Flat rejection of unconstitutionality action due to expiration of underlying proceedingRechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad por caducidad del proceso base

Document Review 1 \*200171270007CO\* Res. No. 2020-021331 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at thirteen hours and sixteen minutes of the fourth of November two thousand twenty.

An unconstitutionality action brought by JUAN CARLOS ARGUEDAS MORENO, of legal age, married, commercial airplane pilot -helicopters and airplanes-, resident of San José, identity card no. 1-0533-0544, in his personal capacity and as general agent without sum limit of the company HELI JET AVIATION S.A., corporate identity card no. 3-101-343329, and GUILLERMO ARGUEDAS MORENO, of legal age, divorced, commercial airplane pilot -helicopters and airplanes-, identity card no. 1-0453-00554, in his personal capacity; against Articles 294, subsection d); 296, subsections g) and i); and 300 of the Ley General de Aviación Civil.

WHEREAS:

1. 1By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 14:24 hours on September 18, 2020, the complaining party requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 294, subsection d); 296, subsections g) and i); and 300 of the Ley General de Aviación Civil be declared. They state that in the case of legal entities, in accordance with Article 300 of the Ley General de Aviación Civil, it is established that: “*Article 300.- A minimum fine of twenty minimum wages shall be imposed, according to the seriousness of the act, on the air service company operating in the country, on the aeronautical technical personnel, or on any person for infringing this law, its regulations or related provisions not covered in the preceding articles*”. They explain that in their case, by the simple factual circumstance of an expired medical certificate of one of the company's two pilots, Guillermo Arguedas, the severe penalty of 20 wages was applied to him, for a sum of ₡5,862,653.40.They consider that this rule violates the principles of proportionality and legal equality, given that it does not take into consideration the assets of the sanctioned legal entity. It lacks a range that would allow the administration to determine the seriousness of the conduct, for, in their opinion, it contains a terrible legislative technique, it only allows the imposition of a single penalty, which is precisely the 20 base wages. When the challenged rule states “according to the seriousness of the act”, it is because the legislator intended to grant discretion to the administration, in this case the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil (CETAC), to assess the seriousness of the conduct; however, by establishing a single penalty, it prevents the administration from applying a fine that respects the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as well as from assessing the conditions of the legal entity, its assets, and its capacity to face financial sanctions, so that it can be sanctioned, rectify its error by improving future procedures, and continue its operations in accordance with the law.They point out that, as the challenged rule is drafted, it seems intended that for a minor infraction -as they consider occurred in the specific case-, the company be placed in a difficult financial situation, due to an expired document of a pilot, which never resulted in any harm to safety and was resolved on the same day the fault was detected. Regarding the unconstitutionality of Article 296, subsections g) and i), of the Ley General de Aviación Civil, these establish the following: “*Article 296.- The penalties provided in this article shall be imposed for the following (…) g) Piloting the aircraft without a license or with an expired license, with a fine of fifty minimum wages. (…) i) Commencing flight without ascertaining the validity of the airworthiness certificate, the flight crew licenses, or that the aircraft bears the nationality and registration marks, with a fine of thirty minimum wages.(…)*”. They explain that the complainant Guillermo Arguedas was penalized with a fine of 80 minimum wages, in the sum of ₡23,450,613.60, in application of the aforementioned rule. They consider that this rule is also contrary to the principle of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalty.

They explain that the plaintiff Guillermo Arguedas was sanctioned with a fine of 80 minimum wages, for the sum of ₡ 23,450,613.60, in application of the aforementioned provision. They consider that this provision is also contrary to the principle of reasonableness and proportionality of the sanction. They explain that the only fault confirmed in their case was the failure to renew a medical certificate which, although it is an error, it is not possible for the administration to have the power to destroy his assets and his career as a pilot, for a completely negligent error, which did not cause any harm. They indicate that from reading other infractions that exist in the law, it can be detected that there is a serious error in legislative technique, because similar infractions, defined in other articles of the same law, have derisory sanctions. By way of example, they cite Article 295, which sanctions similar conduct, but establishes fines from 300 to 3000 colones.

