Public nature of state-owned corporations and scope of continuous embezzlementNaturaleza pública de sociedades anónimas de propiedad estatal y alcance del peculado continuado

III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

[...] Eighteenth ground. Violation of the rules of sound judgment (erroneous derivation): The violation of Articles 11, 27, 36, 39, and 41, all of the Political Constitution; 1, 106, 144, 145, 392, 395, 396, 397, 400, 449, 471, 474, 476, 477, 482, and 483, these last of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, is reproached, in that, in the appellant's opinion, in order to hold that the funds used in the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. belonged to Banco Anglo Costarricense and not to private companies, the court affirms that the investments were made by the aforementioned banking entity and not by A.V.C., such that the funds were public, its officials were also public, and the law applicable to such corporations is that of the Public Administration, a conclusion that, in his view, is erroneous. He indicates that Almacén de Valores Comerciales A.V.C. was legally founded through law number 15 of October 15, 1934, authorized to function in 1988 as a corporation governed by the laws of private law. The appellant indicates, as the Constitutional Chamber points out, that in the case at hand, one cannot conclude that the group of A.V.C. companies were public companies, for being 100% owned by Banco Anglo Costarricense, a state institution. And this is so, because to modify the defect it was necessary to modify the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, who did not have the authority to audit those companies, as the reform tacitly recognizes, since through Law 7428 of September 7, 1997, Articles 8 and 9, the possibility was granted to confer on those companies the classification of public and to audit the same, tacitly recognizing that they could not do so before. The claim is not receivable. Having examined the appealed judgment, it is noted that the appellant starts from a premise that does not correspond to the merits of the case file, insofar as the judges never stated that, in order to hold that the funds used by A.V.C. were from Banco Anglo Costarricense, the questioned investments were carried out by this banking entity and not by the acquired company. In reality, from the paragraph extracted by the petitioner visible on folios 4827 and 4828, it is observed that the court indicated, not that Banco Anglo Costarricense carried out the leveraged investments directly, but rather that it was not true, as the defendants claimed, that if the questioned investments were made through A.V.C., which was a private entity, they did not require authorization from the Central Bank of Costa Rica, given that A.V.C. was a subsidiary with 100% shareholding participation of the banking entity. Furthermore, while it is true, as the appellant points out, that the company A.V.C. was created based on the General Law of Deposit Warehouses of 1934 and its operation as a corporation was authorized through an Executive Decree issued in 1988, given the inherent nature of a deposit warehouse, the constitutional jurisprudence to which the petitioner alludes – Voto 1106-95 of 10:27 a.m. on February 24, 1995, corresponding to an Amparo Appeal filed against Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – is not applicable, because what is alluded to in that ruling, as can be inferred from its complete context, is a private entity that is a concessionaire of a public right – Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – a situation that cannot be applied to A.V.C., which was a company that, although constituted as a corporation, has a different nature – a general deposit warehouse – although in practice it departed from the typical parameters of a deposit warehouse. Thus, the Constitutional Chamber stated on that occasion "that the right of petition does not exist against private entities, and it is obvious that Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, although majority-owned by a public institution, is itself a private legal entity exactly like all others, such that it could not be considered public either by reason of its owner, or by reason of the public interest involved in its activity..." However, in this same ruling, the Constitutional Chamber hastens to indicate that notwithstanding the foregoing, it was necessary "to make a distinction regarding entities that, while private, exercise a part of the administrative function of the State as concessionaires of a public service." It also pointed out that in this sense, these companies – concessionaires of a public service – are the inverse of the public companies referred to in Article 3.2 of the General Law of Public Administration. That provision reads as follows: 3.2: Private law shall regulate the activity of those entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their line of business, can be considered industrial or mercantile enterprises. The Constitutional Chamber clarifies that the aforementioned article refers to those public enterprises which, like the commercial banks of the State, are governed in their organization by public law, but in their activity by private law, while private companies – it refers here to concessionaires of public services – whether owned by individuals, or by the State or its public institutions, or even mixed ownership companies, are organized and governed by private law – for which reason they are excluded from the General Law of Public Administration – but in their activity as concessionaires of public services, they are exceptionally subject to public law and obligated to behave in conformity therewith. The appellant, although citing the jurisprudential precedent, omits this last part, referring to the activity of the private company, although we insist that the constitutional ruling specifically refers to the case of private companies that are concessionaires of public services, this not being the case for A.V.C. However, for the subject that concerns us, it is worth rescuing from the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, the mention it makes of public enterprises, especially the commercial banks of the State, which in their organization are governed by public law and in their activity by private law, being included within the parameters of application of the General Law of Public Administration; consequently, if A.V.C. was 100% owned by Banco Anglo Costarricense, even if it could be constituted as a corporation in its activity, because the Law of General Deposit Warehouses permitted it, the public funds that fed it so that it could carry out precisely the activities typical of an entity of such a nature, continued under that quality, just as the source that originated them held, and this is so, to the point that, as also highlighted by the Constitutional Chamber in the mentioned ruling, private companies, such as concessionaires of public services for example, in their activity, are also exceptionally subject to public law and obligated to behave in accordance with the guidelines of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, in the case at hand, considering the A.V.C. companies as subsidiary entities of Banco Anglo Costarricense, which is subject in its organization to public law, or alternatively, from the perspective of a private company that provides public services, their subjection to the provisions of public order subsists. [...] III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS [...] Third ground. The erroneous application of the General Law of the Public Administration – Articles 111, 112, and 113 – and the failure to apply the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber – Voto 1106-95 of 10:27 a.m. on February 14, 1995 – and of Law 3284 – Commercial Code – in its Articles 102 to 233 – on corporations – is claimed. The appellant questions the fact held as proven by the court to the effect that the funds used in the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. belonged to Banco Anglo Costarricense, because the group of companies was 100% owned by the banking entity, and that consequently they were not private companies, with the court affirming that the investments were made by Banco Anglo Costarricense and not A.V.C. The appellant indicates that the Constitutional Chamber has established that companies such as those that made up A.V.C. are not public but are governed by private law and are excluded from the General Law of the Public Administration, with that provision having been corrected only some time later through a modification to the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic by means of Law 7428 of September 7, 1994, published in La Gaceta 210 of November 4, 1994, Articles 8 and 9, so that the Comptroller could audit them considering them as public. The claim is not receivable. We cannot fail to mention that the appellant, in his allegation, disregards the facts held as proven by the court, which is inadmissible within a challenge on the merits, altering in any case, the same factual premises determined by the judges, insofar as, as we pointed out when referring to the eighteenth ground of the appeal filed by this same petitioner – a ground for procedural defects – the judgment never indicates that the investments had been made by Banco Anglo Costarricense and not by Almacén de Valores, and it was always clear that A.V.C. was obviously a corporation, which was governed, in principle, by common commercial rules, as we shall see later. On this subject, the arguments previously set forth in the resolution of the indicated ground are reiterated. Not withstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to reflect on a transcendental issue in the resolution of this case, referring to the legal nature of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries ABC Valores S.A. and Boltec S.A., once they are acquired by Banco Anglo Costarricense, and their determination as a company, constituted as a corporation, belonging 100% to a banking entity – a public entity. Certainly, the judges considered this last circumstance – the ownership character of the Bank – which is undoubtedly supported by the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, contributed and analyzed, which allows it to be determined with complete accuracy that on May 24, 1993, the Board of Directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense, in session 44-5/93, held starting at 4:20 p.m., which all the accused attended, ratified the closing offer signed by the defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, in his capacity as General Manager of the banking institution, with the fugitive co-defendant José Luis López Gómez, representative of the shareholders of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand dollars, through the exchange mechanism – swap – of external debt bonds from Venezuela and Brazil, supposedly owned by the banking entity, at market value, for the shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. with its operating licenses or operation concessions, with A.V.C. also being the owner of 100% of the shares of Boltec S.A., ABC Valores S.A., and the building with furniture and computer equipment. In said offer, it was established that the deal was firm, definitive, and irrevocable, to be formalized the following day, Tuesday, May 25, 1993. Ratification that was approved in Article 1 of the next session of the Board of Directors of the banking entity, number 45-5/93 of May 31, 1993, and which all the accused also attended, being that on this same day, the accused Robles Macaya, based on the authorization granted by the directors in the cited session 44-5/93, effectively signed with José Luis López Gómez, the purchase contract for the companies A.V.C. and its two subsidiaries, a purchase that was paid according to what was agreed in the closing offer, carrying out the assignment in favor of Banco Anglo Costarricense of the totality of the shares – twelve hundred – In this way, the banking institution acquired the aforementioned companies, becoming their 100% owner, that is, the sole partner of the corporation in which they were constituted. Having determined then that A.V.C. became, as of that date, a corporation, 100% owned by a state entity, it is necessary to elucidate whether said company conforms absolutely within the canons of private law and is considered exclusively as a private company, or whether, taking into account the ownership relationship that links it with the public entity, we could then speak of the existence of a public enterprise. From a restricted perspective, we could conceptualize the public enterprise based on the nature of the owner, such that the enterprise will be private if its owner is private and will be public if its owner is public. From a broader position, it could be pointed out that an enterprise will be public if it serves as an instrument to achieve public ends, it being understood that this will occur in every case in which the entrepreneur is a public administration, and also, when even being a private person, it is ultimately an instrument of action of a public administration – Murillo Arias, Mauro. "Ensayos de Derecho Público". Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia. First edition. San José, Costa Rica. 1988, page 106 – This conceptualization of public enterprise leads us to determine the types of public enterprise doctrinally accepted: a) the public enterprise-organ: dependent on a public entity without legal personality, for example the National Liquor Factory; b) the public enterprise-institution: which are autonomous juridical institutions or not, with a business line, for example: the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS), and the Banks of the National Banking System; c) the enterprises-societies – see Ortiz Ortiz, Eduardo. "La empresa Pública como ente público". Revista Ivstitia, issue 52. Year 5. April 1991, page 12 – Within this last type of public enterprise-society, a distinction is theoretically made between the so-called "State societies" when they belong entirely to the State and anonymous societies with majority state participation, being able to place deposit warehouses within the type of public enterprises-societies. In order to introduce the legal possibility for commercial banks to form corporations – by creation or participation – that allow them to carry out the public ends for which they have been constituted, with deposit warehouses being found among such societies, we must firstly recall that the commercial banks that make up the National Banking System constitute autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administration, and with their own responsibility in the execution of their functions, emanating from their boards of directors, whose members are obligated to act in accordance with their own criteria in the direction and administration of the bank, in accordance with constitutional, legal, regulatory, and technical provisions, and must be accountable for their management – Article 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System – The essential functions of Commercial Banks are: to collaborate in the execution of the monetary, exchange, credit, and banking policy of the Republic; to ensure the liquidity, solvency, and good functioning of the National Banking System; when it concerns State banks, to safeguard and administer the banking deposits of the community and to prevent the existence of idle means of production in the country, seeking out the producer to place at his service the economic and technical means available to the System – Article 3 of the same legal body – Integral to these functions, commercial banks maintain a series of prohibitions, established by the same Organic Law of the National Banking System, among them that of participating directly or indirectly in agricultural, industrial, commercial, or any type of enterprise, and purchasing products, merchandise, and real estate that are not indispensable for their normal operation – Article 73. 3 ibid – in application of the principle of specialty contained in section 61 of the same law, which binds public enterprises, circumscribing them to their corporate purpose, except when a law so permits, prima facie, as pointed out by the Attorney General's Office in its Report C-014-2001 dated January 19 of that year, whose guidelines, as far as concerns us, we share, "... public entities are not authorized to create corporations due to the risk that such creation implies. Hence, the creation of societies by public enterprises requires, in principle, legal authorization. It is the legislator who must establish the rules for the creation of those societies and their operation..." This legal authorization to which we refer will be found embodied in Article 73 itself, already cited, which contains the exception to such prohibitions on participation, exempting banks that might come to have participation in the capital of financial institutions of public or semipublic order that might be created, and the banks that established deposit warehouses, in accordance with the respective law, or that as of the date of enactment of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, already had participation in them, only with respect to the businesses and operations resulting from the operation of such warehouses, also excepting those cases in which the commercial banks of the State, jointly or separately, constitute or employ legal entities of their exclusive property for the provision of services for themselves, with prior authorization from the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, or for the administration of properties awarded in court. Likewise, in relation to deposit warehouses themselves, their legal authorization for the public enterprise – commercial bank – to create or constitute them, we find it in section 48 of the Law of General Deposit Warehouses number 15 of October 15, 1934, which allows Commercial Banks domiciled in the country to establish and maintain General Deposit Warehouses in those places where they have not been established by private initiative within the first six months of the effectiveness of this law; a premise also contained in section 115 of the cited Organic Law of the National Banking System, when it indicates that commercial banks may freely establish General Deposit Warehouses, which shall be governed in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law, as well as to execute similar operations of storage of products and merchandise in their own warehouses. This legal authorization, as far as Banco Anglo Costarricense is concerned, materializes through the known Executive Agreement number 16-H of February 27, 1974, which permitted the banking institution to operate as a general deposit warehouse and fiscal warehouse. Doctrinally, by definition, it is understood that general deposit warehouses are those dedicated to the conservation and custody of all types of merchandise of licit trade, contributing to the greater circulation of wealth by means of the receipts they issue for such merchandise – on this matter see: Espejo de Hinojosa, Ricardo. Curso de Derecho Mercantil. Barcelona. Eighth Edition. 1931; a concept that our Law of General Deposit Warehouses of 1934 takes up in its Article 1 when it states that General Deposit Warehouses are credit institutions whose purpose is the conservation and custody of fruits, products, and merchandise of national or foreign origin, the issuance of certificates of deposit and pledge bonds, and the granting of loans guaranteed by the same. Having thus established the legal possibility that Banco Anglo Costarricense maintained to acquire a General Deposit Warehouse, and therefore to purchase A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., within the parameters proper to a warehouse of this nature in accordance with the current legislation on the matter, which did not happen, as can be observed from the entirety of the judgment issued, a legal possibility that does not necessarily imply that this latter acquisition, as indeed turned out, conformed within the legal canons, the character of absolute owner of the banking entity over the acquired corporation is evident, the latter, although it is configured or organized within the premises of private law, the activity it provides becomes public, even if it retains its own legal personality, which, as the Attorney General's Office pointed out in its Report C-012-93 dated January 20, 1993, despite constituting an asset of the Bank, is not confused with or subsumed into the legal entity that is its owner – the public entity – although the latter, constituted in a shareholders' meeting, can decide all types of measures that allow it to be informed about the result of the Warehouse's activity, as well as to control its operation and its finances, that same report indicating that since the General Deposit Warehouse is a "credit institution", as provided by section 1 of its respective law, the General Audit of Financial Entities – AGEF – and now the Superintendency of Financial Entities was empowered to exercise the controls provided for by the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, which already outlines for us, although it does not openly express it, the public character of the general deposit warehouse of which a commercial bank, as a public entity, becomes the owner. While it is true, this last circumstance – the control of the AGEF over the deposit warehouse – is reconsidered by the same Attorney General's Office years later, in Report C-067-98 of April 14, 1998, subjecting them not to the AGEF or SUGEF, but to the Internal Audit of the banking entity, this is because it is considered that Deposit Warehouses, despite being empowered to grant credits, are not "financial entities" since they do not carry out financial intermediation, understood as the intervention in the market by capturing monetary resources and placing them through credit operations and others of a financial nature, and this is so within a pure conception of a deposit warehouse in accordance with the legislation that informs it. However, as was demonstrated in the judgment, even though the accused, with full knowledge of the matter, proclaimed the idea that the negotiation with A.V.C. and its subsidiaries aimed to function as a deposit warehouse, even though within their commercial line of business they could act as a securities clearinghouse, as authorized by section 36 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law, since it could carry out non-banking activity, the A.V.C. business complex did not function as a deposit warehouse, but rather as a financial company, wherefore from that perspective it should indeed have been controlled by the AGEF. It is convenient to clarify that the Attorney General's Report C-067-98, regarding the concept of financial intermediation, is based on Article 116 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank number 7558 of November 3, 1995, subsequent to the accused acts, so it does not strictly apply to the case at hand. However, the pronouncement of the state organ leads us to the central issue we are developing here, regarding the possibility of considering A.V.C. as a public enterprise, despite its formation as a corporation subject in principle to common commercial premises, the aspect of the banking organ's ownership in relation to the constituted society maintaining relevance. Thus, Doctor Antonio Sobrado González, at that time Fiscal Attorney, established "... that since the share capital of the corporation that administers the general deposit warehouse is entirely subscribed by the Bank, both form a business unit..." – the emphasis is ours – understood as "... the organization of capital and labor destined for the production or mediation of goods or services for the market ..." – Broseta Pont, Manuel. "La empresa, la unificación del Derecho de Obligaciones y el Derecho Mercantil". Madrid, Tecnos, 1965 , page 274 - since "the warehouse operates under the tutelage of the owning bank and at the service of the economic interests of the latter." This assertion is absolutely shared by this Cassation Chamber, being that it rests on the current doctrine on the matter; thus, Doctor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, in his aforementioned essay "La empresa pública como ente público", when analyzing the nature of corporations that are constituted by public enterprises, affirms that a relationship of instrumentality subsists between the public entity and the society, since the public enterprise will achieve its ends through the constituted mercantile company, and if, furthermore, the public entity retains all or the majority of the shares of that corporation, it can manage the latter in accordance with its policies and plans, transforming it into an instrument for the realization of its ends, thus making the created corporation and its activity public. Taking this approach to the case at hand, Banco Anglo Costarricense, a public entity classifiable within the category of public enterprise-institution, legally empowered, acquires a deposit warehouse – A.V.C. and its subsidiaries Boltec S.A. and ABC Valores S.A. – constituted as a corporation, which, due to its instrumental character, must develop a public service activity, consequently responding to the public ends of the banking institution that is its owner of 100% of the subscribed share capital and therefore sole partner of that corporate entity, even though the latter does not carry out strictly banking activities, such that said deposit warehouse, once acquired by the banking entity, becomes a public enterprise-society or state society, and therefore with an eminently public law nature, which impacts its activity whose regulation would also be public – General Deposit Warehouse Law – because it was so ordered both by the Executive Agreement that authorized Banco Anglo Costarricense to operate the General Deposit and Fiscal Warehouse in 1974 and Executive Decree number 44-88 that authorized the operation of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. as a General Deposit Warehouse, subjecting them to the Law on the matter, its regulation, and related laws, as we specified when resolving the previous ground. But in the activity related to the purchase and sale of securities, with the economic resources coming from the banking entity, A.V.C. had to submit to the Securities Market Regulatory Law, from the very moment it functionally presented itself as a securities clearinghouse, an activity that, as a deposit warehouse, was permitted by section 36 of the cited Law, as determined above. The instrumental character of said deposit warehouse in relation to the banking institution allowed the latter, which was the one that financially fed the corporation, to participate competitively in the market indirectly; and this close relationship between the public entity – BAC – and the corporate entity – A.V.C. – is recognized by the accused themselves, which is evidenced when the defendant of the petitioner himself, in session 43 of A.V.C.

Panama, held at 10:30 a.m. on October 18, 1993, in his capacity as General Manager of the business complex, expressly stated that the existing link between the group of companies and BAC could not be separated, as it was convenient for them to be perceived in the market as complementary. However, there would be an important aspect to consider in the instrumental role of the bonded warehouse in relation to the banking entity, which is the fact that, through an amendment to the articles of incorporation of A.V.C., the defendants established that to be a member of the Board of Directors of A.V.C., one necessarily had to be a member of the Board of Directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense, losing such status when one ceased to be a director of the banking body. This would allow us to affirm that the Board of Directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense set the policies of A.V.C., and as stated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in Report C-070-2001 of March 13, 2001, “by definition, the shareholders' meeting of the new company is the owning entity itself through its superior body, but furthermore, that determination is heightened if the relationship is no longer produced solely through the Shareholders' Meeting, but through an identity in the status of director of the public entity and director of the instrumental entity...” In the case before us, this situation, which in a normal exercise of the typical activities of a general bonded warehouse would not arouse suspicion, took a different course, as indicated by the trial court, when this circumstance allowed the accused to close the circle of control over their illicit activity, insofar as from the very origin of the leveraged purchases of external debt, through which the public funds belonging to Banco Anglo Costarricense were embezzled, namely the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, their purpose and objectives were contrary to existing banking legislation, aspects of which the accused were fully aware, which did not inhibit them from continuing their strategy, which resulted in the well-known economic debacle. As a basis for the instrumental nature of the corporate entity, controlled and directed by the State, in this case the banking entity, as sole partner, the author Vittorio Ottaviano in his essay “Subjection of the Public Enterprise to Private Law,” collective work titled “The Public Enterprise,” Publications of the Royal College of Spain in Bologna, 1970, pages 273 and 275, cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the aforementioned essay, states: “... when the enterprise is developed by an economic entity, it, in turn, will be public insofar as it is linked to another entity holding the public purposes connected with the enterprise. That is: the public nature of the economic entity will be in relation to its position of dependence with respect to another entity ... or, if you will, with its instrumental nature...” On this same subject, Luigi Ferri, an Italian commercial law scholar, indicates that “... the screen of the commercial company barely serves to conceal this reality, if one bears in mind that where there is a 'prevailing participation,' the corporate instrument falls into the hands of the State and becomes subject to the service of its purposes...” and furthermore, said author, also cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, points out that “... to say that since the entity (the company) is private, the estate also remains private, is to remain voluntarily on the surface without delving into the reality of the phenomenon, which implies, in substance, an expansion of the public sphere at the expense of the private, and consequently, a restriction of the scope in which private autonomy operates...” – Ferri, Luigi. “Impressions of a Jurist on Estates with Predominant State Participation.” Collective work “The Public Enterprise” cited, volume 2, page 1570 – which begins to outline an aspect of transcendental importance in the case before us, which is the determination, as considered by the trial court, of the public nature of the assets negotiated by the accused through the A.V.C. business complex. We must rescue here the concept of State shareholding control in these corporations (sociedades anónimas), such that, even when their structure follows this private law model, the condition of sole or majority partner of the public entity “...makes it impossible to apply common commercial law, and the corporation in question begins to function rather as a public dependency... – Ortiz Ortiz, op. cit., page 6 – This Chamber fully shares the proposition of Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, since, certainly, the considerations of the State as 'owner' of the created corporation (sociedad anónima), the 'public interest' that motivates its formation, and the 'public purpose' of its management, prevent an unrestricted application of common commercial rules, and we begin to observe this from the very moment of the creation of the corporate entity, from the quantitative perspective of the partners, because in these companies that, like A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., belong one hundred percent to the State through the public banking entity, we find a single partner, in contrast to section 104 of the Commercial Code, which requires for the formation of a corporation (sociedad anónima) the existence of at least two partners and that each of them subscribe to at least one share – subsection a) – which also has an impact on the chapters referring to shareholding participation, so that, for these reasons alone, we could not apply unrestrictedly, as the defense of the accused González Lizano intends, the Commercial Code in the considerations pertaining to this Valores Warehouse, and our position is based on the doctrine of practically all jurisdictions; thus, it has been stated that “the internal legal regime of public economic establishments is determined by Public Law, especially with regard to the relations between the decentralized entity and the central administration... given the presence of the State in these companies (with a single public partner), a series of derogations to the regime and structure of commercial companies arise, which lead to the conclusion that the applicability of commercial law rules cannot be total and complete. In the first place, because some special provisions that regulate these companies establish numerous express derogations to the regime of corporations (sociedades anónimas); for example, and among others we will see, the plurality of partners disappears, and the non-transferability of the State's shares is generally established, as well as an external control of the company itself. But furthermore, the fact of being a public entity shareholder and the fact that this is the sole partner makes the legal regime of corporations (sociedades anónimas) or limited liability companies inapplicable in many cases, since bodies disappear and some essential requirements are lacking...” Brewer Carías, Allan R. “Public Enterprises in Comparative Law.” Central University of Venezuela, Caracas, 1967, pages 115 and 116 – Our national doctrine also maintains this same line of thought; thus, Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the commented essay points out that the commercial law applied to companies that are entirely owned by the State or mostly owned by it is, then, a modified or special one, with an inevitable predominance of the interest and position of the State or the owning public entity, which increases when analyzing the regime of internal relations between the public shareholder and owner entity – or dominant partner – and the company in question, by virtue of that same preponderance – Op. cit. page 7 – Finally, on this subject, one might ask the reasons why a public entity, based on legislation that authorizes it, creates or participates in private entities structured under the model of private companies, if it will not have the characteristics and advantages of such a nature; however, the answer is found in the business flexibility and capacity that allow executing the purposes that the public entity has set for itself. On this issue, since 1984, analyzing the suitability of corporations (sociedades anónimas) and their consideration with respect to the public enterprise, the First Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Decision 46-1984, stated in what interests us: “... it is reasonable that the legislator has relied on the legal form of privately structured bodies for certain business activities to be carried out with the participation of the State. This has been designed in this way to grant the management of the enterprise the convenient degree of executability, flexibility, elasticity, and business capacity, and to obtain mixed participation and collaboration convenient for the direct and indirect purposes sought in certain cases...” From all of the above, the importance that the issue relating to the ownership of the State entity as the sole partner of the corporate enterprise will have in the consideration of the corporation (sociedad anónima) formed by a public entity is inferred, as well as the public interest thereof and, therefore, the instrumental nature of the company and the public purpose pursued. It is for this reason that we respectfully disagree with some of the considerations issued by the Constitutional Chamber in Decision number 1106-95 of 10:27 a.m. on February 24, 1995 – whose non-application the appellant claims – regarding the interpretation of some concepts, especially since it downplays the importance of the circumstances pertaining to 'public ownership and interest' in those companies linked in their formation to a State entity, a jurisprudential precedent on which the appellant reproaches its non-application by the court that issued the judgment before us. It is convenient to clarify the scope of a decision issued by the Constitutional Chamber regarding its mandatory compliance, or when it deals with mere legal opinions or considerations on a particular topic. Thus, its application will be erga omnes for the specific situation on which the intervention of the high constitutional court is being raised, or it may be applied to situations similar to the one addressed in the jurisdictional pronouncement. However, for other situations that do not maintain a relationship of identity with the case in question, a precedent of this nature must be analyzed with special care, within the integral perspective in which it was issued, so as to allow its application in diverse circumstances not strictly related to what was resolved, such that the appraisals of the Constitutional Chamber that constitute legal opinions or interpretations of a specific topic are not binding, and therefore, in that sense, their mandatory application is not imposed, as the appellant intends in this case. It is now appropriate to analyze the cited jurisprudential precedent, which refers to an amparo appeal filed against the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, a public service concessionaire company, which, although it also constitutes a corporation (sociedad anónima) dependent on a public entity, maintains a different nature from that of a general bonded warehouse, like A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., and here we would have a first fundamental difference when requesting its erga omnes application; hence, the ruling issued was of mandatory compliance for the case in question and perhaps for other similar situations, in matters of amparo pertaining to public service concessionaire companies, but not for the case before us, so that there would be no obligation binding the judges of the trial court or this Chamber of Cassation to apply the cited resolution. The remaining considerations contained in the issued decision are understood as simple legal analyses, not binding, so this Chamber, within the approach followed on the topic brought to our attention, even if it finds some of its propositions of interest, which we take into consideration when resolving the cassation ground previously indicated, allows itself to disagree on other aspects, insofar as, as we stated above, although it is true that corporations (sociedades anónimas) when they are majority-owned by a public institution, constitute 'in principle' a legal entity governed by private law, they cannot maintain the same treatment as any other private law entity, formed solely by private individuals, injected with private capital, and that strictly fulfills private purposes, because the idea that the State could configure a commercial company as the sole partner or participate in it in a majority manner through acts or contracts with the same characteristics and scope as those of a company subscribed among private individuals becomes inadmissible. That is why, contrary to what the Constitutional Chamber states on such considerations in the commented decision, in our opinion, supported by national and international doctrine, within a Comparative Law analysis, as well as the regulations that govern us, the determination of the character of owner of the State entity over the formed corporation (sociedad anónima), its public interest, and the also public purposes that govern them, is indeed of considerable importance, because the opposite would be to contribute to the establishment of a dangerous precedent so that, using the mechanism of creating private entities, without greater oversight, the public entities that form them could misappropriate or embezzle the assets of the public treasury that financially feeds those private companies. And such considerations are logical because we can already anticipate that from this perspective, the nature of the assets that make up, on one hand, the share capital of the corporation (sociedad anónima) belonging to the public entity, as well as the resources injected by it into the corporate enterprise, as happened between Banco Anglo Costarricense and A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., cannot be other than public as well. Hence, the eminent public law scholar Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz rightly indicated with absolute forcefulness that, once the quality of a public enterprise of the corporation (sociedad anónima) constituted by the public entity whose sole or majority partner is the State is established, an immediate consequence of the public character of the corporation (sociedad anónima) as an enterprise, and of its activity as a public service, is the also public character of its assets, which cannot be administered internally as if they were private – Op. cit. page 10 – which he supports with a jurisprudential citation from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, decision number 98 of 2:30 p.m. on July 30, 1985, which states in what interests us: “Nationalized companies formed with State capital retain their public character, no matter how much their organization and operation are subject to Private Law, because even if legally the assets belong to the company, it cannot be ignored that insofar as these deteriorate, the capital is affected, represented by the shares, and that, consequently, to that same extent the State's assets are harmed. It should be added that, for these same reasons, the State has an interest in the correct functioning of these companies.” This consideration about the public nature of the assets that make up the capital of a corporation (sociedad anónima) whose sole partner is the State finds echo in some regulatory provisions, through Executive Decrees, in force at the time when the events before us occurred, where the public character of the funds or resources administered by state enterprises when they operate as commercial companies is determined without room for doubt or interpretation. Thus, on the occasion of the creation of the Costa Rican Development Corporation – CODESA – it was determined through Executive Decree 7927-H of January 12, 1978, that the Executive Branch, considering it convenient that in the case of this type of enterprise, constituted with the characteristics of a corporation (sociedad anónima), governed by the Law that creates them in the first place, their regulations, and supplementarily by the Commercial Code, have a minimum framework of legality that regulates essential aspects of their activity and at the same time be subject to oversight by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, considers it necessary to legislate in this field, given the deep concern about the consequences that may arise from the lack of decision-making in this matter. Therefore, while the referenced legislation is enacted, it deems it prudent to issue a set of provisions via regulation that provide greater assurances for the correct administration of the managed resources. This Decree was amended by another similar one, number 14666-H of May 9, 1983; however, no variation was made to the determination of the public nature of the assets that make up the estate of these particular enterprises, similar in nature in terms of their constitution to that of the general bonded warehouse. And it cannot be otherwise for the sake of protecting state public funds, as we indicated above. Once the nature of the assets managed by these sui generis corporations (sociedades anónimas) has been determined, such considerations also allow us to affirm that the directors of a public enterprise, as occurs in the case before us with the firm A.V.C., as a corporation (sociedad anónima) of a public entity – Banco Anglo Costarricense – which is its sole partner, are public officials precisely because they are the heads of said corporate entity, and this in accordance with the same articles 111, 112, and 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, the disregard of which the appellant reproaches. Thus, article 111. 1 of the cited law establishes that “a public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence from the representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity” – the emphasis is ours – In the case before us, A.V.C., as we have been maintaining, once it is acquired by Banco Anglo Costarricense, participating in its share capital at 100%, becomes a public enterprise and therefore is part of the Administration, and the defendants, as its directors, providing a service to the Administration, are public servants because they are the heads of the enterprise, which constitutes a principle of Public Law relating to public enterprises. Thus, “administrative doctrine indicates that the fact that these entities are not subject to Administrative Law, in whole or in part, does not mean that they are not part of the Administrative Organization, since the connection with the state organization is maintained, their instrumental character remaining with respect to it” – Alonso Ureba Alberto. “The Public Enterprise”. Montecorvo, Madrid, 1985, page 299, cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in his mentioned essay – such that, interpreting the scope of the cited article 111.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, a public servant will be one who provides an activity to the Public Administration even when this does not maintain an imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character, or the activity deployed is private or by simple contracting, a case in which the director of the corporation (sociedad anónima) of which the State is the sole owner is found, whose primary work is neither imperative nor subject in principle to Public Law, given the nature of the corporate entity he directs. Such considerations do not appear contradictory to the postulates contained in sections 111.3 and 112.2 of the same General Law of Public Administration, because within an integrated logic of both norms, it is observed that such provisions apply only to subordinate public servants and not to the heads who exercise leadership tasks; and this is so because the first of the cited sections indicates that employees of state enterprises or economic services in charge of activities subject to common law will not be considered public servants – 111.3 – also determined that service relations with workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the previous article 111, will be governed by labor or commercial law. In relation to this type of subordinate employees, this Chamber considers that those who exercise a management and oversight role within the public enterprise that, structured as a corporation (sociedad anónima), belongs to the public entity cannot be taken into consideration in this category, because such officials – managers, deputy managers, and auditors – do participate in the public management of the Administration insofar as, during the performance of their duties, they form part of the decision-making of the corporate enterprise, even if they do not have voting rights within the sessions of the Board of Directors, but they do have the right to voice, which allows them to express their opinions and generate a certain trend in decision-making, or they administer the public funds injected by the state entity, being the direct and principal executive arm of the Board of Directors of the corporate entity, with directive and hierarchical capacity – manager and deputy manager – over the remaining ranks of the company – employees, workers, and laborers – In any case, within our legislation, even the servants included in sections 111.3 and 112.2 of the cited Law, for criminal purposes, are considered public – article 112.4 ibidem – and this is so “... to prevent the servant who works for a State enterprise from taking advantage of his special condition and being able to make improper use of the public assets of the enterprise... which is fully in line with the constitutional parameter, in consideration of the interests it protects, which are: administrative morality and legality and the protection of public assets...” – see Decision number 6520-96 of 3:09 p.m. on December 3, 1996. Constitutional Chamber – hence, in the case before us, all the accused maintain the status of public officials, and the funds that the banking entity to which A.V.C. belonged injected into it so it could carry out its functions are also public, including the leveraged purchases in external debt bonds, essential elements for the determination of the criminal type of Embezzlement (Peculado) for which they were convicted. For all the foregoing, the invoked ground is dismissed. [...] III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS [...] Fifth ground. Erroneous application of article 77 of the Criminal Code – on the continued crime (delito continuado) – is claimed, because from what the court held as proven, it is established that the companies were bought with the purpose of venturing into investment banking and buying external debt instruments, so a continued crime is not constituted, insofar as within the so-called third phase of the judgment, the purchase of the A.V.C. group of companies should have been included and not separated as was done, since the penalty is primarily higher and the same law indicates that the postulates of the continued crime will be applied when the crimes are of the same kind – embezzlement (peculado) – and affect patrimonial legal interests – funds of Banco Anglo Costarricense – and pursue the same purpose – venturing into investment banking and buying external debt instruments – In the appellant's opinion, the purchase of the group of companies should be subsumed into what the court called the third phase, which were the leveraged purchases from June 27 to February 1994, because with what was described in the previous phase, the second pursued the same purpose as stated by the law, and therefore, the former should be subsumed into the latter and, applying the rules of concurrence, reduce the penalty to five years, which was the sanction imposed for the purchase. The claim is partially admissible. In accordance with the facts held as proven, as indicated by the court, the case in question must be analyzed globally and chronologically, since each fact turns out to be the antecedent of the next – volume 16 of the judgment, folio 4511 – the judges specifying that this was so even though the acts carried out did not constitute a single action, but rather each factual circumstance constituted in itself a crime of Embezzlement (Peculado), dividing the proven facts, for a better understanding, into three phases they called: First: cash purchases, attributed solely to the defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya; Second: the purchase of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries Boltec S.A. and ABC Valores S.A., where both Robles Macaya and the members of the Board of Directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense, including the defendant Carlos Manuel González Lizano, were accused; Third: the leveraged purchases of Latin American External Debt, attributed to all the accused – Robles Macaya and the Board of Directors of the banking entity – However, despite the foregoing, at the time of the legal classification of the facts and the establishment of the penalties to be imposed, the court separates the phases and classifies the facts regarding Robles Macaya as two crimes of Embezzlement (Peculado) in the form of a continued crime – for the first and third phases – plus another crime of Embezzlement (Peculado) – second phase – these three illicit acts materially concurring, for which it imposed, by reason of the two continued crimes of Embezzlement (Peculado), ten years of imprisonment for each, and for the other crime five years of imprisonment, for a total of 25 years. For its part, for each of the members of the Board of Directors, it classified the facts against them as one continued crime of Embezzlement (Peculado) – 7 leveraged purchases (third phase) – materially concurring with another crime of Embezzlement (Peculado) – purchase of A.V.C. (second phase) – imposing on each one a penalty of ten years for the first illicit act and five years for the second, for a total of fifteen years of imprisonment. Such a form of legal classification and punitive sanction, as the appellant rightly pointed out with respect to his client Carlos Manuel González Lizano, accused in the second and third phases, appears mistaken, because within the approach developed by the judges, from a congruent and logical perspective, the criminal conducts attributed to all the accused and held as proven must be concatenated into a single illicit act of Embezzlement (Peculado) in the form of a continued crime, “where each fact is the antecedent of the next” and insofar as the objective and subjective postulates established in section 77 of the Criminal Code, which contemplates its penalty, are met. The commented norm states that “when the crimes in concurrence are of the same kind and affect patrimonial legal interests, provided that the agent pursues the same purpose, the penalty provided for the most serious one shall be applied, increased by up to another half.” In the case before us, the court considered, on one hand, that the proven facts each constituted the crime of continued Embezzlement (Peculado), which this Chamber of Cassation agrees with, because the postulates that make up said figure relative to the application of the penalty are indeed determined; thus, we are faced with crimes of the same kind – embezzlement (peculado) – that affect patrimonial legal interests; regarding this aspect, we must clarify that although it is true that Embezzlement (Peculado) does not contain assets (patrimonio) as its fundamental legal interest, since it is a crime committed against the Duties of Public Function, referring to the duty of probity on the part of the public official in the performance of his duties, with respect to the goods or monies he administers, receives, or has custody of by reason of his position; however, because Embezzlement (Peculado) is a multi-offensive crime, the possible concurrence of a patrimonial injury derived from the criminal conduct carried out by the active subject – public official – translated into the misappropriation or embezzlement of the money or goods, whose administration, receipt, or custody has been entrusted to him by reason of the position, is also undeniable.

