Indigenous agrarian property and customary law in Cabécar-Talamanca ReservePropiedad agraria indígena y derecho consuetudinario en reserva Cabécar-Talamanca

III.- The special judicial representative of the plaintiff, attorney Alvaro Montero Vega, filed an appeal arguing the following: 1.- His grantor seeks to vindicate his right of possession, acquired on October 14, 1972, and which was not registered as of that date, given that its previous owner possessed it for six years. 2.- When the indigenous territorial reserves were created, the plaintiff already had acquired rights as a possessor, and therefore they could not be taken away by giving retroactive effect to the Law, given that the boundaries of the Reserve were established several years after its creation in 1977. 3.- Indigenous Law No. 6172 established a procedure to resolve the problems of indigenous and non-indigenous possessors who had remained within the reserves, and their improvements should be recognized and they should be relocated to areas outside of them, given that this solution was never proposed to the plaintiff, he and his family being indigenous. He argues it is erroneous to ask him to prove his status as such, insofar as the Association itself affirms he is indigenous, since he appears with a right as such to lot No. 7, a sketch of which was attached to the answer; furthermore, he says, he finds it strange that, his aboriginal status not having been debated, it is brought up when issuing judgment. 4.- It is of utmost interest, he says, to define whether a possessor of more than ten years, who acquired those lands when they were not registered, has the right to defend his possession and resort to the courts to bring a reivindicatory action, given that the Civil Code adopted and embodied precepts of Roman doctrine on usucapion and French jurisprudence. He invokes articles 316, 317, 318, 320 and 322 of the Code, to support his reivindicatory action as a possessor, since denying him the right to defend his reivindicatory action would be to deny him the possibility of exercising a right that the Civil Code and agrarian doctrine grant him. 5.- The evidence provided in the case file, he says, is clear and compelling and demonstrates his right of possession prior to the creation of the Indigenous Reserve, hence he has active standing to sue, by exercising peaceful, continuous, personal, good-faith possession, and that he should be absolved from paying the costs of the proceeding. 6.- He finds it strange that the lower court "threw overboard" the judgment and the appraisal of the evidence from the same judgment issued previously and which was annulled, and therefore he requests that the Tribunal take into account the proven and unproven facts of said ruling, in particular the appraisal of the evidence. [...]

V.- The present action could be classified as one "of better right of possession," since it involves a conflict between indigenous persons disputing the possession of a parcel located within the Cabécar de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve. While it is true that Nicomedes Hidalgo Villanueva's lawsuit is titled as "ordinary agrarian reivindication," the lawsuit itself indicates the property is unregistered, located outside the indigenous reserve, and bordering it to the North and to the West (see folios 8 and 9). The defendants, however, in their answer, indicate that said property forms part of the indigenous reserve and is registered in the name of the Association (see answer at folios 20 to 26), objecting to the lack of identity of the property. Consequently, it is a problem in which indigenous possession is discussed, and not the title to the property, which by law corresponds to the Association. In that sense, it is not possible to enter into a discussion of to whom the title to that parcel corresponds, but rather to whom the legitimate possession of the land in conflict corresponds, which is perfectly possible in this ordinary proceeding, provided that the indigenous regulations issued by our legislator are respected, as well as the Customary Law which, as will be seen, governs indigenous agrarian property as collective property. In the following considerandos, an analysis will be made of the Jurisprudence rendered on the subject in order to resolve the controversy that is the object of this litis with arguments that are more solid and closer to Customary Law.

VI.- In relation to the subject of indigenous property, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved: "XII. The preceding statement has strong historical and legal roots, very well known, which resulted in the registration in the Public Property Registry of the Boruca-Térraba Indigenous Reserve, which, being of public interest, this Tribunal cannot in any way ignore. The Bruncas are located in the Southern Pacific zone, in what is known as Boruca Curré, in the same zone as the Térrabas, who until the 18th century were settled in the Atlantic zone. The first regulation that refers to this situation is found in Law of Uncultivated Lands number 13 of January 10, 1939, by establishing in its article 8 that '....a prudential zone is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, at the discretion of the Executive Branch, in the places where Tribes of these exist, in order to conserve our autochthonous race and to free them from future injustices.' This norm, which could be understood as programmatic, was expanded by Decree number 45 of December 3, 1945, by creating the Board for the Protection of the Aboriginal Races of the Nation, whose basic function was aimed at the protection of the lands of the aborigines. A short time later, by Executive Decree number 34 of November 15, 1956, the Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra, and China Kichá indigenous reserves were declared. By virtue of this regulation, the Boruca Terrába Indigenous Reserve was declared inalienable, exclusive property of the indigenous people under the terms of the Law of Uncultivated Lands. These provisions acquired a rank even superior to the Law, pursuant to article 7 of the Political Constitution, insofar as the Legislative Assembly by Law number 2330 of April 9, 1959 (La Gaceta number 84 of April 17, 1959) approved Convention number 107 of the International Labor Organization regarding the 'Protection and integration of indigenous populations and other tribal and semi-tribal populations,' which, among other things, recognizes their legitimate right to have under their dominion the lands of their property, be it in individual or collective form, and that succession shall be governed by the principles of the customs of the peoples. The Land and Colonization Law number 2825 of October 14, 1961, also incorporated a chapter referring to the subject with the object of protecting those lands and the autochthonous races. It was based on this regulation that, by Executive Decrees of 1996, number 11 of April 2 and number 26 of November 12, it was ordered to register in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization, today the Institute of Agrarian Development, the three indigenous reserves created in 1956, one of them being Boruca Térraba. The foregoing means that this reserve is registered and with legal protection regarding the inalienability of its lands, even before the Law Creating the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs number 5251 of July 11, 1973. In this latter law, its transitory provision established that the Institute of Lands and Colonization would deliver the lands through the possessory information proceeding to the indigenous people, later reformed by Law number 5651 of December 13, 1974, to return to the concepts of inalienability. This also means that the Boruca Térraba Indigenous Reserve had a special regime long before the State's action to legalize the situation of the indigenous reserves through Executive Decree number 5904-G of March 11, 1976 (for those of Chirripó, Guaymí de Coto Brus, Estrella, Guatuso, and Talamanca) or the same Executive Decree number 6037-G of March 26, 1976. The reserves acquired legal rank by article 1 of Indigenous Law number 6712 of November 29, 1977, by expressly citing the decrees constituting them, to have more detailed treatment through the Regulation of the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978. The analysis of all this regulation exceeds the needs required by the case to resolve the appeal, but it does allow for a broader vision regarding the rights of property and possession alleged." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 223 at 15:30 hours of July 6, 1990. – The underlining is not original).

VII.- This Tribunal, in a ruling on possessory conflicts between indigenous persons, stated the following: "Indigenous Law number six thousand one hundred seventy-two, published on December twenty, nineteen hundred seventy-seven, establishes in its articles 3, 4, and 5, among other things, the inalienable and imprescriptible character of the Indigenous Reserves. Indigenous people can only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people, and they are expressly protected from invasions carried out by non-indigenous third parties on the reserves, since the competent authorities must immediately proceed to their eviction without payment of any compensation (article 5, second paragraph). Furthermore, the Regulation to the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree Number eight thousand four hundred eighty-seven-G of April twenty-six, nineteen hundred seventy-eight, in its article 10 provides that 'To guarantee the rights regulated in articles 3 and 5 of the Law, the President of the Integral Development Association shall appear by him or herself or through their representative or delegate, as soon as possible after the infraction occurs, accompanying the certification showing the registration of the Reserve, to file, before the competent official, the corresponding legal action.' As we see, neither the Law nor the Regulation establish the protection of the reserves or possessions of the indigenous people from invasions carried out by themselves; normally, conflicts between indigenous people are resolved administratively, through the respective Association, which is responsible for granting 'concessions' or rights of possession to each indigenous person or family group according to their needs. The Association, in case of discord, summons the parties to an oral appearance and seeks to resolve the conflict internally, imposing warnings on the offender; however, said Entity does not have coercive measures with which to repress crimes by repeat-offender indigenous persons; hence, as a last resort, they must resort to common Jurisdictional instances to provide a solution to the same... It is evident that in our country, the majority of indigenous populations have a fairly advanced degree of cultural evolution, and by their current form of organization, through Development Associations, the solution of conflicts is sought internally, and only in extreme cases -as, we repeat, is the present one-, is the repressive avenue of the Courts resorted to, which in any case are obligated to abide by the provisions of the cited international conventions." (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 107 at 10 hours 20 minutes of February 16, 1994).

VIII.- In relation to the effectiveness of the agreements reached by indigenous communities on matters of agrarian possession, it has also been indicated: "Agrarian courts cannot deny jurisdictional protection to indigenous possession problems. On the contrary, they must have special sensitivity towards that type of conflict, and even know their customs, in order to thereby impose the respect deserved by the agreements agreed upon in administrative headquarters. While it is true that the regime of indigenous agrarian property is an exception, regarding collective property, it is not possible to ignore the legitimate possession that each indigenous family exercises in our country. Therefore, if an administrative solution has not been reached, through the Association or the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs, or if, having been reached, the agreements are disrespected, the Agrarian Courts as a last resort must restore the corresponding rights, in order to provide the Indigenous Community with adequate protection for their cultural forms. In the present case, the legitimate possession exercised by the plaintiff Roselía Rojas Morales and her husband over the land in conflict, which they had dedicated to forest reserves, is clearly demonstrated." (Agrarian Tribunal, Vote No. 429 at 15:30 hours of July 24, 1997). This interpretation by the Agrarian Tribunal referring to the substantive norms of indigenous agrarian property, as special property, finds perfect support in the constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes the administrative powers of the local indigenous governments, under the figures of the Associations, to make the necessary decisions for the defense of their rights. Otherwise, "…the fundamental right of the Indigenous Peoples to have their own representative bodies and to be able to act autonomously in the defense of their rights would be disregarded…" (Constitutional Chamber, No. 2005-06856, at 10:02 hours of June 1, 2005). In this way, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a superior hierarchy to International Conventions, such as ILO Convention No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), which grant indigenous persons an even higher degree of protection, that is, an "elevated level of protection" regarding those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand respect, in the ordinary courts, for the decisions derived from the communities themselves and their representatives through custom and the self-determination of said indigenous peoples.

