Statute of limitations in ideal concurrence and civil compensatory actionPrescripción en concurso ideal y acción civil resarcitoria

"II- As the *fourth ground* of the appeal, the appellant alleges the omission to declare the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the crimes of negligent bodily injury (lesiones culposas), since —in their opinion— different limitation periods cannot exist for the crime of negligent bodily injury depending on whether they concur with other crimes in the same action, as established by the lower court (a quo). **The claim is partially admissible:** This specific point has been studied by this Chamber on repeated occasions, and more recently it was addressed extensively in judgment number 2004-01375 of 12:20 p.m. on November 26, 2004, which —in relevant part— stated: “It is within the framework of these latter considerations that what the Chamber stated in precedent 85-99 of 9:40 a.m. on January 20, 1999 [sic] cited by the appellant must be interpreted. On that occasion, this Court specified that: ‘[...] The institution of the statute of limitations is configured for each fact, individually, taking into account the criminality (tipicidad) of the action, independently of the other crimes (delincuencias) that may be adjacent in the specific case, even if a functional link mediates between them, as the attorney B.N. alleges. It is erroneous to consider the totality of the eventual (sic) penalty to be imposed for the accused crimes to determine the statute of limitations; on the contrary, each fact and its legal classification must be individualized, as has been correctly resolved in the appealed judgments. [...] **it must be considered that when multiple crimes are being investigated, each one of them would prescribe separately because they involve separate or independent actions (material concurrence [concurso material]), but if the case involves an ideal concurrence of crimes (concurso ideal de delitos), that is, a single action with a multiplicity of typical results, the fixing of the prescriptive period is established considering the penalty for the most serious crime. In the case at hand, the lower court has considered the fraud (estafa) and the use of a false document to be viable, excluding the falsification of a document, ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), and unfaithful sponsorship (patrocinio infiel). From that perspective, analyzing the criteria followed to establish the cause of extinction regarding the latter three cited crimes, it is estimated that the resolution fully conforms to law** [...] (emphasis supplied).’ The statute of limitations is an institution that operates for each crime —legal classification— independently, and this is the general rule. However, when we deal with crimes that in principle form an ideal concurrence, since they are facts that **legally** will be considered and assessed as a single action and because this is the assessment that matters to the criminal process, it is not possible to declare, along the way, the statute of limitations for actions that make up the concurrence, independently or in advance, because this affects the factual framework (cuadro fáctico) in its entirety, considered as a legally speaking unit, and compromises the principle of ne bis in idem. ‘[...] In general, legal doctrine affirms that for the guarantee of **ne bis in idem** to operate, the basic structure of the factual hypothesis must be maintained. That is, in general terms, the fact must be the same. Otherwise, it would be very easy to circumvent this guarantee by including any detail or circumstance that offers a slight variation in the criminal hypothesis. Even so, the formula developed by procedural dogmatics has proven very vague, because there are no very clear rational criteria to determine when the basic structure of the fact is preserved [...] Ultimately, the solution is eminently evaluative, rather than rational. That is, in those cases in which the criminal power has been exercised with sufficient intensity and, furthermore, there has been the possibility of adequately completing the description of the fact, even if this has not occurred due to deficiencies in the investigation itself, the identity of the fact must be understood in the broadest possible way. What must be taken into account is the unity of meaning of the fact in accordance with the legal norms. Because in the context of the criminal process, one cannot speak of ‘facts’ independently of the legal norms: a procedural fact is a fact with reference to the legal norms. Therefore, in the study of **ne bis in idem** it is absolutely necessary to refer to the discussions that exist in the field of substantive criminal law, regarding the identity between facts for the purposes of their legal classification: when they are independent facts, when it is a single fact with different classifications, or when the legal order establishes a fiction and grants unity to a fact that in its phenomenological aspect is undoubtedly a separate fact. There are particular cases that are widely studied in the manuals to which we refer [...] All this shows us that, for the determination of the identity of the fact, it is essential to refer to its legal meaning. The processes of subsumption are a round-trip path, in which one moves from the factual information to the legal norm and from this to the facts again. Provided that, according to the legal order, it involves the same factual identity, with similar legal meaning in general terms —and here ‘similar’ must be understood in the broadest possible way— then the principle of **ne bis in idem** must operate [...]’. Binder, Alberto. Introducción al Derecho Procesal Penal, Buenos Aires, AD HOC S.R.L., 1993. 318 p. p. 167. Now, it must indeed be clearly understood that the unity of action, the basis of the ideal concurrence, is a legal concept. ‘[...] There is no social unity of action, pre-existing the legal one, to which legal concepts are subordinated. Nor can the plan or design of the author unite several actions into one. The unity of action is a legal concept; it is not the natural unity of action that dictates when there is an action in the legal sense; it can rather occur that an action in the natural sense legally constitutes a plurality of actions, or that a plurality of actions in the natural sense legally constitutes a single action. The separation between unity of action and plurality of actions is only possible through an interpretation of the meaning of the realized criminal type [...]’