Consequently, even though the requirement established in Article 77 of the Penal Code is the affecting of patrimonial legal interests (bienes jurídicos patrimoniales), this does not imply that the crime submitted below has patrimony as its sole legal interest, for "the continuing offense (delito continuado) can exist, even though the acts of continuation—which must violate the same norm—affect, in addition to patrimonial legal interests, another legal interest" – Castillo González, Francisco. El concurso de Delitos en el Derecho Penal Costarricense, page 98 – Lastly, in this case, we are faced with a continuing offense of Peculado, insofar as the defendants, including Mr. González Lizano, pursued a single purpose through their illicit activity, which was, as is evident from the proven facts, the making of illegal purchases in External Debt, allowing Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. to use the public funds for its benefit, opening the way for further negotiations with this company, which culminated, with the concurrence of all the members of the Board of Directors of the banking entity, in the illegal purchase of the repeatedly mentioned Almacén de Valores Comerciales and its subsidiaries and the subsequent acquisition of Latin American external debt, internationalizing the public funds of the Banco Anglo Costarricense through the creation of the Anglo American Bank in order to avoid the controls of the state entities supervising such dealings. In this case, the premise relating to a single purpose is present independently of the structuring that the court gave to the facts by dividing them into the three phases, insofar as, within the common purpose that sheltered the defendants, all the actions deployed by the defendants to execute the common program were combined – in that same sense, Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, page 102 – Along this line of thought, as indicated by the petitioner, the purchase of the A.V.C. group of companies by the Banco Anglo Costarricense – second phase – carried out with the concurrence of all the defendants, some as directors of the banking entity and the other – Robles Macaya – as General Manager of said institution, must be appreciated and assessed within a continuing perspective, together with the subsequent leveraged purchases of Latin American external debt that were carried out precisely through the acquired business complex – third phase – said plurality of actions being sanctioned as a single crime of Peculado. Despite the foregoing, the judges, as we mentioned supra, notwithstanding their consideration that the case should be analyzed globally, separately classified each of the phases into which they structured the proven factual framework, subsequently joining them through the premises of real concurrence (concurso real), although they stated that they were applying the penalty for a continuing offense. Such inconsistency becomes unacceptable; however, it is not pertinent to grant the claims of Licentiate Solórzano Sánchez, who requests that his client be given a sentence of five years' imprisonment as a co-perpetrator (coautor) of the continuing offense of Peculado. Indeed, while it is true that the court considered the accused Carlos Manuel González Lizano as a co-perpetrator of the crime of Peculado for the purchase of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, by reason of which a term of five years' imprisonment was imposed upon him, and as the perpetrator (autor) of the crime of Peculado—embodied in the seven leveraged purchases of external debt—in the modality of a continuing offense, imposing a term of five years' imprisonment as the principal penalty, increased by another such term for a total of ten years, the overall punitive sanction being fifteen years in accordance with the rules of material concurrence (concurso material), such classification and punitive application is not shared by this Chamber, for which reason the judgment is modified, as will be stated. Coinciding with what was indicated by Doctor Francisco Castillo González, when responding to the Cassation appeal filed by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the penalty applied by the judges in this case does not conform to the premises of the continuing offense of Peculado. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of Article 352 (currently 354) of the Penal Code, first paragraph, the public official who abstracts or diverts money or property whose administration, receipt, or custody has been entrusted to them by reason of their office shall be punished with imprisonment from three to twelve years. For its part, Article 77 ibidem sets the penalty for the continuing offense, indicating that "...the penalty provided for the most serious shall be applied – the highlighting is not in the original – increased by up to another such term." This implies that, for the purposes of the penalty in abstracto, which is the first that must be defined, in the case of a continuing offense of Peculado, the judge must determine it between the minimum and maximum limits provided for said crime—which in this case is the only one that manifests in continuation—that is, between three and twelve years of imprisonment, being able to increase it by up to another such term, in such a way that the maximum penalties that can be applied range between 6 and 24 years of imprisonment. Once the penalty in abstracto is established, the judge will proceed to determine the specific punitive sanction between these two latter limits, in such a way that the penalty for the continuing offense of Peculado cannot be less than six years of imprisonment nor exceed, in any event, twenty-four years. Applying the foregoing to the case in question, considering that we are in the presence of a crime of Peculado in the modality of a continuing offense committed by the accused Carlos Manuel González Lizano, the specific penalty is set at the amount of six years of imprisonment increased by another such term for a total of twelve years of imprisonment, in application of the penalty for the continuing offense, in accordance with the provisions of Article 77 of the Penal Code, which does not violate the principles of non reformatio in peius provided for in Article 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 applicable to this case, insofar as the modifications determined herein do not prejudice the interests of the accused González Lizano regarding the type and amount of penalty imposed by the judges, which in this case was fifteen years of imprisonment, without it being acceptable to consider that the limit penalty that must be respected for the sake of applying the principle of non reformatio in peius, as the appellant intends, is that of five years of imprisonment, for, as we have clearly defined supra, the minimum specific punitive sanction that can be imposed for the continuing offense of Peculado is six years. This Cassation Chamber considers that the new amount of penalty imposed is fundamentally based on the reasoning established by the court when setting the principal penalty, in application of the premises contained in Article 71 of the Penal Code, but adapting it to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, given the legal reclassification indicated. In application of the principle of the extensive effect of the cassation appeal contained in Article 455 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, what has been resolved regarding the considerations on the legal classification of the facts and the punitive sanction imposed relating to the accused González Lizano, are also applicable to the accused Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, who must be considered a co-perpetrator of the crime of Peculado in its modality of a continuing offense, applying the penalty of six years of imprisonment increased by another such term for a total penalty of twelve years of imprisonment, based on the reasons previously established for said quantification. Consequently, the ground raised by the appellant is partially granted, modifying the legal classification of the facts attributed against Carlos Manuel González Lizano to a crime of Peculado in its modality of a continuing offense committed to the detriment of the State, reducing the penalty to twelve years of imprisonment. By the extensive effect of the cassation appeal, the modification made is applied under equal circumstances to the accused Arturo Fallas Zúñiga. In all other aspects in which the judgment does not suffer modification, it remains unaltered. [...] V. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS: First ground. [...] Our Magna Carta in its Article 39 enshrines the principle of constitutional legality, such that no one can be sanctioned if there is no prior law that so determines and by virtue of a judgment issued by competent authority. According to the factual framework held as proven and to which the appellants do not adhere, the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya was convicted of the crime of Peculado, the court considering in the resolution before us that through his illicit actions he incurred in that crime by diverting the public funds whose administration had been entrusted to him by reason of his office as General Manager of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, actions deployed in total disregard of the duty of probity to which he was obligated as a public official. In this diversion of funds, the accused incurred in a series of infractions of the banking regulations prevailing at the time of their commission, contemplated in the Organic Law of the National Banking System – LOSBN –, the Securities Market Regulatory Law, the Law on General Deposit Warehouses, the Organic Law of the Central Bank – LOBC – and general principles contained in the Political Constitution and the General Law of Public Administration, as well as guidelines on the matter established by the Central Bank of Costa Rica and the National Securities Commission. Decree-Law on Bank Nationalization Number 71 of June 21, 1948, nationalized private banking, establishing that henceforth only the State could mobilize, through its own banking institutions, the public's deposits, already outlining the credit orientation required by the economic circumstances that the country was going through at that time, aimed at materializing all the banking reforms necessary to make the ordered nationalization effective, and while it is true that the nature of the banking pursued is not indicated here, by 1953 with the issuance of the Organic Law of the Central Bank Number 1552 of April 23, 1953, the purposes and orientation of that entity were determined, being expressly destined to contribute to the achievement of the goals of the National Development Plan – Article 1 – tasked with promoting the orderly development of the Costa Rican economy within the purpose of achieving the full occupation of the Nation's productive resources, being obligated to avoid the inactivity of the means of production when this is caused by a lack of timely credit and to promote the gradual diversification of national production toward those articles that strengthen the country's balance of payments – Article 4 –. Such normative provisions demonstrate without a doubt that the nature of the banking pursued in our country, starting from nationalization, is fundamentally a development bank and not an investment bank, postulates that are later gathered in the Organic Law of the National Banking System when it defines the essential functions of commercial banks, establishing among others: to avoid there being inactive means of production in the country, seeking out the producer to put at their service the economic and technical means available to the system – Article 3 subsection 4) – normative provisions that should have governed the actions of the accused Robles Macaya in the exercise of his public functions, but which, as the court well pointed out, were flagrantly disregarded, because even considering that it is feasible for banks to engage in activities typical of investment banking, this is not an unrestricted activity, without controls, and in the judgment it was fully demonstrated that what Robles Macaya pursued was an incursion into this type of banking without any supervision, violating his legally established duties. The Political Constitution designates the State Banks as autonomous institutions – Article 189 subsection 1 – that enjoy administrative independence but are subject to the law in matters of governance – Article 188 ibidem – a principle that is translated in Article 2 of the Law of the National Banking System, and because such institutions form part of the Public Administration, they are obligated to act in accordance with the legal system, being able only to carry out those authorized public acts or services, that is, the public officials that make up the State's financial entities are subject to the principle of legality. These considerations allow us to point out that, contrary to what the appellants indicate, the factual framework that the court attributes to their client is not permitted for any state bank, insofar as the legal-banking regulations in force at the time of the facts in no way empowered a public official who administers, receives, or has custody of public funds, to incur in their diversion, failing in the duty of probity to which they are obligated by reason of their office. While it is true that Commercial Banks are governed in their organization by Public Law, but in their activity by Private Law, the operations carried out by the accused Robles Macaya, which make up the proven intentional (dolosos) facts, in the manner in which they were carried out, are expressly prohibited by the prevailing legislation. The judges centered the unlawfulness on the actions of the accused Robles Macaya, not on the fact that he made investments in external debt, whether Costa Rican or from other Latin American nations, because he was obviously empowered to do so within the purposes permitted to commercial banks in that matter – Article 61.7 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System –; nor is he condemned because the aforementioned investments might have a logical commercial risk inherent to them; or because he carried out operations known as "over the counter"; or because he did not continue negotiating with the securities brokerage firm Interbolsa. Nor is he being condemned for using, purely and simply, the leverage system in order to increase the amount of the investments to be made. The court determined the criminal liability of the accused Robles Macaya, because in the exercise of his functions he incurred in a series of illegalities that, with full knowledge and will on his part, essentially contributed to increasing the risk in the transactions carried out, violating the norms that governed banking performance, because contrary to what the appellants state, the accused, as General Manager of a banking entity, obligated by law to exercise his functions inherent to his condition as general administrator, in full observance of the laws and regulations as well as compliance with the resolutions of the Board of Directors – Article 41 ibidem – was not allowed to negotiate with financial entities such as Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., which were not of first order recognized by the Board of Directors of the Central Bank, and which lacked the authorization to make a public offering of securities or to provide securities brokerage services in the national territory granted by the National Securities Commission, as was demanded at that time by the Securities Market Regulatory Law Number 7201 of September 18, 1990, and the guidelines of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, as promoter of favorable conditions for the strengthening, liquidity, solvency, and proper functioning of the Banks that made up the National Banking System and superior director of bank credit, supervisor and coordinator of these – Article 5 subsections 5 and 7 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica –. At the time the questioned transactions were carried out, ATF was not registered as a first-order entity, since it had been rejected as such by the Central Bank since early 1990, nor did it have authorization from the National Securities Commission to carry out such business, without the accused making the slightest effort to ensure such conditions, which increased the risk of the transactions carried out, leaving the state banking entity unprotected. But furthermore, as we have already stated supra, the accused diverted the public funds by exceeding the offer for the sale of bonds and the line of credit offered by ATF in representation of the Internationale Nederlanden Bank, allowing the payment of overprices charged by the BAC, by transferring the public funds in advance of the agreed payment date, making them available to ATF so that it could buy the external debt bonds on the international market and sell them to the bank at a higher price, allowing the change in that company's position, from intermediary to direct seller, with the consequent effect on the collection of earnings or profits, extending the invested amount beyond the limits for which he was authorized, compromising the liquidity of the banking institution and allowing the bonds never to be in its name and therefore that it lacked negotiable availability over them, which clashes with the principles of security, solvency, and liquidity that must prevail in the dealings of commercial banks, in accordance with the law – Article 3 of the Law of the National Banking System –. Likewise, the court condemns the accused Robles Macaya for his determined illicit participation in the purchase of the A.V.C. companies and their subsidiaries, with all the illegalities committed therein, all with the purpose, as he himself stated in the BAC Board of Directors session number 25-3/93 of March 23, 1993, of venturing into investment banking that was forbidden to them at that time and of which he was fully aware, capturing funds without reserve requirement or leverage limit, granting and requesting credits from abroad without authorization, which denotes, without a doubt, the intentional nature (carácter doloso) of the actions of the accused, and the clear determination to avoid controls and supervision of the corresponding financial entities. Robles Macaya is condemned for having incurred in leveraging when negotiating external debt bonds, which subjected the banking entity to a strong economic commitment, causing it to incur the payment of high sums in interest arising from the leveraged credits and that ultimately contributed to the loss of the entire investment portfolio of the BAC that some time before had already been transferred to A.V.C., it being derived from the Organic Law of the National Banking System and from the Organic Law of the Central Bank itself that for this type of leveraged business relating to credits that came from abroad, the accused necessarily had to have the authorization of the Central Bank as regulator of currency, banking, credit, and foreign exchange – relation of Articles 6 and 121 of the LOBC, 14 and 74 of the LOSBN –. The accused was also sanctioned for reversing basic principles of investor protection by placing return before security. The appellants forget in their claim that the resources handled by their client were PUBLIC FUNDS, and could not receive the same risky treatment as any other private investor who risks their patrimony in investments or operations accepting that they may lose a lot or indeed gain a lot, characteristics typical of speculative and risky dealings, which, contrary to the assertions of the appellants, clash with the general principles of liquidity, solvency, security, and rational risk that legally determine the dealings in which assets of this nature are involved, and which are not limited to the conditions of the securities that a commercial bank may trade, as the petitioners restrictively interpret. It has been indicated that the legal system does not permit risky and speculative investments to be made with public treasury resources, because while it is true that the LOSBN in its Article 27 allows banking officials to assume an acceptable commercial risk, this is coupled with an adequate proportion to the nature of the operation undertaken, provided that they have not acted with intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) and within a sound banking negotiation, extremes of acceptability that are not applicable to the criminal conduct displayed by the accused, where, as was widely set forth, he raised the risk of the operations carried out to surprising levels to the detriment of the economic interests of the state bank, causing its financial collapse. It cannot be interpreted, as the appellants indicate, that the commercial, rational, and acceptable risk in this type of transaction can be interpreted as a legal authorization to carry out speculative business; for speculation has no place in dealings with public funds, understanding it "as the action or practice of buying or selling goods, shares and participations, etc., with the purpose of profiting from the rises and falls in market values, as opposed to normal dealing or investment" – see Oxford Universal Dictionary. Volume 3, p. 514 – insofar as this form of dealing also openly clashes with the general principles of legal and financial security, rational risk, and liquidity inherent in a financial operation under those conditions, and a State bank, as well as any other public institution, cannot expose its patrimony to the unrestricted swings of the market. Therefore, the claim is declared without merit. [...] V. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS: [...] Fifth ground. The incorrect application of Articles 57, 58, 71, 354, and 358 all of the Penal Code and disregard of Articles 1, 2, and 24 ibidem and 39 of the Political Constitution is claimed, insofar as the court convicted the accused Robles Macaya of 17 crimes of Peculado—nine spot purchases and eight leveraged repurchases—and imposed 25 years of imprisonment for conducts that according to the judges' analysis are negligent (culposas)—contempt of the care that should have been taken according to the circumstances—Regarding the first nine purchases: The appellants indicate that Robles Macaya is reproached for not having ascertained that ATF was in fact a representative of the NMB Bank, as well as for having transferred the resources directly to that company, such that the rebel co-accused José Luis and Mariano, both López Gómez, owners of ATF, were allowed to carry out purchases in international banking on their own account and name and not as manager or representative of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, as should have been according to the offer approved by the Board of Directors, for which Robles Macaya is reproached for negligent conduct that does not entail intent (dolo). The claim is not admissible. The subjective element in the crime of Peculado—intent (dolo)—according to our legislation, comes to be constituted by the will in the active subject—who necessarily must be vested with the quality of public official—directed at abstracting or diverting money or property, whose administration, receipt, or custody has been entrusted to them by reason of their office, with full knowledge that such assets are public because they belong to the Public Administration, hence intent (dolo) is the knowing—knowledge—and wanting—will—the realization of the objective elements of the criminal type. Consequently, the agent will commit the crime of Peculado by abstraction or diversion—Article 354 paragraph 1 of the Penal Code—when, even without a purpose directed at personal gain or that of third parties, with full knowledge of their function and of the public character of the assets or monies that by reason of their office they administer, receive, or have custody of, they direct their will to abstract or divert them, violating the duties of probity to which they are obligated in the performance of their functions; and we assert the foregoing, because the specific purpose of personal gain or in favor of third parties is only expressly contemplated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned norm, referring to what is called "Peculado by services," when under those premises, the public official uses labor or services paid for by the Administration. In the case before us, based on the facts proven by the trial court, contrary to the assertions of the appellants, the actions deployed by the accused Robles Macaya, far from being considered negligent (culposas) conducts—negligence—turned out to be actions lacking probity, when, in the exercise of his functions as General Manager of a State Bank, he diverted the funds he administered, with full knowledge that they belonged to the Public Administration, and directed his will to carrying out dealings with external debt bonds, under absolutely irregular conditions—spot purchases—and later participates in the purchase of the A.V.C. companies, which is the phase where his intentional conduct (actuar doloso) is revealed more properly and he expressly manifests it by indicating the true purpose pursued with the purchases of such companies, to which we have extensively referred supra, and which materializes later when, with the consensus and participation of the remaining accused, they execute the leveraged purchases, and it is precisely in that dimension that the court's reasoning and conclusions are understood, for as has been determined previously, the illicit facts attributed to the accused Robles Macaya, and in general to all the accused, must be analyzed jointly, within an integrated vision, where each of the committed actions is the antecedent of the next, and there is not the slightest doubt that Robles Macaya directed his conscious and voluntary actions toward the achievement of his criminal ends. The formulated claim is without merit. V. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS: [...] Sixth ground. [...] As we indicated supra, Peculado, in its modality of abstraction and diversion of public monies, according to our legislation, does not necessarily require, either as a subjective element of the wrong, or as an objective element of the type, the personal gain or gain in favor of third parties of those public monies or assets, an element that is present in the Peculado by services contained in the second paragraph of Article 354 of the Penal Code, when the public official uses for those purposes services or labor paid for by the Administration. The foregoing is established without prejudice to the fact that in the carrying out of the illicit conducts, the "gain" factor to which we have referred may arise, and which in the majority of cases is coupled with their commission. Hence, in the case before us, even if it had not been proven that Robles Macaya and the remaining accused gained for their benefit or in favor of third parties derived from their diverting acts, the figure of Peculado, for which they are later condemned and criminally sanctioned, is not distorted or undermined, insofar as it was sufficient for its configuration that the accused, in the performance of their functions, with full and absolute knowledge, directed their wills to divert the public funds they administered by reason of their offices, one as General Manager of the Bank—Robles Macaya—and the others as directors of the banking entity and administrators of the A.V.C. business complex, violating their duties of probity in the handling of state resources, framed within the laws and regulations that public officials are obligated to comply with in the performance of public functions.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, according to the list of proven facts in the appealed judgment, although it is true that the personal benefit of the defendants was not demonstrated, their actions lacking in probity, focused on the execution of the various negotiations in External Debt bonds, where they prioritized return on investments over security, both in those attributed exclusively to defendant Robles Macaya – spot purchases – and in those for which the latter later shares responsibility with the remaining defendants, allowed the economic advantage of public funds by the company Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., which, as was demonstrated through accounting, had a profit close to seventeen million dollars – US $17MM – out of the total losses incurred by the banking entity, which were over fifty-seven million dollars – US $57MM – that never gained negotiable availability over said securities, which always remained in favor of ATF. [...] VI.- CASSATION APPEALS [...] FIRST PART [...] First ground [...] The crime of Peculado (Embezzlement of Public Funds), as the complainant rightly points out, presents the following objective elements: the public official status of the agent; the act of withdrawing or diverting (sustraer o distraer); the condition of being “public” of the goods or money withdrawn or diverted by the agent; and that those goods or money, at the time of the commission of the offense, are under the administration, collection, or custody of the public official by reason of their position. The challenger, in support of his thesis regarding the absence of a material object of the action attributed to his defendants – public goods – who, from his perspective, would be acting under a reverse error of type (error de tipo al revés), departs substantially from the accredited factual framework, isolating the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries attributed to his clients as directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense from the facts that preceded it and that constitute the so-called spot purchases of Costa Rican, Venezuelan, and Brazilian External Debt bonds, which, although it is true that at the level of criminal liability are only attributed to the General Manager of the banking entity, Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, were not unknown to the directors accused here, since it was precisely they, in the exercise of their positions, who authorized Robles Macaya to carry out the aforementioned spot purchases of bonds, up to an amount of twenty million dollars $20MM – and tacitly accepted, without major reproach, that the aforementioned Robles Macaya exceed the authorized amount for those purposes, reaching an investment of more than thirty-seven million dollars $37MM – with their absolute complacency. This knowledge of the challenger’s clients is of vital importance to determine the element of the objective type of Peculado relating to the condition of public money or goods as the material object of the imputed action, subsequently used by the defendants in the purchase of the A.V.C. group of companies, who had full cognitive domain over the character of the same, insofar as they belonged to the Public Administration, originating from the state Bank in which they provided their services. According to the facts held as proven, those bonds purchased spot by the BAC with its own economic resources, specifically those dated February 24 and May 10, both in 1993, serve to pay part of the price agreed upon for the sale of the related companies, by being exchanged for the shares of the A.V.C. complex, hence, contrary to what the challenger indicates, the crime of Peculado attributed to his clients in this second phase of the criminal act does contain the material object of the action required for its configuration, which is the condition of being public of the goods used for the questioned acquisition, without such circumstance being distorted by the lack of negotiable availability that the BAC had over the securities, which is precisely one of the factors that influence the illegality of the negotiations carried out by the defendants. Consequently, the reverse error of type claimed by the petitioner becomes non-existent, and it is not admissible to think that the defendants, as members of the Board of Directors of the banking institution, acted under the belief that the goods used in the questioned purchase of the business complex were public because they belonged to the Bank, when they were not, lacking the element of ownership over such goods. Regarding this last aspect – ownership – it is worth noting that all the negotiations with public funds attributed to the defendants, in the three different stages of their incursion, were indeed materialized, albeit within an already known environment of illegality, with part of the intentional conduct of the defendants accredited by the court being the act of allowing the acquired bonds to remain at the disposal of ATF and not the BAC, hence the necessity that the negotiations be conducted with that financial entity and not another, which increased the risk factor and the economic commitment of the banking entity, making it unacceptable that the defendants take advantage of the criminal deployment of their actions to come and argue, in their favor, precisely the lack of availability for the Bank over the acquired securities, which they themselves helped cause. Contrary to what the appellant states, the judgment not only held as proven the simple irregular or illegal acquisition of goods or monies by a public entity, but rather, adhering to the accredited factual framework, the judges succeeded in proving, based on the examined body of evidence, the diversion of public goods (distracción de bienes públicos) by the accused bank directors, both in relation to the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, and in the subsequent leveraged purchases in External Debt, with full knowledge of their status as public officials, as well as the origin of the monies and goods used and which by reason of their position they administered, violating their duties of probity to which they were bound. [...] VI.- CASSATION APPEALS [...] FIRST PART [...] Third ground. The appellant claims the improper application of articles 57, 58, 71, 354, and 358 all of the Penal Code and non-application of articles 1, 2, and 24 last part of the same legal body; 39 of the Political Constitution, for convicting the defendants of Peculado, in an act where there is no material object of the action, in the custody, collection, or administration of a public official by reason of their position. The petitioner indicates that the judgment held as true that the Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt bonds, which were exchanged for the shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, were deposited in the custody account of Ariana Trading and Finance at ING Bank and in the possession and ownership of the latter, and since the defendants – Robles Macaya and the Board of Directors – are the public officials that the ruling deems involved in the illegal purchase of A.V.C. Valores and its subsidiaries, they could not draw on the custody account of ATF, nor could they order José Luis López Gómez, within the hierarchical chain of command, to draw on that account, so none of the defendants had the custody, collection, or administration of those bonds with which the exchange for shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries was made, which is an element required by article 354 of the Penal Code to configure the objective type, since the real administration, in the case of the bonds, was in the hands of ATF, and neither the latter, being a legal entity, nor José Luis López Gómez, as administrator of ATF, were public officials. Hence, in the challenger’s opinion, the judgment commits the error of holding as true that the Board of Directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense and Robles Macaya had the administration of the bonds, incurring an error of subsumption, which is committed at the moment of verifying if the conduct fits a criminal type, since it considers that over the bonds, which were in the power of a third party and not a public official by reason of their position, the Board of Directors or Robles Macaya had their administration by reason of their position, when no public official can have them if those bonds were not within an administrative sphere of custody, and ATF's account at ING Bank is evidently not an administrative sphere of custody. The appellant considers that in this situation the defendants acted under the false belief that an element of the typicity of the crime of Peculado existed, which is the material object of the action, and it was not so, there being an absolute impossibility to consummate the offense, meaning a reverse error of type occurred, resulting in an impossible crime (delito imposible) and therefore the charged act is unpunishable. The claim is not admissible. In what is of interest, we refer to the arguments set forth when resolving the first of the grounds challenged. According to the facts held as proven, part of the defendants’ illicit plan was to allow the bonds acquired with public funds to be in the name and at the disposal of Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. and not in the name and availability of the Bank, precisely to avoid the controls of the oversight entities and thus develop negotiations that were prohibited by the prevailing banking regulations, circumstances that were fully known to the defendants as held as proven by the ruling, and which the appellant disregards. To administer (Administrar), according to the Real Academia de la Lengua Española, among other meanings means “to direct an institution. To order, dispose, organize, especially one’s estate or goods” – Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Twenty-second edition. 2001. Madrid. Volume I, p.47 – Referring to the administration of public funds, to administer is to give the funds entrusted to the public official the destination that legislation directs toward achieving the common welfare that the State proposes. Although it is true that one form of administering public treasury goods goes hand in hand with their material possession by the official in charge by reason of their functions, this is not the only form of administration, as this can also be done by someone who only maintains legal availability over said goods, provided that such administration has come to the public official by reason of their functions. In the case at hand, the public funds used by the accused in the different illicit operations carried out have their origin in the so-called spot purchases, which even though they were only attributed to Robles Macaya, were carried out with the complacency and authorization of the remaining defendants as bank directors, those public funds being under the administration of all the defendants by reason of their respective positions, as they also were when carrying out the leveraged purchases, since it was the Bank’s financial resources that fed the A.V.C. companies to carry out the acquisitions in leveraged External Debt bonds, which is not distorted by the fact that, as a guarantee for the loans granted by ATF, the same purchased bonds remained in the possession of the contracting financial entity, insofar as the acts diverting funds were already consummated, it being sufficient for this that the public goods or money at the time the questioned negotiations were carried out were under the administration of the defendants by reason of the exercise of their positions, as indeed occurred. The ground is dismissed. [...] VII. CASSATION APPEAL [...] Appeal on the merits. First ground. The erroneous interpretation of articles 22, 76, and 77 in relation to 352 – now 354 – all of the Penal Code is claimed, considering that the court, in the first nine investments in external debt bonds acquired directly – without illegal financing – and in the purchase of the eight investments with illegal leverage of Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt, the acts of peculado occurred in the modality of a continued offense (delito continuado). The appellants consider that in the crime of peculado, the protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado) is not property but probity in the exercise of the duties of public office, and therefore, the injury to property is not an objective element configuring the applied criminal type, which is why this crime does not meet the requirements expressly indicated by article 77 of the Penal Code, that is, the affecting of proprietary legal interests (bienes jurídicos patrimoniales). For the challengers, the delinquencies carried out by the defendants occurred in material concurrence (concurso material). The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office indicate that doctrine establishes that the crime of peculado does not specifically protect property as in other delinquencies, but rather the security of its allocation to the ends for which it was created or gathered, and that it is characterized by the abnormal handling of goods by those who functionally have them in their charge, to make them fulfill their purpose or to preserve them for those ends. They indicate that in this case, the concurrence of crimes incurred by the defendants are of the same kind, but do not affect a proprietary legal interest, but rather, as they already indicated, probity in the exercise of the duties of public office, for which each of the facts held as accredited materially concur, and the corresponding penalties must be applied for each of the crimes committed. Thus, for defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya they request 10 years of imprisonment for each of the nine crimes of peculado – first 9 investments – for a total of ninety years of imprisonment, as the perpetrator (autor), and as co-perpetrator (coautor), they request 10 years of imprisonment for each of the eight crimes of peculado relating to the investments leveraged in Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt, for a total of eighty years, which globally adds up to the sum of one hundred and seventy years of imprisonment. For their part, the representation of the Public Prosecutor's Office requests for the defendants, Franz Amrhrein Pinto, Ronald Fernández Pinto, Carlos Manuel González Lizano, Carlos Enrique Osborne Escalante, Edwin Salazar Arroyo, and Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, the penalty of 10 years of imprisonment for each of them as co-perpetrators of 7 crimes of peculado for the leveraged investments, for a total of 70 years of imprisonment for each of them. And for all defendants, the prosecuting entity requests five years of imprisonment for the purchase of the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries. The claim is not acceptable. According to the facts held as proven in the appealed ruling and the legal foundation sustained by the judges, despite their final error in the legal classification and the determination of the imposed penalties, to which we refer supra, we are facing the concurrence of a plurality of actions carried out by the defendants, but with characteristics of homogeneity in their manner of commission – crimes of the same kind – in the injury to the same protected legal interest and in the same pursued purpose, configuring a continued offense of Peculado. Although it is true, the figure of Peculado is systematically located within the crimes committed against the Duties of the Public Office – title XV section V of the Penal Code – the protected legal interest being not precisely property but rather the public office, translated into the duty of probity of the public official in the performance of their duties, so a property injury is not necessarily required for the offense to be configured, teleologically, because Peculado is a multi-offensive crime (delito pluriofensivo), the injury to property, although not indispensable, frequently accompanies its commission, consequently violating not only the duty of probity of the public official, but also property, understood as public money and goods. Therefore, contrary to what the appellants assert, Peculado does allow the application of the continued offense in the application of penalties, by reconciling the fundamental presuppositions established by article 77 of the Penal Code for its existence, it being determined in said norm that for its applicability it is required that the crimes in concurrence be of the same kind and affect proprietary legal interests, and that the agent pursue the same purpose; so that, in the case at hand, the facts relating to the nine spot purchases in External Debt attributed exclusively to defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, as well as the purchases, also of Latin American External Debt through illegal leverage, carried out through the business complex A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., charged to all the defendants – directors and general manager of Banco Anglo Costarricense – although it is true each one of them constitutes, by themselves, a crime of Peculado, which materially concur with each other, for purposes of their legal classification and the punitive sanctions to apply, they configure the continued offense of Peculado, insofar as they constitute crimes of the same kind – Peculado – tending toward the same purpose, and affected not only the duty of probity of the defendants in the exercise of their public functions, but also proprietary legal interests, the property damage that the illicit conduct carried out by the defendants from the second half of 1992 until the month of May 1994 caused to Costa Rican society being of undeniable verification, damage that was produced not only from an economic perspective but also from a social perspective. In conclusion, in the aspect relating to the injured proprietary legal interest, the requirement established on that particular in the aforementioned norm that contains the parameters on the penalty of the continued offense was met, which cannot be interpreted restrictively in the sense that the only legal interest protected in the crime committed and whose penalty is applied by continuation is property, since as has been rightly pointed out when resolving one of the grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the public defender Licenciado Rodolfo Solórzano Sánchez, the continued offense will proceed, even when the acts of continuation affect, in addition to proprietary legal interests, other different interests. The foregoing considerations lead to the determination that, contrary to the pretensions of the appellants, in this case we are not before a material concurrence of crimes, insofar as, although it is true that the plurality of actions carried out by the defendants, which begins with the spot purchases of external debt carried out by Robles Macaya on behalf of Banco Anglo Costarricense and which culminates with the purchases made with illegal leverage materially executed by manager Robles Macaya with the full authorization and knowledge of the remaining defendants in their capacity as directors of the banking institution and administrators of the business complex A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. – Carlos Manuel González Lizano and Arturo Fallas Zúñiga –, constitute by themselves crimes of Peculado that concur in real form, just as the trial court repeatedly pointed out, echoing the theses sustained by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which they now disregard, this conglomerate of facts had to be assessed integrally because each one of them was the antecedent of the following one, and it is precisely this concatenation that imparts the character of factual, legal, and subjective homogeneity to the case in question, allowing for the purposes of the applicable penalty to resort to the figure of the continued offense in relation to the crime of Peculado, distinguishing it from material concurrence, which will arise when any of these three presuppositions is missing: crimes of the same kind that affect proprietary legal interests and pursue the same purpose – in this sense see Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, page 93 – This Cassation Chamber has repeatedly pronounced on the indispensable criteria to distinguish a continued offense and a material concurrence of crimes, determining as a fundamental differentiating element the same purpose that the author pursues in relation to the legal interests they are affecting with their actions and that it be incompatible with the nature of material concurrence – in this sense see Voto 769-F-96 of 10:30 a.m. on December 6, 1996, reiterated in resolution number 94-2000 of 8:45 a.m. on January 28, 2000. Third Criminal Chamber – Such subjective criterion is complemented by doctrine with objective criteria; thus, the Argentine author Carlos Creus establishes that the linking of the distinct facts to a single “criminal enterprise” does not depend exclusively on the design of the author, but on other circumstances of an objective character “that condition the adequacy of the distinct facts within that concept, such as the unity of the attacked legal interest, for which the analogy of the interests affected by the distinct facts will not suffice, but rather the identity of the holder ... and at least, that the material objects of the distinct facts can be considered components of a ‘natural universality’ ... But both dependency criteria must appear together for one to speak of continuation...” – Derecho Penal Parte General. Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1988, pages 241 and 242 – In the present case, the parameters of continuation are clearly defined, both objectively and subjectively, insofar as the defendants, from the beginning of their dealings, which originate in the first contact Robles Macaya makes with the company Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. in order to buy Costa Rican external debt securities from it, divert the public funds of Banco Anglo Costarricense, allowing third parties to negotiate the monies of the public treasury and obtain profits to the detriment of state interests, this contact with ATF being what facilitates the subsequent proposal for the BAC to acquire the company A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, violating the current banking legislation and the controls of the public entities in charge of supervising such negotiations, and then, through the acquired business complex, carry out the illegal leveraged purchases, causing the economic debacle translated into the loss of more than fifty-seven million dollars and the closure of the country’s oldest state bank, in such a way that this plurality of temporally discontinuous but mutually dependent facts, insofar as they pursued the same purpose, injured proprietary legal interests of the same holder, Banco Anglo Costarricense, and turned out to be of the same kind – Peculado – converge, for purposes of the penalty to apply, into a continued offense and not a material concurrence. For all the foregoing, the ground alleged by the challengers is declared without merit.&quot;</span></font> <font size=\"3\"><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: Times New Roman; mso-fareast-font-family: Times New Roman; mso-ansi-language: ES; mso-fareast-language: ES; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA\">&quot;</span><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: Times New Roman; mso-fareast-font-family: Times New Roman; mso-ansi-language: ES; mso-fareast-language: ES; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA\">III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON FORM: [...] Eighteenth ground. Violation of the rules of sound reasoning (erroneous derivation): The transgression of articles 11, 27, 36, 39 and 41, all of the Political Constitution; 1, 106, 144, 145, 392, 395, 396, 397, 400, 449, 471, 474, 476, 477, 482 and 483, the latter of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, is challenged, since, in the judgment of the challenger, in order to hold as proven that the monies used in the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. belonged to Banco Anglo Costarricense and not to private companies, the court affirms that the investments were made by the said banking entity and not A.V.C., therefore the monies were public, its officials were also public, and the law applicable to such corporations are those of the Public Administration, a conclusion that, in his opinion, is erroneous. He points out that Almacén de Valores Comerciales A.V.C. was legally founded by law number 15 of October 15, 1934, authorized to operate in 1988 as a corporation (sociedad anónima) governed by the laws of private law. The appellant indicates, as the Constitutional Chamber points out, in the case at hand, one cannot conclude that the group of companies A.V.C. were public companies, because they belonged 100% to Banco Anglo Costarricense, a state institution. And this is so, because in order to modify the defect, the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República had to be modified, as they had no power to audit those companies, as the reform tacitly recognizes, since through law 7428 of September 7, 1997, articles 8 and 9, the possibility was granted for those companies to be given the classification of public and to be able to audit them, tacitly recognizing that they could not do so before. The claim is not acceptable. Having examined the appealed judgment, it is noted that the challenger starts from a premise that does not respond to the merit of the case file, insofar as the judges at no time stated that, in order to hold as proven that the monies used by A.V.C. belonged to Banco Anglo Costarricense, the questioned investments were made by this banking entity and not by the acquired company. In reality, from the paragraph excerpted by the petitioner, visible at folios 4827 and 4828, it is observed that the court indicated, not that Banco Anglo Costarricense made the leveraged investments directly, but that it was not true, as the defendants considered, that if the questioned investments were made through A.V.C., which was a private company, they did not require authorization from the Banco Central de Costa Rica, given that A.V.C. was a subsidiary with 100% equity participation of the banking entity. On the other hand, although it is true, as the appellant points out, the company A.V.C. was created based on the Ley General de Almacenes de Depósito of 1934 and its operation was authorized as a corporation by Executive Decree issued in 1988, given the very nature of a bonded warehouse (almacén de depósito), the constitutional jurisprudence to which the petitioner alludes – Voto 1106-95 of 10:27 a.m. on February 24, 1995, corresponding to an Amparo Appeal filed against the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – is not applicable, since what is referred to in said resolution, as is clear from its integral context, is a private entity concessionaire of a public right – the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – a situation that cannot be applied to A.V.C., which was a company that, although constituted as a corporation, presents another nature – a general bonded warehouse (almacén general de depósito) – although in practice it departed from the presuppositions of a bonded warehouse proper. Thus, the Constitutional Chamber indicated on that occasion “that the right of petition does not exist against private entities, and it is obvious that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, although belonging mostly to a public institution, is itself a legal entity under private law exactly equal to all the others, so it could not be considered as public either by reason of its owner, or by reason of the public interest involved in its activity...” However, in this same resolution, the Constitutional Chamber hastens to indicate that notwithstanding the foregoing, it was necessary “to make a distinction regarding those entities that, being private, exercise a part of the administrative function of the State as concessionaires of a public service.” It also pointed out that in this sense, these companies – concessionaires of a public service – are the inverse of the public companies referred to in article 3.2 of the Ley General de Administración Pública. Said norm reads as follows: 3.2: Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their business, may be deemed as industrial or mercantile companies.