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Res. 00948-2020 Sala Segunda de la Corte · Sala Segunda de la Corte · 29/05/2020
OutcomeResultado
The majority left the denial of the police-risk supplement intact and vacated the judgment only to exempt the park ranger from litigation costs, while a dissent would have awarded the supplement and its financial consequences except for vacation-pay differences.La mayoría mantuvo el rechazo del plus por riesgo policial y anuló la sentencia únicamente para exonerar al guardaparque del pago de las costas, mientras un voto salvado habría reconocido el plus y sus consecuencias económicas salvo las diferencias de vacaciones.
SummaryResumen
The Second Chamber decided an appeal brought by a SINAC park ranger who sought the 18% police-risk salary supplement because his duties included surveillance and protection of natural resources at the Barra del Colorado National Wildlife Refuge. The majority preserved the rejection of the salary claim and granted the appeal only as to litigation costs, vacating the order requiring the employee to pay them. It also rejected the procedural objections because the failure to receive witness testimony and the party’s statement had not been challenged at the proper time, and it found that the trial judgment was adequately reasoned. Justice Varela Araya dissented: she concluded that park rangers exercise police authority, face physical danger while confronting illegal hunting, fishing, and logging, and should receive the supplement under the principle of equal pay even if their positions are not formally classified as police posts. Her proposed disposition would also have awarded corresponding Christmas-bonus differences, interest, indexation, and employer contributions, but not vacation-pay differences.La Sala Segunda resolvió el recurso de un guardaparque del SINAC que reclamaba el plus salarial del 18 % por riesgo policial debido a sus labores de vigilancia y protección de recursos naturales en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado. La mayoría mantuvo el rechazo de la pretensión salarial y acogió el recurso únicamente respecto de las costas, anulando la condena impuesta al trabajador y exonerándolo de esos gastos. También descartó los reproches procesales porque la omisión de recibir la prueba testimonial y la declaración de parte no fue impugnada oportunamente, y concluyó que la sentencia de instancia estaba suficientemente fundamentada. La magistrada Varela Araya salvó el voto: consideró que los guardaparques ejercen autoridad policial, afrontan riesgos físicos al combatir caza, pesca y tala ilegales y, por igualdad salarial, deben recibir el plus aunque sus plazas no estén formalmente catalogadas como policiales. Su posición habría reconocido además aguinaldos, intereses, indexación y aportes patronales, pero no diferencias de vacaciones.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Consequently, the asserted ground of appeal cannot succeed because the alleged defect was not challenged at the proper time, as required. The appeal is partially granted. The judgment under review is vacated only insofar as it ordered the claimant to pay both categories of litigation costs. Instead, the claimant is exempted from those expenses. Justice Varela Araya dissents and would grant the appeal on the merits; she would vacate the challenged judgment, deny the defense of lack of entitlement except as to the claim for vacation-pay differences, which she would reject, and order the respondent to pay the claimant the risk salary supplement and the resulting differences in his Christmas bonuses accrued since April 20, 1998, for as long as he works as a park ranger. She would order the respondent to pay the corresponding statutory interest and indexation from the date each sum became due until full payment, and require payment of the differences in employer contributions resulting from recognition of the supplement to the Labor Capitalization Fund and Mandatory Pension Regime; she would direct that a copy of the ruling be sent to Social Security for action within its authority and would decide the matter without a special award of costs.En consecuencia, el agravio alegado no puede prosperar, porque no se reclamó oportunamente el vicio alegado, como correspondía. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso. Se anula la sentencia recurrida únicamente en cuanto condenó al actor al pago de ambas costas. En su lugar se exonera al accionante respecto a dichos gastos. La Magistrada Varela Araya salva el voto y declara con lugar el recurso por el fondo; anula la sentencia impugnada, deniega la excepción de falta de derecho excepto en cuanto al reclamo de diferencia de vacaciones, extremo que deniega; ordena a la parte accionada pagar al actor el plus salarial por riesgo y las diferencias que eso conlleva en sus aguinaldos devengados desde el veinte de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho y mientras labore como guarda parques. Condena a la parte accionada a cancelar los intereses legales e indexación correspondientes que se abonarán desde que cada una de las sumas era exigible hasta su efectiva satisfacción, y ordena a la demandada el pago de las diferencias en los aportes patronales que el reconocimiento del plus conlleva sobre las cuotas del Fondo de Capitalización Laboral y Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones; dispone el envío de copia del pronunciamiento a la Seguridad Social, para lo propio de su cargo y resuelve este asunto sin especial condena en costas.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El deber de fundamentar debidamente las resoluciones judiciales constituye una obligación consustancial a los derechos fundamentales del debido proceso y de defensa."
"The duty to provide adequate reasons for judicial decisions is an obligation inherent in the fundamental rights to due process and defense."
Considerando III
"El deber de fundamentar debidamente las resoluciones judiciales constituye una obligación consustancial a los derechos fundamentales del debido proceso y de defensa."
Considerando III
"El juez afirmó, que una vez valoradas las funciones enumeradas, no era factible otorgar el derecho, porque el actor no desempeña labores propiamente policiales, no está investido como servidor policial y su puesto de trabajo no presenta un riesgo inminente a su integridad."
"The judge held that, after assessing the listed duties, the benefit could not be awarded because the claimant did not perform strictly police functions, was not invested as a police officer, and his position did not pose an imminent risk to his physical integrity."
Considerando IV
"El juez afirmó, que una vez valoradas las funciones enumeradas, no era factible otorgar el derecho, porque el actor no desempeña labores propiamente policiales, no está investido como servidor policial y su puesto de trabajo no presenta un riesgo inminente a su integridad."
Considerando IV
"En consecuencia, se le ha de reconocer el plus por riesgo policial, con fundamento en el principio de igualdad salarial, de rango constitucional."
"Consequently, the police-risk supplement must be awarded to him on the basis of the constitutional principle of equal pay."
Voto salvado de la Magistrada Varela Araya
"En consecuencia, se le ha de reconocer el plus por riesgo policial, con fundamento en el principio de igualdad salarial, de rango constitucional."
Voto salvado de la Magistrada Varela Araya
"De esa línea jurisprudencial se colige, sin lugar a dudas, que solo se justificaría, en el caso concreto, un trato salarial distinto en el tema del plus que se reclama, si el actor, por el puesto y las responsabilidades legales que tiene, no se viera expuesto a riesgos a su integridad física."
"That line of precedent establishes beyond doubt that different salary treatment concerning the claimed supplement would be justified in this case only if the claimant, given his position and legal responsibilities, were not exposed to risks to his physical integrity."
Voto salvado de la Magistrada Varela Araya
"De esa línea jurisprudencial se colige, sin lugar a dudas, que solo se justificaría, en el caso concreto, un trato salarial distinto en el tema del plus que se reclama, si el actor, por el puesto y las responsabilidades legales que tiene, no se viera expuesto a riesgos a su integridad física."
Voto salvado de la Magistrada Varela Araya
Full documentDocumento completo
*180007410929LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia Res: 2020-000948 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at twelve noon on May twenty-nine, two thousand twenty.
Ordinary proceeding (proceso ordinario) brought before the Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica by [Nombre 001], single, a specialist in environmental protection and conservation-area management, residing in Limón, holder of identity card number [Valor 001], against the STATE, represented by its Deputy State Counsel, Attorney Olga Duarte Briones; and the SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, represented by its special judicial attorney-in-fact, Attorney Verny Avendaño Moya. Attorney Yerlin Sanabria Valladares acts as legal-aid counsel for the plaintiff; she is an attorney, and her other particulars are unknown. All are of legal age, married, and residents of San José, subject to the exceptions indicated; Justice Chacón Artavia authors the opinion; and,
WHEREAS:
By means of the complaint, the plaintiff stated that he works for the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE), specifically for the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), providing services as a park ranger at the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado in the Área de Conservación Tortuguero. He states that his duties involving risk are: 1. Safeguarding State assets; 2. Assisting with fuel-expense records; 3. Following up on police proceedings; 3. Control and protection. He explained that he has a weapons-carry permit for all these duties and has been required to respond to forest fires, including during the border dispute concerning Isla Calero, when the International Court of Justice in The Hague authorized only park rangers and SINAC-MINAE officials to enter in order to assess the damage in the area. He further noted that he responds to illegal fishing, logging, hunting, and drug-trafficking incidents (in which he coordinates with the Fuerza Pública and the Organismo de Investigación Judicial).
