Legislative Consultation on CCSS Autonomy in Setting Social Security Contribution RatesConsulta legislativa sobre la autonomía de la CCSS en la fijación de cuotas de la seguridad social

**Ruling Nº 2022009345** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at twelve hours and fifty minutes on the twenty-sixth of April, two thousand twenty-two.

Optional legislative consultation on constitutionality filed by deputies Laura Guido Pérez, Enrique Sánchez Carballo, Víctor Morales, Catalina Montero Gómez, Mario Castillo Méndez, Luis Ramón Carranza, Nielsen Pérez Pérez, Carolina Hidalgo Herrera, Welmer Ramos González, José María Villalta, Paula Vega Rodríguez, Shirley Díaz, Walter Muñoz, Patricia Villegas, and Yorleny León, regarding the bill "Ley de igualdad para los trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social," processed under legislative file number 22.323.

**Whereas** 1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on March 21, 2022, the signing Deputies filed an Optional Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality regarding the bill "Ley de igualdad para los trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social," processed under legislative file number 22.323. They recount the background of the bill, which was approved in the ordinary session of the Legislative Plenary, number 113, on March 14, 2022, by a favorable vote of 22 deputies. They note that the bill consists of a single article, by which it is intended to reform Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and include two transitory provisions, and the purpose of the bill is "to equalize the collection of quotas from the worker-employer regimes, since currently they are not the same for the different types of workers, meaning workers under the worker-employer regime, independent workers or voluntary insured persons, given that all of these are entitled to receive the same service from the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social." Regarding the new wording proposed for Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS, the consultants question the constitutionality of the phrases "or own income (ingresos propios)" and "or another source of income (u otra fuente de ingresos)" included in the first paragraph; also, what would be the new second paragraph of said article; and from the fifth paragraph, the phrase stating that "for such regulations, requirements, benefits, and conditions, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must equitably respect the right to health protection for all workers." Likewise, they express their opposition to the two transitory provisions, which impose on the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social a six-month deadline to "make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the worker-employer worker (trabajador obrero patronal)" (Transitory I), and a deadline of no more than three months to implement and carry out "the mechanisms and adjustments necessary in the computer systems so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their quotas." The first reason for consultation on substantive grounds is that the indicated provisions violate the autonomy of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, enshrined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, through which the institution is granted exclusivity in the administration and governance of social insurance, both in the Disability, Old Age, and Death regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), the non-contributory regime (régimen no contributivo), and the Sickness and Maternity Insurance (Seguro de Enfermedad y Maternidad). They consider that what is intended to be regulated by the bill falls under the competence of the CCSS's autonomy and forms part of its core activity, which is the exclusive and exclusionary exercise of the competence of governance and administration of social insurance, in terms of political autonomy. They mention that the bill intends to establish a contribution regime that may appear equal for all different types of insured persons, imposing from the outset the same amount to contribute, but without making even internal distinctions, and closing off that decision-making possibility to the CCSS Board of Directors itself. They refer to the opinion of the Technical Services Department, noting that the bill, at its core, concerns "equalizing the quota contributions of workers regardless of their modality, being the same percentage for all," as well as "establishing that there cannot be any type of differences between salaried, independent, voluntary insured persons, or any other type of modality established by the CCSS." They explain that social security resources have a specific constitutional purpose imposed upon the legislator itself, which consists of the fact that social security resources cannot be transferred or used for purposes other than social insurance, the administration of which is the exclusive competence of the institution. Viewed this way, they add, the bill imposes on the Caja how to manage an essential item in the area of governance and administration of social insurance, specifically, the determination of the main economic requirement for affiliation to the social security regime. They point out that the Technical Services Department had already warned that the institution's own competence includes "the possibility of making compliance with the obligations payable for quotas more flexible," since, they add, this type of activity falls within the essential competence of the Caja's governance and administration, and outside the scope of the ordinary legislator. They affirm that the constitutional autonomy granted to the CCSS regarding the administration and governance of social insurance reaches such a degree that not even the Legislative Assembly can modify its competences, as has also been recognized by the Constitutional Chamber. They emphasize that the Caja's autonomy is a second-degree autonomy, that is, political or governmental autonomy (autonomía política o de gobierno), as the institution requires it to adequately resolve, and without political pressure, very important technical matters, such as defining the final amount of worker-employer quotas payable to the Caja, whether temporarily or until further notice, and they refer, in the same sense, to the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, which specifically indicates that autonomy must be such that it allows the institution to collect the economic resources represented in the contributions instituted by the constituent, and guarantee the existence of the self-sufficient social security regime.

They mention that the proposed reform does not modify Article 23 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, which is an auxiliary numeral to Article 3 that is being reformed.

They emphasize that determining the economic amount of the quotas, and calculating that amount, is a matter that constitutionally does not fall to the ordinary legislator, especially trying to impose a new institutional policy on the CCSS Board of Directors regarding economic treatment decisions for the sector of insured independent workers, and, specifically, the determination of the fundamental percentages of the amount of quotas to be charged to them. They reiterate that the Legislative Assembly lacks competence to interfere in technical and even political matters constitutionally reserved to the governmental autonomy of the Caja, and therefore, in that case, they consider that the principle of the legislator's free configuration would not apply.

They refer that when the Procuraduría General de la República was consulted within the framework of the committee discussion of the legislative file in question, the Procuraduría indicated that the initiative does invade the areas constitutionally reserved to the Caja, because it intends to regulate the terms under which to establish the contribution of the different types of workers, which is part of the autonomy constitutionally attributed to the institution. They add that, in the same opinion, the Procuraduría indicated that the proposed law not only imposes mandatory rules regarding contribution but also imposes deadlines on the Caja to implement the proposed changes, which exceeds the legislator's power.

They emphasize that these are legislative acts of undue interference, and even supplantation of institutional authority, to the detriment of the technical-scientific and political competence of the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, despite constitutional jurisprudence defining that the competence of the Legislative Assembly is insufficient to modify, by way of law, an open list of aspects pertaining to the political autonomy of the Caja. They also note that jurisprudence has recently established that defining the entry requirements to the social security regime falls under the competence of the institution's Board of Directors, while simultaneously considering as reasonable the complementary regulation granted by Article 23 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, which establishes that quotas and benefits shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in accordance with the cost of services and in conformity with the respective actuarial calculations (cálculos actuariales).

Thus, they conclude that the proposed reform of Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social violates the institution's autonomy enshrined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

The second reason for consultation on substantive grounds raised by the consultants deals with the violation of the principles of necessity, suitability, legitimacy, proportionality, and reasonableness, as well as the violation of the principle of equality. Regarding necessity, they explain that the explanatory statement of the bill mentions that the CCSS Board of Directors has made differentiations in the contributions of workers under the worker-employer regime and the contributions of independent workers, who contribute more, and therefore it is considered necessary for all workers to contribute the same percentage because the care provided is the same for all. The consultants explain that the necessity of the measure is directly linked to proportionality, and that one must question whether the bill would generate greater justice among social security contributors.

They provide a table they claim comes from the Caja's Actuarial and Economic Directorate, showing the five ascending categories or scales of contributions by independent workers according to their income, and they emphasize that only 1% of independent workers are in the fourth and fifth groups, which are the people with the highest contribution percentages. Meanwhile, they note that 96% of independent workers are in the first two categories, such that if the contribution of independent workers were equalized with that of workers under worker-employer insurance, the effect will be that those in the highest categories, who are the people with the highest incomes, will see their contribution reduced, while those with lower incomes will pay more than those with higher incomes. Thus, they indicate, there is a clear violation of the principle of equality.

Similarly, they continue, it is evident that the proposed provision is not only unnecessary but also disproportionate, because it would only benefit less than 1% of people, so that they contribute less, while making the rest—96%—bear most of the weight relative to their income.

In that sense, they affirm that the proposal is absolutely regressive, and therefore does not meet the requirement of being a suitable measure to achieve the intended objective, but rather generates greater inequality and disproportionality among people contributing to social security. They emphasize that "the provision seeks to benefit a few who earn more, to the detriment also of social security, which will be affected by the measure by receiving fewer contributions." They explain that the Caja warned of this, stating that "it could cause an impact on income to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) and no cost-benefit studies of the new scheme are provided." They add that the lack of actuarial studies and general technical studies supporting the proposal makes it impossible to conduct a reasonableness examination, but it is clear that the bill would affect the finances of the Sickness and Maternity Insurance (Seguro de Enfermedad y Maternidad) and the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), as a consequence of the reduction in contribution by higher-income independent workers.

Regarding legitimacy, they note that enacting a law does not correspond to the legitimate means for regulating the contributions, amounts, and deadlines of social insurance, since the Caja has constitutional autonomy for the administration and governance of social insurance, and therefore such reforms must be made with the corresponding technical studies, by the institution's Board of Directors. Attempting to regulate this matter by law so that there is equality of contributions represents an unnecessary restriction on the options available to the Caja's technical bodies to configure the distribution of tripartite or bipartite contribution rates, depending on the type of worker and their contribution capacities.

They mention that the pursued objectives can be achieved through regulatory reforms by the Board of Directors, within the framework of the legal and constitutional powers granted to said body, in full exercise of the autonomy for the administration and governance of social insurance.

Thus, they consider that the bill does not comply with the constitutional principles of necessity, proportionality, reasonableness, legitimacy, and suitability, while simultaneously violating the principle of equality, placing most of the contribution burden on independent workers with lower incomes.

2.- By official communication from the Presidency of this Chamber, number PSC-0040-2022, dated March 22, 2022, the President of the Legislative Assembly is notified of the filing of this Optional Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality.

3.- By ruling of the Presidency of this Chamber, at ten hours and eight minutes on March 23, 2022, this Optional Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality is admitted, and the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly is requested to send legislative file number 22.323.

4.- By official communication received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on March 25, 2022, the President of the Legislative Assembly sends a certified copy of legislative file number 22.323. Consequently, and considering the period during which Holy Week of this year 2022 is celebrated and commemorated, the deadline to evacuate the consultation expires on May 2, 2022.

5.- By ruling of the Presidency of this Chamber, at ten hours and fifty-one minutes on March 25, 2022, the certified copy of legislative file number 22.323 is considered received and this consultation is turned over for its due knowledge.

6.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on March 25, 2022, deputy Jonathan Prendas Rodríguez, submits a passive coadjuvancy and opposes the aspects raised by the deputies signing this consultation, indicating his arguments and criteria regarding the consultation topics, and therefore requests that the constitutionality of the bill be declared.

7.- The provisions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Araya García; and, **Considering** **I.- On the formulation of the Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality.** The prior advisory opinion on legislative bills may be requested on a mandatory basis - subsection a) of Article 96 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional) - or an optional basis - subsections b), c), and ch) of the same provision -. In the latter case, there are three scenarios: in the first, it is the parliamentary body itself that makes the request – when filed by no fewer than ten deputies -; in the second, it concerns the consultation of bills referring to the constitutional competence of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) or the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), a consultation that must be filed by these bodies themselves; and, in the third, the consultation can be filed by the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes) when it is considered that fundamental rights or freedoms are infringed. Likewise, Article 98 of the law governing this jurisdiction states that in the case of bills other than constitutional reforms, the Legislative Consultation must be filed after the bill has been approved in the first debate and before receiving definitive approval in the second debate; this provision as a requirement for the admissibility of the Legislative Consultation finds support because it is after the first debate that there is greater certainty about the approval probabilities of the text submitted for consultation – see, among others, rulings of this Chamber numbers 193-90 and 2017-11714-.

**II.- On the admissibility of the Legislative Consultation now being heard.** The case under study is an optional legislative consultation on constitutionality. In accordance with what was indicated in the previous considering, and as provided in subsection b) of Article 96 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, this type of consultation must be filed by ten or more deputies, once the bill has been approved in the first debate. In this case, 15 legislators signed the consultation, so this admissibility requirement is considered fulfilled. Likewise, the bill processed under legislative file No. 22.323 was approved in the first debate by the Plenary of the Legislative Assembly, in ordinary session number 103, on March 14, 2022. In this way, being duly grounded and complying with the indicated admissibility requirements, the Chamber proceeds to hear the consultation filed.

For its part, it is important to note that, in the case of optional legislative consultations on constitutionality – such as the one now being heard – and in accordance with the application and integration of the provisions stipulated in Articles 99 and 101 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, this Chamber has stated that its review is limited solely to the specific arguments raised by the consulting deputies in their filing brief, and not to others that might be derived but were not raised as such. Indeed, through ruling number 2001-11643 – reiterated, among others, in rulings numbers 2012-9253, 2017-11714, and 2021-21204 – the Chamber stated:

"It must also be recalled that the same law provides in its Article 101 that the Chamber shall evacuate the consultation by issuing an opinion 'on the aspects and reasons consulted or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional point of view,' but the court interprets that 'the aspects and reasons consulted' are those which, in accordance with Article 99, question or object to the bill, or ground the doubt that the legislators might have about it. Given, then, that the consultation deviates from what is legally established, it is not receivable; if the court, nevertheless, were to admit and absolve it, it would place itself in a situation outside the scope of its attributions." – emphasis added - This criterion was reiterated and consolidated by the Chamber's jurisprudence, determining, in the already cited ruling number 2012-9253, that:

"[T]his is so because 'regarding optional legislative consultations, the competence of the Constitutional Chamber originates in the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators' – ruling 2001-12459 -, so that if such arguments do not exist as such, or when the consulting deputies themselves state they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the provisions or bills consulted, it would be improper for the Chamber to issue any opinion, as it would be in scenarios that transcend the Chamber's competences regarding legislative consultations on constitutionality – ruling 2002-3460 -." – emphasis is not from the original - In this sense, it is necessary to indicate that this Chamber will focus on studying only the arguments raised in a timely manner by the consultants and not other general questions of constitutionality of the bill under reference, in accordance with what is regulated in Article 99 of the law governing this jurisdiction, and therefore any pronouncement on procedural and substantive defects not alleged in a timely manner by the consulting deputies is omitted.

**III.- Preliminarily. On the coadjuvancy request filed.** The Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality – whether optional or mandatory – is a constitutional process established for the prior control of the constitutionality of laws, and by definition, reserved to be exercised during the law approval process by legislators and under certain assumptions of formulation and admissibility. By nature, it is a consultation process through which Deputies who maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of a bill express their questions before the Constitutional Chamber so that it can be determined whether, indeed, there is some degree of constitutional nonconformity between the bill or consulted provision, and the Political Constitution. In this sense, it is a process reserved to legislators and at a specific moment of the law approval procedure, which is why our legislation does not contemplate the possibility of filing any type of coadjuvancy to the consultations raised by legislators. Therefore, what formally corresponds is to declare the inadmissibility of the coadjuvancy request referred to in the sixth whereas of this ruling. In this sense, considering the statements made by Mr. Prendas Rodríguez through the brief received on March 25, 2022, expressing his support for the bill being consulted, the appropriate course is to add them to the file, without a special ruling regarding their content - see, in a similar sense, rulings 2016-15712 and 2021-21204 -.

**IV.- On the precision in citing the articles consulted and the necessary expression and substantiation of the reasons for consultation in legislative consultations.** Article 99 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction clearly states that in the case of an optional consultation on constitutionality, it must be filed by means of a reasoned brief, expressing the aspects of the bill that are questioned, as well as the reasons for which there are doubts or objections about its constitutionality. This provision determines – and has been repeatedly recognized by constitutional jurisprudence – that the filing brief must express the articles of the bill whose constitutionality is questioned or consulted, and clearly state the reasons why it is considered that a provision of the bill may be unconstitutional, otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible – see, in this sense, rulings numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643, 2012-9253 -. Indeed, on this matter, the Chamber has said:

"In this case, the consultants do not indicate the articles of the bill they question, nor the reasons why they have doubts or objections about its constitutionality, and they simply point out the topic consulted, dispensing with making any type of constitutional argument, and therefore it is not appropriate to evacuate the consultation. This has been repeatedly resolved by constitutional jurisprudence, and for that reason, the appropriate course is that there are no grounds to evacuate the consultation filed." Beyond the specific citation of the articles whose constitutionality is consulted, as indicated, the reasons for which the legislative consultation is made must also be clear and express, detailing the reasons why the deputies maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of the consulted provisions. In this regard, the Chamber has stated that if the arguments are omitted, insufficient, or vague, the consultation must be deemed inadmissible and, therefore, unavoidable, as this Court would lack the express reasons on which to rule. Indeed, the Chamber has said:

"It must also be recalled that the same law provides in its Article 101 that the Chamber shall evacuate the consultation by issuing an opinion 'on the aspects and reasons consulted or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional point of view,' but the court interprets that 'the aspects and reasons consulted' are those which, in accordance with Article 99, question or object to the bill, or ground the doubt that the legislators might have about it. Given, then, that the consultation deviates from what is legally established, it is not receivable; if the court, nevertheless, were to admit and absolve it, it would place itself in a situation outside the scope of its attributions. Magistrates Sancho, Vargas, and Armijo, dissent and declare that the optional consultation on constitutionality regarding the Bill 'Ley del Estatuto de Servicio de la Asamblea Legislativa,' File No. 11,839, is evacuated, in the sense that it is unconstitutional that Article 18, insofar as it excepts a group of officials of the Legislative Assembly from the prohibition governing other public servants, of directly linking themselves with the political parties to which they belong." – ruling 2001-11643 - Thus, if a consultation turns out to be imprecise in citing the articles or in setting forth the reasons for which there are well-founded doubts of constitutionality, it would be inadmissible and unavoidable. And this is so because "regarding optional legislative consultations, the competence of the Constitutional Chamber originates in the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators" – rulings 2001-12459 and 2012-9253 -, so that if such arguments do not exist as such, or when the consulting deputies themselves state they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the provisions or bills consulted, it would be improper for the Chamber to issue any opinion, as it would be in scenarios that transcend the Chamber's competences regarding legislative consultations on constitutionality – rulings 2002-3460, 2012-9253, and 2021-21204 -.

**V.- Object of the consultation.** The consulting deputies raise as the object of their consultation, that the bill called "Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social," legislative file number 22.323, which modifies Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and includes two transitory provisions, is contrary to the autonomy of administration and governance of said institution, as provided for in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, and has been recognized and developed by constitutional jurisprudence.

The bill whose provisions are consulted, states:

"LEY DE IGUALDAD PARA LOS TRABAJADORES ANTE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL

CHAPTER I

SOLE ARTICLE- Article 3 of Ley 17, Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social CCSS, of October 22, 1943, is reformed. The text is as follows:

Article 3- Social security coverages—and entry thereto—are mandatory for all manual and intellectual workers who receive a salary or wage or own income (ingresos propios). The amount of the quotas payable under this law shall be calculated on the total remuneration that, under any denomination, is paid, due to or derived from the worker-employer relationship or another source of income (u otra fuente de ingresos).

The worker's contribution to social security shall be the same percentage in all cases where income is equal to or greater than the legal minimum wage for a generic unskilled worker established by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). The reference for this percentage shall be that established for the worker under worker-employer insurance (seguro obrero - patronal).

No distinctions may be established between employed workers, self-employed workers, volunteers, or any other type of insured person stipulated by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Self-employed workers shall be exempt from payment of the employer's contribution.

The Board of Directors is authorized to take measures aimed at assisting in the medical care of the indigent, in occupational risks and accidents, and in the preventive medicine campaign.