. Castillo, Francisco. El concurso de delitos en el Derecho Penal Costarricense, San José, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Costa Rica. P. 19. The ideal concurrence starts from the concept of the unity of action which allows, despite the unity, different legal assessments that do not exclude each other. When the Chamber indicates in the cited precedent that, for purposes of computing the statute of limitations, one starts from the penalty for the most serious crime, what it means to indicate is that this is the parameter that will allow us to assess whether the case can effectively be brought to trial without the statute of limitations having run, because ultimately that will be the penalty that, if criminal liability is declared, will serve as the basis for fixing the quantum that corresponds. But that does not mean affirming, as the appellant seems to understand it, that by virtue of forming an ideal concurrence, it would be the penalty of the most serious crime that would serve for computing the statute of limitations for all the crimes involved, because that is not correct. Procedurally, the existence of a unitary punitive claim —ideal concurrence— is considered, with the expectation of specifying criminal liability for the violation of several legal classifications —for the plurality of legal injuries—. This expectation of sanction may be frustrated with respect to some of these classifications, by the statute of limitations for the corresponding criminal action, but this can only be assessed at a single moment, that is, this entire framework must be the subject of one and the same single pronouncement due to the possible effect on res judicata (cosa juzgada), as was explained. The anticipated factual fragmentation with a finding of the statute of limitations regarding the criminal action for any of the crimes in concurrence compromises this principle. Thus, the principle that the legislator laid down, that the statute of limitations is computed independently for each fact —which integrates, it should be noted, the guarantee of legality and is set forth in Article 32, second paragraph of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)— is always preserved, but if these form an ideal concurrence, the legal assessment must be made in a single pronouncement, even if before arriving at trial there is the possibility of confirming the statute of limitations for some of the criminal actions for the crimes that make up the concurrence. One will arrive at trial guided by the penalty of the most serious crime for purposes of the abstract computation of the statute of limitations, and in the judgment, if the extinction of the punitive claim is confirmed with respect to some of the legal classifications, this will mean: i) that the ruling cannot establish criminal consequences with respect to that legal classification, because the criminal action prescribed with respect to it; ii) depending on whether some of the other classifications subsist along with that of the most serious crime, this could mean either maintaining the existence of the ideal concurrence for the subsisting classifications or, the impossibility of establishing the existence of an ideal concurrence —due to the statute of limitations for the actions of the other crimes that compose it—, all this, of course, already in the judgment and therefore, in this latter event, it would only be possible to establish criminal consequences with respect to the most serious fact and adhering to the penalty limits established for it, without the possibility of increasing the penalty according to the penalty rules of the ideal concurrence, that is, without the possibility of fixing the judgment of reproach considering the legal classifications whose action is time-barred. III- In summary, the Chamber’s position is that, given the unity of action that is the basis of the ideal concurrence, the actions that comprise it must be judged jointly, and the statute of limitations cannot be assessed independently; rather, if it exists, it must be declared in the judgment in which such unity is known and judged, so as not to compromise the ne bis in idem principle and its procedural corollary of res judicata.” This being the case, the appellant is correct regarding this claim, because the Trial Court incurred the error of considering that, as it involved a single criminal action that produced two results (four crimes of negligent homicide [homicidio culposo] and nine crimes of negligent bodily injury [lesiones culposas]), the prescriptive period corresponding to all the crimes is the penalty applicable to the most serious crime, that is, eight years of imprisonment. With this reasoning, the Trial Court considered that the crimes of negligent bodily injury were not time-barred, which is incorrect, since applying the outlined guidelines, the criminal action for these crimes prescribes independently at the moment the factual framework is judged as a whole. In other words, it involves a single action, but what prescribes separately is the violation of each norm, which will be analyzed jointly, as indicated, so as not to compromise the principle of ne bis in idem and res judicata. However, the statute of limitations for those unlawful acts in no way affects what was resolved by the criminal judges regarding the civil action brought by the injured parties, as the appellant seems to understand it. The foregoing is so by virtue of the fact that the statute of limitations that applies to civil claims derived from a punishable act is the ten-year one and must —in cases like the present one— be heard by the criminal jurisdiction, according to the jurisprudence of this Court, which regarding this topic has established: “Based on the reasoning set forth, the following general conclusions can be drawn, which the Chamber deems prudent to indicate, in order to avoid eventual misunderstandings that may attempt to rely on what was stated herein: a) Article 871 of the Civil Code was tacitly repealed by Article 96 of the Penal Code. b) No sentence to repair damages and losses is possible, in criminal matters, if the civil action for compensation was not exercised (and except as provided regarding restitution and confiscation, as indicated by law). c) The criminal action and the civil action derived from the punishable act do not prescribe jointly and have different rules: the former is governed by the rules contained in the Punitive Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (which, it is worth clarifying, did not repeal the cited Article 96 nor did it interfere in matters relating to the substantive right of the injured party) and the statute of limitations for the civil action refers to the ordinary rules established by the Civil Code. d) The term for the 'civil action' to prescribe in order to claim the civil consequences of the punishable act —regardless of the unlawful act in question and the venue chosen, including