CCSS obligation to pay special contribution to SUPEN prevails over general tax exemptionObligación de la CCSS de pagar contribución especial a la SUPEN prevalece sobre exoneración general tributaria

IV.- The Court considers that the present dispute is a question of pure law, since the parties reduce their arguments to determining the correct interpretation of a set of rules applicable to a situation. The case is that through Law 7523 of July 7, 1995, on the PRIVATE REGIME OF COMPLEMENTARY PENSIONS AND REFORMS TO THE SECURITIES MARKET REGULATORY LAW AND THE COMMERCIAL CODE, it is established in Article 33 that the pension regime would be regulated and supervised by a superintendency, a body of maximum deconcentration with instrumental legal personality and capacity, attached to the Banco Central de Costa Rica; subsequently, through Law 7732 of December 19, 1997, the SECURITIES MARKET REGULATORY LAW, it was provided that the budget of the superintendencies would be financed eighty percent by resources from the Banco Central and twenty percent from expenses actually incurred, through mandatory contributions from the supervised entities (Article 174), each of which would contribute a maximum of two percent of their gross income, to be specified through an Executive Branch regulation setting the contribution percentages according to the various types of supervised entities (Article 175). Finally, through Law 7983 of February 16, 2000, on WORKER PROTECTION, it was provided that all entities authorized to administer pension systems would be subject to the Superintendencia de Pensiones, as "Supervised Entities," including the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with respect to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, and as "Regulated Entities" those previously mentioned excepting the plaintiff; it also amended Article 37 of Law 7983, granting a series of supervisory, control, and oversight powers to SUPEN regarding the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Caja, such that as of this latter legislation, the plaintiff became subject to supervision and, consequently, to collaborating in the aforementioned terms with the financing of the supervisory body, through the mandatory payment of a percentage of its annual gross earnings, which corresponds to a form of tax that the Tax Code classifies as a special contribution (contribución especial) (Article 4). Nonetheless, the plaintiff maintains that such interpretation is improper by virtue of the application of the provisions of its Organic Law (Ley Constitutiva), number 17 of October 22, 1943, which establishes in its Article 1 its character as an autonomous institution responsible for the governance and administration of social insurance, and the express prohibition against the funds and reserves of these being transferred or used for purposes other than those justifying their creation; furthermore, in Article 58, subsection a), the general exemption from all direct or indirect taxes (impuestos), including municipal contributions, present and future; coupled with Article 73 of the Constitution, which reiterates, at the level of a fundamental norm, the prohibition against diverting said funds, reinforced by the State's duty to cooperate with and protect the integrity, efficacy, and permanence of the regime by providing the necessary revenues (Article 177). Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the correct and harmonious application that is proper within this legal framework.- V.- The Court considers that, in the first place, the provision of Article 58, subsection a) of the Organic Law of the Caja must be considered, insofar as it establishes a general exemption from taxes in favor of this institution, to determine whether this renders the laws invoked by the defendant inapplicable. In this regard, the defendant argues that in accordance with Article 4 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), technically "tax" (impuesto) is a concept different from "special contribution" (contribución especial), which is the type of obligation being charged, such that the invoked exemption does not cover this case; however, this Office does not share that position, given that the drafting of the Organic Law (Ley Constitutiva) is much earlier than the enactment of this other regulatory body. The referenced Article 58 makes a general statement and can be understood to use the term "tax" (impuesto) in a broad sense, that is, as a tribute (tributo); despite this, the plaintiff's argument does not prevail; this rule does not prevent the application of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora de Mercado de Valores) and the charging of the special contribution (contribución especial) for two reasons: the first is that the later law, as the latter is, modifies the earlier one; consequently, a rule from the year 2000 changes the meaning and application of another from 1943, especially when both regulate a special matter such as the regulation of pension funds. Secondly, it has been repeatedly stated that the Legislative Branch cannot renounce, for the future, the exercise of its powers and authorities that are inherent to it by fundamental norm; in this regard, it is appropriate to cite the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional): "V.