</span></font></p> </HTML>" The Constitutional Chamber clarifies that the aforementioned article refers to those public enterprises which, like the commercial banks of the State, are governed in their organization by public law, but in their activity by private law, whereas private enterprises – referring here to concessionaires of public services – whether owned by individuals, or by the State or its public institutions, or even mixed enterprises, are organized and governed by private law – which is why they are excluded from the General Law of Public Administration – but in their activity as concessionaires of public services, they are exceptionally subject to public law and obliged to behave accordingly. The appellant, while citing the jurisprudential precedent, omits this last part, referring to the activity of the private enterprise, although we insist that the constitutional ruling refers specifically to the case of private enterprises that are concessionaires of public services, which is not the case of A.V.C. However, for the topic that concerns us, what is noteworthy from the Constitutional Chamber's resolution is the mention it makes of public enterprises, especially the commercial banks of the State, which in their organization are governed by public law and in their activity by private law, and are included within the scope of application of the General Law of Public Administration; consequently, if A.V.C. was 100% owned by the Banco Anglo Costarricense, even though it could be constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima) in its activity, because the General Deposit Warehouses Law so permitted, the public funds that fed it so that it could carry out precisely the activities inherent to an entity of such a nature, continued under that status, just as the source that originated them held it, and this is so, to the point that, as also highlighted by the Constitutional Chamber in the ruling mentioned, private enterprises, such as concessionaires of public services for example, in their activity, are also exceptionally subject to public law and obliged to behave in accordance with the guidelines of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, in the case before us, considering the A.V.C. companies as subsidiary entities of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, which is subject in its organization to public law, or alternatively from the perspective of a private enterprise providing public services, the subjection to provisions of public order subsists for the former. [...] <b>III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS [...]<i> Third ground.</i></b> The erroneous application of the General Law of Public Administration – articles 111, 112 and 113 – and the non-application of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber – Voto 1106-95 of 10:27 a.m. on February 14, 1995 – and of Law 3284 – Commerce Code – in its articles 102 to 233 – on corporations (sociedades anónimas) – are claimed. The appellant challenges the fact deemed proven by the court that the monies used in the A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. group of companies belonged to the Banco Anglo Costarricense, because the group of companies was 100% property of the banking entity, and that consequently they were not private companies, the court affirming that the investments were made by the Banco Anglo Costarricense and not A.V.C. The appellant indicates that the Constitutional Chamber has established that companies like those that made up A.V.C. are not public but are governed by private law and are excluded from the General Law of Public Administration, it being only later that such provision was corrected through an amendment to the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República by means of Law 7428 of September 7, 1994, published in Gaceta 210 of November 4, 1994, articles 8 and 9, so that the Contraloría could supervise them, considering them public. The claim is not admissible. We cannot avoid mentioning that the appellant, in his argument, disregards the facts deemed proven by the court, which is inadmissible within a challenge on the merits, altering in any case the very factual assumptions determined by the judges, because, as we pointed out when referring to the eighteenth ground of the appeal formulated by this same applicant – a ground based on procedural defects – the judgment never indicates that the investments had been made by the Banco Anglo Costarricense and not by the Almacén de Valores, and it was always clear that A.V.C. was obviously a corporation (sociedad anónima), which was governed, in principle, by common commercial rules, as we will see later. On this subject, the arguments previously set forth in the resolution of the indicated ground are reiterated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to reflect on a transcendent issue in the resolution of this case, referring to the legal nature of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries ABC Valores S.A. and Boltec S.A., once they were acquired by the Banco Anglo Costarricense, and their determination as an enterprise, constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), belonging 100% to a banking entity – a public entity. Certainly, the judges considered this latter circumstance – the ownership status of the Bank – which is undoubtedly supported by the evidence, both documentary and testimonial provided and analyzed, which allows determining with complete accuracy that on May 24, 1993, the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, in session 44-5/93, held starting at 4:20 p.m., attended by all the accused, ratified the closing offer signed by the defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, in his capacity as General Manager of the banking institution, with the co-defendant fugitive José Luis López Gómez, representative of the shareholders of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand dollars, through the mechanism of exchange – swap – of external debt bonds from Venezuela and Brazil, supposedly property of the banking entity, at market value, for the shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. with its operating licenses or operating concessions, A.V.C. also being the owner of 100% of the shares of Boltec S.A., ABC Valores S.A., and the building with furniture and computer equipment. In said offer, it was established that the deal was firm, definitive, and irrevocable, to be formalized the following day, Tuesday, May 25, 1993. Ratification was approved in article 1 of the subsequent session of the Board of Directors of the banking entity, number 45-5/93 of May 31, 1993, also attended by all the accused, and it being the case that on this same day, the defendant Robles Macaya, based on the authorization granted by the directors in said session 44-5/93, indeed signed with José Luis López Gómez the contract for the purchase of the companies A.V.C. and its two subsidiaries, a purchase that was settled as agreed in the closing offer, with the assignment taking place in favor of the Banco Anglo Costarricense of all the shares – twelve hundred – In this way, the banking institution acquired the mentioned companies, becoming their 100% owner, that is, the sole partner of the corporation (sociedad anónima) in which they were constituted. Having determined then that A.V.C. became, as of that date, a corporation (sociedad anónima), 100% owned by a state entity, it is necessary to elucidate whether said company conforms absolutely within the canons of private law and is considered exclusively a private enterprise, or whether, considering the ownership relationship linking it to the public entity, we could then speak of the existence of a public enterprise. From a restricted perspective, we could conceptualize the public enterprise according to the nature of the owner, in such a way that the enterprise will be private if its owner is private and will be public if its owner is public. From a broader position, it could be said that an enterprise will be public if it serves as an instrument to achieve public purposes, it being understood that this will occur in every case where the entrepreneur is a public administration, and additionally, when even being a private person, it is ultimately an instrument of action of a public administration – Murillo Arias, Mauro. “Ensayos de Derecho Público”. Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia. First edition. San José, Costa Rica. 1988, page 106 – This conceptualization of a public enterprise leads us to determine the types of public enterprise doctrinally accepted: a) the public enterprise-organ: dependent on a public entity without legal personality, for example the Fábrica Nacional de Licores; b) the public enterprise-institution: which are autonomous juridical institutions or not, with a business activity, for example: the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and the Banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional; c) the enterprises-companies – see Ortiz Ortiz, Eduardo. “La empresa Pública como ente público”. Revista Ivstitia, number 52. Year 5. April 1991, page 12 – Within this last type, the public enterprise-society, a theoretical distinction is made between the so-called “state companies” when they belong entirely to the State and corporations (sociedades anónimas) with majority state participation, <i>with general deposit warehouses being classifiable within the type of public enterprises-societies</i>. In order to introduce the legal possibility for commercial banks to form corporations (sociedades anónimas) – by creation or participation – that allow them to carry out the public purposes for which they were constituted, such companies including general deposit warehouses, we must remember firstly that the commercial banks that make up the Sistema Bancario Nacional constitute autonomous public law institutions, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters, and with their own responsibility in the execution of their functions, emanating from their boards of directors, whose members are obliged to act according to their criteria in the direction and administration of the bank, in accordance with constitutional, legal, regulatory, and technical provisions, and must answer for their management – article 2 of the Organic Law of the Sistema Bancario Nacional – The essential functions of the Commercial Banks are: <i>to collaborate in the execution of the Republic's monetary, exchange, credit, and banking policy; to procure the liquidity, solvency, and proper functioning of the Sistema Bancario Nacional; when dealing with State banks, to safeguard and administer the public's bank deposits and to prevent there being inactive means of production in the country, seeking out the producer to place at his service the economic and technical means available to the System</i> – article 3 of the same legal body – Together with these functions, the commercial banks maintain a series of prohibitions, established by the same Organic Law of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, among them <i>that of participating directly or indirectly in agricultural, industrial, commercial, or any other type of enterprises, and buying products, merchandise, and real estate not indispensable for their normal operation</i> – article 73. 3 ibidem – in application of the principle of specialty contained in numeral 61 of the same law, which binds public enterprises, circumscribing them to their corporate purpose, unless a law so permits, prima facie, as indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República in its Report C-014-2001 dated January 19 of that year, whose guidelines, insofar as they interest us, we share, <i>“... public entities are not authorized to create corporations (sociedades anónimas) due to the risk that such creation entails. Hence, the creation of companies by public enterprises requires, in principle, legal authorization. It is the legislator who must establish the rules for the creation of those companies and their operation...”</i> This legal authorization we mention will be found embodied in the aforementioned article 73, which contains the exception to such participation prohibitions, freeing the banks that might have participation in the capital of public or semi-public order financial institutions that might be created, and that of banks that established general deposit warehouses, in accordance with the respective law, or that at the date of enactment of the Organic Law of the Sistema Bancario Nacional already had participation in them, solely with respect to the businesses and operations resulting from the functioning of such warehouses, also excepting those cases in which the commercial banks of the State, jointly or separately, constitute or employ legal persons owned exclusively by them for the provision of services for themselves, with prior authorization from the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or for the administration of assets awarded in legal proceedings. Likewise, in relation specifically to general deposit warehouses, their legal authorization so that a public enterprise – commercial bank – can create or constitute them is found in numeral 48 of the Law of General Deposit Warehouses number 15 of October 15, 1934, which allows Commercial Banks domiciled in the country to establish and maintain General Deposit Warehouses in those places where they have not been established by private initiative within the first six months of the effectiveness of this law; an assumption also contained in numeral 115 of the cited Organic Law of the Sistema Bancario Nacional when it indicates that commercial banks may freely establish General Deposit Warehouses, which shall be governed according to the provisions of the relevant law, as well as execute similar operations for the storage of products and merchandise in their own warehouses. This legal authorization, regarding the Banco Anglo Costarricense, materialized through the known Acuerdo Ejecutivo number 16-H of February 27, 1974, which allowed the banking institution to operate as a general deposit warehouse and fiscal warehouse. Doctrinally, by definition, it is understood that <i>general deposit warehouses are those dedicated to the conservation and custody of all kinds of merchandise of lawful commerce, contributing to the greater circulation of wealth by means of the receipts they issue for said merchandise</i> – on this point see: Espejo de Hinojosa, Ricardo. <i>Curso de Derecho Mercantil.</i> Barcelona. Eighth Edition. 1931; a concept captured in our Law of General Deposit Warehouses of 1934, in its article 1 when it states that <i>General Deposit Warehouses are credit institutions whose purpose is the conservation and custody of fruits, products, and merchandise of national or foreign origin, the issuance of deposit certificates and pledge bonds, and the granting of loans guaranteed by the same.</i> Having established, then, the legal possibility that the Banco Anglo Costarricense maintained to acquire a General Deposit Warehouse, and therefore to buy A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., within the characteristic guidelines of a warehouse of this nature in accordance with the legislation in force on the subject, which did not occur, as noted from the entirety of the handed-down judgment, a legal possibility that does not necessarily imply that this latter acquisition, as indeed happened, conformed to legal canons, the character emerges of the banking entity as absolute owner of the acquired corporation (sociedad anónima), which, although configured or organized within the assumptions of private law, the activity it provides becomes public, even though it retains its own legal personality which, as the Procuraduría General de la República indicated in its Report C-012-93 dated January 20, 1993, constitutes an asset of the Bank, but which is neither confused with nor subsumed into the legal person that is its owner – the public entity – although the latter, constituted as a shareholders assembly, can decide on all types of measures that allow it to obtain information about the results of the Warehouse's operations, as well as control its functioning and its finances, the same report indicating that since the General Deposit Warehouse is a “credit institution,” as stipulated in numeral 1 of its respective law, the Auditoría General de Entidades Financieras – AGEF – and today the Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras, was empowered to exercise the controls provided for by the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which already outlines for us, although it does not openly express, the public nature of the general deposit warehouse owned by a commercial bank as a public entity. While it is true that this latter circumstance – the control of the AGEF over the deposit warehouse – is reconsidered by the same Procuraduría years later, in report C-067-98 of April 14, 1998, subjecting them not to the AGEF or SUGEF but to the Internal Audit of the banking entity, this is because it is deemed that Deposit Warehouses, despite being empowered to grant credits, are not “financial entities” since they do not engage in financial intermediation, understood as intervention in the market by capturing monetary resources and placing them through credit and other financial operations, and this is the case within a pure conception of a deposit warehouse in accordance with the legislation that informs it; however, as was demonstrated in the judgment, despite the accused, with full knowledge thereof, proclaiming the idea that the negotiation with A.V.C. and its subsidiaries had the objective of functioning as a deposit warehouse, even though within their commercial turn they could operate as a securities center, as authorized by numeral 36 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law, since they could carry out non-banking activity, the A.V.C. business complex did not function as a deposit warehouse, but as a financial enterprise, for which reason, from that perspective, it should indeed have been controlled by the AGEF. It is convenient to clarify that the Procuraduría's Report C-067-98, regarding the concept of financial intermediation, is based on article 116 of the Organic Law of the Banco Central number 7558 of November 3, 1995, subsequent to the events charged, so it does not strictly apply to the particular case. However, the pronouncement of the state body brings us to the central theme we are developing here, regarding the possibility of considering A.V.C. as a public enterprise, despite its constitution as a corporation (sociedad anónima) subject in principle to common commercial assumptions, with the aspect of ownership by the banking body retaining relevance regarding the constituted company. Thus, Doctor Antonio Sobrado González, at that time Procurador Fiscal, established <i>“...that since the share capital of the corporation (sociedad anónima) that administers the general deposit warehouse is fully subscribed by the Bank, both constitute a business unit...”</i> – emphasis ours – understood as <i>“... the organization of capital and labor intended for the production or mediation of goods or services for the market...”</i> – Broseta Pont, Manuel. “La empresa, la unificación del Derecho de Obligaciones y el Derecho Mercantil”. Madrid, Tecnos, 1965, page 274 <i>- since “the warehouse operates under the tutelage of the owning bank and at the service of the bank's economic interests.”</i> This assertion is absolutely shared by this Cassation Chamber, and it rests on the prevailing doctrine on the matter; thus, Doctor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, in his aforementioned essay “La empresa pública como ente público”, when analyzing the nature of corporations (sociedades anónimas) that are constituted by public enterprises, affirms that between the public entity and the company a relationship of instrumentality subsists, since the public enterprise will achieve its purposes through the constituted commercial enterprise, and if, moreover, the public entity retains all or the majority of the shares of that corporation (sociedad anónima), it can manage it according to its policies and plans, transforming it into an instrument for the realization of its purposes, rendering the created corporation (sociedad anónima) and its activity public. Taking this approach to the case before us, the Banco Anglo Costarricense, a public entity classifiable within the category of public enterprise-institution, legally empowered, acquires a deposit warehouse – A.V.C. and its subsidiaries Boltec S.A. and ABC Valores S.A. – constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), which, due to its instrumental nature, must develop a public service activity, consequently responding to the public purposes of the banking institution that is its 100% owner of the subscribed share capital and therefore sole partner of that corporate entity, even though it does not exercise strictly banking activities, such that said deposit warehouse, once acquired by the banking entity, becomes a public enterprise-society or state company, and therefore with an eminently publicistic nature, which has repercussions on its activity, the regulation of which would also be public – General Deposit Warehouse Law – because both the Acuerdo Ejecutivo that authorized the Banco Anglo Costarricense to operate the General Deposit and Fiscal Warehouse in 1974 and the Decreto Ejecutivo number 44-88 that authorized the functioning of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. as a General Deposit Warehouse so ordered, subjecting them to the Law on the matter, its regulations, and related Laws, as we specified when resolving the previous ground. But in the activity related to the purchase and sale of securities, with the economic resources coming from the banking entity, A.V.C. had to be subject to the Securities Market Regulatory Law, from the very moment it functionally presented itself as a securities center, an activity which, as a deposit warehouse, was permitted by numeral 36 of the cited Law, as determined lines above. The instrumental character of said deposit warehouse in relation to the banking institution allowed the latter, which was the one financing the corporation (sociedad anónima), to participate competitively in the market indirectly; and this close relationship between the public entity – BAC – and the corporate entity – A.V.C. – is recognized by the accused themselves, which is evident when the appellant's own defendant, in session 43 of A.V.C. Panamá, held at 10:30 a.m. on October 18, 1993, in his capacity as General Manager of the business complex, expressly stated that the existing link between the group of companies and the BAC could not be separated, since it was convenient for them to be perceived in the market as complementary. But there would be an important aspect to consider in the instrumental role of the deposit warehouse in relation to the banking entity, and it is the fact that, by amendment to the constitutive pact of A.V.C., the defendants established that to be a member of the Board of Directors of A.V.C., one necessarily had to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, such status being lost when one ceased to be a director of the banking body; this would allow us to affirm that the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense set the policies of A.V.C., and as the Procuraduría General de la República pointed out in Report C-070-2001 of March 13, 2001, <i>“by definition, the shareholders assembly of the new company is the owning entity itself through its superior body, but moreover, that determination is heightened if the relationship is no longer produced solely through the Shareholders Assembly, but through an identity in the condition of director of the public entity and director of the instrumental entity...”</i> In the case before us, this situation, which in a normal exercise of the activities characteristic of a general deposit warehouse would not cause suspicion, took a different course, as the trial court indicated, when this circumstance allowed the accused to close the circle of control over their illicit activity, insofar as from the very origin of the leveraged purchases of external debt, through which the public funds belonging to the Banco Anglo Costarricense were diverted, which is the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, their purpose and objectives were contrary to existing banking legislation, aspects the accused were fully aware of, which did not inhibit them from continuing their strategy, which resulted in the well-known economic debacle. As a basis for the instrumental character of the corporate entity, controlled and directed by the State, in this case the banking entity, as sole partner, the author Vittorio Ottaviano in his essay “Sometimiento de la Empresa Pública al Derecho Privado”, collective work titled “La empresa Pública”, Publications of the Real Colegio de España in Bologna, 1970, pages 273 and 275, cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the mentioned essay, states: <i>“... when the enterprise is developed by an economic entity, it in turn will be public insofar as it is linked to another entity that holds the public purposes connected with the enterprise. That is: the public nature of the economic entity will be in relation to its position of dependence with respect to another entity ... or, if you will, with its instrumental nature...”</i> On this same subject, Luigi Ferri, an Italian commercial law expert, indicates that <i>“... the screen of the commercial company barely serves to cover up this reality, if one bears in mind that where there is a ‘prevailing participation,’ the corporate instrument falls into the hands of the State and becomes subject to the service of its purposes...”</i> and furthermore, said author, also cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, points out that “<i>... to say that since the entity (the company) is private, the assets also remain private, is to remain voluntarily on the surface without delving into the reality of the phenomenon, which implies, in substance, an expansion of the public sphere at the expense of the private, and consequently, a restriction of the sphere in which private autonomy operates...”</i> – Ferri, Luigi. “Impresiones de un jurista sobre las haciendas con participación estatal predominante”. Collective work “La Empresa Pública” cited, volume 2, page 1570 – which outlines for us an aspect of transcendent importance in the case before us, which is the determination, as the trial court considered, of the public condition of the assets negotiated by the defendants through the A.V.C. business complex. We must here rescue the concept of State shareholding control in these corporations (sociedades anónimas), such that, even when their constitution is under this model of private law application, the condition of sole or majority partner of the public entity <i>“...makes it impossible to apply common commercial law, and the corporation (sociedad anónima) in question begins to function rather as a public dependency...</i> – Ortiz Ortiz, op. cit., page 6 – This Chamber fully shares the approach of Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, since certainly, the considerations of “ownership” by the State of the created corporation (sociedad anónima), the “public interest” that drives its constitution, and the “public purpose” of its management, prevent an unrestricted application of common commercial rules, and we begin to observe this from the very moment of the creation of the corporate entity, from the quantitative perspective of the partners, since in these companies that, like A.V.C.

Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., belongs one hundred percent to the State through the public banking entity, we find a *single shareholder*, in contrast to article 104 of the Commercial Code which requires for the formation of a corporation the existence of at least two shareholders and that each of them subscribe to at least one share – subsection a) – which also has a bearing on the chapters referring to shareholding participation, so that, for these reasons alone we could not apply in an unrestricted manner, as the defense of the accused González Lizano intends, the Commercial Code in the considerations pertaining to this Almacén de Valores, and our position is based on the doctrine of practically all latitudes; it has thus been indicated that *“the internal legal regime of public economic establishments is determined by Public Law, especially regarding the relations between the decentralized entity and the central administration... given the presence of the State in those companies (with a single public shareholder), a series of derogations to the regime and structure of commercial companies arise, leading to the conclusion that the applicability of commercial law norms cannot be total and complete. In the first place because some special provisions that regulate these companies establish numerous express derogations to the regime of corporations; for example, and among others that we will see, the plurality of shareholders disappears and the non-transferability of the State's shares is generally established, as well as external control of the company itself. But furthermore, the fact that a public entity is a shareholder and the fact that it is the sole shareholder, makes the legal regime of corporations or limited liability companies inapplicable in many cases, since organs disappear and some essential requirements are lacking”*... Brewer Carías, Allan R. “Las Empresas Públicas en el Derecho Comparado”. Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, 1967, pages 115 and 116 – Our national doctrine also maintains this same line of thought; thus Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the commented essay points out that the commercial law that is applied to companies that are entirely owned by the State or mostly so, is then a modified or special one, with inevitable predominance of the interest and position of the State or owning public entity, which increases when analyzing the regime of internal relations between the public entity shareholder and owner – or dominant partner – and the company in question, due to that same preponderance – Op cit page 7 – Finally on this topic one could ask the reasons why a public entity, supported by legislation that so authorizes it, creates or participates in private entities formed under the model of private companies, if it is not going to have the characteristics and advantages of one of such nature, however the answer is found in the flexibility and entrepreneurial capacity that allow executing the purposes that the public entity has proposed. On this matter, since 1984, analyzing the origin of corporations and their consideration with respect to the public enterprise, the First Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 46-1984, in what interests us stated: *“... it has its reason for being that the legislator has relied on the legal form of organisms of privatist structure so that certain entrepreneurial activities are carried out with the participation of the State. This has been designed in this way to grant the company's management the convenient degree of executivity, flexibility, elasticity and entrepreneurial capacity, and to obtain mixed participation and collaboration convenient for the direct and indirect purposes sought in certain cases...”* From all the above it is inferred the importance that the topic related to the property of the state entity as sole shareholder of the corporate company will have, in the consideration of the corporation formed by a public entity, as well as the public interest thereof and therefore the instrumental character of the company and the public purpose pursued, it is for this reason that we respectfully disagree with some of the considerations issued by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling number 1106-95 at 10:27 hours on February 24, 1995 – whose non-application is claimed by the appellant – regarding the interpretation of some concepts, especially in that it downplays the importance of the circumstances pertaining to “property and public interest” in those companies linked in their formation to a state entity, a jurisprudential precedent, on which the applicant reproaches its non-application by the court that issued the judgment at hand. It is convenient to clarify the scope of a ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber, regarding its mandatory compliance, or when it deals with mere opinions or legal considerations on a particular topic. Thus, its application will be *erga omnes* for the specific situation on which the intervention of the high constitutional court is being raised, or it can be applied to situations similar to that addressed by the jurisdictional pronouncement. However, for other situations that do not maintain a relationship of identity with the case in question, a precedent of this nature must be analyzed with special care, within the integral perspective in which it was issued, so as to allow its application in diverse circumstances that are not strictly related to what was resolved, so that the appreciations of the Constitutional Chamber that constitute opinions or legal interpretations of a determined topic are not binding, and therefore in that sense their mandatory application is not imposed, as the appellant intends in this case. It is now convenient to analyze the cited jurisprudential precedent, which refers to a recurso de amparo filed against the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, a public service concessionary company, which even though it also constitutes a corporation dependent on a public entity, maintains a different nature from that of a general deposit warehouse, such as A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., here we would already have a first fundamental difference when requesting its *erga omnes* application; hence the issued ruling was of mandatory compliance for the case in question and perhaps for other similar situations, regarding recurso de amparo pertaining to public service concessionary companies, but not for the cause at hand, so there would be no obligation binding the judges of the trial court nor this Cassation Chamber to apply the cited resolution. The remaining considerations contained in the issued ruling are understood as simple legal analyses, not binding, so this Chamber, within the approach followed on the topic brought to our knowledge, even though it considers some of its approaches of interest, which we take into consideration when resolving the cassation ground previously indicated, allows itself to differ on other aspects, insofar as, as we set forth supra, while it is true that corporations, when they are majority-owned by a public institution, constitute “in principle” a legal entity of private law, they cannot maintain treatment similar to any other private law entity, formed solely by private individuals, injected with private capital and that strictly fulfills private purposes, since the idea that the State can configure a commercial company as sole shareholder or participate in it in a majority manner, through acts or contracts of the same characteristics and scopes as those of a company subscribed among private individuals, becomes inadmissible. That is why, contrary to what the Constitutional Chamber points out in the commented ruling on such considerations, in our opinion, supported by national and international doctrine, within a Comparative Law analysis, as well as by the regulations that govern us, the determination of the proprietary character of the state entity over the formed corporation, its public interest and the also public purposes that govern them, is of considerable importance, since otherwise it would be contributing to the establishment of a dangerous precedent so that, using the mechanism of creating private entities without greater oversight, the public entities that form them distract or divert the assets of the public treasury that financially feed those private companies. And such considerations are logical because we can now anticipate that from this perspective, the nature of the assets that make up, on the one hand, the share capital of the corporation belonging to the public entity, as well as the resources injected by it into the corporate company, as happened between the Banco Anglo Costarricense and A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., cannot be anything other than public as well. Hence, with good reason the eminent public law scholar Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicated with absolute forcefulness that, once the quality of public enterprise of the corporation formed by the public entity whose sole or majority shareholder is the State is established, an immediate consequence of the public character of the corporation as a company, as well as of its activity as a public service, is the also public character of its assets that cannot be administered internally as if they were private – Op cit page 10 – which he supports with a jurisprudential citation from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling number 98 at 14:30 hours on July 30, 1985 that in what is of interest states: *“Nationalized companies that are formed with the capital of the State conserve their public character, even though their organization and operation are subject to Private Law, because while legally the assets belong to the company, it cannot be ignored that insofar as these deteriorate, the capital, represented by the shares, is affected, and that, consequently, to that same extent the State's assets are damaged. It is worth adding that, for these same reasons, the State has an interest in the correct functioning of these companies.”* This consideration about the public nature of the assets that make up the equity of a corporation whose sole shareholder is the State, finds echo in some regulatory provisions, through Decretos Ejecutivos, in force at the time when the events that concern us occurred, where the public character of the funds or resources that state companies manage when they operate as commercial companies is determined without doubt or interpretations. Thus, on the occasion of the creation of the Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo – CODESA – it was determined by Decreto Ejecutivo 7927-H of January 12, 1978 that the Executive Branch, considering it convenient that in the case of this type of companies, constituted with the characteristics of a corporation, governed by the Law that creates them in the first place, their regulations and supplementarily by the Commercial Code, have a minimum framework of legality that regulates essential aspects of their activity and at the same time are subject to oversight by the Contraloría General de la República, considers it necessary to legislate in that field, given the deep concern for the consequences that may derive from the lack of decision-making on this matter, so while the reference legislation is promulgated, it considers it prudent to issue a set of provisions via regulation that provide greater security for the correct administration of the resources administered. This Decree was modified by another similar one, number 14666-H of May 9, 1983, however no variation was made to the determination as public of the assets that make up the equity of these particular companies, of a nature similar in terms of their formation to that of the general deposit warehouse. And it could not be otherwise for the sake of protecting state public funds, as we indicated supra. Having determined the character of the assets administered by these *sui generis* corporations, such considerations also allow us to affirm that the directors of a public enterprise, just as occurs in the case that occupies us with the firm A.V.C., as a corporation of a public entity – Banco Anglo Costarricense – which is its sole shareholder, are public officials precisely because they are the heads of said corporate entity, and this in accordance with the same articles 111, 112 and 113 all of the General Public Administration Law, the non-observance of which the applicant reproaches. Thus, article 111.1 of the cited law establishes that *“a public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf of and at the expense thereof, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with entire independence of the representative, remunerated, permanent or public character of the respective activity”* – the emphasis is ours – In the case that occupies us A.V.C., as we have been maintaining, once it is acquired by the Banco Anglo Costarricense, participating 100% in its share capital, it becomes a public enterprise and therefore is part of the Administration, and the defendants, as its directors, providers of a service to the Administration, are public servants because they are the heads of the company, which constitutes a Public Law principle related to public enterprises. Thus *“the administrative doctrine points out that the fact that Administrative Law is not applied to these entities, in whole or in part, does not mean that they are not part of the Administrative Organization, since the connection with the state organization is maintained, their instrumental character remaining with respect thereto”* – Alonso Ureba Alberto. “La Empresa Pública”. Montecorvo, Madrid, 1985, page 299, cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in his mentioned essay – so that, interpreting the scope of the cited article 111.1 of the General Public Administration Law, a public servant will be one who provides an activity to the Public Administration even when this does not maintain an imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent or public character, or the deployed activity is private or by simple contracting, a case within which the director of the corporation of which the State is its sole owner is found, whose primary function is neither imperative nor is it subject in principle to Public Law, given the nature of the corporate entity he directs. Such considerations do not appear contradictory with the presuppositions contained in numerals 111.3 and 112.2 of the same General Public Administration Law, since within an integrated logic of both norms it is noted that such provisions apply only to subordinate public servants and not to the heads who exercise management functions; and this is so because the first of the cited numerals indicates that the employees of economic companies or services of the State charged with dealings subject to common law will not be considered public servants – 111.3 – also determining that service relations with workers, laborers and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the previous article 111, will be governed by labor or commercial law. In relation to this type of subordinate employees, this Chamber considers that those who exercise an administration and oversight function within the public enterprise that, formed as a corporation, belongs to the public entity cannot be taken into consideration, since such officials – managers, deputy managers and internal auditors – do participate in the public management of the Administration insofar as during the performance of their duties, they form part of the decision-making of the corporate company, even though they do not have voting rights within the sessions of the Board of Directors, but they do have the right to speak, which allows them to express their opinions and generate a determined trend in decision-making, or they administer the public funds that the state entity injects into them, being the direct and principal executing arm of the Board of Directors of the corporate entity, with directive and hierarchical capacity – manager and deputy manager – over the remaining levels of the company – employees, laborers and workers – In any case, within our legislation, even the servants contained in numerals 111.3 and 112.2 of the cited Law, for criminal purposes, are deemed as public. – article 112.4 ibidem – and this is so *“... to prevent the servant who works for a State company from taking advantage of his special condition and being able to make improper use of the public assets of the company... which is fully adjusted to the constitutional parameter, in attention to the interests it protects, which are: administrative morality and legality and the protection of public assets...”* – see Ruling number 6520-96 at 15:09 hours on December 3, 1996, Constitutional Chamber – hence in the case that occupies us, all the accused maintain the quality of public officials, the funds that the banking entity to which A.V.C. belonged injected it so that it could develop its functions also being public, including the leveraged purchases in external debt bonds, essential elements for the determination of the criminal type of Embezzlement for which they were convicted. For all the foregoing, the ground invoked is without merit. [...] **III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] SUBSTANTIVE APPEAL [...] *Fifth ground.* ** Erroneous application of article 77 of the Criminal Code – on the continued crime – is claimed, since from what the court found as proven, it is established that the companies were purchased with the purpose of entering into investment banking and buying external debt securities, so a continued crime is not formed, insofar as within the so-called third phase of the judgment, the purchase of the group of companies A.V.C. should have been included and not separated as was done, since the penalty is in the first place higher and the law itself indicates that the presuppositions of the continued crime will be applied when the crimes are of the same kind – embezzlement – and affect proprietary legal interests – monies of the Banco Anglo Costarricense – and the same purpose is pursued – entering into investment banking and buying external debt securities – In the appellant's opinion, the purchase of the group of companies must be subsumed into what the court called the third phase, which were the leveraged purchases from June 27 to February 1994, since with what was described in the previous phase, the second pursued the same end as the law indicates, and therefore the former should be subsumed in the latter and applying the rules of joinder, reduce the sentence to five years which was the penalty imposed for the purchase. The claim is partially admissible. According to the facts found as proven, as the court pointed out, the cause in question must be analyzed globally and chronologically, since each fact turns out to be the antecedent of the following – volume 16 of the judgment folio 4511 – the judges specifying that this was so even though the acts carried out did not form a single action, but that each factual circumstance constituted in itself a crime of Embezzlement, dividing the proven facts, for a better understanding, into three phases which they called: First: the cash purchases, attributed solely to the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya; Second: the purchase of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries Boltec S.A. and ABC Valores S.A., where both Robles Macaya and the members of the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense including the accused Carlos Manuel González Lizano were accused; Third: the leveraged purchases of Latin American External Debt, attributed to all the defendants – Robles Macaya and the Board of Directors of the banking entity – However, despite the above, at the moment of the legal classification of the facts and the establishment of the penalties to be imposed, the court separates the phases and classifies the facts regarding Robles Macaya, as two crimes of Embezzlement in the modality of continued crime – for the first and third phases – plus another crime of Embezzlement – second phase – materially joining these three illicit acts, for which it imposed on him by reason of the two continued crimes of Embezzlement ten years in prison for each, and for the other crime five years in prison, for a total of 25 years. For its part, for each of the members of the Board of Directors, it classified the facts against them as one continued crime of Embezzlement – 7 leveraged purchases (third phase) – materially joined with another crime of Embezzlement – purchase of A.V.C. (second phase) – imposing on each the penalty of ten years for the first illicit act and five years for the second for a total of fifteen years in prison. Such form of legal classification and punitive sanction, as the appellant well pointed out regarding his defendant Carlos Manuel González Lizano, accused in the second and third phases, appears mistaken, since within the approach developed by the judges, from a consistent and logical perspective, the criminal conducts attributed to all the accused and found as proven must be concatenated into a single illicit act of Embezzlement in the modality of continued crime, “where each fact is the antecedent of the following” and insofar as the objective and subjective presuppositions established in numeral 77 of the Criminal Code that contemplates its penalty are met. The commented norm indicates that “when the crimes in joinder are of the same kind and affect proprietary legal interests, provided that the agent pursues the same purpose, the penalty provided for the most serious one shall be applied, increased up to another equal amount.” In the case that occupies us, the court considered on the one hand that the proven facts each constituted the crime of continued Embezzlement, which this Cassation Chamber shares, since indeed the presuppositions that make up said figure relative to the application of the penalty are determined; thus, we find ourselves before crimes of the same kind – embezzlement – that affect proprietary legal interests; regarding this aspect, we must clarify that while it is true Embezzlement does not contain assets as its fundamental legal interest, since it is a crime committed against the Duties of Public Function, referring to the duty of probity on the part of the public official in the performance of his duties, regarding the assets or monies that he administers, receives or guards, by reason of his position; however, because Embezzlement is a multi-offensive crime, the possible concurrence of a patrimonial injury derived from the criminal conduct carried out by the active subject – public official – translated into the subtraction or distraction of money or assets, whose administration, receipt or custody has been entrusted to him by reason of his position, is also undeniable. Consequently, the requirement established in numeral 77 of the Criminal Code being the affectation of proprietary legal interests, this does not imply that the crime subjected to continuation has assets as its only legal interest because *“the continued crime can exist, even though the acts of continuation – which must violate the same norm – affect, in addition to proprietary legal interests, another legal interest”* – Castillo González, Francisco. El concurso de Delitos en el Derecho Penal Costarricense, page 98 – Finally, in the species, we find ourselves before a continued crime of Embezzlement, insofar as the accused, including Mr. González Lizano, pursued with their illicit activity the same purpose, which was, as emerges from the proven facts, the carrying out of illegal purchases in External Debt, allowing Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. to use public funds for its benefit, paving the way for subsequent negotiations with this company, which culminated, with the concurrence of all the members of the Board of Directors of the banking entity, in the illegal purchase of the so often mentioned Almacén de Valores Comerciales and its subsidiaries and the subsequent acquisition of Latin American external debt, internationalizing the public funds of the Banco Anglo Costarricense through the creation of the Anglo American Bank in order to thus avoid the controls of the state entities supervising this type of dealings. In the species, the presupposition related to the same purpose is presented independently of the structuring that the court gave to the facts by dividing them into the three phases, insofar as, within the common purpose that the accused harbored, all the actions deployed by the accused were combined to execute the common program – in that same sense, Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, page 102 – On this line of thought, as the applicant indicated, the purchase of the group of companies A.V.C. by the Banco Anglo Costarricense – second phase – carried out with the concurrence of all the accused, some as directors of the banking entity and the other – Robles Macaya – as General Manager of said institution, must be appreciated and valued within a continued perspective, with the subsequent leveraged purchases of Latin American external debt that were carried out precisely through the acquired business complex – third phase – said plurality of actions being punished as a single crime of Embezzlement. Despite the above, the judges, just as we mentioned supra, notwithstanding considering that the cause should be analyzed globally, separately classified each of the phases into which they structured the proven factual framework, later joining them through the presuppositions of real joinder, although they stated they were applying the penalty of the continued crime. Such inconsistency becomes unacceptable; however, it is not pertinent to accede to the claims of attorney Solórzano Sánchez, who requests that a penalty of five years in prison be applied to his defendant as co-perpetrator of the continued crime of Embezzlement. Indeed, while it is true the court considered the accused Carlos Manuel González Lizano as co-perpetrator of the illicit act of Embezzlement for the purchase of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, by reason of which the amount of five years in prison was imposed on him, and as perpetrator of the crime of Embezzlement – translated into the seven leveraged purchases of external debt – in the modality of continued crime, imposing on him the amount of five years in prison as the principal penalty, increased by another equal amount for a total of ten years, the global punitive sentence being fifteen years according to the rules of material joinder, such classification and punitive application is not shared by this Chamber, for which reason the judgment is modified, as will be stated. Coincidentally with what Doctor Francisco Castillo González pointed out, when responding to the Cassation Appeal filed by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the penalty applied by the judges in this cause does not adjust to the presuppositions of the continued crime of Embezzlement. Thus, according to what is established in numeral 352 (currently 354) of the Criminal Code, first paragraph, a public official who subtracts or distracts money or assets whose administration, receipt or custody has been entrusted to him by reason of his position will be punished with three to twelve years in prison. For its part, article 77 ibidem sets the penalty of the continued crime indicating that “... the penalty provided for the most serious one – the emphasis is not in the original – increased up to another equal amount shall be applied.” This implies that, for the purposes of the abstract penalty, which is the first that must be defined, in the case of the continued offense of Peculado, the judge must determine it between the minimum and maximum limits provided for that offense – which in this case is the only one that manifests in continuation – that