Mandate and Civil Arrest in Child Support ProceedingsMandato y Apremio Corporal en Procesos Alimentarios

I. MANDATE GRANTED BY THE RESPONDENT PARTY

Regarding the mandate contract, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 6395-2011, 15:19 of May 18, 2011, stated: “A power of attorney, in this case a special judicial power, is a mandate contract that presupposes an express declaration of will by the mandatary. The challenged provision states that if a power has been issued for a specific business or act, it is automatically revoked if another is issued for that same business or act. However, and given that it is a problem of expression of will of the party, it is clear that if the will of the principal (mandante) is for the first power to subsist, a declaration by him to that effect will suffice. The provision does not cause a violation of the right of access to justice, since it would be enough for the principal to take the necessary precautions so that this tacit revocation does not occur. For legal certainty, the issuance of a new power has restrictive effects; however, this circumstance does not violate any fundamental right. Certainly, the legislator could have chosen another scheme; however, the one chosen does not conflict with Constitutional Law and judges must apply it as it is, since, moreover, the content of the provision leaves no room for doubt or confusion. In this sense, the Chamber considers that the circumstance that the plaintiff disagrees with the design chosen by the legislator to regulate this matter as well as with the way in which the jurisdictional bodies apply the provision, does not raise a problem of constitutionality.” Although the constitutional ruling refers especially to Article 1280 of the Civil Code, it is important to highlight the definition that said judgment contemplates regarding mandate and how the consensual nature of that contract stands out. Therefore, it is very important to consider the content of a power as a whole, in order to determine the will of the person who granted it. As a complement, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the emblematic judgment No. 069-1993, 15:00 of November 3, 1993, stated: “III.- The mandate is a classic topic. Gaius divided contracts according to their social economic function into four different types: emptiovenditio, locatio condutio, societas and mandatum. For all of them, he noted their lack of perfection with consent alone if the interests were not at the same time provided for in the legal system, that is, the justa causa, consequently, the relationship between the agreement of the parties (consensus) and the typical purpose of interests configured by the legal system (justa causa) acquires particular significance, until forming the fundamental qualifying element of the contract's structure. There should be few doubts about the mandate, however, the legislation responsible for informing the argument of granting and substitution of powers shows a wide range of possibilities - this also happens with doctrine and jurisprudence (the second voice of the law: the first on the theoretical plane, the second on the practical plane) - which sometimes leads to confusion. IV.- It is convenient to start by mentioning the argument of substitution of the mandate. Even when there is an express provision, resorting to doctrines and jurisprudence of legal systems where substitution is not prohibited, or is expressly authorized, naturally generates interpretations different from those authorized by Article 1264 of the Civil Code, especially if it is analyzed in light of the provisions of the repealed Código General. To determine the true personality of the national provision on the subject, it is convenient, even if briefly, to mention the different possible theses in foreign doctrine and jurisprudence. V-. In France, the mandate has its regulation in the Code Civil of 1804 (Articles 1984-2010), finding that - within the obligations of the mandatary - the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) has no prohibition against substituting his power. This thesis comes from Canon Law where the substitution of power is fully authorized. In that form, it is provided: "Article 1994. The mandatary is responsible for the one whom he substitutes in the management: 1º. When he has not received the power to substitute another; 2º. When this power has been conferred upon him without designation of a person, and the one he has chosen was notoriously incapable or insolvent. In all cases, the principal may act directly against the persons whom the mandatary has substituted." From the interpretation of this provision has derived the principle according to which powers are susceptible to substitution by the attorney-in-fact, unless expressly prohibited by the grantor (poderdante). But the scope of that provision must also be interpreted in relation to the responsibility of the mandatary. Indeed, the mandate is granted intuito personae, this excludes the possibility of exemption from responsibility, consequently, if the mandatary substitutes - in whole or in part, in the latter case sharing it - his power, the assistance or substitution in no way affects his responsibility towards the principal. Furthermore, substitution would be impossible, and ineffective, with respect to the mandate, when it concerns the fulfillment of functions reserved personally for the mandatary. On the subject, however, there is no consensus in classical French doctrine; for authors such as Josserand and even for Planiol and Rippert, the mandate can be substituted, but there are others like Colin and Capitant who do not agree with this thesis. In modern French civil law, the two currents also exist. VI.