- On the derogation of created exemptions. The plaintiffs question the constitutionality of Articles 64 of Law number 4755, of May 3, 1971 (Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), and subsection d) of Article 7 of Law 6990, of July 22, 1985. The promoters of this process argue that the elimination of exemptions to the detriment of the acquired rights of the beneficiaries of such fiscal advantages is unconstitutional. Specifically, that the fact that the exemption rate for motor vehicle lessors was reduced from one hundred percent to fifty percent is contrary to the constitutional principles of reasonableness and non-retroactivity of normative acts. In relation to the scope of state competence in this matter, this Chamber has previously stated that: '...at a given time and under certain assumptions, the law exempts pensions and retirements from any State regimes from the payment of Income Tax, this does not grant the beneficiaries, who acquired their right to a pension or retirement under those conditions, an indefinite exemption in space and time, nor an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation in their favor, in the sense that those can never ever be modified, since it would imply creating a limitation on the State's taxing power (creating an indefinite tax immunity), which the Political Constitution itself does not contemplate. Exemptions, although granted based on certain conditions valued at the time by the legislator, can be repealed or modified by a subsequent law, even when it involves, as in this case, retirements or pensions. Such a procedure is not arbitrary in and of itself, but rather appears as a response to the country's fiscal needs and with the understanding that its application will be prospective, that is, it will take effect as of its entry into force.'" (Part of Considerando III of resolution number 1341-93, at ten hours and thirty minutes on March 21, 1993) That is, it is not appropriate to assert that the State, through the Legislative Assembly, is disabled from exempting the payment of certain taxes (tributos), or from eliminating said exemptions (exenciones), provided it does so through the procedure for the creation of formal Law. In that sense, it is clear that the plaintiffs are not correct. On the other hand, they argue that it is unconstitutional that the reduction in the amount of the exemption was applied to automobile lessors and not to other branches of activity within the tourism sector. On a similar matter, this Chamber has previously had the opportunity to express itself regarding similar arguments, in the following sense: 'II).- THE TAXING POWER.- The so-called "Taxing Power"—the sovereign power of the State to demand contributions (contribuciones) from persons or property within its jurisdiction or to grant exemptions—recognizes no limitations other than those originating in the Political Constitution itself. That power to levy taxes is the power to enact legal norms from which the obligation to pay a tax (tributo) or to respect a tax limit may arise or can arise, and among the constitutional principles of Taxation are immersed the Principle of Legality or Reservation of Law, of Equality or Isonomy, of Generality, and of Non-Confiscation. Taxes must emanate from a Law of the Republic, must not create discrimination against taxpayers, must comprehensively cover all persons or property contemplated in the law and not only a part thereof, and must be careful not to be of such intensity as to violate private property (Articles 33, 40, 45, 121 subsection 13 of the Political Constitution).' (Voto 1999-04844 at 16:18 hours on June 22, 1999, expediente 97-006726-0007-CO, the boldface is not from the original).- Consequently, the argument that the Organic Law (Ley Constitutiva) established a general exemption from taxes (tributos) that prevents the enactment of subsequent rules that modify its application or content in any way is not accepted; therefore, it must be considered whether there are limitations at the constitutional level.- VI.- The plaintiff points out that the Political Constitution establishes in its Articles 73 and 177 the impossibility of making the payment under question. In this sense, it is observed that the referenced Article 177, in its third paragraph, establishes the State's obligation to contribute to the universalization of social insurance, such that sufficient revenues must be created in favor of the Caja to cover the entity's current and future needs; it is added that if in the future a deficit arises due to the insufficiency of those revenues, the State must assume it, for which the respective budget allocation must be included; for its part, Article 73, which establishes the creation of social insurance for the benefit of the country's workers, through the mandatory contribution of the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect them against the risks of disability, old age, and death, or sickness and maternity, specifically prohibits that the funds and reserves of this institution may be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation, the latter provision being found in Article 1 of the Organic Law (Ley Constitutiva) under discussion. From the cited rules emerges a constitutional principle of protection of the established regime, safeguarding and financial support of the institution by the State; thus, the constituent's concern to guarantee the existence and efficiency of the system is observed, which is inherent to its financing; in this sense, Article 177 does not impose a specific regulation on the destination of the funds, and Article 73 establishes that they may not be assigned a purpose other than that which motivated their creation. Within this context, the Court considers the position expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República (see opinion C-073-2004 at folios 120-129 of the main file) and by the defendant to be correct, according to which the obligation to contribute to the financing of the Superintendencia de Pensiones is not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, but rather involves covering the cost of a control by a specialized technical body that seeks to guarantee the good administration and protection of the funds and the regime in its financial aspect, to prevent mismanagement or inadequate administration that could endanger its stability and solvency, and indeed to take the necessary measures to overcome a possible crisis in this regard. The regulatory framework in question responds to the principles and purposes imposed in Article 177 of the Constitution, and in relation to Article 73, it is not about pursuing a purpose other than that which motivates the creation of the funds, but rather, on the contrary, one directly related to their existence: controlling their good administration and guaranteeing their prosperity.