is, between three and twelve years of imprisonment, being able to increase it by up to another equal amount, such that the maximum penalties that can be applied range between 6 and 24 years of imprisonment. Once the abstract penalty is established, the judge will proceed to determine the specific punitive sanction between these last two limits, such that the penalty for the continued offense of Peculado cannot be less than six years of imprisonment nor exceed, in any case, twenty-four years. Applying the foregoing to the case in question, considering that we are in the presence of an offense of Peculado in the form of a continued offense committed by the accused Carlos Manuel González Lizano, the specific penalty is set at the amount of six years of imprisonment increased by another equal amount for a total of twelve years of imprisonment, in application of the penalty for a continued offense, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 77 of the Código Penal, which does not violate the principles of non-reformation in pejus contemplated in Article 459 of the Código de Procedimientos Penales of 1973 applicable to the case in question, insofar as the modifications determined herein do not harm the interests of the accused González Lizano regarding the type and amount of penalty imposed by the judges, which in this case was fifteen years of imprisonment; it is not acceptable to consider that the limit penalty that must be respected for the sake of applying the principle of non reformatio in peius, as the appellant intends, is five years of imprisonment, since, as we have clearly defined supra, the minimum specific punitive sanction that can be imposed for the continued offense of Peculado is six years. This Casation Chamber considers that the new amount of penalty imposed is fundamentally based on the reasoning established by the court when setting the principal penalty, in application of the assumptions contained in Article 71 of the Código Penal, but adapting it to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, given the legal reclassification indicated. In application of the principle regarding the extensive effect of the cassation appeal contained in Article 455 of the Código de Procedimientos Penales of 1973, the resolution regarding the considerations on the legal classification of the facts and the punitive sanction imposed relating to the accused González Lizano are also applicable to the defendant Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, who must be considered a co-perpetrator of the offense of Peculado in its form of a continued offense, applying to him the penalty of six years of imprisonment increased by another equal amount for a total penalty of twelve years of imprisonment, based on the reasons previously established for said quantification. Consequently, the ground raised by the appellant is partially granted, modifying the legal classification of the facts attributed against Carlos Manuel González Lizano to an offense of Peculado in its form of a continued offense committed to the detriment of the State, and reducing the penalty to twelve years of imprisonment. By the extensive effect of the cassation appeal, the modification made is applied under equal circumstances to the accused Arturo Fallas Zúñiga. In all other aspects where the judgment does not suffer modification, it shall remain unchanged. [...] V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: First ground. [...] Our Magna Carta in its article 39 enshrines the principle of constitutional legality, such that no one may be sanctioned unless there is a prior law that so determines and by virtue of a sentence issued by a competent authority. In accordance with the factual framework held as proven and to which the appellants do not adhere, the defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya was convicted of the offense of Peculado, with the court considering in the resolution before us that with his illicit actions he incurred in that offense through the misappropriation (distracción) of public funds whose administration (administración) had been entrusted to him by reason of his position as General Manager of Banco Anglo Costarricense, actions deployed in total disregard of the duty of probity to which he was obligated as a public official. In this misappropriation of funds, the accused incurred a series of violations of the banking regulations prevailing at the time of their commission, contemplated in the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional – LOSBN -, the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, the Ley sobre Almacenes Generales de Depósito, the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central –LOBC - and general principles contained in the Constitución Política and the Ley General de Administración Pública, as well as directives on the matter established by the Banco Central de Costa Rica itself and the Comisión Nacional de Valores. The Decreto-Ley de Nacionalización Bancaria number 71 of June 21, 1948, nationalized the private Banking sector, establishing that henceforth only the State could mobilize, through its own banking institutions, the public's deposits, already outlining the credit orientation required by the economic circumstances the country was going through at that time, aimed at materializing all the banking reforms necessary to make the ordered nationalization effective; and although it is true, the nature of the banking pursued is not indicated here, by 1953 with the issuance of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central number 1552 of April 23, 1953, the purposes and orientation of that entity were determined, expressly destined to contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo – Article 1 – charged with promoting the orderly development of the Costa Rican economy within the purpose of achieving full occupation of the productive resources of the Nation, being obligated to avoid the inactivity of the means of production when this is caused by a lack of timely credit and to promote the gradual diversification of national production towards those articles that strengthen the country's balance of payments – Article 4 -. Such normative provisions manifest without a doubt that the nature of the banking pursued in our country, starting from nationalization, is fundamentally development banking and not investment banking, postulates later picked up by the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional when it defines the essential functions of commercial banks establishing among others: to avoid that there are inactive means of production in the country, seeking out the producer to put at their service the economic and technical means available to the system – Article 3 subsection 4) – normative provisions that should have governed the actions of the defendant Robles Macaya in the exercise of his public functions, but which, as the court well pointed out, were flagrantly disregarded, because even considering that it is feasible for banks to incur in activities characteristic of investment banking, this is not an unrestricted activity, without controls, and in the judgment it was fully demonstrated that what Robles Macaya pursued was an incursion into this type of banking without any oversight, violating his legally established duties. The Constitución Política designates the State Banks as autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas) – Article 189 subsection 1- that enjoy administrative independence but are subject to the law in matters of governance – Article 188 ibidem – a principle that translates into numeral 2 of the Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional, and because such institutions form part of the Public Administration they are obligated to act in accordance with the legal system, being able only to perform those authorized acts or public services, that is, that the public officials who make up the financial entities of the State are subject to the principle of legality. These considerations allow us to point out that, contrary to what the challengers indicate, the factual framework that the court attributes to their client is not permitted to any state bank, insofar as the legal-banking regulations in force at the time of the facts did not empower, from any point of view, a public official who administers, receives (percibe) or guards (custodie) public funds to incur in their misappropriation, failing in the duty of probity to which they are obligated by reason of their position. Although it is true that Commercial banks are governed in their organization by Public Law, but in their activity by Private Law, the operations carried out by the accused Robles Macaya, which constitute the proven willful acts (hechos dolosos), in the manner in which they were carried out, are expressly prohibited by the prevailing legislation. The judges centered the unlawfulness on the actions of the defendant Robles Macaya, not on the fact that he made investments in foreign debt, whether Costa Rican or from other Latin American nations, since he was obviously empowered to do so within the purposes permitted to commercial banks in that matter – Article 61.7 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional -; nor is he condemned because the aforementioned investments might have a logical commercial risk inherent to them; or because he carried out operations known as "over the counter"; or because he did not continue negotiating with the brokerage firm Interbolsa. Neither is he being condemned for using, purely and simply, the leverage system to increase the amount of investments to be made. The court determined the criminal liability of the accused Robles Macaya because in the exercise of his functions he incurred a series of illegalities that, with full knowledge and will on his part, essentially contributed to increasing the risk in the transactions carried out, violating the norms that governed banking performance; because, contrary to what the challengers state, the defendant, as General Manager of a banking entity, obligated by law to exercise his functions inherent to his condition as general administrator (administrador general), within full observance of the laws and regulations as well as compliance with the resolutions of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) – Article 41 ibidem – was not permitted to negotiate with financial entities such as Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., which were not of first order recognized by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central, and which lacked the authorization to carry out a public offering of securities or to provide brokerage services (servicios de intermediación bursátil) in the national territory granted by the Comisión Nacional de Valores, as demanded at that time by the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores number 7201 of September 18, 1990, and the directives of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, as promoter of conditions favorable to the strengthening, liquidity, solvency and good functioning of the Banks that made up the Sistema Bancario Nacional and senior director of banking credit, supervisor and coordinator of these – Article 5 subsections 5 and 7 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica –. At the time the questioned transactions were carried out, ATF was not registered as a first-order entity, since at the beginning of 1990 it had been rejected as such by the Banco Central, nor did it have authorization from the Comisión Nacional de Valores to carry out such business, without the defendant making the slightest effort to ensure such conditions, which increased the risk of the transactions carried out, leaving the state banking entity unprotected. But furthermore, as we have already stated supra, the accused misappropriated the public funds by exceeding the sale offer of bonds and the line of credit offered by ATF on behalf of the Internationale Nederlanden Bank, allowing the payment of surcharges to be borne by the BAC, by transferring the public funds in advance of the agreed payment date, making them available to ATF so that it could buy the foreign debt bonds on the international market and sell them to the bank at a higher price, allowing the change in that company's position, going from intermediary to direct seller, with the consequent effect on the collection of gains or profits, extending the invested amount beyond the limits for which he was authorized, compromising the liquidity of the banking institution and allowing the bonds to never be in its name and therefore that it lacked negotiable availability over them, which contravenes the principles of security, solvency and liquidity that must prevail in the negotiations of commercial banks, according to the law – Article 3 of the Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional –. Likewise, the court condemns the accused Robles Macaya for his determined illicit participation in the purchase of the companies A.V.C. and their subsidiaries, with all the illegalities committed therein, all with the purpose, as he himself stated in the session of the Junta Directiva of the BAC number 25-3/93 of March 23, 1993, of venturing into investment banking that was prohibited to them at that moment and about which he was fully aware; to capture funds without reserve requirement (encaje) or leverage limit; to grant and request loans from abroad without authorization, which denotes without a doubt the willful nature of the actions of the incriminated, and the clear determination to avoid controls and supervision by the corresponding financial entities. Robles Macaya is condemned for having incurred in leveraging when negotiating foreign debt bonds, which subjected the banking entity to a strong economic commitment, which made it incur the payment of high sums for interest resulting from the leveraged credits and which ultimately contributed to the loss of the entire investment portfolio of the BAC that some time before had been transferred to A.V.C., deriving from the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional and the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central itself that for this type of leveraged business pertaining to credits that came from abroad, the defendants necessarily had to have the authorization of the Banco Central as regulator of currency, banking, credit and foreign exchange – relationship of Articles 6 and 121 of the LOBC, 14 and 74 of the LOSBN –. The defendant was also sanctioned for reversing basic principles of investor protection, prioritizing yield over security. The challengers forget in their claim that the resources managed by their client were PUBLIC FUNDS, and could not receive the same risky treatment as any other private investor who risks their assets in investments or operations accepting that they can lose a lot or gain a lot, characteristics typical of speculative and risky negotiations, which, contrary to the appellants' affirmations, contravene the general principles of liquidity, solvency, security and rational risk that legally determine the negotiations in which assets of this nature are involved, and which are not only transferred to the conditions of the negotiable instruments that a commercial bank may trade, as the petitioners restrictively interpret. It has been indicated that the legal system does not permit, with public treasury resources, incurring in risky and speculative investments; because although it is true that the LOSBN in its Article 27 allows banking officials to assume an acceptable commercial risk, this is coupled with an adequate proportion to the nature of the operation undertaken, provided that they have not acted with intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) and within sound banking negotiation, extremes of acceptability that are not applicable to the criminal conduct deployed by the accused, where, as was extensively set forth, he raised the risk of the operations carried out to surprising levels to the detriment of the economic interests of the state bank, causing its financial collapse. It cannot be interpreted, as the appellants indicate, that commercial, rational and acceptable risk in this type of transaction can be interpreted as a legal authorization to carry out speculative business; because speculation has no place in negotiations with public funds, understood "as the action or practice of buying or selling goods, stocks and shares, etc., with the purpose of profiting from rises and falls in market values, as distinguished from normal trading or investment" – see Oxford Universal Dictionary. Volume 3, p.514 – insofar as this form of negotiation also openly contravenes the general principles of legal and financial security, rational risk and liquidity inherent to a financial operation under those conditions, and a state Bank, as well as any other public institution, cannot expose its patrimony to the unrestricted fluctuations of the market. Therefore, the claim is declared without merit. [...] V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: [...] Fifth ground. An incorrect application of Articles 57, 58, 71, 354 and 358 all of the Código Penal and disregard of numerals 1, 2 and 24 ibidem and 39 of the Constitución Política is claimed, insofar as the court convicted the defendant Robles Macaya for 17 offenses of Peculado – nine cash purchases and eight leveraged repurchases – and imposed 25 years of imprisonment for conduct that according to the judges' analysis are negligent (culposa) – disregard of the care that should have been taken according to the circumstances - Regarding the first nine purchases: The appellants indicate that Robles Macaya is reproached for not having made sure that ATF was in fact a representative of the NMB Bank, as well as for having directly transferred the resources to that company, so that the rebel co-defendants José Luis and Mariano both López Gómez, owners of ATF, were allowed to carry out purchases in international banking for their own account and name and not as a manager or representative of Banco Anglo Costarricense, as should have been according to the offer approved by the Junta Directiva, for which reason Robles Macaya is reproached for negligent conduct that does not entail intent. The claim is not receivable. The subjective element in the offense of Peculado – intent (dolo) – according to our legislation, is comprised of the will in the active subject – who necessarily must be invested with the quality of public official – directed to subtract (sustraer) or misappropriate (distraer) money or property, whose administration, receipt (percepción) or custody (custodia) has been entrusted to them by reason of their position, with full knowledge that such property is public since it belongs to the Public Administration; hence, intent is the knowledge (conocimiento) and desire (voluntad) to realize the objective elements of the criminal offense. Consequently, the agent will commit the offense of Peculado by subtraction (sustracción) or misappropriation (distracción) – Article 354 paragraph 1 of the Código Penal – when, even without a purpose directed at their own benefit or that of third parties, with full knowledge of their function and of the public nature of the property or money that by reason of their position they administer, receive (perciba) or guard (custodie), they direct their will to subtract or misappropriate them, violating the duties of probity to which they are obligated in the performance of their functions; and we affirm the foregoing because the specific purpose of personal benefit or in favor of third parties is only expressly contemplated in the second paragraph of the mentioned norm, referring to what is called "embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios)", when under those assumptions, the public official uses works or services paid for by the Administration. In the case at hand, based on the facts proven by the trial court, contrary to the appellants' affirmations, the actions deployed by the accused Robles Macaya, far from being considered negligent conduct (negligencia), turned out to be actions lacking probity, when in the exercise of his functions as General Manager of a state Bank, he misappropriated the funds he administered, with full knowledge that they belonged to the Public Administration and he directed his will to the realization of negotiations with foreign debt bonds, under absolutely irregular conditions – cash purchases – and subsequently participates in the purchase of the companies A.V.C., which is the phase where his willful action is revealed with greater property and he expressly manifests it indicating the true purpose pursued with the purchase of such companies, to which we have extensively referred supra, and which materializes later when, with the consensus and participation of the remaining defendants, they execute the leveraged purchases; and it is precisely in that dimension that the reasoning and conclusions of the court are understood, because, as has been previously determined, the illicit acts attributed to the incriminated Robles Macaya, and in general to all the accused, must be analyzed jointly, within an integrated vision, where each of the committed actions is the antecedent of the next; and there is no doubt that Robles Macaya directed his conscious and voluntary action toward the achievement of his criminal purposes. The claim formulated is without merit. V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: [...] Sixth ground. [...] As we indicated supra, Peculado, in its modality of subtraction and misappropriation of public money or property, according to our legislation, does not necessarily require, either as a subjective element of the offense (injusto), or as an objective element of the criminal offense (tipo), the personal benefit or benefit of third parties from that public money or property, an element that is present in the Peculado of services contained in the second paragraph of numeral 354 of the Código Penal, when the public official uses services or work paid for by the Administration for those purposes. The foregoing is established without prejudice to the fact that, in the realization of the illicit conducts, the "benefit (provecho)" factor to which we have referred may arise, and which in most cases is coupled with their commission. Hence, in the cause before us, even if it had not been proven that Robles Macaya and the remaining defendants derived benefit for themselves or for third parties from their misappropriation acts, the figure of Peculado, for which they are later condemned and criminally sanctioned, is not denatured or distorted, insofar as it was sufficient for its configuration that the incriminated, in the performance of their functions, with full and absolute knowledge, directed their wills to misappropriate the public funds they administered by reason of their positions, one as general manager of the Bank – Robles Macaya – and the others as directors of the banking entity and managers of the business complex A.V.C., violating their duties of probity in the handling of state resources, framed within the laws and regulations that public officials are obligated to comply with in the performance of public functions. Despite the foregoing, according to the list of proven facts in the appealed judgment, although it is true the personal benefit of the defendants was not demonstrated, their actions lacking probity, focused on carrying out the different negotiations in Foreign Debt bonds, where they prioritized the yield of the investments over security, both in those attributed exclusively to the defendant Robles Macaya – cash purchases – and those for which the latter later shares responsibility with the remaining accused, allowed the economic benefit of the public funds to the company Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., which, as was demonstrated through accounting, had a profit of close to seventeen million dollars – US $17MM – from the total losses incurred by the banking entity, which was over fifty-seven million dollars – US $57MM – and which never had negotiable availability over those securities, which remained always in favor of ATF. [...] VI.- RECURSOS DE CASACIÓN [...] PRIMERA PARTE [...] First ground [...] The offense of Peculado, as the complainant rightly points out, presents as objective elements: the quality of public official of the agent; the action of subtracting or misappropriating; the "public" condition of the property or money subtracted or misappropriated by the agent; and that those goods or money, at the time of the commission of the offense, are under the administration, receipt or custody of the public official by reason of their position. The challenger, in support of his thesis about the absence of the material object of the action attributed to his clients – public property – who would act, from his perspective, under an error of type in reverse, substantially departs from the accredited factual framework, isolating the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries attributed to his clients as directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense, from the facts that preceded it and that constitute the so-called cash purchases of Costa Rican, Venezuelan and Brazilian Foreign Debt bonds; which, although it is true, at the level of criminal liability are only attributed to the General Manager of the banking entity, Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, were not unknown to the directors here accused, because it was precisely they, in the exercise of their positions, who authorized Robles Macaya to carry out the referred cash bond purchases, up to an amount of twenty million dollars $20MM – and tacitly accepted, without major reproach, that the aforementioned Robles Macaya exceeded the authorized amount for those purposes, coming to invest more than thirty-seven million dollars $37MM – with their absolute complacency. This knowledge of the petitioner's clients is of vital importance for determining the element of the objective criminal offense (tipo objetivo) of Peculado relative to the condition of public money or property as the material object of the imputed action, subsequently used by the accused in the purchase of the group of companies A.V.C., who had full cognitive domain over their character, insofar as they belonged to the Public Administration, coming from the state Bank in which they provided their services. According to the facts held as proven, those bonds acquired in cash by the BAC with its own economic resources, specifically those dated February 24 and May 10, both of 1993, serve to pay part of the price agreed upon for the sale of the related companies, by being exchanged for the shares of the A.V.C. complex; hence, contrary to what the challenger points out, the offense of Peculado attributed to his clients in this second phase of the criminal act does contain the material object of the action required for its configuration, which is the public condition of the property used for the questioned acquisition, without this circumstance being distorted by the lack of negotiable availability over the securities that the BAC had, which is precisely one of the factors influencing the illegality of the negotiations carried out by the defendants.

Consequently, the reverse mistake of fact alleged by the petitioner becomes non-existent, as it is inadmissible to think that the defendants, as members of the Board of Directors of the banking institution, acted under the belief that the assets used in the questioned purchase of the business complex were public because they belonged to the Bank, when they were not, lacking the element of ownership over such assets. Regarding this last aspect – ownership – it should be noted that all the negotiations with public funds attributed to the accused, in the three different stages of their involvement, indeed materialized, albeit within an already known environment of illegality, and part of the fraudulent conduct of the accused proven by the court was allowing the acquired bonds to remain at the disposal of ATF and not of BAC, hence the necessity that the negotiations be conducted with that financial entity and not with another, which increased the risk factor and the financial commitment of the banking entity, making it unacceptable for the accused to take advantage of the criminal deployment of their actions to now allege in their favor precisely the lack of availability to the Bank over the acquired securities that they themselves helped to cause. Contrary to what the appellant states, the judgment not only deemed proven the mere irregular or illegal acquisition of assets or monies by a public entity, but rather, adhering to the proven factual framework, the judges were able to verify, based on the evidentiary record examined, the diversion of public assets by the accused bank directors, both regarding the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, and in the subsequent leveraged purchases in External Debt, with full knowledge of their status as public officials, as well as of the origin of the monies and assets used and which they administered by reason of their position, violating their duties of probity to which they were obligated. [...] **VI.- CASSATION APPEALS [...]** **FIRST PART [...]** **Third ground.** The appellant claims the improper application of articles 57, 58, 71, 354 and 358 all of the Penal Code and the non-application of articles 1, 2 and 24, last part, of the same body of law; and article 39 of the Political Constitution, by convicting the accused of Peculado (embezzlement of public funds), in an act where the material object of the action, in the custody, receipt, or administration of a public official by reason of their position, does not exist. The petitioner indicates that the judgment held as true that the Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt bonds, which were exchanged for the shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, were deposited in the custody account of Ariana Trading and Finance at ING Bank and in its possession and ownership, and since the accused – Robles Macaya and the Board of Directors – are the public officials that the ruling considers involved in the illegal purchase of A.V.C. Valores and its subsidiaries, they could not draw on the ATF custody account nor could they order José Luis López Gómez, within the hierarchical chain of command, to draw on that account, therefore none of the accused had the custody, receipt, or administration of those bonds with which the exchange for shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries was made, which is an element required by article 354 of the Penal Code to configure the objective type, since the real administration, in the case of the bonds, was in the hands of ATF, and neither this, as a legal entity, nor José Luis López Gómez, as administrator of ATF, were public officials. Hence, in the appellant's opinion, the judgment makes the error of holding as true that the Board of Directors of Banco Anglo Costarricense and Robles Macaya had administration of the bonds, incurring a subsumption error, committed at the moment of verifying whether the conduct fits a criminal type, because it considers that over the bonds, which were in the power of a third party and not of a public official by reason of their position, the Board of Directors or Robles Macaya had administration of them by reason of their position, when no public official can have them if those bonds were not within an administrative sphere of custody, and the ATF account at ING Bank is evidently not an administrative sphere of custody. The appellant considers that in this situation the accused acted under the false belief that an element of the criminality of the offense of Peculado existed, namely the material object of the action, and it was not so, there being an absolute impossibility to consummate the unlawful act, that is, a reverse mistake of fact occurred, resulting in an impossible offense and therefore the charged act is unpunishable. The claim is not admissible. In what is of interest, the court refers to the arguments set forth when resolving the first of the grounds being challenged. According to the facts deemed proven, part of the illegal plan of the accused was to allow the bonds acquired with public funds to be in the name and at the disposal of Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. and not in the name and availability of the Bank, precisely to avoid the controls of the oversight entities and thus develop negotiations that were prohibited by the prevailing banking regulations, circumstances that were fully known by the accused as the ruling deemed proven, and which the appellant disregards. *To administer*, according to the Royal Spanish Academy, among other meanings means *"to direct an institution. To order, arrange, organize, especially the treasury or assets"* – Dictionary of the Spanish Language. Twentieth. Second edition. 2001. Madrid. Volume I, p.47 – Referred to the administration of public funds, to administer is to give the wealth entrusted to the public official the destination that the legislation provides aimed at achieving the common welfare that the State proposes. While it is true that one way of administering the assets of the public treasury is linked to their material possession by the official in charge by reason of their duties, this is not the only form of administration, as it can also be done by one who only maintains legal availability over said assets, as long as that administration came to the public official by reason of their duties. In the case at hand, the public funds used by the defendants in the different illegal operations carried out have their origin in the so-called cash purchases, which, even though they were only attributed to Robles Macaya, were carried out with the complacency and authorization of the remaining accused as bank directors, said public funds being under the administration of all the accused by reason of their respective positions, as they also were when making the leveraged purchases, since it was the Bank's financial resources that fed the A.V.C. companies to carry out the acquisitions in leveraged External Debt bonds, which is not invalidated by the fact that as collateral for the loans granted by ATF, the same purchased bonds remained in possession of the contracting financial entity, insofar as the fund-diverting actions were already consummated, it being sufficient that the public assets or monies, at the time the questioned negotiations were carried out, were under the administration of the accused by reason of the exercise of their positions, as indeed occurred. The ground is dismissed. [...] **VII. CASSATION APPEAL [...]** **Appeal on the merits.** ***First ground.*** The erroneous interpretation of articles 22, 76 and 77 in relation to 352 – now 354 – all of the Penal Code is claimed, as the trial court considered that in the first nine investments of external debt bonds acquired directly – without illegal financing – and in the purchase of the eight investments with illegal leverage of Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt, the embezzlements occurred in the modality of a continuing offense (delito continuado). The appellants consider that in the offense of Peculado, the protected legal interest is not property but rather probity in the exercise of the duties of public function, and therefore, the injury to property is not an objective, constitutive element of the applied criminal type, which is why this offense does not meet the requirements expressly stated in article 77 of the Penal Code, which is the affectation of property-related legal interests. For the appellants, the crimes committed by the accused occurred in a material concurrence of offenses (concurso material). The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office indicate that the doctrine establishes that the offense of Peculado does not specifically protect property as in other crimes, but rather the security of its allocation to the purposes for which it was created or gathered, and that it is characterized by the abnormal handling of assets by those who functionally have them in their charge, to make them fulfill their purpose or to preserve them for those purposes. They point out that in this case, the concurrence of offenses incurred by the accused are of the same kind, but do not affect a property-related legal interest, but rather, as they already indicated, probity in the exercise of the duties of public function, so each of the facts deemed accredited materially concur, requiring the corresponding penalties to be applied for each of the crimes committed. Thus, for the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, they request 10 years of prison for each of the nine offenses of Peculado – first 9 investments – for a total of ninety years of prison, as the perpetrator (autor), and as co-perpetrator (coautor), they request 10 years of prison for each of the eight offenses of Peculado related to the investments leveraged in Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt, for a total of eighty years, which globally totals the sum of one hundred seventy years of prison. For their part, the representation of the Public Prosecutor's Office requests for the accused Franz Amrhrein Pinto, Ronald Fernández Pinto, Carlos Manuel González Lizano, Carlos Enrique Osborne Escalante, Edwin Salazar Arroyo, and Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, the penalty of 10 years of prison for each of them as co-perpetrators of 7 offenses of Peculado for the leveraged investments, for a total of 70 years of prison for each of them. And for all the accused, the prosecuting entity requests five years of prison for the purchase of the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries. The claim is not receivable. In accordance with the facts deemed proven in the appealed judgment and the legal basis supported by the judges, despite their final error in the legal classification and the determination of the penalties imposed, to which we refer supra, we are faced with the concurrence of a plurality of actions carried out by the accused, but with characteristics of homogeneity in their mode of commission – offenses of the same kind – in the injury to the same protected legal interest and in the same pursued purpose, configuring a continuing offense of Peculado. While it is true that the figure of Peculado is systematically located within the offenses committed against the Duties of Public Function – Title XV, Section V of the Penal Code – the protected legal interest not being precisely property but the *public function*, translated into the *duty of probity* of the public official in the performance of their duties, so no property injury is necessarily required for the unlawful act to be configured, teleologically, because Peculado is a multi-offensive crime, the injury to property, although not indispensable, is frequently linked to its commission, consequently violating not only the duty of probity of the public official, but also property, understood as public money and assets. Therefore, contrary to what the appellants affirm, Peculado does allow the application of the continuing offense in the application of penalties, by reconciling the fundamental requirements established by article 77 of the Penal Code for its existence, said norm determining that for its applicability it is required that the offenses in concurrence be of the same kind and affect property-related legal interests and the agent pursue the same purpose; so that, in the case at hand, the facts relating to the nine cash purchases in External Debt attributed exclusively to the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, as well as the purchases, also of Latin American External Debt through illegal leverage, carried out through the business complex A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., attributed to all the accused – directors and general manager of Banco Anglo Costarricense – although it is true each one of them constitutes, by itself, an offense of Peculado, which materially concur with each other, for purposes of their legal classification and the punitive sanctions to be applied, they configure the continuing offense of Peculado, insofar as they constitute offenses of the same kind – Peculado – tending towards the same purpose, and affected, not only the duty of probity of the accused in the exercise of their public functions, but also property-related legal interests, the property damage that the illicit conduct developed by the accused from the second half of 1992 until the month of May 1994 caused to Costa Rican society being undeniably proven, damage that was produced not only from an economic perspective but also from a social perspective. In conclusion, regarding the injured property legal interest, the requirement established on this matter in the aforementioned norm containing the parameters on the penalty of the continuing offense was met, which cannot be interpreted restrictively in the sense that the only legal interest protected in the committed offense, whose penalty is applied by continuation, is property, because as has already been pointed out when resolving one of the grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the public defender Licenciado Rodolfo Solórzano Sánchez, the continuing offense will proceed, even when the acts of the continuation affect, besides property legal interests, other different interests. The foregoing considerations lead to the determination that, contrary to the appellants' claims, in this case we are not facing a material concurrence of offenses, insofar as, although it is true that the plurality of actions carried out by the accused that begins with the cash purchases of external debt, carried out by Robles Macaya representing Banco Anglo Costarricense and which culminates with the purchases made with illegal leverage materially executed by the manager Robles Macaya with the full authorization and knowledge of the remaining accused in their capacity as directors of the banking institution and administrators of the business complex A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. – Carlos Manuel González Lizano and Arturo Fallas Zúñiga –, constitute by themselves offenses of Peculado that concur in real form, as repeatedly stated by the trial court, echoing the theses held by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which they now disregard, this conglomerate of facts had to be evaluated integrally since each one of them was the antecedent of the following, and it is precisely this concatenation what imparts the character of factual, legal, and subjective homogeneity to the case in question, allowing, for purposes of the applicable penalty, recourse to the figure of the continuing offense in relation to the illegal act of Peculado, distinguishing it from the material concurrence, which will arise when any one of these three requirements is missing: offenses of the same kind that affect property-related legal interests and pursue the same purpose – in this regard see Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, page 93 – This Cassation Chamber has repeatedly ruled on the indispensable criteria to distinguish a continuing offense from a material concurrence of offenses, determining as a fundamental differentiating element the same purpose pursued by the author in relation to the legal interests being affected by their actions and that it be incompatible with the nature of the material concurrence – in this regard see Voto 769-F-96 of 10:30 a.m. on December 6, 1996, reiterated in resolution number 94-2000 of 8:45 a.m. on January 28, 2000. Third Criminal Chamber – This subjective criterion is complemented by doctrine with objective criteria; thus, the Argentine author Carlos Creus establishes that the linking of the different acts to the same "criminal enterprise" does not depend exclusively on the author's design, but on other circumstances of an objective nature *"that condition the adequacy of the different acts within that concept, such as the unity of the legal interest attacked, for which the analogy of the interests affected by the different acts will not suffice, but rather the identity of the holder ... and at least, that the material objects of the different acts can be considered components of a 'natural universality' ... But both dependency criteria must appear together so that one can speak of continuation..."* – *Derecho Penal Parte General*. Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1988, pages 241 and 242 – In the present case, the parameters of continuation are clearly defined, both objectively and subjectively, insofar as the accused, from the beginning of their dealings originating in the first contact Robles Macaya makes with the company Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. for the purpose of buying Costa Rican external debt securities from it, divert the public funds of Banco Anglo Costarricense, allowing third parties to negotiate the monies of the public treasury and obtain profits to the detriment of state interests, it being this contact with ATF that facilitates the subsequent proposal for BAC to acquire the company A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, violating the banking legislation in force and the controls of the public entities in charge of supervising such negotiations, and then, through the acquired business complex, carry out the illegal leveraged purchases, causing the economic debacle translated into the loss of more than fifty-seven million dollars and the closure of the oldest state bank in the country, such that, this plurality of acts, temporally discontinuous but dependent on each other, insofar as they pursued the same purpose, injured property-related legal interests of the same holder, Banco Anglo Costarricense, and turned out to be of the same kind – Peculado – converge, for purposes of the applied penalty, into a continuing offense and not into a material concurrence. For all the foregoing, the ground alleged by the appellants is declared without merit." **III. CASSATION APPEAL** [...] **PROCEDURAL APPEAL:** [...] **Eighteenth ground.** Violation of the rules of sound criticism (erroneous derivation): The violation of Articles 11, 27, 36, 39, and 41, all of the Political Constitution, is reproached; 1, 106, 144, 145, 392, 395, 396, 397, 400, 449, 471, 474, 476, 477, 482, and 483, the latter from the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, because, in the appellant's judgment, to find it proven that the monies used in the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. belonged to the Banco Anglo Costarricense and not to private companies, the court states that the investments were made by the cited banking entity and not by A.V.C., meaning the monies were public, its officials were also public, and the law applicable to such corporations (sociedades anónimas) is that of the Public Administration, a conclusion that, in his opinion, is erroneous. He points out that Almacén de Valores Comerciales A.V.C. was legally founded by Law No. 15 of October 15, 1934, authorized to operate in 1988 as a corporation (sociedad anónima) governed by private law. The appellant indicates, as the Constitutional Chamber points out, in the case at hand, one cannot conclude that the group of A.V.C. companies were public companies, because they belonged 100% to the Banco Anglo Costarricense, a state institution. And this is so because, in order to modify the defect, the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic had to be modified; that entity had no authority to supervise those companies, as the reform tacitly recognizes, since through Law 7428 of September 7, 1997, Articles 8 and 9, the possibility was granted for those companies to be classified as public and to supervise them, tacitly recognizing that they could not do so before. The claim is inadmissible. Upon examining the judgment under appeal, it is noted that the appellant starts from a premise that does not correspond to the merits of the case file, inasmuch as the judges never stated that, to find it proven that the monies used by A.V.C. belonged to the Banco Anglo Costarricense, the questioned investments were made by this banking entity and not by the acquired company. In reality, from the paragraph extracted by the petitioner, visible on folios 4827 and 4828, it is seen that the court indicated, not that the Banco Anglo Costarricense made the leveraged investments directly, but that it was not true, as the defendants estimated, that if the questioned investments were made through A.V.C., which was a private company, they did not require authorization from the Central Bank of Costa Rica, since A.V.C. was a subsidiary with 100% share participation of the banking entity. On the other hand, while it is true, as the appellant points out, that the A.V.C. company was created based on the General Law of Deposit Warehouses of 1934 and its operation as a corporation (sociedad anónima) was authorized by executive decree issued in 1988, given the inherent nature of a deposit warehouse, the constitutional case law to which the petitioner alludes – Vote 1106-95 at 10:27 a.m. on February 24, 1995, corresponding to an Amparo Appeal filed against the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – is not applicable, because what is alluded to in said resolution, as can be inferred from its full context, is a private entity concessionaire of a public right – the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – a situation that cannot be applied to A.V.C., which was a company that, although constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), presents a different nature – general deposit warehouse – although in practice it departed from the proper assumptions of a deposit warehouse. Thus, the Constitutional Chamber indicated on that occasion *“that the right of petition does not exist against private entities, and it is obvious that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, although it belongs primarily to a public institution, is itself a legal entity under private law exactly the same as all others, such that it could not be considered public either by reason of its owner, or by reason of the public interest involved in its activity...”* However, in this same resolution, the Constitutional Chamber hastens to indicate that notwithstanding the foregoing, it was necessary *“to make a distinction regarding entities that, being private, exercise a part of the administrative function of the State as concessionaires of a public service.”* It also pointed out that in this sense, these companies – concessionaires of a public service – are the inverse of the public companies referred to in Article 3.2 of the General Law of Public Administration. Said provision reads thus: *3.2: Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, by their overall regime and the requirements of their business, can be considered industrial or mercantile enterprises (empresas).* The Constitutional Chamber clarifies that the aforementioned article refers to those public enterprises (empresas) that, like the state commercial banks, are governed in their organization by public law, but in their activity by private law, while private enterprises (empresas) – it refers here to the concessionaires of public services – whether they are owned by private parties, or by the State or its public institutions, or even mixed ones, are organized and governed by private law – which is why they are excluded from the General Law of Public Administration – but in their activity as concessionaires of public services, they are exceptionally subject to public law and obliged to behave accordingly. The appellant, while citing the case law precedent, omits this last part, referring to the activity of the private enterprise (empresa), although we reiterate that the constitutional ruling refers specifically to the case of private enterprises (empresas) concessionaires of public services, this not being the case of A.V.C. However, for the topic of interest to us, what is salvageable from the Constitutional Chamber's resolution is the mention it makes of public enterprises (empresas públicas), especially state commercial banks, which in their organization are governed by public law and in their activity by private law, finding themselves included within the application assumptions of the General Law of Public Administration; consequently, if A.V.C. was 100% owned by the Banco Anglo Costarricense, even though it could be constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima) in its activity, because the Law of General Deposit Warehouses allowed it so, the public funds that fed it to carry out precisely the activities proper to an entity of such nature, continued under that quality, just as the source that originated them held it, and this is so, to the point that, just as the Constitutional Chamber also highlights in the ruling mentioned, private enterprises (empresas), such as the concessionaires of public services for example, in their activity, are also exceptionally subject to public law and obliged to behave in accordance with the guidelines of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, in the case at hand, considering the A.V.C. enterprises (empresas) as subsidiary entities of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, which is subject in its organization to public law, or from the perspective of a private enterprise (empresa) that provides public services, the subjection to provisions of public order persists for the former. [...] **III. CASSATION APPEAL [...] SUBSTANTIVE APPEAL [...] *Third ground.** * The erroneous application of the General Law of Public Administration – Articles 111, 112, and 113 – and the non-application of the case law of the Constitutional Chamber – Vote 1106-95 at 10:27 on February 14, 1995 – and of Law 3284 – Commercial Code – in its articles 102 to 233 – concerning corporations (sociedades anónimas) – is claimed. The appellant questions the fact held to be proven by the court in the sense that the monies used in the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. belonged to the Banco Anglo Costarricense, because the group of companies was 100% property of the banking entity, and that consequently, they were not private companies, with the court affirming that the investments were made by the Banco Anglo Costarricense and not by A.V.C. The appellant indicates that the Constitutional Chamber has established that companies like those that formed A.V.C. are not public but are governed by private law and are excluded from the General Law of Public Administration, it being that much later said provision was corrected by modification to the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic through Law 7428 of September 7, 1994, published in Gazette 210 of November 4, 1994, Articles 8 and 9, so that the Comptrollership could supervise them by considering them as public. The claim is inadmissible. We cannot fail to mention that the appellant, in his pleading, disregards the facts held to be proven by the court, which is inadmissible in a substantive appeal, altering, in any case, the same factual assumptions determined by the judges, because, as we pointed out when referring to the eighteenth ground of the appeal filed by this same petitioner – a ground for procedural defects – the judgment never indicates that the investments had been made by the Banco Anglo Costarricense and not by the Almacén de Valores, and it was always clear that A.V.C. was obviously a corporation (sociedad anónima), which was governed, in principle, by common commercial norms, as we will see later. On this topic, the arguments that were set forth earlier in the resolution of the indicated ground are reiterated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to reflect on a transcendental topic in the resolution of this case, referring to the legal nature of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries ABC Valores S.A.