In the latter type of case, they must apprehend suspects and perform custodial duties. He asserted that, in wildlife offenses, it is common to encounter armed hunters whose weapons must be searched for, seized, and transferred to the Ministerio Público. He also contends that persons serving as park rangers are responsible for protecting flora and fauna, which constitute national heritage, and must verify that the public conforms its conduct to environmental laws and regulations. He requested that the State be ordered to pay the police-risk salary supplement (18% of base salary), together with the resulting differences in vacation pay and the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), as well as interest and indexation on the amounts owed. He also sought both categories of litigation costs (costas) and requested that the State be ordered to pay the amounts corresponding to the Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones and Fondo de Capitalización laboral arising from the resulting salary differences, and to notify the CCSS so that it could take the appropriate action (images 3 to 9 of the Trial Court record in PDF).
The State’s representative opposed the complaint and raised the affirmative defense of lack of legal entitlement (falta de derecho). She requested that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety and that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay both categories of litigation costs (images 249-259 of the Trial Court’s virtual record). The State and SINAC responded in their respective pleadings by opposing the claims and raising the affirmative defense of lack of legal entitlement (images 30 to 38 and 52 to 56, ibid.). The trial judge dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiff to pay both categories of litigation costs, setting attorney’s fees at 121.000 colones (images 87 to 97 of the Trial Court record in PDF).
Through his legal-aid counsel, the plaintiff expresses disagreement with the ruling issued by the lower court. As his first ground for appeal, he alleges that the judge failed to determine clearly and precisely the facts deemed proven and failed to provide reasons for the judgment. He argues that the ruling is deficient because it neither mentions nor analyzes all the evidence supporting the factual findings deemed proven in the judgment. He notes that the section on facts not proven states that the plaintiff failed to prove that he performed high-risk duties, without considering that this occurred because the judge did not hear the witnesses or the party testimony offered by the plaintiff in support thereof. He explained that the evidence was assessed erroneously because the third proven fact lists a series of duties (performing surveillance and protection work and ensuring the safety of the public at large) that themselves demonstrate permanent exposure to risk.
He explains that every person vested with police authority, as the plaintiff is, must receive the salary supplement because that person’s physical safety is placed at risk. In support of this argument, he lists activities that he says Mr. [Nombre 001] performs daily (for example, entering forested areas and confronting armed hunters, among others). He challenges the erroneous application of sections 54 of the Ley Forestal and 6 and 91 of the Ley General de Policía, from which it follows that park rangers are police officers. He clarifies that, although different laws govern the various police forces, compensation must be equitable when employees risk their lives in performing their positions, which is a working condition they share. He asserts that the “high-risk payment is guaranteed on account of the duties actively performed by the officials who receive it, and not merely because of their physical exposure.” He reiterates that the principle of equal pay has been violated and mentions that this Chamber has granted that supplement in factual circumstances in which, despite the absence of an express rule, it has recognized the supplement under that principle of equality.
He also challenges the award of litigation costs. He states that this case concerns a person of limited means who has litigated in evident good faith and that, pursuant to Article 563 of the Código de Trabajo, if the ruling is upheld, he must be relieved from paying litigation costs. He argues that the plaintiff was consistent and precise, and that his purpose was to improve his salary, to which he believes he is entitled because of the imminent risk to which he is subjected in his daily duties. He requested that the appeal be granted, that the challenged judgment be vacated, and that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff, or, alternatively, that the matter be resolved without any special award of litigation costs.
Article 587 of the amended Labor Code governs the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) on procedural grounds in the following terms: “An appeal shall be admissible on procedural grounds when it alleges:/1.- Any of the defects for which nullity of proceedings (nulidad de actuaciones) is warranted, provided that such defects were alleged during one of the preceding stages of the proceedings and the claim was denied./2.- Inconsistency in the judgment (incongruencia de la sentencia) or absolute obscurity of its latter part. In cases of inconsistency, the appeal shall be admissible only when the procedure for supplementation or clarification (adición o aclaración) has been exhausted./3.- Failure to determine clearly and precisely the facts established by the court./4.- The judgment having been based on unlawful evidence or evidence unlawfully introduced into the proceedings./5.- Lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning in the judgment./6.- The judgment having been issued outside the prescribed time period.” The first circumstance must be read in conjunction with Article 471 of that same body of law, a provision that specifically addresses nullity (nulidad), as follows: “Nullity shall apply:/(…) 9) When access to justice or the right of defense has in any way been impeded, or when due process has been violated.
(…)” (emphasis added). As indicated, the appeal states that, to prove the facts alleged in the complaint, the following evidence was offered: the testimony of a party (declaración de parte) and the testimony of three witnesses ([Nombre 004], [Nombre 005] and [Nombre 006]). However, by ruling issued at fifteen hours and eleven minutes on diecisiete de agosto de dos mil diecinueve, the complaint was deemed answered, the evidence offered by the opposing party was admitted, and the parties were granted three days to submit closing arguments, on the grounds that the matter involved questions of law only (numeral 511 ibid.)—see image 64 of the trial court record in PDF format. It could be said that, because of that fact, the plaintiff is entitled to appeal the judgment on procedural grounds, since he was left without an adequate defense, thereby violating judicial due process, and thus the matter would fall within the circumstance provided for in subsection 1 of numeral 587, in conjunction with subsection 9 of Article 471, both of the Labor Code.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that, for the objection to be admissible, the claim had to have been raised in a timely manner and denied; that did not occur in this case. It should be noted that, in the plaintiff’s next procedural submission, he acquiesced and limited his filing to providing the requested closing arguments, since he did not object to the judge’s omission (see images 77 to 31 of the record). Consequently, the alleged ground of grievance cannot succeed because the claimed defect was not challenged in a timely manner, as required. The plaintiff also objects to an alleged lack of reasoning in the judgment. In this regard, subsection 5 of Article 587, cited above, recognizes the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning in the judgment as grounds for cassation on procedural grounds. The duty to provide proper reasons for judicial decisions is an obligation inherent in the fundamental rights to due process and a defense.
Setting out the reasons that led the adjudicating judge to adopt one decision or another is what enables the parties to review the ruling through the procedural mechanisms established for that purpose. On this matter, this Chamber has stated: “The reasoning of the judgment is the intellectual work performed by the judge to justify the decision adopted concerning the matter submitted for adjudication. To that end, the legal decision-maker must state the factual and legal grounds supporting the position taken, since otherwise the decision will be arbitrary. The foregoing is not merely a formal requirement of the judgment, but rather a requirement derived from the principle of due process, because through the statement of reasons for the ruling, both plaintiff and defendant may avail themselves of the ordinary remedies granted by law in order to exercise oversight over judicial authority” (Second Chamber, judgment n° 181 at 9:45 on 5 de febrero de 2010).
Accordingly, Articles 421 and 560 of the Labor Code expressly establish the obligation to provide reasons for decisions. The latter provides that the reasoning section of the judgment shall state “…the evidence supporting the conclusion, the reasons supporting it, and the assessment criteria applied, for which purpose the analysis of the various items of evidence presented must be placed on the record through a detailed and exhaustive explanation of each of them… the factual, legal, doctrinal, and jurisprudential reasons shall be provided, and the merits or lack of merit of the propositions shall be assessed... It is essential to cite the legal provisions serving as the basis for the conclusions concerning the merits or lack of merit of the claims or defenses raised.” Having analyzed the challenged judgment, the Chamber notes that the Court did set forth the legal and factual reasons on which it based its decision.
The plaintiff’s arguments regarding this issue actually constitute substantive objections based on the alleged erroneous application of the legal system (Articles 6 and 91 of the General Police Act, 54 of the Ley Forestal, and the principle of equality and nondiscrimination), because, in his view, the third established fact shows that he performs hazardous duties compensated by the “police risk” salary supplement.