- VII.- In this sense, there is no contradiction with the previous opinion of the Procuraduría invoked by the petitioner, C-045 of March 9, 1995, according to which the Legislator State cannot, through its tax activity: "...undermine, hinder, or nullify the competence of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to develop a social security regime..." because in this specific case, the purpose of the tax (tributo) is not to cover the general expenses of the State or another purpose alien to the institution's goals, but rather is directed at a means of control and protection of the fund that contributes to guaranteeing its functioning; it cannot be stated that in any way this is about undermining or hindering the institution's competence to promote its purpose. In fact, the Worker Protection Law echoes this principle when it establishes that SUPEN's power in relation to the Caja shall be Supervision but, in contrast to all other regimes, shall not be regulation (Article 2, subsections g and h), and consequently, while it is appropriate to interpret that a general constitutional principle of tax exemption (exoneración de impuestos) is created, a special contribution (contribución especial) exclusively dedicated to the partial financing of a control and supervision of its financial functioning is indeed in accordance with that same principle and for the same reasons of protection and support of the social security system.- VIII.- Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the principle of legality and reservation of law is infringed, as set forth in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, according to which the essential elements of a tax (Tributo) can only be established by law and cannot be fixed by infra-legal norms. In this regard, it must be commented that the argument does not specify which violation is being alleged; moreover, Article 5, subsection a) of the Tax Code clarifies that it is the exclusive power of the legislator to create or modify the tax, define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the relationship, the rates, their calculation bases, and indicate the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo); meanwhile, Articles 174 and 175 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law regulate all these elements: the obligor, which is the supervised entities; the entity authorized for collection, which is the Banco Central; the taxable event, which is the benefit derived from the supervisory activity carried out by the Superintendencia de Pensiones; and the basis for calculating the rate, which is up to two percent of the gross earnings from the regime's investments that must be subject to revision or control, the proceeds of which must have no other purpose than the financing of that service. Thus, in the legal provisions indicated, all the basic elements of the obligation are regulated, and the only matter delegated to the Executive Branch is the setting of the specific rate, which was done through Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 30243-H, Regulation to Govern the Participation of Supervised Entities and the Banco Central in the Financing of the Budget of the Superintendencies, which in its Article 3 fixes an amount, within the authorized framework, of two percent of annual gross income, without violation of either the law or the legal framework corresponding to the rules under discussion. On the other hand, the Regulation clearly indicates that all supervised entities must pay that same fee equally, with the exception of non-financial securities issuing companies, which shall pay up to zero point one percent; therefore, no omission or violation of the legal framework is verified; there are specific criteria to guide the exercise of the regulatory power and they are correctly defined, so that the charge can be made in accordance with the law and the challenged administrative acts are valid.- In this regard, it is observed that the aforementioned numeral 177, in its third paragraph, establishes the State’s obligation to contribute to the universalization of social insurance, so sufficient revenues must be created in favor of the Caja to cover the entity’s current and future needs; it is added that if a deficit arises in the future due to the insufficiency of those revenues, the State must assume it, for which the respective budget item must be included. For its part, Article 73, which establishes the creation of social insurance for the benefit of the country’s workers, through the compulsory contribution of the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect them against the risks of disability, old age, and death, or of sickness and maternity, specifically prohibits that the funds and reserves of this institution may be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation, a provision that is found in Article 1° of the Constitutive Law under discussion. From the cited norms, a constitutional principle of protection of the established regime, safeguard, and financial support of the