ESPH not exempt from municipal patent taxImprocedencia de exoneración de patente municipal a la ESPH

**III.** Before proceeding to the analysis of each of the grievances expressed, it is appropriate to bring up the argument made by this Chamber in judgment No. 12 of 11:00 a.m. on March 25, 1994, concerning the operative differences between state and municipal taxes, as well as the basis for Municipalities to establish taxes: “**IV.** … Generically, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, in its article 4, first paragraph, defines taxes as ‘... pecuniary contributions that the State, in the exercise of its sovereign power, demands in order to obtain resources for the fulfillment of its purposes ...’. In the case of Municipalities, any type of tax (impuestos, contribuciones especiales or tasas) is aimed at obtaining resources, through collections, for the promotion of activities tending toward the fulfillment of their purposes (the extra-fiscal purpose of the tax). Municipal purposes are different from strictly state purposes. Each municipality must address priority problems within the territorial scope where it exercises its autonomy (article 2.1 of the General Public Administration Law). For this reason, identity between the State proper and lower entities cannot be maintained, since although both are governed by the same rules regarding relationship and action functions, they are legally distinct from one another (article 2 Ibidem). The State’s own purposes are generic and of uniform programming, while lower entities have more restricted and particular purposes. **V.-** The power of Municipalities to establish taxes rests on a Constitutional attribution. Article 170 of the Constitution guarantees municipal autonomy and grants these lower entities the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes, but always subject to legislative authorization (article 121, subsection 13). The act of authorization is typically protective. It consists of the removal of a legal obstacle to performing the authorized activity. The holder of the activity is the authorized body and not the authorizing one. The Legislative Assembly cannot assume a creative role for municipal taxes (tributos in general), since it is the corporations themselves that are the creators of said taxes in the exercise of their autonomy. The Assembly may reject a new municipal tax but not establish one different from that originating from the municipal will. Therefore, for the imposition of municipal taxes, all the principles of tax law must be met: legality, generality, equality, ability to pay, and non-confiscation, since only thus would it be formally and legally valid.” **IV.** In light of such doctrine, it is appropriate to analyze the alleged grievance. Regarding the alleged improper application and violation of Laws No. 7285 of January 28, 1992; 5889 of March 8, 1976, 7040 of April 23, 1996, 7293 of March 31, 1992, and 7789 of April 30, 1998, it is appropriate to analyze each of them in order. The Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia was created by Law 5889 of March 8, 1976, whose article 4 exempted it from all types of tasas, cánones, and impuestos, for the activity it was going to develop. But said rule did not include exemption from municipal taxes, since, as this Chamber made clear in the judgments already mentioned, these are distinct taxes. For its part, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote No. 1631-91 of 3:15 p.m. on August 21, 1991, is clear regarding the creation of municipal taxes by the Municipalities, who do not formulate a mere proposal to the Legislative Assembly but rather submit true tax assessments for its consideration, although the Legislative Assembly holds the power to deny the approval of a tax requested by local governments.

**V.** It is clear, then, that state and municipal taxes are distinct, created by different entities, for which reason it cannot be understood that the exemption established by article 4 of Law 5889 of March 8, 1976, included municipal ones. Having this point clear is of utmost importance in order to understand the type of exemptions operating in the other laws cited as violated. An identical situation is presented by the exemption in article 36 of Law 7040 of May 6, 1986, relating to impuestos, tasas, and cánones for water use and hydraulic power concessions. It does not indicate exemption from municipal taxes, much less from the business license tax (patente), since the only entity that could grant it is the respective Municipality, which did not happen in this case. On the other hand, and in relation to Law 7200 of September 13, 1990, in its article 17, it defines the exemption for autonomous or parallel electric power production companies, stating it is equal to that enjoyed by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the importation of machinery and equipment for water conveyance, as well as for “turbining,” generating, controlling, regulating, transforming, and transmitting electric power; the list of matters to be exempted is exhaustive and refers to state and not municipal taxes. The entity that would be responsible for granting the municipal exemption, as has been repeatedly stated, is the Municipality itself, in accordance with the constitutionally contemplated principle of autonomy. In the same vein, Law 7293 of March 31, 1992, by repealing in its first article all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal rules referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, and vehicle property taxes, all refer to state and not municipal taxes; hence, when establishing subsections c) and ch) of article 2, various cases of exemption do not include municipal taxes, for the reasons previously given. Therefore, the exemptions granted for the development of private programs proposing to produce and distribute electric power for commercial purposes and when dedicated to the supply of potable water for domestic, industrial, and human consumption uses, as well as to the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and stormwater or wastewater, groundwater, and any other kind, and to the collateral and complementary activities thereof, do not refer to municipal taxes but rather to state ones. In that same sense, when, through Law 7789 of April 23, 1998, the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia is transformed into a corporation (sociedad anónima), repealing in its article 34 the Constitutive Law No. 5889 of March 8, 1976, to the extent it conflicts, article 4 of Law 5889 must be understood as in force since Law No. 7789 does not refer to the issue, and thus no conflict operates. Despite this, as clarified earlier, said article does not refer to the exemption from municipal taxes but only to some state ones. Finally, and in relation to Law 7285 of November 20, 1992, which regulates the rate of Municipal Taxes of the Canton of Poás, its article 1 establishes that individuals or legal entities engaged in the exercise of any type of for-profit activities (actividades lucrativas) in the Canton of Poás will be obliged to pay the Municipality a business license tax (impuesto de patentes) to exercise those activities, in accordance with that law, as applicable. Therefore, none of the other laws brought up imposed an exemption from municipal taxes in favor of the appellant. It was not until Law 7285 that the business license tax for individuals or legal entities whose activity is for-profit in the Canton of Poás was regulated, in the terms set forth.

