Retroactive child support and unjust enrichmentCobro retroactivo de alimentos y enriquecimiento sin causa

**V.- ON THE OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT (ALIMENTOS):** Fatherhood and motherhood are natural and social facts of great transcendence, which give rise to a series of obligations for the parents—material and moral—in relation to the children they procreate. Many of these obligations are duly regulated. Article 64 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) establishes the provisions that paying child support (alimentos) entails, stating: "Child support (alimentos) is understood to mean that which provides sustenance, housing, clothing, medical assistance, education, recreation, transportation, and others..." And in subsection 2) of article 169, it states that both the father and the mother have the obligation to provide child support (alimentos) to their minor or incapacitated children. In the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), Law No. 7.739, of January 6, 1998, published in La Gaceta No. 26, of February 6 following, a series of norms were introduced that strengthen those obligations expressly contained in the first cited code. Thus, in a general manner, article 29 establishes the right of the child to enjoy comprehensive development, stating that "The father, mother, or person in charge is obliged to ensure the physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and social development of their children under eighteen years of age." In article 37 of that same body of norms, it refers to the Family Code (Código de Familia) and related laws—Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias)—regarding child support matters, while expanding the concept of child support (alimentos), in the sense indicated therein, by stating the following: "Article 37°- Right to child support provision (prestación alimentaria). The right to receive child support (alimentos) is guaranteed under the terms provided in the Family Code (Código de Familia) and related laws. Extraordinarily, the child support provision (prestación alimentaria) shall also include the payment of the following: a) Extraordinary expenses for education, derived directly from the study or instruction of the beneficiary. b) Extraordinary medical expenses, of clear and urgent need. c) Funeral of the beneficiary. d) Collection of the prenatal and lactation subsidy. e) Expenses for therapy or specialized care, in cases of sexual abuse or domestic violence. Subsequently, in that same code, a series of norms are provided that undoubtedly develop higher-ranking legislation; especially, that contained in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, in force since November 20, 1959. The protection of minors constitutes, then, a fundamental pillar of the State, as can be inferred from norms 51, 53, 55 and 71 of the Magna Carta. Indeed, the first cited norm states that "The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State. The mother, child, elderly, and the helpless sick shall also have the right to that protection." As provided in constitutional article 53, "parents have with respect to their children born out of wedlock the same obligations as with those born within it." Consequently, in the case under analysis, the obligation that the defendant had regarding his son is clear. It is, without a doubt, a shared obligation between both parents, as stated in the second subsection of article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia).

**VI.- THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ENRIQUECIMIENTO SIN CAUSA) SUPPORTS THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM:** As indicated, the obligation to provide child support (alimentos) to the children, in the broad sense of the term, constitutes a shared obligation between the father and the mother, as can be inferred from the cited legal provision. The responsibility for the procreation of a child is, therefore, one of a shared nature between both parents, both morally and materially. Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) refer to the retroactive collection of child support (alimentos). The former stated that "When the Court upholds the action for declaration of paternity, it may in the judgment order the father to reimburse the mother according to principles of equity, the maternity expenses and the child support (alimentos) for the child during the three months following the birth"; and, currently, subsequent to the reform introduced by the Responsible Paternity Law (Ley de Paternidad Responsable), No. 8.101, in force since April 27, 2001, said period was increased to twelve months after birth. The second numeral, for its part, establishes that "Past child support (alimentos) cannot be collected for more than twelve months prior to the lawsuit, and those in the event that the obligee (alimentario) has had to incur debts to live. All without prejudice to the provisions of article 96." The first numeral refers to a situation of reimbursement of expenses by one parent to the other. The second norm establishes a relationship between obligee (alimentario) and obligor (alimentante). The former, which is the one that actually matters to the case, does not exclude the possibility of demanding liability by one spouse from the other, based on the full application of the legal order, and the wording of the norm aims to facilitate said collection, at least for the period indicated therein, but never to exclude the possibility of filing the claim through another procedural route, when it finds protection in the legal order, as will be explained later. It can be seen that, in this matter, the trend of the legislator has been to provide greater protection to the needy. Thus, for example, although it concerns the relationship between obligor (alimentante) and obligee (alimentario), the reform introduced to numeral 167 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) shows this evolution in the thought of the legislator and also of the doctrine. Said norm, before the reform introduced by law No. 7.654, of December 19, 1996, stated: "The right to request child support (alimentos) cannot be waived, nor transferred in any way. The debt for current child support (alimentos) is not compensable." After the modification, currently, as relevant, it establishes: "The right to child support (alimentos) cannot be waived or transferred in any way. The child support (alimentaria) obligation is imprescriptible, highly personal, and incompensable. /..." It follows, then, the intention to provide the exercise of these actions with more guarantee-oriented norms and not ones that limit the exercise of the right. Thus, the Chamber deems applicable Articles 1,043 and 1,044 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which make up Chapter V, "Of Quasi-Contracts (cuasicontratos)", of Title I (Contracts and Quasi-Contracts), of Book IV of said normative body. The first cited norm establishes: "Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third persons." The cited numeral 1,044 indicates: "To this class of obligations belong, among others, the management of affairs, the administration of a thing in common, voluntary guardianship (tutela voluntaria) and undue payment (pago indebido)." (The bolding and underlining are by the drafter). As can be seen, this last norm does not exclude the application of other legal concepts, considered as quasi-contracts (cuasicontratos). The doctrine, for its part, includes unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) within this scope.

Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: "Another case of legal obligation is constituted by unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa)... Included in the concept of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) ... are the cases in which someone converts another's property for their own benefit, or benefits from another's activity (the so-called useful version or in rem versio) to the detriment of another, without there being a reason that justifies the profit or the benefit: in other words, without there being a legal relationship, already constituted, which serves as a cause legitimizing the profit, or the benefit, of the enriched party.../ Said formula ... also includes cases of enrichment without the will of another person (impoverished party), the lack of will of the impoverished party resolving into a concept of lack of cause./ The action for unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) tends to reestablish the equilibrium between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, through the demand for an indemnity./ Several are the prerequisites for the action we are dealing with. It requires: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that his estate receives an increment ..., and enrichment is also considered the saving of an expense, or having avoided, with one's own financial sacrifice, a loss for another... b) that, to such an increment for the enriched party, corresponds a diminution in the estate of another subject (impoverished party)... c) ... a relationship of correspondence between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, furthermore, a nexus of causality between the financial diminution suffered by one subject and the financial advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occurs without cause... Absence of cause means that there is no financial relationship ... that justifies the enrichment-impoverishment... /The effect of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) is the birth of the obligation of indemnity; on the part of the enriched party, in favor of the impoverished party... Finally, it must be observed that the indemnity must be adjusted to the extent of the enrichment and cannot exceed it..." (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1955, pp. 465-466). (On the subject, see also BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel and [Nombre1], Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 812-813).