the criminal one— is the ordinary term set forth in Article 868 of the Civil Code: TEN YEARS, because the exceptional cause that Article 871 established is precisely the one understood to be repealed, with all the effects that this entails. e) The acts that suspend or interrupt the 'statute of limitations for the civil compensatory action' are not those contemplated by the criminal norms (now only procedural in nature, as of the 1996 code), but those determined by the Civil Code, insofar as they are applicable due to their compatibility with the design of the criminal process, among them those described in Articles 879 and 880 of said regulatory body, in concordance with what is regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure (Articles 206 and 217), or other special laws (e.g.: Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction [Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional]). Thus, for example, any judicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation will interrupt the ten-year period —and it will begin to run anew in its entirety—, such as the request to be constituted as a civil plaintiff —provided it is not declared inadmissible, withdrawn, or the defendant is acquitted in the judgment, it being understood, of course, that said acquittal refers to the civil aspect and not the criminal one, since the latter does not entail that the compensatory claims must necessarily be dismissed, if substantive rules imposing liability concur—; conciliation —in which some form of compensation is agreed— has an identical effect, because the injured party is trying to obtain the fulfillment of the debt; and the same happens with the statements made giving notice that the defendant is failing to comply with what was agreed and requesting the continuation of the process. Other scenarios will exist that must be examined on a case-by-case basis, adhering to the general rules discussed herein, and it must also be emphasized that recourse to civil law norms is restricted to determining the term and the reasons that interrupt or suspend the computation of the statute of limitations; therefore, regarding the form, procedure, and other conditions of the civil compensatory action, one must adhere to what the Code of Criminal Procedure provides. Due to its particular interest, the Chamber must reiterate its criterion that the reduction by half —for a single time— of the ordinary term for which the criminal action prescribes (when the first of the scenarios that the law exhaustively contemplates occurs) does not affect the civil action in any way, as they are different regimes and institutions that, only for reasons of speed and procedural economy, are processed jointly. f) The criminal judges must rule on the civil claims raised in the compensatory action —upholding or denying them—, even if it is determined in the judgment (after the debate and the deliberative phase) that the criminal action is time-barred. In these scenarios, what is of interest is safeguarding the rights of the civil defendant, who was able —through the formalization of the civil claim in the hearing and the raising of claims and defenses or exceptions— to fully exercise their defense and the adversarial process. Of course, the statute of limitations for the civil action is not declarable ex officio. In the other scenarios, of dismissal due to the statute of limitations for the criminal action without the compensatory claim having been formalized in the debate (and without the consequent full exercise of the defense by the defendant, including the closing argument phase), the parties must be referred to the civil venue, if they so wish. In such hypotheses, as observed, the inviolability of the defense of the interested subjects must be ensured, and the judge's submission to the legal restrictions regarding the object of the civil process. g) Of course, when it is determined in an acquittal judgment that the conduct is not punishable, but some form of civil liability subsists (e.g.: strict liability, for civil 'fraud [dolo]' or negligence [culpa], lack of expertise [impericia], duty 'in vigilando', etc., or arising from the criminal wrong or, to be precise, causes of inculpability), the limitation period is and has always been TEN YEARS, as it does not involve civil consequences of a 'punishable act,' but rather mere non-contractual civil liability, and the criminal judges have the power (power-duty) to rule on it, provided that the compensatory claim has been exercised. h) The criminal judges must resolve the formally raised civil claims and cannot refer the parties to another venue, except in the cases of exception derived from the law. (The underlining is not in the original)." The matter will proceed to trial guided by the penalty of the most serious offense for purposes of the abstract calculation of the statute of limitations, and in the judgment, if the extinguishment of the punitive claim is verified regarding some of the legal classifications, this will mean: <b>i)</b> that the ruling cannot establish criminal consequences regarding that legal classification, because the criminal action has prescribed with respect to it; <b>ii)</b> depending on whether some of the other classifications subsist alongside that of the most serious offense, this could mean either maintaining the existence of the ideal concurrence (concurso ideal) for the subsisting classifications, or the impossibility of establishing the existence of an ideal concurrence (concurso ideal) –due to the prescription of the actions for the other offenses that comprise it–, all of this, of course, already in the judgment, and therefore, in this latter event, it would only be possible to establish criminal consequences regarding the most serious act and adhering to the penalty limits established for it, without the possibility of increasing the penalty according to the penalty rules of the ideal concurrence (concurso ideal), that is, without the possibility of setting the judgment of reproach considering the legal classifications whose action is prescribed.</u> <u>III- In summary, the Chamber's position is that, given the unity of action that is the basis of the ideal concurrence (concurso ideal), the actions that comprise it must be judged jointly, and the statute of limitations cannot be assessed independently; rather, if it exists, it must be declared in the judgment in which such unity is heard and judged, so as not to compromise the principle of ne bis in idem and its procedural corollary of res judicata (cosa juzgada).