Inapplicability of selective consumption tax to minibus for lack of legislative approval of decreeInaplicabilidad de impuesto selectivo de consumo a microbús por falta de aprobación legislativa del decreto

**V.** The first three grievances essentially concern the improper application of Article 12, subsection ch) and the non-application of subsections a), b), c) of that article of the Law 6820, and consequently the violation of Decreto Ejecutivo número 23773-H; for this reason, they will be resolved jointly. In the challenged judgment, the Tribunal reasoned: *"Proven facts... 11) That the imported vehicle was classified for tax purposes by the National Customs Service (Servicio Nacional de Aduanas), under tariff heading 8702.10.90 of the Central American Harmonized System - SAC (as stated in the customs clearance form, and as recognized by the National Customs Tribunal, in order, on folios 5, 6, 171 to 194 of the administrative file).-/ II).- UNPROVEN FACTS: It has not been demonstrated: a) That Decreto Ejecutivo número 23.773-H, of November 3, 1994, obtained the legislative approval required by subsection ch) of Article 12 of the Law for the Consolidation of the Selective Consumption Tax (Ley de Consolidación del Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo), number 4961 and its amendments. No proof was sought in this regard... V.- Despite the regulatory whirlwind involved in the situation under examination, this Tribunal finds that minibuses (microbuses) were taxed under NAUCA subheading 732-03-01, established as such in Law 4961 of March 10, 1972, on the Selective Consumption Tax, which was later amended by law number 6820 of November 3, 1982. The latter, in its Article 5 states: “Modify Article 12... Furthermore, as a second point of importance for the present case, it must be highlighted that subheading 732.03.01, which included minibuses (microbuses), was eliminated from Law 6820, in its annexes, thus leaving them free of the tax. On May 10, 1983, Decreto Ejecutivo número 14616 was issued, pursuant to which the rate for taxed vehicles was increased to sixty-five percent (65%), maintaining the exclusion of minibuses (microbuses). Subsequently, in March 1984, the Executive Branch sent to the Assembly Decree Number 15337-H which modified the list of goods taxed with selective consumption taxes, including in the annexes Nauca Heading 732.03.01, subsection a), referring to minibuses (microbuses), but such decree was rejected by legislative agreement number 2357 of June 1 of that year, and expressly repealed by Law number 6962 of August 8 of the following year in Article 33, thus maintaining the condition of minibuses (microbuses) as exempt from the selective tax. In accordance with law 7017 published in La Gaceta number 248 of December 27, 1985 (NAUCA I), heading 732 01 02, which taxed passenger cars N.E.S. (including station wagons, racing cars, and three-wheeled cars), not minibuses (microbuses), was relocated to Chapter 87, subheading 02 01 99 00. By means of Decreto Ejecutivo 16845-H of February 17, 1986, it was established that all goods taxed with the Selective Consumption Tax, indicated under the tariff headings of the NAUCA, were to be incorporated into a single annex named with the letter “A” of the Convention on the Central American Tariff and Customs Regime (NCCA). Within it, motor vehicles of any kind, for the transport of persons or goods are defined according to tariff heading 87.02, and under this classification, minibuses (microbuses) (for collective transport), only, were introduced; with subheading 87.02.0199, in its subsection a), leaving those exempt. Nothing is said about another type of minibus (microbús), which this collegiate body understands to mean that they remain untaxed... In light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that upon undertaking the change from the old tariff regime of NAUCA II and NCCA to the Harmonized System (Sistema Armonizado), the rates established in the former were not affected, despite the change in nomenclature and classification of headings. On November 3, 1994, Decreto Ejecutivo número 23.773-H of November 3, 1994, was issued, which established the payment of the Selective Consumption Tax for minibus (microbús) type vehicles at sixty percent (60%) (heading 87.02.10.90)... Having said this, the conclusion is reached that it was only with Decree 23773-H that the Executive Branch, using the power conferred by Article 12 of the Consumption Law (Ley de Consumo), once again included minibuses (microbuses) not dedicated to the collective transport of persons, within the taxed goods, a status they had not held since the enactment of Law number 6820, which eliminated heading 732 03 01... The Tribunal requested, as evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver), proof of compliance with said procedure. However, the state representative merely pointed out that this was unnecessary, and therefore, the record contains no proof