Statute of limitations on IDA's liability in precarious occupancy conflictsPrescripción de la responsabilidad patrimonial del IDA en conflictos de ocupación precaria

IV.Regarding the general regime of the statute of limitations (prescripción), our case law has indicated the purposes for which said institute was established, especially to avoid situations of uncertainty or legal insecurity: “…The dominant position, at present, attributes the basis of the statute of limitations (prescripción) to the need to create a state of legal security in the face of an objective situation of uncertainty produced by the failure to exercise the right in a timely manner. It can be affirmed, therefore, that the value protected by law in these cases is legal security, which is why the surprising exercise of a right is intended to be avoided. In any case, the statute of limitations (prescripción) emerges as a means to create security, which promotes order and social tranquility. However, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the statute of limitations (prescripción) may serve, in a certain way, to protect injustices and prevent the exercise of rights that truly existed. In this regard, it should be noted that law, as a vehicle for the realization of justice, must necessarily operate within a framework of certainty and security. Otherwise, the ultimate stated purpose would be frustrated in its practical or functional dimension. Justice cannot operate amid situations of uncertainty and instability. That is why security inevitably rises, together with justice, as an essential value of law. Neither of the two, as an end of the latter, is absolute in legal practice. At some point, one of them, for the sake of the other's survival, must yield. This occurs in the case of the statute of limitations (prescripción) when, in favor of security, justice yields. Otherwise, justice, as an essential purpose of law, would be endangered, with uncertainty and disorder becoming entrenched in the social environment, factors that make it unattainable. Such a phenomenon does not mean ignoring justice, but rather the legislator setting a period within which its protection finds room; but once this period has elapsed, and in deference to security, it yields to the need to avoid lawsuits and controversies raised untimely, and therefore difficult to resolve, whose potential incidence would maintain an enervating feeling of uncertainty in human relations (See, among others, Sala Primera de Casación, No. 120 of 15:00 hours on July 29, 1992, Considerando IV and No. 119 of 14:30 hours on October 20, 1995, Considerando VI). V. In the public law sphere, the regime of the statute of limitations (prescripción) has been much stricter, departing from the general rules, especially regarding time limits, of civil law. Both administrative law and public agrarian sector law have designed distinct rules on the statute of limitations (prescripción). Indeed, the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes in its Article 196, that “The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall prescribe (prescribirá) in four years, counted from the event giving rise to the liability…” (in accordance with the reform introduced by Ley No. 7611 of July 12, 1996, since previously it was 3 years). Now, that regime is equally applicable to public agrarian entities, as has been established by this Tribunal Agrario (See ruling of 15:10 hours on August 29, 1995, regarding the Centros Agrícolas Cantonales) and confirmed by the case law of the Sala I de Casación on repeated occasions. In particular, referring to the Centros Agrícolas Cantonales, the Sala de Casación indicated: “…In such a situation, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), a specific regulation must be applied, that regulated in the Ley General de Administración Pública. The ordinary civil statute of limitations (prescripción) is not applicable to the case because a public entity is involved. The rules of the Ley General de la Administración Pública contain shorter limitation periods for both non-contractual and contractual matters. Thus, if the complaint was filed on August 14, 1991, and the sublease contract was rescinded in March 1987, by the date of filing the action, the claimed right had already prescribed, which was extinguished in just three years. (Sala I de Casación No. 132 of 14:25 hrs on December 20, 1996; see, for greater abundance, rulings No. 56 of 15:00 hours on July 4, 1997). In another case, very similar to the one at hand, the Sala I stated: “I.-The appellant, as owner of several farms in the province of Limón, seeks recognition of the right to be compensated for their value, as well as payment for the damages caused, as a consequence of said properties having been included in the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado.

