Legal Nature of Worker-Member in Self-Managed CooperativeNaturaleza jurídica del socio-trabajador en cooperativa autogestionaria

**IV. ON THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR BETTER PROVISION:** In this instance, the plaintiff submitted two notarial certificates, visible at folios 251 and 252. By resolution at 3:30 p.m. on August 3, 2005 (folio 276), only the first was admitted (deed number 14 of volume 12 of the protocol of Notary Public [Name1] Sánchez Boza), because the other (deed number 25 idem) was already in the case file (folio 68). At folio 281 appears the filing by which the defendant party responded to the hearing granted for that purpose, referring both to deed number 14 and to deed number 25, but, for the reason noted, only the arguments related to the notarial certificate at folio 251 will be considered. The attorney for the defendants opposes the admission of this evidence because she believes the instrument is null, given that it was drawn up by the plaintiff's legal advisor, who, as such, has an interest in the matter, which is prohibited by Article 7 subsection c) of the Notarial Code. The argument lacks legal basis, because while there may be some type of interest on the part of Licda. Sánchez Boza in winning the lawsuit, this is merely secondary or indirect (insufficient to disqualify her actions as a notary public), since the party truly interested in obtaining victory is the holder of the right being disputed in court. Therefore, her objectivity cannot be understood to be compromised (a requirement contained in subsection d) of numeral 102 of the Notarial Code). Another criticism made is that Ms. [Name1] was permitted to attend the members' assembly in her capacity as legal advisor to the plaintiff, not as a notary public, and the attorney failed to disclose her intention to draft a notarial certificate. However, at the time the events occurred, the title of Attorney at Law simultaneously implied that of Notary Public (it was not required, as it is now, to have a specialization in Notarial Law), so Ms. [Name1]'s attendance at the event was in that dual capacity. On the other hand, Licda. [Name2] had no obligation to identify herself as a notary public or to communicate her purpose of drawing up a notarial certificate, as will be discussed below. Article 101 of the Notarial Code defines the notarial certificate as follows: “Notarial certificates are public instruments whose main purposes are to verify, through the notary public and at the request of an interested party, facts, events, or situations that are known to him or her or occur in his or her presence, to grant them authentic character, or to record notifications, warnings, or intimations as provided by law.” That is, the notarial certificate serves to: a) verify facts, events, or situations known to the notary public or that occur in his or her presence, granting them authentic character, and b) to record notifications, warnings, or intimations. For its part, subsection c) of the following numeral (102) states: “The notary public who does not know those whom he or she must notify, inform, intimate, or warn, must endeavor to identify them and inform them on whose behalf he or she is proceeding, his or her status as a notary public, the proceeding to be carried out, and the right they have to record any statements they may wish to make regarding that proceeding, provided they are pertinent in the professional's judgment.” As can be observed, the Notary Public must proceed in this manner only in the case of notarial certificates whose purpose is to record notifications, warnings, or intimations; not when the purpose is to verify facts, events, or situations that occur in his or her presence, which is precisely what happened in this specific case. Continuing with the objections raised by Licda. Gloria Navas Montero against the notarial certificate at folio 251, she indicates that it does not reflect the reality of what happened on the day of the events. If that were true, the proper course is to challenge the validity of the instrument, but as long as falsity is not declared in a judgment, the document constitutes full proof (Articles 370, 396, and 397 of the Civil Procedure Code). In any case, the assembly minute book could well have been brought into the record to contrast its content with the challenged notarial certificate, an omission solely attributable to the defendant. The sworn statement at folio 288, given by the manager of Coopesalud, is not suitable to rebut the notarial certificate. In another line of reasoning, it is alleged that the reason the plaintiff was not reinstated was because she was working at the Hospital México, an argument that is entirely novel, so its admission at this stage of the proceeding would leave the counterparty defenseless. The subject of the litis (object of the lawsuit) is defined with the complaint and the answer; therefore, neither party can seek to have other aspects debated that were not raised at the appropriate procedural moment (as resolved in votes of this Chamber No. 346 at 10:00 a.m. on June 27, 2001, and No. 55 at 10:20 a.m. on February 13, 2002). Finally, it is argued that this Chamber could not proceed to hear the merits of the case without violating the principle of double instance (doble instancia), since the court a quo and the court ad quem, having declared the right time-barred, omitted to rule on the merits. The guarantee of double instance implies that the parties have the opportunity for a higher body to review the actions of the lower one, which has been fully complied with in this proceeding, since the litigants have had not two but three instances, and it would be completely illogical and unnecessary to require the judge who upholds a statute of limitations (prescripción) to rule on the merits of the matter, without this preventing the appellate body from hearing the merits if it considers that said defense does not apply.

**V. REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):** The appellant objects to the use of labor regulations to resolve the defense of statute of limitations. She believes the Civil Code should be applied due to the absence of an express rule in the legislation regulating cooperatives, and that the Labor Code is only applicable procedurally. First of all, it must be clarified that what the plaintiff seeks is not her reinstatement, but the payment of certain economic rights. Had she requested reinstatement, the defense of statute of limitations would not be admissible, since as she was never officially expelled from the cooperative by the body competent to do so (general assembly), the associative bond was never extinguished, and therefore no statute of limitations period began to run for those purposes. However, since what was claimed was not that but the payment of advances (anticipos), the statute of limitations must be resolved in the manner stated below. This Chamber has already repeatedly ruled on the applicable statute of limitations period regarding cooperatives (see rulings No. 134 at 3:20 p.m. on May 27, 1998, and No. 57 at 10:40 a.m. on February 13, 2002), stating that it is that of Article 607 of the Labor Code, based on vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 5969 at 3:21 p.m. on November 26, 1993, issued on the occasion of an unconstitutionality action filed against said numeral 607, an occasion in which it was recorded: “Specifically, Article 607 of the Code, the constitutionality of which is challenged here, establishes: 'Unless there is a special provision to the contrary, all rights and actions arising from this Code, its Regulations, and its related laws, which do not originate from employment contracts, shall prescribe in the term of three months. This period shall run for employers from the occurrence of the respective event and for workers from the moment they are in an effective position to claim their rights or exercise the corresponding actions.' It should be noted that, in relation to the rights referred to in this rule, it would seem that they can only be those 'not linked' to the employment contract or relationship; not because they derive from the law do they cease to derive from the contract, as already stated. Thus, the hypothesis contemplated by this rule will only refer to rights that do not arise within, by virtue of, or in connection with the employment relationship, —e.g., those related to the organization and functioning of unions and cooperatives, the right to claim against employment policy or minimum wages considered incorrect, or social security rights” (emphasis not in the original). As observed, that pronouncement is very clear that in cooperative matters, the statute of limitations operates after three months, and this body cannot depart from the provisions thus issued by the Constitutional Chamber, whose rulings are binding erga omnes (numeral 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). This 3-month period is counted, as provided by the legal text itself, from the moment the party is in the effective possibility of claiming the rights or exercising the respective actions, so it is necessary to identify precisely when that moment was when the plaintiff could have claimed her rights. Recounting what happened, on December 27, 1996, the general manager of Coopesalud informed Ms. [Name3] that, due to reorganization motives, her services would be terminated as of January 1, 1997, explaining that her rights as a worker would be paid by the Personnel Office, while her rights as an associate would be paid once the board of directors completed the pertinent procedures (folio 37). The settlement of the “labor rights” was made on January 15, 1997 (folio 62). It was not until July 8, 1998, that the plaintiff was summoned to an extraordinary assembly to be held on July 17 to define her corporate situation (folio 40). However, it is not evident in the case file whether that meeting was actually held. At folio 38 verso appears another call to an extraordinary assembly, for October 2, 1998, on whose agenda appears the “definition of the case of Ms. [Name3].” On the scheduled day, the general assembly, supreme body of the Cooperative (numeral 37 of the Law of Cooperative Associations), rejected the motion for expulsion of the plaintiff, without ruling on the advances she had ceased to receive, ordering the board of directors to take the pertinent measures to reassign Ms. [Name4]; this latter body then transferred the matter to the legal advisor so that within a period of 22 days, she could issue an opinion on the conditions of reinstatement (folio 251). The enforceability of each monthly sum for advances arose each month, starting in January 1997, and the plaintiff was entitled to claim from that moment, but her inertia caused her rights to be time-barred. However, the assembly's agreement ordering reinstatement carries the logical and necessary consequence of acknowledging the advances not received while the separation lasted, thus operating as an act interrupting the statute of limitations (Article 876 subsection 1 of the Civil Code), so the new calculation of the statute of limitations is counted from the expiration of the deadline that the general assembly gave the legal advisor to report on the terms of reinstatement, that is, from October 24, 1998. Since the request to the manager was made on February 17, 1999, and the lawsuit was filed on December 17 of the same year, the statute of limitations applicable to the case operated, because more than three months elapsed between one action and another, thus leaving unaffected by it only the advances arising three months before the filing of the lawsuit. Therefore, the ruling on the statute of limitations must be modified, and said defense must be partially accepted. For greater clarity, it is important to emphasize the incorrect procedure followed in the plaintiff's case, by dividing her situation into a labor relationship (proceeding with her dismissal and settlement of statutory benefits) and another of an associative nature (whose extinction was left pending for more than a year, without the assembly adopting the respective expulsion agreement). In reality, Ms. [Name3]'s status was unique and indivisible: an associate of a self-managed cooperative, as she herself acknowledges when referring to the exceptions raised by the co-defendants (folios 74 and 75), stating that there was no subordinate labor relationship, but rather an associative one, where the owners and workers of the cooperative are the same and therefore are not governed by labor regulations, but by those referring to the association. This Chamber has already had the opportunity to develop the topic, indicating that the members of a cooperative of this type are not workers in the strict sense of the term. Thus, it is appropriate to cite vote No. 329 at 10:00 a.m. on October 22, 1999: "The Law of Cooperative Associations and Creation of the Institute of Cooperative Development, No. 4179, of August 22, 1968, amended by Laws Nos. 7391, of April 27, 1994; 6756, of April 30, 1982; 6893, of May 22, 1983; and 7053, of December 9, 1986, defines Cooperatives as 'voluntary associations of persons and not of capital, with full legal personality, of indefinite duration and limited liability, in which individuals organize democratically in order to satisfy their needs and promote their economic and social improvement, as a means of overcoming their human condition and their individual formation, and in which the motive of work and production, distribution, and consumption is service and not profit.' (Article 2). Based on their purpose, this regulation differentiates, by way of example, several classes of Cooperatives, namely: consumer, production, marketing, supply, savings and credit, housing, services, school, youth, transport, and multiple ones (numeral 15, first paragraph). As relevant to the case, Article 17 idem states that 'Production cooperatives have as their purpose the production, manufacturing, or transformation, directly by the associates, of natural or processed articles, or the initiation or development of all kinds of agricultural, livestock, industrial, and artisanal enterprises, distributing the surpluses they may accumulate through their joint work effort, in proportion to production, manual or intellectual work, or the performance with which each of the associates has contributed to the enterprise.' Numeral 15, in turn, establishes, in its second paragraph, that this type of cooperative may be simple, co-managed, or self-managed; and the latter are defined by Article 99, ibidem, as 'those enterprises organized for the production of goods and services, in which the workers who comprise them direct all the activities thereof and directly contribute their workforce, with the primary purpose of carrying out productive activities and receiving, in proportion to their work contribution, benefits of an economic and social nature.' From this rule and the content of numerals 67, 109, subsection a), and 110, subsection c), of the indicated regulatory body, it follows that the fundamental obligation of the member consists of contributing his or her personal work to the enterprise, directly and irreplaceably; which underpins the self-managed associative phenomenon and integrates, with preeminence, its social capital. It is also important to highlight that, by express provision of subsection a), of numeral 105, ibidem, the individuals who form an organization of this category must obtain their subsistence, at the start of its constitution, from work, whether as employees or as self-employed workers. The concordance of the cited provisions leads to the conclusion, then, that the self-managed production Cooperative is a typical organization of workers—a term understood here in its economic sense—whose social capital is constituted by the permanent and direct contribution of the workforce that each associate must make, based on his or her own productive capacity. Its purpose is to develop activities for the production of goods and services, with the aim of achieving economic and social benefits for all its members. This business modality is designed to be directed by its own associates and so that the production tasks constituting its object are executed, basically, by them, personally. It is recognized, as a guiding element of its organizational scheme, that the economic benefits obtained are divided proportionally to the work contribution each one makes—numerals 99, 104, and 114, b), 8)—. In relation to this, Articles 17 and 104 ibidem restrict the possibility of hiring salaried employees—workers in the legal sense—that is, persons who are not associates of the same; which may be done but only in very qualified cases. There is no doubt that the groups under discussion, within which the defendant falls and which the legislator considers of 'public convenience and utility and of social interest' (Article 1), have a clearly special legal regulation. The particularity of their rules has strong support in numeral 64 of the Costa Rican Political Constitution, which establishes, as a state duty of the first order, the promotion of the creation of worker cooperatives. This characteristic inherent to the cooperative legal system entails the impossibility of applying, in a primary, exclusive, and exclusionary manner, any other protective legislation—specifically, Labor Law—to the legal relationship that binds the cooperative association and its member-worker, despite the fact that both its constitution and its functioning are naturally linked to this field. The cited numeral 17 establishes, in its final paragraph, that: 'In labor contractual matters, these cooperatives [production ones] shall be governed by the provisions contained in current labor legislation, but for the purposes of the legal relationship of the associate with the cooperative, it must be interpreted that his or her socio-economic status is that of member-worker, as a single natural person.' This is reaffirmed also in numeral 131 ibidem, which attributes a supplementary character, in a limited manner, to the Labor Code, below several sources of law and provided the provisions to be applied 'do not contravene cooperative principles, doctrine, and philosophy.' In the case at hand, the plaintiff was a member-worker of the defendant Cooperative. Consequently, the legal relationship existing between them is different from the characteristic or typical labor relations over which the legal protection contained in current Labor regulations does apply. As a result, it is not possible to maintain that the defendant Cooperative 'receives' the fruits of the plaintiff's work, that is, appropriates them for itself. This is because the same are integrated—precisely, through the distribution of surpluses—into the patrimony of the one who produced them: the member-worker. In these cases, the exchange of services implied by work, consisting of the alienation of the fruits obtained through the personal rendering of services in exchange for a price, does not occur, which is what is typical and normal in typical labor relations; likewise, the element of subordination attributable to a person different from the worker, i.e., the employer, does not arise. It is clear that the plaintiff's obligation to contribute his or her workforce—his or her duty to work—for the execution of the services the Cooperative contracts and provides to third parties, did not originate in an employment contract, but in another of an associative nature; the desired and protected consequence of which, under positive law, is, among others, just that. On this matter, Argentine jurists Francisco Junyent Vélez and Roberto Fermín Bertossi assert that worker cooperatives 'have as their main characteristic and very reason for being, the non-existence within them of the \"employer-employee\" possibility, which is equivalent to saying: \"no type of labor relationship between associate and cooperative, since they have freely and voluntarily assumed the so-called entrepreneurial risk, a decision that deserves the utmost respect.\" / In a worker cooperative, it is up to the associates, as an essential requirement, to contribute personal work, without which they cannot hold such status, it thus being that they are associates because they work and they work because they are associates, inseparable statuses.' (The Cooperative, Buenos Aires, EDIAR, Sociedad Anónima Editora Comercial, Industrial y Financiera, 1987, p. 293). Likewise, other authors, in relation to this contractual figure, have established that: 'Partnership contract and employment contract are two different figures; in those cases where the structure and content of the employment contract appear substituted by those configuring the partnership contract, we will be before this type of relationship and not before the former. The employment contract is a typical and specific legal figure; the partnership contract is a different one, independent of the former.' (Manuel Alonso García, Course on Labor Law, Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, S.A., ninth edition, 1985, pp. 321-322). Manuel Alonso Olea and María Emilia Casas Baamonde indicate that 'The \"member-worker\" is not bound to the cooperative by an employment contract, but [by one] of a corporate type [although] the mentioned circumstances bring him/her closer to the employee; hence \"the labor-legal imbuing\" of their regime\" (Labor Law, Madrid, University of Madrid-Faculty of Law, thirteenth edition, 1993, p. 149). Consequently, in this case, there is no specific labor relationship between the parties, and the roles of employee and employer cannot be individualized or extracted. The duty of submission to the guidelines established by the supreme social body of the Cooperative—the Members' Assembly—, incumbent upon the worker-associate, is not a product of the alleged labor relationship—here nonexistent, as already indicated—but of another type of legal subjection, arising precisely from the associative agreement (...). Pursuant to the provisions of numeral 2 of the cited Law, these associative mechanisms must be inspired by the democratic model of distribution and exercise of collective power, arising from the group; which implies, among other things, placing in representatives the taking of certain decisions and the execution of those of a consensual nature, recognizing their authority, and submitting to the will of the majority. From this arises, then, a modality of a relationship of dependence or legal subordination, clearly distinct from the labor one, which—as stated—is subject to specific regulation. The circumstance that each member-worker satisfies his or her needs with the compensation and surpluses obtained through the work contributed to the Cooperative does not automatically convert him or her into a salaried employee, nor make him or her the holder of the rights of someone in this legal condition. The compensation to which he or she is entitled, which cannot be 'lower than the minimum wage set for the different activities governing private enterprises.' (Article 108, subsection a), is not a salary, in the labor sense of the term; although it undoubtedly constitutes the labor production cost that all members, as entrepreneurs, cover. The applicable legislation is careful to assign it such a denomination, and although it resorts to the concept of 'minimum wage,' it does not equate them and does so only for the purpose of setting a legal, objective, and variable parameter for determining the minimum and maximum that the Cooperative must allocate to satisfy said productive cost. This compensation, like the surpluses or any other sums allocated to member-workers, has its legal cause in what cooperative legislation qualifies as 'the distribution of the economic and social benefits, product of the common effort' (numeral 100, subsection a); which ultimately constitutes the realization of the legal and social purpose of this type of human organization. It must also be taken into account that these different remunerations are determined by the associates themselves, within certain conditions, in direct proportion to the effort or work contribution each one made in the production of the corresponding goods and services (Articles 17, first paragraph, 99, and 114). From all the foregoing, it is concluded without doubt that there are notable differences between relationships established at a typically labor level and those shown in self-managed cooperative associations. This allows determining that, in the latter, the member-workers have, effectively, a special legal status, different from that of a salaried employee. They are co-owners of the means of production, i.e., cooperativized entrepreneurs, whose decisions are made at the guild level, based on a democratic organization. In turn, they are workers, but not salaried employees but independent ones, who organize collectively and who are the owners of their own enterprise. Hence, it is said they are their own employers; which, despite reflecting a clear conceptual contradiction, eliminates outright the existence of a relationship of subordination and dependence in the typical labor sense. It is true that Article 133 of the Law of Cooperative Associations indicates that \"The Labor Courts, except for the cases expressly indicated in this law, shall have jurisdiction over the actions arising from it, in accordance with the provisions of Title VIII, Chapter I of the Labor Code.\" However, what this rule does is grant jurisdiction to the Labor Courts to hear lawsuits filed on the occasion of the application of that regulation, without, in any way, it being possible to affirm that this circumstance 'laboralizes' the relationships among the associates of a self-managed cooperative" (in the same sense, see votes No. 172 at 9:30 a.m. on July 6, 1994, and No. 134 at 3:20 p.m. on May 27, 1998). For this reason, the dismissal and labor settlement of Ms. [Name4] are acts lacking legal support, because the provisions of the Labor Code regulating the payment of notice period, severance pay, and vacations, nor the Law on Year-End Bonuses for Private Enterprise, cannot be applied in this case. The only procedure that should have been followed was to adopt an exclusion agreement by the assembly (Article 34 subsection f) of the Law of Cooperative Associations). However, this never happened, as the defendants admit when answering the complaint: “Her separation as an associate of the cooperative, a relationship distinct from the labor one, has not yet been completed, which is why she is still being summoned to assemblies.” Therefore, the challenged judgment must be reversed, insofar as it fully upheld the defense of statute of limitations and dismissed the lawsuit, and we must proceed to hear the merits of the case.

