulgación –en medios de comunicación– del supuesto caso de corrupción denominado por las autoridades judiciales como “Caso Diamante”; de hecho, en el acápite 3 del apartado “Normas y principios constitucionales infringidos por la norma impugnada” del documento inicial, se indica que la norma transitoria es “una sanción pública dirigida especialmente a algunas autoridades que ostentamos la condición de Alcaldes propietarios reelectos” (folio 3 del escrito de interposición). Esa especificidad, a criterio de quien acciona, supone una violación a los principios de inocencia, de igualdad y el de abstracción y generalidad de las normas. En sistemas jurídicos de tradición romano-germánica (continental) como lo es el nuestro, la fuente escrita (la ley en sentido amplio) ocupa el lugar de privilegio en lo que a regular comportamientos respecta; en ese sentido, la generalidad, la abstracción y la vocación de permanencia son tres de los atributos que se exigen a las leyes. Sin embargo, esas características no son excluyentes de que las normas, como producto político que son, respondan a episodios y coyunturas sociales específicas. El concepto de “fuente material” de la ley refiere a los aspectos socioeconómicos, culturales y de contexto que impulsaron la toma de la decisión legislativa, en el entendido de que el Derecho positivizado es un instrumento puesto al servicio de intereses colectivos y de la resolución de conflictos societales. En otras palabras, difícilmente una norma se promulga sin que en el medio nacional o internacional se esté dando alguna situación que, a criterios de los promoventes, justifique que se haga una iniciativa para regular jurídicamente en uno u otro sentido el fenómeno en curso. La existencia de factores sociales que accionen el procedimiento parlamentario e incluso que lleven a la aprobación de leyes específicas no es, per se, contrario al Derecho de la Constitución; la creación normativa precisamente responde a demandas colectivas y a estados de necesidad concretos, tal y como ocurrió durante la pandemia por la COVID-19: durante 2020 se aprobaron leyes para atender la situación de emergencia sanitaria que vive el país. Ahora bien, esa génesis mediada sociológicamente no exime al producto (la ley en sí misma) de cumplir con ciertos requerimientos técnico-jurídicos, como lo son los criterios de validez formal y material. Tratándose de los argumentos del accionante, justamente se aduce que la ley impugnada tiene destinatarios específicos y, en todo caso, que supone una sanción directa a alcaldes reeleccionistas que no han tenido que ver con el citado “Caso Diamante”. A criterio de esta Magistratura, el señor Oviedo Espinoza confunde una condición de inelegibilidad con una sanción. El constituyente o el legislador, según corresponda, pueden establecer supuestos en los cuales una persona no resulta elegible para un determinado puesto público, sin que ello suponga –en sí mismo– un castigo. Es claro que quienes estarán en la situación de hecho prevista normativamente será un grupo determinado de ciudadanos, pero eso no implica que se les esté irrogando un correctivo como producto de un acto lesivo en perjuicio de intereses colectivos o de particulares, como características básicas de un acto sancionatorio. No es extraño que el ordenamiento jurídico establezca ese tipo de condiciones, ya que, por ejemplo, el constituyente previó que una persona que desee inscribirse como candidata a la Presidencia o a la Vicepresidencia de la República no puede haberse desempeñado en los doce meses anteriores a la elección como Ministro de Estado (inciso 4. del numeral 132), sin que ello pueda considerarse una sanción para quienes ostentan la titularidad de una cartera ministerial o una norma específica porque los titulares de los ramos del ejecutivo son una cantidad de funcionarios concreta y pueden ser fácilmente determinados. En similar sentido, debe tenerse presente que la norma, justamente por ser general y abstracta, aplicará a todas las personas que cumplan con la hipótesis fáctica prevista, incluso a quienes no estando hoy en el cargo acumulen –a futuro– más de dos períodos en la alcaldía, aunque su desempeño se dé ya en un espacio temporalmente distanciado de la investigación judicial por la que, según el accionante, se les está “castigando” a los funcionarios municipales de elección que actualmente se encuentran en el puesto. Como se indicó párrafos atrás, la Asamblea Legislativa tiene casi dos décadas de estar discutiendo -en diferentes proyectos de ley- la pertinencia de limitar la reelección sucesiva de los servidores municipales y en especial de los alcaldes; esa reforma, que corresponde a una en el diseño de los sistemas político y electoral, sería de imposible implementación si se siguiera la tesis del accionante, pues siempre habrán ciudadanos en el cargo con intenciones de reelegirse en el puesto y en contra de quienes podría entenderse se está llevando a cabo la modificación, argumento que tornaría pétrea una temática que no lo es. En suma, este Órgano Constitucional concluye que la Ley n.° 10.183 no es, en sí misma, una acción sancionatoria en contra de personas específicas y que sí reúne los parámetros de generalidad y abstracción que deben cumplir las normas emitidas por el Poder Legislativo. En ese sentido, se estima que el argumento del accionante no es de recibo. b) En el escrito de interposición se plantea que existe reserva de Constitución en punto a la limitación del derecho a la reelección de las autoridades municipales, puesto que esos cargos se encuentran enunciados en los artículos 169 y 171 de la Norma Suprema (punto 3 del apartado “Fundamentación” del escrito inicial). La descentralización territorial del Estado y el diseño de los gobiernos locales se encuentran previstos en el título XII de la Constitución Política, normas que refieren a que las municipalidades estarán a cargo de un cuerpo deliberante integrado por regidores municipales de elección popular (concejo municipal) y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designará la ley (alcalde); sin embargo, el constituyente no puntualizó cuáles serían los requisitos, los impedimentos y las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a tales puestos (tómese en consideración que el citado funcionario ejecutivo, previo a los comicios de 2002, no era de elección popular; la Constitución no establece que deba tener tal forma de nombramiento). Esa falta de desarrollo de la temática en comentario en el texto político fundamental debe ser entendida como una delegación para que sea la ley ordinaria la que regule tales circunstancias; en otras palabras, pese a que los puestos de alcalde y regidores son creación constitucional, sus atribuciones, exigencias por cumplir si se desea acceder a ellos y otras especificidades son temáticas libradas al quehacer legislativo. Sobre esa línea, la Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia n.º 2128-94 de las 14:51 minutos del 3 de mayo de 1994, precisó: “… en materias no reguladas, pero sí delegadas en el legislador por la Constitución, este puede establecer condiciones de desigualdad real o aparente cuando sus excepciones están absoluta y claramente justificadas en razón de otros principios o valores constitucionales y sobre todo, de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. En consecuencia, las excepciones, limitaciones, requisitos o impedimentos que regirán en materia electoral, definidos por el legislador en función de la responsabilidad delegada por la propia Constitución, deben sustentarse en razones objetivas y claramente motivadas por los requerimientos propios del sistema electoral y del ejercicio del cargo. En otras palabras, pueden admitirse las restricciones que fortalezcan el sistema democrático y los procesos electorales, aun cuando una persona o un grupo sufra la limitada consecuencia de aquélla (sic) reglamentación”. Este Tribunal, a la luz de lo expuesto, ha estimado que corresponde al legislador definir, respetando el Derecho de la Constitución, cuáles serán las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a cargos municipales, categoría dentro de la que está incluida la limitación a la reelección sucesiva; sea, este es un tema que se encuentra librado a la discrecionalidad legislativa. En consecuencia, se estima que tampoco este argumento es de recibo, por lo que debe declararse sin lugar la acción en este extremo. c) En los apartados 4 y 6, el accionante fundamenta por qué, en su criterio, la norma tiene una aplicación retroactiva en perjuicio de sus derechos fundamentales y el de los actuales alcaldes que tienen más de dos períodos en sus puestos. Empero, por lo que se expondrá, este Tribunal entiende que no se da la violación alegada. El derecho de participación política garantiza que los ciudadanos tengan la oportunidad de intentar acceder a cargos en las estructuras internas de las agrupaciones políticas, así como de eventualmente integrar las listas de candidatos, sin que esa posibilidad pueda ser truncada por aspectos distintos a los habilitados por el Derecho Convencional. Es claro que la referida prerrogativa no implica un derecho al cargo o a resultar electo en él, más bien asegura que se pueda formar parte del grupo de personas que lo disputan; en esa lógica, la aspiración a continuar en un puesto no implica la automática renovación del mandato por un período adicional. Las candidaturas a cargos de elección popular deben provenir de procesos partidarios internos disputados, libres y democráticos, en los que los militantes, siempre que cumplan con los requisitos del ordenamiento jurídico (lo cual incluye las exigencias estatutarias), puedan proponer sus nombres para que sus correligionarios, y a la postre la asamblea superior (como máxima autoridad representativa), decidan quién será la persona nominada. Es en esa dinámica en la que logran operacionalizar el principio democrático y el derecho de participación política sin más cortapisas que las legítimamente autorizadas por el Derecho de la Constitución. De hecho, la jurisprudencia electoral –a través del tiempo– ha ido profundizando en el ideal democrático y su aplicación a la designación de candidatos por parte de las agrupaciones de cara a comicios municipales. Sobre ese tema, se ha dejado claro que, si el partido optó –en su estatuto– porque fuera su estructura cantonal la que realizara las postulaciones, la asamblea superior podía ratificar o no a la persona propuesta, mas si no acogía la recomendación, debía devolver a la instancia territorial el asunto para una nueva nominación. Esa medida impide que personas que no compitieron a lo interno de la agrupación por una postulación sean nombradas de forma sorpresiva por parte del órgano superior, lo que supondría una inaceptable afectación de la lealtad de la competencia que debe imperar en los procesos partidarios, a la luz del imperativo constitucional de democracia interna (artículo 98). Así las cosas, la limitación de la reelección sucesiva a dos mandatos no supone, en sí misma, un quebrantamiento del principio de irretroactividad; el derecho fundamental a la reelección (calificado así por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia n.° 2003-02771), como toda prerrogativa de tal naturaleza, admite restricciones y, en este caso, se entiende que la restricción a postular el nombre por un tercer mandato es una medida proporcional que no vacía de contenido el derecho y que, además, responde a una medida para asegurar otros fines constitucionalmente legítimos como la rotación de cuadros de gobierno y la creación de condiciones para que nuevos ciudadanos se involucren en los puestos de toma de decisión política, tal cual lo pretende la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic). Un ciudadano que ha estado dos o más períodos consecutivos en el puesto de representación ha podido ejercer su derecho a la relección e, incluso, podría volver a él luego de transcurrido el lapso de 8 años desde la conclusión de su segundo mandato, si goza del favor de sus correligionarios (para alcanzar la postulación) y, luego, del colegio electoral. Estar, en la actualidad, en el ejercicio de un cargo de elección popular no implica que las nuevas reglas del sistema electoral no se le puedan aplicar a ese mandatario sino hasta que él rompa vínculos con su puesto de representación, en tanto ello supondría diferir los efectos de la ley a un hecho futuro, incierto y personalizado a la situación de un sujeto específico, lo cual frustraría, en el caso concreto, el fin que persigue la regulación, según lo plasmó el legislador en la exposición de motivos del proyecto que fue presentado, valga decir, en febrero de 2020. Importa insistir en que la posibilidad de intentar la permanencia en el cargo es el derecho tutelado tratándose de la relección, ya que el funcionario con intenciones de permanecer en el puesto, como se indicó, debe superar las dinámicas internas para ser incluido en la papeleta y, posteriormente, debe gozar del favor electoral de sus conciudadanos, eventos todos inciertos y sujetos a la voluntad popular de los respectivos colegios electorales. Esas especificidades hacen que el principio de irretroactividad, como manifestación de la Seguridad Jurídica, deba modularse y no interpretarse extensivamente. La limitación que impone la ley no es un vaciamiento del derecho a la relección, sino que es únicamente una forma de regularlo; en ese sentido, no podría haber señalado el legislador que los actuales alcaldes -con más de dos mandatos- debían concluir sus funciones inmediatamente o que no podrían volver a someter sus nombres al electorado en el futuro, ya que tales previsiones sí serían una aplicación retroactiva ilegítima. Sin embargo, el restringir que se vuelvan a presentar a los dos comicios inmediatos siguientes resulta ser una modulación razonable habida cuenta de que, al momento de entrada en vigencia de la nueva legislación, las autoridades locales tienen solamente una expectativa de continuar en sus puestos, ya que ni siquiera sus respectivas agrupaciones han validado tales aspiraciones. En consecuencia, esta Magistratura no estima que se dé un quebranto al principio de irretroactividad de la ley. d) El señor Oviedo Espinoza, en el punto 5 de la fundamentación, hace suya la objeción de constitucionalidad planteada por este Tribunal en la respuesta a la audiencia conferida por la Asamblea Legislativa durante la tramitación del proyecto n.° 21.810 (convertido hoy en la ley que se impugna). En concreto, se cuestiona que la Ley n.° 10.183 impida que una persona que ha permanecido en el mismo cargo municipal de elección -por dos períodos consecutivos- se pueda presentar, en los comicios inmediatos siguientes a la conclusión de su segundo mandato, a otro cargo del gobierno local. Este Órgano Constitucional, como lo hizo ver al órgano legislativo, considera que la norma tiene un vicio de constitucionalidad, al restringir, totalmente, el sufragio pasivo a los funcionarios reeleccionistas. Puntualmente, este Tribunal, en su oportunidad, indicó: “… la restricción de que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en el cargo no puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular contraviene los parámetros constitucional y convencional. El derecho humano de participación política implica, entre otros, que los ciudadanos puedan elegir a sus gobernantes pero, a la vez, que puedan postularse a los diversos cargos que componen la estructura del Estado. Esa posibilidad de someter el nombre al Colegio Electoral no es irrestricta, pues la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic) indica que los ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales pueden regular el ejercicio de tal prerrogativa por “razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente” (artículo 23). En el caso costarricense, la legislación ha establecido entre otras condiciones para acceder al gobierno local, el domicilio electoral en la circunscripción que se pretende servir el cargo por un lapso específico (entre otros, numeral 15, 22.e y 56 del Código Municipal), el no tener los derechos políticos suspendidos por una sentencia y el ser costarricense (ordinales 15.a y 22.a del referido cuerpo normativo); empero, no sería legítimo que un Estado impidiera el sufragio pasivo (derecho a ser electo) en razón de haber ocupado un puesto específico -distinto al que se aspiraría- en los dos períodos inmediatos anteriores. Las restricciones de los funcionarios reelegidos (para que no puedan optar por otro cargo en la municipalidad) imposibilitarían que esos ciudadanos puedan acceder a contiendas partidarias internas en aras de, luego, ser postulados para cargos de elección popular distintos al que ocupan. En otros términos, por más que pertenezcan a una agrupación y cumplan con los requisitos legales de postulación, en razón de la función pública que desempeñan –ab initio– tales servidores no podrían competir ni siquiera en los procesos internos en los que se disputan las nominaciones. Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos. Véase que en este punto estriba la diferencia sustancial entre el proyecto de ley que prohibiría la doble postulación y esta iniciativa: en aquel se impide competir por dos cargos simultáneamente, pero se mantiene el derecho de hacerlo por uno (no prohíbe absolutamente la postulación), mientras que en este expediente legislativo se bloquea totalmente la posibilidad de integrar una nómina de candidatos. De otra parte, no puede perderse de vista que los cambios operados en el texto del proyecto lo convierten en inconexo, en tanto la exposición de motivos desarrolla porqué los promoventes consideran legítimo y necesario limitar la reelección, pero no se alude a que debe restringirse cualquier otro tipo de postulación; de hecho, se sostiene lo contrario. Puntualmente, en el citado preámbulo de la propuesta los propios legisladores señalan que “… es imprescindible modificar el párrafo final del artículo 14 del Código Municipal antes citado para limitar el ejercicio de un mismo cargo municipal por un máximo de períodos determinado, sin que ello implique la imposibilidad de postularse y eventualmente ser electo a partir del período inmediato siguiente para algún otro puesto de elección popular con las mismas limitaciones.” (subrayado y resaltado no pertenecen al original). Sobre esa línea, el título del proyecto es “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales”, sin que se haga mención a la restricción absoluta que tendrían algunos servidores, luego de ser reelectos, para presentarse como candidatos a otros cargos municipales de elección popular. Ciertamente, el nombre de la ley no tiene por qué dar cuenta de todo su contenido; no obstante, en este caso, evidencia cómo la propuesta original no era la de establecer una prohibición tan intensa como la que, vía mociones, se incorporó. Esa particularidad compromete el principio de congruencia, en la inteligencia de lo indicado por la Procuraduría General de la República en su pronunciamiento OJ-049-2018 del 31 de mayo de 2018 (reiterado en el OJ 059-2018 del 18 de julio de ese año): “Así las cosas, es claro que el contenido del proyecto de Ley es mucho más amplio de lo que su título denota, pues es notorio, otra vez, que la iniciativa no propone una mera reforma a la Ley del Sistema de Banca de Desarrollo sino que conllevaría, además, una modificación sustantiva de las competencias del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje. Luego, debe precisarse que una buena técnica legislativa, requiere que exista congruencia entre el título de la Ley y su contenido. En este orden de ideas, la literatura especializada en materia de Técnica Legislativa en Costa Rica, ha destacado que la congruencia entre el título de la Ley y su contenido, tiene 2 funciones de la mayor importancia: a. Ayuda a determinar el contenido y alcance del objeto de la Ley y, por tanto, de modo indirecto, permite servir de base para permitir o no enmiendas o modificaciones a un proyecto de Ley, y b. Facilita la vinculación de un contenido con el proyecto de Ley o permite determinar, caso contrario, que se trata una materia ajena al mismo. Al respecto, es oportuno citar lo escrito por MUÑOZ QUESADA: “En alguna medida, el título puede ayudar a determinar el contenido y alcance del objeto de la ley y, de modo indirecto, ir de base para permitir o no enmiendas o modificaciones sustanciales a un proyecto de ley. El título facilita también la vinculación de un contenido relacionado o ajeno totalmente al objeto del proyecto. Por eso, cabe admitir que el título ha de reflejar el contenido, el objeto o la materia del texto; y en esa medida constituye un elemento importante no solo para identificación del proyecto, sino también para la determinación del objeto del proyecto.” (MUÑOZ QUESADA, HUGO ALFONSO et alt. ELEMENTOS DE TECNICA LEGISLATIVA. Asamblea Legislativa, San José, 1996, p. 82). Ergo, debe reiterarse que el título del presente proyecto de Ley – el cual se lee así “Reforma a la Ley N.° 8634, Sistema de Banca para el Desarrollo, de 23 de Abril de 2008 y sus reformas” – no denota de forma congruente su contenido, pues como se ha explicado, éste conllevaría además a una reforma sustancial del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje. Es decir que el proyecto de Ley, podría tener un problema de técnica legislativa, el cual eventualmente podría hacer incurrir en yerros procedimentales a la hora de admitir o no mociones de enmiendas que presenten los señores diputados. En todo caso, debe recordarse que, en virtud de lo que dispone el artículo 11 constitucional en relación con el numeral 121 del Reglamento a la Asamblea Legislativa, el procedimiento legislativo está sujeto a un principio de transparencia, en virtud del cual la ciudadanía tiene derecho a conocer la información relevante en relación con los proyectos de Ley que se discutan en el Congreso. Luego se comprende que la congruencia entre el título de los proyectos y su contenido, es esencial para que los ciudadanos puedan, en efecto, conocer lo que se pretende debatir a través de un particular proyecto de Ley”. Este Tribunal reitera que establecer condiciones para limitar la reelección en los cargos municipales corresponde al Parlamento en ejercicio de su discrecionalidad legislativa; sin embargo, en el proyecto que ahora se conoce se genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo. Si, por ejemplo, una persona se desempeña como alcalde y resulta electa (inmediatamente después de su segundo período) como regidora, entonces no se estaría dando una reelección sino una elección en un puesto distinto”. A la luz de lo expuesto, esta Magistratura se allana al fundamento identificado con el número 5 en el escrito de interposición (folio 11 de ese documento), máxime cuanto tal objeción de constitucionalidad fue planteada por esta Autoridad Electoral en el trámite del respectivo proyecto de ley. IV.- CONCLUSIÓN De conformidad con las consideraciones previamente expuestas, el TSE considera importante señalar las siguientes conclusiones: •Corresponde al legislador definir, respetando el Derecho de la Constitución, cuáles serán las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a cargos municipales, categoría dentro de la que está incluida la limitación a la reelección sucesiva. • La Ley n.° 10.183 no es, en sí misma, una acción sancionatoria en contra de personas específicas y sí reúne los parámetros de generalidad y abstracción que deben cumplir las normas emitidas por el Poder Legislativo. • El constituyente no puntualizó cuáles serían los requisitos, los impedimentos y las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a los puestos municipales de elección popular; esa falta de desarrollo de la temática debe ser entendida como una delegación constitucional para que sea la ley ordinaria la que regule tales circunstancias. • El restringir que las actuales autoridades municipales, con más de dos períodos en el cargo, se vuelvan a presentar en los dos comicios inmediatos siguientes resulta ser una modulación razonable, habida cuenta de que, al momento de entrada en vigencia de la nueva legislación, los mandatarios locales tienen solamente una expectativa de continuar en sus puestos, ya que ni siquiera sus respectivas agrupaciones han validado tales aspiraciones, por lo que no se violenta el principio de irretroactividad de la ley. •La ley n.° 10.183 produce un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo en tanto impide que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en un cargo puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular en los comicios inmediatos siguientes. V.- PRETENSIÓN El TSE solicita que se declare parcialmente con lugar la acción interpuesta, únicamente en lo que refiere al impedimento para que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo no puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular.” 8.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 31 de mayo de 2022, se apersona Rodrigo Arias Sánchez, en su condición de presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa. Expone lo siguiente: “I.- TRAMITACIÓN DE LA LEY La Ley 10183 Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794; Código Municipal, del 30 de abril de 1998, (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales). Fue tramitada bajo el expediente No. 21810, este proyecto se inició el 18 de febrero de 2020, y se publicó el 02 de marzo de 2020, en la Gaceta No. 11 Alcance No. 33. Fue asignado para estudio a la Comisión Permanente Especial de Asuntos municipales y Desarrollo Local Participativo. Fue consultada a la Municipalidades, a los Consejos (sic) Municipales de Distrito y al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. El proyecto contó con un Dictamen afirmativo el 13 de octubre de 2021. Fue aprobado en Primer Debate el 25 de enero del 2022 y en Segundo Debate el 29 de marzo de 2022; finalmente, la ley fue sancionada por el Poder Ejecutivo el el (sic) 5 de abril de 2022 y publicada en el Alcance 73 de La Gaceta No. 68 del 8 de abril de 2022. II. SOBRE LOS CUESTIONAMIENTOS El accionante alega, que la ley emitida es contraria a los artículos 7, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 93, 169, 171 de la Constitución Política, así como, a los principios de igualdad, de libertad política, de proporcionalidad, de razonabilidad, de irretroactividad de las normas, así como a principios propios del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho y a otros, contenidos en tratados internacionales, en especial el artículo 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Esta Presidencia procederá a la argumentación de cada uno de los aspectos cuestionados: 1.- Sobre el alegato de violación de los principios de igualdad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, libertad política e individual. Carece de fundamento, y por ello se rechaza lo alegado por el accionante en relación con la supuesta violación de los principios de igualdad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, libertad política e individual en el Transitorio o en parte sustantiva de la Ley No.10083 “Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794; Código Municipal, del 30 de abril de 1998, (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales)”. La ley recurrida establece limitaciones de tipo temporal para la postulación en algunos cargos de elección popular municipales. Limitaciones que resultan absolutamente razonables y se ajustan al bloque de constitucionalidad. La ley accionada señala, que las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. Indica que no podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Es decir, establece límites en cuanto a la reelección sucesiva. Similar restricción se establece para los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas, que también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no haya trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. En el mismo sentido, las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito, y para quienes ocupen cargos de suplencias, establece que podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período. Las reformas aprobadas son contestes con el artículo 9 constitucional, que señala que el Gobierno de la República es popular, representativo, participativo, alternativo y responsable. La alternancia como bien lo ha señalado el Tribunal Constitucional es un principio constitucional que implica la posibilidad real y efectiva de que los cargos públicos se ocupen temporalmente, conforme a los períodos previamente fijados en la Constitución Política o en la ley. Es así como se materializa, la renovación periódica de los puestos públicos de elección popular, mediante elecciones libres, y en este sistema, resaltan los elementos de legitimidad y de control político, al ser requerida la participación de toda la ciudadanía –en su posibilidad de participar en las elecciones Presidenciales, de los diputados, de los regidores, de los síndicos y del alcalde municipal. Incluso esa renovación fraccionada de cuadros de funcionarios directivos está presente también, en el caso de la integración de órganos colegiados de entidades públicas. La alternancia en el Poder requiere de un régimen democrático que permita la competencia real y equitativa de los partidos políticos o de los grupos, sectores o asociaciones de participar de manera efectiva. La alternancia en el poder no presupone la rotación de los puesto entre los diversos grupos, partidos o sectores que participen en un proceso electoral, sino más bien la existencia de procesos de elección sustentados en el principio democrático, esto es, en la convocatoria de elecciones libres y pluripartidistas, y en forma secreta. Esta reforma no anula, ni hace nugatorio o imposible el ejercicio del derecho fundamental a ser electo (figura del voto pasivo). La forma y los casos en que la ley estipula la reelección para los cargos municipales no contraría al bloque de constitucionalidad. Adicionalmente, debe considerarse que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones ha señalado claramente que: “…la reelección admite limitaciones razonables a su ejercicio mediante la promulgación de una ley en sentido formal y material, correspondiéndole al legislador decidir, dentro del marco constitucional, cuáles serán las modulaciones a ese derecho.” (TSE-0784-2019 del 10 de abril de 2019, remitido a la Sala Constitucional como respuesta a la audiencia conferida en el expediente Nº 19-000892-0007CO). El derecho a elegir y ser electo no son derechos absolutos. Pueden ser sujetos a limitaciones con justificación objetiva, proporcionada y razonable, límites que deben se (sic) iguales para todos y que legítimamente los Estados pueden establecer para regular el ejercicio y goce de los derechos políticos. 2.- Sobre la alegada violación al principio de irretroactividad de las normas jurídicas. La ley 10083 señala que rige a partir de su publicación. Y contiene un transitorio único que señala lo siguiente: Transitorio Único- Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal. // Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley. Las normas transitorias son disposiciones temporales que son creadas para facilitar el paso de la normativa que se deroga o modifica (que tiene una serie de situaciones existentes a la fecha de vigencia de una ley), hacia la nueva ley. Las normas transitorias tienen una vigencia momentánea o temporal, permiten el ajuste entre las disposiciones legales antiguas y las nuevas, para darle certeza al ciudadano de cómo cambiaron sus condiciones y que se realicen los acomodos necesarios, son normas secundarias porque actúan como complementarias de las principales que están en la nueva normativa. En el caso que nos ocupa, la norma transitoria le es aplicable a quienes están actualmente desempeñando los puestos a los que la reforma se refiere. La norma no hace nugatorio o imposible el ejercicio del derecho fundamental a ser electo (figura del voto pasivo). La forma y los casos en que la ley estipula la reelección para los cargos municipales no es contraría (sic) al bloque de constitucionalidad. Por lo que no es correcto señalar que se da una aplicación retroactiva de la norma y en perjuicio de algún ciudadano. Esa norma lo que haceess (sic) resolver los posibles cconflictos (sic) intertemporales derivados de la eficacia derogatoria de la propia ley. Aplicable para todos los ciudadanos en iguales condiciones, por (sic) cuanto la ley no debe ir mas (sic) alla (sic) del momento en que se extingue. 3.- Sobre la alegada violación a los artículos 38, 39 y 40 de la Constitución Política. Se rechaza la vulneración alegada por los accionantes de los artículos 38,39 y 40 de la Constitución Política, porque en ningún caso la Asamblea Legislativa usurpa funciones propias de otros poderes, ni se ha extralimitado en sus competencias legislativas, ni de control político, no es de recibo considerar que la elaboración de una ley constituya una sanción para persona o grupo alguno. La formulación de la ley es una potestad exclusiva de la Asamblea Legislativa, la cual, al formar su voluntad, valora aspectos de necesidad, conveniencia u oportunidad, en el marco del respeto al ordenamiento jurídico, al Estado de Derecho y a los principios y valores propios de nuestra nación y el respeto absoluto a los derechos de la ciudadanía, y muy especialmente, a lo que respecta a la participación política de las personas en los distintos puestos de elección. 4.- Sobre la alegada violación a los artículos 169 y 171 de la Constitución Política. Conforme lo ha señalado la Procuraduría General de la República.[6], el legislador ordinario, puede redefinir o cambiar, lo que considere oportuno o conveniente, del sistema que rige las elecciones municipales, siempre y cuando las decisiones legislativas sean razonables y proporcionales. En la elaboración de esta ley la Asamblea Legislativa ha sido respetuosa de los intereses municipales y servicios locales de los distintos cantones, y no es de recibo considerar que se irrespetan o violan los intereses de los gobiernos municipales, así como el respeto la integración de los gobiernos municipales y sus cuerpos deliberantes integrado por distintos cargos de elección popular. De igual forma, se respeta la autonomía municipal, dada que el proyecto de ley fue consultado a todas las municipalidades. No se interfiere en las competencias municipales, más bien la voluntad manifestada en la creación de esta ley, las considera en un marco de respeto hacia los intereses de las corporaciones municipales. 5.- Sobre la alegada violación al artículo 7 de la Constitución Política. Se rechaza la alegada violación al artículo 7 de la Carta Magna, que señala que la Asamblea Legislativa ha desconocido la jerarquía de los tratados internacionales o irrespetado algún derecho humano establecido en instrumentos o tratados internacionales, el derecho a elegir y a ser electo no ha sido afectados mediante lo dispuesto en esta norma, si bien, el legislador decide dar un tratamiento distinto a los diferentes puestos de elección, esta diferenciación responde precisamente a que se trata de puestos distintos y responsabilidades distintas por lo que no se está afectando el principio de igualdad, ni limitando irrazonable o indiscriminadamente el derecho a postularse en los puesto, además, la limitación impuesta es temporal. Por otra parte, si el Tribunal constitucional considera que el legislador deba replantear o revalorar algún aspecto en cuanto a la diferenciación o exclusión de los cargos tal como se regulan en la ley recién promulgada, objeto de esta acción, eso no implica per se una inconstitucionalidad de la norma. Es claro que la intención del legislador en ningún momento ha sido la de vaciar el derecho de participación electoral de ningún ciudadano. Todo lo contrario, se trata hacer respetar la autonomía municipal y los intereses y servicios locales de esas corporaciones. III:-PETITORIA Conforme con el informe rendido, se solicita sea rechazada la acción de inconstitucionalidad”.