**VI.** Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, that is, the administrative act intended to enable the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, called the business license tax (patente). In the Costa Rican Legal System, the “patente” is the tax tasked with imposing a levy on the exercise of a specific for-profit activity whose exercise requires a municipal license or authorization. Article 79 of the Municipal Code establishes the obligation of interested parties to have a municipal license to exercise any for-profit activity, which is obtained by paying a tax. The business license tax (Impuesto de Patentes) has for many years been an important source of income for Costa Rican Local Governments, and it is one of the oldest taxes in their history, since although it was regulated by national rules, such as the Municipal Code, and previously in municipal ordinances, it has always been locally administered. Through a reform to the Municipal Code in 1989, the power to regulate this tax was conferred onto the Municipalities, these being the ones who must propose their bills of law before the Legislative Assembly, through which each one will independently regulate, in exercise of its municipal autonomy, the essential elements of the tax, such as the tax base (base imponible), rate, its form of management, collection, and oversight, with only the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax being regulated in the Municipal Code, that being the performance of for-profit activities or, alternatively, holding the municipal license. This tax is created by special law for each of the country’s Municipalities, who individually exercise their taxing power through the initiative of their respective law, thus regulating the local tax obligations that the Constitution and the law grant them. Tax power derived from the application of articles 170 and 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, as well as article 83 of the Municipal Code, where it is established that this tax must be regulated by special law.

**VII.** The Constitutional Chamber, in Vote No. 2197-92, justified the business license tax (impuesto de patente) on the need to cover the cost of the indivisible public services that the individual receives from the Municipality. Commercial businesses or for-profit activities are highly benefited by the security, order, cleanliness, and general municipal activity; therefore, it is the obligation of the individual who exercises the respective for-profit activity to fulfill their duty to contribute to the public expenses generated in the canton, in accordance with article 18 of the Political Constitution (Principle of solidarity and duty to contribute to public burdens). The business license tax (Impuesto de Patente) imposes a levy on any for-profit activity that is identified based on common, easily identifiable external characteristics, without there being a single system in this regard. This is why the business license tax laws differ from one municipality to another, and the tax bases (bases impositivas) can be equally varied; they can be based on gross profits, gross sales, categories, or classes to which a specific amount of tax is linked. Therefore, the Municipal Code establishes in its article 83 that the business license tax shall be regulated by special law. Consequently, the tax base used is irrelevant, nor even whether the activity is exercised or not; the tax to be charged does not depend on the actual exercise of the activity, regardless of whether it generates profits or not, or whether it generates net income, since that is not the origin or justification of the tax. Thus, it does not impose a levy on the obtaining or consumption of income by the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo); it does not impose a levy on the obtaining of a benefit; it does not impose a levy on the possession of an estate; nor does it impose a levy, in that sense, on the circulation of goods or services, or commercial or legal traffic. It imposes a levy on a fact that is also objective, like the previous ones, which is the mere exercise of an economic activity. The taxable event (hecho generador) of the business license tax is not constituted by the obtaining of income from for-profit activities carried out within the territorial sphere of the municipality —contrary to what occurs in the income tax, because the obtaining of income does constitute the taxable event of that tax— but rather, this tax arises with the mere possession of the license (article 79 of the Municipal Code). For this reason, Municipalities are free to set the quantitative elements independently of the concept of profit or net income. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote 3494-94, stated: “… it is the constitutional text itself that contemplates the possibility of establishing this double taxation, since, on the one hand, it grants the Legislative Assembly the general power to impose taxes and other tax burdens, and on the other, it grants the Municipalities the same prerogatives in their territorial jurisdiction, subject to prior authorization from Congress. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the aforementioned principle—prohibition of double tax imposition on the same taxable event—were to exist, it could not be violated by virtue of the fact that the taxable event of the tax in question is not income, the assumption from which the appellant starts to affirm that such a principle is violated, but rather the exercise of a lawful and for-profit activity.” It is therefore clear that, regardless of whether the appellant company generates income or not, the fact is that this is not a factor to be taken into account in the business license tax (Impuesto de Patentes), since it is only defined by whether the activity is lawful and for-profit, as is the case with the Company in question. That is, the business license tax imposes a levy on the mere exercise of a for-profit activity or on having a license even if the activity is not carried out. The chargeable event (hecho imponible) occurs automatically by virtue of having a license. It is required, in any case, that the activity exercised involves the organization, on one's own account, of means of production and human resources, or one of them, with the purpose of intervening in the production or distribution of goods or services.