- In Spanish Law, the Civil Code of 1889 - generally following the French model - in regulating the mandate (Articles 1709 to 1739), departs from its predecessor regarding the substitution of the mandate, since this can happen unless prohibited by the grantor, whereby the canonical thesis is more evident. This is clear from the letter of the law. "Article 1721. The mandatary may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he is responsible for the management of the substitute: 1º. When he was not given the power to appoint one. 2º. When this power was given to him, but without designating the person, and the appointee was notoriously incapable or insolvent. What is done by the substitute appointed against the principal's prohibition shall be null." The responsibility of the substitute towards the original grantor is also defined in Spanish Law. "Article 1722. In the cases included in the two numbers of the previous article, the principal may also direct his action against the substitute." The vision of the Spanish codifier is clear, who departed from the criteria of friendship, trust, affection, affinity, between grantor and attorney-in-fact characteristic of French Law, to allow any third party the possibility of providing some service or doing something on behalf or by order of another (Article 1709). VII.- In the German Civil Code, B.G.B., of 1900, within the contracts, the mandate is also regulated (Articles 662 to 676), following somewhat different criteria from those of other legal systems regarding substitution. "Article 664. The mandatary cannot, in case of doubt, entrust the carrying out of the mandate to a third party. If the transmission is permitted, the mandatary is only responsible for fault attributable to him in the transmission. For the fault of an assistant, he is responsible according to paragraph 278. The claim for the carrying out of the mandate, in case of doubt, is not transferable." The author Enneccerus - in the well-known Tratado de Derecho Civil, by Enneccerus, Kipp and Wolff - maintains that since the Code does not stipulate whether the principal's claim for the execution of the mandate is transferable or not, it must be understood as not authorized, however, the non-transferability would be subordinate to an agreement to the contrary. On the scope of this orientation, the well-known author Joseph Hupka - La representación voluntaria en los negocios jurídicos, Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1930 - considers that it is a separation of modern codifications from canonical criteria since - as in almost all contracts - in the mandate, substitution is inadmissible unless expressly authorized in the contract by the principal, considering the special circumstances of the case. VIII.- In Costa Rica, the Código General, of 1841, also gave special attention to the mandate (Articles 1328 to 1353) following almost literally the norm of the Code Civil, regarding the authorization of substitution. "Article 1338. The mandatary is responsible for the one whom he substitutes in the administration: 1. When he has not received the power to substitute another; 2. When this power has been conferred upon him without designation of a person, and the one he has chosen is notoriously incapable or insolvent." But this criterion was radically changed in the Civil Code of 1886, where - while still maintaining the general principles of the reference contract (Articles 1251 to 1300) - the substitution of the mandate can only be carried out by the mandatary if he is expressly authorized by the principal. "Article 1264. The mandatary may substitute the assignment if he is expressly empowered to do so in the power of attorney, and he will only be responsible for the acts of the substitute in the event that the principal had not designated for him the person in whom he made the substitution of the power, and the substitute was notoriously incapable or insolvent. When it concerns a specialísimo (very special) power, the substitution may only be made in the person or persons designated by the principal in the same power." In the same way, the same mandatary is limited in disposing regarding the substitution of the substitute, following the principle of prior authorization. "Article 1265. The previous mandatary may not revoke the substitution he may have made, except when he was authorized to do so and expressly reserved that power when making the substitution." IX.- As principles of the substitution of the mandate in Costa Rican law, the following could be referred to: A) The attorney-in-fact has a legal prohibition against substituting his mandate. The granting is intuito personae, since in the contract, the power conferred to represent the principal operates based on ties of friendship, trust, affinity, or affection between the grantor and the attorney-in-fact. Since the functions of the mandate refer to both the patrimonial and personal spheres, the law does not authorize the mandatary to substitute the conferred mandate by his will alone. B) Substitution of the mandate is possible only if the grantor expressly authorizes it in the power of attorney. The non-transferability of the mandate, as a general rule, derives from the law, as it weighs the will of the principal over that of the mandatary or the mandate itself. Consequently, this other principle is constituted by the idea of subordinating the non-transferability to an agreement to the contrary, that is, highlighting the interest of the principal's will over any other interest, as protection for that bond of trust, from which patrimonial or personal consequences may derive for him. If the authorization to substitute the mandate is open, that is, empowering the mandatary to designate the substitute, or if, on the contrary, the will of the grantor binds it to a specific substitute, this has its legal effects in the sphere of responsibility. X.- Originally, the mandate was reputed to be gratuitous, however, today, the rule is the inverse: it is not presumed gratuitous unless it was so stipulated (Article 1258), because even though its etymology is linked to trust, in modern Law, it has more of a transactional (negocial) character where the attorney-in-fact carries out, in the name of the grantor, the businesses or tasks entrusted, with direct legal effects on his assets or personal sphere. The principal, in this form, is responsible for the actions taken in his name by the attorney-in-fact, unless in his management the latter breaks the law or acts with fault or fraud (culpa o dolo), in which case the principal can demand accountability. One of these cases could be when a substitute had been designated without the express authorization of the principal, being able to proceed against both the attorney-in-fact and the substitute. XI.