Reimbursement of child support and unjust enrichment between parentsReembolso de alimentos y enriquecimiento sin causa entre progenitores

**III.- REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM:** The appellant's disagreement, in the sense that at the time the minor [Nombre1]. was born, on March 19, 1995 (folio 7), the Ley de Paternidad Responsable was not yet in force, and the text of article 96 of the Código de Familia did not extend liability beyond three months after the minor's birth, is not admissible. This is because the claim of the plaintiff [Nombre2] is not the collection of child support (alimentos) within the father-child relationship, but is different; it is the reimbursement of the child support that she had to pay due to the defendant's non-compliance, as he did not assume the obligation until a child support payment (cuota alimentaria) was judicially imposed upon him. This is evident from section A) of the petition, in which she requests a declaration: “... That the defendant owes me the sum of two million five hundred sixty thousand colones for overdue child support for our son for a period of five years and four months, since that is the amount of child support currently set and being collected ...” (folio 9). This claim is grounded in the provisions of article 53, paragraph 2 of the Constitución Política, according to which, “Parents have the same obligations toward children born out of wedlock as toward those born within it.” Also, in article 169, subsection 2 of the Código de Familia, which establishes that both the father and the mother are obligated to provide child support to their minor and incapacitated children, which includes sustenance, housing, clothing, medical assistance, education, transportation, and others. For its part, article 29 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Ley Nº 7739, of January 6, 1998, published in La Gaceta Nº 26, of the following February 6, establishes the right of the child to enjoy integral development, by providing the following: “The father, the mother, or the person in charge are obligated to ensure the physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and social development of their children under eighteen years of age.” Article 37 of that regulation refers to the Código de Familia and related laws –Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias– regarding child support matters, and expands what this concept comprises, stating: “Article 37°- Right to the child support benefit. The right to receive child support is guaranteed under the terms provided in the Código de Familia and related laws. Extraordinarily, the child support benefit shall also include payment for the following: a) Extraordinary expenses for education, directly derived from the beneficiary's study or instruction. b) Extraordinary medical expenses of evident and urgent need. c) Burial of the beneficiary. d) Collection of the prenatal and lactation subsidy. e) Expenses for therapy or specialized care in cases of sexual abuse or domestic violence. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the obligation of parents to provide child support to their sons and daughters is a shared obligation, as established in article 169, subsection 2 of the Código de Familia. **IV.- ON THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ENRIQUECIMIENTO SIN CAUSA):** The upbringing of children involves expenses, which must be jointly assumed by the parents, expenses that are undoubtedly insignificant compared to the care that minors require. In the case under study, if the defendant did not fulfill his obligation to provide child support to his son, and only Ms. [Nombre2] did so, he must reimburse her for the portion of the obligation that she had to assume for a long time, originating from his non-compliance, since it was not until paternity was judicially declared, and a child support payment was later imposed on him, that he did so. This is based on the provisions of articles 1043 and 1044 of the Código Civil. This Chamber has so resolved in Voto Nº 574, of 9:30 a.m. on July 14, 2004: “ ... VI.- ... Thus, the Chamber deems the application of articles 1,043 and 1,044 of the Código Civil to be appropriate, which make up Chapter V, “Of Quasi-Contracts,” of Title I (Contracts and Quasi-Contracts), of Book IV of said regulatory body. The first cited norm establishes: “Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties.” The cited article 1,044 indicates: “To this class of obligations belong, among others, the management of another's affairs, the administration of a thing in common, voluntary guardianship, and undue payment.” (The bold and underlining are the drafter's). As can be seen, this last norm does not exclude the application of other legal concepts, considered as quasi-contracts. Legal doctrine, for its part, includes unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) within this scope. Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: “ Another case of legal obligation is constituted by unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) ... Included in the concept of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) are ... cases in which someone converts another's property to their own benefit, or benefits from another's activity (the so-called useful version or in rem versio) causing harm to another, without there being a reason that justifies the gain or the benefit: in other words, without there being a pre-existing legal relationship that serves as a cause to legitimize the gain, or the benefit, of the enriched party... /In said formula, ... also included are cases of enrichment without the will of another person (impoverished party); the lack of will of the impoverished party results in a lack of cause./ The action for unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) aims to restore the balance between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, by means of a claim for compensation./Several are the prerequisites for the action we are discussing. It requires: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that their estate receives an increase ..., and enrichment is also considered the saving of an expense, or having avoided a loss for another through one's own patrimonial sacrifice... b) that, to such an increase for the enriched party, there corresponds a decrease in the estate of another subject (impoverished party)... c) ... a corresponding relationship between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, furthermore, a causal link between the patrimonial decrease suffered by one subject and the patrimonial advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occurs without cause... Absence of cause means that there is no patrimonial relationship ... that justifies the enrichment-impoverishment.../ The effect of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) is the birth of the obligation to compensate; on the part of the enriched party, in favor of the impoverished party... Finally, it must be observed that the compensation must be adjusted to the extent of the enrichment and cannot exceed it...” (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Volume VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1955, pp. 465-466). (On the subject, see also BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel and [Nombre3], Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 812-813) ...” **V.-** To resolve contrary to these postulates would be to consent to the unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) that has been generated in favor of the defendant, who assumed the obligation only after his paternity was judicially declared and a child support payment was subsequently set. To the detriment of the plaintiff, who had to satisfy the needs of her son from conception and subsequent birth. In this regard, the legal scholar [Nombre4] states the following: “there are certain facts that, although not being unlawful acts, can cause the unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another. Then, an obligation arises for the former, within the limits of their enrichment, to repair the harm caused to the latter. In this sense, it is said that unjust enrichment or enrichment without cause is a source of obligations ... but, undoubtedly, the principle that one who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is obligated to compensate them is one of those that inspires our Legal System. This has been insistently recognized by jurisprudence and legal doctrine ... It requires: 1. A patrimonial increase of any kind (whether consisting of obtaining profit or avoiding an expense or damage) experienced by a person. It is not necessarily required that they acted in bad faith or engaged in any unlawful conduct ..., since in the case of unjust enrichment, what matters is the enrichment itself, and not always, furthermore, the conduct of the enriched party; 2. That such increase lacks a legal reason to support it (which is expressed by saying it is unjust or without cause); 3. That it causes a correlative impoverishment of another (that is, that it is obtained at the expense of the latter) ...”. Regarding the effects, he adds: “Against the unjustly enriched party, and in favor of the one who was impoverished, there arises –up to the limit of the actual enrichment at the expense of the impoverishment of the former– the obligation to, in principle, if possible and there are no other reasons to exclude it, restore the same thing or what was received in its place; and, ultimately, to compensate for the value of the enrichment ... The value, for there to be true compensation, must be updated to the date on which compensation is made ...” (Derecho Civil, Volume Two, Derecho de Obligaciones, Los contratos en particular y las obligaciones no contractuales, ninth edition, José María Bosch Editor, S.A., Barcelona, 1993, pages 449 to 452). In accordance with the foregoing, there is no violation of articles 595, subsections 1 and 3 of the Código Procesal Civil in relation to 96 and 172 of the Código de Familia and 34 of the Constitución Política, as alleged, because the plaintiff's claim is for the defendant to compensate her for the value of the child support not paid by him for his son, and which she had to cover; therefore, her claim is not exhausted in these norms, but rather transcends the provisions contained in articles 96 and 172 of the Código de Familia, and finds support, among others, in articles 1043 and 1044 of the Código Civil, the legal doctrine that supports them, and in unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento injusto). Nor is there a violation of articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Código Procesal Civil, regarding the limits of interpretation, integration, and objectivity of the judges, impartiality, and mandatory treatment, because article 3 ibidem provides that when interpreting the procedural norm, the judge must take into account that its purpose is to give application to the substantive norms, and in case of doubt, may resort to the general principles of Procedural Law; and cited article 4 establishes that cases not provided for in this Code shall be regulated by the established norms, whether for analogous cases or in the contrary sense; if that is not possible by those means, integration shall be done with the constitutional principles and the general principles of Procedural Law. **VI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN).** The appellant disagrees because he was ordered to pay child support for the period from April 6, 1998, to June 20, 2000, in the sum of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, as he believes that, based on the provisions of article 172 of the Código de Familia, he could not be charged for past child support beyond the twelve months prior to the lawsuit. However, the cassation appellant must bear in mind, as stated in preceding lines, that the plaintiff is not collecting child support for her son, but rather seeks reimbursement for what she had to assume during the time he did not fulfill that obligation. Therefore, it is that in the case under study, the issue of liability for fulfilling family duties cannot be exhausted with articles 96 and 172 of the Código de Familia, but must be resolved according to an integration of the legal system, the principles that inform it, and jurisprudence. It must also respond to the principles of civil liability and unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa). Scenarios in which the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) period is neither twelve months nor three months, as alleged. In any case, it is pertinent to note that this Chamber, in the cited Voto Nº 2004-00574, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), considered the following: “... VIII.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN): The defendant raised the exception of the statute of limitations (prescripción). Without a doubt, we are in the presence of the concept of negative prescription; and, in that sense, article 865 of the Código Civil states that “By negative prescription, a right is lost. For this, the passage of time is sufficient.” In the specific case, it is considered that the provision of article 868 of the Código Civil should be applied, which provides for a period of ten years; since the situation does not fit into any of the special prescription scenarios provided for in the following norms ...” However, as the sole appellant is the defendant, and there cannot be a reformatio in peius, what was resolved regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be upheld. **VII.- REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT:** In the appealed judgment, the defendant is ordered to pay Ms. Jaén Barboza compensation for the maintenance of the child [Nombre5], for the period from April sixth, nineteen ninety-eight to June twentieth, two thousand (date on which the child support payment was collected in the regular proceeding), in the sum of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, which is indicated as the result of multiplying sixty thousand colones by twenty-six months. The cassation appellant objects to this, considering that his circumstances and those of the minor at the time the monthly payment was set were not the same, so the parameter used violates the historical and economic reality of the parties. The Chamber considers that the appellant is correct on this particular point, as the determination of the amount should be left for the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) stage, at which time the child support needs of the minor and the possibilities of the defendant, during the period in question, shall be assessed. **VIII.-** Consequently, the appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it establishes the amount of the compensation at one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, which is left to be quantified in the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) stage. In all other respects, the appeal is declared without merit." There is also no violation of articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), regarding the limits of interpretation, integration, and objectivity of judges, impartiality, and mandatory treatment, since numeral 3 ibidem provides that when interpreting the procedural norm, the judge must consider that its purpose is to give application to the substantive norms, and in case of doubt, may resort to the general principles of Procedural Law; and the cited article 4 establishes that cases not provided for in this Code shall be regulated by the established norms, either for analogous cases or in the opposite sense; if this is not possible through those means, integration shall be done with constitutional principles and the general principles of Procedural Law. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN). </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">The appellant disagrees because he was ordered to pay child support (alimentos) for the period from April 6, 1998, to June 20, 2000, in the amount of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, since he believes that based on the provisions of article 172 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), he could not be charged past child support beyond the twelve months prior to the lawsuit. However, the cassation appellant must bear in mind, as stated in preceding lines, that the plaintiff is not claiming child support for her son, but rather seeks reimbursement for what she had to assume during the time he failed to comply with that obligation.