This act implies for the owners, as the appellant alleges, a de facto expropriation… Indeed, the administrative proceeding requesting compensation was filed 3 years, 1 month, and 16 days after the Decree’s publication; the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) occurred 3 years, 3 months, and 20 days after the Decree; and the lawsuit was filed 3 months and 27 days after seeking exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is clear, from the chronological analysis verified, that the appellant proceeded before the Public Administration more than three years after the publication of the Decreto Ejecutivo…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 26 of 11:15 a.m. on May 13, 1994). VI. In the present case, we are faced with a lawsuit that includes, among other claims, one for patrimonial liability against the State, specifically against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which is an “... autonomous institution governed by public law, with its own legal personality, own patrimony, and administrative independence...” (art. 1 of its Law of Creation), and has as one of its main functions the capacity to buy lands and distribute them in order to promote the country’s agrarian development (art. 2 and 3 of the Law of Creation of the IDA). As one of its priorities, the Law establishes the following: “The Institute shall, with priority, seek the solution of problems resulting from the occupation of national reserves and from the precarious occupation (ocupación en precario) of lands in private domain. The Institute is authorized, when appropriate, to redistribute and reorganize the areas that were subject to conflict, subsequent to its conclusion.” In that sense, the Institute has the duty to intervene in conflicts of precarious occupation of lands, and to seek to provide a solution within the terms established by the same Law, in order to give legal certainty to the parties involved in the conflict. In that sense, the same Ley de Tierras y Colonización, in chapter IV referring to the “Regulation of conflicts between owners and precarious possessors (poseedores en precario)”, provides what those mechanisms are and the time limits for putting them into practice. Such mechanisms may be voluntary, through the direct purchase of lands, or compulsory, through expropriation and payment for the properties to the individuals. All of this is regulated in Article 94 of the Law, which establishes: “ARTICLE 94.- The solution of conflicts derived from the precarious possession (posesión precaria) of lands shall be fundamentally sought through direct purchase-sale contracts between the owner and the occupants, with the intervention of the Institute, and in the manner indicated in the following articles. Prior to the establishment of any judicial action in which a problem of precarious possession of lands may be involved, the owners must present their claim before the Institute, in accordance with the procedures mentioned in this Chapter. After three months have elapsed from the receipt of the respective proceeding without the Institute having declared the existence of a land possession conflict, or one year from that declaration without the conflict having been solved, the administrative procedure shall be deemed exhausted (agotado el procedimiento administrativo), and the claimants may address the Courts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any of the interested parties may request the Judge or Alcalde of the Jurisdiction where the farm is located to carry out a judicial inspection (inspección ocular), with summons to the parties, to verify any facts or signs that could vary or disappear over time. While the matter is before the Institute, the prescriptive period (término de la prescripción) shall not run for any of the parties. Once the conflict has been solved by the Institute with the owner’s agreement, or once expropriation has been ordered by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), the owner shall lack any judicial action, whether civil or criminal, against the possessors in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the occupants shall be exposed to the common legal sanctions that may proceed. The briefs submitted by the parties before the Institute, in proceedings for the solution of conflicts of precarious possession of lands and others related to agrarian issues, shall be exempt from authentication and from the use of fiscal stamps.” (The underlining is ours). From the above provision, we can extract the following relevant elements for the decision in this matter: 1) Prior to establishing any judicial action, the owners of farms with problems of precarious possession must exhaust the agrarian administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo agrario) contemplated in the Ley de Tierras; 2) The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario has three months to declare, or not, the existence of the conflict; 3) Once the conflict is declared, the Institute has one additional year to intervene seeking a peaceful solution to it, whether through the direct purchase of the property, or through expropriation. Consequently, there are two ways to exhaust administrative remedies (agotar la vía administrativa): the first operates through administrative silence (silencio administrativo) by the Institute; the second operates one year after the declaration of the conflict’s existence, as this is the period the agrarian legislator granted to the Entity to try to solve the said conflict. In this latter case, evidently, the legislator’s purpose was to leave “the judicial path open,” that is, to give the owner or the possessors the opportunity to debate the defense of their rights in court. Likewise, the interpretation of the norm leads to the conclusion that any owner who feels disturbed, threatened, or harmed by the Institute’s administrative action, not having reached any administrative solution (through purchase-sale or expropriation) within the year, could resort to the appropriate judicial avenue to claim compensation against the State itself. VII. From another perspective, it could occur that both the owner and the precarious occupants themselves, after that year has elapsed, decide to voluntarily submit to an administrative proceeding, with a view to avoiding judicial action. But that wait is completely voluntary, because if the owner considers, as in this case, the possibility of selling the property or being compensated by the Institute, they run the risk that, in the end, their patrimonial interest will not be satisfied. The State is not obligated, pursuant to the cited legal provisions, to provide a patrimonial solution to the owner, nor is it the only avenue the owner has to claim their property right. On the contrary, every owner, once the year from the declaration has elapsed, has open access to the judicial avenue to undertake the corresponding ordinary and patrimonial actions in defense of their ownership rights (atributos dominicales). But if the owners let the period expire, remaining subject to the hope that “someday” the Institute might pay them for the property, they would be incurring a situation of legal insecurity, of legal uncertainty, which could cause, with the passage of time, the loss of their right to claim compensation against the State. For this reason, the agrarian legislator, when regulating the way to reach a solution to the conflict, sets very specific, and generally very short, time limits so that the Administration may act promptly in the search for a peaceful solution to the land conflict. In that sense, the interpretation of the paragraph of Article 94 of the Ley de Tierras that establishes “While the matter is before the Institute, the prescriptive period shall not run for any of the parties” must be restrictive, since it is assumed that the Institute must seek a solution to the conflict within the year and, if it does not do so, administrative remedies are exhausted, and therefore the prescriptive periods begin to run again. It is not, consequently, an act that interrupts the prescription (prescripción), but rather a temporary suspension, of one year, during which the prescriptive period does not run. This is also confirmed by reading the TRANSITORIO of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which provides the following: “…At the request of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the Courts, in a reasoned resolution, may suspend the proceedings established against any person who has been declared by the cited organism as a precarious possessor (poseedora en precario) of lands. Said suspension may be decreed at any phase or stage of the proceeding in question, and for the time prudentially necessary for the Institute to achieve a satisfactory solution to the conflict, and may be extended, following the same indicated procedure. Once the conflict is solved in the manner indicated in the third paragraph of Article 94, the Institute shall inform the Courts so that they may declare the civil actions lapsed and extinguish both the criminal actions and the penalties that may have been imposed against the precarious possessors, in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the owners may again address the ordinary Courts, for whose purpose no term shall run against them during the suspension of the proceedings…” From this norm, two important conclusions are also drawn in relation to what is established in Article 94: First, that after administrative remedies are deemed exhausted under the conditions established by Article 94, the owners have the right to resort to the judicial avenue. Second, if the Institute continues to intervene in the solution to the conflict after the year has elapsed or the 3 months causing administrative silence have passed, due to the submission of the interested parties thereto, the Institute may request the suspension of the judicial process, a period during which the prescriptive period would not run; conversely, if the claim was not filed in court, the prescriptive period continues to run, since in such case the Institute cannot request the Courts to suspend the process. As can be concluded from the above, we are facing a special regime (of the agrarian Public Sector), applicable to both public and private subjects, where the periods and modes for exhausting administrative remedies are regulated, as well as the causes for interruption or suspension of the eventual prescription to which the rights of the parties may be subject, and this special regime must be applied to the case at hand. [...] IX. In the case at hand, it is evident that the statute of limitations (prescripción) has operated in favor of the Public Administration and, particularly, in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. The plaintiff company (Sociedad actora) submitted the land conflict to the knowledge of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in 1986. On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for usurpation and damages, availing itself of the administrative silence of the Institution. On October 18, 1988, when the three months of administrative silence had been amply exceeded (an opportunity at which the judicial avenue was already open in favor of the owners), the Institute declared the existence of the conflict of precarious occupation of lands. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested a reconsideration and reversal (reposición), and such request was not adjudicated until October 14, 1992, when the same Institute revoked the declaration, considering that the resolution had been out of time (extemporánea), and in this second resolution it indicated “ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE EXHAUSTED (SE AGOTA LA VIA ADMINISTRATIVA) in proceedings numbered one thousand four hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Nombre1] appear as parties (see folios 327-329). Said resolution was notified to the Representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe on January 6, 1993 (notification at folio 329). That was the administrative act that exhausted the corresponding avenue for the conflict of precarious occupation of lands. According to the doctrine, “The act that exhausts administrative remedies or that ‘causes state’ (causa estado) is the one that closes the administrative procedure, having been issued by the highest competent authority –the hierarch–, after the remedies established in the norms governing the administrative instance have been exhausted.” (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, pág. 303). Therefore, from the moment this procedural prerequisite was configured, the plaintiff company had open access to the jurisdictional avenue to file any claim against the State. This was a final act (acto firme) that was not annulled, revoked, or modified, leaving the judicial avenue open for its challenge. The plaintiff company had knowledge of the facts that motivated the State’s liability since 1986 and, having exhausted the administrative procedure in 1993, did not resort to the judicial avenue. On the contrary, the claimant company, as it admits in its own appeal, continued to negotiate with the Institute for the payment of the property, but this time no longer through the channel of the precarious occupation conflict, but rather by offering to sell its properties to the Administration (see documents at folios 61 to 64). This in no way obligated the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to buy the property and therefore was not an act that could interrupt the statute of limitations in court, as it was a unilateral offer from the owner, as indicated in that same sale offer document. The prescriptive period continued its course, definitively and inexorably ending on January 6, 1997, the date on which the 4 years established in Article 196 of the Ley General de Administración Pública were completed. After this date, acts interrupting a statute of limitations already completed could not occur, except for the express or tacit waiver of the prescription by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which, as we shall see, did not make such a waiver; on the contrary, it alleged the statute of limitations. It is subsequent to that date, January 6, 1997, that the Representative of the company at that time, Mrs. Brenes Castro, directs a brief dated September 23, 1997 (that is, 7 months after the statute of limitations had operated), to the Presidency of the Republic, alleging the supposed liability of the Institute, alleging damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), and requesting compensation from the State. This proceeding opened a new administrative file before the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, but based on the same facts that supposedly motivated the State’s liability, originating in 1987. Consequently, the said administrative claim could in no way “reopen” a new prescriptive period. The Sala I de Casación interpreted it this way when, in a similar factual situation, it held: “VII.- In the case at hand, it is observed that the falsity of the document in question was declared by criminal judgment dated October 13, 1986, a moment from which the fatal three-year period began to run, which was at that time the prescription period contemplated in Article 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, for claiming the eventual patrimonial liability of the State for the specific act. Once the term provided by law has been fulfilled, it is obvious, and indeed illogical, that the prescriptive period can be interrupted. To interrupt is, the Real Academia Española states, ‘to cut the continuity of something in place or in time’… A period is interrupted while it is in progress, never when it has already expired. Thus, in the sub-lite, once the prescription had operated since October 13, 1989, it is impossible to think of an ‘interruption.’ Consequently, the administrative claim could in no way constitute an act interrupting the prescriptive period…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 861-F-2000 of 3:15 p.m. on November 16, 2000). X. In the case at hand, it is evident that if the prescriptive period began to run from the date on which administrative remedies were deemed exhausted, a circumstance notified to the party on January 6, 1993, and the four years were completed on January 6, 1997, the subsequent administrative claim before the Presidency of the Republic could not have the virtue of “interrupting” that fatal period that had already been fulfilled. The plaintiff company, instead of resorting to the judicial avenue in claim of its rights, continued to wait for an administrative solution, thereby generating a situation of legal insecurity and uncertainty, both for the Institute and for the owner itself. Thus, more than 4 YEARS elapsed, from January 1993 to September 1997. On August 13, 1998, the Institute decided to refer the plaintiff company to the judicial avenue. But by that date, as indicated, the fatal prescription period set by Article 196 of the Ley General de Administración Pública had amply elapsed. Even following the plaintiff’s line of argument, that the applicable prescription norm would be that of the Civil Code, i.e., 10 years, one could conclude that if the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario was aware of the conflict since 1986, a fact that motivated the possible liability also known by the plaintiff, and it did not rule within three months, from that date the plaintiff company’s possibility was open to file any claim against the State in court, but by not doing so, the ten-year prescriptive period was completed in 1997. It is inconceivable, consequently, that for so many years the plaintiff company in this proceeding allowed so much time to elapse before filing its claim in court. Its own lack of diligence (incuria) makes it deserving of that sanction. XI. For the reasons stated, the appellant’s grievances must be rejected. The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario never waived the statute of limitations; on the contrary, it expressly invoked it as an exception when answering this ordinary lawsuit (demanda ordinaria). Nor can it be considered that the reports from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario derived from its last administrative claim favor its claims or negate the prescriptive period, because as has been said, it had already operated, with ample margin, when the compensation claim was filed both in administrative and judicial venues. Finally, regarding the application of Article 356, subsection 1, of the Ley General de Administración Pública, it must be indicated that this norm is not applicable in these cases, since the same Law excluded the Ley de Tierras y Colonización from its application, as far as administrative procedures are concerned (see Article 367.2 Ley General de Administración Pública, Decreto number 8979-P of December 18, 1978); consequently, if the Ley de Tierras y Colonización establishes the modes by which Administrative Remedies are deemed exhausted, the legal opinion could not be required, as the appellant intends. Even so, in both cases where the Institute deemed administrative remedies exhausted (1993 and 1998), the Legal Department was always consulted, but with the particularity that for the second case (1998), the prescriptive period favorable to the administration had already operated." Regarding the general regime of prescription, our case law has indicated the purposes for which this institution was established, especially to avoid situations of legal uncertainty or insecurity: “…The dominant position, at present, attributes the basis of prescription to the need to create a state of legal certainty in the face of an objective situation of uncertainty produced by the failure to exercise a right in a timely manner. It can be stated, therefore, that the value protected by law in these cases is legal certainty, for which reason the surprise exercise of a right is intended to be avoided. In any case, prescription emerges as a means to create certainty, which tends toward order and social tranquility. However, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which prescription may serve, in a certain way, to protect injustices and prevent the exercise of rights that truly existed. In this regard, it should be noted that law, as a vehicle for the realization of justice, must necessarily operate within a framework of certainty and security. Were it not so, the ultimate purpose stated would be frustrated in its practical or functional dimension. Justice cannot operate amidst situations of uncertainty and instability. That is why certainty inevitably stands, alongside justice, as an essential value of law. Neither of the two, as an end thereof, is absolute in legal endeavors. At some point, one of them, for the sake of the survival of the other, must yield. That is what occurs in the case of prescription when, in favor of certainty, justice yields. Were it not so, justice, as an essential end of law, would be endangered, as uncertainty and disorder become entrenched in the social environment, factors that render it unattainable. Such a phenomenon does not mean ignoring justice, but rather fixing a time limit by the legislator, within which its protection finds a place; but, once this has elapsed, and in deference to certainty, it yields to the need to avoid untimely litigation and controversies, and therefore of difficult resolution, whose potential incidence would maintain an unnerving feeling of uncertainty in human relations (See, among others, First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), No. 120 of 3:00 p.m. on July 29, 1992, Considerando IV and No. 119 of 2:30 p.m. on October 20, 1995, Considerando VI). V. In the field of public law, the regime of prescription has been much stricter, departing from the general rules, especially regarding time limits, of civil law. Both administrative law, and the law of the public agrarian sector, have designed different rules on prescription.