The plaintiff challenges the denial of the police-risk supplement, even though the third proven fact established that, as part of his duties, the claimant could and was required to: “1- Conduct inspections, prepare and record the activities carried out, prepare reports concerning inspection results, perform preventive maintenance on boats, engines, etc.; all as set forth in official letter ACTo-GASP-102 of 21 de octubre del 2009. More recently, his duties have included: 2- Performing surveillance work within the facilities, carrying out activities to protect natural resources, safeguarding security and the general public, reporting irregularities, coordinating and supervising the activities of a group of coworkers, instructing members of the public who visit the facilities, conducting field trips, filing complaints, attending trials, among other duties set forth in official letter SINAC-SE-DGIRH-734 of 25 de junio del 2018, shown in image 46; in addition to those already indicated, he also performs duties such as: 3- Providing information on the location of buildings and offices and instructing members of the public who visit the facilities, as set forth in official letter SINAC-SE-DGIRH-314 (…) ”.
The judge stated that, after assessing the listed duties, granting the entitlement was not warranted because the plaintiff does not perform strictly police duties, is not vested with authority as a police officer, and his position does not pose an imminent risk to his physical integrity (see the trial judgment in images 87 to 97). Section 91 of the Ley General de Policía, n.° 7410 of 26 de mayo de 1994 (added by Article 3 of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Civilista, n.° 8096 of 15 de marzo de 2001; and renumbered pursuant to section 1 of the Ley de Creación de la Policía Escolar y de la Niñez, n.° 8449 of 14 de junio de 2005, which moved it from former section 85 to current section 91), provides: “An incentive known as police risk is hereby created, consisting of a salary supplement equivalent to eighteen percent of base salary; it shall be payable to all officials who perform police duties involving a risk to their physical integrity, regardless of their placement within the administrative structure (the preceding paragraph having been amended in accordance with the partial annulment ordered by judgment of the Sala Constitucional n.° 12017 of 16 de agosto de 2006).
The granting of this salary incentive must be substantiated in each specific case by stating the reasons why the corresponding employee’s duties fall within the defined hazardousness criterion.” Through Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 29597 of 5 de junio de 2001, the “Reglamento para el pago del riesgo policial” was promulgated, section 1 of which states: “The salary supplement known as ‘Police Risk’ is payable solely and exclusively to ‘police officers,’ by virtue of their performance of the ‘police duties’ assigned to them based on the authority vested in them and the appointment, position, and office they hold as members of the Fuerza Pública, where the performance of those duties entails an imminent risk to their physical integrity because of the hazardous nature of police work. By means of a reasoned decision, the hazardous circumstances posing a risk to the officer’s physical integrity shall be explained in each specific case, regardless of the officer’s placement within the Ministry’s administrative structure; compliance with the conditions detailed in this regulation must also be verified.” Article 2, in turn, states: “‘Police officer’ means a person appointed to a police-service position in one of the police forces whose jurisdiction is established by law, to serve the State in the exercise of police duties, for which purpose the person is vested with public authority in accordance with the Constitución Política and the law.
Accordingly, for a person to be a police officer, all of the following conditions must be met: a) Authority vested by the Presidente de la República and the relevant Minister through an Executive Agreement. b) The taking of the constitutional oath to perform and exercise the office of public authority. c) Appointment to a police-service position in one of the Police Forces comprising the Fuerza Pública, whose jurisdiction is established by law. The appointment must comply with the law and with the recruitment, selection, and appointment requirements and procedures established in the legislation governing the service relationship and police duties. d) Performance of police duties in the strict sense.” Section 3 then states: “‘Police duties,’ without prejudice to the provisions of other higher-ranking rules, means duties falling within the general categories of defense of national sovereignty, maintenance of public order, surveillance, and public safety.
These therefore include the duties performed by an official vested with authority to guarantee national security, the security of persons and property, physical integrity and respect for citizens’ rights and freedoms, the maintenance of public order and tranquility, the prevention and suppression of crime, and the enforcement of decisions by judicial and administrative bodies; for which purpose the official is vested with public authority and empowered lawfully to conduct searches, seizures, and arrests in accordance with the Constitución Política and the law.” In its recitals, the regulation under discussion provides a historical account of the police-risk supplement, which it is considered appropriate to reproduce:
“Recitals:
I.Whereas budget provision N° 46 of Ley N° 7040 of 25 de abril de 1986 created an additional salary payment known as ‘Police Risk’ in the amount of ¢1.000,00 for officials of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública and Gobernación y Policía, regardless of the duties performed. Following that provision, the additional salary payment continued to be included repeatedly in the laws governing the Republic’s Ordinary and Extraordinary, Fiscal, and Program-Based Budgets for the fiscal years: 1987 in Ley N° 7055 of 11 de diciembre de 1986; 1988 in Ley N° 7089 of 4 de diciembre de 1987; 1989 in Ley N° 7111 of 24 de noviembre de 1988; 1990 in Ley N° 7141 of 13 de diciembre de 1989; and 1991 in Ley N° 7216 of 19 de diciembre de 1990. II.-Whereas subsequently, budget provision N° 20 of Ley N° 7272 of 18 de diciembre de 1991 ordered an increase in the benefit in question, but solely for employees of Seguridad Pública and Gobernación y Policía who were in ‘active service,’ excluding ‘officials who perform administrative duties’; the provision was implemented on those terms through Article 2 of Decreto Nº 21276-G-SP-H of 7 de mayo de 1992, increasing the additional salary payment to ¢2.800,00.
Subsequently, through budget provisions 40 and 49 of Ley Nº 7306 of 15 de julio de 1992, that benefit was extended to other police forces, with the stipulation that ‘officials in these programs who perform administrative duties shall not be included,’ and the amount was increased to ¢3.200,00 ‘solely for those officials who are in active service.’ III.-Whereas through Ley General de Policía Nº 7410, of 26 de mayo de 1994, payment for police risk was included as one of the benefits previously granted by law to members of the Fuerza Pública. V.-Whereas through Ley Nº 8096, of 15 de marzo de 2001, published in La Gaceta Nº 59 of 23 de marzo de 2001, Ley Nº 7410 ‘Ley General de Policía’ was amended by adding Article 85, following renumbering, which provided: ‘Article 85.-Police Risk. An incentive known as police risk is hereby created, consisting of a salary supplement equivalent to eighteen percent (18%) of base salary; it shall be payable to all officials of the ministerios de Gobernación y Policía y Seguridad Pública who perform police duties involving a risk to their physical integrity, regardless of their placement within that Ministry’s administrative structure.
The granting of this salary incentive must be substantiated in each specific case by stating the reasons why the corresponding employee’s duties fall within the defined hazardousness criterion.’” The Procuraduría General de la República, in opinion n.° 213-2009, explained: “(…) Ley N° 7040 of 25 de abril de 1986 provided for the incentive known as ‘Police Risk’ for the first time in Article 46. Article 46 states as follows: ‘The Ministerio de Hacienda shall include in the next extraordinary budget the corresponding appropriation to provide employees of the Guardia Civil and the Guardia de Asistencia Rural with a payment of ¢1.000 per month for Police Risk’ (…). The quotation transcribed above clearly shows that the legal procedure used to regulate police risk was not the most appropriate, because it was governed by budgetary provisions. The legislature sought to remedy this situation through Article 3 of Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Civilista N° 8096 of 15 de marzo del 2001, addressing the irregular manner in which the supplement or additional salary payment known as police risk had been governed; for that reason, Article 85 (currently 91) was added to Chapter IX of Ley de General de Policía N° 7410, thereby regulating the supplement through an ordinary statute.” In conclusion, the police-risk supplement was not created in 2001; it had already existed before then.
In a related vein, it is useful to cite the definitions of “public force” and “police duties” developed by the Sala Constitucional in decision n.° 4368-2003: “Regarding the general role of the various police forces, Article 12 of the Constitution provides that the police forces necessary for the surveillance and preservation of public order shall exist; this refers to the primary duty of the Fuerza Pública, namely maintaining public order generally and safeguarding the security of the inhabitants. This Sala has likewise held as much in, among many others, judgments numbers 1588-91, 5882-93 and 884-98. Specifically, the following was stated on this point: ‘We may define the concept of Fuerza Pública as the body of security forces—and their officers—which, under the authority of the Poder Ejecutivo, is intended to maintain public order and safeguard the security of the inhabitants, performing primarily preventive and occasionally enforcement-related duties.