</u>" Thus, the appellant is correct regarding this claim, because the Trial Court erred in considering that, since it was a single criminal action that produced two results (four offenses of involuntary manslaughter and nine offenses of negligent bodily injury), the prescriptive period corresponding to all the offenses is the penalty applicable to the most serious offense, that is, eight years of imprisonment. With this reasoning, the Trial Court considered that the negligent bodily injury offenses were not time-barred, which is incorrect, because applying the guidelines transcribed, the criminal action for these offenses prescribes independently at the time the factual framework is judged as a whole. In other words, it is a single action, but what prescribes separately is the violation of each norm, which will be analyzed jointly, as indicated, so as not to compromise the principle of ne bis in idem and res judicata (cosa juzgada). <i><u>However, the prescription of those unlawful acts in no way affects what was decided by the criminal judges regarding the civil action (acción civil) filed by their victims, as the appellant seems to understand.</u></i> The foregoing is so by virtue of the fact that the statute of limitations that applies to civil claims (pretensiones civiles) arising from a punishable act is the ten-year statute of limitations, and must –in cases such as this one– be heard by the criminal jurisdiction, according to the jurisprudence of this Court, which regarding this topic has established: "<i>From the reasoning set forth, the following general conclusions can be drawn, which the Chamber deems prudent to point out, in order to avoid eventual misunderstandings that may attempt to be based on what was indicated here: a) Article 871 of the Civil Code was tacitly repealed by Article 96 of the Penal Code. b) No condemnation to repair damages (daños y perjuicios) is possible, in criminal matters, if the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) was not exercised (and except as provided regarding restitution and confiscation, as indicated by law). c) The criminal action (acción penal) and the civil action (acción civil) derived from the punishable act do not prescribe jointly and have different rules: the former is governed by the norms contained in the Punitive Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (which, it is worth clarifying, did not repeal the cited Article 96 nor did it interfere in matters related to the substantive right of the injured party), and the prescription of the civil action (acción civil) is referred to the ordinary rules established by the Civil Code. d) The term for the 'civil action' (acción civil) to prescribe in order to claim the civil consequences of the punishable act –regardless of the unlawful act in question and the venue chosen, including the criminal one– is the ordinary term set forth in Article 868 of the Civil Code: TEN YEARS, because the exceptional cause established by Article 871 is precisely the one that is understood to be repealed, with all the effects that this entails. e) The acts that suspend or interrupt the 'prescription of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria)' are not those contemplated by the criminal norms (now only procedural in nature, as of the 1996 Code), but rather those determined by the Civil Code, to the extent they are applicable due to their compatibility with the design of the criminal process, among them those described in Articles 879 and 880 of said normative body, in accordance with what is regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure (Articles 206 and 217), or other special laws (e.g., Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Thus, for example, the ten-year period will be interrupted –and will begin to run anew in its entirety– by any judicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation, such as the request to be constituted as a civil plaintiff (actor civil) –provided it is not declared inadmissible, withdrawn, or the defendant is acquitted in the judgment, it being understood, of course, that said acquittal refers to the civil aspect and not the criminal one, since the latter does not necessarily entail that the claims for damages must be declared without merit, if substantive norms that impose liability concur–; conciliation –in which some form of compensation is agreed upon– has an identical effect, because the victim seeks to obtain the fulfillment of the debt; and the same occurs with the statements given notifying that the defendant is breaching what was agreed and requesting that the process continue. There will be other scenarios that must be examined on a case-by-case basis, in strict adherence to the general rules being discussed, and it must also be emphasized that recourse to civil law norms is restricted to determining the period and the reasons that interrupt or suspend the calculation of the statute of limitations; therefore, regarding the form, procedure, and other conditions of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), what the Code of Criminal Procedure provides must be observed. Due to its particular interest, the Chamber must reiterate its criterion that the reduction by half –on a single occasion– of the ordinary period for the criminal action (acción penal) to prescribe (when the first of any of the scenarios that the law exhaustively contemplates occurs) in no way affects the civil action (acción civil), because they are different regimes and institutions that will only be processed jointly for reasons of speed and procedural economy. f) Criminal judges must rule on the civil claims raised in the action for damages (acción resarcitoria) –upholding or denying them–, even if it is determined in the judgment (after the debate and the deliberative phase) that the criminal action (acción penal) is time-barred. In these scenarios, what is of interest is safeguarding the rights of the civil defendant (accionado civil), who was able –through the specification of the claim (demanda) in the hearing and the raising of claims and defenses or exceptions– to fully exercise their defense and the adversarial principle. Of course, the prescription of the civil action (acción civil) cannot be declared ex officio. In all other scenarios, of dismissal due to the prescription of the criminal action (acción penal) without the claim for damages (demanda resarcitoria) having been specified in debate (and without the consequent full exercise of defense by the defendant, including the closing arguments phase), the parties must be referred to the civil venue, if they so wish. In such hypotheses, as observed, the inviolability of the defense of the interested parties and the judge's submission to legal restrictions regarding the object of the civil process must be ensured. g) Of course, when it is determined in an acquittal judgment that the conduct is not punishable, but some form of civil liability subsists (e.g., strict liability, for 'civil' 'willful misconduct (dolo)' or 'negligence (culpa)', negligence, lack of skill, duty 'in vigilando', etcetera, or based on the criminal wrong or, to be precise, causes of inculpability), the prescription period is and always has been TEN YEARS, because these are not civil consequences of a 'punishable act,' but rather mere extracontractual civil liability, and criminal judges have the power (power-duty) to rule on it, provided that the claim for damages (demanda resarcitoria) has been exercised. h) <u>Criminal judges must resolve formally filed civil claims (pretensiones civiles) and cannot refer the parties to another venue, except in the exceptional cases derived from the law.