institution by the State emerges; thus, the constituent’s concern for guaranteeing the existence and efficiency of the system is observed, which is consubstantial with its financing. In this sense, Article 177 does not impose a specific regulation on the destination of the funds, and Article 73 establishes that they cannot be assigned a purpose other than that which motivated their creation. Within this context, the Tribunal considers correct the position expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República (see opinion C-073-2004 on folios 120-129 of the principal file) and by the defendant, according to which the obligation to contribute to the financing of the Superintendencia de Pensiones (SUPEN) is not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, but rather it is a matter of defraying the cost of a control by a specialized technical body that seeks to guarantee the good administration and protection of the funds and the regime in its financial aspect, to prevent mismanagement or inadequate administration that endangers its stability and solvency, and indeed to take the necessary measures to overcome a possible crisis in this regard. The regulations in question respond to the principles and purposes imposed in numeral 177 of the Constitution, and in relation to Article 73, it is not a matter of pursuing a purpose different from that which motivates the creation of the funds, but on the contrary, one directly related to their existence: controlling their good administration and guaranteeing their prosperity.- VII.- In this sense, there is no contradiction with the previous opinion of the Procuraduría invoked by the petitioner, C-045 of March ninth, nineteen ninety-five, according to which the Legislative State cannot, through its tax activity: \"... impair, hinder, or render nugatory the competence of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to develop a social security regime...\" because in this specific case, the purpose of the tax is not to defray the general expenses of the State or another purpose foreign to the ends of the institution, but rather it is directed to a means of control and protection of the fund that contributes to guaranteeing its operation. It cannot be pointed out in any way that it involves impairing or hindering the institution's competence to promote its purpose. In fact, the Ley de Protección al Trabajador echoes this principle when it establishes that the authority of SUPEN in relation to the Caja shall be of Supervision but, contrary to all other regimes, shall not be of regulation (Article 2, subsections g° and h°), and consequently, although it is appropriate to interpret that a general constitutional principle of tax exemption is created, a special contribution dedicated exclusively to the partial financing of a control and supervision of its financial operation is in accordance with that same principle and for the same reasons of protection and shelter of the social security system.- VIII.- On the other hand, the plaintiff alleges that the principle of legality and reservation of law is infringed, as provided in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitution and Article 5° of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, according to which the essential elements of a tax can only be established by law and cannot be set by infra-legal norms. In this regard, it should be noted that the allegation does not specify the violation it accuses; furthermore, Article 5°, subsection a° of the Código Tributario clarifies that it is the exclusive power of the legislator to create or modify the tax, define the taxable event, the rates, their calculation bases, and indicate the taxpayer. For their part, numerals 174 and 175 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores regulate all these elements: the obligated party, which are the supervised subjects; the entity authorized to collect, which is the Banco Central; the taxable event, which is the benefit derived from the supervision activity carried out by the Superintendencia de Pensiones; and the calculation base of the rate, which is up to two percent of the gross earnings from the regime's investments that must be subject to review or control, the proceeds of which shall have no other destination than the financing of that service. Thus, all the basic elements of the obligation are regulated in the legal norms indicated, with only the setting of the specific rate being delegated to the Executive Branch, which was done through Decreto Ejecutivo 30243-H, Reglamento para Regular la Participación de los Sujetos Fiscalizados y del Banco Central en el Financiamiento del Presupuesto de las Superintendencias, which in its third numeral sets an amount, within the authorized framework, of two percent of annual gross income, without violation of either the law or the legal framework corresponding to the norms under discussion. Moreover, the Reglamento clearly indicates that all supervised subjects must pay that fee equally, with the exception of non-financial securities-issuing companies, which shall pay up to zero point one percent, so no omission or violation of the legal framework is noted; there are specific criteria to guide the exercise of the regulatory power and they are correctly defined, so that the collection can be carried out in accordance with the law and the challenged administrative acts are valid.