- In all legal systems, as a general principle of Law, the termination of the mandate operates with the death of the grantor or the attorney-in-fact. The norm is expressly found in Article 1278, subsection 5), of the Costa Rican Civil Code. Similarly, in the Code Civil français, 2003, in subsection 3) of Article 1732 of Spain, in the norm of 672 of the German B.G.B., in 1722 subsection 4) of the Italian Codice civile, and in 1346 subsection 3) of the Código General de Carrillo. Even in many of these systems, it also refers to civil death, or to states of bankruptcy and insolvency. XII.- For all the foregoing, the appeal must be rejected, since the plaintiff's claims contravene the most elementary principles of the mandate. Indeed, the holder of the dollar savings account number (...) in Bank (...) was (...) and not the plaintiff. She was his attorney-in-fact insofar as she was authorized to withdraw money from it. Said power legally had two limitations. The first consists of the non-transferability of the power because it is juridically prohibited to substitute it in a third party not expressly authorized by the grantor (Article 1264). The second due to its legal non-existence produced as a result of the death of the principal (Article 1278 subsection 5). From the foregoing, the ineffectiveness of said mandate is clear, both for withdrawing money once the holder of the savings account has died, and for substituting the power in a third party. (…).” Based on everything stated, it is pertinent to analyze the general provisions on the mandate, as well as the different types of mandates that exist, since the mandate contract is determined both by the extent - powers - and by the form in which the will of the person granting it must be expressed. Regarding the extent of the mandate, there are four mandates of a representative nature - because whoever manages does so in the name and on behalf of the principal - and a fifth scenario derived from various laws as will be explained: 1) Generalísimo (Most General). This type of mandate is regulated in Articles 1253 and 1254 of that Code and is a power of disposition and administration. Furthermore, it can be granted for all, one, or some specific businesses. Pursuant to Article 253 of the Commercial Code, it must be registered in the Mercantile Registry if it is granted by a merchant, and the revocation, substitution, modification, or extension of the mandate must also be registered. In addition, if the grantor is not a merchant, it must be registered in the Public Registry pursuant to Article 466 subsection 6) of the Civil Code. Such registrations constitute requirements for validity and effectiveness. It is important to indicate that a generalísimo power of a judicial nature does not permit litigation when personal claims are being ventilated. In this regard, the content of Article 1253 of the Civil Code must be observed, which states: “By virtue of the mandate or generalísimo power for all the businesses of a person, the mandatary may sell, mortgage, and in any other way alienate or encumber all types of property; accept or repudiate inheritances, litigate judicially, enter into all types of contracts, and execute all other juridical acts that the principal could do, except those that according to the law must be executed by the owner himself in person and the acts for which the law expressly requires a specialísimo power.” That is, the norm clearly excepts from the powers of a generalísimo principal claims of a personal nature, as well as those acts for which the law requires a specialísimo power. Thus, for example, it is not possible, by means of a generalísimo power, for the mandatary to grant prenuptial agreements since it is a matter of a personal nature. Since the generalísimo power can be granted for one or some businesses or for all the businesses of the principal, Article 1254 of the Civil Code states: “If the generalísimo power is only for one or some businesses, the mandatary shall have, with respect to the business or businesses to which his power refers and the goods that they comprise, the same powers that, according to the previous article, the generalísimo attorney-in-fact has for all the businesses of a person.” In other words, a generalísimo power for one or several businesses grants the mandatary the same powers as a generalísimo power granted for all businesses. 2) General. The general mandate is regulated in Article 1255 of that Code and is a power of administration, but not of disposition. Similarly, it can be granted for all, one, or some of the principal's businesses. Also, pursuant to Article 253 of the Commercial Code, it must be registered in the Mercantile Registry if granted by a merchant, and the revocation, substitution, modification, or extension of the mandate must also be registered. Furthermore, also if the grantor is not a merchant, it must be registered in the Public Registry pursuant to Article 466 subsection 6) of the Civil Code. Such registrations are requirements for validity and effectiveness. With respect to the powers granted by a general mandate for all, one, or some businesses of the principal, Article 1255 of the Civil Code states: “By the general power for all, one, or some businesses, the mandatary has, with respect to the business or businesses to which his power refers, broad and general administration, this comprising the following powers: 1st.- To enter into agreements and execute the acts necessary for the conservation or exploitation of the goods. 2nd.- To bring and sustain judicially possessory actions and those that are necessary to interrupt the statute of limitations (prescripción) with respect to the things that the mandate comprises. 3rd.- To rent or lease movable goods for up to one year; but, if the power is limited to a certain time, the lease period must not exceed that term. To lease real estate (bienes inmuebles), a generalísimo or special power is required. (Thus reformed the previous subsection by Article 132 of the Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, Law No. 7527 of July 10, 1995). 