They allege that there can be no rational explanation to justify those differences in monetary sanctions, in the application of a fine for the same conduct, so they consider it to be an obvious legislative error. As for the unconstitutionality of Article 294, subsection d), of the General Law of Civil Aviation, it reads as follows: *“Artículo 294.- Se impondrán las multas citadas en este artículo a los talleres aeronáuticos, los propietarios privados y los concesionarios de operaciones comerciales de aeronaves civiles o de fumigación, en lo que a cada uno concierne, por los siguientes hechos: (…) d) Permitir que las naves sean tripuladas por personas sin la licencia correspondiente o con la licencia vencida, con multa de cien salarios mínimos. (…)”*. They allege that there is no possible way to understand the parameters used by the legislator to impose such a significant sanction (100 minimum wages) on all concessionaire companies in a generalized manner.

In the aviation business, one cannot compare the economic damage of a similar sanction on a small company, to a similar sanction on a large or medium company, which have million-dollar or even billion-dollar superior flows. They claim that the legislator did not establish a differentiation between the categories of concessionaire companies; it is a legislative technique that did not respect any of the basic principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the sanction and violated the principle of legal equality by treating unequal entities as equals. They note that the challenged provisions establish an arbitrary, unjust, and indefensible sentencing range; violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness. They argue that the challenged provisions suffer from a lack of legislative technique, by granting absolute and arbitrary powers to the administration, so that it imposes the sanction it chooses, without any scale or measurement parameter, without establishing a range that allows differentiating the circumstances of each specific case.

The aforementioned provisions do not establish any difference as to when the maximum penalty should be applied or when it should be mitigated, since they all have the common denominator of applying a single penalty. They add that the administration not only intends to apply the maximum penalty in all cases (since it is its only option), but also does not even allow the individual to exercise any defense, because they are subject to a single disproportionate sanction, regardless of the defense they may present. They state that it is important for pilots to have proof of their health status; however, there are less burdensome means that would have allowed weighing the cases in which the pilot or the company really makes an error and when the individual willfully intends not to comply with their formal obligations. They consider that it is disproportionate, unreasonable, and a violation of due process, that for conduct that is merely confirmatory and a formal obligation, the individual is not allowed to remedy the error or at least give an explanation for their omission, with the concessionaire warned that, if non-compliance continues, they will be liable for the corresponding sanction. Based on the foregoing, they request that the unconstitutionality of the provisions challenged herein be declared.

1. 2In order to support their standing, based on Article 75, paragraph 1°, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the plaintiffs indicate that they are the plaintiff party in the underlying matter, case file No. 19-008309-1027-CA, which is pending before the Administrative Litigation Court, against the State and the Civil Aviation Technical Council (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil). They provide a certified writ of the invocation of unconstitutionality dated December 20, 2019.
2. 3By official communication dated September 24, 2020, from the Court Chamber's technician, addressed to the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court, the referral to this Chamber of judicial file No. 19-008309-1027-CA was requested.
3. 4By institutional email at 1:48 p.m. on September 25, 2020, the support technician for the coordination of the Administrative Litigation Court sends the requested digital file and indicates that *“el expediente está fuera del despacho en el Tribunal de Apelación”* (the file is out of the office at the Court of Appeals).
4. 5By writ received via Online Management of the Constitutional Chamber at 4:05 p.m. on September 25, 2020, the lead attorney for the plaintiff party states that upon reviewing the file, they consider that it omits the appeal that was filed with suspensive effects before the Administrative Appeals Court against resolution No. 14:25-2020 of 3:05 p.m. on September 10, 2020, an appeal of which they attach a copy with a receipt stamp.
5. 6By official communication dated September 28, 2020, from the Court Chamber's technician, addressed to the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court of Appeals of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, the referral to this Chamber of judicial file No. 19-008309-1027-CA was requested.
6. 7By email at 9:19 a.m. on September 29, 2020, digital file No. 19-008309-1027-CA was received from the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court of Appeals, whose status is “En trámite” (In Process) and the sub-status is “ESTUDIO ADMISIBILIDAD” (ADMISSIBILITY STUDY).
7. 8By email at 9:49 a.m. on October 21, 2020, addressed to the Administrative Litigation Court of Appeals of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, it was requested to report on the procedural status of the appeal filed within case file No. 19-008309-1027-CA.
8. 9By email at 10:29 a.m. on October 21, 2020, the judicial technician of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court of Appeals of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José communicated that case file No. 19-008309-1027-CA is suspended, until the matter raised before the Constitutional Chamber is resolved. Likewise, they provided a digital copy of the case file in question.
9. 10Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any proceeding submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous similar or identical rejected proceeding.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and, CONSIDERANDO (WHEREAS):

I. REGARDING THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION

This Chamber has repeatedly stated that the unconstitutionality action is a proceeding with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility prerequisites for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, either in a judicial venue – including habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or in an administrative venue – in the procedure for exhausting this route – in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision is invoked, as a reasonable means of protecting the right that is considered infringed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – the underlying matter is not required – in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).

Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the unconstitutionality action is constituted or configured as:

*“(...) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that it requires the existence of a matter pending resolution - either before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route - to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that, the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered infringed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the provisions that must be applied in said matter (...)”*. (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 2:51 p.m. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

*“(…) Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an unconstitutionality action, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connecting point that must exist between the process in which the provision deemed unconstitutional is applied, and the object of the constitutional process and the basis that legitimizes the plaintiff's claim as a last procedural remedy in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, more than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel of the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a "prior matter" that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function - special - and not distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions.

For this reason, the unconstitutionality action needs its existence - of the prior matter - as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest that is considered infringed. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the plaintiff should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to bring an action without requiring the existence of a pending matter to resolve; rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is deemed infringed. (…)”* Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is deduced that the unconstitutionality action is, primarily, a proceeding of an incidental nature, so a matter pending resolution in an administrative venue – in the administrative procedure of challenge against the final act – or judicial venue is required for the action to prosper. In this way, only in exceptional cases established by law, the existence of this requirement will not be necessary.

II. REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION

The petitioner files this unconstitutionality action against Articles 294, subsection d); 296, subsections g) and i); and 300 of the General Law of Civil Aviation; considering them contrary to Articles 33 and 39 of the Political Constitution, 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality and prohibition of arbitrariness. To this effect, they base their standing on Article 75, paragraph 1°, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since the plaintiffs are the plaintiff party in the underlying matter, case file No. 19-008309-1027-CA, which is pending before the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court of Appeals, and they provide a certified writ of the invocation of unconstitutionality. From the study of digital file No. 19-008309-1027-CA provided to the record, it is verified that the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court, by resolution No. 1425-2020 of 3:05 p.m. on September 10, 2020, declared the expiration of the process (caducidad del proceso) and ordered the filing.

By writ at 1:42 p.m. on September 18, 2020, the plaintiffs challenged the resolution that ordered the expiration of the process. Consequently, the appeal is under admissibility study before the Administrative Litigation Court of Appeals. Furthermore, it is accredited that by resolution at 4:25 p.m. on October 2, 2020, the appeals court ordered the suspension of the processing of the ordinary appeal filed by the plaintiff party, until the Constitutional Chamber resolves the corresponding matter. Consequently, the underlying matter is currently in a procedural state that prevents determining if this action is a reasonable means of protecting the rights or interests that are deemed violated by the challenged regulations, given that the expiration of the process was ordered in the first instance and the appeal filed against that decision has not yet been admitted. In the opinion of this Court, admitting this unconstitutionality action under those conditions would imply accepting the existence of a sort of popular action, which is entirely inadmissible according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Chamber. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the action must be rejected.

III. DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE

The parties are warned that if any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new technology-produced device have been provided, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

POR TANTO (THEREFORE):

The action is rejected outright. Judge Hernández López dissents and orders the action to be processed.

Fernando Castillo V.

| Luis Fdo.

Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Alicia Salas T.

Dissenting vote of Magistrate Hernández López. Respectfully, I dissent from the majority vote because the case meets the requirements established in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since it has a pending trial in which the challenged matter may have an impact. The majority notes that the fact that the base matter is on appeal prevents determining whether this action is a reasonable means of protecting the rights or interests deemed violated by the challenged regulation, given that at first instance the expiry of the proceeding was ordered and the appeal filed against that decision has not yet been admitted. From my perspective, it is sufficient that the appeal has been filed to serve as a basis for admission for the purposes of this action. Interpreting otherwise goes beyond what was intended by the legislator, with a restrictive interpretation that runs counter to the petitioner's access to justice.