</u> (The underlining is not from the original)."</i> The matter will proceed to trial guided by the penalty of the most serious crime for purposes of the abstract computation of prescription, and in the judgment, if the extinguishment of the punitive claim is verified with respect to some of the legal classifications, this will mean: **i)** that the judgment cannot establish criminal consequences regarding that legal classification, because the criminal action has prescribed with respect to it; **ii)** depending on whether some of the other classifications subsist alongside that of the most serious crime, this could mean either maintaining the existence of the ideal concurrence for the subsisting classifications or, the impossibility of establishing the existence of an ideal concurrence —due to the prescription of the actions of the other crimes that comprise it—, all of this, of course, already in the judgment and therefore, in this latter event, it would only be possible to establish criminal consequences regarding the most serious act and adhering to the penalty limits established for it, without the possibility of increasing the penalty according to the penalty rules of the ideal concurrence, that is, without the possibility of setting the judgment of reproach considering the legal classifications whose action is prescribed. III- In summary, the position of the Chamber is that given the unity of action that is the basis of the ideal concurrence, the actions that comprise it must be judged jointly and the prescription cannot be assessed independently; rather, if it exists, it must be declared in the judgment in which such unity is heard and judged, so as not to compromise the *ne bis in idem* principle and its procedural counterpart of *res judicata*.

This being the case, the appellant is correct regarding this claim, because the Tribunal erred in considering that, as it involves a single criminal action that produced two results (four crimes of negligent homicide and nine crimes of negligent injury), the prescriptive period corresponding to all the crimes is the penalty applicable to the most serious crime, that is, eight years of imprisonment. With this reasoning, the Tribunal considered that the crimes of negligent injury were not prescribed, which is incorrect, because applying the transcribed guidelines, the criminal action for these crimes prescribes independently when the factual scenario is judged as a whole. In other words, it is a single action, but what prescribes separately is the violation of each norm, which will be analyzed jointly, as indicated, so as not to compromise the principle of *ne bis in idem* and *res judicata*. *However, the prescription of those offenses in no way affects what was decided by the criminal judges regarding the civil action brought by their victims, as the appellant seems to understand.* The foregoing is so by virtue of the fact that the prescription applicable to civil claims derived from a punishable act is the ten-year prescription and must —in cases such as the present— be heard by the criminal jurisdiction, according to the case law of this Court, which regarding this issue has established: “From the reasoning set forth, the following general conclusions can be drawn, which the Chamber deems prudent to point out, in order to avoid potential misunderstandings that may seek to be based on what was indicated here: a) Article 871 of the Civil Code was tacitly repealed by Article 96 of the Penal Code. b) No condemnation to repair damages and losses, in matters of crimes, is possible if the civil action for damages was not exercised (and except as provided regarding restitution and confiscation, as indicated by law). c) The criminal action and the civil action derived from the punishable act do not prescribe jointly and have different rules: the former is governed by the norms contained in the Penal Code and in the Criminal Procedure Code (which, it is worth clarifying, did not repeal the cited Article 96 nor meddle in issues relating to the substantive law of the injured party) and the prescription of the civil action is referred to the ordinary rules established by the Civil Code. d) The term for the “civil action” to prescribe in order to claim the civil consequences of the punishable act —regardless of the offense in question and the venue chosen, including the criminal one— is the ordinary term set forth in Article 868 of the Civil Code: TEN YEARS, for the exceptional cause established by Article 871 is precisely the one that is understood to be repealed, with all the effects that this entails. e) The acts that suspend or interrupt the “prescription of the civil action for damages” are not those contemplated by criminal norms (now only of a procedural nature, as of the 1996 code), but rather those determined by the Civil Code, insofar as they are applicable due to their compatibility with the design of the criminal process, among them those described in Articles 879 and 880 of said normative body, in concordance with what is regulated in the Civil Procedure Code (Articles 206 and 217), or other special laws (e.g.: Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Thus, for example, the ten-year period shall be interrupted —and shall begin to run anew in full— by any judicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation, such as the request to be constituted as a civil party —provided it is not declared inadmissible, waived, or the defendant is acquitted in the judgment, it being understood, of course, that said acquittal refers to the civil matter and not the criminal one, since the latter does not entail that the claims for damages must necessarily be declared without merit, if there are substantive norms that impose liability—; conciliation —in which some form of compensation is agreed upon— has an identical effect, because the victim is trying to obtain fulfillment of the debt; and the same occurs with statements made giving notice that the defendant is failing to comply