**VIII.** It is now appropriate to analyze whether the activity performed by the appellant is for-profit or not, in order to determine the assumption contemplated in article 1 of Law 7285. For these purposes, it is also appropriate to consider articles 5, 8, 10, and 11 of said law. The first of these indicates the full powers of the appellant Company to provide potable water, sewerage, and stormwater evacuation services, as well as for the generation, distribution, transmission, and commercialization of electric power and public lighting, in agreement with the incorporated municipalities of the Province of Heredia, within the jurisdiction thereof. Furthermore, the company may perform these functions directly, through its subsidiaries, by entering into contracts or alliances with entities of recognized technological and financial prestige. On the other hand, article 8 indicates the subjection of the company and its subsidiaries to private law in the normal course of its activities. Meanwhile, article 10 provides the possibility for the company to contract loans with national or foreign credit agencies, as well as to issue all classes of securities. Even clearer, article 11 indicates the duty of subsidiary companies to withhold and deliver to the Public Treasury the amount of the corresponding taxes on the profits distributed to their private shareholders. And as a key rule on the matter in question, the Company is obliged to capitalize the net profits obtained from activities carried out directly, as well as from the profits received from its subsidiaries.

In light of such regulations, as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber and of this Chamber, set forth above, it is easily concluded that the activity developed by the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima is “for-profit” (lucrativa), and it has not been exempted from paying municipal taxes.

**IX.** Regarding the other regulatory provisions alleged to have been violated, it is appropriate to make the following reasoning. According to article 5 of the Tax Code, only the law may grant tax exemptions, while article 6 establishes restrictive exemption in the matter. And according to article 8 of the Civil Code, laws are only repealed by subsequent ones. The Administrative-Contentious Tribunal did not violate such regulations by giving them the erroneous interpretation alleged by the appellant, since the appellant company has not been exempted in any way from the payment of municipal taxes. Although the Tribunal incurred the error of interpreting the existence of an implied repeal of tax-exempting laws prior to the transformation of the appellant Company in 1998 into a corporation (sociedad anónima), such error was not alleged in the terms set forth here. Rather, before the enactment of the Law of Municipal Taxes of the Canton of Poás, said Company had not been exempted from paying them, including the business license tax (patente), simply because it had not been established. Therefore, this is not a matter of repeal; it is simply a municipal tax created starting in 1992, not applied before to the appellant Company because it was not a corporation (Sociedad Anónima) and did not carry out a for-profit activity, but upon being transformed in 1998 as such, it fits perfectly within the assumption of article 1 of the Business License Tax Law of the Municipality of Poás. The appellant cannot be exempted unless by the Municipality of Poás itself or by a subsequent law incompatible with the tax law. This Chamber has pronounced in this regard in judgment No. 12, already cited, of 1994, stating: “VII.- The interpretation of exemptions in Tax Law is restrictive. The Tax Code (article 6, second paragraph) says: ‘Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions may not be created.’ On the other hand, even if there is an express provision of tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation (article 63 ibidem) and may be repealed or modified by a subsequent law, without liability for the State (article 64 ibidem). From the relationship of these rules, the protection of the principle of legality in exemption matters is inferred, through the impossibility of broadly interpreting the rules referring to them.” As such, the alleged infractions have not occurred, and the objection is therefore rejected. Nor has the alleged violation of article 129 of the Constitution occurred, since the Legislative Assembly merely limited itself to approving a municipal tax law, introduced by the entity with the power to do so, that is: the Municipality of the Canton of Poás, in exercise of its autonomy.

Through a reform to the Código Municipal in 1989, the power to regulate this tax was conferred upon the Municipalities, and they must be the ones to propose their legislative bills before the Asamblea Legislativa, through which each one will independently regulate, in exercise of their municipal autonomy, the essential elements of the tax, such as the taxable base (base imponible), rate (tarifa), its form of management, collection, and oversight (fiscalización), with only the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax being regulated in the Código Municipal, that is, carrying out for-profit (lucrativas) activities or holding the municipal license. This tax is created by a special law for each of the country's Municipalities, which individually exercise their taxing power through the initiative of their respective law, thus regulating the local tax obligations that the Constitution and the law grant them. Taxing power derived from the application of Articles 170 and 121, subsection 13) of the Constitución Política, as well as Article 83 of the Código Municipal, which establishes that this tax must be regulated by a special law.