IX.- In addition to the above, it is appropriate to carry out an analysis of national regulations in light of the jurisprudence on human rights of indigenous peoples, emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the judgment of August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community VS. Nicaragua), the following was stated regarding matters of interest for this case: "146. The terms of an international human rights treaty have autonomous meaning, and therefore cannot be equated with the meaning attributed to them in domestic law. Furthermore, said human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times, and, in particular, to current living conditions. 147. In turn, article 29.b of the Convention establishes that no provision may be interpreted in the sense of 'limiting the enjoyment and exercise of any right or freedom that may be recognized under the laws of any of the States Parties or under another convention to which one of said States is a party.' 148. Through an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights, taking into account the applicable norms of interpretation and, in accordance with article 29.b of the Convention—which prohibits a restrictive interpretation of rights—this Court considers that article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that comprises, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized in the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. 149. Given the characteristics of the present case, it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding the concept of property in indigenous communities. Among indigenous peoples, there is a communal tradition regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that its belonging is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community. Indigenous peoples, by the mere fact of their own existence, have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship that indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production but a material and spiritual element that they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations…151. The customary law of indigenous peoples must be especially taken into account, for the purposes at hand. As a product of custom, possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities that lack a real title to the ownership of the land to obtain official recognition of said ownership and the consequent registration…" (The underlining is not original).

X.- From all of the foregoing, it is concluded that indigenous property and possession are governed by customary norms, and that the characteristics of this special type of agrarian property must be highlighted: In the first place, an original character that is supra-legal and supra-constitutional must be recognized in the institution, for it is recognized in International Human Rights Treaties, and it is a character conferred by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself. In the second place, indigenous property is of a collective or community character; its belonging is not to an individual, but to a group. In the third place, it exists and is the fundamental basis of their culture, their spiritual life, and their economic subsistence. In the fourth place, the sense of belonging of indigenous property is not measured by a title—registered or not—but by the possession of the land in a community sense, with the community attending to the needs of each indigenous family, independently of its mere registration. In the fifth place, the community character of the property means that conflicts and the disposition of indigenous community property are the competence of the community itself, in our case, through the Development Association, as a "community structure," it being the competent body to dispose of the possession of the land in order to guarantee access to it for all indigenous inhabitants, attending to the needs of each family nucleus. In the sixth place, in conflicts of indigenous property and possession, indigenous custom prevails, and in this case, that of enjoying collective agrarian property, over positive law that is incompatible with said tradition, making inapplicable the norms on individual rights enshrined in the positive legal system for the protection of individual property and possession, because between indigenous peoples, the collective and distributive interest of the property must prevail, according to the needs of each one, over the purely individual interest. Therefore, if the essential core of indigenous collective property is the group or community ownership over the land, this means that the right to possess, occupy, and use the land is inherent to the idea that indigenous peoples have of themselves, and it is the local community, the tribe, the nation, or the group of indigenous people upon whom that right is conferred.

XI.- In countries where there are indigenous communities and peoples with their own identity, such as ours, one must establish which systems of authorities, norms, and procedures regulate their social life and resolve their conflicts, since in principle they are different from the state order regulated by positive Law. Customary law is normally characterized by the following elements: a) the existence of norms, uses, and customs; b) the authorities and collective bodies responsible for administering justice; and, c) the existence of their own methods of conflict resolution. That is to say, it involves an entire legal system that allows the community to resolve conflicts internally, within the scope in which it acts and where the influence of the authority reaches, in relation to the individual's belonging to the social group. That is, customary law is based on a long tradition of approved practices in a specific cultural context, with a global vision, and where it is administered by authorities appointed by the community itself. Normally, indigenous community justice has more local and direct mechanisms, an oral and flexible procedure that is not necessarily equitable, and internal conflicts are resolved through arrangements aimed at maintaining peace in the community. In summary, the principal actor of Customary law is the community, which, with its collective and consensual feeling, prevails over individual authority.

XII.- Consequently, the grievances of the appellant are viewed in light of the foregoing. Regarding the first grievance, indigenous agrarian property being of a community character, any acquisition, by non-indigenous persons or between indigenous persons, not authorized by the community itself through a private sale is null and illegal, since it contravenes the very nature of the right, being a community asset, because it can perfectly occur that through an individual transaction the collective interests of the community are affected. By the year 1972, even though indigenous property is, as stated, originally from the ancestral peoples, a great number of laws and decrees had already been approved in Costa Rica, as well as ILO Convention 107, which recognized indigenous property as community property. Indigenous Law 6172 did nothing other than ratify all of the foregoing, expressly establishing in its third article: "Indigenous people may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereof in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, is absolutely null… The reserves shall be governed by the indigenous people in their traditional community structures…". In the case before us, the plaintiff maintained in his lawsuit that the property subject to restitution was located outside the indigenous reserve, indicating that it bordered it to the north and to the west, which was not true, nor demonstrated. On the contrary, it was determined that the property possessed by the defendants, and by the Association, is located within the Cabécar-Talamanca Reserve, and therefore, given that there is no identity of the property, and that it is located in an indigenous reserve, it can be concluded that we are in the presence of an original agrarian property of a collective character, and no right of individual property or possession can be claimed over it to the detriment of the community to which it belongs. In the second place, as has been indicated, the plaintiff could not invoke "prior" rights acquired before the Indigenous Law, or the creation of the reserves themselves, since what is produced by this is a mere "legal recognition," given that the title of property is original and responds to the exigency and style of culture, spiritual life, and needs of economic subsistence of the indigenous population. In the third place, in this grievance, the appellant raises an aspect of core importance for customary law, which is that the law established a procedure to resolve the problems of indigenous and non-indigenous possessors, and their improvements should be recognized. The grievance is contradictory, because on one hand he claims to be indigenous, and on the other, he claims compensation (to which he could have a right as a non-indigenous person). Note that the Law excludes, and omitted all reference to, compensation for improvements in favor of an indigenous person, and that is precisely due to the very essence and characteristic of indigenous agrarian property as the property of the entire community; but on the other hand, he accepts that the Association has granted or adjudicated lot No. 7 to him, whereby even if his argument were valid, the truth is that the Association—community—has also made efforts to address his territorial needs. From the foregoing, the discussion about the indigenous character of the plaintiff is harmless, given that the Association itself and he himself recognize said character. In the fourth place, it is absolutely inconceivable to counterpose an alleged individual "right of possession," of an exclusive and absolute character, which responds rather to a conception of liberal positive law, derived from the French Civil Code, and to attempt to derive from it an eventual "usucapion" on an individual basis, because, as has been indicated, this is totally foreign to the institutions and customs of the law of indigenous agrarian property as collective property, in which the figure of usucapion on an individual basis to the detriment of collective property could not be admitted. That would be to superimpose positive law onto customary law, in open violation of the International Treaties recognized by Costa Rica. In the fifth place, while it is true that the plaintiff submitted a title by which he acquired possession of a land of more than two hundred hectares, as has been indicated, the identity of the property has not been demonstrated, since as stated, the lands under dispute are located within the Indigenous Reserve (see folios 27 to 30 and judicial inspection at folio 81 and 82), and therefore belong to the Community, the Association being the only entity responsible, as representative of the community, for carrying out the distribution for the use and enjoyment of the land, and thus there is no reason to exempt the plaintiff from costs, when he intended to be the owner of a communal asset (article 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law). Finally, regarding the sixth grievance, it must be stated that the lower court, by virtue of the principle of judicial independence, could freely evaluate the evidence and express its own criteria in the specific case, whose arguments, even if adhering only to positive law, are correct insofar as it provides that the matter concerns a community asset or property.

XIII.- For all the reasons set forth above, the appellant being without merit in his grievances, the appealed judgment must be affirmed.

