Absolute prohibition of strike in public hospital services and its constitutionalityProhibición absoluta de huelga en servicios públicos hospitalarios y su constitucionalidad

**Document Review** ***180159340007CO*** Res. No.: 2022-001015 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at twelve hours and fifteen minutes on the twelfth of January of two thousand twenty-two.

Unconstitutionality action brought by H. LENIN HERNÁNDEZ NAVAS, holder of identity card No. 1-967-277, in his capacity as SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE SINDICATO NACIONAL DE ENFERMERÍA, legal entity identification No. 3-011-045082, seeking a declaration that Articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code are unconstitutional, considering them contrary to Articles 33 and 61 of the Political Constitution and to the principles of reasonableness and the prohibition of arbitrariness, as well as to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and Articles 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Also participating in the proceeding were the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, and the Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

**Whereas:** 1.- By a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:56 p.m. on October 9, 2018, the petitioner requests that Articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code be declared unconstitutional, considering them contrary to Articles 33 and 61 of the Political Constitution and to the principles of reasonableness and the prohibition of arbitrariness, as well as to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and Articles 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights. It is alleged that the challenged regulations are unconstitutional insofar as the exercise of the right to strike is absolutely prohibited in the case of public services—as would be the case of the CCSS—, even though, in light of the criteria emanating from the ILO, such prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike should be limited to those highly qualified public services and, furthermore, the strike may be permitted as long as the minimum functioning of the services provided by public institutions is guaranteed. The petitioner states that Article 61 of the Political Constitution does not provide for a total prohibition on strikes in public services, but rather contemplates a legal reservation, empowering the ordinary legislator to determine the services in which the strike is restricted or prohibited. Moreover, in light of the criteria emanating from the ILO, such a prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike should be limited to those highly qualified public services and, furthermore, the strike may be permitted as long as the minimum functioning of the services provided by public institutions is guaranteed, as is the case of the CCSS. He points out that, in conclusion, the right to strike should be restricted only to those workers who are absolutely indispensable. He insists that the ILO has indicated that the maintenance of the minimum service constitutes an ideal solution that, on the one hand, safeguards the right to strike of the majority of workers and, on the other hand, guarantees the satisfaction of the needs of users. He states that, consequently, the challenged norms are unconstitutional insofar as the right to strike of workers who provide their services at the CCSS is absolutely prohibited. It is also alleged that the Administration, shielded by the labor law, has engaged in abusive use of its powers by encompassing all activities under the concept of "essential service." He claims that this infringes the principles of equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. He complains that there is discrimination to the detriment of all CCSS employees because, although they provide an important service, the law has been a loophole allowing the Administration to generalize the concept of "essential service" without having demonstrated the suitability of such a determination. He alleges that the challenged regulations allow, in the end, for the institutions and their heads to determine, through administrative acts (such as, for example, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP), which services are essential. He asserts that this infringes the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness. He points out that the legislator left a dangerous loophole open for the Administration to decide—by regulatory means—which services are essential, in violation of the fundamental right to strike. He alleges that, in this specific case, we are in the presence of a situation of “political strike”; in which case, the ILO has recognized that this type of strike, like the protest strike, implies the exercise of a labor and human right. He states that, nevertheless, the Labor Code does not provide for or regulate the political strike, and therefore the labor procedures established in that normative body are incorrect and insufficient for hearing this type of matter.

2.- To support the standing they hold to bring this unconstitutionality action, they indicate that it derives from Article 75, first and second paragraphs, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, given that the petitioner cites as the underlying matter the strike qualification proceeding being processed in case file No. 18-002813-1178-LA, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked, and, additionally, the defense of a corporate interest on the part of the petitioning union in safeguarding the right to strike of its members is verified.

3.- By a ruling issued at 8:28 a.m. on October 17, 2018, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, and the Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

4.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 216, 217, and 218 of the Boletín Judicial, on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of November 2018.

5.- The Procuraduría General de la República submitted its report. It states that: Regarding admissibility. The petitioner holds the representation, as legal representative, of the Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería (SINAE), and therefore appears claiming ownership and defense of a collective or corporate interest of the persons who make up the membership base of said Union, who are undoubtedly affected by the challenged norms. Furthermore, the action brought is admissible since the challenged norms are applicable in the underlying matter pending resolution, which consists of a Strike Qualification Proceeding brought before the Juzgado de Trabajo of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, under case file number 18-002813-1178-LA, which is on appeal before the Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo of that same Circuit; an appeal in which SINAE, as a party, invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest they consider harmed. A) The strike in Public International Law and the “non-binding” nature of the Recommendations of the ILO Supervisory Bodies. The right to strike is not normatively regulated by any specific and concrete ILO convention that, once ratified by a member State, could create international legal obligations for it; rather, it derives from the materialization of so-called trade union action, recognized and regulated in Conventions such as ILO Conventions 87 and 98. (Principios de la OIT sobre el Derecho de Huelga, Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO and Horacio GUIDO, OFICINA INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO GINEBRA, 2000 Edition). Except for the case of Article 8.1 a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, and subparagraph b) of Article 8.1 of the Protocol of San Salvador—incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system by Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999—, it is provided that the subscribing member undertakes to guarantee the right to strike, exercised in accordance with the laws of each country; it is even recognized that, at the legal level, restrictions on the exercise of that right may be established in the case of public services. Hence, in reality, the minimum principles and rules of conduct established, as “non-binding” guidance by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association regarding the right to strike, are thus derived from international labor recommendations that do not constitute autonomous, binding legal instruments, but rather mere guidance or directives of an orienting and interpretive nature for possible national action on the matter involved, and therefore, they are not even subject to ratification by member States (Normas Internacionales del Trabajo para Magistrados, Juristas y Docentes en Derecho, Centro Internacional de Formación OIT, San José, Costa Rica, April 3-7, 2006, p. 13 et seq.). Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the ILO recommendations on which the petitioner bases his arguments do not have the binding legal value that is alluded to; therefore, their eventual judicial use is actually limited, serving at most as a reference for interpreting the provisions of domestic law (an interpretive tool), especially when the latter has been inspired by the respective conventions or as a mere orienting guide for a possible national action on the matter involved (See in this regard judgment 2011-010832 of 2:30 p.m. on August 12, 2011, Constitutional Chamber, by which, even based on the principle of legal reservation, the respective legislation is ordered to be enacted taking into consideration the recommendations made to that effect by the ILO, without them being applied directly), but never to consider those norms abrogated or replace them with those international recommendations; especially when the criterion that “The ILO supervisory bodies do not have the competence to give interpretations with the value of jurisprudence of the international labor conventions, since such competence resides exclusively in the International Court of Justice” –Art. 37, paragraph 1 of the ILO Constitution- is settled and consensual. (Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, Consejo de Administración, 323rd session, Geneva, March 12-27, 2015, GB.323/INS/5/Annex III, Institutional Section, paragraph 55). B) Limitation or prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential public services from the perspective of the ILO. According to Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO, and Horacio GUIDO of the International Labor Office, op. cit., Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), referring to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining respectively, are of special interest; although they do not expressly mention the strike, they constitute its theoretical foundation, to such an extent that it is from them and from the non-binding doctrine of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations that the scope of the exercise of the right to strike has been clarified and delimited within that organization, both in the case of “public servants exercising authority functions in the name of the State” (ILO, 1996, paragraph 534) and in “essential services.” And regarding what is of interest for this report, we will say that these ILO Supervisory Bodies, in their pronouncements made within the complaint procedure for violation of freedom of association, are those that have case-by-case determined that there are cases in which, by way of exception, the exercise of the strike can be restricted and even prohibited, as is the case of so-called “essential services.” It was the Committee of Experts that first considered the prohibition of the right to strike in “essential services” admissible, which in the strict sense it defined as “services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population” (ILO, 1983b, paragraph 214); a definition that was later adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association. But it must be noted from the outset that both bodies understand that the definition of essential services will largely depend on the specific conditions of each country's legislation, since while the interruption of certain services (essential by extension) might only cause economic problems in some countries, in others it could have disastrous effects and quickly create situations where the health, safety, or life of the population would be compromised, as it may also be the case that a service not considered essential in the strict sense of the term becomes essential because the duration of a strike could endanger the life, personal safety, or health of all or part of the population (ILO, 1996, paragraph 541; Recopilación de decisiones y principios del Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT, Paragraph 582. 34 Recopilación de decisiones y principios del Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT, Paragraph 591). It is undeniable that the “essential” nature of a public service is established based on at least four criteria accepted by ILO doctrine: 1) when it directly contributes to the protection of legal interests, the satisfaction of interests, or the realization of values, together with respect, validity, exercise, and effectiveness of fundamental rights and freedoms; 2) the essentiality of the service is linked to its magnitude; 3) the concept of essential public service entails a balancing of values and interests; and 4) the concept of public service implies a constant evolution of the political, economic, and social situation of each country. From that basis, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered as essential services, in the strict sense, in which the right to strike may be subject to significant restrictions, or even prohibition: the hospital sector, electricity services, water supply services, telephone services, the police and armed forces, fire services, public or private penitentiary services, the supply of food to school-age pupils and the cleaning of school establishments, and air traffic control (ILO, Libertad Sindical, para. 585). It should be clarified that these criteria cannot be considered as exhaustive, much less binding, but rather as merely illustrative. Ultimately, it can be stated that the Committee on Freedom of Association has not made an absolute listing of services that are or are not essential, but has made an enumeration arising from the cases brought before it. Therefore, in reality—we insist—its eventual judicial use is limited, serving at most as a reference for interpreting the provisions of domestic law (an interpretive tool), especially when the latter has been inspired by the respective conventions or as a mere orienting guide for a possible national action on the matter involved. C) Constitutional case law on the prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential services (Costa Rica). 1.- Constitutionality of Articles 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code. Although our legal framework recognizes, as part of the essential content of the Right to organize - trade union action -, the right of workers to strike (Art. 61 of the Constitution), as the right to temporarily breach the employment contract, in accordance with current national legislation, for the purpose of preserving, affirming, and pursuing the interests set forth in the Constitution itself and for which the State must seek adequate legal and institutional channels, the fact is that this right of undeniable collective action, like any right, is not unlimited, and in our environment, the clearest limitation—also expressly reflected in the Constitution—occurs in the case of affecting the so-called “essential services” of the community, the continuity of which is consequently constitutionally guaranteed and with respect to which a legal reservation is established, resulting in the fact that any restriction or exclusion of the aforementioned right to strike must be done by law and may in no way favor acts of coercion or violence. A mandate that, as the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated, is satisfied through Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code. On the constitutionality of Article 375 of the Labor Code, see Resolution No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, reaffirmed by No. 2003-05264 of 2:42 p.m. on June 18, 2003, as well as by Nos. 2011-010832 of 2:30 p.m. on August 12, 2011, 2016-006463 of 9:30 a.m. on May 13, 2016. And regarding the constitutionality of Article 376, see Resolutions Nos. 1998-01317, 2003-05264, and 2016-006463 op. cit. As we noted in Dictamen C-151-2003, of May 28, 2003, when conducting the legal analysis of the cited ruling No. 1998-01317: "Attempting to approach what should be understood by \"public service\", which seems more akin to \"essential service of the community\", the Constitutional Chamber indicated that \"although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute 'public services' and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, cannot be suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain legal interests\" (Considerando VII of resolution No. 1998-01317, op. cit.). Moreover, without attempting to exhaust the definition of what should be understood by \"public service\", that Court stated that \"that public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and consists of positive provisions of the Administration or that are under some control and regulation thereof\" (Considerando VIII of judgment No. 1998-01317 op. cit.).” (…) Certainly, the Constitution establishes by itself the limits on fundamental rights, as occurs in this case with Article 61, in which it limits, for certain cases fixed and determined by law, the exercise of the right to strike in public services. And that limitation also derives, in a mediate and indirect manner, from the need to protect or preserve not only other constitutional rights (life and health), but also other constitutionally protected legal interests (public economy). And that is why in these cases the law establishes the precise guarantees to ensure, in the event of a strike, the maintenance of services “absolutely indispensable” for the community. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has considered, this exclusion from exercising the strike in public services, or in services of recognized and unpostponable necessity, implies that the right of workers to defend their interests through the strike must yield when it causes or could cause a greater harm than the striking workers would experience if their claim or demand were unsuccessful. And therefore, it is stated with complete propriety that, “To the extent that the recipient and creditor of such services is the entire community and the services are at the same time essential for it, the strike cannot impose the sacrifice of the interests of the recipients of the essential services. The right of the community to these vital provisions is a priority over the right to strike.” This criterion, according to which the interest of the community prevails over the particular interest of the strikers, is also adopted by our Constitutional Chamber, which has indicated: \"... activities that may be considered vital or essential for the community, which is the legal interest to be protected and for which the right of workers to defend and promote their interests through the strike yields; that is, when it causes or could cause a greater harm than that suffered by the strikers ...\" (Considerando XI of judgment No. 1998-01317, op. cit.).” It is undeniable that, “…the right to strike, recognized for a sector of society, like any right, has its limits which are imposed by the need to protect the exercise of the rights of the rest of society.” Therefore, in these cases, the legal maxim by virtue of which the general or public interest predominates over the particular or private interest acquires a fundamental dimension in relation to the constitutional limitation on the right to strike related to the “essential public services defined by the legislator.” In multiple circumstances, conflicts arise that the interpreter or legal operator must resolve between rights of equal normative hierarchy. In this case, the conflict and its solution are posed by Article 61 of the Constitution. Indeed, there is a conflict between the right to use the strike as a legitimate mechanism to resolve collective conflicts and the rights of the users of essential public services not to interrupt these due to a conflict to which they are completely unrelated and from which they could suffer damages of social significance, given the very nature of the services. This conflict is typical and results from a value-based tension inherent to any Social State of Law. It involves, according to the doctrine, a situation of the “third-party effect” of the conflict, that is, its extension beyond the strictly contractual relationship between workers and employers, also affecting constitutionally protected legal interests of the community as a whole of citizens who are potential users of the service, who appear as passive subjects of the conflict and who should not suffer additional harm beyond what is strictly necessary to respect the essential content of the right to strike. (PADILLA RUIZ, P., “La huelga en los servicios esenciales”, Revista Doctrinal Aranzadi Social, No. 9, 2010, pp. 6 and 9). And in this regard, the Constitution itself, in its Article 61, in a harmonious and systematic relationship with Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code, favors the solution, preferring the continuity inherent to essential public services over the right to strike. 2.- Prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential and welfare services of the Social Security (public hospital service), as a guarantee of its mandatory continuity. The case law of the Chamber has been abundant, consistent, and reiterated, according to which, for adequate protection of the right to health and life (Art. 21 of the Constitution) and as a manifestation of the unnamed right to the proper functioning of essential welfare public services (Arts. 140.8, 139.4, and 191 of the Constitution), such as Social Security (Art. 73), provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as well as other public bodies and entities that provide public health services, these services must be provided imperatively and without postponement continuously, without interruptions. And based on a necessary evolutionary normative interpretation of Article 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law, it concludes inexorably that that norm encompasses the “public hospital service” provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as the main hospital entity in the country. And by virtue of this, it has considered that “it is clear that, based on the criteria expressed by the ILO Committees on Freedom of Association and Experts, the case law of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal regulations in force in the country, the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population.” (Resolution No. 2016-006463 op. cit.). To illustrate the position assumed and maintained in this regard by the Chamber, see Resolution No. 2016-006463 of 9:30 a.m. on May 13, 2016 (And in a similar sense, among many others, Nos. 2011-017211 of 3:30 p.m. and 2011-17212 of 3:31 p.m., both of December 14, 2011, 2011-017358 of 9:00 a.m. on December 16, 2011, 2011-017455 of 10:37 a.m. on December 16, 2011, 2011-017680 of 2:51 p.m. on December 21, 2011, 2011-17981 of 10:30 a.m. on December 23, 2011, 2011-17982 of 10:31 a.m. on December 23, 2011, 2012-005969 of 4:06 p.m. on May 9, 2012, 2012-01824 of 2:30 p.m. on February 14, 2012, 2012-002415 of 10:35 a.m. on February 21, 2012, 2012-009794 of 9:05 a.m. on July 20, 2012, 2016-007342 of 11:33 a.m. on May 27, 2016, 2016-007390 of 9:05 a.m. on June 1, 2016, 2016-008625 of 9:05 a.m. on June 24, 2016, 2016-009403 of 9:05 a.m. on July 6, 2016, and 2018-001115 of 9:30 a.m. on January 26, 2018, all from the Constitutional Chamber). Consequently, the case law of the Chamber has emphasized the constitutionally guaranteed continuity of certain public welfare services, such as Social Security, and specifically the “public hospital service” provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which, because it affects the sphere of health and life of individuals, is classified as an “essential service” (Resolution No. 2007-000424 of 3:07 p.m. on January 16, 2007) and with respect to which it is imperatively established that its effective provision must not be interrupted (Resolution No. 2014-003636 of 9:05 a.m. on March 14, 2014). And for which it admits as legally valid various mechanisms provided for by the administrative legal system that guarantee this principle, such as the prohibition of strikes and work stoppages in so-called “essential services,” among others. Resulting, therefore, that any action—by act or omission—by officials that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. (See in this regard, among many others, resolutions Nos. 2007-008462 of 4:13 p.m. on June 13, 2007, and 2009-005898 of 2:36 p.m. on April 13, 2009, both from the Constitutional Chamber). It is therefore incontrovertible that, in accordance with the law and values of the Constitution, regarding the prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential services, and specifically in the case of the so-called “public hospital service,” the necessary legal prerequisites for this are met, according to our legal system, since from a formal point of view, its definition as an essential public service derives from the Law (Art. 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code) and materially, because it is linked to the protection and satisfaction of fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population, the Constitution itself, in its Article 61, mandates that its effective provision must imperatively not be interrupted. 3.- Conceptual approach to the scope of the term “essential hospital service,” according to our domestic legal system. Certainly, due to the abstract meaning given doctrinally to so-called essential public services, whose conceptual limits or contours are not well defined in their statement, it is difficult to establish a univocal and general “a priori” concept thereof. But despite the marked indeterminacy of the concept, it can be specified at the time of application, for it is intended to delimit a specific situation which must be arrived at by interpreting the specific case, through the application to its specific circumstances of objective and subjective factors that are congruent with its generic statement, through explanation and application. In order to avoid conceptual narrowness characteristic of legal normativism, based on the superstition of a single true meaning, with a precise sense clearly established in and of itself, we will therefore begin by accepting that the real scope of the concept “essential public service” is “elastic” in several dimensions, as we alluded to in Section B of this report.

And in order to delimit, at least in approximation, the scope of the same, one must especially consider the structural and organizational conformation of the public service involved (the service's own particularities), in view of the purpose pursued in the social context in which it is applied, as the practical objective of the precept (axiological-teleological): what are the legal provisions considered for, or what should they serve? Now then, given that the challenged norms serve to prohibit the strike in essential public services, and specifically, in the hospital public services provided by the authorities of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in order to guarantee their continuity and avoid endangering fundamental legal rights of society, such as the health and life of persons in all or part of the population, it can reasonably be held that "within the public services rendered and the competencies exercised by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, those referring to health or medical benefits (prestaciones sanitarias), provided directly or indirectly to the insured, patients, or users of such services, are of an essential nature. Consequently, it must be understood that the services provided in both preventive medicine through the EBAIS and those provided in curative medicine through clinics and hospitals of all levels and orders, whatever their classification, are essential. It is evident that in such cases, even the auxiliary organizational units for diagnosis and treatment (e.g., clinical laboratory, blood banks, immunohematology units, pharmacy, nursing, equipment sterilization) and the purely administrative bodies that provide support or collaboration to such basic care centers, clinics, and hospitals (e.g., administration, supply, treasury, accounting, maintenance, food service, laundry and linen, cleaning, transport, waste disposal and treatment, etc.) cannot exercise the right to strike, since the paralysis or suspension of work in such units negatively impacts the necessary and indispensable continuity of the public health services provided to the population suffering from some ailment or illness." (This has been a separate note subscribed by former Magistrate Jinesta in, at least, the following judgments: 2011-017211 at 15:30 hrs. and 2011-17212 at 15:31 hrs. of December 14, 2011, 2011-017455 at 10:37 hrs. of December 16, 2011, 2011-017680 at 14:51 hrs. of December 21, 2011, 2011-17981 at 10:30 hrs. of December 23, 2011, 2011-17982 at 10:31 hrs. of December 23, 2011, 2012-002415 at 10:35 hrs. of February 21, 2012, 2012-005969 at 16:06 hrs. of May 9, 2012, and 2012-009794 at 09:05 hrs. of July 20, 2012). This is so because that public welfare service, of undeniable essential character, as the Chamber's own jurisprudence has recognized, implies a multiplicity of services and welfare programs that materialize in diverse health and even economic benefits (payment of subsidies, pensions or retirements, and other short- and long-duration economic benefits) intended for contributors and other beneficiaries nationwide, which obviously extends beyond the hospital sphere, clinics, and other health care units. And indisputably, within that multi-comprehensive concept of essential and welfare public service of Social Security provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the corps of nurses, professional and non-professional, is inevitably immersed, for it can be seen that Laws Nos. 5395 –Ley General de Salud–, 6836 –De Incentivos a Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas–, and 7085 –Estatuto de Servicios de Enfermería–, classify them as professionals in Health Sciences and place them in various public and private health institutions. And within the Caja, they are functionally classified as an indispensable support corps within the work of so-called hospital care (See Manual Descriptivo de Puestos of the Caja). And by reason of what has been set forth so far, it is logical and moreover reasonable that the proscription of the strike also extends to all of them, especially when the Chamber's jurisprudence has reiterated that the activities carried out in clinics, hospitals, and other health care units of the Caja constitute an essential public service in the terms in which Article 61 of the Constitution has been reasonably and proportionally interpreted, in relation to articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code. There are substantial differences between officials who, like them, perform indispensable functions in essential public services and others who do not, and therefore, the situations brought for comparison not being homogeneous, the constitutionally established differentiation that allows imposing the prohibition of the right to strike on those who work in essential public services, especially those directly linked to such welfare obligations, proves to be constitutionally reasonable and proportional to the purpose pursued – to guarantee the continuity of services whose interruption could endanger the life, safety, or health of the person in all or part of the population. Nor is it arbitrary, because it is based on distinguishable objective reasons (undeniable essential nature of the hospital service with respect to the rights or interests it satisfies), nor does it violate the principle of interdiction of arbitrariness, because it is constitutionally valid according to the jurisprudence of this Chamber. 4.- "Minimum services (servicios mínimos)" an option that can be chosen exclusively by the legislator to reconcile the right to strike and the continuity of "non-essential" public services. The establishment of the so-called "minimum service", when the legislator opts not to prohibit the strike but imposes the minimum service, is a mere legislative option, but never an obligation, and even less so in the case of essential public services, as is unjustifiably claimed by the claimant. Without a doubt, it is a balancing formula between the right to strike and the continuity of "non-essential" public services, in which a part of the labor law doctrine has seen the solution in the imposition of minimum services that must be provided during the collective work stoppage; this is so "When the Legislator, the sole authority on the matter, does not prohibit the strike (...) for some public services, by establishing a minimum service to ensure a minimum continuity of the service (...)" (LACHAUME, JEAN FRANCOIS et al, Droit des Services Publics, Ediciones Dalloz, Paris, 2004, pp. 354-355). The purpose of establishing so-called "minimum services" is to guarantee the maintenance of the service during the strike, ensuring coverage of the population's basic needs, and the continuous or safe operation of the facilities, albeit in a limited manner, respecting its essential content, but without reaching the usual level of performance so that the impact of the strike on the service is perceptible, as a mechanism of labor pressure. Thus, its establishment at the legal level requires adequately weighing the interests at stake, the constitutionally protected rights and principles, and the fundamental right to strike, and a balance must be found between them. However, as is easy to infer from the constitutional and legal norms studied here, the measure chosen by both the original Constituent Power and the ordinary legislator was different: the prohibition of the right to strike in essential public services, in order to guarantee their uninterrupted continuity, as we noted in Dictamen C-151-2003, and as we specified in pronouncements OJ-017-2006, of February 13, 2006, and OJ-125-2007, of November 19, 2007. Furthermore, as recently recognized by this Chamber: "there is no constitutional mandate to determine what the assumptions for strikes that the legislator must regulate should be, nor how it should do so (...) the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (art. 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power (...)" (Resolution No. 2018017681 at 09:40 hrs. of October 24, 2018, Constitutional Chamber). We do not find, then, that there is discriminatory, unreasonable, disproportionate, or arbitrary treatment that contravenes the criteria which constitutionally prevail and must prevail in this matter. The establishment of a mixed or alternative system, which provides for the assurance of "minimum services" to permit the exercise of the right to strike even in essential public services, is not legally enforceable through this action, because besides being openly contrary to the alternative chosen by the original Constituent Power, the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator, to establish normative rules that would allow the claimants to be excepted from the prohibition of the strike constitutionally established for essential public services, as is groundlessly intended. Hence, with respect to this claim, an inadmissibility of the action arises due to the object, which should entail its outright rejection (Resolution No. 2018017681 op. cit.). 5.- The so-called "Political Strike (Huelga Política)" does not fall within the scope of the ILO principles of freedom of association, nor has it been formally or materially recognized in our legal system. The claimant alleges the supposed unconstitutionality for not regulating strikes of a political nature; that is, unconstitutionality by omission, which, in his judgment, both challenged legal norms contain. In this regard, as we have recently debated at the level of ordinary labor jurisdiction, on the occasion of the process for qualifying the illegality of the strike currently maintained especially in the teaching sector, based on our legislation in force, the so-called political strike has not been recognized, and therefore is unlawful, because given the way the right to strike has been constitutionally conceptualized in our system, it is unquestionable that the recognition of this right does not have to necessarily entail all forms and modalities of direct action by workers, much less all possible intended purposes (Dictamen C-151-2003 op. cit). And we even noted that the recognition and legal regulation of this atypical form of strike against public policies was expressly excluded from the Labor Procedure Reform, due to a lack of consensus among the different social interlocutors (Record No. 08 of June 16, 2010, legislative file No. 15.990, Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral and Unanimous Affirmative Report of August 17, 2010). In its proper dimension, the right to strike is recognized and enshrined in our system as a subjective right of a fundamental and autonomous nature. And as expressed by the norm under commentary, it is incumbent upon the ordinary legislator, as the representative of popular sovereignty, to craft a regulation of the conditions for exercising that right, which could be more or less restrictive, in accordance with the political guidelines driving it, provided it does not exceed, in the first instance, the limits imposed by the norm itself – the first, regarding the activities in which that right is recognized, because it expressly excludes public services – as we explained, the essential ones – whose determination in any case corresponds to the legislator; the second, regarding the modality, since in its exercise, acts of coercion or violence must be disallowed – or other limits derived from its possible connection with other constitutional rights and even with other constitutionally protected principles. Remember that no right is unlimited, and like all others, the right to strike is not absolute and must have its limitations. And in accordance with the legal definition of the right to strike given by the legislator (art. 371 of the Labor Code), following the minimum basis set by the Constitution (art. 61), the exercise of that right does not necessarily entail all forms and modalities of direct action by workers, much less all possible intended purposes, especially since, in our legal system in force, we might not be facing the constitutionally protected phenomenon of a strike when disturbances in the production of public goods and services or in the normal functioning of the latter are introduced with the exclusive aim of pressuring the Public Administration or State organs to achieve more favorable governmental measures for the interests of a particular institution or group of officials, for in these cases the strike would not be the result of a labor dispute (conflicto laboral) proper, given that the professional motivation is clearly marginal. Thus, the unlawfulness of this type of strike, beyond the professional and economic interests – direct and indirect – of the workers involved, from a material standpoint arises because the claims, objectives, and political purposes pursued exceed those proper to union action, and therefore, are not consistent with the legal system, as they are not directed against specific employers but against the State Government as a public power; especially when, by the means employed, the attempt to alter the constitutional order and coerce the free decision of democratic institutions of the State is clear, putting the authority of the State at stake. Indeed, according to the various recommendatory criteria of the ILO, the Committee on Freedom of Association has linked the exercise of the right to strike to the purpose of promoting and defending the economic and social interests of workers; a criterion that excludes purely political strikes from the scope of international protection within the ILO. So it is evident that in our system, the demand for the recognition, at the constitutional level, of the existence of so-called political strikes, such as the one that has materialized and been prolonged these days, is inadmissible, because "there is no constitutional mandate to determine what the assumptions for strikes that the legislator must regulate should be, nor how it should do so (...) the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (art. 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power (...)" (Resolution No. 2018017681 at 09:40 hrs. of October 24, 2018, Constitutional Chamber). And in any case, because political strikes are neither recognized nor regulated in our environment, and because as such, they are not even covered by the principles of freedom of association, according to the non-binding recommendations of the ILO. Finally, the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator, in order to modify legislative texts in favor of specific interests and recognize political strikes in our environment, thereby contravening the Law of the Constitution (Among many others, Resolution No. 2010-8600 at 15:08 hrs. of May 12, 2010). Hence, with respect to this claim, an inadmissibility of the action arises due to the object, which should entail its outright rejection (Resolution No. 2018017681 op. cit.). Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, this Advisory Body suggests to the Constitutional Chamber: 1) Regarding the omissions to regulate minimum services and the political strike in essential services, to reject this action outright, for two basic reasons: there is no constitutional mandate whatsoever that so orders, and because the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator. 2) And in all other respects, to declare it without merit and ratify the jurisprudential line according to which Articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code are constitutional.

6.- ROMAN MACAYA HAYES submits his report, in his capacity as Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and states in summary: That the CCSS believes that the challenged norms are compliant with the Political Constitution and the international treaties subscribed to by the Government of Costa Rica; it is thus considered that the limitation on the right to strike in the public services provided by the CCSS stems from the protection of the supreme right to life and human health. Regarding the limitation of the strike by domestic law (constitutionality and conventionality of the limitation via ordinary law): Our Political Constitution, in its Article 61 (Artículo 61), recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right; however, this same norm allows for limiting its exercise in the case of public services, reserving to the law the determination of the public services where the right to strike must be understood to be limited. In accordance with the above, Articles 375 and 376.d) are not contrary to Article 61, as both norms have the rank of law; thus, the limitation imposed complies with the reservation set forth in the constitutional norm. If the Constitution expressly indicates that the right to strike can be limited via law, under no logical argument can it be considered that the challenged norms could be contrary to Article 61 of the Constitution. It should be noted that international law ratified by our country is consistent with Article 61 of the Constitution; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right but admits that the domestic law of each country may impose limitations in the case of state administration (see subsection 2 of Article 8). In this line of thought, the Protocol of San Salvador contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right but provides that it is a legal reserve to establish restrictions on the exercise of that right in the case of public services (see Article 8). This Chamber has already extensively addressed the subject under study (see Resolution 2016-006463). Now, the concept of prohibiting the strike in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation. Regarding the scope of the articles of the Labor Code, Judgment 1998-01317 noted the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension compromised the legal rights of health and the public economy. On that occasion, it was considered that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary, and proportional, because the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of such services had to be protected, a criterion that coincides with the opinions expressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO. As can be observed, it is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution that the exercise of the right to strike be limited via law in our country. It should be noted that the limitation of the strike by legal norm is a matter regulated in a similar manner in countries such as Spain (Article 28.2), Colombia (Article 56), Panama (Article 69), and Chile (Article 16). From the above, it is concluded that the right to strike, as a fundamental freedom right, coexists in a system of rights that allows its limitation, as provided for by the legal system of each country; in the case of our system, the limitation is considered valid as long as the norm is proportional, reasonable, and necessary, as explained below. Non-existence of a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The right to strike can be limited by provision of law. Article 61 (Artículo 61) of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted to mean that there is a total prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services; on the contrary, it is for the law to determine the cases in which it is appropriate to establish such prohibition, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. It is for the Legislative Assembly to establish the cases under which the right to strike cannot be exercised. Thus, neither the Judge nor the Executive Branch can substitute the legislator in determining the cases in which the right to strike can be impeded. The reasons the Constituent Power and the ordinary legislator had for prohibiting the strike in these services was to avoid, in cases such as the one at hand, a serious impact on essential public services; observe, for example, the health services of the CCSS, during the strike movement in the period between September 10, 2018, and October 5, 2018, an impact was generated on the production of necessary inputs for direct patient care (suspension of 80,949 general medicine appointments, 40,657 specialty appointments, and 8,329 appointments with other health professionals; that is, a total of 129,935 appointments were lost, in addition to the 3,706 suspended surgeries). This clearly shows the impact on the public service, which leads to the conclusion that the strike in hospital and health services must be prohibited to protect the supreme right to human life, just as the legislator has effectively done in Articles 375 and 376.c, in the context of Articles 21 and 61 of the Political Constitution. The limitations on the right to strike in public services via law, and particularly those established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code, are legitimate, reasonable, proportional, and necessary; it is illogical and unjustifiable to affect the right to health of more than 150,000 insured persons in order to exercise a supposedly unrestricted right to strike. It has been made clear that the limitation of the strike in public services is compliant with the Constitution, and it is the ordinary legislator who defines the affected services. Services that cannot go on strike have a conflict resolution procedure: The ILO Committee of Experts has noted that the legislation of a large number of countries provides that, before undertaking a strike, conciliation and mediation procedures must be exhausted. Even though the strike is prohibited in public services as determined by law, officials have a guarantee of conflict resolution prior to a judicial instance, such as direct settlement, conciliation, and arbitration. Corollary: The right to strike constitutes a workers' right; our Constitutional Law permits the imposition of limitations when the right to strike implies the interruption or impact on public services, limitations whose imposition is governed by the principle of legal reserve. The limitation of the right to strike established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code is compliant with the law of the Constitution, because it was introduced by law, in a reasonable, proportional, and necessary manner. Therefore, we request that the action filed be declared rejected on the merits.

7.- STEVEN NUÑEZ RIMOLA submits his report, in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social Security, and states in summary that: Article 61 of the Constitution establishes, as a fundamental right, the right of workers to strike. That is why Article 375 of the Labor Code provides for the prohibition of the strike in public services, specifically, regarding those indispensable workers who cannot suspend their services without causing serious harm to the economy or public health. In Comparative Law, there are systems under which the right to strike is totally suppressed in the case of public officials; there are also others in which constitutional law establishes no restriction whatsoever, and others like ours, as detailed below. In a similar sense to Article 61 of the Constitution, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights admits that the law may impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the state administration. Likewise, the Protocol of San Salvador provides that it is a legal reserve to establish restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of public services. Furthermore, this Chamber already specified the scope of Article 61 of the Political Constitution in Decision 1317-98, and that the definition of public activities that have the right to strike restricted is a matter reserved to law. In that same decision, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of Article 375 (Artículo 375) of the Labor Code, making it clear that this norm must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, so that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. In addition, subsection d) of Article 376 was also subject to a constitutional review. Pursuant to the foregoing, the power granted by the Constituent Power to the legislator to regulate which public service activities have the right to strike restricted is embodied in Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code, and these norms must be integrated with the International Conventions ratified by Costa Rica and with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber issued in this regard. The Committee's principles relating to situations in which the strike by public officials may be subject to significant restrictions, or even prohibition, are shared by the Committee of Experts. In 1983, the Committee of Experts defined them as "services whose interruption could endanger the life, safety, or health of the person in all or part of the population." This definition was adopted shortly thereafter by the Committee on Freedom of Association. The Committee on Freedom of Association's list of non-essential services is also not exhaustive. In any case, it is worth noting that, concerning a complaint not involving an essential service, the Committee maintained that serious long-term consequences for the national economy that a strike might have did not justify its prohibition. The Committee has recommended the modification of some legislation so that only strikes in essential services in the strict sense of the term are prohibited, particularly when the authorities have discretionary powers to expand the list of essential services. Specifically, on the prohibition of the strike in hospital service, we find in Decision No. 2011-017680 of the Constitutional Chamber, where it was indicated that the strike in hospital services, as an essential State activity, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal rights of society, such as the health and life of the population. A criterion the Chamber accepts in the sense that, in hospital service, the prohibition of the strike affects only those public officials and workers whose suspension of work means the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. Pursuant to the foregoing, the claimant's lack of reason regarding his allegations is clear, since Articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code in no way establish an absolute prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. What exists is a restriction on access to this right for those public officials who participate in activities considered essential public services, among which are hospital services, and in these services, as this Chamber has indicated, this prohibition affects only those officials whose suspension of work means the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. These limitations do not conflict with the Political Constitution or with International Human Rights Treaties, given that, as has been stated, the right to strike is not unrestricted, and it is necessary, for reasons of rationality and proportionality, to limit the exercise of the right to those services that are essential, understanding these as those that threaten the life, safety, or health of persons. Therefore, we consider that the questioned norms are not unconstitutional. We omit a pronouncement on the allegations regarding Decree No. 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP and the political strike, as they are not part of the action of unconstitutionality filed.

8.- Appearing as a coadjuvant, MARVIN ATENCIO DELGADO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines (SIPROCIMECA), indicates that this union organization fully adheres to the arguments put forth by the petitioning union organization, insofar as it is clear that a reading of articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) under challenge contravenes the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). They therefore request that the action be granted and that articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code be deemed unconstitutional, as they are contrary to the constitutional rights of unionization, strike, and equality enshrined in articles 33, 60, and 61 of our Political Constitution.

9.- Appearing as a coadjuvant, LUIS GERARDO CHAVARRIA VEGA, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA), indicates that the norms are not unconstitutional, but rather the interpretations that have been made of both articles are. According to this interpretation of the legal norms, against the grain of constitutional article 61, it has come to be maintained that there is an absolute prohibition of the strike in the different activities listed in subsection d) of article 376 of the Labor Code. This overreaching interpretation is not consistent with constitutional article 61 for the following reasons: the limitation imposed by the legal norm only limits the exercise of the right to strike by workers who are absolutely indispensable to guarantee the maintenance or minimal functioning of the services provided by those companies or institutions, including health services. The rest of the workers, who are not absolutely essential, have no impediment to exercising the right to strike. Therefore, the restriction imposed by the norm has a determined and limited subjective scope, which does not encompass the entire corresponding service or economic activity, nor all the workers of the respective institution or activity, but exclusively those workers absolutely indispensable to guarantee that the minimal provision of the service is not interrupted. We could admit, in the worst case, that the norm contains a relative prohibition, restricting the strike only to these workers, but it could never be maintained that the provision prohibits, in an absolute and general manner, the strike in the health sector, unless it is by violating the express text of said provision and of the constitutional norm itself. This norm of the Labor Code resorts to the technique of maintaining a minimal service, which harmoniously resolves any contradiction between the need for continuity in the provision of health services and the recognition of the right to strike. The ILO establishes that maintaining a minimal service constitutes an ideal solution that, on one hand, safeguards the right to strike of the majority of workers, and on the other, guarantees the satisfaction of the vital needs of users. Our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized the normative value of these ILO pronouncements, and the pronouncements of the Committee on Freedom of Association constitute jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court has applied in its judgments, which we request be applied in this matter. Furthermore, in accordance with article 15 of the Labor Code, these pronouncements are incorporated into our legal system. They request that the action be granted regarding its interpretation.

10.- Appearing as a coadjuvant, RODRIGO LÓPEZ GARCIA, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería (ANPE), indicates that this union has a legitimate interest in defending the constitutional right to strike that has been curtailed by the application or, in some sense, the erroneous interpretation of articles 375 and 376.d) of the Labor Code. In application of our Political Constitution and what has been ratified by Costa Rica in international conventions, the limitations imposed on the right to strike in some public services must conform to the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In reality, the limitation of the right to strike is for workers who are absolutely indispensable, not for all workers (see the legal opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) 125-J of November 19, 2007). Considering and sustaining the decision that all public services are indispensable or essential undermines the right to strike for many and inevitably leads to harming those who defend a right or situation that directly affects their labor, political, and economic rights and subjective interests. They request that this action be granted.

11.- By resolution at 3:15 p.m. on December 19, 2018, the coadjuvancies of Marvin Atencio Delgado in his capacity as Secretary General of the Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines (SIPROCIMECA), Luis Chavarría Vega, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA), and Rodrigo López García, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería (ANPE), were deemed filed. Furthermore, the hearings granted to the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), and the Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social were deemed answered.

12.- The hearing indicated in articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by article 9 of the same law, as this resolution is deemed sufficiently grounded in clear principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

13.- The legal prescriptions have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- Object of the challenge.- The petitioner, representing the Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería (SINAE), accuses articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code of being unconstitutional, which literally provide the following:

“ARTICLE 375. - Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. Differences arising in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where the strike is prohibited, shall be submitted obligatorily to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts.” “ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be:

(…)

d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the functioning of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate damage to public health or the public economy, such as clinics and hospitals, sanitation, cleaning, and lighting in towns.” The allegations of supposed unconstitutionality can be synthesized in the following aspects:

• 1)Violation of article 61 of the Political Constitution: said constitutional norm does not provide for an absolute prohibition of the right to strike in public services like those provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and it establishes a legal reservation for the legislator to determine in which public services the strike is not applicable. The most recent doctrine indicates that the prohibition of the exercise of the right to strike in public services is limited to those that are highly qualified. Said articles are unconstitutional insofar as they absolutely prohibit the right to strike of all workers providing services in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.
• 2)Violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as Recommendations: insofar as the prohibition or restriction of the right to strike must be limited, firstly, only to those highly qualified public services, and secondly, with respect to those workers who are absolutely indispensable in said services; the strike must be permitted even in said services, as long as the functioning of minimal services is guaranteed.
• 3)Violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and the prohibition of arbitrariness in the exercise of union freedom and the right to strike: because all activities are encompassed under the concept of "essential service," it is clear there is discrimination against all employees of the CCSS because, although they provide an important service, the law has been a loophole for the Administration to violate these principles, making generalizations about the concept of "essential service." Furthermore, they do not provide for the case of a political protest strike in such services.

Now, at the end of the action brief, certain allegations are indicated that correspond to the realm of legality, regarding the procedure followed for the declaration of illegality of the strike in the specific case serving as the base matter, mentioning that the procedure is not appropriate, as it is not a collective bargaining strike when in reality it is a political strike. All of which falls outside the analysis of constitutionality in this action, as it corresponds to the ordinary jurisdiction to classify the type of strike occurring in the base matter.

Finally, it is appropriate to make the following clarification: the regulations of the Labor Code, where these norms are located, were reformed and added to by Law to provide legal certainty on the strike and its procedures, No. 9808 of January 21, 2020. However, we proceed to its analysis for the effects produced while they have been in force exactly as challenged.

II.- The rules of standing in unconstitutionality actions and standing in this case.- Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, demanding the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when due to the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those concerning the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), or the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. In this case, the petitioner holds the representation, as legal representative, of the Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería (SINAE), and therefore, appears alleging the ownership and defense of a collective or corporate interest of the persons who make up the associative base of said Union, who are undoubtedly affected by the challenged norms. Furthermore, the action filed is admissible because the challenged norms are applicable in the pending base matter, which consists of a Strike Qualification Procedure (Procedimiento de Calificación de Huelga) filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José), First Section, under case file number 18-002813-1178-LA, which is on appeal before the Labor Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo) of that same Circuit; an appeal in which SINAE, as a party, invoked the unconstitutionality of articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest they consider harmed. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the petitioner has sufficient standing to claim the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms. In addition, these are legal norms, the constitutionality of which can be reviewed through this channel. Finally, the petitioner complied with the requirements stipulated in articles 78 and 79 of the procedural law. In conclusion, this action is admissible, so the object and merits of the matter must be discussed immediately.

III.- Regarding constitutional jurisprudence on strikes in public services and the similar allegations in this action.- The petitioning Union challenges articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as it considers them violative of constitutional Article 61, of ILO conventions and recommendations, and of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and the prohibition of arbitrariness. This is because such norms absolutely prohibit the right to strike in public services, when such a prohibition should only apply to essential public services. Furthermore, even in those cases, the right to strike could not be prohibited for all workers, but only for those workers who are absolutely indispensable in said services. In this regard, it is the criterion of the representative of the Attorney General's Office, the representative of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the Ministry of Labor that the challenged norms are not unconstitutional, as they indicate. According to the Attorney General's Office, the challenged norms are constitutional, according to the Chamber's jurisprudential line, insofar as the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since fundamental legal rights of society, such as the health and life of the population, are endangered (Resolution No. 2016-006463). According to the criterion of the representative of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, articles 375 and 376.d) are not contrary to article 61 because both norms have the rank of law, thus the imposed limitation complies with the reservation established in the constitutional norm. For example, in the health services of the CCSS, during the strike movement in the period between September 10, 2018, and October 5, 2018, an impact was generated as a total of 129,935 appointments were lost, in addition to the 3,706 suspended surgeries. According to the Ministry of Labor, this Chamber declined to declare the unconstitutionality of article 375 of the Labor Code, making it clear that this norm must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, so that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Furthermore, subsection d) of article 376 was also subject to the constitutionality review. It therefore considers that the petitioner's lack of reason regarding their allegations is clear, since articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code in no way establish an absolute prohibition for the exercise of the right to strike in public services. What exists is a restriction of access to this right for those public officials who participate in activities considered essential public services, among which are hospital services, and in these services, as this Chamber has indicated, this prohibition affects only those officials whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. On the other hand, according to the criterion of the active coadjuvants, a reading of articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code under challenge contravenes the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution (Siprocimeca), although it would appear that the norms are not unconstitutional, but rather the interpretations that have been made of both articles, which is why they request the unconstitutionality of the interpretation (Undeca), and considering and sustaining the decision that all public services are indispensable or essential is undermining the right to strike of many (Anpe).

In this regard, this Chamber considers it denotes that, through judgment No. 1317-98 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution No. 5264-2003 of 2:42 p.m. on June 18, 2003, and resolution No. 2019-20596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019), it already heard the challenge of the articles challenged here (375 and 376.d of the Labor Code), based on arguments similar to those indicated in this action. It was resolved as follows:

VI.- ON THE RIGHT OF UNIONIZATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES.- The petitioners accuse that article 375 (formerly 368) of the Labor Code establishes the prohibition of the right to strike for any activity that is a public service, which exceeds the constitutional text that enshrines the right of free unionization for workers and employers, without any conditioning; an affirmation that requires the following analysis. With the social legislation of the 1940s, the so-called social guarantees were introduced into the Political Constitution in Costa Rica, specifically in the year 1943, and the right to unionization was expressly enshrined. This fundamental right is maintained in the 1949 Constitution, specifically in its article 60. On another level, Costa Rica subsequently approved ILO Conventions No. 87 - concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize - and No. 98 - concerning the right to organize and collective bargaining - by Law No. 2561 of May 11, 1960. In the cited international conventions, the right of unionization is recognized and guaranteed, limiting its exercise to the observance of the statutes and the legality of the member State (articles 2 and 8 of Convention No. 87). The right of unionization thus has constitutional rank in Costa Rica and is regulated internally through legal norms, specifically the Labor Code, which regulates in its article 332 and following - located in Title Five "On Social Organizations" - the functioning and dissolution of unions and defines the rules for the protection of union rights. Article 332 of the Labor Code also declares the legal constitution of unions, which are distinguished "(…) as one of the most effective means of contributing to the support and development of popular culture and Costa Rican democracy", to be of public interest. The preceding reference allows concluding at this stage that the fundamental right of unionization is recognized without distinction of the public or private nature of the labor sectors; that is, to a comparable extent. In relation to the content of union action, specifically concerning the right to strike, article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of the cited right of collective action is a matter reserved to law, and that any restriction of said right must be made by law and can in no way favor acts of coercion or violence. It is also a result of the authority conferred by constitutional article 61 cited, that it is the legislator's responsibility to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate that is satisfied through article 375 (formerly 368) of the Labor Code, which must adjust to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality to be consistent with the democratic principle upon which the national legal system rests, embodied in article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is the supreme value of the Constitutional Rule of Law.

VII.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (formerly 368) OF THE LABOR CODE WHICH EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FROM PUBLIC SERVICES. The strike, as a manifestation of union action, finds its limit when its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which it is the law's responsibility to determine according to article 61 of the Political Constitution. To this effect, the first phrase of article 375 (formerly 368) of the Labor Code, which states: "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. (…)", although it would seem to proscribe the strike in these services, that is, although it would seem to have an absolute preclusive sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is consistent with the purpose it pursues. This questioned article 375 (formerly 368) also harmonizes with article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which - as transcribed in Considering III. -, establishes the obligation of union organizations to conform their activity to domestic legislation. In other words, although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute "public services" and that, due to their nature or the social impact they have, cannot be suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed without causing significant, serious, and immediate damage to certain interests. Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which the strike is permitted, the established legal limits cannot be exceeded, as the exercise of the strike must fall within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the questioned article 375 (formerly 368), by stating: "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…", by itself exceeds the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In synthesis, the questioned article 375 (formerly 368) is not in itself unconstitutional and the analysis of unconstitutionality must shift to the cases established by law in which the preclusive effect, in public services, occurs. Consistent with the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action regarding this aspect.

(…)

IX.- ON THE OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, INDICATED BY ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.- From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law the enumeration of in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute preclusive effect, which would proscribe the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases such exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which enumerates in article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code - transcribed in Considering II - in which public services the strike is excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it. However, as the petitioners and the Attorney General's Office correctly observe in their report, article 376 (formerly 369), when its subsection a) details the public services in which the exercise of the strike is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not facilitate distinguishing which minimal public services it refers to, when indicating: "All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…". It is clear to this Court that this statement does not allow recognizing which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; an imprecision that conflicts with the order in the aforementioned constitutional precept 61, therefore it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional. In another order, subsection c) of the cited article 376 (formerly 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the strike; furthermore, it clearly establishes the limit on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading tasks on docks and landing places. Finally, subsection c) also establishes limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of "workers in transit of any other private transportation company," which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike in the effective provision of public land transportation service. On the other hand, subsection d) of article 376 (formerly 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal rights of health and the public economy. Indeed, in this section, services are listed or distinguished with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal right of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those related to sanitation, cleaning, and lighting of towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must involve absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they are likely to compromise the legal rights of health and the public economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Regarding subsection b) of the questioned article - which excludes the strike from agricultural activity -, this Court refers to what was stated in Considering VIII. Finally, in relation to the norm contained in subsection e) of the challenged article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to dictate in which other public activities the strike is prohibited under the hypothesis that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such attribution as it exceeds the principle of legal reservation established in constitutional article 61, according to which the authority to establish in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited falls exclusively on the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code.

In that judgment, the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subsections a), b), and e) of article 376 of the Labor Code were declared unconstitutional, because it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved to law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of article 375 of the Labor Code, which expressly prohibits the strike in public services; however, it was clear in emphasizing that this norm must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, so that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Likewise, regarding subsection d) of article 376, it was also not considered unconstitutional because it was indicated that it establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal rights of health and the public economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those related to sanitation, cleaning, and lighting of towns; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Therefore, given that these are similar arguments already resolved by the indicated jurisprudence, and there being no reasons to change the criterion, the dismissal of this action is appropriate.

IV.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE. The parties are warned that if any document on paper has been provided, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device, or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Regulation on Electronic Court Records before the Judicial Branch" (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Therefore:

By majority, the action is DISMISSED. Judges Salazar Alvarado and Pacheco Salazar record a note. Judge Rueda Leal provides different reasons. Judge Cruz Castro dissents and grants the action.

Fernando Castillo V.

President Fernando Cruz C. Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A . Jorge Araya G.

Jorge Isaac Solano A. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Note by Judge Salazar Alvarado and Judge Pacheco Salazar, with drafting by the former.

We agree that this action of unconstitutionality must be dismissed, since indeed the law, in its formal and material sense, could regulate the prohibition or limitation of the right to strike in certain cases of essential public services, but for that purpose it is necessary to draw the line of argument in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. This was pointed out in the dissenting vote we subscribed to in Judgment No. 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019. On that occasion, we expressed that:

“In the opinion of the undersigned, there is a common basis for agreeing with the majority that there are certain essential public services where the legislator may prohibit the right to strike, such that, in general, it is possible to admit cases in which the law could limit the exercise of the fundamental right. But, as in any discussion in which the prohibition of fundamental rights is present, it is necessary that they be in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

In our approach, the bill should establish only restrictions on the right to strike, and not absolute prohibitions, as the legislators and the majority of the Chamber establish as constitutional. Thus, in the ten cases established by the bill to reform Article 376 of the Labor Code, there is no adequate weighing of the right to strike against the fundamental rights that serve as its limit, because not in all cases do they have the same intensity regarding the services provided by all workers. The regulation should only be aimed at prohibiting the strike when this workers' mechanism represents a clear and manifest threat to the life, security, or health of all or part of the population. Otherwise, a large majority of public servants should not be deprived of the fundamental right to strike, when it is not an essential service, and there is no clear and imminent threat to those. In the terms established, it implies for many an illegitimate restriction and a right that remains in theory, despite being constitutionally recognized. The criteria of the Committee on Freedom of Association can effectively guide this conclusion, since it has considered that:

‘The principle regarding the prohibition of strikes in “essential services” could be distorted if a strike were declared illegal in one or several companies that did not provide an “essential service” in the strict sense of the term, that is, services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population (case of Nigeria No. 2432 and Sri Lanka No. 2519).’ ‘It does not seem appropriate that all state enterprises be treated on the same basis in terms of restrictions on the right to strike, without distinguishing in the pertinent legislation between those which are genuinely essential and those which are not’ (case of Canada No. 3057).

In our opinion, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is fundamental in the interpretation of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, since an exercise must be carried out to determine that in certain professional or even administrative positions, they might not represent a danger, so as to start from such a demanding premise that allows concluding that all activities lead to a clear and imminent threat to the right to life, health, and public safety. Certainly, such a conclusion might not be reasonable. In this sense, the imposed restriction unduly weighs on the fundamental right established in the Political Constitution [...].

For this, recourse is likewise made to the Committee on Freedom of Association, insofar as it maintains that:

‘The following do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term: radio-television, the petroleum sector and oil installations, the distribution of petroleum for the operation of air transport, the gas sector, the filling of gas cylinders and their marketing, ports (loading and unloading), banks, the Central Bank, insurance services, computer services for the collection of tariffs and taxes, department stores and amusement parks, metallurgy and the entire mining sector, transport, in general, including metropolitan services, airline pilots, the generation, transport and distribution of fuels, railway services, metropolitan transport, postal services, refuse collection services, refrigeration companies, hotel services, construction, automobile manufacturing, agricultural activities, the supply and distribution of food products, tea, coffee and coconut plantations, the Mint, the State Graphic Agency and the state monopolies on alcohol, salt and tobacco, the education sector, mineral water bottling companies, aircraft repair, elevator services, export services, private security services, except prison services, airports, except air traffic control services, pharmacies, bakeries, beer production and the glass industry’ (case of Republic of Korea No. 1865, Philippines No. 2252, Colombia No. 2355, among others).

Those cases that are genuinely essential must be established, and those that are not distinguished, thus the provision at hand exceeds a criterion of harm to the health of the population, such that it does impact the right to strike, and does not make a gradation or leveling of those health sectors that do not represent a danger to the life of patients, or even administrative ones, which might not have major consequences on the right to health of individuals. Falling into the temptation of qualifying that all strikes in home medical care, outpatient consultation, medical examinations, laboratory tests, all generate a clear and imminent threat to the life, security, or health of all or part of the population, is a fallacy of argumentation, because not all of them lead to situations where the loss of health or human life has a direct relationship with the lack of an essential service. Consequently, the technique of the norm prohibiting all activity, for example by regulation in health and hospital services, is not legitimate.

In our opinion, then, it must be allowed that, within the ten cases established in the norm in question, measures can be defined to guarantee that said service is provided in a minimum expression, sufficient to avoid the dangers that an essential service can entail, that is, a threat or infringement to life, security, and the health of part or all of the population. It is important to revisit Judgment No. 2017-13786 of 11:50 a.m. on August 29, 2017, in which the Chamber heard the refusal in the Department of Forensic Medicine to perform forensic autopsies and deliver the bodies to family members due to being on strike. In it, the right of the deceased's family members to receive the death certificate and the body of the deceased, the right to respect for deceased persons, and public health were weighed. In this decision, the undersigned Judge Salazar Alvarado added a note indicating that in essential services, those that are minimum must be defined, which need to be maintained to protect the recipients of essential services from receiving a service suspended due to a strike, when weighing all the rights involved, it is reasoned that:

‘Given the particularities, the maintenance of essential community services is a limit to the right to strike in the face of the occurrence and possible infringement of fundamental rights. The foregoing implies the performance of the work necessary for coverage that guarantees the rights, freedoms, or goods that the service itself satisfies. Thus, in the exercise of a strike that occurs in essential services that concern the community, there must be a reasonable proportion between the sacrifices imposed on the strikers and those suffered by the users thereof. So, the measures must be aimed at guaranteeing the minimums indispensable for the preservation of the services, as long as said maintenance cannot mean -in principle- that reaching the usual level of performance is required, nor ensuring the normal functioning of the service, but the interest of the community must be disturbed by the strike only to reasonable extremes and not render it nugatory. I reiterate that the consideration of a service as essential cannot entail the suppression of the right to strike of the workers who would have to provide it, but rather the need to have precise measures for its preservation; or, put another way, to ensure the performance of the work necessary for the coverage of the rights, freedoms, or goods that said service satisfies, without requiring reaching the usual level of performance or ensuring its normal functioning. So, the lack of timely delivery of the bodies awaiting the performance of an autopsy, thus violates the right to health of the family members, in the understanding that said concept encompasses emotional, social, psychological, and spiritual health.’ Thus, we conclude that the determination made by the legislator that the essential services established in the reform to Article 376 of the Labor Code are all activities where the strike must be prohibited, does not differentiate from those activities that allow ensuring a minimum provision of services and thus providing coverage for the service, without prejudice to allowing the exercise of the right to strike as a fundamental right, and not establishing an absolute prohibition.” In accordance with the foregoing transcription, it is indeed possible to establish restrictions and limitations on the right to strike in public services, understood as essential ones. But, also as indicated in the foregoing transcription, not in all cases should they be understood as cases in which the legislator could prohibit this exercise of the right to strike for being strictly essential. In this sense, the legislator must weigh, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the application of those restrictions, when establishing those non-essential public services, in which case it is indeed possible to resort to the strike as a pressure and/or negotiation mechanism. This resides in a task of establishing the distinction in the type of public service activity, so that there are no absolute prohibitions on the exercise of a fundamental collective labor right of the country's workers.- Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Judge Aracelly Pacheco S. Judge Res. No. 2022-001015 Different reasons of Judge Rueda Leal. In the sub examine, the unconstitutionality of Article 375 and subsection d) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code is alleged, which established:

“ARTICLE 375. - The strike shall not be permitted in public services. The differences that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where the strike is prohibited, shall be submitted obligatorily to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts.” “ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to mean:

(...)

d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the functioning of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in populated areas.” It should be noted that, on the occasion of Law No. 9808 called “Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos” of January 21, 2020, the strike regime in Costa Rica was reformed. Furthermore, even though subsection d) of ordinal 376 was removed from the legal system (numeral 375 remained the same), its analysis does proceed by virtue of the possible effects that Specifically, the plaintiff alleges the transgression of numeral 61 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, it claims that such norm does not establish the absolute prohibition of the right to strike in the services provided by the CCSS and establishes a legal reserve for the determination of public services in which the strike is not permissible. It adds that the prohibition of this right is circumscribed to qualified public services. It reproaches the absolute prohibition of the right to strike for all workers who provide services in the CCSS. On the other hand, it also claims the violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association. In that sense, it argues that the restriction of the right to strike must be circumscribed to qualified public services and to those absolutely indispensable workers; that is, it considers that the strike must be permitted provided that the functioning of minimum services is guaranteed. Finally, it alleges the transgression of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and interdiction of arbitrariness in the exercise of freedom of association and the right to strike, by encompassing all activities within the concept “essential service.” It considers that there is discrimination against all CCSS employees, since the concept “essential service” is generalized. It adds that the case of the political protest strike is not foreseen.

On the matter, on the occasion of the legislative consultation of the bill called “Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos” that reformed the strike regime in Costa Rica, this Court, in opinion 2019020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019, developed a series of general postulates regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition of the strike in essential public services, which I consider applicable in the sub lite. On that occasion, the Chamber held:

“A) First general premise: soft law nature of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

For the purposes of resolving this consultation, we consider it fundamental ab initio to clarify the non-binding nature of the recommendations of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and what implications derive from this.

The ILO is a “tripartite” agency of the United Nations Organization that deploys its work through three fundamental bodies with representatives of governments, employers, and workers:

‘The International Labour Conference establishes international labour standards and defines the general policies of the Organization. The Conference, which is often called the international parliament of labour, meets once a year. It is also a forum for the discussion of fundamental social and labour issues.

The Governing Body is the executive body of the ILO and meets three times a year in Geneva. It makes decisions on ILO policy and establishes the program and budget, which is then submitted to the Conference for adoption.

The International Labour Office is the permanent secretariat of the International Labour Organization. It is responsible for the overall activities of the ILO, which it carries out under the supervision of the Governing Body and the direction of the Director-General.’[2] The CFA, created by the ILO in 1951, is a Committee of the Governing Body and, as a supervisory body, its purpose is to analyze complaints of violations of freedom of association, which may be filed by employers' or workers' organizations. It is composed, as a tripartite body, of nine full members and nine alternate members, coming in equal numbers from the Governmental, Workers, and Employers groups of the Governing Body, in addition to an independent chairperson elected by that same Council. [3] Regarding the nature of the CFA's decisions, the International Labour Office stated:

‘2. (…) The Committee meets three times a year and, taking into account the observations transmitted by the governments, examines the complaints filed against them and recommends to the Governing Body, as appropriate, that a case requires no further examination (final report) or that the attention of the government concerned should be drawn to the problems found and invited to take the appropriate measures to resolve them (interim reports or reports in which the Committee asks to be kept informed of the evolution of the situation). Finally, the Committee may have to determine whether it is appropriate to seek the agreement of the government concerned for the case to be referred to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission.

3. The conclusions adopted by the Committee in specific cases are intended to guide Governments and national authorities in discussions and actions to be taken in follow-up to its recommendations on freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. (…).’[4] From the foregoing, it is observed that within the ILO, the decisions of the CFA are conceived as recommendations with the character of guidance guidelines, which is consistent with the fact that there is no conventional legal norm that expressly confers binding character on such decisions.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama, the defendant raised before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court) an objection of lis pendens, since the unions had already denounced that state before the ILO, the latter had found Panama guilty, and a resolution had already been issued recommending a series of measures to be complied with. However, the Court rejected the motion, among other arguments, because:

‘57. Furthermore, the nature of the recommendations issued by said Committee [referring to the Committee on Freedom of Association] is different from that of the judgments issued by the Inter-American Court. In the first case, it is an act of an ILO body with the legal effect proper to a recommendation to the States. In the second case, it is a judgment that, under the terms of the Convention, is definitive and unappealable (Article 67), and obligatorily binding (Article 68.1).’ (Judgment of November 18, 1999 -Preliminary Objections-; emphasis not in original).

Ergo, at the level of the highest conventional body in human rights matters within the American sphere, the different legal nature between a ‘recommendation’ of the Committee on Freedom of Association, whose legal effect is restricted to the limits proper to a decision of this type, and a judgment of the IACHR Court, which (among other characteristics that distinguish it from the former) is obligatorily binding, according to numeral 68.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights), has also been affirmed.

Now, even though the CFA's recommendations are not binding, this Chamber recognizes the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the supervisory bodies, distinct from that of simple axiological or theoretical recommendations. In this way, the CFA's recommendations are useful as qualified guides to orient the interpretation and application of labor regulations, since they are a source of soft law to the extent that, despite no normative provision conferring binding character on them, they always hold legal relevance. However, such a degree of importance does not imply that national authorities lack a margin of appreciation before a CFA recommendation, provided that a reasonable and duly supported justification is noted, which in no way entails an action contrary to the obligation to act in good faith in compliance with international treaties. Specifically, in the constitutional sphere, the recommendation of an ILO supervisory body would be a relevant element to consider among other involved factors, also of great significance, when resolving a conflict between constitutional goods (even of a non-labor nature, such as those related to the protection of the environment, health, life, security, or property), where what is fundamental is to seek an adequate balance between these and avoid a transgression of the essential content of any of them, all under the aegis of the general principle that any private action that harms morality or public order, or that harms a third party, is subject to the action of the law (Article 28 of the Political Constitution).

Having clarified this point, the course of this position in the sub examine will take into consideration several of the CFA's recommendations; however, the Chamber will depart from some, to the extent that they constitute soft law and giving reasoned grounds for doing so. In this sense, as soft law, the referred recommendations become suitable for developing the contents of the Constitution, but not for going against them, since, from a positive hierarchical point of view, evidently, the former cannot be placed before the latter, which are of fully positive-legal and binding nature (hard law).

• B)Second premise: the delegation of the definition of the concept of public service to the legislator.

Numeral 61 of our Political Constitution currently reads:

‘ARTICLE 61.- The right of employers to the lockout and of workers to the strike is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and according to the regulations that it establishes, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence.’ This text, which has remained unchanged since 1949, expressly recognizes the right of workers (public and private) to strike; however, at the same time it indicates that this is not absolute in nature, since it contemplates an exception: public services. Accompanying the foregoing is the provision that both the determination of public services and their regulation are relegated to the sphere of law, the legislator being obliged to disavow any act of coercion or violence.

In this regard, it is important to note that Article 61 mentioned above is a replication of the content of ordinal 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, which had been introduced through a partial reform (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943):

‘ARTICLE 56.- The right of employers to the lockout and of workers to the strike is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and according to the regulations that it establishes, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence.’ Now, from reading the minutes of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, it is inferred that the regulation of the workers' right to strike was the subject of intense discussions within the National Constituent Assembly. Specifically, the criteria expressed by the Deputies are read in minutes No. 122 and 123:

• 1)Minute No. 122 of August 3, 1949:

‘In relation to Article 56, the Social Democrat faction presented a motion for it to read as follows:

“The right of employers to the lockout and of workers to the strike is recognized, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services.” [61] Mr. MONTEALEGRE remarked on the advisability of maintaining the final concept of Article 56, in the sense that the regulations subsequently made by law to the right to strike must disavow any act of coercion or violence.

Mr. ESQUIVEL spoke in similar terms. He also suggested saying, instead of public services, “public utility services,” a more correct expression, since the former can be understood as the services provided in public offices.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ accepted the suggestion of Mr. Edmundo Montealegre, but not the change of expressions pointed out by the latter.

Deputy TREJOS indicated the advisability of prohibiting strikes in agricultural work, given the vital importance of agricultural production in our country. A strike in this class of work can result in the loss of one or more harvests, with the consequent damages for the community.

Mr. FACIO expressed that, without prejudice to future study with more care of the grammatical and ideological meaning of the terms “public utility services,” delimiting the fields of each of them, he thinks it is better to maintain the original wording of the 1871 Constitution on this matter. In Administrative Law, public services are those activities which, due to their importance and significance in national life, cannot be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electric power. In that broad sense, the basic branches of agriculture are included, in which it is not possible to accept a strike that would paralyze them.

Deputy ESQUIVEL clarified that the principle of exempting fundamental agricultural activities from the right to lockout or strike is established by our Labor Code in its Article 369, subsection b). The explanation is easy; since agriculture is the fundamental activity of the country, on which our economy gravitates, a strike that would paralyze activities vital for the nation cannot be accepted. Hence -he continued saying- we are obliged to enshrine in constitutional norm the prohibition of strikes in agriculture. He added that the formula “public utility services” is more comprehensive than that of “public services,” which Article 56 originally contains.

Representative BAUDRIT SOLERA stated that he judged the distinction between public services and public utility services unnecessary, because Labor Law has a different concept of what in Administrative Law is understood as public services, which refer to all those activities of public interest, whether or not in the hands of the Public Administration. He read to that effect paragraphs from Castorena Cabanellas, and Francisco Walter Linares. He added that the 1949 Draft went further on this matter. It expressly excluded the strike only with respect to public servants. He then referred to the study by Mr. Otto Fallas, professor of Labor Law at our School of Law, a study he has been citing on previous occasions. He read what the mentioned professor of Labor Law wrote in relation to Article 56 of the 1871 Charter. Regarding the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work, he expressed disagreement since certain agricultural activities may be of public interest but others not. If the strike is prohibited in the former, there is no reason to extend that prohibition to the latter.

Deputy ESQUIVEL again intervened in the debate. He explained that the reasons of Mr. Baudrit Solera proved him right, since public services are one thing for Administrative Law and another for Labor Law. It is better then to adopt the term that will not later lend itself to twisted interpretations. Everyone understands the concept of public utility services.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ expressed that it was not through the path of restrictions that strikes can be stopped. It is necessary to go to their causes, to end a series of social injustices. Those who seek to stop strikes through the system of restrictions ignore that they are a social phenomenon that obeys many complex causes. The right to strike is one of the fundamental conquests achieved by workers, after bloody struggles. The motion of Mr. Esquivel -he then added- represents a curtailment of that right of the working class since it prohibits strikes in public utility services and in agricultural work.

Mr. ESQUIVEL clarified that he was not introducing new principles into the constitutional text that curtail or restrict the workers' right to strike. He is simply carrying over to the Constitution limitations that already appear in the Labor Code, which prohibits strikes in agricultural work. He is not moved in any way by the petty interest of restricting a right from the workers, but by the patriotic interest of safeguarding the country's economy, which would be enormously harmed by a strike in the fundamental activities of agriculture. Regarding public utility services, he only seeks to say clearly what our 1871 Constitution, in its Article 56, says in an ambiguous way.

Deputy ZELEDON indicated that he understood that the strike occurred once the legal remedies to achieve a peaceful and just solution to the problem had been exhausted.

He believes that the constitutional text should state that the right to strike of workers is guaranteed, but only once all legal resources and means to peacefully resolve the conflict at hand have been exhausted.

Put to a vote, the Social Democratic motion was rejected.

Discussion then began on the motion by Licenciado ESQUIVEL, which reads:

“The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work and in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública), according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” [61] Diputado HERRERO stated that prohibiting strikes in agricultural work benefits all Costa Ricans without distinction of any kind.

Representante MONGE ALVAREZ insisted that the motion under debate represented a violation of the guarantee in Article 56. He recalled that the Assembly, in a certain way, had committed to not curtailing any of the social guarantees from the 1871 constitutional text. The Esquivel motion practically eliminates the right to strike achieved by workers after the most tragic struggles in history. It should not be forgotten that the vast majority of the country's workers are agricultural. If their right to strike is restricted, one of their basic rights will be curtailed. In fact, this right is being prohibited to the majority of Costa Rican workers. He added that in the banana zone there are many activities that could well be paralyzed by a strike. If the motion under debate passes, workers in that zone will not be able to strike in justified cases. He insisted again that restrictions were not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes; even when expressly prohibited in certain activities, as social phenomena that they are, they can appear at any moment. In this regard, he cited the strikes of the “Northern” and the “Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico”. According to our laws, both strikes were prohibited. However, because they were based on just causes, they could not be stopped. Strikes cannot be ended by writing prohibitions into the Constitution. They will only end when the problems that motivate them have been solved.

Señor MONTEALEGRE indicated that in his many years dedicated to agriculture, he has never witnessed a strike in the countryside. Personally, he said, I have only attended one strike: the slowdown strike (brazos caídos). On that occasion, we closed the dairies. However, we distributed the milk free of charge to poor families and charitable institutions.

Diputado CHACON stated that he had voted for the previous discarded motion, but he will not vote for the one under debate, which practically comes to suppress a social guarantee. If agricultural workers, who in Costa Rica are the vast majority, are prohibited from striking, this means the right to strike will have disappeared in Costa Rica. (…) He also considered the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” to be very broad. He prefers that the original text of Article 56 be maintained.

(…)

Representantes LEIVA and BAUDRIT SOLERA explained the reasons leading them not to vote for Licenciado Esquivel’s motion. The former indicated that he had voted for the previous discarded one, considering it fairer. He added that writing into the Constitution the prohibition for rural workers to strike represents a notable step backward in this matter. (…) The latter—señor Baudrit Solera—expressed that he would vote for the motion if the prohibition regarding agricultural workers were excluded from it. There is no reason whatsoever to deprive a large sector of the country's workers of the right to strike in specific cases. When an agricultural activity is truly of public interest, our labor legislation already proscribes the right to strike in such activities. He added that the great mass of rural workers is being deprived of the means to defend their economic and social gains. Evidently, such a thing signifies an inexplicable step backward in this matter, since, in general, the civilized countries of the world have granted workers the fundamental right to strike, a right they have won after a long and painful struggle. At the fourth conference of the International Labour Organization, held just a few weeks ago in Rio de Janeiro, it was established that agricultural workers should be equated with other workers in their rights. That was said and agreed upon at the aforementioned conference with the vote of our delegates. However, in the Constituent Assembly of Costa Rica, shortly thereafter, a truly inexplicable regression is being attempted. In other respects, the speaker referred again to what he had previously stated regarding public services.