- In this regard, it is observed that the aforementioned Article 177, in its third paragraph, establishes the State's obligation to contribute to the universalization of social insurance, for which sufficient revenues must be created in favor of the Caja to cover the current and future needs of the entity; it is added that if a deficit should arise in the future due to the insufficiency of those revenues, the State must assume it, for which the respective allocation must be included in the budget. For its part, Article 73, which establishes the creation of social insurance for the benefit of the country's workers, through the compulsory contribution of the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect them against the risks of disability, old age, and death, or of sickness and maternity, specifically prohibits that the funds and reserves of this institution may be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation, a provision that is found in Article 1° of the Constitutive Law under discussion. From the cited norms, a constitutional principle of protection of the established regime, safeguarding and financial support of the institution by the State emerges; thus, the constituent's concern to guarantee the existence and efficiency of the system is observed, which is inherent to its financing. In this sense, Article 177 does not impose specific regulation on the destination of the funds, and Article 73 establishes that they may not be assigned a purpose different from that which motivated their creation. Within this context, the Tribunal considers correct the position expressed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) (see opinion C-073-2004 on pages 120-129 of the main file) and the defendant, according to which the obligation to contribute to the financing of the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones) is not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, but rather it involves defraying the cost of a control by a specialized technical body that seeks to guarantee the sound administration and protection of the funds and the regime in its financial aspect, to prevent mismanagement or inadequate administration that endangers its stability and solvency, and, in fact, to take the necessary measures to overcome a possible crisis in this regard. The regulation in question responds to the principles and purposes imposed in Article 177 of the Constitution, and in relation to Article 73, it is not a matter of pursuing a purpose different from that which motivates the creation of the funds, but rather, on the contrary, one directly related to their existence: controlling their sound administration and guaranteeing their prosperity.- **VII.-** In this sense, there is no contradiction with the prior opinion of the Office of the Attorney General invoked by the petitioner, C-045 of March 9, 1995, according to which the Legislative State cannot, through its tax activity: "*… undermine, hinder, or render nugatory the competence of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) to develop a social security regime…*" because in this specific case, the purpose of the tax is not to defray the general expenses of the State or another purpose alien to the ends of the institution, but rather it is directed at a means of control and protection of the fund that contributes to guaranteeing its operation. It cannot be pointed out that this in any way involves undermining or hindering the competence of the institution to further its purpose; in fact, the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador) echoes this principle when it establishes that the authority of SUPEN in relation to the Caja shall be one of Supervision but, unlike with all other regimes, shall not be one of regulation (Article 2, subsections g° and h°), and consequently, although it can be interpreted that a general constitutional principle of tax exemption is created, a special contribution exclusively dedicated to the partial financing of a control and supervision of its financial operation is in accordance with that principle and for the same reasons of protection and safeguarding of the social security system.- **VIII.-** Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the principle of legality and legislative reserve is infringed, as set forth in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitution and Article 5° of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), according to which only by law can the essential elements of a tax be established, which cannot be set by infra-legal norms. In this respect, it should be noted that the allegation does not specify what the claimed violation is. Furthermore, Article 5°, subsection a° of the Tax Code (Código Tributario) clarifies that it is the exclusive authority of the legislator to create or modify the tax, define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the relationship, the rates, their calculation bases, and indicate the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo). For its part, Articles 174 and 175 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores) regulate all these elements: the obligor, which are the supervised entities (sujetos fiscalizados); the entity authorized to collect, which is the Central Bank (Banco Central); the taxable event, which is the benefit derived from the supervisory activity carried out by the Superintendency of Pensions; and the calculation base for the rate, which is up to two percent of the gross earnings from the investments of the regime that must be subject to review or control, the proceeds of which must have no other destination than the financing of that service. Thus, in the legal norms indicated, all the basic elements of the obligation are regulated, delegating to the Executive Branch only and solely the setting of the specific rate, which was done by means of Executive Decree 30243-H (Decreto Ejecutivo 30243-H), *Regulation to Govern the Participation of Supervised Entities and the Central Bank in the Financing of the Budget of the Superintendencies* (Reglamento para Regular la Participación de los Sujetos Fiscalizados y del Banco Central en el Financiamiento del Presupuesto de las Superintendencias), which in its Article 3 sets an amount, within the authorized framework, of two percent of the annual gross income, without violating either the law or the legal framework pertaining to the norms under discussion. Furthermore, the Regulation clearly indicates that all supervised entities must pay that fee equally, with the exception of non-financial securities issuing companies, which shall pay up to zero point one percent; therefore, no omission or violation of the legal framework is verified. There are specific criteria to guide the exercise of regulatory power, and they are correctly defined, such that the collection can be carried out in accordance with the law, and the challenged administrative acts are valid.