IDA Lease Rescission Does Not Permit Summary EvictionRescisión de arrendamiento del IDA no permite desahucio sumario

IV.To resolve the appeal filed, it is important to briefly analyze the legal context within which this matter must be resolved. Agricultural eviction (desahucio agrario) is one of the actions that must be heard in this specialized jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Article 2, subsection b) of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria). Regarding the procedure for this type of process, the Law did not establish express regulation, but rather referred to the procedure established in each case by the respective Code (Article 79 of the Law). It is the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) that regulates the eviction procedure starting from Article 448. As for the grounds on which eviction can be approved, that same rule refers to Article 121 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos) and those established by other provisions of the current legal system. Agrarian case law has stated that the issue of eviction grounds must be treated with care (see, among others, the resolutions of the Tribunal Superior Agrario No. 234 of 13:10 hours on April 20, 1994, and No. 103 of 14:05 hours on February 7, 1995); national commentators [Name1] and [Name2] are of the same opinion. The reason lies in the fact that the authorization of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law for the application of the Procedural Code is regarding the procedure of the eviction process and not regarding the substantive rules that would make such types of processes possible. In that sense, attention is drawn to the fact that what is at the base of or behind the eviction process is a lease contract (contrato de arrendamiento), and the eviction procedure is a summary avenue to recover the property, subject to a series of conditions, because this fast track, so to speak, is only justified in expressly regulated cases, by virtue of those grounds being considered amply justified and proven, since otherwise the parties must resort to the ordinary avenue, where with all the guarantees of an adversarial proceeding it must be proven whether the contract should be rescinded (rescindido) or resolved (resuelto). In the case of the civil process, we were saying, there is an express reference to the Urban Leases Law (Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos), which exhaustively requires demonstrating one of the grounds that we will develop later, based on the type of goods and other considerations about the nature of the goods to be protected in that type of lease (for example, social interest housing). In our case, the agricultural lease (arrendamiento agrario) is a type of agricultural contract that has specialty compared to the civil lease and its different possibilities, such as the rental of housing or commercial premises. The agricultural lease contract has been defined in doctrine and case law as a contract for the constitution of an agricultural enterprise (empresa agraria). It is not, therefore, a mere rental of a good, as in civil matters, because with it come other obligations and elements specific to that enterprise. The common characteristic of these contracts is that there is a community of interests between the one who grants and the one who receives the lease, because both the lessor and the lessee are interested in the agricultural enterprise being developed, and therefore in the elements of the agricultural estate (hacienda agraria) that is transferred being cared for and improved. This particular object of agricultural contracts, insofar as they are instrumental to the agricultural enterprise, means they are vested with their own principles: such as that of effectiveness, according to which the contract is explained not only by the content of the document, but by the effective deployment of the agricultural acts of constitution or operation of the agricultural enterprise, which shape that contract in reality. Also the principle of duration, because when dealing with agricultural activities determined by a technical fact, namely, the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals, it is subject to terms and characteristics specific to the cycles of nature (in this sense, see the resolutions of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) No. 73 of 14:30 hours on June 30, 1993, and No. 75 of 14:15 hours on July 2, 1993). Men and women in the exercise of agriculture continue to be conditioned by the cycles of agricultural products, or of the gestation and development of animal life, and although some of these processes are genetically manipulated today, fundamentally the normal course of life of those products and animals must be respected; therefore, regarding the duration of the contract, depending on the activity, the rules must adjust to that. Consequently, when it comes to the eviction process, it is necessary to analyze in each specific case whether the ground invoked conforms to the principles of Agrarian Law, as interpreted by agrarian case law, as the second voice of the law. For example, grounds based on lack of payment or tolerance have been widely accepted in this matter. However, the reference made by the Civil Procedure Code to Article 121 of the Leases Law puts us in front of other grounds. Let us see what Article 121 says: *Through the eviction process established in the Civil Procedure Code, the actions that the lessor brings for the following causes shall be pursued: a) expiration of the lease term, pursuant to subsection e) of Article 113) of this law. b) Termination of the lease contract by expiration of the right of the usufructuary or fiduciary, in accordance with Article 74 of this law. c) Resolution of the contract for breach of the lessee's obligations, according to Article 1145 of this law d) occupancy for own use by family members and new construction, in the case of social character housing, in accordance with Articles 100, 101, 102, 103, and 104 of this Law. “* As can be observed, the law permits eviction on a wide range of possibilities, fundamentally making a classification of three types of grounds: the first, which relates to the end of the contract term; the second, based on grounds for termination of the contract by expiration of the usufructuary's rights in general, but limited to what is established in Article 74 of that same Law; and the grounds based on contractual resolution for breach of the lessee's obligations. Also, as a specific case, different from the previous ones, eviction is contemplated for own occupancy or that of family members and new construction.