Diputado FACIO stated that even if strikes were prohibited, they would not disappear. If they are authorized, they will not multiply because of that. Thinking that way is to ignore that strikes are social phenomena, outside the Constitution or laws, products of factual situations. Strikes must be admitted with courage as a characteristic of current economic times. Prohibiting the right to strike in a Constitution is an easy but innocuous task, since the social problem that the strike represents and produces will not have been solved in any way. He added that this topic had been much discussed within the Drafting Committee of the 1949 Project. At first, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a valid recourse for all the country’s workers, but only after exhausting certain rigorous peaceful resolution procedures. However, the Committee later altered its opinion, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services, a system very common in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and finally we have returned to the text of the 1871 Constitution, which summarizes that same principle. Señor Facio then made a call to his colleagues in the Chamber to keep the right to strike unalterable, just as the guarantee of Article 56 enshrines it, because by doing so, the Constituent Assembly would be telling the country that the Social Guarantees, promulgated by Calderón with specific purposes that we all know and independently of that origin, are guarantees to which every Costa Rican worker is entitled, and that the former Opposition comes to purify, making that thesis its own. (…)

Representante HERRERO expressed that he was going to vote for the motion under debate, without thinking of curtailing a right of the workers. However, in deference to his sincerity and good faith, he suggests to the proponent that he withdraw from it the prohibition regarding strikes in agricultural work.

Señor ESQUIVEL agreed to withdraw that part of his motion, but not without first stating for the record how ruinous and deplorable a strike in agricultural activities would be for the country's economy. My motion, he said, tended to prevent greater damages for the country in the future. The nation's fundamental activity is agriculture, upon which our ailing economy rests. If a future strike affects agricultural activities, the damages would be incalculable. I only intended with my motion to prevent such a situation for the country.

Diputado MORUA indicated that he had voted for the discarded motion. He did not plan to vote for that of señor Esquivel because it maintained the prohibition on agricultural workers going on strike, thereby depriving the banana zone workers of that legitimate right.

Señor ACOSTA JIMENEZ noted that since the proponent had withdrawn the prohibition on strikes in agricultural work, words were superfluous. (…) He added later that as Article 56 of the 1871 Charter stood, when strike movements arose in the country, they could be solved. He is for maintaining the right to strike, because it would not be fair to deprive workers of certain foreign corporations that have taken and continue to take millions of dollars from the country of the right to strike to improve their social and economic conditions. Moreover, by proceeding in this way, he is consistent with his earlier ideas, when he proposed that the chapter on Social Guarantees be discussed article by article, without diminishing any guarantee.

Diputado GAMBOA declared that he would not vote for the motion under debate, as he stands by the text of Article 56. He considers the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” too broad. Tomorrow, a series of agricultural and industrial activities could be considered of public utility. It is leaving the door open to curtail the right to strike of workers.

Put to a vote, señor Esquivel’s motion, with the noted amendment, was approved. Consequently, the article of the new Constitution will read:

“The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública), according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” [61]” 2) Minutes No. 123 of August 4, 1949:

“(…)

Article 4.- The discussion of the chapter on Social Guarantees from the 1871 Constitution continued.

Representante ARROYO presented a motion to review the article approved yesterday regarding the right to strike of workers and employers. If the review prospers, he makes a motion that the respective article read as follows:

“The right to strike for workers and to lockout (paro) for employers is guaranteed, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and conserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services. For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations ensuring a conciliation period. The exercise of violence or coercion as a means of initiating, maintaining, or paralyzing strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited.” [61] The proponent indicated that the formula approved in the previous session represented a curtailment of the right to strike. In the future, a Congress could broadly interpret the scope of the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)”, diminishing the right to strike. It could even be said that a banana contract, for example, is of public utility, to place the company outside the scope of strike movements.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL expressed that the only variation of his approved motion with respect to Article 56 of the 1871 Charter, which seems to have so concerned the Representative of Rerum Novarum, señor Arroyo, is the one referring to the incorporation of the concept: “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” instead of “public services,” which is much more comprehensive. Precisely, the Labor Code gives that meaning to the term “public services.” He added that his attitude was not due to a desire to curtail a right of workers, nor to make a social guarantee illusory. He has adhered to what the Labor Code provides on this matter, which within the term “public services” includes a series of fundamental activities that cannot be affected by a strike. Those activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electrical energy—must be placed outside the scope of a strike, not to squeeze workers, but for the benefit of society in general. He insisted that his intention was not to restrict a right of workers, but to seek a just middle ground, thus avoiding the dangers of an indiscriminate strike for the community.

Diputado MONGE ALVAREZ expressed his pleasure upon learning that his colleague Arroyo has presented a motion to review what was agreed upon in the previous session regarding the right to strike, enshrined in all the Constitutions of the most advanced countries. He added later that he had searched the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)”. However, none of the scholars he consulted refer to that term. They all speak of “public services,” in which strikes are prohibited. Moreover, the approved term from señor Esquivel’s motion is too broad; it practically comprises all the economic activities of the country, since all are of evident public utility. He then indicated what he had stated in the previous session, that is, that restrictions are not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes.

Diputado VARGAS VARGAS declared that he had deliberately not wanted to participate in the debate. In the previous session, he did not vote for the motion of colleague Monge Álvarez, because the recent strike of the Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico—which he had supported and defended—demonstrated the injustice of prohibiting workers in public services from striking when the motives were just. He then read some concepts regarding limitations on the right to strike from the scholar on the subject, Dr. Carlos García Oviedo, professor at the University of Seville. He added that he would vote for the motion presented, which adjusts to reality. Should señor Arroyo's motion not prosper, he is in agreement that Article 56 be maintained intact.

Diputado BRENES GUTIERREZ stated that he agreed with the thesis of señor Esquivel, which conforms entirely to the provisions of Article 369 of the Labor Code. The approved term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” is the appropriate one and he opines that it does not harm workers in any way.

Licenciado GAMBOA indicated that he would vote for the review, as he considers that if the formula approved in the previous session is maintained, the right to strike is threatened with death. Tomorrow, to avoid a strike movement in a particular industry, it will be declared of public utility. The same could occur regarding any banana contracting. The legitimate right of workers to strike must be established in the Constitution in a way that does not lend itself to doubt or misinterpretation.

Put to a vote, the review was approved.

Discussion then began on the substantive motion of señor Arroyo.

Diputado HERRERO observed that in this matter, the problems of each country are distinct. In highly industrial countries, strikes in public services—for example, in transportation—are the most damaging. The opposite occurs in small countries like Costa Rica, where public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) are those of greatest importance. He added that it was most convenient to adopt the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution, to avoid a long debate.

Representante ROJAS VARGAS stated he was in agreement with señor Arroyo’s motion, which he considered fairer than the formula approved yesterday. Furthermore, it strengthens and invigorates the right to strike by restricting only public services.

In matters of restrictions, it is necessary to employ the most concrete and exact terms. The term “public services” is less extensive than that of “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)”. Or, to put it another way, the latter includes the former. He added that the right to strike must be maintained, hopefully with the fewest number of restrictions.

Diputado SOLORZANO also expressed agreement with the motion under debate. He stated that no matter how much dialectical effort is made, he is not convinced that the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” is more expressive than that of “public services.” With the approved formula, the right to strike is guaranteed and at the same time left hanging. On the other hand, a very wide door is opened for future Congresses to annul that right of the working class.

Señor CASTRO SIBAJA stated that, should señor Arroyo’s motion not be approved, he has presented one to the Bureau to maintain the original wording of Article 56. He added that he considered the inclusion in the constitutional text of a conciliation period before reaching a strike to be regulatory in nature. Such an eventuality is contemplated by our legislation on the matter.

Licenciado BAUDRIT SOLERA expressed that he maintained the criterion stated in the previous session insofar as the approved formula does not introduce any fundamental variation to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike. He believes that, rather, this right is broadened, because among public services, some are of public interest, but others are not. He continues to consider the approved term more adequate for the reasons stated in the previous session. In any case, he added, what is fundamental is that the legislator will define what are public services and what are public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública). The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or broadening of the term. The law will become a reflection of the Assembly's makeup. If it leans to the left, public services will be few. If, on the contrary, it leans to the right, they will be many. For these reasons, and given that there is manifest insistence on it, even as he remains firm in his criterion, he will vote for the motion of colleague Castro Sibaja to return to the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Charter.

Diputado ZELEDON observed that señor Arroyo’s motion completely satisfied his desires from the previous session, which is why he would give it his vote.

Diputado CHACON JINESTA briefly referred to the matter under discussion. He began by saying that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the right to strike for workers. In Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches are evidently of public utility. If this concept is maintained, it is logical that the right to strike will have disappeared from our legislation. He considers it more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text, so he suggests to colleague Arroyo that he withdraw his motion to allow that of Castro Sibaja to proceed. The proponent agreed to withdraw his motion.

Put to a vote, the motion of Diputado Castro Sibaja to conserve Article 56 as it stands was approved.

Consequently, Article 56 of the new Constitution will read as follows:

“The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” [61] From the analysis of the arguments of the Diputados, a series of useful elements is extracted to define the scope given by the Constituent to numeral 61 of the Constitución Política in relation to the concept of “public services.” Precisely during the discussion of the motions related to the rule in question, arguments arose both for and against using the concepts of “public services” or “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública),” which, for greater clarity, are set forth in a point-by-point manner.

• 1)The first motion of August 3, 1949, which sought to modify Article 56 of the Constitución Política of 1871, was rejected; however, during its discussion, several elements related to the reference made to “public services” emerged:

Diputado Esquivel proposed changing that term to “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública),” since, in his judgment, this was more correct and, furthermore, public services could be understood as those provided by public offices.

Diputados Facio and Baudrit sought to provide some kind of definition for “public services.” The former conceptualized them as those activities that, due to their importance and significance in national life, could not be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy, and the basic branches of agriculture in a broad sense. The latter indicated that they referred to all those activities of public interest, whether or not they were in the hands of the Public Administration. Regarding its definition, Diputado Facio considered that it was better to maintain the wording of the 1871 Constitution.

• 2)The second motion of August 3, 1949, this time made by Diputado Esquivel, suggested modifying the rule in the following terms: “The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work and in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública), according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” Due to the foregoing, regarding public utility services and public services, the constituents pronounced themselves in this way:

Diputados Chacón and Gamboa stated that the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” was very broad and they preferred the original text of numeral 56. Precisely, Diputado Gamboa clarified that the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” could designate a series of agricultural activities within that category.

Diputado Facio expressed himself in the following terms: “this topic had been much discussed within the Drafting Committee of the 1949 Project. At first, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a valid recourse for all the country’s workers, but only once certain rigorous procedures for peaceful resolution had been exhausted. However, the Committee later altered its opinion, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services, a system very common in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and finally we have returned to the text of the 1871 Constitution, which summarizes that same principle.” Diputado Baudrit Solera reiterated what he had already stated about public services.

Finally, prior to Diputado Esquivel withdrawing the part of his motion referring to agricultural work, the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente approved the article as follows: “The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública), according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” 3) On August 4, 1949, a motion to review the numeral approved the previous day was filed, and if the review were to prosper, another motion was proposed so that the article would read: “The right to strike for workers and to lockout (paro) for employers is guaranteed, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and conserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services. For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations ensuring a conciliation period. The exercise of violence or coercion as a means of initiating, maintaining, or paralyzing strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited.” At that moment, discussion proceeded in this manner:

Diputado Arroyo, who was the proponent, considered that Congress could interpret the scope of the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” in a very broad way, which would diminish the right to strike and, moreover, he stated that with the foregoing, it could even be claimed that a banana contract was of public utility.

Diputado Esquivel referred to the fact that the Labor Code gave meaning to the term “public services,” which included a series of fundamental activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electrical energy—not to “squeeze” workers, but for the benefit of society in general.

Diputado Monge Álvarez stated that, after searching the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública),” none referred to that term, but rather all spoke of “public services,” in which strikes were prohibited; furthermore, he considered the term (referring to public utility services) was too broad and comprised practically all the economic activities of the country, since all were of evident public utility.

Diputado Vargas Vargas agreed, if the proposed motion was not approved, that Article 56 be maintained intact.

Diputado Gamboa indicated that the right to strike was “threatened with death,” because movements of that nature would be prevented in an industry if it were classified as of public utility, which could occur with any banana contracting, which is why a Constitution should establish some form that does not lend itself to doubt.

The review motion was approved.

• 4)On August 4, 2019 (sic) [1949], the substantive motion of Diputado Arroyo was heard, for which, of relevance, the following was debated:

Diputado Herrero stated that in Costa Rica, public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) were those of greatest importance and that it was most convenient to adopt the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution to avoid a long debate.

Diputado Rojas Vargas considered that the right to strike was strengthened and invigorated by limiting only public services; likewise, he argued that in matters of restrictions, it was necessary to employ the most concrete and exact terms. He pointed out that “public services” was less extensive than “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública),” and that the latter included the former. He added that the right to strike must be maintained, hopefully with the fewest number of restrictions.

Diputado Solórzano expressed that they could not convince him that the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)” was more expressive than “public services,” and that the former opened a very wide door for future Congresses to annul the right to strike of the working class.

Diputado Baudrit Solera maintained the criterion stated in the previous session, insofar as the approved formula did not introduce any fundamental variation to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike, but rather broadened that right, because among public services, some are of public interest and others are not; he added: “what is fundamental is that the legislator will define what are public services and what are public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública). The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or broadening of the term. The law will become a reflection of the Assembly's makeup. If it leans to the left, public services will be few. If, on the contrary, it leans to the right, they will be many. For these reasons, and given that there is manifest insistence on it, even as he remains firm in his criterion, he will vote for the motion of colleague Castro Sibaja to return to the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Charter.” Diputado Chacón Jinesta stated that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the right to strike of workers; he posited that, in Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches are evidently of public utility, so if this concept were maintained, the right to strike would disappear; finally, he considered it more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text and suggested to Arroyo that he withdraw his motion to allow that of Castro Sibaja to proceed.

Diputado Arroyo agreed to withdraw his motion.

• 5)Finally, on August 4, 1949, the motion of Diputado Castro Sibaja was approved to conserve Article 56 of the 1871 Charter as it stood: “The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” Thus, from the study of the minutes, no proper discussion of Diputado Castro Sibaja's motion—who proposed maintaining the original wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution[5]—emerges, but only various isolated statements from Diputados who, during the debate on other motions, considered it more convenient to return to the original wording. Now, from what was stated by the Constituents, it is also observed that they reconsidered using the term “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública),” initially approved, because they considered it too broad, and thus, finally, they replaced it with the notion of “public service,” deemed more precise. However, it is no less true that no clear consensus was reached on the legal or political meaning of such a concept, and, rather, the final decision consisted of maintaining what was mandated in the Constitución Política of 1871, precisely the proposal of Constituent Castro Sibaja.

The foregoing is noteworthy because, within the framework of this replication of ordinal 56 of the Constitución Política of 1871 (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943) in Article 61 of the current Fundamental Law, one of the Constituents made direct reference to the fact that the term “public services” was defined in the Labor Code (Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943).

In that regard, both the partial reform of the 1871 Political Constitution and the Labor Code were approved by the same Constitutional Congress of Costa Rica less than two months apart: first, the constitutional reform that enshrined the right to strike and its respective exception (public services according to legal regulation); and second, the Labor Code which established a list of public services in which strikes were not permitted. Concerning the foregoing, the Labor Code, at the time of its issuance, also classified as public services some services provided by private entities (for example, private companies related to clinics, hospitals, sanitation, cleaning, and public lighting in towns). From this it is inferred that the 1949 Constituent did not opt for the public nature of the entity responsible for providing the service—a subjective element—to define “public service,” but rather, regardless of ownership, emphasized the importance of the activity for the community; that is, it resorted to an objective element.

Within this context, it is concluded that the reference to “public service” in Article 61 of the Constitution did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the decision was made to maintain the notion from the 1871 Constitution, which is understood in light of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link to the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which encompassed activities of general interest and particular importance to society. This situation further reveals that the Constituent left the establishment of concrete examples of public service to the ordinary legislator, in accordance with the right to free legislative configuration. As Deputy Baudrit Solera noted: “In any case—he added—the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what services of public utility are.” Now, it is clear that the aforementioned freedom of configuration must be exercised with full respect for the basic parameters derived from constitutional jurisprudence. Precisely, in judgment No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Tribunal stated, regarding Article 61 of the Political Constitution and its conception of public services, the following:

“VI.- CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO UNIONIZE IN PUBLIC SERVICES.- (…) In relation to the content of union action, specifically regarding the right to strike, Article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of the aforementioned right of collective action is a matter reserved for legislation (materia de reserva de ley), with any restriction of said right being required by law and in no way favoring acts of coercion or violence. It is also a result of the power conferred by the cited constitutional Article 61 that it falls to the legislator to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate satisfied by Article 375 (formerly 368) of the Labor Code, which must conform to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality to be consistent with the democratic principle on which the national legal system rests, enshrined in Article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is the supreme value of the Constitutional Rule of Law State.

VII.- CONCERNING THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (FORMERLY 368) OF THE LABOR CODE WHICH EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FOR PUBLIC SERVICES. The strike, as a manifestation of union action, finds a limit when its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which the law must determine according to Article 61 of the Political Constitution. To this effect, the first phrase of Article 375 (formerly 368) of the Labor Code, which states: ‘Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…’, although it might seem to proscribe strikes in these services, that is, although it might seem to have an absolute prohibitive meaning, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases fixed or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality, so that it is consistent with the purpose pursued. This challenged Article 375 (formerly 368) also harmonizes with Article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which—as transcribed in Considering III—establishes the obligation of trade union organizations to adjust their activity to domestic legislation. In other words, while the strike is a right for all, exercisable in any activity, it is feasible for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when it involves activities that constitute ‘public services’ and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, cannot be suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain legal interests. Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which strikes are permitted, the established legal limits cannot be exceeded, as the exercise of the strike must be framed within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the challenged Article 375 (formerly 368), by stipulating: ‘Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…’, by itself exceeds the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In summary, the challenged Article 375 (formerly 368) is not in itself unconstitutional, and the analysis of unconstitutionality must shift to the cases fixed by law in which the prohibitive effect, in public services, occurs. Consistent with the above, the action must be dismissed regarding this point.

VIII.- CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.- We will now proceed to analyze the grounds of unconstitutionality raised by the claimants in relation—in the first place—to the prohibition of the right to strike set forth in the Labor Code for the agricultural sector in its Article 376 subsection b) (formerly 369 subsection b). As stated in Considering V, ILO Convention 11 gave content to freedom of association in the agricultural sector to guarantee this part of the population the free exercise of the right to organize under equal conditions with the industrial sector, through accepted pressure instruments for the pursuit of their objectives, specifically through the exercise of the right to strike. It is evident, in the Chamber’s view, that Article 376 (formerly 369) makes a clumsy statement of what must mandatorily be understood by ‘public services,’ at least insofar as it includes within this concept the activity carried out by workers engaged in the sowing, cultivation, care, or harvesting of agricultural, livestock, or forest products; since these tasks do not fit within the generally accepted notion of public service. Without seeking to exhaust the definition of what the public service is as a legal institution, it must be kept in mind for the purposes of this judgment that a public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and consists of positive provisions (prestaciones positivas) provided by the Administration or that are under some control and regulation by it. The prohibition of the exercise of the strike in activities that are not public services exceeds Article 61 of the Constitution, which orders the legislator to establish the activities in which the exercise of the right to strike is restricted solely in public services. From the foregoing, it is inferred that when the legislator—in subsection b) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code—identified agricultural activity with public service, it acted arbitrarily, since such inclusion lacks legal basis and entails the denial of the exercise of the right to strike in that sector; which is also contrary to the recognized purpose of international Convention No. 11 of the ILO, to guarantee the agricultural sector the full exercise of the right to freedom of association and its consequences. Based on the stated reasons, the action must be granted on this point, and consequently subsection b) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code must be annulled.

IX.- CONCERNING THE OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, AS INDICATED IN ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.- From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law the enumeration of in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect that proscribes the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases such exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the beneficiaries or users of such services. In such a case, limiting the exercise of the right is viable, which must be done applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which enumerates in Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code—transcribed in Considering II—in which public services the strike is excluded, despite predating the 1949 Constitution, does not therefore contradict it. However, as the claimants and the Procuraduría General de la República rightly observe in their report, Article 376 (formerly 369) when its subsection a) details the public services in which the exercise of the strike is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not make it easy to distinguish which minimum public services it refers to, by indicating: ‘All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…’ It is clear to this Tribunal that this statement does not allow recognition of which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; imprecision that conflicts with the dictates of the constitutional precept 61 already commented on, and therefore it must be declared unconstitutional. In another vein, subsection c) of the cited Article 376 (formerly 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the strike; furthermore, it clearly establishes the limit on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading tasks at docks and wharves. Finally, subsection c) also sets limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of ‘workers in transit of any other private transportation company,’ which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike during the effective provision of public land transportation service. On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and the economy. Indeed, this section enunciates or distinguishes services concerning which the strike is likely to compromise the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those related to sanitation, cleaning, and public lighting in towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must involve absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they must be likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and the economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Regarding subsection b) of the challenged article—which excludes the strike from agricultural activity—this Tribunal refers to what was stated in Considering VIII. Finally, in relation to the norm contained in subsection e) of the impugned article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to dictate in which other public activities the strike is prohibited in the event that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such attribution for exceeding the principle of reservation of law (reserva de ley) set forth in Article 61 of the Constitution, according to which the power to establish in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited rests exclusively with the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code. (…)” As a corollary of the stated reasoning, by constitutional mandate the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what are the limitations on the exercise of the strike within it. However, such a task must be developed within the framework of constitutionality, meaning that, according to the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction, no competence may be assigned to the Executive Branch to define in what type of public service the exercise of the strike must be prevented; since such a function is exclusive to the Legislative Branch. Likewise, the legislator’s free configuration must respect the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality, for which purposes the nature of the public service in question or its particular social impact becomes determinative, factors that would justify preventing it from being suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed, given the significant, serious, and immediate harm this would entail to certain legal interests such as health, life, safety, or the public economy. Additionally, what the legislator defines as a public service must involve the satisfaction of collective needs, as well as refer to positive provisions of the Administration or those subject to particular control by it.” C) Constitutionality of Article 376 of the bill under consultation. (…)

In this regard, pursuant to point A) of this considering, let the consulting parties observe that the recommendations of the CFA are not of mandatory compliance, but rather are guiding principles, which aligns with the fact that there is no conventional legal norm that expressly confers binding character to such recommendations, a position endorsed even by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. The foregoing does not mean that this Chamber ignores the juridical and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the ILO supervisory bodies, whose technical and historical authority gives them a value superior to that of a recommendation of a purely axiological or theoretical nature. However, such recognition does not mean that the constitutional jurisdiction lacks a margin of appreciation when applying constitutional review, since the referred recommendations, as already indicated, are not binding in nature; hard law—the prevailing constitutional regulation—must take precedence over soft law, and the various constitutional interests at stake must be safeguarded in a balanced manner.

Consequently, the notion of essential services, beyond the life, health, and safety of the person, can encompass the public economy, when it concerns an absolutely indispensable public service likely to compromise such a legal interest, as this Chamber established in judgment No. 1998-01317 at 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998.

Having clarified the above, the question now is whether the Legislator may approve an absolute and general prohibition in a public service, or whether it must conform to a scheme of minimum functioning of the service, such as that regulated in Article 376 subsection d) of the current Labor Code.

In this regard, this Chamber considers that the Legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, may establish the absolute and general prohibition of the strike in essential public services, provided this does not violate the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality. Now, for the purpose of specifying the scope of the legislator’s powers in this matter, consideration must be given to what the Political Constitution itself regulates.

Thus, according to Article 61 of our Political Constitution: “The right of employers to lockout and that of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations it establishes, which must prohibit any act of coercion or violence.” This norm is a replication of Article 56 of the 1871 Political Constitution, pursuant to the constitutional reform of 1943.

As already elucidated in point B) of this considering, the reference to “public service” in Article 61 of the Constitution did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the 1949 Constituent opted to maintain the notion of the 1943 Constitutional Congress contained in Article 56 of the 1871 Charter. If the historical moment of the approval of this norm in July 1943 is taken into consideration, its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, is easily apparent. Concerning the strike, this latter regulation links the concept of public service with the special importance of the activity for the community; that is, with an objective element. Therefore, from the standpoint of our Fundamental Law it is plausible to extend the notion of essential public service to the life, health, and safety of the person, as well as to the public economy, provided that it concerns, as indicated supra, a public service that is absolutely indispensable and likely to compromise such a legal interest.

Precisely, this particular impact on the aforementioned constitutional interests justifies the legislator opting for an absolute prohibition of the strike in the referred services. This is an alternative that becomes reasonable, insofar as the Constituent itself opted for two rules: 1) to recognize the right of employers to lockout and that of workers to strike, and 2) to except from the previous rule public services, according to what the legislator determines.

In this sense, reforming what is regulated in the current Labor Code cannot be considered unconstitutional, since, precisely, the Constituent entrusted the legislator with regulating the strike in public services, for which it is fully competent to formulate the corresponding legal reforms.

A limit to such attribution is, among others, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality (vote 1998-01317), which in the sub lite is not observed to be violated, since, on one hand, the Constitution itself does not reject the option that the strike be prohibited in public services of particular importance (on the contrary, it makes the exception of the strike in public services according to the legislator’s criteria), and, on the other hand, the consulting parties do not develop any technical, precise, and solidly supported argumentation, much less any legal test of reasonableness, such that this Tribunal might consider the list of essential public services regulated in Article 376 of the bill, as lacking a relevant impact and social incidence, so that its suspension would not cause significant, serious, and immediate harm to health, life, safety, or the public economy. In such a definition, the constitutional judge must exercise self-restraint, given the broad margin of appreciation that the Legislator enjoys in this matter, so that only if the irrelevance of a public service for the aforementioned constitutional interests were proven with absolute solidity, could some injury to the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality eventually be sustained, which is not the case here.

Additionally, no violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness is observed. As the Chamber noted in judgment 2018-000230 at 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018:

“Regarding the alleged establishment of a numerus clausus list by the legislator without the existence of technical criteria, the Chamber dismisses that there is any injury to the constitutional order. As can be deduced from the preceding paragraphs, the determination of the parameters for categorizing a profession as a health science falls within the legislator’s right to free configuration. The Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all of the legislator’s decisions must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would annul the discretionary power of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when an express norm exists regarding the matter (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands it, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness. In the case at hand, the legislator’s decision clearly raised the requirements for being a professional in health sciences, by demanding the minimum degree of licentiate and expressly enumerating the included professions, a decision that does not require a technical or scientific study.” (Emphasis not in original).

On this point, it is reiterated that the reference to “public service” in Article 61 of the Constitution did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the decision was made to maintain the notion of the 1871 Constitution, which is understood in light of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which encompassed activities of general interest and particular importance to society. This situation further reveals that the Constituent left the establishment of concrete examples of public service to the ordinary legislator, in accordance with the right to free legislative configuration. As Deputy Baudrit Solera noted: “In any case—he added—the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what services of public utility are.” Likewise, by constitutional mandate the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what are the limitations on the exercise of the strike within it. Similarly, in relation to the ILO conventions and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, no reasons are observed that would imply a declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged norms. Such normative instruments do not directly allude to the right to strike, and the interpretations or recommendations of the ILO bodies are not binding in nature. Therefore, even though they are relevant, in the specific case the constitutional norms that regulate the subject and the reasoning provided by the Chamber must prevail.

Precisely, this Tribunal, in judgment 1998-01317 at 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, upheld the constitutionality of Article 375 and subsection d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code, without any reasons being apparent that would detract from the arguments developed on that occasion, nor was any overstepping by the impugned norms demonstrated in relation to the Law of the Constitution.

Additionally, even though it is indicated that at the time the action was filed, the political strike was not regulated, it is no less true that no arguments were developed that would support such an alleged disregard as an unconstitutionality by omission. Precisely, no development of norms or principles was presented from which an express or tacit obligation of the legislator to enact a law in that sense could be derived.

Finally, under the terms set forth in the filing brief and taking into consideration the content of the impugned norms, matters concerning the declaration of a strike and its qualification regarding specific situations, specific institutions, and the servants thereof, exceed the scope of analysis of this constitutional review process.

Paul Rueda L.

Dissenting vote of Magistrate Cruz Castro. The restrictions imposed on workers’ right to strike exceed the limits of reasonableness and proportionality provided for in the Constitution.

In deciding this matter, I consider that I must issue a separate vote, considering that the prohibition of the strike in public services, as indicated in Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, are unconstitutional. While it is true that the majority of this Chamber performs a conforming interpretation in this regard, I consider that both the literal wording of the phrase contained in the impugned Article 375 (“ARTICLE 375.—Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…”) and the lack of differentiation between types of workers in the impugned Article 376.d) (“ARTICLE 376.—For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to mean: (…) d. (…) such as clinics and hospitals, sanitation, cleaning and public lighting in towns.”), are unconstitutional, according to the reasons I indicate below.

From Article 61 of the Political Constitution it follows that the workers’ right to strike is a fundamental right that, although it may be subject to limitations when it comes to public services, can never be subject to an absolute prohibition. Now, regarding the point about which public services are involved, it seems to me that what the Chamber established in judgment number 2011-017212 at 3:31 p.m. on December 14, 2011, is correct. It was established there that the limitations on the right to strike encompass not the totality of public services, but only the so-called essential public services:

“Such limitation does not encompass the totality of public services. Thus, the conventions and recommendations issued by the International Labour Organization, through the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts, have been shaping the cases in which the strike may be subject to restrictions or even prohibition and compensatory guarantees. In this sense, the ILO has used the term ‘essential services’ to determine when it is viable to prohibit the strike in public services. In 1983, the ILO Committee of Experts defined essential services as those ‘whose interruption could endanger the life, safety or health of the person in all or part of the population.’ This criterion was subsequently adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association, for which the determining factor is the existence of an evident and imminent threat to the life, safety or health of all or part of the population (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 540; 320th report, case no. 1989, paragraph 324; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 517; 329th report, case no. 2195, paragraph 737; 332nd report, case no. 2252, paragraph 883; 336th report, case no. 2383, paragraph 766; 338th report, case no. 2326, paragraph 446 and case no. 2329, paragraph 1275.) This concept is not absolute, since a non-essential service can become an essential service when the duration of a strike exceeds a certain period or certain scope and thereby endangers the life, safety of the person, or the health of all or part of the population. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 541; 320th report, case no. 1963, paragraph 229; 321st report, case no. 2066, paragraph 340; 330th report, case no. 2212, paragraph 749; 335th report, case no. 2305, paragraph 505 and 338th report, case no. 2373, paragraph 382.) Specifically, and concerning what is relevant to this case, the ILO Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association considers as an essential service, among others, the hospital sector (see 1996 Digest, paragraph 544; 300th report, case no. 1818, paragraph 366; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 427; 308th report, case no. 1897, paragraph 477; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 517, case no. 2077, paragraph 551; 329th report, case no. 2174, paragraph 795; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292 and 338th report, case no. 2399, paragraph 1171). The Committee on Freedom of Association has clarified that in essential services, some categories of employees, for example laborers and gardeners, should not be deprived of the right to strike. (See 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274 and 338th report, case no. 2403, paragraph 601), a criterion that this Chamber adopts in the sense that in hospital service, the prohibition of the strike affects only those public officials and workers whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. Now, the concept of prohibiting the strike in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation.” As indicated supra, numeral 61 of the Political Constitution recognizes the right of workers to strike, except in public services, in accordance with the determination of these made by law and pursuant to the regulations established therein. In that regard, articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code regulate the following:

"ARTICLE 375. - The strike shall not be permitted in public services. Differences that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases in which the strike is prohibited, shall be submitted obligatorily to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts." "ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be: a. (...) d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the functioning of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in population centers." Regarding the scope of these numerals, in judgment number 1998-01317 of 10:12 hours of February 27, 1998, this Court indicated that:

"To that effect, the first phrase of article 375 of the Labor Code, which states: 'The strike shall not be permitted in public services. (...)', although it appears to proscribe the strike in these services, that is, although it appears to have an absolute impeding sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is congruent with the goal it pursues. This challenged article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which - as transcribed in Considerando III. - establishes the obligation of union organizations to adapt their activity to domestic legislation. In other words, although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute 'public services' and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, cannot be suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain legal interests." In that same judgment, in relation to numeral 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, this Chamber addressed the subject of the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension compromised the legal interests of health and the public economy. On that occasion, it was considered that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, because the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services must be protected, a criterion that agrees with the opinions expressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO. Thus, this Chamber, in the referenced judgment, mentioned the following:

"From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law the enumeration of which public services allow for the exclusion or limitation of the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute impeding effect that proscribes the exercise of the right to strike in public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases such exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done with the application of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which enumerates in article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code the public services in which the strike is excluded, despite preceding the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it (...) On the other hand, subsection d) of article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is capable of compromising the legal interests of health and the public economy. Indeed, this subsection enunciates or distinguishes services with respect to which the strike is capable of compromising the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those alluding to hygiene, sanitation, and the lighting of population centers. The law in this case defines the guidelines to establish in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must concern absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they are capable of compromising the legal interests of health and the public economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality." Furthermore, the fact that article 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code refers to private companies requires an evolutionary interpretation, since as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law and by mandate of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution, today the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) administers the public hospital service, making it inexorable that the norm in question encompasses such service provided by the country's main hospital entity. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that based on the criteria expressed by the ILO Freedom of Association Committee and Committee of Experts, the jurisprudence of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal norms in force in the country, the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population. Now then, this Chamber is aware that the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO Governing Body has also considered that given the prohibition of the strike in essential public services, the affected workers must enjoy adequate protection, so that they are compensated for the restrictions imposed on their freedom of action in potential conflicts. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 546 and, e.g., 300th Report, case no. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th Report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 310th Report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th Report, case no. 1999, paragraph 166; 324th Report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 327th Report, case no. 2127, paragraph 192; 330th Report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd Report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th Report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th Report, case no. 2244, paragraph 1269). Among such compensatory measures, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered that the limitation of the strike must be accompanied by adequate, impartial, and rapid conciliation and arbitration procedures in which the interested parties can participate at all stages. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 547 and, e.g., 300th Report, case no. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th Report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 308th Report, case no. 1897, paragraph 478; 310th Report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th Report, case no. 2020, paragraph 318; 324th Report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 330th Report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd Report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th Report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th Report, case no. 2244, paragraph 1269.) (...)" These criteria are ratified through vote number 2018-01115 of 09:30 hours of January 26, 2018, when it was indicated that the strike is admissible in those non-essential public services. Thus then, constitutional article 61 establishes, as a fundamental right, the right of workers to strike. However, the same constitutional norm makes possible: -A limitation on the exercise of such right to strike. Note that it is a limitation and not an absolute prohibition. -The limitation on the exercise of that right can only be by law. -The limitation is for the case of public services, but only those that are essential.

Regarding the right to strike in public services, there exist in Comparative Law three possibilities: absolute prohibition, absolute permissibility, and a mixed system like ours. Legal systems where the right to strike is totally suppressed in the case of public officials are, for example, the Chilean Constitution, which in its article 16 prohibits the strike in absolute form for public officials and even for employees of private companies whose services may be classified as public utility, or whose stoppage causes serious harm to the health and economy of the country. This model is similar to the U.S. model where the strike is prohibited for federal government employees. (Paragraph 1918, chapter 93, title 18 of the US CODE). Other systems where the constitutional right establishes no restriction at all would be, for example, the Italian Constitution which in its numeral 40 is limited to establishing the right to strike and refers to the law for its development. The Portuguese charter which in its ordinal 59 simply establishes the right to strike. A third model, similar to ours, is found in the Panamanian Constitution which in its article 65 provides that the law may establish special restrictions for the exercise of the right to strike in public services. Then, the Colombian Constitution, in its numeral 56, indicates that it shall correspond to the legislator to specify the essential public services in which a strike declaration is not appropriate. Then, the Greek Constitution, in its article 23.2, establishes that the law may impose concrete restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike by public officials. However, it clarifies that legal limitations may not lead to the suppression of the right. In the case of the Spanish Constitution, article 28.2 establishes the right to strike, but indicates that the law shall determine the necessary guarantees to ensure the essential services of the community. Thus then, our Constitution opts for this third path, in such a way that while the right to strike is recognized as a fundamental right, it is permitted to limit its exercise to some degree in the case of public services. We transcribe the cited numeral 61:

"Article 61.- The right of employers to lockout and that of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination made thereof by law and according to the regulations that the same establishes, which must disallow all acts of coercion or violence." In a similar sense, the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – incorporated into Costa Rican Law through Law No. 4229 of December 11, 1969 – grants the right to strike the rank of a fundamental right, and admits that the law may impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the administration of the State. Ordinal 8 of that international instrument prescribes:

"Article 8.- 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: a) (...) d) The right to strike, exercised in conformity with the laws of each country. 2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of legal restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police, or of the administration of the State. 3. (...)" Likewise, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, "Protocol of San Salvador" – incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999 – contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right. However, the conventional norm foresees that it is reserved to the law to establish restrictions on the exercise of this right in the case of public services. It is worth noting that according to that international instrument, the limitations that the law might impose must be consistent with the democratic order, that is, the restrictions on the right to strike must be proportionate and aimed at protecting health, morals, and public order, as well as the rights of the majority of the citizenry. To that effect, numeral 8 of the Protocol provides:

"Article 8.- Trade union rights. 1.- The States Parties shall ensure: a) (...) b) The right to strike. 2.- The exercise of the rights set forth above may only be subject to the limitations and restrictions provided by law, provided that these are proper to a democratic society, necessary to safeguard public order, to protect public health or morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others. Members of the armed forces and of the police, as well as those of other essential public services, shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by law. 3.- (...)." As stated, this Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to specify the scope of article 61 of the Political Constitution. Thus, in judgment No. 1317-98 of 10:12 hours of February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution No. 5264-2003 of 14:42 of June 18, 2003), the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subsections a), b), and e) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code were declared unconstitutional, because it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved to the law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, which expressly prohibits the strike in public services; however, it was indicated that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Indeed, I consider that numeral 61 of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted in the sense that there exists a total prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. On the contrary, it corresponds to the law to determine the cases in which it is appropriate to establish said prohibition, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. Furthermore, as indicated, that limitation on the exercise of the right to strike in public services is only for those qualified as essential. Having set forth the above, it is possible to affirm that the constituent's decision is framed within the social constitutional tradition that, on one hand, recognizes the right to strike, but on the other, admits the possibility of imposing certain limitations in the case of public services, limitations that can only be imposed by law, which cannot be interpreted, from my point of view, as an absolute prohibition; and which refers only to essential public services.

Furthermore, I must emphasize that the legal reform introduced by the law regulating strikes, No. 9808, to articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code to specify the scope of the definition of essential services and the regulation of the exercise of the right to strike in such services, was equally validated by this Chamber, through judgment of this Chamber, number 2019-20596, of nineteen hours fifteen minutes of October 25, 2019, a judgment in whose voting I did not participate. This matter requires a very balanced legislative framework, in accordance with criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, because it concerns the restriction of a fundamental human right: the right to strike. The restriction must be careful and of restrictive criteria. Curiously, employers have the right to lockout (paro) and the restrictions on such exercise are not as restrictive and unreasonable as those imposed on the strike of workers. A constitutional right as relevant as the right to strike must have very specific and reasonable restrictions.

Thus then, I consider that article 375 of the Labor Code, insofar as it indicates "The strike shall not be permitted in public services," is unconstitutional for being a categorical affirmation, without nuance, since clearly such a prohibition cannot be an absolute prohibition but rather, the strike should only be limited in the case of essential public services. And for its part, regarding subsection d) of article 376 of the Labor Code, which defines "clinics and hospitals" as public services, limiting the strike in those cases, I consider that it is also unconstitutional because it does not differentiate among those officials whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. The restrictions in this case exceed the limits of reasonableness and proportionality that justify the restriction of such a relevant fundamental right.

Fernando Cruz C.

Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. South of the Iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 and 21, avenidas 8 and 6 [2] Official page of the International Labour Organization. Retrieved from: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--es/index.htm [3] International Labour Office. Freedom of Association. Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. Sixth edition (2018). Retrieved from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf [4] International Labour Office. Freedom of Association. Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. Sixth edition (2018). Retrieved from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf [5] Only a comma is noted as a difference, since article 56 recorded "trabajadores a la huelga salvo en los servicios públicos" while, according to the SINALEVI, the current norm reads "trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios públicos," which, in this case, lacks all relevance.

He claims that this infringes the principles of equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. He complains that there is discrimination to the detriment of all CCSS employees, because, although they provide an important service, the law has been a loophole for the Administration to make a generalization about the concept of “essential service (servicio esencial)”, without having demonstrated the suitability of such a determination. He accuses the challenged regulations of allowing, ultimately, the institutions and their heads to determine, through administrative acts (such as, for example, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP), which services are essential. He accuses that this infringes the principle of interdiction of arbitrariness. He points out that the legislator left a dangerous loophole open for the Administration to decide—via regulation—which services are essential, in violation of the fundamental right to strike. He claims that, in this specific case, there is a situation of “political strike (huelga política)”; in which case, the ILO has recognized that this type of strike, like the protest strike, implies the exercise of a labor and human right. He affirms that, however, the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) does not provide for or regulate the political strike, so the labor procedures established in that regulatory body are incorrect and insufficient to hear this type of matter.

**2.-** To substantiate their standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they indicate that it stems from Article 75, first and second paragraphs, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in that the plaintiff cites as the base matter the strike classification proceeding being processed in expediente No. 18-002813-1178-LA in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked and, additionally, the defense of a corporate interest on the part of the plaintiff union is noted in protection of its members' right to strike.

**3.-** By resolution at 08:28 hours on October 17, 2018, the action was given course, granting an audience to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), the Minister of Labor and Social Security (Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), and the Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social).

**4.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 216, 217, and 218 of the Boletín Judicial, on the days of November 21, 22, and 23, 2018.

**5.-** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report. It states that: Regarding admissibility. The plaintiff holds representation, as legal representative, of the National Nursing Union (Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería, SINAE), and therefore, appears claiming ownership and defense of a collective or corporate interest of the persons who form the associative base of said Union, who are undoubtedly affected by the questioned norms. Furthermore, the action filed is admissible because the challenged norms are applicable in the pending base matter, which consists of a Strike Classification Proceeding (Procedimiento de Calificación de Huelga) brought before the Labor Court (Juzgado de Trabajo) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, under expediente number 18-002813-1178-LA, which is on appeal before the Labor Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo) of that same Circuit; an appeal in which SINAE, as a party, invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest they consider harmed. A) The strike in Public International Law and the “non-binding” nature of the Recommendations of ILO Supervisory Bodies. The right to strike is not normatively regulated by any specific and concrete ILO convention that, once ratified by a member State, can create international legal obligations for it, but rather it derives from the materialization of so-called union action, recognized and regulated in Conventions such as 87 and 98 of the ILO. (ILO Principles on the Right to Strike, Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO and Horacio GUIDO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE GENEVA, 2000 Edition). Except in the case of Article 8.1(a) of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and subsection (b) of Article 8.1 of the Protocol of San Salvador—incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999—, it is provided that the subscribing member undertakes to guarantee the right to strike, exercised in accordance with the laws of each country; even recognizing that restrictions on the exercise of that right can be established at the legal level in the case of public services. Hence, in reality, the minimum principles and rules of conduct established, by way of “non-binding” guidance, by the Committee of Experts (Comisión de Expertos) and the Committee on Freedom of Association (Comité de Libertad Sindical) regarding the right to strike, thus derive from international labor recommendations that do not constitute autonomous mandatory legal instruments, but a mere guide or guidelines of an advisory and interpretative nature for eventual national action on the subject involved, and therefore, are not even subject to ratification by member States (International Labour Standards for Judges, Jurists and Law Professors, ILO International Training Centre, San José, Costa Rica, April 3-7, 2006, p. 13 et seq.). Given the foregoing, it is evident that the ILO recommendations on which the plaintiff bases its arguments lack the binding legal value alluded to; therefore, their eventual judicial use is limited, at most serving as a reference to interpret the provisions of domestic law (interpretative tool), especially when the latter has been inspired by the respective conventions or as a mere guide of an advisory nature for eventual national action on the involved subject (See in this regard ruling 2011-010832 of 14:30 hrs. on August 12, 2011, Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), by which even, by principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva legal), it was ordered to enact the respective legislation taking into consideration the recommendations the ILO makes to that effect, without applying them directly), but never to consider those [domestic provisions] repealed or supplant them with those international recommendations; especially when the peaceful and consensus criterion is that “The supervisory bodies of the ILO are not competent to give interpretations with the value of case law of the international labor conventions, since such competence resides exclusively in the International Court of Justice” –Art. 37 paragraph 1 of the ILO Constitution-. (International Labour Office, Governing Body, 323rd Session, Geneva, March 12–27, 2015, GB.323/INS/5/Annex III, Institutional Section, item 55). B) Limitation or prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential public services from the ILO's perspective. According to Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO and Horacio GUIDO, of the International Labour Office op. cit., Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), referring to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining respectively, are of special interest. While these do not expressly mention the strike, the truth is that they constitute its theoretical foundation, to such an extent that it is based on them and on the non-binding doctrine of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations that the scope of the exercise of the right to strike has been specified and delimited in said organization, both in the case of “officials exercising authority functions in the name of the State” (ILO, 1996, paragraph 534), and in “essential services”. And regarding what is relevant to this report, we will say that such ILO Supervisory Bodies, in their pronouncements made within the complaints procedure for violation of freedom of association, are those that have casuistically determined that there are cases in which, by way of exception, the exercise of the strike can be restricted and even prohibited, as is the case of the so-called “essential services”. It was the Committee of Experts that first considered admissible the prohibition of the right to strike in “essential services”, which in the strict sense it conceptualized as “services whose interruption could endanger the life, safety or health of the person in all or part of the population” (ILO, 1983b, paragraph 214); a definition that was later adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association. But it must be noted from the outset that both bodies understand that the definition of essential services will largely depend on the specific conditions of each legislation, since while the interruption of certain services (essential by extension) could in certain countries only cause economic problems, in others it could have disastrous effects and create in a short time situations in which the health, safety or life of the population would be compromised, just as it can also be the case that a service not considered essential in the strict sense of the term became essential because the duration of a strike might endanger the life, personal safety or health of all or part of the population (ILO, 1996, paragraph 541; Compilation of decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO. Paragraph 582. 34 Compilation of decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO. Paragraph 591). It is undeniable that the “essential” nature of a public service is established based on at least four criteria accepted by ILO doctrine: 1) when it directly contributes to the protection of goods, the satisfaction of interests or the realization of values, together with respect, validity, exercise and effectiveness of fundamental rights and freedoms; 2) the essentiality of the service is linked to its magnitude; 3) the concept of essential public service entails a weighing of values and interests; and 4) the concept of public service implies a constant evolution of the political, economic and social situation of each country. From there, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered as essential services, in the strict sense, in which the right to strike can be subject to important restrictions, or even prohibition: the hospital sector, electricity services, water supply services, telephone services, the police and armed forces, firefighting services, public or private penitentiary services, the supply of food to school-age pupils and the cleaning of school establishments, air traffic control (ILO, Freedom of Association, para. 585). It should be clarified that these criteria cannot be considered exhaustive, much less binding, but rather merely illustrative. Ultimately, it can be pointed out that the Committee on Freedom of Association has not made an absolute outline of which services are or are not essential, but has provided an enumeration stemming from the cases brought to its consideration. So in reality –we insist– their eventual judicial use is limited, at most serving as a reference to interpret the provisions of domestic law (interpretative tool), especially when the latter has been inspired by the respective conventions or as a mere guide of an advisory nature for eventual national action on the subject involved. C) Constitutional case law on the prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential services (Costa Rica). 1.- Constitutionality of Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code. Although in our system it is recognized as part of the essential content of the Right to unionization – union action –, the right of workers to strike (art.

constitutional right under Article 61), such as the right to temporarily fail to comply with an employment contract, in accordance with current national legislation, for the purpose of preserving, affirming, and pursuing the interests set forth by the Constitution itself and for which the State must provide adequate legal and institutional channels, the fact remains that this right of undeniable collective action, like any right, is not unlimited, and in our context the clearest limitation, which is also expressly reflected in the Constitution, occurs in the case of affecting what are called "essential services" of the community, the continuity of which is consequently constitutionally guaranteed, and regarding which a legal reserve is established. It follows that any restriction or exclusion of the aforementioned right to strike must be established by law and can in no way favor acts of coercion or violence. A mandate which, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has reiterated, is satisfied through Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). On the constitutionality of Article 375 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), see Resolution No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 hrs. on February 27, 1998, reaffirmed by No. 2003-05264 of 14:42 hrs. on June 18, 2003, as well as by Nos. 2011-010832 of 14:30 hrs. on August 12, 2011, and 2016-006463 of 09:30 hrs. on May 13, 2016. And regarding the constitutionality of Article 376, see Resolutions Nos. 1998-01317, 2003-05264, and 2016-006463 cited above. As we noted in Legal Opinion (Dictamen) C-151-2003 of May 28, 2003, when conducting the legal analysis of the aforementioned ruling No. 1998-01317: "In attempting an approach to what should be understood by 'public service,' which seems more akin to 'essential community service,' the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicated that 'although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is feasible for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when it involves activities that constitute 'public services' and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, cannot be suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain assets' (Considering (Considerando) VII of resolution No. 1998-01317, cited above). Moreover, without claiming to exhaust the definition of what should be understood by 'public service,' this Court enunciated that 'a public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and involves positive provisions by the Administration or which are under certain control and regulation by the latter' (Considering (Considerando) VIII of judgment No. 1998-01317 cited above)." (...) Certainly, the Constitution itself establishes the limits on fundamental rights, as occurs in this case with Article 61, in which it limits the exercise of the right to strike in public services for certain cases determined and specified by law. And this limitation also derives, in a mediate and indirect manner, from the need to protect or preserve not only other constitutional rights (life and health), but also other constitutionally protected assets (public economy). And it is for this reason that in these cases, the law establishes the precise guarantees to ensure, in the event of a strike, the maintenance of services that are "absolutely indispensable" for the community. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has held, this exclusion from the exercise of the strike in public services, or in services of recognized and non-deferrable necessity, implies that the right of workers to defend their interests through a strike must yield when it causes or may cause a greater harm than that which the strikers would experience if their claim or demand were unsuccessful. And for this reason, it is stated with full propriety that "To the extent that the recipient and creditor of such services is the entire community and the services are at the same time essential for it, the strike cannot impose the sacrifice of the interests of the recipients of the essential services. The community's right to these vital provisions takes priority over the right to strike." This criterion, according to which the community's interest prevails over the particular interest of the strikers, is also adopted by our Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which has indicated: "... activities that can be considered vital or essential for the community, which is the asset to be protected and for which the right of workers to defend and promote their interests through a strike yields; that is, when it causes or may cause a greater harm than that suffered by the strikers ..." (Considering (Considerando) XI of judgment No. 1998-01317, cited above)." It is undeniable that "... the right to strike, recognized to a sector of society, like any right, has its limits, which are imposed by the need to protect the exercise of the rights of the rest of society." Therefore, in these cases, the legal maxim applies whereby the general or public interest predominates over the particular or private interest, acquiring a fundamental dimension in relation to the constitutional limitation on the right to strike related to "essential public services defined by the legislator." In many circumstances, conflicts arise that the interpreter or legal operator must resolve between rights of equal normative hierarchy. In this case, the conflict and its solution are set out in Article 61 of the Political Constitution (Carta Política) itself. Indeed, there is a conflict between the right to use the strike as a legitimate mechanism to resolve collective conflicts and the rights of the users of essential public services not to have these interrupted due to a conflict to which they are completely extraneous and from which they could suffer considerable social harm, given the very nature of the services. This conflict is typical and results from a value-based tension inherent in any Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho). According to the doctrine, it is a case of "tertiarization" of the conflict, meaning its extension beyond the strictly contractual sphere between workers and employers, also affecting constitutionally protected assets of the community as a whole of citizens who are potential users of the service and who appear as passive subjects of the conflict, who should not suffer additional harm beyond what is strictly necessary to respect the essential content of the right to strike. (PADILLA RUIZ, P., "The Strike in Essential Services" ["La huelga en los servicios esenciales"], Doctrinal Journal Aranzadi Social, no. 9, 2010, pp. 6 and 9). And in this regard, the Political Constitution (Carta Política) itself, in its Article 61, in harmonious and systematic relation with sections 375 and 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), endorses the solution, preferring the inherent continuity of essential public services over the right to strike. 2.- Prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential and assistance services of the Social Security (public hospital service), as a guarantee of its mandatory continuity. The Chamber's jurisprudence has been abundant, coincident, and reiterated, according to which, for an adequate protection of the right to health and to life (Article 21 constitutional) and as a manifestation of the unnamed right to the proper functioning of essential public services of an assistance nature (Articles 140.8, 139.4, and 191 constitutional), such as those of the Social Security (Article 73), provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), as well as other public bodies and entities that provide public health services, that these services must be provided imperatively and without postponement on a continuous basis, without interruptions. And based on a necessary evolutionary normative interpretation of Article 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), it concludes that inexorably that norm encompasses the "public hospital service" provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), as the main hospital entity of the country. And by virtue of this, it has considered that "it is clear that, based on the criteria expressed by the ILO Committees on Freedom of Association and Experts, the jurisprudence of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal regulations in force in the country, the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal assets of society, such as the health and life of the population." (Resolution No. 2016-006463 cited above). To illustrate the position assumed and maintained in this regard by the Chamber, see Resolution No. 2016-006463 of 09:30 hrs. on May 13, 2016 (And similarly, among many others, Nos. 2011-017211 of 15:30 hrs. and 2011-17212 of 15:31 hrs., both of December 14, 2011, 2011-017358 of 09:00 hrs. on December 16, 2011, 2011-017455 of 10:37 hrs. on December 16, 2011, 2011-017680 of 14:51 hrs. on December 21, 2011, 2011-17981 of 10:30 hrs. on December 23, 2011, 2011-17982 of 10:31 hrs. on December 23, 2011, 2012-005969 of 16:06 hrs. on May 9, 2012, 2012-01824 of 14:30 hrs. on February 14, 2012, 2012-002415 of 10:35 hrs. on February 21, 2012, 2012-009794 of 09:05 hrs. on July 20, 2012, 2016-007342 of 11:33 hrs. on May 27, 2016, 2016-007390 of 09:05 hrs. on June 1, 2016, 2016-008625 of 09:05 hrs. on June 24, 2016, 2016-009403 of 09:05 hrs. on July 6, 2016, and 2018-001115 of 09:30 hrs. on January 26, 2018, all from the Constitutional Chamber [Sala Constitucional]). Consequently, the Chamber's jurisprudence has emphasized the constitutionally guaranteed continuity of certain public assistance services, such as those of the Social Security, and specifically the "public hospital service" provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), which, because it affects the sphere of health and life of individuals, is classified as an "essential service" (Resolution No. 2007-000424 of 15:07 hrs. on January 16, 2007) and with respect to which it is imperatively established that its effective provision must not be interrupted (Resolution No. 2014-003636 of 09:05 hrs. on March 14, 2014). And for which purpose it admits as legally valid various mechanisms provided by the administrative order that guarantee this principle, such as the prohibition of strikes and work stoppages in the so-called "essential services," among others. It follows then that any action - by act or omission - by officials that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. (See in this regard, among many others, resolutions Nos. 2007-008462 of 16:13 hrs. on June 13, 2007, and 2009-005898 of 14:36 hrs. on April 13, 2009, both from the Constitutional Chamber [Sala Constitucional]). It is therefore incontrovertible that, in accordance with the Law and values of the Constitution, with respect to the prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential services, and specifically in the case of the so-called "public hospital service," the necessary legal conditions for this are met, according to our legal system, since from a formal point of view, its conceptualization as an essential public service stems from the Law (Article 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code [Código de Trabajo]) and materially, because it is linked to the protection and satisfaction of fundamental legal assets of society, such as the health and life of the population, the Constitution itself in its Article 61 endorses that its effective provision must imperatively not be interrupted. 3.- Conceptual approach to the scope of the term "essential hospital service," according to our domestic legal system. Certainly, due to the abstract meaning doctrinally given to the so-called essential public services, whose conceptual limits or contours are not well defined in their enunciation, it is difficult to establish a univocal and general "a priori" concept of the same. But despite the marked indeterminacy of the concept, it can be specified at the moment of application, since it attempts to delimit a concrete scenario that must be arrived at by interpreting the specific case, through the application to its specific circumstances of objective and subjective factors that are congruent with its generic enunciation, through explanation and application. To avoid conceptual narrowness typical of legal normativism, based on the superstition of a single true meaning, with a precise meaning clearly established in and of itself, we will therefore begin by accepting that the real scope of the concept "essential public service" is "elastic" in several dimensions, as we alluded to in section B of this report.

And in order to delimit, at least approximately, the scope of the same, it is necessary to especially consider the structural and organizational configuration of the involved public service (the service's own particularities), in view of the purpose pursued in the social context in which it is applied, as a practical objective of the precept (axiological-teleological): what are the considered legal provisions for, or what should they be for? Now then, since the challenged norms serve to prohibit strikes in essential public services, and specifically, in the public hospital services provided by the authorities of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in order to guarantee their continuity and avoid endangering the fundamental legal rights of society, such as the health and life of people in the whole or part of the population, it can reasonably be maintained that "within the public services provided and the competencies exercised by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, those referring to the health or medical services (prestaciones sanitarias), directly or indirectly, provided to the insured, patients, or users of such services, are essential. Consequently, it must be understood that the services provided in both preventive medicine through the EBAIS and those provided in curative medicine through clinics and hospitals of all levels and orders, whatever their classification, are essential. It is evident that in such cases, even the auxiliary organizational units for diagnosis and treatment (e.g., clinical laboratory, blood banks, immunohematology units, pharmacy, nursing, equipment sterilization) and the purely administrative bodies that provide support or collaboration to such basic care centers, clinics, and hospitals (e.g., administration, supply, treasury, accounting, maintenance, food service, laundry and linen service, cleaning, transport, waste disposal and treatment, etc.) cannot exercise the right to strike, because the paralysis or suspension of work in such units has a negative impact on the necessary and indispensable continuity of the public health services provided to the population suffering from some ailment or disease." (This has been a separate note signed by former Magistrate Jinesta in, at least, the following rulings: 2011-017211 at 15:30 hrs. and 2011-17212 at 15:31 hrs. of December 14, 2011, 2011-017455 at 10:37 hrs. of December 16, 2011, 2011-017680 at 14:51 hrs. of December 21, 2011, 2011-17981 at 10:30 hrs. of December 23, 2011, 2011-17982 at 10:31 hrs. of December 23, 2011, 2012-002415 at 10:35 hrs. of February 21, 2012, 2012-005969 at 16:06 hrs. of May 9, 2012, and 2012-009794 at 09:05 hrs. of July 20, 2012). This is so because that public assistance service, of undeniable essential character, as the constitutional chamber's own jurisprudence has recognized, implies a multiplicity of services and assistance programs that materialize in various health and even economic services (payment of subsidies, pensions or retirements, and other short and long-term economic services) intended for contributors and other beneficiaries nationwide, which obviously goes beyond the scope of hospitals, clinics, and other health care units. And unquestionably, within that multi-comprehensive concept of essential and assistance public service of Social Security provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the body of female and male nurses, professional and non-professional, is inevitably immersed, for it can be seen that both Law No. 5395 –Ley General de Salud–, Law No. 6836 –De Incentivos a Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas–, and Law No. 7085 –Estatuto de Servicios de Enfermería–, classify them as professionals in Health Sciences and place them in various public and private health institutions. And within the Caja, they are functionally classified as an essential support body within the work of what is called hospital care (See Manual Descriptivo de Puestos of the Caja). And by reason of what has been set forth so far, it is logical and beyond reasonable that the proscription of the strike also extends to all of them, especially when the constitutional chamber's jurisprudence has reiterated that the activities carried out in clinics, hospitals, and other health care units of the Caja constitute an essential public service in the terms in which Article 61 of the Constitution has been reasonably and proportionally interpreted, in relation to ordinals 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code. There are substantial differences between officials who, like them, perform essential functions in essential public services and others who do not, and therefore, since the situations brought for comparison are not homogeneous, the constitutionally established differentiation that allows imposing the prohibition of the right to strike on those who work in essential public services, especially those directly linked to such service obligations, turns out to be constitutionally reasonable and proportional to the pursued end – guaranteeing the continuity of services whose interruption could endanger the life, security, or health of the person in the whole or part of the population. Nor is it arbitrary, because it is based on differentiable objective reasons (the undeniable essential nature of the hospital service with respect to the rights or interests satisfied by it), nor does it violate the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, as it is constitutionally valid according to that constitutional chamber's jurisprudence. 4.- "Minimum services" is an option that can be exclusively chosen by the legislator to reconcile the right to strike and the continuity of "non-essential" public services. The establishment of the so-called "minimum service," when the legislator chooses not to prohibit the strike but imposes a minimum service, is a mere legislative option, but never an obligation, and even less so in the case of essential public services, as is unjustifiably claimed by the petitioner. Without a doubt, it is a formula for achieving a balance between the right to strike and the continuity of "non-essential" public services, in which a part of the labor law doctrine has seen the solution in the imposition of minimum services that must be provided during the collective work cessation; this is so "When the legislator, the only competent authority in the matter, does not prohibit the strike (...) for some public services, by establishing a minimum service that ensures a minimum of continuity of the service (...)" (LACHAUME, JEAN FRANCOIS et al, Droit des Services Publics, Editions Dalloz, Paris, 2004, pp. 354-355). The purpose of establishing so-called "minimum services" is to guarantee the maintenance of the service during the strike, ensuring coverage of the basic needs of the population, the continuous or safe functioning of installations, albeit in a limited way, respecting its essential content, but without reaching the usual performance level so that the impact of the strike on the service is perceptible, as a mechanism of labor pressure. In such a way, establishing them at the legal level requires properly weighing the interests at stake, the constitutionally protected rights and interests, and the fundamental right to strike, and a balance must be found between them. However, as it is easy to infer from the constitutional and legal norms studied here, the measure chosen by both the original Constituent Assembly and the ordinary legislator was another: the prohibition of the right to strike in essential public services, in order to guarantee their uninterrupted continuity, as we noted in Dictamen C-151-2003, and as we specified in pronouncements OJ-017-2006, of February 13, 2006, and OJ-125-2007, of November 19, 2007. Furthermore, as recently recognized by that constitutional chamber: "there is no constitutional mandate to determine which strike cases the legislator must regulate nor how it must do so (...) the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Art. 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power (...)" (Resolución No. 2018017681 at 09:40 hrs. of October 24, 2018, Constitutional Chamber). We do not find, then, that a discriminatory, unreasonable, disproportionate, or arbitrary treatment exists that contravenes the criteria that constitutionally prevail and must prevail in this matter. The establishment of a mixed or alternative system, which provides for the assurance of "minimum services" in order to permit the exercise of the right to strike even in essential public services, is not legally demandable through this action, because besides being openly contrary to the alternative chosen by the original Constituent Assembly, the constitutional chamber cannot act as a positive legislator, in order to establish normative rules that allow excepting the petitioners from the constitutionally established strike prohibition at the level of essential public services, as is baselessly intended. Hence, regarding this claim, an inadmissibility of the action is configured due to the object that should entail its outright rejection (Resolución No. 2018017681 op. cit.). 5.- The so-called "Political Strike" does not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association of the ILO, nor has it been formally or materially recognized in our legal system. The petitioner alleges the alleged unconstitutionality for not regulating strikes of a political nature; that is, unconstitutionality by omission, which in his opinion both challenged legal norms contain. In this regard, as we have recently debated at the level of the ordinary labor jurisdiction, on the occasion of the process of qualification of illegality of the strike currently maintained especially in the educational sector, based on our current legislation, the so-called political strike has not been recognized, and therefore it is unlawful, because by the way the right to strike has been constitutionally conceptualized in our system, it is unquestionable that the recognition of that right does not necessarily have to entail all the forms and modalities of direct action by workers, much less all the possible intended purposes (Dictamen C-151-2003 op. cit). And we even warned that the legal recognition and regulation of that atypical form of strike against public policies was expressly excluded from the Labor Procedure Reform, due to a lack of consensus among the different social interlocutors (Acta No. 08 of June 16, 2010, legislative file No. 15.990, Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral and Dictamen Afirmativo Unánime of August 17, 2010). In its proper dimension, the right to strike is recognized and enshrined in our system as a fundamental and autonomous subjective right. And according to what the norm under comment expresses, it is up to the ordinary legislator, as the representative of popular sovereignty, to devise a regulation of the conditions for exercising that right, which could be more or less restrictive, in accordance with the political guidelines that drive it, provided it does not exceed, in the first place, the limits imposed by the norm itself –the first, regarding the activities in which that right is recognized, because it expressly excludes public services – according to what we have explained, the essential ones–, whose determination in any case corresponds to the legislator itself; the second, regarding the modality, since in its exercise acts of coercion or violence must be disallowed–, or other limits derived from its possible connection with other constitutional rights and even with other constitutionally protected rights. It should be remembered that no right is unlimited, and like all, the right to strike is not absolute, and must have its limitations. And in accordance with the legal definition given by the legislator of the right to strike (Art. 371 of the Labor Code), following the minimum basis given by the Constitution (Art.

61), the exercise of that right does not necessarily entail all forms and modalities of direct action by workers, much less all possible intended purposes, especially since in our current legal system we might not be facing the phenomenon of a constitutionally protected strike when disruptions occur in the production of public goods and services or in the normal functioning of the latter, which are introduced for the exclusive purpose of pressuring the Public Administration or the organs of the State to obtain the adoption of governmental measures more favorable to the interests of a specific institution or group of public employees, because in these cases the strike would not be the result of a labor conflict properly speaking, since the professional motivation is clearly marginal. Thus, the illegality of this type of strike, beyond the professional and economic interests—direct and indirect—of the workers involved, from a material standpoint arises because the political claims, objectives, and purposes pursued exceed those proper to union action, and therefore, are not in accordance with the legal system, as they are not directed against employers specifically, but against the state Government as a public power; especially when, by the means employed, the intention to alter the constitutional order and coerce the free decision-making of democratic State institutions is clear, putting the authority of the State at stake. Furthermore, according to the various advisory criteria of the ILO, the Committee on Freedom of Association has linked the exercise of the right to strike to the purpose of promoting and defending the economic and social interests of workers; a criterion that excludes purely political strikes from the scope of international protection within the ILO. Thus, it is evident that in our legal system, the demand for recognition, at the constitutional level, of the existence of so-called political strikes, such as the one that has materialized and been prolonged these days, is inadmissible, because “there is no constitutional mandate regarding what the cases of strikes that the legislator must regulate should be nor how it should do so (…) the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power (…)” (Resolution No. 2018017681 of 09:40 hrs. on October 24, 2018, Constitutional Chamber). And in any case, because political strikes are neither recognized nor regulated in our environment, and because as such, they are not even covered by the principles of freedom of association, according to the non-binding recommendations of the ILO. Finally, the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator to modify legislative texts in favor of specific interests and recognize political strikes in our environment, thereby contradicting the Law of the Constitution (Among many others, Resolution No. 2010-8600 of 15:08 hrs. on May 12, 2010). Hence, with respect to this claim, an inadmissibility of the action is configured based on the object, which should entail its outright rejection (Resolution No. 2018017681 op. cit.). Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, this Advisory Body suggests to the Constitutional Chamber: 1) Regarding the omissions to regulate minimum services and the political strike in essential services, to reject this action outright, for two basic reasons: there is no constitutional mandate whatsoever that orders it, and because the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator. 2) And in all other respects, to declare it without merit and ratify the jurisprudential line according to which Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code are constitutional.

**6.-** ROMAN MACAYA HAYES submits his report, in his capacity as Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) and states in summary: That the CCSS considers the challenged norms to be in conformity with the Political Constitution and the international treaties signed by the Government of Costa Rica, thus it is considered that the limitation of the right to strike in the public services provided by the CCSS stems from the protection of the supreme good of life and human health. On the limitation of the strike by internal law (constitutionality and conventionality of the limitation via ordinary law): Our Political Constitution in its numeral 61 recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right, however, this same norm allows its exercise to be limited in the case of public services, reserving to the law the determination of the public services where the right to strike must be understood as limited. In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 375 and 376.d) are not contrary to Article 61 because both norms have the rank of law, thus the imposed limitation complies with the reservation provided in the constitutional norm. If the Constitution expressly indicates that the right to strike can be limited via law, under no logical argument can it be considered that the challenged norms could be contrary to Article 61 of the Constitution. It is noted that international law ratified by our country is consistent with Constitutional Article 61; the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right, but admits that the internal law of each country may impose limitations in the case of state administration (see subsection 2 of Article 8). In this vein, the Protocol of San Salvador contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right, but provides that it is a reserve of law to establish restrictions on the exercise of that right in the case of public services (see Article 8). This Chamber has already extensively addressed the topic under study (see Resolution 2016-006463). Now, the concept of prohibiting the strike in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation. Regarding the scope of the articles of the Labor Code, in judgment 1998-01317 it was indicated that the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension would compromise the legal interests of public health and the public economy. On that occasion, it was considered that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, because the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services had to be protected, a criterion that agrees with the opinions expressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO. As can be observed, limiting the exercise of the right to strike via law in our country is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, and in particular those established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code. It should be noted that the limitation of the strike by legal norm is a topic regulated in a similar manner in countries such as Spain (Article 28.2), Colombia (Article 56), Panama (Article 69), and Chile (Article 16). From the foregoing it is concluded that the right to strike, as a fundamental right of freedom, coexists in a system of rights that allows its limitation, as provided by the legal system of each country; in the case of our legal system, the limitation is considered valid as long as the norm is proportionate, reasonable, and necessary, as explained. Non-existence of a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The right to strike may be limited by legal provision. Numeral 61 of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted as meaning that there is a total prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services; on the contrary, it is for the law to determine the cases in which it is appropriate to establish such prohibition, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. It falls to the Legislative Assembly to establish the circumstances under which the right to strike cannot be exercised. In this way, neither the Judge nor the Executive Power can substitute for the legislator in determining the circumstances in which the right to strike can be prevented. The reasons that the Constituent Power and the ordinary legislator had for prohibiting the strike in these services were to avoid, in cases such as the one at hand, a serious impact on essential public services; for example, consider the health services of the CCSS; during the strike movement in the period between September 10, 2018, and October 5, 2018, an impact was generated on the production of supplies necessary for direct patient care (suspension of 80,949 general medicine appointments, 40,657 specialty appointments, and 8,329 appointments with other health professionals; that is, a total of 129,935 appointments were lost, which is added to the 3,706 suspended surgeries). The impact on the public service is evident, which leads to the conclusion that the strike in hospital and health services must be prohibited to protect the supreme good of human life, just as the legislator has effectively done in Articles 375 and 376.c in the context of Articles 21 and 61 of the Political Constitution. The limitations on the right to strike in public services via law, and in particular those established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code, are legitimate, reasonable, proportionate, and necessary, lacking logic and justification to affect the right to health of more than 150,000 insured persons to exercise an alleged unrestricted right to strike. It has been made clear that the limitation of the strike in public services is in accordance with the Constitution, and it is the ordinary legislator who defines the affected services. Services that cannot go on strike have a conflict resolution procedure: The ILO Committee of Experts has indicated that the legislation of a large number of countries provides that, before undertaking a strike, conciliation and mediation procedures must be exhausted. Even if the strike is prohibited in public services as determined by law, public employees have a guarantee of conflict resolution prior to the judicial instance, such as direct settlement, conciliation, and arbitration. Corollary: The right to strike constitutes a right of workers; our Constitutional Law allows the imposition of limitations when the right to strike implies the interruption or impact on public services, limitations for whose imposition the principle of legal reserve governs. The limitation of the right to strike established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, for being introduced by law, in a reasonable, proportionate, and necessary manner. Therefore, it is requested to declare the rejection on the merits of the filed action.