9.- Mediante resolución 2022012518 de las 9:20 horas del 1º de junio de 2022 dictada en el expediente 22-008424-0007-CO, el pleno de la Sala dispuso: “Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por la ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE ALCALDÍAS E INTENDENCIAS DE COSTA RICA, cédula jurídica número 3-002-658100, representada por su Presidente y apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma HORACIO MARTÍN ALVARADO BOGANTES, mayor, soltero, master en Planificación y Desarrollo Humano, cédula de identidad número 4-024-0551, contra el artículo Único y el Transitorio Único de la Ley N° 10.183, “Ley de Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7795, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998”. Resultando: 1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 13:19 hrs. del 21 de abril de 2022, el representante de la ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE ALCALDÍAS E INTENDENCIAS DE COSTA RICA (en lo sucesivo ANAI) solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo Único y el Transitorio Único de la Ley N° 10.183. Manifiesta, en primer término, que se cuestiona el procedimiento de aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa el cual, a su juicio, lesiona el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. Esto, en razón de que, al ser consultado el proyecto al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, este brindó un criterio negativo en relación con su contenido. En primer lugar, indicó que dicho proyecto de ley genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo al impedir a funciones con dos períodos en el mismo puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal, que no puedan aspirar a otros puestos de esa naturaleza dentro del mismo régimen, sobre todo, a quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias. En segundo término, que dentro de los seis meses previos y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de ley en los cuales el T.S.E., se haya mostrado en desacuerdo. Sobre este último aspecto, la Sala Constitucional se pronunció en el voto N° 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022 y, en lo sustantivo indicó, que el artículo 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso, si un proyecto hace referencia a las elecciones municipales y no se está en el período electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del T.S.E. no tendría efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente agravarla, requiriendo para su aprobación mayoría calificada de dos tercios. La parte accionante considera que la parte final del artículo 97 no está sujeto a ninguna interpretación y su contenido es claro. Por otra parte, en el voto referido, la Sala Constitucional, hace interpretaciones de normas constitucionales electorales, cuando esta labor le corresponde al T.S.E. en forma exclusiva, de conformidad con el artículo 102, inciso 3 de la Constitución Política. Sobre este aspecto cita, en apoyo de su tesis, el voto salvado del magistrado Castillo Víquez en el voto N° 2022-6119. A partir del párrafo 2° del artículo Único de la Ley 10.183, se establece una limitación para que las personas que ocupen el puesto de Alcaldes. Esta limitación resulta inconstitucional pues lesiona, tanto el artículo 23, incisos b) y c) de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic) (Pacto de San José) ratificada por Costa Rica mediante Ley 4534 de 23 de enero de 1970, como el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política. Es un derecho político tanto el votar como el tener la posibilidad de ser electo en procesos electorales periódicos, así como tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas del país, es decir, a puesto de elección popular. No obstante, la disposición en comentario, es que impone a alcaldes y alcaldesas, una prohibición legal que les impide participar en cualquier otro puesto de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal, lo que violenta el derecho al voto pasivo que señala la C.A.D.H., Este cuerpo normativo regula el derecho de los derechos políticos, pero ninguna de las excepciones que plantea contempla la posibilidad de limitar el derecho al voto pasivo. Sobre lo que ha dicho la Sala Constitucional en relación con los derechos políticos, cita el voto N° 2003-2771. La misma prohibición se da en relación con las personas que actualmente ocupan los puestos de intendentes. En este caso, la norma prohíbe a las personas intendentes que cumplan dos períodos de nombramiento, aspirar, dentro de los siguientes ocho años, a un puesto de elección popular. Esta limitación se repite, si bien no en forma tan clara, en el Transitorio Único. La Ley establece una odiosa discriminación entre los distintos puestos de elección popular, pues prohíbe que un Alcalde (sa) o Intendente (a) aspire de nuevo a un puesto dentro del Régimen Municipal, en los siguientes 8 años posteriores de vencimiento de su segundo período de elección, mientras que a los demás puestos de elección popular en los gobiernos locales, se les prohíbe solamente, en los 8 años siguientes al vencimiento de su segundo período, ocupar el mismo puesto, pero si pueden, incluso en forma consecutiva, aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular diferentes a los que fue electo en una Municipalidad. Esto supone una violación al principio de igualdad. El representante de la Asociación actora manifiesta que las normas impugnadas lesionan también, el principio de irretroactividad de la ley. Pretender, como hace la ley cuestionada, que las autoridades de elección popular les apliquen la restricción de reelección contando los períodos ejercidos con antelación a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley, resulta contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, pues se le estaría dando un efecto retroactivo a la norma. El párrafo primero del Transitorio Único de la Ley cuestionada es irracional y desproporcionado. No se debe sumar, para los efectos de la prohibición, períodos de nombramiento durante los cuales la ley aún no estaba vigente. Esta aplicación retroactiva de la ley genera un claro perjuicio a los miembros de ANAI, pues cualquier limitación a un derecho, debe darse a partir de la vigencia de la norma y no en relación con situaciones jurídicas consolidadas como son los nombramientos en puestos de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Cuando se reforma una norma, esa modificación debe tener efectos hacia el futuro, esto es, a partir de la publicación de la norma en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Sin embargo, en este supuesto, el transitorio cuestionado pretende generar una regla de limitación de períodos de elección, contando los que los asociados de ANAI ya tienen al momento de publicación de la ley. Por último, considera que el contenido de las normas impugnadas lesiona el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. El sector público donde existen más puestos de elección popular es el municipal. Por su parte, de los otros puestos de esta naturaleza, el presidente de la República tiene una prohibición para reelegirse de ocho años (artículo 132, inc. 1 de la Constitución Política) los vicepresidentes pueden ser candidatos a presidentes de la República o reelegidos, mientras no hayan ejercido el puesto en los doce meses anteriores a la elección (artículo 132, inc. 1 de la Constitución Política). En cuanto a los diputados, no pueden ser reelegidos de manera consecutiva, pero sí pueden aspirar a ser diputados con solo el transcurso de un período cuatrienal (artículo 107 de la Constitución Política). En el caso de las Alcaldías, la ley dispone una prohibición de 8 años para volver a ocupar un cargo de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal, luego de haber sido electo por dos períodos consecutivos. Se trata de un período irrazonable y desproporcionado que lesiona la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en relación con estos principios, así como el artículo 23 de la C.A.D.H., incisos 1 c) y 2. También resulta irrazonable y desproporcionada la limitación temporal que se impone a las personas que ocupan una alcaldía municipal, por cuanto se trata del único puesto donde los munícipes tienen la posibilidad de destituir a la persona que ocupa el cargo, mediante un plebiscito revocatorio, de conformidad con el artículo 19 del Código Municipal. Asimismo, se violenta el principio de proporcionalidad, al imponerse limitaciones y condiciones más gravosas al puesto de elección de la alcaldía municipal, que a los demás puestos dentro del régimen municipal y en relación con los otros puestos de elección de los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo. 2.- Para efectos de legitimación señala que deriva del artículo 75, párrafo 2° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto acuden en defensa de los intereses corporativos de los miembros afiliados a la asociación que representa, cuyo objeto es la defensa de los intereses del colectivo que representa (Alcaldías e Intendencias del país), en tanto lo regulado violenta los derechos constitucionales del colectivo ANAI. 3.- La parte accionante solicita, como medida cautelar, se ordene no aplicar la norma transitoria (párrafo 1°) hasta tanto la Sala resuelva por el fondo esta acción. Considera que la apariencia de buen derecho en este asunto, es más que evidente, lo que justifica la suspensión solicitada. 4.- Por resolución de las 15:49 horas del 13 de mayo, se solicitó a la parte actora aportar copia de los Estatutos de la Asociación. La prevención fue cumplida dentro del término de ley. El artículo 4° indica que uno de los fines de la Asociación es “(…) el mutuo apoyo y defensa de los derechos y garantías de los Gobiernos Locales en general, de las Alcaldía e Intendencias Municipales y de las estructuras administrativas de las Municipalidad en particular (…)” .5.- Ante esta misma Sala pende la acción de inconstitucionalidad número 22008383-0007-CO, en la que se impugnan las mismas disposiciones que son objeto de cuestionamiento en el sub examine. Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y, Considerando: I.- El artículo 84 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional dispone que si después de planteada la acción y antes de la publicación del aviso respectivo se presentaren otras acciones de inconstitucionalidad contra la misma ley, decreto, disposición, acuerdo o resolución, esas acciones se acumularán a la primera y se tendrán como ampliación. También se acumularán las acciones que con ese carácter interpongan las partes de los juicios suspendidos, si fueren presentadas dentro de los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso. Por lo expuesto y ante la evidente conexidad que existe entre los hechos planteados en este asunto y los discutidos en el expediente número 22-008383-0007-CO que se tramita ante esta Sala, y a fin de evitar resoluciones contradictorias que pudieren afectar los derechos e intereses de las partes involucradas, se dispone en este acto acumular este expediente al citado. II.- CONSIDERACIONES EN RELACIÓN CON LA MEDIDA CAUTELAR SOLICITADA. Solicita el representante de la parte accionante, como medida cautelar, que se ordene no aplicar la norma transitoria (párrafo primero) hasta tanto la Sala no resuelva por el fondo la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. A su juicio, el peligro en la demora en resolver el asunto, causaría grave daño a los alcaldes, alcaldesas e intendentes actuales, quienes no podrían participar en el proceso de elección para el año 2024-2026. En relación con lo manifestado se remite a la parte a lo dispuesto en la resolución de las 8:27 horas del 9 de mayo, dictada en el expediente N° 22-008383-0007-CO, a la cual se está acumulando esta acción y en la que se indicó expresamente: “RESPECTO DE LOS EFECTOS JURÍDICOS DE LA ADMISIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Ciertamente, a tenor del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se debe advertir a los “órganos que agotan la vía administrativa que esa demanda, ha sido establecida, a efecto de que en los procesos o procedimientos en que se discuta la aplicación de la ley, decreto, disposición, acuerdo o resolución, tampoco se dicte resolución final mientras la Sala no haya hecho el pronunciamiento del caso”. Empero, en el caso concreto, la aplicación del ordinal 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional enervaría la aplicación de la norma y consiguientemente impediría la realización del próximo proceso electoral. Por lo expuesto, en aplicación del ordinal 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se impone modular el efecto suspensivo del artículo 81 de ese cuerpo normativo, indicándose, expresamente, que no se suspende el dictado de ninguna resolución final, ya sea en sede interna, administrativa o electoral.” (…) Por tanto: Acumúlese esta acción a la que bajo expediente número 22-008383-0007CO se tramita ante esta Sala”. En relación con lo anterior, el escrito de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada por Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes, en su condición de presidente de la ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE ALCALDÍAS E INTENDENCIAS DE COSTA RICA, contiene los siguientes argumentos: “SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN PARA ACCIONAR El párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional señala que "No será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto." Sobre la no existencia de una lesión individual o directa, la Sala Constitucional en resolución 2001-09390, de las 14:52 horas del 19 de setiembre del año 2001, señaló: “Dispone el texto en cuestión que procede cuando “Por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista lesión individual ni directa”, lo cual quiere decir, cuando por esa misma naturaleza, la lesión sea colectiva (antónimo de individual) e indirecta. Sería el caso de actos que lesionen los intereses de determinados grupos o corporaciones en cuanto tales, y no propiamente de sus miembros en forma directa." (la negrita no es del original) En el caso de la ANAI, esta es una asociación formada con fundamento en Ley de Asociaciones, número 218 y cuyo objetivo principal es la defensa de los intereses del colectivo que representa (a todas las alcaldías e intendencias del país), siendo que, lo regulado por la Ley que se acusa de inconstitucional violenta los derechos constitucionales del colectivo ANAI. De igual manera, existe legitimación de la ANAI para plantear la acción de inconstitucionalidad, ello con fundamento en la segunda excepción que establece el numeral 75 ya señalado, esto es, que la norma cuestionada violenta intereses difusos, pues como se establecerá más adelante, estamos ante una clara violación de los derechos electorales, tal y como lo ha establecido la Sala Constitucional en resolución 2001-09390, ya mencionada: “Sin embargo, según la nueva clasificación que se hace en la sentencia número referida en el Considerando anterior (número 8239-2000), la materia electoral ya no se conceptualizaría como un típico interés difuso, sino más bien como un interés nacional, en tanto se trata de una materia que no se circunscribe únicamente a un grupo de personas no organizadas formalmente, sino a la colectividad nacional en su totalidad; en tanto esta materia comprende los derechos de ser electo en puestos de representación popular o de ocupar los públicos en general, así como también el derecho de elegir libremente a sus gobernantes, con lo que queda en evidencia su afectación general, dada la envergadura de los derechos relativos al sufragio. En el caso en estudio, se intenta defender los derechos de participación política de los partidos minoritarios, precisamente en lo que se refiere al sistema de conteo para determinar los puestos para diputados y regidores municipales; lo cual es de evidente interés nacional, con lo cual, el accionante se encuentra legitimado para plantear esta acción, sin requerir la existencia de un proceso pendiente de resolver, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional”. Con fundamento en lo expuesto la ANAI ostenta la legitimación necesaria para el planteamiento de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, tanto por la violación de los derechos constitucionales del colectivo, como por violación a un interés nacional como lo representa la materia electoral que regula la normativa objetada acá. SOBRE LA NORMA CUESTIONADA DE INCONSTITUCIONAL Con la presente acción se cuestiona la constitucionalidad del procedimiento de aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, así como la constitucionalidad del Artículo Único, así como el Transitorio Único de la Ley número 10.183, Ley REFORMA DEL ARTÍCULO 14 DE LA LEY 7794, CÓDIGO MUNICIPAL, DE 30 DE ABRIL DE 1998 (LEY QUE LIMITA LA REELECCIÓN INDEFINIDA DE LAS AUTORIDADES LOCALES, publicada en el Alcance 73 de La Gaceta 68, del 8 de abril del año 2022 y vigente a partir del 8 de abril del año 2022, la cual literalmente señala: "ARTÍCULO ÚNICO- Se reforma el quinto párrafo del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998. El texto es el siguiente: (…) Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la presidencia y las vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años y podrán ser reelegidos. Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001 , así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período. Transitorio Único: Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal. Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley”. 1- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD POR VIOLACIÓN AL PROCEDIMIENTO LEGISLATIVO PARA DICTAR NORMAS QUE REGULAN MATERIA ELECTORAL: Sobre este aspecto, considero que el procedimiento seguido por la Asamblea Legislativa para la aprobación de la Ley objeto de esta acción, violenta el artículo 97 de nuestra Constitución Política, mismo que señala: “Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo." (la negrita y cursiva no son del original). Se considera violentado, por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, el artículo 97 de la Constitución, ello por cuanto el proyecto de Ley, expediente 21.810, al ser consultado al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, ese brindó un criterio negativo, o sea, manifestó su objeción con la eventual aprobación del dicho proyecto de Ley, en los términos en que fue redactado. La Sala debe tomar en consideración los siguientes antecedentes del proyecto: “a) El plenario de la Asamblea Legislativa conoció el proyecto de Ley número 21.810, denominado REFORMA DEL ARTÍCULO 14 DE LA LEY 7794, CÓDIGO MUNICIPAL, DE 30 DE ABRIL DE 1998 (LEY QUE LIMITA LA REELECCIÓN INDEFINIDA DE LAS AUTORIDADES LOCALES), siendo que la sesión extraordinaria número 53 del 25 de enero del año 2022, este aprobó en primer debate el citado proyecto de Ley, con una votación de 40 votos a favor. b) Mediante oficio AL-DSDI-OFl-0005-2022 del 11 de enero de 2022, la Secretaria del Directorio Legislativo remite el texto actualizado y aprobado en primer debate del proyecto de ley 21.810 al Tribunal Supremo de elecciones para consulta obligatoria. c)Mediante oficio TSE-0199-2022, de fecha 20 de enero del año 2022, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones le comunica a la Secretaria del Directorio Legislativo, el acuerdo tomado por dicho Tribunal en el artículo quinto de la sesión ordinaria n.º 6-2022, celebrada el 20 de enero de 2022, en cuya conclusión se indica: “En lo que respecta a las limitaciones a la reelección de las autoridades locales, la iniciativa supone materia librada a la discrecionalidad de la Asamblea Legislativa. Sin embargo, en razón de que la propuesta genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo, al impedir que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular, este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente n.º 21.810. Tal objeción se levantaría si los legisladores modifican el proyecto para que, según el espíritu de la propuesta, se limite la reelección consecutiva a una única vez (máximo dos períodos continuos en el mismo cargo), sin que se prohíba la posibilidad de optar, al cabo del segundo mandato, por otro puesto de elección popular. Respetuosamente, se recuerda que "Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (...) convertir en leyes los proyectos (...) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo" (numeral 97 constitucional). ACUERDO FIRME.»" (la negrita y cursiva no es del original). d) Varios diputados, en fecha 27 de enero de 2022, presentan a la Sala Constitucional una consulta facultativa sobre la constitucionalidad de la reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal que se tramita bajo el expediente 21.810, en la que cuestionan eventuales vicios de forma, en relación a (sic) si el proyecto de Ley podría ser aprobado en estas fechas (elección nacional 2022), dado que hay una objeción por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y si existe una violación al artículo 97 constitucional, pues no es periodo de elecciones municipales y; vicios de fondo, por cuanto el (sic) cuestionan la eventual existencia de un vaciamiento al derecho humano a ser electo y eventual violación al principio constitucional de irretroactividad de las normas. e) Por medio de voto 2022-006119, de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo del año 2022, notificado a la Asamblea Legislativa el día 23 de marzo del año 2022, la Sala Constitucional determina: "En cuanto a los vicios de procedimiento, por mayoría se evacua la consulta de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley "Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley no 7794 del 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales)", que se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 21.810, en el sentido de que no hay vicios de procedimiento... En cuanto a los vicios de fondo, por mayoría, se declara inevacuable la consulta de constitucionalidad...”. f) Que el plenario legislativo en la sesión ordinaria realizada en fecha martes 29 de marzo de 2022, aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley 21.810, sin variar la redacción del proyecto y haciendo caso omiso a las ordenanzas del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. g) Que en fecha 5 de abril del año 2022, el señor Presidente de la República procedió a firmar la Ley y ordenó su publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Puede verse que el Tribunal Supremo de elecciones (sic), establece dos situaciones concretas por las cuales objeta el proyecto, primero, que el proyecto de Ley genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo al impedir que funcionarios con dos periodos en un mismo puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal, no puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular dentro del mismo régimen municipal, en especial, para asociación que represento, a quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias) y; segundo, que dentro de los seis meses y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de Ley en los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se haya mostrado en desacuerdo. La Sala Constitucional al analizar en su voto 2022-006119, de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo del año 2022, el tema del vicio del procedimiento en la aprobación del proyecto de ley señaló:“ ..En el diseño original del Constituyente de 1949 su voluntad fue que en un solo días (sic) se realizaran las tres elecciones, sea: las presidenciales, legislativas y municipales. En efecto, se decantó porque las elecciones para presidente y vicepresidentes de la República (artículo 133 constitucional), los miembros de Poder Legislativo (numeral 107 constitucional) y los regidores municipales (artículo 171 constitucional), se realizaran el mismo día... Ahora bien, mediante ley -entrada en vigencia del Código Electoral, artículo 110-, se separaron las elecciones municipales de las presidenciales y legislativas, trasladándose las primeras para el medio periodo constitucional. Esta modificación del sistema pasar de modelo único o concentrado a uno dual- impone una interpretación del numeral 97 constitucional de cara a esta nueva realidad. Cuando se trataba de tres elecciones en un mismo día, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al proyecto de ley tenía el efecto de suspender la potestad de legislar para el caso concreto -durante los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la elección-; si el criterio se vertida fuera de ese periodo, se agravaba la potestad de legislar. La situación a (sic) cambiado radicalmente en la actualidad, en la que hay elecciones separadas entre las presidenciales y diputadiles y las municipalidades. En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe de interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto hace referencia a las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional al ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional. Es por esta razón, de que, en el caso concreto, no existe ningún vicio del procedimiento por hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya aprobado en primer debate el proyecto de ley consultado. Más aún, incluso hay un error de concepto en lo consultado, toda vez que, conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el hipotético caso de que estuviéramos en el supuesto de la prohibición del 97 constitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa está autorizada por el Derecho de la Constitución y por las normas del Estatuto Parlamentario a aprobar un proyecto de ley en primer debate en el que hay una objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; lo que si no podría hacer es aprobarlo en la votación definitiva después de concluido el segundo debate. Ergo, con fundamento en lo anterior se descarta el vicio de procedimiento…” No se comparte la posición de la Sala sobre la inexistencia de un vicio de procedimiento, que se emitió en la consulta de Constitucionalidad ya mencionada. La parte final del artículo 97 constitucional no está sujeta interpretación alguna, pues claramente señala que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los provectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.” (la negrita, cursiva y subrayado no son del original). En el caso de la Ley acusada de inconstitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa al aprobar en segundo debate el proyecto de Ley, hizo caso omiso a la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, siendo mandatoria la prohibición dicha. Por otra parte, la Sala en el voto ya mencionado, procede a emitir una interpretación de normas constitucionales electorales, siendo que ello es materia exclusiva del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Véase que el artículo 102, inciso 3 de la Constitución Política señala claramente que el Tribunal Supremo de elecciones tiene en sus funciones el "Interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales y legales referentes a la materia electoral”. (la negrita y cursiva no son del original). Es por lo anterior que, existe una clara violación al procedimiento legislativo en la aprobación de la Ley 10.183, ello por cuanto existe una objeción hecha por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en oficio TSE-0199-2022, de fecha 20 de enero del año 2022, lo que impedía dicha aprobación. La misma Sala Constitucional en votos como los números 0557-98, 2277-92, 3194-92, 0034-97, 0034-98 y 3718-97 ha señalado: “Esta Sala, en reiteradas ocasiones. ha señalado que en caso del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en materia electoral. no son impugnables ante la jurisdicción constitucional sus actos subjetivos administrativos, sus disposiciones reglamentarias autónomas y sus resoluciones jurisdiccionales -en el llamado «contencioso electoral». que si le corresponde exclusivamente-; aunque sí lo son las normas, incluso las electorales, de carácter legislativo o ejecutivo -sujetas al control de Constitucionalidad previsto por los artículos 10 de la Constitución y 73 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, así como, en su caso, las normas no escritas originadas en sus precedentes o jurisprudencia -artículo 3 del mismo cuerpo normativo-.” (la negrita, cursiva y subrayado no son del original). Por lo expuesto, existe un evidente vicio en el procedimiento de aprobación de la Ley objeto de esta acción, toda vez que se aprobó en segundo debate, omitiendo que existe una objeción a la misma por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, objeción que fue en dos aspectos, por el fondo al limitar la elección en otros puestos autoridades de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal e irretroactivad (sic) de las normas y por otra parte, que se apruebe la norma dado que se está dentro del plazo de prohibición que establece el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, norma que es clara y no permite interpretación alguna y de tener que hacer una interpretación, esta corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y no a la Sala Constitucional, dado que es materia exclusiva electoral. En este punto, cabe recordar que lo señalado por el Magistrado Fernando Cruz Castro en su voto disidente de la resolución 2022-006119, de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo del año 2022, quien indica: “En este caso, resulta inobjetable que el proyecto en cuestión se refiere a materia electoral, pues incide en la regulación y restricción de ciertos supuestos de reelección en las elecciones municipales. Además, no se puede distinguir donde la Constitución Política no lo hace, por ello resulta improcedente afirmar que el artículo 97 constitucional en cuestión se refiere sólo a las elecciones nacionales y no a las municipales. Claramente tal norma lo que hace referencia es a "la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a "materias electorales" sin distinguir tipos de elecciones. Asimismo, resulta evidente que el TSE se ha manifestado en desacuerdo con este proyecto de ley. Así entonces, considero que resulta aplicable lo establecido por el artículo 97 en cuestión en cuanto a lo siguiente: -La Asamblea Legislativa puede apartarse de la opinión del TSE; pero para ello necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros, siempre no esté dentro del período de veda legislativa. -En todo caso, esa votación calificada no tiene virtud de desconocer el periodo de veda, conforme al cual: dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá convenir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo. Los partidos políticos que actúan en el parlamento, son importantes actores en todo tipo de elecciones, por esta razón considero que la prohibición constitucional, es saludable. Impide que los actores políticos puedan variar las reglas electorales en cualquier tipo de elección. Distinguir entre elecciones municipales y elecciones nacionales, es una distinción artificial. La incidencia de las luchas electorales y la porosidad de los partidos, son razones suficientes para impedir que las reglas de contiendas electorales, sean locales o nacionales, se modifiquen durante el periodo electoral. La historia electoral evidencia la volatibilidad y conflictividad que contiene esta materia, por esta razón el texto constitucional es tajante, muy claro. Cualquier elección popular impide la variación de las reglas electorales..." (la cursiva no es del original). 2- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD POR MOTIVOS DE FONDO, VIOLACIÓN AL DERECHO AL VOTO PASIVO: A partir del párrafo segundo del artículo único de la Ley 10.183 se establece una limitación para que las personas que ocupen el puesto de elección popular correspondiente a la Alcaldía Municipal al señalar: "No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001 , así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período”. Consideramos que la norma en lo indicado resulta inconstitucional, toda vez que, violenta tanto el artículo 23 incisos b) y c) de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic) (Pacto de San José) ratificada por Consta Rica mediante Ley 4534 del 23 de febrero del año 1970, así como el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política. Precisamente, los incisos b) y c) de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic), señalan sobre los derechos políticos de los ciudadanos: "I- Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades: b) de votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad. a las funciones públicas de su país. 2- La ley debe reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a que se refiere el inciso anterior, exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, Residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente. en proceso penal. (la negrita, subrayado y cursiva no son del original). En síntesis, en es un derecho político tanto el votar como el tener la posibilidad de ser electo en procesos electorales periódicos, así como tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad a las funciones públicas de país, llámese en este caso, acceso a los puestos de elección popular. El problema que se presenta con la norma accionada, es que para el caso de los alcaldes u alcaldesas que cumplan ocho años de ocupar el puesto, inmediatamente se les impone una prohibición legal que le impide participa en cualquier otro puesto de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal, lo cual a todas luces resulta inconstitucional por cuanto violenta el derecho al voto pasivo que señala la convención americana de derechos humanos (sic), pues estamos en presencia de puestos de elección popular totalmente diferentes. El mismo artículo 23 de la Convención Americana, señala en su inciso 2 que, es posible, mediante una Ley, regular el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a que se refiere en inciso I del artículo 23 la misma convención, pero, esa regulación será exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental o condena por un juez competente, en proceso penal. Ninguna de las excepciones que permiten limitar esos derechos contempla la posibilidad de limitar el derecho al voto pasivo (posibilidad de ser elegido en un puesto de elección popular) por haber ocupado otros puestos de elección popular. La Sala Constitucional, en voto 2003-02771, de las 11:40 horas del 4 de abril del año 2003 se refirió a los derechos humanos fundamentales y los derechos políticos de la siguiente manera: “VI. SOBRE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS FUNDAMENTALES Y LOS DERECHOS POLITICOS. Se consigna a continuación la doctrina relevante al fondo del asunto, con el propósito de construir un marco referencial para resolver las acciones presentadas. A. LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS FUNDAMENTALES. El Estado de Derecho nació, de acuerdo a (sic) la historia y a la doctrina jurídica occidental, como una fórmula de compromiso que implicaba aunar un amplio grupo de derechos fundamentales con una serie de garantías formales y materiales, todo ello dentro de una Constitución que consagrara la división de poderes y los principios de legitimidad y legalidad. Tendente, esta suma de ideas, a evitar las arbitrariedades eventualmente provenientes de las instituciones estatales. Es así que la primacía de un grupo central de normas que caracterizan a la Constitución como ordenamiento superior descansa en (i) su carácter de expresión directa de la voluntad general y (ii) en su enunciación de los derechos humanos fundamentales y de las libertades ciudadanas. El “principio democrático”, expresado en la idea de la soberanía popular, es una respuesta jurídica al problema de la legitimación política, tanto en el plano material como formal. En el plano material, porque (a) establece la legitimación constitucional del derecho fundamental a la participación política de los ciudadanos, (b) obliga a las instituciones estatales a respetar los derechos fundamentales y (c) establece el reconocimiento social a la diversidad de iniciativas y valores de todos los individuos; y en el plano formal, porque representa a la vez una fórmula de articulación racional del proceso político y, de nuevo, una limitación expresa al poder estatal -sea éste una manifestación de la función ejecutiva, legislativa, judicial, electoral o municipal-. El principio de soberanía popular se manifiesta como la principal condición limitante de la actuación de las instituciones estatales y está dirigido a asegurar que cualquier ejercicio del poder por parte de cualquier órgano del Estado respete su previa legitimación popular y el criterio del pueblo, externado por el poder constituyente originario. Es en lo anteriormente dicho que se fundamenta la trascendencia jurídicopolítica de haber insertado en la Constitución a los derechos fundamentales, los que a su vez constituyen un fuerte y esencial componente para la configuración del Estado de Derecho. Ejemplos de derechos fundamentales, son aquellos propios del ciudadano -ciudadanía, nacionalidad-; la libertad de las personas — libertad personal, de religión y conciencia, de residencia, de contratación, de elección de actividad económica, entre otros-; la igualdad jurídica entre las personas; el derecho de propiedad privada; y aquellos que permiten el acceso de las personas al control jurisdiccional. Es así que el pensamiento jurídico occidental ha declarado innegociable que los derechos fundamentales constituyan la principal garantía con que cuentan los ciudadanos de que los sistemas jurídico y político, en su conjunto, en un Estado de Derecho, estén orientados hacia el respeto y la promoción de la persona humana, hacia el desarrollo humano y hacia una constante ampliación de las libertades públicas. Asimismo, le corresponde a los derechos fundamentales un importante cometido legitimador de las formas constitucionales, ya que constituyen los presupuestos del consenso sobre los que se ha edificado la sociedad democrática. Dicho en otros términos, su función es la de sistematizar el contenido axiológico objetivo del ordenamiento democrático al que la mayoría de los ciudadanos han prestado su consentimiento y también la de establecer la sujeción de las instituciones estatales a tales principios. Los derechos fundamentales, en el orden constitucional, ostentan una doble dimensión, son derechos subjetivos y son derechos objetivos. Por un lado son subjetivos, o sea derechos de los individuos, no sólo en cuanto derechos de los ciudadanos en sentido estricto, sino en cuanto garantizan la libertad en el ámbito de la convivencia democrática. Por otro lado, son elementos esenciales del ordenamiento objetivo, por cuanto éste se configura como marco de una convivencia humana, justa y pacífica. En razón de su importancia, la Constitución ha previsto instrumentos normativos, especialmente reforzados, dirigidos a evitar la alteración de su contenido o la limitación de sus alcances por cualquier institución estatal: las garantías constitucionales. De lo anteriormente argumentado se deduce que la mutación o limitación del estatuto de los derechos fundamentales no implica una mera amputación parcial de la Constitución, sino que entraña la sustitución plena de la Constitución y el irrespeto a la voluntad popular. Todo lo anterior explica, porqué desde las primeras constituciones costarricenses, se consagró el principio de la "rigidez", es decir, de la inalterabilidad del catálogo de derechos fundamentales y libertades ciudadanas o públicas. El principio de rigidez, que como principio de reserva del poder originario será analizado posteriormente, además de establecer una frontera impenetrable para la actividad legislativa y ejecutiva al ámbito de los derechos fundamentales, también alcanza, como garantía constitucional, a las llamadas "decisiones políticas fundamentales", que son aquellas resoluciones de la sociedad que son determinantes acerca de un principio constitucional y que representan una forma históricamente duradera del sentir y pensar social. Las dos decisiones más importantes con las que se enfrenta una sociedad son, la elección de su modelo económico y la de su sistema político (parte de la doctrina considera que en el fondo ésta es una sola y única decisión). Dentro del sistema político, la sociedad opta por una forma de elegir a sus representantes y gobernantes y por los requisitos que debe tener quien pueda ser electo para un puesto público: ambas, coinciden los expertos de forma aplastante, son decisiones políticas fundamentales. La fuente de la que nos alimentamos, la jurisprudencia constitucional, ha coincidido en que la reforma de las decisiones políticas fundamentales corresponde exclusivamente al pueblo como soberano a través de la competencia que delega en las asambleas nacionales constituyentes, electas para este efecto y representativas de la voluntad popular general. Estas cláusulas son modificables pero el único sujeto autorizado para reformarlas es el poder constituyente." (La negrita y cursiva no son del original). En el mismo voto de la Sala, 2003-02771 se hace referencia al derecho de elección como un derecho fundamental, al señalar: “D.EL DERECHO DE ELECCIÓN COMO DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL. Históricamente la soberanía ha sido el instrumento apriorístico para justificar y legitimar al poder estatal, entendido este último como la superioridad frente a cualquier otra fuerza que se desenvuelva en el ámbito del Estado, y que ejerzan los diversos grupos sociales que integran el elemento humano de la organización política. El poder estatal debe sin embargo, respetar siempre la voluntad popular manifestada mediante las decisiones de las asambleas constituyentes originarias. La libertad-participación constituye una esfera de autonomía individual que le otorga al individuo la posibilidad de actuar o participar en lo político y social, de acuerdo a (sic) su propia voluntad, mientras respete las normas especiales de cada actividad. La titularidad de ese derecho, en lo que atañe a su ejercicio, y por imposición de la idea política dominante en la actual sociedad, corresponde al grupo humano que integra el Estado, el cual lo ejerce directamente, o por medio de sus representantes que lo conforman, en el plano originario el poder constituyente y en el derivado el gobierno y los legisladores. Los derechos políticos se dirigen a los ciudadanos para posibilitarles participar en la expresión de la soberanía nacional: derecho al voto en las elecciones y votaciones, derecho de elegibilidad, derecho de adhesión a un partido político. etc. Son los que posibilitan al ciudadano a participar en los asuntos públicos y en la estructuración política de la comunidad de que forma parte. El ejercicio de estos derechos en sede estatal, lejos de colocar al ciudadano electo en lejanía, separación u oposición a tal Estado, lo que hace es habilitarlo para tomar parte en la articulación y planificación política de la sociedad de la cual es miembro. Sobre derechos que están destinados a los ciudadanos para posibilitarles la participación en la expresión de la soberanía nacional; su fin primordial es evitar que el Estado (mediante cualquiera de sus funciones, ejecutiva, legislativa, judicial, electoral o municipal) invada o agreda ciertos atributos del ser humano. Es así que suponen por lo tanto: una actitud pasiva o negativa del Estado, una abstención por parte de éste, dirigida a respetar, a no impedir y a garantizar el libre y no discriminatorio goce de los mismos. Son derechos por tanto que se ejercen para afirmar y confirmar el poder soberano del pueblo sobre el Estado. y proveen a sus titulares, los ciudadanos, de medios y garantías para defenderse contra el ejercicio arbitrario del poder público. Precisamente a través del reconocimiento y ejercicio de las libertades políticas, opera la participación de los individuos en el proceso del poder, y al ser la democracia una forma de toma de decisiones colectivas, tal ejercicio a su vez es la esencia del principio democrático. La diferencia entre las libertades civiles y las libertades políticas no reside en su naturaleza. sino en la finalidad a la cual responde su ejercicio. Una de las varias libertades públicas jurídicas a que nos referimos en esta sección, consiste en el derecho de los ciudadanos de participación política siempre su análisis lleva al estudio del concepto de soberanía popular, ya que ésta es la fuente y única legitimación del poder político. Es el pueblo que la (sic) articula mediante sus representantes -diputados constituyentes, presidente y vice-presidentes de la República, diputados a la Asamblea Legislativa y alcaldes municipales- y les encomienda el ejercicio de tal poder de forma provisional. Las libertades de participación política están destinadas a los nacionales mayores de edad. y están encapsulados en el derecho fundamental de ciudadanía: la que puede suspenderse únicamente por interdicción judicialmente declarada y por sentencia que imponga la pena de suspensión de los derechos políticos. No hay otra restricción del derecho y jamás el poder político puede arbitrariamente limitarlo. Para ciertos puestos públicos. el Constituyente originario decidió por un mínimo de edad que supera la frontera de la mayoridad civil, pero mantuvo su prohibición para que los poderes públicos restringieran esta libertad pública jurídica. El derecho de elección, como derecho político, también constituye un derecho humano de primer orden, y por ende, es un derecho fundamental ... De hecho, a pesar de que la reforma parcial en cuestión se produjo posteriormente, esto se viene a confirmar luego con la suscripción de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic) que en el artículo 23 establece: “1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades...b) de votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, ..."; y que no admite mayores limitaciones, que las siguientes: "2. La ley puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a que se refiere el inciso anterior, exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal.” De este último párrafo de la Convención de Derechos Humanos, se desprenden de manera clara, las únicas razones por las cuales pueden establecerse restricciones al ejercicio de los derechos ahí declarados. La reelección, según se desprende de la voluntad popular suscrita históricamente, establece la posibilidad para el ciudadano de elegir libremente a sus gobernantes, por lo que al reformarse la Constitución en detrimento de la soberanía del pueblo, y en desgaste de sus derechos fundamentales, lo que se produjo en este caso fue la imposición de más limitaciones que las ya existentes en razón de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena. Por otro lado, Costa Rica suscribió este Convenio sin reserva alguna, aceptando el ejercicio de tales derechos en la mayor libertad posible, asumiendo como únicas limitaciones las que deriven del inciso 2 del artículo 23. De resultar inconstitucional la forma en que la Asamblea Legislativa suprimió este derecho, implicaría que su restauración deba sujetarse al procedimiento correspondiente”. La misma prohibición inconstitucional se da con las personas que actualmente ocupan los puestos de Intendencia, pues la norma cuestionada señala en relación a (sic) ellos: "Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001 , así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período." En este caso, la norma prohíbe a las personas intendentas que cumplan dos periodos de nombramiento aspirar, dentro de los ocho años posteriores, a otro puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Aún y cuando la redacción del artículo único no es tan clara, en el transitorio único, si se establece claramente al señalar "Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal. Es evidente que la norma cuestionada también impone una limitación totalmente inconstitucional a las personas que ocupan cargos de intendentes al establecer una prohibición expresa de poder aspirar a otros cargos de elección del régimen municipal, diferentes al que ocupan en la actualidad, lo cual violenta el derecho al voto pasivo que ostentan ellos al amparo del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic), sobre todo, por cuanto la norma cuestionada de inconstitucional no se ajusta a las excepciones de regulación que establece el inciso 2 del artículo 23 dicho, ello por cuanto las regulaciones que se pueden imponer por Ley en relación a (sic) la posibilidad de aspirar a un cargo público (diferente al que se ocupa en la actualidad) solamente refieren a temas de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal. Lo expuesto, tanto para el caso de las personas que ocupan alcaldías como para las personas que ocupan intendencias, resulta en una clara violación a los derechos electorales que tienen ellos como ciudadanos costarricenses en pleno ejercicio de sus derechos, por lo que, se debe acoger la acción de inconstitucionalidad por violación a los derechos políticos de nuestros asociados en la ANAI y proceder a su anulación por ser contraria al derecho de la Constitución. También, se considera que la normativa cuestionada es violatoria del artículo 33 de la Constitución Política, el cual establece que "Toda persona es igual ante la ley y no podrá practicarse discriminación alguna contraria a la dignidad humana." De los puestos de elección popular existentes en nuestro país, los del régimen municipal son los que tienen la mayor cantidad de ellos, pues en el Poder Ejecutivo solamente el Presidente y Vicepresidentes, en el Poder Legislativo solamente los diputados, mientras que en el régimen municipal se cuenta con las alcaldías, vicealcadías, regidurías y sus suplencias, sindicaturas y sus suplencias, intendencias, viceintendencias y concejalías de distrito y sus suplencias. Al establecerse una prohibición para que las personas que ocupen por 8 años los puestos de Alcaldía o Intendencia no puedan aspirar a otros cargos de elección popular resulta violatorio de dicho principio de igualdad, pues la misma norma señala que para los demás puestos de elección popular en el régimen municipal, específicamente en el párrafo segundo del Transitorio Único de la norma cuestionada: "Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley”. Como se aprecia la norma hace una odiosa diferenciación entre puestos de elección popular del Régimen Municipal, ello por cuanto prohíbe que un Alcalde (sa) o Intendente (a) a aspirar dentro de los 8 años posteriores de vencimiento de su segundo periodo de elección aspirar a cualquier otro puesto de elección popular dentro del Régimen Municipal, mientras que a los demás puestos de elección popular en los Gobiernos Locales, se les prohíbe solamente, en los 8 años siguientes al vencimiento de sus (sic) segundo periodo, el ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular, pero, si se les permite, incluso en forma consecutiva, en aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular diferentes a los que fue electo en una Municipalidad. Es clara la violación del principio de igualdad que se comete en la redacción de la norma cuestionada, por lo que se debe anular la redacción de la norma por ser contraria al derecho a la constitución. 3- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD POR MOTIVOS DE FONDO, VIOLACIÓN DEL PRINCIPIO DE IRRETROACTIVIDAD DE LAS NORMAS: El párrafo primero del Transitorio Único de la Ley cuestionada establece lo siguiente: “Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal." Lo regulado por dicho transitorio resulta inconstitucionalidad toda vez que se le quiere dar un efecto retroactiva a la Ley 10.183, que entró en vigencia el día 8 de abril del año 2022 ello en contraposición a lo ordenado por el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política que señala: "A ninguna ley se le dará efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de persona alguna, o de sus derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas." Pretender, como lo hace la Ley cuestionada, que a las autoridades municipales de elección popular les aplique la restricción de reelección contando los periodos ejercidos con antelación a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley resulta contrario al derecho de la constitución pues se le estaría dando un efecto retroactivo a la norma. La Sala Constitucional en sentencia 2765-1997 de las 15:03 horas del 20 de mayo de 1997 señaló que la garantía de irretroactividad, comparte con los demás derechos y libertades fundamentales, un carácter material y no solamente formal al indicar: “… el principio de irretroactividad, al igual que los demás relativos a los derechos o libertades fundamentales, no es tan solo formal, sino también y sobre todo material, de modo que resulta violado, no solo cuando una nueva norma o la reforma de una anterior altera ilegítimamente derechos adquiridos o situaciones consolidadas al amparo de la dicha norma anterior, sino también cuando los efectos. la interpretación o la aplicación de esta última produce un perjuicio irrazonable o desproporcionado al titular del derecho o situación que ella misma consagra”. En el caso bajo estudio, es evidente que la aplicación retroactiva que hace el Transitorio Único ya mencionado, en perjuicio de los personas que actualmente ocupan puestos de Alcaldías e Intendencias, resulta contrario al derecho de la Constitución, ello en el tanto, se estaría produciendo un perjuicio totalmente desproporcionado a las actuales autoridades municipales de elección popular (Alcaldías e Intendencias), puesto que si actualmente ostentan dos periodos consecutivos en el cargo, no pueden aspirar, de nuevo, a dicho cargo de elección popular, ni a ningún otro cargo de elección popular dentro del Régimen Municipal. En una redacción adecuada de la norma, lo que la misma debió de indicar en su transitorio es que, para el conteo de los plazos de la prohibición para ejercer el mismo puesto de elección popular, se tomará en consideración a partir del periodo de nombramiento que se ostenta al momento de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley. Como puede apreciarse párrafo primero del Transitorio Único de la Ley cuestionada resulta inconstitucional debido a que, aplicar en forma retroactiva la Ley, en perjuicio de los derechos de las alcaldías e Intendencia actuales, resulta irracional y desproporcionado. Este aspecto está muy relacionado con el tema del derecho al voto pasivo, en el tanto en que, de aplicarse retroactivamente la Ley, se le estaría imponiendo una condición muy gravosa a las alcaldías y (sic) intendencias actuales, al querer sumar, para efectos de prohibición, periodos de nombramiento donde la Ley no estaba vigente, lo cual es contrario al derecho de la Constitución y por ende debe anularse el transitorio dicho. La Constitución prohíbe dar efecto retroactivo a las normas cuando esta retroactividad produce perjuicio a una persona, afecta sus derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. En el presente caso, se (sic) acuerdo a (sic) lo regulado por el Transitorio antes dicho, la norma establece una aplicación retroactiva de la misma toda vez que se contabilizan periodos anteriores de nombramientos, cuando la Ley no estaba vigente, lo cual genera un claro perjuicio a los miembros de la ANAI, pues cualquier limitación a un derecho como lo es el voto pasivo, debe ser a partir de la vigencia de la norma y no en relación a (sic) situaciones jurídicas consolidadas como lo son nombramientos en puestos de elección popular, en el régimen municipal, que hayan tenido los asociados de la ANAI. En sentencia de la Sala Constitucional número 2021-3276, esta señala en cuanto a la irretroactividad de las normas: “En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada. Ahora bien, específicamente en punto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un "derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento", es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior; lo que significa es que —como se explicó— si se ha producido el supuesto condicionante, una reforma legal que cambie o elimine la regla no podrá tener la virtud de impedir que surja el efecto condicionado que se esperaba bajo el imperio de la norma anterior. Esto es así porque, se dijo, lo relevante es que el estado de cosas de que gozaba la persona ya estaba definido en cuanto a sus elementos y a sus efectos, aunque éstos todavía se estén produciendo o, incluso, no hayan comenzado a producirse. De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla.” También en voto 202100838, de las 11:15 horas del 28 de abril del año 2021, la Sala Constitucional indicó en cuanto a la irretroactividad de las normas: “Como se concluye con toda facilidad, si las leyes surten efectos hasta que se publican en el diario oficial o desde que estas indiquen, no es posible hacerlas retroactivas en contra de derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, ni siquiera las leyes que derogan a otras”. Cuando una norma realiza una modificación de otra norma existente, la modificación debe tener efectos hacia futuro, esto es a partir de la publicación de la norma en el diario oficial La Gaceta, pero en el presente caso, el transitorio cuestionado pretende generar una regla de limitación de periodos de elección, contando los que los asociados de la ANAI ya tienen al momento de la publicación de la Ley, lo cual a todas luces resulta contario a lo establecido en el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política y así debe declararlo la Sala. Se aclara que no se está en una posición de mantener la reelección indefinida de los puestos de elección popular en el Régimen Municipal, aspecto que es evidente es una potestad del legislador regular, pero lo cierto del caso es que, la regla de limitación debe de aplicar a partir de la publicación de la Ley y sobre los periodos de elección popular que se den posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la norma (8 de abril de 2022) sin contabilizar, como lo pretende el Transitorio cuestionado, periodos anteriores, donde la regla de juego que establecía la Ley, era diferente. 4- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD POR MOTIVOS DE FONDO, VIOLACIÓN DEL PRINCIPIO DE RAZONABILIDAD Y PROPORCIONALIDAD: El artículo 1 de la Ley cuestionada señala que "Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.", Igualmente señala que "Las personas…, intendentes, ... de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, . podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período." (la negrita no es del original). En el mismo sentido, el Transitorio Único de la Ley dicha señala en cuanto a las personas que actualmente ejercen el puesto de Alcaldía, "Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal." (la negrita y subrayado no son del original). En Costa Rica, los puestos de elección popular solamente se tienen en el Poder Ejecutivo para el Presidente y Vicepresidentes, en el Poder Legislativo para los diputados y finalmente en el Régimen Municipal, el cual es donde más puestos de elección popular existen, pues se deben de nombrar, Alcaldías, Vicealcaldías, Regidurías propietarias y suplentes, Sindicaturas propietarias y suplentes y Concejales propietarios y suplentes, Intendencias, Viceintendencias y Concejales Municipales de Distrito propietarios y suplentes. De los puestos de elección popular en el caso del Presidente de la República existe una prohibición de reelección de 8 años (artículo 132, inciso I de la Constitución Política), mientras que para los vicepresidentes estos pueden ser candidatos a presidentes de la República o reelegidos, cuando no hayan ejercido el puesto en los 12 meses anteriores a la elección (artículo 132, inciso 1 de la Constitución Política). En el caso de los diputados, estos no pueden se (sic) reelectos en forma consecutiva, pero sí pueden aspirar nuevamente a ser diputados con el solo transcurso de un periodo cuatrienal (artículo 107 de la Constitución Política). En el caso específico de las Alcaldías tanto el artículo 1 como el Transitorio Único de la Ley 10.183 señalan una prohibición 8 años para volver a ocupar un cargo de elección popular dentro del Régimen Municipal, ello luego de haber sido electo por dos periodos consecutivos. Sobre la limitación para ocupar otros puestos, ya se realizó la fundamentación del caso en líneas anteriores, sobre la limitación temporal que se impone, en la Ley dicha, a las personas que ya ocuparon el puesto de la alcaldía, esta resulta irrazonable y desproporcionada. La Sala Constitucional ha desarrollado el Principio de Razonabilidad de las Leyes, en resoluciones como la 2000-01920, de las 15:27 horas del 1º de marzo del 2000, en donde se indica: “III.-DEL PRINCIPIO DE RAZONABILIDAD COMO PARAMETRO (sic) DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD... La jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido clara y conteste en considerar que el principio de razonabilidad constituye un parámetro de constitucionalidad en los siguientes términos: “El Derecho de la Constitución, compuesto tanto por las normas y Principios Constitucionales, como por los del internacional, y particularmente los de sus instrumentos sobre derechos humanos, en cuanto fundamentos primarios de todo orden jurídico positivo, le transmiten su propia estructura lógica y sentido axiológico, a partir de valores incluso anteriores a los mismos textos legislativos, los cuales son a su vez, fuente de todo sistema normativo propio de una sociedad organizada bajo los conceptos del Estado de Derecho, el régimen constitucional, la Democracia, y la Libertad, de modo tal que cualquier norma o acto que atente contra esos valores o principios - entre ellos los de racionalidad. razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. que son por definición. criterios de constitucionalidad o bien que conduzca a situaciones absurdas, dañinas gravemente injustas, o a callejones sin salida para los particulares o para el Estado, no puede ser constitucionalmente válido" (sentencia número 3495-92, de las 14:30 horas del 19 de noviembre de 1992). En ese mismo sentido, en sentencia número 1420-91, de las 9:00 horas del 24 de junio de 1991 , se indicó: “... En efecto, el principio de razonabilidad implica que el Estado pueda limitar o restringir el ejercicio abusivo del derecho, pero debe hacerlo en forma tal que la norma jurídica se adecue en todos sus elementos como el motivo y el fin que persigue, con el sentido objetivo que se contempla en la Constitución. Quiere ello decir que deba existir una proporcionalidad entre la regla jurídica adoptada y el fin que persigue, referida a la imperiosa necesidad que la ley satisfaga el sentido común jurídico de la comunidad, expresado en los valores que consagra la misma Constitución." (la negrita y subrayado no son del original). Se considera que el periodo de limitación de ocho años que impone la Ley a quienes ocupen un puesto de elección popular en una alcaldía municipal, es totalmente irrazonable y desproporcionado, toda vez que violenta la jurisprudencia dicha, así como el artículo 23 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic) en sus incisos 1 c) y 2, pues la limitación impide sin justificación alguna el acceso en condiciones de igualdad a las personas que ocupen una alcaldía a las funciones públicas dentro del régimen municipal, amén de que se norma una situación que limita derechos y oportunidades a las personas, en contra de las excepciones que impone el mismo artículo 23 inciso 2) de la Convención dicha. También resulta irrazonable y desproporcional la limitación temporal que se impone a las personas que ocupen una alcaldía municipal, por cuanto este puesto es el único dentro de todos los puestos de elección popular que existen en el país, donde el pueblo (munícipes del cantón respectivo) tienen la posibilidad de destituir a la persona que ocupe la alcaldía, ello mediante un plebiscito revocatorio, todo según lo establece el artículo 19 del Código Municipal, que en lo que interesa señala: “Por moción presentada ante el Concejo, que deberá ser firmada al menos por la tercera parte del total de los regidores y aprobada por el mínimo de tres cuartas partes de los regidores integrantes, se convocará a los electores del cantón respectivo a un plebiscito, donde se decidirá destituir o no al alcalde municipal. Tal decisión no podrá ser vetada." Véase que incluso la norma le impide a la persona que ocupe la alcaldía ejercer el derecho a veto sobre el acuerdo de convocatoria a un plebiscito. También, se violenta el principio de proporcionalidad al imponerse limitaciones y condiciones más gravosas al puesto de elección popular de la alcaldía municipal, que no tienen los demás puestos de elección popular dentro del mismo régimen municipal y en relación a (sic) otros puestos de elección popular del poder ejecutivo y del poder legislativo. En razón de lo expuesto, se debe acoger la inconstitucionalidad solicitada y declarar que tanto el artículo I como en Transitorio Único de la Ley 10.183 violentan el principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, desarrollados por la Sala Constitucional como parámetros de constitucionalidad de las normas. (…) PRETENSIÓN Con fundamento en lo expuesto, solicito se declare inconstitucional la Ley número 10.183, Ley REFORMA DEL ARTÍCULO 14 DE LA LEY 7794, CÓDIGO MUNICIPAL, DE 30 DE ABRIL DE 1998 (LEY QUE LIMITA LA REELECCIÓN INDEFINIDA DE LAS AUTORIDADES LOCALES, publicada en el Alcance 73 del diario oficial La Gaceta número 68, del 8 de abril del año 2022 y vigente a partir del 8 de abril del año 2022, ello por los vicios y violación a las normas indicadas en la presente acción de Inconstitucionalidad. MEDIDA CAUTELAR Los procesos partidarios para la elección de los candidatos y candidatas a puestos de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal, para el periodo 2024-2028, en los diferentes partidos políticos, inician entre mayo y junio del año 2023, lo cual, para las autoridades actuales que cuentan con dos periodos de nombramiento, de mantenerse la aplicación de la norma, implicaría que estarían vetados para participar en dichos procesos internos. De declararse la inconstitucionalidad de la norma en los términos dichos, sus efectos serían retroactivos a la fecha de promulgación de la Ley, pero, ciertamente ya se le habrá causado un grave perjuicio de imposible reparación a las personas que actualmente ocupan alcaldías e intendencias, dado que, si tienen dos periodos consecutivos de nombramiento, no podrían participar en el próximo proceso electoral, violentando su derecho al voto pasivo. Debe tomarse en consideración, para los efectos de la presente solicitud, que existe todo un fundamento legal para determinar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada. Ante esta situación solicito a la Sala, al amparo del artículo 82 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional que, como medida cautelar, se ordene no aplicar la norma transitoria (párrafo primero) hasta tanto la Sala no resuelva por el fondo la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Se debe considerar que el peligro en la demora es evidente, pues para cuando se resuelva la acción interpuesta, ya se habrá causado un grave daño a los Alcaldes, Alcaldesas, Intendentes e Intendentas actuales, quienes no podrán participar en el proceso de elección para el año 2024-2028. De la misma manera, la apariencia del buen derecho es más que evidente en el presente caso, lo que justifica, aún más, la suspensión solicitada. SOLICITUD DE VISTA. Solicitamos, al amparo del artículo 10 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en el momento procesal oportuno se nos brinde audiencia oral para formular conclusiones antes de la sentencia.” 10.- Mediante resolución 2022013084 de las 9:30 horas de 8 de junio de 2022 dictada en el expediente 22-010888-0007-CO, el pleno de la Sala dispuso: “Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Wilber Quirós Palma, mayor, casado, constructor, vecino de Tucurrique, cédula número 3-254-246, intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Tucurrique, en lo personal y en su condición de presidente de la Federación de Concejos Municipales de Distrito y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales, mayor, casado, vecino de Cervantes, cédula número 3377-830, intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cervantes, en lo personal, contra la Ley nro. 10183, Ley de Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998. Resultando: 1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11:40 horas del 19 de mayo de 2022, los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley nro. 10183, Ley de Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998. Indican, los accionantes, que la nueva Ley introduce la prohibición de reelección sin límites, respecto de puestos de elección popular locales. Trae un transitorio que alcanza a ejecutivos y concejales que funjan actualmente y que hayan sido reelegidos consecutivamente, los cuales no podrán participar en las próximas elecciones de febrero 2024. A los suplentes del ejecutivo y a los regidores y síndicos, que estén en un segundo período consecutivo, se les permite ser reelegidos en otro puesto local, lo que no se les permite a los ejecutivos locales (alcaldes e intendentes). Acusan que es una normativa restrictiva que no tiene base directa en la Constitución e innova radicalmente el ordenamiento. Alegan una violación al principio de no discriminación de los derechos humanos. Aseveran que la Ley nro. 10183, de reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal, incluido su transitorio único, claramente desmejora el contenido actual del derecho a la reelección. Es más, esa fue la intención. Desde el voto nro. 2003-2771 se sostuvo, por parte de esta Sala, que la posibilidad de reelección en los cargos públicos era un derecho humano, derivado del mismo derecho fundamental a ser elegido. En consecuencia y conforme al Derecho de los Derechos Humanos, no puede ser disminuido por el legislador, ni aun en vía de reforma constitucional, mucho menos por ley ordinaria. El derecho a la reelección en cargos locales, es un derecho fundamental por su sustancia y no le resta fuerza el hecho de que hubiese sido conferido en ley ordinaria. Desde la norma que dispone la elección popular del cargo, si esta no trae limitaciones en cuanto a la reelección, no existen entonces. A estos efectos es irrelevante que haya sido por ley ordinaria que se confirió el derecho de reelección sin tope, por cuanto, de todos modos, es un derecho fundamental. Si es conferido sin tope, no puede reducirse, salvo por la Asamblea Constituyente. Durante el trámite legislativo, el mimo Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (of.TSE-0199-2022 del 20 de enero) acusó que el proyecto implicaba un "vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo". Esto lo advirtió el mismo órgano especializado que rige la materia electoral, cual es la del caso (algo que el magistrado Cruz Castro tuvo por "inobjetable", voto 2022-006119). Recuérdese que esta Sala tuvo por ilícita una reforma constitucional sobre reelección presidencial. Aquí ni siquiera se está ante una reforma constitucional, sino ante una simple reforma legal, en materia (disminución de contenido de un derecho humano) en donde la Asamblea Legislativa ni siquiera tiene competencia. Alegan, además, violación a la necesidad de ley especial reforzada, en el caso de funcionarios de los concejos municipales de distrito. En el caso de tales concejos, rige lo dispuesto por el artículo 172.2 de la Constitución, norma aquí violentada. Según dicho numeral, los mencionados concejos “se integran siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades”. Conforme al numeral 169 constitucional, los integrantes del gobierno local son los concejales y el funcionario ejecutivo. El mismo ordinal 172.2 prescribe que la “estructura” y el “funcionamiento” de los concejos municipales de distrito se regulará por “una ley especial aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados”. Esta ley se emitió: nro. 8173-01, reformada por la 9208-14. Los artículos 6 y 7 regulan la elección popular de los concejales y de los integrantes de las intendencias. La reelección indefinida de Código Municipal se les aplicó. La remisión al código es al entonces vigente. Con la modificación del artículo su status (en cuanto a la reelección) se les modificó, pero no vía ley especial, única prevista por la Constitución, pues la reelección es un tema de "estructura" y de "funcionamiento". La reforma al Código Municipal, por la ley que se impugna, regula directamente el status de los funcionarios electivos de los concejos municipales de distrito, lo que constitucionalmente no se puede, pues la organización de estos requiere ley especial, que ya existe. Afirman que lo anterior no implica menoscabo de sus argumentos de que, de todos modos, se están reduciendo derechos humanos vía una ley ordinaria, lo que no cabe. Acusan violación a los principios de razonabilidad e igualdad. Son principios exhaustivamente expuestos por esa Sala, implícito el primero en la Constitución y explícito el segundo (artículo 33). Se complementan, en cuanto el trato desigual es señal de irrazonabilidad. Dado que en verdad no hubo el debido estudio ni cuidado en la reforma, la que más respondió a una campaña de desacreditación del régimen local, orquestada básicamente por la prensa, el esquema aprobado resulta gravemente incongruente y no representa un ejercicio lícito de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Se prohíbe a los alcaldes, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, ocupar algún cargo municipal de elección popular, en tanto a los vicealcaldes solo se les prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo, o el de regidores o síndicos, de donde sí se les permite postularse a alcaldes, e intendentes o viceintendentes y a concejales de un concejo municipal de distrito. Alegan que es una discriminación sin sentido. Según el Transitorio (referido a los actuales funcionarios que repiten elección), si se trata de Ejecutivos no pueden presentarse de candidatos a ningún puesto de elección popular en las dos próximas elecciones. En los casos de vice-ejecutivos o regidores (que no incluye a los concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito), la restricción es solo al mismo tipo de puesto, lo que establece una diferencia totalmente injustificada. Señalan que el tema también puede ser abordado en otro enfoque. Es tradicional comparar la estructura local con la nacional. Según el artículo 107 constitucional, los diputados no pueden ser reelectos consecutivamente. A los regidores y concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito se les restringe por dos periodos la posibilidad de nuevas elecciones, luego de cumplir dos periodos consecutivos, lo que crea una grave discriminación, un palmario trato desigual, sin la menor justificación. Dos periodos de separación obligan inevitablemente a abandonar la carrera política local. Acusan que las discriminaciones señaladas ni siquiera tienen sustento en el artículo 23.2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic), que establece los motivos taxativos que podrían justificar restricciones en cuento a los derechos políticos. Norma que resulta por ello violentado. La reelección indefinida de todos modos no puede tenerse como perversa per se. La carrera política local no es perversa per se y, al contrario, representa una oportunidad democrática de desarrollar líderes políticos Si de hecho se dan las reelecciones (y hasta con diversos partidos), es porque los pueblos valoran el trabajo de los ejecutivos y concejales, cuando es bueno. También alegan infracción al principio de irretroactividad, recogido en el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política. Aclaran que este agravo (sic) va referido al transitorio citado. La reforma crea un régimen general nuevo, que incorpora restricciones antes inexistentes. Esto conlleva que los actuales servidores electos popularmente lo fueron sin que tuviesen restricciones a futuro, lo que les ha permitido (precisamente a los reelectos) formular un proyecto de carrera política local. No se pretende hacer valer que el legislador, en uso de su discrecionalidad esté inhibido de regular de otro modo la materia. Mas es elemental que cualquier regulación debe tener efectos solo a futuro. El transitorio solo es admisible en tanto sea congruente con la norma principal. En tanto esta rige a futuro, implica que la restricción que se introduce se aplicará de aquí en adelante. Sea, que el funcionario solo podrá ser elegido consecutivamente por dos periodos más, cumplido lo cual entra la veda. Esta veda se aplicaría entonces solo a los que fueron electos dos veces ya entrada en vigencia la reforma. El Transitorio en realidad no viene a regular ninguna situación pendiente que la norma principal no haya dejado ya regulada. La situación actual se rigió por una normativa contundente vigente. La reforma pretende un régimen nuevo, que entones debe entrar como tal. De aquí en adelante las reglas son otras. De aquí en adelante los que se inscriban de candidatos saben a lo que van, sea a un régimen que no permite desarrollar una carrera política. Pero el nuevo régimen no puede surtir efectos hacia el pasado, alcanzando a los ya electos legalmente y en funciones. Reclaman que el efecto retroactivo que logra el transitorio más parece una sanción, lo que responde perfectamente al contexto en que se dio la reforma, a la complacencia de las presiones que se dieron para acabar con la carrera política local, fin último de la reforma. Indican, finalmente, que avalan todos los argumentos expuestos en las acciones sobre el mismo tema presentadas por la ANAI y por FEMETROM. Insisten que la reforma respondió más a presiones del momento, que a la necesidad de resolver un problema. Tal cual quedó, acaba con la carrera política local, la que lógicamente valorada ha venido siendo una alternativa útil para la democracia y para el desarrollo local. La Constitución vigente tiene directrices muy claras, en cuanto al fortalecimiento del régimen local. El legislador no puede desentenderse del programa político positivizado y al máximo nivel. 2.- Para efectos de sustentar su legitimación, los accionantes señalan que la referida Federación defiende los intereses generales de los concejos municipales de distrito y ellos, individualmente, son directamente interesados en el tema de la reelección, es decir afectados directamente con la ley impugnada, que por lo demás resulta auto-aplicativa. Se debe sumar que los intereses en este campo electoral son "nacionales", como tiene enseñado esa Sala. 3.- Los accionantes solicitan que se dicte una medida precautoria inmediata urgente. Señala que la medida cautelar que debe operar de pleno derecho del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, claramente en el caso no conducirá a nada. Los funcionarios de los concejos municipales de distrito afectados con la reforma, en caso que esta acción se admita, nada obtendrán, aunque se llegue a resolver por el fondo la acción y favorablemente a sus intereses, dado los plazos de hecho normales que se siguen. Indican que hay elecciones locales en menos de dos años y ya a estas, conforme a la ley que se impugna, muchos no podrán inscribirse. De allí que si se intentase proteger la situación de los funcionarios afectados, solo queden dos posibilidades, o se resuelve rápidamente la acción, o bien, se suspenden los efectos de la reforma, hasta que la Sala defina el asunto. Indican que están en juego derechos humanos que inciden directa e inmediatamente en nuestro sistema democrático. El tema se contaminó con casos de supuesta corrupción local, aparte de que es público y notorio un proceso mediático de satanización del “municipalismo”, movimiento en el que se pretenden incluir estas reelecciones que la reforma restringe y que dan al traste con la posibilidad real de una carrera política local. 4.- Ante esta misma Sala pende la acción de inconstitucionalidad número 22008383-0007-CO, en la que se impugnan las mismas disposiciones que son objeto de cuestionamiento en el sub examine. En esta, la primera publicación, a que hace referencia el artículo 84 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se realizó el 24 de mayo de 2022. Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y, Considerando: I.- SOBRE LA ACUMULACIÓN DE ESTA ACCIÓN A LA QUE SE TRAMITA EN EXPEDIENTE N° 22-008383-0007-CO. El artículo 84 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional dispone que si después de planteada la acción y antes de la publicación del aviso respectivo se presentaren otras acciones de inconstitucionalidad contra la misma ley, decreto, disposición, acuerdo o resolución, esas acciones se acumularán a la primera y se tendrán como ampliación. También se acumularán las acciones que con ese carácter interpongan las partes de los juicios suspendidos, si fueren presentadas dentro de los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso. Por lo expuesto y ante la evidente conexidad que existe entre los reproches planteados en este asunto y los discutidos en el expediente 22 008383-0007-CO que se tramita ante esta Sala, y a fin de evitar resoluciones contradictorias que pudieren afectar los derechos e intereses de las partes involucradas, se dispone en este acto acumular este expediente al citado. II.- CONSIDERACIONES EN RELACIÓN CON LA MEDIDA CAUTELAR SOLICITADA. Solicitan los accionantes que, como medida cautelar, se ordene no aplicar la norma impugnada hasta tanto la Sala no resuelva por el fondo la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. A su juicio, el peligro en la demora en resolver el asunto, causaría grave daños a los funcionarios de los concejos municipales de distrito afectados con la reforma. En relación con lo manifestado se remite a la parte a lo dispuesto en la resolución de las 8:27 horas del 9 de mayo, dictada en el expediente N° 22-008383-0007-CO, a la cual se está acumulando esta acción y en la que se indicó expresamente: “RESPECTO DE LOS EFECTOS JURÍDICOS DE LA ADMISIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Ciertamente, a tenor del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se debe advertir a los “órganos que agotan la vía administrativa que esa demanda, ha sido establecida, a efecto de que en los procesos o procedimientos en que se discuta la aplicación de la ley, decreto, disposición, acuerdo o resolución, tampoco se dicte resolución final mientras la Sala no haya hecho el pronunciamiento del caso”. Empero, en el caso concreto, la aplicación del ordinal 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional enervaría la aplicación de la norma y consiguientemente impediría la realización del próximo proceso electoral. Por lo expuesto, en aplicación del ordinal 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se impone modular el efecto suspensivo del artículo 81 de ese cuerpo normativo, indicándose, expresamente, que no se suspende el dictado de ninguna resolución final, ya sea en sede interna, administrativa o electoral.” Por tanto: Acumúlese esta acción a la que bajo expediente número 22-008383-0007CO se tramita ante esta Sala.” En relación con lo anterior, el escrito de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada por Wilber Quirós Palma, intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Tucurrique, en lo personal y en su condición de presidente de la Federación de Concejos Municipales de Distrito y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales, intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cervantes, en condición personal, contiene los siguientes argumentos:“Comparecemos el primero a nombre de la Federación dicha y en lo personal, y el segundo en lo personal, a incoar Acción de Inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley 10183 cit., como se concretara infra. Esta Acción se establece a tenor de los arts. 73 y ss de la LJC. La Federación que suscribe defiende los intereses generales de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito y los que suscribimos individualmente somos directamente interesados en el tema de la reelección, es decir afectados directamente con la ley impugnada, que por lo demás resulta auto-aplicativa. Se debe sumar que los intereses en este campo electoral son “nacionales”, como tiene ensenado esa Sala. Rogamos la admisión y sugerimos se conceda audiencia sobre el fondo al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, dado que estamos ante materia electoral propia de ese órgano. NORMATIVA IMPUGNADA Se trata de la Ley 10183 del 5 de abril del 2022, que reforma el art. 14 del Código Municipal. La nueva Ley introduce la prohibición de reelección sin límites, respecto de puestos de elección popular locales. Trae un transitorio que alcanza a Ejecutivos y concejales que funjan actualmente y que hayan sido reelegidos consecutivamente, los cuales no podrán participar en las próximas elecciones de febrero 2024. A los suplentes del Ejecutivo y a los regidores y síndicos, que estén en un segundo periodo consecutivo, les permite ser reelegidos en otro puesto local, lo que no les permite a los Ejecutivos locales (alcaldes e intendentes). Es una normativa restrictiva que no tiene base directa en la Constitución e innova radical el ordenamiento. SOLICITUD DE MEDIDA PRECAUTORIA INMEDIATA URGENTE La medida cautelar que debe operar de pleno derecho del art. 81 de la LJC, claramente en el caso no conducirá a nada. Los funcionarios de los CMDs afectados con la reforma, caso de que esta Acción se admita, nada obtendrán aunque se llegue a resolver por el fondo la Acción y favorablemente a sus intereses, dados los plazos de hecho normales que se siguen. Recuérdese que hay elecciones locales en menos de dos años y ya a estas, conforme a la Ley que se impugna, muchos no podrán inscribirse. De allí que si se intentase proteger la situación de los funcionarios afectados, solo queden dos posibilidades: o se resuelve rápidamente la Acción, o bien se suspenden los efectos de la reforma hasta tanto la Sala no defina el asunto. Están en juego Derechos Humanos que inciden directa e inmediatamente en nuestro sistema democrático. Desgraciadamente el tema se contaminó con casos de supuesta corrupción local, aparte de que es público y notorio un proceso mediático de satanización del “municipalismo”, movimiento en el que se pretenden incluir estas reelecciones que la reforma restringe y que dan al traste con la posibilidad real de una carrera política local. VIOLACIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE NO DISMINUCION (sic) DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS La Ley 10183, de reforma del párrafo 5 del artículo 14 del Código Municipal, incluido su transitorio único, claramente desmejora el contenido actual del derecho a la reelección. Es más, esa fue la intención. Desde el voto 2003-2771 se sostuvo ( por parte de esa Sala, que la posibilidad de reelección en los cargos públicos era un derecho humano, derivado del mismo derecho fundamental a ser elegido. En consecuencia y conforme al Derecho de los Derechos Humanos no puede ser disminuido por el legislador, ni aun en vía de reforma constitucional, mucho menos por ley ordinaria. El derecho a reelección en cargos locales es un derecho fundamental por su sustancia y no le resta fuerza el hecho de que hubiese sido conferido en ley ordinaria. Conferido expresamente, porque en verdad desde la norma que dispone la elección popular del cargo, si no trae limitaciones en cuanto a reelección no existen entonces. A estos efectos es irrelevante que haya sido por ley ordinaria que se confirió el derecho de reelección sin tope, por cuanto de todos modos es un derecho fundamental. Pero el tema sí es que conferido sin tope no puede reducirse, salvo por Asamblea Constituyente. Durante el trámite legislativo el mismo Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (of. TSE-0199-2022, del 20 de enero) acusó que el proyecto implicaba un "vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo''. Esto lo advirtió el mismo órgano especializado que rige la materia electoral, cual es la del caso (algo que el Magistrado Cruz Castro tuvo por "inobjetable", voto 2022-006119. Recuérdese que esa Sala tuvo por ilícita una reforma constitucional sobre la reelección presidencial. Aquí ni siquiera estamos ante una reforma constitucional, sino ante una simple reforma legal, en materia (disminución de contenido de un derecho humano) en donde la Asamblea Legislativa ni siquiera tiene competencia. VIOLACIÓN A LA NECESIDAD DE LEY ESPECIAL REFORZADA, EN EL CASO DE FUNCIONARIOS DE CONCEJOS MUNICIPALES DE DISTRITO. En el caso de los CMDs, rige lo dispuesto por el artículo 172.2 de la Constitución, norma aquí violentada. Según dicho artículo los CMDs "se integran siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. "Conforme al 169 idem, los integrantes del gobierno local son los concejales y el funcionario ejecutivo. El mismo 172.2 prescribe que la "estructura y el "funcionamiento'' de los CMDs se regulara por "una ley especial aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados". Esta ley se emitió (N° 8173-01 reformada por la 9208-14). Los arts. 6 y 7 regulan la elección popular de los concejales y de los integrantes de las intendencias. La reelección indefinida de Código Municipal se les aplicó. La remisión al Código es al entonces vigente. Con la modificación del artículo su status (en cuanto a la reelección) se les modifica, pero no vía ley especial, única prevista por la Constitución, pues la reelección es un tema de "estructura" y de "funcionamiento". La reforma al Código Municipal, por la ley que impugnamos, regula directamente el status de los funcionarios electivos de los CMDs, lo que constitucionalmente no se puede, pues la organización de los CMDs requiere ley especial, que ya existe. Lo anterior, por supuesto, no implica menoscabo de nuestros argumentos de que de todos modos se están reduciendo derechos humanos vía una ley ordinaria, lo que no cabe. VIOLACIÓN A LOS PRINCIPIOS DE RAZONABILIDAD Y DE IGUALDAD Son principios exhaustivamente expuestos por esa Sala, implícito el primero en la Constitución y explícito el segundo (art.33). Se complementan, en cuanto el trato desigual es señal de irrazonabilidad. Dado que en verdad no hubo el debido estudio ni cuidado en la reforma, la que más respondió a una campaña de desacreditación del régimen local, orquestada básicamente por la prensa, el esquema aprobado resulta gravemente incongruente y no representa un ejercicio lícito de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Se prohíbe a los alcaldes, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, ocupar algún cargo municipal de elección popular, en tanto a los vicealcaldes solo se les prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo, o el de regidores o síndicos, de donde sí se les permite postularse a alcaldes, e intendentes o viceintendentes y a concejales de un CMD. Es una discriminación sin sentido. Según el Transitorio (referido a los actuales funcionarios que repiten elección), si se trata de Ejecutivos no pueden presentarse de candidatos a ningún puesto de elección popular en las dos próximas elecciones. En los casos de vice-Ejecutivos o regidores (que no incluye a los concejales de los CMD), la restricción es solo al mismo tipo de puesto, lo que establece una diferencia totalmente injustificada. El tema también puede ser abordado con otro enfoque. Es tradicional comparar la estructura local con la nacional. Según el 107 C.P., los diputados no pueden ser reelectos consecutivamente. A los regidores y concejales de los CMDs se les restringe por dos periodos la posibilidad de nuevas elecciones, luego de cumplir dos periodos consecutivos, lo que crea una grave discriminación, un palmario trato desigual, sin la menor justificación. Dos periodos de separación obliga inevitablemente a abandonar la carrera política local. Las discriminaciones señaladas ni siquiera tienen sustento en el 23.2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic), que señala los motivos taxativos que podrían justificar restricciones en cuanto a los derechos políticos, norma que resulta por ello violentada, lo que acusamos. La reelección indefinida de todos modos no puede tenerse como perversa per se; la carrera política local no es perversa per se y, al contrario, representa una oportunidad democrática de desarrollar líderes políticos. Si de hecho se dan las reelecciones (y hasta con diversos partidos), es porque los pueblos valoran el trabajo de los Ejecutivos y concejales, cuando es bueno. VIOLACIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE IRRETROACTIVIDAD Principio recogido en el 34 C.P., aquí violentado. Este agravo (sic) va referido al Transitorio citado. La reforma crea un régimen general nuevo, que incorpora restricciones antes inexistentes. Esto conlleva que los actuales servidores electos popularmente lo fueron sin que tuviesen restricciones a futuro, lo que les ha permitido (precisamente a los reelectos) formular un proyecto de carrera política local. No se pretende hacer valer que el legislador, en uso de su discrecionalidad en estos casos esté inhibido de regular de otro modo la materia (lo que admitimos sin demérito de lo que supra se argumentó). Mas es elemental que cualquier regulación debe tener efectos solo a futuro. El transitorio solo es admisible en tanto sea congruente con la norma principal. En tanto esta rige a futuro, implica que la restricción que se introduce se aplicará de aquí en adelante. Sea, que el funcionario solo podrá ser elegido consecutivamente por dos periodos más, cumplido lo cual entra la veda. Esta veda se aplicaría entonces solo a los que fueron electos dos veces ya entrada en vigencia la reforma. El transitorio en realidad no viene a regular ninguna situación pendiente que la norma principal no haya dejado ya regulada. La situación actual se rigió por una normativa contundente vigente. La reforma pretende un régimen nuevo, que entonces debe entrar como tal. De aquí en adelante las reglas son otras. De aquí en adelante los que se inscriban de candidatos saben a lo que van, sea un régimen que no permite desarrollar una carrera política. Pero el nuevo régimen no puede surtir efectos hacia el pasado, alcanzando a los ya electos legalmente y en funciones. El efecto retroactivo que logra el Transitorio más parece una sanción, lo que responde perfectamente al contexto en que se dio la reforma, a la complacencia de las presiones que se dieron para acabar con la carrera política local, fin último de la reforma. Avalamos en un todo las argumentaciones expuestas en las Acciones sobre el tema presentadas por la ANAI y por FEMETROM. Rogamos el debido trámite y esperamos pronta resolución, dada la afectación que se está produciendo y que podría quedar sin remedio. Insistimos en que la reforma respondió más a presiones del momento que a la necesidad de resolver un problema. Tal cual quedó, acaba con la carrera política local, la que lógicamente valorada ha venido siendo una alternativa útil para nuestra democracia y para el desarrollo local. La Constitución vigente tiene directrices muy claras, en cuanto al fortalecimiento del régimen local. El legislador no puede desentenderse del programa político positivizado y al máximo nivel.

