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Res. 00122-2006 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II · 17/03/2006
OutcomeResultado
The Tribunal upholds the denial of positive silence because it concerned a precarious use permit over public domain assets, which cannot give rise to a presumed authorization act.El Tribunal confirma la denegatoria del silencio positivo por tratarse de un permiso precario de uso de bienes de dominio público, no susceptible de acto presunto de autorización.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Section II) holds that the legal figure of positive administrative silence does not apply to street-vending permits on public domain assets. The case arose when an individual applied for a street-vending license from the Municipality of Alajuela; receiving no timely response, the applicant claimed approval by positive silence. The Tribunal distinguishes between regulated licenses—which recognize pre-existing rights—and precarious use permits over public domain lands, which are discretionary acts that grant no subjective right. Citing well-established case law from the Supreme Court's First Division, it reaffirms that public roads are inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable; any permit issued over them is inherently precarious and revocable unilaterally by the Administration. Therefore, such permits cannot give rise to presumed authorization acts, as they involve mere administrative tolerance rather than acquired rights. The appealed decision denying positive silence is confirmed, and the administrative path is deemed exhausted.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II resuelve que la figura del silencio administrativo positivo no opera para permisos de venta ambulante en bienes de dominio público. El caso se origina en la solicitud de una licencia para venta ambulante ante la Municipalidad de Alajuela; ante la falta de respuesta en el plazo legal, el administrado pretendió que operara el silencio positivo. El Tribunal distingue entre licencias regladas (que reconocen derechos subjetivos) y permisos precarios de uso de bienes dominicales (actos discrecionales que no generan derechos subjetivos). Con base en jurisprudencia consolidada de la Sala Primera, reitera que las vías públicas son inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables; los permisos que se otorgan sobre ellas son siempre a título precario y revocables unilateralmente por la Administración. Por tanto, no son susceptibles de actos presuntos de autorización al no tratarse de derechos adquiridos sino de meras tolerancias administrativas. Se confirma la resolución recurrida que denegó la aplicación del silencio positivo, y se da por agotada la vía administrativa.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Pursuant to the cited case law doctrine, it must be concluded that the claim under discussion is not about granting a 'license' or 'permit' in the general sense—through which a subjective right is recognized by a regulated act (Article 18 of the General Public Administration Act)—but rather about granting a right to use public domain or a precarious right through a discretionary act, where the content of the decision may be determined by principles of logic, technique, justice, and opportunity (Articles 15 to 17 ibid.), so positive silence is not applicable.En virtud de la doctrina jurisprudencial citada, se debe concluir que la gestión que se discute no se trata de otorgar una "licencia" o "patente" en sentido general, de que se reconozca un derecho subjetivo mediante un acto reglado (artículo 18 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), sino de conceder un derecho de uso de dominio público o derecho en precario a través de un acto discrecional, donde el contenido de la resolución puede ser determinado mediante los principios de la lógica, la técnica, la justicia y la oportunidad (artículos 15 a 17 ibídem), por lo que no cabe la aplicación del silencio positivo.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La precariedad de todo derecho o permiso de uso, es consustancial a la figura y alude a la posibilidad que la administración, en cualquier momento lo revoque."
"The precariousness of any right or use permit is inherent to the figure and refers to the possibility that the Administration may revoke it at any time."
Considerando V
"La precariedad de todo derecho o permiso de uso, es consustancial a la figura y alude a la posibilidad que la administración, en cualquier momento lo revoque."
Considerando V
"…no cabe la aplicación del silencio positivo."
"…positive silence is not applicable."
Considerando V – conclusión
"…no cabe la aplicación del silencio positivo."
Considerando V – conclusión
"…se trata de conceder un derecho de uso de dominio público o derecho en precario a través de un acto discrecional."
"…this is about granting a right to use public domain or a precarious right through a discretionary act."
Considerando V – distinción
"…se trata de conceder un derecho de uso de dominio público o derecho en precario a través de un acto discrecional."
Considerando V – distinción
Full documentDocumento completo
The configuration of the Administration's inertia as tacit approval (silencio positivo), and consequently, the creation of an administrative act, is a legal fiction set forth in Article 330 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, under three hypotheses:
V.In accordance with the foregoing, in general terms, if an individual requests a license for the exercise of a lucrative activity, and the Municipality in question does not respond within the deadline set by law, it must be considered granted. However, in the case of street vending (ventas ambulantes), the situation changes radically, because in reality, although the “Reglamento General de Patentes de la Municipalidad de Alajuela”, published in La Gaceta No. 226 of November 24, 2003, Articles 38 et seq., speaks of a “license” (licencia), it is actually a precarious permit (permiso precario) for the use of public roads, which forms part of the public domain assets (bienes dominicales), where implied acts of authorization cannot be configured, and from which the individual generates no subjective right whatsoever. The Sección Primera of this Tribunal, in Voto No. 552-2005 at 2:00 p.m. on December 16, 2005, in a case similar to the present one, stated: “…the appellant points out that according to the Reglamento General de Patentes de la Municipalidad de Alajuela, it is a 'license' (licencia) for street vending; therefore, the invoked rule is applicable.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is considered that this is not a case that falls within that provision, since the petitioner's action does not refer to a situation in which a subjective right protected by the legal system subject to a simple condition of administrative control is accessed. Licenses refer to activities that citizens can generally carry out, such as general commerce, in which the government controls compliance with health, public order, and tax regulations, for which it requires the application for a patent (patente) or license (licencia) that allows it to exercise that control and clears the procedural obstacle so that the interested party acquires the right to exercise that business, which is processed through a regulated act (acto reglado); however, in this case, it involves carrying out an activity on public roads, making use of a space under State domain intended for common enjoyment in which private activities cannot be carried out without the corresponding permit, according to a general prohibition referred to in Article 39 of the invoked Regulation.