**7.-** STEVEN NUÑEZ RIMOLA submits his report, in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social Security and states in summary that: Constitutional Article 61 establishes, as a fundamental right, the right of workers to strike. It is for this reason that Article 375 of the Labor Code provides for the prohibition of strikes in public services, specifically, regarding those essential workers who cannot suspend their services without causing grave harm to the public economy or health. In Comparative Law, there are legal systems under which the right to strike is totally suppressed in the case of public employees; there are also others in which the constitutional right does not establish any restriction, and others, like ours, as detailed further below. In a sense similar to Constitutional Article 61, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights admits that the law may impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the State administration. Likewise, the Protocol of San Salvador provides that it is a reserve of law to establish restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of public services.

On the other hand, this Chamber has already clarified the scope of Article 61 of the Political Constitution in vote 1317-98 and that the definition of the public activities that have the right to strike restricted is a matter reserved to the law. In that same judgment the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, making it clear that this norm must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, so that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, since that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Furthermore, subsection d) of Article 376 was also the subject of constitutional review. As set forth, the power granted by the Constituent to the legislator, to regulate which public service activities find the right to strike restricted, is embodied in numerals 375 and 376 of the Labor Code, and these norms must be integrated with the International Conventions ratified by Costa Rica and with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber issued in this regard. The principles of the Committee concerning situations in which the strike of public officials may be subject to significant restrictions, or even prohibition, are shared by the Commission of Experts. In 1983, the Commission of Experts defined them as “services whose interruption could endanger the life, safety or health of the person in all or part of the population.” This definition was adopted shortly thereafter by the Committee on Freedom of Association. The Committee on Freedom of Association’s list of non-essential services is also not exhaustive. In any case, it is worth noting that, regarding a complaint that did not involve an essential service, the Committee maintained that the serious long-term consequences for the national economy that a strike could have did not justify its prohibition. The Committee has recommended the amendment of some legislations so that strikes are only prohibited in essential services in the strict sense of the term, particularly when the authorities have discretionary powers to expand the list of essential services. Specifically regarding the prohibition of strikes in hospital services, we find in Constitutional Chamber vote No. 2011-017680, where it was indicated that strikes in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, are prohibited, since fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population, are endangered. A criterion that the Chamber accepts in the sense that in the hospital service, the prohibition of strikes affects only those public officials and workers whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. As set forth, the plaintiff’s lack of reason regarding their allegations is clear, since Articles 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code in no way establish an absolute prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. What exists is a restriction of access to this right for those public officials who participate in activities considered essential public services, among which are hospital services and in these services, as this Chamber has indicated, this prohibition affects only those officials whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. These limitations do not conflict with the Political Constitution or with International Human Rights Treaties, since, as has been said, the right to strike is not unrestricted, it being necessary, for reasons of rationality and proportionality, to limit the exercise of the right to those services that are essential, understood as those that threaten the life, safety or health of persons. Therefore, they consider that the challenged norms are not unconstitutional. A pronouncement on the allegations referring to Decree No. 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP and the political strike is omitted as they do not form part of the filed unconstitutionality action.

**8.-** Appearing as a coadjuvant is MARVIN ATENCIO DELGADO, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Union of Professionals in Medical Sciences of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and Affiliated Institutions (Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines, SIPROCIMECA), indicates that this trade union organization fully adheres to the arguments put forth by the plaintiff trade union organization, insofar as it is clear that a reading of Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code subject to challenge contravenes the provisions of Article 61 of the Political Constitution. Thus, they request that the action be granted and that Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code be deemed unconstitutional, for being contrary to the constitutional rights of unionization, strike and equality enshrined in Articles 33, 60 and 61 of our Political Constitution.

**9.-** Appearing as a coadjuvant is LUIS GERARDO CHAVARRIA VEGA, in his capacity as General Secretary of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social, UNDECA), indicates that the norms are not unconstitutional, but rather the interpretations that have been made of both numerals. By virtue of this interpretation of the legal norms, against the grain of Article 61 of the Constitution, the absolute prohibition of the strike has been upheld in the different activities listed in subsection d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code. This overreaching interpretation is not consistent with Article 61 of the Constitution for the following reasons: the limitation imposed by the legal norm only limits the exercise of the right to strike of the workers absolutely indispensable to guarantee the maintenance or minimum functioning (funcionamiento mínimo) of the services provided by those companies or institutions, including health services. The rest of the workers, who are not absolutely indispensable, have no impediment to exercising the right to strike. Therefore, the restriction imposed by the norm has a specific and limited subjective scope, which does not encompass the entire corresponding service or economic activity, nor all the workers of the respective institution or activity, but exclusively those workers absolutely indispensable to guarantee that the minimum service provision is not interrupted. We could admit, in the worst case, that the norm contains a relative prohibition, which restricts the strike only to these workers, but it could never be upheld that the provision absolutely and generally prohibits the strike in the health sector, unless it is by violating the express text of said provision and of the constitutional norm itself. This norm of the Labor Code resorts to the technique of maintaining the minimum service, which harmoniously resolves any contradiction between the need for continuity of health service provision and the recognition of the right to strike. The ILO establishes that the maintenance of the minimum service constitutes an ideal solution that, on the one hand, safeguards the right to strike of the majority of workers, and on the other, guarantees the satisfaction of the vital needs of the users. Our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized the normative value of these pronouncements of the ILO, and the pronouncements of the Committee on Freedom of Association constitute jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court has applied in its judgments, which we request be applied in this matter. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 15 of the Labor Code, these pronouncements are incorporated into our legal system. They request that the action be granted regarding its interpretation.

**10.-** Appearing as a coadjuvant is RODRIGO LÓPEZ GARCIA, in his capacity as General Secretary of the National Association of Nursing Professionals (Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería, ANPE), indicates that this union has a legitimate interest in defending the constitutional right to strike that has been curtailed by the application or, in some sense, the erroneous interpretation of Articles 375 and 376.d) of the Labor Code. In application of our Political Constitution and what has been ratified by Costa Rica in international conventions, the limitations imposed on the right to strike in some public services must conform to the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In reality, the limitation of the right to strike is for the absolutely indispensable workers, not for all workers (see legal opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) 125-J of November 19, 2007). Considering and sustaining the decision that all public services are indispensable or essential is to undermine the right to strike of many and inevitably leads to harming those who defend a right or situation that directly affects their labor, political and economic rights and subjective interests. He requests that this action be granted.

**11.-** By resolution at 15:15 hours on December 19, 2018, the coadjuvant interventions of Marvin Atencio Delgado in his capacity as General Secretary of the Union of Professionals in Medical Sciences of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and Affiliated Institutions (SIPROCIMECA), Luis Chavarría Vega, in his capacity as General Secretary of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (UNDECA), and Rodrigo López García, in his capacity as General Secretary of the National Association of Nursing Professionals (ANPE), were accepted for filing. Furthermore, the hearings granted to the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund were deemed answered.

**12.-** The oral hearing (vista) provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

**13.-** In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **Considering:** **I.- Object of the challenge.-** The plaintiff, representative of the National Nursing Union (Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería, SINAE), accuses Articles 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code as unconstitutional, which literally state the following:

“ARTICLE 375. - A strike shall not be permitted in public services.

The differences that in these arise between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases in which strikes are prohibited, shall be mandatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts.” “ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be:

(…)

d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the operation of private enterprises that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the public economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting.” The allegations of alleged unconstitutionality can be summarized in the following aspects:

• 1)Violation of article 61 of the Political Constitution: said constitutional provision does not provide an absolute prohibition of the right to strike in public services such as those provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and establishes a legal reserve (reserva legal) so that the legislator determines in which public services strikes are not permitted. Given that the most recent doctrine indicates that the prohibition on exercising the right to strike in public services is limited to those that are highly qualified. These articles are unconstitutional insofar as they absolutely prohibit the right to strike of all workers who provide services at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.
• 2)Violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as the ILO Recommendations: insofar as the prohibition or restriction of the right to strike should be limited, first, only to those highly qualified public services, and second, with respect to those workers who are absolutely indispensable in said services; strikes should be permitted even in those services, provided that the operation of minimum services is guaranteed.
• 3)Violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad) in the exercise of freedom of association (libertad sindical) and the right to strike: because all activities are grouped under the concept of “essential service,” it is clear that there is discrimination against all employees of the CCSS since, although they provide an important service, the law has been a loophole for the Administration to violate these principles, making generalizations about the concept of “essential service.” Furthermore, they do not provide for the case of a political protest strike in such services.

However, at the end of the action filing, certain allegations are indicated that fall within the realm of legality, regarding the procedure followed for the declaration of illegality of the strike in the specific case that serves as the base case, mentioning that the procedure is improper, since it is not a labor strike when in reality it is a political strike. All of which falls outside the constitutionality analysis in this action, since it is for the ordinary courts to determine the type of strike that occurred in the base case.

Finally, the following clarification must be made: the provisions of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), where these rules are located, were amended and supplemented by Law to Provide Legal Certainty on the Strike and Its Procedures (Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos), No. 9808 of January 21, 2020. However, an analysis of them is appropriate due to the effects that occurred while they were in force as challenged.

II.- The rules of standing (legitimación) in unconstitutionality actions and standing in this case.- Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) regulates the conditions that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial forum in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when due to the nature of the rule there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Public Prosecutor (Fiscal General de la República) or the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), in these latter cases, within their respective areas of competence. In this case, the plaintiff holds representation, as legal representative, of the National Nursing Union (Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería, SINAE), and therefore, appears claiming the ownership and defense of a collective or corporate interest of the persons who make up the associative base of said Union, who are undoubtedly affected by the challenged rules. Furthermore, the action filed is admissible because the challenged rules are applicable in the underlying base case pending resolution, which consists of a Strike Qualification Procedure (Procedimiento de Calificación de Huelga) filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, with case file number 18-002813-1178-LA, which is on appeal before the Labor Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo) of that same Circuit; an appeal in which SINAE as a party invoked the unconstitutionality of articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest they consider harmed. From the foregoing, it is clear that the plaintiff has sufficient standing to challenge the unconstitutionality of the contested rules. Furthermore, these are statutory rules, matters whose constitutionality is subject to review in this venue. Finally, the plaintiff fulfilled the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the aforementioned Law. In conclusion, this action is admissible, so the object and merits of the matter must be immediately discussed.

III.- On the constitutional jurisprudence regarding strikes in public services and the similar allegations in this action.- The plaintiff Union challenges articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as it considers them violative of Article 61 of the Constitution, of the ILO conventions and recommendations, and of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and prohibition of arbitrariness. This is because such rules absolutely prohibit the right to strike in public services, given that such a prohibition should apply only to essential public services. Moreover, even in those cases, the right to strike could not be prohibited for all workers, but only for those workers who are absolutely indispensable in those services. In this regard, it is the criterion of the representative of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the representative of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the Ministry of Labor (Ministerio de Trabajo) that the challenged rules are not unconstitutional, as they state. According to the Attorney General's Office, the challenged rules are constitutional, following the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, in that striking in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since fundamental legal rights of society, such as the health and life of the population, are endangered (Resolution No. 2016-006463). According to the criterion of the representative of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, articles 375 and 376.d) are not contrary to article 61 because both rules have the force of law, thus the imposed limitation complies with the legal reserve provided for in the constitutional rule. For example, in the health services of the CCSS, during the strike movement in the period between September 10, 2018, and October 5, 2018, an impact was generated because a total of 129,935 appointments were lost, which is added to the 3,706 suspended surgeries. According to the Ministry of Labor, this Chamber declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, making it clear that this rule must be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution, so that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as this would be contrary to the fundamental rule. Furthermore, subsection d) of article 376 was also the subject of a constitutionality review. It therefore considers that the plaintiff's lack of reason in their allegations is clear, since articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code in no way establish an absolute prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. What exists is a restriction on access to this right for those public officials who participate in activities considered essential public services, among which are hospital services, and in these services, as this Chamber has indicated, this prohibition affects only those officials whose suspension of work means that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. On the other hand, according to the criterion of the active coadjuvants (coadyuvantes activos), a reading of articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code subject to challenge contravenes the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution (Siprocimeca), although it appears that the rules are not unconstitutional, but rather the interpretations that have been made of both numerals, for which reason they request the unconstitutionality of the interpretation (Undeca), and to consider and support the decision that all public services are indispensable or essential is to undermine the right to strike of many (Anpe).

In this regard, this Chamber considers it notes that, through judgment No. 1317-98 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution No. 5264-2003 of 2:42 p.m. on June 18, 2003, and resolution No. 2019-20596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019), it already addressed the challenge of the articles challenged here (375 and 376.d of the Labor Code), based on arguments similar to those indicated in this action.

It was resolved as follows:

**VI.- CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO UNIONIZE IN PUBLIC SERVICES.-** The plaintiffs accuse that article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code establishes the prohibition of the right to strike for all activity that is a public service, which exceeds the constitutional text that enshrines the right of free unionization for workers and employers, without any conditioning; an assertion that demands the following analysis. With the social legislation of the nineteen-forties, the so-called social guarantees were introduced in Costa Rica, specifically in the year 1943, into the Political Constitution, and the right to unionize was expressly enshrined. This fundamental right is maintained in the 1949 Constitution, specifically in its Article 60. On another level, Costa Rica subsequently approved Conventions No. 87 -relating to freedom of association and protection of the right to organize- and No. 98 -relating to the right to organize and collective bargaining- both of the I.L.O., through Law No. 2561 of May eleventh, nineteen sixty. In the cited international conventions, the right to unionize is recognized and guaranteed, its exercise being limited to the observance of the statutes and the legality of the member State (articles 2 and 8 of Convention No. 87). The right to unionize thus has constitutional rank in Costa Rica and is regulated internally through norms of a legal nature, specifically the Labor Code, which regulates in its article 332 and following -located in Title Five "Of Social Organizations"- matters concerning the operation and dissolution of unions and defines the rules for the protection of union rights. Article 332 of the Labor Code also declares the legal constitution of unions to be of public interest, which are distinguished "(…)as one of the most effective means of contributing to the sustenance and development of popular culture and Costa Rican democracy." The foregoing reference allows us to conclude at this stage that the fundamental right to unionize is recognized without distinction as to the public or private nature of the labor sectors; that is, in comparable magnitude. In relation to the content of union action, specifically regarding the right to strike, article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of the cited right of collective action is a matter reserved to law, since any restriction of the cited right must occur by way of law and in no way may favor acts of coercion or violence. It is also a result of the attribution conferred by the cited constitutional numeral 61, that it is the legislator's responsibility to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate that is satisfied through article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which must conform to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality so that it is congruent with the democratic principle on which the national legal order rests, embodied in article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is a supreme value of the Constitutional State of Law.

**VII.- CONCERNING THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (formerly, 368) OF THE LABOR CODE WHICH EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FROM PUBLIC SERVICES.** The strike, as a manifestation of union action, finds a limit when its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which it is the law's responsibility to determine according to article 61 of the Political Constitution. To this effect, the first phrase of article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which states: "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. (…)", although it seems to proscribe the strike in these services, that is, although it seems to have an absolute prohibitive sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality, so that it is congruent with the end it pursues. This questioned article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with article 8 of I.L.O. Convention 87 which - as transcribed in Considerando III. - establishes the obligation of union organizations to adapt their activity to internal legislation. In other words, although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when it involves activities that constitute "public services" and which, by their nature or because of the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain goods. Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which the strike is permitted, the established legal limits cannot be exceeded, since the exercise of the strike must be framed within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the questioned article 375 (formerly, 368), by providing: "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…", in itself exceeds the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In summary, the questioned article 375 (formerly, 368) is not in itself unconstitutional, and the analysis of unconstitutionality must shift to the cases established by law in which the prohibitive effect, in public services, occurs. Consistent with the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action as to this point.

(…)

**IX.- CONCERNING THE OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, INDICATED BY ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY, 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.-** From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law the enunciation of which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect that proscribes the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the provision and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which enumerates in article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code -transcribed in Considerando II, in which public services the strike is excluded, despite preceding the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it.

Nonetheless, as the claimants and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) correctly observe in their report, Article 376 (formerly 369), when it details in subsection a) the public services in which the exercise of the right to strike (huelga) is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not facilitate distinguishing which minimum public services it refers to, by stating: "All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…". It is clear to this Court that this statement does not allow for recognition of which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; an imprecision that conflicts with what is ordered in the aforementioned constitutional precept 61, and therefore it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional. In another regard, subsection c) of the cited Article 376 (formerly 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the right to strike; furthermore, it clearly establishes the limit on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading tasks at docks and piers. Finally, subsection c) also sets limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of "workers in transit of any other private transportation company," which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike in the effective provision of public land transportation service. On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the right to strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and public economy. Indeed, this section enumerates or distinguishes services with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, and those related to sanitation, cleaning, and public lighting. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must involve absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they be likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and public economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Regarding subsection b) of the questioned article—which excludes the right to strike from agricultural activity—this Court refers to what was set forth in Considerando VIII. Finally, in relation to the rule contained in subsection e) of the challenged article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to decree in which other public activities the strike is prohibited in the event that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such attribution because it exceeds the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) set forth in constitutional numeral 61, according to which the power to establish in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited falls exclusively on the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

In that judgment, the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subsections a), b), and e) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code were declared unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved to law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, which expressly prohibits the strike in public services; however, it was clear in emphasizing that this rule must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, such that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Likewise, regarding subsection d) of Article 376, it was also not considered unconstitutional inasmuch as it was indicated that it establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the right to strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and public economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, and those related to sanitation, cleaning, and public lighting; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Thus, given that these are similar arguments already resolved by the indicated jurisprudence, and there being no reasons to change the criterion, the dismissal of this action is appropriate.

**IV.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE (EXPEDIENTE).** The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional device of an electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic nature or produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch" (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

**Therefore (Por tanto):** By majority, the action is DISMISSED. Magistrates Salazar Alvarado and Pacheco Salazar enter a note. Magistrate Rueda Leal provides different reasons. Magistrate Cruz Castro dissents and would grant the action.

Fernando Castillo V. President Fernando Cruz C. Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Jorge Araya G.

Jorge Isaac Solano A. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Note by Magistrate Salazar Alvarado and Magistrate Pacheco Salazar, with the writing by the former.

We agree that the present action of unconstitutionality must be dismissed, given that, indeed, the law, in its formal and material sense, could regulate the prohibition or limitation of the right to strike in certain cases of essential public services, but for this, it is necessary to draw the line of argumentation in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. This was indicated in the dissenting vote we subscribed to in Judgment No. 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019. On that occasion, we expressed that:

“In the opinion of the undersigned, there is a common basis for agreeing with the majority that there are certain essential public services where the legislator can prohibit the right to strike, so that, in general, it is possible to admit cases in which the law could limit the exercise of the fundamental right. But, as in any discussion in which the prohibition of fundamental rights is present, it is necessary that they be in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

In our approach, the bill should establish only restrictions on the right to strike, and not absolute prohibitions, as the legislators and the majority of the Chamber, as constitutional, establish. Thus, in the ten cases established by the bill to reform Article 376 of the Labor Code, there is no adequate weighing of the right to strike against the fundamental rights that serve as its limit, because not in all cases do they have the same intensity over the services provided by all workers. The regulation should only be aimed at prohibiting the strike when this mechanism of the workers represents an evident and manifest threat to the life, security, or health of all or part of the population.” Otherwise, a vast majority of public servants should not be deprived of the fundamental right to strike, when it is not an essential service and there is no clear and imminent threat to them. In the established terms, it implies for many an illegitimate restriction and a right that remains in theory, despite being constitutionally recognized. The criteria of the Committee on Freedom of Association can effectively guide this conclusion, since it has considered that:

“The principle regarding the prohibition of strikes in ‘essential services’ could be distorted if it were a matter of declaring a strike illegal in one or several companies that do not provide an ‘essential service’ in the strict sense of the term, that is, services whose interruption could endanger the life, safety or health of the person in all or part of the population (case of Nigeria No. 2432 and Sri Lanka No. 2519).” “It does not seem appropriate that all State enterprises be treated on the same basis regarding restrictions on the right to strike, without distinguishing in the relevant legislation between those that are genuinely essential and those that are not” (case of Canada No. 3057).

In our opinion, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is fundamental in the interpretation of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, since an exercise must be carried out to determine that in certain professional or even administrative positions, they might not represent a danger, so as to start from such a demanding premise that allows concluding that all activities lead to a clear and imminent threat to the right to life, to health, and to public safety. Certainly, such a conclusion might not be reasonable. In this sense, the imposed restriction unduly burdens the fundamental right established in the Political Constitution [...].

To this end, recourse is likewise made to the Committee on Freedom of Association, insofar as it maintains that:

“The following do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term: radio-television, the petroleum sectors and oil facilities, the distribution of petroleum for the operation of air transport, the gas sector, the filling of gas cylinders and their marketing, ports (loading and unloading), banks, the Central Bank, insurance services, computer services for the collection of tariffs and taxes, department stores and amusement parks, metallurgy and the entire mining sector, transport, in general, including metropolitan services, airline pilots, the generation, transport and distribution of fuels, railway services, metropolitan transport, postal services, the garbage collection service, refrigeration companies, hotel services, construction, automobile manufacturing, agricultural activities, the supply and distribution of food products, tea, coffee and coconut plantations, the Mint, the State Graphic Agency and the state monopolies of alcohol, salt and tobacco, the education sector, mineral water bottling companies, aircraft repair, elevator services, export services, private security services, except penitentiary services, airports, except air traffic control services, pharmacies, bakeries, beer production and the glass industry” (case of Republic of Korea No. 1865, Philippines No. 2252, Colombia No. 2355, among others).

Those cases that are genuinely essential must be established and those that are not must be distinguished, thus the provision in question exceeds a criterion of harm to the health of the population, so that it does affect the right to strike, and does not make a graduation or leveling of those health sectors that do not represent a danger to the life of patients, or even administrative ones, that might not have major consequences on the right to health of individuals. Falling into the temptation of qualifying that any strike in home medical care, outpatient consultation, medical examinations, laboratory tests, all generate a clear and imminent threat to the life, safety or health of all or part of the population, is a fallacy of argumentation, because not all of them lead to situations where the loss of health or human life has a direct relationship with the lack of an essential service. Consequently, the technique of the norm of prohibiting all activity, for example by regulation in health and hospital services, is not legitimate.

In our opinion, then, it must be permitted that, within the ten scenarios established in the norm in question, measures can be defined that guarantee that said service is provided in a minimal expression, sufficient to avoid the dangers that an essential service can entail, that is, threat or infringement to life, safety, and the health of part or all of the population. It is important to return to Judgment No. 2017-13786 of 11:50 hours on August 29, 2017, in which the Chamber heard the refusal in the Department of Forensic Medicine to perform forensic medical autopsies and deliver the bodies to the relatives due to being on strike. In it, the right of the relatives of the deceased to be given the death certificate and the body of the deceased, the right to respect for deceased persons, and public health were weighed. In this decision, the undersigned magistrate Salazar Alvarado added a note indicating that in essential services, those that are minimum must be defined, which need to be maintained to protect the recipients of essential services from receiving a provision suspended due to a strike, when weighing all the rights involved, it is reasoned that:

“Given the particularities, the maintenance of the essential services of the community is a limit to the right to strike upon the advent and possible infringement of fundamental rights. The foregoing implies the provision of the work necessary for coverage that guarantees the rights, freedoms or goods that the service itself satisfies. Thus, in the exercise of a strike that occurs in essential services that concern the community, there must be a reasonable proportion between the sacrifices imposed on the strikers and those suffered by the users thereof. In such a way, that the measures must be aimed at guaranteeing minimums indispensable for the preservation of the services, insofar as such maintenance cannot mean -in principle- that reaching the habitual performance level is required, nor ensuring the normal functioning of the service, but the community's interest must be disturbed by the strike only to reasonable extremes and not render it nugatory.” I reiterate that the consideration of a service as essential cannot entail the suppression of the right to strike of the workers who must provide it, but rather the need to have precise measures for its preservation; or, put another way, to ensure the provision of the work necessary to cover the rights, freedoms, or goods that said service satisfies, without requiring that the habitual level of performance be reached or its normal functioning be assured. Thus, the failure to timely deliver the bodies awaiting an autopsy therefore violates the right to health of the family members, with the understanding that this concept encompasses emotional, social, psychological, and spiritual health.” In this way, we conclude that the determination made by the legislator that the essential services established in the reform to Article 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) are all activities where the strike must be prohibited, does not differentiate those activities that allow for ensuring a minimum provision of services and thus covering the service, without prejudice to permitting the exercise of the right to strike as a fundamental right, and not establishing an absolute prohibition.” In accordance with the foregoing transcription, it is indeed possible to establish restrictions and limitations on the right to strike in public services, understood as essential ones. But, as also indicated in the foregoing transcription, not in all cases should they be understood as situations in which the legislator could prohibit this exercise of the right to strike for being strictly essential. In this sense, the legislator must weigh, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the application of those restrictions, by establishing those non-essential public services, in which case it is indeed possible to resort to a strike as a mechanism of pressure and/or negotiation. This lies in a task of establishing the distinction in the type of activity of the public service, so that there are no absolute prohibitions on the exercise of a fundamental collective labor right of the country's workers.-

**Exp: 18-015934-0007-CO** **Res. N° 2022-001015** **Different reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal.** In the *sub examine*, the unconstitutionality of Article 375 and subsection d) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is challenged, which established:

*“ARTICLE 375. - Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. The differences that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where strikes are prohibited, shall be mandatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts (Tribunales de Trabajo).”* *“ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the previous article, public services are understood as:* *(…)* *d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the functioning of private enterprises that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the public economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns.”* It should be noted that, on the occasion of Law No. 9808 (ley nro. 9808) called “Law to Provide Legal Certainty on Strikes and Their Procedures” (*Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos*) of January 21, 2020, the strike regime in Costa Rica was reformed. Furthermore, even though subsection d) of ordinal 376 was suppressed from the legal system (numeral 375 remained the same), its analysis is warranted by virtue of the possible effects that Specifically, the claimant challenges the violation of numeral 61 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). In this regard, it alleges that said norm does not establish the absolute prohibition of the right to strike in the services provided by the CCSS and establishes a legal reserve for determining the public services in which a strike is not permissible. It adds that the prohibition of this right is circumscribed to qualified public services. It reproaches the absolute prohibition of the right to strike for all workers who provide services at the CCSS. On the other hand, it also claims the violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (Comité de Libertad Sindical). In that sense, it argues that the restriction of the right to strike must be circumscribed to qualified public services and to those workers who are absolutely indispensable; that is, it considers that the strike should be permitted as long as the functioning of minimum services is guaranteed. Finally, it challenges the violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and the prohibition of arbitrariness in the exercise of trade union freedom and the right to strike, by encompassing all activities within the concept of “essential service” (*servicio esencial*). It considers that there is discrimination against all CCSS employees, since the concept of “essential service” (*servicio esencial*) is generalized. It adds that the case of a political protest strike is not provided for.

On this matter, on the occasion of the legislative consultation of the bill called “Law to Provide Legal Certainty on Strikes and Their Procedures” (*Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos*) that reformed the strike regime in Costa Rica, this Court, in opinion 2019020596 at 19:15 hours on October 25, 2019, developed a series of general postulates regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition of strikes in essential public services, which I consider applicable in the *sub lite*. On that occasion, the Chamber ruled:

***“A) First general premise: soft law nature of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CLS) of the International Labour Organization (ILO).*** *For the purposes of resolving this consultation, we consider it fundamental ab initio to clarify the non-binding nature of the recommendations of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and what implications derive from this.* *The ILO is a “tripartite” agency of the United Nations Organization that carries out its work through three fundamental bodies with representatives of governments, employers, and workers:* * *“The* [*International Labour Conference*](https://www.ilo.org/ilc/AbouttheILC/lang--es/index.htm) *establishes international labor standards and defines the general policies of the Organization. The Conference, which is frequently called the international parliament of labor, meets once a year.* It is also a forum for the discussion of fundamental social and labor issues.

The Governing Body (Consejo de Administración) is the executive body of the ILO and meets three times a year in Geneva. It makes decisions on ILO policy and establishes the program and budget, which is then submitted to the Conference for adoption.

The International Labour Office (Oficina internacional del trabajo) is the permanent secretariat of the International Labour Organization. It is responsible for all ILO activities, which it carries out under the supervision of the Governing Body (Consejo de Administración) and the direction of the Director General.[2] The CFA, created by the ILO in 1951, is a Committee of the Governing Body (Consejo de Administración) and, as a supervisory body, its purpose is to analyze complaints of violations of freedom of association, which may be filed by employers' or workers' organizations. It is composed, as a tripartite body, of nine full members and nine substitutes, drawn in equal numbers from the Government, Worker, and Employer groups of the Governing Body (Consejo de Administración), in addition to an independent chairperson elected by that same Body.[3] Regarding the nature of the CFA's decisions, the International Labour Office noted:

"2. (…) The Committee meets three times a year and, taking into account the observations submitted by governments, examines the complaints filed against them and recommends to the Governing Body (Consejo de Administración), as appropriate, that a case does not require further examination (definitive report) or that the attention of the government concerned should be drawn to the problems encountered and it should be invited to take appropriate measures to resolve them (interim reports or reports in which the Committee asks to be kept informed of the evolution of the situation). Finally, the Committee may have to determine whether it is appropriate to try to obtain the agreement of the government concerned for the case to be referred to the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation (Comisión de Investigación y de Conciliación).

3. The conclusions adopted by the Committee in specific cases are intended to guide Governments and national authorities in the discussions and actions to be taken in follow-up to its recommendations on freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. (…)”.[4] From the foregoing, it is observed that within the ILO, the CFA's decisions are conceived as recommendations with the character of guidance guidelines, which is consistent with the fact that there is no conventional legal rule that expressly confers binding nature on such decisions.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, the respondent raised a lis pendens exception before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court), since the unions had already denounced that state before the ILO, the latter had found Panama guilty, and a resolution had already been issued recommending a series of measures to be complied with. However, the Court rejected the motion, among other arguments, because:

"57. Furthermore, the nature of the recommendations issued by said Committee [referring to the Committee on Freedom of Association] is different from that of the judgments issued by the Inter-American Court. In the first case, it is an act of an ILO body with the legal effect proper to a recommendation to States. In the second case, it is a judgment that, under the terms of the Convention, is final and not subject to appeal (Article 67), and of mandatory compliance (Article 68.1)." (Judgment of November 18, 1999 -Preliminary Exceptions-; emphasis not in the original).

Ergo, at the level of the highest conventional body on human rights within the American sphere, the distinct legal nature between a "recommendation" from the Committee on Freedom of Association, whose legal effect is restricted to the limits proper to a decision of this type, and a judgment of the IACHR Court, which (among other characteristics that distinguish it from the former) is of mandatory observance, according to numeral 68.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, has also been affirmed.

Now, even though the CFA's recommendations are not binding, this Chamber recognizes the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the supervisory bodies, distinct from that of simple axiological or theoretical recommendations. In this way, the CFA's recommendations are useful as qualified guides to orient the interpretation and application of labor regulations, since they are a source of soft law to the extent that, although no normative provision confers binding nature upon them, they always hold legal relevance. However, such a degree of importance does not imply that national authorities lack a margin of appreciation in the face of a CFA recommendation, provided that a reasonable and duly supported justification is noted, which in no way entails action contrary to the obligation to act in good faith in compliance with international treaties. Specifically, in the constitutional sphere, the recommendation of an ILO supervisory body would be a relevant element to consider among other involved factors, also of great importance, when resolving a conflict between constitutional rights (including those of a non-labor nature, such as those relating to the protection of the environment, health, life, security, or property), where the fundamental objective is to seek an adequate balance among them and avoid a transgression of the essential content of any of them, all under the aegis of the general principle that any private action that harms public morality or order, or that harms a third party, is subject to the action of the law (Article 28 of the Political Constitution).

Having clarified this point, the unfolding of this position in the sub examine will take into consideration several of the CFA's recommendations; however, the Chamber will depart from some of them, to the extent that they constitute soft law and giving reasoned grounds for doing so.

In this sense, as soft law, the aforementioned recommendations become appropriate for developing the contents of the Constitution, but not for going against them, since, from a positive hierarchical point of view, the former evidently cannot be placed above the latter, which are of a fully positive-legal and binding nature (hard law).

**B) Second premise: the delegation of the definition of the concept of public service (servicio público) to the legislator.** Article 61 of our Political Constitution currently reads:

“ARTICLE 61.- The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services (servicios públicos), in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which must prohibit all acts of coercion or violence.” This text, which has remained unchanged since 1949, expressly recognizes the right of workers (public and private) to strike; however, it simultaneously indicates that this right is not absolute, as it contemplates an exception: public services (servicios públicos). This is accompanied by the provision that both the determination of public services (servicios públicos) and their regulation are relegated to the scope of the law, with the legislator being obligated to prohibit all acts of coercion or violence.

In this regard, it is important to note that Article 61 mentioned above is a replication of the content of Article 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, which had been introduced through a partial reform (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943):

“ARTICLE 56.- The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services (servicios públicos), in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which must prohibit all acts of coercion or violence.” Now, from the reading of the minutes of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, it is inferred that the regulation of workers' right to strike was the subject of intense discussions within the National Constituent Assembly. Specifically, the criteria expressed by the Deputies are read in minutes No. 122 and 123:

• 1)Minute No. 122 of August 3, 1949:

“Regarding Article 56, the Social Democratic faction presented a motion for it to read as follows:

‘The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, with the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services (servicios públicos).’ [61] Mr. MONTEALEGRE noted the advisability of maintaining the final concept of Article 56, in the sense that the regulations subsequently made by law regarding the right to strike must prohibit all acts of coercion or violence.

Mr. ESQUIVEL spoke in similar terms. He also suggested saying, instead of public services (servicios públicos), “public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)”, a more correct expression, since the former can be understood as the services provided in public offices.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ accepted Mr. Edmundo Montealegre's suggestion, but not the change of expressions pointed out by the latter.

Deputy TREJOS indicated the advisability of prohibiting strikes in agricultural work (labores agrícolas), given the vital importance of agricultural production for our country. A strike in this type of work can result in the loss of one or more harvests, with the consequent damages to the community.

Mr. FACIO expressed that, without prejudice to a more careful future study of the grammatical and ideological meaning of the terms ‘public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)’, delimiting the fields of each, he thinks it is better to maintain the original wording of the 1871 Constitution on this matter. In Administrative Law, public services (servicios públicos) are those activities which, due to their importance and significance in national life, cannot be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy. In this broad sense, the basic branches of agriculture are included, in which it is not possible to accept a strike that would paralyze them.

Deputy ESQUIVEL clarified that the principle of safeguarding fundamental agricultural activities (actividades agrícolas) from the right to lockout or strike is established by our Labor Code in its Article 369, subsection b). The explanation is easy; agriculture being the fundamental activity of the country, on which our economy depends, a strike that would paralyze activities vital to the nation cannot be accepted. Hence - he continued saying - we are obligated to establish the prohibition of strikes in agriculture as a constitutional norm. He added that the formula ‘public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)’ is more comprehensive than that of ‘public services (servicios públicos)’, which Article 56 originally contains.

Representative BAUDRIT SOLERA stated that he considered the distinction between public services (servicios públicos) and public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) unnecessary, because Labor Law has a different concept of what in Administrative Law is understood by public services (servicios públicos), which refer to all those activities of public interest, whether or not they are in the hands of the Public Administration. He read to this effect paragraphs from Castorena Cabanellas, and Francisco Walter Linares. He added that the 1949 Draft went further in this matter. It expressly excluded the strike only with respect to public servants. He then referred to the study by Mr. Otto Fallas, professor of Labor Law at our Law School, a study he has cited on previous occasions. He read what the aforementioned Labor Law professor wrote regarding Article 56 of the 1871 Charter. Regarding the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work (labores agrícolas), he expressed disagreement since certain agricultural activities (actividades agrícolas) may be of public interest but others are not. If a strike is prohibited in the former, there is no reason whatsoever to extend that prohibition to the latter.

Deputy ESQUIVEL again intervened in the debate. He explained that Mr. Baudrit Solera's reasons proved him right, since public services (servicios públicos) is one thing for Administrative Law and another for Labor Law. It is better then, to adopt the term that will not subsequently lend itself to twisted interpretations. Everyone understands the concept of public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública).

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ expressed that it was not through the path of restrictions that strikes can be stopped. It is necessary to go to their causes, to end a series of social injustices. Those who attempt to stop strikes through the system of restrictions are unaware that they are a social phenomenon that obeys many complex causes. The right to strike is one of the fundamental conquests achieved by workers, after bloody struggles. Mr. Esquivel's motion - he added later - represents a curtailment of that right of the working class since it prohibits strikes in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) and in agricultural work (labores agrícolas).

Mr. ESQUIVEL clarified that he was not introducing new principles into the constitutional text that curtail or restrict the workers' right to strike. He was simply bringing into the Constitution limitations that already appear in the Labor Code, which prohibits strikes in agricultural work (labores agrícolas).

He is in no way moved by the petty interest of restricting, for the workers, a right, but rather by the patriotic interest of safeguarding the country's economy, which would be enormously harmed by a strike in the fundamental agricultural activities. As for public utility services, it only seeks to state clearly what our Constitution of '71, in its article 56, states in an ambiguous form.

Deputy ZELEDON stated that he understood that a strike should occur once the legal remedies to achieve a peaceful and just solution to the problem had been exhausted. He believes the constitutional text should state that the right to strike of workers is guaranteed, but only once all legal resources and means to peacefully resolve the conflict raised have been exhausted.

The Social Democratic motion was submitted to a vote and was rejected.

The floor then moved to discuss the motion by Licenciado ESQUIVEL, which states:

"The right of employers to a lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work and in public utility services, according to the determination of the latter made by law and in accordance with the regulations the same establishes, which must prohibit any act of coercion or violence." [61] Deputy HERRERO stated that the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work benefits all Costa Ricans without distinction of any kind.

Representative MONGE ALVAREZ insisted that the motion under debate represented a violation of the guarantee in article 56. He recalled that the Assembly had, in a certain way, committed itself not to curtail any of the social guarantees of the '71 constitutional text. Esquivel's motion practically does away with the right to strike achieved by workers after the most tragic struggles in history. It should not be forgotten that the vast majority of the country's workers are agricultural. If their right to strike is restricted, one of their basic rights will be curtailed. In fact, this right is being prohibited for the majority of Costa Rican workers. He added that in the banana zone there are many activities that could well be paralyzed by a strike. If the motion under debate passes, the workers of that zone will not be able to strike in justified cases. He insisted once again that restrictions were not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes, even when they are expressly prohibited in certain activities; as social phenomena that they are, they can appear at any moment. In this regard, he cited the strikes of the "Northern" and the "Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico." According to our laws, both strikes were prohibited. However, as they were based on just causes, they could not be stopped. Strikes cannot be ended by bringing prohibitions into the Constitution. They will only end when the problems that motivate them have been solved.

Mr. MONTEALEGRE stated that in the long years he has spent dedicated to agriculture, he has never witnessed a strike in the countryside. Personally, he said, I have only attended one strike: that of the brazos caídos. On that occasion, we closed the dairies. However, we distributed the milk free of charge to poor families and charitable institutions.

Deputy CHACON stated that he had voted for the previous rejected motion, but he will not vote for the one under debate, which practically comes to suppress a social guarantee. If agricultural workers, who in Costa Rica are the vast majority, are prohibited from striking, it means that the right to strike will have disappeared in Costa Rica. (...) He also considered the term "public utility services" to be very broad. He prefers that the original text of article 56 be maintained.

(...)

Representatives LEIVA and BAUDRIT SOLERA set forth the reasons that lead them not to vote for Licenciado Esquivel's motion. The former stated that he had voted for the previously rejected motion because he deemed it more just. He added that bringing a prohibition on striking for field workers into the Constitution is a notable step backward on this matter. (...) The latter, Mr. Baudrit Soler, expressed that he would vote for the motion if the prohibition regarding agricultural workers were excluded from it. There is no reason whatsoever to strip a large sector of the country's workers of the right to strike in specific cases. When agricultural activity is genuinely of public interest, the right to strike in such activities is proscribed by our labor legislation. He added that the great mass of peasant workers is being deprived of the means to defend their economic and social achievements. Clearly, such a thing signifies an inexplicable step backward on this matter, for in general, the civilized countries of the world have granted workers the fundamental right to strike, a right they have gained after a long and arduous struggle. At the fourth conference of the International Labor Organization, held just a few weeks ago in Rio de Janeiro, it was established that the agricultural worker must be placed on an equal footing with other workers in their rights. That was said and agreed upon at the aforementioned conference with the vote of our delegates. However, in the Constituent Assembly of Costa Rica, shortly thereafter, a truly inexplicable step backward is being attempted. As for the rest, the speaker again referred to what he had previously set forth regarding public services.

Deputy FACIO stated that even if strikes were prohibited, they would not disappear. If they are authorized, they will not multiply because of that either. To think in that manner is to ignore that strikes are social phenomena, alien to the Constitution or to laws, products of factual situations. Strikes must be admitted with courage as a characteristic of current economic times. Prohibiting the right to strike in a Constitution is an easy, but innocuous task, since the social problem that the strike represents and produces will not have been solved in any way. He added that this topic had been discussed at length within the Drafting Committee of the '49 Project. At first, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a valid recourse for all the country's workers, but only after exhausting certain rigorous procedures for peaceful resolution. However, the Committee later changed its view, prohibiting the right to strike in very qualified public services, a system very common in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and we have finally returned to the text of the Constitution of '71, which sums up the same principle. Then Mr. Facio made a call to his colleagues in the Chamber to keep the right to strike unaltered, just as the guarantee of article 56 records it, because by doing so the Constituent Assembly would be telling the country that the Social Guarantees, promulgated by Calderón for specific purposes we all know and regardless of that origin, are guarantees to which every Costa Rican worker is entitled, and that the former Opposition is coming to purify, making that thesis its own. (...)

Representative HERRERO expressed that he was going to vote for the motion under debate, without thinking of curtailing a right for the workers. However, for the sake of sincerity and good faith, he suggests to the proponent that he withdraw the prohibition concerning strikes in agricultural work from it.

Mr. ESQUIVEL agreed to withdraw that part of his motion, but not without first stating for the record how ruinous and deplorable a strike in agricultural activities would be for the country's economy. My motion, he said, was aimed at avoiding major harm for the country in the future. The nation's fundamental activity is agriculture, upon which our battered economy rests. If a strike in the future affects agricultural activities, the damage would be incalculable. I only sought with my motion to spare the country from such a situation.

Deputy MORUA stated that he had voted for the rejected motion.

I was not planning to vote for Mr. Esquivel's motion because it maintained the prohibition on agricultural workers going on strike, thereby depriving the workers of the Banana Company of that legitimate right.

Mr. ACOSTA JIMENEZ noted that since the proponent had withdrawn the prohibition on strikes in agricultural work, words were unnecessary, (…) He then added that as Article 56 of the Charter of '71 stood, when strike movements arise in the country, they can be resolved. He is in favor of maintaining the right to strike, because it would not be just to deprive the workers of certain foreign corporations that have taken and continue to take millions of dollars out of the country of the right to strike to improve their social and economic conditions. Furthermore, by proceeding in this way, he is consistent with his earlier ideas, when he proposed that the chapter on Social Guarantees be discussed article by article, without undermining any guarantee.

Deputy GAMBOA stated that he would not vote for the motion under debate, as he stands by the text of Article 56. He considers the term "public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública)" to be too broad. Tomorrow, a series of agricultural and industrial activities could be considered of public utility. It is leaving the door open to curtailing the workers' right to strike.

The motion by Mr. Esquivel, with the amendment noted, was put to a vote and approved. Consequently, the article of the new Constitution shall read as follows:

"The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike (huelga) is recognized, except in public utility services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." [61] 2) Minutes No. 123 of August 4, 1949:

"(…)

Article 4.- Discussion continued on the chapter of Social Guarantees of the Constitution of '71.

Representative ARROYO presented a motion to revise the article approved yesterday regarding the right to strike for workers and employers. Should the revision succeed, he moves that the respective article read as follows:

"The right to strike for workers and to lockout for employers is guaranteed, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services (servicios públicos). For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations ensuring a conciliation period. The exercise of violence or coercion as a means of promoting, maintaining, or halting strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited." [61] The proponent indicated that the formula approved in the previous session represented a curtailment of the right to strike. In the future, a Congress could interpret the scope of the term "public utility services" very broadly, undermining the right to strike. It could even be said that a banana contract, for example, is of public utility, to place the company beyond the reach of strike movements.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL expressed that the only variation of his approved motion with respect to Article 56 of the Charter of '71, which seems to have so concerned the Representative of Rerum Novarum, Mr. Arroyo, is the one referring to the incorporation of the concept "public utility services" instead of "public services," which is much more comprehensive. Precisely, the Labor Code gives that meaning to the term "public services." He added that his attitude did not stem from a desire to curtail a right of the workers, nor to render a social guarantee illusory. He has adhered to what the Labor Code provides on this matter, which within the term "public services" includes a series of fundamental activities that cannot be affected by a strike. Those activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electrical energy—must be placed beyond the reach of a strike, not to exploit the workers, but for the benefit of society in general. He insisted that his intention was not to restrict a right of the workers, but to seek a fair middle ground, thus protecting the community from the dangers of an indiscriminate strike.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ expressed his pleasure upon learning that comrade Arroyo had presented a motion for revision regarding what was agreed upon in the previous session concerning the right to strike, enshrined in all the Constitutions of the most advanced countries. He then added that he had searched the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the term "public utility services." However, none of the scholars he consulted refer to that term. They all speak of "public services," in which strikes are prohibited. Furthermore, the term approved in Mr. Esquivel's motion is too broad; it practically encompasses all the economic activities of the country, since all are of evident public utility. He then indicated what he had stated in the previous session, that is, that restrictions are not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes.

Deputy VARGAS VARGAS stated that he had deliberately chosen not to participate in the debate. In the previous session, he did not vote for comrade Monge Álvarez's motion, because the recent strike of the Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico—which he had supported and defended—demonstrated the injustice of prohibiting public service workers from going on strike when the reasons were just. He then read some concepts regarding limitations on the right to strike from a scholar on the subject, Dr. Carlos García Oviedo, a professor at the University of Seville. He added that he would vote for the motion presented, which aligns with reality. Should Mr. Arroyo's motion not succeed, he agrees that Article 56 be maintained in its entirety.

Deputy BRENES GUTIERREZ stated that he agreed with Mr. Esquivel's thesis, which fully conforms to the provisions of Article 369 of the Labor Code. The approved term "public utility services" is the appropriate one, and he believes it does not harm the workers in any way.

Licenciado GAMBOA indicated that he would vote for the revision, as he believes that if the formula approved in the previous session is maintained, the right to strike is mortally threatened. Tomorrow, in order to prevent a strike movement in a specific industry, it will be said to be of public utility. The same could happen with any banana contracting. The Constitution must establish the legitimate right of workers to strike in a way that does not lend itself to doubt or misinterpretation.

The revision was put to a vote and was approved.

The substantive motion by Mr. Arroyo was then entered into discussion.

Deputy HERRERO observed that in this matter, the problems of each country are distinct. In highly industrialized countries, strikes in public services—for example, in transportation—are the most harmful.

The opposite occurs in small countries like Costa Rica, where public utility services are the most important. He added that the most advisable course was to adopt the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution, to avoid a lengthy debate.

Representative ROJAS VARGAS expressed agreement with Mr. Arroyo's motion, which was fairer than the formula approved yesterday. Furthermore, it strengthens and invigorates the right to strike by restricting it only to public services (servicios públicos).

In terms of restrictions, the most concrete and precise terms must be used. The term "servicios públicos" (public services) is less broad than "servicios de utilidad pública" (public utility services). Or, to put it another way, the latter includes the former. He added that the right to strike must be maintained, hopefully with the fewest possible restrictions.

Deputy SOLORZANO also expressed agreement with the motion under debate. He stated that no amount of dialectical effort could convince him that the term "servicios de utilidad pública" (public utility services) is more expressive than "servicios públicos" (public services). With the approved formula, the right to strike is guaranteed and, at the same time, left hanging in the air. Moreover, it opens a very wide door for future Congresses to nullify this right of the working class.

Mr. CASTRO SIBAJA stated that, should Mr. Arroyo's motion not be approved, he has submitted one to the Board to maintain the original wording of Article 56. He added that the inclusion in the constitutional text of a conciliation period before resorting to a strike seemed to him to be a matter for regulation. Such an eventuality is contemplated in our legislation on the matter.

Licenciado BAUDRIT SOLERA expressed that he maintained the criterion set forth in the previous session, namely that the approved formula introduces no fundamental variation to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike. He considers that said right is instead broadened, since among public services (servicios públicos) there are some that are of public interest (interés público), but others are not. He continues to consider the approved term more adequate for the reasons stated in the previous session. In any case -he added- the fundamental point is that the legislator will define what public services (servicios públicos) are and what public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) are. The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or expansion of the term. The law will become a reflection of the Assembly's makeup. If it leans left, public services (servicios públicos) will be few. If, on the contrary, it tends right, they will be many. For these reasons and given the manifest insistence on the matter, while remaining firm in his criterion, he will vote for comrade Castro Sibaja's motion to return to the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Charter.

Deputy ZELEDON noted that Mr. Arroyo's motion fully satisfied his aspirations from the previous session, which is why he would give it his vote.

Deputy CHACON JINESTA briefly addressed the matter under discussion. He began by stating that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the workers' right to strike. In Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches are evidently of public utility (utilidad pública). If this concept is maintained, it is logical that the right to strike will have disappeared from our legislation. He deems it more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text, and therefore he suggests to comrade Arroyo that he withdraw his motion to allow Castro Sibaja's motion to proceed. The proponent agreed to withdraw his motion.

The motion of Deputy Castro Sibaja to preserve Article 56 as it stands, put to a vote, was approved.

Consequently, Article 56 of the new Constitution will read as follows:

"The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services (servicios públicos), according to the determination of these to be made by law and in accordance with the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." [61] From the analysis of the Deputies' arguments, a series of useful elements can be extracted to define the scope the Constituent Assembly gave to Article 61 of the Political Constitution in relation to the concept of "servicios públicos" (public services). Precisely, during the discussion of the motions concerning the norm in question, arguments arose both for and against using the concepts of "servicios públicos" (public services) or "servicios de utilidad pública" (public utility services), which, for greater clarity, are set forth point by point.

• 1)The first motion of August 3, 1949, which sought to modify Article 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, was rejected; however, during its discussion, several elements related to the reference made to "servicios públicos" (public services) emerged:

i. Deputy Esquivel proposed changing that term to "servicios de utilidad pública" (public utility services), since, in his opinion, this was more correct and, furthermore, public services (servicios públicos) could be understood as those provided by public offices. ii. Deputies Facio and Baudrit sought to give some type of definition to "servicios públicos" (public services). The former conceptualized them as those activities that, due to their importance and significance in national life, could not be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy, and the basic branches of agriculture in a broad sense. The latter indicated that they referred to all those activities of public interest (interés público), whether or not they were in the hands of the Public Administration. In relation to its definition, Deputy Facio considered it better to maintain the wording of the 1871 Constitution.

• 2)The second motion of August 3, 1949, this time formulated by Deputy Esquivel, suggested modifying the norm in the following terms: "The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work (labores agrícolas) and in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública), according to the determination of these to be made by law and in accordance with the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." Due to the foregoing, regarding public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) and public services (servicios públicos), the constituents pronounced as follows:

i. Deputies Chacón and Gamboa stated that the term "servicios de utilidad pública" (public utility services) was very broad and they preferred the original text of Article 56. Precisely, Deputy Gamboa clarified that the term "servicios de utilidad pública" (public utility services) could encompass a series of agricultural activities within that category.

</span></li><li style="margin-left:99.25pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Facio expressed himself</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> in the following terms: "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">this topic had been discussed</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> extensively within the Drafting Committee for the '49 Project. At first, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a valid recourse for all workers in the country, but only after exhausting certain</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> rigorous</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> peaceful resolution procedures. However, the Committee subsequently altered</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> its view, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services, a very common system in the labor legislation of Latin American</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> countries,</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> and finally we have returned to the text of the 1871 Constitution, which summarizes the same principle."</span></li><li style="margin-left:96pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:3.25pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Baudrit Solera again pointed out</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> what he had previously stated regarding public services.</span></li><li style="margin-left:94.66pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:4.59pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Finally, after Deputy Esquivel withdrew the part of </span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">his motion referring to agricultural work, the National Constituent Assembly approved</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> the article in the following manner: "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">The right of employers to lockouts (paro) and of workers to strikes (huelga) is recognized, except in public utility services, in</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> </span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">accordance with the determination thereof made by law and pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which shall disallow any act of coercion or violence."</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">.</span></li></ol><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:85.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:list-item; -aw-list-level-number:0; -aw-list-number-format:'%0)'; -aw-list-number-styles:'decimal'; -aw-list-number-values:'3'; -aw-list-padding-sml:8pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">3)</span><span style="font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">On August 4, 1949, a motion for review was filed regarding the provision approved the previous day and, should the review prosper, another motion was proposed so that the article would read: "</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">The right to strike (huelga) for workers and to lockout (paro) for employers is guaranteed, with the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">, or professional benefits, except in public services. For the exercise of this right, special regulations shall exist to ensure a conciliation period. The use of violence or coercion as a means to instigate, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">maintain, or stop strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited."</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">. At that moment, it was discussed as follows:</span></p><ol type="i" style="margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt"><li style="margin-left:96.38pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:2.87pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Arroyo, who was the proponent, considered</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that Congress could interpret the scope of the term "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public utility services"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> very broadly, which undermined the right to strike. Furthermore, he stated</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that under the previous wording, one could even say that a banana contract was of public utility.</span></li><li style="margin-left:99.25pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Esquivel mentioned</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that the Labor Code defined the term "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public services,"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> which included a series of fundamental activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electric</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> energy—not to "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">squeeze"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> workers, but for the benefit of society in general.</span></li><li style="margin-left:96pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:3.25pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Monge Álvarez stated</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that, after having searched labor law scholars' books for the scope of the term "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public utility services,"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> none referred to that term, but all spoke of "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public services,"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> in which strikes were prohibited. Additionally, he considered</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that the term (referring to public utility services) was too broad and encompassed</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> practically all economic</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> activities in the country, since all were of evident</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> public utility.</span></li><li style="margin-left:94.66pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:4.59pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Vargas Vargas agreed, if the proposed motion was not approved, that the full text of Article 56 should be maintained.</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> </span></li><li style="margin-left:91.33pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:7.92pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Gamboa pointed out</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that the right to strike was "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">threatened with death,"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> as movements of that nature would be prevented in an industry if it were classified as one of public utility, which could occur with any banana</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> contract. Therefore, in a Constitution, a form should be established that left no room for doubt.</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> </span></li><li style="margin-left:94.66pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:4.59pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">The motion for review</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> was</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> approved.</span></li></ol><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:85.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:list-item; -aw-list-level-number:0; -aw-list-number-format:'%0)'; -aw-list-number-styles:'decimal'; -aw-list-number-values:'4'; -aw-list-padding-sml:8pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">4)</span><span style="font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">On August 4, 2019</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; background-color:#ffffff">(sic) [1949]</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> Deputy Arroyo's substantive motion was heard, for which, of relevance, the following was debated:</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> </span></p><ol type="i" style="margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt"><li style="margin-left:89.33pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:9.02pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Herrero explained that in Costa Rica, public utility services were the most important and that the most convenient approach was to adopt the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution to avoid a lengthy debate.</span></li><li style="margin-left:92.67pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:5.68pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Rojas Vargas considered</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that the right to strike was strengthened and invigorated by limiting it only to public services. Likewise, he argued</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that in matters of restrictions, it was necessary to use the most concrete and exact</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> terms. He pointed out</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public services"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> was less extensive than "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public utility services,"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> and that the latter included</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> the former. He added</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that the right to strike should be maintained, preferably with</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> the fewest possible number of restrictions.</span></li><li style="margin-left:96pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:2.35pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Solórzano stated</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that he was not convinced that the term "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public utility services"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> was more precise than "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public services,"</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> and that the former opened a very wide door for future Congresses to annul the working class's right to strike.</span></li><li style="margin-left:94.66pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:3.69pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Baudrit Solera maintained that he held to the view expressed in the previous session, that the approved formula did not introduce any fundamental variation</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike, but rather broadened that right, since among public services there are some that are of public</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> interest</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> and others that are not. He added</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">: "</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> are</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> and what public utility services are.</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> The ideological composition</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or broadening of the term. The law will</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> be a reflection of the Assembly's makeup. If it leans to the left, the</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> </span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">public services will be few. If, on the contrary, it tends to the right, they will be many. For these reasons and given that there is a clear insistence on this, while still firm in his view, he will vote for</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> the motion by colleague Castro Sibaja to return to the wording</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> </span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">of Article 56 of the 1871 Charter."</span></li><li style="margin-left:91.33pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:7.02pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Chacón Jinesta mentioned</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> that the formula approved in the previous session practically</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> liquidated the right to strike for workers. He explained that in Costa Rica, the vast majority</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> of workers are in</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> agriculture, whose branches were evidently of public utility, so if this concept were maintained, the right to strike would disappear</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff">. Finally, he considered</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> it more prudent to maintain the original</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> wording of the 1871 text and suggested</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> to Arroyo the withdrawal</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> of his motion to make way for that of Castro Sibaja.</span></li><li style="margin-left:94.66pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; padding-left:3.69pt; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"><span style="background-color:#ffffff">Deputy Arroyo agreed</span><span style="background-color:#ffffff"> to withdraw his motion.</span></li></ol><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:85.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:list-item; -aw-list-level-number:0; -aw-list-number-format:'%0)'; -aw-list-number-styles:'decimal'; -aw-list-number-values:'5'; -aw-list-padding-sml:8pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">5)</span><span style="font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">Finally, on August 4, 1949, the motion by Deputy Castro Sibaja was approved</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> to preserve Article 56 of the 1871 Charter, just as it</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> was: "</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">The right of employers to lockouts (paro) and of workers to strikes (huelga) is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which shall disallow</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> any act of coercion or violence."</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">Thus</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">, from the study of the minutes, no discussion proper emerges regarding the motion by Deputy Castro Sibaja, who proposed maintaining the original</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution</span><a name="_ftnref4"></a><a href="#_ftn4" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; color:#000000; background-color:#ffffff">[5]</span></a><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">, but rather only</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> several isolated statements by Deputies who, during the debate on other motions, considered</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> it more convenient to return to the original wording. Now, from what the Constituent Members expressed, it is also observed that they reconsidered resorting</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> to the term "</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">public utility services,"</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> initially approved, because they deemed it too broad, so they ultimately replaced it with the notion of "</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff">public service,"</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff"> considered more appropriate.</span></p> However, it is no less true that no clear consensus was reached on the legal or political meaning of that concept and, rather, the final decision consisted of maintaining what was established in the Political Constitution of 1871, precisely the proposal of Constituent Member Castro Sibaja.

The foregoing is noteworthy because, within the framework of this replication of Article 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871 (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943) in Article 61 of the current Fundamental Law, one of the Constituent Members made direct reference to the fact that the term “public services” was defined in the Labor Code (Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943). In that sense, both the partial reform of the Political Constitution of 1871 and the Labor Code were approved by the same Constitutional Congress of Costa Rica less than two months apart: first, the constitutional reform that enshrined the right to strike and its respective exception (public services according to legal regulation); and second, the Labor Code that established a list of public services in which strikes were not permitted. Concerning the foregoing, the Labor Code, at the time of its issuance, also listed as public services some provided by private parties (for example, private companies related to clinics, hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in towns). From this it is inferred that the Constituent Assembly of '49 did not opt for the public nature of the entity responsible for the provision—a subjective element—to define “public service,” but rather, regardless of its ownership, emphasized the relevance of the activity for the community; that is, it resorted to an objective element.

Within this context, it is concluded that the reference to “public service” in Article 61 of the Constitution did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the choice was made to maintain the notion of the Constitution of 1871, which is understood in light of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service of the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which comprised activities of general interest and particular importance for society. This situation also suggests that the Constituent Member left the establishment of specific examples of public service to the ordinary parliamentarian, in accordance with the right to free legislative configuration (derecho a la libre configuración legislativa). As Deputy Baudrit Solera records: “In any case -he added- the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what are public services and what are services of public utility.” Now, it is clear that the aforementioned freedom of configuration must be developed with full respect for the basic parameters derived from constitutional jurisprudence. Precisely, in judgment No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Court indicated, regarding Article 61 of the Political Constitution and its conception of public services, the following:

“VI.- OF THE RIGHT TO UNIONIZE IN PUBLIC SERVICES.- (…) In relation to the content of union action, specifically concerning the right to strike, Article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of the aforementioned right of collective action is a matter reserved for law, and any restriction of said right must occur by means of law and may in no way favor acts of coercion or violence. It is also a result of the power conferred by the cited constitutional Article 61, that it is the responsibility of the legislator to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate that is satisfied through Article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which must conform to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in order to be consistent with the democratic principle upon which the national legal system rests, embodied in Article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is the supreme value of the Constitutional State of Law.

VII.- OF THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (formerly, 368) OF THE LABOR CODE THAT EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC SERVICES. The strike, as a manifestation of union action, encounters a limit when its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which it is the responsibility of the law to determine according to Article 61 of the Political Constitution. To this effect, the first phrase of Article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which states: ‘Strikes shall not be permitted in public services.(…)’, although it might seem to proscribe the strike in these services, that is, although it might seem to have an absolute prohibitive sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with what is established in Article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases set or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is consistent with the objective it pursues. This challenged Article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with Article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which - as transcribed in Considerando III. - establishes the obligation of union organizations to adapt their activity to domestic legislation.” In other words, while the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when it involves activities that constitute “public services” and that, due to their nature or the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain interests. Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which the strike is permitted, the established legal limits cannot be exceeded, as the exercise of the strike must be framed within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the questioned article 375 (formerly, 368), by providing: “Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…”, in and of itself exceeds the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In summary, the questioned article 375 (formerly, 368) is not in itself unconstitutional, and the analysis of unconstitutionality must be shifted to the cases established by law in which the prohibitive effect, in public services, occurs. Consistent with the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the action without merit regarding this point.

**VIII.- ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.-** We will now proceed to analyze the grounds of unconstitutionality raised by the claimants in relation—in the first instance—to the prohibition of the right to strike provided by the Labor Code for the agricultural sector in its article 376 subsection b) (formerly, 369 subsection b). As stated in Considerando V, ILO Convention 11 provided content to the freedom of association of the agricultural sector to guarantee this part of the population the free exercise of the right to organize on an equal footing with the industrial sector, through the pressure instruments accepted for the pursuit of their goals, specifically through the exercise of the right to strike. It is evident, in the judgment of the Chamber, that article 376 (formerly 369) makes a clumsy statement of what must preceptively be understood as “public services,” at least insofar as it includes within this concept the activity carried out by workers engaged in the planting, cultivation, care, or harvesting of agricultural, livestock, or forestry products; since these tasks do not fit within the generally accepted notion of public service. Without attempting to exhaust the definition of what public service is as a legal institute, it must be borne in mind for the purposes of this judgment that a public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and consists of positive provisions by the Administration or is under certain control and regulation by it. The prohibition of the exercise of the right to strike in activities that are not public services exceeds Article 61 of the Constitution, which orders the legislator to establish the activities in which the exercise of the right to strike is restricted solely in public services. From the foregoing it is inferred that by the legislator identifying—in subsection b) of article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code—agricultural activity with public service, it incurs arbitrariness, since such inclusion has no legal basis and entails the denial of the exercise of the right to strike in the aforementioned sector; which is also contrary to the recognized purpose of international Convention No. 11 of the ILO, to guarantee the agricultural sector the full exercise of the right to organize and its consequences. Based on the reasons stated, it is appropriate to declare the action with merit on this point, and consequently subsection b) of article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code must be annulled.

**IX.- ON THE OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, AS INDICATED BY ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY, 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.-** From the analysis conducted, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law to state in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect that banishes the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the provision and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done by applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which enumerates in article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code—transcribed in Considerando II—in which public services the strike is excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it. However, as the claimants and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic correctly observe in their report, article 376 (formerly, 369), when its subsection a) details the public services in which the exercise of the strike is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not make it easy to distinguish which minimum public services it refers to, by indicating: “All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…”. It is clear to this Court that this statement does not allow one to recognize which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; an imprecision that conflicts with what is ordered in the aforementioned constitutional precept 61, and therefore it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional.

In another regard, subsection c) of the cited Article 376 (formerly, 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the strike; furthermore, it clearly establishes the limit on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading tasks at docks and piers. Finally, subsection c) also sets limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of “workers in transit of any other private transportation company,” which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike in the effective provision of land-based public transportation services.

On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests (bienes jurídicos) of public health and economy. Indeed, in this section, provisions are enunciated or distinguished with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, and those relating to hygiene, cleaning, and lighting of towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that they must be absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they are likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. As for subsection b) of the challenged article—which excludes the strike from agricultural activity—this Court refers to what was set forth in Considering VIII. Finally, regarding the rule contained in subsection e) of the challenged article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to dictate in which other public activities the strike is prohibited in the event that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such attribution for exceeding the principle of legislative reserve (reserva de ley) established in constitutional numeral 61, according to which the power to establish in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited rests exclusively with the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code. (...)” As a corollary of the reasoning set forth, by constitutional mandate the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what the limitations on the exercise of the strike therein are. However, such a task must be developed within the framework of constitutionality, so that, according to the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction, no competence whatsoever can be assigned to the Executive Branch to define in what type of public service the exercise of the strike must be prevented, since such a function is exclusive to the Legislative Branch. Likewise, the legislator's free configuration must respect the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality, for which purposes the nature of the public service in question or its particular social impact become determining factors that would justify preventing it from being suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed, given the significant, serious, and immediate harm that this would entail for certain legal interests of health, life, security, or public economy. In addition, what the legislator defines as a public service must involve the satisfaction of collective needs, as well as be related to positive provisions of the Administration or be subject to particular control by the latter.” C) Constitutionality of Article 376 of the consulted bill. (...)

In this regard, according to point A) of this considering, the consultants should note that the recommendations of the CFA are not of mandatory compliance but are rather orientation guidelines, which agrees with the fact that there is no conventional legal norm that expressly confers a binding character on such recommendations, a position endorsed even by the I/A Court H.R. in Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama. The foregoing does not mean that this Chamber disregards the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the ILO supervisory bodies, whose technical and historical authority gives them a value superior to that of a recommendation of a purely axiological or theoretical nature. However, such recognition does not mean that the constitutional jurisdiction lacks a margin of appreciation when applying constitutional review, since the aforementioned recommendations, as already indicated, do not have a binding quality; hard law—the current constitutional regulation—must prevail over soft law, and the various constitutional interests at stake must be safeguarded in a balanced manner.

Consequently, the notion of essential services, beyond the life, health, and security of the person, can encompass the public economy, when it involves an absolutely indispensable public service that is likely to compromise that legal interest, as this Chamber established in judgment No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998.

Having clarified the foregoing, the question now corresponds to whether the Legislator can approve an absolute and general prohibition in a public service, or whether it must adhere to a scheme of minimum service operation, like the one regulated in subsection d) of Article 376 of the current Labor Code.

In this regard, this Chamber considers that the Legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, can establish the absolute and general prohibition of the strike in essential public services, provided that this does not violate the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality. Now, for the purpose of specifying the scope of the legislator's powers in this matter, what the Political Constitution itself regulates must be considered.

Thus, in accordance with numeral 61 of our Political Constitution: “The right of employers to the lockout and that of workers to the strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination that the law makes of these and in accordance with the regulations that it establishes, which must disallow all acts of coercion or violence.” This norm is a replication of numeral 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, in accordance with the constitutional reform of 1943.

As already elucidated in point B) of this considering, the reference to “public service” in Article 61 of the Constitution did not start from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the Constituent Assembly of '49 opted to maintain the notion of the Constitutional Congress of 1943 contained in numeral 56 of the Charter of 1871. If one takes into consideration the historical moment of the approval of this norm in July 1943, its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, is easily noticed.

Regarding the strike, this latter regulation links the concept of public service with the special relevance of the activity for the community; that is, with an objective element. Therefore, from the point of view of our Fundamental Law, it is plausible to extend the notion of essential public service to the life, health, and safety of the person, as well as to the public economy, provided that it concerns, as indicated supra, a public service that is absolutely indispensable and susceptible of compromising such a legal right.

Precisely, this particular impact on the aforementioned constitutional rights justifies the legislator opting for an absolute prohibition of the strike in the referred services. This is an alternative that becomes reasonable, insofar as the Constituent Power itself opted for two rules: 1) recognizing the right of employers to lockouts and that of workers to strike, and 2) excepting public services from the preceding rule, according to what the legislator would determine.

In this regard, it cannot be considered that reforming what is regulated in the current Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is unconstitutional, since, precisely, the Constituent Power entrusted the legislator with regulating the strike in public services, for which it is entirely competent to formulate the corresponding legal reforms.

A limit to such an attribution is, among others, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality (voto 1998-01317), which in the sub lite is not observed to be violated, since, on the one hand, the Constitution itself does not reject the option that the strike be prohibited in public services of particular relevance (on the contrary, it makes the exception of the strike in public services according to the legislator's criteria), and, on the other, the petitioners do not develop any technical, precise, and solidly supported argument, much less any legal test of reasonableness, for this Court to consider the list of essential public services regulated in Article 376 of the bill as lacking a relevant social impact and incidence, such that its suspension would not cause significant, grave, and immediate harm to health, life, safety, or the public economy. In such a definition, the constitutional judge must exercise self-restraint, given the broad margin of appreciation that the Legislator enjoys in the matter, such that only if the lack of transcendence of a public service for the mentioned constitutional rights were demonstrated with absolute solidity, could some injury to the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality eventually be sustained, which in the present case does not occur.

In addition, no violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness is observed either. As the Chamber noted in judgment 2018-000230 of 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018:

“Regarding the alleged establishment of a numerus clausus list by the legislator without the existence of technical criteria, the Chamber dismisses that any injury to the constitutional order exists. As can be inferred from the preceding paragraphs, the determination of the parameters to categorize a profession as a health science falls within the legislator's right to free configuration. The Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, given that such a situation would annul the discretionary power of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (for example, in environmental matters) or when the matter demands them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness. In the case at hand, the legislator's decision clearly raised the requirements to be a professional in health sciences, by demanding a minimum degree of licentiate and expressly enumerating the included professions, a decision that does not require a technical or scientific study.” (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

On this matter, it is reiterated that the reference to “public service” in constitutional Article 61 did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the notion from the 1871 Constitution was retained, which is understood as a function of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which comprised the activity of general interest and particular transcendence for society. Such a situation also reveals that the Constituent Power left the establishment of concrete examples of public service to the ordinary parliamentarian in accordance with the right to free legislative configuration. As Deputy Baudrit Solera records: “In any case -he added- the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what public utility services are.” Likewise, by constitutional mandate, the legislator enjoys a broad freedom of configuration to define what it understands as a public service and what the limitations on the exercise of the strike therein are. Similarly, in relation to the ILO conventions and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, no grounds that imply the declaration of unconstitutionality of the questioned norms are appreciated. Such normative instruments do not directly allude to the right to strike, and the interpretations or recommendations of the ILO bodies are not binding, so that even though these are indeed relevant, in the specific case, the constitutional norms that regulate the subject and the reasoning expressed by the Chamber must prevail.

Precisely, this Court, in judgment 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, endorsed the constitutionality of article 375 and subsection d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code, without appreciating grounds that would detract from the arguments developed on that occasion, nor was any overstepping of the challenged norms in relation to the Law of the Constitution demonstrated.

Furthermore, even though it is indicated that at the time of filing the action, the political strike was not regulated, it is no less true that no arguments were developed that would sustain such an alleged disregard as an unconstitutionality by omission. Precisely, no development of norms or principles was presented from which an express or tacit obligation of the legislator to enact a law in that sense could be derived.