whatsoever to substantiate the fulfillment of this legal requirement. The only thing in the case file is a copy of legislative agreement number 2357 of June 1, 1984, and of Article 33 of Law number 6962 of August 8 of the same year, where the Decreto Ejecutivo número 15337-H was first rejected, and later repealed, after being submitted for legislative analysis by virtue of the application of the rule under discussion. In the case of Decree 23773-H, contrary to what the State alleged, legislative approval was indeed essential in those cases where, as with the minibuses (microbuses) involved here, new goods were taxed. By reason of the foregoing, the application of that decree to the sub examine is illegal, since the tax could not be collected from the plaintiff...”*. The core issue of the matter is that throughout the entire process, the Procuraduría General de la República was unable to demonstrate the legislative approval to which Decreto Ejecutivo 23773-H is subject, as required by numeral 12, subsection ch) of Law 6820. In the first of the charges, the appellant (casacionista) maintains that the vehicle does not meet the conditions to be considered a minibus (microbús) eligible for exoneration. For this reason, he considers the Tribunal erred in its appreciation of the vehicle as evidence by giving it a value it did not have (folio 162); and maintains that this is an obvious error of law. Under this argument, he seeks to vitiate the application of subsection ch) of ordinance 12 referred to above.

**VI.** It is significant to point out that the name the appellant (casacionista) gives to his grievances does not matter; what matters is their legal nature; thus, it is irrelevant that he characterized the reproach set out in the preceding recital (considerando) as an error of law, when the truth is that it constitutes a non-conformity concerning a direct violation of law. And therefore, it will be analyzed along with the other two following reproaches. Along these same lines, he continues with the second, where he insists that what is decisive is not the Legislative Assembly's approval of the Decreto Ejecutivo in question; what is relevant, in his opinion, is that the vehicle intended to be taxed meets the requirements established by the Administration to be subject to the tax, in addition to falling within the assumptions of subsections a, b, c and not ch, all of ordinance 12 of Law 6820; for which reason it was not vital for the Assembly to know of it. Thus, he concludes by stating in his third claim that the application of the NCCA and its relationship with the NAUCA II has been overlooked; and he considers that the Decree should not be disapplied and that the cited subsection ch) should not be used.

**VII.** Firstly, it is important to clarify the conflict the appellant (casacionista) has regarding whether the automobile is a minibus (microbús) or a station wagon (wagon) type. As the state representation asserts, Law 7331 of April 13, 1993, established the definition of minibus (microbús) *"motor vehicle intended for the transport of persons, whose capacity for seated passengers ranges between nine and twenty-five persons."* At folio 5 of the administrative file, customs clearance form or customs declaration number 801282 can be seen, in which is described *"001 MOTOR VEHICLE FOR TRANSPORT OF 12 PASSENGERS, DIESEL."* It is conclusive that the automobile under discussion is of the minibus (microbús) type described above; therefore, the resolution of this case must focus on this type of vehicle. Now then, for this Chamber (Sala) it is clear that this issue has been controversial, insofar as over time minibuses (microbuses) have been subjected to different changes in the imposition of the selective consumption tax. It is true that by virtue of the nomenclature variants that have occurred in the legislation, they have in some cases been subject to tax. The Tribunal explains this concisely in its ruling, as transcribed in the preceding recital (considerando). The essential point is to define whether minibuses (microbuses) are subject to the selective consumption tax as framed within subsections a, b, c of Article 12 cited or rather in subsection ch. What is established in that article is reiterated: *Flexibility. The Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Finance, is empowered to: a) Reduce... b) Restore... c) Raise... ch) Include new goods or substitutes in the annexes, among those covered therein, as well as to temporarily raise the ad valorem tariffs for the goods included in annexes 1 and 2 of this law, for a period not exceeding six months and by up to one hundred percent (100%), for the purpose of addressing problems related to unfair foreign trade practices. In these cases, not only the approval of the Ministry of Finance will be required, but also the favorable report of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica) and the approval of the Legislative Assembly, which must be