"III.- The special judicial representative of the plaintiff, attorney Alvaro Montero Vega, filed an appeal arguing the following: 1.- His grantor seeks to vindicate his right of possession, acquired on October 14, 1972, which was not registered as of that date, and which his previous owner had possessed for six years. 2.- When the indigenous territorial reserves were created, the plaintiff already had acquired rights as a possessor, and therefore they could not be taken away by giving retroactive effects to the Law, since the boundaries of the Reserve were established several years after its creation in 1977. 3.- The Indigenous Law No. 6172 established a procedure to resolve the problems of indigenous and non-indigenous possessors who had ended up within the reserves, and their improvements were to be recognized and they were to be relocated to areas outside of them; such a solution was never proposed to the plaintiff, he and his family being indigenous. He argues it is erroneous to ask him to prove that status, since the Association itself affirms he is indigenous, as he appears with a right as such to lot No. 7, a sketch of which was attached in the response; furthermore, he says, he finds it strange that his aboriginal status, not having been debated, is brought up at the time of judgment. 4.- It is of utmost interest, he says, to define whether a possessor of more than ten years, who acquired those lands when they were not registered, has the right to defend his possession and resort to the courts to file a replevin action, given that the Civil Code collected and embodied precepts of Roman doctrine on adverse possession (usucapión) and French jurisprudence. He invokes articles 316, 317, 318, 320, and 322 of the Code, to support his replevin action as a possessor, for denying him the defense of his right to the replevin action would be denying him the possibility of exercising a right that the Civil Code and agrarian doctrine grant him. 5.- The evidence provided to the case file, he says, is clear and conclusive and demonstrates his right of possession prior to the creation of the Indigenous Reserve, hence he has active legal standing to sue, by exercising peaceful, continuous, personal, good-faith possession, and he should therefore be absolved from paying the costs of the proceeding. 6.- He finds it strange that the lower court 'threw overboard' the judgment and the weighing of evidence from the one previously rendered and that was annulled, for which reason the Court is asked to take into account the proven and unproven facts of that ruling, particularly the weighing of evidence. [...]" V.- The present action could be classified as one of 'better right of possession,' as it involves a conflict between indigenous persons disputing the possession of a parcel located within the Cabécar de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve. While it is true that the lawsuit of Nicomedes Hidalgo Villanueva is titled as an 'ordinary agrarian replevin action,' the same lawsuit indicates the property is unregistered, located outside the indigenous reserve and bordering it to the North and West (see folios 8 and 9). The defendants, however, in their response, indicate that said property forms part of the indigenous reserve, and is registered in the name of the Association (see response at folios 20 to 26), claiming a lack of identity of the property. Consequently, this is a problem in which indigenous possession is disputed, and not the title to the property, which by law corresponds to the Association. In this sense, it is not possible to enter into a discussion of to whom the title to that parcel corresponds, but rather to whom the legitimate possession of the land in conflict corresponds, which is perfectly possible in this ordinary proceeding, provided that the indigenous regulations dictated by our legislator are respected, as well as the Customary Law which, as will be seen, governs indigenous agrarian property as collective property. In the following Considerandos, an analysis of the Jurisprudence rendered on the subject will be made in order to resolve the controversy that is the object of this litigation with arguments that are more solid and closer to Customary Law.

VI.- In relation to the topic of indigenous property, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved: "XII. The previous assertion has a strong historical and legal root, well known, which resulted in the registration in the Public Registry of Property of the Boruca-Térraba Indigenous Reserve, which, being of public interest, this Court cannot in any way ignore. The Bruncas are located in the South Pacific zone, in what is known as Boruca Curré in the same zone as the Térrabas, who until the 18th century were settled in the Atlantic zone. The first regulation referring to this situation is found in the Law of Vacant Lands number 13 of January 10, 1939, establishing in its article 8 that '....a prudent zone at the discretion of the Executive Branch in the places where Tribes of these exist is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, in order to preserve our autochthonous race and liberate them from future injustices.' This norm, which could be understood as programmatic, was broadened by Decree number 45 of December 3, 1945, creating the Board for the Protection of the Aboriginal Races of the Nation (Junta de Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de la Nación), whose basic function tended toward the protection of the aborigines' lands. Shortly thereafter, by Executive Decree number 34 of November 15, 1956, the indigenous reserves of Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra, and China Kichá were declared. By virtue of this regulation, the Boruca Térraba Indigenous Reserve was declared inalienable, exclusive property of the indigenous people under the terms of the Law of Vacant Lands. These provisions acquired a rank even superior to the Law, in accordance with article 7 of the Political Constitution, in that the Legislative Assembly, through Law number 2330 of April 9, 1959 (La Gaceta number 84 of April 17, 1959), approved Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization relating to the 'Protection and integration of indigenous populations and other tribal and semi-tribal populations,' which, among other things, recognizes their legitimate right to have under their dominion the lands of their property, be it in individual or collective form, and that succession shall be governed by the principles of the customs of the peoples. The Law of Lands and Colonization number 2825 of October 14, 1961 also incorporated a chapter on the subject with the object of protecting those lands and the autochthonous races. It was based on this regulation that, by Executive Decrees of 1996, number 11 of April 2 and number 26 of November 12, the three indigenous reserves created in 1956 were ordered to be registered in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), now the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), one of them being the Boruca Térraba. The foregoing means that this reserve is registered and has legal protection regarding the inalienability of its lands, even before the Law Creating the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) number 5251 of July 11, 1973. In the latter, its transitional provision established that the Institute of Lands and Colonization would deliver the lands to the indigenous people by means of the possessory information proceeding, later reformed by Law number 5651 of December 13, 1974 to return to the concepts of inalienability. This also means that the Boruca Térraba Indigenous Reserve had a special regime long before the State's action to legalize the situation of the indigenous reserves through Executive Decree number 5904-G of March 11, 1976 (for those of Chirripó, Guaymí de Coto Brus, Estrella, Guatuso, and Talamanca) or the same Executive Decree number 6037-G of March 26, 1976. The reserves acquired legal rank by article 1 of the Indigenous Law number 6712 of November 29, 1977, by expressly citing the decrees constituting them, to have more detailed treatment through the Regulation to the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978. The analysis of all that regulation exceeds the needs required by the case to resolve the appeal, but does allow for a broader vision regarding the rights of property and possession alleged." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 223 of 3:30 p.m. on July 6, 1990. – The underlining is not original-).

VII.- This Court, in a ruling on possessory conflicts between indigenous persons, noted the following: "The Indigenous Law number six thousand one hundred seventy-two, published on December twenty, one thousand nine hundred seventy-seven, establishes in its articles 3, 4, and 5, among other things, the inalienable and imprescriptible character of the Indigenous Reserves. Indigenous people may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people, and they are expressly protected from invasions carried out by non-indigenous third parties onto the reserves, for the competent authorities must immediately proceed to their eviction without payment of any indemnification whatsoever (article 5, second paragraph). Furthermore, the Regulation to the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree Number eight thousand four hundred eighty-seven-G of April twenty-six, one thousand nine hundred seventy-eight, in its article 10, provides that 'To guarantee the rights regulated in articles 3 and 5 of the Law, the President of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral shall appear by himself or through his representative or delegate, as soon as possible after the infraction occurs, providing the certification showing the registration of the Reserve, to initiate, before the competent official, the corresponding legal action.' As we see, neither the Law nor the Regulation establish the protection of the reserves or possessions of the indigenous people, against invasions carried out by themselves; normally, conflicts between indigenous people are solved administratively, through the respective Association, which is in charge of granting 'concessions' or rights of possession to each indigenous person or family group according to their needs. The Association, in case of discord, summons the parties to an oral appearance and seeks to resolve the conflict internally, imposing warnings on the offender; however, said Entity does not possess coercive measures with which to repress offenses by repeat indigenous offenders; hence, as a last resort, they must resort to common Jurisdictional instances to provide a solution to them... It is evident that in our country, the majority of indigenous populations have a quite advanced degree of cultural evolution, and given their current form of organization, through Development Associations, the solution of conflicts is sought internally, and only in extreme cases -as, we repeat, is the present one-, is resort made to the repressive route of the Courts, which in any case are obliged to comply with the provisions of the cited international conventions." (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 107 of 10:20 a.m. on February 16, 1994).

VIII.- In relation to the effectiveness of the agreements reached by indigenous communities on issues of agrarian possession, it has also been indicated: "The Agrarian Tribunals cannot deny jurisdictional protection to problems of indigenous possession. On the contrary, they must have a special sensitivity towards such types of conflicts, and even become acquainted with their customs, in order to thereby impose the respect that agreements reached in an administrative venue deserve. While it is true that the regime of indigenous agrarian property is an exception, in terms of collective property, it is not possible to disregard the legitimate possession exercised by each indigenous family in our country. Therefore, if an administrative solution has not been reached through the Association or the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, or if having been reached, the agreements are disrespected, the Agrarian Tribunals shall, as a last resort, restore the corresponding rights, in order to provide the Indigenous Community with adequate protection fitting their cultural forms. In the present case, the legitimate possession exercised by the plaintiff Roselía Rojas Morales, and her husband, over the land in conflict, which they had dedicated to forest reserves, is clearly demonstrated." (Agrarian Tribunal, Vote No. 429 of 3:30 p.m. on July 24, 1997). This interpretation by the Agrarian Tribunal regarding the substantive norms of indigenous agrarian property, as special property, finds perfect support in the constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes the administrative powers of the local indigenous governments, under the forms of the Associations, to make the necessary decisions for the defense of their rights. Otherwise, "...it would be disregarding the fundamental right of Indigenous Peoples to have their own representative bodies and to be able to act autonomously in the defense of their rights..." (Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), No. 2005-06856, at 10:02 a.m. on June 1, 2005). Thus, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a higher rank to International Conventions, such as ILO Convention No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), which even grant a higher degree of protection to indigenous persons, that is, an 'elevated level of protection' with respect to those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand, in ordinary Courts, respect for the decisions that, through the channel of custom and the self-determination of said indigenous peoples, are derived from the communities themselves and their representatives.