Indeed, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), establishes in its article 196, that “The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the event giving rise to the liability…” (pursuant to the amendment introduced by Law No. 7611 of July 12, 1996, since previously it was 3 years). Now, this regime is equally applicable to public agrarian Entities, as has been established by this Agrarian Court (Tribunal Agrario) (See ruling (voto) of 3:10 p.m. on August 29, 1995, regarding the Cantonal Agricultural Centers (Centros Agrícolas Cantonales)) and confirmed by the Case Law of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala I de Casación) on repeated occasions. In particular, referring to the Cantonal Agricultural Centers, the Chamber of Cassation indicated: “…In such a situation, regarding matters of prescription, a specific regulation must be applied, that regulated in the General Law of Public Administration. Ordinary civil prescription is not applicable to the case because a public entity is involved. The rules of the General Law of Public Administration contain shorter prescription periods for both non-contractual and contractual matters. Thus, if the lawsuit was filed on August 14, 1991, and the sublease contract was terminated in March 1987, by the date of filing the action, the claimed right had already prescribed, which was extinguished in just three years. (First Chamber of Cassation No. 132 of 2:25 p.m. on December 20, 1996; see, for greater abundance, rulings (votos) No. 56 of 3:00 p.m. on July 4, 1997).

In another case, very similar to the one at hand, the First Chamber stated:

“I.- The appellant, as owner of several farms in the province of Limón, seeks to be recognized the right to be compensated for their value, as well as the payment of damages caused, as a consequence of having included said properties in the Barra del Colorado Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado). This act implies for the owners, as alleged by the appellant, a de facto expropriation… Indeed, the administrative petition requesting compensation was filed 3 years, 1 month, and 16 days after the publication of the Decree, the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) 3 years, 3 months, and 20 days after the Decree, and the lawsuit 3 months and 27 days after petitioning the exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is clear, from the verified chronological analysis, that the appellant petitioned the Public Administration after more than three years had elapsed since the publication of the Decreto Ejecutivo…” (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 26 of 11:15 a.m. on May 13, 1994). VI. In the present case, we are in the presence of a lawsuit, among other claims, for patrimonial liability against the State, specifically against the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), which is an “...autonomous institution of public law, with legal personality, its own patrimony, and administrative independence...” (art. 1 of its Creation Law (Ley de Creación)), and has as one of its main functions the capacity to buy lands and distribute them in order to promote the agrarian development of the country (art. 2 and 3 of the Creation Law of the IDA).