In this sense, the abundant case law has stated: 'The use permits referred to in Ley 6587-81* and the aforementioned regulation authorize the occupation of public roads, which are public domain lands, as expressly defined by the Ley de Construcciones in its Articles 4, 5, and 6; Article 28 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, Articles 44 et seq. of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, in relation to Articles 261 and 262 of the Código Civil and subsection 14 of Article 121 and Article 174 of the Constitución Política.- The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest.- They are the so-called dominical assets (bienes dominicales), demanial assets, public assets or things, or public property, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men.- That is, they are affected by their own nature and vocation.- Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected by the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express rule.- The characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action replaces interdicts to recover domain.- Since they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right of use can be acquired, although not a right of ownership.- The use permit (permiso de uso) is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the individual is the beneficial domain (dominio útil) of the asset, with the State always reserving the direct domain (dominio directo) over the thing.- The precariousness of any right or use permit (permiso de uso) is consubstantial to the figure and alludes to the possibility that the administration may revoke it at any time, whether due to the State's need to fully occupy the asset, for the construction of a public work, as well as for reasons of safety, hygiene, or aesthetics, all to the extent that if a conflict of interests should arise between the purpose of the asset and the granted permit, the natural use of the public thing must prevail.- Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roads of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public places, places them outside the commerce of men, and therefore the permits granted shall always be precarious in nature (a título precario) and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so indicate.'- [* Ley 6587 of July 30, 1981, of Patentes para Ventas Ambulantes y Estacionarias] (Voto of Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia number 2306-91 of November 6, 1991, the bold is not in the original, see also No. 2704-91 of December 20, 1991, ibidem) In another case it was stated: 'This Chamber has repeatedly stated that in accordance with the Ley de Vendedores Ambulantes y Estacionarios, No. 6587 of July 30, 1981, and its Regulation, municipalities have the power to grant permits and licenses precisely to this type of vendors so that they can exercise their activity legally.
However, the places where sales are carried out are public domain assets, and are therefore inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable, which implies that vendors holding municipal permits have a use permit (permiso de uso), understood as "a unilateral legal act issued by the administration in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the individual is the beneficial domain (dominio útil) of the asset, with the State always reserving the direct domain (dominio directo) over the thing." (Voto No. 2306-91). Hence, this Chamber has considered that such permits are precarious in nature (a título precario), meaning the administration has the possibility of revoking them at any time due to the State's need to occupy the asset, for reasons of construction works, safety, hygiene, aesthetics, etc., provided it acts in accordance with the proper purpose of the asset and the general principles of due process.' (Voto 4199-93 of August 27, 1993, ibidem, also 219-94 of January 12, 1994, Voto 2306-91 of November 6, 1991, No. 2306 at 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991, and 1055-92 of April 22, 1992) In the same vein, it is worth citing: 'II.- It is up to the Municipalities, among other entities, to grant use permits to persons who wish to engage in commerce through street vending (ventas ambulantes) or stationary vending (ventas estacionarias) on public sidewalks, parks, and others, to exercise it, upon prior permission from the respective authority and, of course, in accordance with the provisions governing the commercial activity intended to be developed, without the Administration's actions aimed at redressing any irregularity occurring in the exercise thereof curtailing the right to free exercise of commerce, a right which, in any case, is not absolute and can be subject to regulation and even restrictions when superior interests are at stake, such as the problem of vehicular and pedestrian traffic, citizen safety, excessive crowding of the public in parks and roadways, among others.” (Voto 7049-94 of December 2, 1994, and also No. 2306-91 at 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991).
V.- By virtue of the cited jurisprudential doctrine, it must be concluded that the action under discussion does not involve granting a "license" (licencia) or "patent" (patente) in a general sense, involving the recognition of a subjective right through a regulated act (acto reglado) (Article 18 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), but rather granting a right of use of the public domain or a precarious right (derecho en precario) through a discretionary act, where the content of the resolution can be determined through the principles of logic, technique, justice, and opportunity (Articles 15 to 17 ibidem), therefore the application of tacit approval (silencio positivo) is not appropriate."
VI.All of the foregoing leads to confirming the appealed decision. As there is no further appeal (Article 6 of Ley N°7274 of December 10, 1991), the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted.
Given that no further appeal exists (Article 6 of Law N°7274 of December 10, 1991), the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted.
"IV.- La configuración de la inercia de la Administración como silencio positivo, y en consecuencia, el nacimiento de un acto administrativo, es una ficción legal contemplada en el artículo 330 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tres hipótesis:
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