rendered within the following month, counted from the date on which the Executive Branch sends the corresponding executive decree to the Assembly…”*. Before the enactment of Decreto Ejecutivo 23773-H of 1994, Law 7346 was issued, which replaced the Convention on the Central American Tariff and Customs Regime (NCCA) with the Harmonized System (SAC); it is also conclusive that the tariff rates were not affected; even at that time, minibuses (microbuses) were not taxed with the selective consumption tax. The specific case does not fall within the assumptions of subsections a, b, c; because the tariff rates are neither being reduced, restored, nor raised; on the contrary, items are being included as indicated in subsection ch). The reasoning of the judges is shared, when they consider that the Executive Branch, in use of its legal powers, decided to include minibuses (microbuses) among the goods taxed with that tax; and also that it must submit to the established procedure, that is, the corresponding approvals, including that of the Legislative Assembly. However, it is not on record that this requirement was fulfilled; even though the Tribunal itself requested it as evidence for better provision, to which the state agent stated that in his opinion it was unnecessary to present it. This Body (Órgano) does not agree with that assertion; on the contrary, by legal imperative, legislative consent was necessary. Therefore, this Chamber (Sala) considers that the appellant (recurrente) is not correct in asserting that this specific case falls under one of the assumptions of Article 12 in subsections a, b, c instead of ch, as the ruling states; and therefore, the approval of the Legislative Assembly was not required. The appellant (casacionista) states that the ruling did not apply Decretos Ejecutivos números 25361-H, 25765-H, 28925-H from 1996, 1997, and 2000, respectively. It is necessary to clarify to him that the taxable event (hecho generador) of the obligation in this matter occurred on November 9, 1995, the date the goods entered the country, for which reason it is obvious that those regulations should not have been applied by the Tribunal by virtue of the fact that the provisions he alleges were not applied were issued on a later date and are therefore not applicable to the specific case. None of the alleged rules have been violated, and these grievances must therefore be rejected. It is concluded that, although it is true that the Administration intended to impose a tax burden on minibuses (microbuses), in the absence of legislative assent, said imposition is illegal, whereby the selective consumption tax could not be collected on the minibus (microbús).

**V.** The first three grievances essentially refer to the improper application of Article 12, subsection ch) and the non-application of subsections a), b), c) of that provision of Law 6820, and consequently, the violation of Executive Decree number 23773-H; for which reason they will be resolved together. In the contested judgment, the Tribunal reasoned: *"Proven facts... 11) That the imported vehicle was classified for tax purposes by the Servicio Nacional de Aduanas under heading 8702.10.90 of the Central American Harmonized System - SAC (as stated in the warehousing release policy and acknowledged by the Tribunal Aduanero Nacional, in order, at folios 5, 6, 171 to 194 of the administrative file).- II).- UNPROVEN FACTS: It has not been proven: a) That executive decree number 23.773-H, of November third, nineteen ninety-four, obtained the legislative approval required by subsection ch) of Article 12 of the Ley de Consolidación del Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo, number 4961 and its reforms. No evidence was provided to that effect... V.- Despite the regulatory whirlwind involving the situation under review, this Tribunal finds that microbuses were taxed under NAUCA subheading 732-03-01, established as such in Law 4961 of March 10, 1972, of the Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo, which was subsequently amended by law number 6820 of November 3, 1982. The latter, in its Article 5, states: “Modify Article 12... Furthermore, as a second point of importance for the present case, it must be highlighted that subheading 732.03.01, which included microbuses, was eliminated from Law 6820 in its annexes, thus freeing them from the tax. On May tenth, nineteen eighty-three, Executive Decree number 14616 was issued, pursuant to which the tariff for taxed vehicles was increased to sixty-five percent (65%), maintaining the exclusion of microbuses. Subsequently, in March 1984, the Poder Ejecutivo sent to the Asamblea Decree Number 15337-H which modified the list of goods subject to selective consumption taxes, including in the annexes NAUCA Heading 732.03.01, subsection a), referring to microbuses, but such decree was rejected through legislative agreement number 2357 of June 1st of that year, and expressly repealed by Law number 6962 