The Caja shall determine by regulation the admission requirements for each protection regime, as well as the benefits and the conditions under which these will be granted; for such regulations, requirements, benefits, and conditions, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must equitably respect the right to health protection of all workers.

The Board of Directors shall adopt the necessary agreements to progressively extend its services to the entire country, as its material and human resources permit.

For self-employed workers whose net income is less than the legal minimum wage and who request affiliation with the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime of the CCSS, the State's contribution shall be increased in order to partially compensate for the absence of the employer's contribution. For such purposes, a special permanent program shall be created under the responsibility of the Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares (Fodesaf).

CHAPTER II

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

TRANSITORY I.- Within a period not exceeding six months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, through its Board of Directors, must make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the employed worker - employer.

TRANSITORY II.- Within a period not exceeding three months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must implement and carry out the necessary mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems, so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their contributions.

Effective as of its publication.” —emphasis added— In the cited provisions, the aspects on which the consulting Deputies state they have doubts regarding constitutionality are highlighted, focusing their grounds for consultation on the violation of the autonomy of administration and government recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, with respect to social insurance. Based on this argument of impact on the autonomy of the Caja, it is noted that no consultations are raised for reasons of form or procedure, but rather two specific aspects are consulted for substantive reasons, which are resolved as indicated in the following considerandos.

VI.- Regarding the first ground for consultation. The violation of the autonomy of administration and government of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. The consulting Deputies argue that the determination of the parameters for defining the contribution amounts and rates for the different groups of workers affiliated with the social security regimes administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is a function that falls within the scope of autonomy and government constitutionally recognized to the institution, whose Board of Directors defines such aspects based on the corresponding actuarial studies. They add that since such power lies within the scope of constitutional autonomy, the ordinary legislator is prevented from imposing such parameters on the Caja. Thus, if the bill seeks to define the parameters from which the contribution percentages of insured persons are defined, while also seeking to establish that, autonomously from their status as self-employed or employed workers, all workers must contribute the same percentage—based on the amount paid by employed workers—the bill in question would be contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

On this matter, the cited constitutional provision states, where relevant, that:

“ARTICLE 73.- Social insurance shall be established for the benefit of manual and intellectual workers, regulated by a system of compulsory contributions from the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect them against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law may determine.

The administration and government of social insurance shall be entrusted to an autonomous institution, called the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.” To understand the issue of the autonomy of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as provided for in the Political Constitution, it is particularly important to bear in mind the prior and reiterated definitions of constitutional jurisprudence on the matter. From its earliest years, this Chamber has been pronouncing on the issue of the autonomy of the Caja in this aspect, such that, through ruling number 6256-94, it differentiated the autonomy of the CCSS from that recognized to other public sector institutions, stating in this regard that:

“The provision [of Article 73 of the Political Constitution] grants, exclusively to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the administration and government of social insurance, a degree of autonomy which is, of course, distinct from and superior to that defined in general terms in Article 188 thereof…” —emphasis supplied— The degree of autonomy that, based on Article 73 of the Constitution and the jurisprudential criterion recently cited, is recognized to the Caja, was further specified, by defining that such a level of autonomy prevents interference or intervention by the Executive Branch, and, as relevant for purposes of this consultation, it was also indicated that the legislator itself finds a limitation in said autonomy, by which it must comply with the Constitution and is prevented from adopting legislation that involves itself in aspects proper to the institution's definition. Thus, through rulings 2012-17736 and 2021-17098, the Chamber stated that this autonomy:

“Signifies a degree of protection against interference from the Executive Branch, but also limitations on the intervention of the Legislative Branch. Although it is true that the CCSS does not escape the law, the latter cannot 'modify or alter' the competence and autonomy constitutionally given to the CCSS, defining aspects that are its exclusive purview. The Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, being essentially an autonomous institution of constitutional creation, the matter of its competence, constitutionally given, is beyond the action of the law. Stated differently, the legislator, in the case of the administration and government of social insurance, has limitations and must respect what the Constituent Assembly established. Just as the legislator would be forbidden from issuing a law stipulating that the administration and government of social insurance no longer corresponds to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, likewise, it cannot issue a law that encroaches upon aspects proper to or corresponding to the definition of the CCSS, in the administration and government of social insurance.” —the highlighting is not from the original—.

Thus, it is quite clear that the ordinary legislator is prevented from adopting laws that interfere with the exercise of the competences constitutionally assigned to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, such as, precisely, the administration and government of social insurance. It is important to highlight this degree of autonomy, because, as stated, it goes beyond simple administration, since by stating that the autonomy is also "of government," a direct reference is made to the definition of the aspects from which the autonomy "of administration" will also be exercised. In this sense, both aspects of autonomy converge in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, by express provision of the constituent assembly, and because such definition has been recognized and indicated by constitutional jurisprudence.

In the aforementioned ruling 2021-17098, the Chamber further specified this degree of autonomy, by explaining that:

“It must be highlighted that the provision defining the functions and purposes of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is located in our Magna Carta within the chapter on social rights and guarantees, while provisions regarding Autonomous Institutions are located in another Title, XIV; the difference in placement reflects, from a systematic and systemic interpretation, that the fundamental norm itself, by creating the institution of social security, aims to provide solidary and priority protection to the person due to their own condition; evidently, it concerns an institution that assumes the solidary spirit inspiring articles fifty and seventy-four of the Constitution. The intention is that each person has the guarantee that the solidary State assures them health, a pension, disability benefits, and everything related to social security. This provision becomes not only a goal or guide for State action, but also a limit in itself, by ensuring that neither the Executive Branch nor the Legislative Branch could undermine said constitutional competence (...) From the foregoing, it follows that the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), by constitutional provision (art. 73), enjoys administrative and governmental autonomy. This means that, as a functionally decentralized entity, it can establish the rules for the selection of its personnel, the existence of a special regulatory framework for its statutory relationship, attending to and ensuring its degree of autonomy, being valid in this case. That degree of autonomy also allows it to self-administer (dispose of its human, material, and financial resources); to give itself its own internal organization; the setting of purposes, goals, and types of means to achieve them; the issuance of autonomous service or activity regulations, in accordance with the provisions normally called general policy. Thus, as an autonomous institution of constitutional creation and with a greater degree of autonomy (administrative and governmental), it is allowed to be protected against interference from the Executive Branch and limitations when the Legislative Branch legislates (which cannot modify its degree of autonomy via legal means).” —the highlighting is not from the original— Even more concretely, dealing now with the fixing of contribution amounts and the parameters for their determination, the jurisprudence is also emphatic in stating that the definition of the conditions, benefits, and admission requirements for each social security regime administered and governed by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is an exclusive power and competence of the institution itself, and the legislator is not permitted to issue norms that affect autonomy with respect to this specific aspect. Thus, through ruling number 2003-2355, reiterated by ruling number 2021-23611, this Chamber established that:

“Through articles 3 and 23 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, its Board of Directors has full competence to establish the scope of social security benefits via regulation, in such a way that it can define the conditions, benefits, and admission requirements for each protection regime, supported by actuarial studies, in order not to bankrupt the system.” —emphasis added— In this sense, it is clear that if “defining the conditions, benefits, and admission requirements for each protection regime” is an exclusive power of the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, by virtue of the degree of autonomy granted and recognized to it, it is also clear that such definitions are outside the orbit and possibilities of action of other entities, institutions, and Branches of the State, such that if any act or regulation were issued that affected that exclusive power and competence, it would be violating Article 73 of the Political Constitution, and the level or degree of autonomy that said constitutional article recognizes to the CCSS.

It should be noted that the ordinary legislator recognizes this exclusive power and competence of the institution upon which it now seeks to influence or involve itself. Observe that, following the criterion defined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, Article 23 of the same Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social expressly provided that:

“Article 23.- The contributions and benefits shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in accordance with the cost of the services to be provided in each region and in conformity with the respective actuarial calculations.”—the highlighting is not from the original— That is, in the exercise of the legislative function, the legislator has indeed recognized that autonomy of administration and government, because in an absolutely clear manner, it leaves the definition of contributions and benefits to the Board of Directors of the CCSS, in the same sense that this Chamber also recognizes it in the already referenced rulings numbers 2003-2355 and 2021-23611. This provision of Article 23 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS is not subject to reform in the bill now under review, so it is also noted that the questioned legislative proposal would be generating some type of normative or legislative incongruity, because, on one hand, it is the legislator who intends to define that the contribution percentage must be equal in all cases, while in another provision of the same law, it already defines that such aspect shall be fixed by the institution's Board of Directors, the latter being the criterion consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy constitutionally recognized to the Caja.

Furthermore, it is also important to note that during the processing of legislative file number 22.323—regarding this bill—there are respective pronouncements from the Procuraduría General de la República and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in similar terms to those set forth herein, and which confirm that the object of the bill contradicts the institution's autonomy.

In the report rendered by the Procuraduría—OJ-125-2021—the State's advisory body expressly stated that:

“Such an initiative does invade the areas constitutionally reserved to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, because it seeks to regulate the terms under which the contribution of employed, self-employed, and voluntary workers must be established to obtain the protection of social insurance, which forms part of the autonomy constitutionally attributed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (..) Note that the bill being analyzed not only establishes imperative rules regarding contribution but also indicates to the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social the deadline within which it must implement the proposed changes, all of which exceeds the powers held by the legislator in this matter. (…) It is also important to note that the bill makes no reference to financial or actuarial studies analyzing the financial impact that the proposal could have, which ignores the technical rigor that must prevail in these matters. This, despite the fact that the Constitutional Chamber has insisted that setting the conditions under which social insurance must operate is an exclusive attribution of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social…” —emphasis supplied— Thus, the Procuraduría not only warned of the constitutional nonconformity of the bill in the terms developed here but also indicated that the legislative proposal, which impacts the institution's financial definitions, even lacked actuarial studies. On this matter, it is necessary to state and emphasize that it is the criterion of this Chamber that, even if some type of financial or actuarial study existed that sought to support a bill like the one now under review, the existence of such studies would not give rise to nor permit the issuance of this type of legislation, because, in accordance with what has been stated, this is a matter reserved for the autonomy of administration and government that is constitutionally granted and recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social itself, and not to any other body or public instance.

For its part, in the report rendered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social—SJD-1361-2021—the institution emphasized that:

"From the foregoing, it is inferred that, through the exercise of regulatory power, the Institutional Board of Directors, and based on technical actuarial studies, not only establishes the corresponding contributions for employers, workers, and the State or self-employed workers and the State, but also the minimum contribution that the Institution requires to provide its services and grant benefits in the Health Insurance and the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance; the bill, by establishing a regulation regarding the determination of social security contributions by workers, implies an invasion of the competences that the Constitution grants to the Institution in matters of government and administration of social insurance, and therefore harms what is provided in Article 73 of the Political Constitution. Likewise, it is important to consider that the technical criteria submitted by the Financial Management, Pension Management, and the Actuarial and Economic Directorate indicate a possible impact regarding the resources with which the Social Insurances administered by the Caja are financed, should the Bill be approved in the terms consulted.

Based on the preceding considerations, this Legal Directorate recommends opposition to bill file No. 22.323 Law of Equality for Workers before Social Security, given that said provision attempts against the autonomy of government and administration, granted to the institution by constitutional foundation, not only by establishing the way in which workers would contribute to the financing of Social Insurances but also in determining the Minimum Contribution Base"—the highlighting is not from the original— Given the circumstances, note that the institution itself, with expressly declared constitutional autonomy, warned the Legislative Branch that the bill was contrary to the constitutional and legal provisions governing the matter, and, moreover, clearly referred to the existence of actuarial studies submitted to the legislative file, which indicate the risk that such a legislative initiative poses to the financial stability of the insurance regimes and the institution as such.

In this sense, while the Procuraduría warns not only about the formal constitutional nonconformity of the bill, the Caja, for its part, does refer to the institutional impact that the bill could generate, for which purpose it did submit the corresponding financial studies at the legislative level.

It should also be highlighted that within the legislative process itself, the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly also warned that the bill, to the extent it seeks to regulate worker contributions, invades the scope of autonomy recognized to the Caja. Through opinion AL-DEST-IJU-212-2021, said instance stated:

“All the foregoing is brought up regarding the emphasis the Caja has on defining its administrative policies, the medical care it provides, the possibility of making compliance with obligation payments more flexible, and likewise with the invoices owed to it and the extension of deadlines and payment arrangements, among other definitions, all of which are associated with its administrative autonomy. Which is the legal possibility of carrying out its legal purpose without subjection to another entity and it possesses, in addition, government autonomy, which refers to the capacity to set its own objectives for itself, an autonomy that, as the Constitutional Chamber well indicates in the preceding citations, is distinct from and superior to that recorded in Article 188 of the Political Constitution.” —emphasis added— Likewise, emphatically and conclusively, said Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services stated in the same report that:

“It is important to retake what was proposed regarding Constitutional Article 73, from which it derives that the CCSS enjoys special autonomy, and it is through its Board of Directors that all aspects concerning its administration and direction will be established and regulated, by means of the Regulations that it defines.

From said constitutional provision, it derives that, in matters of social insurance, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social has an autonomy that goes beyond the administrative autonomy recognized in Article 188 of the Political Constitution to other autonomous institutions, given that it is also recognized a political autonomy, which grants it the capacity to define its own goals and self-direct, which as a result is incompatible with direction or the imposition of limits by another body or entity, including the Legislative Assembly itself.

Taking into account what was indicated in the analysis of this initiative and, specifically, in the autonomy that the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social enjoys, this advisory body considers that the reform in the terms proposed could present a serious injury to the autonomy granted to the CCSS and therefore a brush with unconstitutionality, such that, if no modifications exist in the proposed drafting, these would be irremediable.” —emphasis added— Thus, it is evident that the Procuraduría General de la República, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly itself all warned the related legislative bodies about the constitutional nonconformity of the bill now under review, precisely because it contradicts the definition of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, as far as the administrative and governmental autonomy of the Caja is concerned; furthermore, it is evident that the legislators were also made aware of the risks to the financial sustainability of the social security regimes and the institution itself. However, despite all this, the bill in question was reported out of committee and subsequently voted on in first debate.

Consequently, and in accordance with what is defined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, and the reiterated jurisprudential criterion on the content and scope of the autonomy of administration and government recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with respect to social insurance; and, particularly, considering that what concerns the definition of the contribution amounts, parameters, and conditions for admission and contribution to the different social security regimes established by the institution turns out to be the exclusive competence of the Caja's Board of Directors, without other governing bodies being able to attempt to influence or affect such contribution amounts, parameters, and conditions, this Chamber concludes that the consulted bill contains the substantive defect pointed out by the consulting Deputies.

This constitutional defect is shown in two aspects. The first, regarding the expansion of the parameters based on which to determine the quota or contribution, by including not only the "remuneration that under any denomination is paid" by reason of a worker relationship—as the current norm states and is the purpose of Article 3 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS—but also adding the "own income" and the "other sources of income" that the worker may have. The second, by determining that in all cases, whether employed workers, self-employed workers, or voluntary insured persons, the contribution or contribution percentage shall be the same. Note that such aspects are matters for the institution's Board of Directors to define, as already mentioned, and was concretely indicated in the referenced rulings 2003-2355 and 2021-23611, without it being viable for the ordinary legislator to impose on the institution based on what and how contributions must be fixed. The fact that the bill indicates to the Board of Directors of the Caja that it must take into consideration not only the remuneration but also other types of own income or another source of income, and that it must fix the contribution or payment percentage equally for all cases, despite their own particular and intrinsic differences, is an act that contradicts the autonomy of administration and government of social insurance, in the terms indicated here.

In this sense, the reform of Article 3 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social proposed by the bill, specifically in the aspects raised in this consultation, is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

VII.- Regarding the transitory norms and the violation of the autonomy of administration and government of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. The consulting Deputies posit that the transitory norms of the bill also contravene the autonomy of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

On this matter, recall that these transitory norms define that:

“TRANSITORY I.- Within a period not exceeding six months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, through its Board of Directors, must make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the employed worker - employer.

TRANSITORY II.- Within a period not exceeding three months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must implement and carry out the necessary mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems, so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their contributions.” Thus, the transitory norms of the bill seek to impose upon the CCSS deadlines to make the administrative adjustments to establish the equal contribution percentage, in addition to indicating the deadline to implement the mechanisms and adjustments in the corresponding computer systems.

In accordance with what has already been stated, fixing through an ordinary law derivations inherent to the exercise of governmental autonomy, such as when adjustments must be made internally within the institution, is an aspect that clearly contravenes the autonomy provided for in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, because it is evidently the competence of the Board of Directors of the Caja to define the moments in which it is appropriate to make certain adjustments regarding the procedures for determining, fixing, the collection mechanism, and other aspects of the corresponding insurance contributions. The intervention of the legislator through an ordinary law that seeks to do so is contrary to the constitutionally recognized autonomy of the CCSS, so that, following the same line of argumentation already indicated in the preceding considerando, the Chamber warns that these transitory norms of the bill are equally contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

VIII.- Regarding the second ground for consultation. The violation of the principle of reasonableness. The second ground for consultation raised by the consulting Deputies relates to what they term a violation of the principles of necessity, suitability, legitimacy, proportionality, and reasonableness, all of which is subsumed into the consultation dealing with the impact on the principle of reasonableness, since the first four mentioned aspects are, precisely, parameters for assessing and determining the eventual violation of the principle of reasonableness. In this regard, it must be stated that the assessment of the principle of reasonableness is conducted based on the so-called reasonableness test, which begins precisely by considering the legitimacy of the norm being questioned or consulted. In the case under study, in accordance with what was stated in the preceding considerandos, it is clear that the genetic source intended to be used to delve into the matter of fixing social security contributions—through a law or bill—is far from being legitimate, because through law it is entirely inappropriate, as explained above, to violate the constitutionally recognized autonomy of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Stated differently, in this case, not even the first of the elements of the reasonableness test—legitimacy—is met, so that from that point onward, it becomes unviable to proceed with the application or assessment of the other parameters.

Thus, taking into consideration the already noted constitutional defect of the bill in the terms set forth in this judgment, the Chamber considers it unnecessary to delve further into the violation of the principle of reasonableness, since, based on the assessments already made, it is determined that the bill under consultation is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, making it superfluous to carry out the reasonableness examination or test typical of these cases, and the declaration of unconstitutionality already made in the preceding considerandos suffices.

IX.- By way of conclusion. Ultimately, this optional legislative consultation of constitutionality is resolved in the sense that the bill for the "Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social" contains the substantive defects indicated by the consulting Deputies, insofar as said bill is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

X.- Note by Magistrate Garro Vargas. As the majority indicates, given that the bill directly harms the Constitution, since it prevents Parliament from legislating on the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the bill is technically sound. However, in another regulatory context, considering the subject matter, it would have been pertinent to examine matters relating to actuarial studies.

Por tanto

This optional legislative consultation of constitutionality is resolved in the sense that, with regard to the aspects specifically consulted, the bill for the "Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social", which is being processed under legislative file number 22.323, violates the autonomy of administration and government of social insurance, recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. Magistrate Garro Vargas records a note. Let it be communicated.- Similarly, Article 98 of the law of this jurisdiction indicates that in the case of bills other than constitutional amendments, the Legislative Consultation must be filed after the bill has been approved in the first debate and before receiving final approval in the second debate; this provision as a requirement for the admissibility of the Legislative Consultation finds support because it is after the first debate that greater certainty is achieved regarding the probabilities of approval of the text submitted for consultation –see, among others, rulings of this Chamber numbers 193-90 and 2017-11714-.