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> For this reason, in the case under study, the issue of liability in fulfilling family duties cannot be exhausted with numerals 96 and 172 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), but must be resolved according to an integration of the legal system, the principles that inform it, and jurisprudence. It must also respond to the principles of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) and unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa).</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Cases in which the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) period is neither twelve months nor three months, as alleged. In any case, it is pertinent to indicate that this Chamber, in the cited Ruling (Voto), No. 2004-00574, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), considered the following: “... </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\"> ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> The defendant raised the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción). Without a doubt, we are in the presence of the figure of negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa); and, in that sense, article 865 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) indicates that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“By negative statute of limitations a right is lost. For this, the passage of time suffices.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In the specific case, it is estimated that the provision of article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which provides a ten-year period, should be applied; because the situation does not fall within any of the special statute of limitations (prescripción) scenarios provided for in the following norms ...”</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">However, since the only appellant is the defendant, and there can be no reformatio in peius, what was decided regarding statute of limitations (prescripción) must be upheld.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VII.- REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In the appealed judgment, the defendant is ordered to pay Mrs. Jaén Barboza compensation for the maintenance of the child [Name5]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, for the period from April 6, nineteen ninety-eight to June 20, two thousand (the date on which child support was claimed in the regular procedure), in the amount of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, which is indicated as the result of multiplying sixty thousand colones by twenty-six months, which the cassation appellant objects to, estimating that his realities and those of the minor at the time of setting the monthly quota were not the same, so the parameter used violates the historical and economic reality of the parties. This Chamber considers that the appellant is correct in this particular, as the determination of the amount should be left for the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) stage, in which the child's support (alimentos) needs and the defendant's means during the relevant period will be assessed.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Consequently, the appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it establishes the amount of compensation at one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, which is left to be quantified in the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) stage. In all other respects, the appeal is declared without merit.</span><span>\"</span></p></div></body></html>" Regarding the effects, it adds: “*At the expense of the unjustly enriched party, and in favor of the one who was impoverished, there arises – up to the limit of actual enrichment at the cost of impoverishing the other – the obligation to, in principle, if possible and there are no other reasons to exclude it, return the same thing or what was received in its place; and, ultimately, to compensate for the value of the enrichment ... The value, for there to be true compensation, must be updated to the date on which compensation is made ...*” (Civil Law, Second Volume, Law of Obligations, Contracts in Particular and Non-Contractual Obligations, ninth edition, José María Bosch Editor, S.A., Barcelona, 1993, pages 449 to 452). In accordance with the foregoing, there is no violation of numerals 595, subsections 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code and article 34 of the Political Constitution, as invoked, since the plaintiff’s claim is that the defendant compensate her for the value of the child support payments not made by him for his son, which she had to cover. Therefore, her claim is not exhausted within these norms, but rather transcends the provisions contained in articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code, and finds its basis, among others, in numerals 1043 and 1044 of the Civil Code, the doctrine that supports them, and in unjust enrichment. Nor is there a violation of articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding the limits of interpretation, integration, and objectivity of the judges, impartiality, and mandatory treatment, since numeral 3 ibidem provides that when interpreting the procedural norm, the judge must take into account that its purpose is to give application to the substantive norms, and in case of doubt, may resort to the general principles of Procedural Law; and the cited article 4 establishes that cases not provided for in this Code shall be regulated by the established norms, either for analogous cases or by contrary reasoning; if this is not possible by those means, integration shall be done with constitutional principles and the general principles of Procedural Law.