In the specific case, it is clear that the plaintiff was compelled to assume entirely the obligation that derived from the conception and subsequent birth of her son. Consequently, and leaving aside what refers to the field of comprehensive development, she had to assume, by her own means, the maintenance of the child. The defendant, who by law should have shared said obligation, did not do so until his paternity was judicially declared and he was later ordered to pay a child support (alimentaria) amount. Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the plaintiff is legitimized to demand from the defendant the indemnification of the expenses that proportionally corresponded to him and that she had to assume in their entirety; for, without a doubt, the defendant was benefited and the plaintiff's estate impoverished, without any cause that would justify such situation.

**VII.- THE IMPROPER ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE:** On the other hand, the appellant's claim is deemed correct, insofar as he alleges an improper assessment of the evidentiary elements contained in the case file, although the reference he makes to article 330 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is not appropriate; since, in family matters, there is a special norm that establishes that "... judges in family matters shall interpret the evidence without subjection to the positive rules of common evidence, considering all the circumstances and elements of conviction that the case file provides; but in all cases, the reasons for the assessment must be recorded." In the specific case, the statements of [Nombre2] (folio 90) and [Nombre3] (folio 91) were produced. The members of the appellate court removed validity from their depositions, insofar as they stated that the defendant had left for Limón and did not return, despite the knowledge he had of the pregnancy; because they considered that such appreciation was only known to them from the plaintiff's account. However, said statements, analyzed in light of experience, are deemed true; since, not infrequently, it happens that the man, upon learning that the woman with whom he has had relations has become pregnant, evades his responsibility. But, in addition to this, among the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff with the initial filing, is the judgment of this Chamber, number 44, of 14:40 hours on February 24, 1999, where the transcript of the testimony of Mr. [Nombre4] appears, which served to support the declaration of paternity established therein and from which it clearly follows that the defendant did know of the existence of his son. As relevant, said witness had stated: "Suddenly a tall, thin man with glasses approached; he asked me if I worked at the [Dirección1], and if I, by chance, knew [Nombre5]. I answered yes, that we were on the same floor; then, he says: 'It's that she and I have a son.' He asked me if I could do him the favor, since he traveled a lot to Limón, that he worked in real estate; how could he communicate with her; to reach an arrangement, if I could do him the favor of delivering a little card..." (See folio 26). Consequently, even with the application of the legal concept of extra-contractual civil liability made by the members of the appellate court, the plaintiff's petition should have been granted; since, the element that was deemed missing, which was the defendant's knowledge, did exist, as follows from the evidence reviewed.

**VIII.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):** The defendant party raised the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción). Without a doubt, we are in the presence of the concept of negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa); and, in that sense, article 865 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states that "By negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) a right is lost. For this, the passage of time is sufficient." For the specific case, it is deemed that the provision of article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) must be applied, which provides for a ten-year term; since the situation does not fit into any of the special statute of limitations (prescripción) cases provided for in the following norms. Then, it is clear that the plaintiff did not pursue the sought-after compensation until August 23, 2000, when she filed her lawsuit. Article 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states that "Any statute of limitations (prescripción) is interrupted civilly: /1° By the tacit or express acknowledgment that the possessor or debtor makes in favor of the owner or creditor of the property or right that is sought to be subject to statute of limitations (prescribe); and / 2° By the judicial summons (emplazamiento), seizure (embargo) or attachment (secuestro) notified to the possessor or debtor." In the following numeral 879, it is indicated that "The negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) is also interrupted by any judicial or extrajudicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation." For its part, article 296 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), as relevant, provides: "The effects of the summons (emplazamiento) are material and procedural, and they are produced from the date of notification thereof. / The material effects are the following: / a) To interrupt the statute of limitations (prescripción). / ..." In the specific case, in accordance with the application made of these norms, it was not until the notification of the summons (emplazamiento) that the defendant then became aware of the collection action brought by the plaintiff; that is, on March 28, 2001 (see record on folio 47 back). Consequently, the right is retroactive to March 28, 1991. All the child support (alimentos) that the plaintiff had to pay from that date backwards until the birth of the child, cannot be effectively granted to the plaintiff, as the negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) operated, to her detriment. On the other hand, the plaintiff stated that as of March 1999, by judicial resolution, the defendant assumed his child support (alimentaria) obligation regarding the child. Consequently, from that date until March 28, 2001, the defendant did assume his obligation, proportionally; for this reason, during this period, the plaintiff did not have to cover the part of the child support (alimentos) that corresponded to him and which is what constitutes the basis of her claim. It is clear, then, that what is owed runs from March 28, 1991, and up to February 1999, inclusive.

**IX.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the foregoing, it is deemed that the appealed judgment must be revoked. In its place, it is appropriate to partially uphold the statute of limitations (prescripción) defense and to declare the petition of the lawsuit admissible, also partially. Thus, the defendant must be ordered to indemnify the plaintiff for the proportion of the expenses that she had to cover for the child's maintenance and that he was supposed to pay, which can be set at fifty percent of the total maintenance expenses of the child; since, the obligation being joint, each one had to assume their portion, corresponding to the period between March 28, 1991, and up to February 28, 1999. The determination must be made in the execution stage of the judgment, by means of an expert, without the set sum being able to exceed three million colones, at which the lawsuit was estimated. As indicated, it is appropriate to uphold the statute of limitations (prescripción) defense, regarding the expenses whose compensation is sought, from the date of the child's birth –October 6, 1983– until March 27, 1991. Regarding the interest, in accordance with articles 651 and 1,163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), the order requested by the plaintiff is appropriate. Assuming that the defendant was supposed to pay a monthly child support (alimentaria) amount, as he was obliged to do as of March 1999, it must be established that the interest must be paid as the obligations arose in legal life and according to the percentage that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica paid at each moment for six-month term certificates of deposit. It is also appropriate to order the losing party to pay both sets of court costs (costas), in application of the provisions of article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). The defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación), lack of interest (falta de interés), and the generic sine actione agit –encompassing the three previous ones– must be denied; since it is clear that the plaintiff has the right to demand the sought-after indemnity; she claimed it with respect to the person obliged to indemnify her, having assumed the fulfillment of an obligation that the defendant deliberately did not fulfill, and because there is interest in exercising her claim.

Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: “Another case of legal obligation is constituted by unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa)... Included within the concept of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) ... are cases in which someone converts another’s property into their own benefit, or benefits from another’s activity (the so-called beneficial version or in rem versio) to the detriment of another, without there being a reason justifying the gain or benefit: in other words, without there being an existing legal relationship that serves as the cause legitimizing the enrichment (enriquecido)’s gain or benefit.../In this formula, ... cases of enrichment without the will of the other person (impoverished party (empobrecido)) are also included; the lack of will of the impoverished party (empobrecido) results in a form of lack of cause./ The action for unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) aims to restore the balance between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, by means of a claim for compensation./There are several prerequisites for the action we are dealing with. The following are required: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that their estate receives an increase ..., and saving an expense, or having prevented a loss for another by means of one’s own patrimonial sacrifice, is also considered enrichment... b) that, to such increase for the enriched party (enriquecido), there corresponds a decrease in the estate of another subject (impoverished party (empobrecido))... c) ... a relationship of correspondence between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, in addition, a causal link between the patrimonial decrease suffered by one subject and the patrimonial advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occurs without cause... Absence of cause means that there is no patrimonial relationship ... justifying the enrichment-impoverishment.../The effect of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) is the birth of an obligation of compensation; on the part of the enriched party (enriquecido), in favor of the impoverished party (empobrecido)... Finally, it must be observed that the compensation must be adjusted to the extent of the enrichment and cannot exceed it...” (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Volume VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1955, pp. 465-466). (On the subject, see also BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel and RIPERT, Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 812-813).

In the specific case, it is clear that the plaintiff was compelled to fully assume the obligation that derived from the conception and subsequent birth of her son. Consequently, and leaving aside that which refers to the field of comprehensive development, she had to assume, by her own means, the child's maintenance. The defendant, who by law should have shared said obligation, did not do so until his paternity was judicially declared and he was subsequently ordered to pay a child support (cuota alimentaria) payment. Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the plaintiff has standing to claim from the defendant compensation for the expenses that corresponded to him proportionally and that she had to assume in their entirety; since, without a doubt, the defendant was benefited and the plaintiff's estate impoverished, without any cause justifying such a situation.

**VII.- THE IMPROPER WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE:** On the other hand, the appellant's claim is considered correct, in that it alleges an improper weighing of the evidentiary elements that appear in the record, although the reference it makes to Article 330 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is not appropriate; because, in family matters, there is a special rule that establishes that *“... judges in family matters shall interpret the evidence without subjection to the positive rules of common evidence, considering all the circumstances and elements of conviction that the record provides; but in any case, the reasons for the evaluation must be stated.”* In the specific case, the statements of [Name2] (folio 90) and [Name3] (folio 91) were taken. The members of the appellate body deprived their depositions of validity, insofar as they stated that the defendant had gone to Limón and did not return, despite his knowledge of the pregnancy; because they considered that such an assessment was only known to them through the plaintiff's word. Nevertheless, these statements, analyzed in light of experience, are deemed true; because, not infrequently, it happens that a man, upon learning that the woman with whom he has had relations has become pregnant, evades his responsibility.

But, in addition to that, among the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff with the initial brief, is the judgment of this Chamber, number 44, of 2:40 p.m. on February 24, 1999, which contains the transcript of the testimony of Mr. [Name4], which served to support the declaration of paternity established therein and from which it clearly emerges that the defendant did indeed know of the existence of his son. In pertinent part, said witness had stated: *“Suddenly, a tall, thin man with glasses approached; he asked me if I worked at [Office1] , and if I, by any chance, knew [Name5] . I answered yes, that we were on the same floor; then, he says to me: ‘It’s just that she and I have a son together.’ He asked me if I could do him the favor, since he traveled a lot to Limón, that he worked in real estate; that how could he communicate with her; to reach an agreement, if I could do him the favor of giving her a little card...”* (See folio 26). Consequently, even with the application of the legal concept of non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) made by the members of the appellate body, the plaintiff's claim should have been granted; because the element that was missed, namely the defendant's knowledge, did exist, as emerges from the evidence reviewed.

**VIII.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):** The defendant raised the exception of the statute of limitations (prescripción). Without a doubt, this involves the concept of negative prescription (prescripción negativa); and, in that sense, Article 865 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states that *“By negative prescription (prescripción negativa) a right is lost. For this, the mere passage of time is sufficient.”* In this specific case, it is deemed that the provision of Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which provides for a ten-year period, must be applied; because the situation does not fall within any of the special prescription (prescripción) scenarios provided for in the following rules. It is then clear that the plaintiff did not pursue the redress sought until August 23 of the year 2000, when she filed her claim. Article 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states that *“All prescription (prescripción) is civilly interrupted: /1° By the tacit or express acknowledgment that the possessor or debtor makes in favor of the owner or creditor of the property or right that is sought to be prescribed; and / 2° By the judicial summons (emplazamiento), seizure, or attachment notified to the possessor or debtor.”* The following numeral 879 indicates that *“Negative prescription (prescripción negativa) is also interrupted by any judicial or extrajudicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation.”* For its part, Article 296 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), in what is relevant, provides: *“The effects of the summons (emplazamiento) are material and procedural, and they are produced from the date of notification thereof./The material effects are the following: / a) To interrupt the statute of limitations (prescripción). / ...”* In this specific case, in accordance with the application made of those rules, it was not until the notification of the summons (emplazamiento) that the defendant became aware of the collection action filed by the plaintiff; that is, on March 28, 2001 (see proof at the reverse of folio 47). Consequently, the right dates back to March 28, 1991. All the child support (alimentos) that the plaintiff had to pay from that date backwards until the child's birth cannot be effectively granted to the plaintiff, as the negative prescription (prescripción negativa) operated, to her detriment. On the other hand, the plaintiff indicated that starting in March 1999, by judicial resolution, the defendant assumed his child support obligation (obligación alimentaria) regarding the child. Consequently, from that date until March 28, 2001, the defendant did assume his obligation, proportionally; for which reason, during this period, the plaintiff did not have to cover the part of child support (alimentos) that corresponded to him and which constitutes the basis of her claim. It is clear, then, that what is owed runs from March 28, 1991, through February 1999, inclusive.