IX.- Added to the foregoing, it is appropriate to conduct an analysis of national regulations in light of the jurisprudence on the human rights of indigenous people, emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the judgment of August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingny Community VS. Nicaragua), the following was stated, as is relevant to this case: "146. The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, and therefore cannot be equated to the meaning attributed to them in domestic law. Moreover, such human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times, and, in particular, to current living conditions. 147. In turn, Article 29.b of the Convention establishes that no provision can be interpreted in the sense of 'restricting the enjoyment and exercise of any right or freedom that may be recognized in accordance with the laws of any of the States Parties or in accordance with another convention to which one of said States is a party.' 148. By means of an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights, taking into account the applicable rules of interpretation and, in accordance with Article 29.b of the Convention—which prohibits a restrictive interpretation of rights—, this Court holds that Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that comprises, among others, the rights of members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized in the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. 149. Given the characteristics of the present case, it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding the concept of property in indigenous communities. Among indigenous peoples there exists a communitarian tradition concerning a communal form of collective property over the land, in the sense that belonging to it is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community. Indigenous peoples, by the very fact of their existence, have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship that indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, including in order to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations… 151. The customary law of indigenous peoples must be especially taken into account, for the purposes herein.

As a result of custom, the possession of the land should be sufficient for indigenous communities lacking a formal title over land ownership to obtain official recognition of said ownership and the subsequent registration…” (The underlining is not in the original).

**X.-** From all the foregoing, it is concluded that indigenous property and possession is governed by customary norms, and the characteristics of this special type of agrarian property must be highlighted: First, the institution must be recognized as having an *originary* (originario) character that is supralegal and supraconstitutional, as it is recognized in International Human Rights Treaties, and it is a character conferred by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself. Second, indigenous property is of a collective or *community* (comunitario) character; its belonging is not to an individual, but to a group. Third, it exists and is the fundamental basis of their culture, their spiritual life, and their economic subsistence. Fourth, the sense of belonging to indigenous property is not measured by a title –whether registered or not– but by the *possession of the land in a community sense* (posesión de la tierra en sentido comunitario), with the community attending to the needs of each indigenous family, regardless of its mere registration entry. Fifth, the community character of the property means that *conflicts and the disposition of indigenous community property fall under the jurisdiction of the community itself*, in our case, through the Asociación de Desarrollo, as the "community structure," being the entity competent to dispose of land possession in order to guarantee access to it for all indigenous inhabitants, attending to the needs of each family nucleus. Sixth, in conflicts of indigenous property and possession, *indigenous custom prevails* (prevalece la costumbre indígena), and in this case, that of enjoying collective agrarian property, over positive law which is incompatible with said tradition, making the norms on individual rights enshrined in the positive legal system for the protection of individual property and possession inapplicable, since among indigenous people the collective and distributive interest of the property, according to the needs of each one, must prevail over the purely individual interest. Therefore, if the essential core of collective indigenous property is the group or community ownership of the land, this makes the right to possess, occupy, and utilize the land inherent to the self-idea that indigenous peoples have of themselves, with that right being conferred on the local community, the tribe, the nation, or the group of indigenous people.

**XI.-** In countries where communities and indigenous peoples with their own identity exist, like ours, it must be established which systems of authorities, norms, and procedures regulate their social life and resolve their conflicts, since in principle they are different from the state order regulated by positive law. Customary law is normally characterized by the following elements: a) the existence of norms, uses, and customs; b) the authorities and collective bodies charged with imparting justice and, c) the existence of their own methods of conflict resolution. That is to say, it is an entire legal system that allows the collective to resolve conflicts internally, within the sphere in which it acts and where the influence of the authority reaches in relation to the individual's belonging to the social group. That is, customary law is based on a long tradition of approved practices in a specific cultural context, with a global vision, and where it is administered by authorities appointed by the community itself. Normally, indigenous community justice has more local and direct mechanisms, an oral and flexible procedure that is not necessarily equitable, with internal conflicts being resolved through arrangements aimed at maintaining peace in the community. In summary, the main actor of customary law is the community which, with its collective and consensual feeling, imposes itself on individual authority.

**XII.-** Consequently, the grievances of the appellant are seen in light of the foregoing. Regarding the first grievance, since indigenous agrarian property is of a community character, any acquisition by non-indigenous people or between indigenous people not authorized by the community itself through a private purchase/sale is null and illegal, as it contradicts the very nature of the right, being a community asset, since it can perfectly occur that an individual transaction affects the collective interests of the community. By the year 1972, even though indigenous property is, as stated, originary to ancestral peoples, a large number of laws and decrees had already been approved in Costa Rica, as well as Convention 107 of the ILO (OIT), which recognized indigenous property as community property. The Ley Indígena 6172 did nothing other than ratify all the foregoing, expressly establishing in its third article: "*Indigenous people may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereof in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous people, is absolutely null… The reserves shall be governed by the indigenous people in their traditional community structures…*". In the case at hand, the plaintiff maintained in his complaint that the property subject to restitution was located outside the indigenous reserve, indicating that it bordered it on the north and west, which was not real, nor proven. On the contrary, it was determined that the property possessed by the defendants, and by the Asociación, is located within the Reserva Cabécar-Talamanca, hence, as there is no identity of the asset, and since it is located in an indigenous reserve, it can be concluded that we are in the presence of an originary agricultural property of a collective character, and no right of individual property or possession can be claimed over it to the detriment of the community of belonging. Secondly, as has been indicated, the plaintiff could not invoke "prior" rights acquired before the Ley Indígena, or the creation of the reserves themselves, because what occurs with this is a mere "legal recognition," with the ownership title being originary and responding to the demand and style of culture, spiritual life, and economic subsistence needs of the indigenous population. Thirdly, in this grievance the appellant raises an aspect of core importance for customary law, which is that the law established a procedure to resolve the problems of indigenous and non-indigenous possessors, with their improvements needing to be recognized. The grievance is contradictory, because on one hand he claims to be indigenous, and on the other he claims compensation (to which he could be entitled as a non-indigenous person). Note that the Law excludes, and omitted any reference to, compensation for improvements in favor of an indigenous person, and this is precisely due to the very essence and characteristic of indigenous agrarian property as property of the entire community; but on the other hand, he accepts that the Asociación has granted or adjudicated lot No. 7 to him, whereby even if his argument were valid, the truth is that the Asociación –the community– has also been concerned with solving his territorial needs. From the foregoing, the discussion about the indigenous character of the plaintiff is inconsequential, given that the Asociación and he himself recognize said character. Fourthly, it is absolutely inconceivable to counterpose a supposed individual "right of possession," of an exclusive and absolute character, which rather corresponds to a conception of liberal positive law, derived from the French Civil Code, and to attempt to derive from it a potential "adverse possession" (usucapión) on an individual basis, because as has been indicated, this is entirely foreign to the institutions and customs of the indigenous agrarian property right as collective property, where the figure of adverse possession on an individual basis to the detriment of collective property could not be admitted. That would be to superimpose positive law onto customary law, in open violation of the International Treaties recognized by Costa Rica. Fifthly, while it is true that the plaintiff provided a title in which he acquired possession of a plot of land of over two hundred hectares, as has been indicated, the identity of the asset was not proven, because as stated, the lands under dispute are located within the Reserva Indígena (see folios 27 a 30 and judicial inspection on folio 81 and 82), and therefore belong to the Community, with the Asociación being the sole entity charged, as representative of the community, with carrying out distribution for the use and enjoyment of the land, hence there is no reason to exempt the plaintiff from costs, when he sought to be the owner of a communal asset (Article 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria). Finally, regarding the sixth grievance, it must be indicated that the lower court (a-quo), by virtue of the principle of judicial independence, could freely assess the evidence and offer its own criteria in the specific case, whose arguments, although adhering solely to positive law, are correct insofar as it orders that it is a community asset or property.

**XIII.-** For all the reasons set forth above, the appellant not being correct in his grievances, it is appropriate to confirm the appealed judgment." In the following recitals, an analysis of the case law (Jurisprudencia) on the subject will be made in order to resolve the dispute at issue in this litigation with more solid arguments closer to customary law (Derecho Consuetudinario).