V.- The Institute of Development (Instituto de Desarrollo) seeks the eviction of Mr. [Name3], basing its ground on Article 448 of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to Article 1 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and the Autonomous Leasing Regulation of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Reglamento Autónomo de Arrendamientos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario). From reading the lawsuit filed, it is observed that the contract was rescinded (rescindido) by the Board of Directors of the Institute of Agrarian Development through Agreement Number 14 of Session Number 081-98, held on November 4, 1998. (folio 7) According to the explanation given, the rescission (rescisión) was due to recommendations from the Institute's technical offices, specifically the Legal Department, in the sense that the defendant had been allocated a parcel, number [Address1], and therefore, upon resolving his land tenure problem, the appropriate course was to rescind the lease contract he holds over parcels 1, 2, and 3 in that settlement, which are dedicated to livestock activity, and which, according to the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) at folio 106, form a single unit (folio 106). The plaintiff indicates that, according to the lease contract signed between the parties, the Institute of Agrarian Development reserves the right to consider this contract resolved (resuelto) at any time in cases that warrant it (seventh clause visible at folio 9). The defendant opposed the agreement and filed several administrative appeals, so in Agreement No. 23 of the Session held on November 13, 2000, authorization was given to carry out the judicial eviction proceedings. The defendant in this trial has stated that he and his partner, named [Name4], have been in possession of the land since 1985 and that he subsequently signed the lease contract without knowing what it was about; he states that on the land they have developed a livestock activity that requires a larger area than that assigned by the Institute of Development as [Address2], so the capacity of the property is reduced by two-thirds, which harms their agricultural enterprise. They have made improvements, built structures for livestock and housing, which he requests be paid to him as a subsidiary claim (folio 72). In the process, the signing of a lease contract has been duly proven, for a term of five years, which expired on October 15, two thousand and one. The existence of an agricultural cattle-raising enterprise has also been proven, on a fund mostly planted with pasture, with a house, a cement pigsty, a cement construction for cheese making, a well, a cement water tank, and more than ten paddocks (judicial inspection at folio 106). It has also been demonstrated that the plaintiff and his partner entered the land approximately since 1990, and the whole of it has been known as a unit (testimonial evidence from [Name5], [Name6], and [Name7], folio 118 to 110).

VI.Based on all the foregoing, the applicable regulations to the case, and the facts that have been deemed proven, this Chamber reaches the conclusion that the judgment must be confirmed insofar as it denies the plaintiff's claim to proceed with the eviction of the defendant. We find ourselves precisely in a case where the ground invoked does not conform to those exhaustively established by Article 121 of the Urban Leases Law and, as we will see below, is also not consistent with the principles that inspire agricultural contracting and its effects. The Institute of Agrarian Development decides to rescind the contract. The rescissory action has been defined in doctrine as “a legal power to challenge a harmful or fraudulent contract. Consequently, standing to bring the action corresponds exclusively to the injured contracting party.” (Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial, Luis Diez Picazo Tomo I, Editorial Civitas, p. 481.) For his part, Mr. [Name8] points out the following regarding rescission (rescisión): “Rescission is nothing more than the legal means, the action that is opened to the injured party by reason of some imperfectly concluded act or contract, void due to relative nullity, to be restored to the position they had before its conclusion. To rescind is to undo, to “tear”—scindere—the defectively formed thing, so that the object that constituted the performance returns to the power of its owner …” “Apart from the rescission discussed, this term is also distinguished in law as the dissolution of a contract by mutual agreement of the parties…” “Therefore, there exists contentious rescission, which is that produced through judicial controversy; and voluntary rescission, resulting from an agreement between the interested parties” (Tratado de las Obligaciones. Editorial Juricentro, 1977, p. 198). From the foregoing, it is observed that rescission can be unilateral, when lesion or relative nullity of the contract is alleged, or by mutual agreement, when the contracting parties reach that agreement. In the case of unilateral rescission, its nature is different from contractual resolution (resolución contractual), in that in the latter, the basis is the breach by one of the parties of their obligations under the contract, while in rescission, the action refers to situations specific to the relative nullity of the contract. This is explained by Mr. Alberto when he states: “Rescissory actions should not be confused with resolutory actions: the former refer to relative nullities, while the latter refer to cases in which, by reason of the existence of an explicit or implicit resolutory condition in an act or agreement, there is occasion to request the invalidity of the same upon fulfillment of the resolutory condition referring to it. Thus, a flawed contract is rescinded; a purchase-sale is resolved due to the buyer not having satisfied the agreed price, thus fulfilling the implicit resolutory condition that the law has established for such a case” (same citation p. 201). In the case of the Institute of Agrarian Development, we recall it is alleged as a ground in the first instance that the defendant already possesses an allocated parcel, and based on the contract, the possibility of rescission exists as one of the powers to be executed unilaterally by the entity. However, even if the contract indicates the