Rejection of possessory information in a protected zoneRechazo de información posesoria en zona protectora

**VIII.** The second, fourth, and fifth grievances of the appellant are interrelated, as they challenge what was held as proven by the lower court (*a quo*) and highlight contradictions between what was stated by the applicant and what was said by the witnesses regarding the mode of acquisition, possessory acts exercised, and delimitation of the land. In this regard, and in accordance with what will be explained in the following recitals, the Attorney General's Office (*Procuraduría*) is correct, it being clarified that only what is on record in this proceeding and the evidence actually received or provided therein is taken into account for analyzing the grievances, and not the reference to testimonies given in other matters, much less if they were not added to the case file as documentary evidence. According to what has been held as proven in this instance, the land to be titled is located within the Nicoya Peninsula Protected Zone (*Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya*), established in April 1994. Consequently, the applicant had to demonstrate clearly and conclusively that he had exercised ten-year possession prior to 1994. This was not duly accredited. In this regard, apart from what will be said about the form and number of witnesses received, the following points must be highlighted. The statements made in this type of proceeding by the applicant have the character of a sworn declaration, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 3, final paragraph, of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*). Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 15 of the same law establish the requirements that must be met when filing the proceeding, both procedural and substantive. In that sense, the Tribunal has explained that "...Possessory Information (*Información Posesoria*) is a non-contentious judicial activity proceeding for the formalization of a registrable title over a property right that has been acquired by usucapion, fulfilling the corresponding legal requirements for this. It is required to demonstrate possession as owner, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner (articles 1 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*) and 856 of the Civil Code (*Código Civil*)). The title applicant, apart from lacking a title registered or registrable in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the farm has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to avoid a double registry inscription over the same property, or to protect third parties with a better right than the applicant, the Law requires notifying certain subjects. It also established an opposition procedure within the Possessory Information, in the event that any of the interested parties feels harmed by the titling (article 8). The Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*) orders the Judge to consider as parties and therefore personally notify, from the beginning of the proceedings, the adjoining landowners, since the titling could encompass part of the lands belonging to them. It is also ordered to notify co-owners or co-tenants. Likewise, to protect the interests of the State, it is ordered that the Attorney General's Office (*Procuraduría General de la República*) and the Institute of Agrarian Development (*Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario*) be considered parties, for the protection of property subject to public domain and state Agrarian Property (article 5). Finally, the Law mandates summoning all interested parties, through the publication of an Edict in the Judicial Bulletin, who may have a legitimate interest in the proceeding (See numeral 5 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*)) (see vote Nº755 of 9:45 hours on November 13, 2003). The existence of well-marked boundaries (fences, lanes, etc.) is also required. The following documents must be provided: livestock brand if the farm is dedicated to livestock; identity card or respective identification document of the applicant; the cadastral map; updated certification from the Public Registry clarifying whether other farms have been titled by the applicant and their size; updated certification from the Ministry of Environment and Energy on whether or not the land is included within any protected area. The legislation in force on soils requires demonstrating the use of the land according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obliged, to ensure the protection of water resources for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity (articles 50 of the Organic Environmental Law (*Ley Orgánica del Ambiente*), subsection 14 of numeral 121 of the Political Constitution, 1, 3, and 17 of the Water Law N°276 (*Ley de Aguas N°276*) of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Forestry Law (*Ley Forestal*) Nº7575 of February 5, 1996, and Executive Decree N°26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997).

**IX.** Apart from the foregoing, the initial brief must contain each of the data required in Article 1 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*): Name and qualifications of the applicant; nature, location, size, and boundaries of the land; names and address of the adjoining landowners (if they are legal entities, their updated legal representation must be accredited); indication of whether there are co-owners and encumbrances (among them, easements (servidumbre), usufructs, etc.), if any, specifying who and which ones (also proving the constitution of the latter); time of possession; description of the possessory acts; extent of crops, forested areas (zonas boscosas), or pasture; existence of constructions and improvements made; quantity of livestock if the farm is for livestock; cause and date of acquisition; name and surnames of the person who transferred it, in the case of a derivative mode, as well as their domicile; estimation of the property and the proceedings; indication of three witnesses residing in the same canton where the property is located, when necessary in accordance with what is indicated in numerals 4 and 6 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*). It must also necessarily be declared that: the farm is not already registered in the Public Registry, there is no registrable title of ownership, and it is not intended to evade the consequences of a probate proceeding. If the ten-year possession is not held at the time of initiating the proceeding, the applicant may add that of his transferors, but in addition to clarifying this in the brief, he must provide the public document in which the transfer of his right is recorded. The documentary evidence and the rest of the evidence that must be provided come to ratify or prove precisely what is reported in the brief. Therefore, it is not appropriate to refer to the content of the documentation accompanying the initial brief. Regarding the required testimonial evidence, in a minimum of three, the legislator imposed the requirement of being residents of the canton where the property is located. This was to ensure that the persons appearing to testify were truly knowledgeable about the situation. In other words, it is presumed that the residents of the area are the ones best able to attest to the owners of the lands near theirs and what happens on them, by frequenting or living in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what was declared in the initial memorial are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Therefore, ignorance regarding them cannot be alleged, much less if professional legal advice is available, as happened in this case. The omission regarding them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is solely the responsibility of the applicant, which the judge cannot assume or attempt to remedy.

**X.** In addition to the aforementioned requirements, in cases where the land is included within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement regarding the exercise and time of possession must be met. "...In accordance with the provisions of article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*), applicable to the case because the property to be titled is located within the Protected Zone ..., in order to register said property in the Public Registry, the applicant must demonstrate having been in possession of the property for at least ten years before the validity of the Decree that created the aforementioned Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource" (vote Nº170-03 of 16:24 hours on March 31, 2003. Also see in this regard the cited vote Nº755-03). The foregoing is required in protection of the State's forest heritage and biodiversity, without thereby affecting the rights that private subjects had effectively consolidated through the passage of time (see in this regard vote Nº497 of 15:20 hours on July 30, 2003 of the Tribunal). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (*Sala Constitucional*) in Vote N° 4587 of 15:45 hours on August 5, 1997, in which it analyzed the constitutionality of the cited article 7, ruled that in order to title lands located in the protected zones indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the validity of the respective Decree. Basically, the Chamber said on that occasion: "... given the nature of the property sought to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the property's designation to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wilderness area prevents possession subsequent to the designation from counting, and prevents the requirements for usucapion from being completed if the right has not been acquired at that moment, that is, if ten years of possession suitable for usucapion under the conditions established by law have not elapsed... it is important to synthesize the basic elements handled in doctrine and jurisprudence on these topics, which oblige the judge – in relation to the challenged norm – to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the property – which becomes part of the protected wilderness area – sought to be titled. The foregoing so that the judge has a broader criterion – not limited to the date of entry into force of the law or executive decree that defines the limits of a specific wilderness area – to establish with greater precision the moment when said properties became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purposes of determining whether possession *ad usucapionem* was exercised over them for ten years prior to their acquiring that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage, determines that when attempting to title – through the possessory information procedure – land located within a protected wilderness area, the discussion should not be reduced to the simple calculation of the time one has been on a property in relation to the date the declaration of the protected wilderness area was made, since - on one hand, to accredit the possession *ad usucapionem* during the period established in article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*), the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates must be considered, and - on the other hand - the possible existence of norms that of old declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific designation to the public domain...". In this case, having conscientiously assessed the evidence without strict adherence to the norms of common law (article 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (*Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria*)), the Tribunal reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it comprises property that forms part of the State's Forest Heritage, as the applicant has not demonstrated having acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected zone in question. This Tribunal considers it unnecessary to analyze prior legislation to see if such lands were designated to the public domain previously by some other law, since in accordance with what has been set forth, there are sufficient grounds for the rejection of these proceedings. The reasons of equity and law that support this conclusion will be given in the subsequent recitals.

**XI.** Regarding the mode of acquisition, time of possession, and possessory acts, there is no consistency among the witnesses, or between them and what was stated by the applicant in his initial brief. Mr. [Nombre1] indicated he had possessed the land since 1971 in an original manner and that his possessory acts were making firebreaks (*rondas*), fences, planting plantains, fruit trees such as mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The former was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified on different occasions: [Nombre2], [Nombre3], [Nombre4], [Nombre5], [Nombre6], [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9] (folios 23, 24, 25, 57, 58, 80, 81, and 82). In fact, the last three cited, in identical fashion, indicated they knew the farm since before 1950, and that it had always belonged to the [Nombre1] Mesén family (folios 80, 81, and 82). [Nombre5] and [Nombre10] declared the applicant acquired it by purchase from Mr. [Nombre11], the first indicating said purchase occurred about twenty years ago and that the latter had possession of more than ten years, as indicated by Mr. [Nombre10]. The applicant, in a manner contradictory to his interests, since it is supposed he offers truthful witnesses, knowledgeable about the farm's situation, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses to prove his claims, provides the memorial dated May 2, 2002, visible on folio 67, with which he intends to "clarify" what was said by those two witnesses, arguing that Mr. [Nombre11] had properties adjacent to the one sought to be titled many years ago, but not this one, and reiterates his mode of acquisition is original. The foregoing is not convincing or acceptable, especially in this case, in which the testimony of different witnesses was unjustifiably accepted on more than one occasion. If his justification were to be admitted, it would have to be held as true that those witnesses then did not testify about the farm that is the object of the proceeding, or else they did not know it, and therefore, they should not have been offered as such. But apart from this highly questionable behavior, and the contradictions regarding the mode and date of acquisition, which prevent holding the exercise of ten-year possession in the manner required by law before 1994 as effectively demonstrated on the part of the applicant, there are other discrepancies that likewise detract from what he affirmed, and which lead to the rejection of this petition.