of the following August 8th in Article 33, thus maintaining the microbuses' status as exempt from the selective tax. In accordance with law 7017 published in La Gaceta number 248 of December 27, 1985 (NAUCA I), heading 732 01 02, which taxed passenger automobiles N.E.S. (including station wagons, racing cars, and three-wheeled automobiles), not microbuses, was relocated to Chapter 87, subheading 02 01 99 00. By means of Executive Decree 16845-H of February 17, 1986, it was established that all goods taxed with the Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo, indicated under the NAUCA tariff headings, be incorporated into a single annex designated by the letter “A” of the Convenio sobre el Régimen Arancelario y Aduanero Centroamericano (NCCA). Within it, motor vehicles of any kind, for the transport of persons or goods are defined according to tariff heading 87.02, and in this classification, microbuses (for collective transport) were introduced exclusively; with subheading 87.02.0199, in its subsection a), these remaining exempt. Nothing is stated about any other type of microbus, which this collegiate body understands to mean that they remain untaxed... Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that when the change from the old NAUCA II and NCCA tariff Regime to the Harmonized System was made, the tariffs established in the former were not affected, despite the change in nomenclature and heading classification. On November third, 1994, Executive Decree number 23.773-H of November 3, 1994, was issued, which established the payment of the Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo for microbus-type vehicles at sixty percent (60%) (heading 87.02.10.90)... Having said the above, the conclusion is reached that it was only with Decree 23773-H that the Poder Ejecutivo, in use of the power granted by Article 12 of the Ley de Consumo, once again included microbuses not dedicated to the collective transport of persons within the taxed goods, which had not been so since the enactment of Law number 6820, which eliminated heading 732 03 01... The Tribunal requested, as evidence for better resolution, proof of compliance with said procedure. However, the State representative merely indicated that this was unnecessary, so there is no evidence whatsoever in the record accrediting the satisfaction of that legal requirement. The only thing existing in the file is a copy of legislative agreement number 2357 of June 1st, 1984, and of Article 33 of Law number 6962 of August 8th of the same year, where executive decree number 15337-H, submitted to legislative scrutiny by virtue of the application of the rule under discussion, was first rejected, and later repealed. In the case of Decree 23773-H, contrary to what was alleged by the State, legislative approval was indeed essential in those cases where, as with the microbuses involved here, new goods were being taxed. For this reason, the application of that decree to the sub examine is illegal, as the tax could not be charged to the plaintiff..."* The core point of the matter is that throughout the entire process, the Procuraduría General de la República could not demonstrate the legislative approval to which Executive Decree 23773-H is subject, as required by subsection 12 ch) of Law 6820. In the first of the charges, the appellant maintains that the vehicle does not meet the requirements to be considered a microbus eligible for exoneration. For this reason, he considers the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the vehicle as evidence by assigning it a value it did not have (folio 162); and he maintains that this is an obvious error of law. Under this argument, he seeks to distort the application of subsection ch) of the aforementioned provision 12.

**VI.** It is important to point out that the designation the appellant gives to his grievances is not what matters; what matters is their legal nature; thus, it is irrelevant that he has qualified the reproach set out in the preceding recital as an error of law, when the truth is that it constitutes a disagreement pertaining to a direct violation of law. And therefore, it will be analyzed along with the other two subsequent reproaches. Along these same lines, he continues with the second, where he insists that the determining factor is not the approval of the Asamblea Legislativa to the Executive Decree in question; what is relevant, in his view, is that the vehicle intended to be taxed meets the requirements established by the Administration to be subject to the tax, in addition to falling within the assumptions of subsections a, b, c, and not ch, all of provision 12 of Law 6820; for which reason it was not vital for the Asamblea to know of it. Thus, he concludes by stating in his third complaint that the application of the NCCA and its relationship with NAUCA II has been set aside; and he considers that the Decree should not be disallowed and subsection ch) cited should not be used.