with what was agreed and requesting that the process continue. Other situations will exist that must be examined on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the general rules discussed, and it should also be noted that recourse to civil law norms is restricted to determining the term and the reasons that interrupt or suspend the computation of prescription, so that as to the form, procedure, and other conditions of the civil action for damages, one must abide by what the Criminal Procedure Code provides. Due to its particular interest, the Chamber must reiterate its criterion that the reduction by half —on a single occasion— of the ordinary term by which the criminal action prescribes (when the first of any of the situations that the law exhaustively contemplates occurs) does not affect the civil action in any way, as they are different regimes and institutes that are processed jointly only for reasons of speed and procedural economy. f) Criminal judges must rule on the civil claims raised in the action for damages —granting or denying them—, even if it is determined in the judgment (after the debate and deliberative phase) that the criminal action is prescribed. In these situations, what is of interest is safeguarding the rights of the civil defendant, who was able —through the concretization of the claim in the hearing and the raising of claims, defenses, or exceptions— to fully exercise their defense and the adversarial principle. Of course, the prescription of the civil action is not declarable *ex officio*. In other situations, of dismissal due to prescription of the criminal action without the claim for damages having been concretized in debate (and without the consequent full exercise of the defense by the defendant, including the conclusions phase), the parties must be referred to the civil venue, if they so choose. In such hypotheses, as observed, the inviolability of the defense of the interested subjects and the judge's submission to legal restrictions regarding the object of the civil process must be ensured. g) Of course, when it is determined in an acquittal judgment that the conduct is not punishable, but some form of civil liability subsists (e.g.: strict liability, for civil “willful misconduct” or “negligence”, negligence, lack of skill, duty “to supervise”, etc., or arising from the criminal wrong or, to be precise, grounds for non-imputability), the prescription term is and always has been TEN YEARS, since it does not involve civil consequences of a “punishable act”, but merely extracontractual civil liability, and criminal judges have the power (power-duty) to rule on it, provided the action for damages has been exercised. h) *Criminal judges must resolve formally raised civil claims and cannot refer the parties to another venue, except in the exceptional cases deduced from the law.* (The underlining is not from the original)."

"II- Como cuarto motivo del recurso, se alega la omisión de declarar la prescripción de los delitos de lesiones culposas, pues –a su juicio- no pueden existir distintos plazos de prescripción para el delito de lesiones culposas según concurran con otros delitos en la misma acción, tal y como lo estableció el a quo. El reclamo es parcialmente atendible: Este punto en específico, lo ha estudiado esta Sala en reiteradas ocasiones, y más recientemente lo hizo de manera amplia mediante la sentencia número 2004-01375 de las 12:20 horas del 26 de noviembre de 2004, que –en lo que interesa- expuso: “Es en el marco de estas últimas consideraciones, que debe interpretarse lo dicho por la Sala en el precedente 85-99 de las 9:40 horas del 20 de enero de 1999 [sic] que cita el impugnante. En esa oportunidad este Tribunal precisó que : “[...]El instituto de la prescripción está configurado para cada hecho, en forma individual, tomando en cuenta la tipicidad de la acción, independientemente de las otras delincuencias que resulten adyacentes en el caso concreto, aún cuando entre ellos mediare un vínculo funcional, como lo alega la letrada B.N. Resulta errado considerar la totalidad de la eventual (sic) pena a imponer por las delincuencias acusadas para determinar la prescripción, por el contrario, debe individualizarse cada hecho y su calificación legal, como bien se ha resuelto en los fallos recurridos. [...] debe considerarse que cuando son varias las delincuencias las que se investigan, cada una de ellas prescribiría en forma separada por tratarse de acciones separadas o independientes entre sí (concurso material), pero si el caso trata de un concurso ideal de delitos, es decir, una sóla acción con multiplicidad de resultados típicos, la fijación del periodo prescriptivo se establece considerando la pena del delito más grave. En el caso de marras el tribunal a quo ha considerado ventilable la estafa y el uso de falso documento, en forma excluyente a la falsificación de documento, falsedad ideológica y patrocinio infiel. Desde esa perspectiva analizando los criterios seguidos para establecer la causal de extinción respecto a los tres últimos delitos citados, se estima que la resolución se ajusta plenamente a derecho[...] (destacado es suplido)”. La prescripción es un instituto que opera para cada delito –calificación jurídica- en forma independiente y esta es la regla general. Sin embargo, cuando tratamos de delitos que en principio integran un concurso ideal, por tratarse de hechos que jurídicamente van a ser considerados y valorados como una sola acción y por ser ésta la valoración que interesa al proceso penal, no es posible declarar sobre la marcha la prescripción de acciones que integran el concurso, en forma independiente o anticipada, porque se afecta el cuadro fáctico en su totalidad, considerado como unidad jurídicamente hablando y se compromete el principio de ne bis in idem. “[...] En general, la doctrina afirma que para que opere la garantía de ne bis in idem, es necesario que se mantenga la estructura básica de la hipótesis fáctica. Es decir, que en términos generales el hecho sea el mismo. Caso contrario, sería muy fácil burlar esta garantía mediante la inclusión de cualquier detalle o circunstancia que ofreciera una pequeña variación en la hipótesis delictiva. Así y todo, la fórmula elaborada por la dogmática procesal ha resultado muy vaga, porque no existen criterios racionales muy claros para determinar cuándo se conserva la estructura básica del hecho [...] En última instancia, la solución es eminentemente valorativa, antes que racional. Es decir, en aquellos casos en los que se ha ejercido el poder penal con suficiente intensidad y, además, ha existido la posibilidad de completar adecuadamente la descripción del hecho, aunque ello no se haya producido por carencias de la propia investigación, la identidad del