**VI. COMPENSATION OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF:** There is no doubt that the abusive and illegitimate conduct of the Cooperative, leaving the plaintiff in total uncertainty for years, with serious detriment to her rights as a worker-associate, caused her damages and losses that must be compensated (Article 41 of the Political Constitution). In vote of this Chamber No. 365 at 9:40 a.m. on November 26, 1999, it was indicated: “Damages (daño), as part of the unlawful act, or as a prerequisite for civil liability, are doctrinally treated as an injury to a legally relevant interest in any sphere of human life and, as such, worthy of protection. It has been defined as: '... the detriment experienced in one's patrimony through the reduction of the economic values that compose it (material damages, daño patrimonial) and also the injury to feelings, honor, or lawful affections (non-material damages, daño moral)'” (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge) General Theory of Civil Liability, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo - Perrot, eighth edition, 1993, p. 167). In this specific case, we are in the realm of contractual civil liability (membership contract of a self-managed cooperative), in which “the damaging event consisting of the non-performance attributable to one of the parties to the contract (or, as the case may be, both), derives from an act or legal transaction that constitutes the source of obligation for them. The unlawful act, in a broad sense, consists precisely in the non-performance of obligations enforceable due to the legal transaction” (Zannoni, Damages in Civil Liability, second edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1993, p. 86).

The general principle governing damages is that the liable party must compensate all the damage caused by their unlawful act (principle of full or complete reparation (principio de la reparación integral o plena)) (on this point, see the work by Orgaz, El daño resarcible, third edition, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 120). Thus, “compensation for damage must restore the injured party’s estate to the situation it would have been in had the harmful event not occurred” (Visintini, Tratado de la responsabilidad civil, volume 2, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 204). The plaintiff seeks compensation for both pecuniary and moral damage suffered. The former (also called material damage (daño material)) is defined as “that which falls upon the estate, either directly on the things or goods that compose it, or indirectly as a consequence or reflection of damage caused to the person themselves, in their rights or faculties (...). Pecuniary damage (daño patrimonial) may manifest in two typical forms: either as the loss or diminution of already existing economic values, that is, as an impoverishment of the estate (actual loss or positive damage (daño emergente o positivo)), or as the frustration of expected economic advantages, that is, as the loss of an anticipated patrimonial enrichment (lost profits (lucro cesante))” (Orgaz, op.cit., pp. 20 and 24). Ms. [Nombre3] requests compensation for lost profits (lucro cesante), as she seeks payment of all income she should have received in her capacity as worker-member of Coopesalud from the time she was separated from her position until 2027 (the year she places as the end of her useful working life), along with the corresponding statutory interest. To correctly resolve this request, the issue of certainty of damage must first be examined, which is one of the requirements for it to be compensable. Vázquez Ferreyra states in this regard that “the certainty of damage (certidumbre del daño) refers to its existence, whether present or future. It is uncertain when there is no assurance that the injury has occurred or will occur. It is certain when it is real and effective, and not merely hypothetical (...). Certainty refers to its existence, and not to its immediacy or the determination of its amount. Thus, a future and certain damage may occur” (Responsabilidad por daños, Editorial Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1993, pp. 178 and 180). For Zannoni, “the certainty of damage always constitutes a finding of present fact that projects, also into the future, a necessary consequence. When the consequence is not necessary, but contingent or hypothetical or purely feared, the damage is uncertain” (op.cit., pp. 50-52). It is also important, for the correct examination of the issue, to distinguish between present damage and future damage: “Present damage (daño actual) is the injury already produced and subsisting. Future damage (daño futuro) is that which does not yet exist but whose future existence leaves no doubt” (Vázquez Ferreyra, op.cit., p. 179). According to doctrine, the chronological moment that separates present damages from future ones is the issuance of the judgment: “From another point of view, damage—whether as actual loss (daño emergente) or as lost profits (lucro cesante)—may be present (or current) and future. The moment considered for this distinction is that of the ruling” (Orgaz, op.cit., pp. 25-26). Zannoni holds the same view: “In summary, then, present damage is the damage, impairment, or injury already effected and subsisting in the injured party’s estate at the time of sentencing. Future damage, on the other hand, is that which has not yet existed, but which will certainly exist, after the sentencing” (op.cit., p. 69). Based on such theoretical premises, the defendant entity must be ordered to compensate the plaintiff for all advances (anticipos) (remuneration provided for in Article 108 of the Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas) that she failed to earn from September 17, 1999 (3 months before the filing of the complaint, which are not time-barred) until the judgment becomes final—unless before this event (finality of the judgment) her legal expulsion as a member of the defendant has occurred, in which case the compensation must be limited to the date of expulsion in accordance with the law—plus the corresponding statutory interest from the time each obligation arose in legal life until its effective payment; all of which shall be determined in the judgment execution stage. As for future damages (daños futuros), since there is no security or certainty that the plaintiff’s useful working life as a member of the defendant will last until the year 2027, the claim as thus framed cannot be granted. However, it is appropriate to interpret it in the sense that in the event that the reinstatement agreement ordered by the assembly has not been fulfilled before the judgment becomes final nor has the expulsion been decreed, the Cooperative must continue paying the plaintiff all income corresponding to her in her capacity as associate-worker, subsequent to the finality of the judgment until effective reinstatement. It must be noted, however, that from the amount that the defendant must ultimately pay to Ms. Villegas Campos as a result of this resolution, the sum of ¢2,429,803.55 paid to her on January 15, 1997 as a “severance settlement (liquidación laboral)” must be deducted, because although said payment lacked legal basis, since no employment-type relationship existed, the truth is that the plaintiff received that money and it is fair and equitable to take it into account when calculating what the cooperative owes, to avoid unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) (folio 62). Likewise, from the sums the defendant must pay, the amounts it proves in the judgment execution stage that the plaintiff received as salary from any employer, during the same period covered by the payment of advances (anticipos) ordered here, shall be deducted. The plaintiff will lose the right to continue receiving this compensation if reinstatement does not occur through her fault within one month computed from the finality of the judgment, for which she may request the assistance of the Court. The moral damage (daño moral) for the “harm to professional prestige” cannot be granted, as it is devoid of evidence, a reason that also justifies denying the request concerning the damages caused by the absence of social security for the plaintiff and her family, since Ms. [Nombre3] at no time indicated or demonstrated what such damages specifically consisted of. Adjustments based on inflation also cannot be ordered, as an express rule authorizing it is required. In this same sense, the Chamber ruled in Voto N° 338 of 9:10 a.m. on July 9, 2003, in which it was stated: “Both indexation and statutory interest are monetary correction formulas that tend to compensate for the loss of the real value of legal tender currency. The difference between the two is given by the fact that, in current legislation, only the latter is provided for and, in the case, as in this matter, of a monetary, pecuniary, or numerary debt or obligation, it grants it an exclusive and excluding character. Indeed, as established in Article 706 of the Civil Code ‘If the obligation is to pay a sum of money, damages and losses consist always and solely in the payment of interest on the sum owed, counted from the maturity of the term.’ Consequently, it is appropriate to also deny these other aspects of the claim filed not only for lack of an express rule that authorizes and regulates indexation, which would oblige the courts, if granting it, to assume the setting of correction percentages, thereby invading an external sphere, but also because, being in the presence of the breach of a legal obligation payable in money, the damages and losses derived from it may not include more than the payment of statutory interest,” and in this case, as was ordered before, the payment of interest from the enforceability of the resulting sums for advances (anticipos) was ordered. Nor is it appropriate to grant the aspects related to vacations, Christmas bonuses (aguinaldos), and seniority bonuses (anualidades), because those items are of a labor nature and, as explained in Considerando V of this resolution, the plaintiff was not a worker in the strict sense, so she lacks the right to demand payment of such concepts, without the fact that a settlement of “labor rights” was paid to her upon being “dismissed” affecting what is so ordered, given that error does not create a right. As a final observation, it should be noted that Ms. [Nombre3] jointly and severally sued the Cooperative and the individuals who held the positions of manager, members of the board of directors (consejo de administración), and members of the oversight committee (comité de vigilancia) at the time of the events. However, the Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas does not establish the joint and several liability of the representatives in this type of case. The rules of said Law that regulate the matter are transcribed below: “Article 49: The oversight committee (comité de vigilancia) elected by the assembly, which shall be composed of no fewer than three members, or the audit mentioned in subsection e) of Article 36, shall be responsible for the examination and oversight of all accounts and operations carried out by the cooperative. It shall also report to the assembly as appropriate. For the examination and oversight of said accounts and operations, the respective financial statements shall be certified by an authorized public accountant, or by the auxiliary cooperative bodies that perform audit functions in accordance with Article 95 of this law. Once certified, they shall be delivered annually to the members. Cooperatives whose volume of operations is below the minimum defined by regulation are excluded from this obligation. The joint and several liability of the members of the board of administration (consejo de administración) and the manager extends to the members of the oversight committee (comité de vigilancia) or the internal auditor, for the acts that the latter did not timely object to. Those members of the committee who expressly dissent within one month following the date on which the respective agreement was adopted are exempt from that liability.” “Article 52: The members of the board of administration (consejo de administración) and the manager, who execute or permit the execution of acts clearly contrary to the interests of the cooperative, or who violate the law or the bylaws, shall be jointly and severally liable with their assets for the losses that said operations cause to the cooperative, without prejudice to the other penalties that apply to them. The director or manager who wishes to save their personal liability, shall request that their vote or opposing view be recorded in the minutes book.” As observed, this is a joint and several liability of the directors towards the Cooperative itself for damages caused to it, not towards its members, a reason that compels upholding the complaint only insofar as it was directed against Coopesalud, since with respect to its representatives the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is admissible." IV-. REGARDING EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR BETTER PROVISION (PRUEBA ADMITIDA PARA MEJOR PROVEER): In this instance, the plaintiff provided two notarial certificates (actas notariales), visible at folios 251 and 252. By resolution at 3:30 p.m. on August 3, 2005 (folio 276), only the first was admitted (deed number 14 of volume 12 of the protocol of Notary [Nombre1] Sánchez Boza), because the other (deed number 25 idem) was already in the case file (folio 68). At folio 281 appears the brief by which the defendant party responded to the hearing granted for that purpose, referring to both deed number 14 and number 25, but, for the reason stated, only the arguments related to the notarial certificate (acta notarial) at folio 251 will be taken into account. The attorney for the defendants opposes the acceptance of this evidence because she considers that the instrument is null, given that it was drawn up by the plaintiff’s legal advisor, who, as such, has an interest in the matter, which is prohibited by Article 7, subsection c) of the Código Notarial. The argument lacks legal basis, because although there may be some type of interest on the part of Ms. Sánchez Boza in winning the lawsuit, this is merely secondary or indirect (insufficient to disqualify her action as a notary), since the one truly interested in obtaining victory is the party who holds the right being disputed in court. Therefore, her objectivity (a requirement contained in subsection d) of numeral 102 of the Código Notarial) cannot be understood as compromised either. Another criticism made is that Ms. [Nombre1] was allowed to attend the members’ assembly in her capacity as legal advisor to the plaintiff, not as a notary public, with the attorney omitting to inform about her intention to draft a notarial certificate (acta notarial). However, at the time the events occurred, the title of Attorney also implied that of Notary Public (it was not required, as it is now, to have a specialization in Notarial Law), so Ms. [Nombre1]'s attendance at the event was in that dual capacity. On the other hand, Ms. [Nombre2] had no obligation to identify herself as a notary or to communicate her purpose of drawing up a notarial certificate (acta notarial), for the reasons that will be stated below. Article 101 of the Código Notarial defines the notarial certificate (acta notarial) as follows: “Notarial certificates (actas notariales) are public instruments whose main purposes are to verify, through the notary and at the request of an interested party, facts, events, or situations that are known to them or occur in their presence, to give them authentic character, or to record notifications, warnings, or intimations appropriate according to law.” That is, the notarial certificate (acta notarial) serves to: a) verify facts, events, or situations that are known to the notary or occur in their presence, giving them authentic character, and b) to record notifications, warnings, or intimations. In turn, subsection c) of the following numeral (102) reads: “The notary who does not know those to whom notifications, information, intimations, or warnings are to be given, must attempt to identify them and inform them on whose behalf they are proceeding, their status as a notary, the diligence to be carried out, and the right they have to state any declarations they may deem appropriate regarding that diligence, provided they are pertinent in the professional's judgment.” As observed, the Notary must proceed in this manner only in the case of notarial certificates (actas notariales) whose purpose is to record notifications, warnings, or intimations; not when it involves verifying facts, events, or situations that occur in their presence, which was precisely what happened in the specific case. Continuing with the objections raised by Ms. Gloria Navas Montero against the notarial certificate (acta notarial) at folio 251, she indicates that it does not reflect the reality of what happened on the day of the events. If that were true, what is appropriate is to challenge the validity of the instrument, but until its falsity is declared in a judgment, the document constitutes full proof (articles 370, 396, and 397 of the Código Procesal Civil). In any case, the assembly minutes book could well have been brought into the record to contrast its content with the challenged notarial certificate (acta notarial), an omission that is only attributable to the defendant. The sworn statement at folio 288, given by the manager of Coopesalud, is not suitable to undermine the notarial certificate (acta notarial). In another order of ideas, it is alleged that the reason the plaintiff was not reinstated was because she was working at the Hospital México, an argument that is completely novel, so its admission at this stage of the proceeding would leave the opposing party in a state of defenselessness. The subject matter of the lawsuit is defined with the complaint and the answer, so neither party can expect that other aspects not raised at the appropriate procedural moment become the object of debate (as was resolved in votes of this Chamber N° 346 at 10:00 a.m. on June 27, 2001, and 55 at 10:20 a.m. on February 13, 2002). Lastly, it is argued that the Chamber could not proceed to hear the merits of the case without violating the principle of double instance, since, as the lower court (a quo) and the appellate court (ad quem) declared the right time-barred, they omitted to rule on the merits. The guarantee of double instance implies that the parties have the opportunity for a superior body to review the actions of the lower one, which has been fully satisfied in this proceeding, because the litigants have had not two but three instances, it being completely illogical, because it is unnecessary, to require the adjudicator who upholds a time bar to resolve the merits of the case, without this preventing the appellate body, if it considers that said exception does not apply, from hearing the merits of the case.