**VII.** In the first term, it is important to clarify the conflict the appellant has regarding whether the automobile is a microbus or a station wagon type. As the State representation affirms, Law 7331 of April 13, 1993 established the definition of microbus: *“a motor vehicle intended for the transport of persons, whose capacity for seated passengers ranges between nine and twenty-five persons.”*. At folio 5 of the administrative file, the warehousing release policy or customs declaration number 801282 can be observed, in which it is described: *“001 MOTOR VEHICLE FOR THE TRANSPORT OF 12 PASSENGERS, DIESEL”*. It is conclusive that the automobile in dispute is of the microbus type described above; therefore, the resolution of this case must focus on this type of motor vehicle. Now then, for this Chamber it is clear that this topic has been controversial, insofar as over time microbuses have been subject to different changes in the imposition of the selective consumption tax. It is true that by virtue of the nomenclature changes that have occurred in legislation, it has at times been subject to taxation. The Tribunal concisely explains the foregoing in its judgment, as transcribed in the previous recital. The essential point is to define whether microbuses are subject to the selective consumption tax that falls within subsections a, b, c of Article 12 cited or rather within subsection ch. The provision of that article is reiterated: *Flexibility. The Poder Ejecutivo, through the Ministerio de Hacienda, is empowered to: a) Reduce... b) Restore... c) Raise... ch) Include new goods or substitutes in the annexes, from those covered therein, as well as temporarily raise the ad valorem tariffs of the goods included in Annexes 1 and 2 of this law, for a period not exceeding six months and up to one hundred percent (100%), for the purpose of addressing problems related to unfair foreign trade practices. In these cases, not only the approval of the Ministerio de Hacienda will be required, but also the favorable opinion of the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica and the approval of the Asamblea Legislativa, which must occur within the following month, counted from the date on which the Poder Ejecutivo sends the corresponding executive decree to the Asamblea…”*. Prior to the enactment of Executive Decree 23773-H of 1994, Law 7346 was issued, which replaced the Convenio Sobre el Régimen Arancelario y Aduanero Centroamericano (NCCA) with the Harmonized System (SAC), and it is conclusive that the tariff rates were not affected; even at that moment, microbuses were not taxed with the selective consumption tax. The particular case does not fall within the assumptions of subsections a, b, c; because the tariff rates are not being reduced, restored, or raised; on the contrary, they are being included as indicated by subsection ch). The reasoning of the judges is shared when they consider that the Poder Ejecutivo, using its legal faculties, decided to include microbuses within the goods taxed with that tax; and also that it must submit to the established procedure, that is, the corresponding approvals, including that of the Asamblea Legislativa. However, there is no record that said requirement was fulfilled; even though the Tribunal itself requested it as evidence for better resolution, to which the State representative stated that in his opinion it was unnecessary to present it. This Body does not agree with that assertion; on the contrary, by legal imperative, legislative consent was necessary. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the appellant is incorrect in maintaining that in this particular case one of the assumptions of Article 12 in subsections a, b, c is present instead of ch, as stated in the judgment; and therefore, the approval of the Asamblea Legislativa was not required.

The appellant states that in the judgment, Executive Decrees numbers 25361-H, 25765-H, 28925-H of the years 1996, 1997, and 2000 respectively were not applied. It is necessary to clarify to him that the triggering event of the obligation in the present matter occurred on November 9, 1995, the date the good entered the country; for which reason it is obvious that those regulations should not have been applied by the Tribunal, given that the provisions he alleges were disregarded were issued on a later date; therefore, they are not applicable to the specific case.

None of the alleged norms have been violated; therefore, these grievances must be rejected. It is concluded that, although it is true that the Administration’s intention was to impose a tax burden on microbuses, in the absence of legislative assent, said imposition is illegal, and therefore, the selective consumption tax could not be charged on the microbus."