VI.- Regarding the issue of indigenous property, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) resolved: “*XII. The previous statement has a strong historical and legal foundation, well known, which resulted in the registration of the Boruca-Térraba Indigenous Reserve (Reserva Indígena) in the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad), which, being a matter of public interest, cannot in any way be ignored by this Court. The Bruncas are located in the South Pacific zone, in what is known as Boruca Curré in the same zone as the Térrabas, who until the 18th century were settled in the Atlantic zone. The first regulation referring to this situation is found in the Law of Vacant Lands (Ley de Terrenos Baldíos) number 13 of January 10, 1939, establishing in its article 8 that “....a prudential zone is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, at the discretion of the Executive Branch, in places where Tribes of these exist, in order to preserve our autochthonous race and to liberate them from future injustices.” This rule, which could be understood as programmatic, was expanded by Decree number 45 of December 3, 1945, creating the Board for the Protection of Aboriginal Races of the Nation (Junta de Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de la Nación), whose basic function was aimed at protecting the lands of the aborigines. Shortly thereafter, by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 34 of November 15, 1956, the indigenous reserves Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra, and China Kichá were declared. By virtue of this regulation, the Boruca Terrába Indigenous Reserve was declared inalienable, exclusive property of the indigenous people under the terms of the Law of Vacant Lands. *These provisions acquired a rank superior even to the Law (Ley), pursuant to Article 7 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), insofar as the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), through Law number 2330 of April 9, 1959 (La Gaceta number 84 of April 17, 1959), approved Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization (Organización Internacional del Trabajo) concerning the “Protection and integration of indigenous populations and other tribal and semi-tribal populations,” which, among other things, recognizes their legitimate right to have under their control the lands they own, whether individually or collectively, and that succession shall be governed by the principles of the peoples' customs.* The Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) number 2825 of October 14, 1961, also incorporated a chapter on the matter with the purpose of protecting those lands and the autochthonous races. It was from this regulation that, by executive decrees of 1996, number 11 of April 2 and number 26 of November 12, it was ordered that the three indigenous reserves created in 1956 be registered in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), now the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), one of them being Boruca Térraba. The foregoing means that this reserve is registered and has legal protection regarding the inalienability of its lands, even before the Law for the Creation of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) number 5251 of July 11, 1973. In the latter, its transitory provision established that the Institute of Lands and Colonization would hand over the lands through the possessory information procedure to the indigenous people, later reformed by Law number 5651 of December 13, 1974, to return to the concepts of inalienability. This also means that the Boruca Térraba Indigenous Reserve had a special regime long before the State's action to legalize the situation of the indigenous reserves through Executive Decree number 5904-G of March 11, 1976 (for those of Chirripó, Guaymí de Coto Brus, Estrella, Guatuso, and Talamanca) or the same Executive Decree number 6037-G of March 26, 1976. The reserves acquired legal rank by Article 1 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) number 6712 of November 29, 1977, by expressly citing the decrees constituting them, to have more detailed treatment through the Regulation of the Indigenous Law (Reglamento de la Ley Indígena), Executive Decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978. The analysis of all this regulation exceeds the needs required by the case to resolve the appeal, but it does allow for a broader view regarding the alleged property and possession rights..” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 223 at 3:30 p.m. on July 6, 1990. – The underlined text is not original-).* VII.- This Court, in a ruling on possessory conflicts between indigenous people, stated the following: “*The Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) number six thousand one hundred seventy-two published on December twentieth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven, establishes in its articles 3, 4, and 5, among other things, the inalienable and imprescriptible character of the Indigenous Reserves. Indigenous people can only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people, and they are expressly protected from invasions carried out by non-indigenous third parties on the reserves, as the competent authorities must immediately proceed with their eviction without payment of any compensation (article 5, second paragraph). Furthermore, the Regulation to the Indigenous Law (Reglamento a la Ley Indígena), Executive Decree Number eight thousand four hundred eighty-seven-G of April twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred seventy-eight, in its article 10 provides that “To guarantee the rights regulated in articles 3 and 5 of the Law (Ley), the President of the Integral Development Association (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral) shall appear, personally or through his attorney-in-fact or delegate, as soon as possible after the infraction occurs, accompanied by the certification showing the registration of the Reserve (Reserva), to initiate, before the competent official, the corresponding legal action.” As we see, *neither the Law nor the Regulation establishes protection of the reserves or possessions of the indigenous people against invasions carried out by themselves; normally, conflicts between indigenous people are resolved administratively, through the respective Association (Asociación), which is responsible for granting “concessions” or possession rights to each indigenous person or family group according to their needs. The Association (Asociación), in case of discord, summons the parties to an oral appearance and seeks to resolve the conflict internally, imposing warnings on the offender; however, said Entity does not have coercive measures with which to repress crimes by repeat indigenous offenders; hence, ultimately, they must resort to common jurisdictional instances to give* *solution to them*..It is evident that in our country, the majority of indigenous populations have a fairly advanced degree of cultural evolution, and due to their current form of organization, through Development Associations, the resolution of conflicts is sought internally, and only in extreme cases -as, we repeat, is the present case-, is the repressive avenue of the Courts resorted to, which in any case are obliged to abide by the provisions of the cited international conventions*.” (Agrarian Court (Tribunal Agrario), No. 107 at 10:20 a.m. on February 16, 1994).

VIII.- Regarding the efficacy of the agreements reached by indigenous communities on matters of agrarian possession, it has also been stated: “*Agrarian Courts cannot deny jurisdictional protection to indigenous possession problems. On the contrary, they must have a special sensitivity towards such types of conflicts, and even know their customs, in order to thereby impose the respect that agreements reached in the administrative forum deserve. While it is true that the indigenous agrarian property regime is an exception, regarding collective property, it is not possible to ignore the legitimate possession exercised in our country by each indigenous family. Therefore, if an administrative solution has not been reached, through the Association (Asociación) or the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas), or if having been reached, the agreements are disrespected, the Agrarian Courts in the final instance must restore the corresponding rights, in order to provide the Indigenous Community (Comunidad Indígena) with adequate protection suited to their cultural forms. In the present case, the legitimate possession exercised by the plaintiff Roselía Rojas Morales, and her husband, over the land in conflict, which they had dedicated to forest reserves, is clearly demonstrated.* (Agrarian Court, Ruling No. 429 at 3:30 p.m. on July 24, 1997). This interpretation by the Agrarian Court regarding the substantive norms of indigenous agrarian property, as special property, finds perfect support in the constitutional case law that recognizes the administrative powers of indigenous local governments, under the forms of the Associations, to make the necessary decisions for the defense of their rights. Otherwise, “...the fundamental right of Indigenous peoples to have their own representative bodies and to be able to act autonomously in the defense of their rights would be ignored…” (Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), No. 2005-06856, at 10:02 a.m. on June 1, 2005). Our constitutional case law thus recognizes a superior hierarchy to International Conventions, such as that of the ILO (OIT), No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), which even grant a higher degree of protection to indigenous persons, that is, an “elevated level of protection” regarding those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand respect, in ordinary Courts, for the decisions that, through the custom and self-determination of said indigenous peoples, derive from the communities themselves and their representatives.

IX.- Added to the foregoing, it is pertinent to analyze the national regulations in light of the case law on human rights of indigenous people, emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos). In the judgment of August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna Community (Comunidad Mayagna) (Sumo) Awas Tingni VS. Nicaragua), the following was stated, as relevant to this case: “*146. The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, so they cannot be equated to the meaning attributed to them in domestic law. Furthermore, such human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times, and, in particular, to current living conditions. 147. In turn, Article 29.b of the Convention (Convención) establishes that no provision may be interpreted in the sense of “limiting the enjoyment and exercise of any right or freedom that may be recognized under the laws of any State party or under another convention to which one of said States is a party.” 148. Through an *evolutionary interpretation of international human rights protection instruments*, taking into account the applicable rules of interpretation and, in accordance with Article 29.b of the Convention— (Convención)— which prohibits a restrictive interpretation of rights—, this Court considers that Article 21 of the Convention (Convención) protects the right to property in a sense that comprises, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) of Nicaragua. 149. Given the characteristics of the present case, it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding the concept of property in indigenous communities. *Among indigenous peoples, there exists a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective land ownership, in the sense that belonging to it is centered not on an individual but on the group and its community. Indigenous peoples, by the very fact of their existence, have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship that indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production but a material and spiritual element they must fully enjoy*, including to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations…151. *The customary law of indigenous peoples must be taken especially into account, for the purposes at hand. As a product of custom, possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking a real title to land ownership to obtain official recognition of said ownership* and the subsequent registration…” (The underlined text is not from the original).

X.- From all of the foregoing, it is concluded that indigenous property and possession are governed by customary norms, and the characteristics of this special type of agrarian property must be highlighted: Firstly, an *originary* (originario) character, supra-legal and supra-constitutional, must be recognized in the institute, as it is recognized in International Human Rights Treaties, and it is a character granted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself. Secondly, indigenous property is of a collective or *communitarian* (comunitario) character; the belonging is not of an individual, but of a group. Thirdly, it exists and is the fundamental basis of their culture, their spiritual life, and their economic subsistence. Fourthly, the sense of belonging to indigenous property is not measured by a title –registered or not–, but by the *possession of the land in a communitarian sense*, with the community attending to the needs of each indigenous family, independently of mere registry registration. Fifthly, the communitarian character of property means that *the conflicts and the disposition of indigenous communitarian property are the competence of the community itself*, in our case, through the Development Association (Asociación de Desarrollo), as a “communitarian structure,” it being the competent body to dispose of land possession in order to guarantee access to it for all indigenous inhabitants, attending to the needs of each family nucleus. Sixthly, in conflicts of indigenous property and possession, *indigenous custom prevails*, and in this case, the custom of enjoying collective agrarian property, over positive law that is incompatible with said tradition, the norms on individual rights enshrined in the positive legal order for the protection of individual property and possession being inapplicable, since among indigenous people the collective and distributive interest of property must prevail, according to the needs of each one, over the purely individual interest. Therefore, if the essential core of indigenous collective property is group or communitarian ownership of the land, this makes the right to possess, occupy, and use the land inherent to the very idea that indigenous peoples have of themselves, with this right being conferred on the local community, the tribe, the nation, or the group of indigenous people.

XI.- In countries where communities and indigenous peoples with their own identity exist, such as ours, it must be established which systems of authorities, norms, and procedures regulate their social life and resolve their conflicts, since, in principle, they are different from the state order regulated by positive law. Customary law (Derecho consuetudinario) is normally characterized by the following elements: a) the existence of norms, uses, and customs; b) the authorities and collective bodies responsible for administering justice, and c) the existence of their own methods of conflict resolution. That is, it is an entire legal system that allows the collectivity to resolve conflicts internally, within the sphere in which it operates and where the authority's influence reaches in relation to the individual's belonging to the social group. That is, customary law is based on a long tradition of approved practices in a specific cultural context, with a global vision, and where it is administered by authorities appointed by the community itself. Normally, indigenous communitarian justice has more local and direct mechanisms, an oral and flexible procedure that is not necessarily equitable, with internal conflicts being resolved through arrangements aimed at maintaining peace in the community. In summary, the main actor of customary law is the community, which with its collective and consensual feeling imposes itself on individual authority.