**II.- On the admissibility of the Legislative Consultation now being heard.** The case under study is a facultative legislative consultation of constitutionality. In accordance with what was indicated in the preceding recital, and as provided in subsection b) of Article 96 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this type of consultation must be raised by ten or more legislators, once the bill has been approved in the first debate. In this case, 15 legislators signed the consultation, so this admissibility requirement is deemed fulfilled. Likewise, the bill processed under legislative file No. 22.323 was approved in the first debate by the Plenary of the Legislative Assembly, in ordinary session number 103, of March 14, 2022. Thus, being duly grounded and having met the indicated admissibility requirements, the Chamber proceeds to hear the consultation filed.

For its part, it is important to note that in the case of facultative legislative consultations of constitutionality –such as the one now being heard–, and in accordance with the application and integration of the provisions of Articles 99 and 101 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this Chamber has indicated that its review is limited solely to the specific arguments raised by the consulting legislators in their filing brief, and not to others that could be derived but have not been so raised. Indeed, through ruling number 2001-11643 –reiterated, among others, in rulings numbers 2012-9253, 2017-11714, and 2021-21204–, the Chamber stated:

“It must also be remembered that the law itself provides in its article 101 that the Chamber shall evacuate the consultation by issuing an opinion ‘on the aspects and motives consulted or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional point of view,’ but the court interprets that ‘the aspects and motives consulted’ are those which, in accordance with article 99, question or object to the bill, or ground the doubt that the legislators might have about it. Given, then, that the consultation departs from what is legally established, it is not admissible; if the court, nonetheless, were to admit and absolve it, it would place itself in a situation that is outside the scope of its attributions.” –emphasis added- This criterion was reiterated and consolidated by the jurisprudence of the Chamber, when it determined, in the aforementioned ruling number 2012-9253, that:

“[T]his is so because ‘in the case of facultative legislative consultations, the competence of the Constitutional Chamber originates in the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators’ -ruling 2001-12459-, so that if such arguments do not exist as such, or when the consulting legislators themselves state they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the norms or bills consulted, it would be improper for the Chamber to issue any opinion, as it would be in assumptions that transcend the Chamber's competences in matters of legislative consultations of constitutionality -ruling 2002-3460-.” –highlighting is not from the original- In this sense, it is necessary to indicate that this Chamber will proceed to study only the arguments raised in a specific manner by the consultants and not other general questions of constitutionality of the bill in question, in accordance with what is regulated in Article 99 of the law governing this jurisdiction, for which reason any pronouncement on procedural and substantive defects not alleged in time by the consulting deputies is omitted.

**III.- Preliminary Matter. On the request for joinder (coadyuvancia) filed.** The Legislative Consultation of Constitutionality –be it facultative or mandatory– is a constitutional process established for the prior review of the constitutionality of laws, and by definition, reserved to be exercised during the approval process of laws by the legislators and under certain assumptions of filing and admissibility. By nature, it is a consultation process through which the Deputies who maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of a bill express their questions before the Constitutional Chamber so that it may determine if, indeed, there is some degree of constitutional nonconformity between the bill or the consulted norm and the Constitución Política. In this sense, it is a process reserved for legislators and at a specific moment in the law approval process, which is why our legislation does not contemplate the possibility of filing any type of joinder (coadyuvancia) to the consultations raised by the legislators. Thus, what formally corresponds is to declare the inadmissibility of the request for joinder (coadyuvancia) referred to in the sixth resultando of this ruling. In this sense, in view of the statements made by Mr. Prendas Rodríguez through a brief received on March 25, 2022, expressing his support for the bill being consulted, what corresponds is to add them to the file, without a special pronouncement regarding their content -see in similar sense, rulings 2016-15712 and 2021-21204-.

**IV.- On the precision in citing the articles consulted and the necessary expression and grounding of the motives for consultation in legislative consultations.** Article 99 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional clearly indicates that in the case of a facultative consultation of constitutionality, it must be raised through a reasoned memorial, in which the aspects of the bill being questioned are expressed, as well as the motives for which there is doubt or objections regarding its constitutionality. This provision determines –and has been repeatedly recognized by constitutional jurisprudence– that the filing brief must express the articles of the bill whose constitutionality is questioned or consulted, and clearly state the motives for which it is estimated that a norm of the bill may be unconstitutional, since otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible –see, in this sense, rulings numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643, 2012-9253–. Indeed, on the matter, the Chamber has stated that:

“In this case, the consultants do not indicate the articles of the bill they question, nor the motives for which they have doubts or objections about its constitutionality, and simply indicate the topic consulted, dispensing with making any type of constitutional argument, therefore it is not appropriate to evacuate the consultation. This has been repeatedly resolved by constitutional jurisprudence and for that reason, the appropriate course is that there is no grounds to evacuate the formulated consultation.” Beyond the specific citation of the articles whose constitutionality is consulted, as has been indicated, the motives for which the legislative consultation is formulated must also be clear and express, detailing the reasons for which the deputies maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of the consulted norms. In this regard, the Chamber has stated that if the arguments are omitted, insufficient, or vague, the consultation must be inadmissible and, therefore, not subject to evacuation, as this Court would not have the express motives on which to rule. Indeed, the Chamber has stated that:

“It must also be remembered that the law itself provides in its article 101 that the Chamber shall evacuate the consultation by issuing an opinion ‘on the aspects and motives consulted or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional point of view,’ but the court interprets that ‘the aspects and motives consulted’ are those which, in accordance with article 99, question or object to the bill, or ground the doubt that the legislators might have about it. Given, then, that the consultation departs from what is legally established, it is not admissible; if the court, nonetheless, were to admit and absolve it, it would place itself in a situation that is outside the scope of its attributions. Magistrates Sancho, Vargas, and Armijo, dissent and declare that the facultative consultation of constitutionality on the Bill ‘Ley del Estatuto de Servicio de la Asamblea Legislativa’, File No. 11.839, is evacuated, in the sense that it is unconstitutional for article 18, insofar as it exempts a group of Legislative Assembly officials from the prohibition that applies to other public servants, of directly linking themselves with the political parties to which they belong.” -ruling 2001-11643- Thus, if a consultation proves to be imprecise in citing the articles or in setting forth the motives for which there are well-founded doubts of constitutionality, it would be inadmissible and not subject to evacuation. And this is so because “in the case of facultative legislative consultations, the competence of the Constitutional Chamber originates in the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators” -rulings 2001-12459 and 2012-9253-, so that if such arguments do not exist as such, or when the consulting legislators themselves state they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the norms or bills consulted, it would be improper for the Chamber to issue any opinion, as it would be in assumptions that transcend the Chamber's competences in matters of legislative consultations of constitutionality –rulings 2002-3460, 2012-9253, and 2021-21204–.

**V.- Object of the consultation.** The consulting Deputies raise as the object of their consultation that the bill called “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social,” legislative file number 22.323, which amends Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and includes two transitory norms, is contrary to the autonomy of administration and government of said institution, as provided in Article 73 of the Constitución Política, and as has been recognized and developed by constitutional jurisprudence.

The bill whose norms are consulted states:

**“LEY DE IGUALDAD PARA LOS TRABAJADORES** **ANTE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL** **CHAPTER I** **SOLE ARTICLE-** Article 3 of Law 17, Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social CCSS, of October 22, 1943, is amended. The text is the following:

Article 3- The coverages of social security –and entry into it– are mandatory for all manual and intellectual workers who receive a wage or salary or own income. The amount of the contributions that by this law must be paid shall be calculated on the total of the remunerations that under any denomination are paid, by reason of or derived from the worker-employer relationship or other source of income.

The worker's contribution to social security shall be the same percentage in all cases whose income is equal to or greater than the legal minimum wage for the generic unskilled worker established by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. The reference for this percentage shall be that established for the worker under the worker-employer insurance scheme. No differences may be established between salaried, independent, voluntary workers, or any other type of insured stipulated by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Independent workers shall be exempt from paying the employer contribution.

The Junta Directiva is authorized to take measures aimed at contributing to medical care for the indigent, in professional risks and accidents, and in the preventive medicine campaign.

The Caja shall determine, by regulation, the entry requirements for each protection scheme, as well as the benefits and the conditions under which they will be granted; for such regulations, requirements, benefits, and conditions, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must equitably respect the right to health protection of all workers.

The Junta Directiva shall take the necessary agreements to progressively extend its services throughout the country, as its material and human resources allow.

For independent workers, whose net income is less than the legal minimum wage and who request their affiliation to the Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte of the CCSS, the State contribution shall be increased in order to partially compensate for the absence of the employer contribution. For such purposes, a special permanent program shall be created under the Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares (Fodesaf).

**CHAPTER II** **TRANSITORY PROVISIONS** **TRANSITORY I-** Within a period not exceeding six months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, through its Junta Directiva, must make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the worker under the worker-employer scheme.

**TRANSITORY II-** Within a period not exceeding three months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must implement and carry out the necessary mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems, so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their contributions.

It shall be in force upon its publication.” -emphasis added- In the cited norms, the aspects regarding which the consulting Deputies state they have doubts of constitutionality are highlighted, centering their motives for consultation around the violation of the autonomy of administration and government recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as far as social security is concerned. Based on this argument of impact on the autonomy of the Caja, it is noted that no consultations are raised for reasons of form or procedure; rather, two specific aspects are consulted for substantive reasons, which are resolved as indicated in the following recitals.

**VI.- On the first ground for consultation. The violation of the autonomy of administration and government of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.** The consulting Deputies argue that the determination of the parameters to define the contribution amounts (cuotas) and contribution rates for the different groups of workers affiliated with the social security schemes administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is a function that falls within the sphere of autonomy and government constitutionally recognized to the institution, whose Junta Directiva defines such aspects based on the corresponding actuarial studies. They add that as such power falls within the sphere of constitutional autonomy, the ordinary legislator is prevented from imposing such parameters on the Caja.

Thus, if the bill of law seeks to define the parameters based on which the contribution percentages of insured persons are determined, while at the same time seeking to establish that, autonomously with respect to their status as independent or salaried workers, all workers must contribute the same percentage—based on the rate paid by salaried workers—the bill in question would be contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

In this regard, the cited constitutional norm states, as pertinent, that:

“ARTICLE 73.- Social security is established for the benefit of manual and intellectual workers, regulated by a system of compulsory contribution from the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect them against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law may determine.

The administration and governance of the social security system shall be entrusted to an autonomous institution, called the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.” To understand the issue of the autonomy of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as provided for in the Political Constitution, it is particularly important to bear in mind the previous and reiterated definitions of constitutional jurisprudence on the matter. From its early years, this Chamber has been ruling on the issue of the Caja's autonomy in this aspect, such that, through judgment number 6256-94, it differentiated the autonomy of the CCSS from that recognized to other public sector institutions, stating in this regard that:

“The norm [of Article 73 of the Political Constitution] exclusively grants to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social the administration and governance of social security, a degree of autonomy that is, of course, distinct from and superior to that generally defined in Article 188 idem…” – emphasis supplied – The degree of autonomy recognized to the Caja, based on Article 73 of the Constitution and the recently cited jurisprudential criterion, was further specified, when it was defined that such a level of autonomy prevents interference or intervention by the Executive Branch, and, for the purposes relevant to this consultation, it was also indicated that the legislator itself encounters a limitation in said autonomy, by which it must comply with the Constitution, and is prevented from adopting legislation that involves itself in specific aspects that are the institution's responsibility to define. Thus, through judgments 2012-17736 and 2021-17098, the Chamber stated that this autonomy:

“Means a degree of protection against interference by the Executive Branch, but also limitations on the intervention of the Legislative Branch. Although the CCSS is certainly not beyond the reach of the law, the latter cannot ‘modify or alter’ the competence and autonomy constitutionally granted to the CCSS, by defining aspects that are its exclusive domain. The Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, being fundamentally an autonomous institution of constitutional creation, the subject matter of its competence, constitutionally granted, lies outside the action of the law. In other words, the legislator, in the case of the administration and governance of social security, has limitations, and must respect what the Constituent Assembly established. Just as the legislator would be prohibited from issuing a law directing that the administration and governance of social security no longer corresponds to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, likewise, it cannot issue a law that intrudes into aspects proper or corresponding to the definition by the CCSS, in the administration and governance of social security.” – emphasis is not from the original –.

Thus, it is quite clear that the ordinary legislator is prevented from adopting laws that interfere with the exercise of the competences constitutionally assigned to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, such as, precisely, the administration and governance of social security. It is important to highlight this degree of autonomy, because, according to what has been said, it goes beyond simple administration, since noting that the autonomy is also ‘of governance’ makes a direct reference to the definition of the aspects based on which the ‘administration’ autonomy will also be exercised. In this sense, both aspects of autonomy converge in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, by express provision of the constituent assembly, and because such definition has been recognized and indicated by constitutional jurisprudence.

In the aforementioned judgment 2021-17098, the Chamber further specified that degree of autonomy, explaining that:

“It must be highlighted that the norm defining the functions and purposes of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is located in our Magna Carta in the chapter on social rights and guarantees, whereas the sections referring to Autonomous Institutions are located in a different Title XIV; the difference in location reflects, from a systematic and systemic interpretation, that the fundamental norm itself, in creating the social security institution, seeks to provide it with protection based on solidarity and priority for the person due to their own condition; it is evidently an institution that assumes the spirit of solidarity inspiring Articles fifty and seventy-four of the Constitution. The aim is for every person to have the guarantee that the supportive State assures them health, a pension, disability benefits, and everything related to social security. This provision becomes not only an end or guide for State action, but also a limit in itself, by ensuring that neither the Executive Branch nor the Legislative Branch could undermine said constitutional competence (...) From the foregoing, it follows that the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), by constitutional provision (Art. 73), enjoys administrative and governance autonomy. This means that, as a functionally decentralized entity, it can establish the rules for the selection of its personnel, the existence of a special regulatory framework for its statutory relationship being valid in this case, which addresses and ensures its degree of autonomy. That degree of autonomy also allows it to self-administer (dispose of its human, material, and financial resources); to establish its own internal organization; the setting of purposes, goals, and types of means to achieve them; the issuance of autonomous regulations for service or activity, in accordance with provisions normally called general policy. Thus then, as an autonomous institution of constitutional creation and with a greater degree of autonomy (administrative and governance), it is allowed to be protected against interference from the Executive Branch and from limitations when legislating for the Legislative Branch (which cannot modify its degree of autonomy by law).” – emphasis is not from the original –.

Even more concretely, dealing already with the setting of quotas and the parameters for their determination, the jurisprudence is also conclusive in indicating that the definition of the conditions, benefits, and entry requirements for each social security regime administered and governed by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is an exclusive power and competence of the institution itself, without the legislator being permitted to issue norms that affect the autonomy regarding this specific aspect. Thus, through judgment number 2003-2355, reiterated by judgment number 2021-23611, this Chamber established that:

“By means of Articles 3 and 23 of the Constituent Law of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, its Board of Directors has full competence to establish the scope of the benefits proper to social security via regulation, so that it can define the conditions, benefits, and entry requirements for each protection regime, based on actuarial studies, in order not to break the system.” – emphasis added –.

In this sense, it is clear that if ‘defining the conditions, benefits, and entry requirements for each protection regime’ is an exclusive power of the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, by virtue of the degree of autonomy granted and recognized to it, it is also clear that such definitions lie outside the orbit and scope of action of other entities, institutions, and Branches of the State, so that if any act or any regulation were issued that affected that exclusive power and competence, Article 73 of the Political Constitution, and the level or degree of autonomy that said constitutional article recognizes to the CCSS, would be violated.

It should be noted that the ordinary legislator recognizes this exclusive power and competence of the institution upon which it now seeks to impact or involve itself. Observe that, following the criterion defined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, Article 23 of the same Constituent Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social expressly provided that:

“Article 23.- The quotas and benefits shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in accordance with the cost of the services to be provided in each region and in conformity with the respective actuarial calculations.” – emphasis is not from the original –.

That is to say, in the exercise of the legislative function, the legislator has recognized that administrative and governance autonomy, because in an absolutely clear manner, it leaves the definition of quotas and benefits to the Board of Directors of the CCSS, in the same sense that this Chamber also recognizes it in the already referenced judgments numbers 2003-2355 and 2021-23611. This norm of Article 23 of the Constituent Law of the CCSS is not subject to reform in the bill of law now being heard, so it is also noted that the questioned law proposal would be generating some type of normative or legislative incongruence, because, on one hand, it is the legislator who seeks to define that the contribution percentage must be equal in all cases, while in another norm of the same law, it already defines that such aspect shall be set by the institution's Board of Directors, the latter being the criterion consistent with the degree of administrative and governance autonomy constitutionally recognized to the Caja.

On the other hand, it is also important to note that during the processing of the legislative file number 22.323 – regarding this bill of law – there are separate pronouncements from the Procuraduría General de la República and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in similar terms to those set forth here, which support the fact that the object of the bill of law contradicts the institution’s autonomy.

In the report issued by the Procuraduría -OJ-125-2021-, the State's advisory body expressly stated that:

“Such an initiative does invade the spheres constitutionally reserved to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, because it seeks to regulate the terms under which the contributions of salaried, independent, and voluntary workers must be established to obtain the protection of social security, which forms part of the autonomy constitutionally attributed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (..) Note that the bill of law being analyzed not only establishes imperative rules regarding contributions, but also indicates to the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social the deadline within which it must implement the proposed changes, all of which exceeds the powers held by the legislator in this matter. (…) It is important to further warn that the bill of law makes no reference to financial or actuarial studies analyzing the financial impact that the proposal could have, which ignores the technical rigor that must prevail in these matters. The foregoing despite the fact that the Constitutional Chamber has insisted that setting the conditions under which social security is to operate is an exclusive attribution of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social…” – emphasis supplied –.

Thus, the Procuraduría not only warned of the constitutional nonconformity of the bill in the terms that have been developed here, but also indicated that the law proposal, which impacts the institution's financial definitions, lacked even actuarial studies. In this regard, it is necessary to point out and emphasize that it is this Chamber's criterion that, even if some type of financial or actuarial study existed that attempted to support a bill of law like the one now being heard, the existence of such studies would not give rise to or permit the issuance of this type of legislation, because, in accordance with what has been said, it concerns a matter reserved to the administrative and governance autonomy constitutionally granted and recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social itself, and not to any other public body or instance.

For its part, in the report issued by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social -SJD-1361-2021-, the institution emphasized that:

“From the foregoing, it is inferred that, through the exercise of regulatory power, the Institutional Board of Directors, and based on technical actuarial studies, not only establishes the contributions corresponding to employers, workers, and the State or independent workers and the State, but also the minimum contribution that the Institution requires to provide its services and grant benefits in the Health Insurance and the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance; being that the bill of law, by establishing a regulation on the matter of determining social security contributions by workers, implies an invasion of the competences that the Constitution grants to the Institution in matters of governance and administration of social security, and therefore harms the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. Likewise, it is important to consider that the technical criteria submitted by the Financial Management, Pension Management, and the Actuarial and Economic Directorate indicate a possible impact on the resources with which the Social Security administered by the Caja are financed, should the Bill of Law be approved under the terms consulted.