"V. Los tres primeros agravios se refieren esencialmente a la indebida aplicación del artículo 12 inciso ch) y la no aplicación de los apartes a), b), c) de ese numeral de la Ley 6820 y en consecuencia la violación del Decreto Ejecutivo número 23773-H; razón por la cual se resolverán en conjunto. En la sentencia impugnada, el Tribunal razonó: "Hechos probados... 11) Que el vehículo importado se clasificó para efectos tributarios por parte del Servicio Nacional de Aduanas, en la partida 8702.10.90 del Sistema Armonizados Centroamericano- SAC (así consta en la póliza de desalmacenaje, y lo reconoce el Tribunal Aduanero Nacional, por su orden, a folios 5, 6, 171 a 194 del expdte. admvo.).-/ II).- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: No está demostrado: a) Que el decreto ejecutivo número 23.773-H, del tres de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, haya obtenido la aprobación legislativa que ordena el inciso ch) del artículo 12 de la Ley de Consolidación del Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo, número 4961 y sus reformas. No se procuró prueba al respecto... V.- A pesar del torbellino normativo que involucra la situación objeto de examen, encuentra este Tribunal, que los microbuses se gravaron en la subpartida del NAUCA 732-03-01, establecida así en la Ley 4961 del 10 de marzo de 1972 del Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo, la que posteriormente fue reformada por ley número 6820 del 03 de noviembre de 1982. Ésta, en su artículo 5 señala: “Modificase el artículo 12... Además como segundo punto de importancia para el presente caso, debe destacarse, que se eliminó de la Ley 6820, en sus anexos, la sub partida 732.03.01, que incluía los microbuses, quedando así, libres del impuesto. El diez de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y tres, se emitió el Decreto Ejecutivo número 14616, conforme al cual, se incrementó la tarifa de los vehículos gravados, al sesenta y cinco por ciento (65%), manteniéndose la exclusión de los microbuses. Posteriormente en marzo de 1984, el Poder Ejecutivo envió a la Asamblea el Decreto Número 15337-H que modificaba la lista de mercancías gravadas con impuestos selectivos de consumo, incluyendo en los anexos la Partida Nauca 732.03.01, inciso a), referente a microbuses, pero tal decreto fue rechazado mediante acuerdo legislativo número 2357 del 1º. de junio de ese año, y derogado expresamente, por Ley número 6962 del 8 de agosto siguiente en el artículo 33, manteniendo así los microbuses su condición de exentos del impuesto selectivo. De conformidad con la ley 7017 publicada en La Gaceta número 248 del 27 de diciembre de 1985 (NAUCA I), la partida 732 01 02, que gravaba los automóviles para pasajeros N.E.P. (incluso station wagon, automóviles de carrera y automóviles de tres ruedas), no microbuses, pasó a ubicarse en el Capítulo 87, sub partida 02 01 99 00. Por medio del Decreto Ejecutivo 16845-H del 17 de febrero de 1986, se estableció que todos los bienes gravados con el Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo, indicados bajo las partidas arancelarias de la NAUCA, fueran incorporados a un único anexo denominado con la letra “A” del Convenio sobre el Régimen Arancelario y Aduanero Centroamericano (NCCA). Dentro de él, los vehículos automóviles de cualquier clase, para transporte de personas o mercancías se definen conforme a la partida arancelaria 87.02, y en esta clasificación, se introdujo a los microbuses (para transporte colectivo), nada más; con la subpartida 87.02.0199, en su inciso a), quedando esos exentos. Nada se dice sobre otro tipo de microbús, lo que entiende este órgano colegiado en el sentido de que se mantienen sin gravar... Conforme lo expuesto se puede concluir, que al realizarse el cambio del antiguo Régimen arancelario del NAUCA II y NCCA al Sistema Armonizado, no se afectaron las tarifas establecidas en los primeros, a pesar del cambio en la nomenclatura y clasificación de las partidas. El tres de noviembre de 1994, se emitió Decreto Ejecutivo número 23.773-H de 3 de noviembre de 1994, que estableció el pago del Impuesto