Finally, in the terms set forth in the filing brief and taking into consideration the content of the challenged norms, the matter regarding the declaration of a strike and its qualification regarding concrete situations, specific institutions, and their employees exceeds the scope of analysis of this constitutional review process.

**Exp: 18-015934-0007-CO** **Dissenting vote of Judge Cruz Castro. The restrictions imposed on the workers' right to strike exceed the limits of reasonableness and proportionality established by the Constitution.** In the decision of this matter, I consider that I must issue a dissenting vote, as I believe that the prohibition of strikes in public services, as indicated by Articles 375 and 376(d) of the Labor Code, is unconstitutional. Although it is true that the majority of this Chamber performs a conforming interpretation in this regard, I consider that both the literal wording of the phrase contained in the challenged Art. 375 (*“ARTICLE 375. – Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…"*) and the lack of differentiation between types of workers in the challenged Art. 376.d) (*“ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, the following are understood as public services: (…) d. (…) such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns.”*), are unconstitutional, for the reasons I state below.

From Article 61 of the Political Constitution, it follows that the right to strike of workers is a fundamental right that, while it may be subject to limitations when dealing with public services, can never be subject to an absolute prohibition. Now, regarding the point about which public services are involved, it seems to me that what the Chamber established in judgment number 2011-017212 at 3:31 p.m. on December 14, 2011, is correct. There, it was established that the limitations on the right to strike encompass not the totality of public services, but only the so-called essential public services (servicios públicos esenciales):

*“Such limitation does not encompass the totality of public services. Thus, the conventions and recommendations issued by the International Labour Organization, through the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts, have been outlining the cases in which a strike may be subject to restrictions or even prohibition and compensatory guarantees. In this sense, the ILO has used the term “essential services” to determine when it is feasible to prohibit strikes in public services. In 1983, the ILO Committee of Experts defined essential services as those “whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population”. This criterion was later adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association, for which the determining factor is the existence of an evident and imminent threat to the life, safety or health of the whole or part of the population (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 540; 320th report, case no. 1989, paragraph 324; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 517; 329th report, case no. 2195, paragraph 737; 332nd report, case no. 2252, paragraph 883; 336th report, case no. 2383, paragraph 766; 338th report, case no. 2326, paragraph 446 and case no. 2329, paragraph 1275.) This concept is not absolute, since a non-essential service can become an essential service when the duration of a strike exceeds a certain period or a certain scope and thereby endangers the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 541; 320th report, case no. 1963, paragraph 229; 321st report, case no. 2066, paragraph 340; 330th report, case no. 2212, paragraph 749; 335th report, case no. 2305, paragraph 505 and 338th report, case no. 2373, paragraph 382.) Specifically, and as it pertains to this case, the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO Governing Body considers the hospital sector, among others, to be an essential service (see 1996 Digest, paragraph 544; 300 report, case no. 1818, paragraph 366; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 427; 308th report, case no. 1897, paragraph 477; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 517, case no. 2077, paragraph 551; 329th report, case no. 2174, paragraph 795; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292 and 338th report, case no. 2399, paragraph 1171). The Committee on Freedom of Association has clarified that in essential services, some categories of employees, for example, laborers and gardeners, should not be deprived of the right to strike. (See 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274 and 338th report, case no. 2403, paragraph 601), a criterion that this Chamber endorses in the sense that in the hospital service, the prohibition of the strike only affects those public officials and workers whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. Now, the concept of prohibiting the strike in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation. As indicated supra, Article 61 of the Political Constitution recognizes the right of workers to strike, except in public services, according to the determination thereof made by law and in accordance with the regulations it establishes. In this sense, Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code regulate the following:* *“ARTICLE 375. - **Strikes shall not be permitted in public services.** Any disputes that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where the strike is prohibited, shall be submitted obligatorily to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts”.* *“ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, the following are understood as public services: a. (…)* *d. (* who perform work that is absolutely indispensable to maintain the operation of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the public economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns." Regarding the scope of these provisions, in judgment number 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Tribunal stated that:

"To this effect, the first sentence of Article 375 of the Labor Code, which reads: 'Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. (...)', although it appears to proscribe strikes in these services, that is, although it appears to have an absolute prohibitive meaning, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is consistent with the purpose it pursues. This contested Article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with Article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which - as transcribed in Considerando III. - establishes the obligation of trade union organizations to adapt their activity to national legislation. In other words, although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when it involves activities that constitute 'public services' and that, by their nature or because of the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain legal interests." In that same judgment, in relation to subsection 376 d) of the Labor Code, this Chamber addressed the issue of the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension would compromise the legal interests of public health and the economy. On that occasion, it was deemed that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, because it was necessary to protect the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services, a criterion that agrees with the opinions expressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO. In this way, this Chamber, in the referenced judgment, mentioned the following:

"From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law the enumeration of which public services may have the exercise of the right to strike excluded or limited. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect, which would proscribe the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service provision and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which lists in Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code, in which public services the strike is excluded, despite preceding the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it (...) On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services deemed absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is susceptible to compromising the legal interests of public health and the economy. Indeed, this section enunciates or distinguishes services with respect to which the strike is susceptible to compromising the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those referring to hygiene, sanitation, and lighting of towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines to establish in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must concern absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they are susceptible to compromising the legal interests of public health and the public economy; guidelines that respond to the criteria of constitutional reasonableness and proportionality." Furthermore, the fact that subsection 376 d) of the Labor Code refers to private companies requires an evolutionary interpretation, since as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law and by mandate of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution, today the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social administers the public hospital service, making it inexorable that the norm in question encompasses such service provided by the country's main hospital entity. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that based on the criteria expressed by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts of the ILO, the jurisprudence of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal regulations in force in the country, the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population. However, this Chamber is not unaware that the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO has also considered that, given the prohibition of the strike in essential public services, the affected workers should enjoy adequate protection, so that they are compensated for the restrictions imposed on their freedom of action in potential conflicts. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 546 and, for example, 300th report, case no. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 310th report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th report, case no. 1999, paragraph 166; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 327th report, case no. 2127, paragraph 192; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th report, case no. 2244, paragraph 1269). Among such compensatory measures, the Committee on Freedom of Association has deemed that the limitation of the strike must be accompanied by adequate, impartial, and rapid conciliation and arbitration procedures in which the interested parties can participate at all stages. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 547 and, for example 300th report, case no. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 308th report, case no. 1897, paragraph 478; 310th report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th report, case no. 2020, paragraph 318; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th report, case no.

2244, paragraph 1269.) (…)”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:19.5pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">These criteria are ratified through vote number 2018-01115 at 09:30 hours on January 26, 2018, when it was indicated that a strike is admissible in those non-essential public services (servicios públicos). Thus, Article 61 of the Constitution establishes, as a fundamental right, the workers' right to strike. However, the same constitutional norm makes possible:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">-A limitation on the exercise of such right to strike. Note that it is a limitation and not an absolute prohibition. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">-The limitation of the exercise of that right can only be by law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">-The limitation is for the case of public services (servicios públicos), but only those that are essential. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Regarding the right to strike in public services, there exist in Comparative Law three possibilities: absolute prohibition, absolute permissibility, and a mixed system like ours. Legal systems where the right to strike is <span style="text-decoration:underline">totally suppressed</span> in the case of public officials are, for example, the Chilean Constitution, which in its Article 16 absolutely prohibits the strike for public officials and even for employees of private companies whose services can be classified as public utility, or whose stoppage causes serious harm to the health and economy of the country. That model is similar to the US model where the strike is prohibited for federal government employees. (Paragraph 1918, Chapter 93, Title 18 of the US CODE). Other legal systems where the constitutional right <span style="text-decoration:underline">does not establish any restriction</span> would be, for example, the Italian Constitution, which in its numeral 40 merely establishes the right to strike and refers to the law for its development. The Portuguese charter, which in its ordinal 59 simply establishes the right to strike. A <span style="text-decoration:underline">third model</span>, similar to ours, is found in the Panamanian Constitution, which in its Article 65 provides that the law may establish special restrictions for the exercise of the right to strike in public services. Then, the Colombian Constitution, in its numeral 56, points out that it will correspond to the legislator to specify the essential public services in which a declaration of strike is not appropriate. Then, the Greek Constitution, in its Article 23.2, establishes that the law may impose concrete restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike of public officials. However, it clarifies that the legal limitations may not lead to the suppression of the right. In the case of the Spanish Constitution, Article 28.2 establishes the right to strike, yet it points out that the law shall determine the necessary guarantees to ensure the essential services of the community. Thus then, our Constitution opts for this third path, in such a way that although the right to strike is recognized as a fundamental right, it is permitted to limit to some degree its exercise when dealing with public services. We transcribe the cited numeral 61:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:19.5pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Article 61.- </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">The right of employers to the lockout and that of workers to the strike is recognized, except in public services (servicios públicos), in accordance with the determination that the law makes of these and in conformity with the regulations that it establishes, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:19.5pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In a similar sense, the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – incorporated into Costa Rican Law through Law No. 4229 of December 11, 1969 – grants the right to strike the rank of a fundamental right, and admits that the law can impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the State administration. Ordinal 8 of that international instrument prescribes:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Article 8.- 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:list-item; -aw-list-level-number:0; -aw-list-number-format:'%0)'; -aw-list-number-styles:'lowerLetter'; -aw-list-number-values:'1'; -aw-list-padding-sml:31.99pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">a)</span><span style="font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span></span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">(…</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of each country.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">3. (…</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">)”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Likewise, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights, “Protocol of San Salvador” – incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999 – contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right. However, the conventional norm foresees that it is a reserve of law to establish restrictions on the exercise of that right in the case of public services. It is important to highlight that according to that international instrument, the limitations that the law could impose must be consistent with the democratic order, that is, that the constraints on the right to strike must be proportional and have the purpose of protecting health, morals, and public order, as well as the rights of the majority of the citizenry. To that effect, numeral 8 of the Protocol provides:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Article 8.- Trade union rights.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">1.- The States Parties shall ensure:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">a) (…</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">b) The right to strike.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">2.- The exercise of the rights set forth above may be subject only to such limitations and restrictions as are provided by law, provided that these are proper to a democratic society, necessary to safeguard public order, to protect public health or morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others. Members of the armed forces and the police, as well as those of other essential public services, shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">3.- (…</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">)”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">As stated, this Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to clarify the scope of Article 61 of the Political Constitution. Thus, in judgment No. 1317-98 at 10:12 hours on February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution No. 5264-2003 at 14:42 on June 18, 2003), the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subsections a), b), and e) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code were declared unconstitutional, because it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved to the law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, which expressly prohibits the strike in public services; however, it was indicated that the prohibition did not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Indeed, I consider that numeral 61 of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted in the sense that there exists a total prohibition for the exercise of the right to strike in public services. On the contrary, it corresponds to the law to determine the cases in which it is appropriate to establish said prohibition, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. Moreover, as was indicated, that limitation on the exercise of the right to strike in public services is only for those classified as essential. Having set out the above, it is possible to affirm that the decision of the constituent assembly is framed within the social constitutional tradition that, on one hand, recognizes the right to strike, but on the other, admits the possibility of imposing certain limitations when dealing with public services, limitations that can only be imposed by law, that cannot be interpreted, from my point of view, as an absolute prohibition; and that refers only to essential public services.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Furthermore, I must highlight that the legal reform introduced by the law regulating strikes, No. 9808, in Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code to specify the scope of the definition of essential services and the regulation of the exercise of the right to strike in such services, was equally validated by this Chamber, through judgment of this Chamber, number 2019-20596, at nineteen hours fifteen minutes on October 25, 2019, a judgment in whose voting I did not participate. This matter requires a very balanced legislative framework, in accordance with criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, because it deals with the restriction of a fundamental human right: the right to strike. The restriction must be careful and of a restrictive criterion. Curiously, employers have the right to the lockout and the restrictions on such exercise are not as restrictive and unreasonable as those imposed on the workers' strike. A constitutional right as relevant as the right to strike must have very specific and reasonable restrictions.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Thus then, I consider that Article 375 of the Labor Code, insofar as it indicates <span style="font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-style:italic">The strike shall not be permitted in public services”</span>, is unconstitutional because it is a categorical affirmation, without nuances, since clearly such prohibition cannot be an absolute prohibition but rather, the strike should only be limited in the case of essential public services. And for its part, regarding subsection d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code, which defines “<span style="font-style:italic">clinics and hospitals”</span> as public services, limiting the strike in those cases, I consider that it is also unconstitutional because it does not differentiate between those officials whose suspension of work means that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. The restrictions in this case go beyond the limits of reasonableness and proportionality that justify the restriction of such a relevant fundamental right. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Fernando Cruz C.</span></p> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Judge</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><div style="-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">EXPEDIENTE N°</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">18-015934-0007-CO</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:1pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; border-top:0.75pt solid #000000"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SAL</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">A-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Electronic </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.South of the Iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, Distrito Catedral, Barrio Gonzá</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">lez Lahmann, calles 19 and 21, avenidas 8 and 6</span></p></div></div><hr style="width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left; -aw-footnote-numberstyle:0; -aw-footnote-startnumber:1; -aw-footnote-type:0" /><div id="_ftn1" style="-aw-footnote-isauto:0"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><a href="#_ftnref1" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; color:#000000; background-color:#ffffff">[2]</span></a><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> Official page of the International Labour Organization. Retrieved from: </span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub; color:#0000ff; background-color:#ffffff">https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--es/index.htm</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> </span></p></div><div id="_ftn2" style="-aw-footnote-isauto:0"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><a href="#_ftnref2" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; color:#000000">[3]</span></a><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> International Labour Office. Freedom of Association. Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. Sixth edition (2018). Retrieved from: </span><a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub; color:#0000ff; background-color:#ffffff">https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf</span></a></p></div><div id="_ftn3" style="-aw-footnote-isauto:0"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><a href="#_ftnref3" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; color:#000000; background-color:#ffffff">[4]</span></a><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> International Labour Office. Freedom of Association. Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. Sixth edition (2018). Retrieved from: </span><a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub; color:#0000ff; background-color:#ffffff">https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf</span></a></p></div><div id="_ftn4" style="-aw-footnote-isauto:0"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><a href="#_ftnref4" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; color:#000000; background-color:#ffffff">[5]</span></a><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> The only difference noted is a comma, since Article 56 stated “</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">trabajadores a </span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">la huelga salvo</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> en los servicios públicos</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">”</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> while, according to SINALEVI, the current norm reads “</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">trabajadores a </span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">la huelga, salvo</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff"> en los servicios públicos</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">”</span><span style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">, which, in this case, is completely irrelevant.</span></p></div></body></html> On that occasion, we stated that:

"In the opinion of the undersigned, there is a common basis for agreeing with the majority that there are certain essential public services where the legislator can prohibit the right to strike, such that, in general, it is possible to admit scenarios in which the law could limit the exercise of the fundamental right. But, as in any discussion in which the prohibition of fundamental rights is present, it is necessary that they are in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

In our approach, the bill should only establish restrictions on the right to strike, and not absolute prohibitions, as the legislators and the majority of this Chamber establish, as constitutional. Thus, in the ten scenarios established by the bill to reform Article 376 of the Labor Code, there is no adequate weighing of the right to strike against the fundamental rights that serve as its limit, because not in all cases do they have the same intensity regarding the services provided by all workers. The regulation should only be aimed at prohibiting the strike when this workers' mechanism represents a clear and manifest threat to the life, safety, or health of all or part of the population. Otherwise, a large majority of public servants should not be deprived of the fundamental right to strike, when it is not an essential service, and there is no clear and imminent threat to those things. In the terms established, it implies for many an illegitimate restriction and a right that remains in theory, despite being constitutionally recognized. The criteria of the Committee on Freedom of Association can effectively guide this conclusion, as it has deemed that:

'The principle regarding the prohibition of strikes in "essential services" could be distorted if an attempt were made to declare a strike illegal in one or several undertakings that did not provide an "essential service" in the strict sense of the term, that is, services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety, or health of all or part of the population (case of Nigeria No. 2432 and Sri Lanka No. 2519).' 'It does not seem appropriate that all State enterprises be treated on the same basis in terms of restrictions on the right to strike, without distinguishing in the relevant legislation between those that are genuinely essential and those that are not' (case of Canada No. 3057).

In our opinion, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is fundamental in the interpretation of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, as an exercise must be carried out to determine that in certain professional or even administrative positions, they might not represent a danger, such as to start from such a demanding premise that allows concluding that all activities lead to the clear and imminent threat to the right to life, health, and public safety. Such a conclusion could certainly not be reasonable. In this sense, the imposed restriction unduly weighs on the fundamental right established in the Political Constitution [...].

To this end, recourse is likewise made to the Committee on Freedom of Association, insofar as it maintains that:

'The following do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term: radio and television, the petroleum sectors and petroleum installations, the distribution of petroleum for the operation of air transport, the gas sector, the filling of gas cylinders and their marketing, ports (loading and unloading), banks, the Central Bank, insurance services, computer services for the collection of customs duties and taxes, department stores and amusement parks, metallurgy and the entire mining sector, transport in general, including metropolitan services, airline pilots, the generation, transport and distribution of fuels, railway services, metropolitan transport, postal services, refuse collection services, refrigeration companies, hotel services, construction, automobile manufacturing, agricultural activities, the supply and distribution of foodstuffs, tea, coffee and coconut plantations, the Mint, the State Printing Agency and the state monopolies on alcohol, salt and tobacco, the education sector, mineral water bottling companies, aircraft repair, elevator services, export services, private security services — except prison services — airports — except air traffic control services — pharmacies, bakeries, beer production and the glass industry' (case of Republic of Korea No. 1865, Philippines No. 2252, Colombia No. 2355, among others).

Those cases that are genuinely essential must be established and distinguished from those that are not, thus the provision at issue exceeds a criterion of harm to the health of the population, such that it does affect the right to strike, and it does not make a graduation or leveling of those health sectors that do not represent a danger to the lives of patients, or even administrative ones, which might not have major consequences for the right to health of individuals. Falling into the temptation of qualifying that every strike in home medical care, outpatient consultation, medical examinations, laboratory tests, all generate a clear and imminent threat to the life, safety, or health of all or part of the population, is a fallacy of argumentation, because not all of them lead to situations where the loss of health or human life has a direct relationship with the lack of an essential service. Consequently, the technique of the norm prohibiting all activity, for example, by regulation in health and hospital services, is not legitimate.

In our opinion, then, it must be allowed that the measures that guarantee that said service is provided at a minimum level can be defined within the ten scenarios established in the norm in question, sufficient to avoid the dangers that an essential service can entail, namely, a threat to or infringement of the life, safety, and health of part or all of the population. It is important to revisit Judgment No. 2017-13786 of 11:50 a.m. on August 29, 2017, in which the Chamber heard the refusal in the Department of Forensic Medicine to perform forensic autopsies and deliver the bodies to family members due to being on strike. In that decision, the right of the deceased's family members to receive the death certificate and the body of the deceased, the right to respect for deceased persons, and public health were weighed. In this decision, the undersigned magistrate Salazar Alvarado added a note indicating that in essential services, those minimum services that need to be maintained to protect the recipients of essential services from receiving a provision suspended due to a strike must be defined, weighing all the rights involved, it is reasoned that:

'Given the particularities, the maintenance of essential community services is a limit on the right to strike in the event of the advent and possible infringement of fundamental rights. The foregoing implies the provision of the work necessary for coverage that guarantees the rights, freedoms, or assets that the service itself satisfies. Thus, in the exercise of a strike occurring in essential services that concern the community, there must be a reasonable proportion between the sacrifices imposed on the strikers and those suffered by the users of those services. Consequently, the measures must be aimed at guaranteeing the minimum indispensable for the conservation of the services, insofar as such maintenance cannot mean —in principle— that it is required to achieve the usual level of performance, nor to ensure the normal functioning of the service, but the interest of the community must be disturbed by the strike only to reasonable extremes and not render it nugatory. I reiterate that the consideration of a service as essential cannot entail the suppression of the right to strike of the workers who would have to provide it, but rather the need to have precise measures for its conservation; or, put another way, to ensure the provision of the work necessary for the coverage of the rights, freedoms, or assets that said service satisfies, without it being required to achieve the usual level of performance nor to ensure its normal functioning. So, the lack of timely delivery of the bodies awaiting an autopsy, then, violates the right to health of the family members, with the understanding that said concept encompasses emotional, social, psychological, and spiritual health.' In this way, we conclude that the legislator's determination that the essential services established in the reform to Article 376 of the Labor Code are all activities where striking must be prohibited does not differentiate those activities that allow ensuring a minimum provision of services and thus provide coverage for the service, without prejudice to allowing the exercise of the right to strike as a fundamental right, and not establishing an absolute prohibition." In accordance with the foregoing transcription, it is indeed possible to establish restrictions and limitations on the right to strike in public services, understood as essential. But, as also indicated in the foregoing transcription, not in all cases should they be understood as scenarios in which the legislator could prohibit this exercise of the right to strike for being strictly essential. In this sense, the legislator must weigh, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the application of those restrictions, by establishing those non-essential public services, in which case it is possible to resort to a strike as a pressure and/or negotiation mechanism. This lies in a task to establish the distinction in the type of public service activity, so that there are no absolute prohibitions on the exercise of a fundamental collective labor right of the country's workers.-

Differences that arise in these matters between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where strikes are prohibited, shall be mandatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts (Tribunales de Trabajo).” “ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be:

(…)

d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable for maintaining the operation of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in towns.” It should be noted that, on the occasion of law no. 9808, called “Law to provide legal certainty regarding strikes and their procedures” ("Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos") of January 21, 2020, the strike regime in Costa Rica was reformed. Furthermore, even though subsection d) of article 376 was removed from the legal system (article 375 remained the same), its analysis is appropriate by virtue of the possible effects that Specifically, the plaintiff alleges the violation of article 61 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, it claims that said norm does not establish an absolute prohibition of the right to strike in the services provided by the CCSS and establishes a legal reserve for the determination of public services in which strikes are not permitted. It adds that the prohibition of this right is limited to qualified public services. It reproaches the absolute prohibition of the right to strike for all workers providing services at the CCSS. On the other hand, it also claims the violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association. In that sense, it argues that the restriction of the right to strike must be limited to qualified public services and to those workers who are absolutely indispensable; that is, it considers that strikes should be permitted provided that the operation of minimum services is guaranteed. Finally, it alleges the violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and the prohibition of arbitrariness in the exercise of freedom of association and the right to strike, by encompassing all activities within the concept of "essential service." It considers that there is discrimination against all CCSS employees, as the concept of "essential service" is generalized. It adds that the case of political protest strikes is not provided for.

On this matter, on the occasion of the legislative consultation on the bill called “Law to provide legal certainty regarding strikes and their procedures” ("Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos") that reformed the strike regime in Costa Rica, this Tribunal, in opinion 2019020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019, developed a series of general postulates regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition of strikes in essential public services, which I consider apply in the sub lite. On that occasion, the Chamber held:

“A) First general premise: soft law nature of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) of the International Labor Organization (ILO). For the purposes of resolving this consultation, we consider it fundamental ab initio to clarify the non-binding nature of the recommendations of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and what implications derive from this. The ILO is a “tripartite” agency of the United Nations that carries out its work through three fundamental bodies with representatives of governments, employers, and workers: · “The International Labor Conference establishes international labor standards and defines the general policies of the Organization. The Conference, which is often called the international parliament of labor, meets once a year. It is also a forum for the discussion of fundamental social and labor issues. · The Governing Body is the executive body of the ILO and meets three times a year in Geneva. It makes decisions on ILO policy and establishes the program and budget, which is then submitted to the Conference for adoption. · The International Labor Office is the permanent secretariat of the International Labor Organization. It is responsible for all ILO activities, which it carries out under the supervision of the Governing Body and the direction of the Director-General”[2] The CFA, created by the ILO in 1951, is a Committee of the Governing Body and, as a control body, its purpose is to analyze complaints of violations of freedom of association, which may be filed by employers' or workers' organizations. It is composed, as a tripartite body, of nine full members and nine substitutes, drawn in equal numbers from the Government, Workers, and Employers groups of the Governing Body, in addition to an independent president elected by that same Council. [3] Regarding the nature of the CFA's decisions, the International Labor Office stated: “2. (…) The Committee meets three times a year and, taking into account the observations transmitted by governments, examines the complaints filed against them and recommends to the Governing Body, as appropriate, that a case does not require more detailed examination (final report) or that the attention of the government concerned should be drawn to the problems found and it should be invited to take appropriate measures to resolve them (interim reports or reports in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of the evolution of the situation). Finally, the Committee may have to determine whether it is appropriate to try to obtain the agreement of the government concerned for the case to be referred to the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation. 3. The conclusions adopted by the Committee in specific cases are intended to guide Governments and national authorities in the discussions and actions to be taken in follow-up to its recommendations on freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. (…)”.[4] From the foregoing, it is observed that within the ILO, the CFA's decisions are conceived as recommendations with the character of guidance guidelines, which is consistent with the fact that there is no conventional legal norm that expressly confers binding character on such decisions. Furthermore, note that, in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, the respondent raised an exception of lis pendens before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), since the unions had already denounced that state before the ILO, the latter had found Panama guilty, and a resolution had already been issued recommending a series of measures to be fulfilled. However, the Court rejected the motion, among other arguments, because: “57. Moreover, the nature of the recommendations issued by said Committee [referring to the Committee on Freedom of Association] is different from that of the judgments issued by the Inter-American Court. In the first case, it is an act proper to an ILO body with the legal effect proper to a recommendation to the States. In the second case, it is a judgment that, under the terms of the Convention, is final and not subject to appeal (Article 67), and of mandatory compliance (Article 68.1).” (Judgment of November 18, 1999 -Preliminary Objections-; emphasis not in original). Ergo, at the level of the highest conventional body on human rights within the American sphere, the distinct legal nature between a “recommendation” of the Committee on Freedom of Association, whose legal effect is restricted to the limits proper to a decision of this type, and a judgment of the IACHR, which (among other characteristics that distinguish it from the former) is of mandatory compliance, according to article 68.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights), has also been affirmed. Now, even though the CFA's recommendations are not binding, this Chamber recognizes the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the control bodies, distinct from that of simple recommendations of an axiological or theoretical nature. Thus, the CFA's recommendations are useful as qualified guides to orient the interpretation and application of labor regulations, as they are a source of soft law to the extent that, despite no normative provision conferring binding character on them, they always hold legal relevance.

However, such degree of importance does not imply that national authorities lack a margin of appreciation when faced with a recommendation from the CLS, provided that a reasonable and duly substantiated justification is shown, which in no way entails an action contrary to the obligation to act in good faith in the fulfillment of international treaties. Specifically, in the constitutional sphere, a recommendation from an ILO supervisory body would be a relevant element to be considered among other implicated factors, also of great significance, when resolving a conflict between constitutional interests (even of a non-labor nature, such as those relating to the protection of the environment, health, life, security, or property), where the fundamental objective is to seek an adequate balance among them and prevent a transgression of the essential content of any one of them, all under the aegis of the general principle that any private action that harms morality or public order, or that harms a third party, is subject to the action of the law (article 28 of the Political Constitution).

Having clarified this point, the reasoning of this position in the sub examine will take into consideration several of the recommendations of the CLS; however, the Chamber will depart from some of them, insofar as they constitute soft law and by giving reasoned grounds for doing so. In this sense, as soft law, the referred recommendations become suitable for developing the contents of the Constitution, but not for going against them, since, from a positive hierarchical point of view, the former evidently cannot be placed before the latter, which are of a fully positive-legal and binding nature (hard law).

**B) Second premise: the delegation to the legislator of the definition of the concept of public service.** Article 61 of our Political Constitution currently states:

"ARTICLE 61.- The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." This text, which has remained unchanged since 1949, expressly recognizes the right of workers (public and private) to strike; however, it simultaneously indicates that this right is not absolute, as it contemplates an exception: public services. Accompanying the foregoing is the provision that both the determination of public services and their regulation is relegated to the purview of the law, with the legislator being obligated to disallow any act of coercion or violence.

In this regard, it is important to note that the aforementioned article 61 is a replication of the content of provision 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, which had been introduced through a partial reform (law no. 24 of July 2, 1943):

"ARTICLE 56.- The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." Now then, from a reading of the minutes of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, it can be inferred that the regulation of the workers' right to strike was the subject of intense discussions within the National Constituent Assembly. Specifically, the criteria set forth by the Deputies are read in minutes no. 122 and 123:

• 1)Minute no. 122 of August 3, 1949:

"In relation to article 56, the Social Democratic faction presented a motion for it to read as follows:

'The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services.' [61] Mr. MONTEALEGRE observed the convenience of maintaining the final concept of article 56, in the sense that the regulations that the law subsequently makes to the right of strike must disallow any act of coercion or violence.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL spoke in similar terms. He also suggested saying, instead of public services, 'public utility services,' a more correct expression, since the first can be understood as the services provided in public offices.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ accepted the suggestion of Mr. Edmundo Montealegre, but not the change of expressions noted by the second.

Deputy TREJOS indicated the convenience of prohibiting strikes in agricultural work, given the vital importance of agricultural production for our country. A strike in this kind of work can result in the loss of one or more harvests, with the consequent harm to the community.

Licenciado FACIO stated that, without prejudice to a future more careful study of the grammatical and ideological meaning of the terms 'public utility services,' delimiting the fields of each, he thinks it is better to maintain the original wording of the Constitution of '71 on this matter. In Administrative Law, public services are those activities which, due to their importance and significance in national life, cannot be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy. In this broad sense, the basic branches of agriculture are included, in which a strike that would paralyze them cannot be accepted.

Deputy ESQUIVEL clarified that the principle of safeguarding fundamental agricultural activities from the right to lockout or strike is established by our Labor Code in its article 369, subsection b). The explanation is easy; since agriculture is the country's fundamental activity, on which our economy gravitates, a strike that would paralyze activities vital to the nation cannot be accepted. Hence - he continued saying - we are obligated to establish the prohibition of strikes in agriculture as a constitutional norm. He added that the formula 'public utility services' is more comprehensive than that of 'public services,' which article 56 originally contains.

Representative BAUDRIT SOLERA stated that he deemed the distinction between public services and public utility services unnecessary, because Labor Law has a different concept of what is understood in Administrative Law by public services, which refer to all those activities of public interest, whether or not they are in the hands of the Public Administration. He read paragraphs from Castorena Cabanellas and Francisco Walter Linares to this effect. He added that the '49 Draft went further on this matter. It expressly excluded the strike only with respect to public servants. He then referred to the study by Licenciado Otto Fallas, professor of Labor Law at our School of Law, a study he has been citing on previous occasions. He read what the mentioned professor of Labor Law wrote in relation to article 56 of the Charter of '71. Regarding the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work, he disagreed, since certain agricultural activities may be of public interest but others are not. If a strike is prohibited in the former, there is no reason whatsoever to extend that prohibition to the latter.

Deputy ESQUIVEL intervened again in the debate. He explained that Mr. Baudrit Solera's reasons ended up proving his point, since public services mean one thing for Administrative Law and another for Labor Law. It is better then to adopt the term that will not subsequently lend itself to twisted interpretations. Everyone understands the concept of public utility services.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ stated that it was not through restrictions that strikes could be stopped. It is necessary to go to their causes, to put an end to a series of social injustices. Those who seek to stop strikes through the system of restrictions ignore that they are a social phenomenon that obeys many complex causes. The right to strike is one of the fundamental conquests achieved by workers, after bloody struggles. Mr. Esquivel's motion - he then added - represents a curtailment of that right of the working class since it prohibits strikes in public utility services and in agricultural work.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL clarified that he was not introducing new principles into the constitutional text that curtail or restrict the workers' right to strike. He is simply taking to the Constitution limitations that already appear in the Labor Code, which prohibits strikes in agricultural work. He is in no way moved by a petty interest to restrict a right from the workers, but rather by the patriotic one of safeguarding the country's economy, which would be greatly harmed by a strike in the fundamental activities of agriculture. As for public utility services, he only seeks to say clearly what our Constitution of '71, in its article 56, says in an ambiguous manner.

Deputy ZELEDON indicated that he understood that a strike took place only after exhausting the legal means to achieve a peaceful and just solution to the problem. He thinks the constitutional text should state that the right to strike of workers is guaranteed, but only after all legal resources and means to peacefully resolve the conflict have been exhausted.

When the Social Democratic motion was put to a vote, it was rejected.

The motion of Licenciado ESQUIVEL then came under discussion, which reads:

'The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work and in public utility services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations established by the same, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.' [61] Deputy HERRERO stated that the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work benefits all Costa Ricans without distinction of any kind.

Representative MONGE ALVAREZ insisted that the motion under debate represented a violation of the guarantee in Article 56. He recalled that the Assembly had, in a certain way, committed itself to not curtailing any of the social guarantees of the constitutional text of '71. Mr. Esquivel's motion practically does away with the right to strike achieved by workers after the most tragic struggles in history. It should not be forgotten that the vast majority of the country's workers are agricultural. If their right to strike is restricted, one of their basic rights will be curtailed. In fact, this right is being prohibited to the majority of Costa Rican workers. He added that in the banana zone there are many activities that could well be paralyzed by a strike. If the motion under debate passes, the workers of that zone will not be able to strike in justified cases. He insisted again that the path of restrictions is not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes; even when expressly prohibited in certain activities, as social phenomena, they can appear at any time. In this sense, he cited the strikes of the “Northern” and the “Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico.” According to our laws, both strikes were prohibited. However, since they were based on just causes, they could not be stopped. Strikes cannot be ended by placing prohibitions in the Constitution. They will only end when the problems that motivate them have been solved.

Mr. MONTEALEGRE indicated that in his many years dedicated to agriculture, he has never witnessed a strike in the countryside. Personally – he said – I have only attended one strike: a sit-down strike. On that occasion we closed the dairies. However, we distributed the milk free of charge to poor families and charitable institutions.

Deputy CHACON stated that he had voted for the previously rejected motion, but he will not vote for the one under debate, which practically comes to suppress a social guarantee. If agricultural workers, who are the vast majority in Costa Rica, are prohibited from going on strike, it means that the right to strike will have disappeared in Costa Rica. (…) He also considered the term “public utility services” to be very broad. He prefers that the original text of Article 56 be maintained.

(…)

Representatives LEIVA and BAUDRIT SOLERA set out the reasons that led them not to vote for Mr. Esquivel's motion. The former indicated that he had voted for the previous, rejected one because he considered it fairer. He added that taking the prohibition of agricultural workers striking to the Constitution constitutes a notable regression in this matter. (…) The latter – Mr. Baudrit Solera – expressed that he would vote for the motion if the prohibition regarding agricultural workers were excluded from it. There is no reason whatsoever to take away the right to strike in specific cases from a large sector of the country's workers. When agricultural activity is truly of public interest, the right to strike in such activities is proscribed by our labor legislation. He added that the great mass of peasant workers is being deprived of the means to defend their economic and social gains. Evidently, such a thing signifies an inexplicable regression in this matter because, in general, the civilized countries of the world have granted workers the fundamental right to strike, a right they have won after a long and painful struggle. At the fourth conference of the International Labor Organization, held just a few weeks ago in Rio de Janeiro, it was established that agricultural workers must be treated equally with other workers in their rights. That was said and agreed upon at the aforementioned conference with the vote of our delegates. However, in the Constituent Assembly of Costa Rica, shortly thereafter, a truly inexplicable regression is being attempted. In other respects, the speaker again referred to what he had previously set forth regarding public services.

Deputy FACIO stated that even if strikes were prohibited, they would not disappear. If they are authorized, they will not multiply because of that either. Thinking in that way is to ignore that strikes are social phenomena, alien to the Constitution or to laws, the product of factual situations. Strikes must be admitted with courage as a characteristic of current economic times. Prohibiting the right to strike in a Constitution is an easy but innocuous task, since the social problem that the strike represents and produces will not have been solved in any way. He added that this topic had been discussed extensively within the Drafting Committee for the Project of 'forty-nine. Initially, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted as a valid recourse for all the country's workers, but only after exhausting certain rigorous procedures for peaceful resolution. However, subsequently the Committee altered its view, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services, a system very common in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and finally we have returned to the text of the Constitution of '71, which summarizes the same principle. Then Mr. Facio called upon his colleagues in the Chamber to keep the right to strike unaltered, just as the guarantee of Article 56 stipulates, because by doing so, the Constituent Assembly would be telling the country that the Social Guarantees, enacted by Calderón for specific purposes we all know and regardless of that origin, are guarantees to which every Costa Rican worker is entitled, and that the former Opposition comes to purify, making that thesis its own. (…)

Representative HERRERO stated that he was going to vote for the motion under debate, without intending to curtail a right of the workers. However, for the sake of his sincerity and good faith, he suggests to the proposer that he withdraw from it the prohibition regarding striking in agricultural work.

Mr. ESQUIVEL agreed to withdraw that part of his motion, but not without first noting how ruinous and deplorable a strike in agricultural activities would be for the country's economy. My motion – he said – was intended to prevent greater damage to the country in the future. The fundamental activity of the nation is agriculture, upon which our battered economy rests. If a future strike affects agricultural activities, the damages would be incalculable. I only intended with my motion to spare the country such a situation.

Deputy MORUA indicated that he had voted for the rejected motion. He was not planning to vote for Mr. Esquivel's because it maintained the prohibition against agricultural workers striking, thereby depriving the banana workers of that legitimate right.

Mr. ACOSTA JIMENEZ noted that, the proposer having withdrawn the prohibition of striking in agricultural work, words were superfluous, (…) He later added that as Article 56 of the Charter of '71 stood, when strike movements appear in the country, they can be resolved. He is in favor of maintaining the right to strike, because it would not be fair to deprive the workers of certain foreign corporations that have taken and continue to take millions of dollars from the country of the right to strike to improve their social and economic conditions. Furthermore, by proceeding in this way, he is consistent with his previous ideas when he proposed that the chapter on Social Guarantees be discussed article by article, without diminishing any guarantee.

Deputy GAMBOA declared that he would not vote for the motion under debate, as he sticks with the text of Article 56. He considers the term “public utility services” too broad. Tomorrow, a series of agricultural and industrial activities could be considered as being of public utility. It is leaving the door open to curtail the workers' right to strike.

Put to a vote, Mr. Esquivel's motion, with the noted amendment, was approved. Consequently, the article of the new Constitution will read:

“The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public utility services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and with the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” [61] 2) Minutes No. 123 of August 4, 1949:

“(…)

Article 4.- The discussion continued on the chapter of Social Guarantees of the Constitution of '71.

Representative ARROYO presented a motion to review the article approved yesterday regarding the right to strike of workers and employers. Should the review prosper, he moves that the respective article be read as follows:

“The right to strike is guaranteed to workers and to lockouts to employers, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services. For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations that ensure a conciliation period. The use of violence or coercion as a means of promoting, maintaining, or paralyzing strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited.” [61] The proposer indicated that the formula approved in the previous session represented a curtailment of the right to strike. In the future, a Congress could interpret in a very broad manner the scope of the term “public utility services,” diminishing the right to strike. One could even go so far as to say that a banana contract, for example, is of public utility, in order to place the company beyond the reach of strike movements.

Mr. ESQUIVEL expressed that the only variation of his approved motion with respect to Article 56 of the Charter of '71, which seems to have so concerned the Representative of the Rerum Novarum, Mr. Arroyo, is the one referring to the incorporation of the concept: “public utility services” instead of “public services,” which is much more comprehensive. Precisely, the Labor Code gives that meaning to the term “public services.” He added that his attitude did not stem from a desire to curtail a right of the workers, nor to make a social guarantee illusory. He has adhered to what the Labor Code provides in this matter, which, within the term “public services,” includes a series of fundamental activities that cannot be affected by a strike. Those activities of manifest public interest – such as the production and distribution of electrical energy – must be placed beyond the reach of a strike, not to squeeze the workers, but for the benefit of society in general. He insisted that his intention was not to curtail a right of the workers, but to find the fair middle ground, thus avoiding for the community the dangers of an indiscriminate strike.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ expressed his pleasure upon learning that colleague Arroyo has presented a motion for review of what was agreed upon in the previous session regarding the right to strike, enshrined in all the Constitutions of the most advanced countries. He later added that he had searched in the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the meaning “public utility services.” However, none of the scholars he consulted refers to that term. They all speak of “public services,” in which strikes are prohibited. Furthermore, the term approved from Mr. Esquivel's motion is too broad; it practically encompasses all of the country's economic activities, since all are of evident public utility. He then indicated what he had set forth in the previous session, that is, that the path of restrictions is not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes.

Deputy VARGAS VARGAS declared that he had deliberately not wanted to participate in the debate. In the previous session, he did not vote for colleague Monge Álvarez's motion, because the recent strike of the Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico – which he had supported and defended – demonstrated the injustice of prohibiting public service workers from going on strike when the reasons were just. He then read, regarding limitations on the right to strike, some concepts by the scholar on the subject, Dr. Carlos García Oviedo, professor at the University of Seville. He added that he would vote for the proposed motion because it conforms to reality.

In the event that Mr. Arroyo's motion does not prosper, he agrees that article 56 should be maintained in its entirety.

Deputy BRENES GUTIERREZ stated that he agreed with Mr. Esquivel's thesis, which fully conforms to the provisions of article 369 of the Labor Code. The approved term "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) is the appropriate one and he believes it does not harm workers in any way.

Licenciado GAMBOA indicated that he would vote for the revision, since he considers that if the formula approved in the previous session is maintained, the right to strike is threatened with death. Tomorrow, to prevent a strike movement in a certain industry, it will be said that it is of public utility. The same could occur with respect to any banana contract. The legitimate right of workers to strike must be established in the Constitution in a way that does not lend itself to doubts or misinterpretations.

Submitted to a vote, the revision was approved.

Discussion then turned to Mr. Arroyo's substantive motion.

Deputy HERRERO observed that in this matter, the problems of each country are different. In highly industrial countries, strikes in public services —for example, in transportation— are the most damaging. The opposite occurs in small countries like Costa Rica, where public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) are of the greatest importance. He added that the most advisable course was to adopt the wording of article 56 of the 1871 Constitution, to avoid a lengthy debate.

Representative ROJAS VARGAS declared himself in agreement with Mr. Arroyo's motion, which is fairer than the formula approved yesterday. Furthermore, it strengthens and invigorates the right to strike by restricting it only to public services (servicios públicos).

In matters of restrictions, the most concrete and exact terms must be used. The term "public services" (servicios públicos) is less extensive than "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública). Or, to put it another way, the latter includes the former. He added that the right to strike must be maintained, hopefully with the fewest possible restrictions.

Deputy SOLORZANO also stated his agreement with the motion under debate. He expressed that no amount of dialectical effort would convince him that the term "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) is more expressive than "public services" (servicios públicos). With the approved formula, the right to strike is guaranteed and at the same time left hanging in the air. Moreover, a very wide door is opened for future Congresses to annul that right of the working class.

Mr. CASTRO SIBAJA stated that, should Mr. Arroyo's motion not be approved, he has submitted one to the Board to maintain the original wording of article 56. He added that the inclusion in the constitutional text of a conciliation period before reaching a strike seemed regulatory to him. Such an eventuality is contemplated in our legislation on the matter.

Licenciado BAUDRIT SOLERA expressed that he maintained the opinion stated in the previous session, that the approved formula does not introduce any fundamental variation to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike. He believes that this right is rather broadened, since among public services (servicios públicos) there are some that are of public interest, but others are not. He continues to consider the approved term more adequate for the reasons set forth in the previous session. In any case —he added— the fundamental point is that the legislator will define what public services (servicios públicos) are and what public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) are. The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or broadening of the term. The law will be a reflection of the Assembly's makeup. If it leans to the left, public services (servicios públicos) will be few. If, on the contrary, it tends to the right, they will be many. For these reasons, and given that there is a manifest determination in that regard, even while remaining firm in his opinion, he will vote for comrade Castro Sibaja's motion to return to the wording of article 56 of the 1871 Charter.

Deputy ZELEDON observed that Mr. Arroyo's motion entirely satisfied his desires from the previous session, which is why he would give it his vote.

Deputy CHACON JINESTA briefly addressed the matter under discussion. He began by saying that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the workers' right to strike. In Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches are evidently of public utility. If this concept is maintained, it is logical that the right to strike will have disappeared from our legislation. He believes it is more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text, and therefore suggests to comrade Arroyo that he withdraw his motion to allow Castro Sibaja's to proceed. The proponent agreed to withdraw his motion.

Submitted to a vote, Deputy Castro Sibaja's motion to preserve article 56 as it stands was approved.

Consequently, article 56 of the new Constitution shall read as follows:

"The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services (servicios públicos), in accordance with the determination of these made by law and according to the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." [61] From the analysis of the Deputies' arguments, a series of useful elements is extracted to define the scope that the Constituent Assembly gave to numeral 61 of the Political Constitution in relation to the concept of "public services" (servicios públicos). Precisely, during the discussion of the motions related to the norm in question, arguments for and against the use of the concepts of "public services" (servicios públicos) or "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) arose, which for greater clarity are set forth point by point.

• 1)The first motion of August 3, 1949, which sought to modify article 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, was rejected; however, during its discussion several elements emerged related to the reference made to "public services" (servicios públicos):

i. Deputy Esquivel proposed changing that term to "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública), since, in his opinion, this was more correct and, furthermore, public services (servicios públicos) could be understood as those provided by public offices.

ii. Deputies Facio and Baudrit sought to give some kind of definition to "public services" (servicios públicos). The former conceptualized them as those activities that, due to their importance and significance in national life, could not be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy, and the basic branches of agriculture in a broad sense. The latter indicated that they referred to all those activities of public interest, whether or not they were in the hands of the Public Administration. In relation to its definition, Deputy Facio considered that it was better to maintain the wording of the 1871 Constitution.

• 2)The second motion of August 3, 1949, this time formulated by Deputy Esquivel, suggested modifying the norm in the following terms: "The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work and in public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública), in accordance with the determination of these made by law and according to the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." Due to the foregoing, regarding public utility services (servicios de utilidad pública) and public services (servicios públicos), the constituents pronounced as follows:

i. Deputies Chacón and Gamboa stated that the term "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) was very broad and they preferred the original text of numeral 56. Precisely, Deputy Gamboa clarified that the term "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) could encompass a series of agricultural activities within that category.

ii. Deputy Facio expressed himself in the following terms: "a great deal of discussion on this topic had taken place within the Drafting Committee for the 1949 Project. At first, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a resource valid for all the country's workers, but only after exhausting certain rigorous procedures for peaceful resolution." However, the Commission subsequently altered its opinion, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services, a system very common in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and finally we have returned to the text of the 1871 Constitution, which summarizes the same principle.” iii. Deputy Baudrit Solera again pointed out what he had already stated regarding public services.

iv. Finally, after Deputy Esquivel withdrew the part of his motion referring to agricultural work, the National Constituent Assembly approved the article as follows: “The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public utility services, according to the determination of these made by law in accordance with the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” 3) On August 4, 1949, a motion to revise the article approved the previous day was filed and, if the revision were to succeed, another motion was proposed so that the article would read: “The right to strike is guaranteed to workers and to lockout to employers, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services. For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations ensuring a conciliation period. The exercise of violence or coercion as a means of promoting, maintaining, or stopping strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited.” At that time, it was discussed in this manner:

i. Deputy Arroyo, who was the proponent, considered that Congress could interpret the scope of the term “public utility services” in a very broad way, which would undermine the right to strike, and, furthermore, stated that with the foregoing one could go so far as to say that even a banana contract was of public utility.

ii. Deputy Esquivel noted that the Labor Code gave meaning to the term “public services,” which included a series of fundamental activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electric energy—not to “squeeze” the workers, but for the benefit of society in general.

iii. Deputy Monge Álvarez stated that, after searching in the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the term “public utility services,” none referred to that term, but rather all spoke of “public services,” in which strikes were prohibited; furthermore, he considered that the term (referring to public utility services) was too broad and comprised practically all economic activities of the country, since all were of evident public utility.

iv. Deputy Vargas Vargas agreed, if the proposed motion was not approved, that Article 56 should be kept intact.

v. Deputy Gamboa pointed out that the right to strike was “threatened with death,” since movements of that nature would be prevented in an industry if it were classified as of public utility, which could happen with any banana contract, and therefore a Constitution should establish some form that would leave no room for doubt.

vi. The motion for revision was approved.

• 4)On August 4, 2019 (sic) [1949], Deputy Arroyo's substantive motion was heard, for which, relevantly, the following was debated:

i. Deputy Herrero explained that in Costa Rica, public utility services were the most important ones and that the most convenient course was to adopt the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution to avoid a lengthy debate.

ii. Deputy Rojas Vargas considered that the right to strike was strengthened and invigorated by limiting it only to public services; likewise, he argued that regarding restrictions, it was necessary to use the most concrete and exact terms.

He indicated that “public services” (servicios públicos) was less extensive than that of “services of public utility” (servicios de utilidad pública), and that the latter included the former. He added that the right to strike should be maintained, ideally with the fewest possible restrictions.

iii. Deputy Solórzano expressed that they did not convince him that the term “services of public utility” (servicios de utilidad pública) was more expressive than “public services” (servicios públicos), and that with the former, a very wide door was opened for future Congresses to annul the working class's right to strike.

iv. Deputy Baudrit Solera maintained that he upheld the criterion expressed in the previous session, in that the formula approved did not introduce any fundamental variation to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike, but rather expanded that right, since among public services there are some that are of public interest and others that are not; he added: “the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what services of public utility are. The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or the expansion of the term. The law will come to be the reflection of the Assembly's composition. If it leans to the left, public services will be few. If, on the contrary, it tends to the right, they will be many. For these reasons and given that there is a manifest insistence on it, while still remaining firm in his criterion, he will vote for the motion of colleague Castro Sibaja to return to the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Charter.” v. Deputy Chacón Jinesta recounted that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the workers' right to strike; he explained that, in Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches were evidently of public utility, and therefore if this concept were maintained, the right to strike would disappear; finally, he considered it more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text and suggested to Arroyo that he withdraw his motion to give way to Castro Sibaja's.

vi. Deputy Arroyo agreed to withdraw his motion.

• 5)Finally, on August 4, 1949, the motion of Deputy Castro Sibaja was approved so that Article 56 of the 1871 Charter would be preserved as it was: “The right of employers to the lockout (paro) and of workers to the strike is recognized except in public services (servicios públicos), in accordance with the determination that the law makes of these and in conformity with the regulations that the same establishes, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence.” Thus, from the study of the minutes, no discussion properly emerges regarding the motion of Deputy Castro Sibaja, who proposed that the original wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution be maintained[5], only several isolated statements from Deputies who, during the debate on other motions, considered it more convenient to return to the original wording. Now, from what was stated by the Constituent members, it is also observed that they reconsidered resorting to the term “services of public utility” (servicios de utilidad pública), initially approved, because they deemed it too broad, so that, finally, they substituted it with the notion of “public service” (servicio público), considered more appropriate. However, it is no less true that no clear consensus was reached on the legal or political meaning of this concept, and rather, the final decision consisted of maintaining what was prescribed in the Political Constitution of 1871, precisely the proposal of Constituent member Castro Sibaja.

The foregoing is noteworthy because, within the framework of this replication of section 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871 (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943) in Article 61 of the current Fundamental Law, one of the Constituent members made direct reference to the fact that the term “public services” (servicios públicos) was defined in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943). In that sense, both the partial reform of the Political Constitution of 1871 and the Labor Code were approved by the same Constitutional Congress of Costa Rica less than two months apart: first, the constitutional reform that consecrated the right to strike and its respective exception (public services according to legal regulation); and second, the Labor Code that established a list of public services in which the strike was not permitted. Regarding the above, the Labor Code, at the time of its issuance, also listed as public services some provided by private parties (for example, private companies related to clinics, hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns). From this it is inferred that the Constituent members of '49 did not opt for the public nature of the entity in charge of the provision—a subjective element—to define “public service” (servicio público), but rather, regardless of its ownership, they emphasized the relevance of the activity for the community; that is, they resorted to an objective element.

Within this context, it is concluded that the reference to “public service” (servicio público) in constitutional section 61 did not start from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, it was decided to maintain the notion from the 1871 Constitution, which is understood in light of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which comprised activity of general interest and particular importance for society. Such a situation also suggests that the Constituent members left the establishment of concrete examples of public service to the ordinary parliamentarian in view of the right to free legislative configuration. As Deputy Baudrit Solera recorded: “In any case -he added- the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what services of public utility are.” Now, it is clear that the referred freedom of configuration must be developed with full respect for the basic parameters derived from constitutional jurisprudence. Precisely, in ruling No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Tribunal indicated, with respect to Article 61 of the Political Constitution and its conception of public services, the following:

“VI.- ON THE RIGHT OF UNIONIZATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES.- (...) In relation to the content of union action, specifically regarding the right to strike, Article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of said right of collective action is a matter reserved to law, with any restriction of said right having to be made by means of law and in no way being able to favor acts of coercion or violence. It is moreover a result of the attribution conferred by the cited constitutional section 61, that it is for the legislator to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate that is satisfied by Article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which must adjust to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in order to be consistent with the democratic principle upon which the national legal system rests, embodied in Article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is the supreme value of the Constitutional State of Law.

VII.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (formerly, 368) OF THE LABOR CODE THAT EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FROM PUBLIC SERVICES. The strike, as a manifestation of union action, finds a limit when its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which it is for the law to determine according to Article 61 of the Political Constitution. To this effect, the first phrase of Article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which states: ‘The strike shall not be permitted in public services. (...)’, although it would seem to proscribe the strike in these services, that is, although it would seem to have an absolute prohibitive sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with what is set forth in Article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, in order to be consistent with the end it pursues. This questioned Article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with Article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which—as transcribed in Considering III—establishes the obligation of union organizations to adjust their activity to internal legislation. In other words, although the strike is a right for all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute ‘public services’ (servicios públicos) and that due to their nature or the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate damage to certain assets. Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which the strike is permitted, the established legal limits cannot be exceeded, since the exercise of the strike must be framed within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the questioned Article 375 (formerly, 368), by providing: ‘The strike shall not be permitted in public services...’, by itself exceeds the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In summary, the questioned Article 375 (formerly, 368) is not in itself unconstitutional, and the analysis of unconstitutionality must be shifted to the cases established by law in which the prohibitive effect, in public services, is produced. Consistent with the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action regarding this point.

VIII.- ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.- We will now proceed to analyze the grounds of unconstitutionality presented by the claimants in relation—in the first instance—to the prohibition of the right to strike provided for by the Labor Code for the agricultural sector in its Article 376, subsection b) (formerly, 369 subsection b). As set forth in Considering V, through ILO Convention 11, content was given to the freedom of association of the agricultural sector to guarantee this part of the population the free exercise of the right of association on an equal footing with the industrial sector, by means of the pressure instruments accepted for the pursuit of their ends, specifically through the exercise of the right to strike. It is evident, in the Chamber's judgment, that Article 376 (formerly 369) makes a clumsy enunciation of what must preceptively be understood by ‘public services’ (servicios públicos), at least insofar as it includes within this concept the activity carried out by workers occupied in the sowing, cultivation, care, or harvesting of agricultural, livestock, or forestry products; because those tasks do not fit into the generally accepted notion of public service. Without attempting to exhaust the definition of what public service is as a legal institute, it must be kept in mind for the purposes of this ruling that a public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and involves positive provisions of the Administration or that are under certain control and regulation by it.

The prohibition of exercising the right to strike in activities that are not public services exceeds Article 61 of the Constitution, which orders the legislator to establish the activities in which the exercise of the right to strike is restricted solely in public services. From the foregoing, it is inferred that when the legislator—in subsection b) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code—identifies agricultural activity with public service, it incurs in arbitrariness, since such inclusion has no legal basis and entails the denial of the exercise of the right to strike in said sector; which is also contrary to the recognized purpose of International Convention No. 11 of the ILO, to guarantee the agricultural sector the full exercise of the right to unionize and its consequences. Based on the stated reasons, it is appropriate to grant the action on this point, and consequently, subsection b) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code must be annulled.

**IX.- OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, AS INDICATED IN ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.-** From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law to list in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect, which would proscribe the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done by applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which lists in Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code—transcribed in Considering II—in which public services the strike is excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not therefore contradict it. However, as the plaintiffs and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic correctly observe in their report, Article 376 (formerly 369), when in its subsection a) it details the public services in which the exercise of the strike is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not make it easy to distinguish which minimum public services it refers to, by stating: "All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…". It is clear to this Court that this statement does not allow for the recognition of which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; an imprecision that conflicts with what is ordered in constitutional precept 61 already commented on, for which reason it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional. In another vein, subsection c) of the cited Article 376 (formerly 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the strike; furthermore, it clearly establishes the limit on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading tasks at docks and wharves. Finally, subsection c) also sets limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of "workers in transit of any other private transportation company," which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike in the effective provision of public land transportation service. On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly 369) establishes parameters that allow for limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is susceptible to compromising the legal interests of public health and the public economy. Indeed, in this section, services are listed or distinguished with respect to which the strike is susceptible to compromising the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, and those alluding to hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must concern absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they be susceptible to compromising the legal interests of health and the public economy; guidelines that respond to constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Regarding subsection b) of the questioned article—which excludes the strike from agricultural activity—this Court refers to what was stated in Considering VIII. Finally, in relation to the norm contained in subsection e) of the challenged article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to dictate in which other public activities the strike is prohibited in the hypothesis that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such attribution because it exceeds the principle of legal reserve established in constitutional numeral 61, according to which the attribution to establish in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited, falls exclusively on the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of Article 376 (formerly 369) of the Labor Code. (…)".

As a corollary of the reasoning set forth, by constitutional mandate, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what the limitations on the exercise of the strike are therein. However, such a task must be carried out within the framework of constitutionality, for which reason, according to the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction, no authority whatsoever can be assigned to the Executive Branch to define in what type of public service the exercise of the strike must be prevented; because such a function is exclusive to the Legislative Branch. Likewise, the legislator's freedom of configuration must respect the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality, for which purposes the nature of the public service in question or its particular social impact becomes decisive, factors that would justify preventing it from being suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed, given the significant, serious, and immediate harm that this would entail to certain legal interests of health, life, security, or the public economy. In addition, what the legislator defines as a public service must involve the satisfaction of collective needs, as well as refer to positive provisions of the Administration or be subject to particular control by it.

**C) Constitutionality of Article 376 of the consulted bill of law.** (…)

In this regard, according to point A) of this considering, the consultants should note that the recommendations of the CFA are not mandatorily binding, but rather are guidance guidelines, which accords with the fact that there is no conventional legal norm that expressly confers binding character on such recommendations, a position even endorsed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panamá. The foregoing does not mean that this Chamber ignores the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the ILO supervisory bodies, whose technical and historical authority gives them a value superior to that of a recommendation of a purely axiological or theoretical nature. However, such recognition does not mean that the constitutional jurisdiction lacks a margin of appreciation when applying constitutional review, since the referred recommendations, as already indicated, do not have a binding quality; hard law—the current constitutional regulation—must prevail over soft law, and the various constitutional interests at stake must be safeguarded in a balanced manner.

Consequently, the notion of essential services, beyond the life, health, and security of the person, can encompass the public economy, when it concerns an absolutely indispensable public service susceptible to compromising such a legal interest, as this Chamber established in judgment no. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998.

Having clarified the foregoing, the question now corresponds to whether the Legislator can approve an absolute and general prohibition in a public service, or whether it must adhere to a scheme of minimum operation of the service, like the one regulated in ordinal 376 subsection d) of the current Labor Code.

In this regard, this Chamber considers that the Legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, can establish the absolute and general prohibition of the strike in essential public services, provided that this does not violate the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality. Now, for the purpose of specifying the scope of the legislator's powers in this matter, what the Political Constitution itself regulates must be considered.

Thus, in accordance with numeral 61 of our Political Constitution: "The right of employers to the lockout and that of workers to the strike is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination that the law makes of these and according to the regulations that the same establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence." This norm is a replication of ordinal 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, in accordance with the constitutional reform of 1943.

As already elucidated in point B) of this considering, the reference to "public service" in Article 61 of the Constitution did not originate from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the Constituent Assembly of '49 opted to maintain the notion of the Constitutional Congress of 1943 contained in numeral 56 of the Charter of 1871. If one considers the historical moment of the approval of this norm in July 1943, its irrefutable political link to the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, is readily apparent. Regarding the strike, this latter regulation links the concept of public service with the special relevance of the activity for the community; that is, with an objective element. Therefore, from the point of view of our Fundamental Law, it is plausible to extend the notion of essential public service to the life, health, and security of the person, as well as to the public economy, provided it concerns, as indicated supra, an absolutely indispensable public service susceptible to compromising such a legal interest.

Precisely, this particular impact on the mentioned constitutional interests justifies the legislator opting for an absolute prohibition of the strike in the referred services. It is an alternative that becomes reasonable, to the extent that the Constituent Assembly itself opted for two rules: 1) recognize the right of employers to the lockout and that of workers to the strike, and 2) except public services from the previous rule, in accordance with what the legislator determined.

In this sense, reforming what is regulated in the current Labor Code cannot be considered unconstitutional, since, precisely, the Constituent Assembly entrusted the legislator with regulating the strike in public services, for which it is entirely competent to formulate the corresponding legal reforms.

A limit on such attribution is, among others, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality (vote 1998-01317), which in the sub lite is not observed to be violated, since, on the one hand, the Constitution itself does not reject the option of prohibiting the strike in public services of particular relevance (on the contrary, it makes the exception for the strike in public services according to the legislator's criteria), and, on the other, the consultants do not develop any technical, precise, and solidly supported argumentation, much less any legal test of reasonableness, such that this Court would consider the list of essential public services regulated in Article 376 of the bill of law as lacking a relevant impact and social effect, so that its suspension would not cause significant, serious, and immediate harm to health, life, security, or the public economy. In such a definition, the constitutional judge must apply self-restraint, given the broad margin of appreciation that the Legislator enjoys in the matter, so that only if the lack of transcendence of a public service for the aforementioned constitutional interests were to be demonstrated with absolute solidity, could some injury to the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality eventually be sustained, which in the specific case does not occur.

In addition, no violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness is observed. As the Chamber stated in judgment 2018-000230 of 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018:

"Regarding the alleged establishment of a numerus clausus list by the legislator without the existence of technical criteria, the Chamber dismisses that there is any injury to the constitutional order. As can be deduced from the preceding paragraphs, the determination of the parameters for categorizing a profession as a health science falls within the legislator's right to free configuration. **The Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties who lack democratic representation**. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands it, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness. In the case at hand, the legislator's decision clearly raised the requirements to be a professional in health sciences, by demanding the minimum degree of a bachelor's degree and expressly listing the included professions, a decision that does not require a technical or scientific study." (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

On this matter, it is reiterated that the reference to "public service" in constitutional ordinal 61 did not originate from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, it was opted to maintain the notion of the Constitution of 1871, which is understood in function of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link to the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which comprised activity of general interest and of particular transcendence for society. Such a situation suggests, moreover, that the Constituent Assembly left the establishment of specific examples of public service to the ordinary parliamentarian in attention to the right to free legislative configuration.

As Deputy Baudrit Solera states: “<i>In any case -he added- the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what services of public utility are</i>.” Likewise, by constitutional mandate, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what the limitations on the exercise of the right to strike therein are. Similarly, in relation to the ILO conventions and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, no grounds are apparent that would imply a declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged norms. Such normative instruments do not directly allude to the right to strike, and the interpretations or recommendations of the ILO bodies are not binding, so even though these are relevant, in the specific case the constitutional norms that regulate the matter and the reasoning provided by this Chamber must prevail.

Precisely, this Court, in judgment 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, endorsed the constitutionality of numeral 375 and subsection d) of article 376 of the Labor Code, without grounds being apparent that would detract from the arguments developed on that occasion, nor was any overreach of the challenged norms in relation to the Law of the Constitution demonstrated.

In addition, even though it is indicated that at the time of filing the action, political strikes were not regulated, it is no less true that no arguments were developed to support such alleged neglect as an unconstitutionality by omission. Precisely, no development of norms or principles was set forth from which an express or tacit obligation of the legislator to issue a law in that sense could be derived.

Finally, in the terms set forth in the filing brief and taking into consideration the content of the challenged norms, issues relating to the declaration of a strike and its qualification regarding specific situations, specific institutions, and the employees thereof exceeds the scope of analysis of this constitutional review process.

**Paul Rueda L.** **CO03/23** **Exp: 18-015934-0007-CO** **Dissenting vote of Judge Cruz Castro. The restrictions imposed on workers' right to strike exceed the limits of reasonableness and proportionality provided for in the Constitution.** In the decision of this matter, I consider that I must issue a separate vote, considering that the prohibition of strikes in public services, as indicated in articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, are unconstitutional. While it is true that the majority of this Chamber performs a conforming interpretation in this regard, I consider that both the literal wording of the phrase contained in the challenged art. 375 (*“ARTICLE 375. – Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…”)* and the lack of differentiation between types of workers in the challenged art. 376.d) (*“ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be: (…) d. (…) such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in towns.”),* are unconstitutional, according to the reasons I indicate below.

From article 61 of the Political Constitution, it follows that the right to strike of workers is a fundamental right that, while it may be subject to limitations when it involves public services, can never be subject to an absolute prohibition. Now, regarding the point of which public services are concerned, it seems to me that what this Chamber established in judgment number 2011-017212 of 3:31 p.m. on December 14, 2011, is correct. There it was established that the limitations on the right to strike comprise not the totality of public services, but only those called essential public services:

“*Such limitation does not comprise the totality of public services*. Thus, the conventions and recommendations issued by the International Labour Organization, through the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts, have been shaping the cases in which the right to strike may be subject to restrictions or even prohibition and compensatory guarantees. In this sense, *the ILO has used the term “essential services” to determine when it is viable to prohibit strikes in public services.* In 1983, the ILO Committee of Experts defined essential services as those “whose interruption could endanger the life, safety, or health of the person in all or part of the population.” This criterion was subsequently adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association, for which the determining factor is the existence of an evident and imminent threat to the life, safety, or health of all or part of the population (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 540; 320th report, case No. 1989, paragraph 324; 324th report, case No. 2060, paragraph 517; 329th report, case No. 2195, paragraph 737; 332nd report, case No. 2252, paragraph 883; 336th report, case No. 2383, paragraph 766; 338th report, case No. 2326, paragraph 446 and case No. 2329, paragraph 1275.) This concept is not absolute, since a non-essential service may become an essential service when the duration of a strike exceeds a certain period or scope and thus endangers the life, safety of the person, or health of all or part of the population. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 541; 320th report, case No. 1963, paragraph 229; 321st report, case No. 2066, paragraph 340; 330th report, case No. 2212, paragraph 749; 335th report, case No. 2305, paragraph 505 and 338th report, case No. 2373, paragraph 382.) Specifically, and as relevant to this case, *the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO Governing Body considers as an essential service, among others, the hospital sector* (see 1996 Digest, paragraph 544; 300th report, case No. 1818, paragraph 366; 306th report, case No. 1882, paragraph 427; 308th report, case No. 1897, paragraph 477; 324th report, case No. 2060, paragraph 517, case No. 2077, paragraph 551; 329th report, case No. 2174, paragraph 795; 330th report, case No. 2166, paragraph 292 and 338th report, case No. 2399, paragraph 1171). The Committee on Freedom of Association has clarified that in essential services, some categories of employees, for example laborers and gardeners, should not be deprived of the right to strike. (See 333rd report, case No. 2277, paragraph 274 and 338th report, case No. 2403, paragraph 601), a criterion that this Chamber adopts in the sense that *in the hospital service, the prohibition of strikes affects only those public officials and workers whose suspension of work means the user cannot receive the provision of the health service.* Now, the concept of prohibiting strikes in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation. As indicated above, numeral 61 of the Political Constitution recognizes the right of workers to strike, except in public services, according to the determination thereof made by law and in accordance with the regulations it establishes. In this sense, articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code regulate the following:” “ARTICLE 375. - ***Strikes shall not be permitted in public services.*** *Differences that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where strikes are prohibited, shall be obligatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts.”* “ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be: a. (…)” “d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the operation of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate damage to public health or the economy, such as ***clinics and hospitals***, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in towns” “Regarding the scope of these numerals, in judgment number 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Court stated that:” “To this effect, the first phrase of article 375 of the Labor Code, which states: ‘Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. (…)’, although it seems to proscribe strikes in these services, that is, although it seems to have an absolute prohibitive meaning, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is congruent with the purpose it pursues. This challenged article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with article 8 of ILO Convention 87, which - as transcribed in Considerando III. -, establishes the obligation of union organizations to adapt their activity to domestic legislation. In other words, while the right to strike is a right for all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute ‘public services’ and that, due to their nature or the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate damage to certain assets” “In that same judgment, in relation to numeral 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, this Chamber addressed the issue of the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension compromised the legal assets of health and the public economy. On that occasion, it was considered that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, because the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services had to be protected, a criterion that agrees with the opinions expressed by the ILO Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of Association. Thus, this Chamber, in the referenced judgment, mentioned the following:” “From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law to state in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. *This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect that proscribes the exercise of the right to strike from public services.* Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done by applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which lists in article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code the public services in which strikes are excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it (…) On the other hand, subsection d) of article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the right to strike in those services deemed absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal assets of health and the public economy. Indeed, this section lists or distinguishes services with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal asset of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those relating to hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines to establish in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that *they must be absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they be likely to compromise the legal assets of health and the public economy*; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality.” “Furthermore, the fact that article 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code refers to private companies requires an evolutive interpretation, given that as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law and by mandate of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution, today the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) administers the public hospital service, so it is inexorable that the norm in question includes such service provided by the main hospital entity of the country. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that, based on the criteria expressed by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and Committee of Experts, the jurisprudence of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal regulations in force in the country, strikes in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, are prohibited, since fundamental legal assets of society, such as the health and life of the population, are endangered. Now, this Chamber is not unaware that the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO Governing Body has also considered that given the prohibition of strikes in essential public services, the affected workers must enjoy adequate protection, so that they are compensated for the restrictions imposed on their freedom of action in potential conflicts. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 546 and, for example, 300th report, case No. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th report, case No. 1882, paragraph 429; 310th report, case No. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th report, case No. 1999, paragraph 166; 324th report, case No. 2060, paragraph 518; 327th report, case No. 2127, paragraph 192; 330th report, case No. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd report, case No. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th report, case No. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th report, case No. 2244, paragraph 1269). Among such compensatory measures, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered that the limitation of the strike must be accompanied by adequate, impartial, and rapid conciliation and arbitration procedures in which the interested parties can participate at all stages. (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 547 and, for example, 300th report, case No.

1818, paragraph 367; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 308th report, case no. 1897, paragraph 478; 310th report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th report, case no. 2020, paragraph 318; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th report, case no. 2244, paragraph 1269.) (…)” These criteria are ratified by means of vote number 2018-01115 of 09:30 hours on January 26, 2018, when it was indicated that a strike is admissible in those non-essential public services. Thus, Article 61 of the Constitution establishes, as a fundamental right, the right of workers to strike. However, the same constitutional provision makes it possible:

-A limitation on the exercise of that right to strike. Note that it is a limitation and not an absolute prohibition.

-The limitation on the exercise of that right can only be imposed by law.

-The limitation applies in the case of public services, but only those that are essential.

Regarding the right to strike in public services, there exist, in Comparative Law, three possibilities: absolute prohibition, absolute permissibility, and a mixed system such as ours. Legal systems where the right to strike is *totally suppressed* in the case of public officials are, for example, the Chilean Constitution, which in its Article 16 prohibits the strike absolutely for public officials and even for employees of private companies whose services may be classified as public utility, or whose stoppage causes serious damage to the health and economy of the country. That model is similar to the United States model where the strike is prohibited for federal government employees. (Paragraph 1918, chapter 93, title 18 of the US CODE). Other legal systems where the constitutional right *establishes no restriction* whatsoever would be, for example, the Italian Constitution, which in its numeral 40 confines itself to establishing the right to strike and refers to the law for its development. The Portuguese charter, which in its ordinal 59 simply establishes the right to strike. A *third model*, similar to ours, is found in the Panamanian Constitution, which in its Article 65 provides that the law may establish special restrictions for the exercise of the right to strike in public services. Then, the Colombian Constitution, in its numeral 56, indicates that the legislator shall be responsible for specifying the essential public services in which a declaration of strike is not applicable. Then, the Greek Constitution, in its Article 23.2, establishes that the law may impose specific restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike by public officials. However, it clarifies that legal limitations may not lead to the suppression of the right. In the case of the Spanish Constitution, Article 28.2 establishes the right to strike, yet it indicates that the law shall determine the necessary guarantees to ensure the essential services of the community. Thus, our Constitution opts for this third way, such that while the right to strike is recognized as a fundamental right, its exercise is permitted to be limited to some degree in the case of public services. We transcribe the cited numeral 61:

“**Article 61.-** The right of employers to lockout and that of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination of these made by law and subject to the regulations that the same establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” In a similar sense, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations – incorporated into Costa Rican Law by means of Ley n.°4229 of December 11, 1969 -, grants the right to strike the rank of a fundamental right, admits that the law may impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the administration of the State. Ordinal 8 of that international instrument prescribes:

“Article 8.- 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:

• a)(…)
• d)The right to strike, exercised in conformity with the laws of each country.