**VI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.** The appellant disagrees because he was ordered to pay child support for the period from April 6, 1998, to June 20, 2000, in the amount of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, as he considers that, based on the provisions of article 172 of the Family Code, they could not charge him past child support beyond the twelve months prior to the lawsuit. However, the cassation appellant must bear in mind, as stated in preceding lines, that the plaintiff is not collecting child support for her son, but rather seeks reimbursement for what she had to assume during the time he did not fulfill that obligation. For this reason, in the case under study, the issue of liability in the fulfillment of family duties cannot be exhausted with numerals 96 and 172 of the Family Code, but must be resolved through an integration of the legal system, the principles that inform it, and jurisprudence. It must also respond to the principles of civil liability and enrichment without cause. Cases in which the applicable statute of limitations period is neither twelve months nor three months, as alleged. In any event, it is relevant to indicate that this Chamber, in the cited Ruling No. 2004-00574, regarding the statute of limitations, considered the following: “... **VIII.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATONS:** The defendant party raised the defense of the statute of limitations. Without a doubt, this is a case of negative prescription; and, in that sense, article 865 of the Civil Code states that *“By negative prescription a right is lost. For this, the passage of time is sufficient.”* In this specific case, it is considered that the provision of article 868 of the Civil Code should be applied, which provides for a ten-year period; as the situation does not fit into any of the special prescription cases provided for in the following norms ...” However, since the sole appellant is the defendant, and there can be no modification to his detriment, what was decided regarding the statute of limitations must be upheld.

**VII.- REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT:** In the appealed judgment, the defendant is ordered to pay Mrs. Jaén Barboza compensation for the maintenance of the child [Name5], for the period from the sixth of April of nineteen ninety-eight to the twentieth of June of two thousand (the date on which the child support payment was collected in the regular proceeding), in the sum of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, which is indicated as the result of multiplying sixty thousand colones by twenty-six months. This is objected to by the cassation appellant, who considers that his circumstances and those of the minor at the time of setting the monthly amount were not the same, so the parameter used distorts the historical and economic reality of the parties. This Chamber considers that the appellant is correct on this particular point, as the determination of the amount must be left for the judgment execution stage, in which the food needs of the minor and the possibilities of the defendant during the period in question shall be assessed.

**VIII.-** Consequently, the appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it establishes the amount of compensation at one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones, which is left to be quantified in the judgment execution stage. In all other respects, the appeal is declared without merit.

"III.- EN CUANTO A LA PRETENSIÓN DE LA ACTORA: La inconformidad del recurrente en el sentido de que si para la época en que el menor [Nombre1]., nació, en fecha 19 de marzo de 1995 (folio 7), aún no se encontraba vigente la Ley de Paternidad Responsable, y el texto del numeral 96 del Código de Familia, no extendía la responsabilidad más allá de tres meses del nacimiento del menor, no resulta atendible. Esto porque la pretensión de la actora [Nombre2] , no es el cobro de alimentos en la relación padre-hijo, sino que es distinta, es el reembolso de los alimentos que ella debió pagar por el incumplimiento del demandado, quien no asumió la obligación hasta que le fue impuesta judicialmente una cuota alimentaria. Así se desprende del aparte A) de la petitoria, en la que ella solicita se declare: “... Que el demandado es en deberme el plazo por alimentos atrasados de nuestro hijo por espacio de cinco años y cuatro meses, la suma de dos millones quinientos sesenta