**XII.** As for the time of possession, [Nombre3] and [Nombre2] (folios 24 and 25) said they had known the farm for 12 and 10 years respectively (approximately 1989 and 1991, according to the date of the declaration). Besides these witnesses not being useful for demonstrating possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the farm forming part of a protected zone, it is striking that despite claiming to have known the farm for so many years, they did not know who its adjoining landowners were. [Nombre4], [Nombre5], [Nombre10], (folios 23, 57, and 58) said they had known the farm for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their dates of declaration). However, like the first cited, Mrs. [Nombre4] did not know who the adjoining landowners were, nor did she refer to how Mr. [Nombre1] became the owner of the land. [Nombre5] also did not know about the adjoining properties or the size of the land. But in addition, together with [Nombre10], they affirmed the farm was acquired from [Nombre11]. The latter said this was about 20 years ago, which gives an approximate date of 1982. The former did not mention the date of acquisition (folios 57 and 58). This contradicts not only the mode of acquisition affirmed by Mr. [Nombre1], but also the time he declared he possessed the land. Which is even more questionable, if one considers that, given the date of creation of the protected zone in question, he should have demonstrated having possessed the farm for at least the ten years prior to 1994, in the legally required form. [Nombre9], [Nombre7], and [Nombre8] (folios 80, 81, and 82), declared they had known the farm since before 1950, which previously formed part of another one. They affirmed it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family. The foregoing contradicts not only what was affirmed by the previous witnesses, but also the applicant's own statement, who affirms with the character of a sworn declaration that he is the owner of the property since 1971 and that he acquired it in an original manner.

**XIII.** Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Nombre2] and [Nombre4] that these consisted of the farm having been fenced along all its boundaries. The latter added that the land was "very clean" (folios 23 and 25); [Nombre3] said they had been the cleaning of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 24). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and they affirmed knowing the land but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification of knowing the land as part of another, they said: [Nombre5], the property had been dedicated to agriculture (folio 57). [Nombre10], it was a property dedicated mostly to fruit trees, fences had been made and repaired, firebreaks (*rondas*) cleaned, and general care (folio 58). The third group of witnesses, who likewise know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and declared: [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9] say the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care required by a farm of that nature (folios 80, 81, and 82). [Nombre9], unlike all the cited witnesses, affirms some parts of the farm have been dedicated to livestock, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care required by a farm of such nature (folio 82). Apart from the evident inconsistencies in what was affirmed by the witnesses among themselves, in the judicial inspection carried out on June 20, 2001, it is derived from what was recorded therein that the land has a broken topography, there were no fences but there were lanes, and there were no constructions, livestock, or crops. It was recorded that it was dedicated to natural conservation. Added to the foregoing, the map that is the subject of the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to "trees" (folio 1), which is also corroborated by the indication of the property's nature in the initial brief (folio 7). Consequently, given so many contradictions, it can in no way be held as clear what the possessory acts have been and to what use the land subject to titling has been dedicated, and therefore this aspect cannot be held as demonstrated in the manner required by law, less so if one takes as a basis that the applicant affirmed they were fences, firebreaks (*rondas*), and the planting of plantains and fruit trees, and according to his last three witnesses, supposedly provided to "clarify or prove" what the previous ones had been unable to say, the land "has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those required by a farm of such nature." **XIV.** Regarding the delimitation of the property, this Tribunal takes into account that it formed part of a material unit, which several of the received witnesses refer to (folios 57, 58, 75, 80, and 81). However, when the applicant decides to file for its registration in parts, specifically in this case land measuring 7864.60 square meters, he is obliged to delimit it clearly. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form and be able to explain what they know about it, because otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, regarding whether what they declared refers to the land subject to titling. In that sense, of the first witnesses who testified in the case file: [Nombre2] and [Nombre4] (folios 23 and 25), they indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Nombre2] even specified that the erection of the fences constituted, for him, the possessory acts exercised (folio 25). [Nombre3] did not refer to how the land was delimited, nor did he know its adjoining properties. This witness declared that the acts of possession have consisted of the total clearing of the land, for the purpose of building a dwelling house (folio 24). [Nombre5] says that because the farm is very rugged, he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: "The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property used to be a single farm but they have been subdividing (loteando) it, I don't know with what intention. I don't know if it has firebreaks (*está rondeada*) or fences (*cercada*) since those are hills that are very difficult to traverse" (folio 57). [Nombre10] (folio 58), affirmed the "lot belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty-something hectares, whose adjacent properties to the west are [Dirección1], to the east [Dirección2], to the north a gringo whose name I don't know, and to the south I don't remember whose." Apart from the problems involved in knowing the lot as part of another land for purposes of locating the same, this witness is not useful then for demonstrating the specific and current boundaries of the one sought to be titled, since it is inferred from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part sought to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9], do not refer to the adjoining properties of the land (folios 80, 81, and 82). But in addition to the foregoing, the applicant in his initial memorial affirms having carried out as acts of possession the making of fences and the planting of plantains and fruit trees (folio 8). This affirmation and what was indicated by the first cited witnesses above is contradicted by what was observed in the judicial inspection carried out in June 2001, since it was clearly indicated the property was not fenced, with lanes existing as delimitation. In addition, it was observed there are no constructions, nor crops of any type (see record on folio 45).

**XV.** What has been analyzed is sufficient to hold the basic prerequisites for granting this petition as not demonstrated. But independently of this, it is important to indicate the following regarding the remaining grievances. What is alleged in the third grievance, regarding the lower court's (*a quo*) argument not being true that the area is easily overgrown (*fácil de enmontar*) and therefore after a harvest is past, it quickly returns to natural regeneration, is improper, apart from being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific zone. But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of easy regeneration, this does not change the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the non-fulfillment of the necessary requirements to approve this titling.

**XVI.** Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that the Tribunal cannot limit the powers of the instance judge in a general manner, regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, especially if numeral 11 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*) provides: "The judge may, when he deems it appropriate, order any proceedings he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Information refers. He shall reject the same if he verifies that it is intended to improperly title national vacant lands (*baldíos nacionales*) or lands belonging to any State institution, as well as forest reserves, national parks, or biological reserves." However, on this occasion, given what occurred and was demonstrated in the case file, the Prosecutor is correct in claiming that the extension of testimonial evidence was improperly admitted, not just once, but on two occasions. The foregoing because in March 2001, the first three witnesses offered by the applicant were received, just as required by Article 6 of the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*). On that first occasion, the Tribunal must highlight that the evidence was received by a commissioned Judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its objectives, which promote respect for the principle of immediacy, save for qualified exceptions. Especially in cases like the present one, where the protection of a protected zone is at stake, and the commissioned action involves the taking of evidence fundamental to the substance of what must be decided, such as testimonial evidence. After this, it is recorded that the Attorney General's Office (*Procuraduría*) appeared, who recalled that the ten-year exercise of possession prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected zone in question had to be demonstrated. Regardless of what was alleged by the Prosecutor, the Judge, by principle, knows the law and is obliged to ensure compliance with that requirement. The titling party was also obliged, from the moment he offered testimonial evidence, to corroborate that the witnesses knew the land for a sufficient time to be able to prove the facts he affirmed. If an error or ignorance, his or his legal advisor's, fails to accredit them in the proper manner at the appropriate time, it is a burden that must only be imputed against him under his responsibility. It is not up to the judge to remedy this situation, unless, without violating his functions and in protection of the party's rights and with respect for the legal system in force, he considers it strictly necessary on well-founded grounds to receive some additional evidence. Subsequent to this, a judicial inspection is carried out, in which this Tribunal cannot refrain from pointing out that a record was drawn up with a rather limited description of the land (see folio 45). In a memorial dated December 6, 2001 (folio 51), the applicant requests permission to offer two other witnesses, because Messrs. Ricardo Azofeifa and José Pérez had known the farm for only a short time, to which the Instance Judge agrees (folio 53). Thus, in February 2002, the declarations of [Nombre10] and [Nombre5] were received (folios 57 and 58). Due to contradictions between what they declared and what was affirmed by the applicant, the latter presents the memorial on folio 67. In it, he first attempts to "clarify" what they said regarding the mode of acquiring the property being derivative, which contradicts what the applicant affirmed. Second, the judicial representative of the applicant requests that three more witnesses be received, "...for the purpose of demonstrating that the lands my client intends to title have always been in his hands and/or his family's hands and that the transfer from parents to children has occurred verbally; and likewise that the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Land and Colonization Law (*Ley de Tierras y Colonización*)...". Despite the fact that this statement varies what was initially affirmed by the applicant, and despite five testimonies already having been admitted, the instance judge agrees to receive them in June 2002 (folios 68, 80, 81, and 82). These, apart from affirming they knew the farm since 1950, do not contribute much information about the land, and even make the evidence received in its totality even more contradictory. The Tribunal clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, because as already explained, it is the Instance Judge's power to determine the number of witnesses he needs to rule, and regarding what is established in the cited Article 6 about the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, as long as it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that the effective fulfillment of the purposes of the legislation in force is not altered thereby. What is unacceptable is allowing the applicant to "rectify" or alter, at his convenience, what he has affirmed or what has gradually been demonstrated, as the proceeding progresses. Especially if the Possessory Information Law (*Ley de Informaciones Posesorias*) is clear regarding requirements, and there is a large number of pronouncements by the Tribunals that have resolved and explained how each one of them is interpreted and must be fulfilled. In this case, in view of the statements of the first two witnesses received, [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] (folios 24 and 25), about knowing the land for only 10 or 12 years, it can be understood that the reception of two more witnesses was ordered, who were supposed to have knowledge of the same for many more years prior, and also, logically, to be sufficiently informed to be able to inform the judge about all the details he might require regarding time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even if the judge omitted asking some question of special interest to corroborate what the applicant reported, the latter and his legal advisor could be present at the declaration and request that the pertinent questions the judge might have failed to ask be put to the declarant. But after the second witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received.