and Boltec S.A., once they are acquired by the Banco Anglo Costarricense, and its determination as a company, constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), belonging 100% to a banking entity – a public entity – Certainly, the judges considered this last circumstance – the ownership status of the Bank – which is undoubtedly supported by the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, provided and analyzed, which allows for determining with complete accuracy that on May 24, 1993, the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, in session 44-5/93, held starting at 4:20 p.m., attended by all the defendants, ratified the closing offer signed by the defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, in his capacity as General Manager of the banking institution, with the fugitive co-defendant José Luis López Gómez, representative of the shareholders of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand dollars, through the mechanism of a swap of external debt bonds from Venezuela and Brazil, supposedly owned by the banking entity, at market value, for the shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. with its operating licenses or operating concessions, with A.V.C. also being the owner of 100% of the shares of Boltec S.A., ABC Valores S.A., and the building with its furniture and computer equipment. In said offer, it was established that the transaction was firm, definitive, and irrevocable, to be formalized the following day, Tuesday, May 25, 1993. Ratification that was approved in article 1 of the subsequent session of the banking entity's Board of Directors, number 45-5/93 of May 31, 1993, also attended by all the defendants, and on that same day, the accused Robles Macaya, based on the authorization granted by the directors in the cited session 44-5/93, effectively signed the purchase contract with José Luis López Gómez for the companies A.V.C. and its two subsidiaries, a purchase that was canceled as agreed in the closing offer, with the transfer in favor of the Banco Anglo Costarricense of all the shares – one thousand two hundred – In this way, the banking institution acquired the mentioned companies, becoming their 100% owner, that is, the sole partner of the corporation in which they were constituted. Having determined, therefore, that A.V.C. became, as of that date, a corporation (sociedad anónima), 100% owned by a state entity, it is necessary to elucidate whether said company conforms absolutely to the canons of private law and is considered exclusively a private company, or if, taking into account the ownership relationship that links it to the public entity, we could then speak of the existence of a public company. From a restricted perspective, we could conceptualize the public company according to the nature of the owner, such that the company will be private if its owner is private, and public if its owner is public. From a broader position, it could be stated that a company will be public if it serves as an instrument to achieve public ends, it being understood that this will occur in every case where the entrepreneur is a public administration, and furthermore, when, even being a private person, it is ultimately an instrument of action of a public administration – Murillo Arias, Mauro. “Ensayos de Derecho Público”. Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia. First edition. San José, Costa Rica. 1988, page 106 – This conceptualization of the public company leads us to determine the types of public companies doctrinally accepted: a) the public company-organ: dependent on a public entity without legal personality, for example the Fábrica Nacional de Licores; b) the public company-institution: which are autonomous legal institutions or not, with a business purpose, for example: the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS), and the Banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional; c) the companies-societies – see Ortiz Ortiz, Eduardo. “La empresa Pública como ente público”. Revista Ivstitia, number 52. Year 5. April 1991, page 12 – Within this last type of public company-society, a theoretical distinction is made between so-called “sociedades del Estado” when they belong entirely to the State, and corporations (sociedades anónimas) with majority state participation, *and general deposit warehouses (almacenes generales de depósito) can be placed within the type of public companies-societies*. In order to introduce the legal possibility for commercial banks to form corporations (sociedades anónimas) – by creation or participation – that allow them to carry out the public purposes for which they have been constituted, including such corporations as general deposit warehouses (almacenes generales de depósito), we must remember first that the commercial banks that make up the Sistema Bancario Nacional constitute autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal status and independence in administrative matters, and with their own responsibility in the execution of their functions, emanating from their boards of directors, whose members are obliged to act according to their own judgment in the direction and administration of the bank, in accordance with constitutional, legal, regulatory, and technical provisions, and must be accountable for their management – article 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional – The essential functions of the Commercial Banks are: *to collaborate in the execution of the monetary, exchange, credit, and banking policy of the Republic; to ensure the liquidity, solvency, and proper functioning of the Sistema Bancario Nacional; in the case of the State banks, to safeguard and administer the banking deposits of the community and to prevent the existence of idle means of production in the country, seeking out the producer to put at his service the economic and technical means available to the System* – article 3 of the same legal body – Along with these functions, commercial banks are subject to a series of prohibitions, established by the same Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, among them, *participating directly or indirectly in agricultural, industrial, commercial, or any other type of enterprise, and purchasing products, merchandise, and real estate that are not indispensable for their normal operation* – article 73. 3 ibid – in application of the principle of specialty contained in numeral 61 of the same law, which subjects public companies, circumscribing them to their corporate purpose, except when a law so permits, prima facie, as stated by the Procuraduría General de la República in its Report C-014-2001 dated January 19 of that year, the guidelines of which, insofar as they interest us, we share: *“... public entities are not authorized to create corporations (sociedades anónimas) due to the risk that such creation implies. Hence, the creation of companies by public enterprises requires, in principle, legal authorization. It is the legislator who must establish the rules for the creation of these companies and their operation...”* This legal authorization we mention is found embodied in the very article 73 already cited, which contains the exception to such prohibitions of participation, exempting banks that might have participation in the capital of public or semi-public financial institutions that might be created, and exempting those banks that established general deposit warehouses (almacenes generales de depósito), in accordance with the respective law, or that, on the date of the enactment of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, already had participation in them, solely with respect to the transactions and operations resulting from the functioning of such warehouses, also exempting those cases in which the commercial banks of the State, jointly or separately, constitute or employ juridical persons of their exclusive ownership for the provision of services for themselves, with prior authorization from the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or for the administration of assets awarded in judgment. Likewise, specifically regarding general deposit warehouses (almacenes generales de depósito), their legal authorization for the public company – commercial bank – to create or constitute them, is found in numeral 48 of the Ley de Almacenes Generales de Depósito, number 15 of October 15, 1934, which allows Commercial Banks domiciled in the country to establish and maintain General Deposit Warehouses in those places where they have not been established by private initiative within the first six months of the validity of this law; a premise also included in numeral 115 of the cited Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional when it indicates that commercial banks may freely establish General Deposit Warehouses, which shall be governed according to the provisions of the law on the matter, as well as execute similar operations of storing products and merchandise in their own warehouses. This legal authorization, as it pertains to the Banco Anglo Costarricense, is materialized through the known Acuerdo Ejecutivo number 16-H of February 27, 1974, which allowed the banking institution to operate as a general deposit warehouse (almacén general de depósito) and a fiscal warehouse (almacén fiscal). Doctrinally, by definition, it is understood that *general deposit warehouses (almacenes generales de depósito) are those dedicated to the conservation and custody of all types of merchandise of lawful commerce, contributing to the greater circulation of wealth by means of the warrants they issue for said merchandise* – on this matter see: Espejo de Hinojosa, Ricardo. *Curso de Derecho Mercantil.* Barcelona. Eighth Edition. 1931; a concept that our Ley de Almacenes Generales de Depósito of 1934 includes in its article 1 when it states that *the General Deposit Warehouses are credit institutions whose object is the conservation and custody of fruits, products, and merchandise of national or foreign origin, the issuance of certificates of deposit and pledge bonds, and the granting of loans secured by the same.* Having thus established the legal possibility that the Banco Anglo Costarricense had to acquire a General Deposit Warehouse, and therefore to purchase A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., within the proper guidelines of a warehouse of this nature in accordance with the current legislation on the matter, which did not occur, as is evident from the entirety of the judgment rendered, a legal possibility that does not necessarily imply that this latter acquisition, as indeed resulted, conformed to legal canons, the status of absolute owner of the banking entity over the acquired corporation (sociedad anónima) is inferred. While this corporation is configured or organized within the prerequisites of private law, the activity it provides becomes public, although it retains its own legal personality. As the Procuraduría General de la República stated in its Report C-012-93 dated January 20, 1993, despite constituting an asset of the Bank, it does not merge or subsume with the juridical person that is its owner – the public entity – although the latter, constituted in a shareholders' meeting, can decide all types of measures that allow it to be informed about the results of the Warehouse's actions, as well as control its operation and finances. It was indicated in that same report that since the General Deposit Warehouse is a “credit institution,” as provided by numeral 1 of its respective law, the Auditoría General de Entidades Financieras – AGEF – and today the Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras, was empowered to exercise the controls provided for by the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, which already outlines for us, although it does not openly express, the public nature of the general deposit warehouse (almacén general de depósito) of which a commercial bank, as a public entity, is the owner. Although it is true, this last circumstance – the control of the AGEF over the deposit warehouse – was reconsidered by the same Procuraduría years later, in report C-067-98 of April 14, 1998, subjecting them not to the AGEF or SUGEF but to the Internal Audit of the banking entity, this is because it is considered that the Deposit Warehouses, despite being empowered to grant loans, are not “financial entities” since they do not carry out financial intermediation, understood as intervention in the market by capturing monetary resources and placing them through credit operations and other financial types, and this is so within a pure conception of a deposit warehouse according to the legislation governing it. However, as was demonstrated in the judgment, despite the defendants, with full knowledge on the matter, proclaiming the idea that the negotiation with A.V.C. and its subsidiaries was intended to function as a deposit warehouse, even though within their commercial scope they could operate as a securities clearinghouse (central de valores), as authorized by numeral 36 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, since it could carry out non-banking activity, the A.V.C. business complex did not function as a deposit warehouse, but rather as a financial company, and therefore from that perspective, it should have been controlled by the AGEF. It is appropriate to clarify that Report C-067-98 of the Procuraduría, regarding the concept of financial intermediation, is based on article 116 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central number 7558 of November 3, 1995, subsequent to the acts charged, so it does not strictly apply to the particular case. However, the pronouncement of the state body brings us to the central theme we are developing here, regarding the possibility of considering A.V.C. as a public company, despite its constitution as a corporation (sociedad anónima) subject in principle to common commercial prerequisites, with the ownership aspect of the banking body in relation to the constituted company remaining relevant. Thus, Doctor Antonio Sobrado González, at that time Procurador Fiscal, established *“...that by having the Bank fully subscribed the share capital of the corporation (sociedad anónima) that administers the general deposit warehouse (almacén general de depósito), both form a business unit...”* – emphasis ours – understood as *“... the organization of capital and work intended for the production or mediation of goods or services for the market ...”* – Broseta Pont, Manuel. “La empresa, la unificación del Derecho de Obligaciones y el Derecho Mercantil”. Madrid, Tecnos, 1965, page 274 – *since “the warehouse operates under the tutelage of the owning bank and at the service of its economic interests.”* This assertion is fully shared by this Casation Chamber, given that it rests on the current doctrine on the subject; thus, Doctor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, in his aforementioned essay “La empresa pública como ente público,” when analyzing the nature of the corporations (sociedades anónimas) that are constituted by public companies, affirms that between the public entity and the company a relationship of instrumentality subsists, since the public company will achieve its purposes through the constituted commercial enterprise, and if, in addition, the public entity retains all or the majority of the shares of that corporation (sociedad anónima), it can manage it according to its policies and plans, transforming it into an instrument for achieving its purposes, thereby turning the created corporation (sociedad anónima) and its activity into public. Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, the Banco Anglo Costarricense, a public entity classifiable within the category of public company-institution, legally empowered, acquires a deposit warehouse – A.V.C. and its subsidiaries Boltec S.A. and ABC Valores S.A. – constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), which, due to its instrumental nature, must develop a public service activity, consequently responding to the public purposes of the banking institution that is its 100% owner of the subscribed share capital and therefore the sole partner of that corporate entity, even though it does not exercise properly banking activities. In such a way that said deposit warehouse, once acquired by the banking entity, becomes a public company-society or sociedad del Estado and therefore with an eminently publicistic nature, which affects its activity, the regulation of which would also be public – Ley de Almacén General de Depósito – because both the Acuerdo Ejecutivo that authorized the Banco Anglo Costarricense to operate the General Deposit and Fiscal Warehouse in 1974, and the Decreto Ejecutivo number 44-88 that authorized the operation of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. as a General Deposit Warehouse so ordered, subjecting them to the Law on the matter, its regulation, and related Laws, as we specified when resolving the previous grounds. But in the activity related to buying and selling securities, with the economic resources coming from the banking entity, A.V.C. had to be subject to the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, from the very moment that it functionally presented itself as a securities clearinghouse (central de valores), an activity that, as a deposit warehouse, was permitted by numeral 36 of the cited Law, as determined lines above. The instrumental nature of said deposit warehouse in relation to the banking institution allowed the latter, which was the one financially supporting the corporation (sociedad anónima), to participate competitively in the market indirectly; and this close relationship between the public entity – BAC – and the corporate entity – A.V.C. – is recognized by the defendants themselves, which is evident when the appellant's own client, in session 43 of A.V.C. Panama, held at 10:30 a.m. on October 18, 1993, in his capacity as General Manager of the business complex, expressly stated that the existing link between the group of companies and the BAC could not be separated, as it was convenient for it to be perceived in the market as complementary. But there would be an important aspect to consider in the instrumental role of the deposit warehouse in relation to the banking entity, and that is the fact that, by amendment to the articles of incorporation (pacto constitutivo) of A.V.C., the defendants established that to be a member of the Board of Directors of A.V.C., one necessarily had to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, losing such status when one ceased to be a director of the banking body. This would allow us to affirm that the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense set the policies of A.V.C., and as stated by the Procuraduría General de la República in Report C-070-2001 of March 13, 2001, *“by definition, the shareholders' assembly of the new company is the owning entity itself through its superior body, but moreover, this determination is heightened if the relationship is now produced not only through the Shareholders' Assembly but through an identity in the status of director of the public entity and director of the instrumental entity...”* In the cause before us, this situation, which in a normal exercise of the activities proper to a general deposit warehouse (almacén general de depósito) would not cause suspicion, took a different turn, as indicated by the trial court, when this circumstance allowed the defendants to close the circle of control over their illicit activity, insofar as from the very origin of the leveraged purchases of external debt, through which the public funds belonging to the Banco Anglo Costarricense were diverted, which is the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, their purpose and objectives were contrary to the existing banking legislation, aspects that the defendants were fully aware of, which did not inhibit them from continuing in their strategy, which resulted in the known economic debacle. As a foundation for the instrumental nature of the corporate entity, controlled and directed by the State, in this case the banking entity, as sole partner, the author Vittorio Ottaviano in his essay “Sometimiento de la Empresa Pública al Derecho Privado,” a collective work titled “La empresa Pública,” Publications of the Real Colegio de España in Bologna, 1970, pages 273 and 275, cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the mentioned essay, points out: *“... when the enterprise is developed by an economic entity, that entity, in turn, will be public to the extent that it is linked to another entity holding the public purposes connected to the enterprise. That is to say: the public nature of the economic entity will be in relation to its position of dependence on another entity ... or, if one prefers, with its instrumental nature...”* On this same subject, Luigi Ferri, an Italian commercial law expert, indicates that *“... the screen of the commercial company barely serves to conceal this reality, if one bears in mind that where a 'prevalent participation' exists, the corporate instrument falls into the hands of the State and is subject to the service of its ends...”* and moreover, said author, also cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, points out that *“... to say that since the entity (the company) is private, the hacienda also remains private, is to remain voluntarily on the surface without delving into the reality of the phenomenon, which implies, in substance, an expansion of the public sphere at the expense of the private one, and consequently, a restriction of the scope in which private autonomy operates...”* – Ferri, Luigi. “Impresiones de un jurista sobre las haciendas con participación estatal predominante.” Collective work “La Empresa Pública” cited, volume 2, page 1570 – which outlines for us an aspect of transcendental importance in the cause before us, which is the determination, as the trial court considered, of the public status of the assets negotiated by the defendants through the A.V.C. business complex. We must recall here the concept of State shareholding dominion in these corporations (sociedades anónimas), such that, even when their constitution is under this model, applying private law, the condition of sole or majority partner of the public entity *“...makes it impossible to apply common commercial law, and the corporation (sociedad anónima) in question begins to function rather as a public dependency...”* – Ortiz Ortiz, op cit, page 6 – This Chamber fully shares the approach of Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, since certainly, the considerations of “ownership” by the State of the created corporation (sociedad anónima), the “public interest” that animates its formation, and the “public purpose” of its management, prevent an unrestricted application of common commercial norms, and we begin to observe this from the very moment of the creation of the corporate entity, from the quantitative perspective of the partners. In these companies that, like A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., belong one hundred percent to the State through the public banking entity, we find a *sole partner*, in contrast to numeral 104 of the Código de Comercio, which requires for the formation of a corporation (sociedad anónima) the existence of at least two partners and that each of them subscribe at least one share – subsection a) – which also has an impact on the chapters referring to shareholding participation. So, for these reasons alone, we could not apply the Código de Comercio in an unrestricted manner, as the defense of the defendant González Lizano intends, in the considerations relating to this Warehouse of Securities, and our position is based on the doctrine of practically all latitudes; thus, it has been indicated that *“the internal legal regime of public economic establishments is determined by Public Law, especially regarding the relations between the decentralized entity and the central administration... given the presence of the State in these companies (with a single public partner), a series of derogations to the regime and structure of commercial companies arise, which lead to the conclusion that the applicability of commercial law norms cannot be total and complete. In the first place, because some special provisions that regulate these companies establish numerous express derogations to the regime of corporations (sociedades anónimas); for example, and among others that we will see, the plurality of partners disappears, and the non-transferability of the State's shares is generally established, as well as external control of the company itself. But furthermore, the fact that a public entity is a shareholder and the fact that it is the sole partner makes the legal regime of corporations (sociedades anónimas) or limited liability companies inapplicable in many cases, since bodies disappear and some essential requirements are lacking”*... Brewer Carías, Allan R. “Las Empresas Públicas en el Derecho Comparado.” Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, 1967, pages 115 and 116 – Our national doctrine also maintains this same line of thought; thus, Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the essay commented on points out that the commercial law applied to companies that are entirely owned by the State, or by the State in their majority, is then a modified or special one, with the inevitable predominance of the interest and position of the State or the owning public entity, which is heightened when analyzing the regime of internal relations between the public entity shareholder and owner – or dominant partner – and the society in question, by virtue of that same preponderance – Op cit page 7 – Finally, on this subject, one might ask the reasons why a public entity, based on legislation authorizing it, creates or participates in private entities formed under the model of private companies, if it will not have the characteristics and advantages of one of such a nature. However, the answer is found in the business flexibility and capacity that allow for executing the purposes that the public entity has proposed. On this matter, since 1984, analyzing the appropriateness of corporations (sociedades anónimas) and their consideration with respect to the public company, the Sala Primera Civil of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, in vote 46-1984, insofar as it interests us, stated: *“... the legislator's reliance on the legal form of bodies of a private structure for carrying out certain business activities with State participation has its reason for being. This has been designed to grant the company's management the appropriate degree of executive capacity, flexibility, elasticity, and business capability, and to obtain a mixed participation and collaboration suitable for the direct and indirect ends sought in certain cases...”* From all the foregoing, the importance that the issue relating to the property of the state entity as sole partner of the corporate enterprise will have in the consideration of the corporation (sociedad anónima) formed by a public entity is inferred, as well as its public interest and therefore the instrumental character of the company and the public purpose pursued. It is for this reason that we respectfully disagree with some of the considerations issued by the Sala Constitucional in vote number 1106-95 of 10:27 a.m. on February 24, 1995 – the non-application of which is claimed by the appellant – regarding the interpretation of some concepts, especially insofar as it downplays the importance of the circumstances related to “property and public interest” in those companies linked in their constitution to a state entity, a jurisprudential precedent, regarding which the appellant reproaches its non-application by the court that issued the judgment before us. It is appropriate to clarify the scope of a vote issued by the Sala Constitucional, regarding its mandatory compliance, or when it involves mere opinions or legal considerations on a specific subject.

Thus, its application will be *erga omnes* for the specific situation for which the intervention of the high constitutional court is being raised, or it may be applied to situations similar to the one addressed by the jurisdictional pronouncement. However, for other situations that do not maintain a relationship of identity with the case in question, a precedent of this nature must be analyzed with special care, within the integral perspective in which it was issued, so as to allow its application in diverse circumstances that are not strictly related to what was decided, such that the assessments of the Constitutional Chamber that constitute opinions or legal interpretations of a specific matter are not binding, and therefore, in that sense, their mandatory application is not imposed, as the appellant intends in this case. It is now appropriate to analyze the cited jurisprudential precedent, which refers to an *amparo* action filed against the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, a public service concessionaire company, which, even though it also constitutes a corporation dependent on a public entity, maintains a different nature from that of a general deposit warehouse, such as A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., and here we would have a first fundamental difference when requesting its *erga omnes* application; hence the ruling issued was of mandatory compliance for the case in question and perhaps for other similar situations, in matters of *amparo* concerning public service concessionaire companies, but not for the case before us, so there would be no obligation binding the judges of the trial court or this Court of Cassation to apply the cited resolution. The remaining considerations contained in the issued vote are understood as simple legal analyses, not binding, for which reason this Chamber, within the approach followed on the matter brought to our knowledge, even though it considers some of its arguments of interest, which we take into consideration when deciding the cassation ground previously indicated, allows itself to disagree on other aspects, insofar as, as we stated supra, while it is true that corporations, when they are majority-owned by a public institution, constitute "in principle" a legal entity of private law, they cannot maintain a treatment similar to any other private law entity, formed solely by private individuals, injected with private capital, and strictly fulfilling private purposes, because the idea that the State could form a commercial company as the sole partner or participate in it in a majority manner, through acts or contracts of the same characteristics and scope as those of a company subscribed between private individuals, becomes inadmissible. For this reason, contrary to what the Constitutional Chamber indicates in the commented vote regarding such considerations, in our view, supported by national and international doctrine, within a Comparative Law analysis, as well as by the regulations that govern us, determining the ownership character of the state entity over the formed corporation, its public interest, and the also public purposes that govern them, is indeed of considerable importance, because the opposite would be to contribute to the establishment of a dangerous precedent so that, using the mechanism of creating private entities, without greater oversight, the public entities that form them could divert or misappropriate the assets of the public treasury that financially nourish these private companies. And such considerations are logical because we can already anticipate that from this perspective, the nature of the assets that constitute, on the one hand, the share capital of the corporation belonging to the public entity, as well as the resources injected by it into the corporate enterprise, as occurred between the Banco Anglo Costarricense and A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., cannot be other than public as well. Hence, the eminent publicist Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz rightly indicated with absolute forcefulness that, once the public enterprise status of the corporation formed by the public entity whose sole or majority shareholder is the State is established, an immediate consequence of the public character of the corporation as an enterprise, as well as of its activity as a public service, is the also public character of its assets, which cannot be administered internally as if they were private – Op cit page 10 – which he bases on a jurisprudential citation from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote number 98 of 14:30 hours on July 30, 1985, which, in its relevant part, states: <i>"Nationalized companies formed with State capital retain their public character, however much their organization and operation is subject to Private Law, for even though legally the assets belong to the enterprise, it cannot be ignored that to the extent these assets deteriorate, the capital represented by the shares is affected, and that, consequently, the State's assets are harmed to that same extent. It should be added that, for these same reasons, the State has an interest in the correct functioning of these enterprises."</i> This consideration regarding the public nature of the assets that make up the patrimonial wealth of a corporation whose sole shareholder is the State finds echo in some regulatory provisions, through Executive Decrees, in force at the time the facts that concern us occurred, where the public nature of the funds or resources administered by state enterprises when they operate as commercial companies is determined without any doubt or interpretation. Thus, on the occasion of the creation of the Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo – CODESA – it was determined through Decreto Ejecutivo 7927-H dated January 12, 1978, that the Executive Branch, deeming it convenient that in the case of this type of enterprise, constituted with the characteristics of a corporation, governed by the Law that creates them in the first place, their regulations, and supplementarily by the Commercial Code, have a minimum framework of legality that regulates essential aspects of their activity and at the same time be subject to oversight by the Contraloría General de la República, considers it necessary to legislate in this field, given the deep concern about the consequences that could arise from the lack of decision-making on this matter, for which reason, while the reference legislation is promulgated, it deems it prudent to issue a set of provisions via regulation that provide greater security for the correct administration of the resources managed. This Decree was modified by another similar one, number 14666-H of May 9, 1983; however, no variation was made to the determination as public of the assets that make up the assets of these particular enterprises, of a nature similar in terms of their formation to that of the general deposit warehouse. And this cannot be otherwise for the sake of protecting state public funds, as we indicated supra. Having determined the character of the assets administered by these sui generis corporations, such considerations also allow us to affirm that the directors of a public enterprise, as occurs in the case before us with the firm A.V.C., as a corporation of a public entity – Banco Anglo Costarricense – which is its sole shareholder, are public officials precisely because they are the heads of said corporate entity, and this in accordance with articles 111, 112, and 113 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, whose non-observance the petitioner reproaches. Thus, article 111.1 of the cited law establishes that <i>"a public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or in the name and on behalf thereof, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of the representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity"</i> – emphasis is ours – In the case before us, A.V.C., as we have been arguing, once it was acquired by the Banco Anglo Costarricense, participating in 100% of its share capital, becomes a public enterprise and therefore is part of the Administration, and the accused, as its directors, providers of a service to the Administration, are public servants for being the heads of the enterprise, which constitutes a principle of Public Law relating to public enterprises. Thus, <i>"administrative doctrine indicates that the fact that Administrative Law is not applied to these entities, in whole or in part, does not mean that they are not part of the Administrative Organization, since the connection with the state organization is maintained, their instrumental character regarding the same remaining"</i> – Alonso Ureba Alberto. "La Empresa Pública". Montecorvo, Madrid, 1985, page 299, cited by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in his aforementioned essay – in such a way that, interpreting the scope of cited article 111.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a public servant will be one who provides an activity to the Public Administration even when this does not maintain an imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character, or the activity deployed is private or by simple contracting, a case within which is found the director of the corporation of which the State is its sole owner, whose primary work is neither imperative nor subject in principle to Public Law, given the nature of the corporate entity he directs. Such considerations do not appear contradictory to the premises contained in numerals 111.3 and 112.2 of the same Ley General de la Administración Pública, for within an integrated logic of both norms, it is noted that such provisions apply only to subordinate public servants and not to the heads who exercise management duties; and this is so because the first of the cited numerals indicates that employees of State enterprises or economic services in charge of operations subject to common law will not be considered public servants – 111.3 – also determining that service relationships with workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the previous article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law. Regarding this type of subordinate employee, this Chamber considers that those who exercise administration and oversight work within the public enterprise that, formed as a corporation, belongs to the public entity, cannot be taken into consideration, because such officials – managers, deputy managers, and comptrollers – do participate in the public management of the Administration insofar as, during the performance of their duties, they form part of the decision-making of the corporate enterprise, even when they do not have the right to vote within the Board of Directors sessions, but do have the right to voice, which allows them to express their opinions and generate a determined trend in decision-making, or they administer the public funds injected by the state entity, being the direct and principal executing arm of the Board of Directors of the corporate entity, with management and hierarchical capacity – manager and deputy manager – over the other command levels of the enterprise – employees, workers, and laborers – In any case, within our legislation, even the servants contained in numerals 111.3 and 112.2 of the cited Law, for criminal purposes, are deemed public. – article 112.4 ibidem – and this is so <i>"... to prevent the servant who works for a State enterprise from taking advantage of his special condition and being able to make undue use of the public assets of the enterprise... which is fully adjusted to the constitutional parameter, in consideration of the interests it protects, which are: administrative morality and legality and the protection of public assets ..."</i> – see Voto number 6520-96 of 15:09 hours on December 3, 1996. Constitutional Chamber – hence, in the case before us, all the accused maintain the status of public officials, the funds that the banking entity to which A.V.C. belonged injected into it so it could carry out its functions, including purchases leveraged in external debt bonds, also being public. These are essential elements for the determination of the criminal type of Peculado (Embezzlement) for which they were convicted. For all the foregoing, the invoked ground is dismissed. [...] **III. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO [...] *Quinto motivo.* ** Claim is made of erroneous application of article 77 of the Penal Code – regarding the continued offense – because from what the court held as proven, it is established that the companies were purchased with the purpose of venturing into investment banking and buying external debt securities, so a continued offense is not formed, insofar as within the so-called third phase of the judgment, the purchase of the A.V.C. group of companies should have been included and not separated as was done, because the penalty is firstly higher and the law itself indicates that the premises of the continued offense will be applied when the offenses are of the same kind – embezzlement – and affect patrimonial legal interests – funds of the Banco Anglo Costarricense – and the same purpose is pursued – venturing into investment banking and buying external debt securities – In the appellant's opinion, the purchase of the group of companies should be subsumed into what the court called the third phase, which were the leveraged purchases starting from June 27 until February 1994, because together with what was described in the previous phase, the second phase pursued the same end as indicated by law, and therefore the former must be subsumed into the latter and, applying the rules of joinder, reduce the penalty to five years, which was the sanction imposed for the purchase. The claim is partially admissible. In accordance with the facts held as proven, as the court indicated, the cause in question must be analyzed globally and chronologically, since each fact turns out to be the antecedent of the next – volume 16 of the judgment, folio 4511 – the judges specifying that this was so even though the actions carried out did not form a single act, but rather each factual circumstance constituted in itself an offense of Embezzlement, dividing the accredited facts, for a better understanding, into three phases they called: First: cash purchases, attributed solely to the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya; Second: the purchase of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries Boltec S.A. and ABC Valores S.A., where both Robles Macaya and the members of the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense were accused, including the defendant Carlos Manuel González Lizano; Third: leveraged purchases of Latin American External Debt, attributed to all the accused – Robles Macaya and the Board of Directors of the banking entity – However, despite the foregoing, at the moment of the legal classification of the facts and the establishment of the penalties to be imposed, the court separates the phases and classifies the facts regarding Robles Macaya as two offenses of Embezzlement in the modality of a continued offense – for the first and third phases – plus another offense of Embezzlement – second phase – these three illicit acts being materially joined, for which it imposed, by reason of the two continued offenses of Embezzlement, ten years of imprisonment for each, and for the other offense five years of imprisonment, for a total of 25 years. For its part, for each of the members of the Board of Directors, it classified the facts against them as one continued offense of Embezzlement – 7 leveraged purchases (third phase) – materially joined with another offense of Embezzlement – purchase of A.V.C. (second phase) – imposing on each a penalty of ten years for the first illicit act and five years for the second, for a total of fifteen years of imprisonment. Such form of legal classification and punitive sanction, as the appellant rightly pointed out regarding his client Carlos Manuel González Lizano, accused in the second and third phases, is shown to be erroneous, because within the approach developed by the judges, from a congruent and logical perspective, the criminal conducts attributed to all the accused and held as proven must be linked into a single illicit act of Embezzlement in the modality of a continued offense, "where each fact is the antecedent of the next" and insofar as the objective and subjective premises established in numeral 77 of the Penal Code that contemplates its penalty are met. The commented norm indicates that "when the offenses in joinder are of the same kind and affect patrimonial legal interests, provided that the agent pursues the same purpose, the penalty provided for the most serious shall be applied, increased by up to another equal amount." In the case before us, the court considered on one hand that the accredited facts each constituted the offense of continued Embezzlement, which this Court of Cassation shares, because in effect, the premises that make up said figure relative to the application of the penalty are determined; thus, we are faced with offenses of the same kind – embezzlement – that affect patrimonial legal interests; regarding this aspect, we must clarify that while it is true that Embezzlement does not contain assets as its fundamental legal interest, being an offense committed against the Duties of Public Function, referring to the duty of probity on the part of the public official in the performance of his duties, regarding the goods or monies he administers, receives, or guards by reason of his office; however, because Embezzlement is a multi-offensive crime, the possible concurrence of a patrimonial injury derived from the criminal conduct carried out by the active subject – public official – translated into the misappropriation or diversion of the money or goods, whose administration, receipt, or custody was entrusted to him by reason of his office, is also undeniable. Consequently, the requirement established in numeral 77 of the Penal Code being the affectation of patrimonial legal interests, this does not imply that the offense subject to continuation has assets as its sole legal interest, because <i>"the continued offense can exist, even if the acts of continuation – which must violate the same norm – affect, in addition to patrimonial legal interests, another legal interest"</i> – Castillo González, Francisco. El concurso de Delitos en el Derecho Penal Costarricense, page 98 – Finally, in the present case, we are faced with a continued offense of Embezzlement, insofar as the accused, including Mr. González Lizano, pursued with their illicit activity one same purpose, which was, as deduced from the accredited facts, the carrying out of illegal purchases of External Debt, allowing Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. to use the public funds for its benefit, paving the way for subsequent negotiations with this company, which culminated, with the concurrence of all the members of the Board of Directors of the banking entity, in the illegal purchase of the oft-mentioned Almacén de Valores Comerciales and its subsidiaries and the subsequent acquisition of Latin American external debt, internationalizing the public funds of the Banco Anglo Costarricense through the creation of the Anglo American Bank in order to avoid the controls of the state entities supervising this type of operations. In the present case, the premise relating to one same purpose is presented independently of the structuring that the court gave to the facts by dividing them into the three phases, insofar as, within the common purpose harbored by the accused, all the actions deployed by the accused to execute the common plan were combined – in that same sense, Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, page 102 – Along this line of thought, as the petitioner indicated, the purchase of the A.V.C. group of companies by the Banco Anglo Costarricense – second phase – carried out with the concurrence of all the accused, some as directors of the banking entity and the other – Robles Macaya – as General Manager of said institution, must be appreciated and valued within a continued perspective, together with the subsequent leveraged purchases of Latin American external debt that were carried out precisely through the acquired business complex – third phase – said plurality of actions being sanctioned as a single offense of Embezzlement. Despite the foregoing, the judges, as we mentioned supra, notwithstanding that they considered that the cause should be analyzed globally, classified each of the phases into which they structured the accredited factual framework separately, subsequently joining them through the premises of real joinder, although they stated they were applying the penalty for the continued offense. Such inconsistency becomes unacceptable; however, it is not pertinent to accede to the claims of Licenciado Solórzano Sánchez, who requests that a penalty of five years of imprisonment be applied to his client as a co-perpetrator of the continued offense of Embezzlement. Indeed, while it is true that the court considered the defendant Carlos Manuel González Lizano as a co-perpetrator of the illicit act of Embezzlement for the purchase of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, for which he was imposed a term of five years of imprisonment, and as a perpetrator of the offense of Embezzlement – translated into the seven leveraged purchases of external debt – in the modality of a continued offense, imposing on him a term of five years of imprisonment as the principal penalty, increased by another equal amount for a total of ten years, the overall punitive sanction being fifteen years according to the rules of material joinder, such classification and punitive application is not shared by this Chamber, for which reason the ruling is modified, as will be stated. Coinciding with what was pointed out by Doctor Francisco Castillo González, when responding to the Recurso de Casación filed by the representatives of the Ministerio Público, the penalty applied by the judges in this cause does not fit the premises of the continued offense of Embezzlement. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 352 (currently 354) of the Penal Code, first paragraph, the public official who misappropriates or diverts money or goods whose administration, receipt, or custody was entrusted to him by reason of his office shall be punished with imprisonment from three to twelve years. For its part, article 77 ibidem fixes the penalty of the continued offense indicating that "...the penalty provided for the most serious shall be applied – the emphasis is not from the original – increased by up to another equal amount." This implies that, for the purposes of the penalty in abstracto, which is the first that must be defined, in the case of the continued offense of Embezzlement, the judge must determine it between the minimum and maximum limits *provided* for said illicit act – which in this case is the only one that manifests in continuation – that is, between three and twelve years of imprisonment, being able to increase it by up to another equal amount, such that the maximum penalties that can be applied range between 6 and 24 years of imprisonment. Once the penalty in abstracto is established, the judge will proceed to determine the punitive sanction in concreto between these last two limits, such that the penalty for the continued offense of Embezzlement cannot be less than six years of imprisonment nor exceed, in any case, twenty-four years. Applying the foregoing to the case in question, considering that we are in the presence of an offense of Embezzlement in the modality of a continued offense committed by the accused Carlos Manuel González Lizano, the concrete penalty is fixed at the amount of six years of imprisonment increased by another equal amount for a total of twelve years of imprisonment, in application of the penalty for the continued offense, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 77 of the Penal Code, which does not violate the principles of non reformatio in peius contemplated in article 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 applicable to the case in question, insofar as the modifications determined here do not harm the interests of the accused González Lizano regarding the type and amount of penalty imposed by the judges, which in this case was fifteen years of imprisonment, without it being acceptable to consider that the limit penalty that must be respected for the sake of applying the principle of non reformatio in peius, as the appellant intends, is that of five years of imprisonment, because as we have clearly defined supra, the minimum concrete punitive sanction that can be imposed for the continued offense of Embezzlement is six years. This Court of Cassation considers that the new amount of penalty imposed is fundamentally based on the reasonings established by the court when fixing the principal penalty, in application of the premises contained in article 71 of the Penal Code, but adapting it to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, given the indicated legal reclassification. In application of the principle of the extensive effect of the recurso de casación contained in article 455 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, what was decided regarding the considerations on the legal classification of the facts and the punitive sanction imposed relating to the accused González Lizano are also applicable to the defendant Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, who must be considered as a co-perpetrator of the offense of Embezzlement in its modality of a continued offense, applying to him the penalty of six years of imprisonment increased by another equal amount for a total penalty of twelve years of imprisonment, based on the reasons previously established for said quantification. Consequently, the ground filed by the appellant is partially granted, modifying the legal classification of the facts attributed against Carlos Manuel González Lizano to one offense of Embezzlement in its modality of a continued offense committed to the detriment of the State, reducing the penalty to twelve years of imprisonment. By the extensive effect of the recurso de casación, the modification made is applied under the same circumstances to the accused Arturo Fallas Zúñiga. In the other aspects where the ruling does not suffer modification, it remains unaltered. [...] **V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: ** ***Primer motivo.** [...]* Our Magna Carta, in its article 39, enshrines the principle of constitutional legality, such that no one can be sanctioned if there is no prior law that so determines and by virtue of a judgment issued by a competent authority. In accordance with the factual framework held as proven and to which the appellants do not adhere, the defendant Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya was convicted of the offense of Peculado (Embezzlement), the court estimating in the resolution before us that with his illicit actions he incurred this offense through the diversion of public funds whose administration had been entrusted to him by reason of his office as General Manager of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, actions deployed in total disregard of the duty of probity to which, as a public official, he was obligated.