As one of its priorities, the Law establishes the following:

“The Institute shall, with priority, endeavor the solution of problems resulting from the occupation of national reserves and from the occupation in precarious circumstances (ocupación en precario) of privately owned lands. The Institute is empowered, when appropriate, to redistribute and reorganize the areas that were the subject of conflict, subsequent to its conclusion.” In that sense, the Institute has the duty to intervene in conflicts of precarious land occupation, and to endeavor to give them a solution within the terms that the same Law establishes, to give legal certainty to the parties involved in the conflict.

In that sense, the same Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), in chapter IV referred to the “Regulation of conflicts between owners and possessors in precarious circumstances (poseedores en precario)”, provides what those mechanisms are and the time limits to put them into practice. Such mechanisms may be voluntary, through the direct purchase of lands, or compulsory, through expropriation and payment of properties to private individuals. All of this is regulated in Article 94 of the Law, which establishes: “ARTICLE 94.- The solution of conflicts derived from the precarious possession of lands shall be fundamentally sought through direct purchase and sale contracts between the owner and the occupants, with intervention of the Institute, and in the manner indicated in the following articles. Prior to the commencement of any judicial action whatsoever in which a problem of precarious possession of lands may be involved, the owners must present their claim before the Institute, pursuant to the procedures mentioned in this Chapter. After three months from receipt of the respective petition without the Institute having declared the existence of a land possession conflict, or one year from that declaration without the conflict having been resolved, the administrative procedure shall be deemed exhausted, and the claimants may address the Courts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any of the interested parties may request the Judge or Mayor (Alcalde) of the Jurisdiction in which the farm is situated to carry out a visual inspection (inspección ocular), with summons of the parties, to verify any facts or signs that might change or disappear with time. While the matter is before the Institute, the term of prescription shall not run for any of the parties. Once the conflict has been resolved by the Institute with the conformity of the owner or the expropriation ordered by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), the owner shall lack any judicial action, whether civil or criminal, against the possessors in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the occupants shall be exposed to the ordinary legal sanctions that may be applicable. The documents submitted by the parties before the Institute, in proceedings for the resolution of conflicts of precarious possession of lands and others related to agrarian matters, shall be exempt from authentication and from the use of fiscal stamps.” (The underlining is ours). From the foregoing provision, we can extract the following relevant elements for the decision of the present matter: 1) Prior to filing any judicial action, the owners of farms with problems of precarious possession must exhaust the agrarian administrative procedure contemplated in the Land Law; 2) The Institute of Agrarian Development has three months to declare, or not, the existence of the conflict; 3) Upon the declaration of the conflict, the Institute has one more year to be able to intervene seeking a peaceful resolution of the same, whether through the direct purchase of the property, or through expropriation. Consequently, there are two ways to exhaust administrative remedies: the first operates by the administrative silence (silencio administrativo) of the Institute; the second operates one year after the declaration of the existence of the conflict, as it is the time limit that the agrarian legislator granted the Entity to try to resolve the referred conflict. In this last case, evidently, the purpose of the legislator was to leave “the judicial avenue open,” that is, to give the owner or the possessors the opportunity to debate the defense of their rights in the judicial venue. Likewise, the interpretation of the rule leads to the conclusion that any owner who feels disturbed, threatened, or prejudiced by the administrative action of the Institute, having not reached any administrative solution (through purchase and sale or expropriation), within the year, could resort to the corresponding judicial venue to claim compensation against the State itself.

VII.From another perspective, it could occur that both the owner and the precarious occupants themselves, after that year has elapsed, decide to submit voluntarily to an administrative procedure, with the aim of avoiding the judicial venue. But that waiting period is completely voluntary, since if the owner thinks, as in this case, about the possibility of selling the property or being compensated by the Institute, they run the risk that, in the end, their patrimonial interest may not be satisfied. The State is not obliged, pursuant to the cited legal provisions, to provide a patrimonial solution to the owner, nor is it the only avenue the owner has to claim their property right.

On the contrary, every owner, once the year from the declaration has elapsed, has the judicial venue open to undertake the corresponding ordinary and patrimonial actions in defense of ownership attributes. But if the owners let the time limit elapse, subjected to the hope that “someday” the Institute may pay them for the property, they would be incurring a situation of legal insecurity, of legal uncertainty, which could cause, with the passage of time, the loss of their right to claim compensation against the State. Therefore, the agrarian legislator, when regulating the manner of reaching a resolution of the conflict, sets very specific time limits, and generally very short ones, so that the Administration can act promptly in seeking a peaceful outcome to the land conflict. In that sense, the interpretation of the paragraph of Article 94 of the Land Law that establishes “While the matter is before the Institute, the term of prescription shall not run for any of the parties,” must be restrictive, since it is assumed that the Institute must seek a resolution of the conflict within the year and, if it does not, administrative remedies are deemed exhausted, and therefore the prescription time limits begin to run again. It is not, consequently, an act that interrupts the prescription, but rather a temporary suspension, of one year, during which the prescription period does not run.

This is also confirmed from the reading of the TRANSITORY PROVISION (TRANSITORIO) of the Land and Colonization Law which provides the following: “…At the request of the Institute of Agrarian Development, the Courts, in a reasoned decision, may suspend the proceedings established against any person who has been declared by said entity as a possessor in precarious circumstances of lands. Said suspension may be ordered at any phase or state of the corresponding proceedings, and for the time prudentially necessary for the Institute to achieve a satisfactory resolution of the conflict, and may be extended, following the same indicated procedure. Once the conflict is resolved in the manner indicated in the third paragraph of Article 94, the Institute shall bring it to the attention of the Courts so that they declare the civil actions lapsed and extinguished, both the criminal proceedings and the penalties that may have been imposed against the precarious possessors, in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the owners may address the ordinary Courts again, for which purpose no term shall run against them during the suspension of the proceedings…” From this rule, two important conclusions are also drawn, in relation to what is provided in Article 94:

In the first place, that after administrative remedies are deemed exhausted under the conditions established by Article 94, the owners have the right to resort to the judicial venue. In the second place, if the Institute continues intervening in the resolution of the conflict, after the year has elapsed or the 3 months causing administrative silence have passed, due to the submission of the interested parties therein, it may request the suspension of the judicial process, a term during which the prescription period would not run; conversely, if the claim was not filed in the judicial venue, the prescription period continues to run, since in that case the Institute cannot request the Courts to suspend the process. As can be concluded from the foregoing, we are faced with a special regime (of the Public Agrarian Sector), applicable to both public and private subjects, where the time limits and manners to exhaust administrative remedies are regulated, as well as the causes of interruption or suspension of the eventual prescription to which the rights of the parties may be subject, this special regime being applicable to the case at hand.[...]