11.- Mediante resolución de las 12:16 horas de 17 de junio de 2022, la Presidencia de la Sala dispuso:“Téngase por ampliada esta acción de inconstitucionalidad 22-008383-0007-CO, en los términos expuestos en las acciones 22-008424-0007-CO y 22-10888-0007-CO a ella acumuladas, en el sentido de que también se impugnan la Ley n.° 10.183, “Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, del 30 de abril de 1998 (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales)”, por estimar que es contraria a los artículos 97 y 102 de la Constitución Política. Las normas se impugnan en cuanto: 1) en la acción acumulada n.° 22-008424-0007-CO se cuestiona el procedimiento de aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa el cual, a su juicio, lesiona el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. Esto, en razón de que, al ser consultado el proyecto al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, este brindó un criterio negativo en relación con su contenido. En primer lugar, indicó que dicho proyecto de ley genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo al impedir a funcionarios con dos períodos en el mismo puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal, que no puedan aspirar a otros puestos de esa naturaleza dentro del mismo régimen, sobre todo, a quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias. En segundo término, que dentro de los seis meses previos y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de ley en los cuales el T.S.E., se haya mostrado en desacuerdo. Sobre este último aspecto, la Sala Constitucional se pronunció en el voto N° 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022 y, en lo sustantivo indicó, que el artículo 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso, si un proyecto hace referencia a las elecciones municipales y no se está en el período electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del T.S.E. no tendría efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente agravarla, requiriendo para su aprobación mayoría calificada de dos tercios. La parte accionante considera que la parte final del artículo 97 no está sujeto a ninguna interpretación y su contenido es claro. Por otra parte, en el voto referido, la Sala Constitucional, hace interpretaciones de normas constitucionales electorales, cuando esta labor le corresponde al T.S.E. en forma exclusiva, de conformidad con el artículo 102, inciso 3 de la Constitución Política. Sobre este aspecto cita, en apoyo de su tesis, el voto salvado del magistrado Castillo Víquez en el voto N°2022-6119. 2) En la acción acumulada n.° 22-10888-0007-CO, se alega, además, violación a la necesidad de ley especial reforzada, en el caso de funcionarios de los concejos municipales de distrito. En el caso de tales concejos, rige lo dispuesto por el artículo 172.2 de la Constitución. Según dicho numeral, los mencionados concejos “se integran siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades”. Conforme al numeral 169 constitucional, los integrantes del gobierno local son los concejales y el funcionario ejecutivo. El mismo ordinal 172.2 prescribe que la “estructura” y el “funcionamiento” de los concejos municipales de distrito se regulará por “una ley especial aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados”. Esta ley se emitió: n.° 8173-01, reformada por la n.° 9208-14. Los artículos 6 y 7 regulan la elección popular de los concejales y de los integrantes de las intendencias. La reelección indefinida de Código Municipal se les aplicó. La remisión al código es al entonces vigente. Con la modificación del artículo su status (en cuanto a la reelección) se les modificó, pero no vía ley especial, única prevista por la Constitución, pues la reelección es un tema de "estructura" y de "funcionamiento". La reforma al Código Municipal, por la ley que se impugna, regula directamente el status de los funcionarios electivos de los concejos municipales de distrito, lo que constitucionalmente no se puede, pues la organización de estos requiere ley especial, que ya existe .Afirman que lo anterior no implica menoscabo de sus argumentos de que, de todos modos, se están reduciendo derechos humanos vía una ley ordinaria, lo que no cabe. También se acusa la violación a los principios de razonabilidad e igualdad, dado que en verdad no hubo el debido estudio ni cuidado en la reforma, la que más respondió a una campaña de desacreditación del régimen local, orquestada básicamente por la prensa, el esquema aprobado resulta gravemente incongruente y no representa un ejercicio lícito de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Se prohíbe a los alcaldes, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, ocupar algún cargo municipal de elección popular, en tanto a los vicealcaldes solo se les prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo, o el de regidores o síndicos, de donde sí se les permite postularse a alcaldes, e intendentes o viceintendentes y a concejales de un concejo municipal de distrito. Alegan que es una discriminación sin sentido. Según el Transitorio (referido a los actuales funcionarios que repiten elección), si se trata de Ejecutivos no pueden presentarse de candidatos a ningún puesto de elección popular en las dos próximas elecciones. En los casos de vice-ejecutivos o regidores (que no incluye a los concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito), la restricción es solo al mismo tipo de puesto, lo que establece una diferencia totalmente injustificada. Señalan que el tema también puede ser abordado en otro enfoque. Es tradicional comparar la estructura local con la nacional. Según el artículo 107 constitucional, los diputados no pueden ser reelectos consecutivamente. A los regidores y concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito se les restringe por dos periodos la posibilidad de nuevas elecciones, luego de cumplir dos periodos consecutivos, lo que crea una grave discriminación, un palmario trato desigual, sin la menor justificación. Dos periodos de separación obligan inevitablemente a abandonar la carrera política local. Acerca de esa ampliación, se confiere audiencia por quince días al procurador General de la República, a la presidenta del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y al presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa. (…) Notifíquese con copia de los escritos de interposición de las acciones acumuladas números 22-008424-0007-CO y 22-10888-0007-CO.” 12.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 7 de julio de 2022, se apersona Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, en su condición de procuradora general adjunta de la República. Expone lo siguiente: “I. OBJETO DE LA AMPLIACIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN En primer lugar, debemos señalar que, al darse curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad tramitada bajo el número de expediente 22-8383-0007-CO, este órgano asesor se pronunció sobre los argumentos de fondo planteados contra lo dispuesto en la parte sustantiva de la Ley 10.183 del 5 de abril de 2022 y su transitorio. Por ello, en cuanto a los reclamos de fondo que se plantean en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad 22-8424-0007CO y 22-10888-0007-CO, acumuladas a dicha acción, remitimos a la Sala a nuestro informe previo, por tratarse de los mismos reclamos. Dado ello, este nuevo informe que presentamos, se limitará a los temas nuevos planteados en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad 22-8424-0007-CO y 22-10888-0007-CO que, en nuestro criterio, se refiere únicamente a los reclamos de procedimiento en la aprobación de la Ley 10183. Partiendo de ello, nos pronunciaremos sobre los siguientes extremos: a) Supuesta violación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, dado que durante el trámite legislativo el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones brindó un criterio negativo sobre el proyecto de ley y que dentro de los seis meses previos y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de ley en los cuales se haya mostrado en desacuerdo dicho órgano electoral; b) Supuesta violación de lo dispuesto en el numeral 172.2 de la Constitución, por cuanto en el caso de los concejos municipales de distrito, su estructura y funcionamiento sólo puede regularse mediante “una ley especial aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados”. Se considera que la Ley 10183 no tiene esa condición, pues se trata de una ley general y no especial, que ya existe. II. SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN La acción de inconstitucionalidad 22-8424-0007-CO fue interpuesta por la Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica y la acción número 22-10888-0007CO, por el Intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Tucurrique (quien a su vez es el Presidente de la Federación de Concejos Municipales de Distrito) y el Intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cervantes. Independientemente de los cargos que ocupan los citados accionantes, debe reiterarse, tal como señalamos en nuestro informe previo, que la Sala Constitucional ha aceptado la existencia de intereses difusos cuando se trate de la defensa de los derechos político electorales, específicamente el derecho a elegir y ser electo. Por tanto, estimamos que no existen problemas de legitimación en las acciones acumuladas, toda vez que se cumple con lo dispuesto en el numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. III. SOBRE LA SUPUESTA VIOLACIÓN DE LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 97 CONSTITUCIONAL. Dentro de la acción 22-8424-0007-CO, se alega que el trámite de aprobación de la Ley 10183 resulta violatorio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, dado que durante el trámite legislativo el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones brindó un criterio negativo sobre el proyecto de ley y que dentro de los seis meses previos y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de ley en los cuales se haya mostrado en desacuerdo dicho órgano electoral. Por su importancia, procedemos a citar el artículo 97 constitucional que señala: “ARTÍCULO 97.- Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.” Como se observa, el artículo indicado establece dos supuestos diferentes. En primer lugar, exige que cualquier ley relativa a la materia electoral, que cuente con oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sea aprobada por dos terceras partes del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa y, en segundo lugar, prohíbe –de manera absoluta- que la Asamblea apruebe un proyecto de ley que cuente con la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones si se está dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular. Para referirnos al reclamo que se plantea en la presente acción, deben tomarse en consideración los siguientes hechos de relevancia del trámite legislativo llevado a cabo para la aprobación de la ley 10183: a) El proyecto de ley 21810, que sirvió de antecedente a la Ley 10.183 del 5 de abril de 2022, fue presentado en la corriente legislativa el 18 de febrero de 2020 (ver expediente legislativo); b) Mediante oficio AL-DSDI-OFI-0005-2022 del 11 de enero de 2022, la Asamblea Legislativa consultó de manera preceptiva el proyecto de ley actualizado al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folio 728 del expediente legislativo); c) Por oficio TSE-0199 del 20 de enero de 2022, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, objetó el proyecto de ley por considerarlo contrario al derecho a ser electo, en cuanto prohíbe que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular del régimen municipal. En dicho oficio se señaló: “… este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente n°21.810. Tal objeción se levantaría si los legisladores modifican el proyecto para que, según el espíritu de la propuesta, se limite la reelección consecutiva a una única vez (máximo dos períodos continuos en el mismo cargo), sin que se prohíba la posibilidad de optar, al cabo del segundo mandato, por otro puesto de elección popular. Respetuosamente, se recuerda que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (numeral 97 constitucional). ACUERDO FIRME.” (folios 1063 al 1072 del expediente legislativo); d) En la sesión extraordinaria número 45 del 23 de diciembre de 2021, el Plenario Legislativo aprobó en primer debate el proyecto de ley 21810, con una votación de 46 votos a favor (folios 551 a 600 y 604 del proyecto de ley); e)En sesión extraordinaria N°46 del 05 de enero del 2022, se inició la discusión del proyecto N°21.810 en segundo debate, donde se aprobó una moción de orden para retrotraer a primer debate y se suspendió la discusión para que ocupara el primer lugar de los primeros debates en sesión siguiente (folio 650). f)Mediante sesión ordinaria Nº 85 del 11 de enero del 2022 del Plenario Legislativo, inició la discusión en el trámite de primer debate del proyecto N°21.810 (folio 702). En sesión extraordinaria N°053 del 25 de enero del 2022 se continuó la discusión en primer debate del proyecto en cuestión y se aprobó en primer debate por 40 votos a favor (folio 1082-1112). g) El 27 de enero de 2022, varios diputados y diputadas de la Asamblea Legislativa presentaron una consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, tramitada bajo el número de expediente 22-001848-0007-CO (folios 1143 a 1162 del expediente legislativo); h)La Sala Constitucional evacuó la consulta mediante el voto 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022, estimando que no existían vicios de procedimiento y declarando la consulta inevacuable en cuanto a los vicios de fondo alegados; i) En sesión ordinaria 105 del 29 de marzo de 2022, el Plenario Legislativo aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley 21.810 con 48 votos a favor, sin acoger las observaciones hechas por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folios 1367 y 1372). Como se desprende de los hechos descritos, por tratarse de un proyecto de ley relativo a la materia electoral, la Asamblea Legislativa lo consultó al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones durante su tramitación, institución que se opuso parcialmente a la iniciativa legislativa, al considerarla contraria al parámetro de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad dada la restricción establecida a los funcionarios municipales con dos periodos consecutivos en el cargo, para optar por otros puestos de elección popular (folio 1068 del expediente legislativo). No obstante lo anterior, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado sin que se tomaran en consideración las observaciones del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues la ley finalmente aprobada mantuvo la restricción señalada por el órgano electoral (restricción sobre la cual nos referimos en nuestro informe previo). Si se toma como parámetro el primer supuesto descrito en el artículo 97 constitucional, es claro que no existe infracción de procedimiento alguna, pues el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate por 40 votos y, en segundo debate, por 48 votos. Esto evidencia que aun con la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Asamblea Legislativa superó la mayoría constitucional para apartarse de dicha oposición. La duda se genera en este caso con el segundo supuesto contemplado en el numeral 97 de la Constitución, que impide a la Asamblea Legislativa de manera absoluta, aprobar proyectos de ley de materia electoral si se está dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, cuando existe oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Como se observa, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate en fecha 25 de enero de 2022, a menos de un mes de las elecciones nacionales realizadas en febrero de 2022 y, en segundo debate el 29 de marzo de 2022, a menos de un mes de la segunda ronda de las elecciones nacionales. Se plantea la discusión entonces si, ante la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Asamblea Legislativa podía aprobar la ley, dado el momento electoral en que nos encontrábamos. De previo a referirnos al reclamo que se plantea, debemos señalar como ya lo hemos hecho en otras oportunidades, que el deslinde de competencias entre la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en materia electoral no ha sido pacífico, especialmente cuando estamos frente al control de constitucionalidad y, especialmente, en lo que respecta a interpretaciones de normas constitucionales y legales en materia electoral. En la sentencia Nº 5379-97 de las 14:36 horas del 5 de setiembre de 1997, la Sala Constitucional ya había manifestado que aun cuando no le corresponde conocer los actos relativos a la materia electoral, sí debe analizar las normas, incluso electorales sujetas al control de constitucionalidad, a partir de lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 de la Constitución y 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. A pesar de ello, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones a través de su jurisprudencia reconoció su competencia para realizar funciones de contralor de constitucionalidad en casos concretos, incluso desaplicando normas estatutarias de partidos políticos por considerarlas contrarias al Derecho de la Constitución (resoluciones 1669 de las 9:30 horas del 24 de agosto de 1999, 393-E-2000 de las 13:15 horas del 15 de marzo del 2000, 1328-E-2001 de las ocho horas con cuarenta minutos del 26 de junio del 2001, N°859-E-2001 de las 15:30 horas del 17 de abril de 2001, N°4102-E1-2013 de las 10:15 horas del 16 de setiembre de 2013, entre otras). Competencia que fue negada parcialmente por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia 2016-017376 de las 11:41 horas del once horas y cuarenta y un minutos del veintitrés de noviembre de dos mil dieciséis, en la cual reservó para sí misma, el análisis de constitucionalidad de las normas electorales, salvo cuando existan antecedentes o jurisprudencia de la propia Sala que pueda servir de parámetro al Tribunal para desaplicar una norma por razones de constitucionalidad con efectos inter partes. En la sentencia 15-016070 de las 11:30 horas del 14 de octubre de 2015, la mayoría de la Sala amplió su competencia, determinado que, además, puede ejercer control de constitucionalidad no sólo sobre las normas electorales, sino también con relación a (sic) la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en materia electoral. A pesar de dicho criterio emitido en el año 2015, posteriormente el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones sostuvo una posición contraria a la Sala, al considerar que “los ejercicios interpretativos del TSE, en el ejercicio de la función electoral, están exentos del control de constitucionalidad encargado a la Sala Constitucional, tanto en lo que se refiere a resoluciones aisladas como a la jurisprudencia resultante de ella.” (resolución 3603-E8-2016) (La negrita no es del original). Sin perjuicio del conflicto de competencias que se ha mantenido entre la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en el tiempo, ha sido criterio de este órgano asesor que en el tanto estemos frente a interpretaciones de normas constitucionales o legales de naturaleza electoral (que no constituyan jurisprudencia), quien debe ejercer esa competencia de manera exclusiva y excluyente es el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues el Constituyente fue claro en reconocerle esa atribución en los artículos 99 y 102 inciso 3 constitucionales. En algunos casos, la Sala Constitucional ha avalado esta tesis (ver por ejemplo la sentencia 2018-003423 de las 9:50 horas de 2 de marzo de dos mil 2018, donde se rechaza de plano una acción contra una resolución interpretativa), pero lo cierto es que su posición no ha sido uniforme. Esta posición que hemos sostenido en cuanto a que debe prevalecer la posición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones cuando se trate de una interpretación de una norma electoral, resulta de importancia para este caso, pues tal como quedó establecido en el apartado de hechos, dicho órgano constitucional se pronunció de manera negativa durante el trámite legislativo, sobre el proyecto de ley que sirvió de antesala a la Ley 10183 y que claramente constituye una norma de carácter electoral. Adicionalmente, dicho órgano constitucional advirtió a la Asamblea Legislativa que “Respetuosamente, se recuerda que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (numeral 97 constitucional). ACUERDO FIRME.” (folios 1063 al 1072 del expediente legislativo); A pesar de ello, la Sala Constitucional durante el trámite legislativo evacuó una consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad interpretando lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 de la Constitución, norma de naturaleza eminentemente electoral, para rechazar la vinculatoriedad del criterio emitido por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones durante el trámite legislativo a la Asamblea Legislativa. Nos referimos específicamente al voto 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022, en el cual la Sala interpretó lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 constitucional, indicando que, por tratarse la Ley 10183 de una norma destinada a las elecciones municipales, no existía impedimento para aprobarse durante una elección nacional, a pesar de la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Indicó en lo que interesa en el citado voto: “En el diseño original del Constituyente de 1949 su voluntad fue que en un solo día se realizaran las tres elecciones, sea: las presidenciales, legislativas y municipales. En efecto, se decantó porque las elecciones para presidente y vicepresidentes de la República (artículo 133 constitucional), los miembros del Poder Legislativo (numeral 107 constitucional) y los regidores municipales (artículo 171 constitucional), se realizaran el mismo día. (…) Ahora bien, mediante ley -entrada en vigencia del Código Electoral, artículo 310-, se separaron las elecciones municipales de las presidenciales y legislativas, trasladándose las primeras para el medio periodo constitucional. Esta modificación del sistema -pasar de un modelo único o concentrado a uno dual- impone una interpretación del numeral 97 constitucional de cara a esta nueva realidad. Cuando se trataba de tres elecciones en un mismo día, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al proyecto de ley tenía el efecto de suspender la potestad de legislar para el caso concreto durante los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la elección-; si el criterio se vertida (sic) fuera de ese periodo, se agravaba la potestad de legislar. La situación ha cambiado radicalmente en la actualidad, en la que hay elecciones separadas entre las presidenciales y diputadiles y las municipales. En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto de ley hace referencia las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría el efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente de agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional de ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional. Es por esta razón, de que, en el caso concreto, no existe ningún vicio de procedimiento por hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya aprobado en primer debate el proyecto de ley consultado. Más aún, incluso hay un error de concepto en lo consultado, toda vez que, conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el hipotético caso de que estuviéramos en el supuesto de la prohibición del 97 constitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa está autorizada por el Derecho de la Constitución y por las normas del Estatuto Parlamentario a aprobar un proyecto de ley en primer debate en el que hay una objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; lo que si no podría hacer es aprobarlo en la votación definitiva después de concluido el segundo debate. Ergo, con fundamento en lo anterior, se descarta el vicio de procedimiento.” Como se desprende de lo anterior, la Sala consideró que la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no suspendía la votación de la Asamblea Legislativa, pues el proyecto de ley que sirvió de antesala a la Ley 10183 iba dirigido a las elecciones municipales y, las que se encontraban en trámite, eran de carácter nacional. Por tanto, consideró la Sala, que únicamente debía aprobarse el proyecto por mayoría agravada de la Asamblea Legislativa. Dicha posición, en nuestro criterio, presenta el inconveniente no sólo de que la Sala se atribuyó la interpretación o actualización de una norma constitucional de naturaleza electoral (artículo 97) que -en principio- corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sino que, además, la Sala realizó dicha interpretación conforme a una norma de rango legal (Código Electoral), desconociendo la voluntad del Constituyente plasmada en los artículos 97, 99 y 102 inciso 3 de la Constitución, aun cuando el régimen electoral cambiara a partir de la vigencia del Código Electoral. Asimismo, es claro que las normas contenidas en el proyecto de ley que sirvió de antesala a la Ley 10183, eran de naturaleza electoral, por lo que la oposición del TSE para que el proyecto se votara vinculaba a la Asamblea Legislativa. En otras palabras, es nuestro criterio que durante el trámite legislativo debió prevalecer la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues es a dicho órgano al que le corresponde de manera exclusiva la interpretación de las normas electorales y nos encontrábamos en medio de una elección popular. Nótese que en ningún momento ese tribunal electoral consideró durante el trámite legislativo que el proyecto de ley podía aprobarse por no tratarse de una elección municipal la que estaba en curso, sino que, por el contrario, indicó al legislador que únicamente podía aprobarlo si acataba las recomendaciones que estaba haciendo al proyecto de ley, cosa que no se hizo por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver actas legislativas ya citadas). Estimamos, además, que el hecho de que una norma legal se refiera a una elección de carácter municipal y que las elecciones en trámite fueran de carácter nacional, no superaba la prohibición establecida en el numeral 97 constitucional, pues bajo esa tesis el legislador podría crear nuevas obligaciones en materia electoral, sin considerar si el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones puede o no hacerles frente, estando en medio de la compleja logística de una elección, sea cual sea su naturaleza. De ahí que precisamente por ello, corresponde al TSE determinar si un proyecto de ley -en materia electoral- puede o no aprobarse durante los meses previos y posteriores a la elección que se está realizando, especialmente porque sólo dicho órgano puede valorar aspectos presupuestarios, logísticos y técnicos relativos a la organización del sufragio y su posibilidad material de atender al mismo tiempo, eventuales normas legales que dicte la Asamblea Legislativa en materia electoral, sean de alcance municipal o nacional. Por ello, aunque respetamos la posición de la Sala Constitucional, estimamos que, en este caso, sí se configuró la violación alegada al procedimiento legislativo. IV. SOBRE LA SUPUESTA VIOLACIÓN DE LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 172.2 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN. El segundo reclamo de procedimiento que se plantea en la acción de inconstitucionalidad 22-10888-0007-CO, acumulada a la 22-8383-0007-CO, es la supuesta violación de lo dispuesto en el numeral 172.2 de la Constitución, por cuanto consideran los accionantes que, en el caso de los concejos municipales de distrito, su estructura y funcionamiento sólo puede regularse mediante “una ley especial aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados”, naturaleza que no cumple la Ley 10183, por cuanto se trata de una ley general. Al respecto, debe citarse lo que establece el artículo 172.2 de la Constitución: “ARTÍCULO 172.- Cada distrito estará representado ante la municipalidad por un síndico propietario y un suplente con voz pero sin voto. Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación. (Así reformado por el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8105 de 31 de mayo del 2001)” Como se desprende del artículo citado, el Constituyente consideró que la creación, estructura, funcionamiento y financiación de los concejos municipales de distrito debe regularse mediante una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados. Precisamente a partir de esta norma, los accionantes estiman la existencia de un vicio de procedimiento al aprobarse la Ley 10183, pues consideran que ésta es de naturaleza general y no especial. Para referirnos al reclamo planteado por los accionantes debe definirse primero qué se entiende por “ley especial”, lo cual ha sido abordado tanto en la doctrina como en la jurisprudencia administrativa de esta Procuraduría. "Con el término ley especial se suele designar aquella norma que sustrae a otra parte de la materia regulada o supuesto de hecho y la dota de una regulación diferente. La noción de ley especial denota una tendencia a la concreción o singularización en la regulación de los supuestos de hecho o, dicho de manera sintética, la existencia de normas que representan una excepción con respecto a otras de alcance más general. La característica última de la ley especial consiste, pues, en que, si ésta no existiera, su supuesto de hecho quedaría automáticamente comprendido en el más amplio de la ley de alcance general". (L, DIEZ-PICAZO: La derogación de las leyes, Civitas, Madrid, 1990, p. 345.) En el dictamen C-007-2003 de 16 de enero del 2003, este órgano asesor se refirió a la diferencia entre las normas generales y especiales, indicando en lo que interesa: "Como ha sido puesto en evidencia por la doctrina y jurisprudencia, el criterio de especialidad es un criterio relacional, en el sentido en que ninguna norma es por sí misma especial, sino que lo es en comparación con otra. La norma "especial" constituye una excepción respecto de lo dispuesto por otra de alcance más general. Lo que impide que el supuesto de hecho regulado por la norma quede comprendido en el más amplio de la ley de alcance general: ‘De su propia definición se desprende la relatividad del concepto de ley especial. Este es relativo, ante todo, por su naturaleza relacional: una norma no puede ser intrínsecamente especial, sino que lo ha de ser por comparación con otra norma. La generalidad y la especialidad no son rasgos esenciales y absolutos de las normas. Son, más bien, graduaciones de su ámbito de regulación, que, en cuanto tales, sólo adquieren sentido cuando se parangonan con los ámbitos de regulación de otras normas. Pero es más: si la especialidad radica en concretar un supuesto de hecho a partir de otro más amplio, resulta evidente que una norma, especial con respecto a otra, puede a su vez ser general con respecto a una tercera y así sucesivamente. La especialidad, como característica relacional de las normas, es susceptible como si de un sistema de círculos concéntricos se tratara- de reproducirse indefinidamente, a medida que las previsiones normativas del ordenamiento van diferenciándose y concretándose’. L, DIEZ-PICAZO: La derogación de las leyes, Civitas, Madrid, 1990, p. 345." Como se desprende del desarrollo anterior, una norma sólo puede ser especial cuando se compara con otra norma de carácter general precisamente por la materia regulada en una y otra, pero no son excluyentes entre sí. En otras palabras, la emisión de una ley especial no impide la existencia de otras leyes más generales en la misma materia, pues lo que cambia en una u otra es su ámbito de regulación. El principio de especialidad también se ha establecido como un criterio de interpretación normativa, que viene a resolver las antinomias, haciendo prevalecer la ley especial sobre la general, pero sin que ello signifique que no puedan coexistir ambas normas. Este principio no supone que ante la existencia de una norma general y otra especial la primera quede derogada, sino que, como señala Villar Palasí, persiste la vigencia simultánea de ambas normas, aun cuando la especial se aplicará con preferencia a la ley general en los supuestos contemplados en aquella (José Luis Villar Palasi: Derecho Administrativo, Universidad de Madrid, 1968, p. 479 y siguientes). Por lo anterior, es técnicamente impreciso el argumento de los accionantes, al estimar que la Ley 10183 es inconstitucional por tratarse de una ley general y que los concejos de distrito únicamente pueden regularse mediante una ley especial. Debe recordarse que la intención de la Ley 10183 es regular la reelección en todos los puestos del ámbito municipal y tiene un fin muy diferente a la Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, N.° 8173 del 7 de diciembre de 2001, que es la que regula la creación, estructura, funcionamiento y financiación de los concejos municipales de distrito en los términos exigidos en el numeral 172.2 constitucional. Así las cosas, la existencia de la Ley 8173, que puede considerarse de naturaleza especial, no veda la atribución del legislador de emitir legislación más general como la contenida en la Ley 10183 que, además, está prevista para regular temas distintos aun cuando abarque a los concejos municipales de distrito. Consecuentemente, estimamos que tampoco existe un vicio de procedimiento por las razones que plantean los accionantes y que la acción debe desestimarse en cuanto a este reclamo por tratarse más bien de un reclamo de legalidad. V. CONCLUSIÓN En vista de lo expuesto, la Procuraduría estima que los accionantes de las acciones 22-8424-0007-CO y 22-10888-0007-CO acumuladas, cuentan con legitimación suficiente. En cuanto a los vicios de procedimiento alegados, consideramos que existe un vicio de procedimiento por la violación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 constitucional. Sobre la supuesta violación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 172.2 de la Constitución, estimamos que la acción debe desestimarse. Sin perjuicio de lo indicado, en cuanto al fondo de la acción, reiteramos nuestro criterio expuesto en el informe anterior. Por tanto, reiteramos que resulta parcialmente inconstitucional lo dispuesto en la Ley N.°10183 y que debe anularse la parte sustantiva de la Ley 10183 y su transitorio, salvo en lo que señala lo siguiente: “Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez... Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez… Las personas… intendentes, viceintendentes…, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.” El resto de la ley, estimamos, resulta inconstitucional por el fondo. En la forma expuesta se deja evacuada la audiencia de ampliación otorgada.” 13.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 8 de julio de 2022, se apersona Max Alberto Esquivel Faerrón, en su condición de presidente a.i. del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Expone lo siguiente: “I.- OBJETO DE LAS ACCIONES INTERPUESTAS Los gestionantes, en esencia, promueven las acciones para que se declare inconstitucional la Ley n.° 10.183 y, en especial, su transitorio único, norma que, en lo conducente, señala: “Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal”. II.- SOBRE EL FONDO DE LAS ACCIONES PLANTEADAS Los accionantes, en sus escritos, plantean varias objeciones de constitucionalidad que, para una mayor claridad expositiva, se abordarán de forma independiente, indicándose -en cada apartado- a cuál de las acciones pertenece. a) Presunto vicio en el trámite de la ley (acción presentada por la ANAI). El señor Alvarado Bogantes señala que la Asamblea Legislativa convirtió, en la ley cuestionada, el proyecto n.° 21.810, pese a que este Tribunal, en los términos del artículo 97 constitucional, lo objetó. Según el gestionante, el citado numeral del texto político fundamental es preciso en indicar que no podrán convertirse en ley, dentro de los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a una elección, aquellas iniciativas con las que este Órgano Electoral haya estado en desacuerdo, cláusula que no se respetó: el TSE se opuso al proyecto en la sesión ordinaria n.° 6-2022 del 20 de enero de 2022 (a menos de un mes de los comicios presidenciales), por lo que, según se expone en el escrito de interposición, existía una veda absoluta que impedía al legislador aprobar, en segundo debate, tal lege ferenda. Se alega que no corresponde interpretar que la citada imposibilidad para legislar sobre materia electoral objetada por el TSE- solo aplica si el contenido de la iniciativa guarda relación con el proceso electoral en curso, en tanto el constituyente no hizo esa diferenciación. Este Tribunal, de una revisión del expediente digital del citado proyecto de ley, constata que la Asamblea Legislativa actuó según pautas dadas por la Sala Constitucional en la resolución que conoció de la consulta facultativa que varios legisladores plantearon, como parte del trámite de la ley objeto de análisis. Puntualmente, en la opinión consultiva n.° 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022, los jueces constitucionales señalaron: “En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto de ley hace referencia las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría el efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente de agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional de ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional. Es por esta razón, de que, en el caso concreto, no existe ningún vicio de procedimiento por hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya aprobado en primer debate el proyecto de ley consultado”. De acuerdo con lo anterior, en el punto cuestionado, el accionar de los legisladores se apegó al criterio del Tribunal Constitucional, razón por la que se omite pronunciamiento en este extremo. b) De la supuesta violación al derecho al sufragio pasivo (punto 2 del escrito de la ANAI). La ANAI considera, en este alegato, que se vacía completamente el derecho al sufragio pasivo por impedir que alcaldes que tienen -en el puesto- más de dos períodos se postulen, en los siguientes comicios, a cualquier otro cargo de elección popular. Además, se aduce que la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos no enlista, a texto expreso y como una de las razones para limitar derechos políticos, el haber ocupado previamente cargos de elección (este razonamiento también está presente en el apartado “violación a los principios de razonabilidad y de igualdad” del escrito de los señores Quirós Palma y Castillo Morales). Esta Magistratura, como se hizo ver en la respuesta a la audiencia conferida en cuanto a la acción inicial del expediente, considera que, efectivamente, la prohibición para que un alcalde releccionista se postule a otro cargo contraviene el Derecho de la Constitución. En consecuencia, sobre este punto, se remite a tal contestación en la que, en lo conducente, se indicó: “Este Órgano Constitucional, como lo hizo ver al órgano legislativo, considera que la norma tiene un vicio de constitucionalidad, al restringir, totalmente, el sufragio pasivo a los funcionarios reeleccionistas. Puntualmente, este Tribunal, en su oportunidad, indicó: “… la restricción de que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en el cargo no puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular contraviene los parámetros constitucional y convencional. El derecho humano de participación política implica, entre otros, que los ciudadanos puedan elegir a sus gobernantes pero, a la vez, que puedan postularse a los diversos cargos que componen la estructura del Estado. Esa posibilidad de someter el nombre al Colegio Electoral no es irrestricta, pues la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic) indica que los ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales pueden regular el ejercicio de tal prerrogativa por “razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente” (artículo 23). En el caso costarricense, la legislación ha establecido entre otras condiciones para acceder al gobierno local, el domicilio electoral en la circunscripción que se pretende servir el cargo por un lapso específico (entre otros, numeral 15, 22.e y 56 del Código Municipal), el no tener los derechos políticos suspendidos por una sentencia y el ser costarricense (ordinales 15.a y 22.a del referido cuerpo normativo); empero, no sería legítimo que un Estado impidiera el sufragio pasivo (derecho a ser electo) en razón de haber ocupado un puesto específico -distinto al que se aspiraría- en los dos períodos inmediatos anteriores. Las restricciones de los funcionarios reelegidos (para que no puedan optar por otro cargo en la municipalidad) imposibilitarían que esos ciudadanos puedan acceder a contiendas partidarias internas en aras de, luego, ser postulados para cargos de elección popular distintos al que ocupan. En otros términos, por más que pertenezcan a una agrupación y cumplan con los requisitos legales de postulación, en razón de la función pública que desempeñan –ab initio– tales servidores no podrían competir ni siquiera en los procesos internos en los que se disputan las nominaciones. Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos. Véase que en este punto estriba la diferencia sustancial entre el proyecto de ley que prohibiría la doble postulación y esta iniciativa: en aquel se impide competir por dos cargos simultáneamente, pero se mantiene el derecho de hacerlo por uno (no prohíbe absolutamente la postulación), mientras que en este expediente legislativo se bloquea totalmente la posibilidad de integrar una nómina de candidatos. De otra parte, no puede perderse de vista que los cambios operados en el texto del proyecto lo convierten en inconexo, en tanto la exposición de motivos desarrolla porqué los promoventes consideran legítimo y necesario limitar la reelección, pero no se alude a que debe restringirse cualquier otro tipo de postulación; de hecho, se sostiene lo contrario. Puntualmente, en el citado preámbulo de la propuesta los propios legisladores señalan que “… es imprescindible modificar el párrafo final del artículo 14 del Código Municipal antes citado para limitar el ejercicio de un mismo cargo municipal por un máximo de períodos determinado, sin que ello implique la imposibilidad de postularse y eventualmente ser electo a partir del período inmediato siguiente para algún otro puesto de elección popular con las mismas limitaciones.” (subrayado y resaltado no pertenecen al original). Sobre esa línea, el título del proyecto es “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales”, sin que se haga mención a la restricción absoluta que tendrían algunos servidores, luego de ser reelectos, para presentarse como candidatos a otros cargos municipales de elección popular. Ciertamente, el nombre de la ley no tiene por qué dar cuenta de todo su contenido; no obstante, en este caso, evidencia cómo la propuesta original no era la de establecer una prohibición tan intensa como la que, vía mociones, se incorporó. Esa particularidad compromete el principio de congruencia, en la inteligencia de lo indicado por la Procuraduría General de la República en su pronunciamiento OJ-049-2018 del 31 de mayo de 2018 (reiterado en el OJ-0592018 del 18 de julio de ese año): “Así las cosas, es claro que el contenido del proyecto de Ley es mucho más amplio de lo que su título denota, pues es notorio, otra vez, que la iniciativa no propone una mera reforma a la Ley del Sistema de Banca de Desarrollo sino que conllevaría, además, una modificación sustantiva de las competencias del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje. Luego, debe precisarse que una buena técnica legislativa, requiere que exista congruencia entre el título de la Ley y su contenido. En este orden de ideas, la literatura especializada en materia de Técnica Legislativa en Costa Rica, ha destacado que la congruencia entre el título de la Ley y su contenido, tiene 2 funciones de la mayor importancia: a. Ayuda a determinar el contenido y alcance del objeto de la Ley y, por tanto, de modo indirecto, permite servir de base para permitir o no enmiendas o modificaciones a un proyecto de Ley, y b. Facilita la vinculación de un contenido con el proyecto de Ley o permite determinar, caso contrario, que se trata una materia ajena al mismo. Al respecto, es oportuno citar lo escrito por MUÑOZ QUESADA: “En alguna medida, el título puede ayudar a determinar el contenido y alcance del objeto de la ley y, de modo indirecto, ir de base para permitir o no enmiendas o modificaciones sustanciales a un proyecto de ley. El título facilita también la vinculación de un contenido relacionado o ajeno totalmente al objeto del proyecto. Por eso, cabe admitir que el título ha de reflejar el contenido, el objeto o la materia del texto; y en esa medida constituye un elemento importante no solo para identificación del proyecto, sino también para la determinación del objeto del proyecto.” (MUÑOZ QUESADA, HUGO ALFONSO et alt. ELEMENTOS DE TECNICA LEGISLATIVA. Asamblea Legislativa, San José, 1996, p. 82) Ergo, debe reiterarse que el título del presente proyecto de Ley – el cual se lee así “Reforma a la Ley N.° 8634, Sistema de Banca para el Desarrollo, de 23 de Abril de 2008 y sus reformas” – no denota de forma congruente su contenido, pues como se ha explicado, éste conllevaría además a una reforma sustancial del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje. Es decir que el proyecto de Ley, podría tener un problema de técnica legislativa, el cual eventualmente podría hacer incurrir en yerros procedimentales a la hora de admitir o no mociones de enmiendas que presenten los señores diputados. En todo caso, debe recordarse que, en virtud de lo que dispone el artículo 11 constitucional en relación con el numeral 121 del Reglamento a la Asamblea Legislativa, el procedimiento legislativo está sujeto a un principio de transparencia, en virtud del cual la ciudadanía tiene derecho a conocer la información relevante en relación con los proyectos de Ley que se discutan en el Congreso. Luego se comprende que la congruencia entre el título de los proyectos y su contenido, es esencial para que los ciudadanos puedan, en efecto, conocer lo que se pretende debatir a través de un particular proyecto de Ley”. Este Tribunal reitera que establecer condiciones para limitar la reelección en los cargos municipales corresponde al Parlamento en ejercicio de su discrecionalidad legislativa; sin embargo, en el proyecto que ahora se conoce se genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo. Si, por ejemplo, una persona se desempeña como alcalde y resulta electa (inmediatamente después de su segundo período) como regidora, entonces no se estaría dando una reelección sino una elección en un puesto distinto.” (oficio de este Tribunal n.° TSE-1242-2022 del 24 de mayo de 2002, incorporado al expediente de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad)”. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, con lo que sí discrepa este Tribunal es con la postura según la cual los derechos políticos solo pueden limitarse por las causales taxativamente enlistadas en el parágrafo 2 del numeral 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, ya que la propia Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha descartado expresamente esa lectura literalista de la norma. En la sentencia de fondo del caso Castañeda Gutman vs México (emitida el 6 de agosto de 2008) la referida Corte hemisférica aclaró que no existe un único tipo o modelo de sistema electoral para todos los países miembros del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos, sino que la Convención Americana, en el citado ordinal 23, prevé algunas exigencias mínimas que debe cumplir todo Estado para que su entramado electoral supere un test de convencionalidad; superados esos requisitos (que suponen un piso o condiciones indispensables), es válido que cada ordenamiento disponga limitaciones adicionales. El órgano de tutela de las Américas, en el precedente en comentario, insistió en que la lectura del artículo 23 de repetida mención debe ser global y que no podía interpretarse de forma aislada o descontextualizando sus partes; además, los jueces interamericanos señalaron que es válido que cada Estado defina las limitaciones al derecho a votar y a ser votado, siempre que esas restricciones no sean desproporcionadas, irrazonables y no atenten contra el derecho a la igualdad. Así, ese tribunal regional precisó: “La disposición que señala las causales por las cuales se puede restringir el uso de los derechos del párrafo 1 tiene como propósito único –a la luz de la Convención en su conjunto y de sus principios esenciales– evitar la posibilidad de discriminación contra individuos en el ejercicio de sus derechos políticos. Asimismo, es evidente que estas causales se refieren a las condiciones habilitantes que la ley puede imponer para ejercer los derechos políticos, y las restricciones basadas en esos criterios son comunes en las legislaciones electorales nacionales, que prevén el establecimiento de edades mínimas para votar y ser votado, ciertos vínculos con el distrito electoral donde se ejerce el derecho, entre otras regulaciones. Siempre que no sean desproporcionados o irrazonables, se trata de límites que legítimamente los Estados pueden establecer para regular el ejercicio y goce de los derechos políticos y que se refieren a ciertos requisitos que las personas titulares de los derechos políticos deben cumplir para poder ejercerlos. […] 161. Como se desprende de lo anterior, la Corte estima que no es posible aplicar al sistema electoral que se establezca en un Estado solamente las limitaciones del párrafo 2 del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana”. En consecuencia, la limitación al derecho de participación política con motivo de restringir la reelección no es inconvencional, lo que sí es contrario el parámetro internacional de Derechos Humanos es que, como se indicó, se prohíba absolutamente la postulación para cargos distintos a aquel en el que se ha permanecido por más de dos períodos. c) Alegato acerca de la violación al principio de irretroactividad (motivo desarrollado en ambos escritos). Los accionantes consideran que la ley viola el principio de irretroactividad al disponer –en su transitorio– que las restricciones a la reelección aplicarán a quienes actualmente estén ocupando, por segunda vez consecutiva, sus cargos de elección. Este Tribunal, en la contestación a la acción n.