V-. REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN): The appellant objects to the use of labor regulations to resolve the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción). She considers that the Civil Code should apply due to the absence of an express rule in the legislation regulating matters related to cooperatives and that the Labor Code is only applicable procedurally. First of all, it should be clarified that what the plaintiff seeks is not her reinstatement, but the payment of certain economic rights. Had she requested reinstatement, the exception of statute of limitations (prescripción) would not be admissible, since, as she was never officially expelled from the cooperative by the body competent to do so (general assembly), the associative bond was never extinguished, so no statute of limitations (prescripción) period began to run for those purposes. However, since what was claimed was not that but the payment of advances (anticipos), the statute of limitations issue must be resolved in the manner to be stated. This Chamber has already ruled repeatedly on the applicable statute of limitations period in cooperative matters (see rulings N° 134 at 3:20 p.m. on May 27, 1998, and 57 at 10:40 a.m. on February 13, 2002), indicating that it is that of Article 607 of the Labor Code, based on the Constitutional Chamber vote N° 5969 at 3:21 p.m. on November 26, 1993, issued on the occasion of an unconstitutionality action filed against the cited numeral 607, an opportunity in which it was stated: “Specifically, Article 607 of the Code, whose constitutionality is questioned here, establishes: 'Unless a special provision states otherwise, all rights and actions deriving from this Code, its Regulations, and its related laws, which do not originate from employment contracts, shall be time-barred (prescribirán) in the term of three months. This period shall run for employers from the occurrence of the respective event and for workers from the moment they are in an effective possibility of claiming their rights or exercising the corresponding actions.' It is worth noting that, in relation to the rights referred to by that rule, it seems they can only be those 'not linked' to the employment contract or relationship; just because they derive from the law, they do not cease to derive from the contract, as already stated. Thus, the hypothesis this rule contemplates will only refer to rights that do not arise within, by virtue of, or in connection with the employment relationship—e.g., those related to the organization and operation of unions and cooperatives, the right to claim against employment policy or minimum wages considered incorrect, or social security rights” (bold not in original). As noted, this pronouncement is very clear that in cooperative matters the statute of limitations (prescripción) operates at three months, and this body cannot depart from what was thus established by the Constitutional Chamber, whose rulings are binding erga omnes (numeral 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). That 3-month period is counted, as the legal text itself provides, from the moment the effective possibility exists to claim the rights or exercise the respective actions, so the precise moment when the plaintiff could have claimed her rights must be located. Reviewing what happened, it is found that on December 27, 1996, the general manager of Coopesalud informed Ms. [Nombre3] that, for reasons of reorganization, her services would be dispensed with as of January 1, 1997, explaining that her rights as a worker would be paid to her by the Personnel Office, while her rights as a member would be paid once the board of administration (consejo de administración) completed the pertinent procedures (folio 37). The settlement of “labor rights” was made on January 15, 1997 (folio 62). It was not until July 8, 1998, that the plaintiff was summoned to an extraordinary assembly to be held on July 17 to define her membership situation (folio 40). However, it is not evident in the record whether that meeting actually took place. At folio 38 verso appears another summons to an extraordinary assembly, for October 2, 1998, in whose agenda appears the “definition of the case of Mrs. [Nombre3]”. On the set day, the general assembly, the supreme body of the Cooperative (numeral 37 of the Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas), rejected the motion for expulsion of the plaintiff, without ruling on the advances (anticipos) she had stopped receiving, ordering the board of administration (consejo de administración) to take the pertinent measures to reassign Mrs. [Nombre4]; this latter body transferred the matter to the legal advisor so that within a period of 22 days she could render an opinion on the conditions of reinstatement (folio 251). The enforceability of each monthly sum for advances (anticipo) arose each month, starting from January 1997, the plaintiff being empowered to claim from that moment, but her inaction caused her rights to be time-barred (prescripción). However, the assembly agreement that ordered reinstatement carries as a logical and necessary consequence the recognition of the advances (anticipos) not received during the separation, thereby operating as an act interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción) (Article 876, subsection 1 of the Civil Code), so the new computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is counted from the expiration of the period that the general assembly gave the legal advisor to report on the terms of reinstatement, that is, from October 24, 1998. Since the request before the manager was made on February 17, 1999, and the complaint was filed on December 17 of the same year, the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) operated, because between one action and another more than three months elapsed, leaving unaffected by it, therefore, only the advances (anticipos) arising three months before the filing of the complaint. For this reason, what was resolved regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be modified and said defense accepted partially. For the sake of greater clarity, it must be emphasized the incorrect procedure followed in the plaintiff’s case, dividing her situation into an employment relationship (proceeding to her dismissal and settlement of legal benefits) and another of a membership nature (whose extinction was left in suspense for more than a year, without the assembly adopting the respective expulsion agreement). In reality, Ms. [Nombre3]'s condition was unique and indivisible: member of a self-managed cooperative, as she herself acknowledges when referring to the exceptions raised by the co-defendants (folios 74 and 75), by stating that there was no subordinate employment relationship, but rather an associative type, where the owners and workers of the cooperative are the same and therefore are not governed by labor regulations, but by those referring to the association. This Chamber has already had the opportunity to develop the issue, indicating that the members of a cooperative of that type are not workers in the strict sense of the term. Thus, it is worth citing Voto N° 329 at 10:00 a.m. on October 22, 1999: “The Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas y Creación del Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, No. 4179, of August 22, 1968, reformed by laws Nos.

7391 of April 27, 1994; 6756 of April 30, 1982; 6893 of May 22, 1983; and 7053 of December 9, 1986, defines Cooperatives as "voluntary associations of persons and not of capital, with full legal personality, of indefinite duration and limited liability, in which individuals organize themselves democratically in order to satisfy their needs and promote their economic and social improvement, as a means of overcoming their human condition and their individual formation, and in which the motive of work and production, distribution and consumption, is service and not profit." (article 2). Based on their purpose, this regulation differentiates, by way of example, several classes of Cooperatives, namely: consumer, production, marketing, supply, savings and credit, housing, services, school, youth, transport, and multiple cooperatives (subsection 15, first paragraph). As is relevant here, article 17 of the same law states that "The purpose of production cooperatives is the production, manufacturing, or transformation, directly by the associates, of natural or manufactured articles, or the initiation or development of all kinds of agricultural, livestock, industrial, and artisanal operations, distributing the surpluses that may accumulate from their joint work effort, in proportion to the production, the manual or intellectual work; or the output with which each associate has contributed to the enterprise." Subsection 15, in turn, establishes, in its second paragraph, that this type of cooperative may be simple, co-management, or self-management; and, the latter are defined, by article 99, ibidem, as "those enterprises organized for the production of goods and services, in which the workers who comprise them direct all of their activities and directly contribute their workforce, with the primary aim of carrying out productive activities and receiving, in proportion to their contribution of work, economic and social benefits." From that provision and the content of subsections 67, 109(a), and 110(c) of the referenced body of law, it follows that the fundamental obligation of the associate consists of contributing their personal work to the enterprise, in a direct and irreplaceable manner; which provides support for the self-managed associative phenomenon and integrates, preeminently, its social capital. It is also important to highlight that, by express provision of subsection (a) of section 105, ibidem, the persons who form an organization of this category must obtain their subsistence, at the moment of beginning its formation, from work, either as salaried employees or as self-employed workers. The concordance of the cited provisions leads to the conclusion, then, that the self-managed production Cooperative is a typical workers' organization—this term, understood here in its economic sense—whose social capital is constituted by the permanent and direct contribution of the workforce that each associate must make, based on their own productive capacity. Its purpose is to develop production activities for goods and services, with the aim of obtaining economic and social benefits for all its members. That business modality is designed to be directed by its own associates and for the production tasks, constitutive of its corporate purpose, to be executed, basically, by them personally. It is recognized, as a guiding element of its organizational scheme, that the economic benefits obtained be divided in proportion to the contribution of work each one makes—subsections 99, 104, and 114(b), 8). In relation to this, articles 17 and 104 ibidem restrict the possibility of hiring salaried employees—workers in a legal sense—that is, persons who are not associated with them; which may be done but only in very specific cases. There is no doubt that the groupings under discussion, within which the defendant is situated and which the legislator considers of "public convenience and utility and of social interest" (article 1), have a legal and clearly special regulation. The particularity of their regulations has strong support in section 64 of the Costa Rican Political Constitution, which institutes, as a first-order state duty, the promotion of the creation of workers' cooperatives. That characteristic proper to cooperative law brings with it the impossibility of applying, in a primary, exclusive, and exclusionary manner, any other protective legislation—specifically, Labor legislation—to the legal relationship that links the cooperative association and its associate-worker, despite the fact that both its constitution and its functioning are naturally linked to this subject. The cited section 17 establishes, in its final paragraph, that: "In contractual labor matters, these [production] cooperatives shall be governed by the provisions contained in current labor legislation, but for the purposes of the legal relationship of the associate with the cooperative, it must be interpreted that their social-economic status must be that of associate-worker, as a single natural person." This is reaffirmed, also, in section 131 ibidem, in which a supplementary character is attributed, in a limited manner, to the Labor Code, below several sources of law and provided that the provisions to be applied "do not contravene cooperative principles, doctrine, and philosophy." In the case at hand, the plaintiff was an associate-worker of the defendant Cooperative. Consequently, the legal relationship existing between them is different from characteristic or typical labor bonds, over which the legal protection contained in current Labor regulations does apply. Accordingly, it is not possible to maintain that the defendant Cooperative "receives" the fruits of the plaintiff's work; that is, that it appropriates them for itself. This is because they are integrated—precisely through the distribution of surpluses—into the patrimony of the one who produced them: the associate-worker. In these cases, the exchange of benefits inherent in work, consisting of the transfer of the fruits obtained through the personal provision of services in exchange for a price, which is typical and normal in typical labor relationships, does not occur; neither does the element of subordination, attributable to a person different from the worker, i.e., the employer. It is clear that the plaintiff's obligation to contribute their labor force—their duty to work—for the execution of the services the Cooperative contracts and provides to third parties, did not originate in an employment contract, but rather in one of an associative nature; whose consequence, desired and protected by positive legislation, is, among others, that. On this subject, Argentine jurists Francisco Junyent Vélez and Roberto Fermín Bertossi assert that worker cooperatives "have as their main characteristic and very reason for being, the non-existence within them of the 'employer-worker' possibility, which is equivalent to saying: 'no type of labor relationship between associate and cooperative, since they have freely, voluntarily assumed the so-called entrepreneurial risk, a decision that deserves the greatest respect.' / In a worker cooperative, it is incumbent upon the associates, as an essential requirement, to contribute their personal work, without which they cannot hold such status, thus resulting in them being associates because they work and working because they are associates, inseparable statuses." (La cooperativa, Buenos Aires, EDIAR, Sociedad Anónima Editora Comercial, Industrial y Financiera, 1987, p. 293). Similarly, other authors, in relation to this contractual figure, have established that: "A partnership contract and an employment contract are two distinct figures; in those cases where the structure and content of the employment contract appear substituted by those that configure the partnership contract, we are dealing with this type of relationship and not the former. The employment contract is a typical and proper legal figure; the partnership contract is another, distinct and independent from the former." (Manuel Alonso García, Curso de Derecho del Trabajo, Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, S.A., ninth edition, 1985, pp. 321-322). Manuel Alonso Olea and María Emilia Casas Baamonde indicate that "The 'associate-worker' is not bound to the cooperative by an employment contract, but [by one] of a partnership type [although] the mentioned circumstances bring him closer to a dependent worker; hence 'the labor-law impregnation' of their regime." (Derecho del Trabajo, Madrid, Universidad de Madrid-Facultad de Derecho, thirteenth edition, 1993, p. 149). Consequently, in this case, the specific employment relationship between the parties does not exist, and the figures of worker and employer cannot be individualized or extracted. The duty of submission to the guidelines established by the highest social body of the Cooperative—the General Assembly of Associates—incumbent upon the worker-associate, is not the product of the alleged employment relationship—non-existent here, as already stated—but of another type of legal subjection, which arises precisely from the associative agreement (...). Pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of the cited Law, these associative mechanisms must be inspired by the democratic model of distribution and exercise of collective power, arising from the grouping; which implies, among other things, entrusting representatives with the making of certain decisions and the execution of those of a consensual nature, recognizing their authority, and submitting to the will of the majority. From this arises, therefore, a modality of relationship of dependence or legal subordination, clearly distinguishable from the labor one, which—as stated—is subject to a specific regulation. The circumstance that each associate-worker satisfies their needs with the remuneration and surpluses obtained from the work they contribute to the Cooperative does not automatically convert them into a salaried employee, nor does it make them the holder of the rights specific to someone in this legal condition. The remuneration to which they are entitled, which cannot be "less than the minimum wage established for the different activities governing private enterprises" (article 108(a)), is not a salary, in the labor sense of the term; although it undoubtedly constitutes the production cost for labor, which all associates, as entrepreneurs, cover. The applicable legislation is careful to assign such denomination and, although it resorts to the concept of "minimum wage," it does not equate them and does so only for the purpose of setting a legal, objective, and variable parameter for determining the minimum and maximum that the Cooperative must allocate to satisfying said production cost. That remuneration, like the surpluses or any other sums allocated to the associate-workers, have their legal cause in what cooperative legislation qualifies as "the distribution of economic-social benefits, the product of the common effort" (section 100(a)); which is, ultimately, the realization of the legal and social purpose of this type of human organization. It must also be taken into account that these different remunerations are determined by the associates themselves, within certain conditions, in direct proportion to the effort or contribution of work that each one made in the production of the corresponding goods and services (articles 17, first paragraph, 99, and 114). From all the foregoing, it is concluded, without a doubt, that there are notable differences between the relationships established at a typical labor level and those seen in self-managed cooperative associations. This makes it possible to determine that, in the latter, the associate-workers have, effectively, a special legal status, different from that corresponding to a salaried worker. They are co-owners of the means of production, that is, cooperative entrepreneurs, whose decisions are made at a guild level, based on a democratic organization. At the same time, they are workers, but not salaried, rather independent, who organize collectively and are the owners of their own enterprise. Hence it is said that they are their own employers; which, despite reflecting a clear contradiction in concept, eliminates outright the existence of a relationship of subordination and dependence, in the typical sense of what is indeed a labor relationship. It is true that article 133 of the Law of Cooperative Associations states that "The Labor Courts, except for the cases expressly indicated in this law, shall have jurisdiction over the actions derived from it, in accordance with the provisions of title VIII, of Chapter I of the Labor Code." However, what this provision does is grant jurisdiction to the Labor Courts to hear claims filed on the occasion of the application of that regulation, without it being possible in any way to affirm that this circumstance "laboralizes" the relations between the associates of a self-managed cooperative" (in the same vein, see votes No. 172 of 9:30 a.m. on July 6, 1994, and 134 of 3:20 p.m. on May 27, 1998). Therefore, the dismissal and the labor settlement of Ms. [Nombre4] are acts lacking legal basis, because the provisions of the Labor Code regulating payment of notice, severance pay, and vacation, nor the Law of Aguinaldo for Private Enterprise, cannot be applied in this case. The only procedure that should have been followed consisted of adopting an exclusion agreement by the assembly (article 34(f) of the Law of Cooperative Associations). However, this never happened, as the defendants admit when answering the complaint: "Her separation as an associate of the cooperative, a relationship distinct from labor, has not yet been completed, for which reason she is still being summoned to assemblies." The contested judgment must therefore be revoked, insofar as it fully upheld the statute of limitations defense and dismissed the claim, and the merits of the case must be examined. VI-. COMPENSATION DUE TO THE PLAINTIFF: There is no doubt that the abusive and illegitimate conduct of the Cooperative, in leaving the plaintiff in total uncertainty for years, with serious detriment to her rights as a worker-associate, caused her damages that must be compensated (article 41 of the Political Constitution). In vote No. 365 of this Chamber, at 9:40 a.m. on November 26, 1999, it was stated: "Damage, as part of the unlawful act, or as a prerequisite of civil liability, is doctrinally treated as harm to a legally relevant interest in any sphere of human life and, as such, deserving of protection. It has been defined as: '... the impairment experienced in the patrimony due to the detriment of the economic values that comprise it (pecuniary damage) and also the injury to feelings, honor, or legitimate affections (moral damage)'" (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge) Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo - Perrot, eighth edition, 1993, p. 167). In the specific case, we are in the realm of contractual civil liability (contract of affiliation to a self-management cooperative), in which "the damaging event consisting of the breach attributable to one of the parties to the contract (or, where applicable, both), derives from a legal act or transaction that constitutes the source of the obligation incumbent upon them. The unlawful act, in a broad sense, consists precisely in the breach of enforceable obligations by reason of the legal transaction" (Zannoni, El daño en la responsabilidad civil, second edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1993, p.86). The general principle governing damages is that the responsible party must compensate all the damage they have caused with their unlawful act (principle of full or integral reparation) (on this point, see the work by Orgaz, El daño resarcible, third edition, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 120). In this way, "the compensation for damages must restore the injured party's patrimony to the situation in which it would have been had the damaging event not occurred" (Visintini, Tratado de la responsabilidad civil, volume 2, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 204). The plaintiff seeks compensation for both the pecuniary damage and the moral damage suffered. The former (also called material damage) is defined as "that which falls upon the patrimony, whether directly on the things or goods that comprise it, or indirectly as a consequence or reflection of damage caused to the person himself, in his rights or faculties (...). Pecuniary damage can manifest in two typical forms: either as the loss or diminution of already existing economic values, that is, as an impoverishment of the patrimony (direct loss or actual damage), or as the frustration of expected economic advantages, that is, as the loss of an anticipated patrimonial enrichment (loss of profits)" (Orgaz, op.cit., pp. 20 and 24). Ms. [Nombre3] requests compensation for loss of profits, as she seeks payment of all the income she should have received in her capacity as an affiliated-worker of Coopesalud from the time she was separated from her post until 2027 (the year in which she places the end of her useful working life), together with the corresponding legal interest. To correctly resolve such a request, the issue of the certainty of the damage, which is one of the requirements for it to be compensable, must first be studied. Vázquez Ferreyra states in this regard that "the certainty of damage refers to its existence, whether present or future. It is uncertain when there is no assurance that the injury has occurred or will occur. It is certain when it is real and effective, and not merely hypothetical (...). Certainty refers to its existence, and not to its current nature or the determination of its amount. Thus, future and certain damage can occur" (Responsabilidad por daños, Editorial Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1993, pp. 178 and 180). For Zannoni, "the certainty of damage always constitutes a verification of a present fact that projects, also into the future, a necessary consequence. When the consequence is not necessary, but contingent or hypothetical or purely feared, the damage is uncertain" (op.cit., pp. 50-52). It is also important, for the correct examination of the question, to distinguish between present damage and future damage: "Present damage is the injury already produced and subsisting. Future damage is that which does not yet exist but whose future existence leaves no doubt" (Vázquez Ferreyra, op.cit., p.