IX.In the case at hand, it is evident that prescription has operated in favor of the Public Administration and, particularly, in favor of the Institute of Agrarian Development. The plaintiff Corporation, since 1986, submitted the land conflict to the knowledge of the Institute of Agrarian Development. On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for usurpation and damages, availing itself of the administrative silence of the Institution. On October 18, 1988, when more than three months of administrative silence had elapsed (an opportunity at which the judicial venue was already open in favor of the owners), the Institute declared the existence of the conflict of precarious land occupation. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested reconsideration and reversal (reconsideración y reposición), and such request was not heard until October 14, 1992, when the same Institute revoked the declaration, considering that the resolution had been untimely, and in this second resolution it indicated “the ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA) ARE DEEMED EXHAUSTED for proceedings numbered one thousand four hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Name1] are participating as parties (see folios 327-329). Said resolution was notified to the Representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe on January 6, 1993 (notification at folio 329). That was the administrative act that exhausted the corresponding remedies for the precarious land occupation conflict. According to the doctrine, “The act that exhausts administrative remedies or that ‘causes state’ is the one that closes the administrative procedure, having been issued by the highest competent authority – the head of the entity (jerarca)–, once the remedies established in the rules governing the administrative instance are exhausted.” (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Treatise on Administrative Law (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo), Volume I, Diké, 2002, p. 303). Therefore, from the moment this procedural prerequisite is configured, the plaintiff corporation had the jurisdictional venue open to raise any claim against the State. It was a final act that was not annulled, revoked, or modified, leaving the judicial avenue clear for its challenge.

The plaintiff Corporation had knowledge of the facts that gave rise to the State’s liability since 1986 and, having exhausted the administrative procedure in 1993, did not resort to the judicial venue. On the contrary, the claimant Corporation, as it admits in its own appeal (recurso de apelación), continued petitioning before the Institute for payment of the property, but this time no longer through the avenue of the precarious occupation conflict, but by offering to sell its properties to the Administration (see documents at folios 61 to 64). This in no way obligated the Institute of Agrarian Development to purchase the property and therefore was not an act that could interrupt the prescription in the judicial venue, as it is a unilateral offer from the owner, just as was indicated in that same offer to sell document.

The prescription period continued its course, until being definitively and inexorably completed on January 6, 1997, the date on which the 4 years established in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration were completed. After this date, acts interrupting an already completed prescription could not occur, except for the waiver of prescription (renuncia a la prescripción), which the Institute of Agrarian Development might expressly or tacitly make, and which, as we shall see, did not make such a waiver, but on the contrary, alleged the prescription. Subsequent to that date, January 6, 1997, is when the Representative of the Corporation, at that time, Mrs. Brenes Castro, addresses a document dated September 23, 1997 (that is, 7 months after the prescription had operated), to the Presidency of the Republic, alleging the supposed liability of the Institute, alleging damages, and requesting compensation from the State. That petition opened a new administrative file before the Institute of Agrarian Development, but based on the same facts that supposedly gave rise to the State’s liability, originating from 1987. Consequently, the referred administrative claim could in no way “reopen” a new prescription period. This is how the First Chamber of Cassation has interpreted it when, in a similar factual situation, it ordered:

“VII.- In the present case, it is established that the falsity of the document in question was declared by criminal judgment dated October 13, 1986, a moment from which the fatal three-year period began to run, which was at that time the prescription period contemplated in Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration, to claim the potential patrimonial liability of the State for the specific event. Once the term provided by law has elapsed, it is obvious, and more than that illogical, that the prescription period can be interrupted. To interrupt is, says the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española), ‘to cut the continuity of a thing in place or time’… A period is interrupted while it is in progress, never when it has already expired. Thus, in the sub-lite, the prescription having operated since October 13, 1989, it is impossible to think of an ‘interruption’. Consequently, the administrative claim could not constitute, in any way, an interrupting act of the prescription period…” (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 861-F-2000 of 3:15 p.m. on November 16, 2000).

X.In the case at hand, it is evident that if the prescription period began to run from the date on which administrative remedies were deemed exhausted, a circumstance notified to the party on January 6, 1993, and the four years were completed on January 6, 1997, the subsequent administrative claim, before the Presidency of the Republic, could not have the virtue of “interrupting” that fatal period that had already elapsed. The plaintiff Corporation, instead of resorting to the judicial venue to claim its rights, remained waiting for an administrative solution, thereby generating a situation of legal insecurity and uncertainty, both for the Institute and for the owner herself. In this way, more than 4 YEARS elapsed, from January 1993 to September 1997. On August 13, 1998, the Institute decided to refer the plaintiff Corporation to the judicial venue. But by that date, as indicated, the fatal prescription term set forth in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration had already amply elapsed. Even, following the plaintiff’s line of reasoning, in the sense that the applicable prescription rule would be that of the Civil Code (Código Civil), that is, 10 years, it could be concluded that if the Institute of Agrarian Development was aware of the conflict since 1986, a fact that motivated the potential liability also known to the plaintiff, and did not rule within three months, from that date, the possibility for the plaintiff Corporation to raise any claim against the State, in the judicial venue, was open, but by not doing so, the decennial prescription period was completed in 1997. It is inconceivable, consequently, that for so many years, the plaintiff Corporation in this process allowed so much time to elapse before filing its claim in the judicial venue. Its own negligence makes it deserving of that sanction.

XI.For the reasons stated, the grievances of the appellant must be rejected. The Institute of Agrarian Development at no time waived the prescription; on the contrary, it expressly invoked it as a defense when answering the present ordinary lawsuit. Neither can it be considered that the reports of the Institute of Agrarian Development derived from its last administrative claim favor its claims or negate the prescription period, since, as has been stated, it had already operated, amply, when the claim for compensation was filed both in the administrative venue and the judicial venue. Finally, regarding the application of Article 356, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, it must be noted that this rule is not applicable in these cases, because the same Law excluded from its application the Land and Colonization Law, insofar as administrative procedures are concerned (see Article 367.2 General Law of Public Administration, Decree number 8979-P of December 18, 1978); consequently, if the Land and Colonization Law establishes the manners in which the Administrative Avenue (Vía Administrativa) is deemed exhausted, the legal opinion could not be required, as the appellant seeks. Even so, in both cases in which the Institute deemed administrative remedies exhausted (1993 and 1998), the Legal Department was always heard, but with the particularity that for the second case (1998), the prescription period favorable to the administration had already operated."