° 22-008383-0007-CO (presentada por el señor Alcalde de Santa Ana), tuvo la oportunidad de referirse a la supuesta inconstitucionalidad por aplicación retroactiva de las nuevas reglas. En ese sentido, corresponde reiterar la postura que ya se ha externado sobre el particular. “El derecho de participación política garantiza que los ciudadanos tengan la oportunidad de intentar acceder a cargos en las estructuras internas de las agrupaciones políticas, así como de eventualmente integrar las listas de candidatos, sin que esa posibilidad pueda ser truncada por aspectos distintos a los habilitados por el Derecho Convencional. Es claro que la referida prerrogativa no implica un derecho al cargo o a resultar electo en él, más bien asegura que se pueda formar parte del grupo de personas que lo disputan; en esa lógica, la aspiración a continuar en un puesto no implica la automática renovación del mandato por un período adicional. Las candidaturas a cargos de elección popular deben provenir de procesos partidarios internos disputados, libres y democráticos, en los que los militantes, siempre que cumplan con los requisitos del ordenamiento jurídico (lo cual incluye las exigencias estatutarias), puedan proponer sus nombres para que sus correligionarios, y a la postre la asamblea superior (como máxima autoridad representativa), decidan quién será la persona nominada. Es en esa dinámica en la que logran operacionalizar el principio democrático y el derecho de participación política sin más cortapisas que las legítimamente autorizadas por el Derecho de la Constitución. De hecho, la jurisprudencia electoral –a través del tiempo– ha ido profundizando en el ideal democrático y su aplicación a la designación de candidatos por parte de las agrupaciones de cara a comicios municipales. Sobre ese tema, se ha dejado claro que, si el partido optó –en su estatuto– porque fuera su estructura cantonal la que realizara las postulaciones, la asamblea superior podía ratificar o no a la persona propuesta, mas si no acogía la recomendación, debía devolver a la instancia territorial el asunto para una nueva nominación. Esa medida impide que personas que no compitieron a lo interno de la agrupación por una postulación sean nombradas de forma sorpresiva por parte del órgano superior, lo que supondría una inaceptable afectación de la lealtad de la competencia que debe imperar en los procesos partidarios, a la luz del imperativo constitucional de democracia interna (artículo 98). Así las cosas, la limitación de la reelección sucesiva a dos mandatos no supone, en sí misma, un quebrantamiento del principio de irretroactividad; el derecho fundamental a la reelección (calificado así por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia n.° 2003-02771), como toda prerrogativa de tal naturaleza, admite restricciones y, en este caso, se entiende que la restricción a postular el nombre por un tercer mandato es una medida proporcional que no vacía de contenido el derecho y que, además, responde a una medida para asegurar otros fines constitucionalmente legítimos como la rotación de cuadros de gobierno y la creación de condiciones para que nuevos ciudadanos se involucren en los puestos de toma de decisión política, tal cual lo pretende la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (sic). Un ciudadano que ha estado dos o más períodos consecutivos en el puesto de representación ha podido ejercer su derecho a la relección e, incluso, podría volver a él luego de transcurrido el lapso de 8 años desde la conclusión de su segundo mandato, si goza del favor de sus correligionarios (para alcanzar la postulación) y, luego, del colegio electoral. Estar, en la actualidad, en el ejercicio de un cargo de elección popular no implica que las nuevas reglas del sistema electoral no se le puedan aplicar a ese mandatario sino hasta que él rompa vínculos con su puesto de representación, en tanto ello supondría diferir los efectos de la ley a un hecho futuro, incierto y personalizado a la situación de un sujeto específico, lo cual frustraría, en el caso concreto, el fin que persigue la regulación, según lo plasmó el legislador en la exposición de motivos del proyecto que fue presentado, valga decir, en febrero de 2020. Importa insistir en que la posibilidad de intentar la permanencia en el cargo es el derecho tutelado tratándose de la relección, ya que el funcionario con intenciones de permanecer en el puesto, como se indicó, debe superar las dinámicas internas para ser incluido en la papeleta y, posteriormente, debe gozar del favor electoral de sus conciudadanos, eventos todos inciertos y sujetos a la voluntad popular de los respectivos colegios electorales. Esas especificidades hacen que el principio de irretroactividad, como manifestación de la Seguridad Jurídica, deba modularse y no interpretarse extensivamente. La limitación que impone la ley no es un vaciamiento del derecho a la relección, sino que es únicamente una forma de regularlo; en ese sentido, no podría haber señalado el legislador que los actuales alcaldes -con más de dos mandatos- debían concluir sus funciones inmediatamente o que no podrían volver a someter sus nombres al electorado en el futuro, ya que tales previsiones sí serían una aplicación retroactiva ilegítima. Sin embargo, el restringir que se vuelvan a presentar a los dos comicios inmediatos siguientes resulta ser una modulación razonable habida cuenta de que, al momento de entrada en vigencia de la nueva legislación, las autoridades locales tienen solamente una expectativa de continuar en sus puestos, ya que ni siquiera sus respectivas agrupaciones han validado tales aspiraciones. En consecuencia, esta Magistratura no estima que se dé un quebranto al principio de irretroactividad de la ley.” (el resaltado no corresponde al original). d) Presunta violación de los principios de proporcionalidad, de razonabilidad y de igualdad (escritos de ambas acciones). El representante de la ANAI, en el punto 4 de su escrito de interposición, fundamenta que la norma impugnada viola los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad al impedir que los actuales alcaldes e intendentes con más de dos períodos en el mismo puesto se postulen, en los comicios de 2024 y de 2028, a esos y cualesquiera otros cargos del gobierno local. En criterio del accionante, el lapso de alejamiento de ocho años es desproporcionado. A criterio de esta Autoridad Electoral el argumento planteado no es de recibo. Como se hizo ver en la respuesta a la consulta obligatoria que realizó la Asamblea Legislativa dentro del trámite del respectivo proyecto de ley (folios 1064 a 1073 del expediente legislativo), este Tribunal estima que el establecer condiciones para limitar la reelección de los funcionarios municipales corresponde al Parlamento en ejercicio de su discrecionalidad legislativa, prerrogativa que incluye, por supuesto, la fijación de los períodos que debe esperar un ciudadano para volver a postularse a un cargo que ha ocupado en el pasado. Eso sí, tales restricciones no pueden incluir, como se ha insistido, una prohibición absoluta para la postulación en otros puestos de representación. De otra parte, los señores Quirós Palma y Castillo Morales alegan que se viola el principio de igualdad porque se establece una cláusula diferenciada para los alcaldes e intendentes que no aplica al resto de servidores municipales. En múltiples oportunidades, este Órgano Constitucional ha indicado que el establecimiento de las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a cargos municipales es un tema que, también, está librado a la discrecionalidad legislativa. En consecuencia, no resulta ilegítimo, per se, que se establezcan distintos requisitos y limitaciones para acceder a cargos que son de por sí distintos en funciones y responsabilidades; puede darse el caso de que la política legislativa sea, por ejemplo, que unos servidores sí puedan generar carrera política en unos órganos (lo cual ocurre principalmente en instancias deliberantes), pero que en otros se privilegie la alternabilidad en el ejercicio del poder, por intermedio de cláusulas que limitan la reelección a ese tipo específico de puestos. El vicio de la ley cuestionada no es que haga un trato diferenciado entre los alcaldes e intendentes y el resto de puestos que se sirven en los gobiernos locales (esa disparidad podría ser legítima y estar sustentada en parámetros objetivos); más bien, la inconstitucionalidad se genera porque ese trato provoca un vaciamiento del derecho a ser electos, al impedirse –a los mandatarios ejecutivos de los cantones y de los concejos municipales de distrito– la postulación a otro tipo de cargos. e) Sobre la necesaria ley especial para limitar la reelección en los Concejos Municipales de Distrito. Los señores Quirós Palma y Castillo Morales consideran que no se puede limitar la reelección de los intendentes con la modificación al artículo 14 del Código Municipal que introduce la ley que se combate; en su criterio, al exigir la Constitución Política una ley especial para la regulación de la estructura y el funcionamiento de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, solo ese tipo de legislación (una especial) puede variar las condicione de elegibilidad de quienes sirven puestos de representación en las citadas instancias. La descentralización territorial del Estado y el diseño de los gobiernos locales se encuentran previstos en el título XII de la Constitución Política, normas que refieren a que las municipalidades estarán a cargo de un cuerpo deliberante integrado por regidores municipales de elección popular (concejo municipal) y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designará la ley (alcalde); además, el constituyente estableció que “las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito” cuya “estructura, funcionamiento y financiación” será desarrollada por una ley especial (artículo 172). Sin embargo, el texto constitucional no puntualizó cuáles serían los requisitos, los impedimentos y las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a los puestos de esos concejos municipales de distrito. Esa falta de desarrollo de la temática en comentario debe ser entendida como una delegación para que sea la ley ordinaria la que regule tales circunstancias; en otras palabras, pese a que esas instancias distritales están previstas constitucionalmente, sus atribuciones, exigencias por cumplir si se desea acceder a ellas y otras especificidades son temáticas libradas al quehacer legislativo. Sobre esa línea, la Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia n.º 2128-94 de las 14:51 minutos del 3 de mayo de 1994, precisó: “… en materias no reguladas, pero sí delegadas en el legislador por la Constitución, este puede establecer condiciones de desigualdad real o aparente cuando sus excepciones están absoluta y claramente justificadas en razón de otros principios o valores constitucionales y sobre todo, de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. En consecuencia, las excepciones, limitaciones, requisitos o impedimentos que regirán en materia electoral, definidos por el legislador en función de la responsabilidad delegada por la propia Constitución, deben sustentarse en razones objetivas y claramente motivadas por los requerimientos propios del sistema electoral y del ejercicio del cargo. En otras palabras, pueden admitirse las restricciones que fortalezcan el sistema democrático y los procesos electorales, aun cuando una persona o un grupo sufra la limitada consecuencia de aquélla (sic) reglamentación”. En cumplimiento del mandato constitucional de desarrollar la estructura de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, el legislador promulgó la ley n.° 8173, en la que se establece que la creación de esos órganos corresponde al concejo municipal del respectivo cantón y que estarán conformados por un cuerpo deliberante (concejales municipales de distrito) y por un servidor ejecutivo (el intendente), quienes estarán sujetos a las reglas de elección (incluidos requisitos e impedimentos) de los regidores y del alcalde, según corresponda (artículos 3, 6 y 7). La ley especial de las citadas instancias distritales incorporó un reenvío normativo al Código Municipal en lo que respecta a las condiciones de elegibilidad de quienes pretendan resultar electos como concejales municipales de distrito e intendentes, de forma tal que no se observa que se incumpla ningún precepto constitucional al prever la limitación de reelección -en tales cargos- en el marco regulatorio general de los gobiernos locales. Como se desprende de la literalidad del artículo 172 constitucional, lo que debe estar previsto en una ley especial es la arquitectura de los concejos municipales de distrito (como efectivamente está en la ley n.° 8173), pero el resto de aspectos, como lo son las características que deben cumplir los aspirantes a esos cargos, bien pueden estar regulados en otro tipo de ley, mientras tenga -ese instrumento normativo- tal carácter en un sentido formal y material. III.- CONCLUSIÓN De conformidad con las consideraciones previamente expuestas, el TSE considera importante señalar las siguientes conclusiones: •La Asamblea Legislativa aprobó, durante época electoral, la ley n.° 10.183, pese a la objeción de este Tribunal; sin embargo, la votación en segundo debate se basó en un criterio de la Sala Constitucional, por lo que esta Autoridad Electoral omite referirse al vicio de procedimiento invocado en la acción presentada por la ANAI. • Los derechos políticos no solo pueden limitarse por las causales taxativamente enlistadas en el parágrafo 2 del numeral 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. La propia Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha descartado expresamente esa lectura literalista de la norma. • Corresponde al legislador definir, respetando el Derecho de la Constitución, cuáles serán las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a cargos municipales, categoría dentro de la que está incluida la limitación a la reelección sucesiva. •El restringir que las actuales autoridades municipales, con más de dos períodos en el cargo, se vuelvan a presentar en los dos comicios inmediatos siguientes resulta ser una modulación razonable, habida cuenta de que, al momento de entrada en vigencia de la nueva legislación, los mandatarios locales tienen solamente una expectativa de continuar en sus puestos, ya que ni siquiera sus respectivas agrupaciones han validado tales aspiraciones, por lo que no se violenta el principio de irretroactividad de la ley. •El establecer condiciones para limitar la reelección de los funcionarios municipales corresponde al Parlamento en ejercicio de su discrecionalidad legislativa, prerrogativa que incluye, por supuesto, la fijación de los períodos que debe esperar un ciudadano para volver a postularse a un cargo que ha ocupado en el pasado. • No es inconstitucional que se prevea la prohibición de reelección para las intendencias en el Código Municipal. •No resulta ilegítimo, per se, que se establezcan distintos requisitos y limitaciones para acceder a cargos que son de por sí distintos en funciones y responsabilidades. • La ley n.° 10.183 produce un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo en tanto impide que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en un cargo puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular en los comicios inmediatos siguientes. IV.- PRETENSIÓN El TSE solicita que se declare parcialmente con lugar las acciones interpuestas, sea, únicamente en lo que refiere al impedimento para que funcionarios con dos períodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo no puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular.” 14.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 8 de julio de 2022, se apersona Rodrigo Arias Sánchez, en su condición de presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa. Expone lo siguiente: “I.- TRAMITACIÓN DE LA LEY La Ley 10183 Reforma del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794; Código Municipal, del 30 de abril de 1998, (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales). Fue tramitada bajo el expediente No. 21810, este proyecto se inició el 18 de febrero de 2020, y se publicó el 02 de marzo de 2020, en la Gaceta No. 11 Alcance No. 33. Fue asignado para estudio a la Comisión Permanente Especial de Asuntos municipales y Desarrollo Local Participativo. Fue consultada a la Municipalidades y Consejos Municipales de distrito y al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. El proyecto contó con un Dictamen afirmativo el 13 de octubre de 2021. Fue aprobado en Primer Debate el 25 de enero del 2022 y en Segundo Debate el 29 de marzo de 2022; finalmente, la ley fue sancionada por el Poder Ejecutivo el el (sic) 5 de abril de 2022 y publicada en el Alcance 73 de La Gaceta No. 68 del 8 de abril de 2022. II. SOBRE LOS CUESTIONAMIENTOS De seguido esta Presidencia se referirá a cada uno de los aspectos cuestionados: 1.- Violación del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política al considerarla poco clara y que no admite interpretación, excepto, por la materia que trata, la del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Discrepamos de los accionantes, por los motivos que a continuación se señalan: Los accionantes alegan que el procedimiento mediante el cual se aprobó la Ley 10183, lesiona el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, al considerar que la parte final de ese artículo no está sujeta a ninguna interpretación, que su contenido no es claro y que la Sala Constitucional, al resolver sobre la tramitación del proyecto que devino en la Ley 10083, realizó interpretaciones que no le correspondían, ya que, señalan los accionantes, la interpretación de normas constitucionales electorales le corresponde en forma exclusiva al Tribunal Supremo de elecciones conforme el artículo 102.3 de la Constitución Política. Artículo 102.- El Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tiene las siguientes funciones: (…) 3) Interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales y legales referentes a la materia electoral;…” Por su parte, el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política señala: “Artículo 97.- Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.” Conforme al artículo 97 transcrito, la Asamblea Legislativa cuando discute y aprueba proyectos de ley, que se refieran a la materia electoral debe realizar una consulta obligatoria de la iniciativa al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Si el Tribunal no está de acuerdo con el proyecto y lo objeta, la Asamblea para aprobarlo, requiere contar con mayoría calificada de los votos, es decir, con el voto afirmativo de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Además, el artículo 97 constitucional señala que la Asamblea no puede dentro de los seis meses antes y cuatro meses después de las elecciones populares, aprobar como leyes proyectos de materia electoral con los cuales el Tribunal no está de acuerdo. Durante tramitación el proyecto (hoy, Ley 10183), se realizó consulta al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones el cual se manifestó en desacuerdo con él. No obstante, la Asamblea Legislativa lo convirtió en Ley, esto por cuanto después de una consulta facultativa a la Sala Constitucional, ésta, en resolución No. 2022-006119 de 16 de marzo 2022 señaló que el artículo 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto hace referencia a las elecciones municipales, por lo que la objeción del T.S.E. no tendría efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente agravarla. La Sala consideró lo señalado en el artículo 150 del Código Electoral, en cuanto a la fecha en la que se verificarán las elecciones, y en relación con las elecciones municipales señala: (…) Las elecciones municipales para elegir regidores, síndicos, alcaldes e intendentes, miembros de concejos de distrito y de los concejos municipales de distrito, con sus respectivos suplentes, se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero dos años después de la elección para presidente, vicepresidentes y diputados(as) a la Asamblea Legislativa. En relación con el artículo 97 la Sala Constitucional señaló: ARTÍCULO 97 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. “…Esta modificación del sistema -pasar de un modelo único o concentrado a uno dual- impone una interpretación del numeral 97 constitucional de cara a esta nueva realidad. Cuando se trataba de tres elecciones en un mismo día, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al proyecto de ley tenía el efecto de suspender la potestad de legislar para el caso concreto -durante los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la elección-; si el criterio se vertida fuera de ese periodo, se agravaba la potestad de legislar. La situación ha cambiado radicalmente en la actualidad, en la que hay elecciones separadas entre las presidenciales y diputadiles y las municipales. En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto de ley hace referencia las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría el efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente de agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional de ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional…”. Los accionantes alegan que el Tribunal Constitucional no debió, o no puede realizar una interpretación del artículo 97 por ser materia electoral, porque la interpretación de esta materia le corresponde exclusivamente al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Si bien la interpretación en materia electoral es competencia exclusiva del Tribunal, Supremo de Elecciones. Si se está en presencia de un asunto de control constitucional; en el que se pretende garantizar la supremacía de la norma constitucional y el bloque de constitucionalidad, ese asunto corresponde dilucidarlo a la Sala Constitucional. Esto por cuanto, en el caso de Costa Rica, el modelo de control de constitucionalidad es concentrado, es decir, resulta de competencia exclusiva de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. La participación de la Sala Constitucional en el proceso de formación de la ley, mediante el control previo constitucional, es para evitar que surjan a la vida jurídica normas inconstitucionales, y es la Sala Constitucional, a quien en sentido estricto le corresponde de forma exclusiva ejercer el control de constitucionalidad, competencia establecida con exclusividad al Poder Judicial desde el año 1887 y a la Sala Constitucional desde 1989. (Sentencia número 201015048 de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del ocho de setiembre de dos mil diez). Como corolario de lo anterior, tal como lo señaló el (sic) la Sala Constitucional al referirse al artículo 102 inciso 2 de la Constitución Política, esta respeta las competencias del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (la interpretación de la materia electoral), pero, la Sala Constitucional tiene sus propias competencias de control constitucional: ARTÍCULO 102 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. “… II.- Sobre el control de constitucionalidad en materia electoral. Sobre las anteriores manifestaciones, esta Sala debe reiterar que el tema de la delimitación de competencias entre la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en materia electoral es complejo, ya que el Constituyente optó por mantener dos órganos con competencias constitucionales en la materia. En algunos casos, la propia Constitución Política se encarga de señalar con claridad, en qué casos puede actuar la Sala -aún en materia electoral- y en otros, el criterio está delimitado en la ley. En el caso de la materia electoral la Constitución Política de 1949 estableció un ámbito constitucional especial a favor del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Así, tiene reconocido en el artículo 9 un rango e independencia frente a los demás poderes del Estado en el ejercicio de su función, que es la de vigilancia exclusiva e independiente de la organización, dirección y vigilancia de los actos relativos al sufragio, así como las demás funciones que le atribuyan la Constitución y la ley. Por su parte, el artículo 102 inciso 3) establece como una de las funciones del Tribunal “interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales y legales a la materia electoral”. El Constituyente creó deliberadamente un fuero especial para la materia electoral como un todo, excluyendo al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de cualquier control, fiscalización o tutela por parte de los otros Poderes del Estado. Las potestades señaladas en efecto establecen deliberadamente un fuero especial para el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pero no una “exclusividad” en “materia electoral”, porque frente a la constitucionalidad de las normas en general, la Sala Constitucional conserva -por disposición expresa del artículo 10 de la Constitución-, la exclusividad de la anulación de normas que estime contrarias a la Constitución, potestad que ejerce también en materia electoral...” “… III.- Así como la Sala Constitucional tiene vedada por Constitución afectar el ejercicio de las competencias constitucionales del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, también es cierto que la misma restricción tiene el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones con respecto al ejercicio de las competencias de otros órganos del Estado, como la Sala Constitucional, aún en materia electoral. En el caso del control de constitucionalidad, el remedio constitucionalmente previsto para eliminar una norma del ordenamiento jurídico, es de dos tipos: a) la modificación, la reforma o la derogación por parte del legislador; o b) la anulación de parte del órgano encargado de ejercer el control de constitucionalidad en sentido estricto, competencia establecida con exclusividad al Poder Judicial desde el año 1887 y a la Sala Constitucional desde 1989. (Sentencia número 2010-15048 de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del ocho de setiembre de dos mil diez). En virtud de lo expuesto, la interpretación oficiosa que realizara el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de la norma impugnada, al resolver el recurso de amparo electoral interpuesto por la accionante Argüello Mora mediante el voto número 3782-E1-2013, mediante el cual “ se desaplicó, para el caso concreto, la norma estatutaria”, en modo alguno es un impedimento para que la Sala Constitucional analice su constitucionalidad y, de esta forma, decida -como le corresponde de acuerdo a (sic) la Constitución Política- sobre la posible afectación de derechos fundamentales, ejerciendo sus competencias para garantizar su tutela, en caso de que así lo considere…” Sentencia 010199-19 En consecuencia, en el ejercicio de la competencia exclusiva de control de constitucionalidad de la Sala Constitucional, la atribución de interpretación de la materia electoral del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones deja de ser exclusiva, dado que la Sala es la que define cuál de las posibles interpretaciones de la norma, es la que más se ajusta al texto constitucional y al bloque de constitucionalidad. El análisis anterior nos conduce a rechazar los alegatos de los accionantes, respecto a que la Sala Constitucional no debió interpretar el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. 2.- Sobre el alegato de que las reformas realizadas en la Ley 10183, por incluir a los Consejos Municipales de Distrito, debieron realizarse en la Ley especial que los regula y no mediante una reforma del artículo 14 del Código Municipal. No se comparten los argumentos de los accionantes por las siguientes razones: En primer lugar, los cargos de las autoridades municipales que se escogen mediante elección popular son los siguientes:-Los alcaldes de cada cantón, así como un vicealcalde y un tercer cargo de alcalde suplente o segundo vicealcalde.-Los síndicos propietarios y los concejales propietarios y sus suplentes en cada uno de los distritos del país quienes conforman los Concejos de Distrito. -Los regidores que conforman los Concejos Municipales de los municipios, propietarios y suplentes. Su número varía según la población del cantón que gobiernan. Los intendentes de distritos muy alejados o islas. De seguido, se transcribe el artículo 14 del Código Municipal vigente. Puede observarse que la Ley 10083 modificó ese artículo y estableció algunas limitaciones en cuanto a la reelección de algunos cargos: “Artículo 14.- Denominase alcalde municipal al funcionario ejecutivo indicado en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política.// Existirán dos vicealcaldes municipales: un(a) vicealcalde primero y un(a) vicealcalde segundo. El (la) vicealcalde primero realizará las funciones administrativas y operativas que el alcalde titular le asigne; además, sustituirá, de pleno derecho, al alcalde municipal en sus ausencias temporales y definitivas, con las mismas responsabilidades y competencias de este durante el plazo de la sustitución.// En los casos en que el o la vicealcalde primero no pueda sustituir al alcalde, en sus ausencias temporales y definitivas, el o la vicealcalde segundo sustituirá al alcalde, de pleno derecho, con las mismas responsabilidades y competencias de este durante el plazo de la sustitución.// En los concejos municipales de distrito, el funcionario ejecutivo indicado en el artículo 7 de la Ley N.° 8173, es el intendente distrital quien tendrá las mismas facultades que el alcalde municipal. Además, existirá un(a) vice intendente distrital, quien realizará las funciones administrativas y operativas que le asigne el o la intendente titular; también sustituirá, de pleno derecho, al intendente distrital en sus ausencias temporales y definitivas, con las mismas responsabilidades y competencias de este durante el plazo de la sustitución.// Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la presidencia y las vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1 º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años y podrán ser reelegidos.// Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.// Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, vice intendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.” Al realizar una correcta lectura del artículo 172 de la Constitución Política, puede determinarse que la inteligencia de este artículo, se refiere a los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, si bien, la norma hace mención de una ley especial, se trata de que esa ley especial, regule las condiciones en que se pueden crear los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, su estructura y funcionamiento. En cuanto a la elección de sus miembros, la norma constitucional remite al procedimiento utilizado por las municipalidades. Veamos: ARTÍCULO 172.- Cada distrito estará representado ante la municipalidad por un síndico propietario y un suplente con voz pero sin voto. Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación.” (Así reformado por el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8105 de 31 de mayo del 2001) La norma constitucional transcrita es clara en cuanto a su objetivo: para la integración de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, deben seguirse los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. El artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, regula el tema del plazo de nombramiento y reelección de los puestos de elección popular de las municipalidades. Por lo que, los aspectos novedosos sobre reelección que se plantearon en la Ley 10183, si fueron bien ubicados en la reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal. Cabe agregar que es el Código Municipal, en su artículo 55, el que hace referencia a la integración de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, norma que a su vez remite al artículo 14 de ese mismo Código: “Artículo 55. - Los Concejos de Distrito estarán integrados por cinco miembros propietarios; uno de ellos será el síndico propietario referido en el artículo 172 de la Constitución Política y cinco suplentes de los cuales uno será el síndico suplente establecido en el referido artículo constitucional. Los suplentes sustituirán a los propietarios de su mismo partido político, en los casos de ausencia temporal u ocasional y serán llamados para el efecto por el Presidente del Concejo, entre los presentes y según el orden de elección. Los miembros del Concejo de Distrito serán elegidos popularmente por cuatro años, en forma simultánea con la elección de los alcaldes municipales, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 14 de este código, y por el mismo procedimiento de elección de los diputados y regidores municipales establecido en el Código Electoral…” Tiene un trato diferenciado, la creación de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, y por otra parte, los procedimientos de elección de los miembros que lo integran. El artículo 2 de la Ley 8173 Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, regula cómo la creación de esos Concejos Municipales, que se realiza por votación de dos terceras partes del total Concejo del cantón, a solicitud de un número de vecinos del Distrito que la ley fija, y se somete a consulta popular, que debe contar con el apoyo de 15% de los votantes inscritos en el cantón. La Ley 8173 regulariza el funcionamiento y estructura de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito. En materia de elección, en cambio, la norma constitucional (Articulo 172) optó porque la integración de esos concejos se haga siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades; por esa razón las reformas en materia de relección se hicieron en el Código Municipal, porque es este cuerpo normativo el que regula todo lo relativo a la elección de los cargos municipales. La Ley de Concejos Municipales (Ley N° 8173), en los artículos 6 y 7, en cuanto a los concejales, e intendentes propietarios y suplentes señala, que se regirán bajo las mismas condiciones de deberes y atribuciones de otros cargos que se encuentran sistematizados en el Código Municipal: Artículo 6°-Los concejos municipales de distrito estarán integrados, como órganos colegiados, por cinco concejales propietarios y sus respectivos suplentes, todos vecinos del distrito; serán elegidos popularmente en la misma fecha de elección de los síndicos y por igual período. Asimismo, tanto los concejales propietarios como los suplentes se regirán bajo las mismas condiciones y tendrán iguales deberes y atribuciones que los regidores municipales...” “Artículo 7.- El órgano ejecutivo de los concejos municipales de distrito será la Intendencia, cuyo titular también será elegido popularmente, en la misma fecha, por igual período, bajo las mismas condiciones y con iguales deberes y atribuciones que el alcalde municipal. “El análisis anterior, permite arribar a la conclusión del equívoco en lo argumentado por los accionantes, respecto a que los cambios realizados en el artículo 14 del Código Municipal por la Ley N°10083 debieron hacerse en la Ley 8173 Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, argumento que debe ser rechazado. 3. Sobre el alegato de reducción de derechos humanos y afectación de los principios de razonabilidad, igualdad y no discriminación de la Ley 10083. Los argumentos que sostienen que la Ley 10083 produce una reducción a los derechos humanos y afecta los principios de razonabilidad e igualdad, así como de no discriminación; carecen de razonamiento: En primer lugar, ya el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones señaló en el oficio No. TSE0784-2019 del 10 de abril de 2019, remitido a la Sala Constitucional como respuesta a la audiencia conferida en el expediente No. 19-000892-007-CO, en el siguiente sentido: “…como todo derecho, la reelección admite limitaciones razonables a su ejercicio mediante la promulgación de una ley en sentido formal y material, correspondiéndole al legislador decidir, dentro del marco constitucional, cuáles serán las modulaciones a ese derecho...”. La descentralización territorial del Estado y el diseño de los gobiernos locales se encuentran previstos en el título XII de la Constitución política, normas que determinan que las municipalidades estarán a cargo de un cuerpo deliberante integrado por regidores municipales de elección popular (concejo municipal) y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designará la ley (alcalde, art. 169). Sin embargo, el constituyente no puntualizó cuales serían los requisitos, los impedimentos y las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a los puestos de elección municipal. Antes del año 2002 el puesto de alcalde no era de elección popular. La regulación de las atribuciones y exigencias para acceder a esos puestos, así como otras especificaciones, se entienden delegadas al quehacer legislativo. En la sentencia No. 2128-94 del 3 de mayo de 1994, precisa lo siguiente: “…materias no reguladas, pero sí delegadas en el legislador por la Constitución, este puede establecer condiciones de desigualdad real o aparente cuando sus excepciones están absoluta y claramente justificadas en razón de otros principios o valores constitucionales y sobre todo, de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. En consecuencia, las excepciones, limitaciones, requisitos o impedimentos que regirán en materia electoral, definidos por el legislador en función de la responsabilidad delegada por la propia Constitución, deben sustentarse en razones objetivas y claramente motivadas por los requerimientos propios del sistema electoral y del ejercicio del cargo. En otras palabras, pueden admitirse las restricciones que fortalezcan el sistema democrático y los procesos electorales, aun cuando una persona o un grupo sufra la limitada consecuencia de aquélla reglamentación…”. El Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones ha estimado que corresponde al legislador definir, respetando el Derecho de la Constitución, cuáles serán las condiciones de inelegibilidad para acceder a cargos municipales, categoría dentro de la que se está incluida la limitación a la reelección sucesiva; sea, este un tema que se encuentra librado a la discrecionalidad legislativa. De igual forma, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones ha señalado que: “…la limitación de la reelección sucesiva a dos mandatos no supone en sí misma, un quebrantamiento al principio de irretroactividad; el derecho fundamental a la reelección, (calificado así por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia 203-02771), como toda prerrogativa de tal naturaleza, admite restricciones y, este caso, se entiende que la restricción a postular el nombre por un tercer mandato es una medida proporcional que no vacía de contenido el derecho y que, además, responde a una medida para asegurar otros fines constitucionalmente legítimos como a rotación de cuadros de gobierno y la creación de condiciones para que nuevos ciudadanos se involucren en los puestos de toma de decisión política, tal cual lo pretende la Convención Americano de Derechos Humanos.” Si bien esta ley establece limitaciones de tipo temporal, en los cargos para postularse en puestos de elección popular municipales, estas limitaciones son razonables y se ajustan al bloque de constitucionalidad. Las reformas aprobadas son contestes con el artículo 9 constitucional que señala que el Gobierno de la República es popular, representativo, participativo, alternativo y responsable. La alternancia, como bien lo ha señalado el Tribunal Constitucional, es un principio constitucional que implica la posibilidad real y efectiva de que los cargos públicos se ocupen temporalmente conforme a los períodos previamente fijados en la Constitución Política o en la ley. Esto es, la renovación periódica de los puestos públicos por medio de elecciones libres, de donde resaltan los elementos de legitimidad y control político, al ser requerida la participación de la ciudadanía en su totalidad –para las elecciones Presidenciales, de los diputados, regidores, síndicos y el alcalde municipal - o fraccionada - en caso de la integración de órganos colegiados de entidades públicas; la alternancia en el Poder requiere de un régimen democrático que permita la competencia real y equitativa de los partidos políticos o de los grupos, sectores o asociaciones. La alternancia en el poder, no presupone la rotación del puesto elegible entre los diversos grupos, partidos o sectores que participen en un proceso electoral, sino más bien la existencia de procesos de elección sustentados en el principio democrático, esto es, en la convocatoria de elecciones libres y pluripartidistas, y en forma secreta. Adicionalmente, debe considerarse que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones ha señalado claramente que: “…la reelección admite limitaciones razonables a su ejercicio mediante la promulgación de una ley en sentido formal y material, correspondiéndole al legislador decidir, dentro del marco constitucional, cuáles serán las modulaciones a ese derecho.” (TSE-0784-2019 del 10 de abril de 2019, remitido a la Sala Constitucional como respuesta a la audiencia conferida en el expediente Nº 19-000892-0007CO). Conforme lo ha indicado la Procuraduría General de la República[7], el legislador ordinario, puede redefinir o cambiar, lo que considere oportuno o conveniente, del sistema que rige las elecciones municipales, siempre y cuando las decisiones legislativas sean razonables y proporcionales. Esta reforma no anula, no hace nugatorio, ni torna en imposible el ejercicio del derecho fundamental a ser electo (figura del voto pasivo). La forma y los casos en que la ley estipula la reelección para los cargos municipales no contraría al bloque de constitucionalidad. Tampoco resultan inconstitucionales las normas de la Ley 10083, que establecen impedimentos temporales para que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo, no puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular; en primer lugar por tratarse de una modulación razonable que el legislador consideró necesario realizar, y en segundo lugar, porque las restricciones establecidas no representan una discriminación, es igual para todos, En ese sentido, el principio de igualdad permite hacer diferenciaciones, y las distintas limitaciones responden a las diferencias propias de los cargos municipales de elección popular, por lo que, no se trata de diferenciaciones arbitrarias. Conforme lo expuesto, se solicita al Tribunal Constitucional rechazar lo alegado por los accionantes en este punto. 4. Sobre el alegato de que la ley responde a una campaña de desacreditación de los regidores locales. La promulgación de las leyes puede responder a una serie de factores y coyunturas sociales, económicas, culturales diversas, ya sea para resolver conflictos, o dar solución a específicas situaciones nacionales o internacionales. No obstante, resulta a todas luces infundada la aseveración de los accionantes, que se rechaza en todos sus extremos, al invocar en beneficio de sus intereses, la tesis de que la Ley 10083 responde a una campaña de desacreditación de los regidores locales. Esa aseveración carece de sustento. La Ley 10083 desde su origen, al momento de la presentación como proyecto de ley, según puede apreciarse en su exposición de motivos, así como en el transcurso de su discusión, no pretendió en ningún momento constituirse en una sanción de ningún tipo, y menos una campaña de desacreditación. Consta en los autos que en todo momento el parlamento actuó dentro de los parámetros de su función exclusiva de legislar, crear y reformar leyes. No actuó, ni pretendió actuar, en ejercicio del control político, para lo cual posee sus propias cometidos distintos, que operan en diferente dimensión, utilizan distintas vías y tienen distintos efectos. Y por supuesto en ningún caso la Asamblea Legislativa utilizaría la formulación de una ley con el propósito de afectar a ciudadano alguno, todo lo contrario, el Parlamento busca crear espacios de discusión, análisis y definición de voluntades políticas, en mejora de la sociedad y con absoluto respeto al bloque de constitucionalidad, con especial atención al respeto de principios como el democrático, el de razonabilidad, los derechos fundamentales, y los derechos humanos, en definitiva a la dignidad humana. Por lo que se le solicita al Tribunal Constitucional sea rechazado un argumento infundado de ese tipo. III.- PETITORIA Conforme con el informe rendido, se solicita sea rechazada la acción de inconstitucionalidad.” 15.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 20 de setiembre de 2022, se apersona Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza. Expone lo siguiente: “Tanto la Procuraduría General de la República, como el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, se han pronunciado ampliamente sobre la clara violación de constitucionalidad generada a partir de la forma y el fondo en que fue aprobado el Transitorio Único de la Ley 10.183, constituido como una reacción política en el contexto de una lucha electoral y un escándalo de presunta corrupción, instrumentándolo como sanción publica y política, contra las personas que habíamos sido favorecidos en varias oportunidades en nuestra condición de Alcaldes y Alcaldesas, irrespetando la prohibición de realizar este tipo de reformas dentro de los 6 meses anteriores a una elección y creando una odiosa desigualdad, excluida desde la Constitución Política, de duplicar la cantidad de años de prohibición para no reelegirse, para los representantes municipales, respecto de los representantes electos a nivel nacional, sean Diputados, Presidente o Vicepresidentes de la Republica. En mi condición de Alcalde y Presidente de un ente asociativo municipal, que integra representantes de alrededor de 17 Partidos Políticos diferentes, entre nacionales y locales, sufrimos la incertidumbre política, personal y social, ante la obligación inminente de desarrollar nuestros procesos internos electorales, de asambleas distritales cantonales, provinciales y nacionales, de no saber si vamos a poder participar en las próximas elecciones, en razón de la grosera sanción que fuimos víctimas miles de representantes políticos, costarricenses honestos, cuyo único pecado fue haber recibido la confianza del sufragio de los ciudadanos costarricenses. Los procesos internos de los partidos políticos tendrán que dar inicio muy pronto y esta prohibición está siendo usada para, no solo para socavar nuestras aspiraciones personales, sino además ha creado una gran zozobra e incertidumbre social y estaría representando uno de las golpes más fuertes sufridos por nuestra democracia política en los tiempos recientes. Por lo anterior y ante la urgencia de iniciar los procesos electorales internos de las diversas agrupaciones políticas, solicitamos en forma vehemente y respetuosa a los señores Magistrados y señoras Magistradas, acoger las extensas y claras consideraciones técnicas esbozadas, tanto por el órgano asesor jurídico de la República, como por el Tribunal Supremo que sustenta la competencia constitucional exclusiva en materia electoral, declarando la inconstitucionalidad el Transitorio Único impugnado” 16.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 23 de noviembre de 2022, el magistrado Jorge Araya García plantea inhibitoria.