By constitutional provision—and surely for historical reasons, since, as the sole armed body, it held the power attendant upon the possession and use of weapons—the Constitution not only vests supreme command over it in the Poder Ejecutivo but also, for the obvious reason that its officials must be absolutely loyal, establishes as an authority of the Presidente and the respective Minister the appointment and removal of the members comprising that Fuerza Pública (…).
Thus, it is a proper function of the public security force (fuerza pública) to maintain public order in general and safeguard the security of the inhabitants, a task in which it performs a primarily preventive function.” Furthermore, with regard to the governing body (órgano rector) of the police forces, Article 140 of the Constitution, in subsections 1), 6), and 16), establishes that the President of the Republic and the respective Minister of Government are responsible for freely appointing and removing members of the public security force, maintaining the order and tranquility of the Nation, taking the necessary measures to safeguard public liberties, and deploying the public security force to preserve the order, defense, and security of the country; and subsection 3) of Article 139 thereof states that the person exercising the Presidency of the Republic has exclusive responsibility for exercising supreme command over the public security force.
The system established by our Political Constitution to preserve the order and tranquility, defense, and security of the country places concentrated responsibility upon the Executive Branch, under the exclusive command of the President of the Republic (decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, numbers 10134-99, de las once horas del veintitrés de diciembre mil novecientos noventa y nueve; and 1049-01, de las dieciséis horas con treinta minutos del seis de febrero del dos mil uno). It is also relevant to refer to the concept of the police function (función policial), which is drawn from Article 6 of the Ley General de Policía, which includes among the police forces (fuerzas de Policía) responsible for public security the following: the Guardia Civil, the Guardia de Asistencia Rural, the police responsible for controlling unauthorized drugs and related activities; the Policía de Fronteras, the Policía de Migración y Extranjería, the Policía del Control Fiscal, the Dirección de Seguridad del Estado, the Policía de Tránsito, the Policía Penitenciaria, and any other police forces whose jurisdiction (competencia) is established by law.
Pursuant to Article 2 thereof, members of the police forces are public officials (funcionarios públicos) required to observe and comply with the Political Constitution, international treaties, and the laws in force; their duties under provision 4 include monitoring, maintaining public order, preventing manifestations of criminal activity, and cooperating in their suppression in the manner prescribed by the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico). In accordance with the foregoing, and also on the basis of provisions 10, 44, 45, 47, 52, 59, 69, and 70 of the Ley General de Policía, all members of all police forces of the Executive Branch are subject to all the mandates with which the Administrative Police (Policía Administrativa) must comply in a Republic, as well as entitled to all the rights accruing to them as public servants in the various administrative departments.” It must therefore be determined, in light of the articles set forth and the duties performed by the claimant, whether the alleged violation of substantive rules (normas sustanciales) occurred or whether, to the contrary, within the applicable legal and case-law parameters, the decision denying him recognition of the requested salary supplement (plus salarial) must be upheld.
In this regard, the following laws governing several of the duties performed by park rangers should be mentioned: a) Ley Forestal, n.° 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996, provision 54: “Officials of the Administración Forestal del Estado shall have the status of police authorities (autoridad de policía) and, as such and in accordance with this law, shall report any violations committed to the competent authorities. The police authorities shall be required to assist officials of the Administración Forestal del Estado whenever those officials request such assistance in order to fully perform the functions and duties imposed upon them by this law. In exercising their powers, these officials, identified by their respective credentials, shall have the right to travel through and conduct inspections on any rural property or industrial forestry facility, except for dwellings located thereon; they may also seize timber and other forest products unlawfully harvested or processed and impound, as security for a potential penalty, the equipment and machinery used in the unlawful act.
They shall also seize any means of transportation used as an instrument or facilitator in the commission of the offense, after drawing up the corresponding record. All of the foregoing shall be placed at the disposal of the competent judicial authority within no more than three days.” b) Ley del Servicio de Parques Nacionales, n.° 6084 del 24 de agosto de 1977, provision 9: “Any person who contravenes the provisions of Article eight shall be immediately expelled from the National Park and placed at the disposal of the corresponding judicial authorities by employees of the Servicio de Parques Nacionales, who shall have the status of police authorities for that purpose.” c) Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, n.° 7317 del 30 de octubre de 1992, mandate 16: “For the faithful performance of the obligations established in this law, wildlife inspectors, forestry inspectors, park rangers, and Sinac officials duly accredited for those purposes, while performing their duties, are authorized to stop persons, travel through, enter, and conduct inspections within any property or vessel, as well as within the industrial and commercial facilities involved, and to seize wildlife organisms, parts, products, and derivatives, together with the equipment used in the commission of an offense or activity prohibited by this law.
In the case of private residences, permission must be obtained from the competent judicial authority or the owner.” It may be inferred from the foregoing that, although it is provided that the officials shall have the status of police authorities, this status is limited to reporting and giving notice of the respective violations to the competent authorities. Their duties are even said to include inspections, detentions, seizures, and the impoundment of equipment and machinery, but it is emphasized that everything must be placed at the disposal of the competent judicial authority. In other words, their obligations are merely collaborative. This assertion is supported by the third proven fact (hecho probado) cited by the claimant, which establishes the daily duties of Mr. [Nombre 001] as follows: “conduct inspections, prepare and record the activities carried out, prepare reports concerning the results of inspections, perform preventive maintenance on boats, engines, etc.; all as set forth in official letter (…) 2-Perform monitoring duties within the facilities, carry out duties to protect natural resources, safeguard security and the public in general, report irregularities, coordinate and supervise the activities of a group of colleagues, instruct members of the public visiting the facilities, conduct field visits, file complaints, attend trials (…) 3-Provide information on the location of buildings and offices, instruct members of the public visiting the facilities (…).” All of the claimant’s duties are consistent with those established in the provisions cited above.
Consequently, the supplement created to compensate for the risks faced by members of police forces cannot be applied to the work performed by the claimant as a park ranger, because, unlike the claimant, the former are responsible, as part of their daily duties, for guaranteeing national security—not only the security of property but also that of persons; ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms of all citizens by maintaining public order and tranquility; preventing and suppressing crime; and enforcing the decisions of judicial and administrative bodies. It is therefore clear that, when the claimant’s duties established in the record are compared with those specified for members of police forces, there can be no doubt that the latter are directly exposed to dangerous or risky situations arising from the duties performed that threaten their physical integrity. It should also be noted that the law clearly specifies that payment of the supplement is warranted only when an employee who is a member of a police force with legal jurisdiction performs police duties that place his or her physical integrity or life at risk, a situation in which the claimant clearly does not find himself.
Furthermore, regarding the principle of equality (principio de igualdad), decision n.° 4368-2003 of the Sala Constitucional held: “Then, specifically with respect to the principle of equality, it is important to recall what the Corte Plena stated when it served as the constitutional court: ‘The Principle of Equality before the law is violated only if a law, without justification, treats differently persons who are in the same situation; that is, the rules must be the same for the same category of persons.’ (Sesión extraordinaria del once de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y tres). Likewise, at the sesión extraordinaria del veintiocho de junio de mil novecientos ochenta y cuatro, it held: ‘Equality before the law means not only equal treatment under equal conditions, since applying the same measure under different conditions would be contrary to this principle. It must be emphasized, however, that not every difference constitutes a legitimate ground for establishing different treatment, much less without any restriction, because the difference may relate to irrelevant aspects that do not affect the substance of the case; moreover, a constitutional violation could also arise from excess, that is, when exorbitant measures are adopted in relation to the differences that might justify some form of different treatment.’ These concepts served as the basis for the subsequent case-law development by this Constitutional Court regarding the principle in question, which is enshrined both in domestic law (specifically in Article 33 of the Political Constitution) and in International Law (in the various international human-rights instruments in force in our country).