). According to legal doctrine, the chronological moment that separates current damages from future damages is the issuance of the judgment: “From another point of view, damage—whether as direct loss (daño emergente) or as loss of profit (lucro cesante)—can be present (or current) and future. The moment considered for this distinction is that of the ruling” (Orgaz, op.cit., pp. 25-26). Zannoni is of the same opinion: “In summary, then, current damage is the damage, impairment, or loss already suffered and subsisting in the injured party’s assets at the time of judgment. Future damage, on the other hand, is that which has not yet come into existence, but which will certainly exist after the judgment” (op.cit., p. 69). Based on such theoretical premises, the defendant entity must be ordered to compensate the plaintiff for all advances (anticipos) (remuneration provided for in Article 108 of the Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas) that she failed to earn from September 17, 1999 (3 months before the filing of the complaint, which are not time-barred) until the judgment becomes final—unless before this event (the finality of the judgment) her legal expulsion as a member (socia) of the defendant has occurred, in which case the indemnification must be limited to the date of expulsion in accordance with the law—plus the corresponding legal interest from the time each obligation came into legal existence until its effective payment; all of which shall be determined in the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) stage. Regarding future damages, since there is no certainty or assurance that the plaintiff's useful working life as a member (socia) of the defendant will last until the year 2027, the claim as thus presented cannot be upheld. However, it is appropriate to interpret it as meaning that, in the event that the reinstatement agreement ordered by the assembly has not been fulfilled before the judgment becomes final, nor has expulsion been decreed, the Cooperative must continue to pay the claimant all income corresponding to her in her capacity as member-worker (asociada-trabajadora), subsequent to the judgment’s finality until effective reinstatement. It must be cautioned, of course, that from the amount that the defendant must ultimately pay to Ms. Villegas Campos as a result of this resolution, the sum of ¢2,429,803.55 paid to her on January 15, 1997, as a “labor settlement” (liquidación laboral) must be deducted. Although such payment lacked legal basis because there was no labor relationship, the truth is that the plaintiff received that money, and it is just and equitable to take it into account when calculating what the cooperative owes, in order to prevent unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) (folio 62). Likewise, from the sums that the defendant must pay, any amounts that the defendant proves during judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) that the plaintiff received as salary from any employer during the same period covered by the payment of advances (anticipos) ordered herein shall be deducted. The plaintiff will lose the right to continue receiving this indemnification if reinstatement does not occur through her fault within a period of one month calculated from the finality of the judgment, for which she may request the assistance of the Court. The non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) for “impact on professional reputation” cannot be granted, as it lacks evidence, a reason that also justifies denying the petition regarding the damages caused by the absence of social security for the plaintiff and her family, since Ms. [Name3] at no time indicated or demonstrated what these damages specifically consisted of. Adjustments based on inflation cannot be ordered either, as an express authorizing rule is required. In this same vein, the Chamber ruled in vote No. 338 of 9:10 a.m. on July 9, 2003, which stated: “Both indexation and legal interest are monetary correction formulas that tend to compensate for the loss of the real value of legal tender currency. The difference between the two is given by the fact that, in current legislation, only the second of these is included, and in the case, as in this matter, of a monetary, pecuniary, or numerary debt or obligation, it gives it an exclusive and exclusionary character. Indeed, as established by Article 706 of the Civil Code: ‘If the obligation is to pay a sum of money, the damages (daños y perjuicios) always and only consist of the payment of interest on the sum owed, calculated from the maturity of the term.’ Consequently, it is appropriate to deny this other extreme of the claim filed, not only due to the lack of an express rule that authorizes and regulates indexation—which would oblige the courts, if granted, to assume the setting of correction percentages, thereby invading an external sphere—but also because, being in the presence of the breach of a legal obligation payable in money, the damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from it cannot include more than the payment of legal interest,” and in this case, as previously ordered, the payment of interest was ordered from the enforceability of the amounts resulting from advances (anticipos). It is also not appropriate to grant the items related to vacations, year-end bonuses (aguinaldos), and annual increments (anualidades), as those items are of a labor nature, and as explained in the fifth recital (considerando) of this resolution, the plaintiff was not a worker in the strict sense; therefore, she has no right to demand payment of such concepts. The fact that she was paid a settlement of “labor rights” upon being “dismissed” does not affect what has been thus ordered, since error does not create a right. As a final observation, it should be noted that Ms. [Name3] jointly and severally sued the Cooperative and those who held the positions of manager, members of the board of directors (consejo de administración), and members of the audit committee (comité de vigilancia) at the time of the events. However, the Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas does not establish the joint and several liability of the officers in this type of case. The rules of said Law that regulate the matter are transcribed below: “Article 49: The audit committee (comité de vigilancia) elected by the assembly, which shall be composed of no fewer than three members (asociados), or the audit mentioned in subsection e) of Article 36, shall be responsible for the examination and oversight of all accounts and operations carried out by the cooperative. It shall also report to the assembly as appropriate. For the examination and oversight of the aforementioned accounts and operations, the respective financial statements shall be certified by an authorized public accountant, or by the auxiliary cooperative bodies that carry out audit work in accordance with Article 95 of this law. Once certified, they shall be delivered annually to the members. Cooperatives whose volume of operations is below the minimum defined by regulation are excluded from this obligation. The joint and several liability of the members of the board of directors (consejo de administración) and the manager extends to the members of the audit committee (comité de vigilancia) or the internal auditor, for acts that the latter did not timely object to. Committee members who expressly record their dissenting vote within the month following the date on which the respective agreement was adopted are exempt from such liability.” “Article 52: The members of the board of directors (consejo de administración) and the manager, who execute or allow the execution of acts that are notoriously contrary to the interests of the cooperative, or that violate the law or bylaws, shall be jointly and severally liable with their assets for the losses that such operations cause to the cooperative, without prejudice to the other penalties that may apply to them. The director or manager who wishes to save his personal liability shall request that his opposing vote or opinion be recorded in the minutes book.” As can be observed, this refers to a joint and several liability of the directors to the Cooperative as such, for the damages caused to it, not to its members (asociados). This reason obliges us to uphold the complaint only insofar as it was directed against Coopesalud, since regarding its officers, the defense of lack of standing to be sued (falta de legitimación pasiva) is admissible." The attorney for the defendants opposes the admission of this evidence because she believes the instrument is null and void, given that it was drawn up by the plaintiff's legal advisor, who, as such, has an interest in the matter, which is prohibited by Article 7, subsection c) of the Notarial Code. The argument lacks legal basis, because even though Licda. Sánchez Boza may have some type of interest in winning the case, it is merely secondary or indirect (insufficient to disqualify her actions as a notary), since the party truly interested in obtaining a victory is the holder of the right being disputed in the case. For this reason, her objectivity cannot be understood to be compromised either (a requirement contained in subsection d) of number 102 of the Notarial Code).

Another criticism made is that Mrs. [Nombre1] was allowed to attend the associates' assembly in her capacity as the plaintiff's legal advisor, not as a notary public, and the attorney failed to report her intention to draft a notarial act (acta notarial). However, at the time the events occurred, the title of Attorney also implied that of Notary Public (it was not required, as it is now, to have a specialization in Notarial Law), so Mrs. [Nombre1]'s attendance at the event was in that dual capacity. On the other hand, Licda. [Nombre2] had no obligation to identify herself as a notary nor to communicate her intention to draw up a notarial act (acta notarial), for the reasons that will be stated next. Article 101 of the Notarial Code defines the notarial act (acta notarial) as follows: "Notarial acts (actas notariales) are public instruments whose main purposes are to verify, through the notary and at the request of an interested party, facts, events, or situations that are known to the notary or occur in the notary's presence, to give them authentic character, or to record notifications, warnings, or demands made in accordance with the law." That is, the notarial act (acta notarial) serves to: a) verify facts, events, or situations known to the notary or occurring in the notary's presence, giving them authentic character, and b) to record notifications, warnings, or demands. For its part, subsection c) of the following number (102) reads: "The notary who does not know those to whom notification, information, demand, or warning must be given, must attempt to identify them and inform them on whose behalf the notary is proceeding, of the notary's status, of the diligence to be performed, and of their right to record any statements they wish to make regarding this diligence, provided they are pertinent in the professional's judgment." As can be seen, the Notary must proceed in this manner only in the case of notarial acts (actas notariales) whose purpose is to record notifications, warnings, or demands; not when it involves verifying facts, events, or situations that occur in the notary's presence, which is precisely what happened in the specific case.

Continuing with the objections raised by Licda. Gloria Navas Montero against the notarial act (acta notarial) on page 251, she indicates that it does not reflect the reality of what happened on the day of the events. If this were true, the appropriate course is to challenge the validity of the instrument, but as long as its falsity is not declared in a judgment, the document constitutes full proof (Articles 370, 396, and 397 of the Civil Procedure Code). In any case, the assembly minutes book could well have been brought into the case file to contrast its content with the contested notarial act (acta notarial), an omission attributable solely to the defendant.

The sworn statement on page 288, given by the manager of Coopesalud, is not suitable to refute the notarial act (acta notarial).

In another vein, it is alleged that the reason the plaintiff was not reinstated was because she was working at the Mexico Hospital, an argument that is entirely new, so its admission at this stage of the proceedings would leave the counterparty defenseless. The subject matter of the litigation (litis) is defined with the complaint and the answer; therefore, neither party can seek to bring other aspects into the debate that were not raised at the appropriate procedural moment (as resolved in rulings of this Chamber No. 346 at 10:00 a.m. on June 27, 2001, and 55 at 10:20 a.m. on February 13, 2002). Finally, it is argued that the Chamber could not address the merits of the matter without violating the principle of double instance (doble instancia), given that, as the lower court (a quo) and the appellate court (ad quem) declared the right time-barred, they omitted to rule on the merits. The guarantee of the double instance (doble instancia) means that the parties have the opportunity for a superior body to review the actions of the lower body, which has been fully complied with in this proceeding, because the litigants have had not two but three instances, making it completely illogical, and unnecessary, to require the judge who upholds the statute of limitations (prescripción) to resolve the merits of the case, without this preventing the appellate body, if it considers said exception (excepción) inadmissible, from addressing the merits of the case.