17.-Mediante resolución de las 10:16 horas de 24 de noviembre de 2022, la Presidencia de la Sala tuvo por separado al magistrado Araya García y dispuso comunicar tal situación a la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia para su sustitución.

18.- Por sorteo 10808, la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia seleccionó a la magistrada suplente Rosibel Jara Velásquez en sustitución del magistrado Jorge Araya García.

19.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente digital el 23 de noviembre de 2022, se apersona Heriberto Cubero Morera, en su condición de presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la ANAI. Expone lo siguiente: “Con el mayor de los respetos y siendo que los procesos internos de los diferentes partidos políticos, para efectos de nombrar a las personas aspirantes a cargos de elección popular dentro del Régimen Municipal, inician en febrero del del año 2023, al amparo del artículo 41 de la Constitución Política, solicitamos que se le dé pronto despacho a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Debe tomarse en consideración el hecho que, de acogerse la acción, si la resolución de fondo se emite en fecha posterior al inicio de los procesos partidarios internos, las actuales autoridades municipales que tienen dos periodos de nombramiento se verían seriamente afectadas en sus derechos a participar en este próximo proceso electoral municipal, haciendo imposible su participación.” 20.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibidem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

21.-En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el magistrado Rueda Leal, con excepción del considerando V que lo redacta el magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- Cuestión preliminar. Este Tribunal priorizó la resolución de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, en virtud de la inminencia de los procesos electorales de naturaleza municipal y por razones de seguridad jurídica para las personas con aspiraciones de participación tanto activa como pasiva.

II.-Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso sujeto a ciertas formalidades, que deben observarse a efectos de que la Sala válidamente pueda conocer el fondo de la impugnación. Justamente, el numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En primer término, exige un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial o administrativa (en el procedimiento para agotarla), en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Los párrafos segundo y tercero contemplan supuestos, en los que de manera excepcional no se exige el asunto previo, tales como la inexistencia de una lesión individual y directa por la naturaleza del asunto, la defensa de intereses difusos o colectivos, o cuando la acción es formulada directamente por el contralor general de la República, el procurador general de la República, el fiscal general de la República o el defensor de los Habitantes.

Al respecto, si bien las partes accionantes sustentan su legitimación en diversos argumentos afines con el derecho a elegir y ser electo en el régimen municipal, así como en sus condiciones personales, en los cargos que ocupan y en las agrupaciones que representan, no menos cierto es que la Sala ha reconocido la existencia de intereses difusos en este tipo de temas, ya que guarda relación con el sistema democrático en general. Verbigracia, en la sentencia nro. 2012-001966 de las 9:32 horas de 17 de febrero de 2012, este Tribunal señaló:

“El derecho a elegir y ser electo en puestos de elección popular, como derechos políticos, tienen no sólo la naturaleza de poder afectar a un ciudadano o ciudadana en concreto, sino de afectar al sistema democrático en general, que se basa en la renovación periódica de sus estructuras políticas como uno de sus postulados, por medio de la elección popular de distintos puestos, de modo que tiene esa doble naturaleza que lo hace difuso y por lo tanto impugnable directamente, por vía de excepción (…).” Ergo, la Sala avala la legitimación de la parte accionante en el sub iudice con base en el párrafo segundo del ordinal 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

III.-Objeto de la acción. En el sub examine se cuestiona la constitucionalidad de la parte sustantiva y el transitorio único de la ley nro. 10183 del 5 de abril de 2022, denominada ‘Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales’. Por una parte, se alegan dos vicios de naturaleza procedimental: a) violación al artículo 97 constitucional y b) transgresión al párrafo segundo del numeral 172 constitucional. Por otro, en cuanto al fondo se acusa que el impedimento de reelección por dos periodos consecutivos en los cargos de elección municipal (incluyendo los mandatos anteriores a la vigencia de la norma) transgrede los artículos 7, 33, 34, 39, 40, 93, 169 y 171 de la Constitución Política, así como los principios de igualdad y libertad política; proporcionalidad; razonabilidad; irretroactividad; Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho; y el ordinal 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

IV.- Sobre la normativa impugnada. La ley nro. 10.183 del 5 de abril de 2022, denominada ‘Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales’ y cuya constitucionalidad se cuestiona, contiene esta normativa:

“ARTICULO ÚNICO- Se reforma el quinto párrafo del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998. El texto es el siguiente:

(...)

Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la presidencia y las vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa.

Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1 º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años y podrán ser reelegidos.

Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.

Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.

Transitorio Único- Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.

Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley.” V.- Sobre la consulta de constitucionalidad evacuada en relación con el expediente legislativo nro. 21.810. Este Tribunal, en el dictamen nro. 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022, evacuó la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad, que se formuló sobre el proyecto ‘Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)’, tramitado en el expediente legislativo nro. 21.810. En esa oportunidad, se resolvió:

“II.- SOBRE EL OBJETO DE LA CONSULTA. - Los diputados consultan sobre el proyecto de "Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)", que se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 21.810. Se plantean tres aspectos. En cuanto a ello, denota esta Sala que lo consultado se plantea como preguntas. Así se consulta:

• A)Violación procedimental: Indican los diputados consultantes que la intención del Constituyente, en cuanto a las restricciones del art.97 Constitucional, era evitar transformaciones del sistema electoral en épocas cercanas a los comicios. En este caso en particular la modificación propuesta es relativa única y exclusivamente para el régimen municipal, cuyo periodo electoral no se encuentra activo, siendo que el llamado electoral en el que se encuentra es relativo al Gobierno de la República y la Asamblea Legislativa, quedando excluido el régimen municipal en su totalidad, por lo tanto, surge la duda relacionada con el trámite legislativo: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?
• B)Violaciones de fondo: Consideran los diputados consultantes que el proyecto de ley en cuestión:

1. Violenta el derecho humano a la participación política.- Los diputados consultantes mencionan el argumento del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, cuando fue consultado sobre este proyecto, en el sentido de que, la propuesta genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo por cuanto impide que los funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular. Por lo anterior, indican que es preciso dirimir la conclusión esbozada por el TSE respecto al vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo, al impedir que ocupen un cargo de elección popular municipal, optar por la elección de forma inmediata, en un cargo distinto dentro del mismo régimen municipal, dado que implica una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de aspirar por cargos públicos.

2. Violenta el principio de irretroactividad de la ley: Consideran los diputados consultantes que, el transitorio único violenta el artículo 34 Constitucional, por cuanto impide que las actuales autoridades municipales electas por elección popular, que ya han servido dos o más periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo, no puedan volver a optar por el mismo cargo en la elección del año 2024.

Se aclara además que, el texto que tiene a la vista esta Sala para realizar el examen de la norma consultada, es la “Redacción Final” con fecha 26 de enero del 2022.

III.- EN GENERAL SOBRE EL PROYECTO CONSULTADO Y EL PROCEDIMIENTO SEGUIDO.- El proyecto de aprobación de la "Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)", que se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 21.810 siguió, en general, el siguiente procedimiento legislativo:

• a)El 18 de febrero del 2020 varios diputados presentan en proyecto de ley “Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal, y sus reformas, Ley n°7794 del 30 de abril de 1998” (ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales), el cual se tramitó en el expediente legislativo n°21.810 (ver folios 1-13).
• a)En fecha 18 de febrero del 2020 se pasó el expediente n°21.810 a la Comisión Permanente Especial de Asuntos Municipales y Desarrollo Local Participativo (folio 31).
• b)En fecha 02 de marzo del 2020 en la Gaceta n°41 del Alcance n°33 salió publicado el proyecto de ley.
• c)En fecha 13 de junio del 2020 la Jefa del Área de Comisiones Legislativas envía el proyecto n°21.810 a consulta obligatoria al Presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Que en esa misma fecha se enviaron las consultas obligatorias a todas las Municipalidades del país (folio 46-77, 83).
• d)En fecha 16 de junio del 2020, mediante oficio TSE-1098-2020, el Presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones comunica el acuerdo adoptado en el artículo sexto de la sesión ordinaria n°58-2020 celebrada el 16 de junio del 2020 por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, donde se indica que el TSE no objeta el proyecto de ley en cuestión (folio 78-82) e) En fecha 13 de octubre del 2021, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Asuntos Municipales y Desarrollo Local Participativo procede a rendir el Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría (folio 300-307).
• f)En fecha 18 de noviembre del 2021 mediante oficio AL-DEST-IJU-279-2021 se remite el Informe Jurídico del expediente n°21.810 (folio 312).
• g)En fecha 22 de noviembre del 2021 inicia la discusión de primer debate del proyecto n°21.810 (folio 331).
• h)En sesión extraordinaria n°45 del 23 de diciembre del 2012 se aprobó en primer debate, con 46 votos a favor y uno en contra (folio 600).
• i)En sesión extraordinaria n°46 del 05 de enero del 2022 se inició la discusión del proyecto n°21.810 en segundo debate, donde se aprobó una moción de orden para retrotraer a primer debate y se suspendió la discusión para que ocupe el primer lugar de los primeros debates en sesión siguiente (folio 650).
• j)En sesión ordinaria n°85 del 11 de enero del 2022 del Plenario Legislativo, inicia la discusión en el trámite de primer debate del proyecto n°21.810 (folio 702). En sesión extraordinaria n°053 del 25 de enero del 2022 se continuó la discusión en primer debate del proyecto en cuestión y se APROBO EN PRIMER DEBATE por 40 votos a favor (folio 1082-1112).
• k)En fecha 11 de enero del 2020 el Director a.i de la Secretaría del Directorio envía el texto actualizado del proyecto n°21.810 a consulta obligatoria al Presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Que en esa misma fecha se enviaron las consultas obligatorias a todas las Municipalidades del país (folio 721 y 731 en adelante, 1038).
• l)En fecha 12 de enero del 2022 el Director a.i de la Secretaría del Directorio envía a publicación el texto actualizado del proyecto n°21.810 (folio 724).
• m)En fecha 20 de enero del 2022 mediante oficio TSE-0199-2022 la Magistrada Presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones comunica al Director a.i del Departamento Secretaría del Directorio, el acuerdo adoptado en el artículo quinto de la sesión ordinaria n°6-2022 celebrada el 20 de enero del 2022 por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones donde se indica: “… este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente n°21.810. Tal objeción se levantaría si los legisladores modifican el proyecto para que, según el espíritu de la propuesta, se limite la reelección consecutiva a una única vez (máximo dos períodos continuos en el mismo cargo), sin que se prohíba la posibilidad de optar, al cabo del segundo mandato, por otro puesto de elección popular. Respetuosamente, se recuerda que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (numeral 97 constitucional). ACUERDO FIRME.» (folio 1063-1072).

De lo anterior, se observa que el proyecto n°21.810 siguió, en general, el procedimiento legislativo establecido. Fue debidamente presentado, enviado a Comisión para su dictamen, publicado, consultado, se rindió informe técnico, y discutido en el Plenario Legislativo en primer debate. Se hace notar que, el proyecto inicial luego fue variado, tal como se observa en el cuadro adjunto, y además que, inicialmente fue votado en primer debate en diciembre del 2021, pero el trámite fue retrotraído, y luego votado en primer debate en enero del 2022. Asimismo, que el TSE contestó la consulta sobre la primera versión del proyecto indicando que no tenía objeción alguna. Luego, ante la consulta del texto actualizado, el TSE planteó su objeción.

Código Municipal actual Proyecto n°21.810 (versión inicial) Proyecto n°21.810 (versión aprobada) Artículo 14.- Denomínase alcalde municipal al funcionario ejecutivo indicado en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política. Existirán dos vicealcaldes municipales: un(a) vicealcalde primero y un(a) vicealcalde segundo. El (la) vicealcalde primero realizará las funciones administrativas y operativas que el alcalde titular le asigne; además, sustituirá, de pleno derecho, al alcalde municipal en sus ausencias temporales y definitivas, con las mismas responsabilidades y competencias de este durante el plazo de la sustitución.

En los casos en que el o la vicealcalde primero no pueda sustituir al alcalde, en sus ausencias temporales y definitivas, el o la vicealcalde segundo sustituirá al alcalde, de pleno derecho, con las mismas responsabilidades y competencias de este durante el plazo de la sustitución.

En los concejos municipales de distrito, el funcionario ejecutivo indicado en el artículo 7 de la Ley N.° 8173, es el intendente distrital quien tendrá las mismas facultades que el alcalde municipal. Además, existirá un(a) viceintendente distrital, quien realizará las funciones administrativas y operativas que le asigne el o la intendente titular; también sustituirá, de pleno derecho, al intendente distrital en sus ausencias temporales y definitivas, con las mismas responsabilidades y competencias de este durante el plazo de la sustitución.

Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la Presidencia y las Vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años, y podrán ser reelegidos.

ARTÍCULO ÚNICO- Refórmase el párrafo final del artículo 14 del Código Municipal, Ley N.° 7794, de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas, de la siguiente manera:

(…)

Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la Presidencia y las Vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años, y podrán ser reelegidos en el mismo puesto, de forma sucesiva, por un período, sin menoscabo de su derecho para ser electos en cualquiera de los otros cargos en iguales condiciones.

Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal, podrán ser reelegidos en forma no sucesiva y se aplicarán las mismas reglas del párrafo anterior.

ARTÍCULO ÚNICO- Se reforma el quinto párrafo del artículo 14 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998. El texto es el siguiente:

(…)

Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la presidencia y las vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1° de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años y podrán ser reelegidos.

Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.

Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.

Transitorio Único: Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.

Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley.

En la exposición de motivos del proyecto inicial se indica que su objetivo es limitar la reelección indefinida de los alcaldes y autoridades locales. Posteriormente se observa que, el texto aprobado, además de limitar la reelección indefinida procede a establecer ciertas reglas para limitar los puestos a los que, después, puedan acceder los alcaldes, vicealcaldes, regidores, síndicos, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias. Estableciendo un transitorio que cubre a las personas que actualmente se desempeñan en esos puestos.

IV.- SOBRE LOS VICIOS DE PROCEDIMIENTO CONSULTADOS (redacta el magistrado Castillo Víquez).- Los consultantes consideran que se pudo haber incurrido en un vicio de procedimiento con la aprobación de este proyecto de ley, en contraposición a lo establecido en la última oración del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. Indican que existe un pronunciamiento formal del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones oponiéndose a la votación. Ese Tribunal, por medio del oficio TSE-0199-2022 del 20 de enero del 2022 indicó: “en razón del vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo, al impedir que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular, este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente 21.810.” Consideran los diputados consultantes que, la aplicación del artículo 97 no puede ser literal ni entendida desde una interpretación formal, porque la realidad del legislador constituyente al momento entendía las elecciones como un solo momento cada cuatrienio y por lo tanto la limitación era general y absoluta, dado que la legislación que implicara a uno de los niveles de funcionarios elegibles, les aplicaba a todos y las circunstancias actuales son distintas. Agregan que, esa fue la razón por la que aprobaron en primer debate el proyecto de ley, seguros de que su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones que se realizó el 6 de febrero pues no tenía relación con alguna autoridad municipal. Por lo tanto, preguntan: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?

En el diseño original del Constituyente de 1949 su voluntad fue que en un solo día se realizaran las tres elecciones, sea: las presidenciales, legislativas y municipales. En efecto, se decantó porque las elecciones para presidente y vicepresidentes de la República (artículo 133 constitucional), los miembros del Poder Legislativo (numeral 107 constitucional) y los regidores municipales (artículo 171 constitucional), se realizaran el mismo día. Sobre el particular, las Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, número 75, indican lo siguiente:

“El Diputado Leiva aclaró que estimaba que en treinta días el Tribunal no podrá escrutar todos los votos emitidos, incluyendo los sufragios para la elección de las Municipalidades. Sugirió que esta tarea podría quedar en manos de las Juntas electorales. El Representante Facio aceptó modificar la moción, pero dejando en manos del Tribunal el recuento de todos los votos emitidos en cualquier elección popular.

Los Representantes Pinto y Arroyo se opusieron a que no se fijara al Tribunal una fecha precisa para hacer la declaratoria de la elección de Presidente y Vice-Presidentes. Es necesario que ese plazo se determine en la propia Constitución. El Diputado Facio presentó esta otra fórmula, la cual fue aprobada: ‘Hacer dentro de los treinta días siguientes a la fecha de la votación, la declaratoria definitiva de la elección de Presidente y Vice-Presidentes de la República, y dentro del plazo que la ley determine, la de los demás funcionarios citados en el inciso 6 [hoy 7] de este artículo”. (Las negritas no corresponden al original).

Ahora bien, mediante ley -entrada en vigencia del Código Electoral, artículo 310-, se separaron las elecciones municipales de las presidenciales y legislativas, trasladándose las primeras para el medio periodo constitucional. Esta modificación del sistema -pasar de un modelo único o concentrado a uno dual- impone una interpretación del numeral 97 constitucional de cara a esta nueva realidad. Cuando se trataba de tres elecciones en un mismo día, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al proyecto de ley tenía el efecto de suspender la potestad de legislar para el caso concreto -durante los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la elección-; si el criterio se vertida (sic) fuera de ese periodo, se agravaba la potestad de legislar. La situación ha cambiado radicalmente en la actualidad, en la que hay elecciones separadas entre las presidenciales y diputadiles y las municipales. En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto de ley hace referencia las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría el efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente de agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional de ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional. Es por esta razón, de que, en el caso concreto, no existe ningún vicio de procedimiento por hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya aprobado en primer debate el proyecto de ley consultado. Más aún, incluso hay un error de concepto en lo consultado, toda vez que, conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el hipotético caso de que estuviéramos en el supuesto de la prohibición del 97 constitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa está autorizada por el Derecho de la Constitución y por las normas del Estatuto Parlamentario a aprobar un proyecto de ley en primer debate en el que hay una objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; lo que si no podría hacer es aprobarlo en la votación definitiva después de concluido el segundo debate. Ergo, con fundamento en lo anterior, se descarta el vicio de procedimiento.

V.- NOTA DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL.- Como consigna el voto de mayoría, que el infrascrito suscribe, para que aplique el plazo de los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, durante el cual la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en ley los proyectos objetados por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones ‑TSE‑ (artículo 97 de la Ley Fundamental), el cuestionamiento debe estar referido al tipo de proceso eleccionario correspondiente. Es decir, si la objeción atañe a un aspecto específico de una elección municipal, el plazo antedicho aplica solo, precisamente, a un proceso electoral de esa naturaleza; misma ratio iuris opera cuando se trata de una elección nacional. No obstante, se pasa por alto que puede haber asuntos relativos a materia electoral que no estén directamente vinculados a la naturaleza municipal o nacional de una elección, sino que se refieran a la jurisdicción electoral en general (verbigracia, si se propusiere variar la conformación del TSE o la forma de elegir las personas magistradas), caso en el cual el plazo de marras aplicaría respecto de cualquier clase de proceso electoral.

VI.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO CRUZ CASTRO.- Al respecto, es pertinente citar el artículo 97 de la Constitución:

“Art. 97. Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En este caso, resulta inobjetable que el proyecto en cuestión se refiere a materia electoral, pues incide en la regulación y restricción de ciertos supuestos de reelección en las elecciones municipales. Además, no se puede distinguir donde la Constitución Política no lo hace, por ello resulta improcedente afirmar que el artículo 97 constitucional en cuestión se refiere sólo a las elecciones nacionales y no a las municipales. Claramente tal norma lo que hace referencia es a “la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales” sin distinguir tipos de elecciones. Asimismo, resulta evidente que el TSE se ha manifestado en desacuerdo con este proyecto de ley. Así entonces, considero que resulta aplicable lo establecido por el artículo 97 en cuestión en cuanto a lo siguiente:

La Asamblea Legislativa puede apartarse de la opinión del TSE; pero para ello necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros, siempre no esté dentro del período de veda legislativa. En todo caso, esa votación calificada no tiene la virtud de desconocer el periodo de veda, conforme al cual: dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.

Los partidos políticos que actúan en el parlamento, son importantes actores en todo tipo de elecciones, por esta razón considero que la prohibición constitucional, es saludable. Impide que los actores políticos puedan variar las reglas electorales en cualquier tipo de elección. Distinguir entre elecciones municipales y elecciones nacionales, es una distinción artificial. La incidencia de las luchas electorales y la porosidad de los partidos, son razones suficientes para impedir que las reglas de contiendas electorales, sean locales o nacionales, se modifiquen durante el período electoral. La historia electoral evidencia la volatibilidad y conflictividad que contiene esta materia, por esta razón el texto constitucional es tajante, muy claro. Cualquier elección popular impide la variación de las reglas electorales. Por otra parte, el texto constitucional contiene un “veto particular” del Tribunal Electoral, pues no puede introducirse ninguna modificación electoral, en los seis meses anteriores y en los cuatro posteriores de la celebración de una elección popular, en materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo. Esto es precisamente lo que ocurrió en este caso. El voto de mayoría ignora que existe una intervención calificada del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, que no depende sólo del período de exclusión de la potestad legislativa, sino que el Tribunal tiene una competencia calificada, que no puede ser ignorada por el poder legislativo ni por esta instancia constitucional. No es buen síntoma el debilitamiento de las potestades del Tribunal electoral, no puede desconocerse la historia, pues fue una de las reivindicaciones políticas más importantes después de los hechos violentos del cuarenta y ocho.

Dado que las elecciones nacionales se realizaron el 06 de febrero del 2022, el periodo de veda mencionado cubriría desde el 06 de agosto del 2021. Es evidente que el primer debate se llevó a cabo el 25 de enero 2022, claramente se celebró dentro del periodo vedado en cuestión. Además, se hizo sobre una reforma a la que se opuso el Tribunal. En razón de los argumentos expuestos, considero que existe el vicio de procedimiento señalado, pues se contraviene las prohibiciones y limitaciones impuestas por el periodo de veda establecido en el artículo 97 constitucional.

VII.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS.- En la parte resolutiva de este dictamen se consigna:

“La magistrada Garro Vargas salva el voto respecto del supuesto vicio de procedimiento planteado y considera que es inevacuable, pues la consulta no presenta propiamente un cuestionamiento, sino una defensa ante la posición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en relación con el alcance del art. 97 de la Constitución Política”.

Para ilustrar mi tesis basta hacer referencia a las propias manifestaciones de los legisladores consultantes, quienes lejos de invocar dudas u objeciones razonadas de constitucionalidad del trámite dado al proyecto de ley, pretenden blindarlo frente a los cuestionamientos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE). Al respecto, se indica lo siguiente:

“Desde una interpretación formal, rígida y estricta de la norma tenemos tres posibles implicaciones relacionadas con el trámite legislativo: la primera, acogemos la recomendación del Tribunal en el sentido irrestricto y absoluto del derecho a ser electo y mantenemos "la puerta giratoria" en donde los funcionarios municipales de elección popular, pueden "saltar" cada ocho años (luego de una reelección sucesiva) a otros puestos también de elección popular, y con ello limitamos la participación política de otros ciudadanos, y además, promovemos los puestos ad perpetuam en los gobiernos locales; la segunda, no votamos el proyecto de ley que cuenta con el aval de gran mayoría de diputados y diputadas que representamos la voluntad ciudadana o; la tercera, le heredamos a la Asamblea Legislativa entrante, cuya composición e intención no conocemos, la decisión sobre una propuesta que a todas luces pretende fortalecer la democracia”.

De su razonamiento ‒frente a la argumentación realizada por el TSE‒ los propios legisladores plantean tres escenarios que califican como negativos: 1) acoger la recomendación del TSE, lo que trae como consecuencia la limitación a la participación política de los ciudadanos y la promoción de puestos ad perpetuam; 2) no votar el proyecto, el cual, según ellos mismos reconocen “cuenta con el aval de la gran mayoría de diputados y diputadas” que representan la voluntad ciudadana; y 3) le heredan el proyecto a una nueva conformación de la Asamblea Legislativa con el peligro de que no se logre concretar, advirtiendo que es una propuesta que “a todas luces pretende fortalecer la democracia”.

Seguidamente realizan una reseña histórica sobre la regulación de las elecciones municipales y de las elecciones nacionales, para ilustrar su tesis ‒la que consideran es la apropiada interpretación del art. 97 de la Constitución Política‒ y solamente de seguido plantean una consulta a esta Sala. Al respecto, el escrito de la consulta indica textualmente lo siguiente:

“¿Cuál es el objetivo de esta reseña? Evidenciar que la aplicación del artículo 97 no puede ser literal ni entendida desde una interpretación formal, porque la realidad del legislador constituyente al momento de redactar la norma en cuestión entendía las elecciones como un solo momento cada cuatrienio y por lo tanto la limitación era general y absoluta, dado que la legislación que implicara a uno de los niveles de funcionarios elegibles, les aplicaba a todos y las circunstancias actuales son distintas.

Lo que queremos denotar ante el honorable Tribunal, es que la interpretación de este artículo debe ser material y teleológica, desde el contenido de la norma, desde su fin último y con la aprobación de este proyecto de ley en su trámite de primer debate, no se está afectando la dinámica de las elecciones municipales que se celebrarán en febrero del año 2024, es decir, dentro de 24 meses. Esa fue la razón por la que aprobamos en primer debate el proyecto de ley, seguros de que su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones que se realizará el 6 de febrero de este año, en el que se elegirá la Presidencia de la República y los diputados a la Asamblea Legislativa, de ninguna forma, alguna autoridad municipal.

Por lo anterior, considerando los alcances y la intención de las personas constituyentes de evitar transformaciones del sistema electoral en épocas cercanas a los comicios, en este caso en particular donde la modificación jurídica propuesta es relativa única y exclusivamente para el régimen municipal, cuyo periodo electoral no se encuentra activo, siendo que el llamado electoral en el que nos encontramos es relativo al Gobierno de la República y la Asamblea Legislativa, queda excluido el régimen municipal en su totalidad, por lo tanto surge la duda relacionada con el trámite legislativo: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

A partir de una detallada lectura del propio memorial suscrito por los legisladores consultantes, se aprecia que toda la argumentación no tiene por objeto fundamentar una duda sobre el procedimiento seguido para aprobar el proyecto que ellos impulsan, sino defender tanto el proyecto como ese procedimiento frente al criterio formalmente remitido por el TSE en el marco del iter parlamentario. La única pregunta propiamente dicha de ese epígrafe relativo al presunto vicio de procedimiento es la que está al final, pero toda la argumentación que la antecede no tiene ningún vestigio de duda u objeción sobre el trámite brindado al proyecto de ley, sino, muy por el contrario, pone de manifiesto el convencimiento de que “su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones” llevado a cabo el pasado 6 de febrero.

En virtud de tal constatación, considero que la consulta debe ser declarada inevacuable, a la luz de lo dispuesto en el art. 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que señala lo siguiente:

"Art. 99. Salvo que se trate de la consulta forzosa prevista en el inciso a) del artículo 96, la consulta deberá formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieren dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Como se desprende del contenido de dicho numeral, para que la consulta legislativa sea admisible se deben expresar con claridad los motivos por los cuales se tienen dudas u objeciones de constitucionalidad. Y esto es precisamente lo que aquí se echa en falta, puesto que de los extractos citados –y del entero escrito– se puede advertir que los legisladores no cuestionan un trámite en particular respecto del que se tengan dudas concretas de constitucionalidad. Más bien, se muestran disconformes con la postura institucional del TSE (ver en idéntico sentido la reciente opinión consultiva que, mediante el dictamen n°.2872-2022, suscrito unánimemente por esta Sala, con casi igual integración, declaró inevacuable la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad tramitada en el expediente n.°21-025530-0007-CO).

En consecuencia, considero que en lo relativo al presunto vicio de procedimiento los consultantes sólo enuncian la pregunta, sin argumentar el por qué estiman que amerita plantear la cuestión a esta Sala. Por el contrario, sus alegatos buscan justificar lo actuado. Por eso, bien se puede afirmar que, al no contener una objeción de constitucionalidad, la consulta legislativa es inadmisible e inevacuable.

VIII.- SOBRE LA INEVACUABILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA SOBRE LOS ALEGADOS VICIOS DE FONDO (redacta el magistrado Castillo Víquez).- El artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece:

“Artículo 99. Salvo que se trate de la consulta forzosa prevista en el inciso a) del artículo 96, la consulta deberá formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieren dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad.” A tenor de lo dispuesto en tal numeral, esta Sala, en el voto nro. 2012-009253, precisó que:

“el libelo de interposición deba expresarse los artículos del proyecto cuya constitucionalidad se cuestiona o consulta, y manifestarse de manera clara los motivos por los cuales se estima que una norma del proyecto puede ser inconstitucional, pues caso contrario la consulta sería inadmisible -ver, en este sentido, sentencias números 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643”.

En ese mismo voto agregó lo que sigue:

“«tratándose de consultas legislativas de tipo facultativo, la competencia de la Sala Constitucional tiene origen en las dudas o reparos de constitucionalidad que formulen los legisladores» -sentencia 2001-12459-, de forma que si tales argumentos no existen como tal, o bien, cuando los propios diputados consultantes manifiesten carecer de dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas o proyectos consultados, resultaría impropio para la Sala emitir criterio alguno, pues se estaría en supuestos que trascienden las competencias de la Sala en materia de consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad -sentencia 2002-3460-.” En el sub judice, los diputados consultantes solicitan que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre un “presunto vaciamiento del derecho humano a la participación política pasiva” a causa de la reforma propuesta en el expediente legislativo nro. 21.810. Sin embargo, de la lectura del escrito de la consulta se puede constatar que los diputados consultantes no formulan ni muchos menos desarrollan efectivas objeciones o reparos sobre la constitucionalidad del proyecto; por el contrario, lo que exponen a lo largo de tal escrito son sus distintos argumentos o justificaciones a favor de la reforma pretendida y, en realidad, lo que se procura es que Sala confirme que tal posición es la correcta, ante las observaciones realizadas por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en cuanto a este punto. Los diputados consultantes también solicitan que este Tribunal se pronuncie sobre una presunta infracción al artículo 34 de la Constitución Política, en razón de lo dispuesto en el transitorio único del proyecto. En lo atinente a este aspecto, los diputados consultantes no formulan ni justifican algún motivo específico que los haga dudar de la constitucionalidad de tal transitorio. Los diputados consultantes se circunscriben a señalar que “Otro de los temas que ha sido considerado, en la vasta discusión que este proyecto generada (sic) a lo interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, tiene que ver con el contenido de la norma transitoria del proyecto, en relación con el principio de retroactividad de la ley”. No obstante, luego de tal afirmación, los consultantes se limitan a exponer y argumentar las razones por los cuales consideran que no existiría infracción alguna al ordinal 34 constitucional. En definitiva, en el sub lite, lejos de plantearse dudas debidamente razonadas de constitucionalidad, conforme lo exigido por el citado numeral 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, lo que procuran los diputados consultantes es que esta Sala avale su posición en defensa del contenido del proyecto. Lo que resulta improcedente, como así ha resuelto esta Sala en casos similares. Se puede citar, al efecto, el voto nro. 2020-013837, en que este Tribunal resolvió lo siguiente:

“Debe tomarse en consideración, que el artículo 99 dispone que “ la consulta deberá formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieran dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad ”; aspecto que no cumplimenta el memorial de interposición de esta consulta legislativa, pues lo que solicitan en cada uno de sus planteamientos, es que este Tribunal avale, si el análisis realizado por la Asamblea se ajusta o no a la Constitución Política, lo que no constituyen motivos de duda u objeciones de constitucionalidad.

(...)

Corolario de lo expuesto, en lo que respecta a la consulta legislativa n.° 20-06822-0007-CO, acumulada a este expediente, debe ser declarada inevacuable, al no haber cumplido con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en relación con el debido planteamiento y razonamiento de las dudas de constitucionalidad que tuvieren los consultantes en relación con el expediente legislativo de estudio.

(…)

En cuanto al expediente No. 20-006822-0007-CO, por unanimidad se declara inevacuable la consulta, por cuanto los diputados consultantes omiten formular alguna duda u objeción de constitucionalidad en los términos del artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.” Consideraciones aplicables al presente caso. Como corolario de lo anterior, la consulta formulada resulta inevacuable respecto a los alegados vicios de fondo del proyecto.

IX.- NOTA DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS.- Respecto de los vicios de fondo he coincidido con la mayoría de la Sala en el sentido de que “los diputados consultantes no formulan ni mucho menos desarrollan efectivas objeciones o reparos sobre la constitucionalidad del proyecto; por el contrario, lo que exponen a lo largo de tal escrito son sus distintos argumentos o justificaciones a favor de la reforma pretendida y, en realidad, lo que se procura es que Sala confirme que tal posición es la correcta” y, además, que “los diputados consultantes no formulan ni justifican algún motivo específico que los haga dudar de la constitucionalidad de tal transitorio”.

Sobre el primer vicio, no hay alusión alguna a los motivos por los que estiman que corresponde cuestionar la constitucionalidad de la norma que dispone que quienes hayan ejercido el cargo al frente de una alcaldía durante dos periodos consecutivos estarán impedidos para optar a un cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Al referirse al segundo vicio, relativo al transitorio, transcriben el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política y plantean la pregunta, pero luego no argumentan ni se desarrollan por qué tal normativa pudiese ser inconstitucional. En ambos casos, habría que destacar que nuevamente se incumple lo señalado en el art. 99 de la LJC, esta vez en lo que se refiere concretamente a la obligación de “formularse [la consulta] en memorial razonado”.

Finalmente, cabe agregar que esta línea de razonamiento es coincidente con la que, en su momento, siendo magistrada suplente, expuse:

“2. Sin embargo, estimo que –tal como está redactada y presentada– la consulta dista de lo que prescribe el artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que establece: la consulta facultativa “deberá formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieren dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad”.

3. En efecto, de la lectura de la presente consulta se advierte que ésta carece del debido razonamiento que fundamente las objeciones que presenta. No se esgrimen los motivos por los que el proyecto bajo examen lesiona el principio de igualdad y la autonomía de la CCSS, ni por qué podría ser inconstitucional que su contenido se redacte como un transitorio.

4. En virtud del artículo 99 antes citado, no corresponde a esta Sala suponer qué quisieron expresar los consultantes sobre las eventuales lesiones constitucionales que, de ser aprobada, podría acarrear la norma, ya sea por sí misma o por sus efectos inmediatos o previsibles. Corresponde a este tribunal atenerse a lo que recoge el texto de la consulta. Ciertamente ésta viene acompañada del expediente legislativo, pero la lógica de tal requisito no es que la Sala sustituya a los consultantes en la elaboración de sus argumentos, sino que corrobore los distintos extremos de la consulta que tienen su asidero en dicho expediente”. (Nota a la resolución 2015-015927).

En el mismo sentido me he pronunciado, como magistrada propietaria, en otros votos salvados. Por ejemplo, el voto salvado al dictamen n°.2872-2022, relativo a la consulta tramitada en el exp. n°.21-25092 y el voto salvado al dictamen n°.21-17098, relativo a la consulta tramitada en el exp. n°.21-12714, ambas presentadas por la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que estimé evacuables salvo sobre aquellos aspectos en los que no había fundamentación de los cuestionamientos.

Por lo tanto, siendo consistente con mi línea resolutiva y con el plexo normativo que rige a este Tribunal, corresponde declarar inevacuable la consulta legislativa también en lo que al fondo se refiere.

X.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL.- 1) Desarrollo jurisprudencial convencional.

Comienzo por examinar la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (CADH) y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Corte IDH) acerca de los derechos político‑electorales, específicamente, en lo de interés para la resolución del sub lite.

El numeral 23 de la CADH regula los derechos políticos:

“Artículo 23. Derechos Políticos 1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades:

• a)de participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos; b) de votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país.

2. La ley puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a que se refiere el inciso anterior, exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal.” De este modo, la CADH, por un lado, contempla ejemplos concretos de derechos político‑electorales, y, por otro, orienta acerca de cómo reglamentarlos de manera válida, lo que comporta restringirlos.

El punto de partida consiste en comprender que “el ejercicio efectivo de los derechos políticos constituye un fin en sí mismo y, a la vez, un medio fundamental que las sociedades democráticas tienen para garantizar los demás derechos humanos previstos en la Convención y que sus titulares, es decir, los ciudadanos, no sólo (sic) deben gozar de derechos, sino también de “oportunidades”. Este último término implica la obligación de garantizar con medidas positivas que toda persona que formalmente sea titular de derechos políticos tenga la oportunidad real para ejercerlos.” (Yatama vs. Nicaragua, sentencia de 23 de junio de 2005).

Propiamente en lo atinente al ejercicio de un cargo público de elección popular, en primer lugar, se debe tomar en cuenta que los derechos políticos no son absolutos.

En tal sentido, la Corte IDH ensaya en Yatama vs. Nicaragua una especie de “test de razonabilidad” a fin de ponderar la viabilidad jurídica de alguna restricción. Así, amén de explícitamente acudir a los principios de legalidad e igualdad ‑los requerimientos para participar en una contienda electoral y el procedimiento correspondiente deben estar definidos por ley y no ser discriminatorios‑, afirma que las limitaciones deben “basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.” Hago el paréntesis de que, en relación con este tipo de análisis, acudiendo a la jurisprudencia alemana, este Tribunal Constitucional también ha elaborado un test o protocolo similar para valorar la razonabilidad de una medida:

“En tal sentido, la Sala considera que la medida impugnada se encuentra acorde al principio de razonabilidad. Este último está compuesto por los siguientes componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, la autoridad competente debe elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aunque una medida sea idónea y necesaria, será irrazonables si lesiona el contenido esencial de otro derecho fundamental, si lo vacía de contenido.” (Sentencia nro. 2013001276 de las 14:50 horas del 29 de enero de 2013, reiterada en las sentencias nros. 2017011793 de las 16:41 horas de 26 de julio de 2017, 2019007035 de las 9:20 horas del 26 de abril de 2019 y 2020022295 de las 9:15 horas 20 de noviembre de 2020, entre muchas otras).

Continuando con la evolución convencional, en Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008) se desarrollan con mayor precisión los parámetros de regulación de los derechos políticos.

En primer lugar, en cuanto al numeral 23.1 de la CADH, la Corte IDH precisa que, de manera correlativa a los derechos y oportunidades de los ciudadanos en la materia, al Estado se le impone la “obligación de hacer, de realizar ciertas acciones o conductas, de adoptar medidas, que se derivan de la obligación de garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos humanos de las personas sujetas a su jurisdicción (artículo 1.1 de la Convención) y de la obligación general de adoptar medidas en el derecho interno (artículo 2 de la Convención).” En tal sentido, concreta:

“157. Esta obligación positiva consiste en el diseño de un sistema que permita que se elijan representantes para que conduzcan los asuntos públicos. En efecto, para que los derechos políticos puedan ser ejercidos, la ley necesariamente tiene que establecer regulaciones que van más allá de aquellas que se relacionan con ciertos límites del Estado para restringir esos derechos, establecidos en el artículo 23.2 de la Convención. Los Estados deben organizar los sistemas electorales y establecer un complejo número de condiciones y formalidades para que sea posible el ejercicio del derecho a votar y ser votado.” Es decir, el numeral 23.1 no solo contempla derechos y oportunidades a favor del ciudadano, sino que de manera concomitante impone obligaciones al Estado con el propósito de configurar un sistema para la elección a cargos públicos, que de suyo se caracteriza por un complejo número de condiciones y formalidades, requeridas para posibilitar el ejercicio eficaz y efectivo de los derechos a votar y a ser votado.

Con miras a la elaboración de semejante filigrana jurídico‑positiva, los factores de restricción estatuidos en el ordinal 23.2 se quedan cortos; ellos son solo parte del entramado normativo, puesto que hay límites jurídicamente plausibles allende de tal regulación. En tal sentido, de forma contundente sentencia el órgano judicial de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA): “no es posible aplicar al sistema electoral que se establezca en un Estado solamente las limitaciones del párrafo 2 del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana.” ¿Qué condiciones deben darse y qué pautas hermenéuticas deben seguirse a los efectos de configurar tales restricciones conforme a la CADH?

A fin de contestar esto, parto de la premisa de que el deber ser normativo es insuficiente, toda vez que la eficacia y efectividad de cualquier derecho precisa, como ya se indicó, de un complejo aparato institucional, económico y humano que funcione en el plano de la realidad. En resumen, un “deber ser” sin “realidad” es inane.

Dice la Corte IDH: “si no hay códigos o leyes electorales, registros de electores, partidos políticos, medios de propaganda y movilización, centros de votación, juntas electorales, fechas y plazos para el ejercicio del sufragio, éste (sic) sencillamente no se puede ejercer, por su misma naturaleza; de igual manera que no puede ejercerse el derecho a la protección judicial sin que existan los tribunales que la otorguen y las normas procesales que la disciplinen y hagan posible.” En adición, la Corte IDH postula, que la CADH no se decanta por un sistema electoral en particular; todo lo contrario, admite diversidad de opciones, solo sujetas a su compatibilidad para con los derechos cobijados por aquella. Igual norte ha guiado al Comité de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas y al Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.

En este punto, la Corte IDH modula las consecuencias de Yatama, haciendo énfasis que, en el último caso, primaron las cualidades culturales de los miembros de una comunidad indígena y la imposición de una forma de organización ‑en el marco de una elección municipal‑ totalmente ajena a tales parámetros, de lo que resultó una lesión al derecho convencional a ser electo.

De este modo, en Castañeda Gutman, la Corte IDH viene a confirmar que la regla general es la plausibilidad de diversas restricciones y distintos modelos de sistema electoral, siempre que no se violen los derechos fundamentales, para cuyos efectos concreta ciertas pautas.

Comienza por reiterar que las restricciones a los derechos electorales solo se pueden instituir por ley.

Acto seguido evoca ciertos elementos propios de un test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Así, alude al fin de la medida restrictiva, en tanto su causa debe ser procedente a la luz de la CADH.

Dentro de este planteamiento, destaca el caso en que el propósito sea el resguardo de algún derecho fundamental, tal como el orden o la salud pública (según los numerales 12.3, 13.2.b y 15 eiusdem, entre otros). Por añadidura, hace referencia a otro grupo de restricciones: aquellas que más bien se enlazan con finalidades generales legítimas (por ejemplo, “las libertades de las demás personas” o “las justas exigencias del bien común, en una sociedad democrática”, ambas en el ordinal 32 eiusdem).

Ahora, propiamente, el numeral 23 convencional no regula de forma explícita ni las causas legítimas ni las finalidades permitidas, por las cuales la ley puede regular los derechos políticos. En efecto, esa norma “se limita a establecer ciertos aspectos o razones (capacidad civil o mental, edad, entre otros) con base en los cuales los derechos políticos pueden ser regulados en relación con los titulares de ellos, pero no determina de manera explícita las finalidades, ni las restricciones específicas que necesariamente habrá que imponer al diseñar un sistema electoral, tales como requisitos de residencia, distritos electorales y otros. Sin embargo, las finalidades legítimas que las restricciones deben perseguir se derivan de las obligaciones que se desprenden del artículo 23.1 de la Convención …” (Castañeda Gutman).

De esta forma, el mencionado aspecto ligado al objetivo de una regulación o medida corresponde al elemento “legitimidad” del tipo de test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad desarrollado por la Sala, acorde a lo definido supra.

Acto seguido, en Castañeda Gutman, la Corte IDH aclara que la demostración de un fin permitido por la CADH no implica per se la razonabilidad de la medida, pues esta también debe responder al factor “necesidad en una sociedad democrática”. Este último lo secciona de la siguiente forma:

“184. Con el fin de evaluar si la medida restrictiva bajo examen cumple con este último requisito la Corte debe valorar si la misma: a) satisface una necesidad social imperiosa, esto es, está orientada a satisfacer un interés público imperativo; b) es la que restringe en menor grado el derecho protegido; y c) se ajusta estrechamente al logro del objetivo legítimo.” Concerniente a la “necesidad social imperiosa”, de nuevo evoca el elemento “legitimidad” del test de razonabilidad del Tribunal Constitucional, en tanto la disposición va dirigida a procurar una solución a tal cuestión, es decir, se trata de un fin legítimo, que inexorablemente debe estar presente. Asimismo, la Corte sostiene que, entre varias medidas legítimas, se debe escoger aquella que restrinja en menor grado el derecho fundamental afectado; esto es idéntico al elemento “necesidad” del test constitucional de la Sala. Por último, cuando la Corte IDH refiere el requisito de que la determinación se ajuste estrechamente al logro de un objetivo legítimo, se presenta una denotada correspondencia con el elemento “idoneidad” del test de razonabilidad del Tribunal Constitucional, con base en el cual la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar el objetivo pretendido. Solo en relación con el elemento del test de razonabilidad de la Sala “proporcionalidad en sentido estricto” (según el cual una disposición puede ser legítima, idónea y necesaria, pero aun así irrazonable, cuando su aplicación lacera el núcleo esencial de un derecho fundamental), no se advierte alguna concordancia directa con el examen de razonabilidad desarrollado por de la Corte IDH.