**IX.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the foregoing, it is deemed that the challenged decision must be overturned. In its place, it is appropriate to partially grant the exception of the statute of limitations (prescripción) and to declare the petition valid, also partially. Thus, the defendant must be ordered to compensate the plaintiff for the proportion of the expenses that she had to cover for the child's maintenance and that it was up to him to pay, which can be established at fifty percent of the total child maintenance expenses; since, the obligation being joint, each had to assume their share, corresponding to the period between March 28, 1991, and February 28, 1999. The determination must be made in the judgment execution stage, by an expert, without the fixed sum being able to exceed the three million colones at which the claim was estimated. As indicated, it is appropriate to grant the exception of the statute of limitations (prescripción) regarding the expenses whose recovery is sought from the date of the child's birth –October 6, 1983– until March 27, 1991. As for interest, in accordance with Articles 651 and 1,163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), the award claimed by the plaintiff is proper. Based on the assumption that the defendant was required to pay a monthly child support (cuota alimentaria) payment, as he was obliged to do starting in March 1999, it must be established that the interest shall be paid as the obligations arose in legal life and according to the percentage paid at each moment by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit.

It is also appropriate to order the losing party to pay both sets of costs (costas), in application of the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). The exceptions of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación), lack of interest (falta de interés), and the generic sine actione agit –encompassing the three previous ones– must be denied; because it is clear that the plaintiff has the right to demand the compensation sought; she claimed it from the person obligated to compensate her, having herself assumed the fulfillment of an obligation that the defendant deliberately did not fulfill, and because there is an interest in pursuing her claim.” Thus, in a general manner, Article 29 establishes the right of the child to enjoy integral development, stating that "</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">The father, mother, or person in charge is obligated to ensure the physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and social development of their children under eighteen years of age."</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Article 37 of that same body of rules refers to the Family Code and related laws –the Alimony Law– with respect to support matters, while also expanding the concept of support, in the sense indicated therein, by stating the following:</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Article 37°- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Right to support payments.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> The right to receive support is guaranteed under the terms provided in the Family Code and related laws.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Extraordinarily, the support payment (prestación alimentaria) shall also include payment for the following:</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">a) Extraordinary educational expenses, derived directly from the beneficiary’s study or instruction.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">b) Extraordinary medical expenses, of obvious and urgent need.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">c) Burial of the beneficiary.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">d) Collection of the prenatal and breastfeeding subsidy.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">e) Expenses for therapy or specialized care, in cases of sexual abuse or domestic violence.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Subsequently, the same code provides a series of rules that undoubtedly develop higher-ranking norms, especially those contained in the Political Constitution and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, in force since November 20, 1959. The protection of minors constitutes, then, a fundamental pillar of the State, as can be inferred from Articles</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> 51, 53, 55, and 71 of the Magna Carta. Indeed, the first cited norm states that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to special protection from the State. The mother, the child, the elderly, and the helpless sick shall likewise have the right to that protection.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">As provided in Article 53 of the Constitution, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“parents have the same obligations towards their children born out of wedlock as towards those born within it.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Therefore, in the case under analysis, the obligation that the defendant had towards his son is clear. It is, without a doubt, a shared obligation between both parents, as stated in the second paragraph of Article 169 of the Family Code. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VI.- THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT SUPPORTS THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM:</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> As indicated, the obligation to provide support to sons or daughters, in the broad sense of the term, constitutes a shared obligation between the father and the mother, as can be inferred from the cited legal provision. The responsibility for procreation of a child is, therefore, one of a shared nature between both parents, both morally and materially. Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code refer to the retroactive collection of support. The first stated that “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">When the Court upholds the paternity declaration action, it may in the judgment order the father to reimburse the mother, according to principles of equity, for maternity expenses and support of the child during the three months following birth”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">; and, currently, after the reform introduced by the Responsible Paternity Law, No. 8.101, in force since April 27, 2001, said period was increased to twelve months after birth. The second article, for its part, establishes that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Past support may not be collected for more than twelve months prior to the claim, and only in the event that the support recipient (alimentario) had to incur debts to survive. All without prejudice to the provisions of Article 96.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">The first article refers to a situation of reimbursement of expenses from one parent to the other. The second rule establishes a relationship between the support recipient (alimentario) and the support provider (alimentante). The first, which is the one actually relevant to the case, does not exclude the possibility of demanding liability from one parent to the other, based on the full application of the legal system, and the wording of the norm aims to facilitate such collection, at least for the period indicated therein, but never to exclude the possibility of filing the claim through another procedural avenue, when it finds protection in the legal order, as will be explained later. Note that, in this matter, the legislator’s tendency has been to provide greater protection to the needy.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Thus, for example, although it concerns the relationship between the support provider (alimentante) and the support recipient (alimentario), the reform introduced to Article 167 of the Family Code illustrates this evolution in the thinking of the legislator and also in legal doctrine. Said norm, before the reform introduced by Law No. 7.654, of December 19, 1996, stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“The right to claim support cannot be waived, nor transmitted in any way. The debt for present support is not subject to set-off”. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">After the amendment, currently, in the relevant part, it establishes: “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">The right to support may not be waived nor transmitted in any way. The support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is imprescriptible, strictly personal, and not subject to set-off</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> /...</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> The intention to provide more protective norms, rather than ones that limit the exercise of the right, for the pursuit of these actions can thus be inferred. Therefore, the Chamber deems the application of Articles 1.043 and 1.044 of the Civil Code, which comprise Chapter V, “Of quasi-contracts (cuasicontratos)”, of Title I (Contracts and Quasi-contracts (Contratos y Cuasicontratos)), of Book IV of that body of law, to be appropriate. The first cited norm establishes: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third persons.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">The cited Article 1.044 indicates: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“To this class of obligations belong, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">among others</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">, the management of affairs, the administration of a common thing, voluntary guardianship, and undue payment.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(The bold text and underline are the drafter’s). As can be seen, this last norm does not exclude the application of other legal concepts, considered as quasi-contracts (cuasicontratos). Legal doctrine, for its part, includes unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) within this scope. Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Another case of legal obligation is constituted by unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa)... Included within the concept of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) ..., are cases in which someone converts another’s property for their own benefit, or benefits from another’s activity (the so-called versión útil or in rem versio) to the detriment of another, without a reason justifying the advantage or benefit: in other words, without a legal relationship, already constituted, serving as the cause (causa) legitimizing the advantage, or benefit, of the enriched person.../Within said formula, ... also fall cases of enrichment without the will of the other person (the impoverished party), the lack of will of the impoverished party resolves into a case of absence of cause./ The action for unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) aims to re-establish the equilibrium between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, through a claim for compensation./The prerequisites for the action we are dealing with are several. They require: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that their estate receive an increase ..., and enrichment is also considered to be the saving of an expense, or having prevented a loss for another through one’s own estate sacrifice... b) that, to such an increase for the enriched party, there corresponds a decrease in the estate of another subject (the impoverished party)... c) ... a relationship of correspondence between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, furthermore, a causal link between the estate decrease suffered by one subject and the estate advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occur without cause (causa)... Absence of cause (causa) means that there is no estate relationship ... that justifies the enrichment-impoverishment.../The effect of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) is the creation of the obligation to compensate; on the part of the enriched party, in favor of the impoverished party... Finally, it should be noted that the compensation must be adjusted to the amount of the enrichment and cannot exceed it...” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(MESSINEO, Francesco. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Manual of Civil and Commercial Law</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, Volume VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1955, pp. 465-466). (On the topic, one may also consult BONNECASE, Julien, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Elementary Treatise of Civil Law</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel y [Nombre1], Georges, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Civil Law</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 812-813).</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> In the specific case, it is clear that the plaintiff was compelled to fully assume the obligation that derived from the conception and subsequent birth of her son. Consequently, and leaving aside what pertains to the field of integral development, she had to bear, by her own means, the maintenance of the child. The defendant, who by law should have shared this obligation, did not do so until his paternity was judicially declared and he was subsequently ordered to pay a support payment (cuota alimentaria). Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the plaintiff has legal standing (legitimada) to claim from the defendant compensation for the expenses that proportionally corresponded to him and that she had to assume in their entirety; for, without a doubt, the defendant was benefited and the plaintiff’s estate impoverished, without any cause (causa) that justified such a situation. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\"> THE IMPROPER ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE:</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Furthermore, the appellant’s claim is considered correct, insofar as it alleges an improper assessment of the evidentiary elements contained in the case file, although the reference it makes to Article 330 of the Civil Code is not appropriate; because, in family matters, there is a special rule establishing that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“... judges in family matters shall interpret evidence without subjection to the positive rules of common evidence, taking into account all circumstances and elements of conviction that the case file provides; but in all cases, the reasons for the assessment must be stated in the record.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In the specific case, the witness statements of [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(folio 90) and [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(folio 91) were given. The members of the appellate body diminished the validity of their statements, insofar as they testified that the defendant had gone to Limón and did not return, despite knowing of the pregnancy; because they considered that such an assessment was only known to them through the plaintiff’s account. However, those statements, analyzed in light of experience, are considered true; because, not infrequently, it happens that a man, upon learning that the woman with whom he has had relations has become pregnant, evades his responsibility.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> But, in addition to this, among the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff along with the initial pleading, is the judgment of this Chamber, number 44, of 2:40 p.m. on February 24, 1999, which contains the transcript of the witness testimony of Mr. [Nombre4]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, which served to support the declaration of paternity established therein and from which it clearly emerges that the defendant did know of the existence of his son. In the relevant part, said witness had stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Then a tall, thin gentleman with glasses approached; he asked me if I worked at the [Dirección1], and if I, by chance, knew [Nombre5]. I replied that yes, we were on the same floor; then, he tells me: ‘It’s just that she and I have a son.’</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">He asked me if I could do him the favor, since he traveled a lot to Limón, and he worked in real estate; how he could communicate with her; to reach an arrangement, if I could do him the favor of delivering a little card...” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(See folio 26). Consequently, even with the application of the legal concept of tort liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) made by the members of the appellate body, the plaintiff’s petition should have been granted; because the element that was considered missing, that is, the defendant's knowledge, did exist, as shown by the evidence reviewed.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VIII.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> The defendant raised the defense of the statute of limitations (prescripción). Without any doubt, this involves the concept of negative prescription (prescripción negativa); and, in that sense, Article 865 of the Civil Code states that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“By negative prescription (prescripción negativa) a right is lost.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> For this, the mere passage of time is sufficient.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In this specific case, it is considered that the provision of Article 868 of the Civil Code, which provides for a ten-year period, must be applied; because the situation does not fit any of the cases of special prescription (prescripción especial) provided for in the subsequent rules. Accordingly, it is clear that the plaintiff did not pursue the sought-after compensation until August 23, 2000, when she filed her claim. Article 876 of the Civil Code states that “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">All</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">prescription (prescripción) is interrupted civilly: /1° By the tacit or express acknowledgment that the possessor or debtor makes in favor of the owner or creditor of the property or right sought to be prescribed; and / 2° By the judicial summons, attachment, or seizure notified to the possessor or debtor.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Article 879 following indicates that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Negative prescription (prescripción negativa) is also interrupted by any judicial or extrajudicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">For its part, Article 296 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the relevant part, provides: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“The effects of the summons are material and procedural,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> and are produced from the date of its notification./The material effects are the following: / a) Interrupt the prescription (prescripción). / ...” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In the specific case, in accordance with the application made of those rules, it was not until the notification of the summons that the defendant thus became aware of the collection action filed by the plaintiff; that is, March 28, 2001 (see proof at folio 47 verso). Consequently, the right relates back to March 28, 1991. All support that the plaintiff had to pay from that date and backward until the child’s birth cannot be effectively granted to the plaintiff, because the negative prescription (prescripción negativa) operated to her detriment. Furthermore, the plaintiff indicated that as of March 1999, by judicial resolution, the defendant assumed his support obligation regarding the child. Consequently, from that date until March 28, 2001, the defendant did assume his obligation, proportionally; for this reason, during this period, the plaintiff did not have to cover the portion of support that corresponded to him, which constitutes the basis of her claim. It is clear, then, that the amount owed runs from March 28, 1991, to February 1999, inclusive.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">IX.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> In accordance with the foregoing, it is considered that the challenged ruling must be reversed. In its place, it is appropriate to partially uphold the defense of the statute of limitations (prescripción) and to declare the claim admissible, also in part. Thus, the defendant must be ordered to compensate the plaintiff for the proportion of expenses that she had to cover for the child's maintenance and that corresponded to him to pay, which may be set at fifty percent of the total child maintenance expenses; since, the obligation being joint, each one should have assumed their share, corresponding to the period between March 28, 1991, and up to February 28, 1999. The determination shall be made in the enforcement stage of the judgment, through an expert, without the sum set exceeding three million colones, at which the claim was valued. As indicated, it is appropriate to uphold the defense of the statute of limitations (prescripción), regarding the expenses whose compensation is sought, from the date of the child’s birth –October 6, 1983– until March 27, 1991. As for interest, in accordance with Articles 651 and 1.163 of the Civil Code, the award claimed by the plaintiff is appropriate. Starting from the premise that the defendant was responsible for paying a monthly support payment (cuota alimentaria), as he was obligated to do as of March 1999, it must be established that the interest shall be paid as the obligations emerged into legal life and according to the percentage that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica paid at each moment for six-month certificates of deposit.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> It is also appropriate to order the losing party to pay both sets of costs, in application of the provisions of Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defenses of lack of right, lack of standing (falta de legitimación), lack of interest, and the generic sine actione agit –encompassing the three previous ones– must be denied; because it is clear that the plaintiff has the right to demand the compensation sought; she claimed it against the person obligated to compensate her, having assumed the fulfillment of an obligation that the defendant deliberately failed to perform, and because there is an interest in pursuing her claim.</span><span>\"</span>