V-. REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN): The appellant objects to the use of labor regulations to resolve the statute of limitations defense (prescripción). She believes that the Civil Code should be applied due to the absence of an express rule in the legislation regulating cooperatives, and that the Labor Code is only applicable in procedural matters. First of all, it should be clarified that what the plaintiff seeks is not her reinstatement, but the payment of certain economic rights. Had she requested reinstatement, the exception (excepción) of prescription (prescripción) would not be admissible, since she was never officially expelled from the cooperative by the body competent to do so (general assembly), the associative bond never extinguished, meaning no prescription (prescripción) period began to run for those purposes. However, as what was claimed was not that but the payment of advances (anticipos), the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be resolved in the manner that will be stated. This Chamber has already repeatedly ruled on the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) term in cooperative matters (see judgments No. 134 at 3:20 p.m. on May 27, 1998, and 57 at 10:40 a.m. on February 13, 2002), stating that it is that of Article 607 of the Labor Code, the foregoing based on Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruling No. 5969 at 3:21 p.m. on November 26, 1993, issued on the occasion of an action of unconstitutionality filed against the cited number 607, an opportunity in which the following was recorded: "Specifically, Article 607 of the Code, whose constitutionality is questioned here, establishes: 'Unless otherwise provided, all rights and actions arising from this Code, its Regulations, and its related laws, which do not originate from employment contracts, shall prescribe within three months. This period shall run for employers from the occurrence of the respective event, and for workers from the moment they are effectively able to claim their rights or exercise the corresponding actions.' It is worth noting that, in relation to the rights to which this rule refers, it seems they can only be those 'not linked' to the employment contract or relationship; not because they derive from the law do they cease to derive from the contract, as already stated. Thus, the hypothesis contemplated by this rule will only refer to rights that do not arise within, by virtue of, or in connection with the labor relationship - e.g., those referring to the organization and operation of unions and cooperatives, the right to claim against employment policy or minimum wages considered incorrect, or social security rights" (the bold is not in the original). As can be seen, this pronouncement is very clear that in cooperative matters, the statute of limitations (prescripción) operates at three months, and this body cannot depart from what was so ordered by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), whose rulings are binding erga omnes (number 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

This 3-month period is counted, as provided by the legal text itself, from the moment one is effectively able to claim the rights or exercise the respective actions, so the precise moment when the plaintiff could have claimed her rights must be identified. Recounting what happened, it is found that on December 27, 1996, the general manager of Coopesalud informed Mrs. [Nombre3] that, for reasons of reorganization, her services would be dispensed with as of January 1, 1997, explaining that her rights as a worker would be paid by the Personnel Office, while her rights as an associate would be paid once the board of directors completed the pertinent procedures (page 37). The settlement of the "labor rights" was made on January 15, 1997 (page 62). It was not until July 8, 1998, that the plaintiff was summoned to an extraordinary assembly to be held on July 17 to define her corporate situation (page 40). However, it is not on record whether that meeting actually took place. On the back of page 38, there is another call to an extraordinary assembly, for October 2, 1998, on whose agenda the "definition of the case of Mrs. [Nombre3]" appears. On the scheduled day, the general assembly, the supreme body of the Cooperative (number 37 of the Cooperatives Associations Law), rejected the motion to expel the plaintiff, without ruling on the advances (anticipos) she had stopped receiving, ordering the board of directors to take the pertinent measures to relocate Mrs. [Nombre4]; this latter body referred the matter to the legal advisor so that, within a period of 22 days, she could render an opinion on the terms of restitution (page 251). The enforceability of each monthly sum for advances (anticipo) arose each month, starting in January 1997, with the plaintiff being empowered to claim from that moment, but her inaction caused the prescription (prescripción) of her rights. However, the assembly agreement ordering restitution carries, as a logical and necessary consequence, the acknowledgment of the advances (anticipos) not received during the separation, therefore acting as an interrupting act of the prescription (prescripción) (Article 876, subsection 1 of the Civil Code), meaning the new computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is counted from the expiration of the period the general assembly gave the legal advisor to report on the terms of the reinstatement, that is, from October 24, 1998. As the request to the manager was made on February 17, 1999, and the complaint was filed on December 17 of the same year, the statute of limitations (prescripción) applicable to the case took effect, since more than three months elapsed between one proceeding and another, leaving only the advances (anticipos) arising three months before the filing of the complaint unaffected by it. Therefore, what was resolved regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be modified and said defense accepted partially.

For greater clarity, it is worth emphasizing the incorrect procedure followed in the plaintiff's case, by dividing her situation into a labor relationship (proceeding with her dismissal and settlement of legal benefits) and an associative one (whose extinction was left suspended for over a year, without the assembly taking the respective expulsion agreement). In reality, Mrs. [Nombre3]'s condition was unique and indivisible: an associate of a self-managed (autogestionaria) cooperative, as she herself acknowledges when referring to the exceptions (excepciones) raised by the co-defendants (pages 74 and 75), by stating that there was no subordinate labor relationship, but rather an associative one, where owners and workers of the cooperative are the same, and that is why they are not governed by labor regulations, but by those referring to the association. This Chamber has already had the opportunity to develop the topic, indicating that the members of this type of cooperative are not workers in the strict sense of the term. Thus, it is worth citing ruling No. 329 at 10:00 a.m. on October 22, 1999: "The Cooperatives Associations and Creation of the Cooperative Development Institute Law, No. 4179, of August 22, 1968, amended by Laws Nos. 7391, of April 27, 1994; 6756, of April 30, 1982; 6893, of May 22, 1983; and 7053, of December 9, 1986, defines Cooperatives as 'voluntary associations of persons and not of capital, with full legal personality, of indefinite duration and limited liability, in which individuals organize themselves democratically in order to satisfy their needs and promote their economic and social improvement, as a means of overcoming their human condition and their individual formation, and in which the motive of work and production, distribution, and consumption, is service and not profit.' (Article 2). Based on their purpose, this regulation differentiates, by way of example, several classes of Cooperatives, namely: consumer, production, marketing, supply, savings and loan, housing, services, school, youth, transportation, and multiple ones (number 15, first paragraph). As relevant to the case, Article 17 of the same law states that 'Production cooperatives have as their purpose the production, manufacturing, or transformation, directly by the associates, of natural or elaborated articles, or the initiation or development of all kinds of agricultural, livestock, industrial, and artisanal operations, distributing any surpluses (excedentes) that may accumulate through their collective work effort, in proportion to the production, manual or intellectual work; or the output with which each of the associates has contributed to the enterprise.' Number 15, in turn, establishes, in its second paragraph, that this type of cooperative can be simple, co-management (cogestión), or self-managed (autogestión); and, these last are defined, by Article 99, ibidem, as 'those enterprises organized for the production of goods and services, in which the workers who comprise them direct all their activities and directly contribute their labor force, with the primary purpose of carrying out productive activities and receiving, in proportion to their work contribution, economic and social benefits.' From this rule and the content of numbers 67, 109, subsection a), and 110, subsection c), of the indicated regulatory body, it follows that the fundamental obligation of the member is to contribute personal work to the enterprise, directly and irreplaceably; which supports the self-managed (autogestionario) associative phenomenon and integrates, preeminently, its social capital. It is also important to highlight that, by express provision of subsection a) of number 105, ibidem, the persons who form an organization of this category must obtain their subsistence, at the start of its constitution, from work, either in their condition as salaried workers or as self-employed workers. The concordance of the cited provisions leads to the conclusion, then, that the self-managed production cooperative (Cooperativa de producción autogestionaria) is a typical workers' organization—the term 'worker' understood here in its economic sense—whose social capital consists of the permanent and direct contribution of the labor force that each associate must make, based on their own productive capacity. Its purpose is to develop activities for the production of goods and services, with the aim of achieving economic and social benefits for all its members. This business model is designed to be directed by its own associates and for the production tasks constituting its purpose to be executed, basically, by them, personally. A guiding element of its organizational scheme is recognized: that the economic benefits obtained be divided in proportion to the work contribution each one makes—numbers 99, 104, and 114, b), 8)—. In relation to this, Articles 17 and 104 ibidem restrict the possibility of hiring salaried employees—workers in the legal sense—that is, persons not associated with them; which can be done but only in very specific cases. There is no doubt that the groups in question, within which the defendant falls, and which the legislator considers of 'public convenience and utility and of social interest' (Article 1), have a clearly special legal regulation. The particularity of their regulations has a strong basis in number 64 of the Costa Rican Political Constitution, which institutes, as a primary state duty, the promotion of the creation of worker cooperatives. This characteristic of the cooperative legal system entails the impossibility of applying, primarily, exclusively, and restrictively, any other protective legislation—specifically, Labor law—to the legal relationship linking the cooperative association and its partner-worker (socio-trabajador), even though its constitution and operation are naturally linked to this matter. The cited number 17 establishes, in its final paragraph, that: 'In contractual labor matters, these cooperatives [production cooperatives] shall be governed by the provisions contained in the current labor legislation, but for the purposes of the legal relationship of the associate with the cooperative, it must be interpreted that their socioeconomic status must be that of partner-worker (socio-trabajador), as a single natural person.' This is reaffirmed also in number 131, ibidem, which attributes a supplementary character, in a limited way, to the Labor Code, below various sources of law, and provided that the provisions to be applied 'do not contravene the principles, doctrine, and philosophy of cooperatives.' In the case at hand, the plaintiff was a partner-worker (socio trabajador) of the defendant Cooperative. Consequently, the legal relationship existing between them is different from the characteristic or typical labor bonds, over which the legal protection contained in the current Labor regulations does apply. Consequently, it is not possible to maintain that the defendant Cooperative 'receives' the fruits of the plaintiff's work, that is, appropriates them for itself. This is because they are integrated—precisely through the distribution of surpluses (excedentes)—into the assets of the one who produced them: the associate-worker (asociado-trabajador). In these cases, the exchange of benefits that the work entails, consisting of the alienation of the fruits obtained through the personal provision of services in exchange for a price—which is typical and normal in typical labor relationships—does not occur; nor does the element of subordination, attributable to a person different from the worker, i.e., to the employer, occur. It is clear that the plaintiff's obligation to contribute her labor force—her duty to work—for the execution of the services that the Cooperative contracts and provides to third parties did not originate from an employment contract, but from another associative one; whose consequence, desired and protected by legislation, is, among others, that. On this matter, the Argentine jurists Francisco Junyent Vélez and Roberto Fermín Bertossi affirm that worker cooperatives 'have as their main characteristic and their very reason for being, the non-existence within them of the possibility of "employer-worker," which is equivalent to saying: "no class of labor relationship between associate and cooperative, since they have freely, voluntarily, assumed the so-called entrepreneurial risk, a decision that deserves the greatest respect." / In a worker cooperative, it corresponds to the associates, as an essential requirement, to contribute personal work, without which they cannot hold such status, resulting thus that they are associates because they work and they work because they are associates, indivisible qualities.' (La cooperativa, Buenos Aires, EDIAR, Sociedad Anónima Editora Comercial, Industrial y Financiera, 1987, p. 293). Likewise, other authors, in relation to this contractual figure, have established that: 'Partnership contract (contrato de sociedad) and employment contract (contrato de trabajo) are two different figures; in those cases where the structure and content of the employment contract appear substituted by those that configure the partnership contract, we will be before this type of relationship and not the former. The employment contract is a typical and proper legal figure; the partnership contract is another, distinct from and independent of the former.' (Manuel Alonso García, Curso de Derecho del Trabajo, Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, S.A., ninth edition, 1985, pp.