**XVII.** Finally, the Tribunal must also note that in the recitals of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and compliance with the procedural and substantive prerequisites required to grant the proceeding, the position of the Attorney General's Office (*Procuraduría*) is contested, considering that it engages in an "inconvenient" practice of changing the "rules of the game" (folio 92). Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was affirmed in the initial brief about there being no encumbrances on the property and what was recorded on the base map of the proceedings, where the existence of a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) is marked, which evidently serves as access to it.

This is not only a discrepancy that should have been noted by the lower court (a quo), so that, if pertinent, it would order proof of its constitution in the proper form and clarify which was the servient tenement, whether or not it was registered, the dimensions of the easement (servidumbre) (width and length), and its purpose. But furthermore, in this case, given that the property forms part of a protected zone, if the title applicant had not consolidated his right prior to the effective date of the decree creating it, the constitution of a lien such as the one cited was improper. In this regard, it should be remembered that state-protected wilderness areas form part of the State's natural heritage (articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 and 14 of the Ley Forestal; 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, ruling of the Sala Constitucional No. 2988 at 11:57 a.m. on April 23, 1999, and No. 755-03 cited by the Tribunal Agrario). This heritage, for its part, is composed of forests and forest lands of national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in the name of the State, properties of municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other Public Administration bodies, except for properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its assets (articles 13 and 15 Ley Forestal). The forest lands and forests comprised within the State's natural heritage are unattachable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to a lien in the terms of Civil Law (see in this regard rulings No. 1092 at 4:09 p.m. on February 7, 2001, and No. 421 at 3:20 p.m. on January 16, 2001. In the same sense, No. 2988 at 11:57 a.m. on April 23, 1999, all of the Sala Constitucional). XVIII.- By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked, insofar as it approved these possessory information (información posesoria) proceedings. In its place, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings brought by [Nombre1] are rejected.

In that regard, of the first witnesses who testified in the case file: [Nombre2] and [Nombre4] (folios 23 and 25), they indicated that the land was fenced on all four sides. [Nombre2] even specified that the erection of the fences constituted, for him, the possessory acts exercised (folio 25). [Nombre3] did not refer to how the land was delimited, nor did he know its boundaries. This witness testified that the acts of possession consisted of the complete clearing of the land, for the purpose of building a dwelling house (folio 24). [Nombre5] says that because the farm is very rugged, he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: “The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property was previously a single farm, but it has been being subdivided (loteado), I don’t know with what intention. I don’t know if it is bounded or fenced since those are hills that are very difficult to traverse” (folio 57). [Nombre10] (folio 58), affirmed that the “lot belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty or more hectares, whose boundaries on the west side are with [Dirección1], on the east with [Dirección2], on the north with a gringo whose name I do not know, and on the south I do not remember whose.” Aside from the problems involved in knowing the lot as part of another property for purposes of locating it, this witness is therefore not useful for demonstrating the specific and current boundaries of the one sought to be titled, since it can be inferred from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part that was sought to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9], do not refer to the boundaries of the land (folios 80, 81, and 82). But in addition to the foregoing, the applicant, in his initial brief, affirms having carried out as acts of possession the making of fences and the planting of plantains and fruit trees (folio 8). That affirmation, and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above, is contradicted by what was observed in the judicial inspection conducted in June 2001, since it was clearly indicated that the property was not fenced, existing as delimitation only lanes. Furthermore, it was verified that there are no buildings, nor crops of any kind (see record on folio 45).

**XV.-** The foregoing analysis is sufficient to consider the basic requirements for granting this proceeding as not proven. But regardless of that, it is important to indicate regarding the remaining grievances the following. What is alleged in the **third** grievance, regarding the a quo's argument being untrue that the area is prone to becoming overgrown (enmontar) and therefore after a harvest it quickly returns to natural regeneration, is unfounded, apart from it being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific zone. But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of rapid regeneration, this does not change the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the non-fulfillment of the necessary requirements to approve this titling.

**XVI.-** Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that the Tribunal cannot limit the powers of the lower court judge in a general manner, regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, especially since numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides: “The judge may, when he deems it appropriate, order all those proceedings he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Information refers. He shall reject the same if he comes to verify that it is sought to unduly title national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) or lands belonging to any State institution, as well as forest reserves, national parks, or biological reserves.” However, on this occasion, given what occurred and was demonstrated in the case file, the Procurador is correct in claiming that the expansion of testimonial evidence was unduly admitted, not just on one, but on two occasions. The foregoing is because in March 2001, the first three witnesses offered by the applicant were received, just as required by Article 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. On that first occasion, the Tribunal must highlight that the evidence was received by a commissioned judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its purposes, which promote respect for, except in qualified exceptions, the principle of immediacy. Especially in cases such as this one, where the protection of a protected area is at stake, and where the commissioned action was the evacuation of fundamental evidence for the substance of what is called to be resolved, such as the testimonial evidence. After that, it is recorded that the Procuraduría appeared, recalling that the ten-year exercise of possession prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected area in question had to be demonstrated. Regardless of what was alleged by the Procurador, the Judge, by principle, knows the law and is obligated to ensure compliance with the stated requirement. The applicant, furthermore, should have, from the moment he offered testimonial evidence, corroborated that the witnesses knew the land for sufficient time to be able to prove the facts affirmed by him. If an error or ignorance, his or his legal advisor’s, does not accredit them in the proper manner at the opportune moment, it is a burden that must only be imputed against him under his responsibility. It does not fall to the judge to rectify that situation, unless, without violating his functions and in protection of the party’s rights and with respect for the current legal system, he considers, on a well-founded basis, that it is strictly necessary to receive some additional evidence. Subsequent to that, a judicial inspection is conducted, in which this Tribunal cannot refrain from pointing out that a record is drawn up with a rather limited description of the land (see folio 45). In a brief dated December 6, 2001 (folio 51), the applicant requests permission to offer two more witnesses, because Messrs. Ricardo Azofeifa and José Pérez had known the farm for a short time, to which the lower court Judge agrees (folio 53). Thus, in February 2002, the statements of [Nombre10] and [Nombre5] were received (folios 57 and 58). Due to contradictions between what they declared and what was affirmed by the applicant, the latter presents the brief on folio 67. In it, he first tries to “clarify” what they said regarding the form of acquisition of the property being derived, which contradicts what was affirmed by the applicant. Second, the legal representative of the applicant requests that three more witnesses be heard, “…for the purpose of demonstrating that the lands my client seeks to title have always been in his hands and/or his family’s hands and that the transmission from parents to children has occurred verbally; that likewise, the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización….” Despite that statement varying what was initially affirmed by the promoter, and despite having already admitted five testimonies, the lower court judge agrees to hear them in June 2002 (folios 68, 80, 81, and 82). These witnesses, apart from stating they have known the farm since 1950, do not contribute much information about the land, and even make the totality of the evidence received even more contradictory. The Tribunal clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, because as already explained, it is the power of the lower court Judge to determine the number of witnesses he needs to render a decision, and regarding what is established in the cited Article 6 on the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, provided it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that it does not alter the effective fulfillment of the aims of the current legislation. What is unacceptable is to allow the applicant to be “rectifying” or altering at his convenience what he has affirmed or what has been gradually demonstrated, as the process unfolds. Especially if the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a great quantity of pronouncements by the Tribunals that have resolved and explained how each of them must be interpreted and fulfilled. In the case, in view of the affirmations of the first two witnesses received, [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] (folios 24 and 25), about having known the land for only 10 or 12 years, it can be understood that it was ordered to receive two more witnesses, who presumably should have had knowledge of it many more years prior, and furthermore, logically, be sufficiently informed to be able to inform the judge about all the details he might require regarding time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even when the judge omits asking a question of special interest to corroborate the information provided by the applicant, the applicant and his legal advisor may be present at the statement and request that the pertinent questions the judge omitted be asked of the declarant. But after the second set of witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received.

**XVII.-** Finally, the Tribunal must also note that in the whereas clauses (considerandos) of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and the fulfillment of the procedural and substantive requirements demanded to grant the proceeding, the position of the Procuraduría is contested, considering it engages in an “inconvenient” practice of changing the “rules of the game” (folio 92). Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was affirmed in the initial brief about there being no real liens (cargas reales) on the property and what is stated on the base map of the proceedings, by marking the existence of an easement (servidumbre) of passage, which evidently serves as access to it. This is not only a discrepancy that should have been noticed by the a quo, so that, if pertinent, he would order its constitution to be demonstrated in the proper manner and clarify which was the servient tenement, whether it was registered or not, the measurements of the easement (servidumbre) (width and length), and its purpose. But furthermore, in this case, given that the property forms part of a protected area, if the applicant had not consolidated his right prior to the effective date of the decree creating it, the constitution of an encumbrance such as the one cited was improper. Regarding this, it should be remembered that state-protected wild areas form part of the natural heritage of the State (articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 and 14 of the Ley Forestal; 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, vote of the Sala Constitucional No. 2988 of 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, and No. 755-03 cited from the Agrarian Tribunal). The latter, for its part, is formed by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in the name of the State, properties of the municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its patrimony (articles 13 and 15 of the Ley Forestal). The forest lands and forests comprised within the natural heritage of the State are unattachable (inembargables), inalienable (inalienables), and imprescriptible (imprescriptibles), in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to encumbrance (gravamen) in the terms of Civil Law (see regarding this votes No. 1092 of 16:09 hours on February 7, 2001, and No. 421 of 15:20 hours on January 16, 2001. In the same sense, No. 2988 of 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, all from the Sala Constitucional).