In this diversion of funds, the accused engaged in a series of violations of the banking regulations in force at the time of their commission, set forth in the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional – LOSBN), the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), the Law on General Deposit Warehouses (Ley sobre Almacenes Generales de Depósito), the Organic Law of the Central Bank (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central – LOBC), and general principles contained in the Political Constitution and the General Law of Public Administration, as well as guidelines on the matter established by the Central Bank of Costa Rica itself and the National Securities Commission. Decree-Law No. 71 of June 21, 1948, on Bank Nationalization, nationalized private banking, establishing that henceforth only the State could mobilize, through its own banking institutions, the public's deposits, already outlining the credit orientation required by the economic circumstances the country was going through at that time, aimed at materializing all the banking reforms necessary to make the ordered nationalization effective, and although it is true that the nature of the banking being pursued is not indicated here, by 1953, with the issuance of the Organic Law of the Central Bank No. 1552 of April 23, 1953, the purposes and orientation of that entity are determined, being expressly destined to contribute to the achievement of the goals of the National Development Plan – Article 1 – tasked with promoting the orderly development of the Costa Rican economy within the purpose of achieving full employment of the Nation's productive resources, being obliged to avoid the inactivity of the means of production when this is caused by a lack of timely credit and to promote the gradual diversification of national production towards those articles that strengthen the country's balance of payments – Article 4. Such normative provisions undeniably demonstrate that the nature of the banking pursued in our country, starting from nationalization, is fundamentally a development bank and not an investment bank, postulates later taken up by the Organic Law of the National Banking System when it defines the essential functions of commercial banks, establishing among others: to avoid having inactive means of production in the country, seeking out the producer to place at their service the economic and technical means available to the system – Article 3, subsection 4) – normative provisions that should have governed the actions of the accused Robles Macaya in the exercise of his public functions, but which, as the court rightly pointed out, were blatantly disregarded, because even considering that it is feasible for banks to engage in activities typical of investment banking, this is not an unrestricted activity, without controls, and the judgment fully demonstrated that what Robles Macaya was pursuing was an incursion into this type of banking without any oversight, violating his legally established duties. The Political Constitution designates State Banks as autonomous institutions – Article 189, subsection 1 – which enjoy administrative independence but are subject to the law in matters of governance – Article 188 ibidem – a principle that is reflected in numeral 2 of the Law of the National Banking System, and because such institutions form part of the Public Administration, they are obliged to act in accordance with the legal system, being able to perform only those authorized public acts or services; that is, the public officials who make up the State financial entities are subject to the principle of legality. These considerations allow us to point out that, contrary to what the appellants argue, the factual framework that the court attributes to their client is not permitted for any state bank, insofar as the legal-banking regulations in force at the time of the events did not, from any point of view, empower a public official who administers, receives, or holds custody of public funds to engage in their diversion, failing in the duty of probity to which they are obligated by reason of their position. While it is true that Commercial Banks are governed in their organization by Public Law, but in their activity by Private Law, the operations carried out by the accused Robles Macaya, which constitute the proven fraudulent acts, in the manner in which they were carried out, are expressly prohibited by the prevailing legislation. The judges centered the illegality on the actions of the accused Robles Macaya, not on the fact that he made investments in foreign debt, whether Costa Rican or from other Latin American nations, as he was obviously authorized to do so within the purposes permitted to commercial banks in that matter – Article 61.7 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System; neither was he convicted because the referred investments might have a logical commercial risk inherent to them; or because he carried out operations known as "over the counter"; or because he did not continue negotiating with the Interbolsa brokerage desk. Nor is he being convicted for using, purely and simply, the leverage system to increase the amount of investments to be made. The court determined the criminal liability of the accused Robles Macaya because, in the exercise of his functions, he engaged in a series of illegalities which, with full knowledge and will on his part, essentially contributed to increasing the risk in the transactions carried out, violating the rules governing banking performance, for, contrary to what the appellants argue, the accused, as General Manager of a banking entity, obligated by law to exercise his functions inherent to his condition as general administrator, in full observance of the laws and regulations as well as compliance with the resolutions of the Board of Directors – Article 41 ibidem – was not permitted to negotiate with financial entities such as Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., which were not first-tier entities recognized by the Board of Directors of the Central Bank, and which lacked the authorization to make public offerings of securities or to provide brokerage services in the national territory granted by the National Securities Commission, as demanded at that time by the Securities Market Regulatory Law No. 7201 of September 18, 1990, and the guidelines of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, as promoter of favorable conditions for the strengthening, liquidity, solvency, and proper functioning of the Banks that made up the National Banking System and superior director of bank credit, supervisor, and coordinator thereof – Article 5, subsections 5 and 7 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica. At the time the questioned transactions were carried out, ATF was not registered as a first-tier entity, since it had been rejected as such by the Central Bank since early 1990, nor did it have authorization from the National Securities Commission to conduct such business, without the accused making the slightest effort to ensure such conditions, which increased the risk of the transactions carried out, leaving the state banking entity unprotected. But furthermore, as we have already stated above, the accused diverted public funds by exceeding the sale offer of bonds and the line of credit offered by ATF representing the Internationale Nederlanden Bank, allowing the payment of overprices charged to BAC, by transferring the public funds ahead of the agreed payment date, placing them at the disposal of ATF so that it could buy the foreign debt bonds on the international market and sell them to the bank at a higher price, allowing the change in the position of that company, from intermediary to direct seller, with the consequent effect on the collection of gains or profits, extending the amount invested beyond the limits for which it was authorized, compromising the liquidity of the banking institution and allowing the bonds to never be in its name and, therefore, to lack negotiable availability over them, which conflicts with the principles of security, solvency, and liquidity that must prevail in the negotiations of commercial banks, according to the law – Article 3 of the Law of the National Banking System. Likewise, the court convicts the accused Robles Macaya for his decisive illicit participation in the purchase of the companies A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, with all the illegalities committed therein, all with the aim, as he himself stated in the session of the BAC Board of Directors No. 25-3/93 of March 23, 1993, of venturing into investment banking that was prohibited to them at that time and about which he was fully aware, capturing funds without reserve requirements or leverage limits, granting and requesting credits from abroad without authorization, which undoubtedly denotes the fraudulent nature of the incriminated individual's actions, and the clear determination to avoid controls and oversight by the corresponding financial entities. Robles Macaya is convicted for having incurred in leverage when negotiating foreign debt bonds, which subjected the banking entity to a heavy economic commitment, causing it to incur the payment of large sums in interest resulting from the leveraged credits and which ultimately converged in the loss of the entire BAC investment portfolio that had been transferred some time before to A.V.C., deriving from the Organic Law of the National Banking System and the Organic Law of the Central Bank itself that for this type of leveraged business pertaining to credits originating from abroad, the accused necessarily had to have authorization from the Central Bank as regulator of currency, banking, credit, and foreign exchange – relationship of Articles 6 and 121 of the LOBC, 14 and 74 of the LOSBN. The accused was also sanctioned for reversing basic principles of investor protection by prioritizing yield over security. The appellants forget in their claim that the resources managed by their defendant were PUBLIC FUNDS, and could not receive the same risky treatment as any other private investor who risks their patrimony in investments or operations accepting that they may lose a lot or gain a lot, characteristics typical of speculative and risky negotiations, which, contrary to the assertions of the appellants, conflict with the general principles of liquidity, solvency, security, and rational risk that legally determine the negotiations involving assets of this nature, and which are not only transferred to the conditions of the securities that a commercial bank may trade, as the petitioners restrictively interpret. It has been indicated that the legal system does not permit risky and speculative investments to be made with public treasury resources, for although it is true that the LOSBN in its Article 27 allows banking officials to assume an acceptable commercial risk, this is coupled with an adequate proportion to the nature of the operation undertaken, provided that there has been no fraud or negligence and within a sound banking negotiation, extremes of acceptability that are not applicable to the criminal conduct displayed by the accused, where, as was amply set forth, he raised the risk of the operations carried out to astonishing levels to the detriment of the economic interests of the state bank, causing its financial collapse. It cannot be interpreted, as the appellants argue, that the commercial, rational, and acceptable risk in this type of transaction can be interpreted as a legal authorization to carry out speculative business; for speculation has no place in negotiations with public funds, understood "as the action or practice of buying or selling goods, shares and participations, etc., with the purpose of profiting from the rises and falls in market values, as opposed to normal trading or investment" – see Oxford Universal Dictionary. Volume 3, p.514 – insofar as this form of negotiation also openly conflicts with the general principles of legal and financial security, rational risk, and liquidity inherent in a financial operation under those conditions, and a State Bank, as well as any other public institution, cannot expose its patrimony to the unrestricted fluctuations of the market. Therefore, the claim is declared without merit. V. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS: [...] Fifth ground. The incorrect application of Articles 57, 58, 71, 354, and 358, all of the Penal Code, and the disregard of numerals 1, 2, and 24 ibidem and 39 of the Political Constitution is claimed, insofar as the court convicted the accused Robles Macaya for 17 offenses of Peculation – nine cash purchases and eight leveraged repurchases – and imposed a sentence of 25 years in prison for conduct that, according to the judges' analysis, is negligent – disregard for the care that should have been taken according to the circumstances. Regarding the first nine purchases: The appellants indicate that Robles Macaya is blamed for not having verified that ATF was in fact the representative of NMB Bank, as well as for having transferred the resources directly to that company, so that the fugitive co-defendants José Luis and Mariano both López Gómez, owners of ATF, were allowed to carry out purchases in international banking on their own behalf and in their own name and not as manager or representative of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, as it should have been according to the offer approved by the Board of Directors, therefore Robles Macaya is blamed for negligent conduct that does not entail intent (dolo). The claim is not admissible. The subjective element in the crime of Peculation – intent – according to our legislation, is constituted by the will of the active subject – who must necessarily be vested with the status of a public official – directed at misappropriating or diverting money or goods, whose administration, receipt, or custody have been entrusted to them by reason of their position, with full knowledge that such goods are public because they belong to the Public Administration. Hence, intent is the knowledge – cognition – and desire – will – to carry out the objective elements of the criminal type. Consequently, the agent will commit the crime of Peculation by misappropriation or diversion – Article 354, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code – when, even without a purpose aimed at personal benefit or that of third parties, with full knowledge of their function and the public nature of the goods or money that by reason of their position they administer, receive, or hold in custody, they direct their will to misappropriate or divert them, violating the duties of probity to which they are obligated in the performance of their duties. And we affirm this because the specific purpose of personal benefit or for the benefit of third parties is only expressly contemplated in the second paragraph of the mentioned provision, referring to what is called "peculation of services," when under those premises, the public official uses work or services paid for by the Administration. In the case at hand, based on the facts proven by the trial court, contrary to the appellants' assertions, the actions carried out by the accused Robles Macaya, far from being considered negligent conduct – negligence – proved to be actions lacking in probity, when in the exercise of his functions as General Manager of a State Bank, he diverted the funds he administered, with full knowledge that they belonged to the Public Administration, and directed his will to carrying out negotiations in foreign debt bonds, under absolutely irregular conditions – cash purchases – and subsequently participates in the purchase of the companies A.V.C., which is the phase where his fraudulent conduct is revealed with greater propriety and he expressly manifests it indicating the true purpose pursued with the purchase of such companies, to which we have extensively referred above, and which materializes later when, with the consensus and participation of the remaining defendants, they execute the leveraged purchases. It is precisely in that dimension that the court's reasoning and conclusions are understood, for, as has been previously determined, the illicit acts attributed to the accused Robles Macaya, and in general to all the defendants, must be analyzed jointly, within an integrated vision, where each of the actions committed is the antecedent of the next, and there is no doubt that Robles Macaya directed his conscious and voluntary conduct toward the achievement of his criminal purposes. The formulated claim is without merit. V. CASSATION APPEAL [...] APPEAL ON THE MERITS: [...] Sixth ground. [...] As we indicated above, Peculation, in its modality of misappropriation and diversion of public money or goods, according to our legislation, does not necessarily require, either as a subjective element of the wrongful act, or as an objective element of the type, the benefit for oneself or for third parties derived from that public money or goods, an element that is present in the Peculation of services contained in the second paragraph of numeral 354 of the Penal Code, when the public official uses for those purposes services or work paid for by the Administration. The foregoing is established without prejudice to the fact that in the commission of the illicit conduct, the "benefit" factor to which we have referred arises, and which in most cases goes hand in hand with their commission. Hence, in the case before us, even if it had not been proven that Robles Macaya and the remaining defendants obtained a benefit for themselves or for third parties derived from their acts of diversion, the figure of Peculation, for which they are later convicted and criminally sanctioned, is not distorted or undermined, insofar as it was sufficient for its configuration that the accused, in the performance of their functions, with full and absolute knowledge, directed their wills to divert the public funds they administered by reason of their positions, one as general manager of the Bank – Robles Macaya – and the others as directors of the banking entity and administrators of the A.V.C. business complex, violating their duties of probity in the management of state resources, framed within the laws and regulations that public officials are obliged to comply with in the performance of public functions. Despite the above, according to the list of proven facts in the appealed judgment, although it is true that the personal benefit of the defendants was not demonstrated, their actions lacking in probity, focused on carrying out the different negotiations in Foreign Debt bonds, where they prioritized the yield of the investments over security, both in those attributed exclusively to the accused Robles Macaya – cash purchases – and those for which the latter later shares responsibility with the remaining defendants, allowed the economic benefit of the public funds to the company Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., which, as was proven in the accounting records, obtained a profit of close to seventeen million dollars – US $17MM – out of the total losses incurred by the banking entity, which exceeded fifty-seven million dollars – US $57MM – and which never gained negotiable availability over said securities, availability that always remained in favor of ATF. [...] VI.- CASSATION APPEALS [...] FIRST PART [...] First ground [...] The crime of Peculation, as the complainant rightly points out, presents as objective elements: the status of public official of the agent; the action of misappropriating or diverting; the "public" condition of the goods or money misappropriated or diverted by the agent; and that those goods or money, at the time of the commission of the illicit act, are under the administration, receipt, or custody of the public official by reason of their position. The appellant, in support of his thesis on the absence of the material object of the action attributed to his clients – public goods – who would be acting, from his perspective, under a reverse mistake of type, substantially departs from the accredited factual framework, isolating the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries attributed to his clients as directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, from the facts that preceded it and that constitute the so-called cash purchases of Costa Rican, Venezuelan, and Brazilian Foreign Debt bonds. While it is true that, at the level of criminal liability, these are only attributed to the General Manager of the banking entity, Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, they were not unknown to the directors accused herein, for it was precisely they, in the exercise of their positions, who authorized Robles Macaya to carry out the referred cash bond purchases, up to an amount of twenty million dollars – $20MM – and tacitly accepted, without major reproach, that the cited Robles Macaya exceeded the amount authorized for those purposes, coming to invest more than thirty-seven million dollars – $37MM – with their absolute complacency. This knowledge of the appellant's clients is of vital importance to determine the element of the objective type of Peculation relating to the condition of public money or goods as the material object of the attributed action, later used by the defendants in the purchase of the A.V.C. group of companies, who had full cognitive mastery over their nature, insofar as they belonged to the Public Administration, originating from the State Bank in which they rendered their services. According to the facts held as proven, those bonds purchased in cash by BAC with its own economic resources, specifically those of February 24 and May 10, both 1993, served to pay part of the price agreed upon for the sale of the related companies, by being exchanged for the shares of the A.V.C. complex. Hence, contrary to what the appellant argues, the crime of Peculation attributed to his clients in this second phase of the criminal act does contain the material object of the action required for its configuration, that being the public condition of the goods used for the questioned acquisition, without this circumstance being undermined by the lack of negotiable availability that BAC had over the securities, which is precisely one of the factors influencing the illegality of the negotiations carried out by the defendants. Consequently, the reverse mistake of type claimed by the petitioner proves non-existent, and it is not admissible to think that the defendants, as members of the Board of Directors of the banking institution, acted under the belief that the goods used in the questioned purchase of the business complex were public because they belonged to the Bank, when they were not, lacking the element of ownership over such goods. Regarding this last aspect – ownership – it is worth noting that all the negotiations with public funds attributed to the defendants, in the three different stages of their incursion, were indeed materialized, albeit within an already known environment of illegality. Part of the fraudulent conduct of the defendants accredited by the court was allowing the acquired bonds to remain at the disposal of ATF and not BAC, hence the necessity that the negotiations be carried out with that financial entity and not another, which increased the risk factor and the economic commitment of the banking entity, making it unacceptable that the defendants take advantage of the criminal deployment of their actions to come and allege in their favor precisely the lack of availability for the Bank over the acquired securities that they themselves helped cause. Contrary to what the appellant argues, the judgment not only held as proven the simple irregular or illegal acquisition of goods or money by a public entity, but rather, adhering to the accredited factual framework, the judges were able to verify, with support in the body of evidence examined, the diversion of public goods by the accused bank directors, both in relation to the purchase of A.V.C. and its subsidiaries, and in the subsequent leveraged purchases in Foreign Debt, with full knowledge of their status as public officials, as well as the origin of the money and goods used and that by reason of their position they administered, violating their duties of probity to which they were obligated. [...] VI.- CASSATION APPEALS [...] FIRST PART [...] Third ground. The appellant claims the improper application of numerals 57, 58, 71, 354, and 358, all of the Penal Code, and the failure to apply Articles 1, 2, and 24, last part, of the same body of law; 39 of the Political Constitution, when convicting the defendants for Peculation, in an act where there is no material object of the action, under the custody, receipt, or administration of a public official by reason of their position. The petitioner indicates that the judgment held as true that the Venezuelan and Brazilian foreign debt bonds, which were exchanged for the shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, were deposited in the custody account of Ariana Trading and Finance at ING Bank and in its possession and ownership. And noting that the defendants – Robles Macaya and the Board of Directors – are the public officials that the judgment considers involved in the illegal purchase of A.V.C. Valores and its subsidiaries, they could not draw on the custody account of ATF nor could they order José Luis López Gómez, within the hierarchical chain of command, to draw on that account, meaning that none of the defendants had custody, receipt, or administration of those bonds with which the exchange for shares of A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries was made, which is an element required by Article 354 of the Penal Code to configure the objective type, as the actual administration, in the case of the bonds, was in the hands of ATF, and neither ATF, being a legal entity, nor José Luis López Gómez, as administrator of ATF, were public officials. Hence, in the appellant's view, the judgment commits the error of holding as true that the Board of Directors of the Banco Anglo Costarricense and Robles Macaya had the administration of the bonds, incurring an error of subsumption, which is committed at the moment of seeing if the conduct fits into a criminal type, because it considers that over the bonds, which were in the possession of a third party and not of a public official by reason of their position, the Board of Directors or Robles Macaya had their administration by reason of their position. However, no public official can have them if those bonds were not within an administrative sphere of custody, and ATF's account at ING Bank is evidently not an administrative sphere of custody.

The appellant considers that in this situation the accused acted under the false belief that an element of the criminality of the crime of Peculado existed, namely the material object of the action, and it was not so, there being an absolute impossibility to consummate the unlawful act, that is, a reverse mistake of fact occurred, resulting in an impossible crime and therefore the accused act is unpunishable. The claim is not admissible. In what is relevant, the Court refers to the arguments set forth when resolving the first of the grounds challenged. According to the facts held as proven, part of the illicit plan of the accused was to allow the bonds acquired with public funds to be in the name and at the disposal of Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. and not in the name and availability of the Bank, precisely to avoid the controls of the oversight entities and thus develop negotiations that were prohibited by the prevailing banking regulations, circumstances which were fully known to the accused as the judgment held as proven, and which the appellant overlooks. To *administer*, according to the Real Academia de la Lengua Española, among other meanings, means *“to direct an institution. To order, dispose, organize, especially the treasury or assets”* – Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Vigésima. Segunda edición. 2001. Madrid. Tomo I, p.47 – Referred to the administration of public funds, to administer is to give the funds entrusted to the public official the purpose that the legislation provides, directed at achieving the common welfare that the State intends. Although it is true that one way of administering the assets of the public treasury is linked to their material possession by the official in charge by reason of his functions, this is not the only form of administration, as it may also be done by one who only maintains legal availability over said assets, provided that said administration has come to the public official by reason of his functions. In the case before us, the public funds used by the defendants in the different illicit operations carried out have their origin in the so-called cash purchases, which, even though they were only attributed to Robles Macaya, were carried out with the complacency and authorization of the remaining defendants as bank directors, said public funds being under the administration of all the accused by reason of their respective positions, as they were also when making the leveraged purchases, since it was the Bank’s financial resources that fed the A.V.C. companies to carry out the acquisitions of leveraged External Debt bonds, which is not distorted by the fact that, as guarantee for the loans granted by ATF, the same purchased bonds remained in possession of the contracting financial entity, insofar as the distracting actions of funds were already consummated, it being sufficient that the public assets or monies, at the time the questioned negotiations were carried out, were under the administration of the accused by reason of the exercise of their positions, as indeed occurred. The ground is dismissed. [...] **VII. CASSATION APPEAL [...] Appeal on the merits. *First ground.* ** The erroneous interpretation of articles 22, 76 and 77 in relation to 352 – now 354 – all of the Criminal Code is claimed, by considering the trial court that in the first nine investments of external debt bonds acquired directly – without illegal financing – and in the purchase of the eight investments with illegal leveraging of Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt, the peculados occurred in the modality of a continued crime. The appellants consider that in the crime of peculado the protected legal interest is not property but rather probity in the exercise of the duties of public office, and for this reason, the injury to property is not an objective, configurative element of the criminal type applied, which is why this crime does not meet the requirements expressly indicated in article 77 of the Criminal Code, which is the affectation of patrimonial legal interests. For the challengers, the criminal acts carried out by the accused occurred in a material concurrence. The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office indicate that doctrine establishes that the crime of peculado does not specifically protect property as in other crimes, but rather the security of its allocation to the purposes for which it has been created or gathered, and that it is characterized by the abnormal handling of assets by those who functionally have them in their charge, to make them fulfill their purpose or to preserve them for those ends. They point out that in this case, the concurrence of crimes incurred by the accused is of the same type, but they do not affect a patrimonial legal interest, but rather, as they already indicated, probity in the exercise of the duties of public office, for which reason each of the facts held as accredited materially concur, and the corresponding penalties for each of the crimes committed must be applied. Thus, for the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, they request 10 years in prison for each of the nine crimes of peculado – first 9 investments – for a total of ninety years in prison, in his capacity as perpetrator, and as co-perpetrator, they request 10 years in prison for each of the eight crimes of peculado related to the investments leveraged in Venezuelan and Brazilian external debt, for a total of eighty years, which globally accounts for a sum of one hundred and seventy years in prison. For its part, the representation of the Public Prosecutor's Office requests for the accused, Franz Amrhrein Pinto, Ronald Fernández Pinto, Carlos Manuel González Lizano, Carlos Enrique Osborne Escalante, Edwin Salazar Arroyo and Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, the penalty of 10 years in prison for each of them as co-perpetrators of 7 crimes of peculado for the leveraged investments, for a total of 70 years in prison for each of them. And for all the accused, the prosecuting entity requests five years in prison for the purchase of the group of companies A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries. The claim is not admissible. According to the facts held as proven in the appealed judgment and the legal basis upheld by the judges, despite their final error in the legal classification and the determination of the imposed penalties, to which we referred above, we are faced with the concurrence of a plurality of actions carried out by the accused, but with characteristics of homogeneity in their commission mode – crimes of the same type – in the injury to the same protected legal interest and in the same purpose pursued, configuring a continued crime of Peculado. Although it is true that the figure of Peculado is systematically located within the crimes committed against the Duties of Public Office – Title XV, Section V of the Criminal Code – the protected legal interest being not precisely property but rather *public office*, translated into the *duty of probity* of the public official in the performance of his functions, for which reason patrimonial injury is not necessarily required for the illicit act to be configured, teleologically, because Peculado is a multi-offensive crime, the injury to property, although not indispensable, is frequently associated with its commission, consequently violating not only the duty of probity of the public official, but also property, understood as money and public assets. For this reason, contrary to what the appellants assert, Peculado does allow the application of the continued crime in the application of penalties, by reconciling the fundamental prerequisites established by numeral 77 of the Criminal Code for its existence, it being determined in said norm that for its applicability it is required that the crimes in concurrence be of the same type and affect patrimonial legal interests and that the agent pursue the same purpose; so that, in the case before us, the facts related to the nine cash purchases of External Debt attributed exclusively to the accused Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, as well as the purchases, also of Latin American External Debt through illegal leveraging, carried out through the business complex A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., attributed to all the accused – directors and general manager of Banco Anglo Costarricense – although it is true that each one of them, by themselves, constitutes a crime of Peculado, which materially concur with each other, for purposes of their legal classification and the punitive sanctions to apply, configure the continued crime of Peculado, insofar as they constitute crimes of the same type – Peculado – tending towards the same purpose, and affected, not only the duty of probity of the accused in the exercise of their public functions, but also patrimonial legal interests, the patrimonial damage that the illicit conduct developed by the accused from the second semester of 1992 until the month of May 1994 caused to Costa Rican society being of undeniable verification, damage that occurred not only from an economic perspective but also from the social point of view. In conclusion, in the aspect related to the injured patrimonial legal interest, the requirement established in this regard in the mentioned norm containing the parameters on the penalty for the continued crime was met, which cannot be interpreted restrictively in the sense that the only legal interest protected in the committed crime, the penalty for which is applied by continuation, is property, since, as has been well pointed out when resolving one of the grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the public defender Licenciado Rodolfo Solórzano Sánchez, the continued crime will be applicable, even when the acts of continuation affect, in addition to patrimonial legal interests, other different interests. The foregoing considerations lead to determining that, contrary to the pretensions of the appellants, in this case we are not before a material concurrence of crimes, insofar as, although it is true that the plurality of actions carried out by the accused that begins with the cash purchases of external debt, carried out by Robles Macaya on behalf of Banco Anglo Costarricense and culminates with the purchases made with illegal leveraging materially executed by the manager Robles Macaya with the full authorization and knowledge of the remaining accused in their condition as directors of the banking institution and administrators of the business complex A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. – Carlos Manuel González Lizano and Arturo Fallas Zúñiga –, by themselves constitute crimes of Peculado that concur in real form, just as the trial court repeatedly pointed out, echoing the theses held by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which they now disavow, this conglomerate of facts had to be evaluated integrally because each one of them was the antecedent of the next, and it is precisely this concatenation what imparts the character of factual, juridical and subjective homogeneity to the cause in question, allowing for purposes of the applicable penalty, to resort to the figure of the continued crime in relation to the illicit act of Peculado, distinguishing it from the material concurrence, which will arise when any of these three prerequisites is lacking: crimes of the same type that affect patrimonial legal interests and pursue the same purpose – in this sense see Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, page 93 – This Cassation Chamber has already repeatedly pronounced on the indispensable criteria to distinguish a continued crime from a material concurrence of crimes, determining as a fundamental differentiating element the same purpose that the perpetrator pursues in relation to the legal interests he is affecting with his actions and that it is incompatible with the nature of the material concurrence – in this sense see Voto 769-F-96 of 10:30 hours on December 6, 1996 reiterated in resolution number 94-2000 of 8:45 hours on January 28, 2000. Third Criminal Chamber – Such subjective criterion is complemented by doctrine with objective criteria; thus, the Argentine author Carlos Creus establishes that the linking of the distinct facts to a single “criminal enterprise” does not depend exclusively on the perpetrator’s design, but on other circumstances of an objective nature *“that condition the adequacy of the distinct facts within that concept, such as the unity of the legal interest attacked, for which the analogy of the interests affected by the distinct facts will not suffice, but rather the identity of the holder ... and at least, that the material objects of the distinct facts can be considered components of a ‘natural universality’ ... But both dependency criteria must appear together in order to speak of continuation...”* – *Derecho Penal Parte General*. Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1988, pages 241 and 242 – In the present cause, the parameters of continuation are clearly defined, both objectively and subjectively, insofar as the accused, from the beginning of their dealings that have their origin in the first contact Robles Macaya makes with the company Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. for the purpose of buying Costa Rican external debt securities from it, divert the public funds of Banco Anglo Costarricense, allowing third parties to trade the public treasury’s monies and obtain profits to the detriment of state interests, it being this contact with ATF that facilitates the subsequent proposal for BAC to acquire the company A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. and its subsidiaries, violating the banking legislation in force and the controls of the public entities in charge of supervising such negotiations, and then, through the acquired business complex, carry out the illegal leveraged purchases, provoking the economic debacle translated into the loss of more than fifty-seven million dollars and the closure of the oldest state bank in the country, in such a way that, this plurality of facts, temporally discontinuous but dependent on each other, insofar as they pursued the same purpose, injured patrimonial legal interests of the same holder, Banco Anglo Costarricense, and turned out to be of the same type – Peculado – converge, for purposes of the penalty to apply, into a continued crime and not a material concurrence. For all the foregoing, the ground alleged by the challengers is declared dismissed. </p> </HTML>

"III. RECURSO DE CASACION [...] RECURSO POR LA FORMA: [...] Décimo octavo motivo. Violación a las reglas de la sana crítica (errónea derivación): Se reprocha la transgresión de los artículos 11, 27, 36, 39 y 41, todos de la Constitución Política; 1, 106, 144, 145, 392, 395, 396, 397, 400, 449, 471, 474, 476, 477, 482 y 483 estos últimos del Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973, por cuanto, a juicio del impugnante, para tener por demostrado que los dineros que se utilizaron en el grupo de empresas A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., eran del Banco Anglo Costarricense y no de empresas privadas, el tribunal afirma que las inversiones las hizo el citado ente bancario y no A.V.C., por lo que los dineros eran públicos, sus funcionarios también lo eran y la ley aplicable a tales sociedades anónimas, lo son las de la Administración Pública, conclusión que en su criterio, resulta errónea. Señala que el Almacén de Valores Comerciales A.V.C. se fundó jurídicamente mediante ley número 15 del 15 de octubre de 1934, autorizado a funcionar en 1988 como una sociedad anónima regida por las leyes del derecho privado. Indica el recurrente, tal y como lo señala la Sala Constitucional, en el caso que nos ocupa, no se puede concluir que el grupo de empresas A.V.C. eran empresas públicas, por pertenecer en un 100% al Banco Anglo Costarricense, institución estatal. Y esto es así, porque para poderse modificar el defecto se tuvo que modificar la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, quienes no tenían potestad para fiscalizar esas empresas, como la reforma tácitamente lo reconoce, pues mediante ley 7428 del 7 de setiembre de 1997 artículos 8 y 9, se le otorgó la posibilidad de que a esas empresas se les confiera el calificativo de públicas y poder fiscalizar las mismas, reconociéndose tácitamente que antes no lo podían hacer. El reclamo no es de recibo. Examinada la sentencia que se recurre, se advierte que el impugnante parte de una premisa que no responde al mérito de los autos, en el tanto, en ningún momento manifestaron los juzgadores que, para tener por demostrado que los dineros utilizados por A.V.C. eran del Banco Anglo Costarricense, las inversiones cuestionadas las realizó este ente bancario y no la empresa adquirida. En realidad del párrafo extractado por el gestionante visible a folios 4827 y 4828 se aprecia que el tribunal indicó, no que el Banco Anglo Costarricense haya realizado las inversiones apalancadas directamente, sino que no era cierto, conforme lo estimaron los imputados, que si las inversiones cuestionadas las realizaban a través de A.V.C., que era una empresa de carácter privado, no requerían autorización del Banco Central de Costa Rica, dado que A.V.C. era una subsidiaria con participación accionaria del ente bancario en un 100%. Por otra parte, si bien es cierto, como lo señala el recurrente la empresa A.V.C. se creó con fundamento en la Ley General de Almacenes de Depósito de 1934 y se autorizó su funcionamiento como sociedad anónima mediante decreto ejecutivo emitido en 1988, dada la naturaleza propia de un almacén de depósito, no resulta de aplicación la jurisprudencia constitucional a la que alude el gestionante – Voto 1106-95 de las 10 horas 27 minutos del 24 de febrero de 1995, correspondiente a un Recurso de amparo interpuesto contra la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – por cuanto a lo que se alude en dicha resolución, según se desprende de su contexto integral, es a una entidad privada concesionaria de un derecho público – la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz – situación que no se le puede aplicar a A.V.C. que era una empresa, que si bien se constituyó como sociedad anónima, presenta otra naturaleza – almacén general de depósito – aunque en la práctica se apartó de los presupuestos propios de un almacén de depósito. Así la Sala Constitucional señaló en aquella oportunidad “que el derecho de petición no existe frente a entidades particulares, y es obvio que la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, aunque pertenece mayoritariamente a una institución pública, es ella misma una persona jurídica de derecho privado exactamente igual a todas las demás, de manera que no podría ser considerada como pública ni en razón de su propietaria, ni en razón del interés público que en su actividad se involucra...” Sin embargo, en esta misma resolución la Sala Constitucional se apresura a indicar que no obstante lo anterior era necesario “hacer una distinción en lo que se refiere a las entidades que siendo privadas ejercen como concesionarias de un servicio público una parte de la función administrativa del Estado”. Señaló también que en ese sentido estas empresas – concesionarias de un servicio público – son lo inverso de las empresas públicas a que se refiere el artículo 3.2 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Dicha norma reza así: 3.2: El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles. Aclara la Sala Constitucional que el mencionado artículo se refiere a aquellas empresas públicas que como los bancos comerciales del Estado, se rigen en su organización por el derecho público, pero en su actividad por el derecho privado, mientras que las empresas privadas – se refiere aquí a las concesionarias de servicios públicos – sean propiedad de particulares, o sean del Estado o de sus instituciones públicas o aun las mixtas, se organizan y rigen por el derecho privado – por eso están excluidas de la Ley General de Administración Pública – pero en su actividad como concesionarias de servicios públicos, si están sometidas excepcionalmente al derecho público y obligadas a comportarse de conformidad. El recurrente, si bien cita el antecendente jurisprudencial, omite esta última parte, referente a la actividad de la empresa privada, aunque insistimos que el fallo constitucional se refiere específicamente al caso de las empresas privadas concesionarias de servicios públicos, no siendo este el caso de A.V.C.. Sin embargo, para el tema que nos interesa, resulta rescatable de la resolución de la Sala Constitucional, la mención que realiza de las empresas públicas, especialmente los bancos comerciales del Estado, que en su organización se rigen por el derecho público y en su actividad por el derecho privado, encontrándose incluidas dentro de los presupuestos de aplicación de la Ley General de Administración Pública; en consecuencia, si A.V.C. era propiedad del Banco Anglo Costarricense en un 100%, aun cuando podía constituirse como una sociedad anónima en su actividad, porque así se lo permitía la Ley de Almacenes Generales de Depósito, los fondos públicos que la alimentaban para que llevara a cabo precisamente las actividades propias de una entidad de tal naturaleza, continuaron bajo esa calidad, así como la ostentaba la fuente que los originó, y ello es así, al punto que, tal y como también lo destaca la Sala Constitucional en el fallo en mención, las empresas privadas, como las concesionarias de servicios públicos por ejemplo, en su actividad, también están sometidas excepcionalmente al derecho público y obligadas a comportarse de conformidad con los lineamientos de la Ley General de Administración Pública. De allí que, en el caso que nos ocupa, estimando las empresas A.V.C., como entidades subsidiarias del Banco Anglo Costarricense, el cual está sujeto en su organización al derecho público, o bien desde la óptica de empresa privada que brinda servicios públicos, subsiste para aquella la sujeción a las disposiciones de orden público. [...] III. RECURSO DE CASACION [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO [...] Tercer motivo. Se reclama la errónea aplicación de la Ley General de la Administración Pública – artículos 111, 112 y 113 – y la desaplicación de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional – Voto 1106-95 de las 10.27 horas del 14 de febrero de 1995 – y de la Ley 3284 – Código de Comercio - en sus artículos 102 a 233 – sobre sociedades anónimas – El recurrente cuestiona el hecho tenido por demostrado por el tribunal en el sentido de que los dineros que se utilizaron en el grupo de empresas A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. eran del Banco Anglo Costarricense, por ser el grupo de empresas en un 100% propiedad del ente bancario, y que en consecuencia no eran empresas privadas, afirmando el tribunal que las inversiones las hizo el Banco Anglo Costarricense y no A.V.C.. Indica el recurrente que la Sala Constitucional ha establecido que las empresas como las que conformaban A.V.C., no son públicas sino que se rigen por el derecho privado y están excluidas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, siendo hasta tiempo después que se subsanó tal disposición mediante modificación a la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República mediante Ley 7428 del 7 de setiembre de 1994, publicada en la Gaceta 210 del 4 de noviembre de 1994 artículos 8 y 9, a efecto de que la Contraloría pudiera fiscalizarlas estimándolas como públicas. El reclamo no es de recibo. No podemos dejar de mencionar que el recurrente en su alegato, desconoce los hechos tenidos por comprobados por el tribunal, lo que resulta inadmisible dentro de una impugnación por el fondo, alterando en todo caso, los mismos presupuestos fácticos determinados por los juzgadores por cuanto, tal y como lo señalamos al referirnos al motivo décimo octavo del recurso formulado por este mismo gestionante – motivo por vicios procesales - en la sentencia nunca se indica que las inversiones las había realizado el Banco Anglo Costarricense y no el Almacén de Valores y siempre tuvo claro que A.V.C. era obviamente una sociedad anónima, que se regía en principio, por las normas comerciales comunes, como luego veremos. Sobre este tema se reiteran los argumentos que se expusieron con anterioridad en la resolución del motivo indicado. No obstante lo anterior, conviene reflexionar sobre un tema trascendental en la resolución de esta causa, referido a la naturaleza jurídica de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias ABC Valores S.A. y Boltec S.A., una vez que son adquiridas por el Banco Anglo Costarricense, y su determinación como empresa, constituída en una sociedad anónima, perteneciente en un 100% a un ente bancario – ente público - Ciertamente, los juzgadores estimaron esta última circunstancia – el carácter de propietario del Banco - la cual se apoya indududablemente en la prueba, tanto documental como testimonial aportada y analizada, que permite determinar con toda exactitud que el 24 de mayo de 1993, la Junta Directiva del Banco Anglo Costarricense, en la sesión 44-5/93, celebrada a partir de las 16:20 horas, a la que asistieron todos los acusados, ratificó la oferta de cierre suscrita por el imputado Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, en su condición de Gerente General de la institución bancaria, con el coimputado rebelde José Luis López Gómez, representante de los accionistas de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., por la suma de cuatro millones novecientos mil dólares, mediante el mecanismo de intercambio – swap – de bonos de deuda externa de Venezuela y Brasil, supuestamente propiedad del ente bancario, al valor de mercado, por las acciones de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. con sus licencias de operación o concesiones de operaciones, siendo A.V.C. también dueña del 100% de las acciones de Boltec S.A., ABC Valores S.A. y del edificio con el mobiliario y equipo de cómputo. En dicha oferta se estableció que el negocio era firme, definitivo e irrevocable para ser formalizado al día siguiente, martes 25 de mayo de 1993. Ratificación que fue aprobada en el artículo 1 de la siguiente sesión de Junta directiva del ente bancario número 45-5/93 del 31 de mayo de 1993 y a la que asistieron también todos los acusados, siendo que este mismo día, el inculpado Robles Macaya, con fundamento en la autorización otorgada por los directores en la citada sesión 44-5/93, efectivamente suscribió con José Luis López Gómez, el contrato de compra de las sociedades A.V.C. y sus dos subsidiarias, compra que se canceló según lo acordado en la oferta de cierre, realizándose la cesión a favor del Banco Anglo Costarricense de la totalidad de las acciones – mil doscientas – De esta forma la institución bancaria adquirió las mencionadas empresas, convirtiéndose en su propietaria en un 100%, es decir, socia única de la sociedad anónima en que estaban constituidas. Determinado entonces que A.V.C. se convirtió a partir de esa fecha en una sociedad anónima, propiedad en un 100% de un ente estatal, es necesario dilucidar si dicha sociedad, se conforma absolutamente dentro de los cánones del derecho privado y se le tiene exclusivamente como una empresa privada, o bien si, tomando en cuenta la relación de propiedad que la liga con el ente público, podríamos hablar entonces de la existencia de una empresa pública. Desde una perspectiva restringida podríamos conceptualizar a la empresa pública conforme a la naturaleza del propietario, de tal manera que la empresa será privada si su propietario es privado y será pública si su propietario es público. Desde una posición más amplia podría señalarse que una empresa será pública si sirve de instrumento para alcanzar fines públicos, entendiéndose que ello se dará en todo caso en que el empresario sea una administración pública, y además, cuando aun siendo una persona privada, sea en definitiva un instrumento de acción de una admnistración pública – Murillo Arias, Mauro. “ Ensayos de Derecho Público”. Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia. Primera edición. San José, Costa Rica. 1988, página 106 – Esta conceptualización de empresa pública nos lleva a determinar los tipos de empresa pública aceptados doctrinariamente: a) la empresa pública-órgano: dependiente de un ente público sin personalidad jurídica, por ejemplo la Fábrica Nacional de Licores; b) la empresa pública-institución: que son instituciones jurídicas autónomas o no, con giro empresarial, por ejemplo: el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), el Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) y los Bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional; c) las empresas-sociedades – ver Ortiz Ortiz, Eduardo. “La empresa Pública como ente público”. Revista Ivstitia, número 52. Año 5. Abril 1991, página 12 – Dentro de este último tipo de empresa pública-sociedad teóricamente se hace la distinción entre las denominadas “sociedades del Estado” cuando le pertenecen totalmente al Estado y las sociedades anónimas con participación estatal mayoritaria, pudiendo ubicar dentro del tipo de empresas públicas-sociedades a los almacenes generales de depósito. A efecto de introducir la posibilidad legal de los bancos comerciales de conformar sociedades anónimas – por creación o participación - que les permitan la realización de los fines públicos para los cuales han sido constituidos, encontrándose dentro de tales sociedades los almacenes generales de depósito, debemos recordar en primer término que los bancos comerciales que integran el Sistema Bancario Nacional constituyen instituciones autónomas de derecho público, con personería jurídica propia e independencia en materia de administración, y con responsabilidad propia en la ejecución de sus funciones, emanadas de sus juntas directivas, cuyos miembros están obligados a actuar conforme con su criterio en la dirección y administración del banco, acorde con las disposiciones constitucionales, legales reglamentarias y técnicas, debiendo responder por su gestión – artículo 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional – Las funciones esenciales de los Bancos Comerciales son: colaborar en la ejecución de la política monetaria, cambiaria, crediticia y bancaria de la República; procurar la liquidez, solvencia y buen funcionamiento del Sistema Bancario Nacional; cuando se trate de los bancos del Estado, custodiar y administrar los depósitos bancarios de la colectividad y evitar que haya en el país medios de producción inactivos, buscando al productor para poner a su servicio los medios económicos y técnicos de que dispone el Sistema – artículo 3 del mismo cuerpo legal – Aparejada a estas funciones, los bancos comerciales mantienen una serie de prohibiciones, establecidas por la misma Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, entre ellas la de participar directa o indirectamente en empresas agrícolas, industriales, comerciales o de cualquier índole, y comprar productos, mercaderías y bienes raíces que no sean indispensables para su normal funcionamiento – artículo 73. 3 ibidem – en aplicación del principio de especialidad contenido en el numeral 61 de la misma ley, que sujeta a las empresas públicas, circunscribiéndolas a su objeto social, salvo cuando una ley así lo permite, prima facie, tal y como lo señaló la Procuraduría General de la República en su Informe C-014-2001 de fecha 19 de enero de ese año, cuyos lineamientos, en lo que nos interesa, compartimos, “... los entes públicos no están autorizados para crear sociedades anónimas por el riesgo que esa creación implica. De allí que la creación de sociedades por parte de las empresas públicas requiere, en principio, autorización legal. Es el legislador el que debe establecer las reglas para la creación de esas sociedades y su operación...” Esta autorización legal que mencionamos, la vamos a encontrar plasmada en el propio artículo 73 ya citado, que contiene la excepción a tales prohibiciones de participación, liberando a los bancos que pudieran llegar a tener participación en capital de instituciones financieras de orden público o semipúblico, que llegaren a crearse, y la de los bancos que establecieron almacenes generales de depósito, de acuerdo con la respectiva ley, o que a la fecha de la promulgación de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, tuvieren ya participación en ellos, únicamente con respecto a los negocios y operaciones que resultaran del funcionamiento de tales almacenes, exceptuándose también aquellos casos en que los bancos comerciales del Estado, conjunta o separadamente, constituyan o empleen personas jurídicas de su exclusiva propiedad para la prestación de servicios para ellos mismos, previa autorización de la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica, o para la administración de bienes adjudicados en juicio. Asimismo, con relación propiamente a los almacenes generales de depósito, su autorización legal para que la empresa pública – banco comercial – la pueda crear o constituir, la encontramos en el numeral 48 de la Ley de Almacenes Generales de Depósito número 15 del 15 de octubre de 1934, que permite a los Bancos Comerciales domiciliados en el país establecer y mantener Almacenes Generales de Depósito en aquellos lugares en donde no se hayan establecido por iniciativa privada en el curso de los seis primeros meses de vigencia de esta ley; presupuesto que recoge también el numeral 115 de la citada Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional cuando indica que los bancos comerciales podrán establecer libremente Almacenes Generales de Depósito, los cuales se regirán de acuerdo con las disposiciones de la ley de la materia, así como ejecutar operaciones similares de almacenamiento de productos y mercancías en bodegas propias. Esta autorización legal, en lo que se refiere al Banco Anglo Costarricense se materializa mediante el conocido Acuerdo Ejecutivo número 16-H del 27 de febrero de 1974 que permitió a la institución bancaria operar como almacén general de depósito y almacén fiscal. Doctrinariamente, por definición, se entiende que los almacenes generales de depósito son aquellos que se dedican a la conservación y custodia de toda clase de mercancías de lícito comercio, contribuyendo a la mayor circulación de la riqueza por medio de los resguardos que expiden de dichas mercancías – sobre el particular ver: Espejo de Hinojosa, Ricardo. Curso de Derecho Mercantil. Barcelona. Octava Edición. 1931; concepto que recoge nuestra Ley de Almacenes Generales de Depósito de 1934, en su artículo 1 cuando señala que los Almacenes Generales de Deposíto son instituciones de crédito que tienen por objeto la conservación y custodia de frutos, productos y mercancías de procedencia nacional o extranjera, la expedición de certificados de depósito y bonos de prenda y la concesión de préstamos con garantía de los mismos. Establecida pues la posibilidad legal que el Banco Anglo Costarricense mantenía para adquirir un Almacén General de Depósito, y por ende para comprar A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., dentro de los lineamientos propios de un almacén de esta naturaleza conforme a la legislación vigente sobre la materia, lo que no ocurrió, según se advierte de la integralidad del fallo dictado, posibilidad legal que no implica necesariamente que esta última adquisición, como en efecto resultó, se conformara dentro de los cánones legales, se desprende el carácter de propietario absoluto de la entidad bancaria sobre la sociedad anónima adquirida, la que si bien se configura u organiza dentro de los presupuestos del derecho privado, la actividad que presta deviene en pública, aunque conserve su personalidad jurídica propia que como lo señaló la Procuraduría General de la República en su Informe C-012-93 de fecha 20 de enero de 1993, pese a constituir un activo del Banco, pero que no se confunde ni se subsume con la persona jurídica que es su propietario – el ente público – aunque este, constituido en asamblea de accionistas, puede decidir todo tipo de medidas que le permita informarse sobre el resultado del accionar del Almacén, así como controlar su funcionamiento y sus finanzas, indicándose en ese mismo informe que al ser el Almacén General de Depósito una “institución de crédito”, conforme lo dispone el numeral 1 de su respectiva ley, la Auditoría General de Entidades Financieras – AGEF – y hoy Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras estaba facultada para ejercer los controles previstos por la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, lo que ya nos delinea, aunque no lo expresa abiertamente, el carácter público del almacén general de depósito del cual resulte propietario un banco comercial como ente público. Si bien es cierto, esta última circunstancia – el control de la AGEF sobre el almacén de depósito – es reconsiderada por la misma Procuraduría años después, en el informe C-067-98 del 14 de abril de 1998, sujetándolas no a la AGEF o SUGEF sino a la Auditoría Interna del ente bancario, ello se debe a que se estima que los Almacenes de Depósito, pese a que están facultados a conceder créditos, no son “entidades financieras” puesto que no realizan intermediación financiera, entendida esta como la intervención en el mercado captando recursos monetarios y colocándolos mediante operaciones crediticias y otras de tipo financiero, y ello es así dentro de una concepción pura de almacén de depósito conforme a la legislación que la informa, sin embargo, como quedó demostrado en el fallo, pese a que los acusados, con pleno conocimiento sobre el particular, pregonaron la idea de que la negociación con A.V.C. y sus subsidiarias tenía como objeto funcionar como almacén de depósito, aun cuando dentro del giro comercial podían ejercer como central de valores, según lo autorizaba el numeral 36 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, toda vez que podía realizar actividad no bancaria, el complejo empresarial A.V.C. no funcionó como almacén de depósito, sino como empresa financiera, por lo que desde esa perspectiva sí debía ser controlada por la AGEF. Es conveniente aclarar que el Informe de la Procuraduría C-067-98, en cuanto al concepto de intermediación financiera, se sustenta en el artículo 116 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central número 7558 del 3 de noviembre de 1995, posterior a los hechos acusados por lo que no se ajusta estrictamente al caso en particular. Sin embargo el pronunciamiento del órgano estatal, nos lleva al tema central que aquí estamos desarrollando, en cuanto a la posibilidad de considerar a A.V.C. como empresa pública, pese a su conformación como sociedad anónima sujeta en principio a los presupuestos comerciales comunes, manteniendo relevancia el aspecto de propietario del órgano bancario con relación a la sociedad constituida. Así, estableció el Doctor Antonio Sobrado González, en ese momento Procurador Fiscal “...que al ser suscrito íntegramente por el Banco el capital social de la sociedad anónima que administra el almacén general de depósito, ambos conforman una unidad empresarial...” – el destacado es nuestro – entendida como “... la organización de capital y de trabajo destinada a la producción o mediación de bienes o de servicios para el mercado ...” – Broseta Pont, Manuel. “La empresa, la unificación del Derecho de Obligaciones y el Derecho Mercantil”. Madrid, Tecnos, 1965 , página 274 - puesto que “el almacén opera bajo la tutela del banco propietario y al servicio de los intereses económicos de este”. Esta aseveración, la comparte esta Sala de Casación en forma absoluta, siendo que ella descansa en la doctrina vigente sobre la materia; así, el Doctor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, en su mencionado ensayo “La empresa pública como ente público”, al analizar la naturaleza de las sociedades anónimas que son constituidas por empresas públicas afirma que entre el ente público y la sociedad susbsiste una relación de instrumentalidad, puesto que la empresa pública realizará sus fines a través de la empresa mercantil constituida y si además el ente público conserva la totalidad o la mayoría de las acciones de esa sociedad anónima, puede manejar a esta conforme a sus políticas y planes, transformándola en un instrumento de realización de sus fines, convirtiendo en pública a la sociedad anónima creada y a su actividad. Llevando este planteamiento al caso que nos ocupa, el Banco Anglo Costarricense, ente público ubicable dentro de la categoría de empresa pública-institución, facultado legalmente, adquiere un almacén de depósito – A.V.C. y sus subsidiarias Boltec S.A. y ABC Valores S.A. – constituido en sociedad anónima, que por su carácter instrumental debe desarrollar una actividad de servicio público respondiendo en consecuencia a los fines públicos de la institución bancaria que es su propietaria en un 100% del capital social suscrito y por ende único socio de ese ente societario, aunque este no ejerza actividades propiamente bancarias, de modo tal que dicho almacén de depósito, una vez adquirido por el ente bancario, se convierte en una empresa pública-sociedad o sociedad del Estado y por ende con una naturaleza eminentemente publicística, lo que repercute en su actividad cuya regulación sería también pública – Ley de Almacén General de Depósito – porque así lo dispuso tanto el Acuerdo Ejecutivo que autorizó al Banco Anglo Costarricense a operar en 1974 el Almacén General de Depósito y Fiscal y el Decreto Ejecutivo número 44-88 que autorizó el funcionamiento de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. como Almacén General de Depósito, sujetándolos a la Ley sobre la materia, su reglamento y Leyes conexas, conforme puntualizamos al resolver el motivo anterior. Pero en la actividad referida a compra y venta de títulos valores, con los recursos económicos provenientes del ente bancario, A.V.C. debía sujetarse a la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, desde el momento mismo en que funcionalmente se presentaba como una central de valores, actividad que, como almacén de depósito, le permitía el numeral 36 de la citada Ley, según se determinó líneas atrás. El carácter instrumental de dicho almacén de depósito con relación a la institución bancaria, le permitía a esta, quien era la que alimentaba financieramente a la sociedad anónima, participar competitivamente en el mercado en forma indirecta; y esta estrecha relación entre el ente público – BAC – y el ente societario – A.V.C. – es reconocida por los mismos acusados, lo que se evidencia cuando el propio defendido del gestionante, en la sesión 43 de A.V.C. Panamá, celebrada a las 10:30 horas del 18 de octubre de 1993, en su condición de Gerente General del complejo empresarial, manifestó empresas y el BAC, ya que era conveniente que se percibiera en el mercado como complementarios. Pero existiría un aspecto importante a considerar en el papel instrumental del almacén de depósito con relación al ente bancario, y es el hecho de que, por modificación al pacto constitutivo de A.V.C., los imputados establecieron que para ser miembro de la Junta Directiva de A.V.C., necesariamente se tendría que ser miembro de la Junta directiva del Banco Anglo Costarricense, perdiéndose tal calidad cuando se dejaba de ser directivo del órgano bancario, esto nos permitiría afirmar que la Junta Directiva del Banco Anglo Costarricense fijaba las políticas de A.V.C. y tal y como lo señaló la Procuraduría General de la República en el Informe C-070-2001 del 13 de marzo de 2001 “por definición la asamblea de accionistas de la nueva sociedad es el propio ente propietario por medio de su órgano superior, pero además esa determinación se acrecienta si ya no solo la relación se produce a través de la Asamblea de Accionistas, sino por medio de una identidad en la condición de directivo del ente público y directivo del ente instrumental...” En la causa que nos ocupa, esta situación que en un ejercicio normal de las actividades propias de un almacén general de depósito, no causaría suspicacia, tomó un rumbo diferente, tal y como lo señaló el tribunal de juicio, cuando esta circunstancia le permitió a los acusados cerrar el círculo de control sobre su actividad ilícita, en el tanto desde el mismo origen de las compras apalancadas de deuda externa, mediante las cuales se distrajeron los fondos públicos pertenecientes al Banco Anglo Costarricense, cual es la compra de A.V.C. y sus subsidiarias, su finalidad y objetivos eran contrarios a la legislación bancaria existente, aspectos que los acusados conocían plenamente, lo que no los inhibió para continuar en su estrategia, que tuvo como resultado la debacle económica conocida. Como fundamento del carácter instrumental del ente societario, controlado y dirigido por el Estado, en este caso el ente bancario, como socio único, el autor Vittorio Ottaviano en su ensayo “Sometimiento de la Empresa Pública al Derecho Privado”, obra colectiva titulada “La empresa Pública”, Publicaciones del Real Colegio de España en Bolonia, 1970, páginas 273 y 275, citada por el Doctor Ortiz Ortiz en el ensayo mencionado, señala: “... cuando la empresa sea desarrollada por un ente económico, aquella a su vez, será pública en tanto en cuanto esté ligada a otro ente titular de las finalidades públicas conexas con la empresa. Es decir: la naturaleza pública del ente económico estará en relación con su posición de dependencia respecto de otro ente ... o si se quiere, con su naturaleza instrumental...” Sobre este mismo tema, Luigi Ferri, comercialista italiano indica que “... la pantalla de la sociedad mercantil apenas sirve para encubrir esta realidad, si se tiene presente que donde exista una “participación prevalente”, el instrumento societario cae en manos del Estado y queda sujeto al servicio de sus fines..”. y es más, dicho autor, citado también por el doctor Ortiz Ortiz señala que “... decir que puesto que el ente (la sociedad) es privado, también la hacienda sigue siendo privada, es permanecer voluntariamente en la superficie sin profundizar en la realidad del fenómeno, que implica, en sustancia, una ampliación de la esfera pública a expensas de la privada, y en consecuencia, una restricción del ámbito en que opera la autonomía privada...” – Ferri, Luigi. “Impresiones de un jurista sobre las haciendas con participación estatal predominante”. Obra colectiva “La Empresa Pública” citada, volumen 2, página 1570 – lo que nos va delineando un aspecto de trascendental importancia en la causa que nos ocupa y es la determinación, tal y como lo estimó el tribunal de juicio, de la condición de públicos de los bienes negociados por los imputados a través del complejo empresarial A.V.C.. Debemos rescatar aquí el concepto de dominio accionario del Estado en estas sociedades anónimas, de modo tal que, aun cuando su conformación sea bajo este modelo, de aplicación del derecho privado, la condición de socio único o mayoritario del ente público “...hace imposible aplicar el derecho comercial común y la sociedad anónima del caso empieza a funcionar más bien como dependencia pública... – Ortiz Ortiz, op cita, página 6 – Comparte esta Sala plenamente el planteamiento del Doctor Ortiz Ortiz, por cuanto ciertamente, las consideraciones de “propietario” por parte del Estado de la sociedad anónima creada, el “interés público” que anima a su conformación y el “fin público” de su gestión, impiden una aplicación irrestricta de las normas comerciales comunes, y ello lo empezamos a observar a partir del momento mismo de la creación del ente societario, desde la perspectiva cuantitativa de los socios, pues en estas sociedades que, como A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., le pertenecen en un cien por ciento al Estado a través del ente público bancario, encontramos un único socio, en contraposición al numeral 104 del Código de Comercio que requiere para la formación de una sociedad anónima la existencia de por lo menos dos socios y que cada uno de ellos suscriba por lo menos una acción – inciso a) – lo que también guarda incidencia con los capítulos referidos a participación accionaria, de modo que, por solo estos motivos no podríamos aplicar en forma irrestricta, como lo pretende la defensa del enjuiciado González Lizano, el Código de Comercio en las consideraciones atinentes a este Almacén de Valores, y nuestra posición se fundamenta en la doctrina prácticamente de todas las latitudes; así se ha indicado que “ el régimen jurídico interno de los establecimientos públicos económicos está determinado por el Derecho Público, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a las relaciones entre el ente descentralizado y la administración central... dada la presencia del Estado en esas sociedades (con un solo socio público), surgen una serie de derogaciones al régimen y a la estructura de las sociedades mercantiles, que conducen a concluir en que la aplicabilidad de las normas de derecho comercial no puede ser total e íntegra. En primer lugar porque algunas disposiciones especiales que regulan estas sociedades establecen numerosas derogaciones expresas al régimen de las sociedades anónimas; por ejemplo, y entre otras que veremos, desaparece la pluralidad de socios y se establece generalmente la intransmisibilidad de las acciones del Estado, así como un control externo de la sociedad misma. Pero además, el hecho de ser un ente público accionista y el hecho de que esta sea el único socio, hace inaplicable en muchos casos el régimen jurídico de las sociedades anónimas o de responsabilidad limitada, ya que desaparecen órganos y faltan algunos requisitos esenciales...” Brewer Carías, Allan R. “ Las Empresas Públicas en el Derecho Comparado”. Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, 1967, páginas 115 y 116 – Nuestra doctrina nacional, también mantiene esta misma línea de pensamiento; así el doctor Ortiz Ortiz en el ensayo comentado señala que el derecho comercial que se aplica a las sociedades que son enteramente del Estado o de este en su mayoría, es entonces, uno modificado o especial, con inevitable predominio del interés y de la posición del Estado o ente público dueño, lo que se acrecienta cuando se analiza el régimen de las relaciones internas entre el ente público accionista y dueño – o socio dominante – y la sociedad en cuestión, por obra de esa misma preponderancia – Op cit página 7 – Por último sobre este tema cabría preguntarse las razones por las cuales un ente público, con sustento en legislación que así lo autoriza, crea o participa en entidades privadas conformadas bajo el modelo de sociedades privadas, si no va a tener las características y ventajas de uno de tal naturaleza, sin embargo la respuesta la encontramos en la flexibilidad y capacidad empresariales que permiten ejecutar los fines que el ente público se ha propuesto. Sobre el particular, desde 1984, analizando la procedencia de las sociedades anónimas y su consideración con respecto a la empresa pública, la Sala Primera Civil de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto 46-1984, en lo que nos interesa manifestó: “... tiene su razón de ser que el legislador se haya apoyado en la forma jurídica de los organismos de estructura privatista para que se realicen determinadas actividades empresariales con la participación del Estado. Esto se ha diseñado así para conceder a la gestión de la empresa el grado conveniente de ejecutividad, flexibilidad, elasticidad y capacidad empresariales, y para obtener una participación y colaboración mixtas convenientes para los fines directos e indirectos que se buscan en determinados casos...” De todo lo anterior se colige la importancia que va a tener, en la consideración de la sociedad anónima conformada por un ente público, el tema relativo a la propiedad del ente estatal como socio único de la empresa societaria, así como el interés público de aquella y por ende el carácter instrumental de la sociedad y el fin público perseguido, es por ello que discrepamos respetuosamente de algunas de las consideraciones emitidas por la Sala Constitucional en el voto número 1106-95 de las 10:27 horas del 24 de febrero de 1995 – cuya inaplicación reclama el recurrente - en lo referente a la interpretación de algunos conceptos, sobre todo en cuanto le resta importancia a las circunstancias atinentes a la “propiedad e interés público” en aquellas sociedades ligadas en su conformación a un ente estatal, antecendente jurisprudencial, sobre el cual el gestionante reprocha su inaplicación por el tribunal que dictó la sentencia que nos ocupa. Es conveniente aclarar los alcances de un voto emitido por la Sala Constitucional, en cuanto a su acatamiento obligatorio, o bien cuando se trate de meras opiniones o consideraciones jurídicas sobre un tema en particular. Así, su aplicación será erga homnes para la situación específica sobre la cual se está planteando la intervención del alto tribunal constitucional, o bien se pueda aplicar a situaciones similares a aquella sobre la que trata el pronunciamiento jurisdiccional. Sin embargo, para restantes situaciones, que no mantengan una relación de identidad con el caso en cuestión, un antecendente de esta naturaleza debe analizarse con especial cuidado, dentro de la perspectiva integral en que ha sido dictado, de modo que permita su aplicación en circunstancias diversas que no se relacionen estrictamente con lo resuelto, de modo que las apreciaciones de la Sala Constitucional que constituyan opiniones o interpretaciones jurídicas de un tema determinado, no resultan vinculantes, y por ende en ese sentido no se impone su aplicación obligatoria, como lo pretende el recurrente en este caso. Conviene ahora analizar el antecedente jurisprudencial citado, el cual se refiere a un recurso de amparo formulado contra la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, sociedad concesionaria de servicios públicos, que aun cuando constituye también una sociedad anónima dependiente de un ente público, mantiene una naturaleza diferente a la de un almacén general de depósito, como A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., ya aquí tendríamos una primera diferencia fundamental a la hora de solicitar su aplicación erga homnes; de allí que el fallo dictado resultaba de acatamiento obligatorio para el caso en cuestión y quizá para otras situaciones similares, en materia de amparo atinentes a las compañías concesionarias de servicios públicos, pero no para la causa que nos ocupa, de modo que no existiría ninguna obligación que vinculara a los jueces del tribunal de juicio ni a esta Sala de Casación a aplicar la resolución citada. Las consideraciones restantes contenidas en el voto dictado, se entienden como simples análisis jurídicos, no vinculantes, por lo que esta Cámara, dentro del planteamiento seguido en el tema puesto en nuestro conocimiento, aun cuando estime de interés algunos de sus planteamientos, que tomamos en consideración al resolver el motivo de casación antes señalado, se pemite discrepar en otros aspectos, en el tanto, como lo expusimos supra, si bien es cierto, las sociedades anónimas cuando son propiedad mayoritariamente de una institución pública, constituyen “en principio” una persona jurídica de derecho privado, no pueden mantener un tratamiento similar a cualquiera otra entidad de derecho privado, conformada únicamente por particulares, inyectada con capital privado y que cumple estrictamente fines particulares, pues deviene en inadmisible la idea de que el Estado pueda configurar una sociedad mercantil como único socio o participar de ella en forma mayoritaria, mediante actos o contratos de iguales características y alcances a los de una sociedad suscrita entre particulares, por ello es que, contrario a lo que sobre tales consideraciones, señala la Sala Constitucional en el voto de comentario, en nuestro criterio, sustentado en la doctrina nacional e internacional, dentro de un análisis de Derecho Comparado, así como en la normativa que nos rige, sí resulta de considerable importancia la determinación del carácter de propietario del ente estatal sobre la sociedad anónima conformada, su interés público y los fines también públicos que las rigen, pues lo contrario sería coadyuvar al establecimiento de un peligroso antecedente para que utilizando el mecanismo de creación de entidades privadas, sin mayor fiscalización, los entes públicos que las conformen distraigan o sustraigan los bienes del erario público que alimenta financieramente a esas sociedades privadas. Y resultan lógicas tales consideraciones porque podemos ya adelantar que sobre esta perspectiva, no puede ser más que pública también la naturaleza de los bienes que conforman por una parte el capital accionario de la sociedad anónima perteneciente al ente público, así como lo recursos inyectados por este a la empresa societaria, como sucedió entre el Banco Anglo Costarricense y A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., de allí que con justa razón el eminente publicista Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicara con absoluta contundencia que, una vez establecida la calidad de empresa pública de la sociedad anónima constituida por el ente público cuyo socio único o mayoritario es el Estado, una consecuencia inmediata del carácter público de la sociedad anónima como empresa, cuanto de su actividad como servicio público, es el carácter también público de su patrimonio que no puede administrarse internamente como si fuera privado – Op cit página 10 – lo que fundamenta con una cita jurisprudencial de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto número 98 de las 14:30 horas del 30 de julio de 1985 que en lo que interesa señala: “ Las sociedades nacionalizadas que se formen con el capital del Estado conservan su carácter público, por más que la organización y funcionamiento de ellas esté sometido al Derecho Privado, pues si bien jurídicamente el patrimonio le pertenece a la empresa, no se puede ignorar que en el tanto en el que este se desmejore, se afecta el capital, representado por las acciones, y que, por consiguiente, en esa misma medida se perjudica el patrimonio del Estado. Cabe agregar que, por esas mismas razones, el Estado tiene interés en el correcto funcionamiento de estas empresas.” Esta consideración sobre la naturaleza pública de los bienes que conforman el haber patrimonial de una sociedad anónima cuyo único socio sea el Estado, encuentra eco en algunas disposiciones normativas, a través de Decretos Ejecutivos, vigentes a la época en que sucedieron los hechos que nos ocupan, donde se determina sin lugar a dudas e interpretaciones el carácter de públicos que mantienen los fondos o recursos que administran las empresas estatales cuando operan como sociedades mercantiles. Así, con motivo de la creación de la Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo – CODESA – se determinó mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo 7927-H de fecha 12 de enero de 1978 que el Poder Ejecutivo, estimando conveniente que en el caso de este tipo de empresas, constituidas con las características de una sociedad anónima, regidas por la Ley que las crea en primer lugar, sus reglamentos y supletoriamente por el Código de Comercio, tengan un marco mínimo de legalidad que regule aspectos esenciales de su actividad y a la vez sean sujetos de fiscalización por parte de la Contraloría General de la República, considera necesario legislar en ese campo, dada la honda preocupación por las consecuencias que se puedan derivar de la falta de toma de decisiones en esta materia, por lo que mientras se promulga la legislación de referencia, estima prudente dictar un conjunto de disposiciones vía reglamento que brinden mayores seguridades a la correcta administración de los recursos administrados. Este Decreto se modificó mediante otro similar número 14666-H del 9 de mayo de 1983, sin embargo no se dio variación alguna a la determinación de públicos de los bienes que integran el patrimonio de estas particulares empresas, de naturaleza similar en cuanto a su confomación al del almacén general de depósito. Y ello no puede ser de otra manera en aras de la protección de los fondos públicos estatales, conforme lo indicamos supra. Determinado el carácter de los bienes administrados por estas sui generis sociedades anónimas, tales consideraciones nos permiten también afirmar que los directores de una empresa pública, tal y como ocurre en el caso que nos ocupa con la firma A.V.C., como sociedad anónima de un ente público – Banco Anglo Costarricense - que es su socio único, son funcionarios públicos por ser precisamente los jerarcas de dicho ente societario, y ello de conformidad con los mismos artículos 111, 112 y 113 todos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, cuya inobservancia reprocha el gestionante. Así, el artículo 111. 1 de la citada ley establece que “es servidor público la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva” – los destacados son nuestros – En el caso que nos ocupa A.V.C., como lo hemos venido sosteniendo, una vez que es adquirida por el Banco Anglo Costarricense, participando de su capital accionario en un 100%, se convierte en una empresa pública y por ende es parte de la Administración, y los imputados, como sus directores, prestatarios de un servicio a la Administración, son servidores públicos por ser los jerarcas de la empresa, lo que constituye un principio de Derecho Público relativo a las empresas públicas. Así “señala la doctrina administrativa que el hecho de que a esas entidades no se les aplique el Derecho Administrativo, en todo o parcialmente, no significa que no sean parte de la Organización Administrativa, pues se mantiene la conexión con la organización estatal, permaneciendo su carácter instrumental respecto de la misma” – Alonso Ureba Alberto. “La Empresa Pública”. Montecorvo, Madrid, 1985, página 299. citado por el Doctor Ortiz Ortiz en su ensayo mencionado – de modo tal que, interpretando los alcances del citado artículo 111.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, será servidor público aquel que preste una actividad a la Administración Pública aun cuando esta no mantenga un carácter imperativo, representantivo, remunerado, permanente o público, o bien la actividad desplegada sea privada o por simple contratación, caso dentro del cual se encuentra el director de la sociedad anónima de la cual el Estado es su propietario único, cuya labor primordial ni es imperativa ni está sujeta en principio al Derecho Público, dada la naturaleza del ente societario que dirige. Tales consideraciones no se muestran contradictorias con los presupuestos contenidos en los numerales 111.3 y 112.2 de la misma Ley General de la Administración Pública, pues dentro de una lógica integrada de ambas normas se advierte que tales disposiciones se aplican únicamente a los servidores públicos subordinados y no a los jerarcas que ejercen labores de dirección; y ello es así porque el primero de los numerales citados señala que no se considerarán servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común – 111.3 – determinándose también que las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participen de la gestión pública de la Administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 del anterior artículo 111, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil. Con relación a este tipo de empleados subordinados, estima esta Sala no pueden tomarse en consideración a quienes ejercen una labor de administración y fiscalización dentro de la empresa pública que conformada como sociedad anónima le pertenezca al ente público, pues tales funcionarios – gerentes, subgerentes y fiscales - sí participan de la gestión pública de la Administración en el tanto durante el desempeño de sus funciones, forman parte de la toma de decisiones de la empresa societaria, aun cuando no tengan derecho a voto dentro de las sesiones de Junta directiva, pero sí poseen derecho a voz, lo que les permite externar sus opiniones y generar una tendencia determinada en la toma de decisiones, o bien administran los fondos públicos que les inyecta la entidad estatal, siendo el brazo ejecutor directo y principal de la Junta directiva del ente societario, con capacidad directiva y jerárquica – gerente y subgerente - sobre los restantes mandos de la empresa – empleados, trabajadores y obreros – En todo caso, dentro de nuestra legislación, aun los servidores contenidos en los numerales 111.3 y 112.2 de la citada Ley, para efectos penales, se reputan como públicos. – artículo 112.4 ibidem – y ello es así “... para evitar que el servidor que labora para una empresa del Estado, se aproveche de su especial condición y pueda hacer uso indebido del patrimonio público de la empresa... lo que resulta plenamente ajustado al parámetro constitucional, en atención a los intereses que tutela, cuales son: la moralidad y legalidad administrativa y la protección del patrimonio público ...” – ver Voto número 6520-96 de ls 15:09 horas del 3 de diciembre de 1996. Sala Constitucional - de allí que en el caso que nos ocupa, todos los acusados mantienen la calidad de funcionarios públicos, siendo también públicos los fondos que el ente bancario al cual pertenecía A.V.C. le inyectaba para que pudiera desarrollar sus funciones, incluyendo las compras apalancadas en bonos de deuda externa, elementos esenciales para la determinación del tipo penal de Peculado por el cual se les condenó. Por todo lo expuesto, sin lugar el motivo invocado. [...] III. RECURSO DE CASACION [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO [...] Quinto motivo. Se reclama errónea aplicación del artículo 77 del Código Penal – sobre el delito continuado – por cuanto de lo que el tribunal tuvo por demostrado , se establece que las empresas se compraron con la finalidad de incursionar en la banca de inversión y comprar títulos de deuda externa, por lo que no se conforma un delito continuado, en el tanto dentro de la denominada tercera etapa de la sentencia, debió incluirse la compra del grupo de empresas A.V.C. y no separarla como se hizo, pues la penalidad en primer lugar es más alta y la misma ley indica que se aplicarán los presupuestos del delito continuado cuando los delitos fueren de una misma especie – peculado – y afecten bienes jurídicos patrimoniales – dineros del Banco Anglo Costarricense – y se persiga una misma finalidad – incursionar en la banca de inversión y comprar títulos de deuda externa – En opinión del recurrente la compra del grupo de empresas debe subsumirse en lo que el tribunal denominó tercera etapa, que fueron las compras apalancadas a partir del 27 de junio y hasta febrero de 1994, pues con lo descrito en la fase anterior, la segunda perseguía el mismo fin como lo señala la ley, y por ello aquella debe de quedar subsumida en esta última y aplicando las reglas del concurso, reducir la pena a cinco años que fue la sanción impuesta por la compra. El reclamo es parcialmente procedente. Conforme a los hechos tenidos por demostrados, tal y como lo señaló el tribunal, la causa en cuestión debe ser analizada en forma global y cronológica, pues cada hecho resulta ser el antecedente del siguiente – tomo 16 de la sentencia folio 4511 – puntualizando los juzgadores que ello era sí aun cuando los hechos realizados no conformaban una sola acción, sino que cada circunstancia fáctica constituía en sí misma un delito de Peculado, dividiendo los hechos acreditados, para una mejor comprensión, en tres fases que denominaron: Primera: de las compras al contado, atribuidas únicamente al imputado Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya; Segunda: de la compra de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias Boltec S.A. y ABC Valores S.A., donde se acusó tanto a Robles Macaya como a los miembros de la Junta Directiva del Banco Anglo Costarricense incluido el enjuiciado Carlos Manuel González Lizano; Tercera: de las compras apalancadas de Deuda Externa latinoAmericana, atribuida a todos los inculpados – Robles Macaya y Junta Directiva del ente bancario – Sin embargo pese a lo anterior, al momento de la calificación legal de los hechos y el establecimiento de las penas a imponer, el tribunal separa las fases y califica los hechos en cuanto a Robles Macaya, como dos delitos de Peculado en la modalidad de delito continuado – por las fases primera y tercera – más otro delito de Peculado – segunda fase – concursando materialmente estos tres ilícitos, por lo cual le impuso en razón de los dos delitos continuados de Peculado diez años de prisión por cada uno, y por el otro delito cinco años de prisión, para un total de 25 años. Por su parte, para cada uno de los miembros de la Junta Directiva, calificó los hechos en su contra como un delito de Peculado continuado – 7 compras apalancadas (fase tercera) – concursado materialmente con otro delito de Peculado – compra de A.V.C. (segunda fase) – imponiendo a cada uno la pena de diez años por el primer ilícito y cinco años por el segundo para un total de quince años de prisión. Tal forma de calificación legal y sanción punitiva, como bien lo señaló el recurrente respecto a su defendido Carlos Manuel González Lizano, imputado en las fases segunda y tercera, se muestra equivocada, pues dentro del planteamiento desarrollado por los jueces, en una perspectiva congruente y lógica, las conductas delictivas atribuidas a todos los acusados y tenidas por demostradas, deben ser concatenadas en un solo ilícito de Peculado en la modalidad de delito continuado, “donde cada hecho es el antecendente del siguiente” y en el tanto se cumplen los presupuestos objetivos y subjetivos establecidos en el numeral 77 del Código Penal que contempla su penalidad. Señala la norma de comentario que “cuando los delitos en concurso fueren de la misma especie y afecten bienes jurídicos patrimoniales, siempre que el agente persiga una misma finalidad, se aplicará la pena prevista para el más grave, aumentada hasta en otro tanto”. En el caso que nos ocupa, el tribunal estimó por una parte que los hechos acreditados constituían cada uno de ellos el delito de Peculado continuado, lo que esta Sala de Casación comparte, pues en efecto se encuentran determinados los presupuestos que conforman dicha figura relativa a la aplicación de la pena; así, nos encontramos ante delitos de la misma especie – peculado – que afectan bienes jurídicos patrimoniales; en cuanto a este aspecto, debemos aclarar que si bien es cierto el Peculado no contiene como bien jurídico fundamental el patrimonio, pues se trata de un delito cometido contra los Deberes de la Función Pública, referida al deber de probidad por parte del funcionario público en el desempeño de sus funciones, respecto a los bienes o dineros que administra, percibe o custodia, en razón de su cargo; sin embargo, por ser el Peculado un delito pluriofensivo, es innegable también la posible concurrencia de una lesión patrimonial derivada de la conducta delictiva realizada por el sujeto activo – funcionario público – traducida en la sustracción o distracción del dinero o bienes, cuya administración, percepción o custodia le ha sido confiada por razón del cargo. En consecuencia, siendo el requisito establecido en el numeral 77 del Código Penal, la afectación de bienes jurídicos patrimoniales, ello no implica que el delito sometido a continuación tenga como único bien jurídico el patrimonio pues “el delito continuado puede existir, aunque los actos de la continuación – que deben violar la misma norma – afecten, además de bienes jurídicos patrimoniales, otro bien jurídico” – Castillo González, Francisco. El concurso de Delitos en el Derecho Penal Costarricense, página 98 – Por último, en la especie, nos encontramos ante un delito continuado de Peculado, en el tanto los acusados, incluido el señor González Lizano, perseguían con su actividad ilícita una misma finalidad, cual era, conforme se desprende de los hechos acreditados, la realización de compras ilegales en Deuda Externa, permitiendo que Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. utilizara los fondos públicos en su beneficio, abriendo el camino para ulteriores negociaciones con esta empresa, que culminaron, con el concurso de todos los miembros de la Junta Directiva del ente bancario, en la compra ilegal del tantas veces mencionado Almacén de Valores Comerciales y sus subsidiarias y la subsiguiente adquisición de deuda externa latinoAmericana, internacionalizando los fondos públicos del Banco Anglo Costarricense a través de la creación del Anglo American Bank para así evitar los controles de las entidades estatales supervisoras de este tipo de gestiones. En la especie, el presupuesto relativo a una misma finalidad, se presenta con independencia de la estructuración que el tribunal le dio a los hechos dividiéndolos en las tres