XII.- Consequently, the grievances of the appellant are examined in light of what has been set forth above. Regarding the first grievance, indigenous agrarian property being of a communitarian character, any acquisition by non-indigenous people or between indigenous people that is not authorized by the community itself through a private sale is null and illegal, as it contradicts the very nature of the right, being a communitarian good, since it can perfectly occur that an individual transaction affects the collective interests of the community. For the year 1972, even though indigenous property is, as stated, originary of ancestral peoples, a great number of laws and decrees had already been approved in Costa Rica, as well as ILO Convention 107, which recognized indigenous property as communitarian property. The Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) 6172 did nothing more than ratify all the foregoing, expressly establishing in its third article: “*Indigenous people may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people. Every transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereto in indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous people, is absolutely null… The reserves shall be governed by indigenous people in their traditional communitarian structures…*” In the case at hand, the plaintiff maintained in his claim that the property subject to restitution was located outside the indigenous reserve, stating that it bordered it to the north and to the west, which was neither real nor proven. On the contrary, it was determined that the property possessed by the defendants, and by the Association (Asociación), is located within the Cabécar-Talamanca Reserve (Reserva Cabécar-Talamanca); hence, since the identity of the good does not exist, and the same is located in an indigenous reserve, it can be concluded that we are in the presence of originary agrarian property of a collective character, and no right of individual property or possession can be claimed over it to the detriment of the community of belonging. Secondly, as indicated, the plaintiff could not invoke “prior” rights acquired before the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), or the creation of the reserves themselves, since what occurs with this is a mere “legal recognition,” the title of property being originary and responding to the demands and style of culture, spiritual life, and economic subsistence needs of the indigenous population. Thirdly, in this grievance, the appellant raises an aspect of core importance for customary law (derecho consuetudinario), which is that the law established a procedure to resolve the problems of indigenous and non-indigenous possessors, with their improvements needing to be recognized. The grievance is contradictory, as on one hand he claims to be indigenous, and on the other, he claims compensation (to which he could be entitled as a non-indigenous person).

See that the Law excludes, and omitted any reference to compensation for improvements in favor of an indigenous person, and this responds precisely to the very essence and characteristic of indigenous agrarian property as property of the entire community; but on the other hand, it accepts that the Association has granted or allocated to him lot No. 7, such that even if his argument were valid, the truth is that the Association—community—has also taken care to address his territorial needs. Consequently, the discussion about the indigenous character of the plaintiff is moot, given that the Association itself and he himself acknowledge that character. In fourth place, it is absolutely inconceivable to oppose an alleged individual “right of possession,” of an exclusive and absolute nature, which responds rather to a conception of liberal positive law derived from the French Civil Code, and to seek to derive from it a potential “usucapión” (adverse possession) on an individual basis, since, as has been indicated, this is completely alien to the institutions and customs of indigenous agrarian property law as collective property, under which the figure of adverse possession on an individual basis to the detriment of collective property could not be admitted. That would be to superimpose positive law upon customary law, in open violation of the International Treaties recognized by Costa Rica. In fifth place, although it is true that the plaintiff submitted a title through which he acquired possession of a parcel of land of more than two hundred hectares, as has been indicated, the identity of the property has not been demonstrated, since, as was stated, the lands that are the subject of the dispute are located within the Indigenous Reserve (see folios 27 a 30 and judicial inspection at folios 81 and 82), and therefore belong to the Community, the Association being the sole entity charged, as representative of the community, with carrying out the distribution for the use and enjoyment of the land, hence there is no reason to exempt the plaintiff from costs, when he sought to be the titleholder of a communal property (article 55 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction). Finally, regarding the sixth grievance, it must be indicated that the lower court, by virtue of the principle of judicial independence, could freely assess the evidence and render its own criterion in the specific case, whose arguments, though adhering only to positive law, are correct in as much as it orders that it is a communal property or good.

XIII.- For all the reasons set forth above, as the appellant’s grievances lack merit, the appealed judgment must be confirmed.

"III.- El apoderado especial judicial del actor, licenciado Alvaro Montero Vega interpuso recurso de apelación argumentando lo siguiente: 1.- Su poderdante pretende reivindicar su derecho de posesión, adquirido el 14 de octubre de 1972 y el cual no estaba inscrito para esa fecha, siendo que su anterior dueña lo poseyó por seis años. 2.- Cuando se crearon las reservas territoriales indígenas, ya el actor tenía derechos adquiridos como poseedor, por lo cual no se podría arrebatar dando efectos retroactivos a la Ley, siendo que los linderos de la Reserva fueron establecidos varios años después de su creación en 1977. 3.- La Ley Indígena No. 6172 estableció un procedimiento para resolver los problemas de los poseedores indígenas y no indígenas que hubieren quedado dentro de las reservas, y se deberían reconocer sus mejoras y reubicarlos en zonas fuera de ellas, siendo que al actor nunca se le propuso esa solución, siendo él y su familia indígena. Aduce es erróneo se le pida demostrar su condición de tal, en cuanto la misma Asociación afirma es indígena, pues aparece con un derecho como tal al lote No. 7, del cual se adjuntó un croquis en la contestación; además, dice, le resulta extraño que no habiéndose debatido su condición aborigen, se traiga al dictar sentencia. 4.- Es de sumo interés, dice, definir si un poseedor de más de diez años, que adquirió esos terrenos cuando no se encontraban inscritos, tiene derecho a defender su posesión y recurrir a los tribunales a plantear una acción reivindicatoria, siendo que el Código Civil recogió y plasmó preceptos de la doctrina romana sobre la usucapión y la jurisprudencia francesa. Invoca los artículos 316, 317, 318, 320 y 322 del Código, para sostener su acción reivindicatoria como poseedor, pues negarle a defender su derecho a la acción reivindicatoria sería negarle la posibilidad de ejercitar un derecho que el Código Civil y la doctrina agraria le otorgan. 5.- La prueba aportada a los autos, dice, es clara y contundente y demuestra su derecho de posesión anterior a la creación de la Reserva Indígena, de ahí que tenga personería activa para demandar, al ejercer una posesión pacífica, continua, personal, de buena fe, siendo que debería absolverse del pago de costas del proceso. 6.- Le resulta extraño que el a-quo haya “echado por la borda” la sentencia y la apreciación de la prueba de la misma dictada con antelación y que fue anulada, por lo cual se pide al Tribunal tome en cuenta los hechos probados y no probados de dicho fallo, en particular la apreciación de la prueba. […]

V.- La presente acción podría calificarse como “de mejor derecho de posesión”, pues se trata de un conflicto entre indígenas que disputan la posesión de una parcela ubicada dentro de la Reserva Indígena Cabécar de Talamanca. Si bien es cierto, la demanda de Nicomedes Hidalgo Villanueva se titula como “ordinario agrario de reivindicación”, en la misma demanda se indica el inmueble está sin inscribir, ubicado fuera de la reserva indígena y colindante con ésta por el Norte y por el Oeste (ver folios 8 y 9). Los demandados, sin embargo, al contestar, indican que dicho inmueble, forma parte de la reserva indígena, y está inscrito a nombre de la Asociación (ver contestación de folios 20 a 26), reclamando la falta de identidad del bien. En consecuencia, es un problema en el cual se discute la posesión indígena, y no la titularidad sobre el bien, que por ley le corresponde a la Asociación. En ese sentido, no es posible entrar a discutir a quien corresponde la titularidad sobre esa parcela, sino a quien le corresponde la posesión legítima sobre el fundo en conflicto, lo cual es perfectamente posible en esta vía ordinaria, siempre y cuando se respete la normativa indígena dictada por nuestro legislador, así como el Derecho Consuetudinario que, como se verá, rige la propiedad agraria indígena como propiedad colectiva. En los próximos considerandos se hará un análisis de la Jurisprudencia vertida sobre el tema a fin de resolver la controversia objeto de esta litis con argumentos más sólidos y cercanos al Derecho Consuetudinario VI.- En relación con el tema de la propiedad indígena la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resolvió: “XII. La afirmación anterior tiene un fuerte raigambre histórico y jurídico, muy conocido que dio como consecuencia la inscripción en el Registro Público de la Propiedad de la Reserva Indígena Boruca- Térraba, lo cual por ser de interés público, no puede en modo alguno soslayar este Tribunal. Los Bruncas, están ubicados en la zona del Pacífico Sur, en lo que se conoce como Boruca Curré en la misma zona que se hayan los térrabas que hasta el siglo XVIII estuvieron asentados en la zona atlántica. La primera normativa que hace referencia a esta situación se encuentra en la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos número 13 de 10 de enero de 1939 al establecer en su artículo 8 que "....se declara inalienable y de propiedad exclusiva de los indígenas, una zona prudencial a juicio del Poder Ejecutivo en los lugares en donde exista Tribus de éstos, a fin de que conserven nuestra raza autóctona y de liberarlos de futuras injusticias". Esta norma, que pudiera entenderse, como prográmatica, fue ampliada por el Decreto número 45 de 3 de diciembre de 1945, al crear la Junta de Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de la Nación, cuya función básica tendía a la protección de las tierras de los aborígenes. Poco tiempo después, por Decreto Ejecutivo número 34 de 15 de noviembre de 1956 se declararon las reservas indígenas Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra y China Kichá. En virtud de esta normativa la Reserva Indígena Boruca Terrába fue declarada inalienable, propiedad exclusiva de los indígenas en los términos de la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos. Estas disposiciones adquirieron rango superior incluso a la Ley, al tenor del artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto la Asamblea Legislativa por Ley número 2330 del 9 de abril de 1959 ( La Gaceta número 84 de 17 de abril de 1959) aprobó el convenio número 107 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo relativo a la "Protección e integración de las poblaciones indígenas y de otras poblaciones tribales y semitribales", el cual, entre otras cosas, les reconoce su legítimo derecho a tener bajo su dominio las tierras de su propiedad, sea ello en forma individual y colectiva y que la sucesión se regirá por los principios de las costumbres de los pueblos. La Ley de Tierras y Colonización número 2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961 también incorporó un capítulo referido al tema con el objeto de proteger esas tierras y a las razas autóctonas. Fue a partir de esta normativa que por Decretos ejecutivos de 1996, número 11 del 2 de abril y número 26 de 12 de noviembre, se ordenó inscribir a nombre del Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario las tres reservas indígenas creadas en 1956, siendo una de ellas la Boruca Térraba. Lo anterior significa que esta reserva se encuentra inscrita y con protección legal en cuanto a la inalienabilidad de sus tierras, aún antes de la Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas número 5251 de 11 de julio de 1973. En esta última su transitorio estableció que el Instituto de Tierras y Colonización entregaría las tierras por medio del trámite de información posesoria a los indígenas, siendo luego reformado por la Ley número 5651 de 13 de diciembre de 1974 para regresar a los conceptos de la inalienalidad. Esto quiere decir, también, que la Reserva Indígena Boruca Térraba tuvo un régimen especial mucho antes de la acción del Estado por legalizar la situación de las reservas indígenas a través del Decreto ejecutivo número 5904-G del 11 de marzo de 1976 ( para las del Chirripó, Guaymí de Coto Brus, Estrella, Guatuso y Talamanca) o el mismo Decreto ejecutivo número 6037-G del 26 de marzo de 1976. Las reservas adquieron rango legal por el artículo 1 de la Ley Indígena número 6712 del 29 de noviembre de 1977, al citarse expresamente los decretos constitutivos de ellas, para tener un tratamiento más detallado a través del Reglamento de la Ley Indígena, Decreto ejecutivo número 8487-G del 26 de abril de 1978. El análisis de toda esa normativa rebasa las necesidades requeridas por el caso para resolver el recurso, pero sí permite tener una visión más amplia en torno a los derechos de propiedad y posesión alegados.."(Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No.223 de las 15:30 horas del 6 de julio de 1990. – Lo subrayado no es original-).

