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Res. 07466-2022 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 30/03/2022
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismissed the constitutional challenge due to the plaintiff's lack of standing, as he failed to prove the defense of diffuse or collective interests and did not allege a prior judicial or administrative proceeding.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad por carecer el accionante de legitimación, al no acreditar la defensa de intereses difusos ni colectivos, y no haber alegado un proceso judicial o procedimiento administrativo previo.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismissed a constitutional challenge brought by an employee of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund against Articles 28 and 35 of the Public Finance Strengthening Law (Law No. 9635). The plaintiff argued that these provisions, which regulate the additional payment for exclusive dedication, created a salary inequality compared to colleagues who had signed contracts under a previous regime. The Court found that the plaintiff lacked standing because he invoked the defense of diffuse interests, but the challenged provisions were susceptible to individual application and directly affected his legal sphere. The Chamber reiterated that diffuse interests cannot be invoked when the norm allows for an individual claim, and that the plaintiff also lacked standing to defend collective interests as he did not represent any formally organized corporate entity. The action was dismissed as inadmissible.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por un funcionario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social contra los artículos 28 y 35 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (Ley N° 9635). El accionante alegaba que dichas normas, que regulan el pago adicional por dedicación exclusiva, creaban una desigualdad salarial con respecto a compañeros que habían firmado contratos bajo un régimen anterior. El Tribunal determinó que el actor carecía de legitimación porque invocó la defensa de intereses difusos, pero las disposiciones impugnadas eran susceptibles de aplicación individual y afectaban directamente su esfera jurídica. La Sala reiteró que no cabe alegar intereses difusos cuando la norma permite un reclamo individual, y que el accionante tampoco estaba legitimado para la defensa de intereses colectivos al no representar a ninguna entidad corporativa formal. La acción fue rechazada por inadmisible.
Key excerptExtracto clave
It is evident that these provisions are susceptible to individual application and directly affect the legal sphere of identifiable persons, as is the case with the plaintiff. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned case law, this Chamber finds that the plaintiff lacks direct standing to bring this action in defense of diffuse interests. [...] Based on the above criterion, the plaintiff is also without standing to file this action in defense of the collective interests of the professionals working for the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, given that the actor does not appear on behalf of any formally organized and identified collective, of which he holds legal representation, and is therefore prevented from acting in defense of corporate interests.Es evidente que esas disposiciones son susceptibles de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas identificables, como ocurre en el caso del accionante. En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales precitados, esta Sala estima que el accionante carece de legitimación directa para plantear esta acción en defensa de intereses difusos. [...] Con base en el criterio precitado, el accionante tampoco se encuentra legitimado para interponer esta acción en defensa de intereses colectivos de las personas profesionales que laboran para la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, dado que el actor no acude en representación de alguna colectividad formalmente organizada e identificada, de la cual ostente la representación legal, por lo que se encuentra imposibilitado para actuar en defensa de intereses corporativos.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando la norma que se impugna es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción."
"This Chamber, by majority, has held that when the challenged norm is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action."
Considerando II
"Esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando la norma que se impugna es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción."
Considerando II
"[...] esa interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional [...], tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo."
"[...] that interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to oversee constitutional legality [...], nor can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, since in that case, standing would derive from that claim."
Considerando II
"[...] esa interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional [...], tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo."
Considerando II
Full documentDocumento completo
**Review of the Document** **Exp: 22-005874-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2022007466** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine forty-five hours on March thirtieth, two thousand twenty-two.
An unconstitutionality action brought by GIOVANNI DELGADO CASTRO, identity card No. 1-1118-0296; against articles 28 and 35 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances, Law No. 9635.
**WHEREAS:** **1.-** By a written submission received via Online Filing at 12:11 hours on March 18, 2022, the petitioner requests that articles 28 and 35 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances, Law No. 9635, be declared unconstitutional. He indicates that he is an employee of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, with more than 10 years of seniority at the institution. He currently works as a Professional 2 in the Area of Procurement of Goods and Services and serves as a lawyer in that area. Three years ago, he began working as a professional in the area of Law at different work centers of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and in his work area the institution recognizes exclusive dedication (he clarifies that he is not claiming the right to exclusive dedication, as he already has it and the institution grants it). He explains that he has co-workers with the same profile, but he does not receive the same remuneration or salary for the same functions, due to the application of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances No. 9635. He indicates that he does not receive the same treatment, which has caused a direct economic, emotional, and patrimonial impact on his person. To demonstrate this, he explains that before the application of that law, a 55% exclusive dedication and an additional percentage of career advancement (carrera profesional) were paid. Afterwards, only a 25% exclusive dedication is paid and without career advancement. He deems this to be a clear violation of the provisions of the Political Constitution, the Labor Code, and the international treaties signed by Costa Rica with the ILO. He argues that, currently in his unit and at the institutional level, there are persons appointed under the same profile with different salaries and different remuneration, creating an employment relationship with inequality of remuneration but with the same functions. He indicates that the Magna Carta, the Labor Code, and the international conventions signed by Costa Rica stand above the Law for Strengthening Public Finances No. 9635, where it is clear that such inequality is not permitted. The Political Constitution establishes in its article 57: "Every worker shall have the right to a minimum wage, set periodically, for a normal workday, which provides well-being and a dignified existence. The wage shall always be equal for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency," and in its article 68 that: "No discrimination may be made regarding wages, advantages, or working conditions between Costa Ricans and foreigners, or regarding any group of workers." The Labor Code establishes in its article 167 that: "To set the amount of the wage in each class of work, the quantity and quality of the same shall be considered. For equal work, performed in a position, workday, and conditions of equal efficiency, corresponds equal salary, including in this both the daily quota payments and the benefits, services such as housing and any other good given to a worker in exchange for their ordinary labor; (Paragraph thus amended by article 1, of Law No. 25 of November 17, 1944.) No differences may be established on account of age, sex, or nationality." He adds that the Costa Rican State signed Convention No. 100 concerning Equal Remuneration, 1951, with the ILO, which clearly states in its Article 1 that: "(a) the term remuneration includes the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker's employment; (b) the expression equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value refers to rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex." He deems that the application of the challenged regulations contradicts equal remuneration for work of equal value, since there are currently marked differences in the remuneration and salaries received in the same position. Furthermore, he considers that there is also a difference in treatment, which has caused, in many cases, the employee to suffer a direct impact on their salary due to the application of the law. To explain the aforementioned impact, he provides the following example: a person who is in the same position has two different realities if they signed the exclusive dedication before the law; even if they are not a permanent appointee (propiedad), they do not sign the exclusive dedication contract again and their 55% is maintained; in contrast, another person like the petitioner, each time a personnel action is taken (which in his case is every 6 months for being in a fixed vacancy), has to sign the legal contract every 6 months, which implies in most cases a delay in the payment of the exclusive dedication item, and this has often led to payroll calculation errors, overpayments or underpayments, which other employees in the same position or condition, but with a different application of the law, do not experience. He points out that, in short, this law has created two different categories of employees in the institution, one with different salary conditions and that does not possess the same rights or salary equality, but does have the same obligations. He requests that, due to the relevance this implies and for social justice, this unconstitutionality action be reviewed and declared with merit. As a precautionary measure and due to the social inequality the law has created, he requests that the questioned articles of the law be ordered to be without effect until this unconstitutionality action is resolved.
**2.-** By resolution at 15:17 hours on March 21, 2022, the petitioner was warned of the following: "(…) that within three days, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying the processing of the action in case of non-compliance, they must: 1) Substantiate what their standing (legitimación) is to file this unconstitutionality action, in accordance with article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. 2) Clarify which norms they intend to challenge in this action. 3) Likewise and without prejudice to the foregoing, in accordance with article 4 of Law Number 3245 of December 3, 1963, they are additionally warned that within the same period, they must attach and pay the Colegio de Abogados stamp for the sum of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief, under the warning – in this case – of not hearing the party in default until they comply with the order, without retroaction of terms." **3.-** By a written submission received via fax at the Constitutional Chamber at 06:25 hours on March 23, 2022, the petitioner states that, in response to the warning, although the application of articles 28 and 35 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances No. 9635 partially affects him, the reality is that it affects all professionals who are receiving appointments at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social since 2019, which concerns the collectivity of professionals in the institution, as established in article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which dictates: "No prior case pending resolution shall be necessary when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or that concerns the collectivity as a whole." He indicates that this situation not only occurs at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social but in the majority of public and autonomous institutions of the State, where currently professionals with the same profile receive different remuneration percentages and different salaries. He clarifies that the norms he challenges are articles 28 and 35 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances No. 9635. Likewise, he states that he attaches Colegio de Abogados stamps.
**4.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, including from its presentation, any motion submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is merely a reiteration or reproduction of a prior, identical or similar, rejected motion.
Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue – including habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or in the administrative venue – in the procedure for exhausting this route, i.e., in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act –, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – no base matter is required – in the following cases: a) when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the collectivity as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through Judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 hours on July 28, 1995, stated the following:
"(…) Firstly, it is an incidental proceeding, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution – either before the courts of law or within the procedure for exhausting the administrative route – is required to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the ruling of the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, as it expresses the constitutionality of the norms that should be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation permit direct access to this route – requirements of the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (…)".
Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the introductory brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality considered infringed (article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Additionally, the conditions of standing (legitimación) must be accredited (powers of attorney and certifications), the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp must be paid, and a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter must be provided (article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).
**II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION DUE TO LACK OF STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN).** In the specific case, by resolution at 15:17 hours on March 21, 2022, the petitioner was warned to substantiate what his standing is for filing this unconstitutionality action and to clarify which norms he intends to challenge. In order to comply with the warning, the petitioner stated the following: "(…) Although it partially affects me because I am one of the persons to whom articles: 28 and 35 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances Law 9635 are applied. The reality is that this law affects all professionals who are receiving appointments at the institution since 2019, and which concerns the collectivity of professionals in the institution, this in accordance with what is established in article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (…)". Despite the warning, the petitioner reiterates that his claim is to challenge articles 28 and 35 of Law No. 9635; however, this Chamber observes that the petitioner's disagreement refers to the differences in the percentage he receives for exclusive dedication, compared to other officials of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with the same professional profile, which is actually regulated in the Law of Salaries of the Public Administration, No. 2166, articles 28 and 35 (amended by article 3 of Title III of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances No. 9635 of December 3, 2018). Having clarified the above, it is noted that the petitioner bases his standing (legitimación) on the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as he alleges the defense of the interests of the collectivity of professionals to whom these regulatory provisions apply. Despite what the petitioner alleges, he lacks the standing he claims to hold, given that he does not meet what is required to appear in defense of the interests protected in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as explained below. This Chamber, by majority, has deemed that when the norm challenged is susceptible to individual application, invoking the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action is not appropriate. Thus, in Vote No. 2021-002185 of 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:
"(…) II.- On diffuse interests and the standing (legitimación) of the petitioners in the case under study. The petitioners indicate that their standing arises from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it is pertinent to indicate that, as already mentioned, the cases in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. Diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, all interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the collectivity can file the action to protect the right deemed injured. On the matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:
"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding Whereas Clause, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter - as has been repeatedly stated - is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, therefore, an interest distributed among each of the individuals, mediated if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may possess them, that is the key for the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in different resolutions such as 03705-93 at fifteen hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen hours forty-five on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen hours thirty on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." – see judgment number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to deem that diffuse interest is composed of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. Regarding the first - the subjective one - it is clear that it is diffused among a non-individualized human group that coparticipates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur with collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffuse" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case – see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality - which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction -, it cannot be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, since, in such a case, the standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim – see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the petitioners refer their standing regarding the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what corresponds is to rule as indicated in the following Whereas Clauses.
(…)
In the action now under consideration, the same petitioners challenge the same norms of articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of breeding centers (zoocriaderos), in this action they focus on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education - which was also pointed out in that action -, the truth is that this Chamber's own definition on standing, as provided in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as clearly pointed out by the Procuraduría General de la República and emphatically referred to by the Minister of Environment and Energy, the challenged regulations are indeed totally susceptible to individual application and to directly impact the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons who exercise a certain activity, subject to the regulation indicated in the Wildlife Conservation Law and its regulation. In this way, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they exercise or intend to exercise; note that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy well states, the petitioners are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unfeasible to adduce alleged conservation and environmental education problems to utilize the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct unconstitutionality action, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements stated in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as indicated in Whereas Clauses II and III of this resolution.
Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the petitioners and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now under consideration, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as in that previous occasion, the petitioners lack standing for the filing of this proceeding, therefore it is inadmissible to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Consequently, the appropriate course of action is to declare this action without merit" (the underlining does not correspond to the original).
In a similar sense, in judgment No. 2021-011994 of 16:30 hours on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ordered that:
"(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction); but it also cannot be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, since, in such a case, the standing would derive from that claim (…)".
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court observes that the norms challenged here provide the following:
"Article 28- Exclusive dedication contract. The additional payment for exclusive dedication shall be granted, exclusively, through a contract between the granting Administration and the official who accepts the conditions to receive the economic compensation, in accordance with this law.
The term of this contract may not be less than one year, nor greater than five.
Once the contract is signed, the payment for exclusive dedication shall not constitute a permanent benefit or an acquired right; therefore, upon the expiration of its validity, the Administration shall not have the obligation to renew it.
Not signing a contract for exclusive dedication does not exempt the official from the duty to abstain from participating in activities that compromise their impartiality, enable a conflict of interest, or favor private interest to the detriment of the public interest." "Article 35- Compensation percentages for exclusive dedication. The following economic compensations are established on the base salary of the position held by professional officials who sign exclusive dedication contracts with the Administration: 1. Twenty-five percent (25%) for servants with a licentiate degree (licenciatura) level or another higher academic degree.
2. Ten percent (10%) for professionals with a university bachelor's degree level." It is evident that these provisions are susceptible to individual application and to directly impacting the legal sphere of identifiable persons, as occurs in the petitioner's case. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber deems that the petitioner lacks direct standing to bring this action in defense of diffuse interests.
Now, regarding the defense of collective interests, this Chamber has stated the following:
"(…) III.- On corporate interests. As a second ground for standing, the petitioner adduces the defense of collective interests, a situation contemplated in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. The norm provides: '…[It] shall not be necessary to have a prior case pending resolution when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the collectivity as a whole…'. In this regard, it is appropriate to point out that the Chamber has specified that through the expression 'interests that concern the collectivity as a whole,' the legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its associative base, and provided that it involves the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that nucleus of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the agglutination factor of the group. Since judgment 2006-9170 at sixteen hours thirty-six minutes on June twenty-eighth, two thousand six, this Court has returned to a prior criterion, according to which corporate entities are authorized to directly request the declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm, when it directly affects the sphere of action of the entity and its members, without it being relevant that the norm is susceptible to directly affecting the rights of the members. In this case, however, this thesis is not applicable, because the petitioner does not appear as representative of an organization that, by its nature or purposes, or whose associates, may be affected by the challenged Agreement. On the other hand, the petitioner cannot simply arrogate to himself the de facto representation of any person or professional organization." (Vote No. 2014-020446 of 09:30 hours on December 17, 2014).
Based on the aforementioned criterion, the petitioner is also not qualified to bring this action in defense of the collective interests of the professional persons who work for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, given that the actor does not appear as a representative of any formally organized and identified collectivity, of which he holds the legal representation, therefore he is unable to act in defense of corporate interests.
**III.- CONCLUSION.** By reason of the foregoing, as the petitioner lacks direct standing and has not alleged the existence of a prior judicial process or administrative proceeding that serves as the basis for the unconstitutionality action, this is inadmissible and its outright rejection proceeds. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons regarding standing by diffuse interest. Magistrate Garro Vargas adds a note.
**IV.- Different reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal.** As I have expressed in other cases, I deem that a quality of the diffuse interest consists precisely in the fact that its impact is general - that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors of it - within a context where it is not necessary that the injured subjects know each other (they may even lack nexus or legal relationships among them), but the presence of the same situation of damage or danger to a constitutional good is required, which, equally and without any need for individualization, encompasses and agglomerates an entire society in the abstract. Its defense aims to satisfy a need of society as such, therefore, it is transcendent to that of a human being considered individually or collectively. In judgment No. 2019-17397 of 12:54 hours on September 11, 2019, this Court reiterated the following:
"(…) Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of 'diffuse interests' is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this court number 3750-93, at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) '… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, persons determined, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole.
They are therefore individual interests, but at the same time, diluted within more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer a harm, actual or potential, that is more or less equal for all, such that it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective—because they are common to a generality—and individual, and thus may be claimed in that character." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united by a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could bring, relying on paragraph 2 of article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has listed various rights to which it has given the classification of "diffuse," such as the environment, the cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity and the sound management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the aforementioned goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; an environmental harm does not just affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather injures or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of the sound management of the public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any single group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is nothing more than a simple description inherent to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such may be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable reversal in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "Rule of Rights," which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, a matter of any person being able to resort to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual may act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, just as in this field it is not valid to attempt any exhaustive enumeration" (see judgment No. 2007-01145)." In line with what has been stated and upheld by this Court in its jurisprudence, they are therefore individual interests, but at the same time, diluted within more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer a harm, actual or potential, that is more or less equal for all, such that it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. It is precisely for this reason that, based on judgment no. 2021-2185 of 12:51 on February 3, 2021, I consider, unlike the Majority of this Court, that some of these interests may be embodied in a particular concrete case, without thereby losing their status as a diffuse interest, as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects a single person and everyone in general; and such an impact may be individualized in a particular situation, such as, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects impact the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or proceeding that a neighbor may bring against that factory will not only affect their own interests, but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest and is also the object of a particular individualized situation. That said, this does not mean, in any way, that in every situation invoked one can allege the existence of a diffuse interest, even though it may be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered "diffuse," it must not only affect a community, but must also be blurred, spread within that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the plaintiff, as the Majority states, the challenged regulation does not produce a socially diffused impact, but a specific one, since it refers to the community comprised of professional civil servants who sign exclusive dedication contracts with the Administration, a group that is easily identifiable. Thus, in the case sub lite, what is glimpsed is a particular situation of the plaintiff that, while it may be shared by some group of people, that effect is not of such magnitude as to consider it a diffuse interest. For the reason stated, I agree with the Majority in dismissing this action; however, with the reasoning set forth.