-"</p></div></body></html>"

"IV.- El Tribunal considera que la presente litis es una cuestión de puro derecho, pues las partes reducen sus alegatos a determinar cual es la correcta interpretación de un conjunto de normas aplicables a una situación. El caso es que mediante la ley 7523 de siete de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, del REGIMEN PRIVADO DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS Y REFORMAS DE LA LEY REGULADORA DEL MERCADO DE VALORES Y CODIGO DE COMERCIO, se establece en el artículo 33 que el régimen de pensiones sería regulado y fiscalizado por una superintendencia, un órgano de máxima desconcentración con personalidad y capacidad jurídicas instrumentales y adscrito al Banco Central de Costa Rica; de seguido, por la ley 7732 de diecinueve de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y siete, REGULADORA DEL MERCADO DE VALORES, se dispuso que el presupuesto de las superintencias sería financiado en un ochenta por ciento con recursos del Banco Central y en un veinte por ciento de los gastos efectivamente incurridos, con contribuciones obligatorias de los sujetos fiscalizados (artículo 174), cada uno de los cuales contribuirán con un máximo del dos por ciento de sus ingresos brutos, lo que se concretará mediante un reglamento del Poder Ejecutivo que especificará los porcentajes de la contribución, según los diversos tipos de sujetos fiscalizados (artículo 175). Finalmente, por medio de la ley 7983 de dieciséis de febrero del dos mil, DE PROTECCION AL TRABAJADOR, se dispuso que quedaban sujetas a la Superintendencia de Pensiones, como "Entres Supervisados", todas las entidades autorizadas a administrar sistemas de pensiones, incluyendo la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social en lo relativo al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, y como "Entes Regulados" los anteriores exceptuando a la actora, también reformó el numeral 37 de la ley 7983, con una serie de atribuciones de supervisión, control y fiscalización a favor de la SUPEN con relación al régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte que administra la Caja, de manera que a partir de esta última normativa, la accionante quedó sujeta a la supervisión y, en consecuencia, a colaborar en los términos dichos con el financiamiento de la supervisora, mediante el pago obligatorio de un porcentaje sobre sus ganancias brutas anuales, lo que corresponde a una forma de tributo que el Código Tributario clasifica como contribución especial (artículo 4). No obstante, la demandante sostiene que tal interpretación no procede en virtud de la aplicación de lo dispuesto por su Ley Constitutiva, número 17 de veintidós de octubre de mil novecientos cuarenta y tres, la que establece en su artículo primero su carácter de institución autónoma a la que le corresponde el gobierno y administración de los seguros sociales y la prohibición expresa de que los fondos y reservas de estos sean transferidos o empleados en finalidades distintas a los que justifican su creación, además en el numeral 58 inciso a), la exoneración general de todos los impuestos directos o indirectos, inclusive contribuciones municipales, presentes y futuros; aunado a que en el artículo 73 de la Constitución se reitera, pero a nivel de norma fundamental, la prohibición de desviar los fondos dicha, reforzada con el deber del Estado a cooperar y proteger la integridad, eficacia y permanencia del régimen con la aportación de las rentas que sean necesarias (artículo 177). En consecuencia se debe analizar cual es la aplicación correcta y armónica que procede en este cuadro normativo.- V.- El Tribunal considera que en primer lugar se debe considerar la disposición del artículo 58 inciso a de la Ley Orgánica de la Caja; en cuanto establece una exoneración general de impuestos a favor de esta institución, para determinar si ello hace inaplicable las leyes invocadas por la demandada. Al efecto, esta última alega que de conformidad con el numeral 4 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, técnicamente "impuesto" es un concepto diferente del de "contribución especial", que es el tipo de obligación que se cobra, de manera que la exoneración invocada no cubre este caso; no obstante, este Despacho no comparte esa posición, dado que la redacción de la Ley Constitutiva es muy anterior a la promulgación de este otro cuerpo normativo. El artículo 58 referido hace una afirmación general y se puede entender que usa la expresión "impuesto" en sentido lato, o sea de tributo, pese a esto, no procede el alegato de la actora, esta norma no impide la aplicación de la Ley Reguladora de Mercado de Valores y el cobro de la contribución especial por dos motivos; el primero es que la ley posterior, como es ésta última, modifica la anterior; en consecuencia una norma del año dos mil cambia el sentido y aplicación de otra de mil novecientos cuarenta y tres, sobre todo cuando ambas regulan una materia especial como es la regulación de los fondos de pensión. En segundo lugar, reiteradamente se ha dicho que el Poder Legislativo no puede renunciar a futuro a ejercer sus facultades y poderes que le son consustanciales por norma fundamental, en este sentido cabe citar a la Sala Constitucional: "V.