Two key ideas have emerged in connection with this principle: first, that it entails equal treatment of equals and unequal treatment of those who are unequal (see judgments numbers 7182-94, 1474-93, 5972-94, and 6097-94); and second, that the Constitution permits different situations to be established for persons who are unequal, provided that those distinctions are reasonable and proportionate. Thus, subsequent judgments have stated: ‘The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Political Constitution does not mean that equal treatment must be afforded in every case regardless of any potentially relevant legal distinctions that may exist; in other words, not every inequality necessarily constitutes discrimination. Equality, as this Chamber has stated, is violated only when unequal treatment lacks an objective and reasonable justification. Furthermore, the justification for the act regarded as unequal must be assessed in relation to its purpose and effects, such that there must necessarily be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose itself.
That is, equality (igualdad) must be understood in light of the circumstances arising in each specific case in which it is invoked, such that universal application does not preclude different solutions and different treatment for different situations. All of the foregoing means that equality before the law (igualdad ante la ley) cannot imply material equality or genuine and effective economic equality.” (Sentencias números 1770-94, de las nueve horas dieciocho minutos del quince de abril de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, y 1045-94 de las once horas cincuenta y un minutos del dieciocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro)”. Regarding the principle of equal pay (principio de igualdad salarial), in voto n.° 12017-2006, the body responsible for constitutional review stated: “Regarding the principle of equal pay, and following the position set forth in the judgment quoted in part above, the Court has held that establishing pay differentials is not discriminatory, provided that such different treatment has a reasonable basis—that is, that it reflects particular and objective circumstances that justify it.
Thus, in sentencia 1997-1320 de las 14:54 horas del cuatro de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y siete, the Chamber stated: “It is evident that the constitutional articles alleged to have been infringed (33, 57, 68 y 74) reflect a clear purpose that, in matters of remuneration, the various occupational activities receive balanced and fair treatment, whether or not they are professional in nature. This Chamber has reiterated this principle in its various rulings. However, as has also been explained, such balanced treatment assumes—as in any other case involving a dispute over equality—that the differences among the various activities will be recognized, so that activities that are different are not treated as equal and activities that are equal are not treated differently, thereby avoiding improper privileges resulting from overvaluing some activities or injustices resulting from undervaluing others.” Along these lines, this Chamber considers that the enshrined principle of equality has not been violated by the failure to grant the claimant the police-risk pay supplement (plus salarial por riesgo policial), because he does not fall within the factual circumstances required to qualify for the benefit he claims.
Legal equality (igualdad jurídica), as established in the constitutional provision, entails equal treatment under identical conditions; the claimant is not in the same position as those who benefited from increases in the pay supplement. Consequently, this principle is not violated by treating differently situations that are, by their nature, different, and such treatment therefore constitutes neither discrimination nor a breach of the constitutional principle of equality. See, to the same effect, voto de esta Sala n.° 170 de las 11:10 horas del 12 de marzo de 2004. The supplement is provided by law for those who perform police duties—that is, police officers. Park rangers perform duties that may be similar in many respects, and there is no doubt that they also face danger, as police officers do, but they are not police officers.
The appellant (recurrente) requests that the award of costs against the plaintiff (actor) be reversed because he acted in evident good faith (buena fe). In labor matters, costs are governed by Articles 562 and 563 of the current Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Under those provisions, the rule is to order the losing party (vencido) in the litigation to pay both categories of litigation costs. However, pursuant to the aforementioned Article 563, a person falling within any of the circumstances specified therein may be exempted from paying those expenses, namely: when the losing party litigated in evident good faith; when the claims were partially successful; or when there was reciprocal defeat (vencimiento recíproco). It follows from the foregoing that an award of costs is the rule and the contrary situation is the exception; therefore, such circumstances must be clearly apparent from the case record (autos) for the exception to apply, in addition to the fact that granting the exemption is within the judge’s discretion and is not an obligation.
In this case, the trial judge dismissed the action brought by the claimant (accionante); nevertheless, although he was unsuccessful on every item of relief sought, there are no grounds for considering him a bad-faith litigant. In the case at hand, it appears that the plaintiff could reasonably have believed that he was entitled to the right asserted, since the matter involves merely an analysis of the rules applicable to the case. He could therefore have believed that he was entitled to the right asserted, which permits him to be regarded as a good-faith litigant and exempted from paying those expenses, as requested in the appeal.
As a corollary to the foregoing, the appeal should be granted in part and the judgment vacated solely insofar as it ordered the plaintiff to pay both categories of costs; in its place, the matter shall be resolved without any specific award as to those expenses.
The undersigned Justice dissents from the majority opinion for the reasons set forth below. There are laws governing several of the law-enforcement duties performed by park rangers and even recognizing them as police authorities (autoridades de policía): A) Ley Forestal, n.° 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996, provision 54: “Officials of the State Forestry Administration shall have the status of police authorities and, as such and in accordance with this Law, shall report violations committed to the competent authorities. The police authorities shall be required to cooperate with officials of the State Forestry Administration whenever those officials request such cooperation in order to fully perform the functions and duties imposed upon them by this Law. In the performance of their duties, these officials, upon presentation of their respective identification cards, shall have the right to enter and conduct inspections on any rural property or forestry-industry premises, except for dwellings located thereon; they may also confiscate (decomisar) timber and other forest products unlawfully harvested or processed and seize as security (secuestrar en garantía), pending a possible penalty, the equipment and machinery used in the unlawful act.
They shall also confiscate any means of transportation used as an instrument or facilitator in the commission of the offense, after preparing the corresponding official record (acta). All of the foregoing shall be placed at the disposal of the competent judicial authority within a period not exceeding three days.” B) Ley del Servicio de Parques Nacionales, n.° 6084 del 24 de agosto de 1977, in provisions 8 and 9, insofar as relevant to the resolution of this case, respectively, state: “...2) To hunt or capture wild animals, or collect or remove any of their products or remains... 8) To carry firearms, harpoons, or any other instrument that may be used for hunting... 11) To cause any type of environmental pollution. 12) To remove stones, sand, gravel, or similar products...” “ARTICLE 9°.- Any person who violates the provisions of Article eight shall be immediately expelled from the National Park and placed at the disposal of the corresponding judicial authorities by employees of the National Parks Service, who, for such purpose, shall have the status of police authorities.” (Emphasis added by the author of this opinion). C) Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, n.° 7317 del 30 de octubre de 1992, provision 16:
“To ensure faithful compliance with the obligations established in this Law, wildlife inspectors, forestry inspectors, park rangers, and SINAC officials duly accredited for such purposes are, in the performance of their duties, empowered to detain persons, travel through and enter any property or vessel, and conduct inspections therein, as well as in the industrial and commercial facilities involved; they are also empowered to confiscate wildlife organisms, parts, products, and derivatives, together with the equipment used in the commission of an offense or an activity prohibited by this Law. In the case of private residences, authorization from the competent judicial authority or the owner shall be required.” It follows with complete clarity from the foregoing that park rangers perform law-enforcement duties, such as detaining persons, conducting inspections, confiscating property, carrying out evictions (desalojar), patrolling, and responding to complaints, for which they have the status of police authorities.
By that fact alone, they are exposed to risks to their physical safety; therefore, although their positions are not classified as police positions, this does not exempt them from the aforementioned risks, because they must confront persons caught committing crimes within national parks by engaging in conduct defined by law as criminal. That fact alone, together with their authority and obligation to detain such persons when caught in the commission of an offense and to confiscate products removed from a national park, is inherently dangerous and places them in the very real position of risking even their lives, since they may confront persons carrying weapons for the purpose of committing crimes. No other conclusion can therefore be reached. Accordingly, this case requires an analysis of the legal circumstances governing park rangers’ duties, rather than an inquiry into whether they have submitted testimonial evidence to demonstrate the risks they face, because the laws governing their work, in and of themselves, place them at risk. They should therefore not be treated differently from those holding positions formally classified as police positions.