2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.

3. (…)” Likewise, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, “Protocol of San Salvador” - incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system by means of Ley n.° 7907 of September 3, 1999 -, contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right. However, the conventional norm provides that it is reserved for law to establish restrictions on the exercise of that right in the case of public services. It is important to highlight that according to that international instrument, the limitations that the law could impose must be consistent with the democratic order, that is, that the constraints on the right to strike must be proportional and have the purpose of protecting health, morals, and public order, as well as the rights of the majority of the citizenry. To this effect, numeral 8 of the Protocol provides:

“Article 8.- Trade Union Rights.

1.- The States Parties shall ensure:

• a)(…)
• b)The right to strike.

2.- The exercise of the rights set forth above may only be subject to the limitations and restrictions provided by law, provided that these are characteristic of a democratic society, necessary to safeguard public order, to protect public health or morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others. Members of the armed forces and the police, as well as those of other essential public services, shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by law.

3.- (…)”.

As has been stated, this Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to clarify the scope of Article 61 of the Political Constitution. Thus, in judgment n.°1317-98 of 10:12 hours on February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution n.°5264-2003 of 14:42 on June 18, 2003), the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subparagraphs a), b) and e) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) were declared unconstitutional, because it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved for law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which expressly prohibits the strike in public services; however, it was indicated that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Indeed, I consider that numeral 61 of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted in the sense that there exists a total prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. On the contrary, it is the responsibility of the law to determine the cases in which it is appropriate to establish said prohibition, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. Furthermore, as was indicated, that limitation on the exercise of the right to strike in public services is only for those classified as essential. Having set forth the above, it is possible to affirm that the decision of the constituent power falls within the social constitutional tradition which, on the one hand, recognizes the right to strike, but on the other, admits the possibility of imposing certain limitations in the case of public services, limitations that can only be imposed by law, that cannot be interpreted, from my point of view, as an absolute prohibition; and which refers only to essential public services.

Furthermore, I must highlight that the legal reform introduced by the law that regulates strikes, n°9808, in Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) to clarify the scope of the definition of essential services and the regulation of the exercise of the right to strike in such services, was equally validated by this Chamber, through judgment of this Chamber, number 2019-20596, of nineteen hours fifteen minutes on October 25, 2019, a judgment in whose vote I did not participate. This matter requires a very balanced legislative framework, in accordance with criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, because it concerns the restriction of a fundamental human right: the right to strike. The restriction must be careful and of a restrictive criterion. Curiously, employers have the right to lockout and the restrictions on that exercise are not as restrictive and unreasonable as those imposed on the workers' strike. A constitutional right as relevant as the right to strike must have very specific and reasonable restrictions.

Thus, I consider that Article 375 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), insofar as it indicates “The strike shall not be permitted in public services”, is unconstitutional for being a categorical statement, without nuance, since clearly such a prohibition cannot be an absolute prohibition but rather, the strike should only be limited in the case of essential public services. And for its part, regarding subparagraph d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which defines “clinics and hospitals” as public services, limiting the strike in those cases, I consider that it is also unconstitutional because it does not differentiate between those officials whose suspension of duties means that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. The restrictions in this case transcend the limits of reasonableness and proportionality that justify the restriction of such a relevant fundamental right.

**Fernando Cruz C.** **Magistrate** **CO03/23** LENIN HERNÁNDEZ NAVAS, bearer of identity card No. 1-967-277, in his capacity as GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL NURSES UNION (SINDICATO NACIONAL DE ENFERMERÍA), legal entity identification No. 3-011-045082, petitions that Articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) be declared unconstitutional, deeming them contrary to Articles 33 and 61 of the Political Constitution and to the principles of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), as well as to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and Articles 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Also intervening in the proceedings were the representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), the Minister of Labor and Social Security, and the Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social).

**Whereas (Resultando):** **1.-** By a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 15:56 hours on October 9, 2018, the petitioner requests that Articles 375 and 376, subsection d), of the Labor Code be declared unconstitutional, deeming them contrary to Articles 33 and 61 of the Political Constitution and to the principles of reasonableness and the prohibition of arbitrariness, as well as to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and Articles 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights. It is alleged that the challenged regulations are unconstitutional in that they absolutely prohibit the exercise of the right to strike in the case of public services – as would be the case of the CCSS – even though, pursuant to the criteria issued by the ILO, such a prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike should be limited to those highly qualified public services and, moreover, the strike may be permitted as long as the minimum functioning of the services provided by public institutions is guaranteed. The petitioner affirms that Article 61 of the Political Constitution does not establish a total prohibition on strikes in public services, but rather contemplates a statutory reservation, enabling the ordinary legislator to determine the services in which the strike is restricted or prohibited. Moreover, pursuant to the criteria issued by the ILO, such a prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike should be limited to those highly qualified public services and, furthermore, the strike may be permitted as long as the minimum functioning of the services provided by public institutions is guaranteed, as is the case of the CCSS. It indicates that, in conclusion, the right to strike should be restricted only to those workers who are absolutely indispensable. It insists that the ILO has pointed out that maintaining the minimum service constitutes an ideal solution that, on the one hand, safeguards the right to strike of the majority of workers and, on the other hand, guarantees the satisfaction of users' needs. It states that, consequently, the challenged norms are unconstitutional in that they absolutely prohibit the right to strike of workers who provide their services at the CCSS. It is also claimed that the Administration, shielded by the labor law, has engaged in an abusive use of its powers by encompassing all activities under the concept of "essential service." It alleges that this violates the principles of equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. It claims that there is discrimination to the detriment of all CCSS employees, since, although they provide an important service, the law has been a loophole for the Administration to make a generalization about the concept of "essential service," without having demonstrated the suitability of such a determination. It claims that the challenged regulations allow, ultimately, for the institutions and their senior officials to determine, through administrative acts (such as, for example, Executive Decree No. 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP), which are the essential services. It claims that this violates the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness. It points out that the legislator left open a dangerous loophole for the Administration to decide – via regulation – which services are essential, in violation of the fundamental right to strike. It alleges that, in this specific case, we are in the presence of a case of "political strike" ("huelga política"); in which case, the ILO has recognized that this type of strike, like the claim strike (huelga reivindicativa), involves the exercise of a labor and human right. It affirms that, however, the Labor Code neither provides for nor regulates the political strike, so the labor procedures provided for in said regulatory body are incorrect and insufficient to hear this type of matter.

**2.-** For the purpose of substantiating the standing (legitimación) they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they indicate that it derives from Article 75, first and second paragraphs, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in that the petitioner cites as the underlying matter the strike qualification proceeding (proceso de calificación de huelga) being processed under case file No. 18-002813-1178-LA, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked and, additionally, the defense of a corporate interest on the part of the petitioning union in safeguarding the right to strike of its members is confirmed.

**3.-** By a resolution issued at 08:28 hours on October 17, 2018, the action was admitted for processing, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, and the Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.

**4.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 216, 217, and 218 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on November 21, 22, and 23, 2018.

**5.-** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report. It indicates: Regarding admissibility. The petitioner holds the representation, as legal proxy, of the National Nurses Union (Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería) (SINAE), and therefore, appears alleging the ownership and defense of a collective or corporate interest of the persons who make up the member base of said Union, who are undoubtedly affected by the norms in question. Furthermore, the action filed is admissible because the challenged norms are applicable in the underlying matter pending resolution, which consists of a Strike Qualification Proceeding brought before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Section One, under case file number 18-002813-1178-LA, which is on appeal before the Labor Appeals Court of that same Circuit; an appeal in which SINAE, as a party, invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest they consider harmed. A) The strike in Public International Law and the "non-binding" nature of the Recommendations of the ILO Supervisory Bodies. The right to strike is not normatively regulated by any specific and concrete ILO convention that, once ratified by a member State, can create international legal obligations for it; rather, it derives from the realization of the so-called trade union action, recognized and regulated in Conventions such as ILO 87 and 98. (ILO Principles on the Right to Strike, Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO and Horacio GUIDO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE GENEVA, 2000 Edition). Except for the case of Article 8.1 a) of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and subsection b) of Article 8.1 of the Protocol of San Salvador – incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999 –, it is provided that the subscribing member undertakes to guarantee the right to strike, exercised in accordance with the laws of each country; even recognizing that at the legal level, restrictions on the exercise of that right may be established in the case of public services. Hence, in reality, the minimum principles and rules of conduct established, by way of "non-binding" guidance by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association regarding the right to strike, are derived from international labor recommendations that do not constitute autonomous mandatory legal instruments, but rather a mere guide or guidelines of an orienting and interpretive nature for eventual national action on the matter involved, and therefore, are not even subject to ratification by member States (International Labor Standards for Magistrates, Jurists and Law Academics, ILO International Training Centre, San José, Costa Rica, April 3-7, 2006, p. 13 et seq.). Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the ILO recommendations on which the petitioner bases his arguments do not have the binding legal value alluded to; so in reality, their eventual judicial use is limited, serving at most as a reference to interpret the provisions of domestic law (an interpretive tool), especially when it has been inspired by the respective conventions or as a mere guide of an orienting nature for eventual national action on the matter involved (See in this regard judgment 2011-010832 of 14:30 hrs. of August 12, 2011, Constitutional Chamber, through which, due to the principle of statutory reservation, the promulgation of the respective legislation is ordered taking into consideration the recommendations that the ILO makes to that effect, without applying them directly), but never to consider those as abrogated or to supplant them by those international recommendations; especially when it is settled and consensual criteria that "The ILO supervisory bodies are not competent to give interpretations with jurisprudential value of international labor conventions, since such competence resides exclusively in the International Court of Justice" – Art. 37 paragraph 1 of the ILO Constitution -. (International Labour Office, Governing Body, 323rd session, Geneva, March 12-27, 2015, GB.323/INS/5/Annex III, Institutional Section, paragraph 55. B) Limitation or prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential public services from the perspective of the ILO. According to Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO and Horacio GUIDO, of the International Labour Office op. cit., of special interest are Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) referring to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining respectively, which although they do not expressly mention the strike, the truth is that they constitute its theoretical foundation, to such an extent that it is from them and from the non-binding doctrine of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, that the scope of the exercise of the right to strike has been specified and delimited in said organization, both in the case of "public servants exercising authority functions on behalf of the State" (ILO, 1996, paragraph 534), and in "essential services." And regarding what is relevant to this report, we will say that these ILO Supervisory Bodies, in their pronouncements made within the complaint procedure for violation of freedom of association, are those that have casuistically determined that there are cases in which, by way of exception, the exercise of the strike can be restricted and even prohibited, as is the case of the so-called "essential services." It was the Commission of Experts that first considered admissible the prohibition of the right to strike in "essential services," which in the strict sense it conceptualized as "those services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population" (ILO, 1983b, paragraph 214); a definition that was later adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association. But it must be noted from the outset that both bodies understand that the definition of essential services will depend to a large extent on the particular conditions of each legislation, since while the interruption of certain services (essential by extension) might in certain countries only cause economic problems, in others it could have disastrous effects and quickly create situations in which the health, safety, or life of the population would be compromised, just as it may also be the case that a service not considered essential in the strict sense of the term becomes essential because the duration of a strike could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population (ILO, 1996, paragraph 541; Digest of decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO. Paragraph 582. 34 Digest of decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO. Paragraph 591). It is undeniable that the "essential" character of a public service is established based on at least four criteria accepted by ILO doctrine: 1) when it contributes directly to the protection of goods, the satisfaction of interests, or the realization of values, in conjunction with respect for, the validity, exercise, and effectiveness of fundamental rights and freedoms; 2) the essentiality of the service is linked to its magnitude; 3) the concept of essential public service entails a balancing of values and interests; and 4) the concept of public service implies a constant evolution of the political, economic, and social situation of each country. From there, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered as essential services, in the strict sense, in which the right to strike can be subject to significant restrictions, or even prohibition: the hospital sector, electricity services, water supply services, telephone services, the police and the armed forces, firefighting services, public or private penitentiary services, the supply of food to school-age children and the cleaning of school establishments, and air traffic control (ILO, Freedom of Association, para. 585). It should be clarified that these criteria cannot be considered as exhaustive, much less binding, but rather as merely illustrative in nature. Ultimately, it can be pointed out that the Committee on Freedom of Association has not made an absolute listing of services that are or are not essential, but rather has made an enumeration arising from the cases brought before it for consideration. Therefore, in reality—we insist—its potential judicial use is limited, being able at most to serve as a reference for interpreting the provisions of domestic law (interpretative tool), especially when the latter has been inspired by the respective conventions or as a mere guide of an orienting nature for eventual national action in the matter involved. C) Constitutional jurisprudence on the prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential services (Costa Rica). 1.- Constitutionality of Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code. Although in our context it is recognized as part of the essential content of the right of unionization—union action—the workers' right to strike (Art. 61 of the Constitution), as the right to temporarily breach the employment contract, in accordance with current national legislation, for the purpose of preserving, affirming, and pursuing the interests set forth in the Constitution itself and for which the State must provide adequate legal and institutional channels, the truth is that this right of undeniable collective action, like all rights, is not unlimited and in our environment the clearest limitation, and one expressly reflected in the Constitution, occurs in the case of affecting the so-called "essential services" of the community, whose continuity is consequently constitutionally guaranteed and with respect to which a legal reservation is established, resulting in the fact that any restriction or exclusion of the aforementioned right to strike must occur by means of law and in no way may favor acts of coercion or violence. A mandate that, as the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated, is satisfied through Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code. On the constitutionality of Article 375 of the Labor Code, see Resolution No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, reaffirmed by No. 2003-05264 of 2:42 p.m. on June 18, 2003, as well as by Nos. 2011-010832 of 2:30 p.m. on August 12, 2011, 2016-006463 of 9:30 a.m. on May 13, 2016. And regarding the constitutionality of Article 376, see Resolutions Nos. 1998-01317, 2003-05264, and 2016-006463 op. cit. As we noted in Legal Opinion C-151-2003, of May 28, 2003, when conducting the legal analysis of the cited ruling No. 1998-01317: "Trying to approach what should be understood by 'public service,' which seems to be assimilated more to that of 'essential service of the community,' the Constitutional Chamber indicated that 'although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when it concerns activities that constitute 'public services' and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain goods' (Considerando VII of resolution No. 1998-01317, op. cit.). Moreover, without attempting to exhaust the definition of what should be understood by 'public service,' that Court stated that such 'public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and concerns positive provisions of the Administration or that are under certain control and regulation by it' (Considerando VIII of ruling No. 1998-01317 op. cit.)." (...) Certainly, the Constitution itself establishes the limits to fundamental rights, as occurs in this case with Article 61, in which it limits, for certain cases established and determined by law, the exercise of the right to strike in public services. And that limitation also derives, in a mediate and indirect manner, from the need to protect or preserve not only other constitutional rights (life and health), but also other constitutionally protected goods (public economy). And it is for this reason that in these cases the law establishes the precise guarantees to ensure, in the event of a strike, the maintenance of the services "absolutely indispensable" for the community. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has considered, that exclusion from the exercise of the strike in public services, or in services of recognized and unpostponable necessity, implies that the right of workers to defend their interests through the strike must yield when it causes or could cause a harm more serious than that which the strikers would experience if their claim or demand were not successful. And therefore, it is affirmed with complete propriety, that "To the extent that the recipient and creditor of such services is the entire community and the services are at the same time essential for it, the strike cannot impose the sacrifice of the interests of the recipients of the essential services. The right of the community to these vital provisions is prioritized over the right to strike." This criterion, according to which the interest of the community prevails over the particular interest of the strikers, is also reflected by our Constitutional Chamber, which has indicated: "... activities that may be considered vital or essential for the community, which is the good to be protected and for which the right of workers to defend and promote their interests through the strike yields; that is, when it causes or could cause a greater harm than that suffered by the strikers ..." (Considerando XI of ruling No. 1998-01317, op. cit.)." It is undeniable that "... the right to strike, recognized for one sector of society, like all rights, has its limits which are imposed by the need to protect the exercise of the rights of the rest of society." Therefore, in these cases the legal maxim by virtue of which the general or public interest predominates over the particular or private interest acquires a fundamental dimension in relation to the constitutional limitation on the right to strike related to "essential public services defined by the legislator." In multiple circumstances, conflicts arise that the legal interpreter or operator must resolve between rights of equal normative hierarchy. In this case, the conflict and its solution are posed by Article 61 of the Political Constitution itself. Indeed, there is a conflict between the right to use the strike as a legitimate mechanism to resolve collective disputes and the rights of the users of essential public services not to interrupt them due to a conflict to which they are totally unrelated and from which they could suffer considerable social harm, given the very nature of the services. This conflict is typical and results from a value-based tension inherent in any Social State of Law. According to doctrine, it involves a case of "third-party involvement" (terciarización) of the conflict, that is, the extension of the same beyond what is strictly contractual between workers and employers, also affecting constitutionally protected goods of the community as a whole of citizens potentially users of the service who appear as passive subjects of the conflict and who should not suffer additional harm beyond what is strictly necessary to respect the essential content of the right to strike. (PADILLA RUIZ, P., "The strike in essential services" (La huelga en los servicios esenciales), Aranzadi Social Doctrinal Review, No. 9, 2010, pp. 6 and 9). And in this regard, the Political Constitution itself, in its Article 61, in harmonious and systematic relation with articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code, endorses the solution, preferring the continuity inherent to essential public services over the right to strike. 2.- Prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential and welfare services of Social Security (public hospital service), as a guarantee of its mandated continuity. The jurisprudence of the Chamber has been abundant, coincident, and reiterated, according to which, for adequate protection of the right to health and life (Art. 21 of the Constitution) and as a manifestation of the unnamed right to the proper functioning of essential public services of a welfare nature (Arts. 140.8, 139.4, and 191 of the Constitution), such as those of Social Security (Art. 73), provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), as well as other organs and public entities that provide public health services, these services must be provided imperatively and unpostponably in a continuous manner, without interruptions. And based on a necessary evolving normative interpretation of Article 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law, it concludes inexorably that said norm encompasses the "public hospital service" provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, as the country's main hospital entity. And by virtue of this, it has considered that "it is clear that, based on the criteria expressed by the ILO Committees on Freedom and Experts, the jurisprudence of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal regulations in force in the country, the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since fundamental legal goods of society are endangered, such as the health and life of the population." (Resolution No. 2016-006463 op. cit.). To illustrate the position assumed and maintained in this regard by the Chamber, see Resolution No. 2016-006463 of 9:30 a.m. on May 13, 2016 (And in a similar sense, among many others, Nos.

2011-017211 of 3:30 p.m. and 2011-17212 of 3:31 p.m., both of December 14, 2011, 2011-017358 of 9:00 a.m. of December 16, 2011, 2011-017455 of 10:37 a.m. of December 16, 2011, 2011-017680 of 2:51 p.m. of December 21, 2011, 2011-17981 of 10:30 a.m. of December 23, 2011, 2011-17982 of 10:31 a.m. of December 23, 2011, 2012-005969 of 4:06 p.m. of May 9, 2012, 2012-01824 of 2:30 p.m. of February 14, 2012, 2012-002415 of 10:35 a.m. of February 21, 2012, 2012-009794 of 9:05 a.m. of July 20, 2012, 2016-007342 of 11:33 a.m. of May 27, 2016, 2016-007390 of 9:05 a.m. of June 1, 2016, 2016-008625 of 9:05 a.m. of June 24, 2016, 2016-009403 of 9:05 a.m. of July 6, 2016 and 2018-001115 of 9:30 a.m. of January 26, 2018, all from the Constitutional Chamber). Consequently, the Chamber's jurisprudence has emphasized the constitutionally guaranteed continuity of certain welfare public services, such as those of Social Security, and specifically the "public hospital service" provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), which, because it affects the sphere of health and life of individuals, is classified as an "essential service" (Resolution No. 2007-000424 of 3:07 p.m. of January 16, 2007) and with respect to which it is imperatively established that its effective provision must not be interrupted (Resolution No. 2014-003636 of 9:05 a.m. of March 14, 2014). And for which it admits as legally valid various mechanisms provided by the administrative system that guarantee this principle, such as the prohibition of strikes and work stoppages in so-called "essential services," among others. The result, then, is that any action—by act or omission—by officials that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. (See in this regard, among many others, resolutions Nos. 2007-008462 of 4:13 p.m. of June 13, 2007 and 2009-005898 of 2:36 p.m. of April 13, 2009, both from the Constitutional Chamber). It is therefore incontrovertible that, in accordance with the Law and values of the Constitution, regarding the prohibition of the Right to Strike in essential services, and specifically in the case of the so-called "public hospital service," the necessary legal prerequisites for this are met, according to our legal system. From a formal standpoint, its conceptualization as an essential public service derives from the Law (Article 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)), and materially, because it is linked to the protection and satisfaction of fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population, the Constitution itself, in its Article 61, mandates that its effective provision must imperatively not be interrupted.

3.- Conceptual approach to the scope of the term "essential hospital service," according to our domestic law. Certainly, due to the abstract meaning given doctrinally to so-called essential public services, whose conceptual limits or outlines are not well defined in their enunciation, it is difficult to establish a univocal and general concept "a priori" of the same. But despite the marked indeterminacy of the concept, it can be specified at the moment of application, since it attempts to delimit a concrete case that must be reached by interpreting the specific case, through the application to its specific circumstances of objective and subjective factors that are congruent with its generic enunciation, by means of explanation and application.

In order to avoid conceptual narrowness typical of legal normativism, based on the superstition of a single true meaning, with a precise and clearly established sense in and of itself, we will begin by accepting that the real scope of the concept "essential public service" is "elastic" in several dimensions, as we alluded to in part B of this report. And to delimit, at least approximately, its scope, one must especially consider the structural and organizational makeup of the public service involved (the service's own particularities), in view of the purpose pursued in the social context in which it is applied, as the practical objective of the precept (axiological-teleological): what are the legal provisions under consideration for, or what should they be for? Now, given that the challenged rules serve to prohibit strikes in essential public services, and specifically, in the public hospital services provided by the authorities of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), in order to guarantee their continuity and avoid endangering fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of individuals in all or part of the population, it can reasonably be maintained that "within the public services provided and the powers exercised by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), those referring to health or healthcare benefits, directly or indirectly, provided to the insured, patients, or users of such services, are essential. Consequently, it must be understood that the services provided both in preventive medicine through the EBAIS and those provided in curative medicine through clinics and hospitals of all levels and types, whatever their classification, are essential. It is evident that in such cases, even the auxiliary organizational units for diagnosis and treatment (e.g., clinical laboratory, blood banks, immunohematology units, pharmacy, nursing, equipment sterilization) and the merely administrative bodies that provide support or collaboration to these basic care centers, clinics, and hospitals (e.g., administration, procurement, treasury, accounting, maintenance, food services, laundry and linen services, cleaning, transportation, waste disposal and treatment, etc.) cannot exercise the right to strike, because the paralysis or suspension of work in such units negatively impacts the necessary and indispensable continuity of the public health services provided to the population suffering from some ailment or illness." (This has been a separate note signed by former Magistrate Jinesta in, at least, the following rulings: 2011-017211 of 3:30 p.m. and 2011-17212 of 3:31 p.m. of December 14, 2011, 2011-017455 of 10:37 a.m. of December 16, 2011, 2011-017680 of 2:51 p.m. of December 21, 2011, 2011-17981 of 10:30 a.m. of December 23, 2011, 2011-17982 of 10:31 a.m. of December 23, 2011, 2012-002415 of 10:35 a.m. of February 21, 2012, 2012-005969 of 4:06 p.m. of May 9, 2012 and 2012-009794 of 9:05 a.m. of July 20, 2012). This is so because that welfare public service, of undeniable essential character, as the Chamber's own jurisprudence has recognized, implies a multiplicity of services and welfare programs that materialize in various healthcare and even economic benefits (payment of subsidies, pensions or retirements and other short and long-term economic benefits) intended for contributors and other beneficiaries nationwide, which obviously goes beyond the hospital, clinic, and other healthcare unit scope.

And indisputably, within that multi-comprehensive concept of the essential and welfare public service of Social Security provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), the body of nurses, professional and non-professional, is inevitably immersed, for it is seen that both Laws Nos. 5395 – General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) -, 6836 – Law on Incentives for Professionals in Medical Sciences (De Incentivos a Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas) – and 7085 – Nursing Services Statute (Estatuto de Servicios de Enfermería) -, classify them as professionals in Health Sciences and place them in various public and private healthcare institutions. And within the Fund, they are functionally classified as an essential support body within the work of so-called hospital care (See the Fund's Descriptive Job Manual). And by reason of what has been set forth so far, it is logical and more than reasonable that the proscription of the strike also extends to all of them, especially when the Chamber's jurisprudence has reiterated that the activities carried out in clinics, hospitals, and other healthcare units of the Fund constitute an essential public service in the terms in which Article 61 of the Constitution has been reasonably and proportionately interpreted, in relation to articles 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). There are substantial differences between the officials who, like them, perform indispensable functions in essential public services and others who do not, and therefore, since the situations brought into comparison are not homogeneous, the constitutionally established differentiation that allows imposing the prohibition of the right to strike on those who work in essential public services, especially those directly linked to such service obligations, turns out to be constitutionally reasonable and proportional to the purpose pursued – guaranteeing the continuity of services whose interruption could endanger the life, security, or health of the person in all or part of the population. Nor is it arbitrary, because it is based on differentiable objective reasons (undeniable essential nature of the hospital service with respect to the interests or legal interests satisfied by it), nor does it violate the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness, because it is constitutionally valid according to the jurisprudence of this Chamber. 4.- The "minimum services," an option that can be chosen exclusively by the legislator to reconcile the right to strike and the continuity of "non-essential" public services. The establishment of the so-called "minimum service," when the legislator chooses not to prohibit the strike but imposes the minimum service, is merely a legislative option, but never an obligation, and even less so in the case of essential public services, as is unjustifiably claimed by the petitioner. Without a doubt, it is a balancing formula between the right to strike and the continuity of "non-essential" public services, in which a part of the labor law doctrine has seen the solution in the imposition of minimum services that must be provided during the collective cessation of work; this is so "When the Legislator, the only competent authority in the matter, does not prohibit the strike (...) for some public services, by establishing a minimum service that ensures a minimum of service continuity (...)" (LACHAUME, JEAN FRANCOIS et al, Droit des Services Publics, Editions Dalloz, Paris, 2004, pp. 354-355).

The establishment of so-called "minimum services" aims to guarantee the maintenance of the service during the strike, ensuring coverage of the basic needs of the population, the continuous or safe operation of the facilities albeit in a limited manner, respecting the essential content thereof, but without reaching the usual performance level so that the impact of the strike on the service is perceptible, as a mechanism of labor pressure. Thus, its establishment at the legal level obliges the adequate weighing of the interests at stake, the constitutionally protected interests and rights, and the fundamental right to strike, and a balance must be found between both. However, as is easy to infer from the constitutional and legal regulations studied herein, the measure chosen by both the original Constituent and the ordinary legislator was another: the prohibition of the right to strike in essential public services, in order to guarantee their uninterrupted continuity, as we noted in Opinion C-151-2003, and we specified in pronouncements OJ-017-2006, of February 13, 2006 and OJ-125-2007, of November 19, 2007. Furthermore, as this Chamber recently recognized: "there is no constitutional mandate to determine what the cases of strikes that the legislator should regulate must be or how it should do so (...) the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), in the exercise of its materially legislative function of enacting norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (art.

121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power (…)" (Resolution No. 2018017681 of 09:40 hrs. on October 24, 2018, Constitutional Chamber). We do not find, then, that there exists discriminatory, unreasonable, disproportionate, or arbitrary treatment that contravenes the criteria that constitutionally prevail and must prevail in the matter. It is not legally enforceable through this action to establish a mixed or alternative system, in which the assurance of "minimum services" is provided for, in order to allow the exercise of the right to strike even in essential public services, because in addition to this being openly contrary to the alternative chosen by the original Constituent Power, the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator, in order to establish normative rules that allow the claimants to be excepted from the prohibition of strike constitutionally established at the level of essential public services, as is groundlessly intended. Hence, with respect to this claim, an inadmissibility of the action is configured based on the object that should entail its outright rejection (Resolution No. 2018017681 op. cit.). 5.- The so-called "Political Strike" does not fall within the scope of the principles of ILO freedom of association, nor has it been formally or materially recognized in our legal system. The claimant alleges the supposed unconstitutionality for not regulating strikes of a political nature; that is, unconstitutionality by omission, which in his judgment, both challenged legal norms contain. In this regard, as we have recently debated at the level of the ordinary labor jurisdiction, on the occasion of the process for declaring the illegality of the strike currently maintained especially in the education sector, based on our current legislation, the so-called political strike has not been recognized, and therefore is unlawful, because due to the way in which the right to strike has been constitutionally conceptualized in our system, it is unquestionable that the recognition of this right does not necessarily have to entail all forms and modalities of direct action by workers, much less all the possible intended purposes (Opinion C-151-2003 op. cit). And we even note that the legal recognition and regulation of this atypical form of strike against public policies was expressly excluded from the Labor Procedural Reform, due to a lack of consensus among the different social interlocutors (Acta No. 08 of June 16, 2010, legislative file No. 15.990, Law of Labor Procedural Reform and Unanimous Affirmative Opinion of August 17, 2010). In its proper dimension, the right to strike is recognized and enshrined in our system as a subjective right of a fundamental and autonomous nature. And as expressed by the norm under discussion, it corresponds to the ordinary legislator, as representative of popular sovereignty, to draw up a regulation of the conditions for exercising this right, which could be more or less restrictive, in accordance with the political guidelines that drive it, provided it does not exceed, in the first instance, the limits imposed by the norm itself—the first, regarding the activities in which this right is recognized, because it expressly excludes public services—as we explained, the essential ones—, the determination of which in any case corresponds to the legislator themselves; the second, regarding the modality, since in its exercise acts of coercion or violence must be disallowed—, or other limits derived from its possible connection with other constitutional rights and even with other constitutionally protected goods. It must be remembered that no right is unlimited, and like all, the right to strike is not absolute, and must have its limitations. And in accordance with the legal definition given by the legislator of the right to strike (art. 371 of the Labor Code), following the minimum basis given by the Constitution (art. 61), the exercise of this right does not necessarily entail all forms and modalities of direct action by workers, much less all possible intended purposes, especially since in our current legal system we might not be facing the phenomenon of a constitutionally protected strike, when disturbances occur in the production of public goods and services or in the normal functioning of the latter, introduced with the exclusive purpose of putting pressure on the Public Administration or on the State bodies, to achieve the adoption of government measures more favorable to the interests of a specific institution or group of officials, because in these cases the strike would not be the result of a labor conflict itself, since the professional motivation is clearly marginal. So the unlawfulness of this type of strike, beyond the professional and economic interests—direct and indirect—of the workers involved, from a material point of view occurs because the demands, the political objectives, and purposes pursued exceed those specific to union action, and therefore, are not consistent with the legal system, since they are not directed against the specific employers, but against the state Government as public power; especially when by the means employed, the intention to alter the constitutional order and coerce the free decision of democratic State institutions is clear, putting the authority of the State at stake. Even, according to the various recommendatory criteria of the ILO, the Committee on Freedom of Association has linked the exercise of the right to strike to the purpose of promoting and defending the economic and social interests of workers; a criterion that excludes purely political strikes from the scope of international protection within the ILO. So it is evident that in our system, the enforceability of the recognition, at the constitutional level, of the existence of so-called political strikes is inadmissible, like the one that has materialized and prolonged these days, because "there is no constitutional mandate to determine which must be the cases of strikes that the legislator must regulate nor how to do it (…) the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (art. 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power (…)" (Resolution No. 2018017681 of 09:40 hrs. on October 24, 2018, Constitutional Chamber). And in any case, because political strikes are not recognized nor regulated in our environment, and because as such, they are not even covered by the principles of freedom of association, according to the non-binding recommendations of the ILO. Finally, the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator, in order to modify legislative texts in favor of specific interests and recognize political strikes in our environment, thereby contravening the Law of the Constitution (Among many others, resolution No. 2010-8600 of 15:08 hrs. on May 12, 2010). Hence, with respect to this claim, an inadmissibility of the action is configured based on the object that should entail its outright rejection (Resolution No. 2018017681 op. cit.). Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, this Advisory Body suggests to the Constitutional Chamber: 1) Regarding the omissions of regulating minimum services and the political strike in essential services, to reject this action outright, for two basic reasons: there is no constitutional mandate whatsoever that so orders and because the Chamber cannot act as a positive legislator. 2) And as for the rest, to declare it without merit and ratify the jurisprudential line according to which articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code are constitutional.

6.- ROMAN MACAYA HAYES submits his report, in his capacity as Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and summarizes: That the CCSS estimates that the challenged norms are in conformity with the Political Constitution and the international treaties signed by the Government of Costa Rica, thus it is considered that the limitation of the right to strike in the public services provided by the CCSS derives from the protection of the supreme good of life and human health. On the limitation of strike by domestic law (constitutionality and conventionality of the limitation via ordinary law): Our Political Constitution in its numeral 61 recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right, however, this same norm allows its exercise to be limited in the case of public services, reserving to the law the determination of the public services where the right to strike must be understood as limited. In accordance with the foregoing, articles 375 and 376.d) are not contrary to article 61 because both norms have the rank of law, thus the imposed limitation complies with the reservation established in the constitutional norm. If the Constitution expressly indicates that the right to strike can be limited via law, under no logical argument can it be estimated that the challenged norms could be contrary to article 61 of the Constitution. It should be noted that international law ratified by our country is coherent with article 61 of the Constitution; the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right, but admits that the internal law of each country can impose limitations in the case of state administration (see subsection 2 of article 8). Along these lines, the Protocol of San Salvador contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right, but stipulates that it is reserved to law to establish restrictions on the exercise of that right in the case of public services (see article 8). This Chamber has already referred extensively to the topic under study (see resolution 2016-006463). Now, the concept of prohibiting the strike in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation. Regarding the scope of the articles of the Labor Code, in judgment 1998-01317 it was indicated that the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension compromised the legal goods of health and the public economy. On that occasion, it was estimated that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, because the scope of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services had to be protected, a criterion that agrees with the opinions expressed by the ILO Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association. As can be observed, it is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution that in our country the exercise of the right to strike be limited via law. It is worth noting that the limitation of strike by legal norm is a matter regulated in a similar way in countries such as Spain (article 28.2), Colombia (article 56), Panama (article 69), and Chile (article 16). From the above it is concluded that the right to strike, as a fundamental right of freedom, coexists in a system of rights that allows its limitation, as provided by the legal system of each country; in the case of our system, the limitation is considered valid as long as the norm is proportionate, reasonable, and necessary, as explained. Nonexistence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The right to strike can be limited by legal provision. Numeral 61 of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted to mean that there exists a total prohibition for the exercise of the right to strike in public services; on the contrary, it corresponds to the law to determine the cases in which it is appropriate to establish said prohibition, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly to establish the cases under which the right to strike cannot be exercised. In this way, neither the Judge nor the Executive Branch can substitute the legislator in determining the cases in which the right to strike can be impeded.

The reasons the Constituent Assembly and the ordinary legislator had for prohibiting the strike in these services was to avoid, in cases such as the one before us, a serious impact on essential public services; observe, for example, the health services of the CCSS, during the strike movement in the period between September 10, 2018 and October 5, 2018, there was an impact on the production of supplies necessary for direct patient care (suspension of 80,949 general medicine appointments, 40,657 specialty appointments, and 8,329 appointments with other health professionals, meaning a total of 129,935 appointments were lost, in addition to the 3,706 surgeries suspended). The impact on the public service is evident, which leads to the conclusion that the strike in hospital and health services must be prohibited to protect the supreme good of human life, just as the legislator has effectively done in Articles 375 and 376.c within the context of Articles 21 and 61 of the Political Constitution. The limitations on the right to strike in public services by law, and in particular those established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code, are legitimate, reasonable, proportionate, and necessary; there is no logic or justification in affecting the right to health of more than 150,000 insured persons to exercise an alleged unrestricted right to strike. It has been made clear that the limitation of the strike in public services is consistent with the Constitution, and it is the ordinary legislator who defines the affected services. Services that may not go on strike have a conflict resolution procedure: The ILO Committee of Experts has pointed out that the legislation of a large number of countries provides that, before undertaking a strike, conciliation and mediation procedures must be exhausted. Even though the strike is prohibited in public services as determined by law, the officials have a guarantee of conflict resolution prior to the judicial instance, such as direct settlement, conciliation, and arbitration. Corollary: The right to strike constitutes a right of workers; our Constitutional Law allows the imposition of limitations when the right to strike implies the interruption or impact of public services, limitations for whose imposition the principle of legal reserve governs. The limitation of the right to strike established in Articles 375 and 376.d of the Labor Code is in accordance with the law of the Constitution, as it is introduced by law, in a reasonable, proportionate, and necessary manner. Therefore, it is requested that the action filed be rejected on the merits.

7.- STEVEN NUÑEZ RIMOLA submits his report, in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social Security, and states in summary that: Article 61 of the Constitution establishes the right of workers to strike as a fundamental right. Therefore, Article 375 of the Labor Code provides for the prohibition of strikes in public services, specifically regarding those indispensable workers who cannot suspend their services without causing serious harm to the economy or public health. In Comparative Law, there are legal systems under which the right to strike is totally suppressed in the case of public officials, there are also others in which the constitutional right does not establish any restriction, and others like ours, as detailed below. Similar to Article 61 of the Constitution, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights admits that the law may impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the State administration. Likewise, the Protocol of San Salvador provides that it is a matter of legal reserve to establish restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike, in the case of public services. Furthermore, this Chamber already clarified the scope of Article 61 of the Political Constitution in Voto 1317-98 and that the definition of public activities that have the right to strike restricted is a matter reserved to the law. In that same ruling, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of Article 375 of the Labor Code, making it clear that this norm must be interpreted in accordance with the Constitution, so that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. In addition, subsection d) of Article 376 was also subject to constitutional review. Pursuant to the foregoing, the power granted by the Constituent Assembly to the legislator, to regulate which public service activities have the right to strike restricted, is embodied in Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code, and these norms must be integrated with the International Conventions ratified by Costa Rica and with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber issued in this regard. The principles of the Committee regarding situations where the strike of public officials may be subject to significant restrictions, or even prohibition, are shared by the Committee of Experts. In 1983, the Committee of Experts defined them as "services whose interruption could endanger the life, safety, or health of the person in all or part of the population." This definition was adopted shortly thereafter by the Committee on Freedom of Association. The list of non-essential services of the Committee on Freedom of Association is also not exhaustive. In any case, it is worth noting that, regarding a complaint that did not involve an essential service, the Committee maintained that the serious long-term consequences for the national economy that a strike could have did not justify its prohibition. The Committee has recommended the modification of some legislations to ensure that strikes are only prohibited in essential services in the strict sense of the term, particularly when the authorities have discretionary powers to expand the list of essential services. Specifically, regarding the prohibition of the strike in hospital service, we find in Constitutional Chamber Voto n° 2011-017680, where it was indicated that the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population. A criterion that the Chamber accepts in the sense that in hospital service, the prohibition of the strike affects only those public officials and workers whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. In accordance with the foregoing, the lack of reason of the petitioner regarding their allegations is clear, since Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code in no way establish an absolute prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. What exists is a restriction on access to this right for those public officials who participate in activities considered essential public services, among which are hospital services, and in these services, as this Chamber has indicated, this prohibition affects only those officials whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. These limitations do not conflict with the Political Constitution or with International Treaties on Human Rights, since, as stated, the right to strike is not unrestricted, it being necessary, for reasons of rationality and proportionality, to limit the exercise of the right to those services that are essential, understood as those that threaten the life, safety, or health of people. Therefore, they consider that the questioned norms are not unconstitutional. A ruling on the allegations regarding Decreto n° 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP and the political strike is omitted as they are not part of the unconstitutionality action filed.

8.- MARVIN ATENCIO DELGADO appears as a coadjuvant, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines (SIPROCIMECA), indicating that this union organization fully adheres to the arguments put forth by the petitioner union organization, in that it is clear that a reading of Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code being challenged contravenes the provisions of Article 61 of the Political Constitution. They thus request that the action be granted and that Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code be declared unconstitutional, as they are contrary to the constitutional rights of unionization, strike, and equality enshrined in Articles 33, 60, and 61 of our Political Constitution.

9.- LUIS GERARDO CHAVARRIA VEGA appears as a coadjuvant, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA), indicating that the norms are not unconstitutional, but rather the interpretations that have been made of both articles. By virtue of this interpretation of the legal norms, against the grain of Article 61 of the Constitution, the absolute prohibition of the strike has been upheld in the different activities listed in subsection d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code. This overreaching interpretation is not consistent with Article 61 of the Constitution for the following reasons: the limitation imposed by the legal norm only limits the exercise of the right to strike of workers who are absolutely indispensable to guarantee the maintenance or minimum functioning of the services provided by those companies or institutions, including health services. The rest of the workers, who are not absolutely essential, have no impediment to exercising the right to strike. Therefore, the restriction imposed by the norm has a determined and limited subjective scope, which does not include the entire corresponding service or economic activity, nor all the workers of the respective institution or activity, but exclusively those workers absolutely essential to guarantee that the minimum provision of the service is not interrupted. We could admit, in the worst case, that the norm contains a relative prohibition, which restricts the strike only to these workers, but one could never maintain that the provision prohibits, in an absolute and general manner, the strike in the health sector, unless it is by violating the express text of said provision and of the constitutional norm itself. This norm of the Labor Code resorts to the technique of maintaining the minimum service, which harmoniously resolves any contradiction between the need for the continuity of the provision of health services and the recognition of the right to strike. The ILO establishes that the maintenance of the minimum service constitutes an ideal solution that, on the one hand, safeguards the right to strike of the majority of workers, and on the other, guarantees the satisfaction of the vital needs of users. Our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized the normative value of these ILO pronouncements, and the pronouncements of the Committee on Freedom of Association constitute jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court has applied in its rulings, which we request be applied in this matter. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 15 of the Labor Code, these pronouncements are incorporated into our legal system. They request that the action be granted in terms of its interpretation.

10.- RODRIGO LÓPEZ GARCIA appears as a coadjuvant, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería (ANPE), indicating that this union has a legitimate interest in defending the constitutional right to strike that has been curtailed by the application or some sense of the erroneous interpretation of Articles 375 and 376.d) of the Labor Code.

In application of our Political Constitution and what Costa Rica has ratified in international conventions, the limitations imposed on the right to strike in certain public services must conform to the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In reality, the limitation of the right to strike is for workers who are absolutely indispensable, not for all workers (see legal opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) 125-J of November 19, 2007). To consider and base the decision on the premise that all public services are indispensable or essential is to undermine the right to strike of many and inevitably leads to harming those who defend a right or situation that directly affects their labor, political, and economic rights and subjective interests. It requests that this action be granted.

**11.-** By order issued at 3:15 p.m. on December 19, 2018, the joinders of Marvin Atencio Delgado in his capacity as Secretary General of the Union of Professionals in Medical Sciences of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and Related Institutions (Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines, SIPROCIMECA), Luis Chavarría Vega, in his capacity as Secretary General of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social, UNDECA), and Rodrigo López García, in his capacity as Secretary General of the National Association of Nursing Professionals (Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería, ANPE), were accepted as filed. In addition, the hearings granted to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund were deemed answered.

**12.-** The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 *ibidem*, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the case law of this Court.

**13.-** The procedural requirements of law have been complied with.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **Considering:** **I.- Object of the challenge.-** The claimant, representative of the National Nursing Union (Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería, SINAE), accuses Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) of being unconstitutional, which literally provide the following:

“ARTICLE 375. - Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. Disputes that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where strikes are prohibited, shall be mandatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts.” “ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, the following are understood as public services:

(…)

d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the operation of private enterprises that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in towns.” The allegations of supposed unconstitutionality can be summarized in the following aspects:

**1)** Violation of Article 61 of the Political Constitution: said constitutional norm does not provide an absolute prohibition of the right to strike in public services like those provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and establishes a legal reserve so that the legislator determines in which public services a strike is not permissible. Given that the most recent doctrine indicates that the prohibition of exercising the right to strike in public services is limited to those that are highly qualified. These articles are unconstitutional insofar as they absolutely prohibit the right to strike for all workers who provide services in the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.

**2)** Violation of Conventions 87 and 98, as well as the Recommendations of the ILO: in that the prohibition or restriction of the right to strike should be limited, first, only to those highly qualified public services, and second, with respect to those workers who are absolutely indispensable in said services; strikes must be permitted even in these services, provided the functioning of minimum services is guaranteed.

**3)** Violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and prohibition of arbitrariness in the exercise of trade union freedom and the right to strike: because all activities are encompassed under the concept of "essential service," it is clear that there is discrimination against all employees of the CCSS because, although they provide an important service, the law has been a loophole for the Administration to violate these principles, making generalizations about the concept of "essential service." Furthermore, they do not provide for the case of a political-reivindicative strike in such services.

Now, at the end of the action brief, certain allegations are indicated that correspond to the realm of legality, regarding the procedure followed for the declaration of illegality of the strike in the specific case that serves as the underlying matter, mentioning that the procedure is not appropriate because it is not a reivindicative strike when in reality it is a political strike. All of which falls outside the analysis of constitutionality in this action, since it is within the ordinary realm where the type of strike given in the underlying matter must be qualified.

Finally, the following clarification must be made: the regulations of the Labor Code, where these norms are located, were reformed and supplemented by the Law to provide legal certainty regarding strikes and their procedures, No. 9808 of January 21, 2020. However, their analysis proceeds due to the effects produced while they were in force as challenged.

**II.- The rules of standing in actions of unconstitutionality and standing in this case.-** Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the preconditions that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or interests that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. In this case, the claimant holds the representation, as attorney-in-fact, of the National Nursing Union (SINAE), and therefore, comes forward alleging the ownership and defense of a collective or corporate interest of the persons who make up the associative base of said Union, who are undoubtedly affected by the norms in question. Furthermore, the action filed is admissible because the challenged norms are applicable in the underlying matter pending resolution, which consists of a Strike Qualification Procedure (Procedimiento de Calificación de Huelga) initiated before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Section One, under file number 18-002813-1178-LA, which is on appeal before the Labor Appeals Tribunal of that same Circuit; an appeal in which SINAE as a party invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest they consider harmed. From the foregoing, it is clear that the claimant has sufficient standing to claim the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms. Moreover, these are legal norms, an object whose constitutionality may be reviewed through this avenue. Finally, the claimant fulfilled the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the enabling Law. In conclusion, the present action is admissible, and therefore, the object and merits of the matter must be discussed immediately.

**III.- Regarding constitutional case law concerning strikes in public services and the similar allegations of this action.-** The claimant Union challenges Articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, considering them violative of Constitutional Article 61, the conventions and recommendations of the ILO, and the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and prohibition of arbitrariness. This is because such norms absolutely prohibit the right to strike in public services, when such a prohibition should only apply to essential public services. Furthermore, even in those cases, the right to strike could not be prohibited for all workers, but only for those workers who are absolutely indispensable in said services.

In this regard, it is the opinion of the representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the representative of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), and the Ministry of Labor (Ministerio de Trabajo) that the challenged provisions are not unconstitutional, as they so indicate. According to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the challenged provisions are constitutional, in accordance with the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, in that a strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal rights of society, such as the health and life of the population (Resolution No. 2016-006463). According to the opinion of the representative of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), articles 375 and 376.d) are not contrary to article 61 because both provisions have the rank of law, thus the limitation imposed complies with the reservation established in the constitutional provision. For example, in the CCSS health services, during the strike movement in the period between September 10, 2018, and October 5, 2018, an impact was generated because a total of 129,935 appointments were lost, which is added to the 3,706 suspended surgeries. According to the Ministry of Labor (Ministerio de Trabajo), this Chamber declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, making it clear that this provision must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, such that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Furthermore, subsection d) of article 376 was also the subject of constitutional review. It therefore considers that the plaintiff's lack of reason is clear regarding their allegations, since articles 375 and 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code in no way establish an absolute prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. What exists is a restriction on access to this right for those public officials who participate in activities considered essential public services, among which are hospital services, and in these services, as this Chamber has indicated, this prohibition affects only those officials whose suspension of work means that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. On the other hand, according to the opinion of the active coadjuvants (coadyuvantes activos), a reading of articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code under challenge contravenes the provisions of article 61 of the Political Constitution (Siprocimeca), although it would seem that the provisions are not unconstitutional, but rather the interpretations that have been made of both numerals, for which reason they request the unconstitutionality of the interpretation (Undeca), and considering and supporting the decision that all public services are indispensable or essential is to undermine the right to strike of many (Anpe).

In this regard, this Chamber considers it denotes that, through judgment No. 1317-98 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution No. 5264-2003 of 2:42 p.m. on June 18, 2003, and resolution No. 2019-20596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019), it already heard the challenge of the articles challenged herein (375 and 376.d of the Labor Code), for arguments similar to those indicated in this action. It was thus resolved:

**VI.- ON THE RIGHT OF UNIONIZATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES.-** The plaintiffs allege that article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code establishes the prohibition of the right to strike for any activity that is a public service, which exceeds the constitutional text that enshrines the right of free unionization for workers and employers, without any conditioning; an affirmation that requires the following analysis. With the social legislation of the nineteen-forties, the so-called social guarantees were introduced in Costa Rica, specifically in the year 1943, into the Political Constitution, and the right of unionization was expressly enshrined. This fundamental right is maintained in the 1949 Constitution, specifically in its article 60. On another level, Costa Rica subsequently approved ILO Conventions No. 87 - concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize - and No. 98 - concerning the right to organize and collective bargaining - both by Law No. 2561 of May eleventh, nineteen sixty. In the cited international conventions, the right of unionization is recognized and guaranteed, limiting its exercise to the observance of the statutes and the legality of the member State (articles 2 and 8 of Convention No. 87). The right of unionization thus has constitutional rank in Costa Rica and is regulated internally through legal provisions, specifically the Labor Code, which governs in its article 332 and following - located in Title Five “On Social Organizations” - matters relating to the operation and dissolution of unions and defines the rules for the protection of union rights. In article 332 of the Labor Code, the legal constitution of unions is also declared to be of public interest, which are distinguished “(…)as one of the most effective means of contributing to the support and development of popular culture and Costa Rican democracy”. The foregoing reference allows us to conclude at this stage that the fundamental right of unionization is recognized without distinction of the public or private nature of the labor sectors; that is, in equal magnitude. In relation to the content of union action, specifically concerning the right to strike, article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of the aforementioned right of collective action is a matter reserved for law, being that any restriction of said right must be made by law and may in no way favor acts of coercion or violence. It is also a result of the attribution conferred through the cited constitutional numeral 61, that it is the responsibility of the legislator to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate that is satisfied through article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which must be adjusted to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality so that it is consistent with the democratic principle upon which the national legal order rests, embodied in article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is the supreme value of the Social State of Law.

**VII.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (formerly, 368) OF THE LABOR CODE WHICH EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FROM PUBLIC SERVICES.** The strike, as a manifestation of union action, finds a limit when its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which it is the responsibility of the law to determine according to article 61 of the Political Constitution. In effect, the first phrase of article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which reads: “Strike shall not be permitted in public services (…)”, although it would seem to proscribe strikes in these services, that is, although it would seem to have an absolute prohibitive sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with what is provided in article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is consistent with the purpose it pursues. This questioned article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with article 8 of ILO Convention 87 which - as transcribed in Recital III.

…it establishes the obligation of union organizations to adapt their activity to internal legislation. In other words, while the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is feasible for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute “public services” and that, due to their nature or the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue, or paralyze them without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain legal interests. Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which the strike is permitted, the established legal limits may not be exceeded, as the exercise of the strike must be framed within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the challenged article 375 (formerly, 368), by providing: “Strikes shall not be permitted in public services…,” in itself exceeds the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In summary, the challenged article 375 (formerly, 368) is not in itself unconstitutional, and the analysis of unconstitutionality must shift to the cases established by law in which the preclusive effect, in public services, occurs. Consistent with the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the action without merit on this point.

(…)

IX.- OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, AS INDICATED IN ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY, 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.- From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law to enumerate in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute preclusive effect that would proscribe the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service provision and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of the rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is feasible to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done applying criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which enumerates in article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code - transcribed in Considerando II, in which public services the strike is excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not therefore contradict it. However, as the claimants and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) correctly observe in their report, article 376 (formerly, 369), when its subsection a) details the public services in which the exercise of the strike is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not facilitate distinguishing which minimum public services it refers to, by stating: “All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…”. It is clear to this Court that this statement does not allow one to recognize which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; an imprecision that conflicts with what is ordered in the aforementioned constitutional precept 61, for which reason it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional. In another regard, subsection c) of the cited article 376 (formerly, 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the strike; additionally, it clearly establishes the limitation on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading tasks at docks and berths. Finally, subsection c) also sets limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of “workers in transit of any other private transportation company,” which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike in the effective provision of the public land transportation service. On the other hand, subsection d) of article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and public economy. Indeed, this subsection enunciates or distinguishes service provisions with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those relating to hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting of towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is feasible to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must involve absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they are likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and public economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. As for subsection b) of the challenged article - which excludes the strike from agricultural activity - this Court refers to what was stated in Considerando VIII. Finally, in relation to the rule contained in subsection e) of the challenged article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to dictate in which other public activities the strike is prohibited in the event that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such an attribution for exceeding the principle of legal reserve provided in constitutional numeral 61, according to which the attribution of establishing in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited falls exclusively on the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code.

In that judgment, the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subsections a), b), and e) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code were declared unconstitutional, since it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved to law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of numeral 375 of the Labor Code, which expressly prohibits strikes in public services; however, it was clear in emphasizing that this rule must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, such that the prohibition does not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Likewise, regarding subsection d) of article 376, it was also not considered unconstitutional because it was indicated that it establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and public economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, those relating to hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting of towns; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Thus, since these are similar arguments already resolved by the indicated jurisprudence, and there being no reasons to change the criterion, the declaration of this action without merit is appropriate.

IV.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional device of an electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic nature or produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial”, approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

By majority, the action is declared WITHOUT merit. Magistrates Salazar Alvarado and Pacheco Salazar record a note. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons. Magistrate Cruz Castro dissents and declares the action with merit.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Note by Magistrate Salazar Alvarado and Magistrate Pacheco Salazar, drafted by the former. We concur that this acción de inconstitucionalidad must be dismissed, given that indeed the law, in its formal and material sense, could regulate the prohibition or the limitation of the right to strike in certain cases of essential public services, but to do so it is necessary to draw the line of argument in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. This was indicated in the dissenting vote we subscribed to in Sentencia N° 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019. On that occasion, we expressed that: “In the opinion of the undersigned, there is a common basis for agreeing with the majority that there are certain essential public services where the legislator can prohibit the right to strike, so that, in general, it is possible to admit cases in which the law could limit the exercise of the fundamental right. But, as in any discussion in which a prohibition on fundamental rights is present, they must be consistent with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In our approach, the project should establish only restrictions on the right to strike, and not absolute prohibitions, as established by the legislators and, the majority of the Sala Constitucional. Thus, in the ten scenarios established by the bill to reform Article 376 of the Código de Trabajo, there is no adequate balancing of the right to strike against the fundamental rights that serve as its limit, because not in all cases do all workers' services have the same intensity. The regulation should only be aimed at prohibiting the strike when this workers' mechanism represents an obvious and manifest threat to the life, safety, or health of all or part of the population. Otherwise, a great majority of public servants should not be deprived of the fundamental right to strike, when it is not an essential service and there is no obvious and imminent threat to those. In the established terms, it implies for many an illegitimate restriction and a right that remains in theory, despite being constitutionally recognized. The criteria of the Committee on Freedom of Association can effectively guide this conclusion, since it has considered that: “The principle on the prohibition of strikes in ‘essential services’ could be distorted if an attempt were made to declare illegal a strike in one or several companies that do not provide an ‘essential service’ in the strict sense of the term, that is, services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population (case of Nigeria No. 2432 and Sri Lanka No. 2519).” “It does not seem appropriate that all state enterprises be treated on the same basis regarding restrictions on the right to strike, without distinguishing in the pertinent legislation between those that are genuinely essential and those that are not” (case of Canada No. 3057).

In our view, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is fundamental in the interpretation of Article 61 of the Constitución Política, as an exercise must be made to determine that in certain professional or even administrative positions, they might not represent a danger, such that one could depart from a premise so demanding that it allows concluding that all activities lead to the obvious and imminent threat to the right to life, health, and public safety. Certainly, such a conclusion might not be reasonable. In this sense, the imposed restriction unduly weighs on the fundamental right established in the Constitución Política [...].

For this, recourse is similarly made to the Committee on Freedom of Association, insofar as it maintains that: “The following do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term: radio-television, the petroleum sectors and petroleum installations, the distribution of petroleum for the operation of air transport, the gas sector, the filling of gas cylinders and their marketing, ports (loading and unloading), banks, the Central Bank, insurance services, computer services for the collection of tariffs and taxes, department stores and amusement parks, metallurgy and the entire mining sector, transport, in general, including metropolitan services, airline pilots, the generation, transport and distribution of fuels, railway services, metropolitan transport, postal services, the garbage collection service, refrigeration companies, hotel services, construction, automobile manufacturing, agricultural activities, the supply and distribution of food products, tea, coffee and coconut plantations, the Mint, the State Graphic Agency and the state monopolies of alcohol, salt and tobacco, the education sector, mineral water bottling companies, aircraft repair, elevator services, export services, private security services, except penitentiary services, airports, except air traffic control services, pharmacies, bakeries, beer production and the glass industry” (case of Republic of Korea No. 1865, Philippines No. 2252, Colombia No. 2355, among others).

Those cases that are genuinely essential must be established and those that are not must be distinguished; thus, the provision before us exceeds a criterion of harm to the health of the population, such that it does affect the right to strike, and it does not make a gradation or leveling of those health sectors that do not represent danger to the lives of patients, or even administrative ones, which might not have major consequences for the right to health of individuals.

Falling into the temptation of characterizing all strikes in home medical care, outpatient consultations, medical examinations, and laboratory tests as all generating a clear and imminent threat to the life, safety, or health of all or part of the population is a fallacy of argumentation, because not all of them lead to situations where the loss of health or human life has a direct relationship with the lack of an essential service. Consequently, the legislative technique of prohibiting all activity, for example through regulations in health and hospital services, is not legitimate.

In our view, then, it should be permitted that, within the ten scenarios established in the rule in question, measures can be defined to guarantee that said service is provided at a minimum level, sufficient to avoid the dangers that an essential service can entail, that is, a threat or violation to the life, safety, and health of part or all of the population. It is important to revisit Judgment No. 2017-13786 of 11:50 a.m. on August 29, 2017, in which the Chamber heard the refusal of the Department of Forensic Medicine to perform forensic autopsies and release the bodies to the family members due to being on strike. In it, the right of the deceased's relatives to receive the death certificate and the body of the deceased, the right to respect for deceased persons, and public health were weighed. In this decision, the undersigned magistrate Salazar Alvarado added a note stating that in essential services, those that are minimum must be defined, which are needed to protect the recipients of essential services from receiving a provision suspended due to a strike, when weighing all the rights involved, reasoning that:

"Given the particularities, the maintenance of the community's essential services is a limit to the right to strike in the face of the advent and possible violation of fundamental rights. The foregoing implies the provision of the work necessary for coverage that guarantees the rights, freedoms, or assets that the service itself satisfies. Thus, in the exercise of a strike that occurs in essential services that concern the community, there must be a reasonable proportion between the sacrifices imposed on the strikers and those suffered by the users of those services. Therefore, the measures must be aimed at guaranteeing minimums indispensable for the conservation of the services, while such maintenance cannot mean—in principle—that achieving the usual level of performance is required, nor ensuring the normal functioning of the service, but the community's interest must be disturbed by the strike only to reasonable extremes and not rendered nugatory. I reiterate that the consideration of a service as essential cannot entail the suppression of the right to strike of the workers who would have to provide it, but rather the need to have precise measures for its conservation; or, stated another way, to ensure the provision of the work that is necessary for the coverage of the rights, freedoms, or assets that said service satisfies, without requiring the usual level of performance to be reached or its normal functioning ensured. Thus, the lack of timely delivery of the bodies awaiting the practice of an autopsy, then, violates the right to health of the family members, in the understanding that said concept encompasses emotional, social, psychological, and spiritual health." In this way, we conclude that the determination made by the legislator that the essential services established in the reform of article 376 of the Labor Code are all activities where strikes must be prohibited, does not differentiate those activities that allow for ensuring a minimum provision of services and thus providing coverage for the service, without prejudice to permitting the exercise of the right to strike as a fundamental right, and not establishing an absolute prohibition." In accordance with the foregoing transcription, it is indeed possible to establish restrictions and limitations on the right to strike in public services, understood as essential. But, as also indicated in the foregoing transcription, not all cases should be understood as scenarios in which the legislator could prohibit this exercise of the right to strike for being strictly essential. In this sense, the legislator must weigh, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the application of those restrictions, by establishing those non-essential public services, in which case it is indeed possible to resort to a strike as a mechanism for pressure and/or negotiation. This lies in the task of establishing a distinction in the type of public service activity, so that there are no absolute prohibitions on the exercise of a fundamental collective labor right of the country's workers.-

**Exp: 18-015934-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2022-001015** **Separate reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal.** In the *sub examine*, the unconstitutionality of Article 375 and subsection d) of numeral 376 of the Labor Code is challenged, which established:

"*ARTICLE 375. - Strikes shall not be permitted in public services. Differences that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases where strikes are prohibited, shall be mandatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts.*" "*ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, the following are understood as public services:* (…)

*d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the operation of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate harm to public health or the public economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns.*" It should be noted that, on the occasion of Law No. 9808 called "*Law to provide legal certainty regarding strikes and their procedures*" of January 21, 2020, the strike regime in Costa Rica was reformed. Furthermore, even though subsection d) of numeral 376 was removed from the legal system (numeral 375 remained the same), its analysis is appropriate due to the possible effects it had.

Specifically, the plaintiff challenges the violation of numeral 61 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, it alleges that such norm does not establish an absolute prohibition of the right to strike in the services provided by the CCSS and establishes a legal reserve for determining the public services in which a strike is not permissible. It adds that the prohibition of this right is limited to qualified public services.

It challenges the absolute prohibition of the right to strike for all workers providing services at the CCSS. Furthermore, it also claims a violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (Comité de Libertad Sindical). In that sense, it argues that the restriction of the right to strike should be limited to qualified public services and those workers who are absolutely indispensable; that is, it considers that strikes should be allowed provided the operation of minimum services is guaranteed. Finally, it accuses the transgression of the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, and the prohibition of arbitrariness in the exercise of freedom of association (libertad sindical) and the right to strike, by encompassing all activities within the concept of "essential service". It considers that there is discrimination against all CCSS employees, as the concept of "essential service" is generalized. It adds that the scenario of a political protest strike is not provided for.

On this matter, on the occasion of the legislative consultation of the bill called "Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos" that reformed the strike regime in Costa Rica, this Tribunal, in opinion 2019020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019, developed a series of general postulates regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition of strikes in essential public services, which I consider apply in the sub lite. On that occasion, the Chamber ruled:

"A) First general premise: soft law nature of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (Comité de Libertad Sindical, CLS) of the International Labour Organization (OIT).

For the purposes of addressing this consultation, we consider it fundamental ab initio to clarify the non-binding nature of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO and what implications derive from this.

The ILO is a "tripartite" agency of the United Nations Organization that carries out its work through three fundamental bodies with representatives of governments, employers, and workers:

- "The International Labour Conference establishes international labour standards and defines the general policies of the Organization. The Conference, which is often called the international parliament of labour, meets once a year. It is also a forum for the discussion of fundamental social and labour issues. - The Governing Body is the executive body of the ILO and meets three times a year in Geneva. It makes decisions on ILO policy and establishes the programme and budget, which are subsequently submitted to the Conference for adoption. - The International Labour Office is the permanent secretariat of the International Labour Organization. It is responsible for all activities of the ILO, which it carries out under the supervision of the Governing Body and the direction of the Director General"[2] The CLS, created by the ILO in 1951, is a Committee of the Governing Body and, as a supervisory body, its purpose is to examine complaints concerning violations of freedom of association, which may be lodged by employers' or workers' organizations. It is composed, as a tripartite body, of nine titular members and nine substitutes, drawn in equal numbers from the Government, Workers, and Employers groups of the Governing Body, in addition to an independent chairperson elected by that same Council. [3] Regarding the nature of the CLS's decisions, the International Labour Office stated:

"2. (...) The Committee meets three times a year and, taking into account the observations transmitted by the governments, examines the complaints lodged against them and recommends to the Governing Body, as appropriate, that a case does not require a more detailed examination (final report) or that the attention of the government concerned should be drawn to the problems found and it should be invited to take appropriate measures to resolve them (interim reports or those in which the Committee asks to be kept informed of the evolution of the situation). Finally, the Committee may have to determine whether it is appropriate to try to obtain the agreement of the government concerned for the case to be referred to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission.

3. The conclusions adopted by the Committee in specific cases are intended to guide Governments and national authorities in the discussions and actions to be taken in follow-up to its recommendations on freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. (...)".

From the foregoing, it is observed that within the ILO, the decisions of the CLS are conceived as recommendations with the character of guiding guidelines, which is consistent with the fact that there is no conventional legal norm that expressly confers binding character on such decisions.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, the respondent raised an objection of lis pendens before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH), since the unions had already denounced that state before the ILO, the latter had found Panama guilty, and a resolution had already been issued recommending a series of measures to be complied with. However, the Court rejected the motion, among other arguments, because:

In the second case, it concerns a judgment that, under the terms of the Convention, is final and not subject to appeal (Article 67), and mandatory (Article 68.1).” (Judgment of November 18, 1999 -Preliminary Objections-; emphasis not in the original).

Ergo, at the level of the highest conventional body on human rights in the Americas, the distinct legal nature of a “recommendation” from the Committee on Freedom of Association, whose legal effect is restricted to the limits inherent in a decision of this type, and a judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which (among other characteristics distinguishing it from the former) is mandatory, according to numeral 68.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, has also been affirmed.

Now, even though the CFA recommendations are not binding, this Chamber recognizes the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of supervisory bodies, distinct from that of mere axiological or theoretical recommendations. In this way, the CFA recommendations are useful as qualified guides for guiding the interpretation and application of labor regulations, since they are a source of soft law to the extent that, despite no normative provision conferring binding character upon them, they always hold legal relevance. However, such a degree of importance does not imply that national authorities lack a margin of appreciation (margen de apreciación) before a CFA recommendation, provided that a reasonable and duly supported justification is noted, which in no way entails an action contrary to the obligation to act in good faith in the fulfillment of international treaties. Specifically, in the constitutional sphere, the recommendation of an ILO supervisory body would become a relevant element to consider among other involved factors, also of great significance, when resolving a conflict between constitutional goods (even those of a non-labor nature, such as those relating to the protection of the environment, health, life, security, or property), where the fundamental task is to seek an adequate balance between them and avoid a transgression of the essential content of any of them, all under the aegis of the general principle that any private action that damages public morals or order, or that harms a third party, is subject to the action of the law (Article 28 of the Political Constitution).

Having clarified this point, the development of this position in the sub examine will take into consideration several of the CFA recommendations; however, the Chamber will depart from some of them, to the extent that they constitute soft law and giving well-founded reasons for doing so. In this sense, as soft law, the referred recommendations become suitable for developing the contents of the Constitution, but not for going against them, since, from a positive hierarchical point of view, evidently, the former cannot be placed before the latter, which are of a fully positive-legal and binding nature (hard law).

&#xa0; **B) Second premise: the delegation of the definition of the concept of public service to the legislator.** Numeral 61 of our Political Constitution currently states:

“ARTICLE 61.- The right of employers to lockout (paro) and of workers to strike (huelga) is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination thereof made by law and in accordance with the regulations established therein, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence.” This text, which has remained unchanged since 1949, expressly recognizes the right of workers (public and private) to strike; however, at the same time it points out that this right is not absolute, since it contemplates an exception: public services. Accompanying the foregoing is the provision that both the determination of public services and their regulation are relegated to the ambit of the law, the legislator being obliged to disavow any act of coercion or violence.

In this regard, it is important to note that Article 61 mentioned above is a replication of the content of ordinal 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, which had been introduced through a partial reform (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943):

“ARTICLE 56.- The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized except in public services, according to the determination thereof made by law and in accordance with the regulations established therein, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence.” Now, from the reading of the proceedings of the 1949 Constituent Assembly, it follows that the regulation of the right to strike of workers was the subject of intense discussions within the National Constituent Assembly. Specifically, the criteria expressed by the Deputies are read in proceedings No. 122 and 123:

• 1)Proceeding No. 122 of August 3, 1949:

“In relation to Article 56, the Social Democratic fraction presented a motion for it to read as follows:

&#xa0;“The right of employers to lockout and of workers to strike is recognized, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services”. [61] Mr. MONTEALEGRE observed the advisability of maintaining the final concept of Article 56, in the sense that the regulations subsequently made by law on the right to strike must disavow any act of coercion or violence.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL pronounced in similar terms. Furthermore, he suggested saying, instead of public services, “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)”, a more correct expression, since the former can be understood as the services provided in public offices.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ accepted the suggestion of Mr. Edmundo Montealegre, but not the change of expressions pointed out by the second.

Deputy TREJOS indicated the advisability of prohibiting strikes in agricultural work, given the vital importance of agricultural production for our country. A strike in this type of work can result in the loss of one or more harvests, with the consequent damages for the community.

Licenciado FACIO expressed that, without prejudice to a more careful future study of the grammatical and ideological meaning of the terms “services of public utility”, delimiting the fields of each, he thinks it is better to maintain the original wording of the 1871 Constitution on this matter. In Administrative Law, public services are those activities that, due to their importance and significance in national life, cannot be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy. In that broad meaning, the basic branches of agriculture are included, in which it is not possible to accept a strike that would paralyze them.

Deputy ESQUIVEL clarified that the principle of safeguarding fundamental agricultural activities from the right to lockout or strike is established by our Labor Code in its Article 369, subsection b).

The explanation is simple; agriculture being the fundamental activity of the country, upon which our economy depends, a strike that comes to paralyze activities vital to the nation cannot be accepted. Hence—he continued—we are obligated to establish as a constitutional norm the prohibition of strikes in agriculture. He added that the formula “public utility services” (servicios de utilidad pública) is more comprehensive than that of “public services” (servicios públicos), which originally appears in Article 56.

Representative BAUDRIT SOLERA stated that he deemed the distinction between public services and public utility services unnecessary, because Labor Law has a different concept of what is understood in Administrative Law as public services, which refer to all those activities of public interest, whether or not they are in the hands of the Public Administration. He read to that effect paragraphs by Castorena Cabanellas, and Francisco Walter Linares. He added that the 1949 Draft went further in this matter. It expressly excluded the strike only with respect to public servants. He then referred to the study by Licenciado Otto Fallas, professor of Labor Law at our School of Law, a study he has cited on previous occasions. He read what the aforementioned Labor Law professor wrote in relation to Article 56 of the 1871 Charter. Regarding the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work, he expressed disagreement since certain agricultural activities may be of public interest but others are not. If a strike is prohibited in the former, there is no reason whatsoever to extend that prohibition to the latter.