**XVIII.-** By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked, insofar as it approved the present possessory information proceedings (diligencias de información posesoria). In its place, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings established by [Nombre1] are rejected." The Possessory Information Law orders the Judge to consider adjoining landowners as parties and therefore to notify them personally from the beginning of the proceedings, since the titling could encompass part of the lands belonging to them. It also orders notification to co-owners or co-owners (condueños o condóminos). Likewise, in protection of the State's interests, it orders that the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario be considered parties, for the protection of property subject to public domain, and of State Agrarian Property (article 5). Finally, the Law mandates that all interested parties who may have a legitimate interest in the proceeding be summoned by publication of an Edict in the Boletín Judicial. (See numeral 5 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) (see Voto Nº755 of 9:45 a.m. on November 13, 2003). The existence of well-marked boundaries (fences, dirt tracks, etc.) is also required. The following documents must be provided: livestock brand if the farm is dedicated to cattle raising; the applicant's identity card or respective identification document; the cadastral map; an updated certification from the Registro Público clarifying whether other farms have been titled by the applicant and what their measurements are; an updated certification from the Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía regarding whether or not the land is included within any protected area. The current legislation on soils requires that the use of the land be demonstrated according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obligated, to ensure the protection of water resources for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity for this (articles 50 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, subsection 14 of numeral 121 of the Constitución Política, 1, 3, and 17 of the Ley de Aguas N°276 of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Ley Forestal Nº7575 of February 5, 1996, and Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997). IX.- Apart from what has been indicated, the initial filing must contain each of the data required in article 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Name and qualifications of the applicant; nature, situation, measurement, and boundaries of the land; names and address of the adjoining landowners (if they are legal entities, their current legal representation must be accredited); indication of whether co-owners and real encumbrances (among them, easements (servidumbres), usufructs, etc.) exist, and if so, specifying who and which ones (also proving the constitution of the latter); time of possession; description of the possessory acts; extent of crops, forest-covered areas (zonas boscosas), or pasture; existence of constructions and improvements made; number of cattle head if the farm is for livestock; cause and date of acquisition; first and last name of the person who transferred, in the case of a derivative mode, as well as their domicile; estimation of the property and the proceedings; indication of three witnesses who are neighbors of the same canton where the property is located, when necessary in accordance with what is indicated in numerals 4 and 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. It must also necessarily be declared that: the farm is not already registered in the Registro Público, there is a lack of a registrable title of ownership, and there is no attempt to evade the consequences of a succession proceeding. If the ten-year possession is not held at the time of initiating the proceeding, the applicant may add that of their transferors, but in addition to clarifying that in the filing, they must provide the public document in which the transfer of their right is recorded. The documentation and the rest of the evidence that must be provided serve to ratify or prove precisely what is stated in the filing. For this reason, it is not appropriate to refer to the content of the documentation accompanying the initial filing. Regarding the required testimonial evidence, from a minimum of three, the legislator imposed the requirement of being neighbors of the canton where the property is located. This was for the purpose of allowing people truly knowledgeable of the situation to appear to testify. In other words, it is presumed that neighbors in the area are those best able to attest to the owners of the lands close to theirs and what happens on them, by frequenting or living in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what was declared in the initial brief are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Therefore, ignorance regarding them cannot be alleged, much less if one has professional legal advice, as happened in the case. The omission regarding them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is solely the responsibility of the applicant, which the judge cannot assume nor attempt to resolve. X.- In addition to the mentioned requirements, in cases in which the land is comprised within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement must be met regarding the exercise and time of possession. "…In accordance with the provisions of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, applicable to the case because the property to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora …, in order to register said property in the Registro Público, the petitioner must demonstrate having been in possession of the property for at least ten years prior to the effective date of the Decree that created the cited Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource" (Voto Nº170-03 of 4:24 p.m. on March 31, 2003. See also in this regard the cited Voto Nº755-03). The foregoing is required in protection of the State's forest heritage and biodiversity, without thereby affecting the rights that private individuals had effectively consolidated through the passage of time (see in this regard Voto Nº497 of 3:20 p.m. on July 30, 2003, of the Tribunal). In that sense, the Sala Constitucional in Voto N° 4587 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, in which it analyzed the constitutionality of the cited article 7, ruled that in order to title lands located in the protected zones indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the effective date of the respective Decree. Basically the Sala stated on that occasion: "… given the nature of the property intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the affectation of the property to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected natural area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and impedes the fulfillment of the requirements for usucapion if the right has not been acquired by that moment, that is, the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion under the conditions established by law have not elapsed… it is important to synthesize the basic elements that at the doctrinal and jurisprudential level are handled with these issues, and that obligate the judge – in relation to the challenged norm – to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the property – which becomes part of the protected natural area – that is intended to be titled. The foregoing so that the judge has a broader criterion – not limited to the date of entry into force of the law or the executive decree that defines the limits of a determined natural area – to establish with greater precision the moment in which said property became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purposes of determining whether possession ad usucapionem was exercised over them for ten years prior to their acquiring that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage, determines that when it is intended to title – through the possessory information procedure – a land located within a protected natural area, the discussion is not reduced to the simple calculation of the time one has entered a property in relation to the date on which the declaration of the protected natural area occurred, since – on one hand, for the purposes of accrediting possession ad usucapionem during the term established in article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates must be taken into account, and – on the other hand – the possible existence of norms that formerly declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific affectation to the public domain… ". In the case, having weighed the evidence conscientiously and without strict subjection to the norms of common law (article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), the Tribunal reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it encompasses property that forms part of the Forest Heritage of the State, as the applicant has not demonstrated having acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected zone in question. This Tribunal considers it unnecessary to analyze earlier legislation to see if such lands were affected to the public domain previously by some other law, since according to what has been stated there are sufficient grounds for the rejection of these proceedings. In the subsequent considerandos, the reasons of equity and law that support this conclusion will be given. XI.- Regarding the mode of acquisition, time of possession, and possessory acts, there is no consistency among the witnesses, nor between these and what was said by the applicant in his initial filing. Mr. [Name1] indicated that he has possessed the land since 1971 in an original manner and that his possessory acts were the making of firebreaks, fences, planting of bananas, fruit trees such as mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The former was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified at different times: [Name2], [Name3], [Name4], [Name5], [Name6], [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9] (folios 23, 24, 25, 57, 58, 80, 81, and 82). In fact, the last three cited, identically stated they have known the farm since before 1950, and that it had always belonged to the [Name1] Mesén family (folios 80, 81, and 82). [Name5] and [Name10] declared the applicant acquired it by purchase from Mr. [Name11], the former indicating this purchase was about twenty years ago and that the latter had possession for more than ten years, Mr. [Name10] indicated. The applicant, in a manner contradictory to his interests, insofar as it is assumed he offers truthful witnesses, knowledgeable about the situation of the farm, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses for the purpose of proving his affirmations, provides the brief dated May 2, 2002, visible at folio 67, with which he attempts to "clarify" what was said by those two witnesses, alleging that Mr. [Name11] had farms bordering the one intended to be titled many years ago, but not that one, and reiterates his mode of acquisition is original. The above is neither convincing nor acceptable, especially in this case, in which it was unjustifiably accepted on more than one occasion for different witnesses to testify. If his justification were to be admitted, it would have to be taken as true that those witnesses did not then declare about the farm object of the proceeding, or else they did not know it, and therefore, should not have been offered as such. But aside from this highly questionable conduct, and the contradictions regarding the mode and date of acquisition, which prevent considering the exercise of ten-year possession in the manner required by law before 1994 as effectively demonstrated on the part of the applicant, there are other discrepancies that equally distort what was affirmed by him, and that entail the rejection of this application. XII.- Regarding the time of possession, [Name3] and [Name2] (folios 24 and 25) said they had known the farm for 12 and 10 years respectively (approximately 1989 and 1991, according to the date of the declaration). Besides these witnesses not being useful to demonstrate possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the farm as part of a protected zone, it is striking that despite affirming they had known the farm for so many years, they did not know who its adjoining landowners were. [Name4], [Name5], [Name10], (folios 23, 57, and 58) said they had known the farm for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their dates of declaration). However, like the first ones cited, Mrs. [Name4] did not know who the adjoining landowners were, nor did she refer to how Mr. [Name1] came to be the owner of the land. [Name5] also did not know about the boundaries nor what the measurement of the land was. But moreover, along with [Name10], they affirmed the farm was acquired from Mr. [Name11]. The latter said this was about 20 years ago, which gives the approximate year of 1982. The former did not mention the acquisition date (folios 57 and 58). This contradicts not only the mode of acquisition affirmed by Mr. [Name1], but also the time he declared he possessed the land. Which is even more questionable, if one considers that, given the date of creation of the protected zone in question, he should have demonstrated possessing the farm for at least the ten years prior to 1994, in the legally required manner. [Name9], [Name7], and [Name8] (folios 80, 81, and 82) declared they have known the farm since before 1950, which previously formed part of another. They affirmed it has always belonged to the [Name1] family. The foregoing contradicts not only what was affirmed by previous witnesses, but also the applicant's own statement, who affirms under oath to be the owner of the property since 1971 and to have acquired it originally. XIII.- Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Name2] and [Name4] that such consisted of having fenced the farm on all its boundaries. The latter added that the land was "very clean" (folios 23 and 25); [Name3] said they had been the cleaning of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 24). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and they stated they know the land but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification of knowing the land as part of another, they said: [Name5], the property had been dedicated to agriculture (folio 57). [Name10], it is land dedicated mainly to fruit trees, fences had been made and repaired, firebreak cleaning, and general care (folio 58). The third group of witnesses, who also know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and declared: [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9] say the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care required by a farm of that nature (folios 80, 81, and 82). [Name9], unlike all the cited witnesses, affirms some parts of the farm have been dedicated to cattle raising, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care required by a farm of such nature (folio 82). Aside from the evident inconsistencies in what was affirmed by the witnesses among themselves, in the judicial inspection carried out on June 20, 2001, it is derived from what was recorded therein that the land has broken topography, there were no fences but there were dirt tracks, there were no constructions, cattle, or crops. It was recorded that it was dedicated to natural conservation. Added to the above, the cadastral map object of the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to "trees" (folio 1), which is also corroborated by indicating the nature of the property in the initial filing (folio 7). Consequently, given so many contradictions, it cannot in any way be considered clear what the possessory acts have been and what the land object of titling has been dedicated to, and therefore this aspect cannot be considered demonstrated in the manner required by law, especially if one takes as a basis that the applicant affirmed they were fences, firebreaks, and planting of banana and fruit trees, and according to his last three witnesses, supposedly provided to "clarify or prove" what the previous ones had not been able to say, the land "has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those required by a farm of such nature." XIV.- Regarding the delimitation of the property, this Tribunal takes into account that it formed part of a material unit, to which several of the received witnesses make reference (folios 57, 58, 75, 80, and 81). However, when the applicant decides to propose its registration in parts, specifically in this case a plot of land measuring 7864.60 square meters, he is obligated to clearly delimit it. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form, and be able to explain what they know about it, because otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, as to whether what is declared refers to the land object of titling. In that sense, of the first witnesses who testified in the case file: [Name2] and [Name4] (folios 23 and 25), indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Name2] even specified the erection of the fences were, for him, the possessory acts exercised (folio 25). [Name3] did not refer to the way the land was delimited, and did not know its boundaries either. This witness declared the possessory acts have consisted of the total cleaning of the land, for the purpose of building a dwelling (folio 24). [Name5] says that because the farm is very steep, he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: "The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property used to be a single farm but they have been subdividing it, I don't know with what intention. I don't know if it is fire-broken or fenced since those are hills that are very difficult to walk" (folio 57). [Name10] (folio 58), affirmed the "plot belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty or more hectares, whose boundaries on the west side are with [Address1], on the east with [Address2], on the north with a gringo whose name I don't know, and on the south I don't remember who it belongs to." Aside from the problems involved in knowing the plot as part of another land for purposes of locating it, this witness is therefore not useful to demonstrate the specific and current boundaries of the one intended to be titled, for it is inferred from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part intended to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9], do not refer to the boundaries of the land (folios 80, 81, and 82). But in addition to what has been said, the applicant in his initial brief states he has performed as possessory acts the making of fences, planting of bananas, fruit trees (folio 8). That statement and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above, is contradicted by what was verified in the judicial inspection carried out in June 2001, for it was clearly indicated the property was not fenced, with dirt tracks existing as delimitation. Furthermore, it was verified there are no constructions, nor crops of any type (see record at folio 45). XV.- What has been analyzed is sufficient to consider the basic prerequisites for accepting this application not demonstrated. But independently of that, it is important to indicate regarding the remaining grievances the following. What is alleged in the third grievance regarding the a quo's argument about the area being easy to become overgrown and therefore, after a harvest, it quickly returns to natural regeneration not being true, is improper, aside from being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific area. But, in this matter, even if it were true that the area could be one of easy regeneration, this does not change the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the non-compliance with the necessary requirements to approve this titling. XVI.- Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that the Tribunal cannot limit the trial court judge's powers in a general manner, regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, especially if numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides: "The judge may, when deemed appropriate, order all those proceedings deemed necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts referred to in the Information. He shall reject the same if he comes to confirm that it is intended to improperly title national vacant lands or lands belonging to any State institution, as well as forest reserves, national parks, or biological reserves." However, on this occasion, given what occurred and was demonstrated in the case file, the Procurador is correct in claiming that the expansion of testimonial evidence was improperly admitted, not just on one, but on two occasions.