mil colones, ya que esa suma se le ha fijado de alimentos en la actualidad y está cobrándose ...” (folio 9). Esta pretensión tiene fundamento en lo dispuesto en el artículo 53, párrafo 2° de la Constitución Política, según el cual, “Los padres tienen con sus hijos habidos fuera del matrimonio las mismas obligaciones que con los nacidos en él.” También, en el artículo 169 inciso 2º del Código de Familia, que establece que tanto el padre como la madre están en la obligación de proveer alimentos a sus hijos menores e incapaces, que comprende sustento, habitación, vestido, asistencia médica, educación, transporte y otros. Por su parte, el numeral 29 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Ley Nº 7739, del 6 de enero de 1998, publicado en La Gaceta Nº 26, del 6 de febrero siguiente, establece el derecho del niño y de la niña a gozar de un desarrollo integral, al disponer lo siguiente: “El padre, la madre o la persona encargada están obligados a velar por el desarrollo físico, intelectual, moral, espiritual y social de sus hijos menores de dieciocho años.” El artículo 37 de esa normativa, remite al Código de Familia y a las leyes conexas –Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias-, en cuanto a la materia alimentaria, y amplía lo que comprende este concepto, al señalar: “Artículo 37°- Derecho a la prestación alimentaria.El derecho a percibir alimentos se garantiza en los términos previstos en el Código de Familia y las leyes conexas. Extraordinariamente, la prestación alimentaria comprenderá, además, el pago de lo siguiente: a) Gastos extraordinarios por concepto de educación, derivados directamente del estudio o la instrucción del beneficiario. b) Gastos médicos extraordinarios, de necesidad notoria y urgente. c) Sepelio del beneficiario. d) Cobro del subsidio prenatal y de lactancia. e) Gastos por terapia o atención especializada, en casos de abuso sexual o violencia doméstica.De lo expuesto se colige que la obligación de los progenitores de brindar alimentos a sus hijos e hijas, es una obligación compartida, tal y como lo establece el numeral 169 inciso 2° del Código de Familia. IV.- SOBRE LA TEORÍA DEL ENRIQUECIMIENTO SIN CAUSA: La educación de los hijos supone gastos, que deben asumir conjuntamente los padres, los que sin duda son insignificantes, en comparación a los cuidados que requieren los menores. En el caso en estudio, si el demandado no cumplió con su obligación de dar alimentos a su hijo, y solamente lo hizo la señora [Nombre2] , debe abonar a ésta la parte de la obligación, que ella durante largo tiempo tuvo que asumir, originada en su incumplimiento, pues no fue hasta que judicialmente se declaró la paternidad, y que luego se le impuso una cuota por alimentos, que lo hizo. Esto con fundamento en lo dispuesto en los artículos 1043 y 1044 del Código Civil. Así lo ha resuelto la Sala, en Voto Nº 574, de las 9:30 horas del 14 de julio de 2004: “ ... VI.- ... Así, la Sala estima procedente la aplicación de los artículos 1.043 y 1.044 del Código Civil, que conforman el Capítulo V, “De los cuasicontratos”, del Título I (Contratos y Cuasicontratos), del Libro IV de dicho cuerpo normativo. La primera norma citada establece: “Los hechos lícitos y voluntarios producen también, sin necesidad de convención, derechos y obligaciones civiles, en cuanto aprovechan o perjudican a terceras personas.” El numeral 1.044 citado indica: “A esta clase de obligaciones pertenecen, entre otras, la gestión de negocios, la administración de una cosa en común, la tutela voluntaria y el pago indebido.”(La negrita y el subrayado son del redactor). Como se ve, esta última norma no excluye la aplicación de otras figuras jurídicas, consideradas como cuasicontratos. La doctrina, por su parte, incluye dentro de este ámbito al enriquecimiento sin causa. Respecto de esta teoría, Messineo explica lo siguiente: “ Otro caso de obligación legal está constituido por el enriquecimiento sin causa ... Se comprenden en la figura del enriquecimiento sin causa ..., los casos en que alguien convierta en beneficio propio un bien ajeno, o se beneficie de alguna actividad ajena (la denominada versión útil o in rem versio) con daño ajeno, sin que exista una razón que justifique el provecho o el beneficio: en otras palabras, sin que exista una relación jurídica, ya constituída, que haga de causa que legitime el provecho, o el beneficio, del enriquecido... /En dicha fórmula, ... entran, también, los casos de enriquecimiento sin la voluntad