<p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Arial">321-322).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Manuel Alonso Olea and María Emilia Casas Baamonde indicate that "The 'member-worker' is not bound to the cooperative by an employment contract, but rather [by one] of a corporate nature [although] the mentioned circumstances bring him closer to the employed worker; hence 'the legal-labor impregnation' of his regime" (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Derecho del Trabajo</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, Madrid, Universidad de Madrid-Facultad de Derecho, thirteenth edition, 1993, p. 149).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Consequently, in this case, the specific employment relationship between the parties does not exist and the figures of worker and employer cannot be individualized or extracted. The duty of submission to the guidelines established by the Cooperative's highest corporate body—the Members' Assembly—which is incumbent upon the member-worker, is not a product of the alleged employment relationship—nonexistent here, as already indicated—but rather of another type of legal subjection, which arises precisely from the associative agreement (...). Pursuant to the provisions of numeral 2 of the cited Law, these associative mechanisms must be inspired by the democratic model of distribution and exercise of collective power, arising from the group; which implies, among other things, depositing in representatives the making of certain decisions and the execution of those of a consensual nature, recognizing their authority, and submitting to the will of the majority.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> From here arises, then, a modality of a relationship of dependence or legal subordination, clearly distinguishable from the employment one, which—as stated—is subject to specific regulation. The circumstance that each member-worker satisfies his needs with the remuneration and the surpluses obtained, for the work he contributes to the Cooperative, does not automatically convert him into a salaried employee, nor does it make him the holder of the rights proper to someone in that legal condition.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The remuneration to which he is entitled</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, which cannot be "less than the minimum wage established for the different activities applicable to private companies." (Article 108, subsection a), </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">is not a salary, in the labor sense of the term;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> although it certainly constitutes the production cost for labor, which all members, as entrepreneurs, cover. The applicable legislation takes care to assign it such a denomination and, although it resorts to the concept of "minimum wage," it does not equate them and does so only for the purpose of setting a legal, objective, and variable parameter for determining the minimum and maximum that the Cooperative must allocate to satisfying said productive cost.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> That remuneration, like the surpluses or any other sums destined for the member-workers, has its legal cause in what the cooperative legislation qualifies as "the distribution of the economic and social benefits, the product of common effort" (numeral 100, subsection a); which is, ultimately, the realization of the legal and social purpose of this type of human organization.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> It must also be taken into account that these different remunerations are determined by the members themselves, within certain conditions, in direct proportion to the effort or labor contribution that each one made in the production of the corresponding goods and services (Articles 17, first paragraph, 99, and 114).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> From everything indicated above, it is concluded, without a doubt, that there are notable differences between the relationships established at a typically employment level and those exhibited in self-managed cooperative associations.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> This allows us to determine that, in the latter, the member-workers effectively have a special legal status, different from that corresponding to a salaried worker.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">They are co-owners of the means of production, that is, cooperativized entrepreneurs, whose decisions are made at the guild level, based on a democratic organization.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">In turn, they are workers, but not salaried employees, but rather independent ones, who organize collectively and who are the owners of their own company.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Hence it is said that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">they are their own employers;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> which, despite reflecting a clear contradiction in concept, eliminates outright the existence of a relationship of subordination and dependence, in the typical sense of what is an employment relationship.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> It is true that Article 133 of the Cooperative Associations Law indicates that "The Labor Courts, except for the cases expressly indicated in this law, shall have jurisdiction over actions derived from it, in accordance with the provisions of Title VIII, Chapter I of the Labor Code." However, what this norm does is grant jurisdiction to the Labor Courts to hear claims filed on the occasion of the application of that regulation, without it being possible in any way to affirm that this circumstance "laborizes" the relationships between the members of a self-managed cooperative"</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (in the same sense, see votes No. 172 of 9:30 a.m. on July 6, 1994, and 134 of 3:20 p.m. on May 27, 1998). Therefore, the dismissal and employment settlement of Mrs. [Name4]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">are acts lacking legal support, because the provisions of the Labor Code that regulate the payment of notice, severance pay, and vacations, nor the Aguinaldo Law for Private Enterprise, cannot be applied in this case.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The only procedure that should have been followed was to adopt a resolution of exclusion by the assembly (Article 34, subsection f) of the Cooperative Associations Law).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> However, this never happened, as the defendants admit when answering the complaint: “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Her separation as a member of the cooperative, a relationship distinct from the employment one, has not yet been completed, which is why she continues to be summoned to the assemblies.”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The appealed judgment must therefore be revoked, insofar as it upheld the statute of limitations defense in its entirety and dismissed the claim, and the merits of the case must be examined. VI-. COMPENSATION TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED: There is no doubt that the abusive and illegitimate conduct of the Cooperative, in leaving the plaintiff in total uncertainty for years, with serious impairment of her rights as a member-worker, caused her damages and losses that must be compensated (Article 41 of the Political Constitution).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In this Chamber's vote No. 365 of 9:40 a.m. on November 26, 1999, it was stated: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“Damage, as part of the unlawful act, or as a prerequisite for civil liability, is doctrinally treated as an injury to a legally relevant interest in any sphere of human life and, as such, worthy of protection. It has been defined as: '... the detriment experienced in one's assets by the impairment of the economic values that compose it (material damage) and also the injury to feelings, honor, or legitimate affections (moral damage)' (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo - Perrot, eighth edition, 1993, p. 167).”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In the specific case, we are in the realm of contractual civil liability (membership contract with a self-managed cooperative), in which </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“the harmful event consisting of the breach attributable to one of the parties to the contract (or, where appropriate, both), derives from an act or legal transaction that constitutes the source of the obligation on their part.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> The unlawful act, in a broad sense, consists precisely in the breach of enforceable obligations by reason of the legal transaction”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (Zannoni, El daño en la responsabilidad civil, second edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1993, p.86).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The general principle governing damages is that the liable party must compensate for all the damage caused by his unlawful act (principle of full or complete reparation) (in this regard, see the work by Orgaz, El daño resarcible, third edition, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 120).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Thus, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“the compensation for damage must restore the injured party's assets to the situation in which they would have been had the harmful event not occurred</span><span style="font-family:Arial">” (Visintini, Tratado de la responsabilidad civil, volume 2, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 204). The plaintiff seeks compensation for both the material and moral damage suffered.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The former (also called material damage) is defined as </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“that which falls upon the assets, whether directly on the things or goods that compose them, or indirectly as a consequence or reflection of damage caused to the person himself, in his rights or faculties (...).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Material damage can manifest itself in two typical forms: either as the loss or diminution of already existing economic values, that is, as an impoverishment of the assets (actual loss or positive damage), or as the frustration of expected economic advantages, i.e., as the loss of an anticipated asset enrichment (lost profits)”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (Orgaz, op. cit., pp. 20 and 24).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Mrs. [Name3] requests compensation for lost profits, as she seeks payment of all the income she should have received in her capacity as a worker-member of Coopesalud</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> from the time she was separated from her position until 2027 (the year in which she places the end of her useful working life), along with the corresponding statutory interest.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> To correctly resolve such a petition, the issue of the certainty of the damage must first be studied, which is one of the requirements for it to be compensable. Vázquez Ferreyra states in this regard that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“damage certainty refers to its existence, whether present or future.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> It is uncertain when there is no certainty that the injury has occurred or will occur.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> It is certain when it is real and effective, and not merely hypothetical (...).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Certainty refers to its existence, and not to its actuality or the determination of its amount.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Thus, there can be future and certain damage” </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">(Responsabilidad por daños, Editorial Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1993, pp. 178 and 180).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> For Zannoni, “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">the certainty of damage always constitutes a finding of present fact that projects a necessary consequence into the future as well.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> When the consequence is not necessary, but contingent or hypothetical or purely feared, the damage is uncertain”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (op. cit., pp. 50-52).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> It is also important, for the correct examination of the matter, to distinguish between present damage and future damage:</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“Present damage is the injury already produced and subsisting.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Future damage is that which does not yet exist but whose future existence offers no doubt”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (Vázquez Ferreyra, op. cit., p. 179).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> According to the doctrine, the chronological moment separating present damages from future ones is the issuance of the judgment: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“From another point of view, damage—whether as actual loss or as lost profits—can be present (or current) and future.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> The moment considered for this distinction is that of the ruling”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (Orgaz, op. cit., pp. 25-26).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Zannoni shares the same criterion: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“In summary, then, current damage is the damage, detriment, or injury already operated and subsisting in the injured party's assets at the time of the judgment.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> Future damage, on the other hand, is that which has not yet existed, but which will certainly exist after the judgment”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (op. cit., p. 69).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Based on such theoretical premises, the defendant entity must be ordered to compensate the plaintiff for all the advances (remuneration provided for in Article 108 of the Cooperative Associations Law) that she failed to earn from September 17, 1999 (3 months before the filing of the complaint, which are not time-barred) until the judgment becomes final—unless before this event (the judgment becoming final) her legal expulsion as a member of the defendant has occurred, in which case the compensation must be limited to the date of expulsion in accordance with law—plus the corresponding statutory interest from the time each obligation came into legal existence until its effective payment; all of which shall be determined in the judgment enforcement stage.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Regarding future damages, since there is no security or certainty that the plaintiff's useful working life as a member of the defendant will last until the year 2027, the claim so formulated cannot be upheld. However, it is appropriate to interpret it in the sense that in the event that the reinstatement resolution adopted by the assembly has not been fulfilled before the judgment becomes final and expulsion has not been decreed, the Cooperative must continue to pay the plaintiff all the income corresponding to her in her capacity as a member-worker, subsequent to the finality of the judgment until effective reinstatement. It must be noted, however, that from the amount that the defendant must ultimately pay Mrs. Villegas Campos as a result of this resolution, the ¢2,429,803.55 that were paid to her on January 15, 1997, as an “employment settlement” must be deducted, because although said payment lacked legal support—since no employment-type relationship existed—the fact is that the plaintiff received that money and it is fair and equitable to take it into account when calculating what the cooperative owes, to prevent unjust enrichment (folio 62).</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Likewise, from the sums that the defendant must pay, the amounts that the defendant proves during judgment enforcement that the plaintiff received as a salary from some employer, during the same period covered by the payment of advances ordered herein, shall be deducted.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The plaintiff shall lose the right to continue receiving this compensation if reinstatement does not occur due to her fault within a period of one month computed from the date the judgment becomes final, for which purpose she may request the assistance of the Court.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The moral damage for the "affectation to professional prestige" cannot be granted, as it lacks evidentiary support, a reason that also justifies denying the petition regarding the damages caused by the absence of social security for the plaintiff and her family, since Mrs. [Name3] at no time indicated nor demonstrated what those damages specifically consisted of.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Adjustments based on inflation also cannot be ordered, as an express norm authorizing it is required.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In this same sense, the Chamber ruled in vote No. 338 of 9:10 a.m. on July 9, 2003, in which it was stated: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">“Both indexation and statutory interest are monetary correction formulas that tend to compensate for the loss of the real value of legal tender currency. The difference between the two lies in the fact that, in current legislation, only the second is recognized and, in the case, as in this matter, of a monetary, pecuniary, or numerical debt or obligation, it grants it an exclusive and exclusionary character. Indeed, as established by Article 706 of the Civil Code: 'If the obligation is to pay a sum of money, the damages and losses always and only consist of the payment of interest on the sum owed, counted from the expiration of the term.' Consequently, it is appropriate to also deny this other aspect of the claim filed, not only due to the lack of an express norm that authorizes and regulates indexation, which would oblige the courts, in the event of granting it, to assume the setting of the correction percentages, thereby invading a foreign sphere, but also because, being in the presence of the breach of a legal obligation payable in money, the damages and losses derived from it cannot include anything other than the payment of statutory interest,”</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and in this case, as previously ordered, the payment of interest from the enforceability of the sums resulting from advances was ordered. </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">It is also not appropriate to grant the claims related to vacations, year-end bonuses, and annual increments, as these items are of an employment nature and, as explained in the fifth recital of this resolution, the plaintiff was not a worker in the strict sense, and therefore she lacks the right to demand payment of such concepts, without the fact that she was paid a settlement of “labor rights” upon being “dismissed” affecting what is thus ordered, given that error does not create right. As a final observation, it should be noted that Mrs. [Name3] jointly and severally sued the Cooperative and those who held the positions of manager, members of the board of directors, and members of the oversight committee at the time of the events.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> However, the Cooperative Associations Law does not establish joint and several liability for the officers in this type of case.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The norms of said Law that regulate the matter are transcribed below: “Article 49: The oversight committee elected by the assembly, which shall be composed of no fewer than three members, or the audit mentioned in subsection e) of Article 36, shall be responsible for the examination and supervision of all accounts and operations carried out by the cooperative. It shall also report to the assembly as appropriate. For the examination and supervision of said accounts and operations, the respective financial statements must be certified by a licensed public accountant, or by auxiliary cooperative bodies that carry out audit work in accordance with Article 95 of this law. Once certified, they shall be delivered annually to the members. Cooperatives whose volume of operations is below the minimum defined by regulation are excluded from this obligation. The joint and several liability of the members of the board of directors and the manager extends to the members of the oversight committee or the internal auditor, for acts that the latter did not timely object to. Members of the committee who expressly note their dissenting vote within the month following the date on which the respective resolution was adopted are exempt from this liability.” “Article 52: The members of the board of directors and the manager who execute or permit the execution of acts manifestly contrary to the interests of the cooperative, or who violate the law or the bylaws, shall be jointly and severally liable with their assets for the losses that such operations cause to the cooperative, without prejudice to the other penalties that correspond to them. The director or manager who wishes to preserve his personal liability shall request that his opposing vote or opinion be recorded in the minute book.” As observed, this is a joint and several liability of the directors to the Cooperative as such for the damages caused to it, not to its members, a reason that obliges us to uphold the claim only insofar as it was brought against Coopesalud, since regarding its officers, the defense of lack of passive standing is admissible." </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p>

" IV-. SOBRE LA PRUEBA ADMITIDA PARA MEJOR PROVEER: En esta instancia la actora aportó dos actas notariales, visibles a folios 251 y 252. Por resolución de las 15:30 horas del 3 de agosto del 2005 (folio 276) únicamente se admitió la primera (escritura número 14 del tomo 12 del protocolo de la Notaria [Nombre1] Sánchez Boza), porque la otra (escritura número 25 idem) ya figuraba en los autos (folio 68). A folio 281 aparece el escrito mediante el cual la parte demandada contestó la audiencia conferida al efecto, haciéndose referencia tanto a la escritura número 14 como a la número 25, pero, por la razón apuntada, solo se tomarán en cuenta los alegatos que tengan que ver con el acta notarial de folio 251. La abogada de los accionados se opone a la aceptación de esa prueba porque estima que el instrumento es nulo, dado que fue levantado por la asesora legal de la actora, quien, como tal, tiene un interés en el asunto, lo que está prohibido por el artículo 7 inciso c) del Código Notarial. El argumento carece de fundamento jurídico, pues si bien puede existir algún tipo de interés por parte de la Licda. Sánchez Boza en ganar el juicio, este es meramente secundario o indirecto (insuficiente para descalificar su actuación como notaria), pues quien está realmente interesada en obtener la victoria es la parte titular del derecho discutido en juicio. Por ello, tampoco puede entenderse comprometida su objetividad (requisito contenido en el inciso d) del numeral 102 del Código Notarial). Otra de las críticas que se hacen es que a doña [Nombre1] se le permitió asistir a la asamblea de asociados en su condición de asesora legal de la accionante, no como notaria pública, omitiendo la abogada informar sobre su intención de redactar un acta notarial. No obstante, para la época en que sucedieron los hechos, el título de Abogado implicaba a la vez el de Notario Público (no se requería, como ahora, contar con una especialización en Derecho Notarial), por lo que la asistencia de doña [Nombre1] al acto fue en esa doble condición. Por otro lado, ninguna obligación tenía la Licda. [Nombre2] de identificarse como notaria ni de comunicar su propósito de levantar un acta notarial, por lo que de seguido se dirá. El artículo 101 del Código Notarial define así el acta notarial: “Las actas notariales son instrumentos públicos cuyas finalidades principales son comprobar, por medio del notario y a solicitud de parte interesada, hechos, sucesos o situaciones que le consten u ocurran en su presencia, darles carácter de auténticos, o bien hacer constar notificaciones, prevenciones o intimaciones procedentes según la ley.” Es decir, el acta notarial sirve para: a)comprobar hechos, sucesos o situaciones que le consten al notario u ocurran en su presencia, dándoles carácter de auténticos, y b) para hacer constar notificaciones, prevenciones o intimaciones. Por su parte, el inciso c) del numeral siguiente (102) reza: “El notario que no conozca a quienes debe notificar, informar, intimar o prevenir, deberá procurar identificarlos y hacerles saber por encargo de quién procede, su calidad de notario, la diligencia por efectuar y el derecho que les asiste de hacer constar las manifestaciones que tengan a bien sobre esa diligencia, siempre que sean pertinentes a juicio del profesional”. Como se observa, el Notario debe proceder así únicamente en el caso de las actas notariales cuyo propósito sea hacer constar notificaciones, prevenciones o intimaciones; no así cuando se trate de comprobar hechos, sucesos o situaciones que ocurran en su presencia, que fue precisamente lo que sucedió en el caso concreto. Siguiendo con las objeciones que plantea la Licda. Gloria Navas Montero contra el acta notarial de folio 251, indica que no refleja la realidad de lo que aconteció el día de los hechos. De ser ello verdad, lo que procede es atacar la validez del instrumento, pero mientras no se declare la falsedad en sentencia, el documento hace plena prueba (artículos 370, 396 y 397 del Código Procesal Civil). En todo caso, bien pudo haberse traído al expediente el libro de actas de asamblea para contrastar su contenido con el acta notarial impugnada, omisión que únicamente le resulta achacable a la demandada. La declaración jurada de folio 288, rendida por el gerente de Coopesalud, no es idónea para desvirtuar el acta notarial. En otro orden de ideas, se alega que el motivo por el cual no se reinstaló a la actora fue porque ella se encontraba laborando en el Hospital México, argumento que resulta totalmente novedoso, por lo que su admisión a estas alturas del proceso conllevaría dejar en estado de indefensión a la contraparte. Con la demanda y la contestación se define el objeto de la litis, por lo que ninguna de las partes puede pretender que sean objeto del debate otros aspectos que no fueron los planteados en el momento procesal oportuno (así se resolvió en los votos de esta Sala N° 346 de las 10 horas del 27 de junio del 2001 y 55 de las 10:20 horas del 13 de febrero del 2002). Por último, se aduce que la Sala no podría entrar a conocer el fondo del asunto sin violentar el principio de doble instancia, ya que como el a quo y el ad quem declararon prescrito el derecho, omitieron pronunciarse sobre el fondo. La garantía de la doble instancia implica que las partes tengan la oportunidad de que un órgano superior revise la actuación del inferior, lo que en este proceso se ha cumplido cabalmente, pues los litigantes han contado no con dos sino con tres instancias, careciendo de toda lógica, por innecesario, exigirle al juzgador que acoja una prescripción resolver el fondo del asunto, sin que ello obste para que si el órgano de alzada considera que dicha excepción no procede entre a conocer el fondo del asunto.