The foregoing, because in March 2001 the first three witnesses offered by the title claimant were heard, as required by Article 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. On that first occasion, the Tribunal must note, the evidence was received by a commissioned judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, given their purposes that promote respect for the principle of immediacy, except in qualified exceptions. This is especially so in cases like the present one, where the protection of a protected area is at stake, and the commissioned proceeding involved the taking of fundamental evidence for the substance of what is to be decided, namely the witness evidence. After that, the Procuraduría appeared in the record and pointed out that the exercise of ten-year possession prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected area in question had to be demonstrated. Regardless of what the Procurador argued, the Judge knows the law by principle and is obligated to ensure compliance with the said requirement. Moreover, from the moment the title claimant offered witness evidence, it had to corroborate that the witnesses had known the land for sufficient time to prove the facts it had asserted. Any error or ignorance on its part, or on the part of its legal advisor, in not accrediting them in the proper manner at the appropriate time, is a burden that must be attributed solely against it under its own responsibility. It is not for the judge to remedy that situation, unless, without violating the judge’s functions and in protection of the party’s rights, with respect for the legal system in force, the judge deems it strictly necessary, on a reasoned basis, to receive any additional evidence. Subsequently, a judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) was conducted, in which this Tribunal cannot fail to point out that a record was drawn up with a rather limited description of the land (see folio 45). In a brief dated December 6, 2001 (folio 51), the title claimant requested permission to offer two other witnesses, because Messrs. Ricardo Azofeifa and José Pérez had known the farm for only a short time, which the trial-level Judge granted (folio 53). Thus, in February 2002, the statements of [Nombre10] and [Nombre5] were received (folios 57 and 58). Due to contradictions between their statements and what the title claimant had asserted, the latter filed the brief at folio 67. In it, the title claimant first seeks to “clarify” what the witnesses said regarding the manner of acquiring the property being derivative, which contradicts what the title claimant asserted. Second, the title claimant’s legal representative requests that three more witnesses be heard, “…with the purpose of demonstrating that the lands my client seeks to title have always been in the hands of him and or his family and that the transmission from parents to children has occurred verbally; that likewise the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización…”. Despite the fact that this statement alters what the promoter initially asserted, and that five witness statements had already been admitted, the trial-level judge agreed to hear them in June 2002 (folios 68, 80, 81, and 82). These witnesses, apart from claiming to have known the farm since 1950, do not contribute much information about the land, and even make the evidence received in its entirety even more contradictory. The Tribunal clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, because, as already explained, it is the trial-level Judge’s faculty to determine the number of witnesses needed to adjudicate, and regarding the provision in the cited Article 6 on the number of witnesses, exceeding that number is not illegal, provided it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that this does not alter the effective fulfillment of the purposes of the legislation in force. What is unacceptable is to allow the applicant to “remedy” or alter, at its convenience, what it has asserted or what has been progressively demonstrated as the proceeding unfolds. This is especially so since the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a vast number of pronouncements by the Tribunals that have resolved and explained how each of them is interpreted and must be complied with. In this case, in view of the statements of the first two witnesses heard, [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] (folios 24 and 25), regarding having known the land for only 10 or 12 years, it is understandable that the court might have ordered two more witnesses to be heard, who were supposed to have known the land for many more years prior, and also, logically, to be sufficiently knowledgeable to inform the judge of all the details that the judge might require regarding time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even if the judge omitted to ask a question of special interest to corroborate the information provided by the title claimant, the latter and its legal advisor may be present at the hearing and request that the pertinent questions the judge failed to ask be posed to the declarant. But after the second set of witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was argued, as explained, three more were heard. XVII.- Finally, the Tribunal must also note that in the recitals of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements necessary to grant the proceeding, the position of the Procuraduría is contested, considering that it engages in an “inconvenient” practice of changing the “rules of the game” (folio 92). Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was stated in the initial brief regarding the absence of encumbrances (cargas reales) on the property and what is recorded on the base plan of the proceedings, where the existence of an easement (servidumbre) of passage is indicated, which evidently serves as access to the property. This is not only a discrepancy that the lower court (a quo) should have noticed, so that if pertinent, it could order proof of its constitution in the proper form and clarify which was the servient tenement, whether it was registered or not, the measurements of the easement (width and length), and its purpose. Moreover, in this case, given that the property is part of a protected area, if the title claimant had not consolidated its right prior to the effective date of the decree creating it, the constitution of an encumbrance like the one cited would have been improper. In this regard, it must be remembered that state-owned protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestre protegidas) form part of the natural heritage of the State (artículos 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 and 14 of the Ley Forestal; 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, vote of the Sala Constitucional N°2988 of 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, and Nº755-03 cited from the Agrarian Tribunal). The latter, in turn, is comprised of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, farms registered in the name of the State, farms of the municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other agencies of the Public Administration, except immovable properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its patrimony (Articles 13 and 15 Ley Forestal). The forest lands and forests comprised within the natural heritage of the State are unattachable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law (see in this regard votes N°1092 of 16:09 hours on February 7, 2001, and N°421 of 15:20 hours on January 16, 2001. In the same sense, N°2988 of 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, all from the Sala Constitucional). XVIII.- By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked insofar as it approved the present possessory information proceedings (diligencias de información posesoria). In its place, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings (diligencias de información posesoria) established by [Nombre1] are rejected. "