VII.The Sala Constitucional, in Voto N°2197-92, justified the patent tax (impuesto de patente) based on the need to cover the cost of the indivisible public services that the individual receives from the Municipality. Commercial businesses or for-profit activities are highly benefited by security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general; therefore, it is the obligation of the individual who carries out the respective for-profit activity to comply with their duty to contribute to the public expenses generated in the canton, in accordance with Article 18 of the Constitución Política (Principle of solidarity and duty to contribute to public burdens). The patent tax (Impuesto de Patente) levies any for-profit activity identified on the basis of common, easily identifiable external characteristics, without there being a single system in this regard. That is why patent tax laws differ from one municipality to another, and the tax bases can be equally varied; they can be based on gross profits, gross sales, categories, or classes to which a specific tax amount is linked. Therefore, the Código Municipal establishes in its Article 83 that the patent tax shall be regulated by a special law. Hence, the tax base used is irrelevant, nor even whether the activity is carried out or not; the tax to be charged does not depend on the actual exercise of the activity, regardless of whether it generates profits or not, whether it generates net income (renta neta) or not, because that is neither the origin nor the justification of the tax. Thus, it does not levy the obtaining or consumption of income by the passive subject; it does not levy the obtaining of a benefit; it does not levy the possession of assets; nor does it levy, in that sense, the circulation of goods or services, or commercial or legal traffic. It levies an event, equally objective like the previous ones, which is the mere exercise of an economic activity. The taxable event of the patent is not constituted by the obtaining of income from for-profit activities carried out within the territorial sphere of the municipality—contrary to what happens with the income tax, because the obtaining of income does constitute its taxable event—but rather this tax arises from the mere possession of the license (Article 79 of the Código Municipal). For this reason, Municipalities are free to set the quantitative elements independently from the concept of profit or net income. In that sense, the Sala Constitucional, in voto 3494-94, stated: “… it is the constitutional text itself that contemplates the possibility of establishing such double taxation, because, on one hand, it grants the Asamblea Legislativa the general power to impose taxes and other tax burdens, and on the other, it grants the Municipalities the same prerogatives in their territorial jurisdiction, subject to prior authorization from Congress.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if the aforementioned principle existed—the prohibition against double taxation on the same taxable event—it could not be violated because the taxable event of the tax in question is not income, which is the premise from which the appellant argues that this principle has been violated, but rather the exercise of a lawful and for-profit (lícita y lucrativa) activity. It is therefore clear that regardless of whether the appellant company generates income or not, this is not a factor to be considered in the business license tax (Impuesto de Patentes), since it is only defined by whether the activity is lawful and for-profit, as is the case with the Company in question. That is to say, the business license tax levies the mere exercise of a for-profit activity or the holding of a license even if the activity is not carried out. The taxable event occurs automatically by having a business license. It is required, in any case, that the activity carried out involves the organization, on one’s own account, of means of production and human resources or one of them for the purpose of intervening in the production or distribution of goods or services.

VIII.We must now analyze whether the activity carried out by the appellant is for-profit or not, in order to determine the situation contemplated in Article 1 of Law 7285. For these purposes, it is also appropriate to consider Articles 5, 8, 10, and 11 of said law. The first of these indicates the full powers of the appellant Company to provide drinking water, sanitary sewer, and stormwater evacuation services, as well as for the generation, distribution, transmission, and commercialization of electric power and public lighting, in agreement with the incorporated municipalities of the Province of Heredia, within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the company may perform these functions directly, through its subsidiaries, by entering into contracts or alliances with entities of recognized technological and financial prestige. On the other hand, Article 8 indicates the subjection of the company and its subsidiaries to private law in the normal course of their activities. Meanwhile, Article 10 provides for the company's ability to contract loans with domestic or foreign credit agencies as well as to issue all types of securities. Even more clearly, Article 11 indicates the duty of the subsidiary companies to withhold and deliver to the Public Treasury the amount of the corresponding taxes on the profits distributed to their private shareholders. And as a key provision on the subject in question, the Company is obliged to capitalize the net profits obtained from activities carried out directly, as well as from profits received from its subsidiaries.

In light of such regulations as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and this Chamber, set forth above, one easily concludes that the activity carried out by the company Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima is “for-profit (lucrativa),” and it has not been exempted from paying municipal taxes.