fases, en el tanto, dentro del propósito común que abrigaba a los acusados se conjuntaron todas las acciones desplegadas por los acusados para ejecutar el programa común – en ese mismo sentido, Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, página 102 – Sobre esta línea de pensamiento, conforme lo indicó el gestionante, la compra del grupo de empresas A.V.C. por parte del Banco Anglo Costarricense – segunda fase – realizada con el concurso de todos los acusados, unos como directores del ente bancario y el otro – Robles Macaya – como Gerente General de dicha institución, debe ser apreciado y valorado dentro de una perspectiva continuada, con las posteriores compras apalancadas de deuda externa latinoAmericana que se llevaron a cabo precisamente a través del complejo empresarial adquirido – tercera fase – sancionada dicha pluralidad de acciones como un solo delito de Peculado. Pese a lo anterior, los juzgadores, tal y como lo mencionamos supra no obstante considerar que la causa debía ser analizada globalmente, calificaron por separado cada una de las fases en que estructuraron el marco fáctico acreditado, concursándolas posteriormente mediante los presupuestos del concurso real, aunque manifestaron aplicar la penalidad del delito continuado. Tal inconsistencia deviene en inaceptable; sin embargo, no resulta pertinente acceder a las pretensiones del licenciado Solórzano Sánchez, quien solicita se aplique a su defendido una pena de cinco años de prisión como coautor del delito continuado de Peculado. En efecto, si bien es cierto el tribunal consideró al imputado Carlos Manuel González Lizano, como coautor del ilícito de Peculado por la compra de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias, en razón de lo cual se le impuso el tanto de cinco años de prisión, y como autor del delito de Peculado – traducido en las siete compras aplancadas de deuda externa – en la modalidad de delito continuado, imponiéndosele el tanto de cinco años de prisión como pena principal, aumentada en otro tanto para un total de diez años, siendo la sanción punitiva global de quince años conforme a las reglas del concurso material, tal calificación y aplicación punitiva, no es compartida por esta Cámara, por lo cual se modifica el fallo, conforme se dirá. Coincidentemente con lo señalado por el Doctor Francisco Castillo González, cuando da contestación al recurso de Casación formulado por los representantes del Ministerio Público, la penalidad aplicada por los juzgadores en esta causa no se adecua a los presupuestos del delito continuado de Peculado. Así, conforme a lo establecido en el numeral 352 (actualmente 354) del Código Penal, párrafo primero, será reprimido con prisión de tres a doce años, al funcionario público que sustrajere o distrajere dinero o bienes cuya administración, percepción o custodia le haya sido confiada por razón de su cargo. Por su parte, el artículo 77 ibidem, fija la penalidad del delito continuado indicando que “...se aplicará la pena prevista para el más grave - el destacado no es del original – aumentada hasta en otro tanto”. Ello implica que, para los efectos de la pena en abstracto, que es la primera que debe ser definida, en el caso del delito continuado de Peculado, el juzgador debe determinarla entre los límites mínimo y máximo previstos para dicho ilícito – que en este caso es el único que se manifiesta en continuación – es decir, entre tres y doce años de prisión, pudiéndola aumentar hasta en otro tanto, de tal manera que las penas máximas que pueden aplicarse oscilan entre 6 y 24 años de prisión. Establecida la pena en abstracto procederá el juzgador a determinar la sanción punitiva en concreto entre estos dos últimos límites, de tal manera que la pena para el delito de Peculado continuado, no puede ser inferior a seis años de prisión ni sobrepasar en todo caso los veinticuatro años. Aplicado lo anterior al caso en cuestión, estimando que estamos en presencia de un delito de Peculado en la modalidad de delito continuado cometido por el acusado Carlos Manuel González Lizano, la pena concreta se fija en el monto de seis años de prisión aumentada en otro tanto para un total de doce años de prisión, en aplicación de la penalidad del delito continuado, de conformidad con lo establecido en el numeral 77 del Código Penal, lo que no vulnera los principios de la no reforma en perjuicio contemplada en el artículo 459 del Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973 aplicable al caso en cuestión, en el tanto las modificaciones que aquí se determinan no perjudican los intereses del acusado González Lizano en cuanto a la especie y cantidad de pena impuestas por los juzgadores, que en este caso fue de quince años de prisión, sin que sea aceptable considerar que la pena límite que debe ser respetada en aras de la aplicación del principio de no reformatio in peius, tal y como lo pretende el recurrente, sea la de cinco años de prisión, pues como claramente lo hemos definido supra, la sanción punitiva concreta mínima que puede ser impuesta para el delito continuado de Peculado es de seis años. Considera esta Sala de Casación que el nuevo monto de pena impuesto se fundamenta en lo medular en los razonamientos establecidos por el tribunal al fijar la pena principal, en aplicación de los presupuestos contenidos en el artículo 71 del Código Penal, pero adecuándola a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, dada la recalificación legal señalada. En aplicación del principio sobre el efecto extensivo del recurso de casación contenido en el artículo 455 del Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973, lo resuelto en cuanto a las consideraciones sobre la calificación legal de los hechos y la sanción punitiva impuesta relativas al acusado González Lizano, resultan aplicables también al imputado Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, a quien se le debe tener como coautor del delito de Peculado en su modalidad de delito continuado, aplicándosele la pena de seis años de prisión aumentada en otro tanto para una pena total de doce años de prisión, con fundamento en las razones anteriormente establecidas para dicha cuantificación. En consecuencia, se declara parcialmente con lugar el motivo impuesto por el recurrente, modificándose la calificación legal de los hechos atribuidos en contra de Carlos Manuel González Lizano a un delito de Peculado en su modalidad de delito continuado cometido en perjuicio del Estado, disminuyéndose la pena a doce años de prisión. Por el efecto extensivo del recurso de casación, la modificación realizada se aplica en iguales circunstancias al acusado Arturo Fallas Zúñiga. En los demás aspectos en que no sufra modificación el fallo se mantiene inalterable. [...] V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: Primer motivo. [...] Nuestra Carta Magna en su artículo 39 consagra el principio de legalidad constitucional, de modo que nadie puede ser sancionado si no existe una ley anterior que así lo determina y en virtud de una sentencia dictada por autoridad competente. Conforme al marco fáctico tenido por demostrado y al que los recurrentes no se sujetan, el imputado Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya fue condenado por el delito de Peculado, estimando el tribunal en la resolución que nos ocupa que con sus actuaciones ilícitas incurrió en ese delito mediante la distracción de los fondos públicos cuya administración le había sido confiada en razón de su cargo como Gerente General del Banco Anglo Costarricense, acciones desplegadas en total inobservancia al deber de probidad a la que como funcionario público estaba obligado. En esta distracción de fondos el acusado incurrió en una serie de vulneraciones a la normativa bancaria imperante al momento de su comisión, contempladas en la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional – LOSBN -, la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, la Ley sobre Almacenes Generales de Depósito, la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central –LOBC - y principios generales contenidos en la Constitución Política y la Ley General de Administración Pública, así como directrices que sobre la materia establecía el propio Banco Central de Costa Rica y la Comisión Nacional de Valores. El Decreto-Ley de Nacionalización Bancaria número 71 del 21 de junio de 1948, nacionalizó la Banca particular estableciendo que en adelante solo el Estado podría movilizar, a través de sus instituciones bancarias propias, los depósitos del público, perfilando ya la orientación crediticia requerida por las circunstancias económicas que atravesaba en ese momento el país, tendente a materializar todas las reformas bancarias necesarias para hacer efectiva la nacionalización ordenada, y si bien es cierto, no se indica aquí la naturaleza de la banca que se perseguía, ya para 1953 con la emisión de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central número 1552 del 23 de abril de 1953, se determinan los fines y orientación de ese ente, destinándose Desarrollo – artículo 1 – encargado de promover el ordenado desarrollo de la economía costarricense dentro del propósito de lograr la ocupación plena de los recursos productivos de la Nación, estando obligado a evitar la inactividad de los medios de producción cuando esta sea causada por falta de crédito oportuno y a impulsar la diversificación paulatina de la producción nacional hacia aquellos artículos que fortalezcan la balanza de pagos del país – artículo 4 -. Tales disposiciones normativas manifiestan sin lugar a dudas, que la naturaleza de la banca que se perseguía en nuestro país, a partir de la nacionalización, es una banca de desarrollo fundamentalmente y no una banca de inversión, postulados que recoge posteriormente la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional cuando define las funciones esenciales de los bancos comerciales estableciendo entre otras: evitar que haya en el país medios de producción inactivos, buscando al productor para poner a su servicio los medios económicos y técnicos de que dispone el sistema – artículo 3 inciso 4) – disposiciones normativas que debían regir las actuaciones del imputado Robles Macaya en el ejercicio de sus funciones públicas, pero que, como bien lo señaló el tribunal, fueron inobservadas flagrantemente, porque aun estimando que sea factible que los bancos incurran en actividades propias de la banca de inversión, ello no es una actividad irrestricta, sin controles, y en el fallo quedó plenamente desmostrado que Robles Macaya lo que perseguía era una incursión en este tipo de banca sin fiscalización alguna, vulnerando sus deberes legalmente establecidos. La Constitución Política señala a los Bancos del Estado como instituciones autónomas – artículo 189 inciso 1- que gozan de independencia administrativa pero están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno – artículo 188 ibidem – principio que se traduce en el numeral 2 de la Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional, y por formar tales instituciones parte de la Administración Pública están obligados a actuar conforme al ordenamiento jurídico pudiendo solamente realizar aquellos actos o servicios públicos autorizados, es decir, que los funcionarios públicos que conforman las entidades financieras del Estado se encuentran sujetos al principio de legalidad. Estas consideraciones nos permiten señalar que, contrario a lo que señalan los impugnantes, el marco fáctico que el tribunal le atribuye a su defendido, no está permitido a cualquier banco estatal, en el tanto, la normativa jurídico – bancaria vigente al momento de los hechos no facultaba desde ningún punto de vista, que un funcionario público que administre, perciba o custodie fondos públicos, incurra en su distracción, faltando al deber de probidad a que está obligado en razón de su cargo. Si bien es cierto los Bancos comerciales se rigen en su organización por el Derecho Público, pero en su actividad por el Derecho Privado, las operaciones realizadas por el acusado Robles Macaya, que conforman los hechos dolosos demostrados, en la forma en que fueron llevados a cabo están prohibidos en las actuaciones del imputado Robles Macaya, no en el hecho de que realizara inversiones en deuda externa, ya fuera costarricense o de otras naciones latinoAmericanas, pues obviamente estaba facultado para ello dentro de los fines permitidos a los bancos comerciales en esa materia – artículo 61.7 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional -; tampoco se le condena porque las inversiones aludidas pudieran tener un riesgo comercial lógico e inherente a ellas; o bien porque realizara operaciones de las conocidas como “sobre el mostrador” – “over the counter” - ; o porque no siguiera negociando con el puesto bursátil Interbolsa. Tampoco se le está condenando por utilizar, pura y simplemente, el sistema de apalancamiento a efecto de incrementar el monto de las inversiones a realizar. El tribunal determinó la responsabilidad penal del inculpado Robles Macaya, porque en el ejercicio de su funciones incurrió en una serie de ilicitudes que, con pleno conocimiento y voluntad de su parte, contribuyeron esencialmente a aumentar el riesgo en las transacciones realizadas, violentando las normas que regían el desempeño bancario, pues contrario a lo que establecen los impugnantes, el imputado, como Gerente General de un ente bancario, obligado por ley a ejercer sus funciones inherentes a su condición de administrador general, dentro de una plena observancia de las leyes y reglamentos así como al cumplimiento de las resoluciones de la Junta Directiva – artículo 41 ibidem – no le era permitido, negociar con entidades financieras como Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., que no eran de primer orden reconocidas por la Junta Directiva del Banco Central, y que carecían de la autorización para realizar oferta pública de títulos valores o para prestar servicios de intermediación bursátil en el territorio nacional otorgada por la Comisión Nacional de Valores, como lo demandaban en aquel momento la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores número 7201 del 18 de setiembre de 1990 y las directrices del Banco Central de Costa Rica, como promotor de las condiciones favorables al robustecimiento, liquidez, solvencia y buen funcionamiento de los Bancos que integraban el Sistema Bancario Nacional y director superior del crédito bancario, vigilante y coordinador de estos – artículo 5 incisos 5 y 7 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica –. Para la época en que se realizaron las transacciones cuestionadas, ATF no estaba inscrita como entidad de primer orden, ya que desde principios de 1990 había sido rechazada como tal por el Banco Central, ni tenía autorización de la Comisión Nacional de Valores para realizar tales negocios, sin que el imputado realizara la más mínima gestión para asegurar tales condiciones, lo que aumentó el riesgo de las transacciones realizadas dejando desprotegido al ente bancario estatal. Pero además, como ya lo hemos manifestado supra, el acusado distrajo los fondos públicos al extralimitar la oferta de venta de bonos y la línea de crédito ofrecida por ATF en representación del Internationale Nederlanden Bank, permitiendo el pago de sobreprecios a cargo del BAC, al trasladar con antelación a la fecha de pago convenida, los fondos públicos, poniéndolos a disposición de ATF para que esta comprara en el mercado internacional los bonos de deuda externa y se los vendiera al banco a mayor precio, permitiendo el cambio en la posición de esa empresa, al pasar de intermediario a vendedor directo, con el consecuente efecto en el cobro de ganancias o utilidades, extendiendo el monto invertido más allá de los límites para los que fue autorizado, comprometiendo la liquidez de la institución bancaria y permitiendo que los bonos nunca estuvieran a su nombre y por ende que careciera de disponibilidad negociable sobre ellos, lo que riñe con los principios de seguridad, solvencia y liquidez que deben privar en las negociaciones de los bancos comerciales, conforme a la ley – artículo 3 de la Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional –. Asimismo, el tribunal condena al acusado Robles Macaya, por su decidida participación ilícita en la compra de las empresas A.V.C. y sus subsidiarias, con todas las ilegalidades que en ella se cometieron, todo con el fin, como él mismo lo manifestó en la sesión de Junta directiva del BAC número 25-3/93 del 23 de marzo de 1993, de incursionar en la banca de inversión que les estaba vedada en ese momento y sobre lo que él era plenamente consciente, captar sin encaje ni límite de apalancamiento, conceder y solicitar créditos del exterior sin autorización, lo que denota sin lugar a dudas, el carácter doloso de las actuaciones del incriminado, y la clara determinación de evitar controles y fiscalizaciones de los entes financieros correspondientes. Se condena a Robles Macaya, por haber incurrido en apalancamientos al negociar bonos de deuda externa, que sometieron al ente bancario a un fuerte compromiso económico, que lo hizo incurrir en el pago de altas sumas por intereses producto de los créditos apalancados y que a la postre concurrieron a la pérdida de todo el portafolio de inversiones del BAC que tiempo antes ya había sido traspasado a A.V.C., derivándose de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional y de la propia Ley Orgánica del Banco Central que para este tipo de negocios apalancados atinentes a créditos que provenían del exterior, los imputados debían contar necesariamente con la autorización del Banco Central como regulador de la moneda, la banca, el crédito y el cambio exterior – relación de los artículos 6 y 121 de la LOBC, 14 y 74 de la LOSBN –. Se sancionó también al imputado por revertir principios básicos de protección al inversionista anteponiendo el rendimiento antes que la seguridad. Olvidan los impugnantes en su reclamo, que los recursos manejados por su defendido eran FONDOS PÚBLICOS, y no podían recibir el mismo tratamiento riesgoso que cualquier otro inversionista particular que arriega el patrimonio en inversiones u operaciones aceptando que puede perder mucho o bien ganar mucho, características propias de las negociaciones especulativas y riesgosas, que contrario a las afirmaciones de los recurrentes, riñen con los principios generales de liquidez, solvencia, seguridad y riesgo racional que legalmente determinan las negociaciones en que se encuentran involucrados bienes de esta naturaleza, y que no solo se trasladan a las condiciones de los títulos mobiliarios que pueda transar un banco comercial, como restrictivamente lo interpretan los gestionantes. Se ha indicado que el ordenamiento jurídico no permite, que con recursos del erario público, se incurra en inversiones riesgosas y especulativas, pues si bien es cierto la LOSBN en su artículo 27, permite asumir a los funcionarios bancarios un riesgo comercial aceptable, ello va aparejado de una adecuada proporción con la naturaleza de la operación emprendida, siempre que no se haya actuado con dolo o culpa y dentro de una sana negociación bancaria, extremos de aceptabilidad que no resultan aplicables a la conducta delictiva desplegada por el acusado, donde como en forma amplia se expuso, elevó a niveles sorprendentes el riesgo de las operaciones realizadas en detrimento de los intereses económicos del banco estatal, provocando su colapso financiero. No puede interpretarse, como lo señalan los recurrentes que el riesgo comercial, racional y aceptable en este tipo de transacciones pueda ser interpretado como una autorización legal para realizar negocios especulativos; pues la especulación no tiene cabida en las negociaciones con fondos públicos, entendiéndola “como la acción o práctica de comprar o vender bienes, acciones y participaciones, etc., con el propósito de ganar por las subidas y caídas en los valores de mercado, a diferencia de la negociación o inversión normal” – ver Oxford Universal Dictionary. Volumen 3, p.514 – en el tanto esta forma de negociación riñe abiertamente también con los principios generales de seguridad jurídica y financiera, riesgo racional y liquidez inherentes a una operación financiera bajo esas condiciones, y no puede un Banco estatal, así como ninguna otra institución pública, exponer su patrimonio a los vaivenes irrestrictos del mercado. Por ello, se declara sin lugar el reclamo. [...] V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: [...] Quinto motivo. Se reclama la aplicación incorrecta de los artículos 57, 58, 71, 354 y 358 todos del Código Penal e inobservancia de los numerales 1, 2 y 24 ibidem y 39 de la Constitución Política, en el tanto el tribunal condenó al imputado Robles Macaya por 17 delitos de Peculado – nueve compras al contado y ocho recompras apalancadas – y le impuso 25 años de prisión por conductas que según el análisis de los juzgadores son culposas – menosprecio del cuidado que debió tener según las circunstancias - Sobre las nueve primeras compras: Indican los recurrentes que a Robles Macaya se le reprocha no haberse cerciorado que ATF fuera en realidad representante del NMB Bank, así como haberle girado directamente los recursos a aquella empresa, de manera que se permitió a los coimputados rebeldes José Luis y Mariano ambos López Gómez, dueños de ATF, llevar a cabo compras en la banca internacional por cuenta y nombre propio y no como gestor o representante del Banco Anglo Costarricense, como debió ser de acuerdo con la oferta aprobada por la Junta Directiva, por lo que se le reprocha a Robles Macaya una conducta negligente que no conlleva dolo. El reclamo no es de recibo. El tipo subjetivo en el delito de Peculado –dolo - conforme a nuestra legislación, viene a estar conformado por la voluntad en el sujeto activo - que necesariamente tiene que estar investido de la calidad de funcionario público – dirigida a sustraer o distraer dinero o bienes, cuya administración, percepción o custodia le han sido confiados en razón de su cargo, con pleno conocimiento que tales bienes son públicos pues le pertenecen a la Administración Pública, de allí que el dolo es el saber – conocimiento – y querer – voluntad – la realización de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal. En consecuencia, el agente cometerá el delito de Peculado por sustracción o distracción - artículo 354 párrafo 1 del Código Penal – cuando, aun sin una finalidad dirigida al aprovechamiento propio o de terceros, con pleno conocimiento de su función y del carácter público de los bienes o dineros que en razón de su cargo administre, perciba o custodie, dirija su voluntad a sustraerlos o distraerlos, violentando los deberes de probidad a los que está obligado en el desempeño de sus funciones; y lo anterior lo afirmamos, porque la finalidad específica de provecho propio o a favor de terceros solo la contempla en forma expresa el párrafo segundo de la norma mencionada, referida a lo que se denomina “peculado de servicios”, cuando bajo esos presupuestos, el funcionario público emplee trabajos o servicios pagados por la Administración. En el caso que nos ocupa, con fundamento en los hechos probados por el tribunal de juicio, contrario a las afirmaciones de los recurrentes, las acciones desplegadas por el acusado Robles Macaya, lejos de considerarse conductas culposas – negligencia – resultaron ser acciones carentes de probidad, cuando en el ejercicio de sus funciones como Gerente General de un Banco estatal, distrajo los fondos que administraba, con el pleno conocimiento que le pertenecían a la Administración Pública y dirigió su voluntad a la realización de negociaciones con bonos de deuda externa, en condiciones absolutamente irregulares – compras al contado – y posteriormente participa en la compra de las empresas A.V.C., que es la fase donde se revela con mayor propiedad su actuar doloso y lo manifiesta expresamente indicando la verdadera finalidad perseguida con la compras de tales empresas, sobre la que ampliamente nos hemos referido supra, y que se materializa después cuando con el consenso y la participación de los restantes imputados ejecutan la compras apalancadas, y es precisamente en esa dimensión en que se entiende el razonamiento y las conclusiones del tribunal, pues como se ha determinado con anterioridad, los hechos ilícitos atribuidos al incriminado Robles Macaya, y en general a todos los inculpados, deben ser analizados conjuntamente, dentro de una visión integrada, donde cada uno de las acciones cometidas es el antecendente de la siguiente, y no cabe la menor duda que Robles Macaya dirigió su actuar consciente y voluntario hacia la consecución de sus fines delictivos. Sin lugar el reclamo formulado. V. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] RECURSO POR EL FONDO: [...] Sexto motivo. [...] Tal y como lo indicamos supra, el Peculado, en su modalidad de sustracción y distracción de dineros o bienes públicos, conforme a nuestra legislación, no exige necesariamente ya sea como elemento subjetivo del injusto, o bien como elemento objetivo del tipo, el aprovechamiento propio o a favor de terceros de esos dineros o bienes públicos, elemento que sí se presenta en el Peculado de servicios contenido en el párrafo segundo del numeral 354 del Código Penal, cuando el funcionario público emplea con esos fines servicios o trabajos pagados por la Administración. Lo anteriormente señalado se establece sin perjuicio de que en la realización de las conductas ilícitas, surja el factor “provecho” al que hemos hecho referencia, y que en la mayoría de los casos va aparejado con la comisión de las mismas. De allí que, en la causa que nos ocupa, aun cuando a Robles Macaya y a los restantes imputados no se les hubiera comprobado el aprovechamiento en su beneficio o a favor de terceros derivado de sus actos distractores, la figura del Peculado, por la que luego se les condena y sanciona penalmente, no se ve desnaturalizada ni desvirtuada, en el tanto resultaba suficiente para su configuración que los incriminados, en el desempeño de sus funciones, con pleno y absoluto conocimiento, dirigieran sus voluntades a distraer los fondos públicos que administraban en razón de sus cargos, uno como gerente general del Banco – Robles Macaya – y los otros como directivos del ente bancario y administradores del complejo empresarial A.V.C., vulnerando sus deberes de probidad en el manejo de los recursos estatales, enmarcados dentro de las leyes y reglamentos que los funcionarios públicos están obligados a cumplir en el desempeño de las funciones públicas. Pese a lo anterior, conforme al elenco de hechos probados en el fallo recurrido, si bien es cierto no se demostró el aprovechamiento personal de los imputados, sus actuaciones carentes de probidad, enfocadas a la realización de las diferentes negociaciones en bonos de Deuda Externa, donde antepusieron el rendimiento de las inversiones sobre la seguridad, tanto en aquellas atribuidas exclusivamente al imputado Robles Macaya – compras al contado – como las que luego este último comparte en responsabilidad con los restantes acusados, permitieron el provecho económico de los fondos públicos de la empresa Ariana Trading and Finance Inc., la que conforme se demostró contablemente tuvo una utilidad cercana a los diecisiete millones de dólares – US $17MM – del total de pérdidas en que incurrió el ente bancario que fue superior a los cincuenta y siete millones de dólares – US $57MM - quien nunca entró en disponibilidad negociable sobre dichos títulos valores, la que permaneció siempre a favor de ATF. [...] VI.- RECURSOS DE CASACIÓN [...] PRIMERA PARTE [...] Primer motivo [...] El delito de Peculado, como bien lo señala el quejoso, presenta como elementos objetivos: la calidad de funcionario público del agente; la acción de sustraer o distraer; la condición de “públicos” de los bienes o dinero sustraídos o distraídos por el agente; y que esos bienes o dinero, al momento de la comisión del ilícito, estén bajo la administración, percepción o custodia del funcionario público en razón de su cargo. El impugnante, en apoyo de su tesis sobre la ausencia de objeto material de la acción atribuida a sus defendidos – bienes públicos – quienes actuarían, desde su óptica, bajo un error de tipo al revés, se aparta sustancialmente del marco fáctico acreditado, aislando la compra de A.V.C. y sus subsidiarias atribuida a sus clientes como directivos del Banco Anglo Costarricense, de los hechos que la antecedieron y que constituyen las denominadas compras al contado de bonos de Deuda Externa costarricense, venezolana y brasileña, que si bien es cierto, a nivel de responsabilidad penal solo se le imputan al Gerente General del ente bancario, Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, no eran desconocidas por los directores aquí acusados, pues fueron precisamente ellos, en el ejercicio de sus cargos, los que autorizaron a Robles Macaya para que realizara las referidas compras de bonos al contado, hasta por un monto de veinte millones de dólares $20MM – y aceptaron tácitamente, sin mayor reproche, que el citado Robles Macaya se extralimitara en el monto autorizado con esos fines, llegando a invertir más de treinta y siete millones de dólares $37MM – con su absoluta complacencia. Este conocimiento de los representados del impugnante, resulta de vital importancia para determinar el elemento del tipo objetivo de Peculado relativo a la condición de dinero o bienes públicos como objeto material de la acción imputada, empleados posteriormente por los acusados en la compra del grupo de empresas A.V.C., quienes tenían pleno dominio cognitivo sobre el carácter de los mismos, en el tanto le pertenecían a la Administración Pública provenientes del Banco estatal en el que prestaban sus servicios. Conforme a los hechos tenidos por demostrados, esos bonos adquiridos de contado por el BAC con sus propios recursos económicos, espcíficamente los de fechas 24 de febrero y 10 de mayo, ambos de 1993, sirven para cancelar parte del precio acordado por la venta de las relacionadas empresas, al ser intercambiados por las acciones del complejo A.V.C., de allí que, contrario a lo que señala el impugnante, el delito de Peculado atribuido a sus representados en esta segunda fase del hecho delictivo, sí contiene el objeto material de la acción exigida para su configuración, cual es la condición de públicos de los bienes empleados para la adquisición cuestionada, sin que tal circunstancia se vea desvirtuada por la falta de disponibilidad negociable que sobre los títulos valores tuvo el BAC, y que es precisamente uno de los factores que inciden en la ilegalidad de las negociaciones llevadas a cabo por los imputados. En consecuencia, deviene en inexistente el error de tipo al revés reclamado por el gestionante, sin que resulte admisible pensar que los acusados, como miembros de la Junta Directiva de la institución bancaria, actuaron bajo la creencia de que los bienes empleados en la cuestionada compra del complejo empresarial, eran públicos pues le pertenecían al Banco, cuando no lo eran, al carecer del elemento de propiedad sobre tales bienes. Sobre este último aspecto – propiedad – conviene señalar que todas las negociaciones con los fondos públicos atribuidas a los imputados, en las tres diferentes etapas de su incursionar, efectivamente se materializaron, aunque dentro de un entorno de ilegalidad ya conocido, siendo parte de la conducta dolosa de los acusados acreditada por el tribunal, el permitir que los bonos adquiridos permanecieran en disposición de ATF y no del BAC, de allí la necesariedad de que fuera con esa entidad financiera y no con otra que se realizaran las negociaciones, lo que aumentó el factor de riesgo y el compromiso económico del ente bancario, resultando inaceptable que los acusados se prevalezcan del despliegue delictivo de sus acciones para venir a alegar en su favor precisamente la falta de disponibilidad para el Banco sobre los títulos valores adquiridos que ellos mismos contribuyeron a causar. Contrario a lo que señala el recurrente, la sentencia no solo tuvo por demostrada la simple adquisición irregular o ilegal de bienes o dineros por un ente público, sino que, ateniéndonos al marco fáctico acreditado, los juzgadores lograron comprobar, con sustento en el acervo probatorio examinado, la distracción de bienes públicos por parte de los directores bancarios acusados, tanto en lo relativo a la compra de A.V.C. y sus subsidiarias, como en las posteriores compras apalancadas en Deuda Externa, con pleno conocimiento de su condición de funcionarios públicos, así como del origen de los dineros y bienes utilizados y que en razón de su cargo administraban, vulnerando sus deberes de probidad a los que estaban obligados. [...] VI.- RECURSOS DE CASACIÓN [...] PRIMERA PARTE [...] Tercer motivo. El recurrente reclama la indebida aplicación de los numerales 57, 58, 71, 354 y 358 todos del Código Penal e inaplicación de los artículos 1, 2 y 24 última parte del mismo cuerpo legal; 39 de la Constitución Política, al condenar a los imputados por Peculado, en un hecho en el que no existe objeto material de la acción, en custodia, percepción o administración de un funcionario público por razón de su cargo. Indica el gestionante que la sentencia tuvo por cierto que los bonos de deuda externa venezolana y brasileña, que fueron intercambiados por las acciones de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias, se encontraban depositados en la cuenta de custodia de Ariana Trading and Finance en el ING Bank y en posesión y titularidad de esta, y siendo que los imputados – Robles Macaya y la Junta Directiva – son los funcionarios públicos que el fallo estima involucrados en la compra ilegal de A.V.C. Valores y sus subsidiarias, no podían girar en la cuenta custodia de ATF ni podían ordenarle a José Luis López Gómez, dentro de la cadena jerárquica de mando, que girara en esa cuenta, por lo que ninguno de los imputados tenía la custodia, percepción ni administración de esos bonos con que se hizo el canje por acciones de A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias, que es un elemento requerido por el artículo 354 del Código Penal para configurar el tipo objetivo, pues la administración real, en el caso de los bonos estaba en manos de ATF, y ni esta por ser persona jurídica ni José Luis López Gómez, como administrador de ATF eran funcionarios públicos. De allí que, en criterio del impugnante, la sentencia comete el error de tener por cierto que la Junta Directiva del Banco Anglo Costarricense y Robles Macaya tenían la administración de los bonos, incurriendo en un error de subsunción, que se comete al momento de ver si la conducta encuadra en un tipo penal, pues considera que sobre los bonos, que estaban en poder de un tercero y no de un funcionario público por razón de su cargo, la Junta Directiva o Robles Macaya tenían la administración de ellos por razón de su cargo, cuando no puede tenerlos funcionario público alguno, si esos bonos no estaban dentro de una esfera administrativa de custodia, y la cuenta de ATF en el ING Bank no es evidentemente una esfera administrativa de custodia. Estima el recurrente que en esta situación los acusados actuaron en la falsa creencia de que existía un elemento de la tipicidad del delito de Peculado, cual es el objeto material de la acción, y no era así, existiendo una imposibilidad absoluta para consumar el ilícito, es decir se dio un error de tipo al revés, resultando un delito imposible y por ende el hecho acusado es impune. El reclamo no es atendible. En lo que interesa, se remite a los argumentos señalados al resolver el primero de los motivos que se reprochan. Conforme a los hechos tenidos por demostrados, parte del plan ilícito de los acusados era permitir que los bonos adquiridos con los fondos públicos estuvieran a nombre y disposición de Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. y no a nombre y disponibilidad del Banco, precisamente para evitar los controles de las entidades fiscalizadoras y desarrollar así negociaciones que estaban prohibidas por la normativa bancaria imperante, circunstancias que eran de pleno conocimiento de los acusados según lo tuvo por demostrado el fallo, y que el recurrente inobserva. Administrar, de acuerdo a la Real Academia de la Lengua Española, entre otras acepciones significa “dirigir una institución. Ordenar, disponer, organizar, en especial la hacienda o los bienes” – Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Vigésima. Segunda edición. 2001. Madrid. Tomo I, p.47 – Referida a la administración de fondos públicos, administrar es darle al caudal que se le confía al funcionario público el destino que la legislación dispone dirigido a la consecución del bienestar común, que el Estado se propone. Si bien es cierto una forma de administrar los bienes del erario público va aparejada a su tenencia material por parte del funcionario encargado en razón de sus funciones, esta no es la única forma de administración, pudiendo hacerlo también el que solo mantenga sobre dichos bienes la disponibilidad jurídica, siempre y cuando esa administración le haya llegado al funcionario público en razón de sus funciones. En el caso que nos ocupa los fondos públicos empleados por los justiciables en las diferentes operaciones ilícitas realizadas, tienen su origen en las denominadas compras al contado, que aun cuando solo se le atribuyeron a Robles Macaya, se llevaron a cabo con la complacencia y autorización de los restantes inculpados como directivos bancarios, estando dichos fondos públicos bajo la administración de todos los imputados en razón de sus respectivos cargos, como lo estaban también al realizar las compras apalancadas, pues eran los recursos financieros del Banco los que alimentaban a las empresas A.V.C. para efectuar las adquisiciones en bonos de Deuda Externa apalancada, lo que no se desvirtúa por el hecho de que en garantía de los préstamos otorgados por ATF, los mismos bonos comprados quedaban en posesión de la entidad financiera contratante, en el tanto las acciones distractoras de fondos estaban ya consumadas, bastando para ello que los bienes o dineros públicos al momento en que se realizaron las cuestionadas negociaciones estuvieran bajo administración de los imputados en razón del ejercicio de sus cargos, como en efecto ocurrió. Sin lugar el motivo. [...] VII. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN [...] Recurso por el fondo. Primer motivo. Se reclama la errónea interpretación de los artículos 22, 76 y 77 en relación al 352 – ahora 354 – todos del Código Penal, al considerar el tribunal que en las primeras nueve inversiones de bonos de deuda externa adquiridas en forma directa – sin financiamientos ilegales – y en la compra de las ocho inversiones con apalancamientos ilegales de deuda externa venezolana y brasileña, los peculados se dieron en la modalidad del delito continuado. Consideran los recurrentes que en el delito de peculado el bien jurídico tutelado no es el patrimonio sino la probidad en el ejercicio de los deberes de la función pública, y por ello, la lesión al patrimonio no es un elemento objetivo, configurativo del tipo penal aplicado, razón por la cual este delito no reúne los requisitos que expresamente señala el artículo 77 del Código Penal y que es la afectación de bienes jurídicos patrimoniales. Para los impugnantes, las delincuencias realizadas por los imputados se dieron en concurso material. Indican los representantes del Ministerio Público que la doctrina establece que el delito de peculado no protege en forma específica la propiedad como en otras delincuencias, sino la seguridad de su afectación a los fines para los cuales se le ha creado o reunido, y que se caracteriza por el anormal manejo de los bienes por quienes funcionalmente los tienen a su cargo, para hacerlos cumplir con su finalidad o bien para preservarlos para esos fines. Señalan que en la especie, el concurso de delitos en que incurren los acusados es de la misma especie, pero no afectan un bien jurídico patrimonial, sino como ya indicaron , la probidad en el ejercicio de los deberes de la función pública, por lo que cada uno de los hechos que se tienen por acreditados, concurren materialmente debiéndose aplicar las penas correspondientes por cada uno de los delitos cometidos. Así, para el imputado Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya solicitan 10 años de prisión por cada uno de los nueve delitos de peculado – primeras 9 inversiones – para un total de noventa años de prisión, en calidad de autor, y como coautor, solicitan 10 años de prisión por cada uno de los ocho delitos de peculado relativos a las inversiones apalancadas en deuda externa venezolana y brasileña, para un total de ochenta años, lo que contabiliza globalmente en la suma de ciento setenta años de prisión. Por su parte, la representación del Ministerio Público solicita para los imputados, Franz Amrhrein Pinto, Ronald Fernández Pinto, Carlos Manuel González Lizano, Carlos Enrique Osborne Escalante, Edwin Salazar Arroyo y Arturo Fallas Zúñiga, la pena de 10 años de prisión a cada uno de ellos como coautores de 7 delitos de peculado por las inversiones apalancadas, para un total de 70 años de prisión para cada uno de ellos. Y para todos los imputados, el ente fiscal solicita cinco años de prisión por la compra del grupo de empresas A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias. El reclamo no es de recibo. Conforme a los hechos tenidos por comprobados en el fallo que se recurre y el fundamento jurídico sustentado por los juzgadores, pese a su error final en la calificación legal y la determinación de las penas impuestas, al cual nos referimos supra, nos encontramos frente a la concurrencia de una pluralidad de acciones realizadas por los imputados, pero con características de homogeneidad en su modo comisivo – delitos de la misma especie – en la lesión al mismo bien jurídico tutelado y en la misma finalidad perseguida, configurando un delito continuado de Peculado. Si bien es cierto, la figura del Peculado, se encuentra sistemáticamente dentro de los delitos cometidos contra los Deberes de la Función Pública – título XV sección V del Código Penal - siendo el bien jurídico tutelado no precisamente el patrimonio sino la función pública, traducida en el deber de probidad del funcionario público en el desempeño de sus funciones, por lo que no se requiere necesariamente lesión patrimonial para que se configure el ilícito, teleológicamente, por ser el Peculado un delito pluriofensivo, la lesión al patrimonio, aunque no indispensable, frecuentemente va aparejada a su comisión, vulnerándose en consecuencia, no solo el deber de probidad del funcionario público, sino también el patrimonio, entendido como dinero y bienes públicos. Por ello, contrario a lo afirmado por los recurrentes, el Peculado sí permite la aplicación del delito continuado en la aplicación de las penas, al conciliar los presupuestos fundamentales establecidos por el numeral 77 del Código Penal para su existencia, determinándose en dicha norma que para su procedencia se requiere que los delitos en concurso sean de la misma especie y afecten bienes jurídicos patrimoniales y el agente persiga una misma finalidad; de modo que, en el caso que nos ocupa, los hechos relativos a las nueve compras al contado en Deuda Externa atribuidas exclusivamente al imputado Carlos Hernán Robles Macaya, así como las compras, también de Deuda Externa latinoAmericana mediante apalancamientos ilegales, llevadas a cabo a través del complejo empresarial A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A., endilgadas a todos los acusados - directores y gerente general del Banco Anglo Costarricense – si bien es cierto constituyen cada uno de ellos, por sí solos, un delito de Peculado, que concursan materialmente entre sí, para efectos de su calificación legal y de las sanciones punitivas a aplicar, configuran el delito continuado de Peculado, en el tanto constituyen delitos de la misma especie – Peculado – tendentes a una misma finalidad, y afectaron, no solo el deber de probidad de los acusados en el ejercicio de sus funciones públicas, sino también bienes jurídicos patrimoniales, resultando de innegable comprobación el daño patrimonial que la conducta ilícita desarrollada por los imputados desde el segundo semestre de 1992 hasta el mes de mayo de 1994 causó a la sociedad costarricense, daño que no solo se produjo desde una perspectiva económica sino también desde la óptica social. En conclusión, en el aspecto relativo al bien jurídico patrimonial lesionado, se cumplió el requisito que sobre el particular se establece en la mencionada norma que contiene los parámetros sobre la penalidad del delito continuado, lo que no puede interpretarse restrictivamente en el sentido de que el único bien jurídico tutelado en el delito cometido y cuya pena se aplica por continuación, sea el patrimonio, pues como bien se ha señalado al resolver uno de los motivos del recurso de casación incoado por el defensor público Licenciado Rodolfo Solórzano Sánchez, el delito continuado procederá, aun cuando los actos de la continuación afecten, además de bienes jurídicos patrimoniales, otros bienes diferentes. Las anteriores consideraciones llevan a determinar que, contrario a las pretensiones de los recurrentes, en la especie no nos encontramos ante un concurso material de delitos, en el tanto, si bien es cierto la pluralidad de acciones realizadas por los acusados que se inicia con las compras de deuda externa al contado, llevadas a cabo por Robles Macaya en representación del Banco Anglo Costarricense y que culmina con las compras realizadas con apalancamientos ilegales que ejecuta materialmente el gerente Robles Macaya con la plena autorización y conocimiento de los restantes imputados en su condición de directivos de la institución bancaria y administradores del complejo empresarial A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. – Carlos Manuel González Lizano y Arturo Fallas Zúñiga –, constituyen por sí mismos delitos de Peculado que concursan en forma real, tal y como reiteradamente lo señaló el tribunal de juicio, haciendo eco de las tesis sostenidas por los representantes del Ministerio Público, que ahora desconocen, este conglomerado de hechos debía ser valorado integralmente pues cada uno de ellos era el antecendente del siguiente, y es precisamente esta concatenación, lo que le imprime el carácter de homogeneidad fáctica, jurídica y subjetiva a la causa en cuestión, permitiendo para efectos de la penalidad aplicable, recurrir a la figura del delito continuado en relación al ilícito de Peculado, distinguiéndola del concurso material, que surgirá cuando falte alguno de estos tres presupuestos: delitos de la misma especie que afecten bienes jurídicos patrimoniales y persigan una misma finalidad – en este sentido ver Castillo González, Francisco, op cit, página 93 – Ya esta Sala de Casación se ha pronunciado reiteradamente sobre los criterios indispensables para distinguir un delito continuado y un concurso material de delitos, determinando como elemento diferenciador fundamental la misma finalidad que persigue el autor en relación a los bienes jurídicos que está afectando con sus acciones y que sea incompatible con la naturaleza del concurso material – en este sentido ver Voto 769-F-96 de las 10:30 horas del 6 de diciembre de 1996 reiterado en la resolución número 94-2000 de las 8:45 horas del 28 de enero de 2000. Sala Tercera Penal – Tal criterio subjetivo, la doctrina lo complementa con criterios objetivos; así, el autor argentino Carlos Creus establece que la vinculación de los distintos hechos a una misma “empresa delictiva”, no depende exclusivamente del designio del autor, sino de otras circunstancias de carácter objetivo “ que condicionan la adecuación de los distintos hechos dentro de aquel concepto, como es la unidad de bien jurídico atacado, para lo cual no bastará la analogía de los bienes afectados por los distintos hechos, sino la identidad del titular ... y por lo menos, que los objetos materiales de los distintos hechos pueden considerarse componentes de una “universalidad natural” ... Pero ambos criterios de dependencia tienen que presentarse reunidos para que se pueda hablar de continuación...” – Derecho Penal Parte General. Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1988, páginas 241 y 242 – En la presente causa, los parámetros de continuación se encuentran claramente definidos, tanto objetiva como subjetivamente, en el tanto los imputados desde el inicio de sus gestiones que tienen su origen en el primer contacto que realiza Robles Macaya con la empresa Ariana Trading and Finance Inc. a efecto de comprarle títulos de deuda externa costarricense, distraen los fondos públicos del Banco Anglo Costarricense, permitiendo que terceros negociaran los dineros del erario público y obtuvieran ganancias en detrimento de los intereses estatales, siendo este contacto con ATF lo que facilita la ulterior propuesta para que el BAC adquiera la empresa A.V.C. Almacén de Valores Comerciales S.A. y sus subsidiarias, vulnerando la legislación bancaria vigente y los controles de las entidades públicas encargadas de supervisar tales negociaciones, y luego, a través del complejo empresarial adquirido realizar las compras apalancadas ilegales, provocando la debacle económica traducida en la pérdida de más de cincuenta y siete millones de dólares y el cierre del banco estatal más antiguo del país, de tal modo que, esta pluralidad de hechos temporalmente discontinuos pero dependientes entre sí, en tanto persiguieron una misma finalidad, lesionaron bienes jurídicos patrimoniales de un mismo titular, el Banco Anglo Costarricense, y resultaron ser de la misma especie – Peculado – convergen, para efectos de la penalidad a aplicar, en un delito continuado y no en un concurso material. Por todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el motivo alegado por los impugnantes."