- Sobre la derogatoria de las exenciones creadas. Los accionantes cuestionan la constitucionalidad de los artículos 64 de la Ley número 4755, del tres de mayo de mil novecientos setenta y uno (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), y del inciso d) del artículo 7 de la Ley 6990, del veintidós de julio de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco. Alegan los promotores de este proceso que es inconstitucional la eliminación de exoneraciones en perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos por los beneficiarios de tales ventajas fiscales. Específicamente, que el hecho de que a los arrendadores de vehículos automotores les haya sido reducido el índice de exención del ciento por ciento al cincuenta por ciento resulta contrario a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y de irretroactividad de los actos normativos. En relación con los alcances de la competencia estatal en esta materia, ha dicho con anterioridad esta Sala que: "...un momento determinado y bajo ciertas ciertos presupuestos, la ley exonera del pago del Impuesto sobre la Renta, a las pensiones y jubilaciones de cualesquiera regímenes del Estado, ello no otorga a los beneficiarios, que adquirieron su derecho a pensión o jubilación bajo esas condiciones, una exención indefinida en el espacio y el tiempo, ni un derecho adquirido o una situación jurídica consolidada a su favor, en el sentido de que aquéllas no pueden ser modificadas nunca jamás, puesto que implicaría crear una limitación a la potestad impositiva del Estado (creando una inmunidad tributaria indefinida), que no contempla la propia Constitución Política. Las exenciones, no obstante fueran concedidas en función de determinadas condiciones valoradas en su momento por el legislador, pueden ser derogadas o modificadas por una ley posterior, aún cuando se trate, como en este caso, de jubilaciones o pensiones. Tal proceder no resulta arbitrario por sí sólo, sino que aparece como una respuesta a las necesidades fiscales del país y en el entendido de que su aplicación lo será hacia el futuro, es decir, que surtirá efectos a partir de su vigencia." (Parte del Considerando III de la resolución número 1341-93, de las diez horas treinta minutos del veintiuno de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y tres) Es decir, no resulta procedente afirmar que el Estado, a través de la Asamblea Legislativa, se encuentra inhabilitado para exonerar del pago de determinados tributos, o de eliminar dichas exenciones, siempre que lo haga mediante el procedimiento para la creación de la Ley formal. En ese sentido, es claro que no llevan razón los accionantes. Por otro lado, alegan que es inconstitucional que la disminución en el monto de la exoneración se hubiera verificado respecto de los arrendadores de automóviles y no en perjuicio de otros ramos de actividades propios del sector turismo. Sobre un tema similar a éste, ya la Sala había tenido la oportunidad de manifestarse respecto de semejantes alegatos, en el siguiente sentido: "II).- EL PODER TRIBUTARIO.- El llamado "Poder Tributario" -potestad soberana del Estado de exigir contribuciones a personas o bienes que se hallan en su jurisdicción o bien conceder exenciones- no reconoce más limitaciones que las que se originan en la propia Constitución Política. Esa potestad de gravar, es el poder de sancionar normas jurídicas de las que se derive o pueda derivar, la obligación de pagar un tributo o de respetar un límite tributario y entre los principios constitucionales de la Tributación, se encuentran inmersos el Principio de Legalidad o bien, Reserva de Ley, el de la Igualdad o de Isonomía, de Generalidad y de No Confiscación. Los tributos deben emanar de una Ley de la República, no crear discriminaciones en perjuicio de sujetos pasivos, deben abarcar integralmente a todas las personas o bienes previstas en la ley y no solo a una parte de ellas y debe cuidarse de no ser de tal identidad, que viole la propiedad privada (artículos 33, 40, 45, 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política)." (Voto 1999-04844 de 16:18 horas del 22 de junio de 1999, expediente 97-006726-0007-CO, la negrilla no es del original).- En consecuencia, no es de recibo el argumento de que la Ley Constitutiva estableció una exoneración general de tributos que impida la promulgación de normas posteriores que modifiquen en alguna forma su aplicación o contenido; por lo que se debe considerar si hay limitaciones a nivel constitucional.- VI.- Señala la actora que la Constitución Política establece en sus numerales 73 y 177 la imposibilidad de hacer el pago que se cuestiona. En este sentido se observa que en el numeral 177 referido, en su párrafo tercero establece la obligación del Estado de contribuir con la universalización de los seguros sociales, por lo que se deben crear a favor de la Caja rentas suficientes para que cubran las necesidades actuales y futuras de la entidad, se agrega que si en un futuro se produjere un déficit por insuficiencia de esas rentas, el Estado lo debe asumir, para lo cual se deberá incluir en el presupuesto la partida respectiva; por su parte el 73, que establece la creación de los seguros sociales en beneficio de los trabajadores del país, mediante la contribución forzosa del Estado, patronos y trabajadores, a fin de protegerlos contra los riesgos de la invalidez, vejez y muerte, o de enfermedad y maternidad, en forma concreta