Based on the preceding considerations, this Legal Directorate recommends opposition to the bill of law file No. 22.323 Law of Equality for Workers before Social Security, given that said provision violates the governance and administration autonomy, granted to the institution with constitutional roots, not only by establishing the way in which workers would contribute to the financing of Social Security but also in determining the Minimum Contribution Base” – emphasis is not from the original –.

Thus, note that the institution itself, with expressly declared constitutional autonomy, warned the Legislative Branch that the law proposal was contrary to the constitutional and legal provisions governing the matter, and, furthermore, clearly referred to the existence of actuarial studies provided to the legislative file, which indicate the risk that such a law initiative poses to the financial stability of the insurance regimes and the institution as such.

In this sense, while the Procuraduría warns not only of the formal constitutional nonconformity of the bill of law, the Caja, for its part, does refer to the institutional impact that the bill could generate, for which it did provide the corresponding financial studies in the legislative venue.

It should also be highlighted that, within the legislative process itself, the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Asamblea Legislativa also warned that the law proposal, to the extent that it seeks to regulate the quotas of workers, invades the sphere of autonomy recognized to the Caja. Through opinion AL-DEST-IJU-212-2021, said body expressed:

“All of the foregoing is brought up regarding the emphasis that the Caja has on the definition of its administrative policies, the medical care it provides, the possibility of making the fulfillment of obligations related to quotas more flexible, and likewise with the bills owed to it and the extension of terms and payment arrangements, among other definitions, all of them associated with its administrative autonomy.” This, which is the legal possibility of carrying out its legal purpose without being subject to another entity, also possesses autonomy of government, which refers to the capacity to dictate its own objectives, an autonomy that, as the Constitutional Chamber well indicates in the preceding citations, is different from and superior to that which is enshrined in Article 188 of the Political Constitution.” -emphasis added- Likewise, emphatically and conclusively, the aforementioned Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services stated in the same report that:

“It is important to return to what was raised regarding Article 73 of the Constitution, from which it is derived that the CCSS enjoys special autonomy, and it is through its Board of Directors that all aspects concerning its administration and direction will be established and regulated, by means of the Regulations that it defines.

From this constitutional norm, it derives that in matters of social security, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund has an autonomy that goes beyond the administrative autonomy recognized in Article 188 of the Political Constitution for other autonomous institutions, since it is also recognized as having political autonomy, which grants it the capacity to define its own goals and self-direct, which consequently results in being incompatible with the direction or imposition of limits by another organ or entity, including the Legislative Assembly itself.

Taking into account what was indicated in the analysis of this initiative and, specifically, the autonomy enjoyed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, this advisory body considers that the reform in the terms proposed could present a serious injury to the autonomy granted to the CCSS and therefore a brush with unconstitutionality, such that, if no modifications are made to the proposed wording, these would be irremediable.” -emphasis added- Thus, it is evident that the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the Legislative Assembly's own Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services, all warned the relevant legislative bodies about the constitutional nonconformity of the bill now being heard, precisely for contravening the definition of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, regarding the Fund's administrative and government autonomy; furthermore, it is evident that the legislators were also made aware of the risks to the financial sustainability of the social security regimes and the institution itself. Notwithstanding all of this, the bill in question was reported out of committee and subsequently voted on in the first debate.

Consequently, and in accordance with what is defined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, and the reiterated jurisprudential criterion on the content and scope of the administrative and government autonomy recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund regarding social security matters; and, particularly, considering that matters concerning the definition of the quotas, parameters, and conditions for entry and contribution to the different social security regimes established by the institution, are the exclusive competence of the Fund's Board of Directors, without other government bodies being able to attempt to affect or influence such quotas, parameters, and conditions, this Chamber concludes that the consulted bill contains the substantive defect pointed out by the consulting deputies.

This constitutional defect is manifested in two aspects. The first, regarding the expansion of the parameters based on which to determine the quota or contribution, by including not only the “remuneration under any denomination that is paid” by reason of a labor relationship—as the current norm states and is the purpose of Article 3 of the CCSS Constitutive Law (Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS)—but also adding the “own income” and the “other sources of income” that the worker may have. The second, in determining that in all cases, whether salaried workers, independent workers, or voluntary insured persons, the contribution percentage will be the same. Note that such aspects are the purview of the institution's Board of Directors, as has already been mentioned, and was concretely indicated in the cited rulings 2003-2355 and 2021-23611, without it being viable for the ordinary legislator to impose on the institution based on what and how contributions should be set. The fact that the bill instructs the Fund's Board of Directors that it must take into consideration not only remuneration but also other types of own income or another source of income, and that it must set the contribution percentage equally for all cases, despite their own particular and intrinsic differences, is an act that contravenes the administrative and government autonomy of social security, in the terms indicated here.

In this sense, the reform of Article 3 of the CCSS Constitutive Law proposed by the bill, specifically in the aspects raised in this consultation, is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

**VII.- Regarding the transitory norms and the violation of the administrative and government autonomy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.** The consulting deputies raise that the bill's transitory norms also contravene the autonomy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.

In this regard, recall that these transitory norms define that:

**“TRANSITORIO l-** In a period no longer than six months after the entry into force of this law, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, through its Board of Directors, must make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the worker-employer.

**TRANSITORIO ll-** In a period no longer than three months after the entry into force of this law, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund must implement and make the necessary mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems, so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their contributions.” Thus, the bill's transitory norms intend to impose upon the CCSS deadlines to make administrative adjustments to establish the equal contribution percentage, in addition to setting the term to implement the corresponding mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems.

In accordance with what has already been stated, setting derivations specific to the exercise of government autonomy through an ordinary law, such as when internal institutional adjustments must be made, is an aspect that clearly contravenes the autonomy provided for in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, since it is evidently the competence of the Fund's Board of Directors to define the moments when it is appropriate to make certain adjustments regarding the procedures for determining, setting, the mechanism for collection, and others, of the corresponding insurance contributions. The intervention of the legislator through an ordinary law that seeks to do so is contrary to the constitutionally recognized autonomy of the CCSS; therefore, under the same line of argument already indicated in the preceding recital, the Chamber warns that these transitory norms of the bill are equally contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

**VIII.- Regarding the second reason for consultation. The violation of the principle of reasonableness.** The second reason for consultation raised by the consulting deputies relates to what they term a violation of the principles of necessity, suitability, legitimacy, proportionality, and reasonableness, all of which is subsumed in that the consultation concerns the impact on the principle of reasonableness, since the first four aspects mentioned are, precisely, parameters to assess and determine the eventual violation of the principle of reasonableness. In this regard, it must be noted that the assessment of the principle of reasonableness is made based on the so-called reasonableness test, which begins, precisely, by considering the legitimacy of the norm being questioned or consulted. In the case under study, in accordance with what was indicated in the preceding recitals, it is clear that the genetic source that is intended to be used to delve into the issue of setting social security contributions—through a law or draft law—is far from legitimate, since through law it is entirely improper, according to what was explained above, to violate the constitutionally recognized autonomy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. Stated another way, in this case, not even the first of the elements of the reasonableness test—legitimacy—is met, and therefore, from that point on, proceeding with the application or assessment of the other parameters is unfeasible. Thus, taking into consideration the already indicated constitutional nonconformity of the bill in the terms set forth in this ruling, the Chamber considers it unnecessary to delve deeper into the violation of the principle of reasonableness, given that, based on the assessments already made, it is determined that the consulted bill is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution; therefore, carrying out the exam or reasonableness test customary in these cases is superfluous, and the declaration of unconstitutionality already made in the preceding recitals suffices.

**IX.- By way of conclusion.** In short, this optional legislative consultation on constitutionality is resolved, in the sense that the bill for the “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social” contains the substantive defects pointed out by the consulting Deputies, insofar as said bill is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

**X.- Note by Magistrate Garro Vargas.** As the majority indicates, given that the bill frontally injures the Constitution, as it prevents Parliament from legislating on the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the bill is technically well-founded. However, in another normative context, given the subject matter, it would have been pertinent to examine what is relative to actuarial studies.

**Por tanto** This optional legislative consultation on constitutionality is resolved, in the sense that, regarding the aspects specifically consulted, the bill for the “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, which is being processed under legislative file number 22.323, violates the administrative and government autonomy of social security, recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. Magistrate Garro Vargas appends a note. Comuníquese.- **Fernando Castillo V.** **Presidente** **Paul Rueda L.** **Luis Fdo. Salazar A.** **Jorge Araya G.** **Anamari Garro V.** **José Roberto Garita N.** **Rosibel Jara V.** This provision establishes—and it has been repeatedly recognized by constitutional case law—that the filing brief must state the articles of the bill whose constitutionality is challenged or consulted, and must clearly set forth the reasons why a provision of the bill is deemed unconstitutional, since otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible…” CO07/22 ARTICLE 83 OF THE LAW OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION. “…The Legislative Consultation of Constitutionality—whether optional or mandatory—is a constitutional proceeding established for the prior review of the constitutionality of laws, and by definition, reserved to be exercised during the legislative approval process by the legislators and under certain filing and admissibility requirements. By its nature, it is a consultation process through which Deputies who maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of a bill present their questions to the Constitutional Chamber so that it may determine whether, in fact, there exists some degree of constitutional nonconformity between the bill or the provision consulted and the Political Constitution. In this sense, it is a proceeding reserved to legislators and at a specific moment in the legislative approval process, which is why our legislation does not contemplate the possibility of filing any type of coadjuvancy (coadyuvancia) to the consultations raised by legislators…” CO07/22 ARTICLE 73 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. “…it is quite clear that the ordinary legislator is prevented from adopting laws that interfere with the exercise of the powers constitutionally assigned to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which are, precisely, the administration and government of social security. It is important to highlight this degree of autonomy because, as stated, it goes beyond simple administration, since stating that the autonomy is also ‘of government’ makes a direct reference to the definition of the aspects from which the autonomy ‘of administration’ will also be exercised. In this sense, both aspects of autonomy converge in the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, by express mandate of the constituent power, and because this definition has been recognized and indicated as such by constitutional case law…” “…in accordance with what is defined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, and the reiterated jurisprudential criterion regarding the content and scope of the autonomy of administration and government recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund with respect to social security; and, particularly, considering that matters concerning the definition of the quotas, parameters, and conditions of entry and contribution to the different social security regimes established by the institution are the exclusive competence of the Fund’s Board of Directors, without other government bodies being able to attempt to affect or influence such quotas, parameters, and conditions, this Chamber concludes that the bill under consultation contains the substantive defect pointed out by the consulting Deputies…” CO07/22 X.- Note by Magistrate Garro Vargas. As the majority indicates, given that the bill directly violates the Constitution, since it prohibits Parliament from legislating on this matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the bill is technically substantiated. However, in another regulatory context, given the subject matter, it would have been pertinent to examine matters relating to actuarial studies.

CO07/22 Descriptor: SOCIAL SECURITY. EQUALITY OF WORKERS BEFORE SOCIAL SECURITY Sentencia: 009345-22 of April 26, 2022 Tipo de asunto: Consulta Legislativa Facultativa Norma impugnada: Proyecto de Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social. No. 22.323 Parte dispositiva: This optional legislative consultation of constitutionality is answered in the sense that, with respect to the aspects specifically consulted, the bill “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social,” being processed under legislative file number 22.323, violates the autonomy of administration and government of social security recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. Magistrate Garro Vargas records a note. Let this be communicated.- CO08/22 They emphasize that the autonomy of the Caja is a second-degree autonomy, that is, of political or governmental autonomy, as the institution requires this to adequately resolve, without political pressure, very important technical issues, such as defining the final amount of the worker-employer quotas that must be paid to the Caja, whether on a temporary basis or until further notice, and they refer, in the same vein, to the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, which specifically indicates that the autonomy must be such that it allows the institution to collect the economic resources represented in the contributions instituted by the constituent power, and guarantee the existence of the self-sufficient social security regime.

They mention that the proposed reform does not modify Article 23 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, which is an auxiliary provision to Article 3 that is intended to be reformed.

They emphasize that determining the economic amount of the quotas, and calculating that amount, is a matter that constitutionally does not fall within the competence of the ordinary legislator, especially, attempting to impose a new institutional policy on the Board of Directors of the CCSS in matters of decisions regarding the economic treatment of the sector of insured independent workers, and, specifically, the determination of the fundamental percentages of the amount of the quotas to be charged to them. They reiterate that the Legislative Assembly lacks competence to interfere in technical and even political matters, constitutionally reserved to the governmental autonomy of the Caja, so in this case, they consider that the principle of the legislator’s free configuration would not be applicable.

They refer that when the Procuraduría General de la República was consulted within the framework of the committee discussion of the legislative file in question, the Procuraduría indicated that the initiative does invade the spheres constitutionally reserved to the Caja, because it intends to regulate the terms under which to establish the contribution of the different types of workers, which is part of the autonomy constitutionally attributed to the institution. They add that, in the same opinion, the Procuraduría indicated that the proposed law not only imposes imperative rules regarding contributions, but also imposes deadlines on the Caja to implement the proposed changes, which exceeds the legislator's power.

They emphasize that we are in the presence of legislative acts of undue interference, and even supplanting of institutional authority, to the detriment of the technical-scientific and political competence of the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, despite the fact that constitutional jurisprudence defines the competence of the Legislative Assembly as insufficient to modify, by means of a law, an open list of aspects pertaining to the political autonomy of the Caja. They also point out that jurisprudence has recently established that defining the requirements for admission to the social security regime is the competence of the institution's Board of Directors, while at the same time considering as reasonable the complementary regulation granted by Article 23 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, which establishes that the quotas and benefits shall be determined by the Board of Directors, according to the cost of the services and in accordance with the respective actuarial calculations.

In this way, they conclude that the proposed reform of Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social violates the autonomy of the institution enshrined in Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

The **second substantive reason for consultation** raised by the petitioners concerns the violation of the principles of necessity, suitability, legitimacy, proportionality, and reasonableness, as well as the violation of the principle of equality. **Regarding necessity**, they explain that the statement of motives of the bill mentions that the Board of Directors of the Caja has made differentiations in the contributions of workers under the worker-employer regime, and the contributions of independent workers, who contribute more, which is why it is considered necessary for all workers to contribute the same percentage because the care is the same for everyone. The petitioners explain that the necessity of the measure is directly linked to proportionality, and that one must question whether the bill would generate greater justice among social security contributors.

They provide a table that they claim comes from the Dirección Actuarial y Económica de la Caja, in which they show the five ascending categories or scales of contributions of independent workers according to their contributions, and they emphasize that only 1% of independent workers are in the fourth and fifth groups, which are the people who have the highest contribution percentages. For their part, they state that 96% of independent workers are in the first two categories, so if the contribution of independent workers were equalized with that of workers under the worker-employer insurance, the effect would be that those in the highest categories, who are people with higher incomes, will see their contribution reduced, while those with lower incomes will pay more than those with higher incomes. Thus, they indicate, there is a clear violation of the principle of equality.

In the same way, they continue, it is evident that the proposed norm is not only unnecessary, but also **disproportionate**, because it would only benefit less than 1% of people, so that they contribute less, and causing the rest—96%—to bear the greater part of the burden in relation to their income.

In this sense, they affirm that the proposal is absolutely regressive, and therefore **does not meet the requirement of being a suitable measure** to achieve the intended objective, but rather generates greater inequality and disproportionality among people contributing to social security. They emphasize that "the norm seeks to benefit a few who earn more, to the detriment also of social security, which will be affected by the measure by receiving fewer contributions." They explain that the Caja warned of this, stating that "it could cause an impact on the income of the Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte and the cost-benefit studies of the new scheme are not provided." They add that the lack of actuarial studies and technical studies in general to support the proposal makes it impossible to conduct a reasonableness review, but it is clear that the project would affect the finances of the Seguro de Enfermedad y Maternidad, and the Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, as a consequence of the decrease in the contribution of independent workers with higher incomes.

Regarding **legitimacy**, they point out that the enactment of a law does not correspond to the legitimate means for regulating the contributions, amounts, and deadlines of social insurance, since the Caja has constitutional autonomy for the administration and governance of social insurance, meaning that such reforms must be carried out with the corresponding technical studies, by the institution's Board of Directors. Attempting to regulate this matter by law so that there is equality of contributions represents an unnecessary restriction on the options that the technical bodies of the Caja have to configure the distribution of tripartite or bipartite contribution rates, depending on the type of worker and their contribution capacities.

They mention that the objectives pursued can be achieved through regulatory reforms carried out by the Board of Directors, within the framework of the legal and constitutional powers granted to said body, in full exercise of the autonomy for the administration and governance of social insurance.

Thus, they consider that the bill does not comply with the constitutional principles of necessity, proportionality, reasonableness, legitimacy, and suitability, while at the same time violating the principle of equality, placing the greater part of the contribution burden on independent workers with lower incomes.

**2.-** By official communication from the Presidency of this Chamber, number PSC-0040-2022, dated March 22, 2022, the President of the Legislative Assembly was notified of the filing of this Discretionary Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality.

**3.-** By resolution of the Presidency of this Chamber, at ten hours eight minutes on March 23, 2022, this Discretionary Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality is admitted, and the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly is requested to remit legislative file number 22.323.

**4.-** By official communication received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on March 25, 2022, the President of the Legislative Assembly remits a certified copy of legislative file number 22.323. Consequently, and taking into consideration the period during which Holy Week of this year 2022 is celebrated and commemorated, the deadline to evacuate the consultation expires on May 2, 2022.

**5.-** By resolution of the Presidency of this Chamber, at ten hours fifty-one minutes on March 25, 2022, the certified copy of legislative file number 22.323 is considered received and this consultation is assigned for its due cognizance.

**6.-** By written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on March 25, 2022, Deputy Jonathan Prendas Rodríguez presents a passive joinder and opposes the aspects raised by the female and male deputies signing the present consultation, outlining his arguments and criteria on the subjects of consultation, and therefore requests that the bill be declared constitutional.

**7.-** In the proceedings, the provisions of law have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Araya García; and, **Considering** **I.- On the filing of the Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality.** The prior advisory opinion on legislative projects may be requested in a mandatory manner—subsection a) of Article 96 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional—or in a discretionary manner—subsections b), c), and ch) of the same norm. In this latter case, there are three scenarios: in the first, it is the parliamentary body itself that makes the request—when presented by no fewer than ten deputies-; in the second, it concerns the consultation of bills referring to the constitutional competence of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, or the Contraloría General de la República, a consultation that must be presented by these same bodies; and, in the third, the consultation can be presented by the Defensor de los Habitantes when they consider that fundamental rights or freedoms are being infringed. Likewise, Article 98 of the law of this jurisdiction indicates that in the case of bills other than constitutional reforms, the Legislative Consultation must be filed after the bill has been approved in the first debate and before receiving final approval in the second debate; this provision as an admissibility requirement for the Legislative Consultation finds its basis because it is after the first debate that greater certainty about the probabilities of approval of the text submitted for consultation is achieved—see, among others, decisions of this Chamber numbers 193-90 and 2017-11714-.

**II.- On the admissibility of the Legislative Consultation now under consideration.** The case under study is a discretionary legislative consultation on constitutionality. In accordance with what was indicated in the preceding considering clause, and pursuant to the provisions of subsection b) of Article 96 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this type of consultation must be raised by ten or more deputies, once the bill has been approved in the first debate. In this case, 15 legislators signed the consultation, such that this admissibility requirement is considered fulfilled. Likewise, the bill being processed under legislative file No. 22.323 was approved in the first debate by the Plenary of the Legislative Assembly, at ordinary session number 103, on March 14, 2022. In this way, being duly grounded and having fulfilled the indicated admissibility requirements, the Chamber proceeds to hear the consultation filed.

For its part, it is important to note that in the case of discretionary legislative consultations on constitutionality—like the one now under consideration—, and in accordance with the application and integration of the provisions of Articles 99 and 101 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this Chamber has indicated that its cognizance is limited solely to the specific arguments raised by the consulting deputies in their filing brief, and not to others that could be derived but have not been so raised. Indeed, by decision number 2001-11643—reiterated, among others, in decisions numbers 2012-9253, 2017-11714, and 2021-21204-, the Chamber stated:

"It should also be remembered that the same law provides in its Article 101 that the Chamber will evacuate the consultation by issuing a ruling 'on the aspects and motives consulted or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional point of view', **but the court interprets that 'the aspects and motives consulted' are those which, in accordance with Article 99, question or object to the project, or ground the doubt that the legislators might have about it**. Given, then, that the consultation departs from what is legally established, it is not admissible; **if the court, nevertheless, admitted and absolved it, it would place itself in a situation that is outside the scope of its attributions**." –emphasis added- This criterion was reiterated and consolidated by the jurisprudence of the Chamber, when it determined, in the already cited decision number 2012-9253, that:

"[T]his is so because, 'in the case of legislative consultations of a discretionary type, **the competence of the Sala Constitucional originates in the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators**' -decision 2001-12459-, such that if such arguments do not exist as such, or rather, when the consulting deputies themselves state that they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the norms or projects consulted, **it would be improper for the Chamber to issue any opinion, since it would be in situations that transcend the competencies of the Chamber in matters of legislative consultations on constitutionality** -decision 2002-3460-." –the highlighting is not from the original- In this sense, it is necessary to indicate that this Chamber will address only the allegations raised in a punctual manner by the petitioners and not other general questions of constitutionality of the bill in question, in accordance with the provisions of Article 99 of the law governing this jurisdiction, and therefore any pronouncement on procedural and substantive defects not alleged in time by the female and male consulting deputies is omitted.

**III.- Preliminary. On the joinder request filed.** The Legislative Consultation on Constitutionality—whether discretionary or mandatory—is a process of a constitutional nature established for the prior review of the constitutionality of laws, and by definition, reserved to be exercised during the approval process of laws by legislators and under certain filing and admissibility scenarios. By its nature, it is a consultation process through which Deputies who maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of a bill express their questions before the Sala Constitucional so that it can be determined whether, in effect, there exists some degree of constitutional nonconformity between the bill or the norm consulted, and the Political Constitution. In this sense, it is a process reserved to legislators and at a specific moment in the law approval procedure, which is why our legislation does not contemplate the possibility of filing any type of joinder to the consultations raised by legislators. Thus, what formally corresponds is to declare the inadmissibility of the joinder request referred to in the sixth recital of this decision. In this sense, in view of the statements made by Mr. Prendas Rodríguez through a brief received on March 25, 2022, expressing his support for the bill being consulted, what corresponds is to add them to the file, without a special pronouncement regarding their content—see in a similar sense, decisions 2016-15712 and 2021-21204-.

**IV.- On the precision in citing the articles consulted and the necessary expression and grounding of the consultation motives in legislative consultations.** Article 99 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional clearly indicates that in the case of discretionary consultation on constitutionality, it must be filed by means of a reasoned brief, in which the aspects of the bill that are questioned are expressed, as well as the motives for which there were doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality. This provision determines—and has been repeatedly recognized by constitutional jurisprudence—that the filing brief must express the articles of the bill whose constitutionality is questioned or consulted, and clearly state the motives for which it is considered that a provision of the bill may be unconstitutional, since otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible—see, in this sense, decisions numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643, 2012-9253-.

Indeed, on this matter the Chamber has stated that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Calibri">“</span><span style="font-family:Calibri">In this case the consulting parties do not indicate the articles of the bill they </span><span style="font-family:Calibri">question, nor the reasons for which they have doubts or objections regarding its constitutionality, and they simply point out the topic consulted, dispensing with any kind of constitutionality argument, and therefore it is not appropriate to answer the consultation. This has been repeatedly resolved by constitutional jurisprudence and for that reason the appropriate course is to dismiss the consultation formulated.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Beyond the specific citation of the articles whose constitutionality is being consulted, as has been indicated, the reasons for which the legislative consultation is formulated must also be clear and express, detailing the reasons why the deputies maintain reasonable doubts about the constitutionality of the rules consulted. In this regard, the Chamber has stated that if the arguments are omitted, insufficient, or vague, the consultation must be deemed inadmissible and, therefore, unanswerable, since this Court would lack the express reasons on which to rule. Indeed, the Chamber has stated that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Calibri">“</span><span style="font-family:Calibri">It must also be remembered that the same law provides in its article 101 that </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">the Chamber shall answer the consultation by ruling 'on the aspects and reasons consulted or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional standpoint', but the court interprets that 'the aspects and reasons consulted' are those which, in accordance with article 99, question or object to the bill, or substantiate the doubt that the legislators might have about it. Given, therefore, that the consultation departs from what is legally established, it is not admissible; if the court, nevertheless, were to admit and absolve it, it would place </span><span style="font-family:Calibri">itself in a situation that is </span><span style="font-family:Calibri">outside the scope of its powers. </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Magistrates Sancho, Vargas, and Armijo dissent and declare that the optional consultation of constitutionality regarding the Bill 'Law of the Service Statute of the Legislative Assembly', File No. 11,839, is answered in the sense that it is unconstitutional for article 18, insofar as it exempts a group of officials of the Legislative Assembly from the prohibition that applies to other servants, of directly associating with the political parties to which they belong.” –judgment 2001-11643-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Thus, if a consultation proves to be imprecise in citing the articles or in setting forth the reasons for which there are well-founded doubts of constitutionality, it would be inadmissible and unanswerable. And this is so because «</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">in the case of facultative legislative consultations, the competence of the Constitutional Chamber originates in the doubts or objections of constitutionality formulated by the legislators» -judgments 2001-12459 and 2012-9253-, so that if such arguments do not exist as such, or when the consulting deputies themselves state that they have no doubts about the constitutionality of the rules or bills consulted, it would be inappropriate for the Chamber to issue any opinion, since it would be in circumstances that transcend the Chamber's powers in matters of legislative consultations of constitutionality </span><span style="font-family:Calibri">–</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">judgments 2002-3460, 2012-9253, and 2021-21204-.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">V.- </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Object of the consultation.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> The consulting deputies raise as the object of their consultation that the bill entitled “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, legislative file number 22,323, which modifies article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and includes two transitory norms, is contrary to the autonomy of administration and government of said institution, as provided for in article 73 of the Political Constitution, and as has been recognized and developed by constitutional jurisprudence.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">The bill whose norms are consulted states:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center"><a name=\"_Hlk98753376\"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></a></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">“LEY DE IGUALDAD PARA LOS TRABAJADORES</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">ANTE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">CAPÍTULO I</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">ARTÍCULO ÚNICO-</span><span style="width:3.98pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Article 3 of Law 17, the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social CCSS, of October 22, 1943, is hereby reformed.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The text is as follows:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Article 3-</span><span style="width:5.36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The coverage of social security -and the entry into it-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">are mandatory for all manual and intellectual workers who receive a salary or wage </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">or own income</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The amount of the contributions to be paid under this law shall be calculated on the total remuneration that, under any denomination, is paid, by reason of or derived from the employer-worker relationship </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">or other source of income</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">The worker's contribution to social security shall be the same percentage in all cases where their income is equal to or greater than the legal minimum wage for a generic unskilled worker established by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">The reference for this percentage shall be that established for the worker under the employer-worker insurance. No differences may be established between salaried, independent, voluntary workers, or any other type of insured stipulated by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Independent workers shall be exempt from paying the employer's contribution.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The Board of Directors is authorized to take measures tending to assist in medical care for the indigent, in occupational risks and accidents, and in the preventive medicine campaign.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The Caja shall determine, by regulation, the requirements for entry into each protection regime, as well as the benefits and the conditions under which these will be granted; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">for such regulations, requirements, benefits, and conditions, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must equitably respect</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the right to health protection of all workers</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The Board of Directors shall adopt the necessary agreements to progressively extend its services to the entire country, as its material and human resources permit.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:49.65pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">For independent workers whose net income is less than the legal minimum wage and who request their affiliation to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime of the CCSS, the State's contribution shall be increased in order to partially remedy the absence of the employer's contribution.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">For such purposes, a special permanent program shall be created under the charge of the Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares (Fodesaf).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">CAPÍTULO II</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">DISPOSICIONES TRANSITORIAS</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">TRANSITORIO l-</span><span style="width:19.97pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Within a period not exceeding six months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, through its Board of Directors, must make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the employer-insured worker</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span><a name=\"_Hlk99376662\"></a></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">TRANSITORIO ll-</span><span style="width:16.63pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Within a period not exceeding three months after the entry into force of this law, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must implement and execute the necessary mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems, so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their contributions</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">It shall enter into force upon its publication.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">” - emphasis added-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In the cited norms, the aspects regarding which the consulting Deputies state they have doubts of constitutionality are highlighted, centering their reasons for consultation on the violation of the autonomy of administration and government recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as far as social security is concerned. Based on this argument of impact on the autonomy of the Caja, it is noted that consultations are not raised for reasons of form or procedure, but rather two specific aspects are consulted for substantive reasons, which are resolved as indicated in the following recitals (considerandos).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">VI.- Regarding the first reason for consultation. The violation of the autonomy of administration and government of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> The consulting Deputies argue that determining the parameters for defining the contributions and contribution amounts for the different groups of workers affiliated with the social security regimes administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is a function that falls within the </span><span style="font-family:Calibri\">scope of autonomy and government constitutionally recognized to </span><span style="font-family:Calibri\">the institution</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, whose Board of Directors defines such aspects based on the corresponding actuarial studies. They add that since such power falls within the </span><span style="font-family:Calibri\">scope of constitutional autonomy, the ordinary legislator is </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">prevented from imposing such parameters on the Caja. Thus, if the bill seeks to define the parameters from which the contribution percentages of insured persons are defined, while at the same time attempting to establish that, autonomously regarding their status as independent or salaried workers, all workers must contribute the same percentage - based on the rate paid by salaried workers - the bill in question would be contrary to article 73 of the Political Constitution.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On this matter, the cited constitutional norm states, in relevant part, that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“ARTÍCULO 73.- Social security is established for the benefit of manual and intellectual workers, regulated by a system of compulsory contribution by the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect them against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The administration and government of social security shall be in charge of an autonomous institution, called the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="width:7.65pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">To understand the issue of the autonomy of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as provided for by the Political Constitution, it is of particular importance to keep in mind the previous and reiterated definitions of constitutional jurisprudence on the matter. From the early years, this Chamber has been ruling on the issue of the Caja's autonomy in this aspect, so that by means of judgment number 6256-94, it differentiated the autonomy of the CCSS from that recognized to other public sector institutions, pointing out in this regard that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“[T]he norm [of article 73 of the Political Constitution] grants, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">exclusively to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the administration and government of social security, a degree of autonomy that is, of course, different from and superior to that generally defined in article 188 of the same document</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">…” -emphasis supplied-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The degree of autonomy recognized to the Caja based on article 73 of the Constitution and the jurisprudential criterion recently cited was further specified, defining that such a level of autonomy prevents interference or intervention by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), and, as relevant to the purposes of this consultation, it was also indicated that the legislator itself finds a limitation in said autonomy, by which it must comply with the Constitution, and is prevented from adopting legislation that involves itself in aspects properly belonging to the institution to define. Thus, </span><span style="font-family:Calibri\">through judgments 2012-17736 and 2021-17098, the Chamber stated that this </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">autonomy:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“[S]ignifies a degree of protection against interference from the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), but also </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">limitations on the intervention of the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo)</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. Although the CCSS certainly does not escape the law, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the latter cannot 'modify or alter' the competence and autonomy constitutionally given to the CCSS</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, defining aspects that are its exclusive domain. The Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, being essentially an autonomous institution of constitutional creation, has </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">its constitutionally granted material competence beyond the reach of the law</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. In other words, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the legislator, in the case of the administration and government of social security, has limitations</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, and must respect what the Constituent established. Just as the legislator would be forbidden from issuing a law stating that the administration and government of social security no longer corresponds to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, likewise, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">it cannot issue a law that intrudes into aspects belonging to or corresponding to the definition of the CCSS, in the administration and government of social security</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.” -the highlighted text is not from the original-.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Thus, it is quite clear that the ordinary legislator is prevented from adopting laws that interfere with the exercise of the competences constitutionally assigned to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which are precisely the administration and government of social security. It is important to highlight this degree of autonomy, since, according to what has been said, it goes beyond simple administration, because by stating that the autonomy is also 'of government', direct reference is made to the definition of the aspects from which the autonomy 'of administration' will also be exercised. In this sense, both aspects of autonomy converge in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, by express provision of the constituent, and because such a definition has been recognized and indicated by constitutional jurisprudence.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In the aforementioned judgment 2021-17098, the Chamber further specified this degree of autonomy, explaining that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“[I]t must be highlighted that the norm defining the functions and purposes of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is located in our Magna Carta in the chapter on social rights and guarantees, while matters referring to Autonomous Institutions are located in another Title, XIV; the difference in location reflects, from a systematic and systemic interpretation, that the fundamental norm itself, when creating the institution of social security, intends to provide it with solidary and priority protection for the person by their very condition; it is evidently an institution that assumes the solidary spirit that inspires articles fifty and seventy-four of the Constitution. What is intended is that each person has the guarantee that the solidary State ensures health, pension, disability benefits, and everything related to social securityL </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">This provision becomes not only an aim or guide for State action, but also a limit in itself, by ensuring that neither the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) nor the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo) could undermine said constitutional competence</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> (...) From the foregoing it follows that, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), by constitutional provision (art.73) </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">enjoys administrative and governmental autonomy</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. This means that, as a functionally decentralized entity, it can establish the rules for the selection of its personnel, the existence of a special regulatory framework for its statutory relationship being valid in this case, one that attends to and ensures its degree of autonomy. That degree of autonomy also allows it to self-administer (dispose of its human, material, and financial resources); to give itself its own internal organization; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the setting of purposes, goals, and types of means to achieve them; the issuance of autonomous service or activity regulations, in accordance with the provisions normally called general policy</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. Thus, then, as an autonomous institution of constitutional creation and with a greater degree of autonomy (administrative and governmental), </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">it is protected against interference from the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) and from limitations when legislating by the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo) (which cannot modify its degree of autonomy through legislation).” </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">-the highlighted text is not from the original-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Even more concretely, dealing now with the setting of contributions and the </span><span style="font-family:Calibri\">parameters for their determination, the jurisprudence is also categorical in pointing out that the definition of the conditions, benefits, and entry requirements for each social security regime administered and governed by the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social is an exclusive power and competence of the institution itself, and the legislator is not permitted to issue norms that affect the autonomy regarding this specific aspect.</span></p> Thus, through judgment number 2003-2355, reiterated by judgment number 2021-23611, this Chamber established that:

"[T]hrough articles 3 and 23 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Ley Constitutiva de la Cara Costarricense del Seguro Social), **its Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) has full competence to establish the scope of the social security benefits via regulation, so that it can define the conditions, benefits, and entry requirements for each protection regime**, based on actuarial studies, so as not to bankrupt the system." -emphasis added- In this sense, it is clear that if "defining the conditions, benefits, and entry requirements of each protection regime" is an exclusive power of the Board of Directors of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), by virtue of the degree of autonomy granted and recognized to it, it is also clear that such definitions lie outside the orbit and possibilities of action of other entities, institutions, and Branches of Government, so that if any act or regulation were to be issued that affected that exclusive power and competence, it would be violating article 73 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and the level or degree of autonomy that said constitutional article recognizes to the CCSS.

It must be noted that the ordinary legislator recognizes this exclusive power and competence of the institution upon which it now seeks to influence or become involved. Note that, following the criterion defined in article 73 of the Political Constitution, article 23 of the same Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund expressly provides that:

"Article 23.- **The quotas and benefits shall be determined by the Board of Directors, according to the cost of the services to be provided in each region and in accordance with the respective actuarial calculations**." -highlighting is not from the original- That is to say, in the exercise of the legislative function, the legislator has indeed recognized that autonomy of administration and government, since, in an absolutely clear manner, it leaves the definition of quotas and benefits to the Board of Directors of the CCSS, in the same sense that this Chamber also recognizes it in the aforementioned judgments 2003-2355 and 2021-23611. This provision of article 23 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS (Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS) is not subject to reform in the bill (proyecto de ley) now being reviewed, so it is also noted that the questioned bill would be generating some type of normative or legislative inconsistency, because, on the one hand, it is the legislator who intends to define that the contribution percentage must be the same in all cases, while in another provision of the same law, it already defines that this aspect shall be determined by the institution's Board of Directors, the latter being the criterion consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy constitutionally recognized to the Fund (Caja).

On the other hand, it is also important to point out that during the processing of legislative file number 22.323 -regarding this bill-, there are separate pronouncements from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, in similar terms to those set forth here, which support that the object of the bill contradicts the institution's autonomy.

In the report issued by the Office of the Attorney General -OJ-125-2021-, the State advisory body expressly stated that:

"[S]uch initiative **does invade the spheres constitutionally reserved to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, since it intends to regulate the terms under which the contribution of salaried, independent, and voluntary workers must be established to obtain social insurance protection, which is part of the autonomy constitutionally attributed to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund** (..) Note that the bill under analysis not only establishes imperative rules regarding contributions, but also indicates to the Board of Directors of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund the deadline within which the proposed changes must be implemented, all of which exceeds the powers held by the legislator in this matter. (...) **It is important to note also that the bill makes no reference to financial or actuarial studies that analyze the financial impact the proposal could have**, which ignores the technical rigor that should prevail in these matters. The foregoing despite the fact that the Constitutional Chamber has insisted that **setting the conditions under which social insurances must operate is an exclusive attribution of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund**…" -emphasis supplied- Thus, the Office of the Attorney General not only warned of the bill's constitutional non-conformity in the terms developed here, but also indicated that the bill, which impacts the institution's financial definitions, even lacked actuarial studies. On this matter, it is necessary to point out and emphasize that it is the criterion of this Chamber that, even if some type of financial or actuarial study existed that purported to support a bill such as the one now being reviewed, the existence of such studies would not give rise to nor permit the issuance of this type of legislation, since, in accordance with what has been stated, this is a matter reserved to the autonomy of administration and government constitutionally granted and recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund itself, and not to any other body or public instance.

For its part, in the report issued by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund -SJD-1361-2021-, the institution emphasized that:

"From the foregoing, it is inferred that, through the exercise of regulatory power by the Institutional Board of Directors, and based on technical-actuarial studies, it not only establishes the corresponding contributions from employers, workers, and the State or independent workers and the State, but also the minimum contribution that the Institution requires to provide its services and grant benefits under the Health Insurance (Seguro de Salud) and the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte); being that **the Bill, by establishing a regulation on the matter of determining social security contributions by workers, implies an invasion of the competencies that the Constitution grants to the Institution regarding the governance and administration of social insurances**, and therefore injures the provisions of article 73 of the Political Constitution. Likewise, **it is important to consider that the technical criteria submitted by the Financial Management (Gerencia Financiera), Pension Management (Gerencia de Pensiones), and the Actuarial and Economic Directorate (Dirección Actuarial y Económica) indicate a possible impact on the resources with which the Social Insurances administered by the Fund are financed**, in the event that the Bill were approved in the terms consulted.

Based on the preceding considerations, this Legal Directorate recommends opposition to bill file No. 22.323 Equality Law for Workers before Social Security (Ley de Igualdad para los trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social) being that **said provision undermines the autonomy of governance and administration, granted to the institution of constitutional foundation, not only by establishing the manner in which workers would contribute to the financing of the Social Insurances but also in the determination of the Minimum Contribution Base (Base Mínima Contributiva)**" -highlighting is not from the original- Thus, note that the institution with expressly declared constitutional autonomy itself warned the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo) that the bill was contrary to the constitutional and legal provisions governing the matter, and, moreover, clearly referred to the existence of actuarial studies provided to the legislative file, which point out the risk that such legislative initiative poses to the financial stability of the insurance regimes and the institution as such.

In this sense, while the Office of the Attorney General warns not only about the formal constitutional non-conformity of the bill, the Fund (Caja), for its part, does refer to the institutional impact that the project may generate, for which it did provide the corresponding financial studies in the legislative venue.

It should also be highlighted that within the legislative process itself, the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly (Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicios Técnicos de la Asamblea Legislativa) also warned that the bill, insofar as it intends to regulate the quotas of working persons, invades the sphere of autonomy recognized to the Fund (Caja). Through opinion AL-DEST-IJU-212-2021, that instance expressed:

"All of the foregoing is brought up regarding the emphasis that the Fund has on the definition of its administrative policies, the medical care it provides, the possibility of making the **fulfillment of obligations for quotas** more flexible, and likewise with invoices owed to it and the extension of terms and payment arrangements, among other definitions, **all of them associated with its administrative autonomy**. Which is the legal possibility to carry out its legal purpose without subjection to another entity and possesses, in addition, autonomy of governance, which refers to the capacity to dictate to itself its own objectives, an autonomy that, as the Constitutional Chamber well indicates in the preceding citations, is distinct from and superior to that enshrined in article 188 of the Political Constitution." -emphasis added- Likewise, in an emphatic and conclusive manner, said Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services pointed out in the same report that:

"It is important to revisit what was raised regarding Article 73 of the Constitution, from which it derives that the CCSS enjoys special autonomy, and **it is through its Board of Directors that all aspects concerning its administration and direction shall be established and regulated, by means of the Regulations that it defines**.

From said constitutional norm, it derives that regarding social insurances, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund has an autonomy that goes beyond the administrative autonomy recognized in article 188 of the Political Constitution to other autonomous institutions, since a political autonomy is also recognized to it, which **grants it the capacity to define its own goals and to self-direct, which is consequently incompatible with direction or imposition of limits by another body or entity, including the Legislative Assembly itself**.

Taking into account what was indicated in the analysis of this initiative and, specifically, in the autonomy enjoyed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, **this advisory body considers that the reform in the terms proposed could present a serious injury to the autonomy granted to the CCSS and therefore a clash of constitutionality**, such that, if there are no modifications in the proposed wording, these would be unrectifiable." -emphases added- Thus, it is evident that both the Office of the Attorney General, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the Legislative Assembly's own Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services warned the relevant legislative bodies about the constitutional non-conformity of the bill now being reviewed, precisely for contradicting the definition of article 73 of the Political Constitution, concerning the administrative and governance autonomy of the Fund (Caja); furthermore, it is evident that the legislators were also made aware of the risks to the financial sustainability of the social security regimes and the institution itself. However, despite all this, the bill in question was reported out of committee and subsequently voted on in the first debate.

Consequently, and in accordance with what is defined in article 73 of the Political Constitution, and the reiterated jurisprudential criterion on the content and scope of the administrative and governance autonomy recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund as pertains to social insurances; and, particularly, considering that matters concerning the definition of quotas, parameters, and conditions of entry and contribution to the different social security regimes established by the institution are the exclusive competence of the Fund's Board of Directors, without other government instances being able to seek to influence or impact such quotas, parameters, and conditions, this Chamber concludes that the consulted bill contains the substantive defect (vicio de fondo) pointed out by the consulting members of Congress.

This constitutional defect is manifested in two aspects. The **first**, concerning the expansion of the parameters on which to determine the quota or contribution, by including not only the "remuneration that under any denomination is paid" by reason of a labor relationship -as the current norm states and is the purpose of article 3 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS (Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS)-, but adding "own income" and "other sources of income" that the working person may have. The **second**, by determining that in all cases, whether salaried workers, independent workers, or voluntary insured persons, the percentage of contribution or quota shall be the same. Note that such aspects are for the institution's Board of Directors itself to define, as already mentioned, and was concretely indicated in the referenced judgments 2003-2355 and 2021-23611, without it being viable for the ordinary legislator to impose on the institution based on what and how the contributions must be set. The fact that the bill indicates to the Fund's Board of Directors that it must consider not only the remuneration, but even other types of own income or other sources of income, and that it must set the percentage of contribution or quota the same for all cases, despite their own particular and intrinsic differences, is an act that contravenes the administrative and governance autonomy of the social insurances, in the terms indicated herein.

In this sense, the reform of article 3 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund proposed by the bill, specifically in the aspects raised in this consultation, is contrary to article 73 of the Political Constitution.

**VII.- Regarding the transitory norms and the violation of the administrative and governance autonomy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.** The consulting members of Congress argue that the transitory norms of the bill also contravene the autonomy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.

On this matter, recall that these transitory norms define that:

**"TRANSITORY l-** Within a period not exceeding six months after the entry into force of this law, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, through its Board of Directors, must make the necessary administrative adjustments to establish the equal percentage for all workers based on the percentage established for the worker-employer relationship.

**TRANSITORY ll-** Within a period not exceeding three months after the entry into force of this law, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund must implement and carry out the necessary mechanisms and adjustments in the computer systems, so that all insured workers see the equal percentage reflected in the payment of their quotas." Thus, the transitory norms of the bill seek to impose deadlines on the CCSS to make the administrative adjustments to establish the equal contribution percentage, in addition to indicating the deadline to implement the mechanisms and adjustments in the corresponding computer systems.

In accordance with what has already been stated, establishing through an ordinary law derivative actions from the exercise of governance autonomy, such as when internal adjustments to the institution must be made, is an aspect that clearly contravenes the autonomy provided for in article 73 of the Political Constitution, since evidently, it is the competence of the Fund's Board of Directors to define the moments when certain adjustments must be made regarding the procedures for determination, setting, collection mechanisms, and others, of the corresponding insurance quotas. The intervention of the legislator through an ordinary law that so intends is contrary to the constitutionally recognized autonomy of the CCSS, so that under the same line of argument already indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), the Chamber warns that these transitory norms of the bill are equally contrary to article 73 of the Political Constitution.

**VIII.- Regarding the second ground for consultation. The violation of the principle of reasonableness.** The second ground for consultation raised by the consulting members of Congress relates to what they term a violation of the principles of necessity, suitability, legitimacy, proportionality, and reasonableness, all of which is subsumed in that the consultation concerns the impact on the principle of reasonableness, since the first four aspects mentioned are, precisely, parameters for assessing and determining the potential violation of the principle of reasonableness. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the assessment of the principle of reasonableness is made based on the so-called reasonableness test, which begins, precisely, by considering the *legitimacy* of the norm being questioned or consulted. In the case under study, in accordance with what was indicated in the preceding recitals (considerandos), it is clear that the genetic source intended to be used to venture into the matter of setting social security quotas - through a law or bill - is far from being legitimate, since by means of law it is entirely improper, as explained above, to violate the autonomy constitutionally recognized to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. In other words, in this case, not even the first element of the reasonableness test - legitimacy - is met, so that from that point on, it is unfeasible to proceed with the application or assessment of the other parameters.

Thus, taking into consideration the already indicated constitutional non-conformity of the bill in the terms set forth in this judgment, the Chamber considers it unnecessary to delve further into the violation of the principle of reasonableness, given that, based on the assessments already made, it is determined that the bill under consultation is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, making it superfluous to conduct the examination or test of reasonableness typical of these cases, and the declaration of unconstitutionality already made in the preceding recitals suffices.

**IX.- By way of conclusion.** In short, this optional legislative consultation of constitutionality is hereby answered, in the sense that the “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social” bill contains the substantive defects indicated by the consulting Deputies, to the extent that said bill is contrary to Article 73 of the Political Constitution.

**X.- Note of Magistrate Garro Vargas.** As the majority indicates, given that the bill directly injures the Constitution, since this prevents Parliament from legislating on the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the bill is technically substantiated. However, in another normative context, in view of the subject matter, it would have been pertinent to examine matters relating to actuarial studies.

**Por tanto** This optional legislative consultation of constitutionality is hereby answered, in the sense that, regarding the aspects specifically consulted, the “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social” bill, being processed under legislative file number 22.323, violates the administration and governance autonomy of social insurance, recognized to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. Magistrate Garro Vargas enters a note. Let it be communicated.- **Fernando Castillo V.** **Presidente** **Paul Rueda L.** **Luis Fdo. Salazar A.** **Jorge Araya G.** **Anamari Garro V.** **José Roberto Garita N.** **Rosibel Jara V.**

 Res. Nº 2022009345 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas y cincuenta minutos del veintiseis de abril de dos mil veintidós.

Consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad interpuesta por los diputados Laura Guido Pérez, Enrique Sánchez Carballo, Víctor Morales, Catalina Montero Gómez, Mario Castillo Méndez. Luis Ramón Carranza, Nielsen Pérez Pérez, Carolina Hidalgo Herrera, Welmer Ramos González, José María Villalta, Paula Vega Rodríguez, Shirley Díaz, Walter Muñoz, Patricia Villegas y Yorleny León, respecto del proyecto “Ley de igualdad para los trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, que se tramita bajo el expediente legislativo número 22.323.

Resultando

1.- Mediante escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 21 de marzo de 2022, las Diputadas y los Diputados firmantes presentan Consulta Legislativa Facultativa de Constitucionalidad respecto del proyecto de “Ley de igualdad para los trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, que se tramita bajo el expediente legislativo número 22.323”. Refieren los antecedentes del proyecto de ley, el cual fue aprobado en la sesión ordinaria del Plenario Legislativo, número 113, de 14 de marzo de 2022, por votación favorable de 22 diputados. Señalan que el proyecto de ley consta de un único artículo, por el cual se pretende reformar el artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, e incluir dos normas transitorias, y la finalidad del proyecto es «equiparar el cobro de las cuotas del régimen obrero-patronales, ya que en la actualidad no son iguales para los diferentes tipos de trabajadores, entiéndase los trabajadores bajo el régimen obrero-patronal, los trabajadores independientes o asegurado voluntario, siendo que todos estos son acreedores de recibir un mismo servicio por parte de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social». De la nueva redacción propuesta para el artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS, los consultantes cuestionan la constitucionalidad de las frases «o ingresos propios», «u otra fuente de ingresos» que se incluyen en el primer párrafo; también, el que sería el nuevo segundo párrafo de dicho artículo; y del quinto párrafo, la frase que señala que «para tales reglamentos, requisitos, beneficios y condiciones la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social deberá de forma equitativa respetar el derecho a la protección de la salud de todos los trabajadores». De igual manera, manifiestan su oposición a las dos normas transitorias, que le imponen a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social un plazo de seis meses para «efectuar los ajustes administrativos necesarios para establecer el porcentaje igualitario para todos los trabajadores con base en el porcentaje establecido para el trabajador obrero patronal» (transitorio I), y un plazo no mayor de tres meses para que implemente y efectúe «los mecanismos y ajustes necesarios en los sistemas informáticos para que todos los trabajadores asegurados vean reflejado en el pago de sus cuotas el porcentaje igualitario».

El primer motivo de consulta por razones de fondo, es que las normas señaladas violentan la autonomía de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, consagrada en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, a través del cual se le reconoce a la institución la exclusividad en la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales, tanto en el régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, el régimen no contributivo y en el Seguro de Enfermedad y Maternidad. Estiman que lo que se pretende regular con el proyecto, es competencia de la autonomía de la CCSS y forma parte de su actividad principal, cual es el ejercicio exclusivo y excluyente de la competencia de gobierno y administración de los seguros sociales, en clave de autonomía política. Mencionan que el proyecto pretende establecer un régimen de cotización que puede parecer igualitario para todos los diferentes tipos de personas aseguradas, imponiendo de entrada el mismo monto a cotizar, pero sin hacer distinciones siquiera relativas a lo interno, y cerrando esa posibilidad de decisión a la propia Junta Directiva de la CCSS. Refieren el dictamen del Departamento de Servicios Técnicos, al señalar que el proyecto de ley, en lo medular refiere a «equiparar los aportes de las cuotas de los trabajadores independientemente de su modalidad, siendo el mismo porcentaje para todos», como a «establecer que no podrá haber ningún tipo de diferencias entre los asegurados asalariados, independientes, voluntarios o cualquier otro tipo de modalidad que establezca la CCSS».

Mencionan que la reforma planteada no modifica el artículo 23 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, el cual es un numeral auxiliar del artículo 3 que se pretende reformar.

Enfatizan que determinar el monto económico de las cuotas, y calcular ese monto, es un asunto que constitucionalmente no compete al legislador ordinario, especialmente, pretender imponerle una nueva política institucional a la Junta Directiva de la CCSS en materia de decisiones de tratamiento económico del sector de trabajadores independientes asegurados, y, específicamente, la determinación de los porcentajes fundamentales del monto de las cuotas por cobrarles. Reiteran que la Asamblea Legislativa carece de competencia para entrometerse en temas técnicos y hasta políticos, reservados constitucionalmente a la autonomía de gobierno de la Caja, por lo que en ese caso, estiman que no sería aplicable el principio de libre configuración del legislador.

Refieren que al consultarse a la Procuraduría General de la República en el marco de la discusión en comisión del expediente legislativo en cuestión, la Procuraduría señaló que la iniciativa sí invade los ámbitos reservados constitucionalmente a la Caja, porque pretende regular los términos bajo los cuales establecer la cotización de los diferentes tipos de trabajadores, lo que es parte de la autonomía atribuida constitucionalmente a la institución. Agregan, que en el mismo criterio, la Procuraduría indicó que la propuesta de ley no solamente impone reglas imperativas en cuanto a la cotización, sino que también le impone a la Caja plazos para implementar los cambios propuestos, lo que excede la potestad del legislador.

Enfatizan que se está en presencia de actos legislativos de injerencia indebida, e incluso suplantación de autoridad institucional, en perjuicio de la competencia técnico-científica y política de la Junta Directiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a pesar que la jurisprudencia constitucional define la competencia de la Asamblea Legislativa es insuficiente para modificar por vía de ley una lista abierta de aspectos propios de la autonomía política de la Caja. Señalan también, que la jurisprudencia ha establecido recientemente que definir los requisitos de ingreso al régimen de seguridad social, es competencia de la Junta Directiva de la institución, al mismo tiempo que estimó como razonable la normativa complementaria que otorga el artículo 23 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, que establece que las cuotas y prestaciones serán determinadas por la Junta Directiva, de acuerdo con el costo de los servicios y de conformidad con los respectivos cálculos actuariales.

De tal manera, concluyen que la reforma propuesta del artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, violenta la autonomía de la institución consagrada en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política.

El segundo motivo de consulta por razones de fondo que plantean los consultantes, versa sobre la violación a los principios de necesidad, idoneidad, legitimidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, así como la violación al principio de igualdad. En cuanto a la necesidad, explican que la exposición de motivos del proyecto de ley, menciona que la Junta Directiva de la Caja ha hecho diferenciaciones en los aportes de las personas trabajadoras del régimen obrero-patronal, y los aportes de las personas trabajadores independientes, quienes aportan más, por lo que se considera necesario que todos los trabajadores aporten el mismo porcentaje porque la atención es la misma para todos. Explican los consultantes que la necesidad de la medida está directamente ligada con la proporcionalidad, y que hay que cuestionarse si el proyecto de ley generaría mayor justicia entre los contribuyentes de la seguridad social.

Aportan un cuadro que afirman proviene de la Dirección Actuarial y Económica de la Caja, en las que muestran las cinco categorías o escalas ascendentes de aportes de las personas trabajadoras independientes según sus aportes, y enfatizan que solamente el 1% de los trabajadores independientes se encuentran en el cuarto y quinto grupo, que son las personas que tienen los mayores porcentajes de cotización. Por su parte, refieren que el 96% de los trabajadores independientes se encuentran en las dos primeras categorías, por lo que si se igualara la contribución de los trabajadores independientes con los trabajadores del seguro obrero-patronal, el efecto que se tendrá es que quienes se encuentren en las categorías más altas y que son las personas con mayores ingresos, se les verá disminuida su contribución, mientras que los de menores ingresos pagarán más que los de mayores ingresos. Así, señalan, hay una clara violación al principio de igualdad.

De igual manera, continúan, es evidente que la norma propuesta no sólo no es necesaria, sino que también resulta desproporcional, porque sólo beneficiaría a menos del 1% de personas, para que contribuyen menos, y haciendo que el resto -96%- soporten la mayor parte del peso en relación con sus ingresos.

En ese sentido, afirman que la propuesta es absolutamente regresiva, por lo que no cumple con ser una medida idónea para alcanzar el objetivo pretendido, sino que genera mayor desigualdad y desproporcionalidad entre las personas contribuyentes a la seguridad social. Enfatizan que «la norma busca beneficiar a unos pocos que ganan más, en perjuicio también de la seguridad social, la cual se verá afectada con la medida al recibir menos aportes». Explican que así lo advirtió la Caja, al manifestar que «se podría ocasionar afectación en los ingresos al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte y no se aportan los estudios costo-beneficio del nuevo esquema».

Agregan que la carencia de estudios actuariales y estudios técnicos en general que respalden la propuesta, hace imposible realizar un examen de razonabilidad, pero sí queda claro que el proyecto afectaría las finanzas del Seguro de Enfermedad y Maternidad, y el Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, como consecuencia de la disminución de la cotización de las personas trabajadores independientes de mayores ingresos.

En cuanto a la legitimidad, señalan que la promulgación de una ley no corresponde a la vía legítima para regular los aportes, montos, plazos de los seguros sociales, ya que la Caja tiene autonomía constitucional para la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales, por lo que dichas reformas deben hacerse con los estudios técnicos correspondientes, por la Junta Directiva de la institución. Pretender regular por ley esta materia para que haya igualdad de cotizaciones, representa una restricción innecesaria a las opciones que tienen las instancias técnicas de la Caja para configurar la distribución de las tasas de contribución tripartidas o bipartidas, según sea el tipo de trabajador y sus capacidades de contribución.

Mencionan que los objetivos que se persiguen, pueden lograrse mediante reformas reglamentarias a cargo de la Junta Directiva, en el marco de las facultades legales y constitucionales otorgadas a dicho órgano, en pleno ejercicio de la autonomía para la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales.