The undersigned judge considers that, although article 91 of the Ley General de Policía intended the police-risk differential (complemento por riesgo policial) for officials who perform law-enforcement duties entailing a risk to their physical safety, it must be taken into account that the provision requires constant or permanent exposure to risk. The work of park rangers is so dangerous that there is a legislative initiative, expediente N° 16626, intended to enact a law called “Ley de Justicia Salarial para los Guardaparques del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) y Operativización del Fideicomiso de Áreas Silvestres Protegidas,” based on the view that police risk means the danger to which an official of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía who works in the prevention, control, and protection of natural resources, in the capacity of a police authority, is exposed. Although it is only a bill and, by virtue of that status, is not binding on judges deciding these cases, it is nevertheless true that this initiative recognizes and seeks to protect against the reality of the risk to which park rangers are exposed every day because of the nature of their duties.
The fact that their positions are not within the police category is not determinative for denying the differential claimed in this proceeding, because that fact does not exempt them from the risks imposed by the rules governing them, which classify them as police authorities by reason of the duties they must perform.
For those reasons, the undersigned considers that park rangers must receive equal compensation with respect to the police-risk differential (plus de riesgo policial), since the essential feature common to both categories of positions is the risk to physical safety. Indeed, park rangers may face an even greater risk because they must confront individual or organized crime—poachers, among other criminal phenomena—and even conduct searches of homes (allanamientos), subject to prior authorization from criminal judges. These statutory requirements are sufficient to establish that their situation may entail a greater degree of danger than that faced by ordinary police officers in other police forces existing within our system. In the case of park rangers, the assets they must protect are not people, but that does not make those assets any less important to the country, to the extent that laws have been enacted and infrastructure established to enforce them, all for the purpose of safeguarding assets of interest to the community as a whole, such as marine, wildlife, and forest resources.
Those resources are threatened by the individual or collective actions of persons willing to commit crimes, who create an imminent risk because of the reaction that may be expected when they are discovered and detained by park rangers, who are required to carry out the arrests and subsequently deliver the offenders to other authorities for the processing of the applicable criminal penalties.
Based on the foregoing reasons, and because this judge considers that the claimant’s position as a park ranger has duties classified within the police category, as is evident from the rules cited above, he does meet the requirement of exposure to risk to his physical safety in the performance of his position—an actual risk (riesgo cierto)—and is therefore entitled to receive the differential known as “police risk” (riesgo policial). It is not the classification of the position that justifies and is intended to be compensated by that differential, but rather the actual exposure to harm to one’s physical safety while fulfilling the duties associated with the assigned position. Thus, in my view, the claimant falls within the conditions established by the rule created to compensate, through that differential, all officials of police forces who, as stated, are exposed to injury while combating crime—without the nature of the asset they protect being determinative of the rule’s application—because he performs law-enforcement duties consisting of safeguarding the nation’s assets, specifically natural resources in their many forms found in national parks.
In performing those duties, park rangers place their physical safety at risk because they are the only persons vested with such police authority within national protected areas, where, as previously indicated, their work brings them into confrontation with various forms of crime—illegal hunting, fishing, and logging—as well as violations of the wildlife law and other hazardous unlawful activities. Consequently, he must be granted the police-risk differential on the basis of the constitutional principle of equal pay (principio de igualdad salarial).
It should be added that resolution n.° 4368-2003 of the Sala Constitucional referred to the principle of equality (principio de igualdad) in the following terms: “...with regard to the principle of equality, it is important to recall what the Corte Plena stated when it served as the constitutional court: ‘The principle of equality before the law is violated only when a law, without justified cause, accords different treatment to persons in the same situation; that is, the rules must be the same for the same category of persons.’ (Sesión extraordinaria del once de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y tres). Likewise, in sesión extraordinaria del veintiocho de junio de mil novecientos ochenta y cuatro, it held: ‘Equality before the law means not only equal treatment under equal conditions, because applying the same measure under different conditions would be contrary to this principle. It must be emphasized, however, that not every difference constitutes a legitimate basis for establishing different treatment, much less without any restriction, because the difference may concern irrelevant aspects that do not affect the essence of the case.
Moreover, a constitutional violation may also result from excess, that is, when measures are adopted that are disproportionate to the differences that might justify some form of different treatment.’ These concepts provided the basis for the subsequent case law developed by this Constitutional Court concerning the principle at issue, which is enshrined both in domestic law—specifically in article 33 of the Constitución Política—and in International Law, through the various international human-rights instruments in force in our country. Two key ideas have emerged in relation to this principle: first, that it entails equal treatment of equals and unequal treatment of those who are unequal (see judgments numbers 7182-94, 1474-93, 5972-94 and 6097-94); and second, that the Constitution permits differentiated situations to be established for persons who are unequal, provided that such distinctions are reasonable and proportionate.
Thus, subsequent judgments have stated: “The principle of equality (principio de igualdad), enshrined in Article 33 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), means that equal treatment must be afforded in all cases, notwithstanding any legally relevant differentiating factors that may exist; in other words, not every inequality necessarily constitutes discrimination. As this Chamber has held, equality is violated only when the inequality lacks an objective and reasonable justification. Moreover, the justification for the act deemed unequal must be evaluated in relation to its purpose and effects, such that there must necessarily be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose itself. That is, equality must be understood in light of the circumstances present in each specific case in which it is invoked, so that its universal application does not preclude different solutions for different situations, with differing treatment.
All of the foregoing means that equality before the law cannot imply substantive equality or actual and effective economic equality.” (Judgments numbers 1770-94, at nueve horas dieciocho minutos del quince de abril de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, and 1045-94, at once horas cincuenta y un minutos del dieciocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro)” (Emphasis not in the original). Regarding the principle of equal pay (principio de igualdad salarial), in judgment no. 12017-2006, the constitutional review body stated: “With respect to the principle of equal pay, and following the position set forth in the judgment partially transcribed above, the Court has held that establishing wage differentials is not discriminatory, provided that such different treatment has a reasonable basis—that is, that it is based on particular, objective circumstances that justify it. Thus, in judgment 1997-1320, at 14:54 horas del cuatro de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y siete, the Chamber stated: ‘It is evident that a clear intention can be inferred from the constitutional articles alleged to have been violated (33, 57, 68 and 74): that, in wage matters, the various types of work receive balanced and fair treatment, regardless of whether they are professional in nature.
This Chamber has reiterated this in its various rulings. However, as has also been explained, such balanced treatment requires—as in any other case involving an equality dispute—that the differences among the various activities be recognized, so that dissimilar activities are not treated as equivalent and equivalent activities are not treated differently, thereby avoiding improper privileges resulting from overvaluing some or injustices resulting from undervaluing others.’” (Emphasis not in the original). It follows unequivocally from this line of case law that, in this specific case, different wage treatment concerning the premium (plus) being claimed would be justified only if the claimant, by virtue of his position and legal responsibilities, were not exposed to risks to his physical integrity, since that was the fundamental basis on which the legislature created that premium and which, to prevent interpretations adverse to park rangers merely because their positions are not formally classified as police positions, the aforementioned legislative proposal seeks to regulate.
Accordingly, the undersigned considers it appropriate to grant the appeal and uphold the claim, ordering the State to pay the claimant the police-risk premium (plus por riesgo policial) and the differences resulting from the salary increase solely with respect to the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), but not vacation pay, because differences in vacation pay are awarded only when the claimant has been paid some amount under that heading as compensation, and this was not established in the record. It is also appropriate to award indexation (indexación) and statutory interest (intereses legales), under the terms set forth in section 565 of the Código de Trabajo, from the date each sum became due until it is actually paid; to order the defendant to pay the differences in employer contributions resulting from recognition of the premium with respect to the contributions to the Fondo de Capitalización Laboral and Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones; and to provide the Seguridad Social with a copy of the ruling so that it may take the appropriate action within its remit.
The matter must be decided without a special award of costs (especial condena en costas), because the co-defendants are deemed to have litigated in evident good faith, as the issue of whether park rangers are entitled to receive the premium for the risks they face in performing the legal duties inherent in their positions is open to reasonable debate.