IX.Regarding the other regulatory provisions alleged to have been violated, the following reasoning is appropriate. Under Article 5 of the Tax Code (Código Tributario), only the law may grant tax exemptions, while Article 6 establishes restrictive exemption in the matter. And pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), laws are only repealed by subsequent ones. The Contentious Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) did not violate these provisions by giving them the erroneous interpretation alleged by the appellant, because the appellant company has not been exempted in any way from paying municipal taxes. Although the Court erred in interpreting the existence of a tacit repeal of tax exemption laws prior to the transformation of the appellant Company in 1998 into a corporation (sociedad anónima), such error was not challenged in the terms set forth here. Rather, before the promulgation of the Municipal Taxes Law of the Canton of Poás, said Company had not been exempted from paying them, including the business license tax, simply because it had not been established. Therefore, it is not a matter of repeal; it is simply a municipal tax created as of 1992, not previously applied to the appellant Company because it was not a corporation and did not carry out a for-profit activity, but upon its transformation in 1998 as such, it fits perfectly within the situation contemplated in Article 1 of the Business License Law of the Municipality of Poás. The appellant cannot be exempted except by the Municipality of Poás itself or by a subsequent law incompatible with the tax law. In that sense, this Chamber has ruled in judgment No. 12 already cited, of 1994, in which it states: “VII. The interpretation of exemptions in Tax Law is restrictive. The Tax Code (Article 6, second paragraph) says: ‘Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue of it, neither taxes nor exemptions may be created.’ Furthermore, even if there is an express provision of a tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation (Article 63 ibidem) and may be repealed or modified by a subsequent law, without liability for the State (Article 64 ibidem). From the relation of said provisions, the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions is inferred, through the impossibility of broadly interpreting the provisions referring to them.” This being the case, the alleged violations have not occurred, and therefore the objection is rejected. Nor has the alleged violation of Article 129 of the Constitution occurred, because the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) merely approved a municipal tax law, referred by the entity with the authority to do so, that is: the Municipality of the Canton of Poás in the exercise of its autonomy.

"III. Previo a entrar en el análisis de cada uno de los agravios expresados, conviene traer a colación el planteamiento hecho por esta Sala en la sentencia N°12 de las 11 horas del 25 de marzo de 1994, relativos a las diferencias operantes entre tributos estatales y municipales así como sobre el fundamento de las Municipalidades para el establecimiento de tributos: “IV. … En forma genérica el Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios en su artículo 4 párrafo primero define los tributos como "... las prestaciones en dinero, que el Estado, en ejercicio de su poder de imperio, exige con el objeto de obtener recursos para el cumplimiento de sus fines ...". Para el caso de las Municipalidades cualquier tipo de tributo (impuestos, contribuciones especiales o tasas) está encaminado a la obtención de recursos, mediante recaudaciones, para el fomento de actividades tendientes al cumplimiento de sus fines (fin extrafiscal del tributo). Los fines municipales son distintos a los propiamente estatales. Cada municipio debe atender problemas prioritarios dentro del ámbito territorial donde ejerce su autonomía (artículo 2.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Por esa razón no puede sostenerse la identidad entre el Estado propiamente dicho y los entes menores, pues si bien ambos se rigen por las mismas normas en cuanto a las funciones de relación y acción, legalmente son distintos entre sí (artículo 2 Ibídem). Los fines propios del Estado son genéricos y de programación uniforme, mientras los entes menores tienen fines más restringidos y particulares. V.- La potestad de las Municipalidades para el establecimiento de tributos descansa en una atribución de carácter Constitucional. El artículo 170 de la Carta Magna garantiza la autonomía municipal y otorga a estos entes menores la iniciativa para la creación, modificación o extinción de los impuestos municipales, pero siempre sujetos a la autorización legislativa (artículo 121 inciso 13). El acto de autorización es típicamente tutelar. Consiste en la remoción de un obstáculo legal para realizar la actividad autorizada. El titular de la actividad es el órgano autorizado y no el autorizante. La Asamblea Legislativa no puede asumir un papel creador de impuestos municipales (tributos en general), pues son las mismas corporaciones las creadoras de dichos impuestos en el ejercicio de su autonomía. La Asamblea puede rechazar un nuevo impuesto municipal pero no establecer uno distinto al originado en la voluntad municipal. Por ello, para la imposición de tributos municipales, se debe cumplir con todos los principios del derecho