Deputy ESQUIVEL again intervened in the debate. He explained that Mr. Baudrit Solera's reasons were proving him right, since public services is one thing for Administrative Law and another for Labor Law. It is better, then, to adopt the term that will not later lend itself to twisted interpretations. Everyone understands the concept of public utility services.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ expressed that it is not through the path of restrictions that strikes can be stopped. It is necessary to go to their causes, to end a series of social injustices. Those who attempt to stop strikes through the system of restrictions ignore that they are a social phenomenon that obeys many complex causes. The right to strike is one of the fundamental conquests achieved by workers, after bloody struggles. Mr. Esquivel's motion—he added later—represents a curtailment of that right of the working class since it prohibits strikes in public utility services and in agricultural work.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL clarified that he was not introducing new principles into the constitutional text that curtail or restrict the workers' right to strike. He is simply carrying into the Constitution limitations that already appear in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which prohibits strikes in agricultural work. He is not moved in any way by the petty interest of restricting a right of the workers, but by the patriotic interest of safeguarding the country's economy, which will be enormously harmed by a strike in the fundamental activities of agriculture. As for public utility services, he only seeks to say clearly what our 1871 Constitution, in its Article 56, says in an ambiguous form.

Deputy ZELEDON indicated that he understood that a strike occurs once the legal remedies to achieve a peaceful and just solution to the problem have been exhausted. He thinks that the constitutional text should state that the workers' right to strike is guaranteed, but only once all legal remedies and means for peacefully resolving the raised conflict have been exhausted.

When the Social Democratic motion was put to a vote, it was rejected.

Discussion then turned to Licenciado ESQUIVEL's motion, which states:

“The right of employers to the lockout (paro) and of workers to the strike (huelga) is recognized, except in agricultural work and in public utility services, in accordance with the determination of the latter made by law and in conformity with the regulations it establishes, which shall disallow any act of coercion or violence.” [61] Deputy HERRERO stated that the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work benefits all Costa Ricans without distinctions of any kind.

Representative MONGE ALVAREZ insisted that the motion under debate represented a violation of the guarantee of Article 56. He recalled that the Assembly, in a certain way, had committed itself not to curtail any of the social guarantees of the 1871 constitutional text. Esquivel's motion practically extinguishes the right to strike achieved by workers after the most tragic struggles in history. It must not be forgotten that the vast majority of the country's workers are agricultural workers. If their right to go on strike is restricted, one of their basic rights will be curtailed. In fact, then, that right is being prohibited for the majority of Costa Rican workers. He added that in the banana zone there are many activities that can very well be paralyzed by a strike. If the motion under debate passes, the workers of that zone will not be able to go on strike in justified cases. He insisted again that it is not through the path of restrictions that the social phenomenon of strikes can be ended, even when they are expressly prohibited in certain activities, as social phenomena that they are, they can appear at any moment. In this sense, he cited the strikes of the "Northern" and the "Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico." According to our laws, both strikes were prohibited. However, since they obeyed just causes, they could not be stopped. Strikes cannot be ended by carrying prohibitions into the Constitution. They will only end when the problems that motivate them have been solved.

Mr. MONTEALEGRE indicated that in his many years dedicated to agriculture, he has never witnessed a strike in the countryside. Personally—he said—I have only attended one strike: that of the arms-down strike (brazos caídos). On that occasion we closed the dairies. However, we distributed the milk free of charge to poor families and charitable institutions.

Deputy CHACON stated that he had voted for the previous, rejected motion, but he will not vote for the one under debate, which practically comes to suppress a social guarantee. If agricultural workers are prohibited from striking, who in Costa Rica are the vast majority, it means that the right to strike will have disappeared in Costa Rica. (…) He also considered the term “public utility services” to be very broad. He prefers that the original text of Article 56 be maintained.

(…)

Representatives LEIVA and BAUDRIT SOLERA set forth the reasons that lead them not to vote for Licenciado Esquivel's motion. The former indicated that he had voted for the previous, rejected one considering it more just. He added that carrying the prohibition against striking for agricultural workers into the Constitution is to move markedly backwards in this matter. (…) The latter—Mr. Baudrit Solera—expressed that he would vote for the motion if the prohibition regarding agricultural workers were excluded from it. There is no reason whatsoever to deprive a large sector of the country's workers of the right to strike in specific cases. When the agricultural activity is truly of public interest, the right to strike in such activities is proscribed by our labor legislation. He added that the great mass of peasant workers is being deprived of the means to defend their economic and social conquests. Evidently such a thing signifies an inexplicable backward step in this matter because, in general, the civilized countries of the world have granted workers the fundamental right to strike, a right they have won after a long and arduous struggle. At the fourth conference of the International Labor Organization, held just a few weeks ago in Rio de Janeiro, it was established that the agricultural worker must be equated with other workers in their rights. That was said and agreed upon at the aforementioned conference with the vote of our delegates.

However, in the Constituent Assembly of Costa Rica, shortly thereafter, a truly inexplicable step backward was attempted. For the rest, the speaker referred again to what he had previously set forth regarding public services.

Deputy FACIO stated that even if strikes were prohibited, they would not disappear. If they are authorized, they will not multiply for that reason either. To think that way is to ignore that strikes are social phenomena, unrelated to the Constitution or to laws, the product of de facto situations. Strikes must be accepted with value as a characteristic of current economic times. Prohibiting the right to strike in a Constitution is an easy task, but a harmless one, since the social problem that the strike represents and that produces it will not have been solved in any way. He added that this topic had been widely discussed within the Drafting Committee of the Project of forty-nine. Initially, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a valid recourse for all workers in the country, but only after exhausting certain rigorous procedures for a peaceful solution. However, the Committee subsequently altered its view, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services, a very common system in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and finally we have returned to the text of the 71 Constitution, which summarizes the same principle. Then, Mr. Facio called on his colleagues in the Chamber to keep the right to strike unaltered, just as the guarantee of Article 56 enshrines it, because in doing so the Constituent Assembly would be telling the country that the Social Guarantees, enacted by Calderón with specific purposes that we all know and regardless of their origin, are guarantees to which every Costa Rican worker is entitled, and that the old Opposition is coming to purify, making that thesis its own. (...)

Representative HERRERO expressed that he was going to vote for the motion under debate, without thinking of curtailing a right of the workers. However, in deference to his sincerity and good faith, he suggests to the proponent that he withdraw from it the prohibition regarding strikes in agricultural work.

Mr. ESQUIVEL agreed to withdraw that part of his motion, but not without first noting how ruinous and deplorable a strike in agricultural activities would be for the country's economy. My motion—he said—was intended to prevent greater harm to the country in the future. The fundamental activity of the nation is agriculture, upon which our battered economy rests. If a strike in the future affects agricultural activities, the damages would be incalculable. I only sought with my motion to spare the country such a situation.

Deputy MORUA indicated that he had voted for the dismissed motion. He did not intend to vote for Mr. Esquivel's motion since it maintained the prohibition of agricultural workers going on strike, which deprived the Banana Company workers of that legitimate right.

Mr. ACOSTA JIMENEZ noted that since the proponent had withdrawn the prohibition of strikes in agricultural work, words were superfluous. (…) He then added that with Article 56 of the 71 Charter as it stands, when strike movements present themselves to the country, they can be resolved. He is in favor of maintaining the right to strike, because it would not be fair to deprive the workers of certain foreign corporations that have taken and continue to take millions of dollars from the country of the right to strike to improve their social and economic conditions. Furthermore, by proceeding in this manner, he is consistent with his previous ideas, when he proposed that the chapter on Social Guarantees be discussed article by article, without undermining any guarantee.

Deputy GAMBOA declared that he would not vote for the motion under debate, as he would keep the text of Article 56. He considers the term “public utility services” too broad. In the future, a series of agricultural and industrial activities could be considered of public utility. It is leaving the door open to curtail the workers' right to strike.

When Mr. Esquivel's motion, with the noted amendment, was put to a vote, it was approved. Consequently, the article of the new Constitution will read:

“The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public utility services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which must prohibit all acts of coercion or violence”. [61]” 2) Minutes No. 123 of August 4, 1949:

“(…)

Article 4.- The discussion of the chapter on Social Guarantees of the 71 Constitution continued.

Representative ARROYO presented a motion to review the article approved yesterday regarding the right to strike for workers and employers. If the review succeeds, he makes a motion for the respective article to read as follows:

“The right to strike for workers and to lockouts for employers is guaranteed, with the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services. For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations ensuring a conciliation period. The exercise of violence or coercion as a means of promoting, maintaining, or paralyzing strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited”. [61] The proponent indicated that the formula approved in the previous session represented a curtailment of the right to strike. In the future, a Congress could interpret the scope of the term “public utility services” very broadly, undermining the right to strike. One could even go so far as to say that a banana contract, for example, is of public utility, to place the company beyond the reach of strike movements.

Licenciado ESQUIVEL expressed that the only variation in his approved motion compared to Article 56 of the 71 Charter, which seems to have so concerned the Representative of Rerum Novarum, Mr. Arroyo, is that referring to the incorporation of the concept: “public utility services” instead of “public services,” which is much more comprehensive. Precisely, the Labor Code gives that meaning to the term “public services.” He added that his attitude did not stem from a desire to curtail a right of the workers, nor to make a social guarantee illusory. He has adhered to what the Labor Code provides on this matter, which within the term “public services” includes a series of fundamental activities that cannot be affected by a strike. Those activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electrical energy—must be placed beyond the reach of a strike, not to squeeze the workers, but for the benefit of society in general. He insisted that his intention was not to restrict a right of the workers, but to seek a fair balance, thus avoiding for the community the dangers of an indiscriminate strike.

Deputy MONGE ALVAREZ expressed his satisfaction upon learning that colleague Arroyo has presented a motion to review what was agreed upon in the previous session regarding the right to strike, enshrined in all the Constitutions of the most advanced countries.

He added later that he had searched in the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the meaning of "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública). However, none of the scholars he consulted refer to that term. They all speak of "public services" (servicios públicos), in which strikes are prohibited. Furthermore, the term approved from Mr. Esquivel's motion is too broad; it encompasses practically all economic activities in the country, since all are of evident public utility. He then indicated what he had stated in the previous session, that is, that restrictions are not the way to end the social phenomenon of strikes.

Deputy VARGAS VARGAS declared that he had deliberately not wanted to participate in the debate. In the previous session he did not vote for the motion of colleague Monge Álvarez, because the recent strike of the Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico—which he had supported and defended—demonstrated the injustice of prohibiting public service workers from striking when the reasons were just. He then read, regarding limitations on the right to strike, some concepts by the scholar on the subject, Dr. Carlos García Oviedo, professor at the University of Seville. He added that he would vote for the proposed motion, which conforms to reality. Should Mr. Arroyo's motion not succeed, he agrees that Article 56 (Artículo 56) should be maintained intact.

Deputy BRENES GUTIERREZ stated that he agreed with Mr. Esquivel's thesis, which fully conforms to the provisions of Article 369 of the Labor Code. The approved term "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) is the appropriate one, and in his opinion it does not harm workers in any way.

Licenciado GAMBOA indicated that he would vote for the review, as he considers that if the formula approved in the previous session is maintained, the right to strike is threatened with death. Tomorrow, to prevent a strike movement in a specific industry, it will be said that it is of public utility. The same could occur regarding any banana contract. The Constitution must establish the legitimate right of workers to strike in a form that is not subject to doubt or misinterpretation.

Submitted to a vote, the review was approved.

The substantive motion of Mr. Arroyo was then entered into discussion.

Deputy HERRERO observed that in this matter the problems of each country are different. In highly industrial countries, strikes in public services—for example, in transport—are the most damaging. The opposite is true in small countries like Costa Rica, where public utility services are the most important. He added that the most convenient course was to adopt the wording of Article 56 (Artículo 56) of the 1871 Constitution, to avoid a long debate.

Representative ROJAS VARGAS expressed his agreement with Mr. Arroyo's motion, which is fairer than the formula approved yesterday. Furthermore, it strengthens and invigorates the right to strike by restricting it only to public services.

In matters of restrictions, the most concrete and exact terms must be used. The term "public services" (servicios públicos) is less broad than that of "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública). Or to put it another way, the latter includes the former. He added that the right to strike must be maintained, preferably with the fewest number of restrictions.

Deputy SOLORZANO also expressed his agreement with the motion under debate. He stated that no matter how much dialectical effort is made, they do not convince him that the term "public utility services" (servicios de utilidad pública) is more precise than "public services" (servicios públicos). With the approved formula, the right to strike is guaranteed and at the same time left hanging. On the other hand, a very wide door is opened for future Congresses to annul this right of the working class.

Mr. CASTRO SIBAJA stated that, should Mr. Arroyo's motion not be approved, he has presented one to the Board so that the original wording of Article 56 (Artículo 56) is maintained. He added that he considered the inclusion in the constitutional text of a conciliation period before resorting to a strike to be regulatory. Such an eventuality is contemplated by our legislation on the matter.

Licenciado BAUDRIT SOLERA expressed that he maintained the criterion stated in the previous session, in that the approved formula does not introduce any fundamental variation to the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike. He believes that such a right is rather broadened, since among public services there are some that are of public interest, but others are not. He continues to consider the approved term more appropriate for the reasons stated in the previous session. In any case—he added—the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what public utility services are. The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or the broadening of the term. The law will become a reflection of the composition of the Assembly. If it leans to the left, public services will be few. If, on the contrary, it tends to the right, they will be many. For those reasons and given that there is a manifest insistence on it, while he remains firm in his criterion, he will vote for the motion of colleague Castro Sibaja to return to the wording of Article 56 (Artículo 56) of the Charter of 1871.

Deputy ZELEDON observed that Mr. Arroyo's motion fully satisfied his aspirations from the previous session, which is why he would give it his vote.

Deputy CHACON JINESTA briefly referred to the matter under discussion. He began by saying that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the right to strike for workers. In Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches are evidently of public utility. If this concept is maintained, it is logical that the right to strike will have disappeared from our legislation. He considers it more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text, and therefore suggests that colleague Arroyo withdraw his motion to allow that of Castro Sibaja to proceed. The proponent agreed to withdraw his motion.

Submitted to a vote, Deputy Castro Sibaja's motion that Article 56 (Artículo 56) be preserved as it is was approved.

Consequently, Article 56 (Artículo 56) of the new Constitution shall read as follows:

"The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strikes is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and pursuant to the regulations it establishes, which must proscribe any act of coercion or violence." [61] From the analysis of the Deputies' arguments, a series of useful elements is extracted to define the scope that the Constituent Assembly gave to numeral 61 of the Political Constitution in relation to the concept of "public services" (servicios públicos).

Precisely, during the discussion of the motions relating to the rule in question, arguments both for and against using the concepts of “public services (servicios públicos)” or “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)” arose, which are set out in detail for greater clarity.

• 1)The first motion of August 3, 1949, which sought to amend Article 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, was rejected; however, during its discussion, several elements arose related to the reference made to “public services (servicios públicos)”:

i. Deputy Esquivel proposed changing that term to “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)”, since, in his opinion, this was more correct and, furthermore, public services (servicios públicos) could be understood as those provided by public offices.

ii. Deputies Facio and Baudrit sought to provide some type of definition for “public services (servicios públicos)”. The former conceptualized them as those activities which, due to their importance and significance in national life, could not be paralyzed, such as the production and distribution of electrical energy, and the basic branches of agriculture in a broad sense. The latter indicated that they referred to all those activities of public interest, whether or not they were in the hands of the Public Administration. Regarding its definition, Deputy Facio considered it better to maintain the wording of the 1871 Constitution.

• 2)The second motion of August 3, 1949, this time formulated by Deputy Esquivel, suggested that the rule be amended in the following terms: “The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in agricultural work and in services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública), in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and in conformity with the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” Due to the foregoing, regarding services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública) and public services (servicios públicos), the constituent delegates pronounced as follows:

i. Deputies Chacón and Gamboa stated that the term “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)” was very broad and preferred the original text of numeral 56. Precisely, Deputy Gamboa clarified that the term “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)” could mean a series of agricultural activities within that category.

ii. Deputy Facio expressed himself in the following terms: “this topic had been discussed extensively within the Drafting Committee of the '49 Project. At first, the principle of the right to strike without limitations was adopted, as a valid recourse for all workers in the country, but only after exhausting certain rigorous procedures for peaceful resolution. However, the Committee later altered its opinion, prohibiting the right to strike in highly qualified public services (servicios públicos), a system very common in the labor legislation of Latin American countries, and finally we have returned to the text of the '71 Constitution, which summarizes the same principle.” iii. Deputy Baudrit Solera again noted what he had already stated about public services (servicios públicos).

iv. Finally, following Deputy Esquivel’s withdrawal of that part of his motion referring to agricultural work, the National Constituent Assembly approved the article as follows: “The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública), in accordance with the determination thereof made by law and in conformity with the regulations it establishes, which must disallow any act of coercion or violence.” 3) On August 4, 1949, a motion for review of the numeral approved the previous day was interposed, and should the review succeed, another motion was proposed so that the article would read: “The right to strike for workers and to lockout for employers is guaranteed, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits, except in public services (servicios públicos). For the exercise of this right, there shall be special regulations ensuring a conciliation period. The exercise of violence or coercion as a means of promoting, maintaining, or paralyzing strike or lockout movements is strictly prohibited.” At that time, the discussion proceeded as follows:

i. Deputy Arroyo, who was the proponent, considered that Congress could interpret the scope of the term “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)” in a very broad way, which diminished the right to strike, and furthermore, he stated that with the above one could even say that a banana contract was of public utility.

ii. Deputy Esquivel stated that the Labor Code gave meaning to the term “public services (servicios públicos)”, which included a series of fundamental activities of manifest public interest—such as the production and distribution of electrical energy—not to “squeeze” the workers, but for the benefit of society in general.

iii. Deputy Monge Álvarez stated that, after having searched in the books of labor law scholars for the scope of the term “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)”, none referred to that term, but rather all spoke of “public services (servicios públicos)”, in which strikes were prohibited; furthermore, he considered the term (referring to services of public utility) to be too broad and to encompass practically all economic activities of the country, since all were of evident public utility.

iv. Deputy Vargas Vargas agreed, if the proposed motion was not approved, with maintaining Article 56 intact.

v. Deputy Gamboa noted that the right to strike was “mortally threatened,” because movements of that nature would be avoided in an industry if it were classified as of public utility, which could happen with any banana contracting; therefore, a Constitution should establish some formulation that would not give rise to doubt.

vi. The motion for review was approved.

• 4)On August 4, 2019 (sic) [1949], the substantive motion of Deputy Arroyo was heard, for which, of relevance, the following was debated:

i. Deputy Herrero stated that, in Costa Rica, services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública) were those of greatest importance and that the most advisable course was to adopt the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution to avoid a lengthy debate.

ii. Deputy Rojas Vargas considered that the right to strike was strengthened and invigorated by limiting only public services (servicios públicos); likewise, he argued that, in matters of restrictions, the most concrete and exact terms must be used. He noted that “public services (servicios públicos)” was less broad than “services of public utility (servicios de utilidad pública)”, and that the latter included the former.

He added that the right to strike should be maintained, ideally with the fewest possible restrictions.

Deputy Solórzano expressed that he was not convinced that the term “public utility services” (“servicios de utilidad pública”) was more expressive than “public services” (“servicios públicos”), and that the former would open a very wide door for future Congresses to annul the working class's right to strike.

Deputy Baudrit Solera maintained the opinion expressed in the previous session, to the effect that the approved formula did not introduce any fundamental variation from the 1871 Constitution regarding the right to strike, but rather broadened that right, since among public services there are some that are of public interest and others that are not; he added: “the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what public utility services are. The ideological composition of the Legislative Assembly will lead to the restriction or broadening of the term. The law will reflect the composition of the Assembly. If it leans to the left, public services will be few. If, on the contrary, it tends to the right, they will be many. For these reasons, and given that there is a manifest insistence on it, he remains firm in his opinion and will vote for colleague Castro Sibaja's motion to return to the wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Charter.” Deputy Chacón Jinesta stated that the formula approved in the previous session practically liquidated the workers' right to strike; he explained that, in Costa Rica, the vast majority of workers are in agriculture, whose branches were evidently of public utility, so if this concept were maintained, the right to strike would disappear; finally, he considered it more prudent to maintain the original wording of the 1871 text and suggested to Arroyo the withdrawal of his motion in order to proceed with that of Castro Sibaja.

Deputy Arroyo agreed to withdraw his motion.

• 5)Finally, on August 4, 1949, Deputy Castro Sibaja's motion to preserve Article 56 of the 1871 Charter exactly as it was was approved: “The right of employers to lockouts and of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, according to the determination of these made by law and in accordance with the regulations it establishes, which must prohibit all acts of coercion or violence.” Thus, from the study of the minutes, no actual discussion emerges regarding Deputy Castro Sibaja's motion, who proposed maintaining the original wording of Article 56 of the 1871 Constitution[5], but rather only several isolated statements by Deputies who, during the debate on other motions, considered it more convenient to return to the original wording. Now, from what the Constituent Delegates stated, it is also observed that they reconsidered resorting to the term “public utility services” (“servicios de utilidad pública”), initially approved, because they deemed it too broad, so they finally replaced it with the notion of “public service” (“servicio público”), considered more appropriate. However, it is no less true that no clear consensus was reached on the legal or political meaning of such a concept, and rather, the final decision consisted of maintaining what was established in the 1871 Political Constitution, precisely the proposal of Constituent Delegate Castro Sibaja.

The foregoing is noteworthy because, within the framework of this replication of Article 56 of the 1871 Political Constitution (Law No. 24 of July 2, 1943) in Article 61 of the current Fundamental Law, one of the Constituent Delegates made direct reference to the fact that the term “public services” (“servicios públicos”) was defined in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943). In that sense, both the partial reform of the 1871 Political Constitution and the Labor Code were approved by the same Constitutional Congress of Costa Rica less than two months apart: first, the constitutional reform that enshrined the right to strike and its respective exception (public services according to legal regulation); and second, the Labor Code that established a list of public services in which strikes were not permitted. Concerning the above, the Labor Code, at the time of its issuance, also listed as public services some provided by private entities (for example, private companies related to clinics, hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and public lighting in towns). From this it is inferred that the Constituent Delegate of '49 did not opt for the public nature of the entity responsible for providing the service—the subjective element—to define “public service” (“servicio público”), but rather, regardless of its ownership, emphasized the relevance of the activity to the community; that is, he resorted to an objective element.

Within this context, it is concluded that the reference to “public service” (“servicio público”) in Article 61 of the Constitution did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the choice was made to maintain the notion from the 1871 Constitution, which is understood in light of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which encompassed activities of general interest and particular importance for society. This situation also reveals that the Constituent Delegate left the establishment of specific examples of public service to the ordinary parliamentarian, in accordance with the right to free legislative configuration. As Deputy Baudrit Solera records: “In any case - he added - the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what public services are and what public utility services are.” Now, it is clear that the aforementioned freedom of configuration must be developed with full respect for the basic parameters derived from constitutional jurisprudence.

Precisely, in judgment No. 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Court indicated, regarding Article 61 of the Political Constitution and its conception of public services, the following:

"**VI.- THE RIGHT TO UNIONIZE IN PUBLIC SERVICES.-** (...) Regarding the content of union action, specifically concerning the right to strike, **Article 61 of the Political Constitution establishes that the regulation of said right of collective action is a matter reserved to law, and any restriction of said right must be done by law and in no way may favor acts of coercion or violence.** It is also a result of the power conferred through the cited constitutional numeral 61, **that it is incumbent upon the legislator to define in which cases of public activity the exercise of the right to strike is restricted or excluded; a mandate that is satisfied through Article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which must conform** to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality so that it is consistent with the **democratic principle upon which** the national legal order rests, embodied in Article 1 of the Political Constitution and which is **a supreme value of the Constitutional State of Law.** **VII.- THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 375 (FORMERLY, 368) OF THE LABOR CODE WHICH EXCLUDES THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FROM PUBLIC SERVICES. The strike, as a manifestation of union action, finds a limit when** its exercise interferes with the provision of certain public services, which it is up to the law to determine according to Article 61 of the Political Constitution. To this effect, the first phrase of Article 375 (formerly, 368) of the Labor Code, which states: "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services (...)", although it appears to proscribe strikes in these services, that is, although it appears to have an absolute prohibitory meaning, the truth is that **it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases set or determined by law** in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality, so that it is consistent with the purpose it pursues. This questioned Article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with Article 8 of ILO Convention 87, which—as transcribed in Considerando III—establishes the obligation of union organizations to adapt their activity to internal legislation. In other words, **although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute "public services" and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, cannot be suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed without causing significant, serious, and immediate harm to certain assets.** Furthermore, it is understood that in those public activities within which the strike is permitted, the established legal limits cannot be exceeded, as the exercise of the strike must be framed within legality. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that the questioned Article 375 (formerly, 368), by providing: "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services...", exceeds by itself the limits established by the Constitution or international conventions. In summary, the questioned Article 375 (formerly, 368) is not in itself unconstitutional, and the analysis of unconstitutionality must be shifted to the cases set by law in which the prohibitory effect, in public services, occurs. Consistent with the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the action without merit regarding this point.

**VIII.- THE PROHIBITION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.-** We will now proceed to analyze the grounds of unconstitutionality presented by the plaintiffs regarding—firstly—the prohibition of the right to strike that the Labor Code provides for the agricultural sector in its Article 376, subsection b) (formerly, 369, subsection b). As stated in Considerando V, through ILO Convention 11, the freedom of unionization in the agricultural sector was given content to guarantee this part of the population the free exercise of the right to unionize on an equal footing with the industrial sector, through the pressure instruments accepted for the pursuit of their goals, specifically through the exercise of the right to strike. **It is evident, in the Chamber's opinion, that Article 376 (formerly 369) makes a clumsy statement of what should mandatorily be understood as "public services", at least insofar as it includes** within this concept the activity carried out by workers engaged in the sowing, cultivation, care, or harvesting of agricultural, livestock, or forestry products; for these tasks do not fit into the generally accepted notion of public service.

Without attempting to exhaust the definition of public service as a legal institution, it must be kept in mind for the purposes of this judgment that a public service must at least be aimed at satisfying collective needs and involves positive provisions by the Administration or is under a certain degree of its control and regulation. The prohibition on exercising the right to strike in activities that are not public services exceeds Article 61 of the Constitution, which orders the legislator to establish the activities in which the exercise of the right to strike is restricted, solely in public services. From the foregoing, it is inferred that when the legislator identifies—in subsection b) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code—agricultural activity with public service, it incurs in arbitrariness, since such inclusion has no legal basis and entails the denial of the exercise of the right to strike in the aforementioned sector; which is also contrary to the recognized purpose of international convention No. 11 of the I.L.O., to guarantee the agricultural sector the full exercise of the right to unionize and its consequences. Based on the reasons indicated, it is appropriate to declare the action with merit on this point, and consequently, subsection b) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code must be annulled.

IX.- OF THE OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS EXCLUDED, AS INDICATED BY ARTICLE 376 (FORMERLY, 369) OF THE LABOR CODE.- From the analysis made, it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law to state in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect that proscribes the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the provision and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done with the application of criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. The labor legislation, which lists in Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code—transcribed in Recital II—in which public services the strike is excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not contradict it for that reason. However, as the claimants and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic correctly observe in their report, Article 376 (formerly, 369), when detailing in its subsection a) the public services in which the exercise of the strike is excluded, uses imprecise terms that do not facilitate distinguishing which minimum public services it refers to, by indicating: “All those performed by workers of the State or its institutions…”. It is clear to this Court that this statement does not allow one to recognize which public activities are excluded from the exercise of the right to strike; an imprecision that conflicts with what is ordered in the aforementioned constitutional precept 61, and therefore it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional. On another note, subsection c) of the cited Article 376 (formerly, 369) does correctly and adequately define which categories of public transportation are limited in the exercise of the strike; in addition, it clearly establishes the limit on the exercise of the right to strike for workers engaged in loading and unloading work at docks and piers. Finally, subsection c) also sets limits on the exercise of the right to strike in the case of “workers in transit of any other private transportation company,” which must be understood as the impossibility of exercising the right to strike in the effective provision of the public land transportation service. On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests of public health and the economy. Indeed, in this section, provisions are enunciated or distinguished with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, and those referring to sanitation, cleaning, and lighting of towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must involve absolutely indispensable public services and, on the other hand, that they are likely to compromise the legal interests of health and the public economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Regarding subsection b) of the questioned article—which excludes the strike from agricultural activity—this Court refers to what was stated in Recital VIII. Finally, in relation to the norm contained in subsection e) of the challenged article, which authorizes the Executive Branch to dictate in which other public activities the strike is prohibited in the event that the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional power to suspend certain individual guarantees, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of such attribution for exceeding the principle of legal reserve provided in constitutional numeral 61, according to which the attribution to establish in which public service provisions the exercise of the right to strike must be limited rests exclusively with the Legislative Branch. Consequently, this Chamber proceeds to declare the unconstitutionality of subsections a) and e) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code. (…)” As a corollary of the reasoning set forth, by constitutional mandate, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what the limitations on the exercise of the strike therein are.

Nonetheless, such a task must be carried out within the framework of constitutionality, and therefore, according to the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction, the Executive Branch cannot be assigned any competence to define in which type of public service (servicio público) the exercise of the strike must be prohibited; since such a function is exclusive to the Legislative Branch. Likewise, the legislator's free configuration must respect the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality, for which purposes the nature of the public service (servicio público) in question or its particular social impact becomes decisive, factors that would justify preventing it from being suspended, discontinued, or paralyzed, given the significant, serious, and immediate harm that this would cause to certain legal interests of health, life, security, or the public economy. In addition, what the legislator defines as a public service (servicio público) must involve the satisfaction of collective needs, as well as refer to positive provisions of the Administration or those subject to particular control by it." **C) Constitutionality of article 376 of the consulted legislative bill.** (...)

In this regard, according to point A) of this considering clause, let the consultants observe that the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (Comité de Libertad Sindical, CLS) are not of obligatory compliance, but rather are orientation guidelines, which agrees with the fact that there is no conventional legal rule that expressly confers binding character on such recommendations, a position supported even by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) in *Baena Ricardo y otros vs. Panamá*. The foregoing does not mean that this Chamber disregards the legal and doctrinal value of the pronouncements of the ILO supervisory bodies, whose technical and historical authority gives them a value superior to that of a recommendation of a purely axiological or theoretical nature. However, such recognition does not mean that the constitutional jurisdiction lacks a margin of appreciation when applying constitutional review, since the referred recommendations, as already indicated, do not have binding quality; hard law—the current constitutional regulation—must prevail over soft law, and the diverse constitutional interests at stake must be safeguarded in a balanced manner.

Consequently, the notion of essential services, beyond the life, health, and security of the person, can encompass the public economy, when it concerns a public service (servicio público) that is absolutely indispensable and susceptible to compromising such a legal interest, as this Chamber established in judgment no. 1998-01317 of 10:12 hours of February 27, 1998.

Having clarified the foregoing, the question now corresponds to whether the Legislator can approve an absolute and general prohibition in a public service (servicio público), or if it must adjust to a scheme of minimum functioning of the service, like the one regulated in subsection 376(d) of the current Labor Code.

In this regard, this Chamber considers that the Legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, can establish the absolute and general prohibition of the strike in essential public services (servicios públicos), provided that this does not violate the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality. Now, for the purpose of specifying the scope of the legislator's powers in this matter, what the Political Constitution itself regulates must be considered.

Thus, in accordance with numeral 61 of our Political Constitution: "The right of employers to the lockout and that of workers to the strike is recognized, except in public services (servicios públicos), according to the determination that the law makes of these and in accordance with the regulations that it establishes, which must prohibit any act of coercion or violence." This norm is a replication of subsection 56 of the Political Constitution of 1871, pursuant to the constitutional reform of 1943.

As was already elucidated in point B) of this considering clause, the reference to "public service (servicio público)" in article 61 of the Constitution did not stem from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, in reality, the Constituent Assembly of '49 chose to maintain the notion of the Constitutional Congress of 1943 contained in numeral 56 of the 1871 Charter. If the historical moment of the approval of this norm in July 1943 is taken into consideration, its irrefutable political link with the notion of public service (servicio público) of the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, is easily noticeable. Regarding the strike, this latter regulation links the concept of public service (servicio público) with the special relevance of the activity for the community; that is, with an objective element. Therefore, from the point of view of our Fundamental Law, it is plausible to extend the notion of essential public service (servicio público) to the life, health, and security of the person, as well as to the public economy, provided that it concerns, as indicated supra, a public service (servicio público) that is absolutely indispensable and susceptible to compromising such a legal interest.

Precisely, this particular impact on the aforementioned constitutional interests justifies the legislator opting for an absolute prohibition of the strike in the referred services. This is an alternative that becomes reasonable, to the extent that the Constituent Assembly itself opted for two rules: 1) recognizing the right of employers to the lockout and that of workers to the strike, and 2) excepting public services (servicios públicos) from the previous rule, according to what the legislator determined.

In this sense, reforming what is regulated in the current Labor Code cannot be considered unconstitutional, since, precisely, the Constituent Assembly entrusted the legislator with regulating the strike in public services (servicios públicos), for which purpose it is entirely competent to formulate the corresponding legal reforms.

The limit of such attribution is, among others, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality (vote 1998-01317), which in the case at hand is not observed to have been violated, since, on the one hand, the Constitution itself does not reject the option for the strike to be prohibited in public services (servicios públicos) of particular relevance (on the contrary, it makes the exception of the strike in public services (servicios públicos) according to the legislator's criteria), and, on the other, the consultants do not develop any technical, precise, and solidly supported argumentation, much less any legal test of reasonableness, such that this Tribunal could consider the list of essential public services (servicios públicos) regulated in article 376 of the legislative bill to lack a relevant incidence and social impact, such that its suspension would not cause significant, serious, and immediate harm to health, life, security, or the public economy. In such a definition, the constitutional judge must apply self-restraint, given the broad margin of appreciation that the Legislator enjoys in the matter, so that only if the lack of transcendence of a public service (servicio público) concerning the aforementioned constitutional interests were demonstrated with absolute solidity, could some injury to the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality eventually be sustained, which does not occur in the present case.

In addition, no violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness is noticed either. As the Chamber recorded in judgment 2018-000230 of 10:40 hours of January 10, 2018:

"Regarding the alleged establishment of a *numerus clausus* list by the legislator without the existence of technical criteria, the Chamber dismisses the existence of any injury to the constitutional order. As is inferred from the preceding paragraphs, the determination of the parameters for categorizing a profession as a health science falls within the legislator's right to free configuration." The Chamber rejects that, irremediably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, given that such a situation would annul the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule in this regard (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness. In the case at hand, the legislator's decision clearly raised the requirements to be a health sciences professional by demanding a minimum degree of licentiate (licenciatura) and expressly listing the included professions, a decision that does not require a technical or scientific study." (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

On this point, it is reiterated that the reference to "public service (servicio público)" in constitutional precept 61 did not originate from a precise and closed dogmatic concept, but rather, it was chosen to maintain the notion of the 1871 Constitution, which is understood in light of the historical moment of its approval in July 1943 and its irrefutable political link to the notion of public service in the Labor Code a few months later, in August of that same year, which encompassed the activity of general interest and of particular transcendence for society. Such a situation reveals, moreover, that the Constituent Assembly left the establishment of concrete examples of public service to the ordinary parliamentarian, in accordance with the right to free legislative configuration (libre configuración legislativa). As Deputy Baudrit Solera records: "In any case -he added- the fundamental thing is that the legislator will define what are public services and what are services of public utility." Likewise, by constitutional mandate, the legislator enjoys broad freedom of configuration to define what is understood by public service and what the limitations on the exercise of the strike in these services are. Similarly, in relation to the ILO conventions and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, no grounds are observed that imply the declaration of unconstitutionality of the questioned norms. Such normative instruments do not directly allude to the right to strike, and the interpretations or recommendations of the ILO bodies are not binding, so even though these are indeed relevant, in the specific case, the constitutional norms that regulate the matter and the reasoning expressed by the Chamber must prevail.

Precisely, this Court, in judgment 1998-01317 of 10:12 hours on February 27, 1998, endorsed the constitutionality of numeral 375 and subsection d) of article 376 of the Labor Code, without appreciating grounds that detract from the arguments developed on that occasion, nor was it demonstrated that there was any overreach (extralimitación) of the challenged norms in relation to the Constitution's Law.

In addition, even though it is indicated that at the time of filing the action, the political strike was not regulated, it is no less true that no arguments were developed to support such a presumed neglect as an unconstitutionality by omission. Precisely, no development of norms or principles was presented from which an express or tacit obligation of the legislator to issue a law in that sense could be derived.

Finally, in the terms set forth in the filing brief and taking into consideration the content of the challenged norms, matters concerning the declaration of a strike and its classification with respect to concrete situations, specific institutions, and their employees go beyond the scope of analysis of this constitutional review process.

&#xa0; &#xa0; **Paul Rueda L.** &#xa0; &#xa0; &#xa0; **Exp: 18-015934-0007-CO** &#xa0; **Dissenting vote of Magistrate Cruz Castro. The restrictions imposed on the workers' right to strike exceed the limits of reasonableness and proportionality established by the Constitution.** &#xa0; In the decision of this matter, I consider that I must issue a separate opinion, considering that the prohibition of the strike in public services, as indicated by articles 375 and 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code, is unconstitutional. Although it is true that the majority of this Chamber performs a conforming interpretation in this regard, I consider that both the literal wording of what the challenged phrase in Article 375 establishes ("ARTICLE 375. – The strike shall not be permitted in public services…") and the lack of differentiation between types of workers in the challenged Article 376.d) ("ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to mean: (…) d. (…) such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation, and lighting in towns."), are unconstitutional, according to the reasons I indicate below.

From article 61 of the Political Constitution, it is inferred that the right to strike of workers is a fundamental right that, while it may be subject to limitations when it concerns public services, can never be subject to an absolute prohibition. Now, regarding the point about which public services are concerned, it seems to me that what the Chamber establishes in judgment number 2011-017212 of 15:31 hours on December 14, 2011, is correct. There, it was established that the limitations on the right to strike include not the totality of public services, but only those called essential public services (servicios públicos esenciales):

&#xa0; "*Such limitation does not include the totality of public services. Thus, the conventions and recommendations issued by the International Labor Organization, through the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts, have been outlining the cases in which the strike can be subject to restrictions or even prohibition and compensatory guarantees. In this sense, the ILO has used the term "essential services" (servicios esenciales) to determine when it is viable to prohibit the strike in public services. In 1983, the ILO Committee of Experts defined essential services as those "whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population." This criterion was later adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association, for which the determining factor is the existence of a clear and imminent threat to the life, safety, or health of the whole or part of the population (See 1996 Digest, paragraph 540; 320th report, case no. 1989, paragraph 324; 324th report, case no.* 2060, para. 517; 329th Report, Case No. 2195, para. 737; 332nd Report, Case No. 2252, para. 883; 336th Report, Case No. 2383, para. 766; 338th Report, Case No. 2326, para. 446 and Case No. 2329, para. 1275.) This concept is not absolute, since a non-essential service can become an essential service when the duration of a strike exceeds a certain period or a certain scope and thereby endangers the life, personal safety or health of all or part of the population. (See 1996 Digest, para. 541; 320th Report, Case No. 1963, para. 229; 321st Report, Case No. 2066, para. 340; 330th Report, Case No. 2212, para. 749; 335th Report, Case No. 2305, para. 505 and 338th Report, Case No. 2373, para. 382.) Specifically and as it pertains to this case, the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO considers the hospital sector, among others, as an essential service (see 1996 Digest, para. 544; 300th Report, Case No. 1818, para. 366; 306th Report, Case No. 1882, para. 427; 308th Report, Case No. 1897, para. 477; 324th Report, Case No. 2060, para. 517, Case No. 2077, para. 551; 329th Report, Case No. 2174, para. 795; 330th Report, Case No. 2166, para. 292 and 338th Report, Case No. 2399, para. 1171). The Committee on Freedom of Association has clarified that in essential services, some categories of employees, for example laborers and gardeners, should not be deprived of the right to strike. (See 333rd Report, Case No. 2277, para. 274 and 338th Report, Case No. 2403, para. 601), a criterion that this Chamber adopts in the sense that in the hospital service, the prohibition of the strike affects only those public officials and workers whose suspension of work would imply that the user cannot receive the provision of the health service. Now then, the concept of prohibiting the strike in essential public services has been incorporated into national legislation. As indicated supra, Article 61 of the Political Constitution recognizes the right of workers to strike, except in public services, according to the determination that the law makes of these and in accordance with the regulations that it establishes. In that regard, Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code regulate the following:

"ARTICLE 375. - The strike shall not be permitted in public services. The differences that occur in these between employers and workers, as well as in all other cases in which the strike is prohibited, shall be obligatorily submitted to the knowledge and resolution of the Labor Courts".

"ARTICLE 376.- For the purposes of the preceding article, public services are understood to be: a. (…)

d. Those performed by workers who are absolutely indispensable to maintain the operation of private companies that cannot suspend their services without causing serious or immediate damage to public health or the public economy, such as clinics and hospitals, hygiene, sanitation and lighting in towns" Regarding the scope of these articles, in judgment number 1998-01317 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998, this Tribunal pointed out that:

"To this effect, the first phrase of Article 375 of the Labor Code, which states: 'The strike shall not be permitted in public services. (...)', although it appears to proscribe the strike in these services, that is, although it appears to have an absolute prohibitive sense, the truth is that it must be understood in harmony with the provisions of Article 61 of the Political Constitution, which only limits it for certain cases established or determined by law in observance of criteria of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality, so that it is congruent with the purpose it pursues. This challenged Article 375 (formerly, 368) also harmonizes with Article 8 of Convention 87 of the I.L.O. which - as transcribed in Considerando III. - establishes the obligation of trade union organizations to adapt their activity to domestic legislation. In other words, although the strike is a right of all, exercisable in any activity, it is viable for the legislator to determine in which cases the right to strike cannot be exercised, specifically when dealing with activities that constitute 'public services' and which, due to their nature or the social impact they have, it is not possible to suspend, discontinue or paralyze them without causing significant, serious and immediate damage to certain legal interests" In that same judgment, in relation to Article 376 subsection d) of the Labor Code, this Chamber addressed the issue of the exclusion of the right to strike in certain indispensable public services whose suspension compromised the legal interests of health and the public economy. On that occasion it was considered that the prohibition established at the legal level regarding this type of public service was reasonable, necessary and proportionate, by reason that the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services had to be protected, a criterion that agrees with the opinions expressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO. Thus, this Chamber, in the referred judgment, mentioned the following:

"From the analysis made it is clear that the Constitution defers to the law to state in which public services it is appropriate to exclude or limit the exercise of the right to strike. This does not have an absolute prohibitive effect, which would proscribe the exercise of the right to strike from public services. Consequently, the law must discern in which cases that exercise is not legitimate, taking into account the nature of the service and the effects that the strike would produce in the sphere of rights and interests of the recipients or users of said services. In such a case, it is viable to limit the exercise of the right, which must be done with the application of criteria of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality." The labor legislation, which lists in Article 376 (formerly, 369) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) those public services in which strikes are excluded, despite predating the Constitution, which dates from 1949, does not thereby contradict it (…) On the other hand, subsection d) of Article 376 (formerly, 369) establishes parameters that allow limiting the exercise of the right to strike in those services that are considered absolutely indispensable and whose suspension is likely to compromise the legal interests (bienes jurídicos) of health and the public economy. Indeed, in this part, services are enunciated or distinguished with respect to which the strike is likely to compromise the legal interest of health and the economy, by including those provided in clinics and hospitals, and those referring to hygiene, sanitation, and the lighting of towns. The law in this case defines the guidelines for establishing in which cases it is viable to exclude the exercise of the right to strike, which are that it must involve public services that are absolutely indispensable and, on the other hand, that they are likely to compromise the legal interests of health and the public economy; guidelines that respond to the constitutional criteria of reasonableness and proportionality.” Furthermore, the fact that Article 376, subsection d) of the Labor Code refers to private companies requires an evolutionary interpretation, since as a consequence of the development of the Social State of Law and by mandate of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), today the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) administers the public hospital service, so it is inexorable that the rule in question includes such service provided by the country's main hospital entity. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that based on the criteria issued by the ILO Committees on Freedom of Association and Experts, the jurisprudence of this Chamber, and the constitutional and legal regulations in force in the country, the strike in hospital services, as an essential activity of the State, is prohibited, since it endangers fundamental legal interests of society, such as the health and life of the population. Now, this Chamber is aware that the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO Governing Body has also considered that given the prohibition of strikes in essential public services, the workers affected must enjoy adequate protection, so that they are compensated for the restrictions imposed on their freedom of action in potential conflicts. (See the 1996 Digest, paragraph 546 and, for example 300th report, case no. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 310th report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th report, case no. 1999, paragraph 166; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 327th report, case no. 2127, paragraph 192; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th report, case no. 2244, paragraph 1269). Among such compensatory measures, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered that the limitation of the strike must be accompanied by adequate, impartial, and rapid conciliation and arbitration procedures in which the interested parties can participate in all stages. (See the 1996 Digest, paragraph 547 and, for example 300th report, case no. 1818, paragraph 367; 306th report, case no. 1882, paragraph 429; 308th report, case no. 1897, paragraph 478; 310th report, case no. 1943, paragraph 227; 318th report, case no. 2020, paragraph 318; 324th report, case no. 2060, paragraph 518; 330th report, case no. 2166, paragraph 292; 333rd report, case no. 2277, paragraph 274; 336th report, case no. 2340, paragraph 649 and 337th report, case no. 2244, paragraph 1269.) (…)” These criteria are ratified by means of vote number 2018-01115 of 09:30 hours on January 26, 2018, when it was indicated that strikes are admissible in those public services that are not essential. Thus then, Article 61 of the Constitution establishes, as a fundamental right, the right of workers to strike. However, the same constitutional norm makes possible:

-A limitation on the exercise of such right to strike. Note that it is a limitation and not an absolute prohibition.

-The limitation of the exercise of that right can only be by law.

-The limitation is for the case of public services, but only those that are essential.

Regarding the right to strike in public services, there exist in Comparative Law, three possibilities: absolute prohibition, absolute permissibility, and a mixed system like ours. Legal systems where the right to strike is totally suppressed in the case of public officials, are for example, the Chilean Constitution, which in its Article 16 absolutely prohibits strikes for public officials and even for employees of private companies whose services can be classified as of public utility, or whose stoppage causes serious damage to the health and economy of the country. That model is similar to the United States model where strikes are prohibited for federal government employees. (Paragraph 1918, chapter 93, title 18 of the US CODE). Other legal systems where the constitutional law establishes no restriction, would be, for example, the Italian Constitution which in its numeral 40 limits itself to establishing the right to strike and refers to the law for its development. The Portuguese charter which in its ordinal 59 simply establishes the right to strike. A third model, similar to ours, is found in the Panamanian Constitution which in its Article 65 provides that the law may establish special restrictions for the exercise of the right to strike in public services. Then, the Colombian Constitution, in its numeral 56, indicates that it shall be up to the legislator to specify the essential public services in which a strike declaration is not applicable. Then, the Greek Constitution, in its Article 23.2 establishes that the law may impose specific restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike by public officials. However, it clarifies that the legal limitations may not lead to the suppression of the right. In the case of the Spanish Constitution, Article 28.2 establishes the right to strike, but, it indicates that the law shall determine the guarantees necessary to ensure the essential services of the community. Thus then, our Constitution opts for this third way, in such a way that although the right to strike is recognized as a fundamental right, its exercise is allowed to be limited to some degree when it comes to public services. We transcribe the cited numeral 61:

“Article 61.- The right of employers to lockout and that of workers to strike is recognized, except in public services, in accordance with the determination of these made by law and pursuant to the regulations that it establishes, which must disavow any act of coercion or violence”.

In a similar sense, the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – incorporated into Costa Rican Law through law no. 4229 of December 11, 1969 -, grants the right to strike the rank of a fundamental right, admits that the law can impose restrictions in the case of members of the police and the State administration. Ordinal 8 of that international instrument prescribes:

“Article 8.- 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:

• a)(…)
• d)The right to strike, exercised in conformity with the laws of each country.

2.

This article shall not prevent the legal rights of members of the armed forces, the police, or the state administration from being subject to legal restrictions on the exercise of such rights.

3. (…)” Likewise, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights, the “Protocol of San Salvador” —incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system by Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999— contemplates the right to strike as a fundamental right. However, the conventional norm provides that it is a matter reserved to the law to establish restrictions on the exercise of this right in the case of public services. It is important to note that according to this international instrument, the limitations that the law may impose must be consistent with the democratic order; that is, the constraints on the right to strike must be proportionate and aimed at protecting public health, morals, and public order, as well as the rights of the majority of the citizenry. To this effect, Article 8 of the Protocol provides:

“Article 8.- Trade Union Rights.

1.- The States Parties shall ensure:

• a)(…)
• b)The right to strike.

2.- The exercise of the rights set forth above may only be subject to the limitations and restrictions prescribed by law, provided that these are proper to a democratic society, necessary to safeguard public order, to protect public health or morals, and the rights and freedoms of others. Members of the armed forces and the police, as well as those of other essential public services, shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by law.

3.- (…)”.

As stated, this Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to clarify the scope of Article 61 of the Political Constitution. Thus, in judgment No. 1317-98 of 10:12 a.m. on February 27, 1998 (ratified in resolution No. 5264-2003 of 2:42 p.m. on June 18, 2003), the restrictions on the right to strike contemplated in subsections a), b), and e) of Article 376 of the Labor Code were declared unconstitutional, because it was indicated that the regulation of the right to strike is a matter reserved to the law. In that same judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to declare the unconstitutionality of Article 375 of the Labor Code, which expressly prohibits strikes in public services; however, it was indicated that the prohibition did not constitute an absolute impediment, as that would be contrary to the fundamental norm. Indeed, I consider that Article 61 of the fundamental norm cannot be interpreted as establishing a total prohibition on the exercise of the right to strike in public services. On the contrary, it is for the law to determine the cases in which such a prohibition is appropriate, a task that must respond to criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. Moreover, as was indicated, this limitation on the exercise of the right to strike in public services is only for those qualified as essential. Having set forth the foregoing, it is possible to affirm that the constituent's decision is framed within the social constitutional tradition that, on the one hand, recognizes the right to strike, but on the other, admits the possibility of imposing certain limitations in the case of public services, limitations that can only be imposed by law, that cannot be interpreted, from my point of view, as an absolute prohibition; and which refers only to essential public services.

Furthermore, I must point out that the legal reform introduced by the law regulating strikes, No. 9808, in Articles 375 and 376 of the Labor Code to clarify the scope of the definition of essential services and the regulation of the exercise of the right to strike in such services, was also validated by this Chamber, through judgment of this Chamber, number 2019-20596, at nineteen hours and fifteen minutes on October 25, 2019, a judgment in whose vote I did not participate. This matter requires a very balanced legislative framework, in accordance with criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, because it involves the restriction of a fundamental human right: the right to strike. The restriction must be careful and of a restrictive criterion. Curiously, employers have the right to lockouts, and the restrictions on such exercise are not as restrictive and unreasonable as those imposed on workers' strikes. A constitutional right as important as the right to strike must have very specific and reasonable restrictions.

Thus, I consider that Article 375 of the Labor Code, in stating "Strikes shall not be permitted in public services," is unconstitutional because it is a categorical statement, without nuance, as such a prohibition clearly cannot be an absolute prohibition but rather the strike should only be limited in the case of essential public services. And for its part, regarding subsection d) of Article 376 of the Labor Code, which defines "clinics and hospitals" as public services, limiting the strike in those cases, I consider that it is also unconstitutional because it does not differentiate between those officials whose suspension of work implies that the user cannot receive the health service provision. The restrictions in this case transcend the limits of reasonableness and proportionality that justify the restriction of such an important fundamental right.

Fernando Cruz C.

Magistrate

Revisión del Documento *CO* Res. Nº: 2022-001015 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas con quince minutos del doce de enero de dos mil veintidós.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por H. LENIN HERNÁNDEZ NAVAS, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 1-967-277, en su condición de SECRETARIO GENERAL DEL SINDICATO NACIONAL DE ENFERMERÍA, cédula de persona jurídica No. 3-011-045082, para que se declaren inconstitucionales los artículos 375 y 376, inciso d), del Código de Trabajo, por estimarlos contrarios a los artículos 33 y 61 de la Constitución Política y a los principios de razonabilidad y de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, así como a los Convenios Nos. 87 y 98 de la OIT y los ordinales 2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y 16 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. Intervinieron también en el proceso el representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, el Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y el Presidente Ejecutivo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:56 horas del 09 de octubre del 2018, el accionante solicita se declaren inconstitucionales los artículos 375 y 376, inciso d), del Código de Trabajo, por estimarlos contrarios a los artículos 33 y 61 de la Constitución Política y a los principios de razonabilidad y de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, así como a los Convenios Nos. 87 y 98 de la OIT y los ordinales 2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y 16 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. Se alega que la normativa impugnada es inconstitucional en tanto se prohíbe, de forma absoluta, el ejercicio del derecho a la huelga en el supuesto de los servicios públicos –como sería el caso de la CCSS-, pese que, en atención a los criterios emanados de la OIT, tal prohibición al ejercicio del derecho de huelga debe circunscribirse a aquellos servicios públicos sumamente calificados y, además, puede permitirse la huelga en tanto se garantice el funcionamiento mínimo de los servicios que prestan las instituciones públicas. Afirma, el accionante, que artículo 61 de la Constitución Política no dispone una prohibición total a la huelga en los servicios públicos, sino que contempla una reserva de ley, habilitando al legislador ordinario para determinar los servicios en los que la huelga se restringe o prohíbe. Por lo demás, en atención a los criterios emanados de la OIT, tal prohibición al ejercicio del derecho de huelga debe circunscribirse a aquellos servicios públicos sumamente calificados y, además, puede permitirse la huelga en tanto se garantice el funcionamiento mínimo de los servicios que prestan las instituciones públicas, como es el caso de la CCSS. Señala que, en conclusión, el derecho a la huelga debe restringirse, únicamente, a aquellos trabajadores que son absolutamente indispensables. Insiste que la OIT ha señalado que el mantenimiento del servicio mínimo constituye una solución idónea que, por una parte, salvaguarda el derecho de huelga de la mayoría de los trabajadores y, por otra parte, garantiza la satisfacción de las necesidades de los usuarios. Manifiesta que, en consecuencia, son inconstitucionales las normas impugnadas en tanto se prohíbe de forma absoluta el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores que prestan sus servicios en la CCSS. También se acusa que la Administración, amparada en la ley laboral, ha incurrido en un uso abusivo de sus potestades, al englobar todas las actividades bajo el concepto de “servicio esencial”. Alega que con esto se infringen los principios de igualdad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. Reclama que hay una discriminación en perjuicio de todos los empleados de la CCSS, pues, aunque brindan un servicio importante, la ley ha sido un portillo para que la Administración realice una generalización sobre el concepto de “servicio esencial”, sin haber demostrado la idoneidad de tal determinación. Acusa que la normativa impugnada permite que, en definitiva, sean las instituciones y sus jerarcas quienes determinen, mediante actos administrativos (como, por ejemplo, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 38767-MP-MTSS-MJP), cuales son los servicios esenciales. Acusa que, con esto, se infringe el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad. Señala que el legislador dejó abierto un portillo peligroso para que la Administración decida –vía reglamentaria- cuáles servicios son esenciales, en infracción del derecho fundamental a la huelga. Alega que, en la especie, se está en presencia de un supuesto de “huelga política”; en cuyo caso, la OIT ha reconocido que este tipo de huelga, al igual que la huelga reivindicativa, implica el ejercicio de un derecho laboral y humano. Afirma que, no obstante, el Código de Trabajo no prevé ni regula la huelga política, por lo que los procedimientos laborales previstos en dicho cuerpo normativo resultan incorrectos e insuficientes para conocer de este tipo de asuntos.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señalan que proviene del artículo 75, párrafo primero y segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto que el accionante cita como asunto base el proceso de calificación de huelga que se tramita en expediente No. 18-002813-1178-LA en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada y, adicionalmente, se constata la defensa de un interés corporativo de parte del sindicato accionante en resguardo del derecho a la huelga de sus miembros.

3.- Por resolución de las 08:28 horas del 17 de octubre del 2018, se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República, al Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y al Presidente Ejecutivo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

4.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 216, 217 y 218 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 21, 22 y 23 de noviembre del 2018.