V.- NOTE BY MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS In judgment no. 2021-2185, invoked by the majority to reject the present action, I recorded a separate note in which I outline my interpretation regarding the admissibility of actions where an alleged diffuse interest is invoked, which, rather, should be classified as a case where there may clearly be a pending matter for resolution as an incidental mechanism to admit the standing for the unconstitutionality action. In that judgment, I made the following considerations:
"In this matter, I have concurred with my vote in the dismissal of the unconstitutionality action. But I have chosen to record a separate note with which I intend to outline my criterion regarding the standing and admissibility of this specific proceeding.
In that sense, I consider it necessary to clarify that what was resolved by the majority does not mean that it can be admitted—as a general rule—that, when there may be a claim for an individual and direct violation, it is not per se appropriate to assert that it is not proper to simultaneously protect the protection of diffuse interests. That is, there will be cases in which, in light of the substantial legal situation affected, both scenarios could arise.
A different case is one in which it can reasonably be inferred that, although a diffuse interest is alleged, what underlies it is a clear personal and individual utility of another nature or, even, another subjective right that does not simultaneously encompass the protection of diffuse interests. That second scenario is the one presented to us in the concrete case, in which both the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Minister of Environment and Energy showed that the plaintiff is acting in protection of a clearly individual interest, related to the exercise of his ordinary commercial activity, rather than a genuine diffuse interest of protecting the environment. Ultimately, it does not seem valid to use the 'guise' of a diffuse interest to guarantee the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action, when it can be corroborated that what is sought is the protection of other types of rights or interests that could well be protected in an unconstitutionality action, but through the scenario contemplated in Art. 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction." Appreciations that I equally consider are applicable to the concrete case in which an incidental matter could indeed exist. In light of the foregoing, one cannot invoke, in parallel, direct standing based on an alleged diffuse interest.
VI.- Documentation provided to the case file. The parties are forewarned that, if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not retrieved within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.
POR TANTO:
The action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons. Magistrate Garro Vargas adds a note.
Fernando Castillo V.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ana María Picado B.
Jose Roberto Garita N.
Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- It adds that the Costa Rican State signed Convention No. 100 concerning Equal Remuneration, 1951, with the ILO, which is clear in stating in its article 1 that: "(a) the term remuneration comprises the ordinary salary or basic minimum wage, and any other emolument in money or in kind paid by the employer, directly or indirectly, to the worker, in respect of the employment of this latter." (b) the expression equal remuneration for work of equal value. It designates the rates of remuneration fixed without discrimination as to sex.
The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – a base matter is not required – in the following circumstances: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that affect the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Regarding the requirement of a pending matter, this Chamber, through Judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, stated the following:
"(...) First, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved – whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative remedy (vía administrativa) – in order to access the constitutional remedy (vía constitucional), but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that the decision by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, as it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this remedy – the circumstances of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) (...)"
Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality (bloque de constitucionalidad) that are considered infringed (Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). In addition, the conditions of standing (legitimación) must be accredited (powers and certifications), the stamp fee of the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica) must be paid, and a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter must be provided (Article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).
II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION FOR LACK OF STANDING. In the specific case, by resolution of 3:17 p.m. on March 21, 2022, the plaintiff was warned to substantiate his standing to file this unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) and to clarify which norms he intends to challenge. In order to comply with the warning, the plaintiff stated the following: "(...) Although it partly affects me because I am one of the persons to whom Articles 28 and 35 of the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances (Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas), Law 9635, are applied. The reality is that this law affects all professionals who have been receiving appointments in the institution since 2019 and which concerns the community of professionals in the institution, this in accordance with Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (...)". Despite the warning, the plaintiff reiterates that his claim is to challenge Articles 28 and 35 of Law No. 9635; however, this Chamber observes that the plaintiff's disagreement refers to the differences in the percentage he receives for exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva), compared to other officials of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) with the same professional profile, which is actually regulated in the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), No. 2166, Articles 28 and 35 (reformed by Article 3 of Title III of the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances No. 9635 of December 3, 2018). Having clarified the above, it is found that the plaintiff bases his standing on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as he alleges the defense of the interests of the community of professionals to whom these normative provisions are applied. Despite the plaintiff's claims, he lacks the standing he purports to hold, since he does not meet the requirements to appear in defense of the interests safeguarded in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as explained below. This Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the challenged norm is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, in vote No. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:
"(...) II.- On diffuse interests and the standing of the plaintiffs in the case under study. The plaintiffs indicate that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the circumstances of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a specific group or category.
Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community may file the action to protect the right deemed injured. In this regard, the reiterated case law of the Chamber indicates that:
"It has been pointed out that this is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter —as has been repeatedly stated— is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is, therefore, an interest distributed in each one of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves and not the particular situation vis-à-vis them of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as set forth in various resolutions such as 03705-93 of fifteen hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen forty-five hours on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 of thirteen thirty hours on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." —see judgment number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to estimate that the diffuse interest is comprised of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first —the subjective—, it is clear that it is diffused among a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur with the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffused" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case —see, among others, judgments number 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality —which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—, neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, for in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim —see, among others, judgments number 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the petitioners refer their standing (legitimación) regarding the defense of diffuse interests in the matter of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the appropriate course is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.
(...)
In the action now being heard, the same petitioners challenge the same provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), in this action they focus on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education —which was also pointed out in that action—, the fact is that this Chamber's own definition of standing (legitimación), as set forth in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) clearly indicates and the Minister of Environment and Energy (Ministro de Ambiente y Energía) emphatically states, the regulations being challenged are indeed fully susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who carry out a specific activity, subject to the regulation set forth in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and its regulation.
Thus, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; note that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy rightly states, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies linked to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Therefore, it is unfeasible to allege supposed conservation and environmental education problems in order to use the concept of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in Considerando II and Considerando III of this resolution.
Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the plaintiffs and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as in that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing to file this proceeding, and it is therefore improper to hear and rule on the issues raised. Thus, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action” (the underlining does not correspond to the original).
In a similar vein, in judgment No. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ordered that:
“(…) It is reiterated that a diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic as to be confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so specific that it permits an individual claim, since, in such a case, standing would derive from that claim (…)”.
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court observes that the norms challenged here provide as follows:
“Article 28- Exclusive dedication contract. The additional payment for exclusive dedication shall be granted, exclusively, through a contract between the granting Administration and the official who accepts the conditions for receiving the economic compensation, in accordance with this law. The term of this contract may not be less than one year, nor greater than five. Once the contract is signed, the payment for exclusive dedication shall not constitute a permanent benefit or an acquired right; therefore, upon the expiration of its term, the Administration shall have no obligation to renew it. Not signing a contract for exclusive dedication does not exempt the official from the duty to refrain from participating in activities that compromise their impartiality, enable a conflict of interest, or favor private interest to the detriment of the public interest”.
“Article 35- Compensation percentages for exclusive dedication. The following economic compensations are established over the base salary of the position held by professional officials who sign exclusive dedication contracts with the Administration: 1. Twenty-five percent (25%) for employees with a licentiate level or another higher academic degree. 2. Ten percent (10%) for professionals with a university bachelor's level”.
It is evident that these provisions are susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of identifiable persons, as occurs in the plaintiff's case. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber finds that the plaintiff lacks direct standing to bring this action in defense of diffuse interests.
Now, regarding the defense of collective interests, this Chamber has indicated the following:
“(…) III.- On corporate interests. As a second ground for standing, the plaintiff alleges the defense of collective interests, a situation contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. The norm provides: ‘…[I]t shall not be necessary to have a prior pending case when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole…’”.