"VIII.- Los agravios dos, cuatro y cinco de la parte apelante se relacionan entre sí, pues combaten lo tenido por demostrado por el a quo, y resaltan las contradicciones entre lo afirmado por el promovente y lo dicho por los testigos en cuanto a modo de adquisición, actos posesorios ejercidos y delimitación del terreno. Al respecto, y de acuerdo con lo que se explicará en los considerandos siguientes, lleva razón la Procuraduría, aclarándose se toma en cuenta únicamente para analizar los agravios, lo que conste en este proceso y la prueba efectivamente recibida o aportada en él, no así la referencia a los testimonios rendidos en otros asuntos, mucho menos si no fueron agregados a los autos como prueba documental. Según lo tenido por probado en esta instancia, el terreno a titular se encuentra ubicado dentro de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, establecida en abril de 1994. Por consiguiente, debió el promovente demostrar en forma clara y contundente, haber ejercido una posesión decenal anterior a 1994. Lo anterior no fue debidamente acreditado. Al respecto, aparte de lo que se dirá sobre la forma y cantidad de testigos recibidos, deben resaltarse los siguiente puntos. Las declaraciones hechas en este tipo de proceso por los gestionante, tienen el carácter de declaración jurada, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 3 párrafo final de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Los artículos 1, 2, 4, 5 6, 7, 9 y 15 de la misma disponen los requisitos que deben cumplirse al plantearse el proceso, como de trámite y de fondo. En ese sentido, el Tribunal ha explicado, la “…Información Posesoria es un trámite de actividad judicial no contenciosa para la formalización de un título registrable sobre un derecho de propiedad que se ha llegado a adquirir por la usucapión, cumpliendo para ello con los requisitos legales correspondientes. Se exige demostrar la posesión a título de dueño, en forma quieta, pública, pacífica e ininterrumpida (artículos 1 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y 856 del Código Civil). El titulante, aparte de carecer de título inscrito o inscribible en el Registro Público, debe manifestar expresamente que la finca no ha sido inscrita en el Registro Público anteriormente. Por razones de interés público, y para evitar una doble inscripción registral sobre un mismo bien, o bien, para tutelar a terceros de mejor derecho que el titulante, la Ley exige notificar a ciertos sujetos. También estableció un trámite de oposición dentro de la Información Posesoria, en caso de que alguno de los interesados se sienta perjudicado por la titulación (artículo 8). La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias ordena al Juez tener como partes y por tanto notificarles personalmente desde el inicio de las diligencias, a los colindantes, ello por cuanto la titulación podría abarcar parte de las tierras que les pertenecen. También se ordena notificar a los condueños o condóminos. Igualmente, en resguardo de los intereses del Estado, se ordena tener como parte a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, para el resguardo de la propiedad sujeta al dominio público, y de la Propiedad Agraria estatal (artículo 5). Finalmente, la Ley manda a citar a todos los interesados, mediante la publicación de un Edicto en el Boletín Judicial, que puedan tener un interés legítimo en el proceso.(Ver numeral 5 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) ( ver voto Nº755 de las 9:45 horas del 13 de noviembre del 2003). Se exige también la existencia de linderos bien señalados (cercas, carriles, etc.). Deben aportarse los siguientes documentos: marca de ganado si la finca se dedica a ganadería; cédula de identidad o documento de identificación respectivo del titulante; el plano catastrado; certificación actualizada del Registro Público que aclare si se han titulado otras fincas por el promovente y cual es su medida; certificación actualizada del Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía sobre si está o no comprendido el terreno dentro de alguna área protegida. La legislación vigente sobre suelos exige se demuestre el uso del terreno conforme a su aptitud (estudio de suelo). También está obligado el juez, para velar por la protección del recurso hídrico con fines de utilidad pública, de existir nacientes o fuentes de agua, a solicitar el informe respectivo del ente competente para ello (artículos 50 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, inciso 14 del numeral 121 de la Constitución Política, 1, 3 y 17 de la Ley de Aguas N°276 de 27 de agosto de 1942, 33 de la Ley Forestal vigente Nº7575 de 5 de febrero de 1996 y Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE de 19 de junio de 1997). IX.- Aparte de lo indicado, el escrito inicial debe contener cada uno de los datos requeridos en el artículo 1º de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Nombre y calidades del promovente; naturaleza, situación, medida y linderos del terreno; nombres y dirección de los colindantes (si son personas jurídicas debe acreditarse su personería actualizada); indicación de sí existen condueños y cargas reales (entre ellas, servidumbres, usufructos, etc.), de haberlos especificar quiénes y cuáles (probar además la constitución de las últimas); tiempo de posesión; descripción de los actos posesorios; extensión de cultivos, zonas boscosas o de pasto; existencia de construcciones y mejoras realizadas; cantidad de apartos de ser ganadera la finca; causa y fecha de adquisición; nombre y apellidos de la persona que transmitió, en caso de tratarse de un modo derivado, así como su domicilio; estimación del inmueble y las diligencias; indicación de tres testigos vecinos del mismo cantón donde se ubique el inmueble, cuando sea necesario de acuerdo con lo indicado en el numerales 4 y 6 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Debe además necesariamente declararse que: la finca no se encuentra ya inscrita en el Registro Público, se carece de título de dominio inscribible y no se pretende evadir las consecuencias de un juicio sucesorio. De no tenerse la posesión decenal al momento de iniciar la diligencia, puede el promovente sumar la de sus transmitentes, pero además de aclarar eso en el escrito, debe aportar el documento público en el cual conste el traspaso de su derecho. La documental y el resto de la prueba que se debe aportar, vienen a ratificar o probar precisamente lo informado en el escrito. Por ello no resulta procedente se remita al contenido de la documental que acompañe al escrito inicial. En cuanto a la prueba testimonial exigida, en un mínimo de tres, el legislador impuso el requisito de ser vecinos del cantón donde se ubica el inmueble. Ello con el fin de permitir fuesen realmente personas conocedoras de la situación las que se presentaran a declarar. En otras palabras, se presume los vecinos de la zona son quienes mejor pueden dar fe de los dueños de los terrenos cercanos a los suyos y que sucede en ellos, por frecuentar o vivir en el mismo lugar. Todos estos requisitos y la prueba pertinente para corroborar lo declarado en el memorial inicial están claramente especificados en la normativa citada. No puede entonces alegarse desconocimiento al respecto, mucho menos si se cuenta con asesoría legal profesional, como sucedió en el caso. La omisión en cuanto a ellos, o el ofrecimiento de prueba no pertinente, es responsabilidad únicamente del promovente, que el juzgador no puede asumir ni intentar solventar. X.- Además de los requisitos mencionados, en los casos en los cuales el terreno esté comprendido dentro de una zona protegida, debe cumplirse con un requisito más calificado en cuanto al ejercicio y tiempo de la posesión. “…De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, de aplicación al caso por encontrarse el inmueble a titular dentro de la Zona Protectora …, para poder inscribir dicho bien en el Registro Público, es preciso el gestionante demuestre haber estado en posesión del inmueble por lo menos diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto que creó la citada Reserva, así como haber protegido el recurso forestal”(voto Nº170-03 de las 16:24 horas del 31 de marzo del 2003. Ver también al respecto el voto Nº755-03 citado). Lo anterior se exige en protección del patrimonio forestal del Estado y la biodiversidad, sin afectarse por ello los derechos que efectivamente los sujetos privados hubiesen consolidado por el transcurso del tiempo (ver al respecto el voto Nº497 de las 15:20 horas del 30 de julio del 2003 del Tribunal). En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional en Voto N° 4587 de las 15:45 horas del 5 de agosto de 1997, en el cual analizó la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 citado, dispuso para poder titular los terrenos ubicados en las zonas protegidas que ahí se señalan, debía el interesado demostrar la posesión diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto respectivo. Básicamente dijo la Sala en esa oportunidad: "… dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público. Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley… resulta importante sintetizar los elementos básicos que a nivel de doctrina y jurisprudencia se maejan con estos temas, y que obligan al juez – en relación con la norma impugnada- a determinar en cada caso el tipo específico de acto posesorio que se ha ejercido en el fundo – que entra a formar parte del área silvestre protegida- que se pretende titular. Lo anterior con el objeto de que el juez tenga un criterio más amplio – que no se limite a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de la ley o el decreto ejecutivo que defina los límites de un área silvestre determinada- para establecer con mayor precisión el momento en que dichos bienes se convirtieron en inalienables e imprescriptibles, a los efectos de determinar si sobre ellos se ejerció la posesión ad usucapionem durante diez años anteriores a que adquirieron esa condición. Esta perspectiva de mayor amplitud favorece la protección del patrimonio ambiental de la Nación, determina que cuando se pretenda titular – mediante el procedimiento de informaciones posesorias- un terreno ubicado dentro de un área silvestre protegida, la discusión no se reduzca al simple cálculo del tiempo que tiene de haber ingresado a un inmueble en relación con la fecha en que se haya producido la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida, ya que -por un lado deberá contemplarse a los efectos de acreditar la posesión ad usucapionem durante el plazo establecido en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, los elementos que cada tipo específico de posesión contempla, y –por otro lado- la posible existencia de normas que de antaño declaraban inalienables esos terrenos, aún antes de su afectación específica al dominio público… ". En el caso, valorada la prueba a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas de derecho común (artículo 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), el Tribunal llega a la ineludible conclusión de que esta diligencia debe ser rechazada por comprender un bien que forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, al no haber sido demostrado por el titulante haber adquirido y consolidado un derecho de propiedad sobre el mismo con anterioridad a la creación de la zona protegida de marras. Considera este Tribunal innecesario entrar a analizar la legislación anterior para ver si tales terrenos fueron afectados al dominio publico anteriormente por alguna otra ley, pues conforme a lo expuesto existen motivos suficientes para el rechazo de estas diligencias. En los considerandos posteriores se darán las razones de equidad y derecho que fundamentan dicha conclusión. XI.