"V.- SOBRE LA OBLIGACIÓN DE PAGAR ALIMENTOS: La paternidad y la maternidad son hechos naturales y sociales de gran trascendencia, que hacen surgir para los progenitores una serie de obligaciones –materiales y morales- en relación con los o las hijas que procreen. Muchas de esas obligaciones están debidamente regladas. El artículo 64 del Código de Familia establece las prestaciones que conlleva pagar alimentos y en ese sentido señala: “Se entiende por alimentos lo que provea sustento, habitación, vestido, asistencia médica, educación, diversión, transporte y otros...” Y en el inciso 2) del artículo 169, señala que tanto el padre como la madre están en la obligación de proveer alimentos a sus hijos (as) menores o incapaces. En el Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Ley N° 7.739, del 6 de enero de 1.998, publicada en La Gaceta N° 26, del 6 de febrero siguiente, se introdujeron una serie de normas que vienen a fortalecer aquellas obligaciones contenidas expresamente en el primer código citado. Así, de manera general, en el artículo 29 se establece el derecho del niño o de la niña a gozar de un desarrollo integral, señalándose que “El padre, la madre o la persona encargada están obligados a velar por el desarrollo físico, intelectual, moral, espiritual y social de sus hijos menores de dieciocho años.” En el artículo 37 de ese mismo cuerpo de normas, se remite al Código de Familia y a las leyes conexas –Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias-, en cuanto a la materia alimentaria, al tiempo que amplía el concepto de alimentos, en el sentido que ahí se indica, al señalarle lo siguiente: “Artículo 37°- Derecho a la prestación alimentaria. El derecho a percibir alimentos se garantiza en los términos previstos en el Código de Familia y las leyes conexas. Extraordinariamente, la prestación alimentaria comprenderá, además, el pago de lo siguiente: a) Gastos extraordinarios por concepto de educación, derivados directamente del estudio o la instrucción del beneficiario. b) Gastos médicos extraordinarios, de necesidad notoria y urgente. c) Sepelio del beneficiario. d) Cobro del subsidio prenatal y de lactancia. e) Gastos por terapia o atención especializada, en casos de abuso sexual o violencia doméstica. Luego, en ese mismo código se prevén una serie de normas que, sin duda alguna, vienen a desarrollar normativa de mayor rango; en especial, la contenida en la Constitución Política y en la Declaración de los Derechos del Niño, vigente desde el 20 de noviembre de 1.959. La protección de las personas menores de edad constituye, entonces, un pilar fundamental del Estado, según se desprende de las normas 51, 53, 55 y 71 de la Carta Magna. En efecto, la primera norma citada señala que “La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado. Igualmente tendrán derecho a esa protección la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido.” Tal y como se dispone en el artículo 53 constitucional, “los padres tienen con sus hijos habidos fuera del matrimonio las mismas obligaciones que con los nacidos en él.” Por consiguiente, en el caso bajo análisis, está clara la obligación que el accionado tenía respecto de su hijo. Se trata, sin duda, de una obligación compartida entre ambos progenitores, tal y como se señala en el inciso segundo del artículo 169 del Código de Familia. VI.- LA TEORÍA DEL ENRIQUECIMIENTO SIN CAUSA AMPARA EL RECLAMO DE LA ACTORA: Como se indicó, la obligación de brindar alimentos a los hijos o a las hijas, en el sentido amplio del término, constituye una obligación compartida entre el padre y la madre, según se desprende de la citada disposición legal. La responsabilidad por la pro-creación de un hijo, es entonces una de naturaleza compartida entre ambos progenitores, tanto en lo moral, como en lo material. Los artículos 96 y 172 del Código de Familia hacen referencia al cobro de alimentos en forma retroactiva. El primero señalaba que “Cuando el Tribunal acoja la acción de declaración de paternidad podrá en la sentencia condenar al padre a reembolsar a la madre según principios de equidad, los gastos de maternidad y los alimentos del hijo durante los tres meses que han seguido al nacimiento”; y, actualmente, con posterioridad a la reforma introducida por la Ley de Paternidad Responsable, N° 8.101, vigente desde el 27 de abril del 2.001, dicho plazo se aumentó hasta doce meses después del nacimiento. El segundo numeral, por su parte, establece que “No pueden cobrarse alimentos pasados, más que por doce meses anteriores a la demanda, y esos en caso de que el alimentario haya tenido que contraer deudas para vivir. Todo sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto por el artículo 96.” El primer numeral refiere una situación de reembolso de gastos de un progenitor respecto del otro. La segunda norma establece una relación entre alimentario y alimentante. La primera, que es la que en realidad al caso interesa, no excluye la posibilidad de exigir responsabilidad, un cónyuge al otro, con base en la aplicación plena del ordenamiento jurídico y la redacción de la norma lo que pretende es facilitar dicho cobro, por lo menos por el período ahí señalado, pero nunca excluir la posibilidad de plantear el reclamo, por otra vía procesal, cuando éste encuentra amparo en el orden legal, tal y como más adelante se explicará. Véase que, en esta materia, la tendencia del legislador ha sido la de proveer mayor tutela al necesitado. Así, por ejemplo, aunque se trata de la relación entre alimentante y alimentario, la reforma introducida al numeral 167 del Código de Familia muestra esa evolución en el pensamiento del legislador y también de la doctrina. Dicha norma, antes de la reforma introducida por la ley N° 7.654, del 19 de diciembre de 1.996, señalaba: “El derecho a pedir alimentos no puede renunciarse, ni trasmitirse de modo alguno. No es compensable la deuda de alimentos presentes”. Con posterioridad a la modificación, en la actualidad, en lo que interesa, establece: “El derecho a los alimentos no podrá renunciarse ni