V-. ACERCA DE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN: La recurrente objeta la utilización de la normativa laboral para resolver la defensa de prescripción. Estima que debe aplicarse el Código Civil por ausencia de norma expresa en la legislación que regula lo relativo a cooperativas y que el Código de Trabajo solo es aplicable en lo procesal. Antes que nada cabe aclarar que lo que la actora pretende no es su reinstalación, sino el pago de unos derechos de carácter económico. De haber solicitado la reinstalación, la excepción de prescripción no sería de recibo, ya que como nunca fue oficialmente expulsada de la cooperativa por el órgano competente para hacerlo (asamblea general) el vínculo asociativo nunca llegó a extinguirse, por lo que no empezó a correr ningún plazo de prescripción a esos efectos. No obstante, como lo reclamado no fue eso sino el pago de anticipos, debe resolverse la prescripción de la manera que se dirá. Esta Sala ya se ha pronunciado reiteradamente sobre el término de prescripción aplicable en materia de cooperativas (consúltense los fallos N° 134 de las 15:20 horas del 27 de mayo de 1998 y 57 de las 10:40 horas del 13 de febrero del 2002), indicando que es el del artículo 607 del Código de Trabajo, lo anterior con fundamento en el voto de la Sala Constitucional N° 5969 de las 15:21 horas del 26 de noviembre de 1993, dictado con ocasión de una acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada contra el numeral 607 citado, oportunidad en la que se consignó: “Específicamente, el artículo 607 del Código, cuya constitucionalidad aquí se cuestiona, establece: "Salvo disposición especial en contrario, todos los derechos y acciones provenientes de este Código, de sus Reglamentos y de sus leyes conexas, que no se originen en contratos de trabajo, prescribirán en el término de tres meses. Este plazo correrá para los patronos desde el acaecimiento del hecho respectivo y para los trabajadores desde el momento en que estén en posibilidad efectiva de reclamar sus derechos o ejercitar las acciones correspondientes." Cabe observar que, en relación con los derechos a los cuales se refiere esa norma, pareciera que solo pueden ser los "no vinculados" al contrato o relación laboral; no porque sean derivados de la ley, dejan de serlo del contrato, como ya se dijo. Así, la hipótesis que esta norma contempla solamente se referirá a los derechos que no se den dentro, en virtud o en conexión con la relación laboral, -vgr. los referidos a la organización y funcionamiento de los sindicatos y cooperativas, el de reclamar contra la política de empleo o salarios mínimos que considere incorrecta o los derechos de la seguridad social” (la negrita no está en el original). Como se observa, ese pronunciamiento es muy claro en cuanto a que en materia cooperativa la prescripción opera a los tres meses, no pudiendo este órgano separarse de lo así dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional, cuyos fallos son vinculantes erga omnes (ordinal 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Ese plazo de 3 meses se cuenta, según lo dispone el propio texto legal, a partir de que se esté en la posibilidad efectiva de reclamar los derechos o ejercitar las acciones respectivas, por lo que debe ubicarse cuál fue ese preciso momento en que la demandante pudo haber reclamado sus derechos. Haciendo un recuento de lo sucedido, se tiene que el 27 de diciembre de 1996, el gerente general de Coopesalud le comunicó a doña [Nombre3] que, por motivos de reorganización, se prescindiría de sus servicios a partir del 1° de enero de 1997, explicándole que sus derechos como trabajadora le serían pagados por la Oficina de Personal, mientras que sus derechos como asociada le serían cancelados una vez que el consejo de administración realizara los trámites pertinentes (folio 37). La liquidación de los “derechos laborales” se efectuó el 15 de enero de 1997 (folio 62). No fue sino hasta el 8 de julio de 1998 que se convocó a la actora a una asamblea extraordinaria que se llevaría a cabo el 17 de julio para definir su situación societaria (folio 40). No obstante, no consta en autos si efectivamente esa reunión se celebró. A folio 38 vuelto figura otra convocatoria a asamblea extraordinaria, para el 2 de octubre de 1998, en cuyo orden del día aparece la “definición del caso de la señora [Nombre3] ”. El día fijado, la asamblea general, órgano supremo de la Cooperativa (ordinal 37 de la Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas), rechazó la moción de expulsión de la accionante, sin pronunciarse sobre los anticipos que esta había dejado de percibir, ordenándole al consejo de administración tomar las medidas pertinentes para reubicar a la señora [Nombre4] ; órgano este último que trasladó la gestión a la asesora legal para que en un plazo de 22 días rindiera un dictamen sobre las condiciones de la restitución (folio 251). La exigibilidad de cada suma mensual por anticipo surgió cada mes, a partir de enero de 1997, estando la actora facultada para reclamar desde ese momento, pero su inercia provocó la prescripción de sus derechos. Sin embargo, el acuerdo de la asamblea que ordenó la restitución lleva como consecuencia lógica y necesaria el reconocimiento de los anticipos dejados de percibir mientras duró la separación, operando por ende como un acto interruptor de la prescripción (artículo 876 inciso 1 del Código Civil), por lo que el nuevo cómputo de la prescripción se cuenta a partir del vencimiento del plazo que la asamblea general le dio a la asesora legal para informar sobre los términos de la reinstalación, o sea desde el 24 de octubre de 1998. Como la solicitud ante el gerente se hizo el 17 de febrero de 1999 y la demanda se presentó el 17 de diciembre del mismo año, operó la prescripción aplicable al caso, pues entre gestión y gestión transcurrieron más de tres meses, quedando sin afectar por ella entonces solamente los anticipos surgidos tres meses antes de la incoación de la demanda. Por ello debe modificarse lo resuelto sobre la prescripción y aceptarse dicha defensa en forma parcial. En aras de una mayor claridad, cabe recalcar el incorrecto procedimiento que se siguió en el caso de la accionante, al dividir su situación en una relación laboral (procediéndose a su despido y liquidación de prestaciones legales) y otra de carácter asociativo (cuya extinción se dejó en suspenso por más de un año, sin que la asamblea tomase el respectivo acuerdo de expulsión). En realidad, la condición de doña [Nombre3] era única e inescindible: asociada a una cooperativa autogestionaria, como ella misma lo reconoce al referirse a las excepciones opuestas por los codemandados (folios 74 y 75), al manifestar que no hubo una relación laboral subordinada, sino de tipo asociativo, donde dueños y trabajadores de la cooperativa son los mismos y por eso no se rigen por la normativa laboral, sino por la referente a la asociación. Ya esta Sala ha tenido la oportunidad de desarrollar el tema, indicando que los miembros de una cooperativa de ese tipo no son trabajadores en el sentido estricto del término. Así, cabe citar el voto N° 329 de las 10 horas del 22 de octubre de 1999: “La Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas y Creación del Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, No. 4179, de 22 de agosto de 1968, reformada por las leyes Nos. 7391, de 27 de abril de 1994; 6756, de 30 de abril de 1982; 6893, de 22 de mayo de 1983; y 7053, de 9 de diciembre de 1986, define a las Cooperativas, como "asociaciones voluntarias de personas y no de capitales, con plena personalidad jurídica, de duración indefinida y de responsabilidad limitada, en la que los individuos se organizan democráticamente a fin de satisfacer sus necesidades y promover su mejoramiento económico y social, como un medio de superar su condición humana y su formación individual y en las cuales el motivo de trabajo y de la producción, de la distribución y del consumo, es el servicio y no el lucro." (artículo 2). Con base en su finalidad, esa normativa diferencia, a título de ejemplo, varias clases de Cooperativas, a saber: las de consumo, las de producción, las de comercialización, las de suministros, las de ahorro y crédito, las de vivienda, las de servicios, las escolares, las juveniles, las de transportes y las múltiples (ordinal 15, párrafo primero). En lo que al caso interesa, el artículo 17 ídem, consigna que "Las cooperativas de producción tienen por objeto la producción, manufactura o transformación en forma directa por parte de los asociados, de artículos naturales elaborados, o la iniciación o desarrollo de toda clase de explotaciones agrícolas, ganaderas, industriales y artesanales distribuyendo los excedentes que pudieran acumularse por su gestión de trabajo en conjunto, en proporción a la producción, al trabajo manual o intelectual; o al rendimiento con que cada uno de los asociados haya contribuido a la empresa.". El numeral 15, a su vez, establece, en su párrafo segundo, que este tipo de cooperativas puede ser simple, de cogestión, o bien, de autogestión; y, estas últimas son definidas, por el artículo 99, ibídem, como "aquellas empresas organizadas para la producción de bienes y servicios, en las cuales los trabajadores que las integran dirigen todas las actividades de las mismas y aportan directamente su fuerza de trabajo, con el fin primordial de realizar actividades productivas y recibir, en proporción a su aporte de trabajo, beneficios de tipo económico y social.". De esa norma y del contenido de los numerales 67, 109, inciso a), y 110, inciso c), del cuerpo normativo indicado, se deriva que la obligación fundamental del socio, consiste en aportarle, a la empresa, su trabajo personal, en forma directa e irremplazable; lo que da sustento al fenómeno asociativo autogestionario e integra, con carácter preeminente, su capital social. Importa destacar, también que, por disposición expresa del inciso a), del ordinal 105, ibídem, las personas que conforman una organización de esta categoría, deben obtener su subsistencia, al momento de iniciar su constitución, del trabajo, ya sea en su condición de asalariados o bien de trabajadores por cuenta propia. La concordancia de las disposiciones citadas, lleva a concluir, entonces, que la Cooperativa de producción autogestionaria es una típica organización de trabajadores -término, éste, entendido aquí en su sentido económico-, cuyo capital social está constituido por el aporte permanente y directo de la fuerza del trabajo que, cada asociado, debe hacer, basado en su propia capacidad productiva. Su finalidad es la de desarrollar actividades de producción de bienes y de servicios, con el propósito de conseguir beneficios económicos y sociales, para todos sus miembros. Esa modalidad empresarial está diseñada para que sea dirigida por sus propios asociados y para que, las labores de producción, constitutivas de su objeto, sean ejecutadas, básicamente, por ellos mismos, personalmente. Se reconoce, como elemento rector de su esquema organizativo, el que, los beneficios económicos obtenidos, sean divididos en forma proporcional al aporte de trabajo que cada uno realice -numerales 99, 104 y 114, b), 8)-. En relación con esto, los artículos 17 y 104 ibídem restringen la posibilidad de contratar empleados asalariados -trabajadores en sentido jurídico-, es decir, personas que no estén asociadas a las mismas; lo que puede hacerse pero sólo en casos muy calificados. No cabe duda de que, las agrupaciones de comentario, dentro de las cuales se ubica la demandada y a las que el legislador considera de "conveniencia y de utilidad pública y de interés social" (artículo 1), cuentan con una regulación de carácter jurídica y claramente especial. La particularidad de su normativa tiene un contundente sustento en el ordinal 64 de la Constitución Política Costarricense, que instituye, como un deber estatal de primer orden, el fomento de la creación de cooperativas de trabajadores. Esa característica propia del ordenamiento cooperativista, trae aparejada la imposibilidad de aplicarle, de modo primordial, exclusivo y excluyente, a la relación jurídica que enlaza a la asociación cooperativa y a su socio-trabajador, cualquier otra legislación protectora -en concreto, la de Trabajo-, a pesar de que tanto su constitución como su funcionamiento, están vinculados, de modo natural, con esta materia. El citado ordinal 17 establece, en su párrafo final, que: "En asuntos contractuales de trabajo estas cooperativas [las de producción] se regirán por las disposiciones contenidas en la legislación laboral vigente, pero para los efectos de la relación jurídica del asociado con la cooperativa, debe interpretarse que su estatus económico social ha de ser la (sic) de socio-trabajador, como una sola persona física". Lo indicado se reafirma, también, en el ordinal 131 ibídem, en el cual se le atribuye carácter supletorio, de manera limitada, al Código de Trabajo, por debajo de varias fuentes de derecho y siempre y cuando las disposiciones a aplicar "no contravengan los principios, la doctrina y la filosofía cooperativas.". En el caso que nos ocupa, el actor fue socio trabajador de la Cooperativa accionada. Por consiguiente, la relación jurídica que existe entre ellos es distinta a la de los vínculos laborales característicos o típicos, sobre los que sí rige la protección legal, contenida en la normativa de Trabajo vigente. En consecuencia, no es posible sostener que la Cooperativa demandada "reciba" los frutos del trabajo del actor, es decir, que se los apropie para sí. Ello por cuanto, los mismos, se integran -precisamente, a través de la distribución de los excedentes-, al patrimonio de quien los produjo: el asociado- trabajador. En estos casos, no se da el intercambio de prestaciones que el trabajo encierra, consistente en la enajenación de los frutos obtenidos con la prestación personal de servicios, a cambio de un precio, lo cual es lo propio y normal en las relaciones de trabajo típicas; así como tampoco se da el elemento subordinación, atribuible a una persona diferente del trabajador; sea, al patrono. Es claro que, la obligación, del demandante, de aportar su fuerza laboral -su deber de trabajar- para la ejecución de los servicios que la Cooperativa contrata y le presta a terceros, no tuvo su origen en un contrato de trabajo, sino en otro de carácter asociativo; cuya consecuencia, querida y tutelada por la legislación positiva, es, entre otras, esa. Sobre el particular, los juristas argentinos Francisco Junyent Vélez y Roberto Fermín Bertossi, afirman que las cooperativas de trabajo "tienen como característica principal y propia razón de ser, la inexistencia en su seno de la posibilidad "empleador-trabajador" lo que equivale a decir: "ninguna clase de relación laboral entre asociado y cooperativa, puesto que éstos han asumido libremente, voluntariamente, el llamado riesgo empresario, decisión que merece el mayor respeto". / En una cooperativa de trabajo, corresponde a los asociados, como exigencia exencial (sic), aportar el trabajo personal, sin el cual no podrán revestir tal calidad, resultando así que son asociados porque trabajan y trabajan porque son asociados, calidades inescindibles." (La cooperativa, Buenos Aires, EDIAR, Sociedad Anónima Editora Comercial, Industrial y Financiera, 1987, p. 293). Igualmente, otros autores, en relación con esta figura contractual, han establecido que: "Contrato de sociedad y contrato de trabajo son dos figuras distintas, en aquellos casos en que la estructura y contenido del contrato de trabajo aparecen sustituidos por los que configuran al de sociedad, estaremos ante este tipo de relación y no ante aquél. El contrato de trabajo es una figura jurídica típica y propia; el de sociedad es otra distinta, e independiente del primero.