In this regard, it is pertinent to point out that the Chamber has specified that through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole," the legislator intended to refer to the standing (legitimación) held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its associative base, provided that it involves the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the unifying factor of the group. Following judgment 2006-9170 of sixteen hours thirty-six minutes on June twenty-eighth, two thousand six, this Court returned to a prior criterion, according to which corporate entities are authorized to directly request the declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm, when it directly affects the sphere of action of the entity and its members, without it being relevant that the norm is capable of directly affecting the rights of the members. In this case, however, this thesis is not applicable, because the petitioner does not appear on behalf of an organization that, by its nature or purposes, or whose associates, may be affected by the questioned Agreement. On the other hand, the petitioner cannot simply arrogate to himself the de facto representation of any person or professional organization. (Voto n.° 2014-020446 of 09:30 hours on December 17, 2014).
Based on the aforementioned criterion, the petitioner also lacks standing (legitimación) to file this action in defense of collective interests of the professional persons who work for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, given that the petitioner does not appear on behalf of any formally organized and identified collective, for which he holds legal representation, and is therefore unable to act in defense of corporate interests.
III.- CONCLUSION. Based on the foregoing, as the petitioner lacks direct standing (legitimación directa) and has not alleged the existence of a prior judicial process or administrative procedure that serves as a basis for the action of unconstitutionality, it is inadmissible and its outright rejection is warranted. Judge Rueda Leal provides different reasons regarding standing (legitimación) based on diffuse interest. Judge Garro Vargas appends a note.
IV.- Different reasons of Judge Rueda Leal. As I have expressed in other cases, I consider that a quality of diffuse interest consists precisely in that its affectation is general —that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors of it— within a context where it is not required that the harmed subjects know each other (they could even lack any nexus or legal relationships among them), but it does require the presence of a shared situation of harm or danger to a constitutional right that, equally and without any need for individualization, encompasses and binds an entire society in the abstract. Its defense is intended to satisfy a need of society as such; therefore, it transcends that of a human being considered individually or collectively. In judgment n.° 2019-17397 of 12:54 hours on September 11, 2019, this Court reiterated the following:
"(…) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of 'diffuse interests' is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this court number 3750-93, of fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) '… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be under our law —as this Chamber has already stated— merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, specific, or easily identifiable, determined persons or personalized groups are identified, whose standing (legitimación) would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community in its entirety. It therefore concerns individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of persons who share an interest and, therefore, suffer a harm, actual or potential, more or less the same for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are simultaneously collective —for being common to a generality— and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such capacity'." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is spread out, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under paragraph 2 of article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect him or her as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier of "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the sound management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred rights transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not merely affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of the sound management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not merely of any single group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is no more than a simple description inherent to its obligation —as a jurisdictional body— to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to be understood that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scope of the Rule of Law, and its correlative "State of rights," which —as in the case of the Costa Rican model— starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition.
Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal interests explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests with the holders of sovereignty themselves, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not therefore a matter of any person being able to go to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in protection of just any interests (popular action), but rather that any individual can act in defense of those interests that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any exhaustive enumeration” (see judgment No. 2007-01145).” In accordance with what has been stated and upheld by this Court in its jurisprudence, it therefore concerns individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a harm, current or potential, more or less the same for everyone, which is why it is rightly said that they are the equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. It is for this reason, precisely, that, from judgment no. 2021-2185 of 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, I consider, unlike the Majority of this Court, that some of these interests can be embodied in a specific, particular case, without thereby losing their condition as a diffuse interest, as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects one person and everyone in general; and this impact can be individualized in a particular situation, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring area, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects impact the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or process that a neighbor might bring against that factory will not only affect their own interests, but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest and is also the subject of a particular, individualized situation. That said, this in no way means that in every invoked situation, the existence of a diffuse interest can be claimed, even if it can be the subject of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered “diffuse,” it must not only affect a community, but must also become blurred, diffused within that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the petitioner, as the Majority states, the challenged regulation does not produce a socially diffused impact, but rather a specific one, since it refers to the community composed of professional officials who sign exclusive dedication contracts with the Administration, a group that is easily identifiable. So, in the sub lite, what is glimpsed is a particular situation of the petitioner that, although it may be shared by some group of people, that effect is not of such magnitude as to consider it a diffuse interest. For the stated reason, I agree with the Majority in dismissing this action; however, with the reasoning set forth.
V.- NOTE OF MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS In judgment no. 2021-2185, invoked by the majority to reject the present action, I recorded a separate note in which I outline my interpretation regarding the admissibility of actions where an alleged diffuse interest is invoked, which should rather be framed as a case where a matter pending resolution clearly exists as an incidental mechanism to admit standing for the unconstitutionality action. In that judgment, I made the following considerations:
“In this matter, I have concurred with my vote in the dismissal of the unconstitutionality action. But I have chosen to record a separate note with which I intend to outline my criterion regarding standing and the admissibility of this specific process.
In that sense, I consider it necessary to clarify that what was decided by the majority does not mean that it can be admitted ‒as a general rule‒ that, whenever a claim for an individual and direct violation may exist, it is per se improper to assert that the protection of diffuse interests cannot be addressed in parallel. That is, there will be cases in which, given the substantial legal situation affected, both scenarios could be configured.
Different is the case where it can reasonably be inferred that, although a diffuse interest is alleged, what underlies it is a clear personal and individual utility of another nature or even another subjective right that does not simultaneously encompass the protection of diffuse interests. This second scenario is the one presented to us in the specific case, in which both the Procuraduría General de la República and the Minister of Environment and Energy demonstrated that the petitioner is acting in protection of a clearly individual interest, related to the exercise of their ordinary commercial activity, rather than a genuine diffuse interest in protecting the environment. In short, it does not seem valid to use “the guise” of a diffuse interest to guarantee the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action, when it can be corroborated that what is sought is the protection of another type of rights or interests that could well be protected in an unconstitutionality action, but through the scenario contemplated in Art. 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.” Considerations that I likewise believe are applicable to the specific case in which there could indeed be an incidental matter. In view of the above, it is not appropriate to invoke, in parallel, direct standing for an alleged diffuse interest.
VI.- Documentation provided to the case file.
The parties are warned that, if any paper document has been submitted, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer-based, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, they must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not removed within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI, and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.
POR TANTO:
The action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons.
The magistrate Garro Vargas makes a note.
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The image data is preserved verbatim according to the rules, as it contains no translatable text in the provided excerpt. The translated text is as follows:
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width=\"162\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Luis Fdo.</span></p> Salazar A.</span></p></td></tr> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Jorge Araya G.</span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Anamari Garro V.</span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Ana María Picado B.</span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span> | <table><tr><td><img 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
"(...) the petitioner was warned to substantiate his standing (legitimación) to file this unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) and to clarify which norms he intends to challenge. In order to comply with the warning, the petitioner stated the following: "(...) Although it partly affects me because I am one of the persons to whom articles 28 and 35 of the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances, Law 9635, are applied. The reality is that this law affects all professionals who have been appointed within the institution since 2019, and this concerns the collective of professionals in the institution, pursuant to article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (...)". Despite the warning, the petitioner reiterates that his claim is to challenge articles 28 and 35 of Law No. 9635; however, this Chamber observes that the petitioner's disagreement refers to differences in the percentage he receives for exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) compared to other officials of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with the same professional profile, which is in fact regulated in the Public Administration Salaries Law, No. 2166, articles 28 and 35 (reformed by article 3 of Title III of the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances No. 9635 of December 3, 2018). Having clarified the above, the petitioner bases his standing (legitimación) on the second paragraph of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, as he alleges the defense of the interests of the collective of professionals to whom those normative provisions apply. Despite what is alleged by the petitioner, he lacks the standing (legitimación) he claims to hold, since he does not meet what is required to appear in defense of the interests protected in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, as explained below. This Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the challenged norm is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) cannot be invoked to admit the action (acción). ..." RGS09/22
It is precisely for this reason that, from judgment no. 2021-2185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, I consider, unlike the Majority of this Court, that some of these interests can be embodied in a specific particular case, without thereby losing their condition as a diffuse interest, as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects one person and everyone in general; and such effect can be individualized in a particular situation, such as, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects impact the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or proceeding that a neighbor may bring against that factory will not only affect their own interests, but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest and is also the object of an individualized particular situation. However, this does not mean, in any way, that in every invoked situation one can allege the existence of a diffuse interest, even though this may be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered "diffuse," it must not only affect a community, but it must also blur, disseminate itself within that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the plaintiff, as the Majority states, the challenged regulations do not produce a socially diffused effect, but rather a specific one, since he refers to the community composed of professional officials who sign exclusivity (dedicación exclusiva) contracts with the Administration, a group that is easily identifiable. Thus, in the sub lite, what is discerned is a particular situation of the plaintiff that, while it may be shared by some group of people, that effect is not of such magnitude as to consider it a diffuse interest. For the reason stated, I agree with the Majority in dismissing this action; however, with the reasoning set forth." RGS09/22 "(…) NOTE BY MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS In judgment no. 2021-2185, invoked by the majority to dismiss the present action, I recorded a separate note in which I outline my interpretation regarding the admissibility of actions in which an alleged diffuse interest is invoked that, rather, must be classified as a case in which there may clearly be a pending matter for resolution as an incidental mechanism to admit standing for the acción de inconstitucionalidad. In said judgment, I made the following considerations:
"In this matter, I have concurred with my vote in the dismissal of the acción de inconstitucionalidad. But I have chosen to record a separate note with which I intend to outline my criterion in relation to the standing and the admissibility of this specific proceeding.