4th.- To sell the fruits as well as the other movable goods that by their nature are destined to be sold or are exposed to being lost or deteriorating. 5th.- To demand judicially or extrajudicially the payment of credits and give the corresponding receipts. 6th.- To execute all the juridical acts that, according to the nature of the business, are virtually comprised in it as means of execution or as necessary consequences of the mandate.” In addition, it is convenient to highlight that, based on the third paragraph of Article 1251 of the Civil Code, both the generalísimo power and the general power must be granted in a public deed (escritura pública) and be registered in the Public Registry as already stated, but, furthermore, they do not produce effects with respect to third parties except from the date of their registration. That is, not from their filing (presentación). 3) Special. This mandate contract is regulated in Article 1256 also of the Civil Code and, according to the second paragraph of that norm, it can be granted with or without registry purposes. This type of mandate - special - does not need to be registered in the Public Registry, but it must be executed in a public deed if it has registry effects. Therefore, as a general rule, this type of mandate does not need to be granted in a public deed except as previously stated. In addition, it may be a special mandate for judicial or extrajudicial matters. It is appropriate to indicate that bill No. 15,617 was once processed in order to authentically interpret Article 1256 of the Civil Code, specifically the phrase that states: “The special power granted for an act or contract with registry effects must be executed in a public deed.” In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 8424-2005, 18:19 of June 28, 2005, ordered: “The numeral interpreted expresses the minimum content that every special power for a concrete and specific judicial or extrajudicial act must have and establishes the rules that must be observed to grant the mandate for an act or contract with registry effects. In this sense, the normative content of Article 1256 of the Civil Code is clear and precise and, therefore, does not require any precision or clarification.” It is appropriate to indicate that the special judicial power and the general judicial power must necessarily be granted to a lawyer. Likewise, it is appropriate to highlight that the special judicial power is not always sufficient to litigate in family matters, since some matters, as will be explained, require a specialísimo power. 4) Specialísimo (Very Special). This power basically arises from what is regulated in the last two lines of Article 1253, since that norm indicates that, by virtue of a generalísimo mandate for all the principal's businesses, the mandatary can execute all the “juridical acts that the principal could do, except those that according to the law must be executed by the owner himself in person and the acts for which the law expressly requires a specialísimo power.” In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 690-E-13, 11:25 of June 4, 2013, regarding the exceptions contemplated in Article 1253 with respect to the generalísimo power, ordered: “However, this must be interpreted restrictively and never extensively, taking into account the public interest that assists said normative doctrine, so as not to create odious limitations that come to impede or affect its occupation casuistically, since the interest of the community in avoiding surprising discussions that disturb the social order and the legal certainty that revolves around the exercise of this type of power must prevail.” Regarding the irrational and unfounded requirement of a special or specialísimo power, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 16868-2008, 13:26 of November 7, 2008, stated: “III.- ON THE MERITS (SOBRE EL FONDO): The claim for the alleged violation of the right of petition of the protected party is based, on the one hand, on the fact that they did not accept the documents to register the marriage of the protected party's daughter and, on the other, on the cause of that refusal, in that the generalísimo power granted by her daughter was not admitted as sufficient power to request the registration of her marriage, celebrated abroad. Regarding the mere fact that the documents were not accepted, the Chamber has considered that if a petition does not meet the established legal and regulatory requirements and the interested party is told how to correct the defects, it may be rejected ad portas, in order to avoid unnecessary administrative costs and procedures (see, among others, judgment number 2007-006167 of eighteen hours and eleven minutes of May eight, two thousand seven). -IV.- However, the interpretation of the respondents, regarding the scope of the mandate granted through a generalísimo power, limits the exercise of the fundamental right of petition of the protected party and the legal right of the interested party to the registration of her marriage. The law does not require a special or specialísimo power to request the registration of a marriage celebrated abroad, but only the request of an interested party (Article 55 of the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones). Although it is true that the Law imposes the requirement of a specialísimo power for the celebration of marriage, such a requirement is not stipulated for the request for marriage registration. The Civil Code establishes the scope of the generalísimo power, as follows: “Article 1253.