Corolario de lo anterior, en el examen de la razonabilidad de una medida o disposición frente a una norma convencional, estimo procedente aplicar los criterios y pautas de la Corte IDH, que están referidos a los principios de legalidad e igualdad, la busca de un fin permitido por la CADH, la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa, la idoneidad y la necesidad de la medida (con claridad aplicados en Argüelles y otros vs. Argentina, sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2014), a lo que agrego el elemento de la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, desarrollado en el test de razonabilidad de la jurisprudencia patria.

• 2)Principio de libre configuración del legislador.

En la sentencia nro. 2003-05090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, la Sala delinea con claridad al principio de libre configuración del legislador, también denominado “libre diseño legislativo” o “discrecionalidad legislativa”.

Así, este Tribunal señala, que el Poder Parlamentario, en el ejercicio de la función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121 inciso 1º de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad para desarrollar normativamente el programa constitucional fijado por el poder constituyente.

En tal contexto, el principio de libre configuración del legislador lo aborda de esta manera. “Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa. De esa forma, el legislador puede crear órganos públicos, asignarles funciones o competencias, desarrollar diversas instituciones o normar la realidad, según lo estime oportuno y conveniente para una coyuntura histórica, social, económica o política determinada. Evidentemente, la discrecionalidad legislativa es mucho más amplia que la administrativa, puesto que, la función legislativa no se puede reconducir a la simple ejecución de la Constitución.” Sin embargo, la “libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios ‑dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa‑ de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, puesto que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo (sic) que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales.” (Ver también las resoluciones nros. 2013011499 de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 2013, 2013011706 de las 11:44 horas del 30 de agosto de 2013 y 2020015542 de las 11:40 horas del 19 de agosto de 2020, entre otras).

En la misma dirección expuesta, el Tribunal Constitucional afirma en la sentencia nro. 2018019511 de las 21:45 horas del 23 de noviembre de 2018, que esa amplia libertad de conformación de la realidad social, económica y política de que gozan las personas diputadas en el ejercicio de la potestad legislativa (que según los ordinales 105 y 121 inciso 1° de la Ley Fundamental reside originariamente en el pueblo y es constitucionalmente delegada en la Asamblea Legislativa por su carácter de órgano político representativo), solo puede estar sometida a “los límites que establece el constituyente y, en general, el bloque de constitucionalidad, de modo que para evitar una limitación indebida de la libertad de configuración legislativa, cualquier disposición que establezca una condición o límite que la agrave debe ser interpretada en sus justos y razonables términos, para facilitar su ejercicio.” No obstante, se debe advertir que, en la sentencia nro. 2018000230 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de enero de 2018, el Tribunal Constitucional rechazó “que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad” (verbigracia, en aplicación del principio de objetivación de la tutela ambiental ‑sentencias nros. 2005014293-de las 14:52 horas del 19 de octubre de 2005, 2012012716 de las 16:01 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2012 y 2021024147 de las 9:15 horas del 27 de octubre de 2021‑.

Asimismo, vale anotar que la discrecionalidad legislativa en el ejercicio del poder constituyente derivado de igual forma se encuentra sometida a ciertos límites procedimentales, temporales y sustanciales (ver resoluciones nros. 2005015094 de las 15:00 horas de 2 de noviembre de 2005, 2013006118 de las 16:22 horas de 30 de abril de 2013 y 2019013270 de las 16:50 horas del 17 de julio de 2019).

Corolario de lo anterior, en el ejercicio de la potestad legisladora, la persona diputada goza de una extensa discrecionalidad, sujeta solo a la observancia al bloque de constitucionalidad.

• 3)Dudas de constitucionalidad por el fondo.

Los consultantes transcriben este criterio del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE), externado en el oficio nro. TSE-0199-2022 de 20 de enero de 2022:

“Las restricciones de los funcionarios reelegidos (para que no puedan optar por otro cargo en la municipalidad) imposibilitarían que esos ciudadanos puedan acceder a contiendas partidarias internas en aras de, luego, ser postulados para cargos de elección popular distintos al que ocupan. En otros términos, por más que pertenezcan a una agrupación y cumplan con los requisitos legales de postulación, en razón de la función pública que desempeñan ‑ab initio‑ tales servidores no podrían competir ni siquiera en los procesos internos en los que se disputan las nominaciones.

Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos.” (El subrayado es del original).

Con base en lo transcrito, los consultantes plantean:

“Por todo lo anterior, es preciso dirimir la conclusión esbozada por el TSE, respecto al vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo, al impedir a personas que ocupen un cargo de elección popular municipal, optar por la elección de forma inmediata, en un cargo distinto dentro del mismo régimen municipal, dado que implica una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de aspirar por cargos públicos.” Atinente a la evacuabilidad de este extremo, según el artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la consulta de constitucionalidad requiere, entre otros aspectos, que se precisen los motivos por los cuales se tienen dudas u objeciones de constitucionalidad.

Concerniente a este punto, resulta evidente y notorio, que los recurrentes formulan una clara duda de constitucionalidad, la cual surge precisamente de la supracitada posición del TSE, es decir, se encuentra fundada y argumentada. La incertidumbre que esto genera no es para nada menor, dada la particular relevancia del órgano constitucional especializado en materia electoral. Incluso, aunque los consultantes discrepan del citado criterio, no menos cierto es que manifiestan de forma expresa: “No obstante, a la luz de lo indicado por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en el oficio TSE-0199-2022, existe duda razonable de si la restricción… vulnera derechos fundamentales.” Ergo, el sub examine sí comprende una palmaria duda de constitucionalidad, motivo por el cual, contrario a la Mayoría, considero la consulta evacuable, aunque, claro está, solo en cuanto a lo explícitamente argumentado por las personas diputadas consultantes.

Al respecto, descarto alguna inconstitucionalidad en los términos en que las persona consultantes formulan esta gestión, es decir, de modo específico en cuanto a la duda generada a partir de la parte del oficio nro. TSE-0199-2022 que en concreto fue transcrita.

En primer término, el punto interrogante se relaciona, como ya se anotó, con que a una persona titular de un cargo de elección popular municipal se le impida optar por la elección de forma inmediata en un cargo distinto dentro del mismo régimen, dado que implica una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de aspirar a cargos públicos.

Examinado el texto del proyecto de esta consulta, se observan tres escenarios:

• 1)Las alcaldesas o los alcaldes podrán ser reelegidos de manera continua por una única vez. No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos periodos desde que finalizó su segundo periodo consecutivo.
• 2)Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidor (a) o síndico (a), hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos periodos desde que finalizó su segundo periodo consecutivo.
• 3)Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, podrán ser reelegidas de manera continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos periodos desde que finalizó su segundo periodo.

Acerca de este punto específico (la restricción a ser electo en un cargo distinto dentro del mismo régimen municipal), las alcaldesas y los alcaldes se ven afectados respecto de todo puesto de elección popular en tal régimen, mientras que los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas en relación con los cargos de regidor o síndico. En cuanto a las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales y sus suplencias también hay incidencia, dado que la titularidad y la suplencia significan puestos distintos.

Como indiqué supra, siguiendo a Yatama vs. Nicaragua (sentencia de 23 de junio de 2005) y Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008), así como la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, el control de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad de las restricciones a los derechos políticos ‑en la especie, el derecho al sufragio pasivo‑ como mínimo comprende estos parámetros: los principios de legalidad e igualdad, la búsqueda de un fin constitucional o convencionalmente permitido, la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa, la idoneidad y la necesidad de la medida, y el análisis de proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, todo lo cual conforme a los alcances y límites del principio de libre configuración del legislador.

Relativo a los principios de legalidad e igualdad, estimo que no sufren menoscabo alguno. La referida restricción, por un lado, se regula por ley (reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal); por otro, parte de un trato ciertamente diferenciado mas no injustificado, dado que procura atender fines de relevancia constitucional y convencional, y, en concreto, una necesidad social imperiosa, como explico infra. En la determinación de qué fines alcanzar o qué considerar como necesidad social imperiosa, la persona legisladora goza de una amplia libertad de configuración.

Así, en la presentación del proyecto en cuestión se hace referencia a un informe preliminar de la Misión Electoral de la OEA, tras las elecciones celebradas el 2 de febrero de 2020. Tal delegación estuvo integrada, según se consigna en el mencionado documento, por 11 expertos electorales de 6 países de la región, quienes habían llegado al país el 25 del mes anterior.

En tal documento, la Misión señaló: “… no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados.” (ver http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf ), lo que fue ampliamente divulgado por varios medios (https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/oea-recomienda-a-costa-rica-limitar-la-reeleccion/OVR5GIP5T5CYXG3DVH4GH36P44/story/, https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/politica/mision-de-oea-reitera-necesidad-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes/, https://observador.cr/pusc-y-nueva-republica-trataran-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes-oea-lo-recomienda/ , https://www.diarioextra.com/Noticia/detalle/410346/oea-jala-orejas-a-costa-rica-por-reeleccion-de-alcaldes, https://www.elmundo.cr/municipales/alcaldes-apoyaran-proyecto-de-ley-que-limita-su-reeleccion/ ).

Luego, ya en la versión final (https://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=421-1219-28-0) se subraya, que la Comisión Europea para la Democracia a través del Derecho (Comisión de Venecia) en dos informes emitidos a partir de una consulta realizada por el secretario general de la OEA, tocante a los límites a la reelección, concluyó “que no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados. Revisar la legislación vigente, recordando nuevamente que, si bien la continuidad en las políticas públicas es valiosa, la alternancia constituye un pilar fundamental del sistema democrático.” (Informe sobre los límites a la reelección Parte II - Miembros del Parlamento, Parte III - Representantes elegidos a nivel local y funcionarios ejecutivos elegidos a nivel local. Comisión Europea para la Democracia a través del Derecho (Comisión de Venecia), 18 de marzo de 2019).

Asimismo, sobre la regulación de la figura de la reelección en las elecciones municipales, la Misión recomendó:

“Revisar la legislación vigente, recordando nuevamente que, si bien la continuidad en las políticas públicas es valiosa, la alternancia constituye un pilar fundamental del sistema democrático.” En consonancia con tal afirmación, la propuesta regulatoria objeto del sub iudice más bien coincide con el principio de alternancia del poder en el ejercicio de los cargos de elección popular y procura la igualdad real en la praxis del derecho fundamental al sufragio pasivo en los procesos eleccionarios del régimen municipal.

Nótese que la Constitución Política, justamente, en relación con los cargos de elección popular, opta por impedir la reelección consecutiva en cuanto a diputados, presidente y vicepresidente de la República (numerales 107, 132, 134 de la Ley Fundamental), lo que no ocurre cuando se trata de otro tipo de nombramientos de relevancia constitucional, pero que no son de elección popular, como contralor general de la República, magistrados del Poder Judicial y del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (ordinales 183, 101 y 158, eiusdem).

Las personas diputadas proponentes del proyecto incluso justifican el proyecto con base en los resultados de las elecciones municipales y en otras fuentes.

De acuerdo con lo anterior, la restricción de marras, por un lado, se apoya en fines legítimos, y, por otro, se funda en datos y argumentos suficientemente plausibles como para sustentar lo que la jurisprudencia convencional ha denominado una “necesidad social imperiosa”. Reitero que, en este ámbito, el legislador goza de una amplia libertad de configuración, de modo que, en tesis de principio, al juez constitucional no le corresponde definir qué es una “necesidad social imperiosa”; por el contrario, se encuentra conminado a aplicar autocontención y no inmiscuirse en una cuestión netamente política, salvo que se diere un quebranto a un derecho fundamental, lo que en el sub lite, al menos en este momento y con los razonamientos de esta consulta en concreto, no llego a apreciar.

El razonamiento expuesto que sirve para descartar un trato desigual injustificado, de la misma forma deviene útil para afirmar que el proyecto legislativo nro. 21.810 satisface plenamente el elemento “finalidad” del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda vez que se trata de un propósito legítimo.

En cuanto al elemento “idoneidad”, prima facie se observa que la citada restricción lo cumple, toda vez que resulta útil para limitar la reelección indefinida en los cargos municipales de elección popular, lo que favorece la alternancia en el poder.

Concerniente al elemento “necesidad”, esto es, la posibilidad de que existan opciones menos lesivas del derecho político al sufragio pasivo (no se debe confundir con la noción “necesidad social imperiosa”), no advierto que en la consulta se plantee alternativa alguna como para sustentar una lesión a tal factor. Como se lee en la exposición de motivos del proyecto, las diputadas y los diputados proponentes tratan de evitar que una particular posición de influencia en un cargo municipal, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, confiera una ventaja indebida frente a otras candidaturas en un proceso de sufragio popular en el régimen municipal. Ante esto, la única forma en que la Sala podría entrar a valorar una transgresión al elemento “necesidad” es si la parte gestionante al menos propusiera opciones o estas se lograran inferir de la prueba aportada en autos (lo que no ocurre en la especie), en cuyo caso el control de constitucionalidad vendría a ser aplicado procurándose un balance entre la discrecionalidad legislativa y la inexorable salvaguardia a los derechos fundamentales.

Por último, atinente al requerimiento de la “proporcionalidad en sentido estricto”, tampoco hay vulneración alguna, toda vez que, en los términos desarrollados en el proyecto, no constato un vaciamiento de contenido en detrimento del derecho al sufragio pasivo.

Con independencia de la discusión de si la reelección es un derecho humano o no, incluso partiendo de que así fuera, lo cierto es que no es absoluto, es decir, puede estar sujeto a restricciones razonables.

En tal sentido y siguiendo la línea jurisprudencial de la Corte IDH, en mi opinión, las limitaciones formuladas no llegan a afectar el contenido esencial de tal derecho, toda vez que no son indefinidas, sino que están sometidas a un plazo de restricción razonable (dos periodos desde que finalizó el segundo periodo consecutivo), en aras de alcanzar los fines que se persiguen, de acuerdo con lo supraexplicado.

Además, dado que la restricción opera dentro del marco de un proceso de elección a cargos municipales, la extensión de sus efectos a otros puestos igualmente de sufragio popular dentro del régimen municipal, pero distintos al que venía ocupando la persona afectada, parte de una misma premisa: el ejercicio consecutivo en dos periodos en un cargo municipal de elección popular confiere una ventaja que resulta plausible restringir según el principio de alternancia en el poder. Esta es una alternativa razonable que únicamente atañe ponderar a la persona legisladora, de manera que, en los términos de este proyecto, su aprobación o desaprobación no es una decisión que competa a la jurisdicción constitucional, sino que exclusivamente reside en el ámbito de discrecionalidad legislativa, esto es, la definición al respecto lleva aneja la responsabilidad política de las personas diputadas.

Por último, los consultantes plantean la dubitación de si el ordinal 34 de la Carta Magna resulta quebrantado por la norma transitoria consultada, cuando estatuye que las actuales autoridades municipales electas por sufragio popular, que ya han servido dos o más periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo, no pueden volver a optar por el mismo cargo en la elección del año 2024.

Al igual que con el otro aspecto consultado por el fondo, considero que este extremo resulta evacuable.

A pesar de que, ciertamente, la formulación de la consulta en parte está revestida de argumentos que más bien afirman la constitucionalidad de la citada norma, no menos cierto es que, según se expresa literalmente, a las personas consultantes les “surge el cuestionamiento de si el contenido de la norma transitoria que se consulta sobre el expediente N° 21.810, al establecer, que las actuales autoridades municipales electas por elección popular, que ya han servido dos o más periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo, no pueden volver a optar por el mismo cargo en la elección del año 2024, violenta el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política.” De esta forma, formulan una duda razonable de constitucionalidad, incluso describiendo la conducta lesiva y citando la norma de la Ley Fundamental afectada, planteamiento que, en mi criterio, alcanza para justificar la evacuabilidad del sub examine, dado que, reitero, el numeral 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional contempla la consulta de constitucionalidad tanto para las objeciones como para las meras dudas de constitucionalidad.

Ahora, en cuanto al fondo, considero que no existe roce de constitucionalidad alguno, porque, a partir de la premisa de que el derecho fundamental al sufragio pasivo no es absoluto, está claro que el solo hecho de que, en un determinado momento, una persona ocupe un cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal no le confiere a ella ni un derecho subjetivo ni una situación jurídica consolidada, que la exima de las modificaciones jurídico-positivas al sistema electoral que se den, mientras se encuentra ejerciendo el cargo y formalmente no ha iniciado el proceso electoral correspondiente. La persona en tal situación ostenta una mera expectativa de derecho a participar en un proceso eleccionario futuro conforme a determinadas reglas; tal expectativa, merced a su naturaleza jurídica, está sujeta a todas las contingencias y variaciones de legislación que oportunamente se aprueben de acuerdo con el marco constitucional.

XI.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO CRUZ CASTRO.- Los diputados consultantes someten a consulta a esta Sala respecto de dos temas de fondo:

Impedir por un plazo de ocho años que, quien ha ocupado un cargo municipal de elección popular, pueda optar de forma inmediata por otro cargo distinto dentro del mismo régimen municipal. Aplicar tal restricción anterior, a las actuales autoridades municipales.

Tal como se observa, no se está consultando sobre la limitación a la reelección indefinida en sede municipal (tema que de todas formas es objeto de conocimiento de la acción de inconstitucionalidad n°2019-00892-0007-CO y que está pendiente de resolverse), sino a esos otros dos temas. Indican los consultantes que existe duda razonable de si la restricción de que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en el cargo no puedan optar por otros puestos de elección popular municipal vulnera derechos fundamentales. Lo anterior, particularmente a partir de lo indicado por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en la respuesta a la consulta obligatoria realizada cuando indica que: “Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos.” Además, en cuanto al Transitorio, indican que surge el cuestionamiento de si el contenido de esta norma, al establecer que las actuales autoridades municipales electas por elección popular, que ya han servido dos o más periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo, no puedan volver a optar por el mismo cargo en la elección del año 2024, violenta el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política. Las normas, como bien lo señala el Tribunal electoral, desbordan criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad respecto al derecho ciudadano a ser electo.

Al respecto, por las razones que se indican, considero que las siguientes normas resultan inconstitucionales:

“(…) No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.

Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, (…) no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.

Transitorio Único: Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.

Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley.” Estas normas del proyecto consultado restringen de manera irrazonable el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos, pues lo que se pretende es prohibir, por espacio de 8 años, que quien ya ha ocupado un cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, pueda ocupar otro cargo municipal de elección popular. Nótese que ello va más allá de límites a la reelección, sino que se pretende ponerle una veda de tiempo para poder tener acceso a un cargo de elección popular, incluso distinto del que ya ha ocupado. Se desbordan así principios básicos de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Sobre la justificación de tal medida, los mismos diputados consultantes indican lo siguiente:

“… nuestra intención como legisladores es justamente limitar lo que hemos denominado “puerta giratoria” entendida como la dinámica por medio de la que algunos funcionarios municipales de elección popular, durante dos periodos son alcaldes, luego someten su nombre a votación y se eligen como vicealcaldes o regidores, y luego de los dos periodos, vuelven a elegirse como alcaldes, haciendo como modus vivendi el ejercicio de la función municipal en cualquiera de los cargos.// Esta situación precisamente es la que se pretendió evitar con esta reforma, y por eso, luego de múltiples negociaciones en las que participaron miembros de todos los partidos políticos representados en la Asamblea Legislativa, establecimos un “periodo de espera” de ocho años para que vuelvan a someterse al escrutinio popular, (…).” Sobre el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos se tiene amplia normativa internacional: el artículo 21.2 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (“…Toda persona tiene derecho de acceso, en condiciones de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país…”), el artículo 20 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del hombre (toda persona tiene el derecho de formar parte del gobierno de su país y de participar en las elecciones populares) y más recientemente, el artículo 23.1.c de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos: “1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades: … c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país…”. En nuestra Constitución Política, tal derecho se deriva de los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales. El derecho fundamental de acceso a cargos públicos es el derecho de toda persona a postularse y acceder a desempeñar cargos dentro de la función pública. En cuanto a los cargos de elección popular, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tiene competencias particulares (ver voto n°2006-008493). Es indudable que, como cualquier otro derecho fundamental, puede estar sujeto a limitaciones, claro está, siempre y cuando cumplan con el principio de reserva legal, pero además, que dichas limitaciones no lleven a un vaciamiento absoluto del derecho. Entre las limitaciones constitucionales, en general, se puede mencionar el régimen de incompatibilidades o las sanciones de inhabilitación temporal. Estas últimas como consecuencia de una falta grave, de un debido proceso y de la sanción correspondiente, impuesta para garantizar la correcta y eficiente administración. Aplicando todo lo anterior al caso que se examina, desde mi perspectiva minoritaria y disidente, coincido con la misma conclusión a la que llega el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en el sentido de considerar que, la normativa en cuestión impone un vaciamiento del derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal, sin cumplir con el parámetro de razonabilidad. Ello por cuanto dicha normativa supone un plazo de exclusión, durante el cual, un funcionario municipal anterior no puede optar por otro cargo municipal de elección popular, sin que ello sea consecuencia de alguna falta cometida. Claramente la preocupación por la corrupción no puede servir de fundamento genérico para la restricción generalizada del derecho de acceso a cargos públicos. La irrazonabilidad y la desproporción se aprecia muy bien en este ejemplo: asumir que la limitación a la reelección presidencial, incluyera también la imposibilidad de ser electo diputado por el hecho de haber sido Presidente de la República. La prohibición que se expande a otros cargos, es realmente irrazonable. Nótese que no se trata del derecho de asumir un cargo per se, sino que ha mediado una elección popular y el electorado se ha manifestado a favor de tener a dicho funcionario en otro cargo. Nada obstaría para que una persona que ya antes ha ejercido un cargo de elección popular, pueda volver a ocupar otro cargo, dentro del mismo régimen municipal, si el electorado así lo ha decidido. Tal como lo indica el TSE en su respuesta a la consulta, no sería legítimo que un Estado impidiera el sufragio pasivo (derecho a ser electo) en razón de haber ocupado un puesto específico -distinto al que se aspiraría- en los dos períodos inmediatos anteriores. Así se indica: “Tal afectación al núcleo esencial derecho se produce justamente porque… se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos públicos. (…) De otra parte, no puede perderse de vista que los cambios operados en el texto del proyecto lo convierten en inconexo, en tanto la exposición de motivos desarrolla porqué los promoventes consideran legítimo y necesario limitar la reelección, pero no se alude a que debe restringirse cualquier otro tipo de postulación (…) la propuesta original no era la de establecer una prohibición tan intensa como la que, vía mociones, se incorporó.” El hecho que una persona que ha ocupado un cargo popular se pueda postular para otro cargo, no resulta per se corrupción ni un “modus vivendi” ilegítimo. No puede ignorarse que se trata de aprovechar la experiencia de una persona que ya ha ocupado cargos similares, y que los munícipes han elegido. En función de impedir la concentración de poder, no pueden introducirse reglas que cercenan, sin ningún sustento, el sufragio pasivo. Las limitaciones a las concentraciones de poder no pueden restringir, sin fundamento, derechos fundamentales.

Tal como lo ha indicado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en cuanto a los derechos políticos, el artículo 23 consagra el derecho de participar, de votar y ser elegido y el derecho de tener acceso a funciones públicas. Así se protege tanto el derecho del candidato como el derecho de los electores:

“El párrafo primero del artículo 23 de la Convención reconoce a todos los ciudadanos los derechos: a) a participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos; b) a votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) a tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a funciones públicas de su país. De forma similar, la Declaración Americana reconoce el derecho a tomar “parte en el gobierno de su país, directamente o por medio de sus representantes, y de participar en las elecciones populares, que serán de voto secreto, genuinas, periódicas y libres”. Tomando en cuenta lo anterior, esta Corte ha señalado que los derechos reconocidos tienen una dimensión individual y colectiva, pues protegen tanto aquellas personas que participen como candidatos como a sus electores.” (OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-28/21 DE 7 DE JUNIO DE 2021) Ahora bien, en cuanto a las limitaciones admisibles a los derechos políticos, se ha indicado que los derechos políticos no son absolutos y pueden estar sujetos a limitaciones. Sin embargo, tales limitaciones deben cumplir con el principio de reserva legal y el principio de razonabilidad (necesidad y proporcionalidad). Así ha dicho la Corte IDH:

“Su reglamentación debe observar los principios de legalidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en una sociedad democrática. La observancia del principio de legalidad exige que el Estado defina de manera precisa, mediante una ley, los requisitos para que los ciudadanos puedan participar en la contienda electoral, y que estipule claramente el procedimiento electoral que antecede a las elecciones. De acuerdo al (sic) artículo 23.2 de la Convención se puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a las que se refiere el inciso 1 de dicho artículo, exclusivamente por las razones establecidas en ese inciso. La restricción debe encontrase prevista en una ley, no ser discriminatoria, basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.” Claramente en el caso del proyecto consultado, no existe base razonable, ni se atiende un propósito útil y oportuno que torne necesaria la exclusión de un derecho fundamental, ni se entiende cuál es el interés público, ni tampoco es proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue. Estos requisitos no se cumplen en este caso. Distinto sería la situación si la interdicción para ocupar otro cargo de elección popular provenga de una inhabilitación declarada, pues en ese caso, existiría justificación razonable. Más recientemente, en cuanto a las restricciones, la Corte IDH ha precisado dos tipos de restricciones admisibles, las de carácter general impuestas por ley y las restricciones producto de una sanción particular:

“(…) esta Corte advierte que el artículo 23.2 establece dos supuestos. El primer supuesto se refiere a las restricciones de carácter general que puede establecer la ley (edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental), mientras que el segundo supuesto se refiere a las restricciones a los derechos políticos impuestas por vía de una sanción a una persona en particular (condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal). De la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal se desprende que la interpretación del término “exclusivamente” incluido en el artículo 23.2 dependerá de si se trata de restricciones a los derechos políticos generales (primer supuesto) o particulares (segundo supuesto). (OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-28/21 DE 7 DE JUNIO DE 2021) Siguiendo el precedente citado, las restricciones a derechos fundamentales deben estar previstas en ley en sentido formal y material (principio de reserva legal), perseguir un fin legítimo y cumplir con los requisitos de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad. Aspectos que no son cumplidos por el proyecto consultado, pues no se entiende cómo la veda temporal para ocupar cargos públicos sea una medida idónea, necesaria ni proporcional.

Todo lo dicho aplica también para la inconstitucionalidad del transitorio, pues el problema de constitucionalidad no se soluciona aplicando la normativa a futuro, sino que contiene vicios de origen por el vaciamiento del derecho de acceso a cargos públicos. Así entonces, considero que toda la normativa en cuestión, incluido el transitorio, resultan inconstitucionales porque ccontienen un vicio de fondo en cuanto vacían de contenido el derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Estimo que en este caso se exceden los límites al poder legislativo; no es posible extender la interdicción al sufragio pasivo respecto de un cargo que no ha ocupado a quien se impone la prohibición. No puede existir un efecto expansivo de las limitaciones de un derecho fundamental.

En razón de los argumentos expuestos, estimo que las normas de fondo consultadas, son irrazonables y desproporcionadas; respecto del transitorio, como lo expresé, conculca la garantía del principio de irretroactividad de las normas. Las normas consultadas contienen previsiones que lesionan el derecho al sufragio pasivo.

XII.- EN CONCLUSION.- 1) En cuanto a los vicios de procedimiento, por mayoría se evacua la consulta de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley "Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)", que se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 21.810, en el sentido de que no hay vicios de procedimiento. 2) En cuanto a los vicios de fondo, por mayoría se declara inevacuable la consulta de constitucionalidad.” VI.-Sobre los acusados vicios de naturaleza procedimental.

• i)Alegatos de las partes.

El accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza indica que el artículo 97 de nuestra Carta Magna impide aprobar reformas electorales durante el plazo de veda ahí estipulado, toda vez que este no distingue entre elecciones nacionales y municipales. Considera que una posición contraria implicaría una modificación del texto por vía de interpretación.

El accionante Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes argumenta que el procedimiento seguido por la Asamblea Legislativa para la aprobación de la ley transgrede el numeral 97 constitucional, por cuanto, en el trámite del expediente legislativo 21.810, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones emitió criterio negativo y objetó la aprobación del proyecto de ley. Asevera que, el 29 de marzo de 2022, luego de la evacuación de la consulta legislativa facultativa ante la Sala Constitucional, el plenario legislativo aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley pese a la oposición del TSE y la fecha de las elecciones nacionales. Expone que el TSE contempló dos motivos para objetar el proyecto: “primero, que el proyecto de Ley genera un vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo al impedir que funcionarios con dos periodos en un mismo puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal, no puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular dentro del mismo régimen municipal, en especial, para asociación que represento, a quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias) y; segundo, que dentro de los seis meses y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de Ley en los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se haya mostrado en desacuerdo.” Cuestiona el dictamen nro. 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022 de esta Sala y señala que disiente del criterio ahí vertido en cuanto a la inexistencia de un vicio de procedimiento. Manifiesta que la parte final del ordinal 97 constitucional no está sujeta a interpretación; de este modo, al ser obligatoria la prohibición ahí contemplada, la Asamblea Legislativa no podía aprobar en segundo debate el proyecto de marras. Agrega que en el dictamen mencionado se interpretaron normas constitucionales electorales, lo que es competencia exclusiva del TSE de acuerdo con el inciso 3 del artículo 102 de la Ley Fundamental. Menciona que el vicio en el procedimiento es el siguiente: “se aprobó en segundo debate, omitiendo que existe una objeción a la misma por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, objeción que fue en dos aspectos, por el fondo al limitar la elección en otros puestos autoridades de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal e irretroactivad (sic) de las normas y por otra parte, que se apruebe la norma dado que se está dentro del plazo de prohibición que establece el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, norma que es clara y no permite interpretación alguna y de tener que hacer una interpretación, esta corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y no a la Sala Constitucional, dado que es materia exclusiva electoral.” Los accionantes Wilber Quirós Palma y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales indican que los concejos municipales de distrito se rigen por el párrafo segundo del numeral 172 de la Constitución Política, que resultó transgredido. Sostienen que con la modificación operada por la ley se modificó la reelección, pero no a través de la vía prevista por la Carta Magna. Aducen que la ley especial ya existe y no puede ser modificada por la norma cuestionada.

• ii)Consideraciones de la Sala.

Atinente a lo anterior, este Tribunal observa que los cuestionamientos de inconstitucionalidad por vicios en el procedimiento se sustentan en dos ordinales de la Ley Fundamental, el 97 y el 172 párrafo segundo. Tales normas estatuyen:

“ARTÍCULO 97.- Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.

(…)

ARTÍCULO 172.- Cada distrito estará representado ante la municipalidad por un síndico propietario y un suplente con voz pero sin voto.

Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación.” En cuanto al vicio procedimental referido al numeral 97 constitucional, por mayoría se pronunció la Sala en la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad relativa al proyecto ‘Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales).’ Concretamente, en el dictamen nro. 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022 se dispuso:

“IV.- SOBRE LOS VICIOS DE PROCEDIMIENTO CONSULTADOS (redacta el magistrado Castillo Víquez).- Los consultantes consideran que se pudo haber incurrido en un vicio de procedimiento con la aprobación de este proyecto de ley, en contraposición a lo establecido en la última oración del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. Indican que existe un pronunciamiento formal del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones oponiéndose a la votación. Ese Tribunal, por medio del oficio TSE-0199-2022 del 20 de enero del 2022 indicó: “en razón del vaciamiento del derecho humano a ser electo, al impedir que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular, este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente 21.810.” Consideran los diputados consultantes que, la aplicación del artículo 97 no puede ser literal ni entendida desde una interpretación formal, porque la realidad del legislador constituyente al momento entendía las elecciones como un solo momento cada cuatrienio y por lo tanto la limitación era general y absoluta, dado que la legislación que implicara a uno de los niveles de funcionarios elegibles, les aplicaba a todos y las circunstancias actuales son distintas. Agregan que, esa fue la razón por la que aprobaron en primer debate el proyecto de ley, seguros de que su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones que se realizó el 6 de febrero pues no tenía relación con alguna autoridad municipal. Por lo tanto, preguntan: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?

En el diseño original del Constituyente de 1949 su voluntad fue que en un solo día se realizaran las tres elecciones, sea: las presidenciales, legislativas y municipales. En efecto, se decantó porque las elecciones para presidente y vicepresidentes de la República (artículo 133 constitucional), los miembros del Poder Legislativo (numeral 107 constitucional) y los regidores municipales (artículo 171 constitucional), se realizaran el mismo día. Sobre el particular, las Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, número 75, indican lo siguiente:

“El Diputado Leiva aclaró que estimaba que en treinta días el Tribunal no podrá escrutar todos los votos emitidos, incluyendo los sufragios para la elección de las Municipalidades. Sugirió que esta tarea podría quedar en manos de las Juntas electorales. El Representante Facio aceptó modificar la moción, pero dejando en manos del Tribunal el recuento de todos los votos emitidos en cualquier elección popular.

Los Representantes Pinto y Arroyo se opusieron a que no se fijara al Tribunal una fecha precisa para hacer la declaratoria de la elección de Presidente y Vice-Presidentes. Es necesario que ese plazo se determine en la propia Constitución. El Diputado Facio presentó esta otra fórmula, la cual fue aprobada: ‘Hacer dentro de los treinta días siguientes a la fecha de la votación, la declaratoria definitiva de la elección de Presidente y Vice-Presidentes de la República, y dentro del plazo que la ley determine, la de los demás funcionarios citados en el inciso 6 [hoy 7] de este artículo”. (Las negritas no corresponden al original).

Ahora bien, mediante ley -entrada en vigencia del Código Electoral, artículo 310-, se separaron las elecciones municipales de las presidenciales y legislativas, trasladándose las primeras para el medio periodo constitucional. Esta modificación del sistema -pasar de un modelo único o concentrado a uno dual- impone una interpretación del numeral 97 constitucional de cara a esta nueva realidad. Cuando se trataba de tres elecciones en un mismo día, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al proyecto de ley tenía el efecto de suspender la potestad de legislar para el caso concreto -durante los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la elección-; si el criterio se vertida (sic) fuera de ese periodo, se agravaba la potestad de legislar. La situación ha cambiado radicalmente en la actualidad, en la que hay elecciones separadas entre las presidenciales y diputadiles y las municipales. En esta coyuntura, el numeral 97 debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la objeción del proyecto de ley ha de estar referida a la respectiva elección, en cuyo caso si un proyecto de ley hace referencia las elecciones municipales y no se está en el periodo electoral para elegir las autoridades municipales, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tendría el efecto de suspender temporalmente la potestad de legislar, sino únicamente de agravarla, es decir, finalizado el segundo debate, en la votación definitiva el proyecto de ley para su aprobación requerirá la mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Si no fuese, la objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones tendría un efecto contrario al texto constitucional de ampliar el periodo de veda -de diez meses o doce meses si hay una segunda vuelta en las presidenciales a veintidós meses-, lo que es, a todas luces, contrario al texto constitucional. Es por esta razón, de que, en el caso concreto, no existe ningún vicio de procedimiento por hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya aprobado en primer debate el proyecto de ley consultado. Más aún, incluso hay un error de concepto en lo consultado, toda vez que, conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el hipotético caso de que estuviéramos en el supuesto de la prohibición del 97 constitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa está autorizada por el Derecho de la Constitución y por las normas del Estatuto Parlamentario a aprobar un proyecto de ley en primer debate en el que hay una objeción del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; lo que si no podría hacer es aprobarlo en la votación definitiva después de concluido el segundo debate. Ergo, con fundamento en lo anterior, se descarta el vicio de procedimiento.” Con base en lo expuesto ut supra, en relación con el numeral 97 de la Constitución Política, este Tribunal descarta el vicio procedimental apuntado, toda vez que no constan argumentos ni elementos novedosos que ameriten cambiar el criterio ya vertido. Más bien, lo que se observa es una inconformidad con la posición de la Sala en la consulta legislativa del proyecto de ley; empero, la vía de la acción no está prevista para ello, sino para cuestionar la inconstitucionalidad de las normas por acción u omisión. En todo caso, tal como se consignó en el dictamen transcrito, el sistema electoral dual vigente de Costa Rica (elecciones nacionales y municipales en fechas distintas), impone la interpretación actualizada de esa norma constitucional, en el sentido de que, para que cumpla su cometido, los proyectos legislativos objetados por el TSE (a los efectos de impedir aprobación) necesariamente deben incidir en la respectiva elección (nacional o municipal).

De ahí que, como la ley impugnada versa sobre el régimen municipal y, además, la alegada imposibilidad de aprobación se sustenta en la celebración de la elección nacional, este Tribunal descarta la transgresión al plazo de veda estipulado en el numeral 97 constitucional. Precisamente, la ley cuestionada, amén de no incidir en las elecciones nacionales, tampoco evidencia afectaciones concretas a la democracia, el derecho al voto, la justicia electoral, la integridad del proceso electoral ni a otras materias propias de la función constitucional del TSE.

Por lo demás, la prerrogativa del TSE de disentir de ciertos proyectos sobre materia electoral (como parte del proceso de formación de la ley) no debe confundirse con su función de interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales referidas a tal ámbito (artículo 102 inciso 3 de la Carta Magna). Al respecto, a la Sala le atañe ejercer control de constitucionalidad sobre las normas de cualquier naturaleza (ordinales 10 de la Constitución Política y 2 inciso b de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) y revisar los vicios en el proceso de formación de la ley (numeral 73 inciso c de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). De ahí que este Tribunal Constitucional sea competente para determinar si la oposición del TSE en cuestión acarrea impedir la aprobación de la ley. Sobre este punto, la Sala no aprecia alguna afectación sustancial a la función constitucional del TSE, ni algún riesgo a su independencia o la institucionalidad del país, por lo que la parte final del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política no resulta transgredida en el sub lite. Incluso, en la audiencia otorgada en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, el TSE no especificó vicio alguno en tal sentido.

Con respecto al párrafo segundo del ordinal 172 de la Carta Magna, si bien el constituyente previó la emisión de una norma especial aprobada con mayoría calificada para la regulación de las condiciones en que pueden ser creados los concejos municipales de distrito, así como su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación, no menos cierto es que, tomando en consideración los argumentos de la parte accionante, este Tribunal no acredita una contradicción entre la ley 10183 y la citada norma constitucional. De igual forma, la ley nro. 8173 denominada ‘Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito’ no impide al legislador emitir una regulación general sobre la reelección de las autoridades del régimen municipal, incluidos los concejos municipales de distrito, pues ambas normas responden a finalidades distintas. En todo caso, el propio numeral 172 establece que los concejos municipales de distrito “se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades.” En consecuencia, se descartan los vicios procedimentales alegados.

VII.- Sobre las acusadas inconstitucionalidades por el fondo.

VII.1. Sobre la alegada inconstitucionalidad de la parte sustantiva de la ley.

i)Alegatos de las partes.

El accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza acusa que la ley impugnada transgrede el artículo 33 constitucional, pues creó “una discriminación odiosa dirigida hacia algunas personas en particular”, lo que resulta violatorio de los principios de igualdad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y libertad política e individual. Refiere que la discrecionalidad legislativa no permite la condena pública de más de 40 alcaldes inocentes a través de una norma que carece de las características básicas o mínimas “de general y abstracta”, sino que está redactada para “causar un efecto en algunas personas únicamente, en detrimento de los principios de proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e igualdad.” Arguye que la única motivación para tramitar y aprobar la ley es “evitar el abuso de poder de los Alcaldes que poseían varios periodos en que la ciudadanía los reelegía.” Asevera que se dio una especie de condenatoria social generalizada a todo alcalde con dos o más periodos. Considera transgredido el principio constitucional de inocencia en cuanto a los alcaldes que no están vinculados con las investigaciones de posibles delitos de corrupción. Menciona que el constituyente no reguló la reelección de las autoridades locales, porque “el control político social era evidentemente mayor por la cercanía a la población que los elegiría o no.” Acota que el menoscabo al principio de igualdad se confirma por varias causas, entre ellas “que todos los ciudadanos costarricenses que cumplan con los requisitos pueden ser electos Alcaldes a partir de la promulgación de la Ley, excepto los que ya estaban y que se habían reelegido cuando esta norma no existía.” Añade que “la violación al principio de igualdad de acentúa cuando el resto de autoridades electas popularmente sí pueden acceder al resto de cargos de esta naturaleza, excepto los Alcaldes y las Alcaldesas, que no podrían acceder a ningún cargo de nombramiento popular, aunque no sea el de Alcalde, verificando así, la característica casuística, personalizada, política e injusta de la norma impugnada.” Menciona que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la resolución nro. TSE-0199-2022 de 20 de enero de 2022, dispuso: “Las restricciones de los funcionarios reelegidos (para que no puedan optar por otro cargo en la municipalidad) imposibilitarían que esos ciudadanos puedan acceder a contiendas partidarias internas en aras de, luego, ser postulados para cargos de elección popular distintos al que ocupan. En otros términos, por más que pertenezcan a una agrupación y cumplan con los requisitos legales de postulación, en razón de la función pública que desempeñan ‑ad initio‑ tales servidores no podrán competir ni siquiera en los procesos internos en los que se disputan las nominaciones... Tal afectación al núcleo esencial del derecho se produce justamente porque no solo se está limitando la reelección, también se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos políticos.” En adición, estima transgredidos los numerales 169 y 171 de la Constitución Política, ya que, según su criterio, solo en la Carta Magna se pueden establecer limitaciones o restricciones electorales a quienes han sido electos o podrían ser electos popularmente. Arguye que la Ley Fundamental, en el caso de las autoridades municipales, no fijó restricciones, por lo que, con la ley impugnada, se da una reforma implícita a la norma superior sin cumplir los trámites constitucionales. Acota que no corresponde a una norma legal restringir o delimitar los derechos políticos consagrados constitucionalmente. Asevera que son los artículos 107 y 132 de la Constitución Política los que tienen la facultad suficiente para constreñir, limitar o condicionar el derecho a la reelección, situación que el constituyente no contempló para las autoridades locales, por cuanto el control político social era evidentemente mayor por la cercanía a la población que los elegiría o no. Refiere que modificar lo anterior implicaría un cambio necesario a nivel de las normas constitucionales, pues son estas las que determinan el plazo del nombramiento, así como las condiciones y limitaciones fundamentales; de esta forma, la ley transgrede los artículos 169 y 171 eiusdem que establecen los aspectos relacionados con la elección de alcaldes y regidores. De igual forma, estima transgredido el numeral 7 eiusdem, ya que los tratados internacionales protegen derechos políticos, especialmente el ordinal 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en relación con el derecho de votar y ser electo en forma libre. Estima que la restricción al cargo público solamente puede darse por dos vías: una norma general y abstracta que respete los principios de igualdad y proporcionalidad y persiga un fin legítimo, o bien, una sentencia firme judicial sancionatoria. Añade que, en el caso expuesto, la Asamblea Legislativa excedió sus límites al diseñar una tercera vía que “sustituye los procedimientos y las atribuciones sancionatorias propias del Poder Judicial.” El accionante Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considera que la normativa cuestionada transgrede el numeral 33 constitucional. Señala que, de los puestos de elección popular, los del régimen municipal representan la mayor cantidad (alcaldías, vicealcaldías, regidurías y sus suplencias, sindicaturas y sus suplencias, intendencias, viceintendencias y concejalías de distrito y sus suplencias). Acusa que el artículo único transgrede los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, ya que, luego de dos periodos consecutivos de mandato, impone una prohibición de ocho años para ocupar un cargo dentro del régimen municipal. Considera que tal periodo de ocho años es irrazonable y desproporcionado, pues viola, amén de la jurisprudencia constitucional, los “incisos 1 c) y 2” de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos , toda vez que, sin justificación alguna, limita el acceso en condiciones de igualdad a las personas que ocupen una alcaldía. Añade que también se norma una situación que limita derechos de las personas en contra de las excepciones que impone el artículo 23 inciso 2) eiusdem. Estima irrazonable y desproporcionada tal limitación temporal para quienes ocupen la alcaldía, ya que ese es el único de todos los puestos de elección popular del país que puede ser destituido a través de un plebiscito revocatorio (ordinal 19 del Código Municipal). Indica que se transgrede el principio de proporcionalidad al instaurarse limitaciones y condiciones más gravosas a la elección de la alcaldía que a otros puestos de elección popular del mismo régimen municipal y de los poderes tanto Legislativo como Ejecutivo. Asimismo, arguye que el párrafo segundo del artículo único de la ley 10183 impone una limitación para las personas que ocupen puestos de elección popular en las alcaldías municipales, lo cual transgrede los incisos b y c del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Sostiene que votar y tener la posibilidad de ser electo es un derecho político, así como tener acceso a condiciones generales de igualdad a los puestos de elección popular. Arguye que el problema que presenta la norma es que, en el caso de los alcaldes y las alcaldesas que cumplan ocho años en el puesto, tienen una prohibición legal inmediata que les impide participar en cualquier otro puesto de elección popular dentro del régimen municipal, lo que transgrede el derecho al voto pasivo contemplado en la convención referida, ya que se trata de puestos diferentes. Manifiesta que ninguna de las excepciones al numeral 23 mencionado permite limitar el derecho al voto pasivo por haber ocupado otros puestos de elecciones popular. Arguye que la Sala, en el voto nro. 2003-02771, considera al derecho de elección como uno fundamental. Sostiene que la misma prohibición aplica para las personas que ocupan los puestos de intendencia. Sostiene que la norma cuestionada no se ajusta a las excepciones estatuidas en el inciso 2 del ordinal 23 antedicho. Asevera que la limitación para quienes ocupan alcaldías e intendencias lesiona sus derechos.