Nancy Hernández López Magistrate They claim that the legislator did not establish a differentiation between the categories of concessionaire companies; it is a legislative technique that did not respect any of the basic principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the sanction and violated the principle of legal equality by treating unequal parties as equals. They note that the challenged norms establish an arbitrary, unjust, and indefensible sanctioning range, violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness. They argue that the challenged norms suffer from a lack of legislative technique by granting absolute and arbitrary powers to the administration to impose whichever sanction it chooses, without any benchmark or measurement parameter, and without establishing a range that allows differentiation of the circumstances of each specific case. The aforementioned norms do not establish any difference regarding when the maximum penalty should be applied or when it should be mitigated, as they all have the common denominator of applying a single penalty.

They add that the administration not only intends to apply the maximum penalty in all cases (since it is its only option), but also does not even allow the administrated party to exercise any defense, as it is subject to a single disproportionate sanction, regardless of the defense it may present. They state that it is important for pilots to have proof of their health status; however, there are less burdensome means that would have allowed weighing cases in which the pilot or the company actually makes an error and when the administrated party fraudulently intends not to comply with its formal obligations. They consider it disproportionate, unreasonable, and a violation of due process (debido proceso) that, for conduct that is merely confirmatory and a formal obligation, the administrated party is not allowed to correct the error or at least provide an explanation for its omission, with the concessionaire being warned that, if it continues to fail to comply, it will be subject to the corresponding sanction. Based on the foregoing, they request that the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged here be declared.

1. 2For the purpose of substantiating their standing, based on Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the claimants state that they are the plaintiff in the base matter, case file number 19-008309-1027-CA, which is pending before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, against the State and the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil. They provide a certified copy of the invocation of unconstitutionality dated December 20, 2019.
2. 3By official communication of September 24, 2020, from the technician of the Court's Chamber, addressed to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, the referral to this Chamber of judicial case file number 19-008309-1027-CA was requested.
3. 4By institutional email at 1:48 p.m. on September 25, 2020, the coordination support technician of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo sent the requested digital case file and indicated that *“the case file is out of the office at the Tribunal de Apelación”*.
4. 5By a brief received via Gestión en Línea of the Sala Constitucional at 4:05 p.m. on September 25, 2020, the directing attorney for the claimant states that, upon reviewing the case file, he believes the appeal that was filed with suspensive effect before the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso against resolution number 14:25-2020 of 3:05 p.m. on September 10, 2020, is omitted, a copy of which appeal he attaches with a stamp showing its receipt.
5. 6By official communication of September 28, 2020, from the technician of the Court's Chamber, addressed to the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Annex A, the referral to this Chamber of judicial case file number 19-008309-1027-CA was requested.
6. 7By email at 9:19 a.m. on September 29, 2020, digital case file number 19-008309-1027-CA was received from the Tribunal de Apelación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, the status of which is “In Progress” and the sub-status is “ADMISSIBILITY STUDY”.
7. 8By email at 9:49 a.m. on October 21, 2020, addressed to the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo of the II Circuito Judicial de San José, Annex A, a report was requested on the procedural status of the appeal filed within case file number 19-008309-1027-CA.
8. 9By email at 10:29 a.m. on October 21, 2020, the judicial technician of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of the II Circuito Judicial de San José reported that case file number 19-008309-1027-CA has been suspended until the matter raised before the Sala Constitucional is resolved. Likewise, they provided a digital copy of the case file in question.
9. 10Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject summarily or on the merits, at any time, including from the time of filing, any petition brought before it that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers there are sufficient grounds for rejection, or that it constitutes the mere reiteration or reproduction of a prior, identical or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I. REGARDING THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION

This Chamber has repeatedly stated that the unconstitutionality action is a procedure with specific formalities, which, if not met, prevent this Chamber from ruling on the merits. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the admissibility prerequisites for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether before the courts – including habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or before the administrative authorities – in the procedure to exhaust that route –, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – not requiring a base matter – under the following circumstances: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.

Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the unconstitutionality action is constituted or configured as:

“(...) *a procedure of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution – whether before the courts or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route – is required to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that* *the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding*, *as it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter* (...)” (Judgment number 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995; the highlighting is not from the original).

Likewise, in judgment number 1319-1997 of 2:51 p.m. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

“(…) *Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an unconstitutionality action the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the claimant's claim as a last procedural remedy in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a "prior matter" that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, in order to maintain the – special – jurisdictional function, and not distort the purity of the system of relations of the State's constitutional powers, of which the Chamber forms a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions.