POR TANTO:
The appeal (recurso) is partially granted. The judgment under appeal (sentencia recurrida) is vacated solely insofar as it ordered the claimant to pay both sets of legal costs (costas). Instead, the claimant is relieved of those expenses. Justice Varela Araya dissents and grants the appeal on the merits; she vacates the challenged judgment, denies the objection of lack of legal entitlement (excepción de falta de derecho), except with respect to the claim for the difference in vacation pay, which she denies; she orders the respondent to pay the claimant the risk-based salary supplement and the resulting differences in his Christmas bonuses accrued since veinte de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho and for as long as he works as a park ranger. She orders the respondent to pay the corresponding statutory interest and indexation, calculated from the date each sum became due until it is actually paid, and orders the respondent to pay the differences in employer contributions resulting from recognition of the supplement with respect to the contributions to the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral) and the Mandatory Pension Regime (Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones); she directs that a copy of the ruling be sent to the Seguridad Social for action within its authority and decides this matter without a special award of costs.
Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Roxana Chacón Artavia Rodrigo Campos Esquivel Res: 2020-000948 GSALASZ/SHERRERAC 1 Telephone numbers: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2295-3009. Email addresses: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr. and jmolinab@poder-judicial.go.cr
*180007410929LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia Res: 2020-000948 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas del veintinueve de mayo de dos mil veinte.
Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, por [Nombre 001], soltero, especialista en protección ambiental y manejo de áreas de conservación, vecino de Limón, portador de la cédula de identidad número [Valor 001], contra el ESTADO, representado por su procuradora adjunta la licenciada Olga Duarte Briones; y el SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, representado por su apoderado especial judicial, el licenciado Verny Avendaño Moya. Actúa como abogada de asistencia social del actor la licenciada Yerlin Sanabria Valladares, abogada y demás calidades desconocidas. Todos mayores, casados y vecinos de San José, con las excepciones indicadas; Redacta la Magistrada Chacón Artavia; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
Por medio de escrito de demanda, el actor manifestó que labora para el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE), específicamente para el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), prestando sus servicios como guarda parques en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado del Área de Conservación Tortuguero. Expone que sus funciones que implican un riesgo son: 1. Custodiar los activos del Estado; 2. Apoyar los registros de gastos de combustible; 3. Dar seguimiento a los procesos policiales; 3. Control y protección. Explicó que para todas estas funciones tiene permiso de portación de armas y le ha correspondido hacer atenciones a incendios forestales, en el caso del conflicto fronterizo por la Isla Calero cuando la Corte Internacional de la Haya únicamente autorizó el ingreso de guarda parques y funcionarios del SINAC-MINAE para determinar los daños de la zona. Asimismo, advirtió que atiende situaciones de pesca ilegal, tala, cacería, tráfico de drogas (situación en la cual coordina con la Fuerza Pública y el Organismo de Investigación Judicial).
Este último caso, deben aprehender a los sospechosos y realizar labores de custodia. Aseveró que en delitos contra la vida silvestre, es usual encontrarse con cazadores con armas, las cuales se deben requisar, decomisar y trasladar al Ministerio Público. Asimismo, aduce que las personas que se desempeñan como guarda parques son las encargadas de la protección de la flora y fauna, que es patrimonio nacional y les corresponde verificar que la ciudadanía adecúe su conducta a las normas jurídico ambientales. Solicitó se condene al Estado al pago del plus salarial por riesgo policial (18% del salario base) junto con las diferencias que ese reconocimiento produce en los extremos de vacaciones y aguinaldo; así como los intereses e indexación sobre lo adeudado. También pidió ambas costas del proceso y obligar al Estado al pago de los montos del Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones y Fondo de Capitalización laboral de diferencias salariales resultantes conjuntamente a comunicar al la CCSS para lo de su cargo (imágenes 3 a 9 del expediente del Juzgado en PDF).
La representación estatal contestó de forma negativa, e interpuso la excepción de falta de derecho. Pidió se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos y se condene a los actores al pago de ambas costas (imágenes 249-259 del expediente virtual del Juzgado). El Estado y el SINAC contestaron, en sus respectivos memoriales, en términos negativos e interpusieron la excepción de falta de derecho (imágenes 30 a 38 y 52 a 56 ídem). El juez de primera instancia declaró sin lugar la demanda y ordenó al actor al pago de ambas costas, fijando las personales en la suma de 121.000 colones por las costas (imágenes 87 a 97 del expediente del Juzgado en PDF).
El actor, por medio de la abogada de asistencia social, se muestra disconforme con lo resuelto en la instancia precedente. Como primer agravio, acusa falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos que el juzgador tuvo por acreditados y, falta de fundamentación de la sentencia. Alega que el fallo es omiso pues no mencionar ni analizar todos los elementos de prueba en los que respalda el cuadro fáctico que tuvo por probado en la sentencia. Advierte que se afirma, en el apartado de hecho no probado, que el actor omitió probar su desempeñó en funciones de alto riesgo; sin tomar en cuenta que esto sucedió porque el juzgador no evacúo los testigos o la declaración de parte, ofrecidos por el actor, que lo sustentaba. Explicó que existe un error en la valoración de la prueba, ya que el tercer hecho probado enumera una serie de funciones (realizar labores de vigilancia, protección, velar por la seguridad y el público en general), que en sí denotan una exposición permanentemente al riesgo.
Explica que a toda persona, con autoridad de policía, como la que ostenta el demandante, debe aplicársele el sobresueldo, porque expone su integridad física. En apoyo a esa tesis, enumera actividades que dice que el señor [Nombre 001] realiza a diario (ejemplo, internarse en zonas boscosas, enfrentarse a cazadores armados, entre otras). Protesta una errónea aplicación de los numerales 54 de la Ley Forestal, 6 y 91 de la Ley General de Policía, de los cuales se sigue que los guardaparques son servidores policiales. Aclara que si bien existen leyes diferentes para los diversos cuerpos policiales; lo cierto es que debe existir una equidad en la remuneración al arriesgarse la vida en el desempeño del puesto, que es una condición de trabajo que comparten. Afirma que el “rubro por alto riesgo está garantizado en razón de las funciones que activamente ejercen los funcionarios que lo reciben y no simplemente por su exposición física”.
Reitera que hay una violación del principio de igualdad en el salario; y, menciona que esta Sala ha otorgado ese plus en situaciones de hecho donde, no habiendo una norma expresa, bajo ese precepto de igualdad, ha conferido su reconocimiento. También protesta la condena en costas. Indica, que estamos ante una persona de escasos recursos, quien ha litigado con evidente buena fe, por lo que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 563 del Código de Trabajo, de mantenerse lo resuelto, debe absolvérsele en costas. Argumenta que el actor fue conteste, puntual y su interés fue mejorar su salario al que estima tiene derecho por el riesgo inminente al que es sometido en sus faenas diarias. Solicitó acoger el recurso, anular la sentencia impugnada y declarar con lugar la demanda, o en su defecto, resolver el asunto sin especial condena en costas.
El artículo 587 del Código de Trabajo reformado regula el recurso de casación por razones procesales en los siguientes términos: “Por razones procesales será admisible cuando se invoque:/1.- Cualquiera de los vicios por los cuales procede la nulidad de actuaciones, siempre y cuando estos hayan sido alegados en alguna de las fases precedentes del proceso y la reclamación se haya desestimado./2.-Incongruencia de la sentencia u oscuridad absoluta de esta última parte. En los supuestos de incongruencia, el recurso solo es admisible cuando se ha agotado el trámite de la adición o aclaración./ 3.-Falta de determinación, clara y precisa, de los hechos acreditados por el juzgado./4.-Haberse fundado la sentencia en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos ilegalmente al proceso./5.-Falta de fundamento o fundamento insuficiente de la sentencia./6.-Haberse dictado la sentencia fuera del tiempo previsto para hacerlo”. El primer supuesto debe relacionarse con el artículo 471 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, disposición que, precisamente, se ocupa de la nulidad, así: “Procederá la nulidad:/(…)
La parte actora reprocha la denegatoria del plus por riesgo policial, a pesar de que en el tercer hecho probado se tuvo por acreditado que el accionante, en sus tareas podía, le correspondía: “1- Realizar inspecciones, elaborar y registrar las actividades registradas, realizar informes correspondientes a productos de inspecciones, dar mantenimiento preventivo a botes, motores, etc; todas contenidas en el oficio ACTo-GASP-102 del 21 de octubre del 2009. Mas recientemente tiene las funciones de 2- Realizar labores de vigilancia dentro de las instalaciones, ejecutar las labores de protecciones de los recursos naturales, velar por la seguridad y el público en general, hacer reportes de anomalías, coordinar y supervisar las actividades de un grupo de compañeros, instruir al público que visita las instalaciones, realizar giras, interponer denuncias, asistir a juicios entre otros contenidos en el oficio SINAC-SE-DGIRH-734 del 25 de junio del 2018,visible en imagen 46, además de las ya indicadas también realiza labores como 3-Brindar información sobre la ubicación de los edificios y oficinas, instruir al público que visita las instalaciones estas contenidas en el oficio SINAC-SE-DGIRH-314 (…) ”.