Los accionantes Wilber Quirós Palma y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales sostienen que la reforma respondió a una campaña de desacreditación del régimen local, orquestada por la prensa. Refieren que el esquema aprobado resulta gravemente incongruente y no representa un ejercicio lícito de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Añaden que se prohíbe a los alcaldes, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, ocupar algún cargo municipal de elección popular, pero a los vicealcaldes solo se les prohíbe ocupar el mismo cargo o el de regidores o síndicos; es decir, sí se les permite postularse a alcaldes, intendentes o viceintendentes y a concejales de un concejo municipal de distrito. Estiman que lo anterior constituye una discriminación sin sentido. Arguyen que, según el transitorio, los funcionarios ejecutivos no pueden postularse en algún puesto de elección popular en las próximas dos elecciones, pero los viceejecutivos o regidores (sin incluir a los concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito) tienen restricción solo en cuanto al mismo puesto; es decir, se da una diferencia injustificada. Explican que, según el artículo 107 de la Constitución Política, los diputados no pueden ser reelectos consecutivamente; empero, a los regidores y concejales se les restringe la posibilidad por dos periodos, lo que crea discriminación y obliga inevitablemente a abandonar la carrera política local. Consideran que las limitaciones reguladas en la ley cuestionada no tienen sustento en el numeral 23.2 de la convención mencionada ut supra¸ que contempla los motivos taxativos para restringir los derechos políticos. Asimismo, alegan que la ley desmejora intencionalmente el contenido actual del derecho a la reelección. Arguyen que la Sala consideró que la “posibilidad de reelección en los cargos públicos” es un derecho humano, derivado del derecho fundamental a ser elegido. Refieren que, de acuerdo con lo anterior, tal derecho no puede ser disminuido por el legislador ni siquiera mediante reforma constitucional. Mencionan que, si una norma dispone la elección popular y no contempla limitaciones en cuanto a la reelección, entonces estas últimas no se pueden disponer. Consideran irrelevante que se hubiese conferido por ley el derecho ilimitado a la reelección, ya que es un derecho fundamental. Estiman que este derecho no puede ser reducido salvo por una Asamblea Constituyente.

ii)Consideraciones de la Sala.

ii.1. Análisis sobre los derechos político-electorales a la luz de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (CADH) y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Corte IDH).

Previo a resolver por el fondo los cuestionamientos de constitucionalidad, es necesario examinar la CADH y la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH en relación con los derechos político‑electorales, que son regulados por el numeral 23 de la CADH así:

“Artículo 23. Derechos Políticos 1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades:

• a)de participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos; b) de votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país.

2. La ley puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a que se refiere el inciso anterior, exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal.” De este modo, la CADH, por un lado, contempla ejemplos concretos de derechos político‑electorales, y, por otro, orienta acerca de cómo reglamentarlos de manera válida, lo que comporta restringirlos.

El punto de partida consiste en comprender que “el ejercicio efectivo de los derechos políticos constituye un fin en sí mismo y, a la vez, un medio fundamental que las sociedades democráticas tienen para garantizar los demás derechos humanos previstos en la Convención y que sus titulares, es decir, los ciudadanos, no sólo (sic) deben gozar de derechos, sino también de “oportunidades”. Este último término implica la obligación de garantizar con medidas positivas que toda persona que formalmente sea titular de derechos políticos tenga la oportunidad real para ejercerlos”. (Yatama vs. Nicaragua, sentencia de 23 de junio de 2005).

Propiamente en lo atinente al ejercicio de un cargo público de elección popular, se debe advertir que los derechos políticos no son absolutos.

Bajo esta perspectiva, la Corte IDH ensaya en Yatama vs. Nicaragua una especie de “test de razonabilidad” a fin de ponderar la viabilidad jurídica de alguna restricción. Así, amén de explícitamente acudir a los principios de legalidad e igualdad ‑los requerimientos para participar en una contienda electoral y el procedimiento correspondiente deben estar definidos por ley y no ser discriminatorios‑, afirma que las limitaciones deben “basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.” En relación con este tipo de análisis, acudiendo a la jurisprudencia alemana, la Sala Constitucional también ha elaborado un test o protocolo similar para valorar la razonabilidad de una medida:

“En tal sentido, la Sala considera que la medida impugnada se encuentra acorde al principio de razonabilidad. Este último está compuesto por los siguientes componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, la autoridad competente debe elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aunque una medida sea idónea y necesaria, será irrazonables si lesiona el contenido esencial de otro derecho fundamental, si lo vacía de contenido.” (Sentencia nro. 2013001276 de las 14:50 horas del 29 de enero de 2013, reiterada en las sentencias nros. 2017011793 de las 16:41 horas de 26 de julio de 2017, 2019007035 de las 9:20 horas del 26 de abril de 2019 y 2020022295 de las 9:15 horas 20 de noviembre de 2020, entre muchas otras).

Ahora, en Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008) se desarrollan con mayor precisión los parámetros de regulación de los derechos políticos por parte de la Corte IDH.

Primeramente, en cuanto al numeral 23.1 de la CADH, la Corte IDH precisa que, de manera correlativa a los derechos y oportunidades de los ciudadanos en la materia, al Estado se le impone la “obligación de hacer, de realizar ciertas acciones o conductas, de adoptar medidas, que se derivan de la obligación de garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos humanos de las personas sujetas a su jurisdicción (artículo 1.1 de la Convención) y de la obligación general de adoptar medidas en el derecho interno (artículo 2 de la Convención).” En tal sentido, concreta:

“157. Esta obligación positiva consiste en el diseño de un sistema que permita que se elijan representantes para que conduzcan los asuntos públicos. En efecto, para que los derechos políticos puedan ser ejercidos, la ley necesariamente tiene que establecer regulaciones que van más allá de aquellas que se relacionan con ciertos límites del Estado para restringir esos derechos, establecidos en el artículo 23.2 de la Convención. Los Estados deben organizar los sistemas electorales y establecer un complejo número de condiciones y formalidades para que sea posible el ejercicio del derecho a votar y ser votado.” Es decir, el numeral 23.1 no solo contempla derechos y oportunidades a favor del ciudadano, sino que de manera concomitante impone obligaciones al Estado con el propósito de configurar un sistema para la elección a cargos públicos, que de suyo se caracteriza por un complejo número de condiciones y formalidades, requeridas para posibilitar el ejercicio eficaz y efectivo de los derechos a votar y a ser votado.

Con miras a la elaboración de semejante filigrana jurídico‑positiva, los factores de restricción estatuidos en el ordinal 23.2 se quedan cortos; ellos son solo parte del entramado normativo, puesto que hay límites jurídicamente plausibles allende de tal regulación. En tal sentido, de forma contundente sentencia el órgano judicial de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA): “no es posible aplicar al sistema electoral que se establezca en un Estado solamente las limitaciones del párrafo 2 del artículo 23 de la Convención Americana.” En virtud de lo anterior, se deben desarrollar las condiciones y pautas hermenéuticas correspondientes a los efectos de configurar las restricciones conforme a la CADH.

La Sala parte de la premisa de que el deber ser normativo es insuficiente, toda vez que la eficacia y efectividad de cualquier derecho precisa, como ya se indicó, de un complejo aparato institucional, económico y humano que funcione en el plano de la realidad. En resumen, un ‘deber ser’ sin ‘realidad’ es inane.

Dice la Corte IDH en Castañeda Gutman: “si no hay códigos o leyes electorales, registros de electores, partidos políticos, medios de propaganda y movilización, centros de votación, juntas electorales, fechas y plazos para el ejercicio del sufragio, éste (sic) sencillamente no se puede ejercer, por su misma naturaleza; de igual manera que no puede ejercerse el derecho a la protección judicial sin que existan los tribunales que la otorguen y las normas procesales que la disciplinen y hagan posible.” En adición, la Corte IDH postula, que la CADH no se decanta por un sistema electoral en particular; todo lo contrario, admite diversidad de opciones, solo sujetas a su compatibilidad para con los derechos cobijados por aquella. Igual norte ha guiado al Comité de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas y al Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.

En este punto, la Corte IDH modula las consecuencias de Yatama, haciendo énfasis en que en aquel primaron las cualidades culturales de los miembros de una comunidad indígena y la imposición de una forma de organización ‑en el marco de una elección municipal‑ totalmente ajena a tales parámetros, de lo que resultó una lesión al derecho convencional a ser electo.

De este modo, en Castañeda Gutman, la Corte IDH viene a confirmar que la regla general es la plausibilidad de diversas restricciones y distintos modelos de sistema electoral, siempre que no se violen los derechos fundamentales, para cuyos efectos especifica una serie de pautas concretas.

Comienza por reiterar que las restricciones a los derechos electorales solo se pueden instituir por ley.

Acto seguido evoca ciertos elementos propios de un test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Así, alude al fin de la medida restrictiva, en tanto su causa debe ser procedente a la luz de la CADH.

Dentro de este planteamiento, destaca el caso en que el propósito sea el resguardo de algún derecho fundamental, tal como el orden o la salud pública (según los numerales 12.3, 13.2.b y 15 eiusdem, entre otros). Por añadidura, hace referencia a otro grupo de restricciones: aquellas que más bien se enlazan con finalidades generales legítimas (por ejemplo, “las libertades de las demás personas” o “las justas exigencias del bien común, en una sociedad democrática”, ambas en el ordinal 32 eiusdem).

Ahora, propiamente, el numeral 23 convencional no regula de forma explícita ni las causas legítimas ni las finalidades permitidas, por las cuales la ley puede regular los derechos políticos. En efecto, esa norma “se limita a establecer ciertos aspectos o razones (capacidad civil o mental, edad, entre otros) con base en los cuales los derechos políticos pueden ser regulados en relación con los titulares de ellos, pero no determina de manera explícita las finalidades, ni las restricciones específicas que necesariamente habrá que imponer al diseñar un sistema electoral, tales como requisitos de residencia, distritos electorales y otros. Sin embargo, las finalidades legítimas que las restricciones deben perseguir se derivan de las obligaciones que se desprenden del artículo 23.1 de la Convención …” (Castañeda Gutman).

De esta forma, el mencionado aspecto ligado al objetivo de una regulación o medida corresponde al elemento ‘legitimidad’ del tipo de test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad desarrollado por la Sala, de acuerdo con lo definido ut supra.

Acto seguido, en Castañeda Gutman, la Corte IDH aclara que la demostración de un fin permitido por la CADH no implica per se la razonabilidad de la medida, pues esta también debe responder al factor “necesidad en una sociedad democrática.” Este último lo articula de esta forma:

“184. Con el fin de evaluar si la medida restrictiva bajo examen cumple con este último requisito la Corte debe valorar si la misma: a) satisface una necesidad social imperiosa, esto es, está orientada a satisfacer un interés público imperativo; b) es la que restringe en menor grado el derecho protegido; y c) se ajusta estrechamente al logro del objetivo legítimo.” Concerniente a la ‘necesidad social imperiosa’, de nuevo evoca el elemento ‘legitimidad’ del test de razonabilidad de esta Sala, en tanto la disposición va dirigida a procurar una solución a tal cuestión, es decir, se trata de un fin legítimo, que inexorablemente debe estar presente. Asimismo, la Corte sostiene que entre varias medidas legítimas se debe escoger aquella que restrinja en menor grado el derecho fundamental afectado; esto es idéntico al elemento ‘necesidad’ del test constitucional de la Sala. Por último, cuando la Corte IDH refiere el requisito de que la determinación se ajuste estrechamente al logro de un objetivo legítimo, se presenta una denotada correspondencia con el elemento ‘idoneidad’ del test de razonabilidad de la Sala Constitucional, con base en el cual la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar el objetivo pretendido. Solo en relación con el elemento del test de razonabilidad de la Sala ‘proporcionalidad en sentido estricto’ (según el cual una disposición puede ser legítima, idónea y necesaria, pero aun así irrazonable, cuando su aplicación lacera el núcleo esencial de un derecho fundamental), no se advierte alguna concordancia directa con el examen de razonabilidad desarrollado por la Corte IDH.

Corolario de lo anterior, en el examen de la razonabilidad de una medida o disposición se deben aplicar los criterios y pautas supracitados, que se encuentran referidos a los principios de legalidad e igualdad, la búsqueda de un fin legítimo, la existencia de una urgencia social imperiosa, la idoneidad y la necesidad de la medida (con claridad aplicados en Argüelles y otros vs. Argentina, sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2014), a lo que hay que agregar el elemento de la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto.

ii.2. Sobre la discrecionalidad legislativa y el principio de libre configuración del legislador.

En la sentencia nro. 2003-05090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, la Sala delinea con claridad al principio de libre configuración del legislador, también denominado ‘libre diseño legislativo’ o ‘discrecionalidad legislativa’. Así, este Tribunal señala, que el Poder Parlamentario, en el ejercicio de la función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto ‑esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121 inciso 1º de la Constitución Política)‑ goza de una amplia libertad para desarrollar normativamente el programa constitucional fijado por el poder constituyente.

Dentro de tal contexto, el principio de libre configuración del legislador lo aborda este Tribunal de esta manera: “Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa. De esa forma, el legislador puede crear órganos públicos, asignarles funciones o competencias, desarrollar diversas instituciones o normar la realidad, según lo estime oportuno y conveniente para una coyuntura histórica, social, económica o política determinada. Evidentemente, la discrecionalidad legislativa es mucho más amplia que la administrativa, puesto que, la función legislativa no se puede reconducir a la simple ejecución de la Constitución.” Sin embargo, la “libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios ‑dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa‑ de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, puesto que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo (sic) que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales.” (Ver también las resoluciones nros. 2013011499 de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 2013, 2013011706 de las 11:44 horas del 30 de agosto de 2013 y 2020015542 de las 11:40 horas del 19 de agosto de 2020, entre otras).

En la misma dirección expuesta, el Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia nro. 2018019511 de las 21:45 horas del 23 de noviembre de 2018, afirma que esa amplia libertad de conformación de la realidad social, económica y política de que gozan las personas diputadas en el ejercicio de la potestad legislativa (que según los ordinales 105 y 121 inciso 1° de la Ley Fundamental reside originariamente en el Pueblo y es constitucionalmente delegada en la Asamblea Legislativa por su carácter de órgano político representativo), solo puede estar sometida a “los límites que establece el constituyente y, en general, el bloque de constitucionalidad, de modo que para evitar una limitación indebida de la libertad de configuración legislativa, cualquier disposición que establezca una condición o límite que la agrave debe ser interpretada en sus justos y razonables términos, para facilitar su ejercicio.” No obstante, se debe advertir que, en la sentencia nro. 2018000230 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de enero de 2018, la Sala Constitucional rechazó “que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad” (verbigracia, en aplicación del principio de objetivación de la tutela ambiental ‑sentencias nros. 2005014293-de las 14:52 horas del 19 de octubre de 2005, 2012012716 de las 16:01 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2012 y 2021024147 de las 9:15 horas del 27 de octubre de 2021‑).

Asimismo, vale anotar que la discrecionalidad legislativa en el ejercicio del poder constituyente derivado de igual forma se encuentra sometida a ciertos límites procedimentales, temporales y sustanciales (ver resoluciones nros. 2005015094 de las 15:00 horas de 2 de noviembre de 2005, 2013006118 de las 16:22 horas de 30 de abril de 2013 y 2019013270 de las 16:50 horas del 17 de julio de 2019).

Corolario de lo anterior, en el ejercicio de la potestad legisladora, la persona diputada goza de una extensa discrecionalidad, sujeta solo a la observancia al bloque de constitucionalidad.

ii.3. Sobre las inconstitucionalidades alegadas en relación con el establecimiento de límites a la reelección de quienes ocupen el cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal; la prohibición de optar por otros cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal para los alcaldes y vicealcaldes reelectos por dos periodos consecutivos; y la acusada irrazonabilidad y desproporcionalidad del plazo de ocho años para optar por la reelección.

En primer lugar, este Tribunal considera que las condiciones de elección de los cargos de alcaldes, en principio, están cubiertas por la libre configuración del legislador, salvo que se lesionen otras normas o principios constitucionales.

El numeral 169 de la Constitución Política establece:

“ARTÍCULO 169.- La administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón, estará a cargo del Gobierno Municipal, formado de un cuerpo deliberante, integrado por regidores municipales de elección popular, y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designará la ley.” Así, disponer o limitar la reelección de ese funcionario ejecutivo es una discusión de naturaleza política propia de desarrollarse en la Asamblea Legislativa por disposición constitucional. Concerniente al punto, la Sala, en la sentencia nro. 2012009226 de las 14:30 horas de 17 de julio de 2012, definió:

“(…) no considera este Tribunal que las normas impugnadas lesionen de modo alguno la Constitución, al establecer la elección del Alcalde y su sustituto por elecciones populares, toda vez que los mismos Constituyentes delegaron en la ley el mecanismo a idear para su nombramiento (…).” En cuanto a los aspectos delegados por el constituyente al legislador en materia electoral, la Sala resolvió en la sentencia nro.1994002128 de las 14:51 horas de 3 de mayo de 1994:

“… en materias no reguladas, pero sí delegadas en el legislador por la Constitución, este puede establecer condiciones de desigualdad real o aparente cuando sus excepciones están absoluta y claramente justificadas en razón de otros principios o valores constitucionales y sobre todo, de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. En consecuencia, las excepciones, limitaciones, requisitos o impedimentos que regirán en materia electoral, definidos por el legislador en función de la responsabilidad delegada por la propia Constitución, deben sustentarse en razones objetivas y claramente motivadas por los requerimientos propios del sistema electoral y del ejercicio del cargo. En otras palabras, pueden admitirse las restricciones que fortalezcan el sistema democrático y los procesos electorales, aun cuando una persona o un grupo sufra la limitada consecuencia de aquélla (sic) reglamentación.” En adición, en cuanto al concejo municipal, tal numeral 169 únicamente establece que los regidores deben ser electos de forma popular.

Por otra parte, atinente a otros cargos municipales de elección popular, la Carta Magna dispone:

“ARTÍCULO 171.-Los regidores Municipales serán elegidos por cuatro años y desempeñarán sus cargos obligatoriamente.

La ley determinará el número de Regidores y la forma en que actuarán. Sin embargo, las Municipalidades de los cantones centrales de provincias estarán integradas por no menos de cinco Regidores propietarios e igual número de suplentes.

Las Municipalidades se instalarán el primero de mayo del año correspondiente .

Transitorio (artículo 171). -Los Regidores Municipales que resulten electos en las elecciones de febrero de mil novecientos sesenta y dos, ejercerán sus cargos desde el primero de julio de mil novecientos sesenta y dos hasta el treinta de abril de mil novecientos sesenta y seis.

(Así reformado mediante el inciso 2 de la Ley N°2741 del 12 de mayo de 1961) ARTÍCULO 172.- Cada distrito estará representado ante la municipalidad por un síndico propietario y un suplente con voz pero sin voto.

Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación.

(Así reformado por el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8105 de 31 de mayo del 2001).” Así, nuestra Ley Fundamental regula específicamente la elección de determinados cargos a nivel municipal, en los que no se preveían restricciones a sus nombramientos; no obstante, ello no quiere decir que tales limitaciones solo puedan establecerse a través de preceptos constitucionales. El hecho de que la Constitución Política sí haya instaurado prohibiciones expresas en cargos nacionales de elección popular (artículos 107 y 132 con respecto a los diputados y presidente y vicepresidentes de la República), no excluye la posibilidad de ejercer la prerrogativa legislativa en lo relativo a puestos municipales de elección popular. De hecho, tal y como se ha desarrollado a lo largo de esta sentencia, el legislador tiene la potestad de modificar aspectos del sistema electoral en cuanto a la elección y reelección de puestos del régimen municipal, siempre y cuando no contraríe el Derecho de la Constitución ni vacíe de contenido los derechos fundamentales. En cuanto a los regidores municipales, síndicos, intendentes, viceintendentes y concejales municipales de distrito, si bien no existe una delegación expresa del constituyente al legislador en cuanto a las condiciones de su designación, las limitaciones establecidas por la parte sustantiva de la ley nro. 10183 no vacían de contenido el derecho a ser electo, sino que, en los términos dispuestos, forman parte de la libre configuración del legislador y su discrecionalidad. En ese sentido, el propio Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, al contestar la audiencia otorgada por la Sala, señaló: “la tesis de este Órgano Constitucional, sostenida desde hace varios lustros, es que no hay un obstáculo para que el legislador limite la reelección sucesiva de los cargos municipales; tal regulación constituye una decisión política cuya valoración -en cuanto a la conveniencia y oportunidad- es exclusiva del legislador.” En adición, aun cuando se alega que la reelección indefinida y sucesiva no puede venir a ser desmejorada por tratarse de un derecho humano, no menos cierto es que, quien ha sido reelecto en un mismo cargo, ya ha ejercido tal derecho y, además, tal como se consignó ut supra, este puede ser limitado y regulado de forma legítima. En ese sentido, no hay un derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento jurídico, amén de que el legislador tiene la potestad de imponer válidamente nuevas condiciones a la reelección en cargos del régimen municipal, en tanto se apliquen a futuro y no sean contrarios al bloque de constitucionalidad. Ergo, la Sala no estima que el cambio de un sistema electoral municipal que contemplaba la reelección sucesiva e indefinida, a otro que solo permite una reelección consecutiva, devenga contrario al Derecho de la Constitución.

Nótese que, si bien el numeral 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos estatuye que la ley debe reglamentar el ejercicio del derecho de votar y ser elegido “exclusivamente por razones de edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental, o condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal”, la jurisprudencia convencional ha establecido que no se trata de una lista taxativa o cerrada, sino que cada Estado puede desarrollar particularidades en su diseño del sistema electoral. Por ello, resulta procedente que el legislador costarricense imponga otras limitaciones que respeten tal instrumento internacional y el bloque de constitucionalidad. Es decir, cada país puede definir restricciones al derecho al voto (en su vertiente activa y pasiva) dentro de ese marco jurídico.

Ahora, debe analizarse si es inconstitucional o no la prohibición de optar por otros cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal para los alcaldes y vicealcaldes reelectos por dos periodos consecutivos. Cabe reiterar que los requisitos o limitaciones para optar por cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal a priori están cobijados por el principio de libre configuración del legislador, salvo que quebranten normas o principios constitucionales o las denominadas normas pétreas. Precisamente, estas decisiones políticas son propias de discutirse en la Asamblea Legislativa para definir su oportunidad y conveniencia, con pleno respeto al principio de separación de poderes, al régimen democrático de un Estado de Derecho como el costarricense, y en general al Derecho de la Constitución.

En el caso concreto, el artículo único de la ley impugnada limita por ocho años la participación en otros puestos públicos de elección popular, a quien haya ocupado el cargo de alcalde o alcaldesa por dos periodos consecutivos. Igual situación ocurre con los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas, pues se les prohíbe ocupar nuevos cargos como regidores o síndicos por el mismo plazo.

Como se indicó supra, siguiendo a Yatama vs. Nicaragua (sentencia de 23 de junio de 2005) y Castañeda Gutman vs. México (sentencia de 6 de agosto de 2008), así como a la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, el control de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad de las restricciones a los derechos políticos ‑en la especie, el derecho al sufragio pasivo‑ como mínimo comprende estos parámetros: los principios de legalidad e igualdad, la búsqueda de un fin constitucional o convencionalmente permitido, la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa, la idoneidad y la necesidad de la medida, y el análisis de proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, todo lo cual en consonancia con los alcances y límites del principio de libre configuración del legislador.

La referida restricción objeto del sub iudice, por un lado, se regula mediante ley (reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal); por otro, parte de un trato ciertamente diferenciado mas no injustificado, dado que procura atender fines de relevancia constitucional y convencional, y, en concreto, una necesidad social imperiosa, como se explica infra. En la determinación de qué fines alcanzar o qué considerar como necesidad social imperiosa, la persona legisladora goza de una amplia libertad de configuración.

Así, en la presentación del proyecto de la ley aquí cuestionada se hizo referencia a un informe preliminar de la Misión Electoral de la OEA, emitido tras las elecciones celebradas el 2 de febrero de 2020. Tal delegación estuvo integrada por 11 expertos electorales de 6 naciones de la región, quienes habían llegado al país el 25 del mes anterior. En tal documento, la Misión señaló: “… no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados.” (ver http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf), lo que fue ampliamente divulgado por varios medios (https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/oea-recomienda-a-costa-rica-limitar-la-reeleccion/OVR5GIP5T5CYXG3DVH4GH36P44/story/, https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/politica/mision-de-oea-reitera-necesidad-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes/, https://observador.cr/pusc-y-nueva-republica-trataran-de-limitar-reeleccion-de-alcaldes-oea-lo-recomienda/, https://www.diarioextra.com/Noticia/detalle/410346/oea-jala-orejas-a-costa-rica-por-reeleccion-de-alcaldes, https://www.elmundo.cr/municipales/alcaldes-apoyaran-proyecto-de-ley-que-limita-su-reeleccion/ ). Luego, ya en la versión final ( https://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=421-1219-28-0 ) se subraya, que la Comisión Europea para la Democracia a través del Derecho (Comisión de Venecia) en dos informes emitidos a partir de una consulta realizada por el secretario general de la OEA, tocante a los límites a la reelección, concluyó “que no existe un derecho humano absoluto para ocupar un cargo, y que los derechos a votar y ser elegido pueden ser regulados. Revisar la legislación vigente, recordando nuevamente que, si bien la continuidad en las políticas públicas es valiosa, la alternancia constituye un pilar fundamental del sistema democrático.” (Informe sobre los límites a la reelección Parte II - Miembros del Parlamento, Parte III - Representantes elegidos a nivel local y funcionarios ejecutivos elegidos a nivel local. Comisión Europea para la Democracia a través del Derecho (Comisión de Venecia), 18 de marzo de 2019).

Asimismo, sobre la regulación de la figura de la reelección en las elecciones municipales, la Misión recomendó: “Revisar la legislación vigente, recordando nuevamente que, si bien la continuidad en las políticas públicas es valiosa, la alternancia constituye un pilar fundamental del sistema democrático.” En consonancia con tal afirmación, la ley objeto del sub lite más bien coincide con el principio de alternancia del poder en el ejercicio de los cargos de elección popular y procura la igualdad real en la praxis del derecho fundamental al sufragio pasivo en los procesos eleccionarios del régimen municipal.

Nótese que la Constitución Política, justamente, en relación con los cargos de elección popular, opta por impedir la reelección consecutiva en cuanto a diputados, presidente y vicepresidente de la República (numerales 107, 132, 134 de la Ley Fundamental), lo que no ocurre cuando se trata de otro tipo de nombramientos de relevancia constitucional, pero que no son de elección popular, como contralor general de la República, magistrados del Poder Judicial y del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (ordinales 183, 101 y 158, eiusdem). Aquí se vuelve relevante el diseño del Estado por parte del constituyente originario, así como sus valores y normas pétreas, ya que constituyen los pilares fundamentales y cimientos en los cuales se basan los equilibrios entre los Poderes Pública y se preservan los pilares de la República.

De acuerdo con lo anterior, la restricción de marras, por un lado, se apoya en fines legítimos, y, por otro, se funda en datos y argumentos suficientemente plausibles como para sustentar lo que la jurisprudencia convencional ha denominado como una ‘necesidad social imperiosa’. Reiteramos que, en este ámbito, el legislador goza de una amplia libertad de configuración, de modo que, en tesis de principio, al juez constitucional no le corresponde definir qué es una ‘necesidad social imperiosa’; por el contrario, se encuentra conminado a aplicar autocontención y no inmiscuirse en una cuestión netamente política, salvo que se diere un quebranto a un derecho fundamental, lo que no se llega a apreciar en el sub examine.

El razonamiento expuesto, que sirve para descartar un trato desigual injustificado, de la misma forma deviene útil para afirmar que la ley satisface plenamente el elemento ‘finalidad’ del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda vez que se trata de un propósito legítimo.

En cuanto al elemento ‘idoneidad’ ‑es decir que la medida cuestionada sea apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido‑ prima facie se observa que la citada restricción lo cumple, toda vez que resulta útil para limitar la reelección indefinida en los cargos municipales de elección popular, lo que favorece la alternancia en el poder.

Concerniente al elemento ‘necesidad’ ‑esto es, la posibilidad de que existan opciones menos lesivas del derecho político al sufragio pasivo (no se debe confundir con la noción ‘necesidad social imperiosa’)‑ tampoco se advierte una lesión a tal factor. Como se lee en la exposición de motivos del proyecto legislativo de la norma impugnada, las diputadas y los diputados aducen la finalidad de tratar de evitar que una particular posición de influencia en un cargo municipal, luego de dos periodos consecutivos, confiera una ventaja indebida frente a otras candidaturas en un proceso de sufragio popular en el régimen municipal. Ante esto, la única forma en que la Sala podría entrar a valorar una transgresión al elemento “necesidad” es si las partes accionantes al menos propusieran opciones de manera fundada en el marco específico de un test de razonabilidad, en cuyo caso el control de constitucionalidad vendría a ser aplicado en procura de un balance entre la discrecionalidad legislativa y la inexorable salvaguardia a los derechos fundamentales.

Atinente al requerimiento de la ‘proporcionalidad en sentido estricto’, de igual modo se descarta alguna vulneración, toda vez que, tal como se desarrolló ut supra, no se constata un vaciamiento de contenido del derecho al sufragio pasivo, sino únicamente el ejercicio de la libre configuración del legislador en cuanto a la limitación a aquel.

En tal sentido, conforme la línea jurisprudencial de la Corte IDH, las restricciones formuladas no llegan a afectar el contenido esencial de tal derecho, toda vez que no son indefinidas, sino que están sometidas a un plazo de restricción razonable (dos periodos desde que finalizó el segundo periodo consecutivo), en aras de alcanzar los propósitos legítimos que se persiguen, de acuerdo con lo explicado líneas arriba.

Así, este Tribunal Constitucional considera que el limitar la reelección consecutiva a una vez y el impedimento de ocupar otros cargos por dos periodos desde que finalizó el segundo mandato consecutivo (ocho años) no resultan abiertamente irrazonables ni desproporcionados. Más bien, tal restricción es legítima por tratarse de una finalidad válida a la luz del ordenamiento jurídico; evidencia una relación necesaria e idónea entre los medios y el objeto que persigue la ley (limitar la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales), y, además, denota una proporcionalidad en sentido estricto entre los medios dispuestos y sus fines, sin que conste algún vaciamiento al contenido esencial de algún derecho fundamental. A efectos de contar con un parámetro de constitucionalidad, ocho años es el mismo plazo establecido para la reelección presidencial en el artículo 132 inciso 1 de la Constitución Política. En todo caso, las partes accionantes tampoco expusieron argumentos que lleven a la Sala a declarar alguna inconstitucionalidad en ese sentido.

Además, dado que la restricción opera dentro del marco de un proceso de elección a cargos municipales, la extensión de sus efectos a otros puestos igualmente de sufragio popular dentro del régimen municipal, pero distintos al que venía ocupando la persona afectada, parte de una misma premisa: el ejercicio consecutivo en dos periodos en un cargo municipal de elección popular confiere una ventaja que resulta plausible restringir según el principio de alternancia en el poder. Esta es una alternativa razonable que únicamente atañe ponderar a la persona legisladora, de manera que exclusivamente reside en el ámbito de discrecionalidad legislativa, esto es, la definición al respecto lleva aneja la responsabilidad política de las personas diputadas.

Con base en lo anterior, se concluye que la extensión de la imposibilidad de ser electo en otros puestos del régimen municipal parte de una misma premisa: el ejercicio consecutivo en dos periodos en un cargo municipal de elección popular confiere una ventaja que resulta procedente restringir con sustento en el principio de alternancia en el poder. De ahí que las disposiciones adoptadas por el legislador constituyen una alternativa razonable que se encuentra dentro del marco de su ponderación y discrecionalidad, por lo que no le corresponde a la Sala incidir en tal ámbito.

ii.4. En conclusión, en los términos planteados en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, se descarta alguna transgresión a los principios de igualdad; razonabilidad y proporcionalidad; libertad; e inocencia; así como a los numerales 169 y 171 de la Constitución Política y al ordinal 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

VII.2. Sobre la acusada inconstitucionalidad del transitorio.

• i)Argumentos de las partes.

El accionante Gerardo Oviedo Espinoza menciona que el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política contempla el principio de irretroactividad de las normas jurídicas; sin embargo, considera que a quienes ostentan “un cargo determinado” se les crea una condición diferenciada que les aplica hacia el pasado. Aduce que la nueva regla dirigida a toda la ciudadanía fija la posibilidad de elección en no más de dos veces consecutivas; empero, se creó una situación especial para quienes se encontraban desempeñando el cargo en el pasado de forma seguida. Acusa que el transitorio incumple los principios y la redacción técnica que debe tener como norma jurídica, pues se elaboró para perjudicar a un poco más de 40 funcionarios electos democráticamente por el sufragio libre de la ciudadanía, como una especie de ‘vendetta o reacción social’ alimentada por algunos medios de comunicación colectiva a partir del inicio de la investigación judicial conocida como el caso Diamante, que analiza la posible comisión de actos de corrupción de algunas autoridades municipales. Asevera que la presunción de tráfico de influencias y de abuso de poder, así como la condena social por actos de supuesta corrupción no justifican la restricción a la reelección de los cargos municipales; por ello, la reforma carece de finalidad legítima y una adecuada determinación de la necesidad social imperiosa, como se requiere para que la norma esté en armonía con nuestra Constitución. En adición, considera transgredidos los numerales 35, 39 y 40 de la Constitución Política, ya que el transitorio estableció una sanción pública dirigida especialmente a quienes ostentan la condición de alcaldes propietarios reelectos, por razones de carácter político y mediático exacerbada por el escándalo conocido como ‘caso Diamante’ en el contexto de una campaña electoral. Considera transgredido el principio de proporcionalidad de toda acción del Estado frente a la colectividad como un todo. Menciona que lo expuesto confirma la ausencia de la finalidad y necesidad social imperiosa de la reforma aprobada. Explica que la misma irracionalidad de la norma impugnada implicaría tomar una coyuntura de escándalo público al iniciarse una investigación judicial, para formular una norma transitoria que el propio Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones insinúa inconstitucional por dejar del todo sin contenido al derecho a ser elegido. Ciertamente, el acceso a cargos públicos no es un derecho absoluto, pues, según los artículos 21.2 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 20 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y 23.1.c de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, puede ser normado de forma general; empero, no puede ser vaciado de contenido mediante una norma transitoria específica, pues tales principios convencionales consolidan expresamente, que toda persona tiene derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en condiciones de igualdad, normas superiores que la ley impugnada transgrede con absoluta claridad a pesar de tener un carácter inferior, lo que a la vez vulnera el parámetro de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

El accionante Horacio Martín Alvarado Bogantes considera que el párrafo primero del transitorio único otorga efecto retroactivo a la ley nro. 10.183 en detrimento del numeral 34 de la Carta Magna. Reprocha que a las autoridades municipales de elección popular se les restrinja la posibilidad de reelegirse con base en los periodos ejercidos antes de la entrada en vigor de la ley. Afirma que el párrafo segundo del transitorio hace una diferencia entre los puestos de elección del régimen municipal, pues prohíbe a los alcaldes e intendentes aspirar durante 8 años luego del vencimiento del segundo periodo a otros cargos de elección popular dentro de ese mismo régimen, mientras que a los demás puestos solo se les prohíbe reelegirse en el puesto que ocuparon, es decir, pueden participar incluso de forma consecutiva. Menciona que lo anterior afecta de forma desproporcionada a quienes ocupan puestos de alcaldías e intendencias, así como lesiona el derecho al voto pasivo. Considera que el transitorio tuvo que haber dispuesto que el conteo de plazos comenzaría a regir a partir del periodo del nombramiento al momento de entrada en vigencia de la ley. Admite que es potestad del legislador regular la reelección de los puestos de elección popular en el régimen municipal, pero clarifica que su posición no es la de que se mantenga la reelección indefinida, mas sí la de que la limitación en cuestión no deba aplicar sino a partir de la publicación de la ley y sobre los periodos posteriores. Refiere que la norma prohíbe a las personas intendentas que cumplan dos periodos de nombramiento, aspirar a otro puesto de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Aduce que aun cuando la norma no es tan clara, en el transitorio sí se indica de manera explícita: “Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.” Los accionantes Wilber Quirós Palma y Marvin Gustavo Castillo Morales consideran que el transitorio viola el principio de irretroactividad. Aduce que los actuales servidores electos popularmente obtuvieron tal condición sin restricciones a futuro y con la posibilidad de efectuar carrera política local. Consideran que toda regulación debe tener efectos solo a futuro. Añaden que el transitorio solo es admisible en tanto sea congruente con la norma principal. Refieren que la irretroactividad de la norma implicaría que los funcionarios que ejercen el cargo solo puedan ser electos por dos periodos consecutivos más. Reprochan que el transitorio no regula situaciones pendientes de la norma principal. Mencionan que el efecto retroactivo de la norma parece más una sanción que responde al contexto de la reforma y a las presiones para acabar con la carrera política local. Arguyen que, según el transitorio, los funcionarios ejecutivos no pueden postularse en algún puesto de elección popular en las próximas dos elecciones, pero los viceejecutivos o regidores (sin incluir a los concejales de los concejos municipales de distrito) tienen restricción solo en cuanto al mismo puesto; es decir, se da una diferencia injustificada.

ii)Consideraciones de la Sala.

ii.1) Sobre la alegada transgresión al principio de irretroactividad y la afectación a un grupo determinado de personas.

En la norma transitoria de la ley cuestionada, el legislador reguló la situación de las personas que, al momento de entrada en vigor de la ley, se encuentren ocupando cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal por al menos dos periodos consecutivos.

Atinente al principio de irretroactividad y la entrada en vigor de las normas, los numerales 34 y 129 de la Constitución Política establecen:

“ARTÍCULO 34. A ninguna ley se le dará efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de persona alguna, o de sus derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas.

(…)

ARTÍCULO 129.- Las leyes son obligatorias y surten efectos desde el día que ellas designen; a falta de este requisito, diez días después de su publicación en el Diario Oficial.

(…).” Ahora, de acuerdo con el principio de libre configuración del legislador, la Asamblea Legislativa puede regular válidamente las condiciones de elección y reelección de los puestos del régimen municipal sometidos al voto popular, siempre y cuando no se transgreda el bloque de constitucionalidad. Por consiguiente, en el sub examine no existe roce de constitucionalidad alguno, porque, a partir de la premisa de que el derecho fundamental al sufragio pasivo no es absoluto, está claro que el solo hecho de que, en un determinado momento, una persona ocupe un cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal no le confiere a ella ni un derecho subjetivo ni una situación jurídica consolidada, que la exima de las modificaciones jurídico-positivas al sistema electoral que se den, mientras se encuentra ejerciendo el cargo y formalmente no ha iniciado el proceso electoral correspondiente. La persona en tal situación ostenta una mera expectativa de derecho a participar en un proceso eleccionario futuro conforme a determinadas reglas; tal expectativa, merced a su naturaleza jurídica, está sujeta a todas las contingencias y variaciones de legislación que oportunamente se aprueben de acuerdo con el marco constitucional.” Precisamente, tal y como se razonó supra, no hay derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento jurídico y tanto el derecho a ser electo como el derecho a la reelección pueden ser limitados de forma legítima. En este caso, en línea con el razonamiento expuesto en los considerandos anteriores, ni la restricción a postularse para un tercer mandato consecutivo en el mismo cargo ni el plazo de ocho años para volver a optar por este vacían de contenido el derecho a la participación política. De hecho, una vez transcurrido tal periodo, la persona tiene la posibilidad de postularse otra vez. Ergo, no se trata de la aplicación retroactiva de la norma, sino de la implementación de un cambio en el sistema electoral sobre la reelección de cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Las partes accionantes no pueden pretender que las nuevas reglas no apliquen a quienes están ejerciendo el cargo de forma consecutiva por dos mandatos; más bien, no solo se les está respetando el periodo por el cual fueron electos, sino que, se reitera, tienen la posibilidad de participar, en igualdad de condiciones, una vez finalizada la restricción temporal. Así, la norma transitoria regula las elecciones municipales futuras en lo concerniente a la situación de quienes, al momento de entrada en vigor de la norma, tienen al menos dos elecciones consecutivas. Ergo, se descarta alguna transgresión al principio de irretroactividad.

En adición, aun cuando una de las partes mencionó que el transitorio incumple los principios y la redacción técnica de las normas jurídicas, no se aprecia algún desarrollo susceptible de ser analizado en esta acción. Igual situación se da con respecto a la alegada vulneración al principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, pues únicamente se indicó que todas las personas tienen derecho de acceso a los cargos públicos en condiciones de igualdad. Además, en lo relativo a las normas de los instrumentos internacionales mencionados no se observan argumentos desarrollados de forma precisa y debidamente sustentada por las partes accionantes. En todo caso, ya la Sala abordó supra la potestad y los límites del legislador en cuanto a la regulación de la elección y reelección de cargos en el régimen municipal.

Por otra parte, la acusada afectación a más de 40 personas funcionarias electas democráticamente, así como los cuestionamientos relativos al contexto en que se promovió la ley, la presunción de la comisión de delitos por parte de las autoridades municipales y la supuesta naturaleza sancionatoria de la imposibilidad de la reelección son insuficientes para sustentar la pretendida inconstitucionalidad de la norma transitoria impugnada. Acerca de tales alegatos, este Tribunal considera que, con independencia del contexto fáctico o político que motivó el dictado de la ley, la Asamblea Legislativa, en general, tiene la potestad de dictar limitaciones a la reelección de cargos electos popularmente en el régimen municipal, sin que esto constituya a priori una sanción a quienes se encuentren ocupando los puestos, ni tampoco presuma la existencia de delitos. Al modificarse el sistema electoral en cuanto a la reelección de determinados cargos en cuestión es evidente que algunas personas previamente electas van a experimentar una variación en las condiciones de participación en las elecciones municipales futuras. Esto no implica, sin embargo, una afectación ilegítima a sus derechos fundamentales, sino únicamente una variación en el diseño y los requisitos de acceso a tales puestos públicos. En este sentido, se reitera, los requisitos o limitaciones para optar por cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal prima facie están sujetos a la libre configuración del legislador, salvo que se contravengan normas o principios constitucionales, incluyendo las denominadas ‘normas pétreas’. Estas decisiones políticas son propias de discutirse en la Asamblea Legislativa, escenario democrático en el que se define su oportunidad y conveniencia, con pleno respeto al principio de separación de poderes, al régimen republicano de un Estado de Derecho como el costarricense, y al Derecho de la Constitución.

ii.2) Sobre la acusada prohibición a los intendentes e intendentas de aspirar durante 8 años, luego del vencimiento del segundo periodo, a otros cargos de elección popular dentro de ese mismo régimen. En cuanto a este alegato, la Sala, ya avaló la restricción por un periodo de ocho años para optar por otros puestos del régimen municipal distintos al ocupado por la persona funcionaria; sin embargo, en el caso específico de su extensión a los intendentes e intendentas por medio de la norma transitoria, no se aprecia algún desarrollo susceptible de ser analizado en esta acción. En ese sentido, únicamente se mencionó ese agravio, por lo que se echa de menos un desarrollo argumentativo preciso y debidamente sustentado por parte de los accionantes en función de la alegada inconstitucionalidad.

VIII.- Razones diferentes del magistrado Rueda Leal en cuanto a la alegada violación al artículo 97 de la Constitución Política. En relación con el numeral 97 eiusdem, en el dictamen nro. 2022006119 de las 13:15 horas de 16 de marzo de 2022, que evacuó la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto ‘Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)’, consigné mi posición en este sentido:

“V.- NOTA DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL.-Como consigna el voto de mayoría, que el infrascrito suscribe, para que aplique el plazo de los seis meses anteriores y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, durante el cual la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en ley los proyectos objetados por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones‑TSE‑(artículo 97 de la Ley Fundamental), el cuestionamiento debe estar referido al tipo de proceso eleccionario correspondiente. Es decir, si la objeción atañe a un aspecto específico de una elección municipal, el plazo antedicho aplica solo, precisamente, a un proceso electoral de esa naturaleza; misma ratio iuris opera cuando se trata de una elección nacional. No obstante, se pasa por alto que puede haber asuntos relativos a materia electoral que no estén directamente vinculados a la naturaleza municipal o nacional de una elección, sino que se refieran a la jurisdicción electoral en general (verbigracia, si se propusiere variar la conformación del TSE o la forma de elegir las personas magistradas), caso en el cual el plazo de marras aplicaría respecto de cualquier clase de proceso electoral”.

Así, ciertamente, los plazos contemplados en el ordinal 97 de la Carta Magna aplican según el tipo de proceso electoral (nacional o municipal) que se vea afectado por determinada ley. Sin embargo, como indiqué en mi razonamiento particular transcrito ut supra, también una normativa legal puede incidir en materia electoral no vinculada con la cualidad nacional o municipal de un proceso electoral, sino concerniente a la jurisdicción electoral en general (verbigracia, si se propusiere variar la conformación del TSE o el modo de elegir a las personas magistradas). En este último caso, los plazos dispuestos en el numeral antedicho aplicarían por igual, es decir, sin que sea relevante el carácter municipal o nacional del proceso electoral respectivo.

IX.-Documentación aportada al expediente. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contado a partir de la notificación de este pronunciamiento. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión n.º 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI, y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión n.º 43-12 del 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

En cuanto a los vicios de procedimiento, por mayoría se declara sin lugar la acción por la alegada violación a los artículos 97 y 172 párrafo segundo de la Constitución Política. El magistrado Rueda Leal da razones diferentes en cuanto al artículo 97 eiusdem.

El magistrado Cruz Castro y la magistrada Jara Velásquez de manera conjunta salvan parcialmente el voto y declaran con lugar la acción por un vicio de procedimiento solo por la alegada violación al artículo 97 de la Constitución Política.

La magistrada Garro Vargas salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad por existir un vicio esencial de procedimiento en la aprobación de la ley n.°10183 del 05 de abril de 2022, Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales, por infracción a lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 en relación con el artículo 102 inciso 3), ambos de la Constitución Política.

En cuanto a los vicios de fondo, por mayoría se declara sin lugar la acción. El magistrado Cruz Castro y la magistrada Jara Velásquez salvan el voto de manera conjunta y declaran con lugar la acción en este extremo.

La magistrada Garro Vargas omite pronunciamiento respecto de los agravios por el fondo.

Notifíquese este pronunciamiento a las partes accionantes, al procurador general de la República, al presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y al presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C. Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Anamari Garro V.

José Roberto Garita N. Rosibel Jara V.

Voto salvado del magistrado Cruz Castro y la magistrada Jara Velásquez, con redacción del primero.

Nos separamos del criterio mayoritario, dictando un voto particular, porque consideramos que la Ley n°10183 denominada “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales”, que reforma el artículo 14 del Código Municipal contiene vicios de procedimiento y de fondo.

Inconstitucionalidad por vicio de procedimiento.- Falta de consulta al TSE (artículo 97 Constitucional) Consideramos que la ley nro. 10183 del 5 de abril de 2022, denominada “Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales” contiene un vicio de procedimiento en su aprobación, referido a la violación a lo dispuesto en el art.97 Constitucional.