possibility of rescinding it unilaterally (seventh clause of the contract), this does not mean that it permits the possibility of eviction as a means to achieve the recovery of the property, because when dealing with this matter, the grounds must be expressly regulated. Returning to Article 121 of the Urban and Suburban Leases Law, the only possibility of rescission contemplated by that Law is the reference made by subsection a) of 121 to 113, when it points to the rescission of the contract as a cause for termination of the lease contract in its subsection b), which it limits to the cases of Articles 30 and 38 of that same law, which are those referring to serious defects in the leased thing or nuisances rationally impossible to bear due to repairs on the leased thing. Even so, 121 does not authorize eviction as a means for those cases, as it limits the grounds for eviction due to expiration of the contract to those referred to in subsection e) of Article 113, which are related to the expiry of the term. Based on those rules, the lawsuit filed would have to be denied. But furthermore, and most importantly, the Chamber considers that the ground invoked cannot be the subject of an eviction process, but rather of an ordinary process in the declarative avenue, if the parties so deem appropriate, because there are a series of aspects of that contract that would have to be discussed. In the first place, the defendant has proven in this process that his possession of the land dates from a time before the signing of the contract. As we saw previously, one of the principles that protect agricultural contracting is that of effectiveness, which refers us to the reality of what the contract has been, so that, to unravel the nature of the contractual relationship between the Institute of Agrarian Development and the defendant, that aspect must be clarified. Secondly, everything concerning the agricultural enterprise conducted by the defendant, which has also been deemed proven, must be assessed. In the event that the partial liquidation of that enterprise were ordered, aspects relating to improvements, and eventual accession, must be resolved, analyzing, in light of the principles of Agrarian Law and existing legislation, the liquidation of the possessory state, especially since on the parcels there exist 26 hectares of pastures, one and a half hectares of plantain and cocoa, a dwelling house, a rule corral and a wooden one, a potable water tank, a pigsty—all this prior to the signing of the contract and recognized in it, according to the foregoing, all improvements were made by the lessee. Note that in this process, the defendant incorrectly establishes a subsidiary petition for recognition of all the improvements made on the land, which would have to be debated in the appropriate avenue. Finally, regarding the issue of the contract's expiration date, this is an aspect that the representative of the Institute of Agrarian Development alleges in this instance, and it was not the subject of debate in the first instance, so it could not be analyzed at this time. For all these reasons, the Chamber does not observe that there is a misappraisal of the evidence on the part of the first-instance ruling, and consequently, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed judgment, including the issue of the costs of the process, since their fixing corresponds to the manner in which the process has been resolved, as the plaintiff's claims have been rejected. (Article 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law in relation to Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code).

We find ourselves precisely in a case where the invoked ground does not conform to those exhaustively established by Article 121 of the Urban Leasing Law and, as we will see further on, is also not consistent with the principles that inspire agrarian contracting and its effects. The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario decides to rescind the contract. The rescissory action has been defined in doctrine as "a legal power to challenge a contract that is injurious or fraudulent. Therefore, the standing to exercise the action belongs exclusively to the injured contracting party." (Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial, Luis Diez Picazo, Volume I, Editorial Civitas, p. 481.) For his part, Don [Nombre8] states the following regarding rescission: "Rescission is nothing more than the legal means, the action that is opened to the injured party by reason of some act or contract celebrated imperfectly, null by relative nullity, to be restored to the position they had before it was celebrated. To rescind is to undo, to 'tear'—scindere—the defectively formed thing, so that the object that constituted the performance returns to the power of its owner '…' Apart from the rescission that has been discussed, the dissolution of a contract by mutual agreement of the parties is also distinguished by that name in law…" "So that there exists contentious rescission, which is that produced through judicial controversy; and voluntary rescission, resulting from an agreement between the interested parties" (Tratado de las Obligaciones. Editorial Juricentro, 1977, p. 198). From the foregoing, it is observed that rescission can be unilateral, when injury or relative nullity of the contract is alleged, or by mutual agreement, when the contracting parties reach that agreement. In the case of unilateral rescission, its nature is distinct from contractual resolution (resolución contractual), because in the latter, the basis is the breach by one of the parties of their obligations in the contract, while in rescission, the action refers to situations proper to the relative nullity of the contract. This is explained by Don Alberto when he points out: "Rescissory actions should not be confused with resolutory actions: the former refer to relative nullities, whereas the latter refer to cases where, by reason of the existence of an explicit or implicit resolutory condition in an act or agreement, there are grounds to request its invalidation because the resolutory condition referring to it has been fulfilled. So that a vitiated contract is rescinded, a purchase-sale is resolved because the buyer has not satisfied the agreed price and therefore, the implicit resolutory condition that the law establishes for such a case is realized" (same citation, p. 201). In the case of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, we recall that the ground alleged in the first instance is that the defendant already has an allocated parcel, and based on the contract, the possibility of rescission is found as one of the powers to be executed unilaterally by the entity. However, even though the contract indicates the possibility of rescinding it unilaterally (seventh clause of the contract), that does not mean it allows for the possibility of eviction (desahucio) as a means to achieve the recovery (reivindicación) of the property, because, when dealing with this matter, the grounds must be expressly regulated. Returning to Article 121 of the Urban and Suburban Leasing Law, the only possibility of rescission that this Law contemplates is the referral made by subsection a) of 121 to 113, when it indicates as a cause for termination of the lease contract in its subsection b) the rescission of the contract, which it limits to the cases of Articles 30 and 38 of that same law, which refer to serious defects in the leased thing or nuisances rationally impossible to bear due to repairs to the leased thing. Even so, 121 does not authorize eviction as a means for those cases, as it limits the grounds for eviction due to expiration of the contract to those referred to in subsection e) of Article 113, which are those related to the expiration of the term. Based on those rules, the filed claim would have to be denied. But furthermore, and most importantly, the Tribunal considers that the invoked ground cannot be the subject of an eviction proceeding, but rather of an ordinary proceeding in the declarative jurisdiction, if the parties see fit, because there are a series of aspects of that contract that would need to be discussed. In the first place, the defendant has proven in this proceeding that his possession of the land has existed since before the contract was signed. As we saw previously, one of the principles that protects agrarian contracting is that of effectiveness, which refers us to the reality of what the contract has been, so that, to unravel the nature of the contractual relationship between the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and the defendant, that aspect must be clarified. In the second place, everything concerning the agrarian enterprise carried out by the defendant, which has also been taken as proven, must be evaluated. In the event that the partial liquidation of that enterprise were ordered, aspects relating to improvements (mejoras), and eventual accession (accesión), must be resolved, analyzing, in light of the principles of Agrarian Law and the existing legislation, the liquidation of the possessory state, especially since on the parcels there exist 26 hectares of pasture, one and a half hectares of plantain and cocoa, a dwelling house, a proper corral and another wooden one, a potable water tank, a pigsty, all of this prior to the signing of the contract and, according to what was set forth above, all the improvements were made by the lessee. It should be noted that in this proceeding, the defendant incorrectly establishes a subsidiary request for all the improvements made on the land to be recognized, which would have to be debated in the corresponding jurisdiction. Finally, regarding the issue of the contract's expiration term, this is an aspect alleged by the representative of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario at this instance, and was not a subject of debate in the first instance, so it cannot be analyzed at this time. For all these reasons, the Tribunal does not observe any erroneous assessment of the evidence by the first-instance ruling, and consequently, it is appropriate to confirm the appealed judgment, including the matter of the proceeding's costs, since their fixing corresponds to the manner in which the proceeding has been resolved, the plaintiff's claims having been rejected. (Article 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law in relation to Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code)." Consequently, standing to bring the action belongs exclusively to the injured contracting party." (Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial, Luis Diez Picazo, Volume I, Editorial Civitas, p. 481.) For his part, Don [Nombre8] indicates the following regarding rescission: "Rescission is nothing more than the legal means, the action made available to the injured party by reason of some act or contract imperfectly entered into, void by reason of relative nullity, to be restored to the position held before its conclusion. To rescind is to undo, to 'tear'—scindere—the defectively formed thing, so that the object constituting the performance returns to the power of its owner…" Apart from the rescission already discussed, this term is also used in law to distinguish the dissolution of a contract by mutual agreement of the parties…" "Thus, there exists contentious rescission, which is that produced through judicial controversy; and voluntary rescission, resulting from an agreement between the interested parties" (Tratado de las Obligaciones. Editorial Juricentro, 1977, p. 198). From the foregoing, it is observed that rescission may be unilateral, when lesion (lesión) or relative nullity of the contract is alleged, or by mutual agreement, when the contracting parties reach such an agreement. In the case of unilateral rescission, its nature differs from contractual resolution (resolución contractual), since in the latter, the basis is one party's breach of its obligations under the contract, whereas in rescission, the action concerns situations inherent to the relative nullity of the contract. This is explained by don Alberto when he states: "Rescissory actions must not be confused with resolutory actions: the former refer to relative nullities, while the latter refer to cases in which, by reason of the existence of an explicit or implicit resolutory condition in an act or agreement, there are grounds to seek its unenforceability because the resolutory condition relating to it has been fulfilled. Thus, a vitiated contract is rescinded; a purchase-sale is resolved because the buyer has not paid the agreed price and the implicit resolutory condition that the law establishes for such case is thereby realized" (same citation p. 201).

In the case of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, we recall that it was alleged, as a ground in the first instance, that the defendant already has an assigned parcel, and based on the contract, the possibility of rescission is found as one of the powers to be executed unilaterally by the entity. However, even though the contract indicates the possibility of rescinding it unilaterally (seventh clause of the contract), that does not mean it allows the possibility of eviction (desahucio) as a means to achieve recovery of possession (reivindicación) of the property, since, in this area of law, the grounds must be expressly regulated. Returning to Article 121 of the Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, the only possibility of rescission contemplated by that Law is the reference made by subsection a) of 121 to 113, when it indicates as a cause for termination of the lease contract in subsection b) the rescission of the contract, which it limits to the cases of Article 30 and 38 of that same law, which refer to serious defects in the leased thing or nuisances rationally impossible to bear due to repairs to the leased thing. Even so, 121 does not authorize eviction (desahucio) as a means for those cases, since it limits the grounds for eviction upon expiration of the contract to those referred to in subsection e) of Article 113, which are those related to the expiration of the term. Based on those norms, the filed complaint would have to be dismissed.

But furthermore, and most importantly, the Court considers that the ground invoked cannot be the subject of an eviction (desahucio) proceeding, but rather of an ordinary declaratory proceeding, should the parties deem it appropriate, because there are a series of aspects of that contract that would need to be litigated. Firstly, the defendant has proven in this proceeding that his possession of the land dates back to well before the signing of the contract. As we saw previously, one of the principles governing agricultural contracting is that of effectiveness (efectividad), which directs us to the reality of what the contract has been; therefore, to unravel the nature of the contractual relationship between the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and the defendant, that aspect must be clarified. Secondly, everything concerning the agricultural enterprise (empresa agraria) carried out by the defendant, which has also been taken as proven, must be assessed. Should it be ordered to partially liquidate that enterprise, aspects relative to improvements (mejoras) and eventual accession (accesión) must be resolved, analyzing, in light of the principles of Agrarian Law and existing legislation, the settlement of the possessory state (estado posesorio), especially given that on the parcels there are 26 hectares of pasture, one and a half hectares of plantain and cacao, a dwelling house, a proper corral (corral de regla) and a wooden one, a potable water tank, and a pigsty—all of this prior to the signing of the contract, and it being recognized in the same, as stated supra, that all the improvements (mejoras) were made by the lessee (arrendatario). Note that in this proceeding, the defendant incorrectly raises a subsidiary petition for recognition of all the improvements (mejoras) made on the land, which would have to be debated in the appropriate legal channel.

Finally, regarding the issue of the contract's expiration date, this is an aspect raised by the representative of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario at this instance, and it was not a subject of debate in the first instance; therefore, it could not be analyzed at this time. For all these reasons, the Court does not find that there was an erroneous assessment of the evidence on the part of the first-instance ruling, and consequently, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed judgment, including the issue of procedural costs (costas del proceso), since their imposition corresponds to the way the proceeding has been resolved, the plaintiff's claims having been rejected (Article 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria in relation to Article 221 of the Código Procesal Civil)."            

"IV. Para resolver la apelación interpuesta es importante hacer un breve análisis del contexto jurídico dentro del cual debe resolverse el presente asunto. El desahucio agrario es una de las acciones que deben ser conocidas en esta jurisdicción especializada en virtud de lo establecido en el artículo 2 inciso b) de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. En cuanto al trámite de este tipo de proceso, la Ley no estableció una regulación expresa, sino que remitió al procedimiento que en cada caso establece el respectivo Código ( artículo 79 de la Ley). Es el Código Procesal Civil el que regula el trámite del desahucio a partir del artículo 448. En cuanto a las causales por las cuales se puede aprobar el desahucio esa misma norma remite al artículo 121 de la Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos y las que establezcan otras disposiciones del ordenamiento jurídico vigente. La jurisprudencia agraria ha dicho, debe tratarse con cuidado el tema de las causales del desahucio ( consultar entre otras las resolucionesdel Tribunal Superior Agrario No. 234 de las 13:10 hrs del 20 de abril de 1994 y No 103 de las 14:05 horas del 7 de febrero de 1995); de igual criterio son los tratadistas nacionales [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] . La razón estriba en que la autorización de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria para la aplicación del Código Procesal, es en cuanto al procedimiento del proceso de desahucio y no en cuanto a las normas sustantivas que harían posible tal tipo de procesos. En ese sentido se llama la atención en cuanto, lo que está de base o detrás del proceso de desahucio es un contrato de arrendamiento y el trámite del desahucio es una vía sumaria para reivindicar el bien, sujeta a una serie de condiciones, pues esta vía rápida, por así decirlo, solo se justifica en los casos expresamente regulados, en virtud de que se consideren ampliamente justificadas y probadas esas causales, pues de lo contrario deben las partes acudir a la vía ordinaria, donde con todas las garantías de contradictorio pruebe debe ser rescindido o resuelto. En el caso del proceso civil decíamos, hay una remisión expresa a la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos, la cual exige taxativamente se demuestre alguna de causales que más adelante desarrollaremos, en función del tipo de bienes y otras consideraciones sobre la naturaleza de los bienes a tutelar en ese tipo de arrendamientos ( por ejemplo viviendas de interés social). En nuestro caso, el arrendamiento agrario es un tipo de contrato agrario que tiene especialidad frente al arrendamiento civil y sus diferentes posibilidades, como el alquiler de viviendas, o locales comerciales. El contrato de arrendamiento agrario ha sido definido en la doctrina y jurisprudencia como un contrato de constitución o para la constitución de una empresa agraria. No se trata entonces de un mero alquiler de un bien, como en materia civil, pues con él van otras obligaciones y elementos propios de esa empresa. La característica común de esos contratos es que hay una comunidad de intereses entre quien da y quien recibe el arrendamiento, pues tanto al arrendador como al arrendatario les interesa que se desarrolle la empresa agraria, y por tanto se cuiden y mejoren los elementos de la hacienda agraria que se traspasa. Este objeto particular de los contratos agrarios, en cuanto son instrumentales a la empresa agraria, hace que estén revestidos de principios propios: como el de efectividad, según el cual, el contrato se explica no solo por el contenido del documento, sino por el despliegue efectivo de los actos agrarios de constitución o ejercicio de la empresa agraria, que configuran en la realidad ese contrato. También el principio de duración, pues al tratarse de actividades agrarias determinadas por un hecho técnico, a saber, el cultivo de plantas o la cría de animales, está sujeto a plazos y características propias de los ciclos de la naturaleza ( pueden consultarse en ese sentido las resoluciones de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 73 de las 14:30 horas del 30 de junio de 1993 y No. 75 de las 14:15 horas del 2 de julio de 1993). El hombre y la mujer en el ejercicio de la agricultura siguen estando condicionados por los ciclos de los productos agrícolas, o de la gestación y desarrollo de la vida animal, y aunque hoy se manipula genéticamente algunos de esos procesos, en lo fundamental debe respetarse el curso normal de la vida de esos productos y animales, por tanto en cuanto a duración del contrato, según se trate de la actividad, las normas deben ajustarse a ello. Como consecuencia, cuando del proceso de desahucio se trata, hay que analizar en cada caso concreto si la causal que se invoca se ajusta a los principios del Derecho Agrario, tal y como lo ha interpretado la jurisprudencia agraria, como segunda voz de la ley. Por ejemplo, las causales fundadas en falta de pago o tolerancia han sido de amplia aceptación en esta materia. No obstante, la remisión que hace el Código Procesal Civil al artículo 121 de la Ley de Arrendamientos nos pone de frente a otras causales. Veamos lo que dice el Artículo 121: Por el proceso de desahucio establecido en el Código Procesal Civil, se deducirán las acciones que arrendador promueve por las siguientes causas: a) expiración del plazo del arendamiento, conforme el inciso e) del artículo 113) de esta ley. b) Extinción del contrato de arrendamiento por expiración del derecho del usufructuario o del fiduciario, de conformidad con el artículo 74 de esta ley. c) Resolución del contrato por incumplimiento de las obligaciones del arrendatario, según el artículo 1145 de esta ley d) habitación para uso propio de familiares y nueva construcción, en caso de vivienda de carácter social, de acuerdo con los artículos 100, 101, 102, 103, y 104 de esta Ley. “ Como se puede observar la ley permite el desahucio en una gama amplia de posibilidades, haciendo en lo fundamental una clasificación de tres tipos de causales, la primera, que se relaciona con la finalización del plazo de los contratos, la segunda fundada en causales de extinción del contrato por expiración de los derechos en general del usufructuario, pero limitados a lo que establece el artículo 74 de esa misma Ley y las causales fundadas en resolución contractual por incumplimiento de las obligaciones del arrendatario. También como caso específico, diferente de lo anteriores se contempla el desahucio por habitación propia o de familiares y nueva construcción. V.- El Instituto de Desarrollo pretende el desahucio de don [Nombre3] , fundando su causal en el artículo 448 del Código Procesal Civil relacionado con el 1 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria y el Reglamento Autónomo de Arrendamientos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. De la lectura de la demanda planteada se observa que el contrato fue rescindido por la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario mediante Acuerdo Número 14 de la Sesión número 081-98, celebrada el 4 de noviembre de 1998. ( folio 7) De acuerdo con la explicación que se da, la rescisión se debió a recomendaciones de las Oficinas técnicas del Instituto, en cuenta el Departamento Legal, en el sentido el demandado fue adjudicado con una parcela, la número [Dirección1] , y por ello, al resolvérsele su problema de tenencia de tierra, lo procedente era rescindir el contrato de arrendamiento que sobre las parcelas 1,2,y 3, tiene en ese asentamiento, las cuales están dedicadas a la actividad de ganadería, y que según el reconocimiento judicial de folio 106 forman una sola unidad ( folio 106). Indica el actor, conforme el contrato de arrendamiento firmado entre las partes, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario se reserva el derecho de dar por resuelto este contrato en cualquier momento en los casos que se amerite ( cláusula sétima visible a folio 9). El demandado se opuso al acuerdo y estableció varios recursos administrativos, por lo que en Acuerdo No 23 de la Sesión celebrada el 13 de noviembre del 2000 se autorizó realizar los trámites del desahucio judicial. El demandado en este juicio ha manifestado se encuentra en posesión del terreno él y su conviviente de nombre [Nombre4] desde el año 1985 y que firmó posteriormente el contrato de arrendamiento, sin saber de qué se trataba, manifiesta en el terreno han desarrollado una actividad ganadera, que requiere de una extensión mayor a la asignada por el Instituto de Desarrollo como [Dirección2] , por lo que le desmejoran en dos tercios la cabida del inmueble, lo cual les perjudica en su empresa agraria. Han hecho mejoras, construido edificaciones para el ganado, y habitacionales, las cuales solicita le sean pagadas en forma de petitoria subsidiaria ( folio 72). En el proceso ha quedado debidamente acreditado, la suscripción de un contrato de arrendamiento, por un plazo de cinco años, los cuales se vencían el 15 de octubre del dos mil uno. También ha resultado acreditado la existencia de una empresa agraria de cría de ganado, en un fundo en su mayoría sembrado de pasto, con una casa, una chanchera de cemento, una construcción de cemento para la elaboración de queso, un pozo, tanque de agua de cemento y más de diez apartos (reconocimiento judicial de folio 106). También ha quedado demostrado el actor y su compañera ingresaron al terreno desde el año 1990 aproximadamente, y se ha conocido toda ella como una unidad ( prueba testimonial de [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] , folio 118 a 110). VI. Con base en todo lo anteriormente expuesto, normativa aplicable al caso y los hechos que se han tenido por probados, este Tribunal llega a la conclusión la sentencia debe confirmarse en cuanto deniega la pretensión de la actora para que se proceda al desahucio del demandado. Nos encontramos precisamente en un caso donde la causal invocada no se ajusta a las que establece el artículo 121 de la Ley de Arrendamiento Urbanos en forma taxativa y como más adelante veremos tampoco es congruente con los principios que inspiran la contratación agraria y sus efectos. El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, decide rescindir el contrato. La acción rescisoria ha sido definida en la doctrina como “ un poder jurídico de impugnación del contrato lesivo o fraudulento. Por consiguiente, la legitimación para ejercitar la acción corresponde exclusivamente al contratante perjudicado.” ( Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial, Luis Diez Picazo Tomo I, Editorial Civitas, pág. 481.) Por su parte Don [Nombre8] señala sobre la rescisión lo siguiente “ La rescisión no es más que el medio legal, la acción que se franquea al perjudicado con motivo de algún acto o contrato celebrado imperfectamente, nulo por nulidad relativa, para ser restituido a la posición que tenía antes de celebrarse. Rescindir es deshacer, “rasgar”-scindere- la cosa defectuosamente formada, para que el objeto que constituía la prestación torne al poder de su dueño “…” Fuera de la rescisión de que se ha hablado, se distingue también con ese nombre, en derecho, la disolución de un contrato de común acuerdo de partes…” “ Por manera que existe rescisión contenciosa, que es aquella que se produce mediante controversia judicial; y rescisión voluntaria, resultando de convenio entre los interesados “ ( Tratado de las Obligaciones. Editorial Juricentro, 1977, pág 198). De lo expuesto se observa la rescisión puede ser unilateral, cuando se alegue lesión o nulidad relativa del contrato, o de común acuerdo, por llegar las partes contratantes a ese acuerdo. En el caso de la rescisión unilateral, su naturaleza es distinta a la resolución contractual, por cuanto en esta última, el fundamento es el incumplimiento de una de las partes, de sus obligaciones en el contrato, mientras que en la rescisión, la acción se refiere a situaciones propias de la nulidad relativa del contrato. Así lo explica don Alberto cuando señala: “ No deben confundirse las acciones rescisorias con las resolutorias: aquellas se refieren a las nulidades relativas, al paso que las últimas a los casos en que con motivo de existir una condición resolutoria explícita o implícita en un acto o convenio, hay lugar a pedir la insubsistencia del mismo por haberse realizado la condición resolutoria a él referente. De suerte que se rescinde un contrato viciado, se resuelve una compraventa por no haber el comprador satisfecho el precio convenido y realizándose por lo tanto, la condición resolutoria implícita y que tal caso tiene establecida la ley “ ( misma cita pág. 201). En el caso del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, recordemos se alega, como causal en primera instancia, que el demandado ya cuenta con una parcela asignada, y con base en el contrato se encuentra la posibilidad de rescisión como una de las atribuciones a ejecutar unilateralmente por parte de la entidad. Ahora bien, aún cuando el contrato señale la posibilidad de rescindirlo unilateralmente ( cláusula sétima del contrato), eso no significa que ello permita la posibilidad del desahucio como vía para lograr la reivindicación del inmueble, por cuanto, tratándose de esa materia las causales deben estar expresamente reguladas. Volviendo al artículo 121 de la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Subrbanos, la única posibilidad de rescisión que contempla esa Ley es la remisión que hace el inciso a) del 121 al 113, cuando señala como causa de extinción del contrato de arrendamiento en su inciso b) la rescisión del contrato, la cual limita a los casos del artículo 30 y 38 de esa misma ley, que son los referidos a defectos graves de la cosa arrendada o molestias racionalmente imposibles de soportar con motivo de reparaciones en la cosa arrendada. Aún así el 121 no autoriza para esos casos el desahucio como vía, pues limita las causales de desahucio por expiración del contrato a las que se refieren al inciso e) del artículo 113, que son las relacionadas con el vencimiento del plazo. Con base en esas normas tendría que denegarse la demanda planteada. Pero además y lo más importante, considera el Tribunal, la causal invocada no puede ser objeto de un proceso de desahucio, sino de un proceso ordinario en la vía declarativa, si a bien lo tienen las partes, por cuanto existen una serie de aspectos de ese contrato que tendrían que ser discutidas. En primer término, el demandado ha probado en este proceso, su posesión en el terreno lo ha sido desde tiempo antes de la firma del contrato. Como vimos anteriormente, uno de los principios que tutela la contratación agraria es el de efectividad, que nos remite a la realidad de lo que ha sido el contrato, por lo que, para desentrañar la naturaleza de la relación contractual entre el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y el demandado, deberá aclararse ese aspecto. En segundo lugar deberá valorarse todo lo concerniente a la empresa agraria realizada por el accionado, la cual también se ha tenido por probada. En el evento de que se ordenara liquidar parcialmente esa empresa, deben resolverse aspectos relativos a las mejoras, y eventual accesión, analizando a la luz de los principios del Derecho Agrario, y la legislación existente, la liquidación del estado posesorio, máxime existiendo en las parcelas 26 hectáreas de pastos, una y media hectárea de cuadrado y cacao, una casa de habitación, un corral de regla y otro de madera, tanque para agua potable, una porqueriza, todo esto de previo a la firma del contrato y reconociéndose en el mismo, según lo expuesto supra todas las mejoras las hizo el arrendatario. Obsérvese que en este proceso, el demandado establece incorrectamente una petición subsidiaria para que se le reconozcan todas las mejoras realizadas en el terreno, las cuales tendrían que debatirse en la vía correspondiente. Finalmente, en relación con el tema del plazo de vencimiento del contrato, éste es un aspecto que alega el representante del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en esta instancia, y no fue motivo de debate en la primera instancia, por lo que no podría analizarse en este momento. Por todo ello no observa el Tribunal exista mala apreciación de la prueba, de parte del fallo de primera instancia, y en consecuencia lo procedente será confirmar la sentencia recurrida incluido el tema de las costas del proceso, por cuanto su fijación corresponde a la forma como se ha resuelto el proceso, al haberse rechazado las pretensiones de la actora. ( artículo 55 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria en relación con el 221 del Código Procesal Civil )."