prohibe que los fondos y reservas de esta institución puedan ser transferidos o empleados en finalidades distintas a las que motivaron su creación, disposición ésta última que se encuentra en el artículo 1 de la Ley Constitutiva en comentario. De las normas citadas se desprende un principio constitucional de protección del régimen establecido, resguardo y apoyo financiero de la institución por parte del Estado; así se observa la preocupación del constituyente por garantizar la existencia y eficiencia del sistema, lo que es consustancial con su financiamiento; en este sentido el 177 no impone una regulación concreta sobre el destino de los fondos y el 73 lo que establece es que no se les podrá asignar un fin distinto al que motivó su creación. Dentro de este contexto, el Tribunal considera acertada la posición expresada por la Procuraduría General de la República (ver dictamen C-073-2004 a folios 120-129 del principal) y de la demandada, según la cual la obligación de contribuir con el financiamiento de la Superintendencia de Pensiones no es contraria a lo dispuesto por la Constitución, sino que se trata de sufragar un costo de un control por un órgano técnico especializado que procura garantizar la buena administración y protección de los fondos y del régimen en su aspecto financiero, impedir un mal manejo o una administración inadecuada que pongan en peligro su estabilidad y solvencia y de hecho tomar las medidas necesarias para superar una posible crisis en este sentido. La normativa en cuestión responde a los principios y fines impuestos en el numeral 177 de la Constitución, y con relación al 73, no se trata de perseguir un fin distinto al que motiva la creación de los fondos, sino por el contrario uno directamente relacionado con su existencia, controlar su buena administración y garantizar su prosperidad.- VII.- En este sentido no hay contradicción con el dictamen anterior de la Procuraduría que invoca la petente, el C-045 de nueve de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, según el cual el Estado Legislador no puede, por medio de su actividad tributaria: " menoscabar, dificultar o hacer nugatoria la competencia de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para desarrollar un régimen de seguridad social" por cuanto en este caso en concreto el fin del tributo no es para sufragar los gastos generales del Estado u otro fin ajeno a los fines de la institución, sino que se dirige a un medio de control y protección del fondo que contribuya a garantizar su funcionamiento, no se puede señalar que en modo alguno se trata de menoscabar o dificultar la competencia de la institución para fomentar su propósito, de hecho la Ley de Protección al Trabajador hace eco de este principio cuando establece que la potestad de la SUPEN con relación a la Caja será de Supervisión pero, contrario respecto de todos los demás regímenes, no será de regulación (artículo 2 incisos g y h), y en consecuencia, si bien cabe interpretar que se crea un principio general constitucional de exoneración de impuestos, si es conforme al mismo y por las mismas razones de protección y amparo del sistema de seguridad social, una contribución especial dedicada en forma exclusiva al financiamiento parcial de un control y supervisión de su funcionamiento financiero.- VIII.- Por otra parte, aduce la accionante que se infringe el principio de legalidad y reserva de ley, dispuesto en el 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución y el 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, según los cuales sólo por ley se pueden establecer los elementos esenciales del Tributo, que no pueden ser fijados por normas infralegales. Al respecto se debe comentar que no se concreta el alegato a determinar cual es la violación que acusa, además el artículo 5 inciso a del Código Tributario aclara que es potestad exclusiva del legislador crear o modificar el tributo, definir el hecho generador de la relación, las tarifas, sus bases de cálculo e indicar el sujeto pasivo; por su parte, en los numerales 174 y 175 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores se regulan todos estos elementos: el obligado que son los sujetos fiscalizados, el ente autorizado al cobro que es el Banco Central, el hecho generador que es el beneficio derivado de la actividad de supervisión que realiza la Superintendencia de Pensiones y la base de cálculo de la tarifa, que es de hasta un dos por ciento de las ganancias brutas con las inversiones del régimen que debe ser objeto de revisión o control, cuyo producto no debe tener otro destino que la financiación de ese servicio; de manera que en las normas legales que se señalan se regulan todos los elementos básicos de la obligación, no delegándose en el Poder Ejecutivo sino y sólo la fijación de la tarifa concreta, lo que se hizo por medio del Decreto Ejecutivo 30243-H, Reglamento para Regular la Participación de los Sujetos Fiscalizados y del Banco Central en el Financiamiento del Presupuesto de las Superintendencias, que en su numeral tercero fija un monto, dentro del marco autorizado, de un dos por ciento de los ingresos brutos anuales, sin violación ni de la ley ni del marco jurídico que corresponde a las normas en comentario. Por otro lado, en el Reglamento se indica con claridad que serán todos los sujetos fiscalizados los que deben pagar por igual esa cuota, con excepción de las empresas emisoras no financieras de valores, que pagarán hasta en un cero punto uno por ciento, por lo que no se constata ninguna omisión o violación del marco legal; hay criterios concretos para orientar el ejercicio del poder reglamentario y se definen correctamente, de manera que el cobro se puede realizar conforme a derecho y los actos administrativos impugnados son válidos.-"