For this reason, the unconstitutionality action requires its existence – of the prior matter – as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the claimant should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs this Chamber's actions. It is not a matter, then, of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision in order to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is deemed injured.* (…)” Based on the cited precedents and this Chamber's jurisprudential line, it is inferred that the unconstitutionality action is, primarily, a procedure of an incidental nature, meaning that a matter pending resolution via the administrative route – in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act – or judicial route is required for the action to prosper. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of that requirement not be necessary.

II. REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION

The petitioner files this unconstitutionality action against Articles 294, subsection d); 296, subsections g) and i); and 300 of the Ley General de Aviación Civil, considering them contrary to Articles 33 and 39 of the Constitución Política, 24 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, and the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and the prohibition of arbitrariness. To this end, they base their standing on Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, given that the claimants are the plaintiffs in the base matter, case file number 19-008309-1027-CA, which is pending before the Tribunal de Apelación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, and they provide a certified copy of the invocation of unconstitutionality. From the study of digital case file number 19-008309-1027-CA provided to the record, it is verified that the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, by resolution number 1425-2020 of 3:05 p.m. on September 10, 2020, declared the statute of limitations (caducidad) had run and ordered the case archived.

By brief at 1:42 p.m. on September 18, 2020, the plaintiffs challenged the resolution that declared the statute of limitations had run. Consequently, the appeal is under admissibility review at the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Furthermore, it is proven that by resolution at 4:25 p.m. on October 2, 2020, the appeals court ordered the suspension of the processing of the ordinary appeal filed by the plaintiff until the Sala Constitucional resolves accordingly. Consequently, the base matter is currently at a procedural stage that prevents determining whether this action is a reasonable means to protect the rights or interests deemed violated by the challenged regulations, given that the statute of limitations was declared at first instance and the appeal filed against that decision has not yet been admitted. In this Court’s opinion, admitting this unconstitutionality action under these conditions would imply accepting the existence of a kind of popular action, which is entirely inadmissible according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Chamber. Thus, based on the foregoing, the action must be rejected.

III. DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE

The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

The action is rejected summarily. Magistrate Hernández López dissents and orders the action to proceed.

Fernando Castillo V. President | Paul Rueda L. | | Nancy Hernández L. | | Luis Fdo. Salazar A. | | Jorge Araya G. | | Anamari Garro V. | | Alicia Salas T. | Dissenting Vote of Magistrate Hernández López. I respectfully dissent from the majority vote because the case meets the requirements established in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since it has a pending proceeding in which the challenged matter could have an impact. The majority indicates that the fact that the base matter is on appeal prevents determining whether this action is a reasonable means to protect the rights or interests deemed violated by the challenged regulations, given that the statute of limitations (caducidad) was declared at first instance and the appeal filed against that decision has not yet been admitted. From my perspective, it is sufficient that the appeal has been filed to serve as a basis for admission for the purposes of this action.

To interpret the contrary is to go beyond what was intended by the legislator, with a restrictive interpretation that runs counter to the claimant's access to justice.

Nancy Hernández López Magistrate

Revisión del Documento 1 Res. Nº 2020-021331 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las trece horas y dieciséis minutos del cuatro de noviembre de dos mil veinte.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por JUAN CARLOS ARGUEDAS MORENO, mayor, casado, piloto comercial de avión -helicópteros y aviones-, vecino de San José, cédula de identidad n° 1-0533-0544, en su condición personal y como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la empresa HELI JET AVIATION S.A., cédula jurídica n° 3-101-343329, y GUILLERMO ARGUEDAS MORENO, mayor, divorciado, piloto comercial de avión -helicópteros y aviones-, cédula de identidad n° 1-0453-00554, en su condición personal; contra los artículos 294, inciso d); 296, incisos g) e i); y 300 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil.

RESULTANDO:

1. 1Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 14:24 horas del 18 de septiembre de 2020, la parte accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 294, inciso d); 296, incisos g) e i); y 300 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil. Manifiestan que en el caso de las personas jurídicas, de conformidad con el artículo 300 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil, se establece que: “Artículo 300.- Se impondrá una multa mínima de veinte salarios mínimos, según la gravedad del hecho, a la empresa de servicio aéreo que opere en el país, al personal técnico aeronáutico, o a cualquier persona por infringir esta ley, sus reglamentos o las disposiciones conexas no previstas en los artículos anteriores”. Exponen que en su caso, por el simple dato fáctico de un certificado médico vencido de uno de los dos pilotos de la empresa, Guillermo Arguedas, se le aplicó la severa sanción de 20 salarios, por una suma de ₡5.862.653,40.Consideran que esa norma violenta los principios de proporcionalidad y de igualdad jurídica, dado que no toma en consideración el patrimonio de la persona jurídica sancionada. No tiene un rango que permita a la administración determinar la gravedad de la conducta, pues en su criterio contiene una pésima técnica legislativa, solo permite la imposición de una sola sanción, que es precisamente los 20 salarios base. Al decir la norma impugnada “según la gravedad del hecho”, es porque el legislador pretendía otorgarle discrecionalidad a la administración, en este caso el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil (CETAC), para valorar la gravedad de las conductas; sin embargo, al establecerse una única sanción, impide a la administración aplicar una multa que respete los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, así como también valorar las condiciones de la persona jurídica, su patrimonio y su capacidad de afrontar sanciones patrimoniales, para que pueda ser sancionada, rectificar su error al mejorar futuros procedimientos y continuar con sus operaciones conforme a derecho.Señalan que, como está redactada la norma impugnada, parece que pretende que por una infracción mínima -como considera que ocurrió en el caso concreto-, se coloque a la empresa en una situación financiera difícil, por un documento vencido de un piloto, que nunca resultó en perjuicio alguno para la seguridad y que fue solucionado el mismo día que se detectó la falta. En cuanto a la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 296, incisos g) e i), de la Ley General de Aviación Civil, estos establecen lo siguiente: “Artículo 296.- Se sancionará con las multas citadas en este artículo (…) g) Tripular la aeronave sin licencia o con la licencia vencida, con multa de cincuenta salarios mínimos. (…) i) Iniciar el vuelo sin cerciorarse de la vigencia del certificado de aeronavegabilidad, de las licencias de la tripulación de vuelo ni de que la aeronave ostenta las marcas de nacionalidad y matrícula, con multa de treinta salarios mínimos.(…)”. Exponen que al accionante Guillermo Arguedas se le sancionó con una multa de 80 salarios mínimos, por la suma de ₡ 23.450.613,60, en aplicación de la norma precitada. Consideran que esta norma también es contraria al principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la sanción. Explican que la única falta constatada en su caso fue la no renovación de un certificado médico que, si bien es un error, no es posible que la administración tenga el poder de destruir el patrimonio y su carrera de piloto, por un error totalmente culposo, que no generó perjuicio alguno. Señalan que de la lectura de otras infracciones que existen en la ley, se puede detectar que existe un grave error en la técnica legislativa, pues infracciones similares, tipificadas en otros artículos de la misma ley, tienen sanciones irrisorias. A manera de ejemplo, citan el artículo 295, que sanciona conductas similares, pero establece multas de 300 a 3000 colones.Alegan que no puede existir una explicación racional que justifique esas diferencias en las sanciones patrimoniales, en la aplicación de una multa por la misma conducta, por lo que estiman que se trata de un evidente error legislativo. En cuanto a la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 294, inciso d), de la Ley General de Aviación Civil, este señala lo siguiente: “Artículo 294.