VII.- Este Tribunal, en un fallo sobre conflictos posesorios entre indígenas, señaló lo siguiente: "La Ley Indígena número seis mil ciento setenta y dos publicada el veinte de diciembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete, establece en sus artículos 3, 4, y 5, entre otras cosas, el carácter inalienable e imprescriptible de las Reservas Indígenas. Los indígenas solo pueden negociar sus tierras con otros indígenas, y están protegidos expresamente de las invasiones que ejecuten terceros no indígenas sobre las reservas, pues de inmediato las autoridades competentes deben proceder a su desalojo sin pago de indemnización alguna (artículo 5 párrafo segundo). Además el Reglamento a la Ley Indígena Decreto Ejecutivo Número ocho mil cuatrocientos ochenta y siete-G de veintiséis de abril de mil novecientos setenta y ocho, en su artículo 10 dispone que "Para garantizar los derechos regulados en los artículos 3 y 5 de la Ley, el Presidente de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral comparecerá por sí o a través de su apoderado o delegado, a la mayor brevedad posible, después de producida la infracción, acompañando la certificación donde aparezca la inscripción de la Reserva, para incoar, ante el funcionario competente, la acción legal correspondiente." Como vemos, ni la Ley ni el Reglamento establecen la protección de las reservas o posesiones de los indígenas, por invasiones ejecutadas por ellos mismos; normalmente los conflictos entre indígenas, son solucionados administrativamente, a través de la Asociación respectiva, que es la encargada de otorgar "concesiones" o derechos de posesión a cada indígena o grupo familiar de acuerdo a sus necesidades. La Asociación, en caso de discordia cita a las partes a una comparecencia oral y se procura solucionar internamente el conflicto, imponiéndosele advertencias al infractor, sin embargo, dicho Ente no goza de medidas coactivas con los cuales reprimir delitos de indígenas reincidentes; de ahí que en última instancia deban acudir a instancias Jurisdiccionales comunes para dar solución a los mismos...Es evidente que en nuestro país, la mayor parte de poblaciones indígenas, tienen un grado de evolución cultural bastante avanzado, y por su forma de organización actual, a través de Asociaciones de Desarrollo, se busca la solución de conflictos internamente, y solo en casos extremos -como, repetimos es el presente-, se acude a la vía represiva de los Tribunales, que en todo caso están obligados a acatar las disposiciones de los citados convenios internacionales."(Tribunal Agrario, No. 107 de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 16 de febrero de 1994).

VIII.- En relación con la eficacia de los acuerdos tomados por las comunidades indígenas, sobre los temas de posesión agraria, también se ha indicado: “Los Tribunales agrarios no pueden negar protección jurisdiccional a los problemas de posesión indígena. Al contrario, deben tener una especial sensibilidad hacia dicho tipo de conflictos, he incluso conocer sus costumbres, para lograr de esa forma imponer el respeto que merecen los acuerdos pactados en sede administrativa. Si bien es cierto, el régimen de la propiedad agraria indígena es una excepción, en cuanto a la propiedad colectiva, no es posible desconocer la posesión legítima que ejercita en nuestro país cada familia indígena. Por ello si no se ha alcanzado una solución administrativa, a través de la Asociación o de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, o si habiéndose alcanzado, se irrespetan los acuerdos, los Tribunales Agrarios en última instancia deberán restablecer los derechos que correspondan, a fin de brindar a la Comunidad Indígena, una tutela adecuada a sus formas culturales. En el presente caso, está claramente demostrada la posesión legítima que ejercía la actora Roselía Rojas Morales, y su esposo, sobre el terreno en conflicto, el cual lo tenían dedicado a reservas forestales. (Tribunal Agrario, Voto No. 429 de las 15:30 horas del 24 de julio de 1997). Esta interpretación del Tribunal Agrario referida a las normas sustantivas de la propiedad agraria indígena, como propiedad especial, encuentra perfecto respaldo en la jurisprudencia constitucional que reconoce las potestades administrativas de los gobiernos locales indígenas, bajo las figuras de las Asociaciones, a tomar las decisiones necesarias para la defensa de sus derechos. De lo contrario, “…se estaría desconociendo el derecho fundamental de los Indígenas a tener sus propios organismos representativos y a poder actuar en forma autónoma en la defensa de sus derechos…” (Sala Constitucional, No. 2005-06856, de las 10:02 horas del 1 de junio del 2005). Reconoce de esa forma, nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional, una jerarquía superior a los Convenios Internacionales, tales como el de la OIT, No. 169 (Ley 7316 del 3 de noviembre de 1992), que otorgan inclusive un grado de tutela superior a las personas indígenas, es decir, un “nivel elevado de protección” respecto de aquellos derechos humanos contemplados en la propia Constitución Política, y que por ende exigen el respeto, en los Tribunales ordinarios, de las decisiones que por la vía de la costumbre y la autodeterminación de dichos pueblos indígenas se deriven de las propias comunidades y sus representantes.

IX.- Aunado a lo anterior, conviene realizar un análisis de la normativa nacional, a la luz de la jurisprudencia sobre derechos humanos de los indígenas, emanada de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. En la sentencia del 31 de agosto del 2001 (Caso de la Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingny VS. Nicaragua), se señaló en lo que interesa para este caso lo siguiente: “146. Los términos de un tratado internacional de derechos humanos tienen sentido autónomo, por lo que no pueden ser equiparados al sentido que se les atribuye en el derecho interno. Además, dichos tratados de derechos humanos son instrumentos vivos cuya interpretación tiene que adecuarse a la evolución de los tiempos, y, en particular, a las condiciones de vida actuales. 147. A u vez, el artículo 29.b de la Convención establece que ninguna disposición puede ser interpretada en el sentido de “limitar el goce y ejercicio de cualquier derecho o libertad que pueda estar reconocido de acuerdo con las leyes de cualquiera de los Estados partes o de acuerdo con otra convención en que sea parte uno de dichos Estados”. 148. Mediante una interpretación evolutiva de los instrumentos internacionales de protección derechos humanos, tomando en cuenta las normas de interpretación aplicables y, de conformidad con el artículo 29.b de la Convención- que prohibe una interpretación restrictiva de los derechos-, esta Corte considera que el artículo 21 de la Convención protege el derecho a la propiedad en un sentido que comprende, entre otros, los derechos de los miembros de las comunidades indígenas en el marco de la propiedad comunal, la cual también está reconocida en la Constitución Política de Nicaragua. 149. Dadas las características del presente caso, es menester hacer algunas precisiones respecto del concepto de propiedad en las comunidades indígenas. Entre los indígenas existe una tradición comunitaria sobre una forma comunal de la propiedad colectiva de la tierra, en el sentido de que la pertenencia a ésta no se centra en un individuo sino en el grupo y su comunidad. Los indígenas por el hecho de su propia existencia tienen derecho a vivir libremente en sus propios territorios; la estrecha relación que los indígenas mantienen con la tierra debe de ser reconocida y comprendida como la base fundamental de sus culturas, su vida espiritual, su integridad y su supervivencia económica. Para las comunidades indígenas la relación con la tierra no es meramente una cuestión de posesión y producción sino un elemento material y espiritual del que deben gozar plenamente, inclusive para preservar su legado cultural y transmitirlo a las generaciones futuras…151. El derecho consuetudinario de los pueblos indígenas debe ser tenido especialmente en cuenta, para los efectos de que se trata. Como producto de la costumbre, la posesión de la tierra debería bastar para que las comunidades indígenas que carezcan de un título real sobre la propiedad de la tierra obtengan el reconocimiento oficial de dicha propiedad y el consiguiente registro…” (Lo subrayado no es del original).