transmitirse de modo alguno. La obligación alimentaria es imprescriptible, personalísima e incompensable. /...” Se desprende, entonces, la intención de proveer al ejercicio de estas acciones, normas más garantistas y no limitadoras del ejercicio del derecho. Así, la Sala estima procedente la aplicación de los artículos 1.043 y 1.044 del Código Civil, que conforman el Capítulo V, “De los cuasicontratos”, del Título I (Contratos y Cuasicontratos), del Libro IV de dicho cuerpo normativo. La primera norma citada establece: “Los hechos lícitos y voluntarios producen también, sin necesidad de convención, derechos y obligaciones civiles, en cuanto aprovechan o perjudican a terceras personas.” El numeral 1.044 citado indica: “A esta clase de obligaciones pertenecen, entre otras, la gestión de negocios, la administración de una cosa en común, la tutela voluntaria y el pago indebido.” (La negrita y el subrayado son del redactor). Como se ve, esta última norma no excluye la aplicación de otras figuras jurídicas, consideradas como cuasicontratos. La doctrina, por su parte, incluye dentro de este ámbito al enriquecimiento sin causa. Respecto de esta teoría, Messineo explica lo siguiente: “ Otro caso de obligación legal está constituido por el enriquecimiento sin causa... Se comprenden en la figura del enriquecimiento sin causa ..., los casos en que alguien convierta en beneficio propio un bien ajeno, o se beneficie de alguna actividad ajena (la denominada versión útil o in rem versio) con daño ajeno, sin que exista una razón que justifique el provecho o el beneficio: en otras palabras, sin que exista una relación jurídica, ya constituída, que haga de causa que legitime el provecho, o el beneficio, del enriquecido.../En dicha fórmula, ... entran, también, los casos de enriquecimiento sin la voluntad de otra persona (empobrecido), la falta de voluntad del empobrecido se resuelve en una figura de falta de causa./ La acción de enriquecimiento sin causa, tiende a restablecer el equilibrio entre los dos patrimonios, o sea, a eliminar el indebido enriquecimiento, mediante la demanda de una indemnización./Varios son los presupuestos de la acción de que tratamos. Hace falta: a) ... el enriquecimiento efectivo de un sujeto, o sea, que el patrimonio de él reciba incremento ..., y se considera enriquecimiento también el ahorro de un gasto, o el haber evitado, con propio sacrificio patrimonial, a otro, una pérdida... b) que, a tal incremento para el enriquecido, corresponda una disminución en el patrimonio de otro sujeto (empobrecido)... c) ... una relación de correspondencia entre el enriquecimiento y el empobrecimiento; y, además, un nexo de causalidad entre la disminución patrimonial, sufrida por un sujeto, y la ventaja patrimonial del otro; ... d) es necesario que el enriquecimiento-empobrecimiento ocurra sin causa... Ausencia de causa significa que no existe una relación patrimonial ... que justifique el enriquecimiento-empobrecimiento.../El efecto del enriquecimiento sin causa es el nacimiento de la obligación de indemnización; por parte del enriquecido, a favor del empobrecido... Finalmente, debe observarse que la indemnización ha de ajustarse a la entidad del enriquecimiento y no puede sobrepasarla...” (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1.955, pp. 465-466). (Sobre el tema, también pueden consultarse BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 808-818 y PLANIOL, Marcel y [Nombre1], Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 812-813). En el caso concreto, está claro que la actora se vio compelida a asumir totalmente la obligación que derivó de la concepción y posterior nacimiento de su hijo. Consecuentemente, y dejando de lado lo que al campo de la formación integral se refiere, ella tuvo que asumir, por sus propios medios, la manutención del niño. El accionado, quien por ley debió compartir dicha obligación, no lo hizo sino hasta cuando judicialmente fue declarada su paternidad y se le fijó luego el deber de cancelar una cuota alimentaria. Con base en lo expuesto, se concluye que la actora está legitimada para demandar del accionado la indemnización de los gastos que a él le correspondían en forma proporcional y que ella debió asumir en su totalidad; pues, sin duda, el accionado se vio beneficiado y el patrimonio de la actora empobrecido, sin causa alguna que justificara tal situación. VII.- LA INDEBIDA VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA: Por otra parte, se estima acertado el reclamo del recurrente, en cuanto acusa una indebida valoración de los elementos probatorios que constan en los autos, aunque la referencia que hace del artículo 330 del Código Civil no resulta apropiada; por cuanto, en materia de familia, se cuenta con una norma especial que establece que “... los jueces en materia de familia interpretarán las probanzas sin sujeción a las reglas positivas de la prueba común, atendiendo todas las circunstancias y los elementos de convicción que los autos suministren; pero en todo caso, deberán hacerse constar las razones de la valoración.” En el caso concreto, se evacuaron las declaraciones de [Nombre2] (folio 90) y de [Nombre3] (folio 91). Los integrantes del órgano de alzada restaron validez a sus deposiciones, en cuanto ellas expusieron que el accionado se había ido para Limón y no regresó, pese al conocimiento que tenía del embarazo; por cuanto consideraron que tal apreciación sólo les constaba por el dicho de la actora. No obstante, dichas declaraciones, analizadas a la luz de la experiencia se estiman verdaderas; por cuanto, no en pocas ocasiones, sucede que el hombre, al saber de que la mujer con quien ha mantenido relaciones ha quedado embarazada, evade su responsabilidad. Pero, además de ello, entre la documental aportada por la demandante junto con el escrito inicial, está la sentencia de esta Sala, número 44, de las 14:40 horas del 24 de febrero de 1.999, donde consta la transcripción del testimonio del señor [Nombre4] , que sirvió para sustentar la declaratoria de paternidad ahí establecida