Selectivo de Consumo para los vehículos tipo microbús con un sesenta por ciento (60%) (partida 87.02.10.90)... Dicho lo anterior, se arriba a la conclusión de que no fue sino con el Decreto 23773-H que el Poder Ejecutivo, en uso de la atribución que le confiere el artículo 12 de la Ley de Consumo, incluyó nuevamente, los microbuses no dedicados al transporte colectivo de personas, dentro de las mercancías gravadas, que no lo estaban desde la promulgación de la Ley número 6820, que eliminó la partida 732 03 01... El Tribunal solicitó, como prueba para mejor resolver, la demostración del cumplimiento de dicho trámite. No obstante, el representante estatal se limitó a señalar, que éste resultaba innecesario de manera que, en autos, no obra prueba alguna que acredite la satisfacción de dicho requerimiento legal. Lo único que existe en el expediente, es copia del acuerdo legislativo número 2357 de 1º. de junio de 1984, y del artículo 33 de la Ley número 6962 del 8 de agosto del mismo año, en donde se rechazó primero, y se derogó luego, el decreto ejecutivo número 15337-H, sometido a análisis legislativo por virtud de la aplicación de la norma de comentario. En el caso del Decreto 23773-H, contrario a lo alegado por el Estado, sí era imprescindible, la aprobación legislativa, en aquellos supuestos que, como en el caso de las microbuses aquí involucradas, se gravaran nuevas mercancías. En razón de lo dicho, la aplicación de ese decreto al sub examine, es ilegal, pues no podía cobrarse el tributo a la actora...”. El punto medular del asunto es que a lo largo de todo el proceso la Procuraduría General de la República no pudo demostrar la aprobación legislativa a la cual está sometido el Decreto Ejecutivo 23773-H, según lo exige el numeral 12 inciso ch) de la Ley 6820. En el primero de los cargos el casacionista sostiene que el vehículo, no cumple con los presupuestos para considerarse una microbús susceptible de exoneración. Por esta razón, considera erró el Tribunal en la apreciación del automotor como prueba al dársele un valor que no tenía (folio 162); y sostiene que ello es un evidente error de derecho. Pretende bajo este argumento desvirtuar la aplicación del aparte ch) del ordinal 12 recién referido. VI. Resulta trascendente señalar que no importa la denominación que el casacionista de a sus agravios, lo importante es su naturaleza jurídica; así, no interesa que haya calificado el reproche expuesto en el anterior considerando como error de derecho, cuando lo cierto es que se trata de una inconformidad atinente a violación directa de ley. Y por ende se analizará junto con los otros dos reproches siguientes. Bajo esta misma línea, continúa con el segundo, donde insiste, lo determinante no es la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa al Decreto Ejecutivo en discusión, lo relevante, en su criterio, es que el automotor pretendido gravar, cumple con los requisitos establecidos por la Administración para ser objeto del impuesto, además de encontrarse dentro de los supuestos de los inciso a, b, c y no del ch, todos del ordinal 12 de la Ley 6820; razón por la cual no era vital lo conociera la Asamblea. Así, concluye diciendo en su tercer reclamo que, se ha dejado de lado la aplicación de la NCCA y su relación con el NAUCA II; y considera, no debería desaplicarse el Decreto y utilizar el inciso ch) de cita. VII. En primer término es importante aclarar el conflicto que tiene el casacionista respecto de si el automóvil es una microbús o bien uno de tipo wagon. Tal y como lo afirma la representación estatal, en la Ley 7331 del 13 de abril de 1993 se estableció la definición de microbús “ vehículo automotor destinado al transporte de personas, cuya capacidad para pasajeros sentados, oscila entre nueve y veinticinco personas.”