5.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe. Señala que: Sobre la admisibilidad. El accionante ostenta la representación, como apoderado, del Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería (SINAE), y por tanto, acude alegando la titularidad y defensa de un interés colectivo o corporativo de las personas que conforman la base asociativa de dicho Sindicato, que sin duda se ven incididos por las normas cuestionadas. Además, la acción planteada resulta admisible por cuanto las normas impugnadas son de aplicación en el asunto base pendiente de resolver, el cual está constituido por un Procedimiento de Calificación de Huelga promovido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, con el número de expediente 18-002813-1178-LA, que se encuentra en alzada ante el Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo de ese mismo Circuito; apelación en la que el SINAE como parte invocó la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que consideran lesionado. A) La huelga en el Derecho Internacional Público y carácter “no vinculante” de las Recomendaciones de Órganos de Control de la OIT. El derecho de huelga no está regulado normativamente por ningún convenio específico y concreto de la OIT que, una vez ratificado por un Estado miembro, pueda crear para éste obligaciones jurídicas internacionales, sino que el mismo se deriva de la materialización de la denominada acción sindical, reconocida y regulada en Convenios como el 87 y 98 de la OIT. (Principios de la OIT sobre el Derecho de Huelga, Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO y Horacio GUIDO, OFICINA INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO GINEBRA, Edición 2000). Salvo el caso del artículo 8.1 a) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de 1966, y el literal b) del artículo 8.1 del Protocolo de San Salvador –incorporado al ordenamiento costarricense mediante la ley n.° 7907 de 3 de setiembre de 1999–, se prevé que el miembro suscriptor se compromete a garantizar el derecho de huelga, ejercido de conformidad con las leyes de cada país; reconociéndose incluso que a nivel legal pueden establecerse restricciones al ejercicio de ese derecho en el caso de los servicios públicos. De ahí que en realidad, los principios y reglas mínimas de conducta establecidos, a modo de orientación “no vinculante” por la Comisión de Expertos y el Comité de Libertad Sindical en materia de derecho de huelga, se derivan entonces de recomendaciones internacionales de trabajo que no constituyen instrumentos jurídicos autónomos obligatorios, sino una mera guía o directrices de carácter orientador e interpretativo para una eventual acción nacional en la materia involucrada, y por tanto, no son siquiera objeto de ratificación por los Estados miembros (Normas Internacionales del Trabajo para Magistrados, Juristas y Docentes en Derecho, Centro Internacional de Formación OIT, San José, Costa Rica, 3-7 de abril de 2006, p. 13 y ss.). En razón de lo expuesto es evidente que las recomendaciones de la OIT en las que fundamenta el accionante sus argumentos, no tienen el valor jurídico vinculante que se alude; por lo que en realidad su eventual uso judicial es limitado, pudiendo a lo sumo servir como referencia para interpretar las disposiciones del derecho interno (herramienta interpretativa), especialmente cuando ésta se ha inspirado en los convenios respectivos o como mera guía de carácter orientador para una eventual acción nacional en la materia involucrada (Véase al respecto la sentencia 2011-010832 de las 14:30 hrs. del 12 de agosto de 2011, Sala Constitucional, por la que incluso, por principio de reserva legal, se ordena promulgar la legislación respectiva tomando en consideración las recomendaciones que al efecto hace la OIT, sin que se les aplique de forma directa), pero jamás para tener aquellas por abrogadas o suplantarlas por aquellas recomendaciones internacionales; máxime cuando es pacífico y de consenso el criterio de que “Los órganos de control de la OIT no tienen competencia para dar interpretaciones con valor de jurisprudencia de los convenios internacionales del trabajo, ya que tal competencia reside exclusivamente en la Corte Internacional de Justicia” –art. 37 párrafo 1 de la Constitución de la OIT-. (Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, Consejo de Administración, 323.ª reunión, Ginebra, 12-27 de marzo de 2015, GB.323/INS/5/Anexo III, Sección Institucional, aparte 55. B) Limitación o prohibición del Derecho de Huelga en los servicios públicos esenciales desde la perspectiva de la OIT. Según refieren Bernard GERNIGON, Alberto ODERO y Horacio GUIDO, de la Oficina Internacional de Trabajo op. cit., especial interés revisten los Convenios 87 y 98 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) referidos a la Libertad Sindical y Negociación Colectiva respectivamente, los cuales si bien no mencionan expresamente a la huelga, lo cierto es que constituyen su fundamento teórico, a tal punto, que es a partir de ellos y de la doctrina no vinculante del Comité de Libertad Sindical y la Comisión de Expertos en Aplicación de Convenios y Recomendaciones, que se ha venido a precisar y delimitar en dicha organización el alcance del ejercicio del derecho de huelga tanto en el caso de “funcionarios que ejercen funciones de autoridad en nombre del Estado” (OIT, 1996, párrafo 534), como en los “servicios esenciales”. Y en lo que interesa al presente informe, diremos que tales Órganos de Control de la OIT, en sus pronunciamientos realizados dentro del procedimiento de quejas por violación de la libertad sindical, son los que casuísticamente han determinado que existen casos en los cuales, por vía de excepción, se puede restringir el ejercicio de la huelga y hasta prohibir, como es el caso de los denominados “servicios esenciales”. Fue la Comisión de Expertos la que primero consideró admisible la prohibición del derecho de huelga en “servicios esenciales”, los que en sentido estricto conceptuó como “los servicios cuya interrupción podría poner en peligro la vida, la seguridad o la salud de la persona en toda o parte de la población” (OIT, 1983b, párrafo 214); definición que fuera más tarde la acogida por el Comité de Libertad Sindical. Pero hay que advertir desde ya que ambos órganos entienden que la definición de servicios esenciales dependerá en gran medida de las condiciones propias de cada legislación, ya que si bien la interrupción de ciertos servicios (esenciales por extensión) podría en ciertos países solamente ocasionar problemas económicos, en otros podría tener efectos desastrosos y crear en poco tiempo situaciones en que se verían comprometidas la salud, la seguridad o la vida de la población, como también puede darse el caso que un servicio no considerado esencial en el sentido estricto del término se convirtió en esencial debido a que la duración de una huelga pueda poner en peligro la vida, la seguridad de la persona o la salud de toda o parte de la población (OIT, 1996, párrafo 541; Recopilación de decisiones y principios del Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT. Párrafo 582. 34 Recopilación de decisiones y principios del Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT. Párrafo 591). Es innegable que, el carácter “esencial” de un servicio público se establece a partir de al menos cuatro criterios aceptados por la doctrina de la OIT: 1) cuando este contribuye de manera directa a la protección de bienes, a la satisfacción de intereses o a la realización de valores, en conjunto con el respeto, la vigencia, el ejercicio y la efectividad de los derechos y las libertades fundamentales; 2) la esencialidad del servicio está vinculada a la magnitud del mismo; 3) el concepto de servicio público esencial que conlleva una ponderación de valores e intereses; y 4) el concepto de servicio público implica una constante evolución de la situación política, económica y social de cada país. A partir de ahí, el Comité de Libertad Sindical ha considerado como servicios esenciales, en sentido estricto, en los que el derecho de huelga puede ser objeto de restricciones importantes, o incluso de prohibición: el sector hospitalario, los servicios de electricidad, los servicios de abastecimiento de agua, los servicios telefónicos, la policía y las fuerzas armadas, los servicios de bomberos, los servicios penitenciarios públicos o privados, el suministro de alimentos a los alumnos en edad escolar y la limpieza de los establecimientos escolares, el control del tráfico aéreo (OIT, Libertad Sindical, párr.. 585). Cabe aclarar que estos criterios no pueden ser considerados como taxativos, ni muchos menos vinculantes, sino de carácter meramente enunciativo. En definitiva, se puede señalar que el Comité de Libertad Sindical no ha hecho una reseña absoluta de los servicios que son o no esenciales, sino que ha hecho una enumeración surgida de los casos puestos a su consideración. Por lo que en realidad –insistimos- su eventual uso judicial es limitado, pudiendo a lo sumo servir como referencia para interpretar las disposiciones del derecho interno (herramienta interpretativa), especialmente cuando ésta se ha inspirado en los convenios respectivos o como mera guía de carácter orientador para una eventual acción nacional en la materia involucrada. C) Jurisprudencia constitucional sobre la prohibición del Derecho de Huelga en servicios esenciales (Costa Rica). 1.- Constitucionalidad de los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo. Si bien en nuestro medio se reconoce como parte del contenido esencial del Derecho de sindicación - acción sindical-, el derecho de los trabajadores a la huelga (art. 61 constitucional), como el derecho de incumplir transitoriamente del contrato de trabajo, de conformidad con la legislación nacional vigente, con el propósito de preservar, afirmar y perseguir los intereses que enuncia la propia Constitución y a los que el Estado debe procurar los adecuados cauces jurídicos e institucionales, lo cierto es que aquel derecho de innegable acción colectiva, como todo derecho no es ilimitado y en nuestro entorno la limitación más clara y además refleja expresamente en la Constitución, se produce en el supuesto de afectación de los llamados “servicios esenciales” de la comunidad, cuya continuidad está en consecuencia garantizada constitucionalmente y con respecto a los cuales se establece una reserva legal, resultando que toda restricción o exclusión del citado derecho de huelga, debe darse por vía ley y de ningún modo puede favorecer los actos de coacción o violencia. Mandato que, según ha reiterado la Sala Constitucional, se satisface mediante los artículos 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo. Sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 375 del Código de Trabajo, ver Resolución No. 1998-01317 de las 10:12 hrs. del 27 de febrero de 1998, reafirmada por la No. 2003-05264 de las 14:42 hrs. del 18 de junio de 2003, así como por las Nos. 2011-010832 de las 14:30 hrs. del 12 de agosto de 2011, 2016-006463 de las 09:30 hrs. del 13 de mayo de 2016. Y con respecto a la constitucionalidad del artículo 376, ver Resoluciones Nos. 1998-01317, 2003-05264 y 2016-006463 op. cit. Según advertimos en el Dictamen C-151-2003, de 28 de mayo de 2003, al hacer el análisis jurídico del citado fallo No. 1998-01317: ”Tratando de hacer un acercamiento a lo que debe entenderse por "servicio público", que pareciera asimilarse más al de "servicio esencial de la comunidad", la Sala Constitucional indicó que "si bien la huelga es un derecho de todos, ejercitable en cualquier actividad, es viable que el legislador determine en qué casos el derecho de huelga no puede ejercitarse, específicamente cuando se trate de actividades que constituyen "servicios públicos" y que por su naturaleza o por el impacto social que tienen, no sea posible suspenderlos, descontinuarlos o paralizarlos sin causar daño significativo, grave e inmediato a ciertos bienes" (Considerando VII de la resolución Nº 1998-01317, op. cit.). Es más, sin pretender agotar la definición de lo que debe entenderse por "servicio público", ese Tribunal enunció que aquel "servicio público debe al menos estar dirigido a satisfacer necesidades colectivas y se trata de prestaciones positivas de la Administración o que están bajo cierto control y regulación de ésta" (Considerando VIII de la sentencia Nº 1998-01317 op. cit.)”. (…) Ciertamente la Constitución establece por sí misma los límites a los derechos fundamentales, como ocurre en este caso con el artículo 61, en el que limita para ciertos casos fijados y determinados por la ley, el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en servicios públicos. Y esa limitación deriva también, de una manera mediata e indirecta, por la necesidad de proteger o preservar no sólo otros derechos constitucionales (la vida y la salud), sino también otros bienes constitucionalmente protegidos (economía pública). Y es por ello que en estos casos la ley establece las garantías precisas para asegurar, en caso de huelga, el mantenimiento de los servicios "absolutamente indispensables" para la comunidad. Según lo ha estimado el Tribunal Constitucional español, esa exclusión al ejercicio de huelga en servicios públicos, o bien en servicios de reconocida e inaplazable necesidad, implica que el derecho de los trabajadores de defender sus intereses mediante la huelga, debe ceder cuando con ello se ocasiona o se puede ocasionar un mal más grave que el que los huelguistas experimentarían si su reivindicación o pretensión no tuviera éxito. Y por ello, se afirma con total propiedad, que "En la medida en que la destinataria y acreedora de tales servicios es la comunidad entera y los servicios son al mismo tiempo esenciales para ella, la huelga no puede imponer el sacrificio de los intereses de los destinatarios de los servicios esenciales. El derecho de la comunidad a estas prestaciones vitales es prioritario respecto del derecho a la huelga". Este criterio, según el cual el interés de la comunidad prevalece sobre el particular de los huelguistas, también es recogido por nuestra Sala Constitucional, que ha indicado: "... actividades que puedan considerarse vitales o esenciales para la comunidad, que es el bien a proteger y por el cual cede el derecho de los trabajadores de defender y promover sus intereses mediante la huelga; sea, cuando con ello se ocasiona o se puede ocasionar un mal mayor que el que sufren los huelguistas ..." (Considerando XI de la sentencia Nº 1998-01317, op. cit.).” Resulta innegable que, “…el derecho de huelga, reconocido a un sector de la sociedad, como todo derecho, tiene sus límites que son impuestos por la necesidad de proteger el ejercicio de los derechos del resto de la sociedad”. Por lo que en estos casos aplica la máxima jurídica en virtud de la cual el interés general o público predomina sobre el interés particular o privado adquiere una dimensión fundamental en relación con la limitación constitucional al derecho de huelga relacionada con los “servicios públicos esenciales definidos por el legislador”. En múltiples circunstancias, se presentan conflictos que el intérprete u operador jurídico debe resolver entre derechos de igual jerarquía normativa. En este caso, el conflicto y su solución lo plantea el mismo artículo 61 de la Carta Política. En efecto, hay un conflicto entre el derecho de usar la huelga como mecanismo legítimo para solucionar los conflictos colectivos y los derechos de los usuarios de los servicios públicos esenciales de no interrumpir estos por un conflicto del que son totalmente ajenos y del cual podrían serles irrogados perjuicios de consideración social, dada la entidad misma de los servicios. Conflicto es típico y resulta de una tensión valorativa propia de todo Estado Social de Derecho. Se trata, según la doctrina, de un supuesto de “terciarización” del conflicto, esto es, la extensión del mismo más allá de lo estrictamente contractual entre trabajadores y empresarios, afectando, asimismo, a bienes constitucionalmente protegidos de la comunidad como conjunto de ciudadanos potencialmente usuarios del servicio que aparecen como sujetos pasivos del conflicto y que no deben sufrir un daño adicional más allá de lo estrictamente necesario para respetar el contenido esencial del derecho de huelga. (PADILLA RUIZ, P., “La huelga en los servicios esenciales”, Revista Doctrinal Aranzadi Social, nº. 9, 2010, págs. 6 y 9). Y al respecto, la misma Carta Política en su artículo 61, en relación armónica y sistemática con los ordinales 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo, prohíja la solución, prefiriendo la continuidad propia de los servicios públicos esenciales sobre el derecho de huelga. 2.- Prohibición del Derecho de Huelga en servicios esenciales y asistenciales de la Seguridad Social (servicio público hospitalario), como garantía de su obligada continuidad. Ha sido abundante, coincidente y reiterada la jurisprudencia de la Sala, según la cual, para una adecuada protección del derecho a la salud y a la vida (art. 21 constitucional) y como manifestación del derecho innominado al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos esenciales de carácter asistencial (arts. 140.8, 139.4 y 191 constitucionales), como los de la Seguridad Social (art. 73), que brinda la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, así como otros órganos y entes públicos que prestan servicios de salud pública, que dichos servicios deben prestarse imperativa e impostergablemente de forma continua, sin interrupciones. Y partiendo de una necesaria interpretación normativa evolutiva del artículo 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, como consecuencia del desarrollo del Estado Social de Derecho, concluye que de forma inexorable aquella norma comprende el “servicio público hospitalario” que presta la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, como principal entidad hospitalaria del país. Y en virtud de ello, ha considerado que “resulta claro que con fundamento en los criterios vertidos por los Comités de Libertad y de Expertos de la OIT, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala y la normativa constitucional y legal vigente en el país, la huelga en los servicios hospitalarios, en tanto actividad esencial del Estado, está prohibida, toda vez que se pone en peligro bienes jurídicos fundamentales de la sociedad, como la salud y la vida de la población.” (Resolución No. 2016-006463 op. cit.). Para ilustrar la posición asumida y mantenida al respecto por la Sala, ver Resolución No. 2016-006463 de las 09:30 hrs. del 13 de mayo de 2016 (Y en sentido similar, entre otras muchas, las Nos. 2011-017211 de las 15:30 horas y 2011-17212 de las 15:31 hrs., ambas del 14 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-017358 de las 09:00 hrs. del 16 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-017455 de las 10:37 hrs. del 16 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-017680 de las 14:51 hrs. del 21 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-17981 de las 10:30 hrs. del 23 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-17982 de las 10:31 hrs. del 23 de diciembre de 2011, 2012-005969 de las 16:06 hrs. del 9 de mayo de 2012, 2012-01824 de las 14:30 hrs. del 14 de febrero de 2012, 2012-002415 de las 10:35 hrs. del 21 de febrero de 2012, 2012-009794 de las 09:05 hrs. del 20 de julio de 2012, 2016-007342 de las 11:33 hrs. del 27 de mayo de 2016, 2016-007390 de las 09:05 hrs. del 1 de junio de 2016, 2016-008625 de las 09:05 hrs. del 24 de junio de 2016, 2016-009403 de las 09:05 hrs. del 6 de julio de 2016 y 2018-001115 de las 09:30 hrs. del 26 de enero de 2018, todas de la Sala Constitucional). Por consiguiente, la jurisprudencia de la Sala ha hecho énfasis en la continuidad garantizada constitucionalmente de ciertos servicios públicos asistenciales, como los de la Seguridad Social, y en concreto el “servicio público hospitalario” que presta la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, que por incidir en la esfera de salud y de la vida de las personas, se califica de “servicio esencial” (Resolución No. 2007-000424 de las 15:07 hrs. del 16 de enero de 2007) y con respecto del cual se establece imperativamente que su prestación efectiva no debe interrumpirse (Resolución No. 2014-003636 de las 09:05 hrs. del 14 de marzo de 2014). Y para lo cual admite como jurídicamente válidos diversos mecanismos previstos por el ordenamiento administrativo que garantizan este principio, tales como la prohibición de la huelga y paro en los denominados “servicios esenciales”, entre otros. Resultando entonces que cualquier actuación -por acción u omisión- de los funcionarios que propenda a interrumpir un servicio público es abiertamente antijurídica. (Véanse al respecto, entre otras muchas, las resoluciones Nos. 2007-008462 de las 16:13 hrs. del 13 de junio de 2007 y 2009-005898 de las 14:36 hrs. del 13 de abril de 2009, ambas de la Sala Constitucional). Resulta entonces incontrovertible que, conforme al Derecho y valores de la Constitución, con respecto a la prohibición del Derecho de Huelga en servicios esenciales, y en concreto en tratándose del denominado “servicio público hospitalario”, se cumplen los presupuestos jurídicos necesarios para ello, según nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, pues desde el punto de vista formal, su conceptualización como servicio público esencial parte de la Ley (art. 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo) y materialmente, por estar ligado a la protección y satisfacción de bienes jurídicos fundamentales de la sociedad, como lo son la salud y la vida de la población, la propia Constitución en su artículo 61 prohíja que imperativamente su prestación efectiva no debe interrumpirse. 3.-Aproximación conceptual al alcance del término “servicio esencial hospitalario”, según nuestro ordenamiento interno. Ciertamente por la acepción abstracta dada doctrinariamente a los denominados servicios públicos esenciales, cuyos límites o contornos conceptuales no aparecen bien precisados en su enunciado, se dificulta establecer un concepto unívoco y general “a priori” del mismo. Pero pese a la acusada indeterminación del concepto, éste admite ser precisado en el momento de aplicación, pues con él se intenta delimitar un supuesto concreto al que hay que llegar interpretando el caso concreto, mediante la aplicación a sus circunstancias específicas de factores objetivos y subjetivos que sean congruentes con su enunciado genérico, mediante una explicación y aplicación. A fin de evitar estrecheces conceptuales propias del normativismo jurídico, basadas en la superstición de un único significado verdadero, con sentido preciso y claramente establecido en sí y por sí mismo, comenzaremos entonces por aceptar que el alcance real del concepto “servicio público esencial” es “elástico” en varias dimensiones, según aludimos en el aparte B de este informe. Y para delimitar, al menos en aproximación, el alcance del mismo hay que considerar especialmente la conformación estructural y organizacional del servicio público involucrado (particularidades propias del servicio), de cara a la finalidad perseguida en el contexto social en el cual se aplica, como objetivo práctico del precepto (axiológico-teleológico): ¿para qué sirve, o debieran servir, las disposiciones jurídicas consideradas? Ahora bien, siendo entonces que las normas impugnadas sirven para prohibir la huelga en servicios públicos esenciales, y en concreto, en los servicios públicos hospitalarios provistos por las autoridades de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a fin de garantizar su continuidad y evitar poner en peligro bienes jurídicos fundamentales de la sociedad, como lo son la salud y la vida de las personas en toda o parte de la población, puede razonablemente sostenerse que “dentro de los servicios públicos prestados y las competencias ejercidas por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, revisten la condición de esenciales aquellos referidos a las prestaciones sanitarias o de salud, directa o indirectamente, brindadas a los asegurados, pacientes o usuarios de tales servicios. Consecuentemente, debe entenderse que son esenciales los servicios prestados tanto en materia de medicina preventiva a través de los EBAIS como los brindados en materia de medicina curativa a través de las clínicas y hospitales de todo nivel y orden, cualquiera que sea su clasificación. Resulta evidente, que en tales supuestos, incluso, las unidades organizativas auxiliares de diagnóstico y tratamiento (v. gr. laboratorio clínico, bancos de sangre, unidades de inmuno-hematología, farmacia, enfermería, esterilización de equipos) y los órganos meramente administrativos que brindan soporte o colaboración a tales centros de atención básica, clínicas y hospitales (v. gr. administración, proveeduría, tesorería, contabilidad, mantenimiento, alimentación, lavandería y ropería, aseo, transportes, disposición y tratamiento de desechos, etc.) no pueden ejercer el derecho a la huelga, por cuanto, la paralización o suspensión de labores en tales unidades repercute, negativamente, en la continuidad necesaria e indispensable de los servicios públicos sanitarios prestados a la población que presenta alguna dolencia o enfermedad.” (Esta ha sido nota aparte suscrita por el ex Magistrado Jinesta en, al menos, las siguientes sentencias:2011-017211 de las 15:30 horas y 2011-17212 de las 15:31 hrs. del 14 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-017455 de las 10:37 hrs. del 16 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-017680 de las 14:51 hrs. del 21 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-17981 de las 10:30 hrs. del 23 de diciembre de 2011, 2011-17982 de las 10:31 hrs. del 23 de diciembre de 2011, 2012-002415 de las 10:35 hrs. del 21 de febrero de 2012, 2012-005969 de las 16:06 hrs. del 9 de mayo de 2012 y 2012-009794 de las 09:05 hrs. del 20 de julio de 2012). Esto es así, porque aquel servicio público asistencial, de innegable carácter esencial, según ha reconocido la propia jurisprudencia de la Sala, implica multiplicidad de servicios y programas asistenciales que se materializan en diversas prestaciones sanitarias e incluso económicas (pago de subsidios, pensiones o jubilaciones y demás prestaciones económicas de corta y larga duración) destinadas a los cotizantes y demás beneficiarios a nivel nacional, que obviamente desborda el ámbito hospitalario, de clínicas y demás unidades de atención sanitaria. E indiscutiblemente, dentro de aquel concepto multi comprensivo de servicio público esencial y asistencial de la Seguridad Social que presta la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el cuerpo de enfermeras y enfermeros, profesionales y no profesionales, está inevitablemente inmerso, pues véase que tanto las Leyes Nos.5395 –Ley General de Salud- , 6836 -De Incentivos a Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas- y 7085 –Estatuto de Servicios de Enfermería-, los cataloga como profesionales en Ciencias de la Salud y los ubica en diversas instituciones públicas y privadas sanitarias. Y dentro de la Caja se clasifican funcionalmente como un cuerpo de apoyo imprescindible dentro de la labor de la denominada atención hospitalaria (Véase Manual Descriptivo de Puestos de la Caja). Y en razón de lo hasta aquí expuesto, es lógico y por demás razonable que los alcance también a todos ellos la proscripción de la huelga, máxime cuando la jurisprudencia de la Sala ha reiterado que las actividades desplegadas en clínicas, hospitales y demás unidades de atención sanitaria de la Caja constituyen servicio público esencial en los términos en que se ha interpretado razonable y proporcionalmente el artículo 61 constitucional, en relación con los ordinales 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo. Existen diferencias sustanciales entre los funcionarios que, como ellos, prestan funciones imprescindibles en servicios públicos esenciales y otros, quienes no lo hacen, y por tanto, siendo las situaciones traídas a comparación no son homogéneas, la diferenciación constitucionalmente establecida que permite imponer la prohibición del derecho de huelga a quienes laboren en servicios públicos esenciales, especialmente vinculados de forma directa a tales obligaciones prestacionales, resulta ser constitucionalmente razonable y proporcional al fin perseguido –garantizar la continuidad de los servicios cuya interrupción podría poner en peligro la vida, la seguridad o la salud de la persona en toda o parte de la población -. No es tampoco arbitraria, porque se sustenta en razones objetivas diferenciables (innegable naturaleza esencial del servicio hospitalario con respecto a los bienes o intereses por él satisfechos), ni viola el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, por resultar constitucionalmente válida conforme a la jurisprudencia de esa Sala. 4.- Los “servicios mínimos” una opción por la que puede optar exclusivamente el legislador para conciliar el derecho de huelga y la continuidad de los servicios públicos “no esenciales”. El establecimiento del denominado “servicio mínimo”, cuando el legislador opta por no prohibir la huelga pero imponiendo el servicio mínimo, es una mera opción legislativa, pero jamás una obligación, y menos tratándose de servicios públicos esenciales, como injustificadamente se pretende por parte del accionante. Sin lugar a dudas, se trata de una fórmula de equilibrio entre el derecho de huelga y la continuidad de los servicios públicos “no esenciales”, en la que una parte de la doctrina laboralista ha visto la solución en la imposición de servicios mínimos que deben prestarse durante la cesación colectiva de labores; esto es así “Cuando el Legislador, único competente en la materia, no prohíbe la huelga (…) para algunos servicios públicos, mediante la instauración de un servicio mínimo que permita asegurar un mínimo de continuidad del servicio (…)” (LACHAUME, JEAN FRANCOIS et al, Drot des Services Publics, Ediciones Dallonz, París, 2004, pp. 354-355). El establecimiento de los denominados “servicios mínimos” tiene como finalidad garantizar el mantenimiento del servicio durante la huelga, garantizando la cobertura de las necesidades básicas de la población, el funcionamiento continuo o en condiciones de seguridad de las instalaciones aunque de forma limitada, respetando el contenido esencial del mismo, pero sin alcanzar el nivel de rendimiento habitual para que sea perceptible la repercusión de la huelga en el servicio, como mecanismo de la presión laboral. De tal forma que su establecimiento a nivel legal obliga a ponderar adecuadamente los intereses en juego, los bienes y derechos constitucionalmente protegidos y el derecho fundamental de huelga, debiendo encontrarse el equilibrio entre ambos. Sin embargo, como es fácil inferir de la normativa constitucional y legal aquí estudiada, la medida por la que optó tanto el Constituyente originario, como el legislador ordinario, fue otra, la prohibición del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos esenciales, a fin de garantizar su continuidad ininterrumpida, según lo advertimos en el Dictamen C-151-2003, y lo precisamos en los pronunciamientos OJ-017-2006, de 13 de febrero de 2006 y OJ-125-2007, de 19 de noviembre de 2007. Además, como recientemente lo reconoció esa Sala: “no existe mandato constitucional en orden a determinar cuáles deben ser los supuestos de huelgas que el legislador debe regular ni cómo debe hacerlo (…) la Asamblea Legislativa, en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (art. 121, inciso 1, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente (…)” (Resolución No. 2018017681 de las 09:40 hrs. del 24 de octubre de 2018, Sala Constitucional). No encontramos entonces que exista un tratamiento discriminatorio, irrazonable, desproporcionado o arbitrario que contravenga los criterios que constitucionalmente priman y deben prevalecer en la materia. No es jurídicamente exigible por medio de esta acción el establecimiento de un sistema mixto o alternativo, en el que se prevea el aseguramiento de “servicios mínimos”, a fin de permitir el ejercicio del derecho de huelga aun en servicios públicos esenciales, porque además de resultar ello abiertamente contrario a la alternativa por la que optó el Constituyente originario, la Sala no puede fungir como legislador positivo, a efecto de establecer reglas normativas que permitan exceptuar a los accionantes de la prohibición de huelga constitucionalmente instaurada a nivel de servicios públicos esenciales, como infundadamente se pretende. De ahí que con respecto a esta pretensión se configura una inadmisibilidad de la acción en razón del objeto que debiera conllevar su rechazo de plano (Resolución No. 2018017681 op. cit.). 5.- La denominada “Huelga Política” no cae dentro del ámbito de los principios de la libertad sindical de la OIT, ni ha sido reconocida formal ni materialmente en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Aduce el accionante la supuesta inconstitucionalidad por no regular las huelgas de carácter político; es decir, inconstitucionalidad por omisión, que a su juicio, contienen ambas normas legales impugnadas. Al respecto, según hemos debatido recientemente a nivel de la jurisdicción ordinaria laboral, con motivo del proceso de calificación de ilegalidad de la huelga que actualmente se mantiene especialmente en el sector magisterial, con base en nuestra legislación vigente, la denominada huelga política no ha sido reconocida, y por tanto es ilícita, pues por la forma en que ha sido conceptuado constitucionalmente en nuestro ordenamiento el derecho de huelga, resulta incuestionable que el reconocimiento de ese derecho no tiene porqué entrañar necesariamente todas las formas y modalidades de acción directa de los trabajadores, ni mucho menos todas las posibles finalidades pretendidas (Dictamen C-151-2003 op. cit). E incluso advertimos que el reconocimiento y regulación legal de esa forma atípica de huelga contra políticas públicas, fue expresamente excluida de la Reforma Procesal Laboral, por falta de consenso entre los distintos interlocutores sociales (Acta No. 08 de 16 de junio de 2010, expediente legislativo No. 15.990, Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral y Dictamen Afirmativo Unánime de 17 de agosto de 2010). En su justa dimensión, el derecho de huelga está reconocido y consagrado en nuestro ordenamiento como derecho subjetivo de carácter fundamental y autónomo. Y según lo expresa la norma de comentario, le corresponde al legislador ordinario, como representante de la soberanía popular, confeccionar una regulación de las condiciones de ejercicio de ese derecho, las cuales podrían ser más o menos restrictivas, de acuerdo con las directrices políticas que la impulsen, siempre y cuando no rebase, en primer término, los límites impuestos por la propia norma -el primero, en cuanto a las actividades en las que ese derecho se reconoce, porque expresamente excluye los servicios públicos –según explicamos, los esenciales-, cuya determinación en todo caso le corresponde al propio legislador; el segundo, en cuanto a la modalidad, pues en su ejercicio deben desautorizarse los actos de coacción o de violencia-, u otros límites derivados de su posible conexión con otros derechos constitucionales e incluso con otros bienes constitucionalmente protegidos. Recuérdese que ningún derecho es ilimitado, y como todos, el derecho de huelga no es absoluto, y ha de tener sus limitaciones. Y conforme con la acepción legal dada por el legislador del derecho de huelga (art. 371 del Código de Trabajo), siguiendo como base mínima dada por la Constitución (art. 61), el ejercicio de ese derecho no entraña necesariamente todas las formas y modalidades de acción directa de los trabajadores, ni mucho menos todas las posibles finalidades pretendidas, máxime que en nuestro sistema jurídico vigente podríamos no encontrarnos ante el fenómeno de huelga protegido constitucionalmente, cuando se producen perturbaciones en la producción de bienes y servicios públicos o en el normal funcionamiento de estos últimos, que se introduzcan con el fin exclusivo de presionar sobre Administración Pública o sobre los órganos del Estado, para conseguir que se adopten medidas gubernativas más favorables para los intereses de una determinada institución o colectivo de funcionarios, pues en estos casos la huelga no sería el resultado de un conflicto laboral propiamente dicho, pues la motivación profesional es claramente marginal. De modo que la ilicitud de este tipo de huelga, más allá de los intereses profesionales y económicos -directos e indirectos- de los trabajadores involucrados, desde el punto de vista material se da porque las reivindicaciones, los objetivos y finalidades políticas perseguidas, rebasan los propios de la acción sindical, y por tanto, no son acordes con el ordenamiento jurídico, pues no están dirigidas contra los empleadores en concreto, sino contra el Gobierno estatal como poder público; máxime cuando por los medios empleados es clara la pretensión de alterar el orden constitucional y coaccionar la libre decisión de instituciones democráticas del Estado, poniendo en juego la autoridad del Estado. Incluso, conforme a los diversos criterios recomendativos de la OIT, el Comité de Libertad Sindical ha vinculado el ejercicio de derecho de huelga a la finalidad de promoción y defensa de los intereses económicos y sociales de los trabajadores; criterio que excluye del ámbito de protección internacional en el seno de la OIT, las huelgas puramente políticas. De modo que resulta evidente que en nuestro ordenamiento es inadmisible la exigibilidad del reconocimiento, a nivel constitucional, de la existencia de las denominadas huelgas políticas, como la que se ha materializado y prolongado en estos días, porque “no existe mandato constitucional en orden a determinar cuáles deben ser los supuestos de huelgas que el legislador debe regular ni cómo debe hacerlo (…) la Asamblea Legislativa, en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (art. 121, inciso 1, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente (…)” (Resolución No. 2018017681 de las 09:40 hrs. del 24 de octubre de 2018, Sala Constitucional). Y en todo caso, porque las huelgas políticas no se encuentran reconocidas ni reguladas en nuestro medio, y porque como tales, no están siquiera cubiertas por los principios de libertad sindical, conforme las recomendaciones no vinculantes de la OIT. Por último, la Sala no puede fungir como legislador positivo, a efecto de modificar los textos legislativos a favor de intereses puntuales y reconocer las huelgas políticas en nuestro medio, contrariando con ello el Derecho de la Constitución (Entre otras muchas, la resolución No. 2010-8600 de las 15:08 hrs. del 12 de mayo de 2010). De ahí que con respecto a esta pretensión se configura una inadmisibilidad de la acción en razón del objeto que debiera conllevar su rechazo de plano (Resolución No. 2018017681 op. cit.). Conclusión: Con fundamento en lo expuesto, este Órgano Asesor sugiere a la Sala Constitucional: 1) En cuanto a las omisiones de regular servicios mínimos y la huelga política en servicios esenciales, rechazar de plano esta acción, por dos razones básicas: no existe mandato constitucional alguno que así lo ordene y porque la Sala no puede fungir como legislador positivo. 2) Y en lo demás, declararla sin lugar y ratificar la línea jurisprudencial según la cual los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo resultan constitucionales.

6.- Rinde su informe ROMAN MACAYA HAYES, en su calidad de Presidente Ejecutivo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y señala en resumen: Que la CCSS estima que las normas impugnadas son conformes con la Constitución Política y los tratados internacionales suscritos por el Gobierno de Costa Rica, así se considera que la limitación del derecho a la huelga en los servicios públicos que presta la CCSS deviene de la protección del bien supremo de la vida y la salud humana. Sobre la limitación de la huelga por el derecho interno (constitucionalidad y convencionalidad de la limitación vía ley ordinaria): Nuestra Constitución Política en su numeral 61 reconoce el derecho a huelga como un derecho fundamental, no obstante, esta misma norma permite limitar su ejercicio tratándose de servicios públicos, reservando a la ley la determinación de los servicios públicos donde debe entenderse limitado el derecho de huelga. Conforme lo anterior, los artículos 375 y 376.d) no son contrarios al artículo 61 pues ambas normas tienen rango de ley, así la limitación impuesta cumple con la reserva dispuesta en la norma constitucional. Si la Constitución expresamente indica que el derecho a huelga se puede limitar vía ley, bajo ningún argumento lógico se puede estimar que las normas impugnadas puedan resultar contrarias al artículo 61 de la Constitución. Obsérvese que el derecho internacional ratificado por nuestro país, es coherente con el artículo 61 Constitucional, el Pacto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas, reconoce el derecho de huelga como derecho fundamental, pero admite que la ley interna de cada país puede imponer limitaciones tratándose de administración estatal (ver inciso 2 del artículo 8). En este orden de ideas, el Protocolo de San Salvador contempla el derecho a huelga como un derecho fundamental, pero prevé que es reserva de ley establecer restricciones al ejercicio de ese derecho en el caso de los servicios públicos (ver artículo 8). Esta Sala ya se ha referido ampliamente al tema bajo estudio (ver resolución 2016-006463). Ahora bien, el concepto de prohibir la huelga en los servicios públicos esenciales, ha sido recogido en la legislación nacional. Sobre los alcances de los artículos del Código de Trabajo, en sentencia 1998-01317 se señaló que la exclusión del derecho de huelga en ciertos servicios públicos indispensables y cuya suspensión comprometía los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública. En esa oportunidad se estimó que la prohibición establecida a nivel legal respecto a este tipo de servicio público resultaba razonable, necesaria y proporcionada, en razón de que se debía proteger el ámbito de los derechos e intereses de los destinatarios o usuarios de dichos servicios, criterio que concuerda con las opiniones vertidas por el Comité de Expertos y el de Libertad Sindical de la OIT. Como puede observarse, es conforme al Derecho de la Constitución que en nuestro país se limite vía ley el ejercicio del derecho a huelga. Cabe indicar que la limitación de la huelga por norma legal, es un tema normado de similar manera en países como España (artículo 28.2), Colombia (artículo 56), Panamá (artículo 69) y Chile (artículo 16). De lo anterior se concluye que, el derecho a huelga, como derecho fundamental de libertad, coexiste en un sistema de derechos que permite su limitación, según se disponga por el ordenamiento jurídico de cada país, en el caso de nuestro ordenamiento la limitación se considera válida en el tanto la norma es proporcionada, razonable y necesaria, según se explica. Inexistencia de violación a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad: El derecho a huelga puede limitarse por disposición de ley. El numeral 61 de la norma fundamental no puede interpretarse en el sentido de que exista una prohibición total para el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos, por el contrario, corresponde a la ley determinar los casos en que procede establecer dicha prohibición, tarea que debe responder a criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Corresponde a la Asamblea Legislativa establecer los supuestos bajo los cuales el derecho de huelga no puede ejercitarse. De ese modo, ni el Juez, ni el Poder Ejecutivo, pueden sustituir al legislador en la determinación de los supuestos en que se puede impedir el derecho de huelga. Las razones que tuvo el Constituyente y el legislador ordinario para prohibir la huelga en estos servicios, fue evitar en casos como el que nos ocupa, una grave afectación en los servicios públicos esenciales, obsérvese por ejemplo los servicios de salud de la CCSS, durante el movimiento de huelga en el periodo entre el 10 de setiembre del 2018 y el 05 de octubre del 2018, se generó una afectación en la producción de insumos necesarios para la atención directa de pacientes (suspensión de 80.949 citas de medicina general, 40.657 citas de especialidad y 8.329 citas de otros profesionales en salud, es decir, se perdieron en total 129.935 citas, lo cual se adiciona a las 3.706 cirugías suspendidas). Lo cual es evidente la afectación al servicio público, lo que hace concluir que la huelga en los servicios hospitalarios y de salud debe estar prohibida para proteger el bien supremo de la vida humana, tal y como en efecto lo ha hecho el legislador en los artículo 375 y 376.c en el contexto de los artículos 21 y 61 de la Constitución Política. Las limitaciones al derecho a huelga en los servicios públicos vía ley, y en particular las establecidas en los artículos 375 y 376.d del Código de Trabajo son legítimas, razonables, proporcionadas y necesarias, careciendo de lógica y justificación afectar el derecho a la salud de más de 150.000 asegurados, para ejercer un pretendido irrestricto derecho a huelga. Ha quedado claro que la limitación de la huelga en servicios públicos es conforme con la Constitución y es el legislador ordinario quien define los servicios afectos. Servicios que no pueden ir a huelga tienen trámite de resolución de conflictos: La Comisión de Expertos de la OIT ha señalado que la legislación de un gran número de países dispone que, antes de emprender una huelga, deben agotarse los procedimientos de conciliación y mediación. Aún siendo prohibida la huelga en los servicios públicos según determinación de ley, los funcionarios tienen una garantía de resolución de conflictos previo a la instancia judicial, como sería el arreglo directo, la conciliación y arbitraje. Corolario: El derecho a la huelga constituye un derecho de los trabajadores, nuestro Derecho Constitucional permite la imposición de limitaciones cuando el derecho de huelga implique la interrupción o afectación de los servicios públicos, limitaciones para cuya imposición rige el principio de reserva legal. La limitación del derecho a huelga establecida en los artículos 375 y 376.d del Código de Trabajo es conforme al derecho de la Constitución, por ser introducida por ley, de manera razonable, proporcionada y necesaria. Por lo cual se solicita declarar el rechazo por el fondo de la acción interpuesta.

7.- Rinde su informe STEVEN NUÑEZ RIMOLA, en su calidad de Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y señala en resumen que: El artículo 61 constitucional establece como derecho fundamental, el derecho de los trabajadores a la huelga. Es por ello que, el artículo 375 del Código de Trabajo dispone la prohibición de huelga en servicios públicos, en específico, en cuanto a aquellos trabajadores indispensables que no pueden suspender sus servicios sin causar un grave daño a la economía o salud pública. En el Derecho Comparado existen ordenamientos bajo los cuales el derecho de huelga es suprimido totalmente en el caso de los funcionarios públicos, también existen otros en los cuales el derecho constitucional no establece restricción alguna y otros como el nuestro, según se detalla más adelante. En sentido similar al artículo 61 Constitucional, el Pacto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales admite que la ley puede imponer restricciones en el caso de los miembros de la policía y la administración del Estado. Asimismo, el Protocolo de San Salvador prevé que es reserva de ley establecer restricciones al ejercicio del derecho a la huelga, en el caso de los servicios públicos. Por otro lado, esta Sala ya precisó el alcance del artículo 61 de la Constitución Política en el voto 1317-98 y que la definición de las actividades públicas que tienen restringido el derecho de huelga es materia reservada a la ley. En esa misma sentencia el Tribunal Constitucional declinó declarar la inconstitucionalidad del numeral 375 del Código de Trabajo, dejando claro que esa norma debe interpretarse de modo conforme con la Constitución, de modo que la prohibición no constituya un impedimento absoluto, pues ello sería contrario a la norma fundamental. Además, el inciso d) del artículo 376 también fue objeto del examen de constitucionalidad. Conforme a lo expuesto, la facultad otorgada por el Constituyente al legislador, de regular cuáles actividades de servicio público encuentran restringido el derecho a huelga, se plasma en los numerales 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo, debiendo integrarse dichas normas con los Convenios Internacionales ratificados por Costa Rica y con la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional emitida al respecto. Los principios del Comité relativos a las situaciones en que la huelga de los funcionarios públicos puede ser objeto de restricciones importantes, o incluso de prohibición, son compartidos por la Comisión de Expertos. En 1983, la Comisión de Expertos los definió como “los servicios cuya interrupción podría poner en peligro la vida, la seguridad o la salud de la persona en toda o parte de la población”. Esta definición fue adoptada poco tiempo después por el Comité de Libertad Sindical. La lista de servicios no esenciales del Comité de Libertad Sindical tampoco es exhaustiva. En cualquier caso merece destacarse que, respecto de una queja en la que no se trataba de un servicio esencial, el Comité mantuvo que las consecuencias graves a largo plazo para la economía nacional que pudiera tener una huelga no justificaban la prohibición de la misma. El Comité ha recomendado la modificación de algunas legislaciones con el objeto de que sólo se prohíban las huelgas en los servicios esenciales en el sentido estricto del término, particularmente cuando las autoridades dispongan de facultades discrecionales para ampliar la lista de servicios esenciales. Específicamente sobre la prohibición de la huelga en el servicio hospitalario, encontramos en voto de la Sala Constitucional n°2011-017680, donde se indicó que la huelga en los servicios hospitalarios, en tanto actividad esencial del Estado, está prohibida, toda vez que se pone en peligro bienes jurídicos fundamentales de la sociedad, como la salud y la vida de la población. Criterio que la Sala acoge en el sentido de que en el servicio hospitalario, la prohibición de la huelga afecta únicamente aquellos funcionarios públicos y trabajadores cuya suspensión de labores implique que el usuario no pueda recibir la prestación del servicio de salud. Conforme a lo expuesto, queda clara la falta de razón del accionante en cuanto a sus alegatos, ya que los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo de ninguna forma establecen una prohibición absoluta para el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos. Lo que existe es una restricción del acceso a este derecho para aquellos funcionarios públicos que participen de actividades consideradas servicios públicos esenciales, entre los cuales se encuentran los servicios hospitalarios y en estos servicios, como ha indicado esta Sala, esta prohibición afecta únicamente a aquellos funcionarios cuya suspensión de labores implique que el usuario no pueda recibir la prestación del servicio de salud. Estas limitaciones no rozan con la Constitución Política ni con Tratados Internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos, toda vez que como se ha dicho el derecho a huelga no es irrestricto, siendo necesario, por motivos de racionalidad y proporcionalidad, limitar el ejercicio del derecho a aquellos servicios que sean esenciales, entendiendo estos como los que atenten contra la vida, la seguridad o la salud de las personas. Por lo anterior, consideran que las normas cuestionadas no son inconstitucionales. Se omite pronunciamiento sobre los alegatos referentes al Decreto n°38767-MP-MTSS-MJP y la huelga política por cuanto no forman parte de la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada.

8.- En calidad de coadyuvante se apersona MARVIN ATENCIO DELGADO, en su condición de Secretario General del Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines (SIPROCIMECA), indica que esta organización sindical se adhiere en forma total a los argumentos esgrimidos por la organización sindical accionante, en el tanto es claro que una lectura de los artículos 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo objeto de impugnación, contraviene lo dispuesto en el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política. Así solicitan que se declare con lugar la acción y se tengan como inconstitucionales los artículos 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo, por ser contrarios a los derechos constitucionales de sindicación, huelga e igualdad consagrados en los artículos 33, 60 y 61 de nuestra Constitución Política.

9.- En calidad de coadyuvante se apersona LUIS GERARDO CHAVARRIA VEGA, en su condición de Secretario General de la Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA) indica que, las normas no son inconstitucionales, sino las interpretaciones que se han realizado de ambos numerales. A merced de esta interpretación de las normales legales, a contrapelo del artículo 61 constitucional, se ha llegado a sostener la prohibición absoluta de la huelga en las diferentes actividades que enuncia el inciso d) del artículo 376 del Código de Trabajo. Esta interpretación extralimitada no resulta consistente con el artículo 61 constitucional por los siguientes motivos: la limitación que impone la norma legal sólo limita el ejercicio del derecho de huelga de los trabajadores absolutamente indispensables para garantizar el mantenimiento o funcionamiento mínimo de los servicios que prestan aquellas empresas o instituciones, incluso los sanitarios. El resto de trabajadores, quienes no son absolutamente imprescindibles, no tienen ningún impedimento de ejercer el derecho de huelga. Entonces, la restricción que impone la norma tiene un ámbito subjetivo determinado y limitado, que no comprende todo el servicio o actividad económica correspondiente, ni a todos los trabajadores de la respectiva institución o actividad, sino exclusivamente a aquellos trabajadores absolutamente imprescindibles para garantizar que no se interrumpa la prestación mínima del servicio. Podríamos admitir, en el peor de los casos, que la norma contiene una prohibición relativa, que restringe la huelga únicamente a estos trabajadores, pero jamás se podría sostener que la disposición prohíbe de manera absoluta y general, la huelga en el sector salud, salvo que sea quebrantando el texto expreso de dicha disposición y de la propia norma constitucional. Esta norma del Código de Trabajo recurre a la técnica del mantenimiento del servicio mínimo, que soluciona de manera armónica cualquier contradicción entre la necesidad de la continuidad de la prestación de los servicios de salud y el reconocimiento del derecho de huelga. La OIT establece que el mantenimiento del servicio mínimo constituye una solución idónea que, por una parte, salvaguarda el derecho de huelga de la mayoría de los trabajadores, y por otra, garantiza la satisfacción de las necesidades vitales de los usuarios. Nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional ha reconocido el valor normativo de estos pronunciamientos de la OIT, y los pronunciamientos del Comité de Libertad Sindical constituyen jurisprudencia que ha aplicado en sus sentencias el Tribunal Constitucional, que solicitamos se aplique en este asunto. Además, de conformidad con el artículo 15 del Código de Trabajo estos pronunciamientos se incorporan a nuestro ordenamiento. Solicitan se declare con lugar la acción en cuanto a su interpretación.

10.- En calidad de coadyuvante se apersona RODRIGO LÓPEZ GARCIA, en su condición de Secretario General de la Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería (ANPE) indica que ese sindicato tiene un interés legítimo en defender el derecho constitucional de huelga que se ha cercenado por la aplicación o algún sentido la errónea interpretación de los artículos 375 y 376.d) del Código de Trabajo. En aplicación de nuestra Constitución Política y lo ratificado por Costa Rica en los convenios internacionales, las limitaciones que se impongan al derecho de huelga en algunos servicios públicos, deben ser conformes con los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. En realidad, la limitación del derecho a huelga es para los trabajadores absolutamente indispensables, no así para todos los trabajadores (véase la opinión jurídica de la Procuraduría General de la República 125-J del 19 de noviembre del 2007). El considerar y sustentar la decisión que todos los servicios públicos son indispensables o esenciales es minar el derecho a huelga de muchos y conlleva ineludiblemente a perjudicar a quienes defienden un derecho o situación que afecta directamente sus derechos laborales, políticos y económicos e intereses subjetivos. Solicita se declare con lugar esta acción.

11.- Mediante resolución de las 15:15 horas del 19 de diciembre del 2018 se tuvieron por presentadas las coadyuvancias de Marvin Atencio Delgado en su condición de Secretario General del Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social e Instituciones Afines (SIPROCIMECA), Luis Chavarría Vega, en su condición de Secretario General de la Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA) y Rodrigo López García, en su condición de Secretario General de la Asociación Nacional de Profesionales en Enfermería (ANPE). Además, se tuvieron por contestadas las audiencias conferidas a la Procuraduría General de la República, al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y al Presidente Ejecutivo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

12.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

13.- En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- Objeto de la impugnación.- El accionante, representante del Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería (SINAE), acusa de inconstitucionales los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, los cuales literalmente disponen lo siguiente:

“ARTICULO 375. - No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos. Las diferencias que en éstos ocurran entre patronos y trabajadores, así como en todos los demás casos en que se prohíbe la huelga, se someterán obligatoriamente al conocimiento y resolución de los Tribunales de Trabajo.” “ARTICULO 376.- Para los efectos del artículo anterior se entienden por servicios públicos:

(…)

d. Los que desempeñen los trabajadores que sean absolutamente indispensables para mantener el funcionamiento de las empresas particulares que no puedan suspender sus servicios sin causar un daño grave o inmediato a la salud o a la economía públicas, como son las clínicas y hospitales, la higiene, el aseo y el alumbrado en las poblaciones.” Los alegatos de la supuesta inconstitucionalidad pueden sintetizarse en los siguientes aspectos:

• 1)Violación del artículo 61 de la Constitución Política: dicha norma constitucional no dispone una prohibición absoluta del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos como los que presta la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, y establece una reserva legal para que el legislador determine en cuáles servicios públicos no cabe la huelga. Siendo que, la doctrina más reciente indica que la prohibición del ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos se circunscribe a aquellos sumamente calificados. Dichos artículos son inconstitucionales en tanto prohíben, de forma absoluta, el derecho de huelga de todos los trabajadores que prestan servicios en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.
• 2)Violación de los Convenios 87 y 98, así como las Recomendaciones de la OIT: en el tanto la prohibición o restricción del derecho de huelga debe circunscribirse, en primer lugar, únicamente a aquellos servicios públicos sumamente calificados, y en segundo término, con respecto a aquellos trabajadores que son absolutamente indispensables en dichos servicios; debiendo permitirse la huelga aun en dichos servicios, siempre y cuando se garantice el funcionamiento de servicios mínimos.
• 3)Violación de los principios de igualdad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e interdicción de la arbitrariedad en el ejercicio de la libertad sindical y del derecho de huelga: por cuanto se engloban todas las actividades bajo el concepto de “servicio esencial”, es claro que hay una discriminación para todos los empleados de la CCSS pues, aunque brindan un servicio importante, la ley ha sido un portillo para que la Administración violente estos principios, efectuando generalizaciones sobre el concepto de “servicio esencial”. Además, que no prevén el supuesto de huelga política reivindicativa en tales servicios.

Ahora bien, al final del escrito de la acción se indican ciertos alegatos que corresponden al ámbito de la legalidad, en cuanto al trámite seguido para la declaratoria de ilegalidad de la huelga en el caso concreto que sirve de asunto base, mencionándose que el trámite no es procedente, pues no se trata de una huelga reivindicativa cuando en realidad es una huelga política. Todo lo cual queda fuera del análisis de constitucionalidad en esta acción, por cuanto es al ámbito ordinario donde corresponde calificarse el tipo de huelga dada en el asunto base.

Finalmente procede realizar la siguiente aclaración: la normativa del Código de Trabajo, donde están ubicadas estas normas, fue reformada y adicionada mediante la Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos, N° 9808 del 21 de enero del 2020. Sin embargo, se procede a su análisis por los efectos que se produjeron mientras han estado vigentes tal cual se impugnan.

II.- Las reglas de legitimación en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y la legitimación en este caso.- El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. En este caso, el accionante ostenta la representación, como apoderado, del Sindicato Nacional de Enfermería (SINAE), y por tanto, acude alegando la titularidad y defensa de un interés colectivo o corporativo de las personas que conforman la base asociativa de dicho Sindicato, que sin duda se ven incididos por las normas cuestionadas. Además, la acción planteada resulta admisible por cuanto las normas impugnadas son de aplicación en el asunto base pendiente de resolver, el cual está constituido por un Procedimiento de Calificación de Huelga promovido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, con el número de expediente 18-002813-1178-LA, que se encuentra en alzada ante el Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo de ese mismo Circuito; apelación en la que el SINAE como parte invocó la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que consideran lesionado. A partir de lo dicho, es claro que el accionante ostenta legitimación suficiente para demandar la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas. Además, se trata de normas legales, objeto cuya constitucionalidad procede revisar en esta vía. Finalmente, el accionante cumplió los requisitos estipulados en los numerales 78 y 79 de la Ley de rito. En conclusión, la presente acción es admisible, por lo que debe entrarse de inmediato a discutir el objeto y el fondo del asunto.

III.- Sobre la jurisprudencia constitucional en cuanto a la huelga en los servicios públicos y los alegatos similares de esta acción.- El Sindicato accionante impugna los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, en tanto los considera violatorios del artículo 61 Constitucional, de los convenios y recomendaciones de la OIT y de los principios de igualdad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e interdicción de la arbitrariedad. Ello por cuanto, tales normas prohíben de forma absoluta el derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos, siendo que tal prohibición debería ser únicamente para los servicios públicos esenciales. Además, aún en esos casos, no se podría prohibir el derecho de huelga a todos los trabajadores, sino únicamente a aquellos trabajadores que sean absolutamente indispensables en dichos servicios. Al respecto, es criterio del representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, del representante de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y del Ministerio de Trabajo que, las normas impugnadas no resultan inconstitucionales, así lo indican. Según la Procuraduría General de la República las normas impugnadas resultan constitucionales, según la línea jurisprudencial de la Sala, en cuanto la huelga en los servicios hospitalarios, en tanto actividad esencial del Estado, está prohibida, toda vez que se pone en peligro bienes jurídicos fundamentales de la sociedad, como la salud y la vida de la población (Resolución No. 2016-006463). Según el criterio del representante de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, los artículos 375 y 376.d) no son contrarios al artículo 61 pues ambas normas tienen rango de ley, así la limitación impuesta cumple con la reserva dispuesta en la norma constitucional. Por ejemplo en los servicios de salud de la CCSS, durante el movimiento de huelga en el periodo entre el 10 de setiembre del 2018 y el 05 de octubre del 2018, se generó una afectación pues se perdieron en total 129.935 citas, lo cual se adiciona a las 3.706 cirugías suspendidas. Según el Ministerio de Trabajo esta Sala declinó declarar la inconstitucionalidad del numeral 375 del Código de Trabajo, dejando claro que esa norma debe interpretarse de modo conforme con la Constitución, de modo que la prohibición no constituya un impedimento absoluto, pues ello sería contrario a la norma fundamental. Además, el inciso d) del artículo 376 también fue objeto del examen de constitucionalidad. Considera entonces que, clara la falta de razón del accionante en cuanto a sus alegatos, ya que los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo de ninguna forma establecen una prohibición absoluta para el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos. Lo que existe es una restricción del acceso a este derecho para aquellos funcionarios públicos que participen de actividades consideradas servicios públicos esenciales, entre los cuales se encuentran los servicios hospitalarios y en estos servicios, como ha indicado esta Sala, esta prohibición afecta únicamente a aquellos funcionarios cuya suspensión de labores implique que el usuario no pueda recibir la prestación del servicio de salud. Por otro lado, según el criterio de los coadyuvantes activos, una lectura de los artículos 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo objeto de impugnación, contraviene lo dispuesto en el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política (Siprocimeca), aunque pareciera que, las normas no son inconstitucionales, sino las interpretaciones que se han realizado de ambos numerales, por lo que solicitan la inconstitucionalidad de la interpretación (Undeca), y considerar y sustentar la decisión que todos los servicios públicos son indispensables o esenciales es minar el derecho a huelga de muchos (Anpe).

Al respecto, esta Sala considera denota que, mediante sentencia n.° 1317-98 de las 10:12 horas del 27 de febrero de 1998 (ratificada en resolución n.° 5264-2003 de las 14:42 del 18 de junio de 2003, y resolución n.°2019-20596 de las 19:15 horas del 25 de octubre del 2019), ya conoció de la impugnación de los artículos aquí impugnados (375 y 376.d del Código de Trabajo), por argumentos similares a los que en esta acción se indican. Así se resolvió:

VI.- DEL DERECHO DE SINDICACIÓN EN LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS.- Los accionantes acusan que el artículo 375 (antes, 368) del Código de Trabajo establece la prohibición del derecho de huelga para toda actividad que sea servicio público, lo que excede el texto constitucional que consagra el derecho de la libre sindicación para los trabajadores y los empleadores, sin condicionamiento alguno; afirmación que exige el siguiente análisis. Con la legislación social de los años cuarenta, se introducen en Costa Rica, específicamente en el año 1943, las llamadas garantías sociales en la Constitución Política, y se consagra expresamente el derecho de sindicación. Este derecho fundamental se mantiene en la Constitución de 1949, específicamente en su artículo 60. En otro plano, Costa Rica aprobó posteriormente los convenios nº 87 -relativo a la libertad sindical y a la protección del derecho de sindicación- y n° 98 -relativo al derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva- ambos de la O.I.T., por la ley nº 2561 de once de mayo de mil novecientos sesenta. En los convenios internacionales citados se reconoce y garantiza el derecho de sindicación limitándose su ejercicio a la observancia de los estatutos y a la legalidad del Estado miembro(artículos 2º y 8° del convenio nº 87). El derecho de sindicación tiene pues, rango constitucional en Costa Rica y se regula internamente mediante normas de carácter legal, específicamente el Código de Trabajo, que norma en su artículo 332 y siguientes -ubicados en el Título Quinto “De las Organizaciones Sociales”- lo referente al funcionamiento y disolución de los sindicatos y define las reglas de protección de los derechos sindicales. En el artículo 332 del Código de Trabajo se declara además de interés público la constitución legal de los sindicatos, que se distinguen “(…)como uno de los medios más eficaces de contribuir al sostenimiento y desarrollo de la cultura popular y de la democracia costarricense”. La referencia anterior permite concluir en esta etapa, que el derecho fundamental de sindicación se reconoce sin distingo de la naturaleza pública o privada de los sectores laborales; es decir, en magnitud equiparable. En relación con el contenido de la acción sindical, específicamente lo que toca al derecho de huelga, el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política establece que la regulación del citado derecho de acción colectiva es materia de reserva de ley, siendo que toda restricción del citado derecho debe darse por vía ley y de ningún modo puede favorecer los actos de coacción o violencia. Es además resultado de la atribución conferida mediante el numeral 61 constitucional citado, que compete al legislador definir en qué casos de la actividad pública se restringe o excluye el ejercicio del derecho de huelga; mandato que se satisface mediante el artículo 375 (antes, 368) del Código de Trabajo, que debe ajustarse a los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad para que sea congruente con el principio democrático sobre el que descansa el ordenamiento jurídico patrio, plasmado en el artículo 1° de la Constitución Política y que es valor supremo del Estado Constitucional de Derecho.

VII.- DE LA ALEGADA INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL ARTÍCULO 375 (antes, 368) DEL CODIGO DE TRABAJO QUE EXCLUYE EL EJERCICIO DEL DERECHO DE HUELGA A LOS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS. La huelga, como manifestación de la acción sindical, encuentra límite cuando su ejercicio interfiere con la prestación de ciertos servicios públicos, que compete a la ley determinar según el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política. Al efecto, la frase primera del artículo 375 (antes, 368) del Código de Trabajo, que dice: “No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos.(…)”, si bien pareciera proscribir la huelga en estos servicios, es decir, si bien pareciera tener un sentido impeditivo absoluto, lo cierto es que debe entenderse en armonía con lo dispuesto en el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política, que sólo la limita para ciertos casos fijados o determinados por la ley en observancia de criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, para que resulte congruente con el fin que persigue. Este artículo 375 (antes, 368) cuestionado, armoniza también con el artículo 8° del Convenio 87 de la O.I.T. que - como se transcribió en el Considerando III. -, estatuye la obligación de las organizaciones sindicales de adecuar su actividad a la legislación interna. En otras palabras, si bien la huelga es un derecho de todos, ejercitable en cualquier actividad, es viable que el legislador determine en qué casos el derecho de huelga no puede ejercitarse, específicamente cuando se trate de actividades que constituyen “servicios públicos” y que por su naturaleza o por el impacto social que tienen, no sea posible suspenderlos, descontinuarlos o paralizarlos sin causar daño significativo, grave e inmediato a ciertos bienes. Además, se entiende que en aquellas actividades públicas dentro de las que sí está permitida la huelga, no pueden sobrepasarse los límites legales fijados, pues el ejercicio de la huelga debe enmarcarse dentro de la legalidad. Con base en lo expuesto, no encuentra esta Sala que el artículo cuestionado 375 (antes, 368), al disponer: “No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos…”, exceda por sí solo los límites que establece la Constitución o los convenios internacionales. En síntesis, el artículo 375 (antes, 368) cuestionado no es en sí mismo inconstitucional y el análisis de inconstitucionalidad ha de desplazarse a los casos fijados por la ley en que el efecto impeditivo, en los servicios públicos, se produzca. Consecuente con lo expuesto, procede declarar sin lugar la acción en cuanto a este extremo.

(…)

IX.- DE LOS OTROS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS EN QUE SE EXCLUYE EL EJERCICIO DEL DERECHO DE HUELGA, QUE SEÑALA EL ARTICULO 376 (ANTES, 369) DEL CODIGO DE TRABAJO.- Del análisis hecho queda claro que la Constitución difiere a la ley enunciar en qué servicios públicos procede excluir o limitar el ejercicio del derecho de la huelga. Esto no tiene un efecto impeditivo absoluto, que proscriba de los servicios públicos el ejercicio del derecho de huelga. Por consiguiente, la ley debe discernir en qué casos ese ejercicio no es legítimo, tomando en cuenta la naturaleza de la prestación y los efectos que produciría la huelga en el ámbito de los derechos e intereses de los destinatarios o usuarios de dichos servicios. En tal caso, es viable limitar el ejercicio del derecho, lo que debe hacerse con aplicación de criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. La legislación laboral, que enumera en el artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo -transcrito en el Considerando II, en qué servicios públicos se excluye la huelga, a pesar de preceder a la Constitución, que data de 1949, no por ello la contradice. No obstante, como bien observan los accionantes y la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe, el artículo 376 (antes, 369) cuando en su inciso a) detalla los servicios públicos en que se excluye el ejercicio de la huelga, utiliza términos imprecisos que no facilitan distinguir a qué servicios públicos mínimos se refiere, al indicar: “Todos los que desempeñen los trabajadores del Estado o de sus instituciones…”. Es claro para este Tribunal que este enunciado no permite reconocer qué actividades públicas quedan excluidas del ejercicio del derecho de huelga; imprecisión que riñe con lo ordenado en el precepto 61 constitucional ya comentado, por lo que procede declararlo inconstitucional. En otro orden, el inciso c) del citado artículo 376 (antes, 369) sí define acertada y adecuadamente qué categorías de transporte público quedan limitadas en el ejercicio de la huelga; además, establece con claridad el límite al ejercicio del derecho de huelga de los trabajadores ocupados en labores de carga y descarga en muelles y atracaderos. Finalmente el inciso c) también fija límites al ejercicio del derecho de huelga en el caso de “los trabajadores en viaje de cualquier otra empresa particular de transporte”, lo que debe entenderse como la imposibilidad de ejercer el derecho de huelga en la prestación efectiva del servicio de transporte público terrestre. Por otro lado, el inciso d) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) establece parámetros que permiten limitar el ejercicio de la huelga en aquellos servicios que se tengan por absolutamente indispensables y cuya suspensión sea susceptible de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública. En efecto, en este aparte se enuncian o distinguen prestaciones con respecto a las cuales la huelga es susceptible de comprometer el bien jurídico de la salud y la economía, al incluir las que se brindan en las clínicas y hospitales, las que aluden a la higiene, al aseo y al alumbrado de las poblaciones. La ley en este caso define las pautas para establecer en qué casos es viable excluir el ejercicio del derecho de huelga, cuales son que debe tratarse de servicios públicos absolutamente indispensables y por otro lado, que sean susceptibles de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública; lineamientos que responden a los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales. En cuanto al inciso b) del artículo cuestionado - que excluye la huelga de la actividad agrícola -, este Tribunal remite a lo expuesto en el Considerando VIII. Finalmente, en relación con la norma contenida en el inciso e) del artículo impugnado, que autoriza al Poder Ejecutivo dictar en qué otras actividades públicas se prohibe la huelga en la hipótesis de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya hecho uso de su facultad constitucional de suspender ciertas garantías individuales, esta Sala procede a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de tal atribución por exceder el principio de reserva de ley dispuesto en el numeral 61 constitucional, según el cual la atribución de establecer en qué prestaciones de servicio público debe limitarse el ejercicio del derecho de huelga, recae exclusivamente en el Poder Legislativo. En consecuencia, esta Sala procede a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de los incisos a) y e) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo.

En esa sentencia se declararon inconstitucionales las restricciones al derecho de huelga contempladas en los incisos a), b) y e) del numeral 376 del Código de Trabajo, por cuanto se indicó que la regulación del derecho de huelga es una materia reservada a la ley. En esa misma sentencia, el Tribunal Constitucional declinó declarar la inconstitucionalidad del numeral 375 del Código de Trabajo, el cual prohíbe expresamente la huelga en los servicios públicos; no obstante, fue claro en remarcar que esa norma debe interpretarse de modo conforme con la Constitución, de tal modo que la prohibición no constituya un impedimento absoluto, pues ello sería contrario a la norma fundamental. Asimismo, en cuanto al inciso d) del artículo 376 tampoco se consideró inconstitucional por cuanto se indicó que establece parámetros que permiten limitar el ejercicio de la huelga en aquellos servicios que se tengan por absolutamente indispensables y cuya suspensión sea susceptible de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública, al incluir las que se brindan en las clínicas y hospitales, las que aluden a la higiene, al aseo y al alumbrado de las poblaciones; lineamientos que responden a los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales. Así entonces, dado que se trata de argumentos similares ya resueltos por la jurisprudencia indicada, no existiendo razones para cambiar de criterio, procede la declaratoria sin lugar de esta acción.

IV.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Por mayoría se declara SIN lugar la acción. Los Magistrados Salazar Alvarado y Pacheco Salazar consignan nota. El Magistrado Rueda Leal da razones diferentes. El Magistrado Cruz Castro salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C. Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A . Jorge Araya G.

Jorge Isaac Solano A. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Nota del magistrado Salazar Alvarado y de la magistrada Pacheco Salazar, con redacción del primero.

Coincidimos en que la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad debe desestimarse, dado que en efecto la ley, en su sentido formal y material, podría regular la prohibición o la limitación al derecho a la huelga en ciertos supuestos de servicios públicos esenciales, pero para ello resulta necesario trazar la línea de argumentación de conformidad con los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Esto se señaló en el voto salvado que suscribimos en la Sentencia N° 2019-020596 de las 19:15 horas del 25 de octubre de 2019. En esa oportunidad, expresamos que:

“En el criterio de los suscritos, hay una base común para coincidir con la mayoría de que hay ciertos servicios públicos esenciales donde el legislador puede prohibir el derecho a la huelga, de manera que, en general, es posible admitir supuestos en los que la ley podría limitar el ejercicio del derecho fundamental. Pero, como en toda discusión en la que se encuentra presente la prohibición a los derechos fundamentales, es necesario que sean acordes con los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

En nuestro enfoque, el proyecto debería de establecer solo restricciones sobre el derecho a la huelga, y no prohibiciones absolutas, como lo establecen los legisladores y, la mayoría de la Sala, como constitucional. Así, en los diez supuestos que establece el proyecto de reforma al artículo 376, del Código de Trabajo, no hay una ponderación adecuada al derecho a la huelga frente a los derechos fundamentales que le sirven de límite, porque no en todos los casos tienen la misma intensidad sobre los servicios que prestan todos los trabajadores. La normativa solo debe estar orientada a prohibir la huelga cuando este mecanismo de los trabajadores, represente una amenaza evidente y manifiesta para la vida, la seguridad o la salud de toda o parte de la población. En caso contrario, no se debe privar a una gran mayoría de servidores públicos del derecho fundamental a la huelga, cuando no sea un servicio esencial, y no exista una amenaza evidente e inminente para aquellos. En los términos establecidos, implica para muchos una restricción ilegítima y un derecho que queda en la teoría, pese a estar reconocida constitucionalmente. Los criterios del Comité de Libertad Sindical, pueden efectivamente orientar a esta conclusión, toda vez que ha estimado que:

“El principio sobre prohibición de huelgas en los «servicios esenciales» podría quedar desvirtuado si se tratara de declarar ilegal una huelga en una o varias empresas que no prestaran un «servicio esencial» en el sentido estricto del término, es decir, los servicios cuya interrupción podría poner en peligro la vida, la seguridad o la salud de la persona en toda o parte de la población (caso de Nigeria N° 2432 y Sri Lanka N° 2519)”.

“No parece apropiado que todas las empresas del Estado sean tratadas sobre la misma base en cuanto a las restricciones al derecho de huelga, sin distinguir en la legislación pertinente entre aquellas que son auténticamente esenciales y las que no lo son” (caso de Canadá N° 3057) .

En nuestro criterio, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad es fundamental en la interpretación del artículo 61, de la Constitución Política, pues debe hacerse un ejercicio por determinar que en ciertos puestos profesionales o incluso administrativos, podrían no representar un peligro, como para partir de una premisa tan exigente que permita concluir que todas las actividades conducen a la amenaza evidente e inminente para el derecho a la vida, a la salud y a la seguridad pública. Ciertamente, dicha conclusión podría no ser razonable. En este sentido, la restricción impuesta pesa indebidamente sobre el derecho fundamental establecido en la Constitución Política [...].

Para ello, se recurre de igual manera, al Comité de Libertad Sindical, en cuanto sostiene que:

“No constituyen servicios esenciales en el sentido estricto del término: la radio-televisión, los sectores del petróleo y las instalaciones petrolíferas, la distribución de petróleo para el funcionamiento del transporte aéreo, el sector del gas, el llenado de bombonas de gas y su comercialización, los puertos (carga y descarga), los bancos, el Banco Central, los servicios de seguros, los servicios de informática para la recaudación de aranceles e impuestos, los grandes almacenes y los parques de atracciones, la metalurgia y el conjunto del sector minero, los transportes, en general, incluidos los servicios, metropolitanos, los pilotos de líneas aéreas, la generación, transporte y distribución de combustibles, los servicios ferroviarios, los transportes metropolitanos, los servicios de correos, el servicio de recolección de basuras, las empresas frigoríficas, los servicios de hotelería, la construcción, la fabricación de automóviles, las actividades agrícolas, el abastecimiento, y la distribución de productos alimentarios, las plantaciones de té, café y coco, la Casa de la Moneda, la Agencia Gráfica del Estado y los monopolios estatales del alcohol, de la sal y del tabaco, el sector de la educación, empresas de embotellamiento de agua mineral, la reparación de aviones los servicios de ascensores, los servicios de exportación, los servicios de seguridad privada, excepto los servicios penitenciarios los aeropuertos, excepto los servicios de control del tráfico aéreo, las farmacias, las panaderías, la producción de cerveza y la industria del vidrio” (caso de República de Corea N° 1865, Filipinas N° 2252, Colombia N° 2355, entre otros).

Debe establecerse aquellos casos en los que son auténticamente esenciales y distinguir los que no lo son, así la disposición que nos ocupa sobrepasa un criterio de daño sobre la salud de la población, de manera que sí incide en el derecho a la huelga, y no hace una graduación o nivelación de aquellos sectores de salud que no representan peligro para la vida de los pacientes, o incluso administrativos, que pudieran no tener mayores secuelas en el derecho a la salud de las personas. Caer en la tentación por calificar que toda huelga en la atención médica domiciliar, consulta externa, exámenes médicos, pruebas de laboratorio, todos generan una amenaza evidente e inminente para la vida, la seguridad o la salud de toda o parte de la población, es una falacia de argumentación, porque no en todas ellas conducen a situaciones donde la pérdida de la salud o la vida humana tiene una relación directa con la falta de un servicio esencial. En consecuencia, no es legítima la técnica de la norma de prohibir toda actividad, por ejemplo de forma reglamentaria en los servicios de salud y hospitalarias.

En nuestro criterio, entonces, debe permitirse que se puedan definir, dentro de los diez supuestos establecidos en la norma en cuestión, las medidas que permitan garantizar que dicho servicio sea prestado en una expresión mínima, lo suficiente como para evitar los peligros que un servicio esencial puede acarrear, sea, amenaza o infracción a la vida, la seguridad, y a la salud de parte o de toda la población. Es importante retomar la Sentencia N° 2017-13786 de 11:50 horas del 29 de agosto de 2017, en el que la Sala conoció la negativa en el Departamento de Medicina Forense, de practicar las necropsias médico forense y entregar los cuerpos a los familiares por estar en huelga. En ella, se sopesó el derecho de los familiares del difunto a que se les entregara el acta de defunción y el cuerpo del fallecido, el derecho al respeto de las personas fallecidas, y la salud pública. En esta decisión, el suscrito magistrado Salazar Alvarado, adicionó una nota que señala que en los servicios esenciales debe definirse aquellos que son mínimos, que se necesitan mantener para proteger a los destinatarios de servicios esenciales de recibir una prestación suspendida por razón de huelga, al ponderar todos los derechos involucrados, se razona que:

“Dadas las particularidades, el mantenimiento de los servicios esenciales de la comunidad, es un límite al derecho a la huelga ante el advenimiento y posible infracción a derechos fundamentales. Lo anterior implica la prestación de los trabajos necesarios para una cobertura que garantice los derechos, libertades o bienes que el propio servicio satisface. Así, en el ejercicio de la huelga que se produzca en servicios esenciales que atañen a la comunidad, debe existir una razonable proporción entre los sacrificios que se impongan a los huelguistas y los que padezcan los usuarios de aquellos. De manera, que las medidas han de encaminarse a garantizar mínimos indispensables para la conservación de los servicios, en tanto que dicho mantenimiento no puede significar -en principio- que se exija alcanzar el nivel de rendimiento habitual, ni asegurar el funcionamiento normal del servicio, pero el interés de la comunidad debe ser perturbado por la huelga sólo hasta extremos razonables y no hacerlo nugatorio. Reitero, que la consideración de un servicio como esencial, no puede suponer la supresión del derecho de huelga de los trabajadores que hubieran de prestarlo, sino la necesidad de disponer de medidas precisas para su conservación; o, dicho de otra forma, para asegurar la prestación de los trabajos que sean necesarios para la cobertura de los derechos, libertades o bienes que satisface dicho servicio, sin que exija alcanzar el nivel de rendimiento habitual ni asegurar su funcionamiento normal. Así que, la falta de la entrega oportuna de los cuerpos que esperaban la práctica de una autopsia, atenta entonces contra el derecho a la salud de los familiares, en el entendido, que dicho concepto abarca la salud emocional, social, psicológica y espiritual”.

De este modo, concluimos que la determinación que hace el legislador de que los servicios esenciales establecidos en la reforma al artículo 376, del Código de Trabajo, son todas actividades donde se debe prohibir la huelga, no diferencia de aquellas actividades que permitan asegurar una prestación mínima de servicios y así dar cobertura al servicio, sin perjuicio de permitir el ejercicio del derecho a la huelga como un derecho fundamental, y no establecer, una prohibición absoluta”.

De conformidad con la anterior transcripción, sí es posible establecer restricciones y limitaciones sobre el derecho a la huelga en los servicios públicos, entiéndase esenciales. Pero, también como se indica en la anterior transcripción, no en todos los casos se deben entender como supuestos en los que el legislador podría prohibir este ejercicio del derecho a la huelga por ser estrictamente esenciales. En este sentido, el legislador debe ponderar, de conformidad con los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, la aplicación de esas restricciones, al establecer aquellos servicios públicos no esenciales, en cuyo caso sí es posible acudir a la huelga como un mecanismo de presión y/o negociación. Esto reside en una labor para establecer la distinción en el tipo de actividad del servicio público, para que no haya prohibiciones absolutas sobre el ejercicio de un derecho laboral colectivo fundamental de los trabajadores del país.- Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Aracelly Pacheco S .

Res. N° 2022-001015 Razones diferentes del magistrado Rueda Leal. En el sub examine, se acusa la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 375 y del inciso d) del numeral 376 del Código de Trabajo, que establecían:

“ARTICULO 375. - No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos. Las diferencias que en éstos ocurran entre patronos y trabajadores, así como en todos los demás casos en que se prohíbe la huelga, se someterán obligatoriamente al conocimiento y resolución de los Tribunales de Trabajo.” “ARTICULO 376.- Para los efectos del artículo anterior se entienden por servicios públicos:

(…)

d. Los que desempeñen los trabajadores que sean absolutamente indispensables para mantener el funcionamiento de las empresas particulares que no puedan suspender sus servicios sin causar un daño grave o inmediato a la salud o a la economía públicas, como son las clínicas y hospitales, la higiene, el aseo y el alumbrado en las poblaciones.” Debe hacerse notar que, con ocasión de la ley nro. 9808 denominada “Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos” de 21 de enero del 2020, el régimen de la huelga en Costa Rica fue reformado. Además, aun cuando el inciso d) del ordinal 376 fue suprimido del ordenamiento jurídico (el numeral 375 se mantuvo igual), sí procede su análisis en virtud de los posibles efectos que En concreto, la parte accionante acusa la transgresión del numeral 61 de la Constitución Política. Al respecto, alega que tal norma no establece la prohibición absoluta del derecho a la huelga en los servicios que presta la CCSS e instaura reserva legal para la determinación de los servicios públicos en los que no cabe la huelga. Añade que la prohibición de este derecho se circunscribe a servicios públicos calificados. Reprocha la prohibición absoluta del derecho de la huelga de todos los trabajadores que prestan servicios en la CCSS. Por otra parte, también reclama la violación de los convenios 87 y 98 de la OIT, así como las recomendaciones del Comité de Libertad Sindical. En ese sentido, argumenta que la restricción del derecho a la huelga debe circunscribirse a los servicios públicos calificados y a aquellos trabajadores absolutamente indispensables; es decir, considera que debe permitirse la huelga siempre que se garantice el funcionamiento de los servicios mínimos. Finalmente, acusa la transgresión de los principios de igualdad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e interdicción de la arbitrariedad en el ejercicio de la libertad sindical y el derecho a la huelga, al englobarse todas las actividades dentro del concepto “servicio esencial”. Considera que hay discriminación para todos los empleados de la CCSS, pues se generaliza el concepto “servicio esencial”. Agrega que no se prevé el supuesto de la huelga política reivindicativa.

Sobre el particular, con ocasión de la consulta legislativa del proyecto de la ley denominada “Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos” que reformó el régimen de la huelga en Costa Rica, este Tribunal, en el dictamen 2019020596 de las 19:15 horas de 25 de octubre de 2019, desarrolló una serie de postulados generales en cuanto a la constitucionalidad de la prohibición de la huelga en los servicios públicos esenciales, los cuales considero aplican en el sub lite. En esa oportunidad, la Sala dispuso:

“A) Primer presupuesto general: naturaleza soft law de las recomendaciones del Comité de Libertad Sindical (CLS) de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT).

A los efectos de absolver esta consulta, consideramos fundamental ab initio clarificar el carácter no vinculante de las recomendaciones del Comité de Libertad Sindical de la OIT y qué implicaciones derivan de esto.

La OIT es una agencia “tripartita” de la Organización de Naciones Unidas que despliega su trabajo a través de tres órganos fundamentales con representantes de gobiernos, empleadores y trabajadores:

“La Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo establece las normas internacionales del trabajo y define las políticas generales de la Organización. La Conferencia, que con frecuencia es denominada el parlamento internacional del trabajo, se reúne una vez al año. Es también un foro para la discusión de cuestiones sociales y laborales fundamentales.

El Consejo de Administración es el órgano ejecutivo de la OIT y se reúne tres veces al año en Ginebra. Toma decisiones sobre la política de la OIT y establece el programa y el presupuesto, que después es sometido a la Conferencia para su adopción.

La Oficina internacional del trabajo es la secretaría permanente de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Es responsable por el conjunto de actividades de la OIT, que lleva a cabo bajo la supervisión del Consejo de Administración y la dirección del Director General”[2] El CLS, creado por la OIT en 1951, es un Comité del Consejo de Administración y, en tanto órgano de control, tiene como propósito analizar quejas por violación a la libertad sindical, que pueden ser formuladas por organizaciones de empleadores o de trabajadores. Está compuesto, como órgano tripartito, por nueve miembros titulares y nueve suplentes, provenientes en cantidades iguales de los grupos Gubernamental, Trabajadores y Empleadores del Consejo de Administración, amén de un presidente independiente electo por ese mismo Consejo. [3] Sobre la naturaleza de las decisiones del CLS, la Oficina Internacional del Trabajo señaló:

“2. (…) El Comité se reúne tres veces por año y, teniendo en cuenta las observaciones transmitidas por los gobiernos, realiza un examen de las quejas presentadas en contra de ellos y recomienda al Consejo de Administración, según corresponda, que un caso no requiere un examen más detenido (informe definitivo) o que se debe llamar la atención del gobierno interesado sobre los problemas que se han encontrado e invitarlo a tomar las medidas apropiadas para resolverlos (informes provisionales o en los que el Comité pide que se le mantenga informado de la evolución de la situación). Finalmente, el Comité puede tener que determinar si resulta apropiado tratar de obtener el acuerdo del gobierno concernido para que el caso sea elevado a la Comisión de Investigación y de Conciliación.

3. Las conclusiones adoptadas por el Comité en casos específicos están destinadas a orientar a los Gobiernos y las autoridades nacionales en las discusiones y acciones a realizar en seguimiento de sus recomendaciones en materia de libertad sindical y el reconocimiento efectivo del derecho de negociación colectiva. (…)”.[4] De lo anterior se observa que a lo interno de la OIT se conciben las decisiones del CLS como recomendaciones con carácter de pautas de orientación, lo cual concuerda con el hecho de que no hay norma jurídica convencional que expresamente les confiera carácter vinculante a tales decisiones.

A mayor abundamiento, obsérvese que, en el caso Baena Ricardo y otros vs. Panamá, el demandado planteó ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Corte IDH) una excepción de litispendencia, puesto que los sindicatos ya habían denunciado a ese estado ante la OIT, esta última había encontrado culpable a Panamá, y ya se había dictado una resolución recomendando una serie de medidas que debían ser cumplidas. No obstante, la Corte rechazó la gestión, entre otros argumentos, porque:

“57. Además, la naturaleza de las recomendaciones emitidas por dicho Comité [se refiere al Comité de Libertad Sindical] es diferente a la de las sentencias emitidas por la Corte Interamericana. En el primer caso se trata de un acto propio de un órgano de la OIT con el efecto jurídico propio de una recomendación a los Estados. En el segundo caso se trata de una sentencia que, en los términos de la Convención, es definitiva e inapelable (artículo 67), y de obligatorio cumplimiento (artículo 68.1).” (Sentencia de 18 de noviembre de 1999 -Excepciones Preliminares-; el destacado no corresponde al original).

Ergo, a nivel del máximo órgano convencional en materia de derechos humanos dentro del ámbito americano también se ha afirmado la distinta naturaleza jurídica entre una “recomendación” del Comité de Libertad Sindical, cuyo efecto jurídico está restringido a los límites propios de una decisión de este tipo, y una sentencia de la Corte IDH, la cual (entre otras características que la distinguen de la primera) es de obligatorio acatamiento, según el numeral 68.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos).

Ahora, aun cuando las recomendaciones del CLS no sean vinculantes, esta Sala reconoce el valor jurídico y doctrinario de los pronunciamientos de los órganos de control, distinto al de las simples recomendaciones de carácter axiológico o teórico. De este modo, las recomendaciones del CLS resultan útiles como guías calificadas para orientar la interpretación y aplicación de la normativa laboral, por cuanto son fuente de soft law en la medida que, a pesar de que ninguna disposición normativa les confiera carácter vinculante, siempre revisten de relevancia jurídica. Sin embargo, tal grado de importancia no implica que las autoridades nacionales carezcan de un margen de apreciación ante una recomendación de la CLS, siempre que se advierta una justificación razonable y debidamente sustentada, que en modo alguno conlleve una actuación contraria a la obligación de actuar de buena fe en el cumplimiento de los tratados internacionales. Específicamente, en el ámbito constitucional, la recomendación de un órgano de control de la OIT vendría a ser un elemento relevante por considerar entre otros factores implicados, también de gran trascendencia, a la hora de resolver un conflicto entre bienes constitucionales (incluso de naturaleza no laboral, como los relativos al resguardo del ambiente, la salud, la vida, la seguridad o la propiedad), donde lo fundamental es procurar el adecuado equilibrio entre estos y evitar una transgresión al contenido esencial de alguno de ellos, todo ello bajo la égida del principio general de que toda acción privada que dañe la moral o el orden público, o que perjudique a un tercero, está sujeta a la acción de la ley (artículo 28 de la Constitución Política).

Aclarado este punto, el discurrir de esta tesitura en el sub examine tomará en consideración varias de las recomendaciones del CLS; empero, de algunas se apartará la Sala, en la medida que constituyen soft law y dando razones fundadas para ello. En este sentido, en tanto soft law, las referidas recomendaciones devienen adecuadas para desarrollar los contenidos de la Constitución, mas no para ir a contrapelo de estos, toda vez que, desde un punto de vista jerárquico positivo, evidentemente, las primeras no se pueden anteponer a los segundos, de plena naturaleza jurídico-positiva y vinculante (hard law).

• B)Segundo presupuesto: la delegación de la definición del concepto de servicio público en el legislador.

El numeral 61 de nuestra Constitución Política actualmente reza:

“ARTÍCULO 61.- Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y el de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia.” Este texto, que se ha mantenido invariable desde 1949, expresamente reconoce el derecho de los trabajadores (públicos y privados) a la huelga; empero, a la vez señala que aquel no es de carácter absoluto, toda vez que contempla una salvedad: los servicios públicos. A lo anterior se acompaña la disposición de que tanto la determinación de los servicios públicos como su regulación queda relegada al ámbito de la ley, quedando obligado el legislador a desautorizar todo acto de coacción o violencia.