² (Manuel Alonso García, Curso de Derecho del Trabajo, Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, S.A., novena edición, 1985, pp. 321-322). Manuel Alonso Olea y de María Emilia Casas Baamonde, indican que "El "socio-trabajador" no está ligado a la cooperativa por un contrato de trabajo, sino [por uno] de tipo societario [aunque] las circunstancias mencionadas le aproximan al trabajador por cuenta ajena; de ahí "la impregnación jurídico-laboral" de su régimen" (Derecho del Trabajo, Madrid, Universidad de Madrid-Facultad de Derecho, decimotercera edición, 1993, p. 149). Por consiguiente, en este caso, no existe el específico vínculo laboral entre las partes y no pueden individualizarse, ni extraerse, las figuras del trabajador y del patrono. El deber de sometimiento a las directrices establecidas por el máximo órgano social de la Cooperativa -la Asamblea de Socios-, que compete al trabajador-asociado, no es producto de la alegada relación laboral -aquí inexistente, como ya se indicó-, sino de otro tipo de sujeción legal, que surge, justamente, del acuerdo asociativo (...).Al tenor de lo previsto en el numeral 2 de la Ley citada, esos mecanismos asociativos han de inspirarse en el modelo democrático de distribución y de ejercicio del poder colectivo, surgido de la agrupación; lo que implica, entre otras cosas, depositar en representantes la toma de ciertas decisiones y la ejecución de aquellas de naturaleza consensual, reconocerles su autoridad y someterse a la voluntad de la mayoría. De aquí surge, pues, una modalidad de relación de dependencia o subordinación jurídica, claramente diferenciable de la laboral, que -como se dijo- está sometida a una regulación específica.La circunstancia de que, cada socio-trabajador, satisfaga sus necesidades con la retribución y con los excedentes obtenidos, por el trabajo que aporta a la Cooperativa, no lo convierte, automáticamente, en asalariado, ni que lo hace titular de los derechos propios de quien está en esta condición jurídica. La remuneración a la que tiene derecho, que no puede ser "inferior al salario mínimo fijado para las distintas actividades que rigen para las empresas privadas." (artículo 108, inciso a), no es salario, en el sentido laboral del término; aunque sí constituye, a no dudarlo, el costo de producción por mano de obra, que todos los socios, en tanto empresarios, cubren. La legislación a aplicar se cuida de asignarle tal denominación y que, si bien, recurre al concepto de "salario mínimo", no los equipara y lo hace sólo con el propósito de fijar un parámetro legal, objetivo y variable para la determinación de lo mínimo y de lo máximo que la Cooperativa debe destinar a satisfacer dicho costo productivo. Esa remuneración, al igual que los excedentes o cualesquiera otras sumas que se destinen a los socios-trabajadores, tienen su causa jurídica en lo que la legislación cooperativista califica como "el reparto de los beneficios económico sociales, producto del esfuerzo común" (numeral 100, inciso a); lo que resulta ser, en última instancia, la concreción de la finalidad legal y social, de este tipo de organización humana. Debe tomarse en cuenta, también, que, esas distintas remuneraciones, se determinan por los propios asociados, dentro de ciertas condiciones, en proporción directa al esfuerzo o al aporte de trabajo que, cada uno, realizó en la producción de los bienes y de los servicios correspondientes (artículos 17, párrafo primero, 99 y 114). De todo lo antes indicado se concluye, sin lugar a dudas, que existen notables diferencias entre las relaciones establecidas a nivel típicamente laboral y las que se muestran en las asociaciones cooperativas autogestionarias. Ello permite determinar que, en estas últimas, los asociados-trabajadores tienen, efectivamente, un estatus jurídico especial, diferente del que le corresponde a un trabajador asalariado. Son co-propietarios de los medios de producción, es decir, empresarios cooperativizados, cuyas decisiones se toman a nivel gremial, con sustento en una organización democrática. A su vez, son trabajadores, pero no asalariados sino independientes, que se organizan colectivamente y que son los titulares de su propia empresa. De ahí que se diga que son patronos de sí mismos; lo que, pese a reflejar una clara contradicción de concepto, elimina, de plano, la existencia de una relación de subordinación y de dependencia, en el sentido típico de lo que sí es laboral. Es cierto que el artículo 133 de la Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas indica que."Los Tribunales de Trabajo, salvo los casos expresamente señalados en esta ley, tendrán competencia sobre las acciones que se deriven de ella, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el título VIII, del Capítulo I del Código de Trabajo".Sin embargo, lo que hace esa norma es otorgar competencia a los Tribunales de Trabajo, para conocer las demandas interpuestas, con ocasión de la aplicación de esa normativa, sin que, de ninguna manera se puede afirmar que esa circunstancia "laboraliza" las relaciones entre los asociados de una cooperativa autogestionaria” (en igual sentido, pueden verse los votos N° 172 de las 9:30 horas del 6 de julio de 1994 y 134 de las 15:20 horas del 27 de mayo de 1998) . Por ello, el despido y la liquidación laboral de la señora [Nombre4] son actos carentes de sustento legal, porque no pueden aplicarse, en este caso, las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo que regulan el pago de preaviso, cesantía y vacaciones, ni la Ley de Aguinaldo para la Empresa Privada. El único trámite que debió seguirse consistía en tomar un acuerdo de exclusión por parte de la asamblea (artículo 34 inciso f) de la Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas). Sin embargo, ello nunca sucedió, como lo admiten los demandados al contestar la demanda: “Su separación como asociada de la cooperativa, relación distinta de lo laboral, no se ha terminado de producir, por lo cual todavía se le continúa convocando a las asambleas”. Debe revocarse por lo tanto la sentencia impugnada, en cuanto acogió la excepción de prescripción en forma total y declaró sin lugar la demanda, y entrarse a conocer el fondo del asunto. VI-. INDEMNIZACIÓN QUE LE CORRESPONDE A LA DEMANDANTE: No hay duda de que la abusiva e ilegítima conducta de la Cooperativa, de dejar en la total incertidumbre a la actora durante años, con grave menoscabo de sus derechos como trabajadora-asociada, le ocasionó daños y perjuicios que deben serle resarcidos (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política). En el voto de esta Sala N° 365 de las 9:40 horas del 26 de noviembre de 1999 se indicó: “El daño, como parte del acto ilícito, o como presupuesto de la responsabilidad civil, doctrinariamente es tratado como un perjuicio a un interés jurídicamente relevante en cualquier esfera de la vida humana y, como tal, merecedor de tutela. Ha sido definido como: “... el menoscabo que se experimenta en el patrimonio por el detrimento de los valores económicos que lo componen (daño patrimonial) y también la lesión a los sentimientos, al honor o a las afecciones legítimas (daño moral)” (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge) Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo - Perrot, octava edición, 1993, p. 167)”. En el caso concreto, estamos en el ámbito de la responsabilidad civil contractual (contrato de afiliación a una cooperativa de autogestión), en el cual “el evento dañoso consistente en el incumplimiento imputable a una de las partes del contrato (o, en su caso, de ambas), deriva de un acto o negocio jurídico que constituye la fuente de obligación a cargo de ellas. El ilícito, en sentido lato, consiste precisamente en el incumplimiento de prestaciones exigibles por causa del negocio jurídico” (Zannoni, El daño en la responsabilidad civil, segunda edición, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1993, p.86). El principio general que rige en materia de daños es que el responsable debe resarcir todo el daño que ha causado con su acto ilícito (principio de la reparación integral o plena) (al respecto, puede consultarse la obra de Orgaz, El daño resarcible, tercera edición, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 120). De este modo, “el resarcimiento del daño debe restablecer el patrimonio del damnificado a la situación en la cual se habría encontrado si no se hubiere verificado el hecho dañoso” (Visintini, Tratado de la responsabilidad civil, volumen 2, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 204). La actora pretende que se le indemnice tanto el daño patrimonial como el moral sufrido. Se define el primero (también denominado daño material) como “aquel que recae sobre el patrimonio, sea directamente en las cosas o bienes que lo componen, sea indirectamente como consecuencia o reflejo de un daño causado a la persona misma, en sus derechos o facultades (...). El daño patrimonial puede manifestarse en dos formas típicas: o como la pérdida o disminución de valores económicos ya existentes, esto es, como un empobrecimiento del patrimonio (daño emergente o positivo), o bien como la frustración de ventajas económicas esperadas, es decir, como la pérdida de un enriquecimiento patrimonial previsto (lucro cesante)” (Orgaz,op.cit., p.p. 20 y 24). Doña [Nombre3] pide que se le indemnice el lucro cesante, pues solicita el pago de todos los ingresos que debió haber percibido en su condición de trabajadora-afiliada a Coopesalud desde que fue separada de su puesto hasta el 2027 (año en que sitúa el fin de su vida laboral útil), junto con los intereses legales correspondientes. Para resolver acertadamente tal petición, ha de estudiarse primero el tema de la certeza del daño, que es uno de los requisitos para que este sea resarcible. Vázquez Ferreyra manifiesta al respecto que “la certidumbre del daño se refiere a su existencia, ya sea presente o futura. Es incierto cuando no existe seguridad de que la lesión se haya producido o vaya a producirse. Es cierto cuando es real y efectivo, y no meramente hipotético (...). La certeza se refiere a su existencia, y no a su actualidad o a la determinación de su monto. Así, puede darse un daño futuro y cierto” (Responsabilidad por daños, Editorial Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1993, p.p. 178 y 180). Para Zannoni, “la certidumbre del daño constituye siempre una constatación de hecho actual que proyecta, también al futuro, una consecuencia necesaria. Cuando la consecuencia no es necesaria, sino contingente o hipotética o puramente temida, el daño es incierto” (op.cit., p.p. 50-52). También resulta importante, para el correcto examen de la cuestión, distinguir entre daño presente y daño futuro: “El daño actual es el perjuicio ya producido y subsistente. El daño futuro es aquel que todavía no existe pero que su existencia futura no ofrece duda” (Vázquez Ferreyra, op.cit., p. 179). Según la doctrina, el momento cronológico que separa los daños actuales de los futuros es el dictado de la sentencia: “Desde otro punto de vista, el daño -sea como daño emergente, sea como lucro cesante- puede ser presente (o actual) y futuro. El momento que se considera para esta distinción es el del fallo” (Orgaz, op.cit., p.p. 25-26). Zannoni es del mismo criterio: “En síntesis, pues, daño actual, es el daño, menoscabo o perjuicio ya operado y subsistente en el patrimonio del damnificado al momento de la sentencia. Daño futuro, en cambio, es aquel que todavía no ha existido, pero que ciertamente existirá, luego de la sentencia” (op.cit., p. 69). Con base en tales premisas de orden teórico, se debe condenar a la entidad accionada a indemnizarle a la actora todos los anticipos (remuneración prevista en el artículo 108 de la Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas) que esta dejó de devengar desde el 17 de setiembre de 1999 (3 meses antes de la presentación de la demanda, que no están prescritos) hasta la firmeza del fallo -salvo que antes de este hecho (firmeza del fallo) se haya producido la expulsión legal como socia de la accionada, en cuya hipótesis deberá limitarse la indemnización a la fecha de expulsión conforme a derecho-, más los intereses legales correspondientes desde que cada obligación surgió a la vida jurídica y hasta su efectivo pago; todo lo cual se determinará en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. En cuanto a los daños futuros, como no existe seguridad o certeza de que la vida laboral útil de la accionante como socia de la accionada dure hasta el año 2027, la pretensión así planteada no puede acogerse. Sin embargo, procede interpretarla en el sentido de que para el evento de que no se haya cumplido el acuerdo de reinstalación dictado por la asamblea antes de la firmeza del fallo ni se haya decretado la expulsión, la Cooperativa debe seguirle cancelando a la demandante todos los ingresos que le correspondan en su condición de asociada-trabajadora, posteriores a la firmeza de la sentencia hasta la efectiva reinstalación. Debe advertirse, eso sí, que del monto que en definitiva deba abonar la demandada a la señora Villegas Campos como resultado de esta resolución, han de rebajarse los ¢2.429.803,55 que se le cancelaron el 15 de enero de 1997 a título de “liquidación laboral”, pues aunque dicho pago careció de sustento legal, porque no medió relación de tipo laboral, lo cierto es que la accionante recibió ese dinero y es justo y equitativo tomarlo en cuenta a la hora de efectuar los cálculos de lo que la cooperativa adeuda, para evitar un enriquecimiento sin causa (folio 62). Asimismo, de las sumas que deba pagar la accionada se rebajarán las cantidades que esta demuestre en ejecución de sentencia que la actora recibió como salario con algún patrono, durante el mismo periodo que comprenda el pago de anticipos aquí ordenados. La actora perderá el derecho a seguir percibiendo esa indemnización si la reinstalación no se produce por su culpa en el plazo de un mes computado a partir de la firmeza del fallo, para lo cual podrá requerir el auxilio del Juzgado. El daño moral por la “afectación al prestigio profesional” no puede ser concedido, por hallarse ayuno de prueba, razón que también justifica denegar la petición referente a los perjuicios ocasionados por la ausencia de seguridad social para la actora y su familia, ya que doña [Nombre3] en ningún momento indicó ni demostró en qué consistían concretamente tales perjuicios. Los ajustes basados en la inflación tampoco se pueden ordenar, por requerirse norma expresa que así lo autorice. En este mismo sentido se pronunció la Sala en el voto de N° 338 de las 9:10 horas del 9 de julio del 2003, en el cual se consignó: “Tanto la indexación como los intereses legales son fórmulas de corrección monetaria que tienden a compensar la pérdida del valor real del dinero de curso legal. La diferencia entre ambas está dada por el hecho de que, en la legislación vigente, sólo se recoge la segunda de ellas y, tratándose, como en este asunto, de una deuda u obligación dineraria, pecuniaria o numeraria, le otorga carácter exclusivo y excluyente. En efecto, conforme lo establece el artículo 706 del Código Civil “Si el obligación es de pagar una suma de dinero, los daños y perjuicios consisten siempre y únicamente en el pago de intereses sobre la suma debida, contados desde el vencimiento del plazo.” En consecuencia, procede denegar también este otro extremos de la pretensión incoada no sólo por falta de norma expresa que autorice y regule la indexación, lo que obligaría a los tribunales, en el caso de concederla, a asumir la fijación de los porcentajes de corrección, con lo que se invade una esfera ajena, sino también porque, estando en presencia del incumplimiento de una obligación legal pagadera en dinero, los daños y perjuicios que de ella se deriven no pueden comprender más que el pago de los intereses legales”, y en este caso, como se dispuso antes, se ordenó el pago de intereses desde la exigibilidad las sumas resultantes por anticipos. Tampoco es procedente otorgar los extremos relacionados con vacaciones, aguinaldos y anualidades, por ser esos rubros de naturaleza laboral y, como quedó explicado en el considerando quinto de esta resolución, la actora no era una trabajadora en sentido estricto, por lo que carece de derecho para exigir el pago de tales conceptos, sin que el hecho de que se le haya pagado una liquidación de “derechos laborales” al ser “despedida” afecte lo así dispuesto, dado que el error no crea derecho. Como última observación, cabe señalar que doña [Nombre3] demandó solidariamente a la Cooperativa y a quienes ocupaban los puestos de gerente, integrantes del consejo de administración y miembros del comité de vigilancia en el momento de los hechos. No obstante, la Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas no establece la responsabilidad solidaria de los personeros en este tipo de casos. A continuación se transcriben las normas de dicha Ley que regulan la cuestión: “Artículo 49: Corresponderá al comité de vigilancia electo por la asamblea, que se integrará con un número no menor de tres asociados, o a la auditoría mencionada en el inciso e) del artículo 36, el examen y la fiscalización de todas las cuentas y operaciones realizadas por la cooperativa. También deberá informar a la asamblea lo que corresponda. Para el examen y la fiscalización de las mencionadas cuentas y operaciones, los respectivos estados financieros serán certificados por un contador público autorizado, o por los organismos cooperativos auxiliares que realicen labores de auditoría de conformidad con el artículo 95 de esta ley. Una vez certificados, se entregarán anualmente a los socios. Exclúyense de esta obligación las cooperativas cuyo monto de operaciones esté por debajo del mínimo definido reglamentariamente. La responsabilidad solidaria de los miembros del consejo de administración y del gerente, alcanza a los miembros del comité de vigilancia o al auditor interno, por los actos que éste no hubiere objetado oportunamente. Quedan exentos de esa responsabilidad los miembros del comité que salven expresamente su voto dentro del mes siguiente a la fecha en que se tomó el respectivo acuerdo”. “Artículo 52: Los miembros del consejo de administración y el gerente, que ejecuten o permitan ejecutar actos notoriamente contrarios a los intereses de la cooperativa, o que infrinjan la ley o los estatutos responderán solidariamente con sus bienes de las pérdidas que dichas operaciones irroguen a la cooperativa, sin perjuicio de las demás penas que les corresponden. El director o gerente, que desee salvar su responsabilidad personal, solicitará que se haga constar su voto o criterio contrario en el libro de actas”. Como se observa, se trata de una responsabilidad solidaria de los directivos ante la Cooperativa como tal por los daños irrogados a esta, no ante sus asociados, razón que obliga a acoger la demanda únicamente en cuando fue dirigida contra Coopesalud, pues respecto de sus personeros es admisible la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva."