Pro homine nasciturus principle in child support for the unbornPrincipio pro homine nasciturus en alimentos para el no nacido

**VIII. PRINCIPLE OF FAVOR DEBILIS:** Article 2 of the Family Code provides that "the unity of the family, the interest of the children, that of minors, and the equality of rights and duties of the spouses shall be the fundamental principles for the application and interpretation of this Code." This article contemplates the principle "favor debilis"—Schötz, Gustavo J. (2013). El favor debilis como principio general del Derecho Internacional Privado. Su particular aplicación a las relaciones de consumo transfronterizas. University of Salamanca. Volume 1. Document consulted on September 4, 2024 https://gredos.usal.es/bitstream/handle/10366/128967/El_ favor_debilis_como_principio_general_.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y—which forms part of the legal system as a general principle of Law, as proposed by the author Gustavo Schötz. The undersigned shares this idea, as I believe that this principle is contemplated in Article 9 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code, Articles 2 and 7 of the Law on Child Support Payments (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), as well as Article 6 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, and even in Article 13 of the Law against Domestic Violence. Other areas of law contemplate principles with identical or similar content: "in dubio pro reo" in criminal law and "in dubio pro operario" in labor law. Thus, the principle "favor debilis" has its raison d'être because the legal system seeks equality, and for this, it is essential to protect the weakest individuals and be clear that vulnerability can arise from multiple factors such as age, economic condition, physical or psychosocial disability, etc. To understand this resolution, what is indicated in Article 9 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code is very important: "Article 9°- Preferential application. In case of doubt, of fact or of law, in the application of this Code, the norm that is most favorable to the minor shall be chosen according to the criteria characterizing their best interest." It must be remembered that this Code dates from 1998, while the Family Code dates from 1973 and entered into force in 1974. Therefore, for all the reasons already stated, what is appropriate in a case such as this one is to shift to the defendant the burden of displacing the presumption established by the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code, since the unborn child (ser en gestación) and the pregnant woman remain in a situation of vulnerability. In this regard, Feito states: "[...] being vulnerable implies fragility, a situation of threat or possibility of suffering harm. Therefore, it implies being susceptible to receiving or suffering something bad or painful, like an illness, and also having the possibility of being hurt physically or emotionally. Vulnerability can also be understood as being able to be persuaded or tempted, being able to be a recipient, being permeable, not being invincible, not having absolute control of the situation, not being in a position of power, or at least having the possibility that such power may be weakened. A person is vulnerable, according to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy, who can be wounded or receive injury, physically or morally." Feito, L. (2007). Vulnerabilidad. Anales del Sistema Sanitario de Navarra, 30(Suppl. 3), 07-22. Consulted on September 4, 2024, on the site https://scielo.isciii.es/scielo.php?pid=S1137-66272007000600002 &script=sci_abstract Along these lines, Estupiñan-Silva warns: "[...] the term vulnerability is always relative and specific with respect to a particular underlying threat. Applied sciences have historically agreed that it is only possible to speak of a degree of vulnerability from the point of view of the probability of the threat and depending on its particular intensity, frequency, and duration. The relevance of delimiting the concept of vulnerability is in fact widely addressed in the scientific field, and although some of its components may be interpreted differently, its structural elements systematically re-emerge in doctrine, namely: causes, sensitivity, exposure, the threat, and the risk itself." Estupiñan-Silva, Rosmerlin (2013). La vulnerabilidad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Esbozo de una tipología. Derechos Humanos y Políticas Públicas. Document consulted on September 4, 2024 https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r39780.pdf At this point, it is essential to consider that the pro persona principle requires the extensive interpretation of the regulatory framework when it involves enshrining or expanding human rights, and restricted interpretation when such rights are limited. It is through the application of the pro persona or pro homine principle that human rights become unconditionally and immediately enforceable, and their limitation can only be of an exceptional nature. (Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1986). Exigibilidad del Derecho de Rectificación o Respuesta. Separate Opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, para. 36.-). Furthermore, for the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, "the pro libertatis principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of human rights doctrine; according to the first, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted extensively, and everything that limits it must be interpreted restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being." This has been expressed, for example, in Resolution No. 3173-93 of 14:57 on July 6, 1993. On the pro homine principle, constitutional votes No. 3550-92 at 4:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992, No. 2588-16 at 2:50 p.m. on February 23, No. 697-16 at 2:30 p.m. on January 19, both from the year 2016, and No. 12659-18 at 9:20 a.m. on August 7, 2018, among others, can also be consulted. Thus, the undersigned does not understand why a pregnant woman should be placed in this anguish regarding the satisfaction of the unborn child's minimum needs. Why place her almost in a situation of begging for justice? The undersigned cannot fully understand why the dignity of the pregnant woman here must be violated for deciding to file a judicial support action for the benefit of the unborn child. What condition must she be in to be considered a person and not a thing that incubates? Note that denying her the right to access to justice objectifies her. Note that, as a result, it is being demanded that the woman's body provide everything it has for the formation of the unborn child (ser en gestación) and that the woman must figure out what to do to ensure the birth occurs. This is unacceptable, and I consider that the principle "pro homine" must have an aggravating factor or reinforcement in the case of conceived children not yet born, that is, nasciturus. Furthermore, I consider that this aggravating factor or reinforcement derives from the Preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states: "Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1959, 'the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth' [...]" It is from this that the legal principle "pro homine nasciturus" is extracted, by virtue of which it is mandatory to interpret all norms—of any rank—in favor of the dignity of individuals, and, if it is an unborn child (ser en gestación), it is mandatory to interpret the regulations in their favor, that is, to ensure their comprehensive health, to consider them as a person in everything that is favorable to them, and to seek the prevention and treatment of diseases or disabilities. Moreover, what is being gestated is a human being and also has the right that its mother does not lose her comprehensive health. Likewise, any regulatory gap must be remedied by the principle "pro homine nasciturus," which, for obvious reasons, is applicable extensively to assisted human reproduction, the prohibition of the free dismissal of pregnant women, the prohibition of labor discrimination against pregnant women, the recognition of the right to child support (derecho alimentario) for nasciturus regardless of the mother's marital status, the prohibition of bodily coercion (apremio corporal) against pregnant women, the right to education and health of adolescent mothers, the right to non-violence against women, which includes the right to non-violence against pregnant women, the eradication of obstetric violence, the prohibition of workplace harassment in general with special severity in cases of workplace harassment against pregnant women, the increase in penalties for those who commit crimes against a pregnant woman, as well as the increase in penalties for sexual assaults resulting in pregnancy, etc. Thus, it is important to clarify that principles are distinguished from legal norms because they do not determine conduct, do not restrict rights, do not impose sanctions, do not entail prohibitions, do not propose a single solution for the specific case, are not exhausted in the content of the norm, nor do they have a propositional structure—factual assumption and legal effect—but rather, they are composed of a general idea that serves as a goal, limit, aspiration, framework for interpretation, and concretion so that the legal system functions as a coherent system that provides answers to specific realities. Principles oscillate throughout the legal system, as they articulate it, meaning they are in its entirety and not confined to a reduced space or prominence. -Domínguez Hidalgo, Carmen. (2005). Los principios que informan el Derecho de Familia Chileno: su formulación clásica y revisión moderna. Revista Chilena de Derecho. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, on the site https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177021336001.pdf Without the principles, one would not understand what the hard core of a norm or the legal system is, nor where to go to find what is protected or sought to be avoided. In this line, principles have a very broad scope of action, as well as a field of influence over specific situations. Therefore, there are procedural and substantive principles. The former guide how substantive law is materialized, and the latter deal with what substantive law is at stake. It is also important to say that there are express and implicit principles. The former "are those that have been expressly dictated by a source of legal production and appear, consequently, included in a normative text, whereas implicit principles are deduced by the law-applier from express provisions of the legal system—although, as we shall see, for one sector of doctrine they must be understood as conclusions drawn from natural law." -Ruiz Ruiz, Ramón. (2012). La distinción entre reglas y principios y sus implicaciones en la aplicación del derecho. Derecho y realidad. Number 20. Page 149. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, at https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/derecho_realidad/article/view/4860/3952 It is also timely to indicate that for a principle to be applicable, it requires its positivization, that is, it must complete the juridification process and be contemplated in the legal system, whether in a concrete or general manner. Otherwise, it would be an ethical principle, but not a legal one. Now, as author Alonso Vidal points out, when implicit principles are applied for the solution of a particular case, the judge must argue to demonstrate the existence of two conditions for their application: "a) Subsidiarity, that is, that there is no authoritatively identifiable norm applicable to the case, or that the authoritatively identifiable norm must be interpreted differently or even be disapplied due to the concurrence of the implicit principle in question. b) Coherence, that is, that the content of the implicit principle is coherent with the explicit rules and principles of the system." -Alonso Vidal, Horacio-José. (2012). Los principios implícitos. Su relevancia en la aplicación del derecho. Pages 165 and 166. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, on the site https://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/47431/1/Doxa_35_07.pdf Consequently, applying an express principle is much simpler than applying an implicit principle. Of course, both types of principles are used to interpret legal norms that are unclear or to fill a regulatory gap. That is, they are not used to contradict the content of a norm, since a principle particularly seeks the coherence of the legal system. All of the above with the observation that, if the content of a norm is contrary to a general principle of Law, what is appropriate is to apply the principle, since the goal is for the legal system to function as a coherent system, hence the need to eradicate contradictions. In practice, it is common to declare a norm unconstitutional for violating the principle of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, non-discrimination, inviolability of the defense, best interest of the minor, etc. Therefore, norms must be excluded from the legal system when they collide with a general principle or with a specific one. Furthermore, in the event of a collision of principles, one of them will have a quantitative projection, insofar as it applies to a specific situation, and, consequently, if other principles must yield to the content of a concrete principle, this constitutes a qualitative projection. That is, one principle has greater weight in a given case compared to other principles. In contrast, in the case of norms, if a collision exists, prevalence is resolved by resorting to the hierarchical order, the criterion of temporality, that of specialty, etc. Thus, Law is nourished by general principles, and each specialty has its own principles, and even within each area, a specific topic is governed by particular principles. Therefore, principles fulfill a prescriptive function insofar as they guide the meaning of each norm and the legal system in general; a pro-substantive law or substantialist function; a systematizing function of the legal system; a limiting function on the field of action of public powers; an informing and guiding function for the legal system as a whole; a protective function regarding acquired rights, consolidated legal situations, minimum rights, standards of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the legal system; an integrating function to give coherence and cohesion to the legal system so that it operates as a system; an interpretative function, to give content to the sense-duty of completeness that should inspire the Law. In this case, the challenged resolution has violated express regulations and the pro homine principle, as well as the pro homine nasciturus principle already set forth.

**IX. PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY:** In addition to all that has already been indicated, the challenged resolution ignores the presumption of paternity established in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code, which states: "Article 92.- The quality of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of the status of child by the presumed father or mother, or by any other means of proof. / The paternity of the man who, during the period of conception, cohabited, in a common-law marriage, in accordance with what is indicated in Title VII of this Code, is presumed." (The second paragraph of this article was added by Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, published in La Gaceta No. 162 of August 28, 1995). The lower court has decided to disapply the cited presumption in an evident protection towards the male defendant. Regarding said presumption, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Resolution No. 7515-1994, 3:27 p.m. on December 21, 1994, stated: "FIFTH. Regarding the proposed addition to Article 92 of the Family Code. The equality clause, together with the prohibition of 'any personal qualification on the nature of filiation' (Article 54 of the Constitution), give rise, as a general rule, to the equal treatment of children born inside and outside of marriage, such that it would be the exceptions or limitations to this principle that would need to be justified to be in accordance with the Political Constitution. In other terms, what is at stake is the fundamental right of non-marital children not to suffer discrimination. The legislator's presumption that we examine does not resolve a conflict between marital life and common-law marriage (relación de hecho), but rather between children born inside and children born outside of marriage, a matter resolved in favor of equality by constitutional Article 54 combined with Article 33. Finally, it is not an argument of constitutional law to maintain that legal presumptions could not derive from common-law marriage, as if the legislator could not establish presumptions in this matter, presumptions that are otherwise reasonable: cohabitation, which will have to be proven, gives rise to the legislator presuming iuris tantum the paternity of the man who cohabited with the woman during the period of conception, a presumption consistent, moreover, with the constitutional protection of the child (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). THEREFORE: A) The consultation is resolved in the sense that the Third Full Legislative Commission must re-examine the project in question in a second debate. B) The criterion of this Chamber is reiterated regarding being against extending the patrimonial effects of the common-law marriage when one of the cohabitants is impeded from marrying due to a prior existing bond. C) Regarding the addition to Article 92 of the Family Code, it contains no unconstitutional provisions. This pronouncement is binding regarding item 'A', as it relates to the legislative procedure of the project." Now, it is possible that the challenged resolution starts from the premise that it is indeed possible to proceed with the lawsuit in those cases by virtue of the presumption of paternity deriving from marriage, according to Article 69 of the Family Code. I say it is possible, as in reality the resolution does not develop this. However, said Code also establishes a presumption of paternity in non-marital couple relationships, namely the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code. It goes without saying that this presumption has been in the Family Code due to a reform introduced by Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, that is, for twenty-nine years. Why does the judicial authority decide not to apply the presumption of paternity established by Article 92 of the Family Code? I say it decides not to apply this latter norm, as it is impossible to even think that it is an unknown norm. In any case, disregarding a norm such as the one indicated, and the national reality, warrants a ruling like the present one because of the enormous impact it will have on the unborn child (ser en gestación) in this process, on its mother, indirectly on the older child of said woman—a young child diagnosed with autism and attention deficit disorder—and possibly in other similar cases. Furthermore, this ruling aims to materialize a norm that, it seems, must fight against androcentric and adult-centric disuse. The length of this ruling is proportional to the prejudice, and the androcentric and adult-centric vision that sustains the challenged resolution.

It is clear that the Family Code regulates presumptions of filiation in Articles 69 and 92, but both presumptions differ in their practicality. In the first case, since marriage is registered—Article 31 of the Family Code and 43 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Civil Registry—in the Civil Registry, it is clear that it is very easy to apply the presumption established in Article 69 of that Code, as it depends on an objective fact: a registered marriage made known to the Civil Registry. In the second case, the situation changes because there is no registry of ongoing or finalized common-law marriages (uniones de hecho) in our country. So, it is here that procedural law must be used, not to obstruct the right of action, but as a tool to materialize substantive law. Note that, in this case, the pregnant woman indicates that the defendant has insured her with the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). In this sense, there are many pronouncements that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has issued regarding insurance between cohabiting persons. For example, No. 8000-2016, 11:52 a.m. on June 10, 2016; No. 8689-2019, 9:30 a.m. on May 17, 2019; No. 12758-2019, 9:30 a.m. on July 12, 2019; No. 18017-2019, 9:30 a.m. on September 20, 2019; No. 20038-2019, 9:45 a.m. on October 15, 2019; 20666-2019, 9:30 a.m. on October 29, 2019; No. 4560-2020, 9:30 a.m. on March 6, 2020, No. 8475-2020, 9:20 a.m. on May 8, 2020, No. 12423-2020, 9:15 a.m. on July 3, 2020, and No. 12842-2020, 9:15 a.m. on July 10, 2020. That is, even on issues of insurance between unmarried couples, the formal component has advanced significantly thanks to the invaluable contribution of binding case law. Note that constitutional case law has made the requirements for common-law marriage (unión de hecho) more flexible regarding social security matters. I highlight that this is even a flexibilization of requirements that impacts public funds. Added to this is that even in the case of the presumption of paternity referred to in Article 69 of the Family Code, the norm itself is flexible in order to broaden the possibilities of its application, and there is no reason whatsoever not to do the same in the case of conceived but unborn children where no marriage exists. As a complement, several years ago the Constitutional Chamber also determined that common-law marriages (uniones de hecho) need not always be recognized only in the Family Jurisdiction. In this regard, it stated in Resolution No. 5266-03 of 2:44 p.m. on June 18, 2003: "V… In any case, it must be taken into account that if the recognition of the common-law marriage is requested as an incident -in another jurisdiction, and obviously, through another process-, it must be resolved by the same judge or court hearing the succession, by virtue of the provisions of subsection 2) of Article 900 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly establishes that in probate proceedings, abbreviated processes related to the succession must be resolved. Finally, in accordance with the above, it must be considered that Article 243 of the Family Code itself does not establish that this recognition must be made in the family jurisdiction; it simply indicates that this recognition must be made 'before the courts of justice'; therefore, a literal and integral interpretation of the norm allows for the above considerations." Thus, this is not about the recognition of a common-law marriage (unión de hecho), but rather about transferring to the defendant the burden of proving that no cohabitation relationship existed during the probable time of conception, and, consequently, it is up to him to demonstrate that the presumption contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code is not applicable. Note that when the common-law marriage was incorporated into the legal system through Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, both the regular and irregular common-law marriage were incorporated, and although the irregular one was declared unconstitutional through Resolution No. 3558-99 at 4:48 p.m. on May 25, 1999, obviously the marital status of the presumed father would not be an obstacle to applying the presumption of the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code, since an interpretation favorable to the unborn child (ser en gestación), to non-discrimination, and to the right to non-violence, as well as to access to justice, must be made. This with the observation that, according to the pregnant woman, the defendant is single. It is worth remembering that many years ago, subsection 2) of Article 16 of the Family Code stated: "Article 16.- Marriage is prohibited: (…) 2) of the woman before three hundred days have elapsed since the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless there has been a birth before said term is completed or it is proven through the opinions of two official medical experts that there is no pregnancy." That norm sought to protect the male spouse in cases of paternity conflicts, and, in this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Resolution No. 2129-2008, 10:30 a.m. on February 14, 2008, held: "IV.- It is clear that the norm establishes a condition for the woman that is not required of the man when it comes to forming a new matrimonial bond. To establish whether this difference in treatment is legitimate or not, it is necessary—as the case law of this Chamber has established—to determine if the inequality is devoid of an objective and reasonable justification, and also the existence of this justification must be appreciated in relation to the purpose and effects of the measure considered, with a relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose pursued being required (see in this regard ruling number 6685-96). Put another way, it is legitimate for the legislator to restrict a right, but they must do so in such a way that the legal norm conforms, in all its elements, such as the motive and the purpose it pursues, with the objective sense of the Constitution. This means that there must be proportionality between the legal norm adopted and the purpose it pursues, referring to the imperative need for the law to satisfy the public interest protected by the supreme norm (see ruling number 832-09). In the case under study, several constitutional legal interests are at play: the right to liberty, protected in Article 28, according to which people are free to do everything not prohibited by law, and even the law cannot unreasonably affect fundamental rights, that is—as indicated—without an objective and reasonable justification that justifies the restriction; the right to equality insofar as a condition is imposed on the woman that is not required of the man, and—in the opinion of the Attorney General's Office—the right of every person to know who their parents are. In this sense, the challenged measure would be justified for the sake of protecting the cited right. However, this Chamber considers that this dilemma does not exist, that is, restricting liberty and equality to protect every person's right to know their filiation, because, as the appellant indicates, it is currently unnecessary in light of legal provisions regulated in the same normative body, which allow resolving paternity conflicts that arise, such as the recognition of a married woman's child, the declaration of an extramarital child, or the challenge of paternity. Given that both current legislation and technology unequivocally allow, with retroactive effects, establishing a minor's paternity with absolute certainty, the requirement imposed by the norm on the woman becomes unnecessary and therefore unreasonable. V.- In the oral hearing or proceedings held in this action, the Attorney General's Office refers to the fact that the challenged norm does not prevent the woman from marrying because Article 17 of the Family Code itself establishes the possibility that a marriage celebrated despite the prohibitions of Article 16 may be valid, and that in this sense, the norm—by itself—does not affect the fundamental right of the woman to marry. It points out that it is Article 28.4 that prevents the notary or authorized official from carrying out the act if they have not first demanded certification of the date of dissolution of the previous marriage, or the proof provided for in subsection 2 of Article 16, referring to the opinions of two official medical experts that there is no pregnancy. As indicated in the preceding recital, this Chamber considers that if the purpose of establishing the challenged requirement is to protect the minor's right to know who their parents are, and this purpose is currently unequivocally satisfied by other legal mechanisms, the requirement effectively becomes unreasonable, not only as indicated, because it is unnecessary, but because it imposes a condition that, by being extreme, becomes a barrier to the woman's marriage, such as the need to obtain, not one but two opinions, not from one official doctor but from two, which is in our context a condition of difficult access for any average person.

It should be added that, while it is true the Family Code establishes both a system of presumptions and a demonstrative system, to protect the right to filiation of minors in safeguarding their best interest and Article 53 of the Constitution, it is sufficient that the domestic legal system guarantees the minor's right to know who their parents are, for the legal system to fulfill its constitutional purpose. In that sense, it suffices for the purposes of this action that filiation can be given effect subsequently and retroactively through the demonstrative mechanisms established by the Family Code itself. The system of presumptions is not affected, nor does it lose its logic in the face of other situations; rather, this Chamber considers that demanding the aforementioned requirements as a condition for the marriage of a woman in the indicated circumstances is unnecessary and unreasonable, because even if a marriage celebrated under those conditions were to be valid, in view of the relationship of the norm with Article 28.4 of the cited Family Code, no authorized official would reasonably want to expose themselves to a sanction or consequences for performing a marriage without the requirements established in the challenged norm (16.2). In practice, the norm does have the potential to act as a barrier to the celebration of a woman's marriage under the conditions indicated in the challenged norm. VI.- It is important to highlight that according to the principle of liberty contained in Article 28 of the Constitution, every person is free to do anything that is not prohibited, and furthermore: (…) "Private actions that do not harm morality or public order, or that do not harm third parties, are outside the reach of the law...". That is to say, on the one hand, its first paragraph establishes the so-called principle of liberty, according to which a person may do anything the law does not prohibit, and it also contains the guarantee that not even the law may invade their intangible sphere of liberty and, therefore, of autonomy and intimacy, outside of the cases exhaustively provided for by the Constitution itself, exceptional cases and, therefore, subject to restrictive interpretation, among which is the restriction of the right only in the face of an imperative need, and in the least harmful manner for the affected right (see judgment number 3550-92). It is evident that the condition imposed in the norm no longer has the characteristic of being an "imperative need" to protect a public interest, because, as already indicated, the protected legal interest, that is, the right of every person to know who their parents are, is fully protected by current legislation and technology, causing the measure to lose its reason for being, to become an odious condition, undoubtedly harmful to the liberty and equality protected by the Constitution, and to every person's right to marry (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 23.2; American Convention on Human Rights, Article 17.2; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16.1; Political Constitution, Article 52). Consequently, it is appropriate to grant the action and annul Article 16, subsection 2) of the Family Code, which states: "Marriage is prohibited: […]2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless a birth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the expert opinions of two official medical experts that she is not pregnant […]." VII. Connectedness. The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes in its Article 89 that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a legal norm or general provision shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof, or of any other law or provision, whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. Given that the phrase "and the proof provided for in subsection 2) of Article 16," contained in Article 28.4 of the Family Code, evidently relates to the subject matter and the process underlying this action—being the basis for the sanction against the appellant—its unconstitutionality is likewise declared. Judge Calzada and Judge Cruz give separate reasons. Judge Sosto López dissents and declares the action without merit and makes a conforming interpretation of Article 16, subsection 2) of the Family Code. THEREFORE: The action is granted, by majority. Consequently, the following are annulled: Article 16, subsection 2), insofar as it states: 2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless a birth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the expert opinions of two official medical experts that she is not pregnant […]. and from Article 28, subsection 4) the phrase "and the proof provided for in subsection 2) of Article 16," both of the Family Code. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, consolidated legal situations, and past judgments with the authority of res judicata. Let this pronouncement be communicated to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Let it be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Let it be notified." See how the Constitutional Chamber made it clear that mechanisms exist to resolve any doubt about paternity. Why not make use of the DNA test in the event that the defendant in this matter refutes paternity? Thus, the challenged resolution assumes that the defendant will deny the paternity attributed to him. On what basis does the first instance assume this? There seems to be an underlying stereotype, in the sense that, when there is no marriage with the pregnant woman, every man named as the father will deny paternity, and that is absolutely false. That is, examples abound of men who acknowledge the pregnancy, exercise notarial possession of status, and accept their paternity. The undersigned has no element to assume that the defendant in this case will not proceed in this way when called judicially to be responsible for the being in gestation. In this manner, only by giving the alleged father the opportunity to express himself and even refute what is provided in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code is it possible to guarantee access to justice without disapplying Article 168 of the Family Code when it provides that the provisional support (pensión provisional) may be set "once the kinship is verified," a norm that has existed—previously in Article 155—in the Family Code since it was enacted (1973), but back then the robust ordinary, constitutional, and supra-constitutional normative framework to which I have referred did not exist. In this context, that norm must be understood in a broad sense and in harmony with all the already analyzed legislation. Furthermore, Article 414 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130, states: "Every legal presumption exempts the party alleging it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed true by virtue of such presumption. / However, whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts that serve as its basis." In this case, from the entirety of the complaint—pro actione principle—, this allegation is deduced, and it is then up to the legal representative of the being in gestation to demonstrate the state of pregnancy and up to the defendant to rebut what is provided in Article 92, second paragraph, of the Family Code. Furthermore, as the said presumption is of a relative nature—since it does not annul certain acts nor provide a peremptory exception if in both cases the law has not expressly reserved proof to the contrary—, if the defendant decides to challenge it, he must act as provided in Article 416 of the cited Civil Procedure Code, because that norm provides: "Apart from absolute presumptions, the others may be challenged by proof to the contrary, for which all legal means are admissible, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of observing them." In other words, regarding the relative presumption of paternity regulated by Article 92, second paragraph, of the Family Code, it is up to the mother to prove the pregnancy and up to the defendant to demonstrate that the said presumption is not applicable. That is, it is not up to the judicial authority to challenge that presumption, much less to disapply it. Added to this, it is the case that, in patrimonial matters, for example, it is perfectly possible for a couple that is just beginning a cohabitation relationship to establish an encumbrance (afectación) on the family patrimony or to grant matrimonial agreements (capitulaciones matrimoniales). Let us recall that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution No. 13920-23, 14:21 of June 9, 2023, recognized the right of couples to subscribe to and register matrimonial agreements for de facto unions (uniones de hecho), including same-sex couples. That is, to encumber the family patrimony when there is no marriage or to grant matrimonial agreements, it is not necessary to wait for more than two years of cohabitation. Furthermore, encumbrance between cohabitants came into legal existence through the Law for the Promotion of Women's Social Equality, Law No. 7142 of 1990, and not with Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, which incorporates the Sole Chapter to Title VII of the Family Code on the De Facto Union. Why, if in patrimonial matters the passage of two years of a de facto union is not required, is the presumption contained in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code not applied with the same fluidity? In this line, it is also opportune to indicate that, as explained by the Constitutional Chamber: "Conventionality control (control de convencionalidad) is a judicial construct of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights whose fundamental purpose is to achieve "conventional supremacy" in all national or local legal systems of the so-called "conventionality parameter," formed by the declarations and conventions on the matter of the Inter-American System for the protection of Human Rights, the judgments rendered by that regional Court, and its advisory opinions. It constitutes a legal revolution in that it imposes on national judges and Tribunals, especially Constitutional ones, the obligation to consolidate the "Conventional State of Law," annulling and expelling from the respective national legal system any norm that irremediably confronts the "conventionality bloc" (v. JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, "Control de convencionalidad ejercido por los Tribunales y Salas Constitucionales" in El Control difuso de convencionalidad -coord. E. Ferrer Mac-Gregor- México, Fundap, 2012 and JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, "La construcción de un Derecho Administrativo Común Interamericano" in Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Público y Administrativo, Year 11, No. 11, 2011). Basically, conventionality control is conceived and designed from two landmark judgments of the Inter-American Court, which are Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006—reiterated in later ones—and Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru of November 24, 2006—also reiterated in subsequent ones—. In the first (Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile), the following was considered (paragraph 124): "The Court is aware that domestic judges and tribunals are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obliged to apply the provisions in force in the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the apparatus of the State, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the Convention are not diminished by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and which from the outset lack legal effects. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a kind of "conventionality control" between the domestic legal norms they apply in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judiciary must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention." In the second (Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru), the following was pointed out (paragraph 128): "When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges are subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of the Convention is not diminished or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, object, and purpose. In other words, the organs of the Judiciary must exercise not only a constitutional control, but also a conventionality control ex officio, between domestic norms and the American Convention, evidently within the framework of their respective competencies and the pertinent procedural regulations. This function must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the plaintiffs in each specific case, although neither does it imply that this control must always be exercised, without considering other formal and material prerequisites of admissibility and origin of this type of action." Finally, in the case "Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico" of November 26, 2010, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights made some extensions or precisions regarding the domestic organs entrusted with exercising conventionality control, indicating that it must be exercised by "225. (…) all its organs—of the State—, including its judges (…) Judges and organs linked to the administration of justice at all levels (…) judges and judicial organs linked to the administration of justice (…)". This position was ratified by the Inter-American Court in the judgment of the case "Gelman v. Uruguay" of February 24, 2011. From this doctrine, it is worth highlighting two relevant issues, which are the following: a) Conventionality control must be exercised, even, ex officio, although the intervening parties have not urged or required it and b) when exercising conventionality control, Constitutional judges and Tribunals enjoy a "national margin of appreciation," because, as indicated in the Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru case of 2006, conventionality control must be exercised "within the framework of their respective competencies and the pertinent procedural regulations," a circumstance that obliges a systematic consideration of the legal system, as a whole that has hermetic plenitude, in order to conclude whether a national norm infringes or not the conventionality parameter; consequently, isolated analyses cannot be made as if the legal system were constituted by watertight or segmented compartments. It is worth highlighting that the national margin of appreciation is an indeterminate legal concept that allows the convergence and harmonization of national and Inter-American law, establishing a convergence threshold that allows overcoming the relativity of national legal traditions." See, among others, constitutional judgments No. 4491 of 4:00 p.m. on April 3, 2013, and No. 15737 of 10:20 a.m. on October 9, 2015. I cite this because, in this case, it is not even a matter of exercising conventionality control but simply materializing what is provided in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code, which, with respect to Article 168 of the Family Code, is a later and special norm in matters of filiation in de facto unions. Furthermore, the enactment of the Childhood and Adolescence Code followed the reform of the cited Article 92. Thus, it is simple and broad at the same time. Moreover, if Article 1400 of our Civil Code—from the century before last—allows a donation in favor of a conceived person, it is absurd to deem them born to benefit them patrimonially and not to recognize the right to support (alimentos), which is not a patrimonial right as already explained and which, by not receiving support, could generate illnesses, disabilities or even premature birth or death, as well as affecting the comprehensive health of the pregnant woman. That norm of the Civil Code states: "To receive by donation, it is necessary to be, at least, conceived at the time of drafting the deed of donation; but the right of the donee to comply with the provisions of Article 13 shall remain pending." Finally, and no less importantly, the challenged resolution also ignores the multiple institutional policies on access to justice regarding populations in vulnerable conditions such as, for example, the Brasilia Rules adopted by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in Session No. 17-2008, of May 26, 2008, Article II and modified according to Circular No. 173-2019 by agreement of the Full Court, session No. 36-2019 of August 26, 2019, Article XXIV; the one adopted by the Full Court, Session No. 34-10, Article XVII and called "Judicial Policy Aimed at Improving Access to Justice for Girls, Boys, and Adolescents in Costa Rica," as well as the one also adopted by the Full Court in Session No. 34-05, Article XIV, called "Declaration of the Gender Equity Policy. "Gender Equity: a policy, a commitment, a practice." These policies are legally relevant efforts to guarantee access to justice and must be applied in accordance with Article 122 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this way, the first instance has clung to the fact that Article 168 of the Family Code establishes that kinship must be verified to set provisional support, but it bears recalling that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly stated: "V.- This Chamber considers that, to interpret a norm, the creative function of the judge is of vital importance in determining the meaning and scope of the laws. Consequently, the judge must not only analyze the grammatical sense or the words used by the legislator to give content to the norm, but also the relationships that unite all the parts of the articles on the point in question, the legal situation existing at the time the law subject to interpretation was enacted, and, finally, to take possession of the action exercised by said law in the general order of law and the place it occupies in this order. A creative function that, in the case at hand, must conclude by adapting the norm to practice and reality so that the purposes intended by the legislator are fulfilled, insofar as they serve to define or resolve an issue between two or more persons." No. 6093-1994, 9:12 of October 18, 1994; No. 1392-00, 18:48 of February 9, 2000; No. 11577-2002, 15:20 of December 10, 2002; No. 1943-03, 15:09 of March 11, No. 9219-2003, 10:55 of August 29, 15392-2003, 15:58 of December 19, all of the year 2003; No. 2602-2004, 10:41 of March 12, 2004; No. 17568-10, 14:42 of October 20, 2010; No. 13623-2013, 14:30 of December 11; No. 15296-2013, 14:30 of November 20, both of 2013; No. 1543-14, 14:30 of February 5, 2014; No. 1706-23, 9:30 of January 25, 2023. Furthermore, said Tribunal in resolution No. 2786-2000, 15:45 of March 28, 2000, also stated: "It is recalled that judges become procedural instruments for the effective resolution of conflicts, but in such a way that they are guarantors not only of legality, but, above all, of fundamental rights, and in that sense, they must have active participation in the process, aimed at that respect; as this Tribunal has previously considered regarding criminal judges, but which has full application in all branches of law and in all jurisdictions: The defense of the Constitution, and therefore of our democratic system, depends to a great extent on judges, who have an active role in this task, being called upon to interpret and enforce constitutional norms and principles and consequently the laws; by becoming guarantors of the rights of persons, which is, moreover—as will be seen further on—, one of the primary objectives of the new criminal procedural legislation: to return to the judge their function as guarantor of the values protected by the Constitution, endowing them with the objectivity necessary to act as a controller of rights and not as an imperfect accuser, resolution No. 6470-1999, 14:36 of August 18, 1999." Thus, as the appealed resolution seriously disregards the current legal system, maintaining its effects could cause the Costa Rican State to be questioned before the CEDAW Committee and even before the Committee on the Rights of the Child, for let us recall that the latter Convention has three protocols: Law No. 8172, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, published in La Gaceta No. 29, February 11, 2002; Law No. 8247, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, published in La Gaceta No. 103, May 30, 2002, and Law No. 9170, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, published in La Gaceta No. 231 of November 29, 2013. Therefore, through this last Protocol, it would also be possible for our country to be exposed for failing to comply with the cited Convention with respect to unborn children (nascituros). The undersigned does not rule out that someone might trivialize this and say it will not happen, but let us remember that the plaintiff here litigates with the public defense service, and that judicial service for access to justice is specialized and perfectly trained to take international action in defense of the rights of the unborn child. It is also possible that this could happen through any legal professional who has in-depth knowledge of the matter and decides to fight the disapplication of all the said normative. Consequently, what is appropriate is to transfer to the defendant the burden of rebutting the presumption established by Article 92, second paragraph, of the Family Code, and therefore it is resolved: ---a) The challenged resolution is revoked. ---b. As the state of pregnancy is demonstrated, it is ordered to attempt an urgent prior conciliation. That conciliation may include the recognition of the paternity of the being in gestation, and in that case, as to that aspect, the agreement must be referred to the Family Court for its respective approval (homologación) and it will be up to that Court to determine what is pertinent regarding the registration of paternity once the birth registration data is known. ---c. If there is no conciliation for whatever reason, the first instance is ordered to immediately proceed with the complaint if no other legal reason prevents it and to set a provisional support (pensión provisional) chargeable to the defendant and in favor of the unborn child. If, once notified, the defendant refutes said paternity, the urgent reception of testimonial evidence or the evacation of evidence of another nature will be ordered to determine whether or not there are elements regarding the existence of the de facto cohabitation during the probable period of conception of the being in gestation. ---d. In the event that it is not possible to prove the said presumption and the defendant refutes the paternity imputed to him, the first instance will order a provisional support chargeable to the defendant and will order the practice of a DNA test once the minor person is born, in order to determine whether it is up to the defendant to continue paying said provisional support, without prejudice to the defendant initiating a paternity determination process for a person yet to be born in the family court, or the mother may initiate it through a paternity investigation process. In either case, that is, if the filiation issue reaches the family court, the support proceeding will only be suspended pending what is resolved by a final judgment in the filiation process if so ordered by the respective Family Court. Thus, it must be very clear to the defendant that nothing prevents him from initiating the determination of paternity, even if the being in gestation has not yet been born, and therefore, it is not enough for him to wait patiently for the mother to take charge of investigating paternal filiation. ---e. If the DNA test ordered in the support proceeding is negative or cannot be performed for a reason attributable to the mother, upon the request of the defendant, the first instance may order that the provisional support cease to be paid by the defendant. ---f. If the present ruling is unfortunately untimely in the sense that premature birth has already occurred, the process must still continue as indicated in this ruling, and if unfortunately an interruption of the pregnancy occurred, the process must also continue, warning the mother if she has an interest in collecting pregnancy expenses for the stillbirth (mortinato). The latter because the Constitutional Chamber has already pronounced on the dignified treatment of the remains of a being that was not born and there is no reason to consider that pregnancy expenses can only be collected if a live birth occurred. In this regard, through judgment No. 6685-01 of 2:06 p.m. on July 17, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber said: "It is obvious that given the frequently infectious-contagious nature of 'products of conception,' these must be manipulated or handled with utmost caution. Hence, this Chamber agrees with the public health reasons that motivated the drafting of the Institutional Norm for the Management of Anatomopathological Waste." However, this Tribunal does not find that everyone's concern in ensuring that such management is done in the safest possible way suppresses the rights of the appellant and her husband, who as parents and practitioners of the Catholic faith consider it vital for their religion and their peace of mind to bury their child. Even if that child did not complete its formation process so as to be able to develop as a normal child and subsist, the truth is that from the moment it was conceived, it was a person with rights. Just as its parents are persons with rights, who have full authority to choose that it have a burial according to the rules religiously established by Catholics. Indeed, the Institutional Norm for the Management of Anatomopathological Waste does not refer to the direct delivery of what it calls 'solid waste that drains liquid' (fetus and placenta) to a third party and provides very clear rules regarding their transfer outside hospital centers and the type of transport and container in which it must be done. However, this Chamber considers that these provisions can and must be complied with to the extent that the interested parties are correctly and directly informed of the established procedure and the destination of said 'waste.' Thus, in the specific case, the 'waste' of interest could have been perfectly transported in accordance with all the respective medical and hygienic stipulations, but informing the appellant and her husband of the procedure to be followed, as well as coordinating with them the date, time, and cemetery where it would finally be disposed of, respecting the appellants' right to give burial to the remains of their child. Because this was not the case, and action was taken without any communication to the appellant and her husband regarding the destination of their child—as if it were a mere object—the appeal must be granted, ordering (…) within the non-extendable period of two days from the notification of this judgment, to deliver to the appellant, (…) the fetus resulting from the natural abortion practiced on her person in accordance with the necessary health measures." As can be seen, the vote is interesting, although it does not contemplate a significant development of the rights at stake; rather, without being the subject of the appeal, it proceeds to define the unborn being as a "person with rights." It is understandable that the Chamber ordered dignified treatment for stillbirths, that is, for beings that did not come to be born alive, but the central issue was not to define whether stillbirths are or are not persons but merely that a spontaneous abortion does not prevent the parents from taking responsibility for the remains of the stillbirth once the sanitary norms guaranteeing public health have been complied with. In any case, it was clear that the remains of a stillbirth must be treated with dignity and even that inhumation is recognized as part of the right to family life. This is how the constitutional resolution is understood, although, as indicated, it does not have a broad development of the rights at stake. All of this with the observation that our country, through Law No. 9797, which corresponds to the comprehensive reform of Law No. 7771, General Law on HIV-AIDS, grants the status of "person" to every being in gestation without any distinction. Expressly, Article 21 of that Law refers to the nasciturus as a "person yet to be born." If the legislative will had been not to grant that legal status, a Law with that content would not have been approved. Furthermore, burial expenses can also be collected in accordance with Article 37 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. X.

To conclude, it is important to highlight that the complaint begins with a deep, eminently legal preamble that develops some of the issues presented here, and yet the contested decision focuses on article 168 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). That is, it is a complaint with a significant development of the applicable law, while the contested decision is quite superficial, but as has been shown, fueled by impressive prejudices. Secondly, article 24 of the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias transcribed in the contested decision has been declared partially unconstitutional. For greater understanding, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), by means of decision no. 2781-2016, 11:40 of February 24, 2016, ordered: “The action is granted. Consequently, the phrase \'de quince años\' of article 24 of the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias is annulled as unconstitutional so that from this judgment forward it shall read \'De incumplirse el deber alimentario, podrá librarse orden de apremio corporal contra el deudor moroso, salvo que sea menor o mayor de setenta y uno\', it being understood that \'menor\' refers to a person under 18 years of age. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date of effectiveness of the annulled norm, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Consequently, the release of all minors who, at the time of issuing this judgment, were detained by body attachment (apremio corporal) is ordered. Report this pronouncement in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and publish it in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez dissent and deny the action. Magistrate Salazar Alvarado dissents and denies the action, provided that article 24 of the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias is interpreted in the sense that body attachment against a minor person but older than fifteen years, who is a maintenance debtor, be the last resort and that it cannot be applied automatically. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Castillo Víquez set forth separate notes. To be notified.” Applied sciences have historically agreed in affirming that it is only possible to speak of a degree of vulnerability from the point of view of the probability of the threat and in terms of its particular intensity, its frequency, and its duration. The relevance of delimiting the concept of vulnerability is, in fact, widely addressed in scientific circles, and although some of its components may be interpreted differently, its structural elements systematically re-emerge in the doctrine, namely: causes, sensitivity, exposure, the threat, and the risk itself." Estupiñan-Silva, Rosmerlin (2013). La vulnerabilidad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Esbozo de una tipología. Derechos Humanos y Políticas Públicas. Document consulted on September 4, 2024 https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r39780.pdf At this point, it is essential to consider that the pro persona principle imposes an extensive interpretation of the normative framework when it concerns enshrining or expanding human rights, and a restrictive interpretation when such rights are limited. It is by application of the pro persona or pro homine principle that human rights become unconditionally and immediately demandable, and their limitation can only be exceptional. (Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1986). Exigibilidad del Derecho de Rectificación o Respuesta. Separate Opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, para. 36.-). Furthermore, for the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, "the pro libertatis principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of the human rights doctrine; according to the first, everything that favors liberty must be interpreted extensively, and everything that limits it, restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being." Thus, it has been expressed, for example, in resolution No. 3173-93 of 14:57 of July 6, 1993. On the pro homine principle, constitutional votes No. 3550-92 of 16:00 hours of November 24, 1992, No. 2588-16 of 14:50 of February twenty-third, and No. 697-16 of 14:30 of January 19, both from the year 2016, and No. 12659-18 of 9:20 of August 7, 2018, among others, may also be consulted. This being the case, the undersigned does not understand why a pregnant woman should be placed in this anguish regarding the satisfaction of the unborn child’s (nascituro) minimum needs. Why place her almost in a situation of begging for justice? The undersigned fails to understand why the dignity of the pregnant woman here must be violated for deciding to bring a judicial support action for the benefit of the unborn child. In what condition must she find herself to be considered a person and not as a thing that incubates? Note that denying her the right of access to justice objectifies her. Observe that, as a result, it is being demanded that the woman's body provide everything it has for the formation of the being in gestation, and that the woman, well, figure out what she does so that the birth occurs. This is unacceptable, and I believe the -“pro homine”- principle must have an aggravating factor or reinforcement in the case of conceived (male or female) not yet born (male or female), that is, nasciturus. Furthermore, I consider that this aggravating factor or reinforcement derives from the Preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and the Girl Child), which states: “Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, ‘the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth’ [...].” It is from this that the legal principle “pro homine nasciturus” is extracted, by virtue of which, it is mandatory to interpret all norms -of any rank- in favor of the dignity of persons and, if it concerns a being in gestation, it is mandatory to interpret the regulations in its favor, that is, to ensure its comprehensive health, to consider it a person in everything favorable to it, and to seek the prevention and treatment of illnesses or disabilities. Moreover, what is being gestated is a human being, and it also has the right that its mother not lose her comprehensive health.

Similarly, any regulatory gap (vacío normativo) must be remedied with the “pro homine nasciturus” principle which, for obvious reasons, is of extensive application to assisted human reproduction, the prohibition of free dismissal of pregnant women, the prohibition of employment discrimination against pregnant women, the recognition of the right to child support (alimentario) for the nasciturus regardless of the mother’s family status, the prohibition of bodily restraint against a pregnant woman, the right to education and health of the adolescent mother, the right to non-violence against women, which includes the right to non-violence against pregnant women, the eradication of obstetric violence, the prohibition of workplace harassment in general with special severity in cases of workplace harassment against pregnant women, the increase of penalties for those who commit crimes against a pregnant woman, as well as the increase of penalties for sexual assaults that result in pregnancy, etc. That being the case, it is important to clarify that principles are distinguished from legal norms because they do not determine conduct, do not restrict rights, do not impose sanctions, do not entail prohibitions, do not propose a single solution for a specific case, are not exhausted in the content of the norm, and do not have a propositional structure—factual scenario and legal effect—but rather, they are composed of a general idea that serves as a goal, limit, aspiration, framework for interpretation, and realization so that the legal system functions as a coherent system that provides a response to given realities. Principles oscillate throughout the legal system, as they articulate it, meaning they are present in its entirety and not confined to a limited space or role. -Domínguez Hidalgo, Carmen. (2005). Los principios que informan el Derecho de Familia Chileno: su formulación clásica y revisión moderna. Revista Chilena de Derecho. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, at the site https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177021336001.pdf Without principles, one would not understand what the hard core of a norm or the legal system is, nor where to look to find what is protected or intended to be avoided. In this vein, principles have a very broad framework of action, as well as a field of influence in concrete situations. For this reason, there are procedural and substantive principles. The former guide how substantive law is materialized, and the latter deal with what substantive law is at stake. It is also important to say that there are express and implied principles. The former, “are those that have been expressly issued by a source of legal production and consequently appear embedded in a normative text, whereas implied principles are deduced by the law-applier from express provisions of the legal system—although, as we shall see, for one sector of the doctrine they must be understood as conclusions drawn from natural law”. -Ruiz Ruiz, Ramón. (2012). La distinción entre reglas y principios y sus implicaciones en la aplicación del derecho. Derecho y realidad. Number 20. Page 149. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, at https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/derecho_realidad/article/view/4860/3952 It is also appropriate to point out that for a principle to be applicable, it requires its positivization, that is, it must complete the process of juridification and be contemplated in the legal system, whether in a concrete or general manner. Otherwise, it would then be an ethical principle, but not a juridical one. Now then, as the author Alonso Vidal points out, when implied principles are applied to the solution of a particular case, the judge must argue to demonstrate the existence of two conditions for their application: “a) Subsidiarity, that is, that there is no authoritatively identifiable norm applicable to the case, or else that the authoritatively identifiable norm must be interpreted differently or even be inapplicable due to the concurrence of the implied principle in question. b) Coherence, that is, that the content of the implied principle is coherent with the express rules and principles of the system”. -Alonso Vidal, Horacio-José. (2012). Los principios implícitos. Su relevancia en la aplicación del derecho. Pages 165 and 166. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, at the site https://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/47431/1/Doxa_35_07.pdf Consequently, the application of an express principle is much simpler than the application of an implied principle. Of course, both types of principles are used to interpret legal norms that are not clear or to fill a regulatory gap (vacío normativo). That is, they are not used to contradict the content of a norm, as a principle particularly seeks the coherence of the legal system. All the foregoing with the observation that, if the content of a norm is contrary to a general principle of Law, what is appropriate is to apply the principle, since the goal is for the legal system to function as a coherent system, hence the need to eradicate contradictions. In practice, the declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm for violating the principle of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, non-discrimination, inviolability of the defense, best interests of the minor child (interés superior de la persona menor de edad), etc., is common. Therefore, norms must be excluded from the legal system when they enter into collision with a general principle or else, with a specific one.

Furthermore, when principles collide, one of them will have a quantitative projection, insofar as it is applicable to a specific situation and, therefore, if other principles must yield before the content of a concrete principle, this is a qualitative projection. That is, one principle carries greater weight in a given case compared to other principles. In contrast, in the case of rules, if a collision exists, prevalence is resolved by resorting to the hierarchical order, the criterion of temporality, that of specialty, etc. Thus, Law is nourished by general principles and, each specialty has its own principles and even, within each area, a specific topic is governed by particular principles. In this way, principles fulfill a prescriptive function insofar as they guide the meaning of each rule and of the legal system in general; a pro-substantive-law or substantialist function; a systematizing function of the legal system; a limiting function on the field of action of public powers; an informing and guiding function of the legal system as a whole; a guarantee function regarding acquired rights, consolidated legal situations, minimum rights, standards of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the legal system; an integrating function to give coherence and cohesion to the legal system so that it operates as a system; an interpretive function, to give content to the sense-duty of completeness to which Law must aspire. **In this case, the challenged resolution has violated express regulations and the pro homine principle, as well as the pro homine nasciturus principle already set forth. IX. PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY:** In addition to all that has already been indicated, the challenged resolution ignores the presumption of paternity established in Article 92, second paragraph, of the Family Code (Código de Familia) which states: *“Article 92.-The quality of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of status of the child by the alleged father or mother, or by any other means of proof./ The paternity of the man who, during the period of conception, cohabited in a common-law marriage (unión de hecho), in accordance with what is indicated in Title VII of this Code, is presumed.”* (The second paragraph of this article was added by Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, published in La Gaceta No. 162 of August 28, 1995). The lower court has decided to disapply the cited presumption in an evident protection toward the defendant man. Regarding said presumption, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in resolution No. 7515-1994, 3:27 p.m. of December 21, 1994, stated: *“FIFTH. Regarding the proposed addition to Article 92 of the Family Code. The equality clause, together with the prohibition of ‘any personal classification concerning the nature of filiation’ (Article 54 of the Constitution), give rise, as a general rule, to the equal treatment of children born within and outside of marriage, such that it would be the exceptions or limitations to that principle that would have to be justified to be in conformity with the Political Constitution. In other terms, what is at stake is the fundamental right of non-marital children not to suffer discrimination. The legislative presumption we are examining does not resolve a conflict between marital life and the common-law relationship, but rather between children born within and children born outside of marriage, a matter resolved in favor of equality by constitutional Article 54 combined with Article 33. Lastly, it is not an argument of constitutional law to maintain that legal presumptions could not derive from a common-law marriage, as if in this matter the legislator could not establish presumptions, which are otherwise reasonable: cohabitation, which must be proven, gives rise to the legislator presuming iuris tantum the paternity of the man who cohabited with the woman during the period of conception, a presumption that is coherent, moreover, with the constitutional protection of the child (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). THEREFORE: A) The consultation is evacuated in the sense that the Third Full Legislative Commission must re-examine the project in question in second debate.* B) The Chamber reiterates its criterion against extending the patrimonial effects of the de facto union (unión de hecho) when one of the cohabitants is impeded from marrying due to a prior existing bond. C) Regarding the addition to Article 92 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), it contains no unconstitutional provisions. This pronouncement is binding with respect to item "A", as it relates to the legislative process of the bill." Now, it is possible that the challenged decision proceeds from the assumption that the claim can indeed be heard in those cases by virtue of the presumption of paternity (presunción de paternidad) derived from marriage pursuant to Article 69 of the Family Code. I say it is possible, because in reality the decision does not develop this point. However, said Code also establishes a presumption of paternity in non-marital partner relationships, namely the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code. It goes without saying that this presumption has been in the Family Code due to a reform introduced through Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, that is, for **twenty-nine years**. Why does the judicial authority decide not to apply the presumption of paternity established in Article 92 of the Family Code? I say it decides not to apply this latter norm, because it is impossible to even think that it is an unknown norm. In any case, disregarding a norm like the one indicated and the national reality warrants a ruling such as this one, due to the enormous impact it will have on the being in gestation (ser en gestación) in this process, on its mother, indirectly on the older child of said woman—a young child diagnosed with autism and attention deficit disorder—and eventually on other similar cases. Furthermore, this ruling seeks to materialize a norm that, apparently, must fight against androcentric and adult-centric disuse. The length of this ruling is proportional to the prejudice, the androcentric and adult-centric vision that sustains the challenged decision.

It is clear that the Family Code regulates presumptions of filiation (presunciones de filiación) in Articles 69 and 92, but both presumptions differ in their practicality. In the first case, since marriage is registered—Article 31 of the Family Code and 43 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Civil Registry (Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y el Registro Civil)—with the Civil Registry (Registro Civil), it is clear that applying the presumption established in Article 69 of that Code is very easy, as it depends on an objective fact: a marriage performed that is brought to the attention of the Civil Registry. In the second case, the situation changes because in our country there is no registry of ongoing or terminated de facto unions. **Thus, it is precisely there that procedural law must be used not to obstruct the right of action (derecho de acción) but as a tool to materialize substantive law.** Note that, in this case, **the pregnant woman** indicates that the defendant has insured her through the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). In this sense, there are many pronouncements that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has issued regarding insurance coverage between cohabiting persons. For example, No. 8000-2016, 11:52 of June 10, 2016; No. 8689-2019, 9:30 of May 17, 2019; No. 12758-2019, 9:30 of July 12, 2019; No. 18017-2019, 9:30 of September 20, 2019; No. 20038-2019, 9:45 of October 15, 2019; 20666-2019, 9:30 of October 29, 2019; No. 4560-2020, 9:30 of March 6, 2020; No. 8475-2020, 9:20 of May 8, 2020; No. 12423-2020, 9:15 of July 3, 2020; and No. 12842-2020, 9:15 of July 10, 2020. That is to say, even in matters of insurance between unmarried couples, the formal component has advanced significantly thanks to the invaluable contribution of binding jurisprudence (jurisprudencia vinculante). It should be noted that constitutional jurisprudence has made the requirements of the de facto union more flexible in social security matters. I emphasize that this is even a flexibility of requirements that impacts public funds. Added to this is the fact that even in the case of the presumption of paternity referred to in Article 69 of the Family Code, the norm itself is flexible with the purpose of expanding the possibilities of its application, and there is no reason whatsoever not to do the same in the case of conceived but unborn children where there is no marriage. As a complement, several years ago the Constitutional Chamber also determined that de facto unions should not always be recognized solely in the Family Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción de Familia). In this regard, it stated in resolution No. 5266-03 of 14:44 of June 18, 2003: "V… In any case, it must be kept in mind that if the recognition of the de facto relationship is requested as an incident—in another jurisdiction, and obviously, through another process—, it must be resolved by the very judge or court hearing the succession (sucesión), by virtue of the provisions of subsection 2) of Article 900 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), which expressly establishes that abbreviated processes related to the succession must be resolved within the succession proceeding." Finally, in accordance with the foregoing, it must be considered that Article 243 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) itself does not establish that this recognition must be made in the family jurisdiction; it simply indicates that said recognition must be made "before the courts of justice"; therefore, a literal and comprehensive interpretation of the provision allows for the foregoing considerations." Thus, it is not about a recognition of a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) but rather about shifting to the respondent the burden of proving that there was no cohabitation relationship during the probable time of conception and, consequently, it is he who must demonstrate that the presumption set forth in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code is not applicable. Note that, when the common-law marriage was incorporated into the legal system through Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, both the regular and irregular common-law marriage were incorporated and, although the irregular one was declared unconstitutional through Resolution No. 3558-99 at 4:48 p.m. on May 25, 1999, obviously the family status of the alleged father would not be an obstacle to applying the presumption of the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code, since an interpretation favorable to the unborn child, to non-discrimination, and to the right to non-violence, as well as access to justice, must be made. This with the observation that, according to the pregnant woman, the respondent is single. It need not be further recalled that, many years ago, subsection 2) of Article 16 of the Family Code stated: "Article 16.- Marriage is prohibited: (…) 2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless childbirth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the opinions of two official medical experts that there is no pregnancy." That provision sought to protect the male contracting party in cases of paternity disputes and, in that regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Resolution No. 2129-2008, 10:30 a.m. on February 14, 2008, ordered: "IV.- It is clear that the provision establishes a condition for women that it does not demand from men when forming a new marital bond. To be able to establish whether that difference in treatment is legitimate or not, it is necessary -as established by the jurisprudence of this Chamber- to determine whether the inequality lacks an objective and reasonable justification and, furthermore, the existence of that justification must be assessed in relation to the purpose and effects of the measure under consideration, requiring a relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the intended purpose (see in this regard judgment number 6685-96). In other words, it is legitimate for the legislator to restrict a right, but it must do so in such a way that the legal norm conforms in all its elements, such as the motive and the purpose it pursues, with the objective meaning of the Constitution. This means there must be proportionality between the legal norm adopted and the purpose it pursues, referring to the imperative need for the law to satisfy the public interest protected by the supreme norm (see judgment number 832-09). In the case under study, several constitutional legal interests are at stake: the right to freedom, protected in Article 28, according to which people are free to do anything not prohibited by law, and even the latter cannot unreasonably affect fundamental rights, that is -as indicated- without an objective and reasonable justification that justifies the restriction; the right to equality insofar as a condition is imposed on women that is not demanded of men, and -in the opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría)- the right of every person to know who their parents are. In that sense, the contested measure would be justified for the sake of protecting said right. However, the Chamber considers that this dilemma does not exist, that is, the dilemma of restricting freedom and equality to protect the right of every person to know their parentage (filiación), because, as the appellant indicates, it is currently unnecessary in light of legal provisions regulated in the same normative body, which allow for resolving arising paternity disputes, such as the recognition of a child of a married woman, the declaration of an extramarital child, or the challenge of paternity." Given that both current legislation and technology unequivocally and retroactively allow the paternity of a minor to be established with absolute certainty, the requirement imposed by the rule on the woman is unnecessary and therefore lacks reasonableness. V.- In the oral hearing held in this action, the Procuraduría referred to the fact that the challenged rule does not prevent a woman from marrying, because Article 17 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) itself establishes the possibility that a marriage celebrated despite the prohibitions of Article 16 may be valid, and that in this sense the rule—in and of itself—does not affect the fundamental right of a woman to marry. It points out that it is Article 28.4 that prevents the notary or authorized official from performing the act, if they have not first required certification of the date of dissolution of the previous marriage, or the proof provided for in subsection 2 of Article 16, referring to the opinions of two official medical experts stating that there is no pregnancy. As indicated in the preceding whereas clause, the Chamber considers that if the purpose of establishing the challenged requirement is to protect the minor's right to know who their parents are, and this purpose is now unequivocally satisfied by other legal mechanisms, the requirement effectively becomes unreasonable, not only as stated, because it is unnecessary, but because it imposes a condition that, by being extreme, becomes a barrier to a woman's marriage, such as having to obtain, not one but two opinions, not from one official doctor but from two, which in our context is a condition of difficult access for any average person. It should be added that although it is true that the Family Code (Código de Familia) establishes both a system of presumptions and a demonstrative one to protect the right to filiation (filiación) of minors in safeguarding their best interest and Article 53 of the Constitution, it is sufficient that the domestic legal system guarantees the minor's right to know who their parents are, for the system to fulfill the constitutional purpose. In that sense, it is enough for the purposes of this action that effects can be given to filiation (filiación) subsequently and retroactively through the demonstrative mechanisms established by the Family Code (Código de Familia) itself. The system of presumptions is not affected, nor does it lose its logic in the face of other situations; it is simply that the Chamber considers that requiring the mentioned requirements as a condition for celebrating the marriage of a woman under the indicated conditions is unnecessary and unreasonable, because although a marriage celebrated under those conditions might ultimately be valid, in view of the rule's relationship with the cited Article 28.4 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), no reasonably authorized official would want to expose themselves to a sanction or consequences for performing a marriage without the requirements established in the challenged rule (16.2). In practice, the rule does have the potential to act as a barrier to the celebration of a woman's marriage under the conditions indicated in the challenged rule. VI.- It is important to highlight that according to the principle of freedom contained in Article 28 of the Constitution, every person is free to do anything that is not prohibited and furthermore: (...) "Private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are beyond the reach of the law...". That is to say, on one hand its first paragraph establishes the so-called principle of freedom, according to which a person can do everything the law does not prohibit, and it also contains the guarantee that not even the law may invade their intangible sphere of freedom and, therefore, of autonomy and privacy, outside of the grounds exhaustively provided for by the Constitution itself, which are exceptional grounds and, therefore, subject to restrictive interpretation, among which is the restriction of the right, only in the face of an imperative necessity, and in the manner least harmful to the affected right (see judgment number 3550-92).

It is evident that the condition imposed by the rule no longer has the characteristic of being an “imperious necessity” to safeguard a public interest, because as already indicated, the protected legal interest, that is, the right of every person to know who their parents are, is fully protected by current legislation and technology, causing the measure to lose its reason for being, to become an odious condition, undoubtedly injurious to the freedom and equality protected by the Constitution, and to the right of every person to marry (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 23.2; American Convention on Human Rights, article 17.2; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 16.1; Political Constitution, article 52). Consequently, it is appropriate to declare the action to annul article 16, subsection 2) of the Family Code with merit, which states: “Marriage is prohibited: […] 2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless birth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the opinions of two official medical experts that there is no pregnancy […].” VII. Connectedness. The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes in its article 89 that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a law or general provision shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof, or of any other law or provision, whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. Given that the phrase “and the proof provided for in subsection 2) of article 16,” contained in article 28.4 of the Family Code, is evidently related to the subject matter and the underlying process of this action –as it is the basis for the sanction against the appellant–, its unconstitutionality is also declared. Judge Calzada and Judge Cruz also give separate reasons. Judge Sosto López dissents and declares the action without merit and makes a conforming interpretation of article 16, subsection 2) of the Family Code. POR TANTO: The action is declared, by majority, with merit. Consequently, article 16, subsection 2) is annulled insofar as it states: 2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless birth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the opinions of two official medical experts that there is no pregnancy […]. and of article 28, subsection 4) the phrase “and the proof provided for in subsection 2) of article 16,” both of the Family Code. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, consolidated legal situations, and past judgments with the authority of material res judicata. This pronouncement shall be communicated to the Legislative and Executive Powers. It shall be published in summary form in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. It shall be notified.” See how the Constitutional Chamber made it clear that mechanisms exist to resolve any doubt regarding paternity.

Why not make use of DNA testing in the event that the respondent in this matter refutes paternity. Thus, the challenged resolution assumes that the respondent will deny the paternity attributed to him. On what basis does the first instance court assume this. It seems there is an underlying stereotype, in the sense that, when there is no marriage to the pregnant woman, every man named as the father will deny paternity, and that is absolutely false. That is to say, examples abound of men who acknowledge the pregnancy, exercise notorial possession of status, and accept their paternity. The undersigned has no basis to assume that the respondent in this case will not proceed in this way upon being judicially called to be responsible for the being in gestation. Thus, only by giving the alleged father the opportunity to express himself and even refute the provision in the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code, is it possible to guarantee access to justice without disapplying article 168 of the Family Code insofar as it provides that the provisional support (pensión provisional) may be set "once the parentage is proven", a rule that has existed—previously in article 155—in the Family Code since it was enacted (1973), but at that time the robust ordinary, constitutional, and supra-constitutional normative framework to which I have referred did not yet exist. In this context, that rule must be understood broadly and in harmony with all the regulations already analyzed. Furthermore, article 414 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130, states: "Every legal presumption relieves the party invoking it of the obligation to prove the fact deemed certain by virtue of such presumption. / However, whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts that serve as its basis." In this case, from the entirety of the complaint—pro actione principle—this allegation is derived, and it is then up to the legal representative of the being in gestation to demonstrate the state of pregnancy and up to the respondent to rebut what is provided in the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code. Moreover, since said presumption is relative in nature—as it does not nullify certain acts nor grant a peremptory exception if in both cases the law has not expressly reserved proof to the contrary—if the respondent decides to challenge it, he must proceed as provided in article 416 of the cited Procedural Code, because that rule provides: "Apart from absolute presumptions, the others may be challenged by proof to the contrary, for which all legal means are admissible, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of observing them." In other words, with respect to the relative presumption of paternity regulated by the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code, it is up to the mother to prove the pregnancy and to the respondent to demonstrate that said presumption is not applicable. That is to say, it is not for the judicial authority to challenge that presumption, much less to disapply it.

Added to this, we have that, in patrimonial matters, for example, it is perfectly possible for a couple that is just beginning a cohabitation relationship to create a family patrimony (afectación al patrimonio familiar) or, rather, to grant marital agreements (capitulaciones matrimoniales). Let us recall that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution No. 13920-23, 14:21 of June 9, 2023, recognized the right of couples to sign and register marital agreements for de facto unions, including same-sex couples. That is to say, to affect the family patrimony when there is no marriage or to grant marital agreements, it is not necessary to wait for more than two years of cohabitation to pass. Furthermore, the family patrimony (afectación) between cohabitants came into legal existence through the Law for the Promotion of Women's Social Equality, Law No. 7142 of 1990, and not with Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, which incorporates the Sole Chapter to Title VII of the Family Code on the De Facto Union.

Why is it that in patrimonial matters the passage of the two years of a de facto union (unión de hecho) is not required, yet the presumption set forth in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) is not applied with the same fluidity? In this line, it is also appropriate to note that, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has explained: “Conventionality control (control de convencionalidad) is a pretorian construction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights whose fundamental purpose is to achieve the ‘conventional supremacy’ (supremacía convencional) in all national or local legal systems of the so-called ‘conventionality parameter’ (parámetro de convencionalidad), comprised of the declarations and conventions in the matter of the Inter-American System for the protection of Human Rights, the judgments rendered by that regional Court, and its advisory opinions. It constitutes a legal revolution in that it imposes upon national judges and Tribunals, especially Constitutional ones, the obligation to consolidate the ‘conventional State of Law’ (Estado convencional de Derecho), annulling and expelling from the respective national legal system any norm that irremediably confronts the ‘conventionality block’ (bloque de convencionalidad) (see JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, “Control de convencionalidad ejercido por los Tribunales y Salas Constitucionales” in Control difuso de convencionalidad -coord. E. Ferrer Mac-Gregor- México, Fundap, 2012 and JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, “La construcción de un Derecho Administrativo Común Interamericano” in Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Público y Administrativo, Year 11, No. 11, 2011). Basically, conventionality control is conceived and designed from two landmark judgments of the Inter-American Court, which are Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006 – reiterated in subsequent ones – and Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru of November 24, 2006 – also reiterated in later ones. In the first (Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile), the following was held (recital 124): “The Court is aware that domestic judges and tribunals are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obliged to apply the provisions in force in the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State apparatus, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the Convention’s provisions are not undermined by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and which from the outset lack legal effects. In other words, the Judicial Branch must exercise a kind of ‘conventionality control’ (control de convencionalidad) between the internal legal norms they apply in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judicial Branch must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.” In the second (Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru), the following was specified (recital 128): “When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges are subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of the Convention is not undermined or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, object, and purpose. In other words, the organs of the Judicial Branch must exercise not only a constitutionality control, but also a conventionality control ex officio, between internal norms and the American Convention, evidently within the framework of their respective competences and pertinent procedural regulations. This function must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the plaintiffs in each specific case, although neither does it imply that this control must always be exercised, without considering other formal and material assumptions of admissibility and appropriateness of this type of actions.” Finally, in the case “Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v.

"Mexico" of November 26, 2010, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights made some expansions or clarifications regarding the internal organs responsible for exercising conventionality control (control de convencionalidad), indicating that it must be exercised by "225. (…) all its organs –of the State–, including its judges (…) Judges and organs linked to the administration of justice at all levels (…) judges and judicial organs linked to the administration of justice (…)". This position was ratified by the Inter-American Court in the judgment of the case "Gelman v. Uruguay" of February 24, 2011. From this doctrine, it is worth highlighting two relevant issues, which are the following: a) Conventionality control must be exercised, even ex officio, even if the intervening parties have not urged or required it and b) when exercising conventionality control, judges and Constitutional Courts enjoy the "national margin of appreciation (margen de apreciación nacional)", since, as indicated in the case of Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru of 2006, conventionality control must be exercised "within the framework of their respective competences and the pertinent procedural regulations", a circumstance that obliges one to consider the legal system systematically, that is, as a whole that has hermetic plenitude, in order to conclude whether a national norm infringes or not the conventionality parameter; consequently, isolated analyses cannot be made as if the legal system were constituted by watertight or segmented compartments. It should be noted that the national margin of appreciation is an indeterminate legal concept that allows the convergence and harmonization of national and inter-American law, establishing a threshold of convergence that allows overcoming the relativity of national legal traditions". See, among others, constitutional judgments No. 4491 at 4:00 p.m. on April 3, 2013 and No. 15737 at 10:20 a.m. on October 9, 2015. I cite this because in this case, it is not even a matter of carrying out a conventionality control but simply, materializing what is provided for in the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), which with respect to article 168 of the Family Code is a later and special norm on filiation matters in common-law marriages (uniones de hecho). Furthermore, subsequent to the cited reform of article 92 follows the enactment of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia). So simple and broad at the same time. Moreover, if article 1400 of our Civil Code (Código Civil) –from the century before last– allows a donation in favor of a conceived person, it is absurd that they are deemed born to benefit them patrimonially and not to recognize the right to child support (alimentos), which is not a patrimonial right as already explained and that, not receiving child support could cause them illnesses, disabilities or even premature birth or death, as well as affecting the comprehensive health of the pregnant woman.

That provision of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states: “In order to receive by donation (donación) it is necessary to be, at least, conceived at the time of drafting the deed of donation; but the right of the donee for the provisions of Article 13 to be fulfilled shall remain pending.” Lastly and no less importantly, the challenged resolution also disregards the multiple institutional policies on access to justice for populations in vulnerable conditions, such as the Brasilia Rules adopted by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in Session No. 17-2008, of May 26, 2008, Article II and modified by Circular No. 173-2019 by agreement of the Full Court, session No. 36-2019 of August 26, 2019, Article XXIV; the policy adopted by the Full Court, Session No. 34-10, Article XVII and called “Judicial Policy Aimed at Improving Access to Justice for Girls, Boys and Adolescents in Costa Rica,” as well as the policy also adopted by the Full Court in Session No. 34-05, Article XIV, called “Declaration of the Gender Equity Policy. ‘Gender Equity: a policy, a commitment, a practice.’” These policies are legally relevant efforts to guarantee access to justice and must be applied in accordance with Article 122 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). In this way, the first instance has clung to the idea that Article 168 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) establishes that kinship must be proven to set provisional support (alimentos provisionales), but it is worth recalling that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has repeatedly stated: “V.- This Chamber considers that, for the interpretation of a norm, the creative function of the judge is of vital importance to determine the meaning and scope of the laws. Consequently, the judge must not analyze only the grammatical meaning or the words that the legislator used to give content to the norm, but also the relationships that unite all parts of the articles on the point in question, the legal situation existing at the time the law subject to interpretation was enacted and, finally, to take possession of the action exercised by said law in the general order of law and the place it occupies within this order. A creative function that, in the case before us, must conclude by adapting the norm to practice and reality so that the purposes proposed by the legislator are fulfilled, insofar as they serve to define or resolve a question between two or more persons.” No. 6093-1994, 9:12 of October 18, 1994; No. 1392-00, 18:48 of February 9, 2000; No. 11577-2002, 15:20 of December 10, 2002; No. 1943-03, 15:09 of March 11, No. 9219-2003, 10:55 of August 29, 15392-2003, 15:58 of December 19, all of the year 2003; No. 2602-2004, 10:41 of March 12, 2004; No. 17568-10, 14:42 of October 20, 2010; No. 13623-2013, 14:30 of December 11; No. 15296-2013, 14:30 of November 20, both of 2013; No. 1543-14, 14:30 of February 5, 2014; No. 1706-23, 9:30 of January 25, 2023.

Furthermore, in ruling No. 2786-2000, 15:45 of March 28, 2000, said Court also ordered: “*It is recalled that judges are procedural instruments for the effective resolution of conflicts, but in such a way that they are guarantors not only of legality, but above all, of fundamental rights, and in that sense, they must have an active participation in the process, aimed at such respect; as this Court has previously considered with respect to criminal judges, but which has full application in all branches of law and in all jurisdictions: The defense of the Constitution, and therefore of our democratic system, depends to a great extent on judges, who have an active role in this task, as they are called upon to interpret and enforce constitutional norms and principles and consequently the laws; by becoming guarantors of people's rights, which is, moreover –as will be seen further on–, one of the primary objectives of the new criminal procedural legislation: returning to the judge his function as guarantor of the values protected by the Constitution, endowing him with the necessary objectivity so that he acts as a controller of law and not as an imperfect accuser, ruling No. 6470-1999, 14:36 of August 18, 1999.*" Thus, as the appealed resolution seriously disregards the current legal system, maintaining its effects could lead to the Costa Rican State being challenged before the CEDAW Committee and even before the Committee on the Rights of the Child, as we recall that this last Convention has three protocols: Law No. 8172, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, published in La Gaceta No. 29, February 11, 2002; Law No. 8247, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, published in La Gaceta No. 103, May 30, 2002, and Law No. 9170, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, published in La Gaceta No. 231 of November 29, 2013. Therefore, through this last Protocol, it would also be possible for our country to be exposed for failing to comply with the cited Convention with respect to unborn children. The undersigned does not rule out that someone might trivialize this and say it will not happen, but let us recall that the plaintiff here litigates with the public defender's office and that judicial service of access to justice is specialized and is perfectly capable of taking international action in defense of the rights of the unborn child. It is equally possible that this occurs at the hand of any legal professional who deeply knows the subject matter and decides to combat the non-application of all the aforementioned regulations.

Consequently, the appropriate course is to shift the burden to the defendant to refute the presumption (presunción) established by paragraph two of Article 92 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and therefore it is resolved: ---a) The challenged resolution is revoked. ---b. As the state of pregnancy is demonstrated, an urgent prior conciliation (conciliación) is ordered. That conciliation (conciliación) may include the acknowledgment of paternity of the being in gestation and then, in that aspect, the agreement must be referred to the Family Court for its respective homologation (homologación) and it will be for that Court to determine what is pertinent regarding the registration of paternity once the birth registration data is known. ---c. If no conciliation (conciliación) exists for any reason whatsoever, the first instance is ordered to immediately proceed with the claim if no other legal reason impedes it and to set a provisional support payment (pensión provisional) to be borne by the defendant in favor of the unborn child (nascituro). If, once notified, the defendant refutes said paternity, the urgent reception of testimonial evidence or the taking of evidence of another nature shall be ordered to determine whether or not there are elements regarding the existence of a de facto cohabitation (convivencia de hecho) during the probable period of conception of the being in gestation.

</span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\">---d.</span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> In the event that it is not possible to substantiate said presumption and the respondent refutes the paternity attributed to him, the first instance court shall order a provisional child support payment (pensión provisional) to be borne by the respondent and, shall order a DNA test to be performed once the minor is born, in order to determine whether the respondent must continue paying said provisional amount, without prejudice to the respondent filing a paternity determination process for an unborn person in the family court or, the mother being able to file it through a paternity investigation process. In either of the two cases, that is, if the filiation matter reaches the family court, the child support (alimentos) proceeding shall only be suspended pending the decision reached by final judgment in the filiation proceeding if so ordered by the respective Family Court. Thus, it must be very clear to the respondent that nothing prevents him from initiating the paternity determination, even if the being in gestation has not been born, and therefore, it is not sufficient for him to wait patiently for the mother to undertake the investigation of paternal filiation.</span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\">---e. </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">If the DNA test ordered in the child support proceeding is negative or cannot be performed for a cause attributable to the mother, at the request of the respondent, the first instance court may order that the provisional child support payment cease to be paid by the respondent. </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\"> </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\">---f. </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">If this judgment is unfortunately tardy in the sense that a premature birth has already occurred, the proceeding must continue as indicated in this judgment and if an interruption of the pregnancy unfortunately occurred, the proceeding must also continue, cautioning the mother if she has an interest in collecting pregnancy expenses for the stillbirth. The latter, since the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has already ruled on the dignified treatment of the remains of a being that was not born and there is no reason to consider that pregnancy expenses can only be collected if a live birth occurred. In this regard, through Judgment No. º 6685-01 of 14:06 of July 17, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber stated: </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">“</span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">It is obvious that given the often infectious-contagious nature of the “products of conception”, these must be manipulated or handled with extreme caution. Hence, this Chamber agrees with the public health reasons that motivated the drafting of the Institutional Standard for the Handling of Anatomopathological Waste. However, this Court does not find that everyone's concern to ensure that such handling is done in the safest possible way suppresses the rights of the appellant and her spouse who, as parents and practitioners of the Catholic faith, consider it vital for their religion and their peace of mind to bury their child. Although that son did not complete his formation process to be able to develop as a normal child and subsist, the truth is that from the moment he was conceived, he was a person with rights. Just as his parents are persons with rights, who have full authority to choose that he have a burial according to the rules established religiously by Catholics. Indeed, the Institutional Standard for the Handling of Anatomopathological Waste does not refer to the direct delivery of what it calls “solid wastes that drain liquid” (fetus and placenta) to a third party and establishes very clear rules regarding their transfer outside hospital centers and the type of transport and container to be used. However, this Chamber considers that said provisions can and must be fulfilled insofar as the interested parties are correctly and directly informed of the established procedure and the destination of said “wastes.” Thus, in the specific case, the “waste” of interest could have been perfectly transported in accordance with all the respective medical and hygienic stipulations, but informing the appellant and her spouse of the procedure to follow, as well as coordinating with them the date, time, and cemetery where it would finally be disposed of, respecting the appellants' right to bury the remains of their son. Because this was not done and actions were taken without any communication to the appellant and her spouse regarding the destination of their son—as if he were a simple object—the appeal must be upheld, ordering (…) that within the non-extendable term of two days counted from the notification of this judgment, deliver to the appellant, (…) the fetus product of the natural abortion performed on her person in accordance with the necessary health measures.</span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">”</span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\"> </span><span data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">As can be seen, the vote is interesting, although it does not contemplate a significant development of the rights at stake, but rather, without it being the subject of the appeal, it goes on to define the unborn being as a “person with rights.”</span> It is understandable that the Chamber ordered dignified treatment for stillborns (mortinatos), that is, for beings that were not born alive, but the central issue was not to define whether stillborns are persons or not, but rather, nothing more than that a spontaneous abortion (aborto espontáneo) does not prevent the parents from taking responsibility for the remains of the stillborn once the sanitary regulations that guarantee public health have been complied with. In any case, it was clear that the remains of a stillborn must be treated with dignity and, indeed, burial (inhumación) is recognized as part of the right to family life. This is how the constitutional resolution is understood, although as indicated, it does not have a broad development regarding the rights at stake. All this with the observation that our country, through Ley N.° 9797 which corresponds to the comprehensive reform of Ley N.° 7771, General Law on HIV-AIDS (Ley General sobre VIH-SIDA), grants the status of “person” to every being in gestation without any distinction. Expressly, Article 21 of that Law refers to the nasciturus as an “unborn person” (persona por nacer). If the legislative intent had been not to grant that legal status, a Law with that content would not have been approved. Furthermore, burial expenses can also be claimed pursuant to Article 37 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia).

X.To conclude, it is important to highlight that the lawsuit begins with a profound, eminently legal preamble that develops some of the issues set forth herein and, nevertheless, the appealed decision focuses on Article 168 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). That is, it concerns a lawsuit with an important development of the applicable law, while the appealed decision is quite superficial, but as has been demonstrated, fueled by astonishing prejudices. Secondly, Article 24 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) transcribed in the appealed decision has been partially declared unconstitutional. For greater understanding, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), through resolution No. 2781-2016, 11:40 of February 24, 2016, ordered: “The action is granted. Consequently, the phrase ‘fifteen years’ (de quince años) of Article 24 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) is annulled as unconstitutional so that henceforth it shall read ‘If the support obligation is breached, a writ of body attachment (orden de apremio corporal) may be issued against the defaulting debtor, unless they are a minor or over seventy-one years of age,’ it being understood that ‘minor’ refers to a person under 18 years of age. This ruling has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date the annulled norm took effect, without prejudice to good-faith acquired rights. Consequently, the release is ordered of all minors who, at the time of issuing this ruling, were detained under body attachment. Let this pronouncement be recorded in the Official Gazette La Gaceta (Diario Oficial La Gaceta) and be published in full in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez file a dissenting vote and dismiss the action. Magistrate Salazar Alvarado files a dissenting vote and dismisses the action, provided that Article 24 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) is interpreted to mean that body attachment against a minor but over fifteen years of age who is a support debtor is the ultima ratio and cannot be applied automatically. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Castillo Víquez attach separate notes. Let it be notified.”

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}, { "id": 2, "nombre": "Duty to shift the burden of rebutting the presumption of paternity to the defendant, since the unborn being and the pregnant woman remain in a situation of vulnerability" } ] }, { "id": 2, "nombre": "Rights of the unborn", "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Analysis of the application of the favor debilis principle" }, { "id": 2, "nombre": "Duty to shift the burden of rebutting the presumption of paternity to the defendant, since the unborn being and the pregnant woman remain in a situation of vulnerability" } ] } ], "tipoContenido": "Majority opinion", "tipoDocumento": "EXT", "tipoInformacion": "Judicial Resolution", "tipoResolucion": "On the merits", "resultado": "Reverses", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<p><span idextracto=\"369152\" class=\"example1 369152\" data-mce-style=\"margin-top: 7.9pt; margin-bottom: 7.9pt; text-indent: 35.5pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;\"><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;\">\"VIII. FAVOR DEBILIS PRINCIPLE:</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> Article 2 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) provides that </span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">“</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">the unity of the family, the interest of the children, that of minors, and the equal rights and duties of the spouses, must be the fundamental principles for the application and interpretation of this Code</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">”</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">. </span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">That article contemplates the </span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">“</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">favor debilis</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">”</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> principle - Sch</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">ö</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">tz, Gustavo J. (2.013). El favor debilis como principio general del Derecho Internacional Privado. Su particular aplicación a las relaciones de consumo transfronterizas. Universidad de Salamanca. Volumen 1. Document consulted on September 4, 2024 https://gredos.usal.es/bitstream/handle/10366/128967/El_ favor_debilis_como_principio_general_.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y which forms part of the legal order as a general principle of Law as proposed by the author Gustavo Sch</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">ö</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">tz. The undersigned shares this idea, as I consider that this principle is contemplated in Article 9 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), Articles 2 and 7 of the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, as well as Article 6 of the Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias, and even in Article 13 of the Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica. Other areas contemplate principles with identical or similar content: </span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">“</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">indubio pro reo</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">”</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> in criminal matters and </span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">“</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">indubio pro operario</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\">”</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> in the labor order. Thus, the \"favor debilis\" principle has its reason for being because the legal system seeks equality, and for this, it is essential to protect the weakest persons and to have clarity that vulnerability can be generated by multiple factors such as age, economic condition, physical or psychosocial disability, etc. For the understanding of this resolution, what is indicated in Article 9 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code is very important:</span> <span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">“</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">Article 9</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">°</span><span style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;\">- Preferential application.</span> In case of doubt, whether factual or legal, regarding the application of this Code, the norm that is most favorable to the minor shall be chosen according to the criteria that characterize their best interest." It should be remembered that this Code dates from 1998, while the Family Code (Código de Familia) dates from 1973 and entered into force in 1974. Therefore, for all the reasons set forth above, what is appropriate in a case such as the present one is to shift to the respondent the burden of rebutting the presumption established by Article 92, paragraph two, of the Family Code (Código de Familia), since the unborn child and the pregnant woman remain in a situation of vulnerability. In this regard, Feito states: "[...]being vulnerable implies fragility, a situation of threat or the possibility of suffering harm. Therefore, it implies being susceptible to receiving or suffering something bad or painful, such as an illness, and also having the possibility of being hurt physically or emotionally. Vulnerability can also be understood as being able to be persuaded or tempted, being able to be a recipient, being penetrable, not being invincible, not having absolute control over the situation, not being in a position of power, or at least having the possibility that such power may be weakened. According to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy, vulnerable is one who can be wounded or receive injury, physically or morally." Feito, L. (2007). Vulnerabilidad. Anales del Sistema Sanitario de Navarra, 30(Supl. 3), 07-22. Accessed on September 4, 2024, at the site https://scielo.isciii.es/scielo.php?pid=S1137-66272007000600002 &script=sci_abstract Along these lines, Estupiñan-Silva warns: "[...]the term vulnerability is always relative and specific with respect to a particular underlying threat. Applied sciences have historically agreed in affirming that it is only possible to speak of a degree of vulnerability from the point of view of the probability of the threat and based on its particular intensity, its frequency, and its duration. The relevance of delimiting the concept of vulnerability is, in fact, widely addressed in scientific circles, and although some of its components may be interpreted differently, its structural elements systematically recur in the doctrine, namely: causes, sensitivity, exposure, the threat, and the risk itself." Estupiñan-Silva, Rosmerlin (2013). La vulnerabilidad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Esbozo de una tipología. Derechos Humanos y Políticas Públicas. Document accessed on September 4, 2024, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r39780.pdf At this point, it is essential to consider that the pro person principle requires an expansive interpretation of the normative framework when human rights are being enshrined or expanded, and a restrictive interpretation when such rights are limited. It is through the application of the pro person or pro homine principle that human rights become unconditionally and immediately enforceable, and their limitation can only be exceptional. (Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1986). Exigibilidad del Derecho de Rectificación o Respuesta. Separate Opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, para. 36.-). Furthermore, for the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, "the pro libertatis principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, forms the core of human rights doctrine; according to the first, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted expansively, and everything that limits it, restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being." It has expressed this, for example, in resolution No. 3173-93 of 14:57 on July 6, 1993. Regarding the pro homine principle, constitutional votes No. 3550-92 of 16:00 hours on November 24, 1992, No. 2588-16 of 14:50 on February 23, and No. 697-16 of 14:30 on January 19, both from the year 2016, and No. 12659-18 of 9:20 on August 7, 2018, among others, may also be consulted. Thus, the undersigned does not understand why a pregnant woman should be placed in this anguish regarding the satisfaction of the unborn child's minimum needs. Why place her almost in a situation of having to beg for justice? The undersigned fails to comprehend why the dignity of the pregnant woman here must be violated for deciding to bring a judicial maintenance action for the benefit of the unborn child. Under what condition must she find herself to be considered a person and not as a thing that incubates? Note that denying her the right of access to justice objectifies her.

<span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Note that, as a result, the woman's body is being required to give everything it has for the formation of the being in gestation and that the woman must see what she can do to bring about the birth. This is unacceptable and, I believe that the principle -“pro homine” (pro person)– must have an aggravating or reinforcing factor in the case of conceived but unborn persons, that is, nasciturus. Furthermore, I consider that this aggravating or reinforcing factor derives from the Preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the Child which states: </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, 'the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth' [...]”.</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> It is from this that the legal principle “pro homine nasciturus” (pro unborn person) is extracted, by virtue of which it is obligatory to interpret all norms -of any rank- in favor of the dignity of persons and, if it concerns a being in gestation, it is obligatory to interpret the regulations in its favor, that is, to procure its comprehensive health, </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">to consider it as a person in everything that is favorable to it and to seek the prevention and treatment of illnesses or, indeed, disabilities. Moreover, what is being gestated is a human being and it also has the right that its mother does not lose her comprehensive health</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">. Similarly, any normative gap must be remedied with the principle “pro homine nasciturus” (pro unborn person) which, for obvious reasons, is of extensive application to assisted human reproduction, to the prohibition of free dismissal of women in a state of pregnancy, to the prohibition of labor discrimination against pregnant women, to the recognition of the </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">right to support (derecho alimentario)</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">for nasciturus regardless of the mother's family status, to the prohibition of bodily restraint (apremio corporal) against a pregnant woman, to the right to education and health of the adolescent mother, to the right to non-violence against women, which includes the right to non-violence against pregnant women, to the eradication of obstetric violence, to the prohibition of workplace harassment in general with special severity in the case of workplace harassment against pregnant women, to the increase in penalties for those who commit crimes against a pregnant woman, as well as the increase in penalties for sexual assaults that result in a pregnancy, etc. Thus, it is important to clarify that principles are distinguished from legal rules because they do not determine conduct, do not restrict rights, do not impose sanctions, do not entail prohibitions, do not propose a single solution for the specific case, are not exhausted in the content of the rule nor have a propositional structure -factual scenario and legal effect- but rather, they are made up of a general idea that serves as a goal, limit, aspiration, framework for interpretation and concretion so that the legal system functions as a coherent system that provides a response to specific realities. Principles oscillate throughout the legal system, as they articulate it, that is, they are in its entirety and not confined to a reduced space or prominence. -Domínguez Hidalgo, Carmen. (2005). Los principios que informan el Derecho de Familia Chileno: su formulación clásica y revisión moderna. Revista Chilena de Derecho. Document consulted on September 4, 2024 at the site https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177021336001.pdf Without the principles, one would not understand what the hard core of a rule or the legal system is and where to go to find what is protected or what is intended to be avoided. In this line, principles have a very broad scope of action, as well as a field of influence regarding concrete situations. Therefore, there are procedural and substantive principles. The former guide how the substantive right is materialized and the latter deal with what the substantive right at stake is. It is also important to state that there are express and implicit principles. The former, </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“are those that have been expressly issued by a source of legal production and appear, consequently, collected in a normative text, while implicit principles are deduced by the applier of the law from express provisions of the legal system -although, as we will see, for one sector of the doctrine they must be understood as conclusions drawn from natural law”</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">. -Ruiz Ruiz, Ramón. (2012). La distinción entre reglas y principios y sus implicaciones en la aplicación del derecho. Derecho y realidad. Number 20. Page 149. Document consulted on September 4, 2024 at https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/derecho_realidad/article/view/4860/3952 </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">It is also timely to indicate that for a principle to be applicable, it requires its positivization, that is, it must complete the juridification process and be contemplated in the legal system, whether in a concrete or general form. Otherwise, it would then be an ethical principle, but not a legal one.</span> Now, as author Alonso Vidal points out, when implicit principles are applied to solve a particular case, the adjudicator must argue to demonstrate the existence of two conditions for their application: “a) Subsidiarity, that is, that there is no authoritatively identifiable rule applicable to the case, or that the authoritatively identifiable rule must be interpreted differently or even be disapplied due to the concurrence of the implicit principle in question. b) Coherence, that is, that the content of the implicit principle is coherent with the explicit rules and principles of the system.” -Alonso Vidal, Horacio-José. (2012). Los principios implícitos. Su relevancia en la aplicación del derecho. Pages 165 and 166. Document consulted on September 4, 2024, at the site https://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/47431/1/Doxa_35_07.pdf Consequently, the application of an express principle is much simpler than the application of an implicit principle. Of course, both types of principles are used to interpret legal norms that are not clear or to fill a normative gap. That is, they are not used to contradict the content of a norm, since a principle particularly seeks the coherence of the legal system. All of the foregoing with the observation that, if the content of a norm is contrary to a general principle of Law, what is appropriate is to apply the principle since the goal is for the legal system to function as a coherent system, hence the need to eradicate contradictions. In practice, the declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm is common for violating the principle of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, non-discrimination, inviolability of the defense, best interest of the minor child, etc. Therefore, norms must be excluded from the legal system when they collide with a general principle or, indeed, with a specific one. Furthermore, in the event of a collision of principles, one of them will have a quantitative projection, as it is applicable to a specific situation and, therefore, if other principles must yield to the content of a specific principle, this is a qualitative projection. That is, one principle has greater weight in a given case compared to other principles. In contrast, in the case of norms, if a collision exists, prevalence is resolved by resorting to the hierarchical order, the criterion of temporality, that of specialty, etc. Thus, the Law is nourished by general principles and each specialty has its own principles; and even, within each area, a specific topic is governed by particular principles. In this way, principles fulfill a prescriptive function insofar as they guide the meaning of each norm and of the legal system in general; a pro-substantive or substantialist law function; a systematizing function of the legal system; a limiting function of the scope of action of public powers; an informing and guiding function of the legal system as a whole; a guaranteeing function regarding acquired rights, consolidated legal situations, minimum rights, standards of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the legal system; an integrating function to give coherence and cohesion to the legal system so that it operates as a system; an interpretive function, to give content to the sense-duty of completeness to which the Law must aspire. In this case, the appealed resolution has violated express regulations and the pro homine principle, as well as the pro homine nasciturus principle already set forth. IX. PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY: In addition to all that has already been indicated, the appealed resolution ignores the presumption of paternity established in Article 92, second paragraph of the Código de Familia, which states: “Article 92.- The status of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of the state of the child by the alleged father or mother, or by any other means of proof./ The paternity of the man who, during the period of conception, cohabited, in a common-law marriage, in accordance with what is indicated in Title VII of this Code, is presumed.” (The second paragraph of this article was added by Ley N.° 7532 of August 8, 1995, published in La Gaceta N.° 162 of August 28, 1995). The first instance has decided to disapply the cited presumption in an evident protection of the defendant man. Regarding said presumption, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in resolution N.° 7515-1994, 15:27 of December 21, 1994, stated: “FIFTH. Regarding the proposed addition to Article 92 of the Código de Familia.

The equality clause, together with the prohibition of "any personal classification regarding the nature of filiation" (article 54 of the Constitution), give rise, as a general rule, to equal treatment of children born within and outside of marriage, such that exceptions or limitations to that principle would be the ones that would need to be justified in order to be in conformity with the Political Constitution. In other words, what is at stake is the fundamental right of non-marital children not to suffer discrimination. The legislative presumption we are examining does not resolve a conflict between married life and the de facto union, but rather between children born within and children born outside of marriage, an issue resolved in favor of equality by constitutional article 54 combined with article 33. Finally, it is not a constitutional argument to maintain that legal presumptions could not derive from a de facto union, as if in this matter the legislator could not establish presumptions, moreover reasonable ones: cohabitation (convivencia), which must be proven, gives rise to the legislator presuming iuris tantum the paternity of the man who cohabited with the woman during the period of conception, a presumption consistent, moreover, with the constitutional protection of the child (article 51 of the Political Constitution). POR TANTO: A) The consultation is answered in the sense that the Third Plenary Legislative Commission must re-examine the bill in question in a second debate. B) The Chamber reiterates its criterion against extending the patrimonial effects of the de facto union when one of the cohabitants is impeded from contracting marriage due to an existing prior bond. C) Regarding the addition to article 92 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), it contains no unconstitutional provisions. This pronouncement is binding as to item "A", as it relates to the legislative procedure of the bill." Now, it is possible that the challenged decision proceeds from the basis that it is indeed possible to allow the claim to proceed in those cases by virtue of the presumption of paternity derived from marriage pursuant to article 69 of the Family Code. I say it is possible, because in reality the decision does not develop this. However, said Code also establishes a presumption of paternity in non-marital partner relationships, that is, article 92, second paragraph of the Family Code. It goes without saying that this presumption has been in the Family Code through a reform introduced by Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, that is, for twenty-nine years. Why does the judicial authority decide not to apply the presumption of paternity established by article 92 of the Family Code? I say decides not to apply this latter norm, since it is impossible to even think that it is an unknown norm. In any case, disregarding a norm as indicated and the national reality warrants a ruling such as the present one due to the enormous impact it will have on the being in gestation in this process, on its mother, indirectly on said woman's older child —a young child diagnosed with autism and attention deficit— and eventually on other similar cases. Furthermore, this ruling intends to materialize a norm that, it seems, must struggle against androcentric and adult-centric disuse. The length of this ruling is proportional to the prejudice, the androcentric and adult-centric vision that sustains the challenged decision.

It is clear that the Family Code regulates presumptions of filiation in articles 69 and 92, but both presumptions differ in their practicality. In the first case, since marriage is registered —article 31 of the Family Code and 43 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Civil Registry (Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y el Registro Civil)— in the Civil Registry, it is clear that it is very easy to apply the presumption established in article 69 of that Code, since it depends on an objective fact: a marriage having taken place which is made known to the Civil Registry. In the second case, the situation changes because in our country there is no registry of ongoing or finalized de facto unions. Therefore, it is precisely there that procedural law must be used not to obstruct the right of action but as a tool to materialize the substantive law.

<span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Note that, in this case, </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: sub;">the pregnant woman indicates that the defendant has insured her with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> In this regard, there are many rulings that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has issued on insurance between cohabiting persons. For example, No. 8000-2016, 11:52 of June 10, 2016; No. 8689-2019, 9:30 of May 17, 2019; No. 12758-2019, 9:30 of July 12, 2019; No. 18017-2019, 9:30 of September 20, 2019; No. 20038-2019, 9:45 of October 15, 2019; 20666-2019, 9:30 of October 29, 2019; No. 4560-2020, 9:30 of March 6, 2020, No. 8475-2020, 9:20 of May 8, 2020, No. 12423-2020, 9:15 of July 3, 2020 and No. 12842-2020, 9:15 of July 10, 2020. </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">That is to say, even in matters of insurance between unmarried couples, the formal component has advanced greatly thanks to the invaluable contribution of binding case law (jurisprudencia vinculante). Note that constitutional case law has made the requirements of the common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in social security matters more flexible. I emphasize that it is even a flexibilization of requirements that impacts public funds. </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">To this must be added that even in the case of the presumption of paternity referred to in Article 69 of the Family Code, the norm itself is flexible with the aim of expanding the possibilities of its application, and there is no reason whatsoever not to do the same in the case of conceived but unborn children where there is no marriage. As a complement, for several years the Constitutional Chamber has also determined that common-law marriages do not always have to be recognized solely within the Family Jurisdiction. Regarding this, it stated in resolution No. 5266-03 of 14:44 of June 18, 2003: </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“V… In any case, it must be taken into account that if the recognition of the common-law relationship were requested as an incidental matter -in another jurisdiction, and obviously, through another proceeding-, it must be resolved by the judge or tribunal that hears the succession, by virtue of the provisions of subsection 2) of Article 900 of the Civil Procedure Code, which expressly establishes that abbreviated proceedings related to the succession must be resolved in the probate court. Finally, in accordance with the foregoing, it must be considered that Article 243 of the Family Code itself does not establish that this recognition must be made in the family jurisdiction; it simply indicates that said recognition must be made ‘before the courts of justice’; therefore, a literal and integral interpretation of the rule allows for the foregoing considerations.” </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Then, it is not a matter of recognition of a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) but of </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">shifting to the defendant the burden of proving that a cohabitation relationship did not exist during the probable time of conception and, consequently, it is up to him to demonstrate that the presumption contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code is not applicable.</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> Note that, when the common-law marriage was incorporated into the legal system by Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, both the regular and irregular common-law marriage were incorporated and, although the irregular one was declared unconstitutional by resolution No. 3558-99 of 16:48 minutes of May 25, 1999, obviously the family status of the presumed father would not be an obstacle to applying the presumption of Article 92, second paragraph of the Family Code, since a favorable interpretation must be made for the unborn being, to non-discrimination and the right to non-violence, as well as to access to justice.</span> This with the observation that, according to the pregnant woman, the respondent is single. It is worth recalling that, many years ago, article 16, subsection 2) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) stated: “Article 16.- Marriage is prohibited: (…) 2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless there has been a birth before that term expires or it is proven through the opinions of two official medical experts (peritos médicos oficiales) that there is no pregnancy.” That provision sought to protect the male spouse in cases of paternity conflicts and, in this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), by its resolution No. 2129-2008, 10:30 a.m. of February 14, 2008, ordered: “IV.- It is clear that the provision establishes a condition for the woman that it does not require of the man when it comes to forming a new matrimonial bond. In order to establish whether that difference in treatment is legitimate or not, it is necessary—as this Chamber’s case law has established—to determine if the inequality lacks an objective and reasonable justification and, in addition, the existence of that justification must be assessed in relation to the purpose and effects of the measure under consideration, requiring a relation of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose pursued (see judgment number 6685-96 in this regard). In other words, it is legitimate for the legislator to restrict a right, but must do so in such a way that the legal rule conforms in all its elements, such as its motive and purpose, with the objective meaning of the Constitution. This means that there must be proportionality between the legal rule adopted and the purpose it pursues, referring to the imperative need for the law to satisfy the public interest protected by the supreme rule (see judgment number 832-09). In the case under study, several constitutional legal interests are at play: the right to liberty, protected in article 28, according to which persons are free to do anything not prohibited by law, and even then, a prohibition cannot unreasonably affect fundamental rights, that is—as stated—without an objective and reasonable justification for the restriction; the right to equality insofar as a condition is imposed on the woman that is not required of the man; and—in the opinion of the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría)—the right of every person to know who their parents are. In that sense, the contested measure would be justified for the sake of protecting said right. However, this Chamber considers that such a dilemma does not exist, that is, the dilemma of restricting liberty and equality to protect the right of every person to know their filiation (filiación), because, as the petitioner indicates, it is currently unnecessary in light of legal provisions regulated in the same body of rules that allow the resolution of paternity conflicts that arise, such as the acknowledgment of a child of a married woman, the declaration of an extramarital child, or the challenge of paternity. Given that both current legislation and technology unequivocally and with retroactive effects allow the paternity of a minor to be established with absolute certainty, the requirement that the provision imposes on the woman is unnecessary and therefore lacks reasonableness. V.- At the oral hearing (audiencia oral) held in this action, the Attorney General’s Office refers to the fact that the contested provision does not prevent the woman from marrying, because article 17 of the Family Code itself establishes the possibility that a marriage celebrated despite the prohibitions of article 16 may be valid, and that in that sense the provision—by itself—does not affect the fundamental right of the woman to marry. It points out that it is article 28.4 that prevents the notary (notaria) or authorized official from performing the act, if they have not first required certification of the date of dissolution of the previous marriage, or the proof provided for in subsection 2 of article 16, referring to the opinions of two official medical experts that there is no pregnancy. As stated in the preceding recital (considerando), this Chamber considers that if the purpose of establishing the contested requirement is to protect the minor’s right to know who their parents are, and this purpose is currently satisfied unequivocally by other legal mechanisms, the requirement indeed becomes unreasonable, not only, as stated, because it is unnecessary, but also because it imposes a condition that, by being extreme, becomes a barrier to the woman’s marriage, such as having to obtain, not one but two opinions, not from one official doctor but from two, which in our context is a condition of difficult access for any average person.

It should be added that while it is true the Family Code (Código de Familia) establishes both a system of presumptions and a demonstrative one, to protect the right to filiation (filiación) of minors in safeguarding their best interest and of Article 53 of the Constitution, it is sufficient that the domestic legal system guarantees the minor's right to know who their parents are, for the legal system to fulfill the constitutional purpose. In that sense, for the purposes of this action, it is enough that subsequently and retroactively, effects can be given to the filiation through the demonstrative mechanisms established by the Family Code itself. The system of presumptions is not affected, nor does it lose its logic in other situations; the Chamber simply considers that requiring the mentioned requirements as a condition for celebrating the marriage of a woman under the indicated conditions is unnecessary and unreasonable, because even if the marriage celebrated under those conditions were to be valid, given the provision's relation to the cited article 28.4 of the Family Code, no authorized official would reasonably want to expose themselves to a sanction or consequences for performing a marriage without the requirements established in the challenged provision (16.2). In practice, the provision does have the potential to act as a barrier to the celebration of marriage for a woman under the conditions indicated in the challenged provision. VI.- It is important to highlight that according to the principle of freedom contained in Article 28 of the Constitution, every person is free to do anything that is not prohibited and furthermore: (...) "Private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are beyond the reach of the law...". That is to say, on the one hand, its first paragraph establishes the so-called principle of freedom, according to which a person can do anything the law does not prohibit, but it also contains the guarantee that not even the law may invade their intangible sphere of freedom and, therefore, of autonomy and privacy, outside of the circumstances exhaustively provided for by the Constitution itself, exceptional circumstances and, therefore, of restrictive interpretation, among which is the restriction of the right, only in the face of a pressing need, and in the least harmful manner for the affected right (see judgment number 3550-92). It is evident that the condition imposed in the provision no longer has the characteristic of being a "pressing need" to protect a public interest, because as already indicated, the protected legal right, that is, the right of every person to know who their parents are, is fully protected by current legislation and technology, causing the measure to lose its reason for being, to become an odious condition, undoubtedly harmful to the freedom and equality protected by the Constitution, and to the right of every person to marry (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 23.2; American Convention on Human Rights article 17.2; Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 16.1; Political Constitution article 52). Consequently, it is appropriate to declare the action well-founded and annul article 16 subsection 2) of the Family Code, which states: "Marriage is prohibited: […] 2) For the woman before three hundred days have elapsed from the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless childbirth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the reports of two official medical experts that no pregnancy exists […]." VII. Connectedness.

The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes in its article 89 that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm of a law or general provision shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof, or of any other law or provision, whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. In view of the fact that the phrase "and the proof provided for in subsection 2) of article 16," contained in article 28.4 of the Family Code, is evidently related to the subject matter and the underlying proceeding of this action—as the basis for the sanction on the appellant—its unconstitutionality is likewise declared. The Magistrate Calzada and the Magistrate Cruz give additional separate reasons. The Magistrate Sosto López dissents and dismisses the action and makes an interpretation in conformity with article 16 subsection 2) of the Family Code. POR TANTO: It is declared, by majority, that the action is granted. Consequently, article 16 subsection 2) is annulled insofar as it states: "2) Of the woman before three hundred days have elapsed since the dissolution or declaration of nullity of her previous marriage, unless childbirth has occurred before that term is completed or it is proven through the opinions of two official medical experts that no pregnancy exists […]." and from article 28 subsection 4) the phrase "and the proof provided for in subsection 2) of article 16," both of the Family Code. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date the annulled norms were in force, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, consolidated legal situations, and past judgments with the authority of res judicata in its substantive sense. Communicate this ruling to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Publish it in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and publish it in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify." See how the Constitutional Chamber made clear that mechanisms exist to resolve any doubt about paternity. Why not make use of DNA testing in the event the respondent in this matter refutes paternity? Thus, the challenged decision assumes that the respondent will deny the paternity attributed to him. On what basis does the lower court assume this? There seems to be an underlying stereotype, in the sense that, when there is no marriage to the pregnant woman, every man identified as the father will deny paternity, and that is absolutely false. That is to say, there are abundant examples of men who recognize the pregnancy, exercise notarial possession of status, and accept their paternity. The undersigned has no element to assume that the respondent in this case will not do the same upon being judicially called to be responsible for the being in gestation. In this way, only by giving the alleged father the opportunity to manifest himself and even refute what is provided in the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code, is it possible to guarantee access to justice without disapplying article 168 of the Family Code insofar as it provides that the provisional support obligation (pensión provisional) may be set "once the kinship relationship is proven," a norm that has existed—previously in article 155— in the Family Code since its enactment (1973), but at that time the robust ordinary, constitutional, and supra-constitutional normative framework to which I have referred did not exist. In this context, that norm must be understood in a broad sense and in harmony with all the legislation already analyzed. Furthermore, article 414 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130 states: "Every legal presumption releases the party invoking it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed certain by virtue of such presumption. / Nevertheless, whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts that serve as its basis." In this case, from the entirety of the complaint—pro actione principle—this allegation is deduced and, it is therefore incumbent upon the legal representative of the being in gestation to demonstrate the state of pregnancy and upon the respondent to rebut what is provided in the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code.

Furthermore, since said presumption is of a relative nature—for it does not annul certain acts nor grant a peremptory exception if in both cases the law has not expressly reserved proof to the contrary—if the defendant decides to rebut it, he must proceed as provided in Article 416 of the aforementioned Procedural Code, for that norm states: "Outside of absolute presumptions, the others may be rebutted by proof to the contrary, for which all legal means are admissible, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of observing them." In other words, with respect to the relative presumption of paternity governed by Article 92, second paragraph of the Family Code, it is incumbent upon the mother to prove the pregnancy and upon the defendant to demonstrate that said presumption is not applicable. That is, it is not for the judicial authority to rebut that presumption, much less to disregard it.

Added to this, it is the case that, in patrimonial matters, for example, it is perfectly possible for a couple that is just beginning a cohabitation relationship to constitute an encumbrance on the family patrimony (afectación al patrimonio familiar) or, alternatively, to grant matrimonial agreements (capitulaciones matrimoniales). Let us recall that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Resolution No. 13920-23, 14:21 of June 9, 2023, recognized the right of couples to sign and register matrimonial agreements for de facto unions (uniones de hecho), including same-sex couples. That is, to encumber the family patrimony when there is no marriage or to grant matrimonial agreements, it is not necessary to wait for more than two years of cohabitation to elapse. Moreover, the encumbrance between cohabitants came into legal existence through the Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer, Law No. 7142 of 1990, and not with Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, which incorporates the Sole Chapter to Title VII of the Family Code on De Facto Unions. Why, if in patrimonial matters the passage of two years of a de facto union is not required, is the presumption contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 92 of the Family Code not applied with the same fluidity?

Along these lines, it is also appropriate to indicate that, as the Constitutional Chamber has explained: "Conventionality control (control de convencionalidad) is a praetorian construction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights whose fundamental purpose is to achieve the 'conventional supremacy' in all national or local legal systems of the so-called 'parameter of conventionality' (parámetro de convencionalidad), made up of the declarations and conventions in the matter of the Inter-American System for the protection of Human Rights, the judgments rendered by that regional Court, and its advisory opinions. It constitutes a legal revolution insofar as it imposes upon national judges and Tribunals, especially Constitutional ones, the obligation to consolidate the 'conventional State of Law,' annulling and expelling from the respective national legal system any norm that irremediably confronts the 'bloc of conventionality' (bloque de convencionalidad) (see JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, 'Control of Conventionality Exercised by Constitutional Tribunals and Chambers' in Diffuse Control of Conventionality -coord. E. Ferrer Mac-Gregor- Mexico, Fundap, 2012 and JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, 'The Construction of a Common Inter-American Administrative Law' in Iberoamerican Journal of Public and Administrative Law, Year 11, No. 11, 2011). Basically, conventionality control is conceived and designed based on two landmark judgments of the Inter-American Court: Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006—reiterated in subsequent ones—and Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru of November 24, 2006—also reiterated in subsequent ones. In the first (Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile), the following was held (recital 124): 'The Court is aware that domestic judges and tribunals are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obliged to apply the provisions in force in the legal system.' But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State apparatus, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the Convention's provisions are not undermined by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and which from the outset lack legal effects. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a kind of "conventionality control" between the domestic legal norms they apply in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In that task, the Judiciary must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention. In the second (Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru), the following was specified (recital 128): "When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges are subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of the Convention is not undermined or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, object, and purpose. In other words, the organs of the Judiciary must exercise not only a control of constitutionality, but also a 'conventionality control' ex officio, between domestic norms and the American Convention, evidently within the framework of their respective competencies and the pertinent procedural regulations. This function must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the plaintiffs in each specific case, although neither does it imply that this control must always be exercised, without considering other formal and material assumptions of admissibility and appropriateness of this type of action." Finally, in the case "Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico" of November 26, 2010, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights made some expansions or clarifications regarding the domestic organs responsible for exercising conventionality control, indicating that it must be exercised by "225. (...) all its organs –of the State–, including its judges (...) The judges and organs linked to the administration of justice at all levels (...) the judges and judicial organs linked to the administration of justice (...)." This position was ratified by the Inter-American Court in the judgment of the case "Gelman v. Uruguay" of February 24, 2011. From this doctrine, it is worth highlighting two relevant issues, which are the following: a) Conventionality control must be exercised, even, ex officio, even if the intervening parties have not urged or requested it and b) when exercising conventionality control, judges and Constitutional Courts enjoy a "national margin of appreciation," since, as indicated in the case Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru of 2006, conventionality control must be exercised "within the framework of their respective competencies and the pertinent procedural regulations," a circumstance that obliges one to consider the legal system systematically, that is, as a whole that has hermetic completeness, in order to conclude whether a national norm infringes or not the conventionality parameter; consequently, isolated analyses cannot be made as if the legal system were constituted by watertight or segmented compartments. It should be noted that the national margin of appreciation is an indeterminate legal concept that allows the convergence and harmonization of national and inter-American law, establishing a threshold of convergence that allows overcoming the relativity of national legal traditions.

See, among others, constitutional judgments No. 4491 of 4:00 p.m. on April 3, 2013, and No. 15737 of 10:20 a.m. on October 9, 2015.

I cite this because in this case, it is not even a matter of carrying out a conventionality review but simply, <span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">materializing what is provided in the second paragraph of article 92 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), which </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">with respect to article 168 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">is a later and special rule on filiation matters in common-law unions (uniones de hecho).</span> <span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Furthermore, </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">after the reform of the aforementioned article 92, the promulgation of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) followed.</span> <span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Thus it is both simple and broad. Moreover, if article 1400 of our Civil Code (Código Civil) </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">-from the century before last- </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">allows a donation (donación) in favor of a conceived person, it is absurd to deem them born for the purpose of benefiting them patrimonially and not to recognize the right to child support (alimentos), which is not a right of a patrimonial nature as already explained and which, failing to receive child support could cause them illnesses, disabilities, or even premature birth or death, as well as affecting the comprehensive health of the pregnant woman. That rule of the Civil Code says:</span> <span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">To receive by donation it is necessary to be, at least, conceived at the time the deed of donation is drafted; but the donee's right to enforce the provisions of article 13 shall remain pending</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">”</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">.</span></p> <p><span idextracto="369152" class="example1 369152" data-mce-style="margin-top: 7.9pt; margin-bottom: 7.9pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;" data-mce-style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Lastly and no less importantly, the challenged decision also ignores the multiple institutional policies on access to justice regarding populations in vulnerable conditions, such as the Brasilia Rules (Reglas de Brasilia) adopted by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in Session No. 17-2008, of May 26, 2008, article II and amended by Circular No. 173-2019 through an agreement of the Full Court, session No. 36-2019 of August 26, 2019, article XXIV; the one adopted by the Full Court, Session No. 34-10, Article XVII and called </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">“</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Judicial Policy Aimed at Improving Access to Justice for Girls, Boys and Adolescents in Costa Rica (Política Judicial dirigida al Mejoramiento del Acceso a la Justicia de las Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes en Costa Rica), as well as the one also adopted by the Full Court in Session No. 34-05, article XIV, called </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">“</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Declaration of the Gender Equity Policy. </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">“</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Gender equity: a policy, a commitment, a practice.</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">”</span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> These policies are legally relevant efforts to guarantee access to justice and must be applied in accordance with article 122 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). </span><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span></span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">In this way, the lower court has clung to the fact that article 168 of the Family Code establishes that the family relationship must be proven to set provisional child support, but it should be remembered that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has repeatedly stated: </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">V.-This Chamber considers that, to interpret a rule, the creative function of the judge is of vital importance to determine the meaning and scope of the laws.</span> Consequently, the judge must not analyze only the grammatical meaning or the words the legislator used to give content to the norm, but rather the relationships that unite all parts of the articles on the point in question, the legal situation existing at the time the law subject to interpretation was enacted, and, finally, take possession of the action exercised by said law in the general order of law and the place it occupies in this order. Creative function that, in the case before us, must conclude by adapting the norm to practice and reality so that the purposes proposed by the legislator are fulfilled, insofar as they serve to define or resolve a question between two or more persons.” No. 6093-1994, 9:12 of October 18, 1994; No. 1392-00, 18:48 of February 9, 2000; No. 11577-2002, 15:20 of December 10, 2002; No. 1943-03, 15:09 of March 11, No. 9219-2003, 10:55 of August 29, 15392-2003, 15:58 of December 19, all of the year 2003; No. 2602-2004, 10:41 of March 12, 2004; No. 17568-10, 14:42 of October 20, 2010; No. 13623-2013, 14:30 of December 11; No. 15296-2013, 14:30 of November 20, both of 2013; No. 1543-14, 14:30 of February 5, 2014; No. 1706-23, 9:30 of January 25, 2023. Furthermore, said Court also held in resolution No. 2786-2000, 15:45 of March 28, 2000: “It is recalled that judges become procedural instruments for the effective resolution of conflicts, but in such a way that they are guarantors not only of legality, but, above all, of fundamental rights, and in that sense, they must have an active participation in the process, tending toward that respect; as this Court has previously considered regarding criminal judges, but which has full application in all branches of law and in all jurisdictions: The defense of the Constitution, and therefore of our democratic system, depends to a large extent on the judges, who have an active role in this task, being those called upon to interpret and enforce constitutional norms and principles and consequently the laws; by becoming guarantors of the rights of individuals, which is, moreover –as will be seen later–, one of the primary objectives of the new criminal procedure legislation: to restore to the judge his function as guarantor of the values protected by the Constitution, endowing him with the necessary objectivity so that he acts as a controller of law and not as an imperfect accuser, resolution No. 6470-1999, 14:36 of August 18, 1999." Thus, since the appealed resolution seriously disregards the current legal system, maintaining its effects could cause the Costa Rican State to be questioned before the CEDAW Committee and even before the Committee on the Rights of the Child, for let us recall that the latter Convention has three protocols: Law No. 8172, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, published in La Gaceta No. 29, February 11, 2002; Law No. 8247, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, published in La Gaceta No. 103, May 30, 2002 and, Law No. 9170, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, published in La Gaceta No. 231 of November 29, 2013. Therefore, through this last Protocol, it would also be possible for our country to be exposed for failing to comply with the cited Convention with respect to the unborn. The undersigned does not rule out that someone might trivialize this and say it will not happen, but let us recall that the plaintiff here litigates with the public defense and that judicial service of access to justice is specialized and is perfectly trained to take international action in defense of the rights of the unborn.

It is also possible that this occurs with the assistance of any legal professional who has in-depth knowledge of the matter and decides to challenge the non-application of all the aforementioned regulations. Consequently, what is appropriate is to shift to the defendant the burden of refuting the presumption established by article 92, second paragraph, of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and therefore it is resolved: ---a) The appealed decision is revoked. ---b. Since the state of pregnancy is proven, an urgent prior conciliation is ordered. That conciliation may include the acknowledgment of paternity of the unborn child and then, in that aspect, the agreement must be referred to the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) for its respective approval and, it will be up to that Court to determine what is pertinent regarding the registration of paternity once the birth registration data are known. ---c. If there is no conciliation for any reason, the first instance is ordered to immediately proceed with the lawsuit if no other legal ground prevents it and to set a provisional child support (pensión provisional) to be paid by the defendant and in favor of the unborn child (nascituro). If, once notified, the defendant refutes said paternity, the urgent receipt of testimonial evidence or the taking of evidence of another nature shall be ordered to determine whether or not there are elements regarding the existence of a de facto cohabitation (convivencia de hecho) during the probable period of conception of the unborn child. ---d. In the event that it is not possible to prove said presumption and the defendant refutes the paternity attributed to him, the first instance shall order a provisional child support to be paid by the defendant and shall order a DNA test to be performed once the minor child is born, in order to determine whether the defendant should continue paying said provisional support, without prejudice to the defendant pursuing, in the family court, the paternity determination process for an unborn person or, the mother may pursue it through the paternity investigation process. In either of the two cases, that is, if the filiation matter reaches the family court, the child support proceeding shall only be suspended pending what is resolved by a final judgment in the filiation process if so ordered by the respective Family Court. Thus, it must be very clear to the defendant that nothing prevents him from initiating the determination of paternity, even though the unborn child has not yet been born, and therefore, it is not sufficient for him to wait patiently for the mother to take charge of investigating the paternal filiation. ---e. If the DNA test ordered in the child support process is negative or cannot be performed for a reason attributable to the mother, at the request of the defendant, the first instance may order that the provisional child support cease to be paid by the defendant. ---f. If this ruling unfortunately proves to be tardy in the sense that a premature birth has already occurred, the process must still continue as indicated in this ruling, and if unfortunately a termination of pregnancy occurred, the process must also continue, warning the mother if she has an interest in collecting pregnancy expenses for the stillbirth. This last point because the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has already ruled on the dignified treatment of the remains of a being that was not born, and there is no reason whatsoever to consider that pregnancy expenses can only be collected if a live birth occurred. In this regard, through judgment No. 6685-01 of 14:06 on July 17, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber stated: “It is obvious that given the often infectious-contagious nature of the ‘products of conception,’ they must be manipulated or handled with extreme caution. Hence, this Chamber agrees with the public health reasons that motivated the drafting of the Institutional Standard for the Management of Anatomopathological Waste. However, this Court does not find that everyone’s concern in ensuring that such management be carried out in the safest possible way suppresses the rights of the appellant and her husband who, as parents and practitioners of the Catholic faith, consider it vital for their religion and their peace of mind to bury their son. Although that son did not complete his formation process so as to be able to develop as a normal child and survive, the truth is that from the moment he was conceived, he was a person with rights. Just as his parents are persons with rights, who have every authority to choose that he be given a burial in accordance with the rules religiously established by Catholics. Indeed, the Institutional Standard for the Management of Anatomopathological Waste does not refer to the direct delivery of what it calls ‘solid waste that drains liquid’ (fetus and placenta) to a third party and provides very clear rules regarding its transfer outside hospital centers and the type of transport and container in which it must be done. However, this Chamber considers that these provisions can and must be complied with insofar as the interested parties are correctly and directly informed of the established procedure and the destination of said ‘waste.’ Thus, in the specific case, the "waste" of interest could have been perfectly transported in accordance with all the respective medical and hygienic stipulations, but informing the petitioner and her spouse of the procedure to follow, as well as coordinating with them the date, time, and cemetery where it would finally be disposed of, respecting the petitioners' right to bury the remains of their son. Because this was not done and they proceeded without any communication to the petitioner and her spouse regarding the fate of their son—as if he were a simple object—the appeal must be granted, ordering (...) that within the non-extendable period of two days counted from the notification of this judgment, deliver to the petitioner, (...) the fetus product of the spontaneous abortion (aborto natural) performed on her person according to the necessary health measures.” As can be seen, the vote is interesting, although it does not contemplate an important development of the rights at play, but rather, without being the subject of the appeal, it proceeds to define the unborn being as a “person with rights.” It is understandable that the Chamber ordered dignified treatment for stillbirths (mortinatos), that is, beings that did not come to be born alive, but the central issue was not to define whether stillbirths are or are not persons but, merely, that a spontaneous abortion (aborto espontáneo) does not prevent the parents from taking responsibility for the remains of the stillbirth once the health regulations that guarantee public health have been met. In any case, it was clear that the remains of a stillbirth must be treated with dignity and, even, burial (inhumación) is recognized as part of the right to family life. Thus, the constitutional resolution is understood, although as indicated, it does not have a broad development on the rights at play. All this with the observation that our country, through Law No. 9797 which corresponds to the comprehensive reform of Law No. 7771, General Law on HIV-AIDS, grants the character of “person” to every being in gestation without any distinction. Expressly, article 21 of that Law refers to the nasciturus as a “person to be born.” If the legislative will had been not to give that legal status, a Law with that content would not have been approved. Furthermore, burial expenses can also be claimed pursuant to article 37 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code.

**X.** To conclude, it is important to highlight that the lawsuit begins with a deep, eminently legal preamble that develops some of the topics presented here and, nevertheless, the challenged resolution focuses on article 168 of the Family Code. That is, it is a lawsuit with an important development of the applicable law, while the challenged resolution is quite superficial, but as has been shown, fueled by impressive prejudices. Secondly, article 24 of the Alimony Law transcribed in the challenged resolution has been declared partially unconstitutional. For a better understanding, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution No. 2781-2016, 11:40 a.m. on February 24, 2016, ordered: “The action is declared with merit. Consequently, the phrase 'fifteen years old' from article 24 of the Alimony Law is annulled for unconstitutionality so that from this judgment forward it reads 'If the alimony duty is breached, a writ of body attachment (apremio corporal) may be issued against the delinquent debtor, except if they are a minor or over seventy-one', it being understood that 'minor' refers to a person under 18 years of age. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date of validity of the annulled norm, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Consequently, the release is ordered of all minors who, at the time of issuing this judgment, were detained by body attachment. Publish this ruling in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and publish it fully in the Judicial Bulletin. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez dissent and declare the action without merit. Magistrate Salazar Alvarado dissents and declares the action without merit, provided that article 24 of the Alimony Law is interpreted to mean that body attachment against a minor but over fifteen years old, who is an alimony debtor, shall be the last ratio and cannot be applied automatically. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Castillo Víquez attach separate notes. Notify.”

"VIII. PRINCIPIO FAVOR DEBILIS: El artículo 2 del Código de Familia dispone que “la unidad de la familia, el interés de los hijos, el de los menores y la igualdad de derechos y deberes de los cónyuges, han de ser los principios fundamentales para la aplicación e interpretación de este Código”. Ese artículo contempla el principio “favor debilis” - Schötz, Gustavo J. (2.013). El favor debilis como principio general del Derecho Internacional Privado. Su particular aplicación a las relaciones de consumo transfronterizas. Universidad de Salamanca. Volúmen 1. Documento consultado el 4 de setiembre de 2024 https://gredos.usal.es/bitstream/handle/10366/128967/El_ favor_debilis_como_principio_general_.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y que forma parte del ordenamiento como principio general del Derecho según propone el autor Gustavo Schötz. Esa idea la comparte la suscrita, pues estimo que ese principio está contemplado en el artículo 9 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, artículos 2 y 7 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, así como el artículo 6 de la Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias e incluso, en el artículo 13 de la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica. Otras materias contemplan principios con un contenido idéntico o similar: “indubio pro reo” en materia penal e “indubio pro operario” en el ordenamiento laboral. Así, el principio "favor debilis" tiene su razón de ser porque el ordenamiento jurídico busca la igualdad y para ello, es indispensable proteger a las personas más débiles y tener claridad de que, la vulnerabilidad puede generarse por múltiples factores como edad, condición económica, discapacidad física, psicosocial, etc. Para la comprensión de esta resolución es muy importante lo que indica el artículo 9 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia: “Artículo 9°- Aplicación preferente. En caso de duda, de hecho o de derecho, en la aplicación de este Código, se optará por la norma que resulte más favorable para la persona menor de edad según los criterios que caracterizan su interés superior.” Debe recordarse que, este Código es del año 1998, mientras que, el Código de Familia data del año 1973 y, entró a regir en el año 1974. Entonces, por todo lo ya expuesto, lo que corresponde en un caso como el presente es, trasladar al accionado la carga de desplazar la presunción que establece el artículo 92 del Código de Familia párrafo segundo, pues el ser en gestación y la mujer gestante permanecen en una situación de vulnerabilidad. Al respecto, Feito afirma: “[...]ser vulnerable implica fragilidad, una situación de amenaza o posibilidad de sufrir daño. Por tanto, implica ser susceptible de recibir o padecer algo malo o doloroso, como una enfermedad, y también tener la posibilidad de ser herido física o emocionalmente. La vulnerabilidad también puede entenderse como poder ser persuadido o tentado, poder ser receptor, ser traspasable, no ser invencible, no tener absoluto control de la situación, no estar en una posición de poder, o al menos tener la posibilidad de que dicho poder se vea debilitado. Es vulnerable, según el Diccionario de la Real Academia, quien puede ser herido o recibir lesión, física o moralmente.” Feito, L. (2007). Vulnerabilidad. Anales del Sistema Sanitario de Navarra, 30(Supl. 3), 07-22. Consultado el 4 de setiembre de 2024 el sitio https://scielo.isciii.es/scielo.php?pid=S1137-66272007000600002 &script=sci_abstract En esta línea, Estupiñan-Silva advierte: “[...[el término vulnerabilidad es siempre relativo y específico con respecto a una amenaza particular subyacente. Las ciencias aplicadas han coincidido históricamente en afirmar que solo es posible hablar de un grado de vulnerabilidad desde el punto de vista de la probabilidad de la amenaza y en función de su intensidad particular, de su frecuencia y de su duración. La relevancia de la delimitación del concepto de vulnerabilidad es de hecho ampliamente abordada en el medio científico y aunque algunos de sus componentes puedan ser interpretados de modo diferente, sus elementos estructurales resurgen sistemáticamente en la doctrina, a saber: las causas, la sensibilidad, la exposición, la amenaza y el riesgo en sí mismo.” Estupiñan- Silva, Rosmerlin (2013). La vulnerabilidad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Esbozo de una tipología. Derechos Humanos y Políticas Públicas. Documento consultado el 4 de setiembre de 2024 https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r39780.pdf En este punto es indispensable considerar que, el principio pro persona impone la interpretación extensiva del marco normativo cuando se trata de consagrar o ampliar derechos humanos y, la interpretación restringida cuando se limitan tales derechos. Es por aplicación del principio pro persona o pro homine, que los derechos humanos se tornan exigibles de forma incondicional e inmediata y su limitación solo puede ser de carácter excepcional. (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (1986). Exigibilidad del Derecho de Rectificación o Respuesta. Opinión Separada del Juez Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, párr. 36.-). Además, para la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, “el principio pro libertatis, el cual, junto con el principio pro homine, constituyen el meollo de la doctrina de los derechos humanos; según el primero, debe interpretarse extensivamente todo lo que favorezca y restrictivamente todo lo que limite la libertad; según el segundo, el derecho debe interpretarse y aplicarse siempre de la manera que más favorezca al ser humano.” Así lo ha expresado por ejemplo en la resolución N.°3173-93 de 14:57 de 6 de julio de 1993. Sobre el principio pro homine, pueden ser consultados también los votos constitucionales N.°3550-92 de las 16:00 horas de 24 de noviembre de 1992, N.°2588-16 de las 14:50 de veintitrés de febrero y N.°697-16 de las 14:30 de 19 de enero, ambas del año 2016 y, N.°12659-18 de las 9:20 de 7 de agosto de 2018, entre otras. Así las cosas, no entiende la suscrita por qué colocar a una mujer embarazada en esta angustia frente a la satisfacción de necesidades mínimas del nascituro. ¿Por qué colocarla casi en una situación de mendigar justicia? No termina de comprender la suscrita por qué la dignidad de la mujer aquí gestante debe ver vulnerada por decidir plantear una acción judicial alimentaria en beneficio del nascituro. ¿En qué condición debe encontrarse para ser considerada como persona y no como una cosa que incuba? Véase que, el negarle el derecho al acceso a la justicia la cosifica. Nótese que, por resultado, se está exigiendo que el cuerpo de la mujer brinde todo lo que tiene para la formación del ser en gestación y que la mujer, vea a ver qué hace para que se produzca el nacimiento. Esto es inaceptable y, estimo que el principio -“pro homine”- debe tener un agravante o refuerzo en caso de concebidos (as) no nacidos (as), es decir nasciturus. Además, considero que ese agravante o refuerzo deriva del Preámbulo de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (y de la Niña) que dice: “Teniendo presente que, como se indica en la Declaración de los Derechos del Niño, adoptada por la Asamblea General el 20 de noviembre de 1959, "el niño, por su falta de madurez física y mental, necesita protección y cuidado especiales, incluso la debida protección legal, tanto antes como después del nacimiento [...]". Es a partir de esto que se extrae el principio jurídico “pro homine nasciturus” en virtud del cual, es obligatorio interpretar todas las normas -de cualquier rango- a favor de la dignidad de las personas y, si se trata de un ser en gestación, es obligatorio interpretar la normativa a su favor, es decir para procurar su salud integral, considerarlo como persona en todo lo que le sea favorable y procurar la prevención y tratamiento de enfermedades o bien, discapacidades. Además, lo que se está gestando es un ser humano y tambipen tiene derecho a que su mamá no pierda la salud integral. De igual forma, cualquier vacío normativo, debe ser subsanado con el principio “pro homine nasciturus” que, por razones obvias, es de aplicación extensiva a la reproducción humana asistida, a la prohibición de libre despido de la mujer en estado de embarazo, a la prohibición de discriminación laboral hacia la mujer embarazada, al reconocimiento del derecho alimentario para nasciturus con independencia del estado de familia de la madre, a la prohibición del apremio corporal contra mujer embarazada, al derecho a la educación y a la salud de la adolescente madre, al derecho a la no violencia contra las mujeres, lo que incluye el derecho a la no violencia contra mujeres embarazadas, a la erradicación de la violencia obstétrica, a la prohibición de acoso laboral en general con especial gravedad en caso de acoso laboral contra mujeres embarazadas, al aumento de las penas a quienes cometan delitos contra una mujer embarazada, así como el aumento de penas por agresiones sexuales que generen un embarazo, etc. Así las cosas, es importante aclarar que los principios se distinguen de las normas jurídicas porque no determinan conductas, no restringen derechos, no imponen sanciones, no conllevan prohibiciones, no proponen una solución única para el caso concreto, no se agotan en el contenido de la norma ni tienen una estructura proposicional -supuesto de hecho y efecto jurídico- sino que, están conformados por una idea general que sirve de meta, límite, aspiración, marco de interpretación y concreción para que el ordenamiento funcione como un sistema coherente que brinde respuesta ante realidades determinadas. Los principios oscilan por el ordenamiento jurídico, pues lo articulan, es decir están en la totalidad de este y no confinados a un espacio o protagonismo reducido. -Domínguez Hidalgo, Carmen. (2005). Los principios que informan el Derecho de Familia Chileno: su formulación clásica y revisión moderna. Revista Chilena de Derecho. Documento consultado el 4 de setiembre de 2024 en el sitio https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177021336001.pdf Sin los principios, no se entendería cuál es el núcleo duro de una norma ni del ordenamiento y hacia dónde ir para encontrar lo que se tutela o se pretende evitar. En esta línea, los principios tienen un marco de acción muy amplio, así como un campo de influencia ante situaciones concretas. Por ello, hay principios procesales y sustanciales. Los primeros, orientan el cómo se materializa el derecho de fondo y los segundos, versan sobre cuál es el derecho de fondo que está en juego. También es importante decir que existen principios expresos e implícitos. Los primeros, “son aquellos que han sido expresamente dictados por una fuente de producción jurídica y aparecen, en consecuencia, recogidos en un texto normativo, en tanto que los principios implícitos son deducidos por el aplicador del derecho a partir de disposiciones expresas del ordenamiento jurídico -si bien, como veremos, para un sector de la doctrina han de entenderse como conclusiones extraídas del derecho natural”. -Ruiz Ruiz, Ramón. (2012). La distinción entre reglas y principios y sus implicaciones en la aplicación del derecho. Derecho y realidad. Número 20. Página 149. Documento consultado el 4 de setiembre de 2024 en https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/derecho_realidad/article/view/4860/3952 También es oportuno indicar que para que un principio sea aplicable, requiere su positivización, es decir debe completar el proceso de juridificación y estar contemplado en el ordenamiento, ya sea de forma concreta o general. Caso contrario, sería entonces un principio ético, pero no jurídico. Ahora bien, tal como señala el autor Alonso Vidal, cuando se aplican principios implícitos para la solución de un caso particular, la persona juzgadora debe argumentar para demostrar la existencia de dos condiciones para su aplicación: “a) Subsidiariedad, esto es, que no exista norma identificable autoritativamente aplicable el caso, o bien que la norma identificable autoritativamente debe ser interpretada de forma diferente o incluso ser inaplicada por la concurrencia del principio implícito en cuestión. b) Coherencia, esto es, que el contenido del principio implícito sea coherente con las reglas y principios explícitos del sistema”. -Alonso Vidal, Horacio-José. (2012). Los principios implícitos. Su relevancia en la aplicación del derecho. Página 165 y 166. Documento consultado el 4 de setiembre de 2024 en el sitio https://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/47431/1/Doxa_35_07.pdf En consecuencia, la aplicación de un principio expreso es mucho más simple que la aplicación de un principio implícito. Por supuesto, ambos tipos de principios se emplean para interpretar las normas jurídicas que no son claras o para llenar un vacío normativo. Es decir, no se emplean para contradecir el contenido de una norma, pues un principio busca particularmente la coherencia del ordenamiento jurídico. Todo lo anterior con la observación de que, si el contenido de una norma es contrario a un principio general del Derecho, lo que corresponde es aplicar el principio puesto que la meta es que el ordenamiento funcione como un sistema coherente, de ahí la necesidad de erradicar las contradicciones. En la práctica, es común la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de una norma por violentar el principio de igualdad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad, no discriminación, inviolabilidad de la defensa, interés superior de la persona menor de edad, etc. Por ello, las normas deben ser excluidas del ordenamiento jurídico cuando entran en colisión con un principio general o bien, con uno específico. Además, ante colisión de principios, uno de ellos tendrá una proyección cuantitativa, en tanto resulta aplicable a una situación específica y, por ello, si otros principios deben ceder frente al contenido de un principio concreto, se trata de una proyección cualitativa. Es decir, un principio tiene mayor peso en un caso determinado frente a otros principios. En cambio, en el caso de normas, si existe colisión, la prevalencia se resuelve acudiendo al orden jerárquico, al criterio de temporalidad, al de especialidad, etc. Entonces, el Derecho está nutrido de principios generales y, cada especialidad, tiene sus propios principios e incluso, dentro de cada área, un específico tema se rige por puntuales principios. Así, los principios cumplen función prescriptiva en tanto orientan el sentido de cada norma y del ordenamiento en general; función pro derecho de fondo o sustancialista; función sistematizadora del ordenamiento; limitadora del campo de acción de los poderes públicos; informadora y orientadora del ordenamiento como un todo; garantista respecto de derechos adquiridos, situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, mínimo de derechos, estándares de eficacia, eficiencia y efectividad del ordenamiento; función integradora para dar coherencia y cohesión al ordenamiento para que opere como sistema; función interpretativa, para dar contenido al sentido-deber de completud al que debe inspirar el Derecho. En este caso, la resolución impugnada ha violentado normativa expresa y el principio pro homine, así como el principio pro homine nasciturus ya expuesto. IX.PRESUNCIÓN DE PATERNIDAD: Además de todo lo ya señalado, la resolución impugnada ignora la presunción de paternidad establecida en el artículo 92 del Código de Familia párrafo segundo que dice: “Artículo 92.-La calidad de padre o madre se puede establecer mediante la posesión notoria de estado del hijo por parte del presunto padre o madre, o por cualquier otro medio de prueba./ Se presume la paternidad del hombre que, durante el período de la concepción, haya convivido, en unión de hecho, de conformidad con lo indicado en el Título VII de este Código.” (El párrafo segundo de este artículo, fue adicionado mediante Ley N.°7532 de 8 de agosto de 1995, publicada en La Gaceta N.°162 de 28 de agosto de 1995). La primera instancia ha decidido desaplicar la citada presunción en una evidente protección hacia el hombre demandado. Con respecto la presunción dicha, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en la resolución N.°7515-1994, 15:27 de 21 de diciembre de 1994 dijo: “QUINTO. En cuanto a la propuesta adición al artículo 92 del Código de Familia. La cláusula de igualdad, unida a la prohibición de "toda calificación personal sobre la naturaleza de la filiación" (artículo 54 de la Constitución) dan lugar, como regla general, a la igualdad de trato de los hijos nacidos dentro y fuera del matrimonio, de forma que serían las excepciones o limitaciones a ese principio las que deberían justificarse para ser conformes a la Constitución Política. En otros términos, lo que está en juego es el derecho fundamental de los hijos no matrimoniales a no sufrir discriminación. La presunción del legislador que examinamos no resuelve un conflicto entre la vida matrimonial y la relación de hecho, sino entre hijos nacidos dentro e hijos nacidos fuera del matrimonio, cuestión resuelta en pro de la igualdad por el artículo 54 constitucional combinado con el 33. Por último, no es argumento de derecho constitucional sostener que de la unión de hecho no podrían derivarse presunciones legales, como si en esta materia el legislador no pudiera establecer presunciones, por lo demás razonables: la convivencia , que habrá de probarse, da lugar a que el legislador presuma iuris tantum la paternidad del hombre que hubiera convivido con la mujer durante el período de concepción, presunción coherente, por lo demás, con la protección constitucional del niño (artículo 51 de la Constitución Política). POR TANTO: A) Se evacúa la consulta en el sentido de que la Comisión Legislativa Plena tercera debe examinar de nuevo en segundo debate el proyecto de marras. B) Se reitera el criterio de la Sala contrario a extender los efectos patrimoniales de la unión de hecho cuando uno de los convivientes esté impedido para contraer matrimonio por existir vínculo anterior. C) En cuanto a la adición al artículo 92 del Código de Familia, no contiene disposiciones inconstitucionales. Este pronunciamiento es vinculante en cuanto al rubro "A", por ser relativo al trámite legislativo del proyecto.” Ahora bien, es posible que la resolución impugnada parta de que sí es posible dar curso a la demanda en esos casos en virtud de la presunción de paternidad que deriva del matrimonio conforme al artículo 69 del Código de Familia. Digo que es posible, pues en realidad la resolución no lo desarrolla. No obstante, dicho Código también establece una presunción de paternidad en las relaciones de pareja no matrimoniales, sea el artículo 92 párrafo segundo del Código de Familia. Sobra decir que, esa presunción está en el Código de Familia por reforma introducida mediante Ley N.°7532 de 8 de agosto de 1995, es decir desde hace veintinueve años. ¿Por qué la autoridad judicial decide no aplicar la presunción de paternidad que establece el artículo 92 del Código de Familia? Digo que decide no aplicar esta última norma, pues es imposible si quiera pensar que se trata de una norma desconocida. En todo caso, desatender una norma como la indicada y la realidad nacional, amerita un fallo como el presente por el enorme impacto que tendrá en el ser en gestación en este proceso, en su madre, indirectamente en el hijo mayor de dicha mujer -un niño de corta edad diagnosticado con autismo y déficit atencional- y eventualmente en otros casos similares. Además, con este fallo se pretende materializar una norma que, al parecer, debe luchar contra el desuso androcéntrico y adultocentrista. La extensión de este fallo es proporcional al prejuicio, la visión androcéntrica y adultocentrista que sostiene la resolución impugnada.

Es claro que el Código de Familia regula presunciones de filiación en los artículos 69 y 92, pero ambas presunciones se diferencian en su practicidad. En el primer caso, como el matrimonio se inscribe -artículo 31 del Código de Familia y 43 de la Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y el Registro Civil- en el Registro Civil, es claro que es muy fácil aplicar la presunción establecida en el artículo 69 de ese Código, ya que depende de un hecho objetivo: matrimonio efectuado que es puesto en conocimiento del Registro Civil. En el segundo caso, la situación cambia porque no existe en nuestro país un registro de uniones de hecho en curso o finalizadas. Entonces, es ahí donde el derecho procesal debe ser empleado no para obstaculizar el derecho de acción sino como una herramienta para materializar el derecho de fondo. Véase que, en este caso indica la mujer gestante, que el demandado la ha asegurado ante la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. En este sentido, son muchos los pronunciamientos que la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha emitido sobre el aseguramiento entre personas convivientes. Por ejemplo, N.°8000-2016, 11:52 de 10 de junio de 2016; N.°8689-2019, 9:30 de 17 de mayo de 2019; N.°12758-2019, 9:30 de 12 de julio de 2019; N.°18017-2019, 9:30 de 20 de setiembre de 2019; N.°20038-2019, 9:45 de 15 de octubre de 2019; 20666-2019, 9:30 de 29 de octubre de 2019; N.°4560-2020, 9:30 de 6 de marzo de 2020, N.°8475-2020, 9:20 de 8 de mayo de 2020, N.°12423-2020, 9:15 de 3 de julio de 2020 y N.°12842-2020, 9:15 de 10 de julio de 2020. Es decir, hasta en temas de aseguramiento entre parejas no casadas el componente formal ha avanzado mucho gracias al aporte invaluable de la jurisprudencia vinculante. Nótese que la jurisprudencia constitucional ha flexibilizado los requisitos de la unión de hecho en temas de seguridad social. Resalto que se trata incluso de una flexibilización de requisitos que impacta fondos públicos. A esto se suma que incluso en el caso de la presunción de paternidad a la que se refiere el artículo 69 del Código de Familia, la propia norma es flexible con el fin de ampliar las posibilidades de su aplicación y, no hay razón alguna para no hacer lo mismo en el caso de concebidos no nacidos donde no media matrimonio. Como complemento, desde hace varios años también la Sala Constitucional determinó que no siempre las uniones de hecho deben ser reconocidas únicamente en la Jurisdicción de Familia. Al respecto dijo en la resolución N°5266-03 de 14:44 de 18 de junio de 2003: “V…En todo caso, debe tenerse en cuenta, que si se solicitare el reconocimiento de la relación de hecho como un incidente -en otra jurisdicción, y obviamente, mediante otro proceso-, éste debe ser resuelto por el propio juez o tribunal que conoce de la sucesión, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el inciso 2) del artículo 900 del Código Procesal Civil, que expresamente establece que en el sucesorio se deben resolver los procesos abreviados relacionados con la sucesión. Por último, en concordancia con lo anterior, debe considerarse que el propio artículo 243 del Código de Familia no establece que sea en la jurisdicción de familia que se deba realizar este reconocimiento, simplemente indica que ese reconocimiento se debe hacer "ante los tribunales de justicia"; por lo que una interpretación literal e integral de la norma permite hacer las anteriores consideraciones.” Entonces, no se trata de un reconocimiento de unión de hecho sino de trasladar al accionado la carga de probar que no existió una relación de convivencia durante la época probable de la concepción y, en consecuencia, es a él a quien corresponde demostrar que la presunción contemplada en el párrafo segundo del artículo 92 del Código de Familia no es aplicable. Véase que, cuando la unión de hecho fue incorporada al ordenamiento jurídico mediante Ley N.°7532 de 8 de agosto de 1995, se incorporó tanto la unión de hecho regular como la irregular y, si bien la irregular fue declarada inconstitucional mediante resolución N.°3558-99 de las 16:48 minutos del 25 de mayo de 1999, obviamente el estado de familia del presunto padre no sería obstáculo para aplicar la presunción del artículo 92 párrafo segundo del Código de Familia, pues corresponde hacer una interpretación favorable al ser en gestación, a la no discriminación y al derecho a la no violencia, así como al acceso a la justicia. Esto con la observación de que, según la mujer gestante, el accionado es soltero. No está de más recordar que, hace muchos años el artículo 16 inciso 2) del Código de Familia decía: “Artículo 16.- Es prohibido el matrimonio: (…) 2) De la mujer antes de que transcurran trescientos días contados desde la disolución o declaratoria de nulidad de su anterior matrimonio, a menos que haya habido parto antes de cumplirse ese término o se pruebe mediante dictámenes de dos peritos médicos oficiales que no existe embarazo.” Esa norma buscaba proteger al varón contrayente en caso de conflictos de paternidad y, al respecto, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante resolución N.°2129-2008, 10:30 de 14 de febrero de 2008 dispuso: “IV.- Es claro que la norma establece una condición a la mujer que no exige al hombre cuando se trata de formar un nuevo vínculo matrimonial. Para poder establecer si esa diferencia de trato es o no legítima, es necesario -según lo ha establecido la jurisprudencia de esta Sala-, determinar si la desigualdad está desprovista de una justificación objetiva y razonable y además la existencia de esa justificación debe apreciarse en relación a la finalidad y efectos de la medida considerada debiendo darse una relación de proporcionalidad entre los medios empleados y la finalidad perseguida (ver al respecto la sentencia número 6685-96). Dicho de otro modo, es legítimo que el legislador restringa un derecho, pero debe hacerlo en forma tal que la norma jurídica se adecue en todos sus elementos, como el motivo y el fin que persigue, con el sentido objetivo de la Constitución. Quiere ello decir que debe existir una proporcionalidad entre la norma jurídica adoptada y el fin que persigue, referida a la imperiosa necesidad que la ley satisfaga el interés público tutelado por la norma suprema (ver sentencia número 832-09). En el caso en estudio existen varios bienes jurídicos constitucionales en juego, el derecho a la libertad, tutelado en el artículo 28, según el cual las personas son libres de hacer, todo aquello que no esté prohibido en la ley, y aún ésta no puede afectar irrazonablemente derechos fundamentales, es decir -como se indicó- sin una justificación objetiva y razonable que justifique la restricción; el derecho a la igualdad en cuanto se impone a la mujer una condición que no se exige al hombre, y -en criterio de la Procuraduría-, el derecho de toda persona a saber quienes son sus padres. En ese sentido, la medida impugnada se justificaría en aras de proteger el citado derecho. No obstante, estima la Sala que ese dilema no existe, es decir el de restringir la libertad y la igualdad para proteger el derecho de toda persona a conocer su filiación, porque tal y como indica la recurrente, actualmente resulta innecesaria a la luz de disposiciones legales reguladas en el mismo cuerpo normativo, que permiten resolver los conflictos de paternidad surgidos, tales como el reconocimiento de hijo de mujer casada, la declaratoria de hijo extramatrimonial o la impugnación de paternidad. En vista de que tanto la legislación como la tecnología actual, permiten inequívocamente y con efectos retroactivos, establecer con absoluta certeza la paternidad de un menor, el requisito que impone la norma a la mujer, resulta innecesario y por lo tanto carente de razonabilidad. V.- En la audiencia oral o vista celebrada en esta acción, la Procuraduría hace referencia a que la norma impugnada no impide a la mujer casarse, porque el propio artículo 17 del Código de Familia, establece la posibilidad de que el matrimonio celebrado a pesar de las prohibiciones del artículo 16 tenga validez, y que en ese sentido la norma -por sí misma-, no afecta el derecho fundamental de la mujer a contraer matrimonio. Señala que es el artículo 28.4 el que impide a la notaria o funcionario autorizado, a realizar el acto, si antes no ha exigido certificación de la fecha de la disolución del anterior matrimonio, o la prueba prevista en el inciso 2 del artículo 16, referida a los dictámenes de dos peritos médicos oficiales que no existe embarazo. Como se indicó en el considerando anterior, estima la Sala que si la finalidad de establecer el requisito que se impugna es proteger el derecho del menor a saber quienes son sus padres, y este fin queda satisfecho en la actualidad en forma inequívoca con otras figuras jurídicas, el requisito efectivamente se vuelve irrazonable, no sólo como se indicó, por ser innecesario, sino porque impone una condición que por extrema, se convierte en una barrera para el matrimonio de la mujer, como es el tener que conseguir, no uno sino dos dictámenes, no de un médico oficial sino de dos, lo que es en nuestro medio una condición de difícil acceso para cualquier persona promedio. Cabe agregar que si bien es cierto el Código de Familia establece tanto un sistema de presunciones como uno demostrativo, para proteger el derecho a la filiación de los menores en resguardo de su interés superior y del artículo 53 Constitucional, basta con que el ordenamiento interno garantice el derecho del menor a saber quienes son sus padres, para que el ordenamiento cumpla con el fin constitucional. En ese sentido alcanza para los efectos de esta acción, con que a posteriori y en forma retroactiva se puedan dar efectos a la filiación a través de los mecanismos demostrativos que establece el propio Código de Familia. No se afecta el sistema de prevenciones, ni este pierde su logicidad frente a otras situaciones, simplemente que estima la Sala que exigir los requisitos mencionados como condición para celebrar el matrimonio de una mujer en las condiciones señaladas, resultan innecesarios e irrazonables, pues aunque el matrimonio celebrado en esas condiciones llegara a tener validez, en vista de la relación de la norma con el artículo 28.4 del Código de Familia citado, ningún funcionario autorizado querrá razonablemente, exponerse a una sanción o a consecuencias, por realizar un matrimonio sin los requisitos establecidos en la norma impugnada (16.2). En la práctica, la norma sí tiene la posibilidad de fungir como una barrera para la celebración del matrimonio de la mujer en las condiciones señaladas en la norma impugnada. VI.- Es importante resaltar que según el principio de libertad contenido en el artículo 28 de la Constitución, toda persona es libre de hacer todo aquello que no esté prohibido y además: (…) "Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley...". Es decir que por un lado establece en su párrafo primero el llamado principio de libertad, según el cual la persona puede hacer todo lo que la ley no le prohíba, sino que tiene también contiene la garantía de que ni siquiera la ley podrá invadir su esfera intangible de libertad y, por ello, de autonomía e intimidad, fuera de los supuestos previstos taxativamente por la propia Constitución, supuestos excepcionales y, por ende, de interpretación restrictiva, entre los que está la restricción del derecho, sólo frente a una imperiosa necesidad, y en la medida menos lesiva para el derecho afectado (ver sentencia número 3550-92). Es evidente, que la condición impuesta en la norma, ya no tiene la característica de ser una “imperiosa necesidad”, para tutelar un interés público, porque como ya se indicó, el bien jurídico tutelado, es decir el derecho de toda persona a conocer quienes son sus padres, está plenamente tutelado con la legislación y tecnología actual, haciendo que la medida pierda su razón de ser, para convertirse en una condición odiosa, sin duda lesiva de la libertad y de la igualdad que tutela la Constitución, y del derecho de toda persona a contraer matrimonio (Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos artículo 23.2; Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos artículo 17.2; Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos artículo 16.1; Constitución Política artículo 52). En consecuencia, procede declarar con lugar la acción anular el artículo 16 inciso 2) del Código de Familia, que señala: “Es prohibido el matrimonio: […]2) De la mujer antes de que transcurran trescientos días contados desde la disolución o declaratoria de nulidad de su anterior matrimonio, a menos que haya habido parto antes de cumplirse ese término o se pruebe mediante dictámenes de dos peritos médicos oficiales que no existe embarazo […].” VII. Conexidad. La Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece en su artículo 89 que la sentencia que declara la inconstitucionalidad de una norma de ley o disposición general, declarará también la de los demás preceptos de ella, o de cualquier otra ley o disposición, cuya anulación resulte evidentemente necesaria por conexión o consecuencia. En vista de que la frase “y la prueba prevista en el inciso 2) del artículo 16”, contenida en el artículo 28.4 del Código de Familia, evidentemente guarda relación con el tema y el proceso base de esta acción -por ser la base de la sanción a la recurrente-, se declara asimismo su inconstitucionalidad. La Magistrada Calzada y el Magistrado Cruz dan además razones separadas. El Magistrado Sosto López salva el voto y declara sin lugar la acción y hace interpretación conforme del artículo 16 inciso 2) del Código de Familia. POR TANTO: Se declara, por mayoría, con lugar la acción. En consecuencia se anulan los artículos 16 inciso 2) en cuanto señala: 2) De la mujer antes de que transcurran trescientos días contados desde la disolución o declaratoria de nulidad de su anterior matrimonio, a menos que haya habido parto antes de cumplirse ese término o se pruebe mediante dictámenes de dos peritos médicos oficiales que no existe embarazo […]. y del 28 inciso 4) la frase “y la prueba prevista en el inciso 2) del artículo 16,” ambos del Código de Familia. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de las normas anuladas, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe, situaciones jurídicas consolidadas y sentencias pasadas con autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Comuníquese este pronunciamiento a los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo. Reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese.” Véase cómo la Sala Constitucional dejó claro que, existen mecanismos para solventar cualquier duda sobre paternidad. ¿Por qué no hacer uso de la prueba de ADN en caso de que el accionado en este asunto refute la paternidad. Así las cosas, la resolución impugnada supone que el accionado negará la paternidad que se le atribuye. ¿Con fundamento en qué asume esto la primera instancia. Parece que hay un estereotipo que subyace, en el sentido de que, cuando no media matrimonio con la mujer gestante, todo hombre señalado como padre negará la paternidad y, eso es absolutamente falso. Es decir, abundan los ejemplos de hombres que reconocen el vientre, ejercen posesión notaria de estado y, aceptan su paternidad. No tiene la suscrita ningún elemento para asumir que el accionado en este caso no procederá así al verse llamado judicialmente a ser responsable respecto del ser en gestación. De esta forma, solamente dando al supuesto padre la oportunidad de manifestarse y, refutar incluso lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo de artículo 92 del Código de Familia, es posible garantizar el acceso a la justicia sin desaplicar el artículo 168 del Código de Familia en cuando dispone que la pensión provisional podrá ser fijada "comprobado el parentesco", norma que existe -antes en el artículo 155- en el Código de Familia desde que fue promulgado (1973), pero para entonces no existía el robusto marco normativo ordinario, constitucional y supraconstitucional al que me he referido. En este contexto, esa norma debe ser entendida en un sentido amplio y en armonía con toda la normativa ya analizada. Además, el artículo 414 del Código Procesal Civil Ley N.°7130 dice: "Toda presunción legal exime a la parte que la alegue, de la obligación de probar el hecho reputado cierto en virtud de tal presunción. / Sin embargo, quien invoque una presunción legal deberá probar la existencia de los hechos que le sirven de base." En este caso, de la integralidad del escrito de demanda -principio pro actione-, se desprende este alegato y, corresponde entonces a la representante legal del ser en gestación, demostrar el estado de embarazo y al accionado, desvirtuar lo que dispone el artículo 92 párrafo segundo del Código de Familia. Además, como la presunción dicha es de carácter relativo -pues no anula ciertos actos ni acuerda una excepción perentoria si en ambos casos la ley no ha reservado expresamente la prueba en contrario-, si el accionado decide combatirla, deberá él accionar conforme dispone el artículo 416 del citado Código Procesal, pues esa norma dispone: "Fuera de las presunciones absolutas, las demás podrán ser combatidas por la prueba en contrario, para lo cual son admisibles todos los medios legales, salvo lo establecido por ley en ciertos casos sobre el tiempo y modo de acatarlas." En otras palabras, respecto de la presunción relativa de paternidad que regula el artículo 92 párrafo segundo del Código de Familia, corresponde a la madre probar el embarazo y al accionado, demostrar que no es aplicable la presunción dicha. Es decir, no corresponde a la autoridad judicial combatir esa presunción y menos, desaplicarla. Sumado a esto, se tiene que, en temas patrimoniales, por ejemplo, es perfectamente posible que una pareja que apenas está iniciando una relación de convivencia, constituya afectación al patrimonio familiar o bien, otorgue capitulaciones matrimoniales. Recordemos que, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia mediante resolución N.°13920-23, 14:21 de 9 de junio de 2023 reconoció el derecho de las parejas a suscribir y registrar capitulaciones matrimoniales para las uniones de hecho, incluyendo a parejas del mismo sexo. Es decir, para afectar al patrimonio familiar cuando no media matrimonio o para otorgar capitulaciones, no es necesario esperar a que transcurran más de dos años de convivencia. Además, la afectación entre convivientes surgió a la vida jurídica por medio de la Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer Ley N.°7142 de 1990 y no con la Ley N.°7532 de 8 de agosto de 1995 que incorpora el Capítulo Único al Título VII del Código de Familia sobre la Unión de Hecho. ¿Por qué si en lo patrimonial no se exige el transcurso de los dos años de una unión de hecho, no se aplica con la misma fluidez la presunción contemplada en el párrafo segundo del artículo 92 del Código de Familia. En esta línea, resulta oportuno indicar también que según lo ha explicado la Sala Constitucional: “El control de convencionalidad es una construcción pretoriana de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos cuyo propósito fundamental es lograr la “supremacía convencional” en todos los ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales o locales del denominado “parámetro de convencionalidad”, conformado por las declaraciones y convenciones en la materia del Sistema Interamericano de protección de los Derechos Humanos, las sentencias vertidas por esa Corte regional y sus opiniones consultivas. Constituye una revolución jurídica en cuanto le impone a los jueces y Tribunales nacionales, en especial, a los Constitucionales, la obligación de consolidar el “Estado convencional de Derecho”, anulando y expulsando del sistema jurídico nacional respectivo toda norma que confronte, irremediablemente, el “bloque de convencionalidad” (v. JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, “Control de convencionalidad ejercido por los Tribunales y Salas Constitucionales” en el Control difuso de convencionalidad -coord. E. Ferrer Mac-Gregor- México, Fundap, 2012 y JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto, “La construcción de un Derecho Administrativo Común Interamericano” en Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Público y Administrativo, Año 11, No. 11, 2011). Básicamente, el control de convencionalidad es concebido y diseñado a partir de dos sentencias señeras de la Corte Interamericana que son Almonacid Arellano y otros c/. Chile de 26 de septiembre de 2006 –reiterada en otras posteriores- y Trabajadores cesados del Congreso (Aguado Alfaro y otros) c/. Perú de 24 de noviembre de 2006 –también reiterada en otras ulteriores-. En la primera (Almonacid Arellano y otros c/. Chile), se estimó (considerando 124) lo siguiente: “La Corte es consciente que los jueces y tribunales internos están sujetos al imperio de la ley y, por ello, están obligados a aplicar las disposiciones vigentes en el ordenamiento jurídico. Pero cuando un Estado ha ratificado un tratado internacional como la Convención Americana, sus jueces, como parte del aparato del Estado, también están sometidos a ella, lo que obliga a velar porque los efectos de las disposiciones de la Convención no se vean mermadas por la aplicación de leyes contrarias a su objeto y fin, y que desde un inicio carecen de efectos jurídicos. En otras palabras, el Poder Judicial debe ejercer una especie de “control de convencionalidad” entre las normas jurídicas internas que aplican en los casos concretos y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. En esa tarea, el Poder Judicial debe tener en cuenta no solamente el tratado, sino también la interpretación que del mismo ha hecho la Corte Interamericana, intérprete última de la Convención Americana”. En la segunda (Trabajadores cesados del Congreso c/. Perú), se puntualizó (considerando 128) lo siguiente: “Cuando un Estado ha ratificado un tratado internacional como la Convención Americana, sus jueces están sometidos a ella, lo que les obliga a velar porque el efecto útil de la Convención no se vea mermado o anulado por la aplicación de leyes contrarias a sus disposiciones, objeto y fin. En otras palabras, los órganos del Poder Judicial deben ejercer no sólo un control de constitucionalidad, sino también de convencionalidad ex officio, entre las normas internas y la Convención Americana, evidentemente en el marco de sus respectivas competencias y de las regulaciones procesales pertinentes. Esta función no debe quedar limitada exclusivamente por las manifestaciones o actos de los accionantes en cada caso concreto, aunque tampoco implica que ese control deba ejercerse siempre, sin considerar otros supuestos formales y materiales de admisibilidad y procedencia de este tipo de acciones.” Finalmente, en el caso “Cabrera García y Montiel Flores c/. México” de 26 de noviembre de 2010, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos efectuó algunas ampliaciones o precisiones en cuanto a los órganos internos encargados de ejercer el control de convencionalidad, al indicar que debe ser ejercido por “225. (…) todos sus órganos –del Estado-, incluidos sus jueces (…) Los jueces y órganos vinculados a la administración de justicia en todos los niveles (…) los jueces y órganos judiciales vinculados a la administración de justicia (…)”. Esta posición fue ratificada por la Corte Interamericana en la sentencia del caso “Gelman c/. Uruguay” de 24 de febrero de 2011. De esta doctrina, cabe resaltar dos cuestiones relevantes, que son las siguientes: a) El control de convencionalidad debe ser ejercido, incluso, de oficio, aunque las partes intervinientes no lo hayan instado o requerido y b) al ejercer el control de convencionalidad, los jueces y Tribunales Constitucionales, gozan del “margen de apreciación nacional”, por cuanto, como se indicó en el caso Trabajadores cesados del Congreso c/. Perú de 2006, el control de convencionalidad debe ser ejercido “en el marco de sus respectivas competencias y de las regulaciones procesales pertinentes”, circunstancia que obliga a considerar de manera sistemática el ordenamiento jurídico, sea como un todo que tiene plenitud hermética, para poder concluir si una norma nacional infringe o no el parámetro de convencionalidad; consecuentemente, no pueden hacerse análisis aislados como si el ordenamiento jurídico estuviere constituido por compartimentos estancos o segmentados. Cabe destacar que el margen de apreciación nacional es un concepto jurídico indeterminado que permite la convergencia y armonización del derecho nacional y del interamericano, estableciendo un umbral de convergencia que permite superar la relatividad de las tradiciones jurídicas nacionales”. Véase, entre otros, las sentencias constitucionales N.°4491 de las 16 horas del 3 de abril de 2013 y N.°15737 de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 9 de octubre de 2015. Cito esto porque en este caso, ni siquiera se trata de realizar un control de convencionalidad sino simplemente, materializar lo previsto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 92 del Código de Familia, que respecto del artículo 168 del Código de Familia es una norma posterior y especial en materia filiatoria en uniones de hecho. Además, con posterioridad a la reforma del artículo 92 citado sigue la promulgación del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Así se simple y amplio a la vez. Además, si el artículo 1400 de nuestro Código Civil -del siglo antepasado- permite la donación a favor de una persona concebida, es absurdo que se le repute nacida para beneficiarla patrimonialmente y no para reconocer el derecho a los alimentos, que no es un derecho de orden patrimonial como ya se explicó y que, no recibir alimentos podría generarle enfermedades, discapacidades o incluso, nacimiento prematuro o bien, la muerte, así como, ello afecta la salud integral de la mujer gestante. Esa norma del Código Civil dice: “Para recibir por donación es preciso estar, por lo menos, concebido al tiempo de redactarse la escritura de donación; pero quedará pendiente el derecho del donatario de que se cumpla lo dispuesto en el artículo 13”.

Por último y no menos importante, la resolución impugnada también desconoce las múltiples políticas institucionales sobre acceso a la justicia respecto de las poblaciones en condición de vulnerabilidad como por ejemplo, las Reglas de Brasilia adoptadas por Corte Plena en Sesión N.°17-2008, de 26 de mayo del año 2008, artículo II y modificadas según Circular N.°173-2019 mediante acuerdo de Corte Plena, sesión N.°36-2019 de 26 de agosto de 2019, artículo XXIV; la adoptada por Corte Plena, Sesión N.°34-10, Artículo XVII y denominada “Política Judicial dirigida al Mejoramiento del Acceso a la Justicia de las Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes en Costa Rica, así como la adoptada también por Corte Plena en Sesión N.°34-05, artículo XIV, denominada “Declaración de la Política de Equidad de Género. “Equidad de género: una política, un compromiso, una práctica.” Estas políticas son esfuerzos jurídicamente relevantes para garantizar el acceso a la justicia y deben ser aplicadas conforme el artículo 122 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De esta forma, la primera instancia se ha aferrado a que el artículo 168 del Código de Familia establece que el parentesco debe estar comprobado para fijar alimentos provisionales, pero cabe recordar que, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dicho de forma reiterada: “V.-Considera esta Sala que, para interpretar una norma, es de vital importancia la función creadora del juez para determinar el sentido y alcance de las leyes. En consecuencia el juez no debe analizar únicamente el sentido gramatical o las palabras de que se ha servido el legislador para dar contenido a la norma, sino las relaciones que unen todas las partes del articulado sobre el punto de que se trata, la situación jurídica existente a la época en que se dictó la ley objeto de la interpretación y, por último, posesionarse de la acción ejercida por dicha ley en el orden general del derecho y el lugar que en este orden ocupa. Función creadora que, en el caso que nos ocupa, debe de concluir con adaptar la norma a la práctica y a la realidad para que se cumpla con los fines que se propuso el legislador, en cuanto sirven para definir o resolver una cuestión entre dos o más personas.” N.°6093-1994, 9:12 de 18 de octubre de 1994; N.°1392-00, 18:48 de 9 de febrero de 2000; N.°11577-2002, 15:20 de 10 de diciembre de 2002; N.°1943-03, 15:09 de 11 de marzo, N.°9219-2003, 10:55 de 29 de agosto, 15392-2003, 15:58 de 19 de diciembre, todos del año 2003; N.°2602-2004, 10:41 de 12 de marzo de 2004; N.°17568-10, 14:42 de 20 de octubre de 2010; N.°13623-2013, 14:30 de 11 de diciembre; N.°15296-2013, 14:30 de 20 de noviembre, ambas de 2013; N.°1543-14, 14:30 de 5 de febrero de 2014; N.°1706-23, 9:30 de 25 de enero de 2023. Además, también dicho Tribunal en la resolución N.°2786-2000, 15:45 de 28 de marzo de 2000 dispuso: “Se recuerda que los jueces se constituyen en instrumentos procesales para la efectiva resolución de los conflictos, pero de manera tal, que son garantes no sólo de la legalidad, sino, sobre todo, de los derechos fundamentales, y en ese sentido, deben tener una participación activa en el proceso, que tienda a ese respeto; como lo ha considerado con anterioridad este Tribunal respecto de los jueces penales, pero que tiene plena aplicación en todas las ramas del derecho y en todas las jurisdicciones: La defensa de la Constitución, y por ende de nuestro sistema democrático, depende en gran medida de los jueces, quienes tienen un papel activo en esta tarea, al ser los llamados a interpretar y hacer valer las normas y principios constitucionales y en consecuencia las leyes; al constituirse en garantes de los derechos de las personas, el cual es, además –como se verá más adelante-, uno de los objetivos primordiales de la nueva legislación procesal penal: la de devolverle al juez su función de garante de los valores que protege la Constitución, dotándole de la objetividad necesaria para que actúe como un contralor de derecho y no cómo un acusador imperfecto, resolución N.°6470-1999, 14:36 de 18 de agosto de 1999." Así las cosas, como la resolución recurrida desatiende seriamente el ordenamiento jurídico vigente, mantener sus efectos podría generar que el Estado costarricense se vea cuestionado ante el Comité de la CEDAW e incluso, ante el Comité de los Derechos del Niño (y de la Niña), pues recordemos que esta última Convención cuenta con tres protocolos: Ley N.°8172, Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (y de la Niña) relativo a la venta de niños, la prostitución infantil y utilización de niños en la pornografía, publicado en La Gaceta N.°29, 11 de febrero de 2002; Ley N.°8247, Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (y de la Niña) Relativo a la Participación de Niños en los Conflictos Armados, publicado en La Gaceta N.°103, 30 de mayo de 2002 y, Ley N.°9170, Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (y de la Niña) relativo a un procedimiento de comunicaciones, publicado en La Gaceta N.°231 de 29 de noviembre de 2013. Entonces, por medio de este último Protocolo también sería posible que nuestro país se vea expuesto por incumplir con la citada Convención con respecto a nascituros. No descarta la suscrita que, alguien podría trivializar esto y decir que no ocurrirá, pero recordemos que, la aquí actora litiga con la defensa pública y ese servicio judicial de acceso a la justicia es especializado y está perfectamente capacitado para accionar internacionalmente en defensa de los derechos del nascituro. Igual es posible que esto ocurra de la mano de cualquier persona profesional en Derecho que conozca a profundidad la materia y decida combatir la desaplicación de toda la normativa dicha. En consecuencia, lo que corresponde es trasladar al accionado la carga de refutar la presunción que establece el artículo 92 del Código de Familia párrafo segundo y por ello se resuelve: ---a) Se revoca la resolución impugnada. ---b. Como está demostrado el estado de embarazo, se ordena intentar una conciliación previa urgente. Esa conciliación puede incluir el reconocimiento de la paternidad del ser en gestación y entonces, en ese aspecto el acuerdo debe ser remitido al Juzgado de Familia para su respectiva homologación y, corresponderá a ese Juzgado determinar lo pertinente sobre la inscripción de la paternidad una vez que se conozcan los datos de inscripción del nacimiento. ---c. Si no existe conciliación por la razón que sea, se ordena a la primera instancia dar curso de inmediato a la demanda si otro motivo legal no lo impide y fijar una pensión provisional a cargo del accionado y a favor del nascituro. Si una vez notificado el accionado refuta dicha paternidad, se dispondrá de la recepción urgente de prueba testimonial o la evacuación de prueba de otra índole para determinar si hay elementos o no sobre la existencia de la convivencia de hecho durante el período probable de concepción del ser en gestación. ---d. En caso de que no sea posible acreditar la presunción dicha y el accionado refute la paternidad que se imputa, la primera instancia dispondrá de una pensión provisional a cargo del accionado y, ordenará la práctica de una prueba de ADN una vez que la persona menor de edad nazca, a efecto de determinar si corresponde al accionado continuar pagando dicha provisional, sin perjuicio de que el demandado gestione en la vía de familia el proceso de determinación de paternidad de persona por nacer o bien, podrá gestionarlo la madre mediante el proceso de investigación de paternidad. En cualquiera de los dos casos, es decir, si el tema filiatorio llega a la vía de familia, el proceso alimentario solamente quedará suspendido a la espera de lo que sea resuelto por sentencia firme en el proceso de filiación si así lo ordena el Juzgado de Familia respectivo. Así, debe quedarle muy claro al accionado que, nada le impide iniciar la determinación de la paternidad, aunque el ser en gestación no haya nacido y por ello, no es suficiente que espere pacientemente a que sea madre la que se ocupe de investigar la filiación paterna. ---e. Si la prueba de ADN ordenada en el proceso de alimentos resulta negativa o no puede ser practicada por causa imputable a la madre, a gestión de la parte accionada podrá la primera instancia disponer que la pensión provisional deje de ser pagada por el accionado. ---f. Si el presente fallo lamentablemente resulta tardío en el sentido de que ya se produjo el nacimiento prematuro, igual el proceso deberá continuar tal como se ha indicado en este fallo y si lamentablemente ocurrió una interrupción del embarazo, también el proceso deberá continuar previniendo a la madre si tiene interés en el cobro de gastos de embarazo del mortinato. Esto último pues la Sala Constitucional ya se pronunció sobre el tratamiento digno de los restos de un ser que no nació y no hay razón alguna para considerar que los gastos de embarazo solamente pueden ser cobrados si ocurrió un nacimiento con vida. Al respecto, mediante sentencia N.°6685-01 de las 14:06 de 17 de julio de 2001, la Sala Constitucional dijo: “Es obvio que dada la naturaleza en muchas ocasiones infectocontagiosas de los “productos de la concepción”, éstos deban de ser manipulados o manejados con suma cautela. De allí que coincide esta Sala con las razones de salud pública que motivaron la redacción de la Norma Institucional para el Manejo de Desechos Anatomopatológicos”. No obstante, no encuentra este Tribunal que la preocupación de todos en procurar que dicho manejo se haga de la manera más segura posible suprima los derechos de la recurrente y su esposo que como padres y practicantes de la fe católica consideren vital para su religión y su tranquilidad enterrar a su hijo. Si bien ese hijo no culminó su proceso de formación como para poder desarrollarse como un niño normal y subsistir, lo cierto es que desde el momento en que fue concebido fue persona con derechos. Así como personas con derechos son sus padres, quienes tienen toda la potestad de escoger que éste tenga un entierro de acuerdo a las reglas establecidas religiosamente por los católicos. Efectivamente, la Norma Institucional para el Manejo de Desechos Anatomopatológicos, no se refiere a la entrega directa de lo que ella llama “desechos sólidos que drenan líquido” (feto y placenta) a tercero y dispone reglas muy claras en cuanto a su traslado fuera de los centros hospitalarios y el tipo de transporte y envase en el que se debe hacer. No obstante, considera esta Sala que dichas disposiciones pueden y deben cumplirse en la medida que a los interesados se les informe de manera correcta y directa del procedimiento establecido y del destino de dichos “desechos”. Así, en el caso concreto, pudo perfectamente transportarse el “desecho” de interés conforme a todas las estipulaciones médicas e higiénicas respectivas, pero enterando a la recurrente y a su esposo del procedimiento a seguir, así como coordinando con éstos la fecha, hora y cementerio en el que se dispondría finalmente de éste, respetando el derecho de los recurrentes a darle sepultura a los restos de su hijo. Debido a que no fue así y se procedió sin comunicación alguna a la recurrente y a su esposo sobre el destino de su hijo -cual si éste fuera un simple objeto- debe estimarse el recurso ordenando a (…) que en el término improrrogable de dos días contados a partir de la comunicación de esta sentencia, entregue a la recurrente, (…) el feto producto del aborto natural practicado a su persona de acuerdo a las medidas de salud necesarias”. Como se aprecia, el voto es interesante, aunque no contempla un importante desarrollo de los derechos en juego, sino que, sin ser tema del recurso, entra a definir al ser no nacido, como “persona con derechos”. Es comprensible que la Sala haya dispuesto un trato digno a mortinatos, es decir a seres que no llegaron a nacer con vida, pero el tema central no era definir si mortinatos son o no personas sino, nada más que un aborto espontáneo, no impide a los padres responsabilizarse de los restos del mortinato una vez cumplidas las normas sanitarias que garanticen la salud pública. En todo caso, quedó claro que los restos de un mortinato deben ser tratados con dignidad e incluso, se reconoce la inhumación como parte del derecho a la vida familiar. Así se entiende la resolución constitucional, aunque como se indicó, no tiene un desarrollo amplio sobre los derechos en juego. Todo esto con la observación de que nuestro país, mediante Ley N.°9797 que corresponde a la reforma integral de la Ley N.°7771, Ley General sobre VIH-SIDA, otorga el carácter de “persona” a todo ser en gestación sin distinción alguna. Expresamente el artículo 21 de esa Ley se refiere al nasciturus como “persona por nacer”. Si la voluntad legislativa hubiese sido no dar ese estatus jurídico, no había sido aprobada una Ley con ese contenido. Además, también los gastos de sepelio pueden ser cobrados conforme el artículo 37 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. X. Para concluir, es importante resaltar que, la demanda inicia con un profundo preámbulo eminentemente jurídico que desarrolla algunos de los temas aquí expuestos y, sin embargo, la resolución impugnada se centra en el artículo 168 del Código de Familia. Es decir, se trata de una demanda con un desarrollo importante del derecho aplicable, mientras que la resolución impugnada es bastante superficial, pero como ha quedado expuesto, nutrida de impresionantes prejuicios. En segundo lugar, el artículo 24 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias transcrito en la resolución impugnada ha sido declarado parcialmente inconstitucional. Para mayor comprensión, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante resolución n.°2781-2016, 11:40 de 24 de febrero de 2016 dispuso: “Se declara con lugar la acción. En consecuencia se anula por inconstitucional la frase "de quince años" del artículo 24 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias para que a partir de esta sentencia se lea "De incumplirse el deber alimentario, podrá librarse orden de apremio corporal contra el deudor moroso, salvo que sea menor o mayor de setenta y uno", debiendo entenderse que "menor" se refiere a persona menor de 18 años de edad. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la norma anulada, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. En consecuencia, se ordena la libertad todas las personas menores de edad que al momento de dictarse esta sentencia, estuvieren detenidos por apremio corporal. Reséñese este pronunciamiento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Los Magistrados Jinesta Lobo y Hernández Gutiérrez salvan el voto y declaran sin lugar la acción. El Magistrado Salazar Alvarado salva el voto y declara sin lugar la acción, siempre y cuando se interprete el artículo 24 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, en el sentido de que el apremio corporal contra la persona menor de edad pero mayor de quince años, que es deudor alimentario, sea la última ratio y que no pueda ser aplicado de forma automática. Los Magistrados Cruz Castro y Castillo Víquez ponen notas separadas. Notifíquese.”."