de otra persona (empobrecido), la falta de voluntad del empobrecido se resuelve en una figura de falta de causa./ La acción de enriquecimiento sin causa, tiende a restablecer el equilibrio entre los dos patrimonios, o sea, a eliminar el indebido enriquecimiento, mediante la demanda de una indemnización./Varios son los presupuestos de la acción de que tratamos. Hace falta: a) ... el enriquecimiento efectivo de un sujeto, o sea, que el patrimonio de él reciba incremento ..., y se considera enriquecimiento también el ahorro de un gasto, o el haber evitado, con propio sacrificio patrimonial, a otro, una pérdida... b) que, a tal incremento para el enriquecido, corresponda una disminución en el patrimonio de otro sujeto (empobrecido)... c) ... una relación de correspondencia entre el enriquecimiento y el empobrecimiento; y, además, un nexo de causalidad entre la disminución patrimonial, sufrida por un sujeto, y la ventaja patrimonial del otro; ... d) es necesario que el enriquecimiento-empobrecimiento ocurra sin causa... Ausencia de causa significa que no existe una relación patrimonial ... que justifique el enriquecimiento-empobrecimiento.../ El efecto del enriquecimiento sin causa es el nacimiento de la obligación de indemnización; por parte del enriquecido, a favor del empobrecido... Finalmente, debe observarse que la indemnización ha de ajustarse a la entidad del enriquecimiento y no puede sobrepasarla...” (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1.955, pp. 465-466). (Sobre el tema, también pueden consultarse BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 808-818 y PLANIOL, Marcel y [Nombre3], Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 812-813) ...” V.- Resolver en sentido contrario a estos postulados, sería consentir el enriquecimiento sin causa que se ha generado a favor del accionado, quien asumió la obligación hasta que judicialmente fue declarada su paternidad y posteriormente se le fijó una cuota alimentaria. En perjuicio de la actora, quien tuvo que satisfacer las necesidades de su hijo desde la concepción y posterior nacimiento. Al respecto, el tratadista [Nombre4] , señala lo siguiente: “hay ciertos hechos que, aun no siendo actos ilícitos, pueden provocar el enriquecimiento injusto de una persona a costa de otra. Entonces nace a cargo de la primera la obligación de, dentro de los límites en que se enriqueció, reparar el perjuicio ocasionado a la segunda. En ese sentido se habla de que es fuente de obligaciones el enriquecimiento injusto o sin causa ... pero, sin duda, es un principio de los que inspira nuestro Ordenamiento el de que el enriquecido injustamente a costa de otro quede obligado a resarcirle. Así lo han reconocido insistentemente la jurisprudencia y la doctrina ... Se requiere: 1.° Un incremento patrimonial de cualquier clase (lo mismo consistente en obtención de lucro que en evitación de gasto o daño) experimentado por una persona. Que no es necesariamente preciso que haya obrado de mala fe ni observado conducta ilícita alguna ..., ya que en el caso del enriquecimiento injusto lo que importa es éste, y no siempre, además, la conducta del enriquecido; 2.° Que tal incremento carezca de razón jurídica que lo fundamente (lo que se expresa diciendo que sea injusto o sin causa); 3.° Que provoque un correlativo empobrecimiento de otro (es decir, que se obtenga a costa de éste) ...”. En cuanto a los efectos, agrega: “A cargo del enriquecido injustamente, y a favor de quien se empobreció, surge –hasta el límite en que haya habido realmente enriquecimiento a costa de empobrecer a aquél- la obligación de, en principio, si es posible, y no hay otras razones que lo excluyan, restituir lo mismo o lo que haya recibido en su lugar; y, en último término, resarcir por el valor del enriquecimiento ... El valor, para que haya verdadero resarcimiento, debe ser actualizado a la fecha en que se resarza ...” (Derecho Civil, Volumen segundo, Derecho de Obligaciones, Los contratos en particular y las obligaciones no contractuales, novena edición, José María Bosch Editor, S.A., Barcelona, 1993, páginas 449 a 452). Conforme a lo expuesto, no existe la infracción a los numerales 595 incisos 1º y 3° del Código Procesal Civil en relación al 96 y 172 del Código de Familia y 34 de la Constitución Política, que se invoca, pues la pretensión de la actora es que el demandado le resarza el valor de los alimentos no cumplidos por él a su hijo, y que debió cubrir ella, por lo que su pretensión no se agota