tributario: legalidad, generalidad, igualdad, capacidad contributiva y no confiscatoriedad, pues solo así sería formal y legalmente válida.” IV. A la luz de tal doctrina procede analizar el agravio acusado. Respecto a la alegada aplicación indebida y violación de las leyes N° 7285 de 28 de enero de 1992; 5889 de 8 de marzo de 1976, 7040 de 23 de abril de 1996, 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992 y 7789 de 30 de abril de 1998, conviene analizar cada una de ellas según su orden. La Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia fue creada mediante Ley 5889 de 8 de marzo de 1976, cuyo artículo 4 la exoneraba de todo tipo de tasas, cánones e impuestos, por la actividad que iba a desarrollar. Pero dicha norma no incluía la exoneración de los impuestos municipales, pues como dejó claro esta Sala en las sentencias ya mencionadas se trata de impuestos distintos. Por su parte la Sala Constitucional, en el voto N° 1631-91 de las 15 horas 15 minutos del 21 de agosto de 1991, es clara respecto a la creación de los impuestos municipales por parte de las Municipalidades, quienes no formulan una mera proposición a la Asamblea Legislativa, sino que someten a su conocimiento verdaderas fijaciones impositivas, aunque cuente la Asamblea Legislativa con el poder de denegar la aprobación de un tributo solicitado por los gobiernos locales. V. Es claro entonces que los tributos estatales y municipales son distintos, creados por entidades diferentes, por lo cual no es posible entender que la exoneración establecida por el artículo 4 de la Ley 5889 del 8 de marzo de 1976 incluía los municipales. Tener claro tal extremo es de suma importancia, a fin de comprender el tipo de exoneraciones operantes en las otras leyes citadas como violadas. Idéntica situación presenta la exoneración del artículo 36 de la Ley 7040 de 6 mayo de 1986, relativa a impuestos, tasas y cánones por concesiones de aprovechamiento de agua, fuerza hidráulica. No indica exoneración de impuestos municipales y mucho menos de la patente, pues la única entidad que podría dictarla es la respectiva Municipalidad, lo cual no sucedió en este caso. Por otra parte, y con relación a la ley 7200 de 13 de setiembre de 1990, en su artículo 17, define la exoneración para las empresas productoras de energía eléctrica autónoma o paralela, dícese es igual de la que goza el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad en la importación de maquinaria y equipo para conducción de agua, así como para “turbinar”, generar, controlar, regular, transformar y transmitir energía eléctrica; siendo taxativa la lista de asuntos a exonerar y se trata de tributos estatales y no municipales. A quien correspondería hacer la exoneración de los municipales, como ya se ha dicho reiteradamente, es a la misma Municipalidad, conforme al principio de autonomía contemplado constitucionalmente. En igual sentido la Ley 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992, al derogar en su artículo primero todas las exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes, decretos y normas legales referentes, entre otros impuestos, a los derechos arancelarios, a las ventas, a la renta, al consumo, al territorial, a la propiedad de vehículos, se refieren todos a tributos estatales y no municipales, de ahí que al establecer los incisos c) y ch) del artículo 2 varios casos de exención, no incluyen los tributos municipales, por las razones antes dadas. Entonces, las exenciones que se conceden para el desarrollo de programas privados donde se proponga producir y distribuir energía eléctrica, con propósitos comerciales y cuando se dediquen al abastecimiento de agua potable para usos domiciliario, industrial y para el consumo humano, así como a la recolección, tratamiento y disposición de aguas negras y pluviales o servidas, subterráneas y de cualquier otra clase y a las actividades colaterales y complementarias de éstas, no se refieren a los municipales sino a los estatales. En ese mismo sentido cuando mediante la Ley 7789 del 23 de abril de 1998 se transforma la empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia en una sociedad anónima derogando en su artículo 34 la Ley Constitutiva N° 5889 de 8 de marzo de 1976, donde se le oponga, se debe entender vigente el artículo 4 de la Ley 5889 por cuanto la N° 7789 no hace referencia al tema, no operando de esa forma choque alguno. Pese a ello tal como se aclaró antes, dicho artículo no se refiere a la exoneración de impuestos municipales sino únicamente a algunos estatales. Finalmente y con relación a la Ley 7285 del 20 de noviembre de 1992, la cual regula la tarifa de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Poás, su artículo 1° establece que las personas físicas o jurídicas, dedicadas al ejercicio de cualquier tipo de actividades lucrativas, en el cantón de Poás estarán obligadas a pagarle a la Municipalidad un impuesto de patentes para ejercer esas actividades, de conformidad con esa ley, según corresponda. Entonces ninguna de las otras leyes traídas a colación, imponían una exoneración de los impuestos municipales a favor de la recurrente. No es sino a partir de la Ley 7285 cuando se regula, en los términos expuestos, el impuesto de patente a las personas físicas o jurídicas cuya actividad es lucrativa en el Cantón de Poás. VI. Nuestra legislación distingue entre la licencia propiamente dicha, es decir el acto administrativo