Así, estiman que el proyecto de ley no cumple con los principios constitucionales de necesidad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad, legitimidad e idoneidad, al mismo tiempo que vulnera el principio de igualdad, cargando la mayor parte de la contribución en las personas trabajadoras independientes con menores ingresos.

2.- Por oficio de la Presidencia de esta Sala, número PSC-0040-2022, de 22 de marzo de 2022, se comunica a la Presidenta de la Asamblea Legislativa de la presentación de esta Consulta Legislativa Facultativa de Constitucionalidad.

3.- Mediante resolución de la Presidencia de esta Sala, de las diez horas ocho minutos de 23 de marzo de 2022, se admite esta Consulta Legislativa Facultativa de Constitucionalidad, y se solicita al Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa la remisión del expediente legislativo número 22.323.

4.- Por oficio recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 25 de marzo de 2022, la Presidenta de la Asamblea Legislativa remite copia certificada del expediente legislativo número 22.323. En consecuencia, y tomando en consideración el período mediante el cual se celebra y conmemora la Semana Santa de este año 2022, el plazo para evacuar la consulta vence el 2 de mayo de 2022.

5.- Mediante resolución de la Presidencia de esta Sala, de las diez horas cincuenta y un minutos de 25 de marzo de 2022, se tiene por recibida la copia certificada del expediente legislativo número 22.323 y se turna esta consulta para su debido conocimiento.

6.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 25 de marzo de 2022, el diputado Jonathan Prendas Rodríguez, presenta coadyuvancia pasiva y se opone a los aspectos planteados por las diputadas y los diputados firmantes de la presente consulta, señalando sus argumentos y criterios sobre los temas de consulta, por lo que solicita se declare la constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley.

7.- En los procedimientos se han observado las disposiciones de ley.

Redacta Magistrado Araya García; y,

Considerando

I.- Sobre el planteamiento de la Consulta Legislativa de Constitucionalidad. La opinión consultiva previa sobre los proyectos legislativos puede ser requerida de manera preceptiva -inciso a) del artículo 96 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional- o facultativa -incisos b), c) y ch) de la misma norma -. En este último caso se tienen tres supuestos: en el primero, es el mismo órgano parlamentario quien la realiza –cuando se presente por no menos de diez diputados-; en el segundo, se trata de la consulta de proyectos de ley referidos a la competencia constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones o la Contraloría General de la República, consulta que debe ser presentada por éstos mismos órganos; y, en el tercero, la consulta la puede presentar el Defensor de los Habitantes cuando considere que se infringen derechos o libertades fundamentales. De igual manera, señala el artículo 98 de la ley de esta jurisdicción, que en el caso de proyectos de ley distintos de las reformas constitucionales, la Consulta Legislativa deberá interponerse después que el proyecto haya sido aprobado en primer debate y antes de recibir la aprobación definitiva en segundo debate; esta previsión como requisito de admisibilidad de la Consulta Legislativa, encuentra asidero porque es luego del primer debate que logra tenerse mayor certeza sobre las probabilidades de aprobación del texto sometido a consulta –véase, entre otras, sentencias de esta Sala números 193-90 y 2017-11714-.

II.- Sobre la admisibilidad de la Consulta Legislativa que ahora se conoce. El caso bajo estudio es una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad. De conformidad con lo indicado en el considerando anterior, y según lo dispuesto en el inciso b) del artículo 96 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, este tipo de consulta debe ser planteada por diez diputados(as) o más, una vez que el proyecto ha sido aprobado en primer debate. En este caso, 15 legisladores suscribieron la consulta, de manera que este requisito de admisibilidad se tiene por cumplido. Asimismo, el proyecto de ley que se tramita bajo el expediente legislativo No. 22.323 fue aprobado en primer debate por el Pleno de la Asamblea Legislativa, en la sesión ordinaria número 103, de 14 de marzo de 2022. De esta manera, al encontrarse debidamente fundamentada y cumplidos los requisitos de admisibilidad señalados, la Sala entra a conocer la consulta planteada.

Por su parte, es importante señalar, que tratándose de las consultas legislativas facultativas de constitucionalidad –como la que ahora se conoce-, y de conformidad con la aplicación e integración de lo estatuido en los artículos 99 y 101 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, esta Sala ha señalado que su conocimiento se circunscribe únicamente a los argumentos concretos planteados por los diputados consultantes en su escrito de interposición, y no a otros que pudieran derivarse pero que no hayan sido así planteados. En efecto, mediante sentencia número 2001-11643 –reiterada, entre otras, en sentencias números 2012-9253, 2017-11714 y 2021-21204-, señaló la Sala:

“Ha de recordarse también que la misma ley dispone en su artículo 101 que la Sala evacuará la consulta dictaminando "sobre los aspectos y motivos consultados o sobre cualesquiera otros que considere relevantes desde el punto de vista constitucional", pero el tribunal interpreta que "los aspectos y motivos consultados" son los que, de acuerdo con el artículo 99, cuestionan u objetan el proyecto, o fundamentan la duda que pudieran tener los legisladores acerca de éste. Dado, pues, que la consulta se aparta de lo legalmente establecido, no es de recibo; si el tribunal, no obstante, la admitiera y absolviera, se colocaría en situación que está fuera de los alcances de sus atribuciones.” –énfasis añadido- Este criterio fue reiterado y consolidado por la jurisprudencia de la Sala, al determinar, en la ya citada sentencia número 2012-9253 que:

“[E]sto es así por cuanto «tratándose de consultas legislativas de tipo facultativo, «la competencia de la Sala Constitucional tiene origen en las dudas o reparos de constitucionalidad que formulen los legisladores» -sentencia 2001-12459-, de forma que si tales argumentos no existen como tal, o bien, cuando los propios diputados consultantes manifiesten carecer de dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas o proyectos consultados, resultaría impropio para la Sala emitir criterio alguno, pues se estaría en supuestos que trascienden las competencias de la Sala en materia de consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad -sentencia 2002-3460-.” –el destacado no es del original- En este sentido, es necesario indicar que esta Sala se avocará a estudiar únicamente los alegatos planteados en forma puntual por los consultantes y no otras cuestiones generales de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley en alusión, de conformidad con lo regulado en el artículo 99 de la ley que rige esta jurisdicción, por lo que se omite todo pronunciamiento sobre vicios de procedimiento y de fondo no alegados en tiempo por las diputadas y los diputados consultantes.

III.- De previo. Sobre la solicitud de coadyuvancia presentada. La Consulta Legislativa de Constitucionalidad –sea esta facultativa o preceptiva- es un proceso de carácter constitucional establecido para el control previo de constitucionalidad de las leyes, y por definición, reservado a ser ejercido durante el trámite de aprobación de las leyes por parte de los legisladores y bajo determinados supuestos de planteamiento y admisibilidad. Por naturaleza es un proceso de consulta por medio del cual, los Diputados que mantienen dudas razonables sobre la constitucionalidad de un proyecto de ley, expresan sus interrogantes ante la Sala Constitucional para que se determine si, en efecto, existe algún grado de inconformidad constitucional entre el proyecto de ley o la norma consultada, y la Constitución Política. En este sentido, se trata de un proceso reservado a los legisladores y en un momento determinado del trámite de aprobación de las leyes, motivo por el cual nuestra legislación no contempla la posibilidad de interponer ningún tipo de coadyuvancia a las consultas planteadas por los legisladores. De tal forma, lo que corresponde formalmente es declarar la improcedencia de la solicitud de coadyuvancia referida en el sexto resultando de esta sentencia. En este sentido, vistas las manifestaciones que plantea el señor Prendas Rodríguez mediante escrito recibido el 25 de marzo de 2022, manifestando su apoyo al proyecto de ley que se consulta, lo que corresponde es agregar las mismas al expediente, sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a su contenido -ver en similar sentido, sentencias 2016-15712 y 2021-21204-.

IV.- Sobre la precisión en la cita de los artículos consultados y la necesaria expresión y fundamentación de los motivos de consulta en las consultas legislativas. El artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, señala claramente que en tratándose de la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, la misma deberá plantearse mediante un memorial razonado, en el cual se exprese los aspectos que se cuestionan del proyecto de ley, así como los motivos por los cuales se tuviere duda u objeciones sobre la constitucionalidad del mismo. Esta disposición determina –y así ha sido reconocido de manera reiterada por la jurisprudencia constitucional- que en el libelo de interposición deba expresarse los artículos del proyecto cuya constitucionalidad se cuestiona o consulta, y manifestarse de manera clara los motivos por los cuales se estima que una norma del proyecto puede ser inconstitucional, pues caso contrario la consulta sería inadmisible –ver, en este sentido, sentencias números 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643, 2012-9253-. En efecto, sobre el particular ha dicho la Sala que:

“En este caso los consultantes no indican los artículos del proyecto que cuestionan, ni los motivos por los cuales tienen dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad, y simplemente señalan el tema consultado, prescindiendo de realizar algún tipo de argumento de constitucionalidad, por lo que no procede evacuar la consulta. Así lo ha resuelto reiteradamente la jurisprudencia constitucional y por ese motivo lo procedente es no ha lugar a evacuar la consulta formulada.” Más allá de la cita puntual de los artículos cuya constitucionalidad se consulta, tal como se ha indicado, los motivos por los cuales se formula la consulta legislativa también deben ser claros y expresos, detallando las razones por las cuales los diputados mantienen dudas razonables sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas consultadas. Al respecto, ha dicho la Sala que si las argumentaciones resultan omisas, insuficientes, o vagas, la consulta debe resultar inadmisible y, por ende, inevacuable, por cuanto no contaría este Tribunal con los motivos expresos por los cuales pronunciarse. En efecto, ha dicho la Sala que:

“Ha de recordarse también que la misma ley dispone en su artículo 101 que la Sala evacuará la consulta dictaminando "sobre los aspectos y motivos consultados o sobre cualesquiera otros que considere relevantes desde el punto de vista constitucional", pero el tribunal interpreta que "los aspectos y motivos consultados" son los que, de acuerdo con el artículo 99, cuestionan u objetan el proyecto, o fundamentan la duda que pudieran tener los legisladores acerca de éste. Dado, pues, que la consulta se aparta de lo legalmente establecido, no es de recibo; si el tribunal, no obstante, la admitiera y absolviera, se colocaría en situación que está fuera de los alcances de sus atribuciones. Los Magistrados Sancho, Vargas y Armijo, salvan el voto y declaran que se evacua la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad sobre el Proyecto "Ley del Estatuto de Servicio de la Asamblea Legislativa", Expediente Nº 11.839, en el sentido de que es inconstitucional que el artículo 18, en cuanto excepciona a un gurpo de funcionarios de la Asamblea Legislativa de la prohibición que rige parar los demás servidores, de vincularse directamente con los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen.” -sentencia 2001-11643- De tal forma, si una consulta resulta ser imprecisa en citar los artículos o en exponer los motivos por los cuales existen dudas fundadas de constitucionalidad, la misma resultaría inadmisible e inevacuable. Y esto es así por cuanto «tratándose de consultas legislativas de tipo facultativo, la competencia de la Sala Constitucional tiene origen en las dudas o reparos de constitucionalidad que formulen los legisladores» -sentencias 2001-12459 y 2012-9253-, de forma que si tales argumentos no existen como tal, o bien, cuando los propios diputados consultantes manifiesten carecer de dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas o proyectos consultados, resultaría impropio para la Sala emitir criterio alguno, pues se estaría en supuestos que trascienden las competencias de la Sala en materia de consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad –sentencias 2002-3460, 2012-9253 y 2021-21204-.

V.- Objeto de la consulta. Las y los diputados consultantes plantean como objeto de su consulta, que el proyecto denominado “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, expediente legislativo número 22.323, el cual modifica el artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, e incluye dos normas transitorias, resulta contrario a la autonomía de administración y gobierno de dicha institución, tal como se encuentra prevista en el articulo 73 de la Constitución Política, y ha sido reconocido y desarrollado por la jurisprudencia constitucional.

El proyecto cuyas normas se consulta, señala:

“LEY DE IGUALDAD PARA LOS TRABAJADORES ANTE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL

CAPÍTULO I

ARTÍCULO ÚNICO- Se reforma el artículo 3 de la Ley 17, Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social CCSS, de 22 de octubre de 1943. El texto es el siguiente:

Artículo 3- Las coberturas del seguro social -y el ingreso a este- son obligatorias para todos los trabajadores manuales e intelectuales que perciban sueldo o salario o ingresos propios. El monto de las cuotas que por esta ley se deban pagar se calculará sobre el total de las remuneraciones que bajo cualquier denominación se paguen, con motivo o derivados de la relación obrero-patronal u otra fuente de ingresos.

El aporte del trabajador al seguro social será el mismo porcentaje en todos los casos cuyos ingresos sean iguales o superiores al salario mínimo legal del trabajador no calificado genérico establecido por el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. La referencia para este porcentaje será el establecido para el trabajador bajo el seguro obrero - patronal. No podrán establecerse diferencias entre asalariados, independientes, voluntarios o algún otro tipo de asegurado estipulado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Los trabajadores independientes estarán exentos de pago de la cuota patronal.

La Junta Directiva queda autorizada para tomar las medidas tendientes a coadyuvar en la atención médica a los indigentes, en los riesgos y accidentes profesionales, y en la campaña de medicina preventiva.

La Caja determinará reglamentariamente los requisitos de ingreso a cada régimen de protección, así como los beneficios y las condiciones en que estos se otorgarán; para tales reglamentos, requisitos, beneficios y condiciones la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social deberá respetar, de forma equitativa, el derecho a la protección de la salud de todos los trabajadores.

La Junta Directiva tomará los acuerdos necesarios para extender progresivamente sus servicios a todo el país, conforme lo permitan sus recursos materiales y humanos.

Para los trabajadores independientes, cuyo ingreso neto sea inferior al salario mínimo legal y que soliciten su afiliación al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la CCSS, la cuota del Estado se incrementará con el fin de subsanar parcialmente la ausencia de la cuota patronal. Para tales efectos, se creará un programa especial permanente a cargo del Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares (Fodesaf).

CAPÍTULO II

DISPOSICIONES TRANSITORIAS

TRANSITORIO l- En un plazo no mayor a seis meses posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la presente ley, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, por medio de su Junta Directiva, deberá efectuar los ajustes administrativos necesarios para establecer el porcentaje igualitario para todos los trabajadores con base en el porcentaje establecido para el trabajador obrero - patronal.

TRANSITORIO ll- En un plazo no mayor a tres meses, posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la presente ley, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social deberá implementar y efectuar los mecanismos y ajustes necesarios en los sistemas informáticos, para que todos los trabajadores asegurados vean reflejado en el pago de sus cuotas el porcentaje igualitario.

Rige a partir de su publicación.” -énfasis agregados- En las normas de cita, se resaltan los aspectos sobre los cuales las y los Diputados consultantes manifiestan que tienen dudas de constitucionalidad, centrando sus motivos de consulta en torno a la vulneración de la autonomía de administración y de gobierno reconocida a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en cuanto a los seguros sociales se refiere. A partir de dicha argumentación de afectación a la autonomía de la Caja, se advierte que no se plantean consultas por razones de forma o procedimiento, sino que se consultan dos aspectos concretos por razones de fondo, los cuales se resuelve conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.

VI.- Sobre el primer motivo de consulta. La vulneración de la autonomía de administración y gobierno de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Las y los Diputados consultantes, argumentan que la determinación de los parámetros para definir las cuotas y montos de cotización de los diferentes grupos de trabajadores adscritos a los regímenes de seguridad social que administra la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, es una función que se encuentra dentro del ámbito de autonomía y de gobierno reconocida constitucionalmente a la institución, cuya Junta Directiva define tales aspectos, con base en los estudios actuariales que corresponda. Agregan que al encontrarse tal potestad dentro del ámbito de autonomía constitucional, el legislador ordinario se encuentra impedido para imponerle a la Caja tales parámetros. Así, si el proyecto de ley pretende definir los parámetros a partir de los cuales se definen los porcentajes de cotización de las personas aseguradas, al mismo tiempo que pretende establecer que, de manera autónoma respecto de su condición como trabajadores independientes o asalariados, todos los trabajadores deban aportar el mismo porcentaje -partiendo de la base que pagan los trabajadores asalariados-, el proyecto en cuestión seria contrario al artículo 73 de la Constitución Política.

Sobre el particular, la norma constitucional de cita refiere, en lo conducente, que:

“ARTÍCULO 73.- Se establecen los seguros sociales en beneficio de los trabajadores manuales e intelectuales, regulados por el sistema de contribución forzosa del Estado, patronos y trabajadores, a fin de proteger a éstos contra los riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine.

La administración y el gobierno de los seguros sociales estarán a cargo de una institución autónoma, denominada Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.” Para comprender el tema de la autonomía de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, tal como lo prevé la Constitución Política, resulta de particular importancia tener presente las previas y reiteradas definiciones de la jurisprudencia constitucional al respecto. Desde los primeros años, esta Sala se ha venido pronunciando sobre el tema de la autonomía de la Caja en este aspecto, siendo así que mediante sentencia número 6256-94, diferenció la autonomía de la CCSS de la reconocida a otras instituciones del sector público, señalando al respecto que:

“[L]a norma [del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política] le concede, en forma exclusiva a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales, grado de autonomía que es, desde luego, distinto y superior al que se define en forma general en el artículo 188 ídem…” -énfasis suplido- El grado de autonomía que a partir del artículo 73 de la Constitución y del criterio jurisprudencial de reciente cita se reconoce a la Caja, se precisó aún más, al definirse que tal nivel de autonomía impide la injerencia o intervención del Poder Ejecutivo, y, en lo que a efectos de esta consulta atañe, se indicó, además, que el propio legislador encuentra en dicha autonomía una limitación, por la cual debe cumplir con la Constitución, y se le impide adoptar legislación que se involucre en aspectos propios que corresponda definirlos a la institución. Así, mediante sentencias 2012-17736 y 2021-17098, señaló la Sala que esta autonomía:

“[S]ignifica un grado de protección frente a la injerencia del Poder Ejecutivo, pero también limitaciones a la intervención del Poder Legislativo. Aunque ciertamente la CCSS no escapa a la ley, esta última no puede "modificar ni alterar" la competencia y autonomía dada constitucionalmente a la CCSS, definiendo aspectos que son de su resorte exclusivo. La Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, por ser básicamente una institución autónoma de creación constitucional, la materia de su competencia, dada constitucionalmente, está fuera de la acción de la ley. Dicho de otro modo, el legislador, en el caso de la administración y el gobierno de los seguros sociales tiene limitaciones, debiendo respetar lo que el Constituyente estableció. Así como estaría vedado al legislador emitir una ley donde disponga que la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales ya no le corresponde a la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, asimismo, tampoco puede emitir una ley que incursione en aspectos propios o correspondientes a la definición de la CCSS, en la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales.” -lo resaltado no es del original-.

De tal forma, es bastante claro que al legislador ordinario se le impide adoptar leyes que interfieran con el ejercicio de las competencias asignadas constitucionalmente a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, como lo son, precisamente, la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales. Es importante resaltar ese grado de autonomía, pues, según lo dicho, va más allá de la simple administración, pues al señalarse que la autonomía también es «de gobierno», se hace una directa referencia a la definición de los aspectos a partir de los cuales se ejercerá también la autonomía «de administración». En este sentido, ambas vertientes de la autonomía confluyen en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, por disposición expresa del constituyente, y porque tal definición así ha sido reconocida y señalada por la jurisprudencia constitucional.