Al respecto, es importante advertir que el artículo 61 supra mencionado es una replicación del contenido del ordinal 56 de la Constitución Política de 1871, que había sido introducido a través de una reforma parcial (ley n.º 24 de 2 de julio de 1943):

“ARTÍCULO 56.- Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia.” Ahora bien, de la lectura de las actas de la Constituyente de 1949 se colige que la regulación del derecho a la huelga de los trabajadores fue objeto de intensas discusiones en el seno de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. En concreto, los criterios expuestos por los Diputados se leen en las actas n°ˢ 122 y 123:

• 1)Acta n.º 122 de 3 de agosto de 1949:

“En relación con el artículo 56, la fracción Social Demócrata presentó moción para que se lea así:

“Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga, con el fin exclusivo de obtener y conservar beneficios económicos, sociales o profesionales, salvo en los servicios públicos”. [61] El señor MONTEALEGRE observó la conveniencia de mantener el concepto final del artículo 56, en el sentido de que las regulaciones que haga posteriormente la ley al derecho de huelga, deben desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia.

El Licenciado ESQUIVEL se pronunció en términos parecidos. Además sugirió decir, en lugar de servicios públicos, “servicios de utilidad pública”, expresión más correcta, ya que la primera se puede entender como los servicios que se prestan en las oficinas públicas.

El Diputado MONGE ALVAREZ acogió la sugerencia de don Edmundo Montealegre, pero no el cambio de expresiones apuntado por el segundo.

El Diputado TREJOS indicó la conveniencia de prohibir las huelgas en las labores agrícolas, dada la importancia vital de la producción agrícola de nuestro país. Una huelga en esta clase de labores puede traer como consecuencia la perdida de una o más cosechas, con los perjuicios consiguientes para la colectividad.

El Licenciado FACIO expresó que, sin perjuicio de que en el futuro se estudie con más cuidado el significado gramatical e ideológico, de los términos “servicios de utilidad pública”, delimitando los campos de cada uno de ellos, piensa que es mejor mantener la redacción original de la Constitución del 71 en esta materia. En Derecho Administrativo, son servicios públicos aquellas actividades, que, por su importancia y significado en la vida nacional, no pueden ser paralizadas, como la producción y distribución de energía eléctrica. En esa acepción amplia, quedan comprendidas las ramas básicas de la agricultura, en las que no es posible aceptar la huelga que venga a paralizarlas.

El Diputado ESQUIVEL aclaró que el principio de poner a salvo del derecho de paro o de huelga las actividades agrícolas fundamentales, lo establece nuestro Código de Trabajo en su artículo 369, inciso b). La explicación es fácil; siendo la agricultura la actividad fundamental del país, sobre la que gravita nuestra economía, no puede aceptarse una huelga que venga a paralizar actividades vitales para la nación. De ahí -continuó diciendo- que estamos en la obligación de erigir en norma constitucional la prohibición de huelgas en la agricultura. Añadió que la fórmula “servicios de utilidad pública” es más comprensiva que la de “servicios públicos”, que originalmente trae el artículo 56.

El Representante BAUDRIT SOLERA manifestó que juzgaba innecesario el distingo entre servicios públicos y servicios de utilidad pública, porque del Derecho de Trabajo tiene un concepto distinto de lo que en Derecho Administrativo se entiende por servicios públicos, que se refieren a todas aquellas actividades de interés público, estén o no en manos de la Administración Pública. Leyó al efecto párrafos de Castorena Cabanellas, y Francisco Walter Linares. Agregó que el Proyecto del 49 iba más allá en esta materia. Expresamente excluía la huelga sólo respecto de los servidores públicos. Luego se refirió al estudio del Licenciado Otto Fallas, profesor de Derecho de Trabajo en nuestra Escuela de Derecho, estudio que ha venido citando en ocasiones anteriores. Leyó lo que en relación con el artículo 56 de la Carta del 71 escribió el mencionado catedrático de Derecho de Trabajo. En cuanto a la prohibición de las huelgas en las labores agrícolas, se manifestó en desacuerdo ya que ciertas actividades agrícolas pueden ser de interés público pero otras no. Si en las primeras está prohibida la huelga no existe razón alguna para extender esa prohibición a las segundas.

El Diputado ESQUIVEL de nuevo intervino en el debate. Explicó que las razones del señor Baudrit Solera le venían a dar la razón, ya que servicios públicos es una cosa para el Derecho Administrativo y otra para el Derecho de Trabajo. Es mejor entonces, acoger el término que luego no se preste a torcidas interpretaciones. Todos entienden el concepto de servicios de utilidad pública.

El Diputado MONGE ALVAREZ expresó que no era por el camino de las restricciones que se pueden detener las huelgas. Es necesario ir a sus causas, terminar con una serie de injusticias sociales. Quienes pretenden detener las huelgas por el sistema de las restricciones ignoran que son un fenómeno social que obedece a muchas causas complejas. El derecho a la huelga es una de las conquistas fundamentales alcanzadas por los trabajadores, después de luchas cruentas. La moción del señor Esquivel -añadió luego- representa un cercenamiento a ese derecho de la clase trabajadora ya que prohíbe las huelgas en servicios de utilidad pública y en las labores agrícolas.

El Licenciado ESQUIVEL aclaró que no estaba introduciendo principios nuevos en el texto constitucional que cercenen o restrinjan el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores. Está simplemente llevando a la Constitución limitaciones que ya constan en el Código de Trabajo, que prohíbe las huelgas en las labores agrícolas. No lo mueve en ninguna forma el interés mezquino de coartarles, a los trabajadores, un derecho, sino el patriótico de salvaguardar la economía del país, que se perjudicará enormemente con la huelga en las actividades fundamentales de la agricultura. En cuanto a los servicios de utilidad pública, tan sólo pretende decir claramente lo que nuestra Constitución del 71, en su artículo 56, dice en una forma ambigua.

El Diputado ZELEDON indicó que él entendía que la huelga se producía, una vez agotados los recursos legales para alcanzar una solución pacífica y justa del problema. Piensa que debe decirse en el texto constitucional que se garantiza el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores, pero una vez que se hayan agotado todos los recursos y medios legales para solucionar pacíficamente el conflicto planteado.

Sometida a votación la moción Social Demócrata, fue desechada.

Se entró a discutir luego la moción del Licenciado ESQUIVEL, que dice:

“Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en las labores agrícolas y en los servicios de utilidad pública, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o violencia”. [61] El Diputado HERRERO manifestó que la prohibición de las huelgas en las labores agrícolas va en beneficio de todos los costarricenses sin distingos de ninguna clase.

El Representante MONGE ALVAREZ insistió en que la moción en debate representaba una violación de la garantía del artículo 56. Recordó que la Asamblea, en cierta forma se había comprometido a no cercenar ninguna de las garantías sociales del texto constitucional del 71. La moción de Esquivel prácticamente acaba con el derecho de huelga logrado por los trabajadores después de las más trágicas luchas de la historia. No debe olvidarse que la gran mayoría de los trabajadores del país son agrícolas. Si se les restringe el derecho de ir a la huelga, se les estará cercenando uno de sus derechos básicos. De hecho pues, se está prohibiendo ese derecho a la mayoría de los trabajadores costarricenses. Agregó que en la zona bananera existen muchas actividades que bien pueden paralizarse mediante una huelga. De pasar la moción en debate, los trabajadores de esa zona no podrán ir a la huelga en casos justificados. Insistió nuevamente en que no era por el camino de las restricciones como se puede terminar con el fenómeno social de las huelgas, aun cuando expresamente se prohíban en determinadas actividades, como fenómenos sociales que son, en cualquier momento pueden aparecer. En este sentido, citó las huelgas de la “Northern” y del “Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico”. De acuerdo con nuestras leyes, ambas huelgas estaban prohibidas. Sin embargo, como obedecían a causas justas, no se las pudo detener. Las huelgas no se pueden acabar llevando las prohibiciones a la Constitución. Sólo se acabarán cuando se hayan solucionado los problemas que las motivan.

El señor MONTEALEGRE indicó que en sus largos años que ha pasado dedicado a la agricultura, nunca ha presenciado una huelga en el campo. Personalmente -dijo- sólo he asistido a una huelga: la de brazos caídos. En esa oportunidad cerramos las lecherías. Sin embargo, la leche la distribuíamos gratuitamente a las familias pobres y a las instituciones de beneficencia.

El Diputado CHACON manifestó que había votado la moción anterior desechada, pero no votará la que está en debate, que prácticamente viene a suprimir una garantía social. Si se prohíbe ir a la huelga a los trabajadores agrícolas, que en Costa Rica son la gran mayoría, quiere decir que el derecho de huelga habrá desaparecido en Costa Rica. (…) Consideró también muy amplio el término “servicios de utilidad pública”. Prefiere que se mantenga el texto original del artículo 56.

(…)

Los Representantes LEIVA y BAUDRIT SOLERA expusieron las razones que los llevan a no votar la moción del Licenciado Esquivel. El primero indicó que había votado la anterior desechada por considerarla más justa. Agregó que llevar a la Constitución la prohibición de ir a la huelga a los trabajadores del campo, es retroceder notablemente en esta materia. (…) El segundo, -señor Baudrit Solera- expresó que votaría la moción si de la misma se excluye la prohibición en cuanto a los trabajadores agrícolas. No hay razón alguna para quitarle a un gran sector de los trabajadores del país el derecho de ir a la huelga en casos determinados. Cuando la actividad agrícola es realmente de interés público, se proscribe por nuestra legislación de trabajo, el derecho a la huelga en tales actividades. Añadió que a la gran masa de trabajadores campesinos se les está privando del medio, de defender sus conquistas económicas y sociales. Evidentemente tal cosa significa un retroceso inexplicable en esta materia pues en general, los países civilizados del mundo han otorgado a los trabajadores el derecho fundamental de la huelga, derecho que han ganado después de una larga y penosa lucha. En la cuarta conferencia de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo, celebrada hace muy pocas semanas en Río de Janeiro, se estableció que debe equipararse el trabajador agrícola a los otros trabajadores en sus derechos, Eso se dijo y se acordó en la mencionada conferencia con el voto de nuestros delegados. Sin embargo, en la Asamblea Constituyente de Costa Rica, poco después, se intenta un retroceso de verdad inexplicable. En lo demás el exponente se refirió de nuevo a lo que antes expuso sobre servicios públicos.

El Diputado FACIO manifestó que aún cuando se prohibieran las huelgas, éstas no desaparecerían. Si se autorizan, tampoco por ello se van a multiplicar. Pensar de ese modo es ignorar que las huelgas son fenómenos sociales, ajenos a la Constitución o a las leyes, producto de situaciones de hecho. Las huelgas deben admitirse con valor como una característica de los tiempos económicos actuales. Prohibir el derecho de huelga en una Constitución es tarea fácil, pero inocua, ya que el problema social que la huelga representa y que la produce, no se habrá solucionado en ninguna forma. Agregó que sobre este tema se había discutido mucho en el seno de la Comisión Redactora del Proyecto del cuarenta y nueve. En un primer momento se adoptó el principio del derecho de huelga sin limitaciones, como un recurso valedero para todos los trabajadores del país, pero una vez agotados determinados trámites rigurosos de solución pacífica. Sin embargo, posteriormente la Comisión alteró su parecer, prohibiendo el derecho a la huelga en los servicios públicos muy calificados, sistema muy usual en la legislación de trabajo de los países latinoamericanos y finalmente hemos vuelto al texto de la Constitución del 71, que resume el mismo principio. Luego el señor Facio hizo un llamado a sus compañeros de la Cámara para que se mantenga inalterable el derecho de huelga, tal y como lo consigna la garantía del artículo 56 porque con ello estaría diciéndole la Asamblea Constituyente al país, que las Garantías Sociales, promulgadas por Calderón con propósitos determinados que todos conocemos y con independencia de ese origen, son garantías a las que todo trabajador costarricense es acreedor, y que la antigua Oposición viene a purificar, haciéndola suya esa tesis. (…)

El Representante HERRERO expresó que iba a votar la moción en debate, sin pensar en cercenar un derecho a los trabajadores. Sin embargo, en obsequio de su sinceridad y buena fe, sugiere al proponente que retire de la misma la prohibición referente a la huelga en las labores agrícolas.

El señor ESQUIVEL accedió a retirar esa parte de su moción, pero no sin antes dejar constancia de lo ruinoso y deplorable que sería para la economía del país una huelga en las actividades agrícolas. Mi moción -dijo- tendía a evitarle al país daños mayores en el futuro. La actividad fundamental de la nación es la agricultura, sobre la que descansa nuestra maltrecha economía. Si una huelga en el futuro afecta las actividades agrícolas, los daños serían incalculables. Sólo pretendía con mi moción evitarle al país semejante situación.

El Diputado MORUA indicó que había votado la moción desechada. No pensaba votar la del señor Esquivel por cuanto mantenía la prohibición de ir a la huelga a los trabajadores agrícolas, con lo que se privaba a los trabajadores de la Bananera de ese legítimo derecho.

El señor ACOSTA JIMENEZ apuntó que habiendo retirado el proponente la prohibición de la huelga en las labores agrícolas, las palabras sobraban, (…) Añadió luego que tal como estaba el artículo 56 de la Carta del 71, cuando al país se le presenten movimientos huelguísticos, se pueden solucionar. Está con el mantenimiento del derecho de huelga, porque no sería justo privarles a los trabajadores de ciertas corporaciones extranjeras que se han llevado y se llevan millones de dólares del país, ir a la huelga para mejorar sus condiciones sociales y económicas. Además, al proceder de este modo, es consecuente con sus ideas anteriores, cuando propuso que el capítulo de las Garantías Sociales se discutiera artículo por artículo, sin menoscabar ninguna garantía.

El Diputado GAMBOA declaró que no votaría la moción en debate, pues se queda con el texto del artículo 56. El término “servicios de utilidad pública” lo considera demasiado amplio. El día de mañana se pueden considerar una serie de actividades agrícolas e industriales como de utilidad pública. Es dejar la puerta abierta para cercenar el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores.

Sometida a votación la moción del señor Esquivel, con la enmienda apuntada, se aprobó. En consecuencia el artículo de la nueva Constitución se leerá:

“Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios de utilidad pública, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia”. [61]” 2) Acta n.° 123 de 4 de agosto de 1949:

“(…)

Artículo 4º.- Se continuó en la discusión del capítulo de las Garantías Sociales de la Constitución del 71.

El Representante ARROYO presentó moción de revisión del artículo aprobado ayer en relación con el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores y patronos. De prosperar la revisión, hace moción para que el artículo respectivo se lea así:

“Se garantiza el derecho de huelga a los trabajadores y de paro a los patronos, con el fin exclusivo de obtener y conservar beneficios económicos, sociales o profesionales, salvo en los servicios públicos. Para el ejercicio de este derecho existirá una reglamentación especial que asegure un período conciliatorio. Queda terminantemente prohibido el ejercicio de violencia o coacción como medio de impulsar, mantener o paralizar los movimientos de huelga o paro”. [61] El proponente indicó que la fórmula aprobada en la sesión anterior representada un cercenamiento del derecho de huelga. En el futuro un Congreso puede interpretar en una forma muy amplia los alcances del término “servicios de utilidad pública”, menoscabando el derecho de huelga. Se puede hasta llegar a decir que un contrato bananero, por ejemplo, es de utilidad pública, para poner a la empresa al margen de movimientos huelguísticos.

El Licenciado ESQUIVEL expresó que la única variante de su moción aprobada con respecto al artículo 56 de la Carta 71, que tanto parece haber preocupado al Representante de la Rerum Novarum, señor Arroyo, es la que se refiere a la incorporación del concepto: “servicios de utilidad pública” en lugar de “servicios públicos”, que es mucho más compresivo. Precisamente el Código de Trabajo da ese significado al término “servicios públicos”. Agregó que su actitud no obedecía al deseo de cercenar un derecho a los trabajadores, ni a hacer ilusoria una garantía social. Se ha ceñido a lo que en esta materia trae el Código de Trabajo, el cual dentro del término “servicios públicos” incluye una serie de actividades fundamentales, que no pueden ser afectadas por una huelga. Esas actividades de manifiesto interés público- como la producción y distribución de energía eléctrica- deben ponerse al margen de una huelga, no para estrujar a los trabajadores, sino en beneficio de la sociedad en general. Insistió en que su intención no fue la de coartar un derecho a los trabajadores, sino la de buscar el justo medio, evitando así a la colectividad los peligros de una huelga indiscriminada.

El Diputado MONGE ALVAREZ manifestó la complacencia al enterarse de que el compañero Arroyo ha presentado una moción de revisión sobre lo acordado en la sesión anterior respecto al derecho de huelga, consagrado en todas las Constituciones de los países más adelantados. Agregó luego que había buscado en los libros de los tratadistas de derecho de trabajo, los alcances de la acepción “servicios de utilidad pública”. Sin embargo, ninguno de los tratadistas a quienes consultó se refiere a ese término. Todos hablan de “servicios públicos”, en los que están prohibidas las huelgas. Además el término aprobado de la moción del señor Esquivel es demasiado amplio, comprende prácticamente todas las actividades económicas del país, ya que todas son de evidente utilidad pública. Indicó después lo que en la sesión anterior expuso, esto es, que no es por el camino de las restricciones como se puede acabar con el fenómeno social de las huelgas.

El Diputado VARGAS VARGAS declaró que deliberadamente no había querido participar en el debate. En la sesión anterior no votó la moción del compañero Monge Álvarez, por cuanto la huelga reciente del Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico -que él había apoyado y defendido- demostró la injusticia de prohibirles a los trabajadores de servicios públicos ir a la huelga, cuando los motivos eran justos. Luego leyó respecto a las limitaciones al derecho de huelga, algunos conceptos del tratadista de la materia. Dr. Carlos García Oviedo, catedrático de la Universidad de Sevilla. Añadió que votaría la moción planteada que se ajusta a una realidad. Caso de no prosperar la moción del señor Arroyo, está de acuerdo en que se mantenga el artículo 56 íntegro.

El Diputado BRENES GUTIERREZ, manifestó que estaba con la tesis del señor Esquivel, que se ajusta en un todo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 369 del Código de Trabajo. El término aprobado “servicios de utilidad pública” es el que conviene y opina que no perjudica en nada a los trabajadores.

El Licenciado GAMBOA indicó que votaría la revisión, pues considera que de mantenerse la fórmula aprobada en la sesión anterior, el derecho de huelga está amenazado de muerte. Mañana, para evitar un movimiento huelguístico en determinada industria, se dirá que es de utilidad pública. Lo mismo podría ocurrir respecto de cualquier contratación bananera. En la Constitución debe establecerse en una forma que no se preste a dudas o a malas interpretaciones, el derecho legítimo de los trabajadores a la huelga.

Sometida a votación la revisión, fue aprobada.

Se entró a discutir luego la moción de fondo del señor Arroyo.

El Diputado HERRERO observó que en esta materia ocurre que los problemas de cada uno de los países son distintos. En países altamente industriales las huelgas en los servicios públicos -por ejemplo, en los transportes- son las más perjudiciales. Sucede lo contrario en países pequeños como Costa Rica, donde los servicios de utilidad pública son los de mayor importancia. Agregó que lo más conveniente era acoger la redacción del artículo 56 de la Constitución del 71, para evitar un largo debate.

El Representante ROJAS VARGAS se manifestó de acuerdo con la moción del señor Arroyo, más justa que la fórmula aprobada ayer. Además fortalece y vigoriza el derecho de huelga restringiendo tan solo a los servicios públicos.

En materia de restricciones es preciso emplear los términos más concretos y exactos. El término “servicios públicos” es menos extenso que el de “servicios de utilidad pública”. O para decirlo en otras palabras, el segundo incluye al primero. Agregó que el derecho de huelga debe mantenerse, ojalá con el menor número de restricciones.

El Diputado SOLORZANO también se manifestó de acuerdo con la moción en debate. Expresó que por más esfuerzos de dialéctica que se hagan no lo convencen de que el término “servicios de utilidad pública” sea más expresivo que el de “servicios públicos”. Con la fórmula aprobada se garantiza el derecho de huelga y al mismo tiempo se deja en el aire. Por otra parte, se abre una puerta muy ancha para que los Congresos del futuro anulen ese derecho de la clase trabajadora.

El señor CASTRO SIBAJA manifestó que, caso de no aprobarse la moción del señor Arroyo, ha presentado a la Mesa una para que se mantenga la redacción original del artículo 56. Añadió que le parecía reglamentaria la inclusión en el texto constitucional del período conciliatorio antes de llegar a la huelga. Tal eventualidad la contempla nuestra legislación sobre la materia.

El Licenciado BAUDRIT SOLERA expresó que mantenía el criterio expuesto en la sesión anterior en cuanto a que la fórmula aprobada no introduce ninguna variación fundamental a la Constitución del 71 en materia de derecho a la huelga. Estima que más bien se amplía tal derecho, pues entre los servicios públicos hay algunos que son de interés público, pero otros no. El término aprobado lo sigue considerando más adecuado por las razones expuestas en la sesión anterior. De todos modos -agregó- lo fundamental es que el legislador va a definir qué son servicios públicos y qué son servicios de utilidad pública. La composición ideológica de la Asamblea Legislativa llevará a la restricción o a la ampliación el término. La ley vendrá a ser el reflejo de la integración de la Asamblea. Si esta se inclina a la izquierda, los servicios públicos serán pocos. Si por el contrario, tiende a la derecha serán muchos. Por esas razones y dado que hay empeño manifiesto en ello, aun se mantiene firme en su criterio, votará la moción del compañero Castro Sibaja para volver a la redacción del artículo 56 de la Carta de 1871.

El Diputado ZELEDON observó que la moción del señor Arroyo satisfacía en todo sus anhelos en la sesión anterior, razón por la cual le daría su voto.

El Diputado CHACON JINESTA se refirió brevemente al asunto en discusión. Empezó diciendo que la fórmula aprobada en la sesión anterior prácticamente liquidaba el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores. En Costa Rica la gran mayoría de los trabajadores son de la agricultura, cuyas ramas evidentemente son de utilidad pública. De mantenerse este concepto, es lógico que el derecho de huelga habrá desaparecido de nuestra legislación. Estima más prudente mantener la redacción original del texto del 71, por lo que sugiere al compañero Arroyo que retire su moción para darle curso a la de Castro Sibaja. El proponente acordó retirar su moción.

Sometida a votación la moción del Diputado Castro Sibaja para que se conserve el artículo 56 tal y como está, fue aprobada.

En consecuencia el artículo 56 de la nueva Constitución se leerá así:

“Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia”. [61] Del análisis de los argumentos de los Diputados se extrae una serie de elementos útiles para definir los alcances que el Constituyente le dio al numeral 61 de la Constitución Política en relación con el concepto de “servicios públicos”. Precisamente, durante la discusión de las mociones relativas a la norma de marras, surgieron argumentos favorables y contrarios a utilizar los conceptos de “servicios públicos” o de “servicios de utilidad pública”, los cuales para mayor claridad se exponen de forma puntual.

• 1)La primera moción del 3 de agosto de 1949 que buscó modificar el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política de 1871 fue desechada; no obstante, durante su discusión surgieron varios elementos relacionados con la referencia que se hizo a “servicios públicos”:

El Diputado Esquivel propuso cambiar ese término por “servicios de utilidad pública”, ya que, según su criterio, este era más correcto y, además, por servicios públicos se podían entender los que prestaban las oficinas públicas.

Los Diputados Facio y Baudrit procuraron dar algún tipo de definición a “servicios públicos”. El primero los conceptualizó como aquellas actividades que, por su importancia y significado en la vida nacional, no podían ser paralizadas, como la producción y distribución de energía eléctrica, y las ramas básicas de la agricultura en una acepción amplia. El segundo señaló que se referían a todas aquellas actividades de interés público, estuvieren o no en manos de la Administración Pública. En relación con su definición, el Diputado Facio consideró que era mejor mantener la redacción de la Constitución de 1871.

• 2)La segunda moción del 3 de agosto de 1949, esta vez formulada por el Diputado Esquivel, sugirió que se modificara la norma en los siguientes términos: “Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en las labores agrícolas y en los servicios de utilidad pública, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o violencia”. Debido a lo anterior, acerca de los servicios de utilidad pública y los servicios públicos, los constituyentes se pronunciaron de esta manera:

Los Diputados Chacón y Gamboa manifestaron que el término “servicios de utilidad pública” era muy amplio y preferían el texto original del numeral 56. Precisamente, el Diputado Gamboa aclaró que con el término “servicios de utilidad pública” podría significar una serie de actividades agrícolas dentro de esa categoría.

El Diputado Facio se expresó en los siguientes términos: “sobre este tema se había discutido mucho en el seno de la Comisión Redactora del Proyecto del cuarenta y nueve. En un primer momento se adoptó el principio del derecho de huelga sin limitaciones, como un recurso valedero para todos los trabajadores del país, pero una vez agotados determinados trámites rigurosos de solución pacífica. Sin embargo, posteriormente la Comisión alteró su parecer, prohibiendo el derecho a la huelga en los servicios públicos muy calificados, sistema muy usual en la legislación de trabajo de los países latinoamericanos y finalmente hemos vuelto al texto de la Constitución del 71, que resume el mismo principio”.

El Diputado Baudrit Solera nuevamente señaló lo que ya había expuesto sobre servicios públicos.

Finalmente, previo retiro del Diputado Esquivel de la parte de su moción referida a las labores agrícolas, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente aprobó que el artículo de la siguiente manera: “Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios de utilidad pública, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia”.

• 3)El 4 de agosto de 1949 se interpuso una moción de revisión del numeral aprobado el día anterior y, de prosperar la revisión, se propuso otra moción para que el artículo se leyera: “Se garantiza el derecho de huelga a los trabajadores y de paro a los patronos, con el fin exclusivo de obtener y conservar beneficios económicos, sociales o profesionales, salvo en los servicios públicos. Para el ejercicio de este derecho existirá una reglamentación especial que asegure un período conciliatorio. Queda terminantemente prohibido el ejercicio de violencia o coacción como medio de impulsar, mantener o paralizar los movimientos de huelga o paro”. En ese momento se discutió de esta forma:

El Diputado Arroyo, quien fue el proponente, consideró que el Congreso podía interpretar en una forma muy amplia los alcances del término “servicios de utilidad pública”, lo que menoscababa el derecho de huelga y, además, manifestó que con lo anterior se podía llegar a decir que hasta un contrato bananero era de utilidad pública.

El Diputado Esquivel refirió que el Código de Trabajo daba significado al término “servicios públicos”, el cual incluía una serie de actividades fundamentales de manifiesto interés público- como la producción y distribución de energía eléctrica-, no para “estrujar” a los trabajadores, sino en beneficio de la sociedad en general.

El Diputado Monge Álvarez manifestó que, luego de haber buscado en los libros de los tratadistas de derecho de trabajo los alcances de la acepción “servicios de utilidad pública”, ninguno se refería a ese término, sino que todos hablaban de “servicios públicos”, en los que estaban prohibidas las huelgas; además, consideró que el término (haciendo referencia a servicios de utilidad pública) era demasiado amplio y comprendía prácticamente todas las actividades económicas del país, ya que todas eran de evidente utilidad pública.

El Diputado Vargas Vargas estaba de acuerdo, si no se aprobaba la moción planteada, con que se mantuviera el artículo 56 íntegro.

El Diputado Gamboa señaló que el derecho de huelga estaba “amenazado de muerte”, pues evitarían movimientos de esa naturaleza en una industria si esta se calificaba de utilidad pública, lo cual podría ocurrir con cualquier contratación bananera, por lo que en una Constitución debía establecerse alguna forma que no se prestase a dudas.

La moción de revisión fue aprobada.

• 4)El 4 de agosto de 2019 (sic) [1949] se conoció la moción de fondo del Diputado Arroyo, para lo cual, de relevancia, se debatió lo siguiente:

El Diputado Herrero expuso que en Costa Rica los servicios de utilidad pública eran los de mayor importancia y que lo más conveniente era acoger la redacción del artículo 56 de la Constitución de 1871 para evitar un largo debate.

El Diputado Rojas Vargas consideró que se fortalecía y vigorizaba el derecho de huelga al limitar tan solo los servicios públicos; asimismo, argumentó que en materia de restricciones era preciso emplear los términos más concretos y exactos. Señaló que “servicios públicos” era menos extenso que el de “servicios de utilidad pública”, y que el último incluía al primero. Agregó que el derecho de huelga debía mantenerse, ojalá con el menor número de restricciones.

El Diputado Solórzano expresó que no lo convencían de que el término “servicios de utilidad pública” fuese más expresivo que el de “servicios públicos”, y que con el primero se abría una puerta muy ancha para que los Congresos del futuro anularan el derecho a la huelga de la clase trabajadora.

El Diputado Baudrit Solera sostuvo que mantenía el criterio expuesto en la sesión anterior, en cuanto a que la fórmula aprobada no introducía ninguna variación fundamental a la Constitución de 1871 en materia de derecho a la huelga, sino que más bien ampliaba ese derecho, pues entre los servicios públicos hay algunos que son de interés público y otros no; agregó: “lo fundamental es que el legislador va a definir qué son servicios públicos y qué son servicios de utilidad pública. La composición ideológica de la Asamblea Legislativa llevará a la restricción o a la ampliación el término. La ley vendrá a ser el reflejo de la integración de la Asamblea. Si esta se inclina a la izquierda, los servicios públicos serán pocos. Si por el contrario, tiende a la derecha serán muchos. Por esas razones y dado que hay empeño manifiesto en ello, aun se mantiene firme en su criterio, votará la moción del compañero Castro Sibaja para volver a la redacción del artículo 56 de la Carta de 1871”.

El Diputado Chacón Jinesta refirió que la fórmula aprobada en la sesión anterior prácticamente liquidaba el derecho de huelga de los trabajadores; expuso que, en Costa Rica, la gran mayoría de los trabajadores son de la agricultura, cuyas ramas evidentemente eran de utilidad pública, por lo que de mantenerse este concepto, el derecho a la huelga desaparecería; finalmente, consideró más prudente mantener la redacción original del texto de 1871 y sugirió a Arroyo el retiro de su moción para darle curso a la de Castro Sibaja.

El Diputado Arroyo aceptó retirar su moción.

• 5)Finalmente, el 4 de agosto de 1949 se aprobó la moción del Diputado Castro Sibaja para que se conservara el artículo 56 de la Carta de 1871, tal y como estaba: “Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y de los trabajadores a la huelga salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia”.

Así las cosas, del estudio de las actas no se desprende alguna discusión propiamente de la moción del Diputado Castro Sibaja, quien propuso que se mantuviera la redacción original del artículo 56 de la Constitución de 1871[5], sino, únicamente, varias manifestaciones aisladas de Diputados que, durante el debate de otras mociones, consideraron más conveniente volver a la redacción original. Ahora, de lo expuesto por los Constituyentes también se observa que reconsideraron acudir al término “servicios de utilidad pública”, inicialmente aprobado, porque lo estimaron demasiado amplio, de manera que, finalmente, lo sustituyeron por la noción de “servicio público”, tenida como más ajustada. Sin embargo, no menos cierto es que no se llegó a algún consenso claro sobre el sentido jurídico o político de tal concepto y, más bien, la decisión final consistió en mantener lo normado en la Constitución Política de 1871, precisamente la propuesta del Constituyente Castro Sibaja.

Lo anterior es digno de destacar pues en el marco de esta replicación del ordinal 56 de la Constitución Política de 1871 (ley n.º 24 de 2 de julio de 1943) en el artículo 61 de la Ley Fundamental vigente, uno de los Constituyentes hizo referencia directa a que el término “servicios públicos” estaba definido en el Código de Trabajo (ley n.º 2 de 27 de agosto de 1943). En ese sentido, tanto la reforma parcial de la Constitución Política de 1871 como el Código de Trabajo fueron aprobados por el mismo Congreso Constitucional de Costa Rica con menos de dos meses de diferencia: de primero, la reforma constitucional que consignó el derecho a la huelga y su respectiva salvedad (servicios públicos según la regulación legal); y de segundo, el Código de Trabajo que estableció una lista de servicios públicos en los que no era permitida la huelga. Concerniente a lo anterior, el Código de Trabajo, al momento de su emisión, también consignaba como servicios públicos algunos prestados por sujetos particulares (verbigracia, empresas particulares relacionadas con clínicas, hospitales, higiene, aseo y alumbrado en las poblaciones). De ahí se infiere que el Constituyente del 49 no se decantó por la naturaleza pública de la entidad encargada de la prestación -elemento subjetivo- para definir “servicio público”, sino que, con independencia de su titularidad, subrayó la relevancia de la actividad para la colectividad; es decir, acudió a un elemento objetivo.

Dentro de este contexto, se concluye que la referencia a “servicio público” del ordinal 61 constitucional no partió de un concepto dogmático preciso y cerrado, sino que, en realidad, se optó por mantener la noción de la Constitución de 1871, la cual se entiende en función del momento histórico de su aprobación en julio de 1943 y de su vínculo político irrefutable con la noción de servicio público del Código de Trabajo pocos meses después, en agosto de ese mismo año, que comprendía la actividad de interés general y de particular trascendencia para la sociedad. Tal situación deja entrever, además, que el Constituyente dejó el establecimiento de ejemplos concretos de servicio público al parlamentario ordinario en atención al derecho a la libre configuración legislativa. Como consigna el Diputado Baudrit Solera: “De todos modos -agregó- lo fundamental es que el legislador va a definir qué son servicios públicos y qué son servicios de utilidad pública”.

Ahora, resulta claro que la referida libertad de configuración debe desarrollarse con pleno respeto de los parámetros básicos derivados de la jurisprudencia constitucional. Justamente, en la sentencia n.º 1998-01317 de las 10:12 horas de 27 de febrero de 1998, este Tribunal señaló, en cuanto al artículo 61 de la Constitución Política y su concepción de servicios públicos, lo siguiente:

“VI.- DEL DERECHO DE SINDICACIÓN EN LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS.- (…) En relación con el contenido de la acción sindical, específicamente lo que toca al derecho de huelga, el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política establece que la regulación del citado derecho de acción colectiva es materia de reserva de ley, siendo que toda restricción del citado derecho debe darse por vía ley y de ningún modo puede favorecer los actos de coacción o violencia. Es además resultado de la atribución conferida mediante el numeral 61 constitucional citado, que compete al legislador definir en qué casos de la actividad pública se restringe o excluye el ejercicio del derecho de huelga; mandato que se satisface mediante el artículo 375 (antes, 368) del Código de Trabajo, que debe ajustarse a los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad para que sea congruente con el principio democrático sobre el que descansa el ordenamiento jurídico patrio, plasmado en el artículo 1° de la Constitución Política y que es valor supremo del Estado Constitucional de Derecho.

VII.- DE LA ALEGADA INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL ARTÍCULO 375 (antes, 368) DEL CODIGO DE TRABAJO QUE EXCLUYE EL EJERCICIO DEL DERECHO DE HUELGA A LOS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS. La huelga, como manifestación de la acción sindical, encuentra límite cuando su ejercicio interfiere con la prestación de ciertos servicios públicos, que compete a la ley determinar según el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política. Al efecto, la frase primera del artículo 375 (antes, 368) del Código de Trabajo, que dice: “No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos.(…)”, si bien pareciera proscribir la huelga en estos servicios, es decir, si bien pareciera tener un sentido impeditivo absoluto, lo cierto es que debe entenderse en armonía con lo dispuesto en el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política, que sólo la limita para ciertos casos fijados o determinados por la ley en observancia de criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, para que resulte congruente con el fin que persigue. Este artículo 375 (antes, 368) cuestionado, armoniza también con el artículo 8° del Convenio 87 de la O.I.T. que - como se transcribió en el Considerando III. -, estatuye la obligación de las organizaciones sindicales de adecuar su actividad a la legislación interna. En otras palabras, si bien la huelga es un derecho de todos, ejercitable en cualquier actividad, es viable que el legislador determine en qué casos el derecho de huelga no puede ejercitarse, específicamente cuando se trate de actividades que constituyen “servicios públicos” y que por su naturaleza o por el impacto social que tienen, no sea posible suspenderlos, descontinuarlos o paralizarlos sin causar daño significativo, grave e inmediato a ciertos bienes. Además, se entiende que en aquellas actividades públicas dentro de las que sí está permitida la huelga, no pueden sobrepasarse los límites legales fijados, pues el ejercicio de la huelga debe enmarcarse dentro de la legalidad. Con base en lo expuesto, no encuentra esta Sala que el artículo cuestionado 375 (antes, 368), al disponer: “No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos…”, exceda por sí solo los límites que establece la Constitución o los convenios internacionales. En síntesis, el artículo 375 (antes, 368) cuestionado no es en sí mismo inconstitucional y el análisis de inconstitucionalidad ha de desplazarse a los casos fijados por la ley en que el efecto impeditivo, en los servicios públicos, se produzca. Consecuente con lo expuesto, procede declarar sin lugar la acción en cuanto a este extremo.

VIII.- DE LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL DERECHO DE HUELGA EN EL SECTOR AGRÍCOLA.- Se irá ahora a analizar los motivos de inconstitucionalidad que exponen los accionantes en relación -en primer término- con la prohibición del derecho de huelga que dispone el Código de Trabajo para el sector agrícola en su artículo 376 inciso b)(antes, 369 inciso b). Tal y como se expuso en el considerando V, por Convenio 11 de la O.I.T. se dotó de contenido a la libertad de sindicación del sector agrícola para garantizar a esta parte de la población el libre ejercicio del derecho de sindicación en paridad de situación con el sector industrial, a través de los instrumentos de presión aceptados para la prosecución de sus fines, específicamente mediante el ejercicio del derecho de huelga. Es evidente, a juicio de la Sala, que el artículo 376 (antes 369) hace una torpe enunciación de lo que preceptivamente ha de entenderse por “servicios públicos”, al menos en cuanto incluye dentro de este concepto la actividad que despliegan los trabajadores ocupados en la siembra, cultivo, atención o recolección de productos agrícolas, pecuarios o forestales; pues no encuadran esas tareas en la noción generalmente admitida de servicio público. Sin pretender agotar la definición de lo que es el servicio público como instituto jurídico, debe tenerse presente para efectos de esta sentencia, que el servicio público debe al menos estar dirigido a satisfacer necesidades colectivas y se trata de prestaciones positivas de la Administración o que están bajo cierto control y regulación de ésta. La prohibición del ejercicio de la huelga en actividades que no son servicio público, excede el artículo 61 constitucional que ordena al legislador establecer las actividades en que se restringe el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos únicamente. De lo anterior se infiere que al identificar el legislador - en el inciso b) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo-, a la actividad agrícola con el servicio público, incurre en arbitrariedad, pues tal inclusión no tiene fundamento jurídico y trae aparejado la negación del ejercicio del derecho de huelga en el citado sector; lo que resulta además contrario al reconocido propósito del convenio internacional N°11 de la O.I.T., de garantizar al sector agrícola el pleno ejercicio del derecho de sindicación y sus consecuencias. Con base en los motivos señalados, procede declarar con lugar la acción en este extremo, y en consecuencia debe anularse el inciso b) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo.

IX.- DE LOS OTROS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS EN QUE SE EXCLUYE EL EJERCICIO DEL DERECHO DE HUELGA, QUE SEÑALA EL ARTICULO 376 (ANTES, 369) DEL CODIGO DE TRABAJO.- Del análisis hecho queda claro que la Constitución difiere a la ley enunciar en qué servicios públicos procede excluir o limitar el ejercicio del derecho de la huelga. Esto no tiene un efecto impeditivo absoluto, que proscriba de los servicios públicos el ejercicio del derecho de huelga. Por consiguiente, la ley debe discernir en qué casos ese ejercicio no es legítimo, tomando en cuenta la naturaleza de la prestación y los efectos que produciría la huelga en el ámbito de los derechos e intereses de los destinatarios o usuarios de dichos servicios. En tal caso, es viable limitar el ejercicio del derecho, lo que debe hacerse con aplicación de criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. La legislación laboral, que enumera en el artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo -transcrito en el Considerando II, en qué servicios públicos se excluye la huelga, a pesar de preceder a la Constitución, que data de 1949, no por ello la contradice. No obstante, como bien observan los accionantes y la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe, el artículo 376 (antes, 369) cuando en su inciso a) detalla los servicios públicos en que se excluye el ejercicio de la huelga, utiliza términos imprecisos que no facilitan distinguir a qué servicios públicos mínimos se refiere, al indicar: “Todos los que desempeñen los trabajadores del Estado o de sus instituciones…”. Es claro para este Tribunal que este enunciado no permite reconocer qué actividades públicas quedan excluidas del ejercicio del derecho de huelga; imprecisión que riñe con lo ordenado en el precepto 61 constitucional ya comentado, por lo que procede declararlo inconstitucional. En otro orden, el inciso c) del citado artículo 376 (antes, 369) sí define acertada y adecuadamente qué categorías de transporte público quedan limitadas en el ejercicio de la huelga; además, establece con claridad el límite al ejercicio del derecho de huelga de los trabajadores ocupados en labores de carga y descarga en muelles y atracaderos. Finalmente el inciso c) también fija límites al ejercicio del derecho de huelga en el caso de “los trabajadores en viaje de cualquier otra empresa particular de transporte”, lo que debe entenderse como la imposibilidad de ejercer el derecho de huelga en la prestación efectiva del servicio de transporte público terrestre. Por otro lado, el inciso d) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) establece parámetros que permiten limitar el ejercicio de la huelga en aquellos servicios que se tengan por absolutamente indispensables y cuya suspensión sea susceptible de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública. En efecto, en este aparte se enuncian o distinguen prestaciones con respecto a las cuales la huelga es susceptible de comprometer el bien jurídico de la salud y la economía, al incluir las que se brindan en las clínicas y hospitales, las que aluden a la higiene, al aseo y al alumbrado de las poblaciones. La ley en este caso define las pautas para establecer en qué casos es viable excluir el ejercicio del derecho de huelga, cuales son que debe tratarse de servicios públicos absolutamente indispensables y por otro lado, que sean susceptibles de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública; lineamientos que responden a los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales. En cuanto al inciso b) del artículo cuestionado - que excluye la huelga de la actividad agrícola -, este Tribunal remite a lo expuesto en el Considerando VIII. Finalmente, en relación con la norma contenida en el inciso e) del artículo impugnado, que autoriza al Poder Ejecutivo dictar en qué otras actividades públicas se prohíbe la huelga en la hipótesis de que la Asamblea Legislativa haya hecho uso de su facultad constitucional de suspender ciertas garantías individuales, esta Sala procede a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de tal atribución por exceder el principio de reserva de ley dispuesto en el numeral 61 constitucional, según el cual la atribución de establecer en qué prestaciones de servicio público debe limitarse el ejercicio del derecho de huelga, recae exclusivamente en el Poder Legislativo. En consecuencia, esta Sala procede a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de los incisos a) y e) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo. (…)”.

Corolario del razonamiento expuesto, por mandato constitucional goza el legislador de una amplia libertad de configuración para definir qué entiende por servicio público y cuáles son las limitaciones al ejercicio de la huelga en este. No obstante, tal tarea debe desarrollarse dentro del marco de constitucionalidad, por lo que, según la jurisprudencia de esta jurisdicción, al Poder Ejecutivo no se le puede asignar competencia alguna para definir en qué tipo de servicio público se debe impedir el ejercicio de la huelga; por cuanto tal función es exclusiva del Poder Legislativo. Asimismo, la libre configuración del legislador debe respetar el principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, para cuyos efectos deviene determinante la naturaleza del servicio público en cuestión o su particular impacto social, factores que justificarían impedir que aquel pudiere ser suspendido, descontinuado o paralizado, dado el daño significativo, grave e inmediato que ello acarrearía a ciertos bienes jurídicos de la salud, la vida, la seguridad o la economía pública. En adición, lo que el legislador defina como servicio público debe implicar la satisfacción de necesidades colectivas, así como estar referido a prestaciones positivas de la Administración o que se encuentren sometidas a un particular control por parte de aquella”.

• C)Constitucionalidad del artículo 376 del proyecto de ley consultado. (…)

Al respecto, conforme el punto A) de este considerando, observen los consultantes que las recomendaciones del CLS no son de acatamiento obligatorio, sino que son pautas de orientación, lo cual concuerda con el hecho de que no hay norma jurídica convencional que expresamente les confiera carácter vinculante a tales recomendaciones, tesitura avalada incluso por la Corte IDH en Baena Ricardo y otros vs. Panamá. Lo anterior no significa que esta Sala desconozca el valor jurídico y doctrinario de los pronunciamientos de los órganos de control de la OIT, cuya autoridad técnica e histórica les da un valor superior al de una recomendación de naturaleza puramente axiológica o teórica. Empero, tal reconocimiento no significa que la jurisdicción constitucional carezca de un margen de apreciación a la hora de aplicar control de constitucionalidad, toda vez que las referidas recomendaciones, como ya se indicó, no revisten cualidad vinculante, debe primar el hard law -la regulación constitucional vigente - sobre el soft law, y de manera equilibrada se deben resguardar los diversos bienes constitucionales en juego.

Por consiguiente, la noción de servicios esenciales, allende de la vida, salud y seguridad de la persona, puede abarcar la economía pública, cuando se trate de un servicio público absolutamente indispensable y susceptible de comprometer tal bien jurídico, como estableció esta Sala en la sentencia n.o 1998-01317 de las 10:12 horas de 27 de febrero de 1998.

Aclarado lo anterior, la duda ahora corresponde a si el Legislador puede aprobar una prohibición absoluta y general en un servicio público, o si debe ajustarse a un esquema de funcionamiento mínimo del servicio, como el regulado en el ordinal 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo vigente.

Al respecto, esta Sala considera que el Legislador, en el ejercicio de su libertad de configuración, puede establecer la prohibición absoluta y general de la huelga en los servicios públicos esenciales, siempre que esto no violente el principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Ahora, a los efectos de precisar los alcances de las potestades del legislador en tal materia, se debe considerar lo que la propia Constitución Política regula.

De este modo, de acuerdo con el numeral 61 de nuestra Constitución Política: Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y el de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia.” Esta norma es una replicación del ordinal 56 de la Constitución Política de 1871, conforme la reforma constitucional de 1943.

Según ya se dilucidó en el punto B) de este considerando, la referencia a “servicio público” del artículo 61 constitucional no partió de un concepto dogmático preciso y cerrado, sino que, en realidad, el Constituyente del 49 optó por mantener la noción del Congreso Constitucional de 1943 contenida en el numeral 56 de la Carta de 1871. Si se toma en consideración el momento histórico de la aprobación de esta norma en julio de 1943, se advierte con facilidad su vínculo político irrefutable con la noción de servicio público del Código de Trabajo pocos meses después, en agosto de ese mismo año. En lo concerniente a la huelga, esta última normativa liga el concepto de servicio público con la especial relevancia de la actividad para la colectividad; es decir, con un elemento objetivo. Por ello, desde el punto de vista de nuestra Ley Fundamental resulta plausible extender la noción de servicio público esencial a la vida, salud y seguridad de la persona, así como a la economía pública, siempre que se trate, como se indicó supra, de un servicio público absolutamente indispensable y susceptible de comprometer tal bien jurídico.

Justamente, esta particular incidencia en los mencionados bienes constitucionales justifica que el legislador opte por una prohibición absoluta de la huelga en los referidos servicios. Se trata de una alternativa que deviene razonable, en la que medida que el propio Constituyente optó por dos reglas: 1) reconocer el derecho de los patronos al paro y el de los trabajadores a la huelga, y 2) exceptuar de la regla anterior a los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con lo que el legislador determinase.

En tal sentido, no se puede considerar que reformar lo regulado en el Código de Trabajo vigente sea inconstitucional, puesto que, precisamente, el Constituyente le encomendó al legislador regular la huelga en los servicios públicos, para lo cual es del todo competente para formular las reformas legales correspondientes.

Límite de tal atribución es, entre otros, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad (voto 1998-01317), el cual en el sub lite no se observa violentado, puesto que, por un lado, la propia Constitución no rechaza la opción de que la huelga sea prohibida en los servicios públicos de particular relevancia (por el contrario, hace la salvedad de la huelga en los servicios públicos según criterio del legislador), y, por otro, las consultantes no desarrollan alguna argumentación técnica, precisa y sólidamente sustentada, ni mucho menos algún test jurídico de razonabilidad, como para que este Tribunal considere al listado de servicios públicos esenciales regulado en el artículo 376 del proyecto de ley, como carente de una relevante incidencia e impacto social, de modo que su suspensión no venga a causar un daño significativo, grave e inmediato en la salud, la vida, la seguridad o la economía pública. En tal definición, el juez constitucional debe aplicar autocontención, dado el amplio margen de apreciación de que el Legislador goza en la materia, de manera que solo si con absoluta solidez se demostrare la intrascendencia de un servicio público para con los mencionados bienes constitucionales, eventualmente se podría sustentar alguna lesión al principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, lo cual en la especie no ocurre.

En adición, tampoco se advierte alguna vulneración al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad. Como consignó la Sala en la sentencia 2018-000230 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de enero de 2018:

“En lo que respecta al alegado establecimiento de una lista numerus clausus por parte del legislador sin la existencia de criterios técnicos, la Sala descarta que exista alguna lesión al orden constitucional. Según se desprende de los párrafos precedentes, cae en el derecho a la libre configuración del legislador la determinación de los parámetros para categorizar a una profesión como ciencia en la salud. La Sala rechaza que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad. En el caso de marras, la decisión del legislador elevó claramente los requisitos para ser profesional en ciencias de la salud, al demandar el grado mínimo de licenciatura y enumerar expresamente las profesiones incluidas, decisión que no requiere un estudio técnico o científico.” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Sobre el particular, se reitera que la referencia a “servicio público” del ordinal 61 constitucional no partió de un concepto dogmático preciso y cerrado, sino que, en realidad, se optó por mantener la noción de la Constitución de 1871, la cual se entiende en función del momento histórico de su aprobación en julio de 1943 y de su vínculo político irrefutable con la noción de servicio público del Código de Trabajo pocos meses después, en agosto de ese mismo año, que comprendía la actividad de interés general y de particular trascendencia para la sociedad. Tal situación deja entrever, además, que el Constituyente dejó el establecimiento de ejemplos concretos de servicio público al parlamentario ordinario en atención al derecho a la libre configuración legislativa. Como consigna el Diputado Baudrit Solera: “De todos modos -agregó- lo fundamental es que el legislador va a definir qué son servicios públicos y qué son servicios de utilidad pública”. Asimismo, por mandato constitucional goza el legislador de una amplia libertad de configuración para definir qué entiende por servicio público y cuáles son las limitaciones al ejercicio de la huelga en este. De igual forma, en relación con los convenios de la OIT y las recomendaciones del Comité de Libertad Sindical, no se aprecian motivos que impliquen la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas cuestionadas. Tales instrumentos normativos no aluden directamente al derecho a la huelga y las interpretaciones o recomendaciones de los órganos de la OIT no tienen carácter vinculante, por lo que aun cuando estas sí sean relevantes, en el caso concreto deben prevalecer las normas constitucionales que regulan el tema y el razonamiento vertido por la Sala.

Precisamente, este Tribunal, en la sentencia 1998-01317 de las 10:12 horas de 27 de febrero de 1998, avaló la constitucionalidad del numeral 375 y del inciso d) del artículo 376 del Código de Trabajo, sin que se aprecien motivos que desvirtúen los argumentos desarrollados en aquella oportunidad, ni tampoco se hubiese demostrado alguna extralimitación de las normas impugnadas en relación con el Derecho de la Constitución.

En adición, aun cuando se indica que al momento de la interposición de la acción no se encontraba normada la huelga política, no menos cierto es que no se desarrollaron argumentos que sustentaran tal presunta desatención como una inconstitucionalidad por omisión. Precisamente, no se expuso algún de desarrollo de normas o de principios, del cual se pudiera derivar la obligación expresa o tácita del legislador de dictar una ley en ese sentido.

Finalmente, en los términos planteados en el escrito de interposición y tomando en consideración el contenido de las normas impugnadas, lo referente a la declaratoria de huelga y su calificación en cuanto a situaciones concretas, instituciones específicas y los servidores de estas, excede el ámbito de análisis de este proceso de control de constitucionalidad.

Paul Rueda L.

Voto salvado del Magistrado Cruz Castro. Las restricciones impuestas al derecho a la huelga de los trabajadores, superan los límites de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que prevé la Constitución.

En la decisión de este asunto, considero que debo dictar un voto particular, al considerar que la prohibición de la huelga en los servicios públicos, según indican los artículos 375 y 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, resultan inconstitucionales. Si bien es cierto la mayoría de esta Sala realiza una interpretación conforme al respecto, considero que, tanto la literalidad de lo que establece la frase contenida en el art. 375 impugnado (“ARTÍCULO 375. – No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos…”) como la falta de diferenciación entre tipos de trabajadores del art. 376.d) impugnado (“ARTÍCULO 376.- Para los efectos del artículo anterior se entienden por servicios públicos: (…) d. (…) como son las clínicas y hospitales, la higiene, el aseo y el alumbrado en las poblaciones.”), resultan inconstitucionales, conforme a las razones que indico a continuación.

Del artículo 61 de la Constitución Política se desprende que el derecho a la huelga de los trabajadores es un derecho fundamental que si bien puede estar sujeto a limitaciones, cuando se trata de servicios públicos, nunca puede ser sujeto de una prohibición absoluta. Ahora bien, en cuanto al punto sobre cuáles servicios públicos se trata, me parece que lo que establece la Sala en sentencia número 2011-017212 de las 15:31 horas del 14 de diciembre del 2011, es lo correcto. Ahí se estableció que las limitaciones al derecho de huelga comprende, no a la totalidad de los servicios públicos, sino únicamente a los denominados servicios públicos esenciales:

“Tal limitación no comprende la totalidad de servicios públicos. Así los convenios y recomendaciones emitidos por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, a través del Comité de Libertad Sindical y el Comité de Expertos, han ido perfilando los casos en que la huelga puede ser objeto de restricciones o incluso de prohibición y garantías compensatorias. En tal sentido, la OIT ha hecho uso del término “servicios esenciales” para determinar cuándo resulta viable prohibir la huelga en los servicios públicos. En 1983, la Comisión de Expertos de la OIT definió los servicios esenciales como aquellos “cuya interrupción podría poner en peligro la vida, la seguridad o la salud de la persona en toda o parte de la población”. Tal criterio fue adoptado luego por el Comité de Libertad Sindical, para el cual lo determinante es la existencia de una amenaza evidente e inminente para la vida, la seguridad o la salud de toda o parte de la población (Véanse Recopilación de 1996, párrafo 540; 320.º informe, caso núm. 1989, párrafo 324; 324.º informe, caso núm. 2060, párrafo 517; 329.º informe, caso núm. 2195, párrafo 737; 332.º informe, caso núm. 2252, párrafo 883; 336.º informe, caso núm. 2383, párrafo 766; 338.º informe, caso núm. 2326, párrafo 446 y caso núm. 2329, párrafo 1275.) Este concepto no es absoluto, puesto que un servicio no esencial puede convertirse en servicio esencial cuando la duración de una huelga rebasa cierto período o cierto alcance y de ese modo pone en peligro la vida, la seguridad de la persona o la salud de toda o parte de la población. (Véanse Recopilación de 1996, párrafo 541; 320.º informe, caso núm. 1963, párrafo 229; 321.º informe, caso núm. 2066, párrafo 340; 330.º informe, caso núm. 2212, párrafo 749; 335.º informe, caso núm. 2305, párrafo 505 y 338.º informe, caso núm. 2373, párrafo 382.) De manera concreta y en lo que interesa a este caso, el Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT considera como servicio esencial, entre otros, el sector hospitalario (véanse Recopilación de 1996, párrafo 544; 300 informe, caso núm. 1818, párrafo 366; 306.º informe, caso núm. 1882, párrafo 427; 308.º informe, caso núm. 1897, párrafo 477; 324.º informe, caso núm. 2060, párrafo 517, caso núm. 2077, párrafo 551; 329.º informe, caso núm. 2174, párrafo 795; 330.º informe, caso núm. 2166, párrafo 292 y 338.º informe, caso núm. 2399, párrafo 1171). El Comité de Libertad Sindical ha aclarado que en los servicios esenciales algunas categorías de empleados, por ejemplo obreros y los jardineros, no deberían verse privados del derecho de huelga. (Véase 333. .º informe, caso núm. 2277, párrafo 274 y 338.º informe, caso núm. 2403, párrafo 601), criterio que esta Sala recoge en el sentido que en el servicio hospitalario, la prohibición de la huelga afecta únicamente a aquellos funcionarios públicos y trabajadores cuya suspensión de labores implique que el usuario no pueda recibir la prestación del servicio de salud. Ahora bien, el concepto de prohibir la huelga en servicios públicos esenciales, ha sido recogido en la legislación nacional. Como se indicó supra, el numeral 61 de la Constitución Política reconoce el derecho de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de estos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca. En tal sentido, los artículos 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo regulan lo siguiente:

“ARTICULO 375. - No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos. Las diferencias que en éstos ocurran entre patronos y trabajadores, así como en todos los demás casos en que se prohibe la huelga, se someterán obligatoriamente al conocimiento y resolución de los Tribunales de Trabajo”.

“ARTICULO 376.- Para los efectos del artículo anterior se entienden por servicios públicos: a. (…)

d. Los que desempeñen los trabajadores que sean absolutamente indispensables para mantener el funcionamiento de las empresas particulares que no puedan suspender sus servicios sin causar un daño grave o inmediato a la salud o a la economía públicas, como son las clínicas y hospitales, la higiene, el aseo y el alumbrado en las poblaciones” En cuanto a los alcances de estos numerales, en sentencia número 1998-01317 de las 10:12 horas del 27 de febrero de 1998, este Tribunal señaló que:

“Al efecto, la frase primera del artículo 375 del Código de Trabajo, que dice: “No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos.(…)”, si bien pareciera proscribir la huelga en estos servicios, es decir, si bien pareciera tener un sentido impeditivo absoluto, lo cierto es que debe entenderse en armonía con lo dispuesto en el artículo 61 de la Constitución Política, que sólo la limita para ciertos casos fijados o determinados por la ley en observancia de criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, para que resulte congruente con el fin que persigue. Este artículo 375 (antes, 368) cuestionado, armoniza también con el artículo 8° del Convenio 87 de la O.I.T. que - como se transcribió en el Considerando III. -, estatuye la obligación de las organizaciones sindicales de adecuar su actividad a la legislación interna. En otras palabras, si bien la huelga es un derecho de todos, ejercitable en cualquier actividad, es viable que el legislador determine en qué casos el derecho de huelga no puede ejercitarse, específicamente cuando se trate de actividades que constituyen “servicios públicos” y que por su naturaleza o por el impacto social que tienen, no sea posible suspenderlos, descontinuarlos o paralizarlos sin causar daño significativo, grave e inmediato a ciertos bienes” En esa misma sentencia, en relación con el numeral 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, esta Sala trató el tema de la exclusión del derecho de huelga en ciertos servicios públicos indispensables y cuya suspensión comprometía los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública. En esa oportunidad se estimó que la prohibición establecida a nivel legal respecto a este tipo de servicio público, resultaba razonable, necesaria y proporcionada, en razón de que se debía proteger el ámbito de los derechos e intereses de los destinatarios o usuarios de dichos servicios, criterio que concuerda con las opiniones vertidas por el Comité de Expertos y el de Libertad Sindical de la OIT. De este modo, esta Sala, en la referida sentencia, mencionó lo siguiente:

“Del análisis hecho queda claro que la Constitución difiere a la ley enunciar en qué servicios públicos procede excluir o limitar el ejercicio del derecho de la huelga. Esto no tiene un efecto impeditivo absoluto, que proscriba de los servicios públicos el ejercicio del derecho de huelga. Por consiguiente, la ley debe discernir en qué casos ese ejercicio no es legítimo, tomando en cuenta la naturaleza de la prestación y los efectos que produciría la huelga en el ámbito de los derechos e intereses de los destinatarios o usuarios de dichos servicios. En tal caso, es viable limitar el ejercicio del derecho, lo que debe hacerse con aplicación de criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. La legislación laboral, que enumera en el artículo 376 (antes, 369) del Código de Trabajo, en qué servicios públicos se excluye la huelga, a pesar de preceder a la Constitución, que data de 1949, no por ello la contradice (…) Por otro lado, el inciso d) del artículo 376 (antes, 369) establece parámetros que permiten limitar el ejercicio de la huelga en aquellos servicios que se tengan por absolutamente indispensables y cuya suspensión sea susceptible de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública. En efecto, en este aparte se enuncian o distinguen prestaciones con respecto a las cuales la huelga es susceptible de comprometer el bien jurídico de la salud y la economía, al incluir las que se brindan en las clínicas y hospitales, las que aluden a la higiene, al aseo y al alumbrado de las poblaciones. La ley en este caso define las pautas para establecer en qué casos es viable excluir el ejercicio del derecho de huelga, cuales son que debe tratarse de servicios públicos absolutamente indispensables y por otro lado, que sean susceptibles de comprometer los bienes jurídicos de la salud y la economía pública; lineamientos que responden a los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales.” Por lo demás, el hecho que el artículo 376 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo haga referencia a empresas particulares requiere una interpretación evolutiva, toda vez que como consecuencia del desarrollo del Estado Social de Derecho y por mandato del numeral 73 de la Constitución Política, hoy en día la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social administra el servicio público hospitalario, por lo que resulta inexorable que la norma en cuestión comprenda tal servicio prestado por la principal entidad hospitalaria del país. En virtud de lo expuesto, resulta claro que con fundamento en los criterios vertidos por los Comités de Libertad y de Expertos de la OIT, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala y la normativa constitucional y legal vigente en el país, la huelga en los servicios hospitalarios, en tanto actividad esencial del Estado, está prohibida, toda vez que se pone en peligro bienes jurídicos fundamentales de la sociedad, como la salud y la vida de la población. Ahora bien, a esta Sala no le pasa desapercibido que el Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT también ha considerado que dada la prohibición de la huelga en los servicios públicos esenciales, los trabajadores afectados deben gozar de una protección adecuada, de suerte que se les compensen las restricciones impuestas a su libertad de acción en eventuales con?ictos. (Véanse Recopilación de 1996, párrafo 546 y, por ejemplo 300.º informe, caso núm. 1818, párrafo 367; 306.º informe, caso núm. 1882, párrafo 429; 310.º informe, caso núm. 1943, párrafo 227; 318.º informe, caso núm. 1999, párrafo 166; 324.º informe, caso núm. 2060, párrafo 518; 327.º informe, caso núm. 2127, párrafo 192; 330.º informe, caso núm. 2166, párrafo 292; 333.º informe, caso núm. 2277, párrafo 274; 336.º informe, caso núm. 2340, párrafo 649 y 337.º informe, caso núm. 2244, párrafo 1269). Entra tales medidas compensatorias, el Comité de Libertad Sindical ha estimado que la limitación de la huelga debe ir acompañada por procedimientos de conciliación y arbitraje adecuados, imparciales y rápidos en que los interesados puedan participar en todas las etapas. (Véanse Recopilación de 1996, párrafo 547 y, por ejemplo 300.º informe, caso núm. 1818, párrafo 367; 306.º informe, caso núm. 1882, párrafo 429; 308.º informe, caso núm. 1897, párrafo 478; 310.º informe, caso núm. 1943, párrafo 227; 318.º informe, caso núm. 2020, párrafo 318; 324.º informe, caso núm. 2060, párrafo 518; 330.º informe, caso núm. 2166, párrafo 292; 333.º informe, caso núm. 2277, párrafo 274; 336.º informe, caso núm. 2340, párrafo 649 y 337.º informe, caso núm. 2244, párrafo 1269.) (…)” Estos criterios son ratificados mediante el voto número 2018-01115 de las 09:30 horas del 26 de enero del 2018, cuando se indicó que es admisible la huelga en aquellos servicios públicos no esenciales. Así entonces, el artículo 61 constitucional establece, como derecho fundamental, el derecho de los trabajadores a la huelga. No obstante, la misma norma constitucional posibilita:

-Una limitación al ejercicio de tal derecho de huelga. Nótese que se trata de una limitación y no de una prohibición absoluta.

-La limitación del ejercicio de ese derecho sólo puede ser por ley.

-La limitación es para el caso de los servicios públicos, pero únicamente aquellos esenciales.

Sobre el derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos, existen en Derecho Comparado, tres posibilidades: la prohibición absoluta, la permisibilidad absoluta, y un sistema mixto como el nuestro. Ordenamientos donde el derecho de huelga es suprimido totalmente en el caso de los funcionarios públicos, son por ejemplo, la Constitución Chilena, que en su artículo 16 prohíbe la huelga en forma absoluta para los funcionarios públicos y aun para los empleados de empresas privadas cuyos servicios puedan ser catalogadas de utilidad pública, o cuya paralización cause grave daño a la salud y la economía del país. Ese modelo es semejanta al estadounidense donde se encuentra prohibida la huelga para los empleados del gobierno federal. (Parágrafo 1918, capítulo 93, título 18 del US CODE). Otros ordenamientos donde el derecho constitucional no establece restricción alguna, serían, por ejemplo, la Constitución Italiana que en su numeral 40 se circunscribe a establecer el derecho de huelga y remite a la ley para su desarrollo. La carta portuguesa que en su ordinal 59 sencillamente establece el derecho a la huelga. Un tercer modelo, similar al nuestro, se encuentra en la Constitución Panameña que en su artículo 65 dispone que la ley podrá establecer restricciones especiales para el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos. Luego, la Constitución colombiana, en su numeral 56, señala que corresponderá al legislador precisar los servicios públicos esenciales en los que no procede una declaratoria de huelga. Luego, la Constitución Griega, en su artículo 23.2 establece que la ley podrá imponer restricciones concretas al ejercicio del derecho de huelga de los funcionarios públicos. No obstante, aclara que las limitaciones legales no podrán conllevar a la supresión del derecho. En el caso de la Constitución Española, el artículo 28.2 establece el derecho a la huelga, empero, señala que la ley determinará las garantías necesarias para asegurar los servicios esenciales de la comunidad. Así entonces, nuestra Constitución opta por esta tercera vía, de tal forma que si bien se reconoce el derecho a huelga como un derecho fundamental, se permite limitar en algún grado su ejercicio tratándose de servicios públicos. Transcribimos el numeral 61 citado:

“Artículo 61.- Se reconoce el derecho de los patronos al paro y el de los trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios públicos, de acuerdo con la determinación que de éstos haga la ley y conforme a las regulaciones que la misma establezca, las cuales deberán desautorizar todo acto de coacción o de violencia”.

En sentido similar el Pacto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas – incorporado al Derecho Costarricense mediante la ley n.°4229 de 11 de diciembre de 1969-, otorga al derecho de huelga el rango de derecho fundamental, admite que la ley puede imponer restricciones en el caso de los miembros de la policía y la administración del Estado. El ordinal 8 de ese instrumento internacional prescribe:

“Artículo 8.- 1. Los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto se comprometen a Garantizar:

• a)(…)
• d)El derecho de huelga, ejercido de conformidad con las leyes de cada país.

2. El presente artículo no impedirá someter a restricciones legales el ejercicio de tales derechos por los miembros de las fuerzas armadas, de la policía o de la administración del Estado.

3. (…)” Asimismo, el Protocolo a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, “Protocolo de San Salvador” -incorporado al ordenamiento costarricense mediante la ley n.° 7907 de 3 de setiembre de 1999-, contempla el derecho a la huelga como un derecho fundamental. No obstante, la norma convencional prevé que es reserva de ley establecer restricciones al ejercicio de ese4 derecho en el caso de servicios públicos. Interesa destacar que conforme ese instrumento internacional, las limitaciones que la ley pudiese imponer deben ser conformes con el orden democrático, es decir, que las constricciones al derecho de huelga deben ser proporcionadas y tener por fin proteger la salud, la moral y el orden público, así como los derechos de la mayoría de la ciudadanía. Al efecto, dispone el numeral 8 del Protocolo:

“Artículo 8.- Derechos sindicales.

1.- Los Estados Partes garantizarán:

• a)(…)
• b)El derecho a la huelga.

2.- El ejercicio de los derechos enunciados precedentemente sólo puede estar sujeto a las limitaciones y restricciones previstas por la ley, siempre que estas sean propias a una sociedad democrática, necesarias para salvaguardar el orden público, para proteger la salud o la moral públicas, así como los derechos y las libertades de los demás. Los miembros de las fuerzas armadas y de policía, al igual que los de otros servicios públicos esenciales, estarán sujetos a las limitaciones y restricciones que imponga la ley.

3.- (…)”.

Tal como se dijo, esta Sala Constitucional ha tenido oportunidad de precisar el alcance del artículo 61 de la Constitución Política. Así, en sentencia n.°1317-98 de las 10:12 horas del 27 de febrero de 1998 (ratificada en resolución n.°5264-2003 de las 14:42 del 18 de junio de 2003), se declararon inconstitucionales las restricciones al derecho de huelga contempladas en los incisos a), b) y e) del numeral 376 del Código de Trabajo, por cuanto se indicó que la regulación del derecho de huelga es una materia reservada a la ley. En esa misma sentencia, el Tribunal Constitucional declinó declarar la inconstitucionalidad del numeral 375 del Código de Trabajo, el cual prohíbe expresamente la huelga en los servicios públicos; no obstante se indicó que la prohibición no constituya un impedimento absoluto, pues ello sería contrario a la norma fundamental. Efectivamente, considero que el numeral 61 de la norma fundamental no puede interpretarse en el sentido de que exista una prohibición total para el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos. Por el contrario, corresponde a la ley determinar los casos en que procede establecer dicha prohibición, tarea que debe responder a criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Por lo demás, según se indicó, esa limitación al ejercicio del derecho de huelga en los servicios públicos es únicamente para aquellos calificados como esenciales. Expuesto lo anterior, es posible afirmar que la decisión del constituyente se enmara dentro de la tradición constitucional social que, de una parte, reconoce el derecho de huelga, pero por otra, admite la posibilidad de imponer ciertas limitaciones tratándose de servicios públicos, limitaciones que solamente pueden ser impuestas por ley, que no pueden interpretarse, desde mi punto de vista, como una prohibición absoluta; y que se refiere únicamente a los servicios públicos esenciales.

Por lo demás, debo destacar que, la reforma legal introducida por la ley que regula las huelgas, n°9808, en los artículos 375 y 376 del Código de Trabajo para precisar el alcance de la definición de los servicios esenciales y la regulación del ejercicio del derecho a huelga en tales servicios, fue igualmente validada por esta Sala, mediante sentencia de esta Sala, número 2019-20596, de las diecinueve horas quince minutos del 25 de octubre de 2019, sentencia de la cual no participé en su votación. Esta materia requiere un marco legislativo muy equilibrado, conforme a criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, porque se trata de la restricción de un derecho humano fundamental: el derecho a la huelga. La restricción debe ser cuidadosa y de criterio restrictivo. Curiosamente, los patronos tienen derecho al paro y las restricciones a tal ejercicio no son tan restrictivas e irrazonables como las que se impone a la huelga de los trabajadores. Un derecho constitucional tan relevante como el derecho a la huelga debe tener restricciones muy puntuales y razonables.

Así entonces, considero que el artículo 375 del Código de Trabajo, en cuanto indica “No será permitida la huelga en los servicios públicos”, resulta inconstitucional por ser una afirmación tajante, sin matices, pues claramente tal prohibición no puede ser prohibición absoluta sino que, sólo debe limitarse la huelga e nel caso de servicios públicos esenciales. Y por su parte, en cuanto al inciso d) del artículo 376 del Código de Trabajo, que define a “las clínicas y hospitales” como servicios públicos, limitando la huelga en esos casos, considerado que resulta también inconstitucional porque no diferencia entres aquellos funcionarios cuya suspensión de labores implique que el usuario no pueda recibir la prestación del servicio de salud. Las restricciones en este caso trascienden los límites de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que justifican la restricción de un derecho fundamental tan relevante.

Fernando Cruz C.

[2] Página oficial de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Recuperado en: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--es/index.htm [3] Oficina Internacional del Trabajo. La Libertad Sindical. Recopilación de decisiones del Comité de Libertad Sindical. Sexta edición (2018). Recuperado en: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf [4] Oficina Internacional del Trabajo. La Libertad Sindical. Recopilación de decisiones del Comité de Libertad Sindical. Sexta edición (2018). Recuperado en: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_635185.pdf [5] Solo se advierte como diferencia una coma, puesto que el artículo 56 consignaba “trabajadores a la huelga salvo en los servicios públicos” mientras que, según el SINALEVI, la norma actual reza “trabajadores a la huelga, salvo en los servicios públicos”, lo cual, en este caso, carece de toda relevancia.