- Se impondrán las multas citadas en este artículo a los talleres aeronáuticos, los propietarios privados y los concesionarios de operaciones comerciales de aeronaves civiles o de fumigación, en lo que a cada uno concierne, por los siguientes hechos: (…) d) Permitir que las naves sean tripuladas por personas sin la licencia correspondiente o con la licencia vencida, con multa de cien salarios mínimos. (…)”. Alegan que no existe forma posible de entender los parámetros utilizados por el legislador para imponer una sanción tan importante (100 salarios mínimos) a todas las empresas de concesionarias de manera generalizada.En el negocio de aviación no se puede comparar el daño patrimonial de una sanción semejante a una empresa pequeña, a una sanción similar a una empresa grande o mediana, que tienen flujos millonarios o hasta billonariamente superiores. Reclaman que el legislador no estableció una diferenciación entre las categorías de las empresas concesionarias, es una técnica legislativa que no respetó ninguno de los principios básicos de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la sanción y violentó el principio de igualdad jurídica al tratar a los desiguales como iguales. Acotan que las normas impugnadas establecen un rango sancionatorio arbitrario, injusto e indefendible; violentando el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad. Aducen que las normas impugnadas cuentan con una falta de técnica legislativa, al otorgarle poderes absolutos y arbitrarios a la administración, para que imponga la sanción que escoja, sin ningún baremo o parámetro de medición, sin establecer un rango que permita diferenciar las circunstancias de cada caso concreto.Las normas precitadas no establecen ninguna diferencia de cuando se debe aplicar la pena mayor o cuando se debe atenuar, pues todas tienen el común denominador que aplican una única pena. Agregan que la administración no solo pretende aplicar la pena mayor en todos lo casos (pues es su única opción), sino que, además, ni siquiera le permite al administrado ejercer defensa alguna, pues está sujeto a una sanción única desproporcionada, independientemente de la defensa que pueda ejercer. Manifiestan que es importante que los pilotos cuenten con una constancia de su estado de salud; sin embargo, existen medios menos gravosos que hubieran permitido ponderar los casos en que realmente el piloto o la empresa comete un error y cuando el administrado dolosamente pretende no cumplir con sus obligaciones formales. Consideran que es desproporcionado, irrazonable y violatorio del debido proceso, que una conducta que es de mera constatación y es una obligación formal, no se le permita al administrado subsanar el error o al menos dar una explicación de su omisión, apercibido el concesionario que, si continúa incumpliendo, será acreedor de la sanción correspondiente. Con base en lo anterior, solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de las normas aquí impugnadas.
2. 2A efectos de fundamentar su legitimación, con base en el artículo 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, los accionantes indican que son parte actora en el asunto base expediente n° 19-008309-1027-CA, que se encuentra en trámite ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en contra del Estado y el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil. Aportan escrito certificado de la invocación de inconstitucionalidad del 20 de diciembre de 2019.
3. 3Por oficio del 24 de setiembre de 2020 de la técnica de Sala de la Corte, dirigido al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, se solicitó la remisión a esta Sala del expediente judicial n° 19-008309-1027-CA.
4. 4Mediante correo electrónico institucional de las 13:48 horas del 25 de septiembre de 2020, la técnica de apoyo a la coordinación del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo remite el expediente digital solicitado e indica que “el expediente está fuera del despacho en el Tribunal de Apelación”.
5. 5Por escrito recibido vía Gestión en Línea de la Sala Constitucional a las 16:05 horas del 25 de septiembre de 2020, el abogado director de la parte accionante manifiesta que revisando el expediente, considera que omite la apelación que se presentó con efectos suspensivos ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso en contra de la resolución n° 14:25-2020 de las 15:05 horas del 10 de septiembre de 2020, recurso del cual adjunta copia con sello de recibido.
6. 6Por oficio del 28 de setiembre de 2020 de la técnica de Sala de la Corte, dirigido al Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, anexo A, se solicitó la remisión a esta Sala del expediente judicial n° 19-008309-1027-CA.
7. 7Mediante correo electrónico de las 09:19 horas del 29 de septiembre de 2020, se recibió de parte del Tribunal de Apelación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda el expediente digital n° 19-008309-1027-CA cuyo estado es “En trámite” y el sub estado es “ESTUDIO ADMISIBILIDAD”.
8. 8Por correo electrónico de las 09:49 horas del 21 de octubre de 2020, dirigido al Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo del II Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, se solicitó informar sobre el estado procesal del recurso de apelación interpuesto dentro del expediente n° 19-008309-1027-CA.
9. 9Mediante correo electrónico de las 10:29 horas del 21 de octubre de 2020 la técnica judicial del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del II Circuito Judicial de San José comunicó que el expediente n° 19-008309-1027-CA se encuentra suspendido, hasta que se resuelva lo planteado en la Sala Constitucional. Asimismo, aportó copia digital del expediente en cuestión.
10. 10El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I. SOBRE LOS PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES DE ADMISIBILIDAD Y LEGITIMACIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD

Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.

En cuanto a la exigencia del asunto pendiente de resolver, establecida en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, esta Sala ha explicado que, en tal supuesto, la acción de inconstitucionalidad se constituye o configura como:

“(...) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto (...)”. (Sentencia n° 4190-95 de las 11:33 horas de 28 de julio de 1995; lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Asimismo, en la sentencia n° 1319-1997 de las 14:51 horas de 4 de marzo de 1997, se consideró lo siguiente:

“(…) El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, por constituir el punto de conexión que ha de existir entre el proceso en que se aplica la norma que se reputa inconstitucional con el objeto del proceso constitucional y el fundamento que legitima la pretensión del accionante como último remedio procesal, en el ejercicio del derecho a la jurisdicción constitucional. El rigor en la legitimación para acceder a la jurisdicción constitucional, más que constituir un obstáculo para impedir el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, constituye el cauce del derecho de acceso a la justicia, derivado de la existencia de un "asunto previo" que haya motivado aquella discordancia o contradicción entre la ley y la Constitución, para mantener la función jurisdiccional -especial-, y no distorsionar la pureza del sistema de relación de los poderes constitucionales del Estado, del que es parte la Sala, porque como integrante de aquellos, no es enteramente libre e ilimitada en sus acciones.

Por esta causa, es que la acción de inconstitucionalidad necesita de su existencia -del asunto previo- como medio razonable para amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Empero, la razonabilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad como medio de defensa del accionante no debe analizarse solo dentro del contexto del asunto previo, sino inmersa en el marco jurídico constitucional que rige las actuaciones de esta Sala. No se trata, entonces, de una consideración particular de la inconstitucionalidad de una disposición normativa, para interponer una acción sin requerir la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sino, que es necesario que se demuestre que constituye un medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. (…)” Con fundamento en los precedentes citados y la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala, se colige que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es, principalmente, un proceso de naturaleza incidental, por lo que se requiere de un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa –en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final- o judicial, para que prospere la acción. De esta manera, solo en casos excepcionales que la ley establece, no será necesaria la existencia de ese requisito.

II. SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN

La parte gestionante interpone esta acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 294, inciso d); 296, incisos g) e i); y 300 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil; por estimarlos contrarios a los artículos 33 y 39 de la Constitución Política, 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad e interdicción de la arbitrariedad. Al efecto, fundamenta su legitimación en el artículo 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que los accionantes son parte actora en el asunto base expediente n° 19-008309-1027-CA, que se encuentra en trámite ante el Tribunal de Apelación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, y aportan escrito certificado de la invocación de inconstitucionalidad. A partir del estudio del expediente digital n° 19-008309-1027-CA aportado a los autos, se constata que el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, mediante resolución n° 1425-2020 de las 15:05 horas del 10 de septiembre de 2020, declaró la caducidad del proceso y ordenó el archivo.

Por escrito de las 13:42 horas del 18 de septiembre de 2020 los actores impugnaron la resolución que dispuso la caducidad del proceso. En consecuencia, el recurso de apelación se encuentra en estudio admisibilidad ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Además, se acredita que por resolución de las 16:25 horas del 2 de octubre de 2020, el tribunal de apelación dispuso suspender el trámite del recurso ordinario presentado por la parte actora, hasta que la Sala Constitucional resuelva lo correspondiente. En consecuencia, el asunto base actualmente se encuentra en un estado procesal que impide determinar si esta acción es un medio razonable de amparar los derechos o intereses que se estiman vulnerados por la normativa impugnada, dado que en primera instancia se dictó la caducidad del proceso y el recurso de apelación interpuesto contra esa decisión aún no ha sido admitido.

A criterio de este Tribunal, admitir esta acción de inconstitucionalidad en esas condiciones, implicaría aceptar la existencia de una suerte de acción popular, que resulta totalmente improcedente conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia de esta Sala. Así, por lo expuesto, la acción debe rechazarse.

III. DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE

Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza de plano la acción. La Magistrada Hernández López salva el voto y ordena cursar la acción.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Alicia Salas T.

Voto salvado de la Magistrada Hernández López. Respetuosamente disiento del voto de mayoría porque el caso cumple con los requerimientos establecidos en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ya que tiene un juicio pendiente de resolución en el que lo impugnado puede tener incidencia. Señala la mayoría que el hecho de que el asunto base esté en apelación impide determinar si esta acción es un medio razonable de amparar los derechos o intereses que se estiman vulnerados por la normativa impugnada, dado que en primera instancia se dictó la caducidad del proceso y el recurso de apelación interpuesto contra esa decisión aún no ha sido admitido. Desde mi perspectiva es suficiente que el recurso de apelación esté planteado para servir de admisión para efectos de esta acción. Interpretar lo contrario es ir más allá de lo pretendido por el legislador, con una interpretación restrictiva que va en contra del acceso a la justicia del accionante.

Nancy Hernández López