"IV. Sobre el régimen general de la prescripción, nuestra jurisprudencia ha indicado los fines para los cuáles se estableció dicho instituto, especialmente para evitar situaciones de incerteza o inseguridad jurídica: “…La posición dominante, en la actualidad, atribuye el fundamento de la prescripción a la necesidad de crear un estado de seguridad jurídica ante una situación objetiva de incertidumbre producida por el no ejercicio oportuno del derecho. Puede afirmarse, por ende, que el valor tutelado por el derecho en estos casos es la seguridad jurídica, por lo cual se pretende evitar el ejercicio sorpresivo de un derecho. En todo caso, la prescripción emerge como un medio para crear seguridad, lo cual propende al orden y a la tranquilidad social. Empero, no resulta difícil imaginar situaciones en las cuales la prescripción pueda servir, en cierto modo, para tutelar injusticias e impedir el ejercicio de derechos los cuales verdaderamente existieron. Al respecto, es de señalar, que el derecho, como vehículo para la realización de la justicia, precisa actuar, necesariamente, dentro de un marco de certeza y seguridad. De no ser así, el fin último enunciado, se vería frustrado, en su dimensión práctica o funcional. La justicia no puede operar en medio de situaciones de incertidumbre e inestabilidad. Es por ello que la seguridad yergue, inevitablemente, junto con la justicia, como valor esencial del derecho. Ninguno de los dos, como fin de éste, es absoluto en el quehacer jurídico. En algún momento, uno de ellos, en aras de la supervivencia del otro, tiene que ceder. Eso ocurre en el caso de la prescripción cuando, a favor de la seguridad, cede la justicia. De no ser así, ésta, como fin esencial del derecho, peligraría, al entronizarse la incertidumbre y el desorden en el medio social, factores que la tornan inalcanzable. Tal fenómeno significa no ignorar la justicia, sino fijar un plazo por parte del legislador, dentro del cual la tutela de ella halla cabida; pero, una vez transcurrido éste, y en obsequio a la seguridad, cede ante la necesidad de evitar litigios y controversias suscitados a destiempo, y por ende de difícil solución, cuya posible incidencia mantendría una enervante sensación de incertidumbre en las relaciones humanas (Ver, entre otros, Sala Primera de Casación, No. 120 de las 15 horas del 29 de julio de 1992, Considerando IV y No. 119 de las 14:30 horas del 20 de octubre de 1995, Considerando VI). V. En el ámbito iuspublicista, el régimen de la prescripción ha sido mucho más estricto, apartándose de las reglas generales, sobre todo en cuanto a plazos se refiere, del derecho civil. Tanto el derecho administrativo, como el derecho del sector público agrario, han diseñado normas distintas sobre la prescripción. En efecto, la Ley General de la Administración Pública, establece en su artículo 196, que “El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad…”(conforme a la reforma introducida por Ley No. 7611 de 12 de julio de 1996, pues anteriormente era de 3 años). Ahora bien, ese régimen es igualmente aplicable a los Entes públicos agrarios, como ha sido establecido por éste Tribunal Agrario (Véase voto de las 15:10 horas del 29 de agosto de 1995, sobre los Centros Agrícolas Cantonales) y confirmado por la Jurisprudencia de la Sala I de Casación en reiteradas ocasiones. En particular, refiriéndose la Sala de Casación a los Centros Agrícolas Cantonales indicó “…En tal situación, en materia de prescripción se debe aplicar una normativa específica, la regulada en la Ley General de Administración Pública. La prescripción ordinaria civil no es aplicable al caso por estar involucrado un ente público. Las normas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública contiene plazos más cortos de prescripción tanto para la materia extracontractual como contractual. Así las cosas, si la demanda fue presentada el 14 de agosto de 1991 y el contrato de subarriendo fue rescindido en marzo de 1987 a la fecha de presentación de la acción ya había prescrito el derecho reclamado el cual se extinguía en tan solo tres años. (Sala I de Casación No. 132 de las 14:25 hrs del 20 de diciembre de 1996; véase, a mayor abundamiento los votos No. 56 de las 15 horas del 4 de julio de 1997). En otro caso, muy similar al que nos ocupa, la Sala I señaló: “I.-El recurrente, como propietario de varias fincas de la provincia de Limón, pretende se le reconozca el derecho a ser indemnizado en el valor de ellas, así como el pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados, como consecuencia de haber sido incluidos dichos inmuebles en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado. Este acto implica para los propietarios, según lo alega el recurrente, una expropiación de hecho…Efectivamente la gestión administrativa solicitando la indemnización fue planteada 3 años 1 mes y 16 días después de publicado el Decreto, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa 3 años 3 meses 20 días después del Decreto, y el juicio 3 meses y 27 días después de gestionar el agotamiento de la vía administrativa. Queda claro, del análisis cronológico verificado, como el recurrente gestionó ante la Administración Pública transcurrido más de tres años desde la publicación del Decreto Ejecutivo…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 26 de las 11:15 horas del 13 de mayo de 1994). VI. En el presente caso, estamos en presencia de una demanda entre otras pretensiones, por responsabilidad patrimonial contra el Estado, concretamente contra el Instituto de Desarrollo agrario, que es una “...institución autónoma de derecho público, con personalidad jurídica, patrimonio propio e independencia administrativa...” (art. 1 de su Ley de Creación), y tiene como una de sus funciones principales la capacidad de comprar tierras y distribuirlas a fin de promover el desarrollo agrario del país (art. 2 y 3 de la Ley de Creación del IDA). Como una de sus prioridades la Ley establece lo siguiente: “El Instituto deberá, con prioridad, procurar la solución de los problemas que resulten de la ocupación de las reservas nacionales y de la ocupación en precario de tierras de dominio privado. El Instituto queda facultado cuando proceda para redistribuir y reordenar las áreas que fueren objeto de conflicto, posteriormente a su finalización”. En ese sentido, el Instituto tiene el deber de intervenir en los conflictos de ocupación precaria de tierras, y procurar darles una solución dentro de los términos que la misma Ley establece, para dar seguridad jurídica a las partes que están involucradas en el conflicto. En ese sentido, la misma Ley de Tierras y Colonización, en el capítulo IV referido a la “Regulación de conflictos entre propietarios y poseedores en precario”, dispone cuáles son esos mecanismos y los plazos para ponerlos en práctica. Tales mecanismos pueden ser voluntarios, mediante la compra directa de tierras, o forzosos, mediante la expropiación y pago de las propiedades a los particulares. Todo ello está regulado en el artículo 94 de la Ley, que establece: “ARTICULO 94.- La solución de conflictos derivados de la posesión precaria de tierras, se buscará fundamentalmente a través de contratos directos de compraventa entre el propietario y los ocupantes, con intervención del Instituto, y en la forma en que se indica en los artículos siguientes. Previamente al establecimiento de una acción judicial cualquiera en que pueda estar comprendido un problema de posesión precaria de tierras, los propietarios deberán presentar su reclamo ante el Instituto, conforme a los procedimientos mencionados en este Capítulo. Transcurridos tres meses a partir del recibo de la gestión respectiva sin que el Instituto haya declarado la existencia de un conflicto de posesión de tierras, o un año desde esa declaratoria sin que el conflicto haya sido solucionado, se tendrá por agotado el procedimiento administrativo, y los accionantes podrán dirigirse a los Tribunales. No obstante lo anterior, cualquiera de los interesados podrá solicitar al Juez o Alcalde de la Jurisdicción en que esté situada la finca, que lleve a cabo una inspección ocular, con citación de partes, para comprobar cualesquiera hechos o señales que pudieren variar o desaparecer con el tiempo. Mientras el asunto esté en el Instituto, no correrá el término de la prescripción para ninguna de las partes. Solucionado el conflicto por el Instituto con la conformidad del propietario u ordenada la expropiación por el Poder Ejecutivo, el propietario carecerá de toda acción judicial, sea civil o penal, contra los poseedores en calidad de tales. Caso contrario los ocupantes quedarán expuestos a las sanciones legales comunes que puedan proceder. Los escritos presentados por las partes ante el Instituto, en diligencias de solución de conflictos de posesión precaria de tierras y otras relacionados con cuestiones agrarias, estarán exentas de autenticación y del uso de especies fiscales.” (Lo subrayado es nuestro). De la anterior disposición, podemos extraer los siguientes elementos relevantes para la decisión del presente asunto: 1) Previo a establecer cualquier acción judicial, los propietarios de fincas con problemas de posesión precaria deben agotar el procedimiento administrativo agrario contemplado en la Ley de Tierras; 2) El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario tiene tres meses para declarar, o no, la existencia del conflicto; 3) Ante la declaratoria del conflicto, el Instituto tiene un año más, para poder intervenir buscando una solución pacífica al mismo, sea mediante la compra directa de la propiedad, o mediante la expropiación. Existen, en consecuencia, dos modos de agotar la vía administrativa: el primero, opera por el silencio administrativo del Instituto; el segundo, opera un año después de declarada la existencia del conflicto, pues es el plazo que el legislador agrario otorgó al Ente para tratar de solucionar el referido conflicto. En éste último caso, evidentemente, el propósito del legislador fue dejar “abierta la vía judicial”, es decir, darle al propietario o a los poseedores, la oportunidad de debatir en la vía judicial la defensa de sus derechos. De igual manera, la interpretación de la norma lleva a concluir que cualquier propietario que se sienta perturbado, amenazado o perjudicado con la actuación administrativa del Instituto, al no haber llegado a ninguna solución administrativa (mediante compraventa o expropiación), dentro del año, podría acudir a la vía judicial correspondiente para reclamar una indemnización contra el mismo Estado. VII. Desde otra perspectiva, podría ocurrir que tanto el propietario, como los mismos ocupantes en precario, luego de transcurrido ese año, decidan someterse en forma voluntaria a un trámite administrativo, con miras a evitar la vía judicial. Pero esa espera, es totalmente voluntaria, pues si el propietario piensa, como en éste caso, en la posibilidad de vender el inmueble o ser indemnizado por el Instituto, se corre el riesgo de que, al final, no sea satisfecho su interés patrimonial. El Estado no está obligado, conforme a las disposiciones legales citadas, a dar una solución patrimonial al propietario, ni es la única vía que tiene el propietario para reclamar su derecho de propiedad. Por el contrario, todo propietario, una vez transcurrido el año de la declaratoria, tiene abierta la vía judicial para emprender las acciones ordinarias y patrimoniales correspondientes en defensa de los atributos dominicales. Pero si los propietarios dejan transcurrir el plazo, sometidos a la esperanza de que “algún día” el Instituto les pueda pagar el inmueble, estarían incurriendo en una situación de inseguridad jurídica, de incerteza jurídica, que podría provocar, con el transcurso del tiempo, la pérdida de su derecho a reclamar una indemnización contra el Estado. Por ello el legislador agrario, al regular la forma de llegar a una solución del conflicto, fija plazos muy determinados, y generalmente muy cortos, para que la Administración pueda actuar con prontitud en la búsqueda de una salida pacífica al conflicto de tierras. En ese