hecho debe ser comprendida del modo más amplio posible. Lo que se debe tener en cuenta es la unidad de sentido del hecho conforme a las normas jurídicas. Porque en el ámbito del proceso penal no se puede hablar de ‘hechos’, en forma independiente de las normas jurídicas: un hecho procesal es un hecho con referencia a las normas jurídicas. Por eso, en el estudio del ne bis in idem es absolutamente necesario hacer referencia a las discusiones que existen en el ámbito del derecho penal sustancial, respecto de la identidad entre hechos a efectos de su calificación jurídica: cuándo se trata de hechos independientes, cuándo se trata de un hecho con distintas calificaciones o cuándo el orden jurídico establece una ficción y le otorga unidad a un hecho que en su aspecto fenomenológico es indudablemente un hecho separado. Existen casos particulares que son ampliamente estudiados en los manuales a los que nos remitimos [...]Todo esto nos demuestra que, para la determinación de la identidad de hecho, es imprescindible remitirse a su significado jurídico. Los procesos de subsunción son un camino de ida y vuelta, en los que se transita de la información fáctica a la norma jurídica y de ésta a los hechos otra vez. Siempre que, según el orden jurídico, se trate de una misma identidad fáctica, con similar significado jurídico en términos generales –y aquí ‘similar’ debe ser entendido del modo más amplio posible- entonces debe operar el principio ne bis in idem[...]”. Binder, Alberto. Introducción al Derecho Procesal Penal, Buenos Aires, AD HOC S.R.L., 1993. 318 p. p. 167. Ahora bien, debe tenerse claro efectivamente que la unidad de acción base del concurso ideal, es un concepto jurídico. “[...]No hay una unidad de acción social, preexistente a lo jurídico, conforme a lo cual estén subordinados los conceptos jurídicos. Tampoco puede el plan o el designio del autor reunir en una, varias acciones. La unidad de acción es un concepto jurídico, no es la unidad natural de acción la que dice cuando hay una acción en sentido legal; puede ocurrir, más bien, que una acción en sentido natural constituya legalmente una pluralidad de acciones o que una pluralidad de acciones en sentido natural constituya legalmente una sola acción. La separación entre unidad de acción y pluralidad de acciones solamente es posible mediante una interpretación del sentido del tipo penal realizado[...]”. Castillo, Francisco. El concurso de delitos en el Derecho Penal Costarricense, San José, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Costa Rica. P. 19. El concurso ideal parte del concepto de unidad de acción que permite, pese a la unidad, distintas valoraciones jurídicas que no se excluyen entre sí. Cuando la Sala señala en el antecedente de cita, que para efectos del cómputo de la prescripción se parte de la pena del delito más grave, lo que se quiere señalar es que ese es el parámetro que nos permitirá valorar si el caso puede efectivamente ser llevado a juicio sin que haya operado la prescripción, porque a fin de cuentas esa será la pena que, de declararse la responsabilidad penal, servirá de base para la fijación del quantum que corresponda. Pero eso no significa afirmar, como parece entenderlo el impugnante, que por el hecho de integrar un concurso ideal, sería la pena del delito más grave la que serviría para el cómputo de la prescripción de todos los delitos involucrados, porque eso no es correcto. Procesalmente se considera la existencia de una pretensión punitiva unitaria –concurso ideal-, con la expectativa de concretar la responsabilidad penal por la infracción de varias calificaciones jurídicas -por la pluralidad de lesiones jurídicas-. Esta expectativa de sanción puede frustrase con relación a alguna de estas calificaciones, por la prescripción de la acción penal correspondiente, pero ello sólo puede ser valorado en un único momento, es decir, todo este marco debe ser objeto de un mismo y único pronunciamiento por la posible afectación a la cosa juzgada, según se expuso. La fragmentación fáctica anticipada con un pronunciamiento de prescripción respecto de la acción penal de alguno de los delitos en concurso compromete este principio. Así, siempre se conserva el principio que el legislador sentó en cuanto a que la prescripción se computa en forma independiente para cada hecho –integra, dicho sea de paso, la garantía de legalidad y se recoge en el artículo 32 párrafo segundo del Código Procesal Penal-, pero si éstos integran un concurso ideal, la valoración jurídica debe hacerse en un solo pronunciamiento, aún cuando antes de arribar a juicio haya la posibilidad de constatar la prescripción de algunas de las acciones penales por los delitos que integran el concurso. Se llegará a juicio guiados por la penalidad del delito más grave para efectos del cómputo abstracto de la prescripción y en sentencia, de constatarse la extinción de la pretensión punitiva respecto de algunas de las calificaciones jurídicas, esto significará: i) que el fallo no puede establecer consecuencias penales respecto de esa calificación jurídica, porque a su respecto prescribió la acción penal; ii) dependiendo de si subsisten algunas de las otras calificaciones junto a la del delito más grave, ello podría significar o bien mantener la existencia del concurso ideal para las calificaciones subsistentes o bien, la imposibilidad de establecer la existencia de un concurso ideal –por la prescripción de las acciones de los otros delitos que lo integran-, todo ello por supuesto ya en la sentencia y por ello, en este último evento, sólo sería posible establecer consecuencias penales respecto del hecho más grave y ateniéndose a los límites de penalidad establecidos para éste, sin posibilidades de aumentar la pena según las reglas de penalidad del concurso ideal, es decir, sin posibilidades de fijar el juicio de reproche considerando las calificaciones jurídicas cuya acción está prescrita. III- En resumen, la posición de la Sala es que ante la unidad de acción que es base del concurso ideal, las acciones que lo integran deben ser juzgadas conjuntamente y no puede valorarse en forma independiente la prescripción, sino que ésta, de existir, debe ser declarada en la sentencia en que se conozca y juzgue tal unidad, para no comprometer el principio ne bis in idem y su correlato procesal de la cosa juzgada.