destinado a habilitar al particular para ejercer la respectiva actividad y el pago del impuesto propiamente dicho, denominado patente. En el Ordenamiento Jurídico costarricense la “patente” es el impuesto encargado de gravar el ejercicio de una determinada actividad lucrativa cuyo ejercicio requiere de licencia o autorización municipal. El artículo 79 del Código Municipal establece el deber de los interesados en contar con licencia municipal para ejercer cualquier actividad lucrativa, la cual se obtiene mediante el pago de un impuesto. El impuesto de Patentes desde hace muchos años es una importante fuente de ingresos de los Gobiernos Locales costarricenses, así como es uno de los tributos más viejos en la historia de los mismos, pues aunque estuvo regulado en normas de carácter nacional, tal como el Código Municipal, y anteriormente en las ordenanzas municipales, siempre ha sido de administración local. Mediante una reforma al Código Municipal en 1989, se le confiere la potestad de regular este impuesto a las Municipalidades, debiendo ser éstas quienes propongan ante la Asamblea Legislativa sus proyectos de ley, mediante los cuales cada una regulará en forma independiente y en ejercicio de su autonomía municipal los elementos esenciales del tributo, tales como base imponible, tarifa, su forma de gestión, recaudación y fiscalización, estando solo regulado en el Código Municipal el hecho generador del impuesto, sea la realización de actividades lucrativas o bien, poseer la licencia municipal. Este impuesto se crea por ley especial para cada una de las Municipalidades del país, quienes ejercen individualmente su poder tributario, mediante la iniciativa de su ley respectiva, regulando así las obligaciones tributarias locales que la Constitución y la ley le otorgan. Potestad tributaria derivada de la aplicación de los artículos 170 y 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, así como del artículo 83 del Código Municipal donde se establece que este impuesto deberá regularse mediante ley especial. VII. La Sala Constitucional en el Voto N°2197-92, justificó el impuesto de patente, en la necesidad de sufragar el costo de los servicios públicos indivisibles que el particular recibe de la Municipalidad. Los negocios comerciales o las actividades lucrativas, se ven altamente beneficiados con la seguridad, el orden, el aseo y la actividad municipal en general, por ello es obligación del particular que ejerce la actividad lucrativa respectiva, cumplir con su deber de contribuir con los gastos públicos generados en el cantón, de conformidad con el artículo 18 de la Constitución Política (Principio de solidaridad y deber de contribuir a las cargas públicas). El Impuesto de Patente grava toda aquella actividad lucrativa que se identifica sobre la base de caracteres externos comunes, fáciles de identificar, sin que exista un único sistema al respecto. Es por ello que las leyes del impuesto de patentes difieren de un municipio a otro, y las bases impositivas pueden ser igualmente variadas, pueden basarse en las utilidades brutas, ventas brutas, categorías o clases a las que se liga un monto determinado por concepto de impuesto. Por ello, el Código Municipal establece en su artículo 83 que el impuesto de patentes, se regulará por la ley especial. Por ello no tiene relevancia cual sea la base impositiva utilizada, ni siquiera si se ejerce o no la actividad, el impuesto a cobrar no depende del ejercicio mismo de la actividad, con independencia de sí genera o no utilidades, si genera o no la obtención de renta neta, por cuanto ese no es el origen ni la justificación del tributo. Entonces no grava la obtención ni el consumo de renta por el sujeto pasivo; no grava la obtención de un beneficio; no grava la posesión de un patrimonio; ni tampoco grava en ese sentido, la circulación de bienes o servicios, el tráfico mercantil o jurídico. Grava un hecho también objetivo como los anteriores, cual es el mero ejercicio de una actividad económica. El hecho generador de la patente no está constituido por la obtención de rentas de las actividades lucrativas donde se desarrollen en la esfera territorial del municipio, -contrario a cuanto ocurre en el impuesto sobre la renta, porque sí constituye la obtención de renta, el hecho generador del impuesto -, sino que este impuesto surge con la mera posesión de la licencia (artículo 79 del Código Municipal). Por ello las Municipalidades son libres de fijar los elementos cuantitativos en forma independiente del concepto de utilidad o renta neta. En ese sentido la Sala Constitucional en el voto 3494-94 dijo. “… es el mismo texto constitucional el que contempla la posibilidad de establecer esa doble imposición, por cuanto, por una parte, le otorga a la Asamblea Legislativa la facultad general de imponer los impuestos y demás cargas tributarias, y por otra, le otorga a las Municipalidades las mismas prerrogativas en su circunscripción territorial, previa autorización del Congreso. No obstante lo anterior, de existir el principio aludido –prohibición a la doble imposición tributaria sobre un mismo hecho generador- no podría ser lesionado en virtud de que el hecho generador del tributo en cuestión no lo constituye la renta, supuesto del que parte el recurrente para afirmar lesionado tal principio, sino el ejercicio de una actividad lícita y lucrativa”. Queda claro entonces que independientemente de generar