En el mismo sentido que lo indicó el Magistrado Cruz en la resolución que resolvió la consulta facultativa de esta ley (voto n°2022-006119), consideramos que existe el vicio de procedimiento señalado, pues se contraviene las prohibiciones y limitaciones impuestas por el periodo de veda establecido en el artículo 97 constitucional. Recordemos que dispone tal norma constitucional:

“Art. 97. Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En este caso, resulta inobjetable que la ley en cuestión se refiere a materia electoral, pues incide en la regulación y restricción de ciertos supuestos de reelección en las elecciones municipales. Además, no se puede distinguir donde la Constitución Política no lo hace, por ello resulta improcedente afirmar que el artículo 97 constitucional se refiere sólo a las elecciones nacionales y no a las municipales. Claramente tal norma hace referencia a “la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales” sin distinguir tipos de elecciones. Asimismo, resulta evidente que el TSE se ha manifestado en desacuerdo con este proyecto de ley. Así entonces, consideramos que resulta aplicable lo establecido por el artículo 97 conforme a los siguientes argumentos:

La Asamblea Legislativa puede apartarse de la opinión del TSE; pero para ello necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros, siempre no esté dentro del período de veda legislativa. En todo caso, esa votación calificada no tiene la virtud de desconocer el periodo de veda, conforme al cual: dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.

Los partidos políticos que actúan en el Parlamento son importantes actores en todo tipo de elecciones, por esta razón consideramos que la prohibición constitucional es saludable. Tal prohibición constitucional impide que los actores políticos puedan variar las reglas electorales en cualquier tipo de elección. Distinguir entre elecciones municipales y elecciones nacionales, es una distinción artificial. La incidencia de las luchas electorales y la porosidad de los partidos, son razones suficientes para impedir que las reglas de contiendas electorales, sean locales o nacionales, se modifiquen durante el período electoral. La historia electoral evidencia la volatibilidad y conflictividad que contiene esta materia, por esta razón el texto constitucional es tajante, muy claro. Cualquier elección popular impide la variación de las reglas electorales. Por otra parte, el texto constitucional contiene un “veto particular” del Tribunal Electoral, pues no puede introducirse ninguna modificación electoral, en los seis meses anteriores y en los cuatro posteriores de la celebración de una elección popular, en materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo. Esto es precisamente lo que ocurrió en este caso. El voto de mayoría ignora que existe una intervención calificada del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, que no depende sólo del período de exclusión de la potestad legislativa, sino que el Tribunal tiene una competencia calificada, que no puede ser ignorada por el poder legislativo ni por esta instancia constitucional. No es buen síntoma el debilitamiento de las potestades del Tribunal electoral, porque no es posible desconocer la historia, pues el fortalecimiento de la jurisdicción electoral fue una de las reivindicaciones políticas más importantes después de los hechos violentos del cuarenta y ocho.

Dado que las elecciones nacionales se realizaron el 06 de febrero del 2022, el periodo de veda mencionado cubriría desde el 06 de agosto del 2021. Es evidente que el primer debate se celebró dentro del periodo vedado en cuestión pues se llevó a cabo el 25 de enero 2022. Además, se hizo respecto de una reforma a la que se opuso el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. En razón de los argumentos expuestos, consideramos que existe el vicio de procedimiento señalado, pues se contravienen las prohibiciones y limitaciones impuestas durante el periodo de veda previsto en el artículo 97 constitucional.

Inconstitucionalidad por vicios de fondo.- Al respecto, por las razones que se indican, consideramos que los siguientes aspectos de las normas cuestionadas, resultan inconstitucionales:

“(…) No podrán ocupar ningún cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo. Los vicealcaldes y las vicealcaldesas también podrán ser reelegidos de forma continua por una única vez y no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo ni el de regidores o síndicos, hasta tanto no hayan trascurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período consecutivo.

Las personas regidoras, síndicas, intendentes, viceintendentes, concejales municipales de distrito de la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, así como quienes ocupen cualquiera de los cargos de suplencias, (…) no podrán ocupar el mismo cargo o su suplencia hasta tanto no hayan transcurrido dos períodos desde que finalizó su segundo período.

Transitorio Único: Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como alcaldes, alcaldesas, intendentes o intendentas, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar cualquier puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal.

Las personas que actualmente se desempeñen como vicealcaldes, vicealcaldesas, viceintendentes y viceintendentas, regidores y regidoras propietarios y suplentes, síndicos y síndicas propietarias y suplentes, y ya han sido elegidas en sus cargos, por al menos dos períodos consecutivos, deberán esperar a que transcurran dos períodos para poder volver a ocupar el mismo puesto de elección popular del régimen municipal; sin embargo, podrán ocupar otros puestos municipales de conformidad con la presente ley.” Como se observa, las partes subrayadas se refieren a la imposibilidad (por un lapso de ocho años) de que quien ha ocupado un cargo de elección popular en el régimen municipal, pueda ocupar OTRO cargo de elección popular municipal. Tal imposibilidad, restricción o veda temporal, se refiere al ejercicio del derecho de acceso a cargos públicos. Sobre el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos se tiene amplia normativa internacional:

El artículo 21.2 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos: “…Toda persona tiene derecho de acceso, en condiciones de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país…”. El artículo 20 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del hombre: “toda persona tiene el derecho de formar parte del gobierno de su país y de participar en las elecciones populares”. El artículo 23.1.c de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos: “1. Todos los ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades: … c) de tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a las funciones públicas de su país…”.

En nuestra Constitución Política, tal derecho se deriva de los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales. El derecho fundamental de acceso a cargos públicos es el derecho de toda persona a postularse y acceder a desempeñar cargos dentro de la función pública. Es indudable que, como cualquier otro derecho fundamental, puede estar sujeto a limitaciones, claro está, siempre y cuando cumplan con el principio de reserva legal, pero además, que dichas limitaciones no lleven a un vaciamiento absoluto del derecho o que supongan limitaciones irrazonables o desproporcionadas. Entre las limitaciones válidas, en general, se puede mencionar el régimen de incompatibilidades o las sanciones de inhabilitación temporal. Estas últimas como consecuencia de una falta grave, previo un debido proceso y de que la sanción impuesta sea para garantizar la correcta y eficiente administración. Ahora bien, si se analiza detenidamente, se constata que las normas impugnadas restringen de manera irrazonable el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos, pues lo que se pretende es prohibir, por espacio de 8 años, que quien ya ha ocupado un cargo de elección popular del régimen municipal, pueda ocupar otro cargo municipal de elección popular. Nótese que ello va más allá de los límites a la reelección, pues se pretende ponerle una prohibición temporal para poder tener acceso a un cargo de elección popular, distinto del que ya ha ocupado. Con ello, claramente se desbordan los principios básicos de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Desde nuestra perspectiva minoritaria y disidente, coincidimos con la misma conclusión a la que llega el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en el sentido de considerar que la normativa en cuestión impone un vaciamiento del derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal, sin cumplir con el parámetro de razonabilidad. Ello por cuanto dicha normativa supone un plazo de exclusión, durante el cual, un funcionario municipal no puede optar por otro cargo municipal de elección popular, sin que ello sea consecuencia de alguna falta cometida. Claramente la preocupación por la corrupción no puede servir de fundamento genérico para la restricción generalizada del derecho de acceso a cargos públicos. La irrazonabilidad y la desproporción se aprecia muy bien en este supuesto, aplicándolo a otra prohibición similar: imponer que la limitación a la reelección presidencial, incluyera también la imposibilidad de ser electo diputado por el hecho de haber sido Presidente de la República. Claramente se aprecia cuando la prohibición se expande a otros cargos, resulta irrazonable. Nótese que no se trata del derecho de asumir un cargo per se, sino que ha mediado una elección popular y el electorado se ha manifestado a favor de tener a dicho funcionario en otro cargo. Consideramos que nada obstaría para que una persona que ya antes ha ejercido un cargo de elección popular, pueda volver a ocupar otro cargo, dentro del mismo régimen municipal, si el electorado así lo ha decidido. Tal como lo indica el TSE en su respuesta a la consulta legislativa resuelta sobre el proyecto que dio origen a esta ley, no es legítimo que un Estado impida el sufragio pasivo (derecho a ser electo) en razón de haber ocupado un puesto específico -distinto al que se aspiraría- en los dos períodos inmediatos anteriores. Así se indica: “Tal afectación al núcleo esencial derecho se produce justamente porque… se estaría dando, como efecto de aplicación de la norma, una suspensión total de la prerrogativa ciudadana de contender por cargos públicos. (…) De otra parte, no puede perderse de vista que los cambios operados en el texto del proyecto lo convierten en inconexo, en tanto la exposición de motivos desarrolla porqué los promoventes consideran legítimo y necesario limitar la reelección, pero no se alude a que debe restringirse cualquier otro tipo de postulación (…) la propuesta original no era la de establecer una prohibición tan intensa como la que, vía mociones, se incorporó.”. El hecho que una persona que ha ocupado un puesto de elección popular se pueda postular para otro cargo, no resulta, per se, fuente de corrupción ni un “modus vivendi” ilegítimo. No puede ignorarse que se trata de aprovechar la experiencia de una persona que ya ha ocupado cargos similares y que los munícipes han elegido. En función de impedir la concentración de poder, no justicia la introducción de reglas que cercenan, sin ningún sustento, el sufragio pasivo. Las limitaciones que pretenden evitar concentraciones de poder, no pueden restringir, sin fundamento, derechos fundamentales. Esta medida luce irrazonable o desproporcionada.

Tal como lo ha indicado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en cuanto a los derechos políticos, el artículo 23 consagra el derecho de participar, de votar y ser elegido y el derecho de tener acceso a funciones públicas. Así se protege tanto el derecho del candidato como el derecho de los electores:

“El párrafo primero del artículo 23 de la Convención reconoce a todos los ciudadanos los derechos: a) a participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos; b) a votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periódicas auténticas, realizadas por sufragio universal e igual y por voto secreto que garantice la libre expresión de la voluntad de los electores, y c) a tener acceso, en condiciones generales de igualdad, a funciones públicas de su país. De forma similar, la Declaración Americana reconoce el derecho a tomar “parte en el gobierno de su país, directamente o por medio de sus representantes, y de participar en las elecciones populares, que serán de voto secreto, genuinas, periódicas y libres”. Tomando en cuenta lo anterior, esta Corte ha señalado que los derechos reconocidos tienen una dimensión individual y colectiva, pues protegen tanto aquellas personas que participen como candidatos como a sus electores.” (OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-28/21 DE 7 DE JUNIO DE 2021) Ahora bien, en cuanto a las limitaciones admisibles a los derechos políticos, se ha indicado que los derechos políticos no son absolutos y pueden estar sujetos a limitaciones. Sin embargo, tales limitaciones deben cumplir con el principio de reserva legal y el principio de razonabilidad (necesidad y proporcionalidad). Así ha dicho la Corte IDH:

“Su reglamentación debe observar los principios de legalidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en una sociedad democrática. La observancia del principio de legalidad exige que el Estado defina de manera precisa, mediante una ley, los requisitos para que los ciudadanos puedan participar en la contienda electoral, y que estipule claramente el procedimiento electoral que antecede a las elecciones. De acuerdo al artículo 23.2 de la Convención se puede reglamentar el ejercicio de los derechos y oportunidades a las que se refiere el inciso 1 de dicho artículo, exclusivamente por las razones establecidas en ese inciso. La restricción debe encontrase prevista en una ley, no ser discriminatoria, basarse en criterios razonables, atender a un propósito útil y oportuno que la torne necesaria para satisfacer un interés público imperativo, y ser proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue.” Claramente en la ley cuestionada no existe base razonable, ni se atiende un propósito útil y oportuno que torne necesaria la exclusión de un derecho fundamental, ni se entiende cuál es el interés público, ni tampoco es proporcional a ese objetivo. Cuando hay varias opciones para alcanzar ese fin, debe escogerse la que restrinja menos el derecho protegido y guarde mayor proporcionalidad con el propósito que se persigue. Estos requisitos no se cumplen en este caso. Distinto sería la situación si la interdicción para ocupar otro cargo de elección popular provenga de una inhabilitación declarada, pues en ese caso, existiría justificación razonable. Más recientemente, en cuanto a las restricciones, la Corte IDH ha precisado dos tipos de restricciones admisibles, las de carácter general impuestas por ley y las restricciones producto de una sanción particular:

“(…) esta Corte advierte que el artículo 23.2 establece dos supuestos. El primer supuesto se refiere a las restricciones de carácter general que puede establecer la ley (edad, nacionalidad, residencia, idioma, instrucción, capacidad civil o mental), mientras que el segundo supuesto se refiere a las restricciones a los derechos políticos impuestas por vía de una sanción a una persona en particular (condena, por juez competente, en proceso penal). De la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal se desprende que la interpretación del término “exclusivamente” incluido en el artículo 23.2 dependerá de si se trata de restricciones a los derechos políticos generales (primer supuesto) o particulares (segundo supuesto). (OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-28/21 DE 7 DE JUNIO DE 2021) Siguiendo el precedente citado, las restricciones a derechos fundamentales deben estar previstas en ley en sentido formal y material (principio de reserva legal), perseguir un fin legítimo y cumplir con los requisitos de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad. Aspectos que no son cumplidos por el proyecto consultado, pues no se entiende cómo la veda temporal para ocupar cargos públicos sea una medida idónea, necesaria ni proporcional. Además, aún cuando se cumpla con el requisito de reserva legal, cabe cuestionarse si una restricción de este tipo debería ser por medio de una reforma constitucional. Por otro lado, resulta claro que el legislador ordinario no es libre en su accionar, sino que está constreñido por el marco constitucional, como lo sería en este caso, los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. No aplica entonces en este caso argumentar a favor del principio de libre configuración del legislador o la discrecionalidad legislativa. Dentro de un Estado constitucional de Derecho, no es admisible reconocer potestades o competencias irrestrictas a ningún Poder de la República. Tal como se indica en el voto de mayoría, la libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, puesto que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales. (Ver también las resoluciones nros. 2013-011499 de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 2013, 2013-011706 de las 11:44 horas del 30 de agosto de 2013 y 2020-015542 de las 11:40 horas del 19 de agosto de 2020, entre otras). Ahora bien, si bien tal libre configuración del legislador pueda alcanzar para admitir la imposición de límites a la reelección, consideramos que no alcanza para admitir la elección en otros cargos. Es evidente que esa extensión resulta, a todas luces, irracional o desproporcionada. A diferencia de lo que se considera en el voto de mayoría, donde se indica que “Cabe reiterar que los requisitos o limitaciones para optar por cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal a priori están cobijados por el principio de libre configuración del legislador, salvo que quebranten normas o principios constitucionales o las denominadas normas pétreas.”, consideramos que, con base en el principio pro libertatis y pro homine, la regla siempre debe ser el ejercicio del derecho fundamental y examinarse, cuidosamente, el establecimiento de restricciones a tales derechos. Partir del razonamiento contrario nos parece un desconocimiento del marco constitucional. Claro que no existe ningún derecho humano o fundamental de forma absoluta, pero la restricción a tales derechos tampoco es absoluta, sino que debe estar sujeta a límites. No encontramos asidero en la justificación que encuentra el voto de mayoría cuando indica que la restricción de marras se apoya en fines legítimos y se funda en datos y argumentos suficientemente plausibles. Ello por cuanto, consideramos que la medida restrictiva en cuestión no pasa el test de razonabilidad, no consideramos que sea una medida necesaria, ni idónea, ni tampoco proporcional. Sino que por el contrario, afectan el contenido esencial del derecho al sufragio pasivo.

Todo lo dicho aplica también para la inconstitucionalidad del transitorio, pues además, la restricción se aplica para los cargos futuros de quienes actualmente se desempeñan en puestos de elección popular en el ámbito municipal. Con lo cual, la restricción se impone con “nombres y apellidos” para los actuales representantes municipales. En la norma transitoria de la ley cuestionada, el legislador reguló la situación de las personas que, al momento de entrada en vigor de la ley, se encuentren ocupando cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal por al menos dos periodos consecutivos. Así entonces, dichas personas desconocían -porque no existía- de tal veda cuando asumieron el cargo. La persona en tal situación ostenta también el derecho de acceso a cargos públicos que le permite participar en un proceso eleccionario futuro.

A diferencia del criterio de mayoría, consideramos que, no es una cuestión menor el considerar que, la normativa en cuestión puede afectar el derecho al sufragio pasivo de más de 40 personas funcionarias electas democráticamente, y puede haber operado como una “sanción sin debido proceso” ante la naturaleza sancionatoria de esta medida que impone una prohibición para ocupar cualquier otro cargo municipal de elección popular. Ello además de poder estar frente a una violación al principio de irretroactividad de las normas y del artículo 34 Constitucional.

Así entonces, consideramos que toda la normativa en cuestión resulta inconstitucional porque contiene un vicio de fondo al vaciar de contenido el derecho de acceso a cargos de elección popular en el régimen municipal. Estimamos que en este caso se exceden los límites al poder legislativo; no es posible extender la interdicción al sufragio pasivo respecto de un cargo que no ha ocupado a quien se impone la prohibición. No puede existir un efecto expansivo de las limitaciones de un derecho fundamental.

En razón de los argumentos expuestos, estimamos que las normas de fondo consultadas son irrazonables y desproporcionadas; y además, respecto del transitorio, como lo expresamos, conculca la garantía del principio de irretroactividad de las normas. Las normas consultadas contienen previsiones que lesionan el derecho al sufragio pasivo.

Fernando Cruz C. Rosibel Jara V.

Magistrado Magistrada Res. n.°2022-029648 VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS La suscrita magistrada, con el respeto acostumbrado, salvo el voto y declaro con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad por existir un vicio esencial en el procedimiento de aprobación de la ley n.°10183 del 05 de abril de 2022, Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de las autoridades locales. Esto por infracción a lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 en relación con el artículo 102 inciso 3), ambos de la Constitución Política.

Al existir un vicio de procedimiento que invalida la reforma, omito pronunciamiento respecto de los agravios por el fondo.

1.- Sobre los precedentes de esta Sala En primer lugar, corresponde advertir que el planteamiento de la reelección de los alcaldes se ha sometido a conocimiento de este Tribunal en dos ocasiones recientes.

En el expediente n.°22-001848-0007-CO se conoció la consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad referente al proyecto de aprobación de la “Reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal y sus reformas, Ley n.°7794 de 30 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas (Ley que limita la reelección indefinida de autoridades locales)”, que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo n.°21.810. En la opinión consultiva en cuestión salvé mi voto al estimar que, en realidad, los legisladores no plantearon una verdadera duda de constitucionalidad. Realicé las siguientes consideraciones:

“En la parte resolutiva de este dictamen se consigna:

“La magistrada Garro Vargas salva el voto respecto del supuesto vicio de procedimiento planteado y considera que es inevacuable, pues la consulta no presenta propiamente un cuestionamiento, sino una defensa ante la posición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en relación con el alcance del art. 97 de la Constitución Política”.

Para ilustrar mi tesis basta hacer referencia a las propias manifestaciones de los legisladores consultantes, quienes lejos de invocar dudas u objeciones razonadas de constitucionalidad del trámite dado al proyecto de ley, pretenden blindarlo frente a los cuestionamientos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE). Al respecto, se indica lo siguiente:

“Desde una interpretación formal, rígida y estricta de la norma tenemos tres posibles implicaciones relacionadas con el trámite legislativo: la primera, acogemos la recomendación del Tribunal en el sentido irrestricto y absoluto del derecho a ser electo y mantenemos "la puerta giratoria" en donde los funcionarios municipales de elección popular, pueden "saltar" cada ocho años (luego de una reelección sucesiva) a otros puestos también de elección popular, y con ello limitamos la participación política de otros ciudadanos, y además, promovemos los puestos ad perpetuam en los gobiernos locales; la segunda, no votamos el proyecto de ley que cuenta con el aval de gran mayoría de diputados y diputadas que representamos la voluntad ciudadana o; la tercera, le heredamos a la Asamblea Legislativa entrante, cuya composición e intención no conocemos, la decisión sobre una propuesta que a todas luces pretende fortalecer la democracia”.

De su razonamiento ‒frente a la argumentación realizada por el TSE‒ los propios legisladores plantean tres escenarios que califican como negativos: 1) acoger la recomendación del TSE, lo que trae como consecuencia la limitación a la participación política de los ciudadanos y la promoción de puestos ad perpetuam; 2) no votar el proyecto, el cual, según ellos mismos reconocen “cuenta con el aval de la gran mayoría de diputados y diputadas” que representan la voluntad ciudadana; y 3) le heredan el proyecto a una nueva conformación de la Asamblea Legislativa con el peligro de que no se logre concretar, advirtiendo que es una propuesta que “a todas luces pretende fortalecer la democracia”.

Seguidamente realizan una reseña histórica sobre la regulación de las elecciones municipales y de las elecciones nacionales, para ilustrar su tesis ‒la que consideran es la apropiada interpretación del art. 97 de la Constitución Política‒ y solamente de seguido plantean una consulta a esta Sala. Al respecto, el escrito de la consulta indica textualmente lo siguiente:

“¿Cuál es el objetivo de esta reseña? Evidenciar que la aplicación del artículo 97 no puede ser literal ni entendida desde una interpretación formal, porque la realidad del legislador constituyente al momento de redactar la norma en cuestión entendía las elecciones como un solo momento cada cuatrienio y por lo tanto la limitación era general y absoluta, dado que la legislación que implicara a uno de los niveles de funcionarios elegibles, les aplicaba a todos y las circunstancias actuales son distintas.

Lo que queremos denotar ante el honorable Tribunal, es que la interpretación de este artículo debe ser material y teleológica, desde el contenido de la norma, desde su fin último y con la aprobación de este proyecto de ley en su trámite de primer debate, no se está afectando la dinámica de las elecciones municipales que se celebrarán en febrero del año 2024, es decir, dentro de 24 meses. Esa fue la razón por la que aprobamos en primer debate el proyecto de ley, seguros de que su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones que se realizará el 6 de febrero de este año, en el que se elegirá la Presidencia de la República y los diputados a la Asamblea Legislativa, de ninguna forma, alguna autoridad municipal.

Por lo anterior, considerando los alcances y la intención de las personas constituyentes de evitar transformaciones del sistema electoral en épocas cercanas a los comicios, en este caso en particular donde la modificación jurídica propuesta es relativa única y exclusivamente para el régimen municipal, cuyo periodo electoral no se encuentra activo, siendo que el llamado electoral en el que nos encontramos es relativo al Gobierno de la República y la Asamblea Legislativa, queda excluido el régimen municipal en su totalidad, por lo tanto surge la duda relacionada con el trámite legislativo: ¿Es la prohibición establecida en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política aplicable para modificaciones relacionadas con el régimen municipal cuando el periodo electoral activo es el relativo al ámbito nacional?” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

A partir de una detallada lectura del propio memorial suscrito por los legisladores consultantes, se aprecia que toda la argumentación no tiene por objeto fundamentar una duda sobre el procedimiento seguido para aprobar el proyecto que ellos impulsan, sino defender tanto el proyecto como ese procedimiento frente al criterio formalmente remitido por el TSE en el marco del iter parlamentario. La única pregunta propiamente dicha de ese epígrafe relativo al presunto vicio de procedimiento es la que está al final, pero toda la argumentación que la antecede no tiene ningún vestigio de duda u objeción sobre el trámite brindado al proyecto de ley, sino, muy por el contrario, pone de manifiesto el convencimiento de que “su aprobación no afecta en absoluto el proceso de elecciones” llevado a cabo el pasado 6 de febrero.

En virtud de tal constatación, considero que la consulta debe ser declarada inevacuable, a la luz de lo dispuesto en el art. 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que señala lo siguiente:

"Art. 99. Salvo que se trate de la consulta forzosa prevista en el inciso a) del artículo 96, la consulta deberá formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieren dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Como se desprende del contenido de dicho numeral, para que la consulta legislativa sea admisible se deben expresar con claridad los motivos por los cuales se tienen dudas u objeciones de constitucionalidad. Y esto es precisamente lo que aquí se echa en falta, puesto que de los extractos citados –y del entero escrito– se puede advertir que los legisladores no cuestionan un trámite en particular respecto del que se tengan dudas concretas de constitucionalidad. Más bien, se muestran disconformes con la postura institucional del TSE (ver en idéntico sentido la reciente opinión consultiva que, mediante el dictamen n°.2872-2022, suscrito unánimemente por esta Sala, con casi igual integración, declaró inevacuable la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad tramitada en el expediente n.°21-025530-0007-CO).

En consecuencia, considero que en lo relativo al presunto vicio de procedimiento los consultantes sólo enuncian la pregunta, sin argumentar el por qué estiman que amerita plantear la cuestión a esta Sala. Por el contrario, sus alegatos buscan justificar lo actuado. Por eso, bien se puede afirmar que, al no contener una objeción de constitucionalidad, la consulta legislativa es inadmisible e inevacuable”.

De lo anterior se desprende que salvé el voto entendiendo que la consulta era inevacuable, por lo que no me pronuncié sobre el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política.

Un par de meses después, la Sala Constitucional resolvió la acción conocida en el expediente n.°19-000892-0007-CO mediante la sentencia n.°2022-016947. En dicha resolución, la Sala, por mayoría, estimó que la omisión cuestionada en ese proceso ‒sea la omisión de incluir límites a la reelección sucesiva e indefinida de los alcaldes municipales‒ había sido solventada por el legislador mediante la reforma al artículo 14 del Código Municipal. En el referido expediente, declaré sin lugar la acción con otras consideraciones, que en resumen son las siguientes:

“De la atenta revisión del libelo de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad se desprende con suma claridad que el accionante cuestionaba el art. 14 del Código Municipal ‒vigente al momento de la interposición de la acción‒ porque autorizaba implícitamente la reelección “sucesiva e indefinida” de las autoridades municipales. En su criterio esa posibilidad tiene nocivas consecuencias respecto del desempeño del sistema democrático, de la alternabilidad en el ejercicio del poder, del derecho a ser electo y de elegir en condiciones de igualdad, y es falto de razonabilidad. Entonces, es necesario precisar que el objeto de la acción no es la reelección per se de los servidores municipales, sino la reelección sucesiva e indefinida, que ‒a juicio del accionante‒ se derivaba de lo regulado en el art. 14 del Código Municipal, que disponía en lo conducente lo siguiente:

“Todos los cargos de elección popular a nivel municipal que contemple el ordenamiento jurídico serán elegidos popularmente, por medio de elecciones generales que se realizarán el primer domingo de febrero, dos años después de las elecciones nacionales en que se elija a las personas que ocuparán la Presidencia y las Vicepresidencias de la República y a quienes integrarán la Asamblea Legislativa. Tomarán posesión de sus cargos el día 1º de mayo del mismo año de su elección, por un período de cuatro años, y podrán ser reelegidos”.

La mayoría de la Sala sostiene que, en vista de que el Poder Legislativo ‒en el ejercicio de sus atribuciones constitucionales‒ emitió la reforma al art. 14 del Código Municipal, ya se procedió a suplir la omisión inconstitucional que se reprochaba y por lo que entiende que la acción carece de interés actual y ordena desestimarla. Al respecto, conviene realizar varias precisiones.

En primer lugar, si bien es cierto se introdujeron nuevas reglas para aspirar a la reelección en los puestos municipales, no se ha suprimido la reelección sucesiva, ya que la norma actual aún lo permite, pues en lo que interesa indica lo siguiente:

(…)

Es palmario que el legislador introdujo reglas y condiciones para aspirar a los cargos municipales de elección popular, pero se sigue autorizando la reelección sucesiva, por lo que no parece que la reforma responda plenamente a lo pretendido en esta acción.

En segundo término, cabe señalar que la sentencia de mayoría hace la siguiente consideración “la omisión inconstitucional que se reprocha en este proceso al artículo 14 del Código Municipal ‒según la cual los alcaldes municipales podían reelegirse sucesiva e indefinidamente‒ no existe”. Sobre este punto es necesario tener presente que esta Sala, al hacer referencia al control de constitucionalidad de las omisiones inconstitucionales, ha dicho lo siguiente (ver sentencias números 2005-5649, 2018-009819 y 2021-3853) (…) A partir de lo indicado por la Sala, considero que en el caso concreto no se cumplen las condiciones para valorar una supuesta inconstitucionalidad por omisión, puesto que la Constitución Política no establece un mandato expreso sobre la forma de elección o reelección de los miembros del gobierno municipal”.

2.- Sobre lo informado por la Procuraduría General de la República y mi decisión en el caso concreto En el presente asunto, luego de examinar los alegatos planteados, coincido con lo informado por la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR). Dicha instancia realizó las siguientes manifestaciones:

“III. SOBRE LA SUPUESTA VIOLACIÓN DE LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 97 CONSTITUCIONAL Dentro de la acción 22-8424-0007-CO, se alega que el trámite de aprobación de la Ley 10183 resulta violatorio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, dado que durante el trámite legislativo el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones brindó un criterio negativo sobre el proyecto de ley y que dentro de los seis meses previos y cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede convertir en leyes los proyectos de ley en los cuales se haya mostrado en desacuerdo dicho órgano electoral.

Por su importancia, procedemos a citar el artículo 97 constitucional que señala:

“ARTÍCULO 97.- Para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a materias electorales, la Asamblea Legislativa deberá consultar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; para apartarse de su opinión se necesitará el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de sus miembros. Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá, sin embargo, convertir en leyes los proyectos sobre dichas materias respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo.” Como se observa, el artículo indicado establece dos supuestos diferentes. En primer lugar, exige que cualquier ley relativa a la materia electoral, que cuente con oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sea aprobada por dos terceras partes del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa y, en segundo lugar, prohíbe –de manera absoluta- que la Asamblea apruebe un proyecto de ley que cuente con la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones si se está dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular.

Para referirnos al reclamo que se plantea en la presente acción, deben tomarse en consideración los siguientes hechos de relevancia del trámite legislativo llevado a cabo para la aprobación de la ley 10183:

• a)El proyecto de ley 21810, que sirvió de antecedente a la Ley 10.183 del 5 de abril de 2022, fue presentado en la corriente legislativa el 18 de febrero de 2020 (ver expediente legislativo); b) Mediante oficio AL-DSDI-OFI-0005-2022 del 11 de enero de 2022, la Asamblea Legislativa consultó de manera preceptiva el proyecto de ley actualizado al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folio 728 del expediente legislativo); c) Por oficio TSE-0199 del 20 de enero de 2022, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, objetó el proyecto de ley por considerarlo contrario al derecho a ser electo, en cuanto prohíbe que funcionarios con dos periodos consecutivos en un mismo cargo puedan aspirar a otros puestos de elección popular del régimen municipal. En dicho oficio se señaló: “… este Tribunal, en los términos y con los alcances del artículo 97 constitucional, objeta el proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente n°21.810. Tal objeción se levantaría si los legisladores modifican el proyecto para que, según el espíritu de la propuesta, se limite la reelección consecutiva a una única vez (máximo dos períodos continuos en el mismo cargo), sin que se prohíba la posibilidad de optar, al cabo del segundo mandato, por otro puesto de elección popular. Respetuosamente, se recuerda que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo” (numeral 97 constitucional). ACUERDO FIRME.” (folios 1063 al 1072 del expediente legislativo); d) En la sesión extraordinaria número 45 del 23 de diciembre de 2021, el Plenario Legislativo aprobó en primer debate el proyecto de ley 21810, con una votación de 46 votos a favor (folios 551 a 600 y 604 del proyecto de ley); e) En sesión extraordinaria N°46 del 05 de enero del 2022, se inició la discusión del proyecto N°21.810 en segundo debate, donde se aprobó una moción de orden para retrotraer a primer debate y se suspendió la discusión para que ocupara el primer lugar de los primeros debates en sesión siguiente (folio 650).
• f)Mediante sesión ordinaria N°85 del 11 de enero del 2022 del Plenario Legislativo, inició la discusión en el trámite de primer debate del proyecto N°21.810 (folio 702). En sesión extraordinaria N°053 del 25 de enero del 2022 se continuó la discusión en primer debate del proyecto en cuestión y se aprobó en primer debate por 40 votos a favor (folio 1082-1112).
• g)El 27 de enero de 2022, varios diputados y diputadas de la Asamblea Legislativa presentaron una consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, tramitada bajo el número de expediente 22-001848-0007-CO (folios 1143 a 1162 del expediente legislativo); h) La Sala Constitucional evacuó la consulta mediante el voto 2022-006119 de las 13:15 horas del 16 de marzo de 2022, estimando que no existían vicios de procedimiento y declarando la consulta inevacuable en cuanto a los vicios de fondo alegados; i) En sesión ordinaria 105 del 29 de marzo de 2022, el Plenario Legislativo aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley 21.810 con 48 votos a favor, sin acoger las observaciones hechas por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folios 1367 y 1372).

Como se desprende de los hechos descritos, por tratarse de un proyecto de ley relativo a la materia electoral, la Asamblea Legislativa lo consultó al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones durante su tramitación, institución que se opuso parcialmente a la iniciativa legislativa, al considerarla contraria al parámetro de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad dada la restricción establecida a los funcionarios municipales con dos periodos consecutivos en el cargo, para optar por otros puestos de elección popular (folio 1068 del expediente legislativo). No obstante lo anterior, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado sin que se tomaran en consideración las observaciones del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues la ley finalmente aprobada mantuvo la restricción señalada por el órgano electoral (restricción sobre la cual nos referimos en nuestro informe previo).

Si se toma como parámetro el primer supuesto descrito en el artículo 97 constitucional, es claro que no existe infracción de procedimiento alguna, pues el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate por 40 votos y, en segundo debate, por 48 votos. Esto evidencia que aun con la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Asamblea Legislativa superó la mayoría constitucional para apartarse de dicha oposición.

La duda se genera en este caso con el segundo supuesto contemplado en el numeral 97 de la Constitución, que impide a la Asamblea Legislativa de manera absoluta, aprobar proyectos de ley de materia electoral si se está dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, cuando existe oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

Como se observa, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate en fecha 25 de enero de 2022, a menos de un mes de las elecciones nacionales realizadas en febrero de 2022 y, en segundo debate el 29 de marzo de 2022, a menos de un mes de la segunda ronda de las elecciones nacionales.

Se plantea la discusión entonces si, ante la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Asamblea Legislativa podía aprobar la ley, dado el momento electoral en que nos encontrábamos. (…)

Sin perjuicio del conflicto de competencias que se ha mantenido entre la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en el tiempo, ha sido criterio de este órgano asesor que en el tanto estemos frente a interpretaciones de normas constitucionales o legales de naturaleza electoral (que no constituyan jurisprudencia), quien debe ejercer esa competencia de manera exclusiva y excluyente es el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues el Constituyente fue claro en reconocerle esa atribución en los artículos 99 y 102 inciso 3 constitucionales.

(…)

Dicha posición, en nuestro criterio, presenta el inconveniente no sólo de que la Sala se atribuyó la interpretación o actualización de una norma constitucional de naturaleza electoral (artículo 97) que –en principio- corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sino que, además, la Sala realizó dicha interpretación conforme a una norma de rango legal (Código Electoral), desconociendo la voluntad del Constituyente plasmada en los artículos 97, 99 y 102 inciso 3 de la Constitución, aun cuando el régimen electoral cambiara a partir de la vigencia del Código Electoral. Asimismo, es claro que las normas contenidas en el proyecto de ley que sirvió de antesala a la Ley 10183, eran de naturaleza electoral, por lo que la oposición del TSE para que el proyecto se votara vinculaba a la Asamblea Legislativa.

En otras palabras, es nuestro criterio que durante el trámite legislativo debió prevalecer la oposición del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues es a dicho órgano al que le corresponde de manera exclusiva la interpretación de las normas electorales y nos encontrábamos en medio de una elección popular. Nótese que en ningún momento ese tribunal electoral consideró durante el trámite legislativo que el proyecto de ley podía aprobarse por no tratarse de una elección municipal la que estaba en curso, sino que, por el contrario, indicó al legislador que únicamente podía aprobarlo si acataba las recomendaciones que estaba haciendo al proyecto de ley, cosa que no se hizo por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver actas legislativas ya citadas).

Estimamos, además, que el hecho de que una norma legal se refiera a una elección de carácter municipal y que las elecciones en trámite fueran de carácter nacional, no superaba la prohibición establecida en el numeral 97 constitucional, pues bajo esa tesis el legislador podría crear nuevas obligaciones en materia electoral, sin considerar si el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones puede o no hacerles frente, estando en medio de la compleja logística de una elección, sea cual sea su naturaleza. De ahí que precisamente por ello, corresponde al TSE determinar si un proyecto de ley -en materia electoral- puede o no aprobarse durante los meses previos y posteriores a la elección que se está realizando, especialmente porque sólo dicho órgano puede valorar aspectos presupuestarios, logísticos y técnicos relativos a la organización del sufragio y su posibilidad material de atender al mismo tiempo, eventuales normas legales que dicte la Asamblea Legislativa en materia electoral, sean de alcance municipal o nacional”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En mi criterio, lleva razón la PGR en el sentido que a la luz de la literalidad de lo dispuesto en el artículo 102 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política le corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE) interpretar en forma exclusiva y obligatoria las disposiciones constitucionales y legales referentes a la materia electoral.

En el sub lite, según se acreditó de la secuencia explicada, el TSE objetó el proyecto de ley y les hizo ver a los legisladores que “Dentro de los seis meses anteriores y los cuatro posteriores a la celebración de una elección popular, la Asamblea Legislativa no podrá (…) convertir en leyes los proyectos (…) respecto de los cuales el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se hubiese manifestado en desacuerdo”. Pese a dicho desacuerdo, la Asamblea Legislativa aprobó el proyecto de ley en período de elecciones nacionales, siendo que el TSE estimó, conforme a su competencia constitucional de interpretar las normas constitucionales en materia electoral, que el referido proyecto de ley no podría convertirse en ley durante el período en mención. Considero que la Asamblea Legislativa, al pasar por alto la oposición del TSE y su competencia de interpretar las normas constitucionales en materia electoral, incurrió en un vicio esencial del procedimiento parlamentario que lo invalidó.

Al respecto, cabe agregar que no me estoy pronunciando sobre cuál es la interpretación apropiada de la segunda parte del artículo 97 de la Constitución Política, sino que reconozco que, a la luz del artículo 102 inciso 3) constitucional, le correspondía exclusivamente al TSE realizar la interpretación del numeral supra citado.

3.- Antecedentes que reflejan mi posición sobre las competencias del TSE Lo dicho en el presente voto salvado es coincidente con mi posición en relación con las competencias constitucionales del TSE.

Por ejemplo, recientemente concurrí con el Pleno de esta Sala al resolver la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.°21-0000897-0007-CO mediante la sentencia n.°2022-027955 en la que se subrayaron justamente las competencias de interpretación del TSE. En lo conducente, se dijo lo siguiente:

“Luego de valorar los argumentos, la Sala estima que el ordinal cuestionado tiene un contenido programático, tendente a brindar seguridad jurídica en el ejercicio de las potestades que competen al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de manera exclusiva, pero sin afectar el contenido de las mismas. Según se desprende de su literalidad, el propósito de la norma es que el TSE realice, dentro de los seis meses siguientes a la vigencia de la ley, las labores de organización y dirección, con el fin de que se celebre -posteriormente- el sufragio para la elección de los miembros del concejo de distrito y síndicos del distrito de Cabeceras. Tal actividad -organización y dirección- difiere de la entendida por el accionante (efectuar elecciones anticipadas). En otras palabras, visto que la celebración de elecciones locales conlleva la conciliación de numerosos elementos fácticos y jurídicos (definición del padrón electoral, labor interna de partidos políticos, propaganda política, deuda política, respeto a los tiempos electorales, respeto a la prohibición de la ley nro. 6068 de modificar la división territorial administrativa en tiempos electorales, etc.), la norma procura que el TSE ejerza sus potestades de organización y dirección en esos meses, a los efectos de brindar seguridad jurídica y determinar la manera de proceder para celebrar las elecciones respectivas. En efecto, a diferencia de lo que se aduce en esta acción, la normativa cuestionada no invade las competencias constitucionales del TSE pues el mandato bajo examen no impone la celebración de las elecciones dentro del plazo de seis meses posterior a la entrada en vigor de la ley, sino que, en congruencia con lo estatuido por la normativa electoral, precisa que el TSE debe emprender las acciones correspondientes para concretar la convocatoria de dicho proceso democrático. Empero, es claro que, en orden a las competencias exclusivas y excluyentes de ese Tribunal Electoral, es dicha instancia quien debe definir las especificidades de ese trámite, dentro de esto, fechas de realización de los comicios y demás detalles propios de esas actividades de designación popular que presentan una especial complejidad en su organización y celebración. Por otra parte, en cuanto a este tipo de normativa, la Sala destaca que nuestro ordenamiento jurídico contiene disposiciones similares en materia de elecciones municipales, verbigracia:

“Artículo 19. — Por moción presentada ante el Concejo, que deberá ser firmada al menos por la tercera parte del total de los regidores y aprobada por el mínimo de tres cuartas partes de los regidores integrantes, se convocará a los electores del cantón respectivo a un plebiscito, donde se decidirá destituir o no al alcalde municipal. Tal decisión no podrá ser vetada.

Los votos necesarios para destituir al alcalde municipal, deberán sumar al menos dos tercios de los emitidos en el plebiscito, el cual no podrá ser inferior al diez por ciento (10%) del total de los electores inscritos en el cantón.

El plebiscito se efectuará con el padrón electoral del respectivo cantón, con el corte del mes anterior al de la aprobación en firme del acuerdo referido en el párrafo primero de este artículo.

Si el resultado de la consulta fuere la destitución del funcionario, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones repondrá al alcalde propietario, según el artículo 14 de este código, por el resto del período.

Si ambos vicealcaldes municipales son destituidos o renuncien, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones deberá convocar a nuevas elecciones en el cantón respectivo, en un plazo máximo de seis meses, y el nombramiento será por el resto del período. Mientras se realiza la elección, el presidente del concejo asumirá, como recargo, el puesto de alcalde municipal, con todas las atribuciones que le otorga este Código.” (El subrayado es agregado. Código Municipal).

“ARTÍCULO 147.- Convocatoria a elecciones La convocatoria a elecciones la hará el TSE cuatro meses antes de la fecha en que han de celebrarse estas.

El TSE convocará a elecciones parciales extraordinarias para llenar las vacantes de las municipalidades que lleguen a desintegrarse, así como en el supuesto del artículo 19 del Código Municipal.” (Código Electoral) La Sala destaca que el TSE se encuentra en la posibilidad de interpretar sistemáticamente la normativa cuestionada con el propósito de armonizarla con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico, velando por la vigencia de los principios constitucionales y electorales que rigen la materia, como lo ha efectuado en otras oportunidades (por ejemplo, la resolución nro. 405-E8-2008 de las 7:20 horas del 8 de febrero de 2008). Corresponde al TSE tanto la interpretación de esa normativa como el ejercicio de las potestades que le han sido asignadas constitucional y legalmente. Incluso, la Sala nota dentro del expediente legislativo que el TSE reconoce tácitamente la necesidad de conciliar la norma con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico para determinar cuándo podrían efectuarse las elecciones:

“Conforme se mencionó anteriormente, la eficacia de este proyecto en caso de ser aprobado por el propio Poder Ejecutivo con anterioridad al 2 de diciembre de 2018, como constitucionalmente corresponde, quedaría -de pleno derecho- diferida para el momento en que se elijan las respectivas autoridades municipales, lo que sucederá en las próximas elecciones municipales a celebrarse el primer domingo de febrero del año 2020, caso contrario, de entrar a regir en el mencionado período de veda, su eficacia quedaría de pleno derecho diferida para el siguiente proceso electoral, sea, febrero de 2024, en ambos casos, momento en el cual este Tribunal organizará y dirigirá de acuerdo a (sic) sus facultades constitucionales la elección de los miembros propietarios y suplentes el consejo (sic) de distrito y los respectivos síndicos del distrito de Cabeceras.” (Folio 149 del expediente legislativo de la ley 9868, disponible en http://www.asamblea.go.cr/) Se acota que tal opinión fue vertida con respecto a la redacción original del proyecto de ley. Sin embargo, se debe enfatizar que la norma cuestionada ya se encontraba incorporada en la versión primigenia del proyecto, en concreto, su artículo 3.

En conclusión, la Sala no encuentra roces de constitucionalidad en el ordinal cuestionado, pues no se determina que él se encuentre en confrontación directa con los tiempos electorales, previstos en los numerales 171 y 172 de la Constitución, ni que desconozca las potestades constitucionales del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Por el contrario, el citado artículo consigna que ese Tribunal, mediante el ejercicio de sus potestades de organización y dirección, deberá brindar seguridad jurídica en relación con la celebración de las elecciones en ese distrito”.

Esta postura, la de respetar el ámbito competencial del TSE en lo relativo a la interpretación de las normas constitucionales y legales referentes a materia electoral, es conteste con lo que he sostenido en otras oportunidades, especialmente en lo que atañe a las consultas de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto de ley de Empleo Público (ver las opiniones consultivas n.°2021-017098 y n.°2872-2022). Por lo demás, esta tesis no es contradictoria con lo que sostuve en lo referente a la paridad horizontal de los legisladores (sentencia n.°2015-016070) y a los puestos de elección popular que son municipales (resolución de admisibilidad n.°2019-011633), tal como puede deducirse del atento estudio de ambas resoluciones.

4.- Conclusión Corolario de las anteriores consideraciones, salvo el voto al encontrar que en el sub lite se incurrió en una infracción al trámite del procedimiento legislativo por la inobservancia a lo establecido en el artículo 102 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política.

Al acreditarse un vicio que invalida el trámite de aprobación de la ley, como he dicho, estimo innecesario pronunciarme sobre los alegatos de fondo.

Anamari Garro V.

[1] http://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Preliminar-CR.pdf (pág 10) [2] Dictamen C-388-2020 del 5 de octubre de 2020 [3] Resolución del TSE, Nº 370-E1-2008 de las 13:45 horas del 5 de febrero de 2008 [4] Dictamen C-191-2000 de 22 de agosto de 2000 y resolución No. 6378-94 de las 16:27 hrs. del 1 de noviembre de 1994, Sala Constitucional [5] Dictámenes C-357-2003 del 13 de noviembre de 2003 y C-178-2007 del 5 de junio de 2007.

[6] Procuraduría General de la República, Informe sobre el Expediente Constitucional Nº 19-0008920007-CO del 3 de mayo de 2019.

[7] Procuraduría General de la República, Informe sobre el Expediente Constitucional Nº 19-0008920007-CO del 3 de mayo de 2019.

Observaciones de SALA CONSTITUCIONAL votado con boleta Clasificación elaborada por SALA CONSTITUCIONALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.