El juez afirmó, que una vez valoradas las funciones enumeradas, no era factible otorgar el derecho, porque el actor no desempeña labores propiamente policiales, no está investido como servidor policial y su puesto de trabajo no presenta un riesgo inminente a su integridad (véase sentencia de instancia de imágenes 87 a 97). El numeral 91 de la Ley General de Policía, n.° 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994 (adicionado por el artículo 3 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Civilista, n.° 8096 del 15 de marzo de 2001; y corrida su numeración mediante el ordinal 1 de la Ley de Creación de la Policía Escolar y de la Niñez, n.° 8449 del 14 de junio de 2005, que lo trasladó del antiguo 85 al 91 actual), estatuye: “Créase un incentivo denominado riesgo policial, el cual consiste en un plus salarial equivalente a un dieciocho por ciento del salario base; corresponderá a todos los funcionarios que desarrollen funciones policiales que impliquen riesgo a su integridad física, independientemente de la ubicación en la estructura administrativa (así reformado el párrafo anterior de acuerdo con la anulación parcial hecha por resolución de la Sala Constitucional n.° 12017 del 16 de agosto de 2006).
El otorgamiento de este incentivo salarial deberá fundamentarse, en cada caso concreto, definiendo las razones por las cuales las funciones del empleado correspondiente encuadran dentro del supuesto de peligrosidad definido”. Por medio del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 29597 del 5 de junio de 2001, se promulgó el “Reglamento para el pago del riesgo policial”, cuyo numeral 1 reza: “El plus salarial denominado "Riesgo Policial", es pagadero única y exclusivamente a los "servidores policiales", en virtud del cumplimiento de las "funciones policiales" que les corresponde en razón de la investidura, nombramiento, puesto y cargo que ostentan, como miembros de la Fuerza Pública, y que en el desempeño de funciones se corra algún riesgo inminente para la integridad física, en razón de la peligrosidad que la función policial pueda significar. Mediante resolución fundada, se razonará en cada caso concreto, en qué consisten las circunstancias de peligrosidad que impliquen algún riesgo para la integridad física del servidor, independientemente de su ubicación dentro de la estructura administrativa del Ministerio, debiéndose constatar además, el cumplimiento de los supuestos que se detallan en el presente reglamento”.
El artículo 2, por su lado, cita: “Se entiende por "servidor policial": La persona nombrada en un puesto de plaza policial de alguno de los cuerpos policiales cuya competencia esté prevista por Ley, para servir al Estado en el ejercicio de la función policial, para lo cual es investido de autoridad pública, de conformidad con la Constitución Política y la Ley. Por consiguiente, para que una persona sea servidor policial, debe darse el concurso de las siguientes condiciones: a) Investidura otorgada por el Presidente de la República y el Ministro del ramo mediante Acuerdo Ejecutivo. b) Juramentación constitucional para el desempeño y ejercicio del cargo de autoridad pública.
Pide la recurrente que se revoque la imposición de costas al actor, porque ha procedido con evidente buena fe. En materia laboral, el tema de las costas está regulado en los artículos 562 y 563 del Código de Trabajo vigente. Con fundamento en esa normativa, la regla es condenar al vencido en el litigio a pagar ambas costas del juicio. Sin embargo, al tenor del artículo 563 citado, se puede eximir del pago de esos gastos a quien se encuentre en alguno de los supuestos señalados en ese numeral, esto es: cuando el vencido haya litigado con evidente buena fe; cuando las proposiciones hayan prosperado parcialmente; o cuando haya vencimiento recíproco. De lo anterior se deduce que la regla es la condenatoria y la situación contraria es la excepción, por lo que tales circunstancias deben inferirse claramente de los autos para poder ser aplicadas, aparte de que la exención es una facultad, y no una obligación para el juzgador.
Ahora bien, el juez de primera instancia declaró sin lugar la demanda interpuesta por el accionante, pero, muy a pesar de que resultó vencido en todos los extremos de la petitoria, no hay mérito para considerarlo como litigante de mala fe. En el caso que ocupa, se aprecia que el demandante pudo, razonablemente, haber tenido la creencia de que le asistía el derecho reclamado, pues se trata de un tema de mero análisis de la normativa aplicable al caso, por lo que pudo creer que le asistía el derecho reclamado, situación que permite considerarle litigante de buena fe y exonerarle del pago en esos gastos, tal y como lo solicita en el recurso.
Como corolario de lo expuesto, procede acoger parcialmente el recurso y anular el fallo únicamente en cuanto impuso al actor la condena de ambas costas; y, en su lugar, resolver el asunto sin especial mención en esos gastos.
La suscrita magistrada disiente del voto de mayoría por las razones que se expondrán. Existen leyes que regulan varias de las tareas policiales que ejercen los guarda parques e incluso les reconocen el carácter de autoridades de policía: A) Ley Forestal, n.° 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996, precepto 54: “ Los funcionarios de la Administración Forestal del Estado tendrán carácter de autoridad de policía, como tales y de acuerdo con la presente ley, deberán denunciar ante las autoridades competentes las infracciones cometidas. Las autoridades de policía estarán obligadas a colaborar con los funcionarios de la Administración Forestal del Estado, cada vez que ellos lo requieran para cumplir, cabalmente, con las funciones y los deberes que esta ley les impone. Para el cumplimiento de sus atribuciones, estos funcionarios, identificados con su respectivo carné, tendrán derecho a transitar y a practicar inspecciones en cualquier fundo rústico o industrial forestal, excepto en las casas de habitación ubicadas en él; así como decomisar la madera y los demás productos forestales aprovechados o industrializados ilícitamente y secuestrar, en garantía de una eventual sanción, el equipo y la maquinaria usados en el acto ilícito.
También, decomisarán el medio de transporte que sirva como instrumento o facilitador para la comisión del delito, previo levantamiento del acta respectiva. Todo lo anterior deberá ponerse a la orden de la autoridad judicial competente, en un plazo no mayor de tres días”.
POR TANTO:
Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso. Se anula la sentencia recurrida únicamente en cuanto condenó al actor al pago de ambas costas. En su lugar se exonera al accionante respecto a dichos gastos. La Magistrada Varela Araya salva el voto y declara con lugar el recurso por el fondo; anula la sentencia impugnada, deniega la excepción de falta de derecho excepto en cuanto al reclamo de diferencia de vacaciones, extremo que deniega; ordena a la parte accionada pagar al actor el plus salarial por riesgo y las diferencias que eso conlleva en sus aguinaldos devengados desde el veinte de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho y mientras labore como guarda parques. Condena a la parte accionada a cancelar los intereses legales e indexación correspondientes que se abonarán desde que cada una de las sumas era exigible hasta su efectiva satisfacción, y ordena a la demandada el pago de las diferencias en los aportes patronales que el reconocimiento del plus conlleva sobre las cuotas del Fondo de Capitalización Laboral y Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones; dispone el envío de copia del pronunciamiento a la Seguridad Social, para lo propio de su cargo y resuelve este asunto sin especial condena en costas.
Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Roxana Chacón Artavia Rodrigo Campos Esquivel Res: 2020-000948 GSALASZ/SHERRERAC 1 imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr. y jmolinab@poder-judicial.go.cr
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