“ Así las cosas, lleva razón el impugnante en cuanto a este reclamo, pues el Tribunal incurrió en el error de considerar que, al tratarse de una sola acción delictiva que produjo dos resultados (cuatro delitos de homicidio culposos y nueve delitos de lesiones culposas), el período prescriptivo es el correspondiente para todos los delitos es la pena aplicable al delito más grave, sea, ocho años de prisión. Con este razonamiento, el Tribunal consideró que los delitos de lesiones culposas no estaban prescritos, lo cual es incorrecto, pues aplicando los lineamiento transcritos, la acción penal para estos delitos prescribe independientemente al momento de juzgarse el cuadro fáctico en su conjunto. En otras palabras, se trata de una única acción, pero lo que prescribe separadamente es la lesión a cada norma, lo que se analizará en forma conjunta, como se indicó, para no comprometer el principio de ne bis in idem y de la cosa juzgada. Sin embargo, la prescripción de esos ilícitos, en nada afecta lo resuelto por los jueces penales en cuanto a la acción civil interpuesta por sus ofendidos como parece entenderlo el recurrente. Lo anterior es así en virtud de que la prescripción que se aplica a las pretensiones civiles derivadas de un hecho punible, es la decenal y debe –en casos como el presente- ser conocida por la jurisdicción penal, según la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, que respecto a este tema ha establecido: “A partir de los razonamientos expuestos, pueden extraerse las siguientes conclusiones generales que la Sala estima prudente señalar, a fin de evitar eventuales equívocos que pretendan sustentarse en lo que aquí se indicó: a) el artículo 871 del Código Civil fue tácitamente derogado por el 96 del Código Penal. b) No es posible ninguna condena a reparar daños y perjuicios, en materia de delitos, si no se ejerció la acción civil resarcitoria (y salvo lo dispuesto en cuanto a la restitución y el comiso, según lo indica la ley). c) La acción penal y la civil derivada del hecho punible no prescriben de manera conjunta y poseen reglas diferentes: la primera se rige por las normas contenidas en el Código punitivo y en el Procesal Penal (que, valga aclarar, no derogó el citado artículo 96 ni se inmiscuyó en cuestiones relativas al derecho de fondo del damnificado) y la prescripción de la acción civil se remite a las normas ordinarias que establece el Código Civil. d) El término para que prescriba la “acción civil” a fin de reclamar las consecuencias civiles del hecho punible –con prescindencia del ilícito de que se trate y de la sede que se escoja, incluida la penal- es el ordinario fijado en el artículo 868 del Código Civil: DIEZ AÑOS, pues la causa excepcional que establecía el artículo 871 es precisamente la que se entiende derogada, con todos los efectos que ello apareja. e) Los actos que suspenden o interrumpen la “prescripción de la acción civil resarcitoria” no son los que contemplan las normas penales (ahora solo de carácter procesal, a partir del código de 1996), sino los que determina el Código Civil, en lo que resulten aplicables por su compatibilidad con el diseño del proceso penal, entre ellos los descritos en los artículos 879 y 880 de dicho cuerpo normativo, en concordancia con lo regulado en el Código Procesal Civil (artículos 206 y 217), u otras leyes especiales (v. gr.: Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Así, por ejemplo, interrumpirán el plazo decenal –y comenzará a correr íntegro de nuevo-, toda gestión judicial para el cobro de la deuda y cumplimiento de la obligación, tales como la solicitud de constituirse como parte actora civil –siempre que no se declare inadmisible, se desista de ella o se absuelva al demandado en sentencia, debiendo entenderse, desde luego, que dicha absolutoria se refiere al extremo civil y no al penal, pues esta última no entraña que deban necesariamente declararse sin lugar las pretensiones resarcitorias, si concurren normas sustantivas que imponen la responsabilidad-; la conciliación –en la que se pacte alguna forma de resarcir- posee idéntico efecto, pues el ofendido trata de obtener el cumplimiento de la deuda; y lo mismo sucede con las manifestaciones que rinda dando noticia de que el justiciable incumple lo pactado y solicitando se continúe con el proceso. Existirán otros supuestos que deberán examinarse caso por caso, con apego a las reglas generales que se comentan y también debe destacarse que el recurso a las normas de orden civil se restringe a determinar el plazo y los motivos que interrumpen o suspenden el cómputo de la prescripción, por lo que en cuanto a la forma, el trámite y las demás condiciones de la acción civil resarcitoria, ha de estarse a lo que dispone el Código Procesal Penal. Por su particular interés, debe la Sala reiterar su criterio de que la reducción a la mitad -por una única vez- del plazo ordinario por el que prescribe la acción penal (cuando concurre el primero de alguno de los supuestos que la ley taxativamente contempla) no incide de ningún modo en la acción civil, por tratarse de regímenes e institutos diferentes que solo por razones de celeridad y economía procesal se tramitarán de manera conjunta. f) Los juzgadores penales deben pronunciarse respecto de las pretensiones civiles planteadas en la acción resarcitoria –acogiéndolas o denegándolas-, aunque se determine en sentencia (luego del debate y la fase deliberativa) que la acción penal se halla prescrita. En estos supuestos, lo que resulta de interés es salvaguardar los derechos del accionado civil, quien pudo –mediante la concreción de la demanda en la audiencia y el planteamiento de las pretensiones y defensas o excepciones- ejercer plenamente su defensa y el contradictorio. Desde luego, la prescripción de la acción civil no es declarable de oficio. En los demás supuestos, de sobreseimiento por prescripción de la acción penal sin que se hubiere concretado la demanda resarcitoria en debate (y sin el consecuente pleno ejercicio de la defensa por el accionado, incluida la fase de conclusiones), habrá de remitirse a las partes a la vía civil, si estas a bien lo tienen. En tales hipótesis, como se observa, ha de asegurarse la inviolabilidad de la defensa de los sujetos interesados y el sometimiento del juzgador a las restricciones legales en cuanto al objeto del proceso civil. g) Desde luego, cuando se determine en sentencia absolutoria que la conducta no es punible, pero subsiste alguna forma de responsabilidad civil (v. gr.: objetiva, por “dolo” o culpa “civiles”, negligencia, impericia, deber “in vigilando”, etcetera., o a partir del injusto penal o, para ser precisos, causas de inculpabilidad), el término de prescripción es y siempre ha sido de DIEZ AÑOS, por no tratarse de consecuencias civiles de un “hecho punible”, sino de mera responsabilidad civil extracontractual y los juzgadores penales tienen la potestad (poder-deber) de pronunciarse en cuanto a ella, siempre que la demanda resarcitoria haya sido ejercida. h) Los juzgadores penales deben resolver las pretensiones civiles formalmente planteadas y no pueden remitir a las partes a otra vía, salvo en los casos de excepción que se deducen de la ley. (El subrayado no es del original)."