o no rentas la empresa recurrente, lo cierto es que ello no es un factor a tomar en cuenta en el Impuesto de Patentes, pues solo lo define si la actividad es lícita y lucrativa, tal como sucede con la Empresa en cuestión. Es decir, el impuesto de patente grava el mero ejercicio de una actividad lucrativa o el tener una licencia aunque la actividad no se realice. El hecho imponible se produce automáticamente por tener una patente. Se exige, en todo caso, que la actividad ejercida suponga la ordenación por cuenta propia de medios de producción y recursos humanos o de uno de ambs con la finalidad de intervenir en la producción o distribución de bienes o servicios. VIII. Corresponde ahora analizar si la actividad realizada por la recurrente es lucrativa o no, a fin de determinar el supuesto contemplado en el artículo 1° de la ley 7285. Para tales efectos conviene también considerar los artículos 5, 8, 10 y 11 de dicha ley. El primero de ellos indica las plenas facultades de la Empresa recurrente para prestar servicios de agua potable, alcantarillado sanitario y evacuación de aguas pluviales, así como para la generación, distribución, transmisión y comercialización de energía eléctrica y alumbrado público, en convenio con las municipalidades de la Provincia de Heredia incorporadas, dentro de la jurisdicción de estas. Además, la empresa podrá desempeñar esas funciones en forma directa, por medio de sus subsidiarias mediante la celebración de contrataciones o alianzas con entidades de reconocido prestigio tecnológico y financiero. Por otra parte el artículo 8 indica el sometimiento de la empresa y sus subsidiarias al derecho privado en el giro normal de sus actividades. Mientras el artículo 10 dispone la posibilidad de la empresa para contratar empréstitos con agencias de crédito nacional o extranjeros así como emitir toda clase de títulos valores. Más claro aún el artículo 11 indica el deber de las sociedades subsidiarias de retener y entregar al Erario Público el importe de los tributos correspondientes sobre las utilidades distribuidas a sus accionistas privados. Y como norma clave sobre el tema en cuestión la Empresa queda obligada a capitalizar las utilidades netas obtenidas por las actividades realizadas de modo directo, así como por las utilidades recibidas de sus subsidiarias. A la luz de tal normativa así como de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional y la de esta Sala, antes expuestas, se concluye fácilmente como la actividad desarrollada por la empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima es “lucrativa”, y no ha sido exonerada de la cancelación de tributos municipales. IX. Con relación a las otras disposiciones normativas alegadas como violadas procede hacer el siguiente razonamiento. Según el artículo 5 del Código Tributario sólo la ley puede otorgar exenciones tributarias, mientras el 6 establece la exención restrictiva en la materia. Y conforme al artículo 8 del Código Civil las leyes sólo se derogan por otras posteriores. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo no violó tal normativa dándole la interpretación errónea acusada por la recurrente, pues la empresa recurrente no ha sido exonerada en forma alguna del pago de impuestos municipales. Si bien el Tribunal incurre en el error de interpretar la existencia de una derogatoria tácita de leyes exonerativas de impuestos anteriores a la transformación de la Empresa recurrente, en 1998, como sociedad anónima, tal yerro no fue acusado en los términos aquí expuestos. Más bien antes de la promulgación de la Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Poás dicha Empresa no había sido exonerada del pago de los mismos, incluida la patente, simplemente porque no se había fijado el mismo. Entonces, no se trata de una derogatoria, simplemente es un impuesto municipal creado a partir de 1992, no aplicado antes a la Empresa recurrente porque no era Sociedad Anónima y no realizaba una actividad lucrativa, pero al ser transformada, en 1998 como tal, calza perfectamente en el supuesto del artículo 1° de la Ley de Patentes de la Municipalidad de Poás. La recurrente no puede ser exonerada sino es por la misma Municipalidad de Poás o por una ley posterior incompatible con la del impuesto. En ese sentido se ha pronunciado esta Sala en la sentencia N° 12 ya citada, de 1994, en cuanto dice: “VII.- La interpretación en el Derecho Tributario de las exenciones es restrictiva. El Código Tributario (artículo 6, párrafo segundo) dice: "La analogía es procedimiento admisible para llenar los vacíos legales pero en virtud de ella no pueden crearse tributos ni exenciones". Por otra parte, aunque exista disposición expresa de ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación (artículo 63 ibídem) y puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado (artículo 64 ibídem). De la relación de dichas normas se desprende la protección al principio de legalidad en materia de exenciones, mediante la imposibilidad de interpretar ampliativamente las normas a ellas referidas.” Así las cosas no han operado las infracciones alegadas por lo cual se rechaza el reproche. Tampoco ha operado la alegada violación al artículo 129 de la Constitución, pues la Asamblea Legislativa se limitó a aprobar una ley de tributos municipales, referida por quien tenía potestad para hacerlo, es decir: la Municipalidad del Cantón de Poás en ejercicio de su autonomía."