y de la que se desprende claramente que el accionado sí conocía de la existencia de su hijo. En lo que interesa, dicho testigo había señalado: “De pronto se acercó un señor alto, delgado, de anteojos; me preguntó que si yo trabajaba en la [Dirección1] , y que si yo, por casualidad, conocía a [Nombre5] . Yo le contesté que sí, que estábamos en la misma planta; entonces, me dice: “Es que ella y yo tenemos un hijo.” Me pidió que si yo podía hacerle el favor, que él viajaba mucho a Limón, que él trabajaba en bienes raíces; que cómo hacía él para comunicarse con ella; para llegar a un arreglo, que si yo podía hacerle el favor de entregarle una tarjetita...” (Ver folio 26). En consecuencia, aún con la aplicación de la figura jurídica de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual que hicieron los integrantes del órgano de alzada, la petición de la actora debió haberse concedido; pues, el elemento que se echó de menos, cual era el conocimiento del demandado, sí existió, según se desprende de la prueba reseñada. VIII.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN: La parte demandada opuso la excepción de prescripción. Sin lugar a dudas, se está en presencia de la figura de la prescripción negativa; y, en ese sentido, el artículo 865 del Código Civil, señala que “Por la prescripción negativa se pierde un derecho. Para ello basta el transcurso del tiempo.” Al caso concreto, se estima que debe aplicársele la disposición del artículo 868 del Código Civil, que prevé un plazo de diez años; pues la situación no enmarca en alguno de los supuestos de prescripción especial que se prevén en las normas siguientes. Luego, está claro que la accionante no gestionó el resarcimiento pretendido, sino hasta el 23 de agosto del año 2.000, cuando planteó su demanda. El artículo 876 del Código Civil señala que “Toda prescripción se interrumpe civilmente: /1° Por el reconocimiento tácito o expreso que el poseedor o deudor haga a favor del dueño o acreedor de la propiedad o derecho que trata de prescribirse; y / 2° Por el emplazamiento judicial, embargo o secuestro notificado al poseedor o deudor.” En el numeral 879 siguiente se indica que “La prescripción negativa se interrumpe también por cualquier gestión judicial o extrajudicial, para el cobro de la deuda y cumplimiento de la obligación.” Por su parte, el artículo 296 del Código Procesal Civil, en lo que interesa, dispone: “Los efectos del emplazamiento son materiales y procesales, y se producen a partir de la fecha de notificación de aquél./Son efectos materiales los siguientes: / a) Interrumpir la prescripción. / ...” En el caso concreto, de conformidad con la aplicación que de esas normas se hace, no fue sino con la notificación del emplazamiento que el accionado tuvo entonces conocimiento de la gestión cobratoria planteada por la accionante; sea el 28 de marzo del 2.001 (ver constancia al folio 47 vuelto). Por consiguiente, el derecho se retrotrae al 28 de marzo de 1.991. Todos los alimentos que la actora tuvo que pagar de esa fecha y hacia atrás hasta el nacimiento del hijo, no pueden ser efectivamente concedidos a la demandante, pues operó la prescripción negativa, en su perjuicio. Por otra parte, la actora señaló que a partir de marzo de 1.999, por resolución judicial, el accionado asumió su obligación alimentaria respecto del niño. Consecuentemente, a partir de esa fecha y hasta el 28 de marzo del 2.001, el demandado sí asumió su obligación, en forma proporcional; razón por la cual, durante este período, la actora no tuvo que cubrir la parte de alimentos que aquél le correspondía y que es lo que constituye la base de su reclamo. Está claro, entonces, que lo adeudado va desde el 28 de marzo de 1.991 y hasta febrero de 1.999, inclusive. IX.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: De conformidad con lo expuesto, se estima que el fallo impugnado debe revocarse. En su lugar, procede acoger parcialmente la excepción de prescripción y declarar la procedencia de la demanda, también en forma parcial. Así, las cosas, debe condenarse al accionado a indemnizar a la demandada, la proporción de los gastos que ésta tuvo que cubrir para la manutención del hijo y que le correspondía cancelarlos a él, los cuales pueden establecerse en el cincuenta por ciento del total de gastos de manutención del hijo; pues, al ser la obligación conjunta, cada uno debió asumir su parte, correspondientes al período comprendido entre el 28 de marzo de 1.991 y hasta el 28 de febrero de 1.999. La fijación deberá hacerse en la etapa de ejecución del fallo, mediante un perito, sin que la suma que se fije pueda superar los tres millones de colones, en que se estimó la demanda. Como se indicó, procede acoger la excepción de prescripción, respecto de los gastos cuyo resarcimiento se pretende, desde la fecha del nacimiento del niño –6 de octubre de 1.983- hasta el 27 de marzo de 1.991. En cuanto a los intereses, de conformidad con los artículos 651 y 1.163 del Código Civil, procede la condenatoria reclamada por la demandante. Partiendo del supuesto de que al accionado le correspondía pagar una cuota alimentaria mensual, como se le obligó a partir de marzo de 1.999, ha de establecerse que los réditos habrán de pagarse conforme fueron surgiendo las obligaciones a la vida jurídica y según el porcentaje que en cada momento pagara el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por los certificados de depósito a seis meses plazo. Procede, también, condenar a la parte vencida al pago de ambas costas, en aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil. Las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación, falta de interés y la genérica sine actione agit –comprensiva de las tres anteriores-, deben ser denegadas; por cuanto está claro que a la actora le asiste derecho a exigir la indemnización pretendida; lo reclamó respecto de la persona obligada a indemnizarla, al haber asumido ella el cumplimiento de una obligación que el accionado deliberadamente no cumplió y porque media interés para ejercer su reclamo."