sentido, la interpretación del párrafo del artículo 94 de la Ley de Tierras que establece “Mientras el asunto esté en el Instituto no correrá el término de la prescripción para ninguna de las partes”, debe ser restrictiva, pues se supone que el Instituto debe buscar una solución al conflicto dentro del año y, si no lo hace, queda agotada la vía administrativa, y por ende comienzan a correr de nuevo los plazos de prescripción. No se trata, en consecuencia, de un acto interruptor de la prescripción, sino de una suspensión temporal, de un año, durante el cual no corre el plazo de la prescripción. Ello se confirma también de la lectura del TRANSITORIO de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización que dispone lo siguiente: “…A petición del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, los Tribunales, en resolución considerada, podrán suspender los procedimientos establecidos contra cualquier persona que hubiere sido declarada por el citado organismo poseedora en precario de tierras. Dicha suspensión podrá decretarse en cualquier fase o estado del juicio de que se trate, y por el tiempo que sea prudencialmente necesario para que el Instituto logre una solución satisfactoria del conflicto, y podrá prorrogarse, siguiendo el mismo procedimiento indicado. Solucionado el conflicto en la forma que indica el párrafo tercero del artículo 94, el Instituto lo pondrá en conocimiento de los Tribunales para que estos declaren caducas las acciones civiles y extinguidas, tanto las penales como las penas que hubieren sido dictadas contra los poseedores en precario, en condición de tales. Caso contrario, los propietarios podrán dirigirse de nuevo a los Tribunales comunes para lo cual no les correrá término alguno en su contra durante la suspensión de los procedimientos…” De ésta norma también se extraen dos conclusiones importantes, en relación con lo dispuesto en el artículo 94: En primer lugar, que luego de darse por agotada la vía administrativa en las condiciones establecidas por el artículo 94, los propietarios tienen el derecho a acudir a la vía judicial. En segundo lugar, si el Instituto continúa interviniendo en la solución del conflicto, después de transcurrido el año o pasados los 3 meses causantes del silencio administrativo, por sometimiento de las partes interesadas en el mismo, éste puede solicitar la suspención del proceso judicial, término durante el cual no correría el plazo de la prescripción; en sentido contrario, si no se interpuso el reclamo en sede judicial, sigue corriendo el plazo de la prescripción, pues en tal caso el Instituto no puede solicitarle a los Tribunales la suspención del proceso. Como se puede concluir de lo anterior, estamos frente a un régimen especial (del Sector Público agrario), aplicable tanto a los sujetos públicos como privados, donde se regulan los plazos y modos para agotar la vía administrativa, así como las causas de interrupción o de suspensión a la eventual prescripción a que puedan estar sujetos los derechos de las partes, debiendo aplicarse éste régimen especial al caso que nos ocupa.[...] IX. En el caso de marras, es evidente que ha operado la prescripción a favor de la Administración Pública y, particularmente, a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. La Sociedad actora, desde 1986 sometió el conflicto de tierras a conocimiento del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. El 15 de octubre de 1987, la actora interpuso una denuncia penal por usurpación y daños, amparándose al silencio administrativo de la Institución. El 18 de octubre de 1988, cuando habían transcurrido sobradamente los tres meses de silencio administrativo (oportunidad en la cual ya quedaba abierta la vía judicial a favor de los propietarios), el Instituto declaró la existencia del conflicto de ocupación precaria de tierras. Posteriormente, la actora pidió una reconsideración y reposición, y tal solicitud fue conocida hasta el 14 de octubre de 1992, cuando el mismo Instituto revocó la declaratoria, por considerar que la resolución había sido extemporánea, y en ésta segunda resolución indicó “se AGOTA LA VIA ADMINISTRATIVA de las diligencias numeradas mil cuatrocientos uno, en que intervienen como partes Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima y [Nombre1] (ver folios 327-329). Dicha resolución fue notificada al Representante de Agropecuaria del Caribe el 6 de enero de 1993 (notificación de folio 329). Ese fue el acto administrativo que agotó la vía correspondiente al conflicto de ocupación precaria de tierras. Conforme a la doctrina “El acto que gota la vía administrativa o que “causa estado” es el que cierra el procedimiento administrativo, al haber sido dictado por la más alta autoridad competente –jerarca-, una vez agotados los recursos establecidos en las normas que rigen la instancia administrativa.”(JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, pág. 303). Por lo tanto, a partir de que se configura ese presupuesto procesal, la sociedad actora tenía abierta la vía jurisdiccional para plantear cualquier reclamo frente al Estado. Se trató de un acto firme que no fue anulado, revocado o modificado, quedando expedita la vía judicial para su impugnación. La Sociedad actora, tuvo conocimiento de los hechos que motivaron la responsabilidad del Estado desde 1986 y, habiendo agotado el procedimiento administrativo en 1993 no acudió a la vía judicial. Por el contrario, la Sociedad reclamante, como lo admite en su propio recurso de apelación, siguió gestionando ante el Instituto el pago de la propiedad, pero ésta vez ya no mediante la vía del conflicto de ocupación precaria, sino ofreciendo en venta sus propiedades a la Administración (ver documentos de folios 61 a 64). Ello de ningún modo comprometía al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario a comprar el inmueble y por ende no era un acto que pudiera interrumpir la prescripción en sede judicial, pues se trata de una oferta unilateral del propietario, tal y como se indicó en ese mismo documento de oferta de venta. El plazo de la prescripción continuó su curso, hasta cumplirse definitiva e inexorablemente el día 6 de enero de 1997, fecha en que se cumplieron los 4 años establecidos en el artículo 196 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Luego de ésta fecha, no podrían producirse actos interrruptores de una prescripción ya cumplida, salvo la renuncia a la prescripción, que en forma expresa o tácita hiciera el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario que, como veremos, no realizó tal renuncia, por el contrario alegó la prescripción. Con posterioridad a esa fecha, 6 de enero de 1997, es que la Representante de la Sociedad, en ese entonces, la señora Brenes Castro, dirige un escrito con fecha 23 de setiembre de 1997 (es decir, 7 meses después de operada la prescripción), a la Presidencia de la República, alegando la supuesta responsabilidad del Instituto, alegando daños y perjuicios y solicitando una indemnización por parte del Estado. Esa gestión abrió un nuevo expediente administrativo ante el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, pero basado en los mismos hechos que supuestamente motivaron la responsabilidad del Estado, originados desde 1987. En consecuencia, el referido reclamo administrativo, de ninguna manera, podía “reabrir” un nuevo plazo de prescripción. Así lo ha interpretado la Sala I de Casación cuando en un una situación fáctica similar dispuso: “VII.- En la especie, se tiene que la falsedad del documento en cuestión fue declarada mediante sentencia penal de fecha 13 de octubre de 1986, momento a partir del cual empezó a correr el plazo fatal de tres años, que era en ese momento del plazo de prescripción que contemplaba el artículo 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, para reclamar la eventual responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado por el hecho concreto. Cumplido el término previsto por la ley, resulta obvio, y más que eso ilógico, que pueda interrumpirse el plazo de prescripción. Interrumpir es, dice la Real Academia Española, “cortar la continuidad de una cosa en el lugar o en el tiempo”…Se interrumpe un plazo mientras está en curso, jamás cuando ya ha fenecido. Así, en el sub-lite, operada la prescripción desde el 13 de octubre de 1989, resulta imposible pensar en una “interrupción”. En consecuencia, el reclamo administrativo no pudo constituir, de ninguna manera, un acto interruptor del plazo de prescripción…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 861-F-2000 de las 15:15 horas del 16 de noviembre del 2000). X. En el caso de marras, es evidente que si el plazo de prescripción comenzó a correr a partir de la fecha en que se tuvo por agotada la vía administrativa, circunstancia notificada a la parte el 6 de enero de 1993, y los cuatro años se cumplieron el 6 de enero de 1997, el reclamo administrativo posterior, ante la Presidencia de la República, no podría tener la virtud de “interrumpir”, ese plazo fatal que ya se había cumplido. La Sociedad accionante, en lugar de acudir a la vía judicial en reclamo de sus derechos, se mantuvo en la espera de una solución administrativa, con lo cual se fue generando una situación de inseguridad e incerteza jurídica, tanto para el Instituto, como para la misma propietaria. De esa forma, transcurrieron más de 4 AÑOS, desde enero de 1993 hasta setiembre de 1997. En fecha 13 de agosto de 1998 el Instituto decide remitir a la Sociedad actora a la vía judicial. Pero ya para esa fecha, como se indicó, había transcurrido sobradamente el término fatal de prescripción señalado por el artículo 196 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Inclusive, aún siguiendo la tesitura de la actora, en el sentido que la norma de la prescripción aplicable fuese la del Código Civil, es decir, los 10 años, podría llegarse a concluir que si el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario conoció del conflicto desde 1986, hecho que motivó la posible responsabilidad también conocido por la actora, y no se pronunció dentro de los tres meses, desde esa fecha quedó abierta la posibilidad de la Sociedad actora para plantear cualquier reclamación, contra el Estado, en la vía judicial, pero al no hacerlo el plazo de la prescripción decenal se completó en 1997. Resulta inconcebible, en consecuencia que, por tantos años, la Sociedad demandante en este proceso, haya dejado transcurrir tanto tiempo para plantear su reclamo en la vía judicial. Su propia incuria la hace merecedora de esa sanción. XI. Por las razones expuestas, deberán rechazarse los agravios del apelante. El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, en ningún momento renunció a la prescripción, por el contrario, la invocó expresamente como excepción al contestar la presente demanda ordinaria. Tampoco puede considerarse que los informes del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario derivados de su último reclamo administrativo favorezcan sus pretensiones o enerve el plazo de la prescripción, pues como se ha dicho, el mismo ya había operado, con creces, al plantearse el reclamo indemnizatorio tanto en sede administrativa como judicial. Finalmente, en cuanto a la aplicación del artículo 356 inciso 1 de La Ley General de Administración Pública, debe indicarse que esa norma no es aplicable en éstos casos, por cuanto la misma Ley excluyó de su aplicación, a la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, en cuanto a procedimientos administrativos se refiere (ver artículo 367.2 Ley General de Administración Pública, Decreto número 8979-P del 18 de diciembre de 1978); en consecuencia si la Ley de Tierras y Colonización establece los modos en que se da por agotada la Vía Administrativa, no podía exigirse el dictamen jurídico, como lo pretende el recurrente. Aún así en ambos casos en que el Instituto dió por agotada la vía administrativa ( 1993 y 1998), siempre se escuchó al Departamento Legal, pero con la particularidad de que para el segundo caso (1998) ya había operado el plazo prescriptivo favorable a la administración." "