In that sense, I consider it necessary to specify that what was decided by the majority does not mean that one can admit -as a general rule- that, when a claim for an individual and direct violation may exist, it is not appropriate per se to affirm that it is not proper to simultaneously protect diffuse interests. That is to say, there will be cases in which, in light of the affected substantial legal situation, both scenarios could be configured.
Different is the case in which it can reasonably be inferred that, although a diffuse interest is alleged, what underlies it is a clear personal and individual utility of another nature or, even another subjective right that does not simultaneously encompass the protection of diffuse interests. That second scenario is the one presented to us in the specific case, in which both the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministro de Ambiente y Energía demonstrated that the plaintiff is acting in defense of a clearly individual interest, related to the exercise of his ordinary commercial activity, rather than a genuine diffuse interest in protecting the environment. In short, it does not seem valid to use "the guise" of a diffuse interest to guarantee the admissibility of an acción de inconstitucionalidad, when it can be corroborated that what is sought is the protection of other types of rights or interests that could well be protected in an acción de inconstitucionalidad, but through the scenario contemplated in Art. 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional." Observations that I equally consider are applicable to the specific case in which an incidental matter could indeed exist. In light of the foregoing, it is not appropriate to invoke, in parallel, a direct standing for an alleged diffuse interest." RGS09/22 For equal work, performed in the same position, working hours, and conditions of equal efficiency, equal pay is due, this including both daily-rate payments and the benefits, services such as housing (habitación), and any other good provided to a worker in exchange for their ordinary labor; (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 25 of November 17, 1944.) No differences may be established based on considerations of age, sex, or nationality”. It adds that the Costa Rican State signed ILO Convention concerning Equal Remuneration, 1951, with the ILO, which is clear in stating in its Article 1 that: “(a) the term remuneration (remuneración) includes the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker’s employment; (b) the expression equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value refers to rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex”. It considers that the application of the challenged regulations contradicts equal remuneration for work of equal value, since currently there are marked differences in the remuneration and salaries received in the same position. On the other hand, it also considers that there is a difference in treatment, which has meant that in many cases the employee has a direct impact on their salary due to the application of the law; to explain the aforementioned impact, it sets out the following example: a person who holds the same position has two different realities if they signed the exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) before the law, even if without job tenure (propiedad) they do not sign the exclusive dedication contract again and keep the 55%; in contrast, another person, like the plaintiff, every time a personnel action is taken, which in their case is every 6 months for being in a fixed vacancy, must sign the contract required by law every 6 months, which implies in most cases a delay in the payment of the exclusive dedication allowance and often this has brought about errors in payroll calculation, overpayments or underpayments, which other employees in the same position or condition do not experience, but with a different application of the law. It points out that, in short, this law has created two different categories of employees in the institution, one with different salary conditions and that does not possess the same rights or salary equality, but does have the same obligations. It requests that, due to the relevance this implies and for social justice, this unconstitutionality action be reviewed and declared with merit. As a preventive measure and because of the social inequality that the law has created, it requests that, until this unconstitutionality action is resolved, the challenged articles of the law be suspended.
**2.-** By a resolution issued at 3:17 p.m. on March 21, 2022, the plaintiff was forewarned as follows: “(…) that within three days, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying processing of the action in case of non-compliance, you must: **1)** substantiate your legal standing (legitimación) to file this unconstitutionality action, in accordance with Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). **2)** Clarify which are the norms you intend to challenge in this action. **3)** In the same way and notwithstanding the foregoing, in accordance with Article 4 of Law number 3245 of December 3, 1963, you are further forewarned that within the same period, you must attach and pay the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados in the amount of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial writ, under the warning –in this case– of not hearing the defaulting party while they do not comply with what is ordered, without retroaction of time limits”.
**3.-** By a writ received via fax by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) at 6:25 a.m. on March 23, 2022, the plaintiff states that, in response to what was forewarned, although they are partly affected by the application of Articles 28 and 35 of the Public Finance Strengthening Law (Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas) No. 9635, the reality is that it affects all professionals who are receiving appointments at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social since 2019, which concerns the collectivity of professionals in the institution, as established by Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which dictates: “It shall not be necessary to have a prior pending case when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or it concerns the collectivity as a whole”. It indicates that this situation not only occurs at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, but in the majority of public and autonomous institutions of the State, where currently professionals with the same profile receive different percentages of remuneration and different salaries. It clarifies that the norms it challenges are Articles 28 and 35 of the Public Finance Strengthening Law No. 9635. Likewise, it states that it attaches stamps of the Colegio de Abogados.
**4.-** Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any action submitted for its consideration that is manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar action that was rejected.
Drafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations.
The first paragraph requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue—including remedies of habeas corpus or amparo—or in an administrative venue—in the procedure for exhaustion of this channel, that is, in the administrative procedure for challenging the final act—in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed harmed in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—no base matter is required—in the following cases: a) when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) when it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, through Judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, indicated the following:
"(...) First of all, this is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel—in order to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right deemed harmed in the principal matter, such that the ruling of the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that pending process, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does legislation allow direct access to this channel—cases set forth in the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (...)"
Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the components of the constitutional framework (bloque de constitucionalidad) that are considered violated (article 78 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). In addition, the conditions of standing (legitimación) must be accredited (powers of attorney and certifications), payment of the stamp duty of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica must be made, and a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter must be provided (article 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).
II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION FOR LACK OF STANDING. In the specific case, by order issued at 3:17 p.m. on March 21, 2022, the plaintiff was warned to substantiate what his standing (legitimación) is to file this unconstitutionality action and to clarify which norms he intends to challenge. To comply with the requirement, the plaintiff stated the following: "(...) Although it partly affects me because I am one of the persons to whom articles 28 and 35 of Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, Law 9635, are applied. The reality is that this law affects all the professionals who are being appointed in the institution since 2019, and which concerns the community of professionals in the institution, pursuant to the provisions of article 75 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional (...)". Despite the requirement, the plaintiff reiterates that his claim is to challenge articles 28 and 35 of Law No. 9635; however, this Chamber observes that the plaintiff's disagreement refers to the differences in the percentage he receives for exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) compared to other officials of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with the same professional profile, which is actually regulated in the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, No. 2166, articles 28 and 35 (reformed by article 3 of title III of Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas No. 9635 of December 3, 2018). Having clarified the foregoing, it is understood that the plaintiff bases his standing (legitimación) on the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since he alleges the defense of the interests of the community of professionals to whom those regulatory provisions are applied. Despite what the plaintiff alleges, he lacks the standing he claims to hold, since he does not meet the requirements to appear in defense of the interests protected under the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as explained below. This Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the norm being challenged is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, in ruling No. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:
"(...) II.- On diffuse interests and the plaintiffs' standing in the case under study. The plaintiffs indicate that their standing (legitimación) comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the cases set forth in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case."
The diffuse interest (interés difuso) has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right may affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community may file the action to protect the right deemed injured. On this point, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:
"It has been noted that it concerns a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to safeguard constitutional legality, since the latter —as has been repeatedly stated— is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is therefore an interest distributed in each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them in relation to them that is the key for the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as expressed in various resolutions such as 03705-93 at three o'clock in the afternoon on the thirtieth of July for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen forty-five hours on the ninth of November of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty on the twenty-fourth of May of nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." –see judgment number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to consider that the diffuse interest (interés difuso) is composed of an eminently subjective element, relating to its ownership or entitlement to the interest, and an objective one, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first —the subjective—, it is clear that it is diffused within a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable group of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest (interés colectivo). And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffused" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest" (interés difuso), but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case —see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that such interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to safeguard constitutional legality —which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction—, nor can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, since in such a case, standing would derive from that claim —see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the plaintiffs refer their standing regarding the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) in the matter of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the appropriate course is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.
(…)
In the action now being heard, the same plaintiffs challenge the same provisions of articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as article 52 of the same instrument, and while, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on issues of ex situ conservation (conservación ex situ) and environmental education (educación ambiental) —which were also noted in that prior action—, the fact is that this Chamber's own definition of standing, as set forth in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) clearly indicates and the Minister of Environment and Energy (Ministro de Ambiente y Energía) emphatically states, the regulation being challenged is indeed fully susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who exercise a specific activity, subject to the regulation set forth in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and its regulation.
Thus, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; note that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy rightly states, the claimants are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies involved in the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is inadmissible to allege supposed problems of conservation and environmental education in order to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in considerandos II and III of this resolution.
Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the claimants and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now under review, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as on that prior occasion, the claimants lack standing (legitimación) to file this proceeding, and therefore it is improper to hear and rule on the issues raised. Accordingly, the proper course is to dismiss this action” (the underlining does not correspond to the original).
In a similar vein, in judgment No. 2021-011994 of 16:30 hours on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ordered that:
“(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so specific that it allows an individual claim, for, in such a case, the standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim (…)”.
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal observes that the provisions challenged here state the following:
“Artículo 28- Exclusive dedication contract. The additional payment for exclusive dedication shall be granted, exclusively, through a contract between the granting Administration and the official who accepts the conditions to receive the economic compensation, in accordance with this law.
The term of this contract may not be less than one year, nor greater than five.
Once the contract is signed, the payment for exclusive dedication shall not constitute a permanent benefit or an acquired right; therefore, upon the expiration of its validity, the Administration shall have no obligation to renew it.
Not signing a contract for exclusive dedication does not exempt the official from the duty to refrain from participating in activities that compromise their impartiality, enable a conflict of interest, or favor private interest to the detriment of the public interest.” “Artículo 35- Compensation percentages for exclusive dedication. The following economic compensations are established on the base salary of the position held by professional officials who sign exclusive dedication contracts with the Administration:
1. Twenty-five percent (25%) for employees with a licentiate degree level or another higher academic degree.
2. Ten percent (10%) for professionals with a university bachelor’s degree level.” It is evident that these provisions are susceptible to individual application and to directly impacting the legal sphere of identifiable persons, as occurs in the claimant’s case. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber finds that the claimant lacks direct standing (legitimación) to bring this action in defense of diffuse interests.
Now, regarding the defense of collective interests, this Chamber has indicated the following:
“(…) III.- Regarding corporate interests. As a second ground for standing (legitimación), the claimant alleges the defense of collective interests, a situation contemplated in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. The provision states: ‘…[I]t shall not be necessary to have a prior case pending resolution when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole…’.” In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Chamber has specified that through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole," the legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when acting through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its associative base, and provided that it concerns the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the unifying factor of the group. As of judgment 2006-9170 of sixteen hours thirty-six minutes of June twenty-eighth, two thousand six, this Tribunal returned to a previous criterion, according to which corporate entities are authorized to directly request the declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm, when it directly affects the sphere of action of the entity and its members, without it being relevant that the norm is susceptible of directly affecting the rights of the members. In this case, however, this thesis is not applicable, because the petitioner does not appear on behalf of an organization that by its nature or purposes, or whose associates, may be affected by the challenged Agreement. Furthermore, the petitioner cannot simply arrogate to himself the de facto representation of any person or professional organization." (Vote No. 2014-020446 of 09:30 hours of December 17, 2014).
Based on the aforementioned criterion, the petitioner also lacks standing to file this action in defense of the collective interests of the professional persons who work for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, given that the petitioner does not appear on behalf of any formally organized and identified collectivity, for which he holds legal representation, and is therefore unable to act in defense of corporate interests.
III.- CONCLUSION. In light of the foregoing, because the petitioner lacks direct standing and has not alleged the existence of a prior judicial process or administrative procedure that serves as the basis for the unconstitutionality action, this action is inadmissible and its outright rejection is appropriate. Magistrate Rueda Leal provides different reasons regarding standing based on diffuse interest. Magistrate Garro Vargas appends a note.
IV.- Different reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal. As I have expressed in other cases, I believe that a quality of the diffuse interest consists precisely in that its impact is general—that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors thereof—within a context where it is not required that the affected subjects know each other (they might even lack any nexus or legal relations among themselves), but it does require the presence of a same situation of damage or danger to a constitutional good that, equally and without any need for individualization, encompasses and agglomerates an entire society in the abstract. Its defense aims to satisfy a need of society as such, therefore, it is transcendent to that of a human being individually or collectively considered. In judgment No. 2019-17397 of 12:54 hours of September 11, 2019, this Tribunal reiterated the following:
"(…) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of 'diffuse interests' is provided for; this concept, whose content has been progressively delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment number 3750-93 of this tribunal, of fifteen hours of July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) '… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable determined persons, or personalized groups whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole, stand out against them. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted into more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive actual or potential, more or less equal harm for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the sets found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, as they are simultaneously collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity.'" In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united around a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make, protected by paragraph 2 of article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect him/her as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the classification of 'diffuse,' such as the environment, the cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the aforementioned goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; an environmental damage does not only affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather injures or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management made of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made does not go beyond a simple description typical of its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to come to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturn in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative 'State of rights,' which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition.
Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal rights explained in the previous lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, a matter of any person being able to appeal to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the entire national community, nor is it valid in this field to attempt any exhaustive enumeration (see judgment No. 2007-01145)." In accordance with what has been stated and upheld by this Tribunal in its jurisprudence, it is thus a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and therefore suffer a harm, current or potential, more or less equal for all. Thus, it is accurately said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. It is precisely for this reason that, as of judgment No. 2021-2185 of 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, I consider, unlike the Majority of this Tribunal, that some of these interests may be embodied in a specific, particular case, without thereby losing their condition of diffuse interest, as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects a single person and everyone in general; and this impact can be individualized in a particular situation, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects affect the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or proceeding that a neighbor might file against that factory will affect not only their own interests, but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest and is also the object of an individualized particular situation. Having said that, this does not mean, in any way, that in every invoked situation the existence of a diffuse interest can be claimed, even if it could be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered "diffuse," it must not only affect a community, but it must also be diluted, be diffused, throughout that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the plaintiff, as referenced by the Majority, the contested regulation does not produce a socially diffused impact, but rather a determined one, as it refers to the community comprised of professional employees who sign exclusivity contracts with the Administration, a group that is easily identifiable. Thus, in the sub lite, what is envisioned is a particular situation of the plaintiff that, although it may be shared by some group of people, this effect is not of such magnitude as to be considered a diffuse interest. For the stated reason, I concur with the Majority in dismissing this action; however, with the reasoning set forth.
**V.- NOTE BY MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS** In judgment No. 2021-2185, invoked by the majority to reject this action, I recorded a separate note in which I outlined my interpretation regarding the admissibility of actions in which an alleged diffuse interest is invoked, but which, rather, should be framed as a case where there could clearly be a matter pending resolution as an incidental mechanism to admit the standing of the unconstitutionality action. In that judgment, I made the following considerations:
"In this matter, I have concurred with my vote in dismissing the unconstitutionality action. However, I have chosen to record a separate note through which I aim to outline my criterion regarding standing and the admissibility of this specific proceeding.
In that sense, I consider it necessary to specify that the resolution by the majority does not mean that it can be admitted —as a general rule— that, when there may be a claim for an individual and direct violation, it is not per se appropriate to affirm that the protection of diffuse interests should not be protected in parallel. That is to say, there will be cases in which, depending on the affected substantial legal situation, both scenarios could be configured.
The case is different when it can reasonably be inferred that, although a diffuse interest is alleged, what underlies it is a clear personal and individual utility of another nature, or even another subjective right that does not simultaneously encompass the protection of diffuse interests. This second scenario is the one presented to us in the specific case, in which both the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministro de Ambiente y Energía demonstrated that the plaintiff is acting in protection of a clearly individual interest, related to the exercise of their ordinary commercial activity, rather than a genuine diffuse interest in protecting the environment. In short, it does not seem valid to use 'the cloak' of a diffuse interest to guarantee the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action, when it can be corroborated that what is sought is the protection of other types of rights or interests that could well be protected in an unconstitutionality action, but through the situation contemplated in Art. 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional." These are considerations that I equally deem applicable to the specific case at hand, in which an incidental matter could indeed exist. In view of the foregoing, a direct standing based on an alleged diffuse interest cannot be invoked in parallel.
**VI.- Documentation provided to the case file** The parties are warned that, if any paper document has been submitted, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer-based, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, they must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not removed within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI, and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.
POR TANTO:
The action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons.
Judge Garro Vargas takes note.
Fernando Castillo V. President Paul Rueda L.
<p>Art. 209.- By operation of law, the lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) of forest areas (áreas boscosas) registered in the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC) is hereby granted, establishing an environmental easement (servidumbre ambiental) that shall be recorded on the respective property title in the National Registry.</p> Salazar A.</span></p></td></tr> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Jorge Araya G.</span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Anamari Garro V.</span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Ana María Picado B.</span> | <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span> | ` Jose Roberto Garita N.
Digitally Signed Document -- Verification Code -- Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482).
Revisión del Documento Res. Nº 2022007466 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de marzo de dos mil veintidos .
Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por GIOVANNI DELGADO CASTRO, cédula de identidad n.° 1-1118-0296; contra los artículos 28 y 35 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, Ley n.° 9635.
RESULTANDO:
1.- Por escrito recibido mediante Gestión en Línea a las 12:11 horas del 18 de marzo de 2022, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 28 y 35 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, Ley n.° 9635. Indica que es funcionario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, con más de 10 años de antigüedad en la institución. Actualmente, labora como Profesional 2 en el Área de Adquisiciones de Bienes y Servicios y se desempeña como abogado en dicha área. Desde hace 3 años empezó a desempeñarse como profesional en el área de Derecho en diferentes centros de trabajo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y en su área de trabajo la institución reconoce la dedicación exclusiva (aclara que no está reclamando el derecho a la dedicación exclusiva, ya que lo tiene y la institución se lo reconoce). Explica que tiene compañeros de trabajo con su mismo perfil, pero no recibe la misma remuneración ni salario por las mismas funciones, debido a la aplicación de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas n.° 9635. Indica que no recibe el mismo trato, lo cual a traído una afectación directa económica, emocional y patrimonial a su persona. Para evidenciar esto, explica que antes de la aplicación de esa ley se pagaba un 55% de dedicación exclusiva y un porcentaje adicional de carrera profesional. Después, solo se paga un 25% de dedicación exclusiva y sin carrera profesional. Estima que esto es una clara violación a lo estipulado en la Constitución Política, el Código de Trabajo y los tratados internacionales firmados por Costa Rica con la OIT. Aduce que, actualmente en su unidad y a nivel institucional, existen personas nombradas bajo el mismo perfil con diferente salario y diferente remuneración, creando una relación laboral en desigualdad de remuneraciones, pero con las mismas funciones. Indica que sobre la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas n.° 9635 se encuentra la Carta Magna, el Código de Trabajo y los convenios internacionales suscritos por Costa Rica, donde es claro que no se permite dicha desigualdad. La Constitución Política establece en su artículo 57: “Todo trabajador tendrá derecho a un salario mínimo, de fijación periódica, por jornada normal, que le procure bienestar y existencia digna. El salario será siempre igual para trabajo igual en idénticas condiciones de eficiencia”, y en su artículo 68 que: “No podrá hacerse discriminación respecto al salario, ventajas o condiciones de trabajo entre costarricenses y extranjeros, o respecto de algún grupo de trabajadores”. El Código de Trabajo establece en su artículo 167 que: “Para fijar el importe del salario en cada clase de trabajo se tendrán en cuenta la cantidad y calidad del mismo. A trabajo igual, desempeñado en puesto, jornada y condiciones de eficiencia iguales, corresponde salario igual, comprendiendo en este tanto los pagos por cuota diaria, cuanto las percepciones, servicios como el de habitación y cualquier otro bien que se diere a un trabajador a cambio de su labor ordinaria; (Así reformado este párrafo por el artículo 1, de la Ley No.25 del 17 de noviembre de 1944.) No podrán establecerse diferencias por consideración a edad, sexo o nacionalidad”. Agrega que el Estado costarricense suscribió con la OIT el Convenio sobre igualdad de remuneración, 1951, el cual es claro en señalar en su artículo 1° que: “(a) el término remuneración comprende el salario o sueldo ordinario, básico o mínimo, y cualquier otro emolumento en dinero o en especie pagados por el empleador, directa o indirectamente, al trabajador, en concepto del empleo de este último. (b) la expresión igualdad de remuneración entre la mano de obra masculina y la mano de obra femenina por un trabajo de igual valor designa las tasas de remuneración fijadas sin discriminación en cuanto al sexo”. Estima que la aplicación de la normativa impugnada se contrapone a la igualdad de remuneración por un trabajo de igual valor, ya que en la actualidad existen diferencias marcadas en la remuneración y salarios recibidos en el mismo puesto. Por otra parte, considera que también existe una diferencia de trato, que ha hecho que en muchos casos el empleado tenga una afectación directa al salario por parte de la aplicación de la ley, para explicar la afectación antes descrita expone el siguiente ejemplo: una persona que se encuentre en la misma plaza tiene dos realidades diferentes si firmó la dedicación exclusiva antes de la ley, aunque esté sin propiedad no vuelve a firmar el contrato de dedicación exclusiva y se le mantiene el 55%; en cambio, otra persona como el accionante, cada vez que se hace acción de personal, que en su caso es cada 6 meses por estar en una vacante fija, tiene que firmar el contrato de ley cada 6 meses, lo que implica en la mayoría de los casos un atraso en el pago del rubro de dedicación exclusiva y muchas veces eso ha traído errores en el cálculo de planillas, pagos de más o menos, que no viven otros empleados en la misma plaza o condición, pero con diferente aplicación de la ley. Señala que, en pocas palabras, esta ley ha creado dos categorías diferentes de empleados en la institución, una con diferentes condiciones de salarios y que no posee los mismo derechos ni igualdad salarial, pero si las mismas obligaciones. Solicita que, por la relevancia que esto implica y la justicia social, se analice y declare con lugar esta acción de inconstitucionalidad. Como medida preventiva y por la desigualdad social que la ley ha creado, solicita que se ordene, hasta que esta acción de inconstitucionalidad sea resuelta, dejar sin efectos los artículos de la ley cuestionados.
2.- Por resolución de las 15:17 horas del 21 de marzo de 2022 se previno a la parte accionante lo siguiente: “(…) que dentro de tercero día, contado a partir del siguiente a la notificación de esta resolución y bajo apercibimiento de denegarle el trámite a la acción en caso de incumplimiento, deberá: 1) fundamentar cuál es su legitimación para interponer esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, conforme al artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. 2) Aclarar cuáles son las normas que pretende impugnar en esta acción. 3) Del mismo modo y sin perjuicio de lo anterior, conforme al artículo 4 de la Ley número 3245 del 3 de diciembre de 1963, se le previene adicionalmente que dentro del mismo plazo, agregue y cancele el timbre del Colegio de Abogados por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito inicial, bajo el apercibimiento –en este caso- de no oír al omiso mientras no cumpla lo ordenado, sin retroacción de términos”.
3.- Por escrito recibido vía fax de la Sala Constitucional a las 06:25 horas del 23 de marzo de 2022, la parte accionante manifiesta que, en atención a lo prevenido, aunque en parte le afecta la aplicación de los artículos 28 y 35 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas n.° 9635, la realidad es que esta afecta a todos los profesionales que están realizando nombramientos en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social desde el 2019, lo que atañe a la colectividad de profesionales en la institución, conforme lo establece el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el cual dicta: “No será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañe a la colectividad en su conjunto”. Indica que esta situación no solo ocurre en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, sino en la mayoría de instituciones públicas y autónomas del Estado, donde actualmente profesionales con el mismo perfil reciben diferente porcentaje de remuneración y diferentes salarios. Aclara que las normas que impugna son los artículos 28 y 35 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas n.° 9635. Asimismo, manifiesta que adjunta timbres del Colegio de Abogados.
4.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.
Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
I.- REQUISITOS Y FORMALIDADES DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan pronunciarse sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo– o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía, sea, en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final–, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base–, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala, mediante Sentencia n.° 04190-95 de las 11:33 horas del 28 de julio de 1995, señaló lo siguiente:
“(…) En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)”.
Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber: el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).
II.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN POR FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN. En el caso concreto, mediante resolución de las 15:17 horas del 21 de marzo de 2022 se previno a la parte accionante que fundamentara cuál es su legitimación para interponer esta acción de inconstitucionalidad y que aclarara cuáles son las normas que pretende impugnar. A fin de cumplir con lo prevenido, el accionante manifestó lo siguiente: “(…) Aunque en parte me afecta a mí porque soy una de las personas a la cual se le aplica los artículos: 28 y 35 de La Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas Ley 9635. La realidad es que esta ley afecta a todos los profesionales que estén realizando nombramientos en la institución desde el 2019 y lo cual atañe colectividad de profesionales en la institución esto conforme lo establece el artículo 75 de la Ley de Jurisdicción constitucional (…)”. Pese a lo prevenido, el accionante reitera que su pretensión es impugnar los artículos 28 y 35 de la Ley n.° 9635; no obstante, observa esta Sala que la inconformidad del accionante se refiere a las diferencias en el porcentaje que recibe por concepto de dedicación exclusiva, respecto a otros funcionarios de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social con su mismo perfil profesional, lo cual en realidad se encuentra regulado en la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, n.° 2166, artículos 28 y 35 (reformados por el artículo 3° del título III de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas n.° 9635 del 3 de diciembre de 2018). Aclarado lo anterior, se tiene que el accionante fundamenta su legitimación en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues alega la defensa de los intereses de la colectividad de profesionales a quienes se les aplican esas disposiciones normativas. Pese a lo alegado por el accionante, este carece de la legitimación que dice ostentar, toda vez que no cumple con lo requerido para acudir en defensa de los intereses que se resguardan en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, como a continuación se explica. Esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando la norma que se impugna es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n.° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente:
“(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que:
"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas. En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-. Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.
(…)
En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción. Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento. De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística. Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución.
Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).
En similar sentido, en la sentencia n.° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que:
“(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)”.
Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, observa este Tribunal que las normas aquí impugnadas, disponen lo siguiente:
“Artículo 28- Contrato de dedicación exclusiva. El pago adicional por dedicación exclusiva se otorgará, exclusivamente, mediante contrato entre la Administración concedente y el funcionario que acepte las condiciones para recibir la indemnización económica, conforme a la presente ley.
El plazo de este contrato no podrá ser menor de un año, ni mayor de cinco.
Una vez suscrito el contrato, el pago por dedicación exclusiva no constituirá un beneficio permanente ni un derecho adquirido; por lo que al finalizar la vigencia de este, la Administración no tendrá la obligación de renovarlo.
El no suscribir contrato por dedicación exclusiva no exime al funcionario del deber de abstenerse de participar en actividades que comprometan su imparcialidad, posibiliten un conflicto de interés o favorezcan el interés privado en detrimento del interés público”.
“Artículo 35- Porcentajes de compensación por dedicación exclusiva. Se establecen las siguientes compensaciones económicas sobre el salario base del puesto que desempeñan los funcionarios profesionales que suscriban contratos de dedicación exclusiva con la Administración: 1. Un veinticinco por ciento (25%) para los servidores con el nivel de licenciatura u otro grado académico superior.
2. Un diez por ciento (10%) para los profesionales con el nivel de bachiller universitario”.
Es evidente que esas disposiciones son susceptibles de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas identificables, como ocurre en el caso del accionante. En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales precitados, esta Sala estima que el accionante carece de legitimación directa para plantear esta acción en defensa de intereses difusos.
Ahora bien, en cuanto a la defensa de intereses colectivos, esta Sala ha señalado lo siguiente:
“(…) III.- Sobre los intereses corporativos. Cómo segundo motivo de legitimación, el accionante aduce la defensa de intereses colectivos, situación contemplada en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. La norma dispone: “…[N]o será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto…”. Al respecto, es oportuno señalar que la Sala ha precisado que a través de la expresión "intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", el legislador quiso referirse a la legitimación que ostenta una entidad corporativa, cuando actúa por intermedio de sus representantes en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa y siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que incidan en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación. A partir de la sentencia 2006-9170 de las dieciséis horas treinta y seis minutos del veintiocho de junio del dos mil seis, este Tribunal retomó un criterio anterior, según el cual los entes corporativos están autorizados para solicitar en forma directa la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de una norma, cuando ésta afecte directamente la esfera de acción del ente y de sus integrantes, sin que tenga relevancia que la norma sea susceptible de afectar en forma directa los derechos de los agremiados. En este caso, sin embargo, esta tesis no es de aplicación, porque el accionante no acude en representación de una organización que por su naturaleza o fines, o cuyos asociados, puedan verse afectados por el Acuerdo cuestionado. Por otra parte, el accionante no puede arrogarse sin más la representación de hecho de ninguna persona u organización profesional”. (Voto n.° 2014-020446 de las 09:30 horas del 17 de diciembre de 2014).
Con base en el criterio precitado, el accionante tampoco se encuentra legitimado para interponer esta acción en defensa de intereses colectivos de las personas profesionales que laboran para la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, dado que que el actor no acude en representación de alguna colectividad formalmente organizada e identificada, de la cual ostente la representación legal, por lo que se encuentra imposibilitado para actuar en defensa de intereses corporativos.
III.- CONCLUSIÓN. En razón de lo expuesto, por carecer el accionante de legitimación directa y no haber alegado la existencia de un proceso judicial o procedimiento administrativo previo que sirva de base a la acción de inconstitucionalidad, esta resulta inadmisible y procede su rechazo de plano. El magistrado Rueda Leal da razones diferentes en cuanto a la legitimación por interés difuso. La magistrada Garro Vargas pone nota.
IV.- Razones diferentes del magistrado Rueda Leal. Tal como lo he expresado en otros casos, estimo que una cualidad del interés difuso consiste precisamente, en que su afectación es general -esto es, incide en toda una población o en amplios sectores de ella- dentro de un contexto, donde no se precisa que los sujetos perjudicados se conozcan entre sí (incluso podrían carecer de nexo o relaciones jurídicas entre ellos), pero sí se requiere de la presencia de una misma situación de daño o peligro a un bien constitucional que, por igual y sin necesidad de individualización alguna, comprende y aglomera a toda una sociedad en abstracto. Su defensa tiene como finalidad satisfacer una necesidad de la sociedad como tal, por ello, es trascendente a la de un ser humano individual o colectivamente considerado. En sentencia n.° 2019-17397 de las 12:54 horas del 11 de setiembre de 2019, este Tribunal reiteró lo siguiente:
“(…) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres) "… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter".
En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros. Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación –como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que –como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República. No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa” (véase la sentencia No. 2007-01145).” En consonancia con lo expuesto y sostenido por este Tribunal en su jurisprudencia, se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es por ello, precisamente, que, a partir de la sentencia n.° 2021-2185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021, considero, a diferencia de la Mayoría de este Tribunal, que algunos de estos intereses pueden estar plasmados en un caso particular en concreto, sin perder por ello su condición de interés difuso, tal como ocurre con la protección al ambiente, cuyo impacto afecta a una persona y a todos en general; y puede ser individualizada tal afectación en una situación en particular, como por ejemplo, la construcción de una fábrica en un sector vecino determinado, sin los estudios ambientales respectivos, cuyos efectos negativos incidan en la capa de ozono del planeta. Indudablemente el resultado de un reclamo o proceso que pueda plantear un vecino contra esa fábrica no solo incidirá en sus intereses propios, sino también en el resto de la colectividad. Por ello, constituye un interés difuso y también es objeto de una situación particular individualizada. Ahora bien, ello no quiere decir, en modo alguno, que en toda situación invocada se pueda alegar la existencia de un interés difuso, aunque este pueda ser objeto de una situación particular. Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso. En el caso del accionante, tal como refiere la Mayoría, la normativa impugnada no produce una afectación socialmente difuminada, sino determinada, pues este hace referencia a la colectividad integrada por los funcionarios profesionales que suscriben contratos de dedicación exclusiva con la Administración, grupo que es fácilmente identificable. De modo que, en el sub lite, lo que se vislumbra es una situación particular del accionante que, si bien puede ser compartida por algún grupo de personas, ese efecto no es de tal magnitud como para considerarlo un interés difuso. Por el motivo expuesto coincido con la Mayoría en desestimar esta acción; empero, con la fundamentación expuesta.
V.- NOTA DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS En la sentencia n.°2021-2185, invocada por la mayoría para rechazar la presente acción, consigné una nota separada en la que perfilo mi interpretación respecto de la admisibilidad de las acciones en las que se invoca un supuesto interés difuso que, más bien, se debe encuadrar como un caso en el que claramente puede existir un asunto pendiente de resolución como mecanismo incidental para admitir la legitimación de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En dicha sentencia realicé las siguientes consideraciones:
“En este asunto he concurrido con mi voto en la desestimatoria de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Pero he optado por consignar una nota separada con la que pretendo perfilar mi criterio en relación con la legitimación y la admisibilidad de este proceso en concreto.
En ese sentido, considero necesario precisar que lo resuelto por la mayoría no significa que se pueda admitir ‒como regla general‒ que, cuando pueda existir un reclamo por una violación individual y directa, no procede per se afirmar que no corresponde tutelar paralelamente la protección de los intereses difusos. Es decir, habrá casos en que en atención a la situación jurídica sustancial afectada podría configurarse ambos supuestos.
Distinto es el caso en que razonablemente se pueda desprender que, si bien se alega un interés difuso, lo que subyace es una clara utilidad personal e individual de otra naturaleza o, incluso otro derecho subjetivo que no engloba paralelamente la protección de los intereses difusos. Ese segundo supuesto el que se nos presenta en el caso concreto, en el cual, tanto la Procuraduría General de la República como el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, evidenciaron que el actor está accionando en resguardo de un interés de corte claramente individual, relacionado con el ejercicio de su actividad comercial ordinaria, más que un genuino interés difuso de tutelar el medio ambiente. En definitiva, no parece que resulte válido utilizar “el ropaje” de un interés difuso para garantizar la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, cuando se puede corroborar que lo que se procura es el resguardo de otro tipo de derechos o intereses que bien podrían ser tutelados en una acción de inconstitucionalidad, pero a través del supuesto contemplado en el art. 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional”.
Apreciaciones que igualmente estimo resultan de aplicación al caso concreto en el que sí podría existir un asunto incidental. En atención a lo anterior, no cabe invocar, de forma paralela, una legitimación directa por un supuesto interés difuso.
VI.- Documentación aportada al expediente. Se previene a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza de plano la acción. El Magistrado Rueda Leal da razones diferentes. La magistrada Garro Vargas pone nota.
Fernando Castillo V.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ana María Picado B.
Jose Roberto Garita N.
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