- Respecto del modo de adquisición, tiempo de posesión y actos en posesorios, no existe coincidencia entre los testigos, y entre estos y lo dicho por el titulante en su escrito inicial. Indicó el señor [Nombre1] poseer el terreno desde 1971 en forma originaria y ser sus actos posesorios la hechura de rondas, cercas, siembra de plátanos, árboles frutales como mango, coco, aguacate y teca (folios 7 y 8). Lo primero no fue corroborado por ninguno de los testigos que declararon en diferentes oportunidades: [Nombre2] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] (folios 23, 24, 25, 57, 58, 80, 81 y 82). De hecho, los tres últimos citados, en forma idéntica indicaron, conocer la finca desde antes de 1950, y haber sido siempre de la familia [Nombre1] Mesén (folios 80, 81 y 82). [Nombre5] y [Nombre10] declararon el promovente adquirió por compra que hiciera al señor [Nombre11] , indicando el primero hace unos veinte años de dicha compra y que éste tuvo una posesión de más de diez años indicó el señor [Nombre10] . El promovente, en forma contradictoria a sus intereses, por cuanto se supone que ofrece testigos veraces, conocedores de la situación de la finca, que VOLUNTARIAMENTE elige con el fin de probar sus afirmaciones, aporta el memorial de fecha 2 de mayo del 2002, visible a folio 67, con el cual pretende “aclarar” lo dicho por esos dos testigos, aduciendo el señor [Nombre11] hace muchos años tuvo fincas aledañas a la que se pretende titular, pero no esa, y reitera su modo de adquisición es originario. Lo anterior no es convincente ni aceptable, máxime en este caso, en el cual en forma injustificada se aceptó en más de una oportunidad declararan diferentes testigos. De ser admitida su justificación, tendría que tenerse por cierto esos testigos no declararon entonces sobre la finca objeto del proceso, o bien no la conocían, y por ende, no debieron ser ofrecidos como tal. Pero aparte de este proceder tan cuestionable, y de las contradicciones en cuanto al modo y fecha de adquisición, que impiden tener por efectivamente demostrada el ejercicio de la posesión decenal en la forma requerida por la ley antes de 1994, por parte del titulante, existen otras discordancias que igualmente desvirtúan lo afirmado por él, y que conllevan el rechazo de esta gestión. XII.- En cuanto al tiempo de posesión, [Nombre3] y [Nombre2] (folios 24 y 25) dijeron conocer la finca desde hacía 12 y 10 respectivamente (aproximadamente 1989 y 1991, de acuerdo con la fecha de la declaración). Además de no ser útiles esos testigos para demostrar una posesión anterior a esas fechas, lo cual era necesario dada la situación especial de la finca al formar parte de una zona protectora, llama la atención pese a afirmar que conocían la finca desde hace tantos años, no sabían quienes eran sus colindantes. [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre10] , (folios 23, 57 y 58) dijeron conocer la finca desde hace como 30 años (lo cual corresponde a 1971 y 1972 respectivamente, según sus fechas de declaración). Sin embargo, al igual que los primeros citados, la señora [Nombre4] no sabía quienes eran los colindantes, ni tampoco se refirió a como llegó a ser el dueño del terreno [Nombre1] . [Nombre5] no sabía tampoco sobre las colindancias ni cual era la medida del terreno. Pero además, junto con [Nombre10] , afirmaron la finca fue adquirida de [Nombre11] . El segundo dijo eso fue hacía como 20 años, lo cual da como fecha aproximada el año de 1982. El primero no mencionó la fecha de adquisición (folios 57 y 58). Esto contradice no solo el modo de adquisición afirmado por el señor [Nombre1], sino además el tiempo que declaró poseer el terreno. Lo cual es aún más cuestionable, si se toma en cuenta, dada la fecha de creación de la zona protectora de marras, debió haber demostrado poseer la finca al menos los diez años anteriores a 1994, en la forma legalmente exigida. [Nombre9] , [Nombre7] y [Nombre8] (folios 80, 81 y 82), declararon conocer la finca desde antes de 1950, la cual antes formaba parte de otra. Afirmaron siempre ha pertenecido a la familia [Nombre1] . Lo anterior desdice no solo lo afirmado por testigos anteriores, sino además el propio dicho del titulante, quien afirma con carácter de declaración jurada ser el dueño del inmueble desde 1971 y haberlo adquirido en forma originaria. XIII.- Sobre los actos posesorios, los primeros testigos recibidos en marzo del 2001 manifestaron: [Nombre2] y [Nombre4] consistían tales en haberse cercado la finca por todos sus linderos. La segunda agregó sobre el terreno era “muy limpio” (folios 23 y 25); [Nombre3] dijo habían sido la limpieza del terreno con el fin de construir una casa (folio 24). El segundo grupo de testigos fue recibido en febrero del 2002, y afirmaron conocer el terreno pero como parte de uno más grande. Específicamente sobre los actos posesorios, con la aclaración de conocer el terreno como parte de otro, dijeron: [Nombre5] , haberse dedicado el inmueble a agricultura (folio 57). [Nombre10] , ser un terreno dedicado a árboles frutales en su mayoría, haberse hecho y arreglado cercos, limpieza de rondas y cuido en general (folio 58). El tercer grupo de testigos, que igualmente conoce el terreno como parte de otro, se recibió en junio del 2002, y declararon: [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] dicen la propiedad se ha dedicado a conservación o regeneración natural y los actos posesorios han sido el cuido general que requiere una finca de esa naturaleza (folios 80, 81 y 82). [Nombre9] , a diferencia de todos los testigos citados, afirma algunas partes de la finca se han dedicado a ganadería, y otras a agricultura, pero en su mayoría a conservación o regeneración natural, y los actos posesorios son el cuido general que requiere una finca de tal naturaleza (folio 82). Aparte de las evidentes inconsistencias en cuanto a lo afirmado por los testigos entre sí, en el reconocimiento judicial efectuado el 20 de junio del 2001, se deriva de lo consignado en ella, el terreno es de topografía quebrada, no existían cercas pero sí carriles, no había construcciones, semovientes ni cultivos. Se consignó estaba dedicado a conservación natural. Aunado a lo anterior, el plano objeto de las diligencias indica el terreno se dedica a “árboles” (folio1), lo cual es corroborado también al indicarse la naturaleza del inmueble en el escrito inicial (folio 7). Por consiguiente, ante tantas contradicciones, en forma alguna se puede tener por claro cuáles han sido los actos posesorios y a qué se ha dedicado el terreno objeto de titulación, y por ende no se puede tener por demostrado dicho aspecto en la forma requerida por la ley, menos si se toma como base el titulante afirmó fueron cercas, rondas y siembra de plátano y frutales, y según sus tres últimos testigos, aportados supuestamente para “aclarar o probar” lo que los anteriores no habían podido decir, el terreno “siempre se ha dedicado a conservación y los actos posesorios han sido los que requiere una finca de tal naturaleza”. XIV.- En cuanto a la delimitación del inmueble, este Tribunal toma en cuenta el mismo formaba parte de una unidad material, a la cual hacen referencia varios de los testigos recibidos (folios 57, 58, 75, 80 y 81). Sin embargo, al decidir el promovente plantear su inscripción por partes, en concreto en este caso un terreno con una medida de 7864.60 metros cuadrados, está obligado a delimitarlo en forma clara. Igualmente los testigos que ofrece deben conocerlo de esa forma, y poder explicar que es lo que saben al respecto, pues de otra manera no se podría aceptar, ni se tendría certeza, sobre si lo declarado se refiere al terreno objeto de titulación. En ese sentido, de los primeros testigos que declararon en autos: [Nombre2] y [Nombre4] (folios 23 y 25), indicaron el terreno estaba cercado por los cuatros costados. [Nombre2] incluso especificó el levantamiento de las cercas eran para él los actos posesorios ejercidos (folio 25). [Nombre3] no se refirió a la forma como estaba delimitado el terreno, y tampoco conocía sus colindancias. Este testigo declaró los actos de posesión han consistido en la limpieza total del terreno, con el fin de construir una casa de habitación (folio 24). [Nombre5] dice que por ser la finca muy quebrada nunca se ha interesado en saberlas. Agrega: “El inmueble está dedicado a la agricultura. Esta propiedad antes era una sola finca pero la han venido loteando no sé con que intención. No sé si está rondeada o cercada ya que esos son unos cerros que cuesta mucho andarlos” (folio 57). [Nombre10] (folio 58), afirmó el “lote pertenece a una finca grande de aproximadamente ochenta y más hectáreas, cuyas colindancias por el rumbo oeste es con [Dirección1] , al este con [Dirección2] , al norte con un gringo cuyo nombre no sé y al sur no recuerdo de quien”. Aparte de los problemas que implican el conocer el lote como parte de otro terreno para efectos de ubicación del mismo, éste testigo no es útil entonces para demostrar los linderos específicos y actuales del que se pretende titular, pues se desprende de su dicho se refiere al terreno como un todo y no a la parte que se pretendía titular. Los últimos tres testigos, [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , no se refieren a las colindancias del terreno (folios 80, 81 y 82). Pero además de lo dicho, el titulante en su memorial inicial afirma haber realizado como actos de posesión la hechura de cercas, siembra de plátanos, árboles frutales. (folio 8). Esa afirmación y lo indicado por los primeros testigos citados anteriormente, se ve desvirtuada con lo constatado en el reconocimiento judicial realizado en junio del 2001, pues claramente se indicó no estaba cercado el inmueble, existiendo como delimitación carriles. Además se constató no hay construcciones, ni cultivos de ningún tipo (ver acta de folio 45). XV.- Lo analizado es suficiente para tener por no demostrados los presupuestos básicos para acoger la presente gestión. Pero independientemente de ello, es importante indicar en cuanto a los agravios restantes lo siguiente. Lo alegado en el tercero respecto de no ser cierto el argumento del a quo de ser fácil de enmontar la zona y por ende luego de pasada una cosecha se vuelva rápidamente de regeneración natural, es improcedente, aparte de tratarse de una situación que debe ser analizada y demostrada en cada caso en concreto, dependiendo del tipo de vegetación y condiciones naturales de la zona específica. Pero, en este asunto, aunque fuese cierto pudiese ser un área de fácil regeneración, ello no varía la conclusión a la que llega el Tribunal en cuanto al no cumplimiento de los requisitos necesarios para aprobar esta titulación. XVI.- Del sexto agravio debe decirse, no puede el Tribunal limitar las facultades del juzgador de instancia en forma general,, en cuanto a la admisión y valoración de la prueba, máxime si el numeral 11 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias dispone: “El juez podrá cuando lo crea conveniente, ordenar todas aquellas diligencias que estime necesarias para comprobar la veracidad de los hechos a que se refiere la Información. Rechazará la misma si llegare a constatar que se pretende titular indebidamente baldíos nacionales o terrenos pertenecientes a cualquier institución del Estado, lo mismo que reservas forestales, parques nacionales o reservas biológicas”. Sin embargo, en esta oportunidad, dado lo acontecido y demostrado en autos, lleva razón el Procurador al reclamar se admitió en forma indebida la ampliación de prueba testimonial, no solo en una, sino en dos oportunidades. Lo anterior por cuanto en marzo del 2001 se recibieron los tres primeros testigos ofrecidos por el titulante, tal y como lo exige el artículo 6 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. En esa primera ocasión debe resaltar el Tribunal, la prueba la recibió un Juez comisionado, lo cual no es una práctica admisible en materia agraria, por sus fines, que propician el respeto, salvo excepciones calificadas, del principio de inmediatez. Máxime en casos como el presente, donde está de por medio la protección de una zona protegida, y al ser la actuación comisionada la evacuación de una prueba fundamental para el fondo de lo llamado a resolver, como lo es la testimonial. Luego de ello consta se apersonó la Procuraduría, quien recordó debía demostrarse el ejercicio decenal de la posesión con anterioridad a la fecha de vigencia del decreto que creó la zona protegida de marras. Independientemente de lo alegado por el Procurador, el Juez por principio conoce el derecho y está obligado a velar por el cumplimiento del requisito dicho. La parte titulante además, debía desde el momento en que ofreció prueba testimonial, corroborar los testigos conociesen el terreno durante el tiempo suficiente para poder probar los hechos por ella afirmados. Si error o ignorancia, suya o de su asesor legal, no los acredita en la forma debida en el momento oportuno, es una carga que solo debe imputarse en su contra bajo su responsabilidad. No corresponde al juez subsanar dicha situación, salvo que, sin violentar sus funciones y en tutela de los derechos de la parte y con respecto del ordenamiento vigente, considere en forma fundada, sea estrictamente necesario recibir alguna prueba adicional. Posterior a ello, se realiza un reconocimiento judicial, en el cual no puede este Tribunal dejar de señalar, se levanta un acta con descripción bastante limitada del terreno (ver folio 45). En memorial de fecha 6 de diciembre del 2001 (folio 51), el titulante pide se le permita ofrecer otros dos testigos, por cuanto los señores Ricardo Azofeifa y José Pérez, tenían poco tiempo de conocer la finca, a lo cual accede el Juzgador de instancia (folio 53). Se recibieron así en febrero del 2002 las declaraciones de [Nombre10] y [Nombre5] (folios 57 y 58). Debido a contradicciones entre lo declarado por ellos y lo afirmado por el titulante, éste presenta memorial de folios 67. En él, primero pretende “aclarar” lo dicho por ellos en cuanto a ser derivada la forma de adquisición del inmueble, lo cual contradice lo afirmado por el titulante. Segundo, el apoderado judicial del titulante solicita se reciban tres testigos más, “…con el propósito de demostrar que las tierras que pretende titular mi representado siempre han estado en manos de él y o su familia y que la transmisión de padres a hijos se ha dado en forma verbal; que a si mismo la posesión ejercida lo ha sido con mucho mas de diez (sic) de antelación a la publicación de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización…”. Pese a que con esa manifestación se varía lo afirmado inicialmente por el promovente, y a haberse admitido ya cinco testimonios, el juez de instancia accede a recibirlos en junio del 2002 (folios 68, 80, 81 y 82). Estos, aparte de afirmar conocer la finca desde 1950, no aportan mucha información sobre el terreno, e incluso hacen aún más contradictoria la recibida en su totalidad. Aclara el Tribunal este agravio se admite en este caso en concreto, por cuanto como ya se explicó, es facultad del Juez de instancia determinar el número de testigos que necesita para fallar, y en cuanto a lo establecido en el artículo 6 citado sobre el número de testigos, su extensión no es ilegal, siempre y cuando sea estrictamente necesario y se corrobore no se altera con ello el cumplimiento efectivo de los fines de la legislación vigente. Lo inaceptable es permitir el gestionante vaya “subsanando” o alterando a su conveniencia, lo que ha afirmado o bien ha ido quedando demostrado, conforme va transcurriendo el proceso. Máxime si la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias es clara en cuanto a requisitos, y existe una gran cantidad de pronunciamientos por parte de los Tribunales que han resuelto y explicado como se interpretan y deben cumplir cada uno de ellos. En el caso, en vista de las afirmaciones de los dos primeros testigos recibidos [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] (folios 24 y 25), sobre conocer el terreno desde hacía apenas 10 o 12 años, se puede entender se haya ordenado recibir dos testigos más, los cuales se suponen debían tener conocimiento sobre el mismo con muchos años más de antelación, y además, lógicamente, estar lo suficientemente enterados para poder informar al juez sobre todos los detalles que éste requiriese en cuanto a tiempo de posesión, actos ejercidos, delimitación y demás datos fundamentales. Incluso, aún cuando el juez omitiese hacer alguna pregunta de especial interés para corroborar lo informado por el titulante, éste y su asesor legal pueden estar presentes en la declaración y solicitar se hagan al declarante las preguntas pertinentes que el juzgador haya dejado de hacer. Pero luego de los segundos testigos, injustificadamente a la luz de lo alegado, como se explicó, se recibieron tres más. XVII.- Finalmente, debe además hacer notar el Tribunal, en los considerandos de la sentencia impugnada, más que analizarse la prueba y el cumplimiento de los presupuestos procesales y de fondo exigidos para acoger la diligencia, se combate la posición de la Procuraduría, al considerar ésta incurre en una práctica “inconveniente” de cambiar las “reglas del juego” (folio 92). Asimismo, existe una contradicción entre lo afirmado en el escrito inicial sobre no existir cargas reales sobre el inmueble y lo consignado en el plano base de las diligencias, al marcarse la existencia de una servidumbre de paso, que evidentemente sirve de acceso al mismo. Ello no solo es una discordancia que debió ser advertida por el a quo, para que en caso de ser pertinente, ordenase demostrar su constitución en la forma debida y se aclarase cual era el fundo sirviente, si estaba o no inscrito, medidas de la servidumbre (ancho y largo) y fin de la misma. Pero además, en este caso, dado que el inmueble forma parte de una zona protegida, de no haber consolidado el titulante su derecho con anterioridad a la vigencia del decreto que la crea, resultaba improcedente la constitución de un gravamen como el citado. Al respecto, recuérdese las áreas silvestre protegidas estatales forman parte del patrimonio natural del Estado (artículos 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 y 14 de La Ley Forestal; 58 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, voto de la Sala Constitucional N°2988 de las 11:57 horas del 23 de abril de 1999 y Nº755-03 citado del Tribunal Agrario). Este por su parte, está conformado por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, áreas declaradas inalienables, fincas inscritas a nombre del Estado, fincas de las municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, excepto inmuebles que garanticen operaciones crediticias del Sistema Bancario Nacional y formen parte de su patrimonio (artículos 13 y 15 Ley Forestal). Los terrenos forestales y bosques comprendidos dentro del patrimonio natural del Estado son inembargables, inalienables e imprescriptibles, de conformidad con los numerales 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal, y no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil (ver al respecto los votos N°1092 de las 16:09 horas del 7 de febrero del 2001 y N°421 de las 15:20 horas del 16 de enero del 2001. En igual sentido el N°2988 de las 11:57 horas del 23 de abril de 1999, todos de la Sala Constitucional). XVIII.- En razón de todo lo expuesto, deberá revocarse la resolución recurrida, en cuanto aprobó las presentes diligencias de información posesoria. En su lugar, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 1, 7 y 11 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y demás normativa citada, se rechazan las diligencias de información posesoria establecidas por [Nombre1] ."