X.- De todo lo anterior, se concluye, que la propiedad y la posesión indígena, se rige por las normas consuetudinarias, siendo que deben resaltarse las características de este tipo especial de propiedad agraria: En primer lugar, debe reconocerse en el instituto un carácter originario supralegal y supraconstitucional, pues es reconocido en los Tratados Internacionales de derechos humanos, y es un carácter que le otorga la propia Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. En segundo lugar, la propiedad indígena es de carácter colectivo o comunitaria, la pertenencia de ésta no es de un individuo, sino de un grupo. En tercer lugar, ella existe y es la base fundamental, de su cultura, de su vida espiritual y de su subsistencia económica. En cuarto lugar, el sentido de pertenencia de la propiedad indígena no se mide por un título –inscrito o no-, sino por la posesión de la tierra en sentido comunitario, atendiendo la comunidad a las necesidades de cada familia indígena, independientemente de su mera inscripción registral. En quinto lugar, el carácter comunitario de la propiedad hace que los conflictos y la disposición de la propiedad comunitaria indígena sea competencia de la misma comunidad, en nuestro caso, a través de la Asociación de Desarrollo, como “estructura comunitaria”, siendo ella la competente para disponer de la posesión de la tierra a fin de garantizar el acceso a ella a todos los pobladores indígenas, atendiendo a las necesidades de cada núcleo familiar. En sexto lugar, en los conflictos de propiedad y posesión indígena, prevalece la costumbre indígena, y en este caso, la de gozar de una propiedad agraria colectiva, sobre el derecho positivo que es incompatible con dicha tradición, siendo inaplicables las normas sobre derechos individuales consagradas en el ordenamiento jurídico positivo para la tutela de la propiedad y la posesión individuales, pues entre indígenas deberá prevalecer el interés colectivo y distributivo de la propiedad, de acuerdo a las necesidades de cada uno, sobre el interés puramente individual. Por lo anterior, si el núcleo esencial de la propiedad colectiva indígena es la titularidad grupal o comunitaria sobre la tierra, ello hace que el derecho a poseer, ocupar y utilizar la tierra sea inherente a la idea de sí mismos que tienen los pueblos indígenas, siendo a la comunidad local, la tribu, la nación o el grupo de indígenas a quien se confiere ese derecho.

XI.- En los países donde existen comunidades y pueblos indígenas con identidad propia, como el nuestro, se debe establecer cuáles sistemas de autoridades, normas y procedimientos regulan su vida social y resuelven sus conflictos, pues en principio son diferentes del orden estatal regulado por el Derecho positivo. El derecho consuetudinario normalmente se caracteriza por los siguientes elementos: a) la existencia de normas, usos y costumbres; b) las autoridades y órganos colectivos encargados de impartir justicia y, c) la existencia de propios métodos de solución de conflictos. Es decir, se trata de todo un sistema jurídico que permite a la colectividad resolver los conflictos internamente, dentro del ámbito en el que actúa y donde alcanza la influencia de la autoridad en relación con la pertenencia del individuo al grupo social. Es decir, el derecho consuetudinario se basa en una larga tradición de prácticas aprobadas en un contexto cultural determinado, con una visión global, y donde es administrado por las autoridades nombradas por la misma comunidad. Normalmente, la justicia comunitaria indígena tiene mecanismos más locales y directos, un procedimiento oral y flexible que no necesariamente es equitativo, siendo que los conflictos de carácter interno se resuelve mediante arreglos tendientes a mantener la paz en comunidad. En síntesis, el actor principal del Derecho consuetudinario es la comunidad que con su sentir colectivo y consensuado se impone a la autoridad individual.

XII.- Se ve, en consecuencia, los agravios del recurrente, a la luz de lo agraria indígena, de carácter comunitario, cualquier adquisición, de no indígenas o entre indígenas no autorizada por la propia comunidad mediante compraventa privada es nula e ilegal, pues está en contraposición de la propia naturaleza del derecho, al ser un bien comunitario, pues perfectamente puede ocurrir que mediante un negocio individual se afecten los intereses colectivos de la comunidad. Para el año 1972, aún cuando la propiedad indígena es como se expuso, originaria de los pueblos ancestrales, ya en Costa Rica se habían aprobado una gran cantidad de leyes y decretos, así como el Convenio 107 de la OIT, que reconocían la propiedad indígena como propiedad comunitaria. La Ley Indígena 6172 no hizo otra cosa que ratificar todo lo anterior, estableciendo expresamente en su artículo tercero: “Los indígenas sólo podrán negociar sus tierras con otros indígenas. Todo traspaso o negociación de tierras o mejoras de éstas en las reservas indígenas, entre indígenas y no indígenas, es absolutamente nulo…Las reservas serán regidas por los indígenas en sus estructuras comunitarias tradicionales…”. En el caso que nos ocupa, el actor sostuvo en su demanda, que el inmueble objeto de la restitución estaba ubicado fuera de la reserva indígena, indicando que colindaba con ella por el norte y por el oeste, lo cual no resultó real, ni demostrado. Por el contrario, se determinó que el inmueble poseído por los demandados, y por la Asociación, se encuentra ubicado dentro de la Reserva Cabécar-Talamanca, de ahí que al no existir identidad del bien, y estar el mismo ubicado en una reserva indígena, puede concluirse que se está en presencia de una propiedad agraria originaria y de carácter colectivo, no pudiendo reclamarse sobre ella ningún derecho de propiedad o de posesión individual en perjuicio de la comunidad de pertenencia. En segundo lugar, como se ha indicado, el actor no podría invocar derechos “anteriores” adquiridos antes de la Ley Indígena, o la creación de las mismas reservas, pues lo que se produce con esto es un mero “reconocimiento legal”, siendo que el título de propiedad es originario y responde a la exigencia y estilo de cultura, vida espiritual y necesidades de subsistencia económica de la población indígena. En tercer lugar, en este agravio el recurrente plantea un aspecto de medular importancia para el derecho consuetudinario, cual es que la ley estableció un procedimiento para resolver los problemas de los poseedores indígenas y no indígenas, debiendo reconocerse sus mejoras. Es contradictorio el agravio, pues por un lado alega ser indígena, y por otro reclama una indemnización (a la cual podría tener derecho como no indígena). Véase que la Ley excluye, y omitió toda referencia a una indemnización de mejoras a favor de un indígena, y ello obedece justamente a la propia esencia y característica de la propiedad agraria indígena como propiedad de la entera comunidad; pero por otro lado, acepta que la Asociación le ha otorgado o adjudicado el lote No. 7, con lo cual aunque su argumento fuese válido, lo cierto es que la Asociación –comunidad- se ha preocupado también por solventar sus necesidades de territorio. De lo anterior resulta inocua la discusión sobre el carácter indígena del actor, siendo que la misma Asociación y él mismo reconoce dicho carácter. En cuarto lugar, es absolutamente inconcebible contraponer un supuesto “derecho de posesión” individual, de carácter exclusivo y absoluto, que responde más bien a una concepción del derecho positivo liberal, derivado del Código Civil francés, y pretender derivar de él una eventual “usucapión” a título individual, pues como se ha indicado, ello es totalmente ajeno a las instituciones y costumbres del derecho de propiedad agraria indígena como propiedad colectiva, en donde no podría admitirse la figura de la usucapión a título individual en perjuicio de la propiedad colectiva. Ello sería sobreponer el derecho positivo, al derecho consuetudinario, en violación abierta de los Tratados Internacionales reconocidos por Costa Rica. En quinto lugar, si bien es cierto el actor aportó un título en el cual adquirió la posesión sobre un terreno de más de doscientas hectáreas, como se ha indicado, no se ha demostrado la identidad del bien, pues como se expuso, los terrenos objeto de discordia están ubicados dentro de la Reserva Indígena (ver folios 27 a 30 y reconocimiento judicial de folio 81 y 82), y por ende pertenecientes a la Comunidad, siendo la Asociación el único ente encargado, como representante de la comunidad, de realizar la distribución para el uso y goce de la tierra, de ahí que no exista motivo para eximir en costas al actor, cuando pretendía ser titular de un bien comunal (artículo 55 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria). Finalmente, en cuanto al sexto agravio, debe indicarse que el a-quo, en virtud del principio de independencia judicial, podría valorar libremente la prueba y verter su propio criterio en el caso concreto, cuyos argumentos, si bien apegados solamente al derecho positivo, resultan correctos en cuanto dispone se trata de un bien o propiedad comunitaria.

XIII.- Por todas las razones anteriormente expuestas, no llevando razón el recurrente en sus agravios, procede confirmar la sentencia apelada."