en estas normas, sino que trasciende las disposiciones contenidas en los artículos 96 y 172 del Código de Familia, y encuentran fundamento, entre otros, en los numerales 1043 y 1044 del Código Civil, la doctrina que los fundamenta, y en el enriquecimiento injusto. Tampoco existe violación de los artículos 3, 4 y 5 del Código Procesal Civil, en cuanto a los límites de la interpretación, integración y objetividad de los juzgadores, imparcialidad y trato obligatorio, pues el numeral 3° ibidem, dispone que al interpretar la norma procesal, el juez deberá tomar en cuenta que la finalidad de aquella es dar aplicación a las normas de fondo, y en caso de duda, podrá acudir a los principios generales del Derecho Procesal; y el 4° citado, establece que los casos no previstos en este Código serán regulados con las normas establecidas, ya sea para casos análogos o en sentido contrario; de no ser posible por esos medios, la integración se hará con los principios constitucionales y los generales del Derecho Procesal. VI.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN. El recurrente se muestra inconforme porque se le obligó a pagar alimentos del período comprendido del 6 de abril de 1998 al 20 de junio de 2000, en la suma de un millón quinientos ochenta y ocho mil colones, pues estima que con fundamento en lo dispuesto en el artículo 172 del Código de Familia, no podían cobrarle alimentos pasados más allá de los doce meses anteriores a la demanda. Sin embargo, debe tener presente el casacionista, como se dijo en líneas precedentes, que la actora no cobra alimentos para su hijo, sino que lo que pretende es el reembolso de los que tuvo que asumir durante el tiempo que él no cumplió con esa obligación. Por ello, es que en el caso en estudio, el tema de la responsabilidad en el cumplimiento de los deberes de familia, no puede agotarse con los numerales 96 y 172 del Código de Familia, sino que debe resolverse conforme a una integración del ordenamiento jurídico, de los principios que lo informan y de la jurisprudencia. También, debe responder a los principios de la responsabilidad civil y el enriquecimiento sin causa. Supuestos en que el plazo de prescripción aplicable no es el de doce meses ni el de tres meses, como se alega. En todo caso interesa indicar, que esta Sala en el Voto citado, Nº 2004-00574, en lo relativo a la prescripción, consideró lo siguiente: “... VIII.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCÓN: La parte demandada opuso la excepción de prescripción. Sin lugar a dudas, se está en presencia de la figura de la prescripción negativa; y, en ese sentido, el artículo 865 del Código Civil, señala que “Por la prescripción negativa se pierde un derecho. Para ello basta el transcurso del tiempo.” Al caso concreto, se estima que debe aplicársele la disposición del artículo 868 del Código Civil, que prevé un plazo de diez años; pues la situación no enmarca en alguno de los supuestos de prescripción especial que se prevén en las normas siguientes ...” Sin embargo, como el único apelante es el demandado, y no puede existir reforma en perjuicio, lo resuelto en cuanto a prescripción debe mantenerse. VII.- EN CUANTO AL MONTO DE LA CONDENATORIA: En la sentencia que se recurre, se obliga al accionado a pagar a la señora Jaén Barboza, una indemnización por la manutención del niño [Nombre5] , por el período comprendido del seis de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho al veinte de junio de dos mil (fecha en que se cobró la pensión alimentaria en el trámite regular), en la suma de un millón quinientos ochenta y ocho mil colones, que se indica es el resultado de multiplicar sesenta mil colones por veintiséis meses, lo que objeta el casacionista, al estimar que las realidades suyas y las del menor al momento de fijar la cuota mensual, no eran las mismas, por lo que el parámetro que se utilizó violenta la realidad histórica y económica de las partes. Estima la Sala, que en este particular lleva razón el recurrente, pues debe dejarse la fijación del monto para la etapa de ejecución de sentencia, en la que se valoren las necesidades alimentarias del menor y las posibilidades del demandado, en el período que interese. VIII.- En consecuencia, se anula la sentencia recurrida en cuanto establece el monto de la indemnización en un millón quinientos ochenta y ocho mil colones, el que se deja para cuantificar en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. En todo lo demás, se declara sin lugar el recurso."