. A folio 5 del expediente administrativo se puede apreciar la póliza de desalmacenaje o declaración aduanera número 801282, en la cual se describe “001 VEHÍCULO AUTOMOTOR PARA TRANSPORTE DE 12 PASAJEROS, DIESEL”. Resulta contundente que el automóvil en discusión es del tipo microbús antes descrito, por ello la resolución de este caso debe enfocarse en este tipo de automotor. Ahora bien, para la Sala es claro que este tema ha sido controversial, en el tanto a través del tiempo las microbuses se han visto sometidas a diferentes cambios en la imposición del gravamen selectivo de consumo. Es cierto que en virtud de las variantes de nomenclatura que se han dado en la legislación, ha resultado en algunos casos objeto de gravamen. Lo anterior lo explica concisamente el Tribunal en su fallo, tal como se transcribió en el anterior considerando. Lo esencial es definir si las microbuses son objeto del impuesto selectivo de consumo que se enmarca dentro de los incisos a, b, c del artículo 12 de cita o bien en el aparte ch. Se reitera lo establecido en ese numeral: Flexibilidad. El Poder Ejecutivo por conducto del Ministerio de Hacienda queda facultado para: a) Reducir... b) Restituir... c) Elevar... ch) Incluir nuevas mercancías o sucedáneos en los anexos, de las comprendidas en ellos, así como elevar temporalmente las tarifas ad valórem de las mercancías incluidas en los anexos 1 y 2 de esta ley, por un plazo no mayor de seis meses y hasta en un cien por ciento (100%), con el propósito de atender problemas relacionados con las prácticas desleales de comercio exterior. En estos casos se requerirá no sólo de la aprobación del Ministerio de Hacienda, sino también el dictamen favorable de la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica y la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa, la cual deberá producirse dentro del mes siguiente, contado a partir de la fecha en que el Poder Ejecutivo envíe el decreto ejecutivo correspondiente a la Asamblea…”. Antes de la promulgación del Decreto Ejecutivo 23773-H de 1994, se emitió la Ley 7346 la cual sustituyó el Convenio Sobre el Régimen Arancelario y Aduanero Centroamericano (NCCA) por el Sistema Armonizado (SAC), así como es contundente que las tarifas arancelarias no se vieron afectadas; aún en ese momento las microbuses no se gravaron con el selectivo de consumo. El caso particular no se enmarca dentro de los supuestos de los acápites a, b, c; porque no se está ni reduciendo, restituyendo o elevando las tarifas arancelarias; por el contrario se está incluyendo como lo indica el inciso ch). Se comparte el razonamiento de los juzgadores, cuando estiman que el Poder Ejecutivo en uso de sus facultades legales decidió incluir las microbuses dentro de los bienes gravados con aquel impuesto; y también que debe someterse al trámite establecido, es decir, las aprobaciones correspondientes, entre ellas la de la Asamblea Legislativa. Sin embargo, dicho requisito no consta se haya realizado; aún cuando el mismo Tribunal lo solicitó como prueba para mejor proveer, a lo cual el personero estatal manifestó que en su criterio era innecesario presentarla. No coincide este Órgano con dicha afirmación, por el contrario por imperativo legal, la anuencia legislativa era menester. Por ello, considera esta Sala, no lleva razón el recurrente al sostener que en el particular se está en presencia de alguno de los supuestos del artículo 12 en los incisos a, b, c en lugar del ch, como lo dice el fallo; y por ende no se requería la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa. Manifiesta el casacionista, en el fallo no se aplicaron los Decretos Ejecutivos números 25361-H, 25765-H, 28925-H de los años 1996, 1997 y 2000 respectivamente. Es necesario aclararle que el hecho generador de la obligación en el presente asunto se dio el 9 de noviembre de 1995 fecha de ingreso del bien al país, por lo cual resulta obvio que aquella normativa no debía ser aplicada por el Tribunal en virtud de que las disposiciones que alude desaplicadas fueron emitidas en data posterior, por ende no son aplicables al caso concreto. No se han conculcado ninguna de las normas alegadas, debiéndose entonces rechazar estos agravios. Se concluye que, si bien es cierto la intención de la Administración fue imponer una carga tributaria a las microbuses, a falta del asentimiento legislativo, dicha imposición es ilegal, con lo cual, sobre la microbús no podía cobrarse el impuesto selectivo de consumo."