En la ya señalada sentencia 2021-17098, la Sala precisó aún más ese grado de autonomía, al explicar que:

“[D]ebe resaltarse que la norma que define las funciones y fines de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, se ubica en nuestra Carta Magna en el capítulo de derechos y garantías sociales, mientras lo referente a Instituciones Autónomas se ubica en otro Título XIV; la diferencia en la ubicación refleja, desde una interpretación sistemática y sistémica, que la propia norma fundamental al crear la institución de la seguridad social, pretende brindarle protección solidaria y prioritaria a la persona por su propia condición; evidentemente se trata de una institución que asume el espíritu solidario que inspira el artículo cincuenta y setenta y cuatro de la Constitución. Lo que se pretende es que cada persona tenga la garantía que el Estado solidario le asegura salud, pensión, beneficios por incapacidad y todo lo referente a la seguridad sociaL Esta disposición que se convierte no sólo es un fin o guía de acción del Estado, sino también en un límite por sí mismo, al asegurar que ni el Poder Ejecutivo o el Poder Legislativo podrían menoscabar dicha competencia constitucional (...) De lo expuesto se deriva que, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), por disposición constitucional (art.73) goza de autonomía administrativa y de gobierno. Lo cual significa que, como ente descentralizado funcional, puede establecer las reglas para la selección de su personal, siendo válido en este caso la existencia de un marco normativo especial para su relación estatutaria, que atienda y asegure su grado de autonomía. Ese grado de autonomía le permite además, autoadministrarse (disponer de sus recursos humanos, materiales y financieros); darse su propia organización interna; la fijación de fines, metas y tipos de medios para realizarlas; la emisión de reglamentos autónomos de servicio o actividad, acorde con las disposiciones normalmente llamadas de política general. Así entonces, como institución autónoma de creación constitucional y con un grado de autonomía mayor (administrativa y de gobierno) le permite estar protegida frente a injerencias del Poder Ejecutivo y de limitaciones a la hora de legislar el Poder Legislativo (quien no puede modificar vía legal su grado de autonomía).” -lo resaltado no es del original- De manera más concreta aún, tratándose ya de la fijación de las cuotas y los parámetros para su determinación, la jurisprudencia también es contundente al señalar que la definición de las condiciones, beneficios y requisitos de ingreso a cada régimen de seguridad social administrado y gobernado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, es una potestad y una competencia exclusiva de la propia institución, sin que se le permita al legislador emitir normas que afecten la autonomía en cuanto a este concreto aspecto se refiere. Así, mediante sentencia número 2003-2355, reiterada por sentencia número 2021-23611, estableció esta Sala que:

“[M]ediante los artículos 3 y 23 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Cara Costarricense del Seguro Social, su Junta Directiva tiene plena competencia para establecer los alcances de las prestaciones propias de la seguridad social vía reglamento, de manera que puede definir las condiciones, beneficios y requisitos de ingreso de cada régimen de protección, con sustento en estudios actuariales, a fin de no quebrar el sistema.” -énfasis agregado- En este sentido, es claro que si «definir las condiciones, beneficios y requisitos de ingreso de cada régimen de protección» es una potestad exclusiva de la Junta Directiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en virtud del grado de autonomía que se le otorga y reconoce, es claro también que tales definiciones se encuentran fuera de la órbita y posibilidades de actuación de otras entidades, instituciones y Poderes del Estado, de manera que si se llegare a emitir algún acto, o alguna normativa que incidiere en esa potestad y competencia exclusiva, estaría violentándose el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, y el nivel o grado de autonomía que dicho artículo constitucional le reconoce a la CCSS.

Debe hacerse notar, que el legislador ordinario reconoce esta potestad y competencia exclusiva de la institución sobre la cual ahora pretende incidir o involucrarse. Véase que, siguiendo el criterio definido en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, en el artículo 23 de la misma Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, se dispuso de manera expresa que:

“Artículo 23.- Las cuotas y prestaciones serán determinadas por la Junta Directiva, de acuerdo con el costo de los servicios que hayan de prestarse en cada región y de conformidad con los respectivos cálculos actuariales.”-el resaltado no es del original- Es decir, que en el ejercicio de la función legislativa, el legislador sí ha reconocido aquella autonomía de administración y de gobierno, pues de forma absolutamente clara, deja en la Junta Directiva de la CCSS, la definición de las cuotas y prestaciones, en el mismo sentido que esta Sala lo reconoce también en las ya referidas sentencias números 2003-2355 y 2021-23611. Esta norma del artículo 23 de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS, no es objeto de reforma en el proyecto de ley que ahora se conoce, por lo que se advierte también que la propuesta de ley cuestionada, estaría generando algún tipo de incongruencia normativa o legislativa, pues, por un lado, es el legislador quien pretende definir que el porcentaje de cotización debe ser igual en todos los casos, mientras que en otra norma de la misma ley, ya define que tal aspecto será de fijación de la Junta Directiva de la institución, siendo este último el criterio acorde con el grado de autonomía administrativa y de gobierno que constitucionalmente se reconoce a la Caja.

Por otra parte, es importante señalar también, que durante la tramitación del expediente legislativo número 22.323 -sobre este proyecto de ley-, existen sendos pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría General de la República y de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en similares términos a los aquí expuestos, y que respaldan que el objeto del proyecto de ley, contraría la autonomía de la institución.

En el informe rendido por la Procuraduría -OJ-125-2021-, el ente asesor del Estado señaló expresamente que:

“[T]al iniciativa sí invade los ámbitos reservados constitucionalmente a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, pues se pretende regular los términos en los que debe establecerse la cotización de los trabajadores asalariados, independientes y voluntarios para obtener la protección de los seguros sociales, lo cual forma parte de la autonomía atribuida constitucionalmente a la Caja Costarricense de Sequro Social (..) Nótese que el provecto de ley que se analiza no solo establece reglas imperativas en materia de cotización, sino que además le indica a la Junta Directiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social el plazo dentro del cual debe implementar los cambios propuestos, todo lo cual excede las potestades que ostenta el legislador en esta materia. (…) Es importante advertir además que el proyecto de ley no hace referencia a estudios financieros o actuariales que analicen el impacto financiero que podría tener la propuesta, lo cual ignora la rigurosidad técnica que debe privar en estos temas. Lo anterior a pesar de que la Sala Constitucional ha insistido en que fijar las condiciones en las que han de operar los seguros sociales es una atribución exclusiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social…” -énfasis suplidos- De tal manera, la Procuraduría no sólo advirtió la inconformidad constitucional del proyecto en los términos que aquí se ha desarrollado, sino que, además, indicó que la propuesta de ley, que impacta en las definiciones financieras de la institución, carecía incluso de estudios actuariales. Sobre el particular, es necesario señalar y enfatizar, que es criterio de esta Sala que, aún existiendo algún tipo de estudio financiero o actuarial que pretendiese respaldar un proyecto de ley como el que ahora se conoce, la existencia de tales estudios no daría lugar ni permitiría la emisión de este tipo de legislación, pues, de conformidad con lo dicho, se trata de una materia reservada a la autonomía de administración y gobierno que constitucionalmente se otorga y reconoce a la propia Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, y no a ningún otro órgano o instancia pública.

Por su parte, en el informe rendido por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social -SJD-1361-2021-, la institución recalcó que:

"De lo anterior, se infiere que, a través del ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria la Junta Directiva Institucional, y con fundamento en los estudios técnico actuariales, no solo establece las contribuciones correspondientes a los patronos, trabajadores y Estado o bien trabajadores independientes y Estado, sino también el mínimo de cotización que requiere la Institución para brindar sus servicios y otorgar los beneficios en el Seguro de Salud y el Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte; siendo que el proyecto de Ley al establecer una regulación en tema de la determinación de las contribuciones a la seguridad social por parte de los trabajadores implica una invasión a las competencias que la Constitución le otorga a la Institución en materia de gobierno y administración de los seguro sociales, y por ende lesiona lo dispuesto en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política. Asimismo, es importante considerar que los criterios técnicos remitidos por la Gerencia Financiera, Gerencia de Pensiones y la Dirección Actuarial y Económica señalan una posible afectación en cuanto a los recursos con los cuales se financian los Seguros Sociales que administra la Caja, en caso de que se aprobare el Proyecto de Ley en los términos consultados.

Con fundamento en las consideraciones precedentes, esta Dirección Jurídica recomienda la oposición al proyecto de ley expediente No. 22.323 Ley de Igualdad para los trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social siendo que dicha disposición atenta contra la autonomía de gobierno y administración, concedida a la institución de raigambre constitucional, no solo al establecer la forma en que se contribuiría por parte de los trabajadores al financiamiento de los Seguros Sociales sino también en la determinación de la Base Mínima Contributiva" -lo resaltado no es del original- Así las cosas, nótese que la propia institución con autonomía constitucional expresamente declarada, advirtió al Poder Legislativo que la propuesta de ley resultaba contraria a las previsiones constitucionales y legales que rigen la materia, y, además, refería claramente la existencia de estudios actuariales aportados al expediente legislativo, que señalan el riesgo que tal iniciativa de ley plantea para la estabilidad financiera de los regímenes de seguros y de la institución como tal.

En este sentido, mientras la Procuraduría advierte no sólo sobre la formal inconformidad constitucional del proyecto de ley, la Caja, por su parte, sí hace referencia a la afectación institucional que el proyecto puede generar, para lo cual sí aportó en sede legislativa los estudios financieros correspondientes.

Debe resaltarse también, que dentro de la propia corriente legislativa, el Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicios Técnicos de la Asamblea Legislativa, advirtió también que la propuesta de ley, en la medida que pretende regular las cuotas de las personas trabajadoras, invade el ámbito de autonomía reconocido a la Caja. Mediante el dictamen AL-DEST-IJU-212-2021, dicha instancia expresó:

“Todo lo anterior se trae a colación respecto al énfasis que tiene la Caja en 1a definición de sus políticas administrativas, la atención médica que presta, la posibilidad de flexibilizar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones a cargo de cuotas, y de igual forma con las facturas que le adeuden y la ampliación de plazos y arreglos de pago, entre otras definiciones, todas ellas asociadas a su autonomía administrativa. La cual, es la posibilidad jurídica de realizar su cometido 1egal sin sujeción a otro ente y posee, además, autonomía de gobierno, que refiere a la capacidad de dictarse a sí misma sus propios objetivos, autonomía que como bien lo indica la Sala Constitucional en las citas anteriores, es distinta y superior a la que consigna el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política.” -énfasis agregado- Asimismo, de manera enfática y concluyente, dicho Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicios Técnicos, señaló en el mismo informe que:

“Es importante retomar lo planteado sobre el artículo 73 Constitucional, de donde se deriva que la CCSS, goza de autonomía especial, y es por medio de su Junta Directiva, donde se establecerán y regularán todos los aspectos concernientes a su administración y dirección, por medio de los Reglamentos que esta defina.

De dicha norma constitucional, deriva que en materia de seguros sociales, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, cuenta con una autonomía que va más allá de la autonomía administrativa reconocida en el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política a las demás instituciones autónomas, puesto que también se le reconoce una autonomía política, que le otorga capacidad para definir sus propias metas y autodirigirse, lo que resulta en consecuencia incompatible con la dirección o imposición de límites por parte de otro órgano o ente, incluyendo la propia Asamblea Legislativa.

Tomando en cuenta lo señalado en el análisis de esta iniciativa y, específicamente en la autonomía de que goza la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, esta asesoría considera que la reforma en los términos planteados, podría presentar una seria lesión a la autonomía otorgada a la CCSS y por lo tanto un roce de constitucionalidad, de tal forma que, de no existir modificaciones en la redacción planteada, estos serían insubsanables.” -énfasís añadidos- De tal manera, es evidente que tanto la Procuraduría General de la República, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, y el propio Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicios Técnicos de la Asamblea Legislativa, advirtieron a los órganos legislativos relacionados, sobre la inconformidad constitucional del proyecto que ahora se conoce, precisamente por contrariar la definición del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, en lo que a la autonomía administrativa y de gobierno de la Caja concierne; además, se evidencia que también se hizo notar a los legisladores, los riesgos para la sostenibilidad financiera de los regímenes de seguridad social y la propia institución. No obstante, a pesar de todo ello, el proyecto en cuestión fue dictaminado y posteriormente votado en primer debate.

En consecuencia, y de conformidad con lo definido en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, y el reiterado criterio jurisprudencial sobre el contenido y alcance de la autonomía de administración y gobierno reconocida a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social en cuanto a los seguros sociales corresponde; y, particularmente, considerando que lo concerniente a la definición de las cuotas, parámetros y condiciones de ingreso y cotización a los diferentes regímenes de seguridad social establecidos por la institución, resultan ser competencia exclusiva de la Junta Directiva de la Caja, sin que sobre tales cuotas, parámetros y condiciones puedan otras instancias de gobierno pretender incidir o influenciar, esta Sala concluye que el proyecto de ley consultado, contiene el vicio de fondo apuntado por las y los diputados consultantes.

Este vicio de constitucionalidad se muestra en dos vertientes. La primera, en lo que concierne a la ampliación de los parámetros con base en los cuales determinar la cuota o cotización, al incluir no solamente las «remuneraciones que bajo cualquier denominación se paguen» con motivo de una relación obrera -como dice la norma actual y es la finalidad del artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS-, sino agregando los «ingresos propios» y las «otras fuentes de ingresos» que pudiere tener la persona trabajadora. La segunda, al determinar que en todos los casos, sean trabajadores asalariados, independientes o asegurados voluntarios, el porcentaje de aportación o cotización será el mismo. Nótese que tales aspectos resultan de definición propia de la Junta Directiva de la institución, tal como ya se ha mencionado, y de manera concreta se señaló en las referidas sentencias 2003-2355 y 2021-23611, sin que resulte viable que el legislador ordinario le imponga a la institución con base en qué y cómo deben fijarse las aportaciones. El hecho de que la propuesta de ley le indique a la Junta Directiva de la Caja que debe tomar en consideración no sólo la remuneración, sino, incluso, otro tipo de ingresos propios u otra fuente de ingresos, y que el porcentaje de cotización o aportación debe fijarlo igual para todos los casos, a pesar de sus propias diferencias particulares e intrínsecas, es un acto que contraía la autonomía de administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales, en los términos aquí señalados.

En este sentido, la reforma del artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social que plantea el proyecto de ley, específicamente en los aspectos planteados en esta consulta, resulta contrario al artículo 73 de la Constitución Política.

VII.- Sobre las normas transitorias y la vulneración de la autonomía de administración y gobierno de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Las y los diputados consultantes, plantean que las normas transitorias del proyecto de ley, también contravienen la autonomía de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Sobre el particular, recuérdese que estas normas transitorias definen que:

“TRANSITORIO l- En un plazo no mayor a seis meses posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la presente ley, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, por medio de su Junta Directiva, deberá efectuar los ajustes administrativos necesarios para establecer el porcentaje igualitario para todos los trabajadores con base en el porcentaje establecido para el trabajador obrero - patronal.

TRANSITORIO ll- En un plazo no mayor a tres meses, posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la presente ley, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social deberá implementar y efectuar los mecanismos y ajustes necesarios en los sistemas informáticos, para que todos los trabajadores asegurados vean reflejado en el pago de sus cuotas el porcentaje igualitario.” De tal manera, las normas transitorias del proyecto de ley pretenden imponerle a la CCSS, plazos para realizar los ajustes administrativos para establecer el porcentaje igualitario de cotización, además, de señalarse el plazo para implementar los mecanismos y los ajustes en los sistemas informáticos correspondientes.

De conformidad con lo ya señalado, fijar mediante una ley ordinaria derivaciones propias del ejercicio de la autonomía de gobierno, como cuándo debe procederse con ajustes a lo interno de la institución, es un aspecto que claramente contraviene la autonomía prevista en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, pues de manera evidente, es competencia de la Junta Directiva de la Caja, definir los momentos en que procede realizar determinados ajustes en cuanto a los procedimientos de determinación, fijación, mecanismo de cobro y demás, de las cuotas de aseguramiento correspondientes. La intervención del legislador mediante una ley ordinaria que así lo pretenda, resulta contraria a la autonomía constitucionalmente reconocida a la CCSS, por lo que bajo la misma línea de argumentación ya señalada en el considerando anterior, la Sala advierte que estas normas transitorias del proyecto de ley, resultan igualmente contrarias al artículo 73 de la Constitución Política.

VIII.- Sobre el segundo motivo de consulta. La vulneración del principio de razonabilidad. El segundo motivo de consulta que plantean las y los diputados consultantes, guarda relación con lo que denominan como violación a los principios de necesidad, idoneidad, legitimidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, todo lo cual se subsume en que la consulta versa sobre la afectación al principio de razonabilidad, ya que los primeros cuatro aspectos mencionados son, precisamente, parámetros para valorar y determinar la eventual vulneración del principio de razonabilidad. Al respecto, debe señalarse que la valoración del principio de razonabilidad se hace con base en el denominado test de razonabilidad, el cual se inicia, precisamente, a partir de considerar la legitimidad de la norma que se cuestiona o consulta. En el caso bajo estudio, de conformidad con lo señalado en los considerandos precedentes, está claro que la fuente genética que se pretende utilizar para incursionar en el tema de la fijación de las cuotas de la seguridad social -a través de una ley o proyecto de ley-, dista de ser legítima, pues mediante ley resulta del todo improcedente, según lo supra explicado, que se vulnere la autonomía constitucionalmente reconocida a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Dicho de otro modo, en este caso no se cumple siquiera el primero de los elementos del test de razonabilidad -la legitimidad-, por lo que desde ese momento resulta inviable proceder con la aplicación o valoración de los demás parámetros. De tal manera, tomando en consideración la ya señalada inconformidad constitucional del proyecto de ley en los términos expuestos en esta sentencia, estima la Sala que resulta innecesario profundizar sobre la violación del principio de razonabilidad, toda vez que, con base en las valoraciones ya realizadas, se determina que el proyecto de ley consultado es contrario al artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, por lo que resulta ocioso realizar el examen o test de razonabilidad propio de estos casos, y basta con la declaración de inconstitucionalidad ya realizada en los considerandos anteriores.

IX.- A modo de conclusión. En definitiva, se evacua esta consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad, en el sentido que el proyecto de “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, contiene los vicios de fondo señalados por las y los Diputados consultantes, en la medida que dicho proyecto de ley, resulta contrario al artículo 73 de la Constitución Política.

X.- Nota de la Magistrada Garro Vargas. Tal como lo señala la mayoría, visto que el proyecto lesiona frontalmente la Constitución, pues esta le impide al Parlamento legislar sobre el particular, es innecesario entrar a considerar si el proyecto está técnicamente fundamentado. Sin embargo, en otro contexto normativo, en atención de la materia, habría sido pertinente examinar lo relativo a los estudios actuariales.

Por tanto

Se evacua esta consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad, en el sentido que, en cuanto a los aspectos específicamente consultados, el proyecto de “Ley de Igualdad para los Trabajadores ante la Seguridad Social”, que se tramita bajo el expediente legislativo número 22.323, vulnera la autonomía de administración y de gobierno de los seguros sociales, reconocida a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política. La Magistrada Garro Vargas consigna nota. Comuníquese.- Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G. Anamari Garro V.

José Roberto Garita N. Rosibel Jara V.