- By virtue of the mandate or generalísimo power for all the businesses of a person, the mandatary may sell, mortgage, and in any other way alienate or encumber all types of property; accept or repudiate inheritances, litigate judicially, enter into all types of contracts, and execute all other juridical acts that the principal could do, except those that according to the law must be executed by the owner himself in person and the acts for which the law expressly requires a specialísimo power.” - This class of empowerment (apoderamiento), as has been said, allows the mandatary to execute all the juridical acts that the principal could do, except those acts for which the law requires them to be performed by the owner himself, in person, or those for which the law expressly requires a specialísimo power. It is paradoxical that the Registry grants greater legal value to a certified request (solicitud autenticada) from one of the spouses than to a generalísimo power, registered in the Public Registry. The protection of the amparo will proceed not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms (Art. 20 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and this is, precisely, one of those cases, in which the fundamental right is violated or, perhaps, limited, by an erroneously interpreted and applied norm. When Article 55 of the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y del Registro Civil refers to “request of an interested party”, understanding that the generalísimo attorney-in-fact is not such, is an interpretation contrary to the citizens' right to petition and to obtain prompt resolution, as well as access to administrative justice and public services; the Administration cannot invent unnecessary obstacles to hinder access to public services. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the amparo with merit and order the respondents to accept the petition and process the registration of the marriage of the protected party's daughter, provided that the protected party meets the other legal requirements required for this purpose.” Now then, the specialísimo power does not need any registration; it is very concrete, as it refers to a specific act and will be required when the regulations expressly establish it, such as, for example, to donate in the name of another person - Article 1408 of the Civil Code -, to challenge paternity - Article 72 of the Family Code -, or to adopt and to grant prenuptial agreements, among other matters. Because it is a concrete mandate, it is not possible for the mandatary to act alleging implied powers. Likewise, a specialísimo power - and granted in a public deed - will be required when, through jurisprudential development, it has been understood that the nature of the right intended to be asserted by using the power so requires. Furthermore, because it is a concrete mandate, the act for which it was granted must be detailed. In this sense, this entire jurisprudential line has arisen basically from the content of Article 30 of the Family Code, since that norm requires a specialísimo power to enter into marriage. In this regard, the norm states: “The marriage may be celebrated through an attorney-in-fact with a specialísimo power contained in a public deed and which expresses the name and personal details of the person with whom the marriage is to be celebrated; but the other contracting party must always attend the celebration in person./ There shall be no marriage if at the time of its celebration the power was already legally revoked.” This with the observation that the Código Procesal de Familia, Law No. 9747, reformed Article 30 of the Family Code as follows: “Marriage. Impossibility of marriage by power. Under no circumstances shall a marriage be verified with the power of attorney of any of the contracting parties.” Furthermore, this reform will come into effect on October 1, 2024. The requirement of a specialísimo power - and in a public deed - has occurred for decades in Family Law regarding divorce by mutual agreement, since the nature of the situation imposes it, so that whoever represents one of the spouses to execute the respective deed must not only have a specialísimo power granted in a public deed, but also, it must contain each and every clause of the divorce agreement. Note that the clauses of the divorce deed are those that will govern the terms of the dissolution of the marital bond, hence, a person with specialísimo power cannot decide on what terms his principal divorces. This is an example in which the nature of the substantive right intended to be asserted obliges requiring a specialísimo power - and in a public deed - if the empowered person is to execute the divorce deed, since if such act is performed personally by his principal, at this moment, under current legislation, only a special judicial power is required to formulate the approval request (solicitud de homologación).

Consequently, the Family Procedural Code, Law No. 9747, which will enter into force, expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) granted in a public deed for the processing of a divorce by mutual agreement, as it reforms Article 48 of the Family Code. That is, the jurisprudential criterion that has governed for decades has now become a statute. Furthermore, that new Code, in Article 55, states: "Special power of attorney (Poder especialísimo). In cases where a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) is necessary, it must be granted in a public deed and shall specify the acts for which the authorization is given within the proceeding; in the case of conciliation or mediation, the exact clauses of the potential agreement must be specified concretely, all under penalty of nullity of the agreement reached. The power of attorney may be revoked at any stage through the same formality of its granting, unless it is done orally in a hearing, for which no formality shall be required." Therefore, with the cited reform, the special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) in Family Law matters must be granted in a public deed, but, in addition, it must detail the content, or rather, for what purpose the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) is authorized.

Now, it is clear that the child and spousal support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is strictly personal (personalísima). This characteristic is expressly contemplated in Article 167 of the Family Code, and the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Resolution No. 9580-2001, 16:17 of September 25, 2001, regarding the support obligation, stated: "(...) it is of a personal nature, inter vivos, that is, it is \" , so its effects do not transcend the death of the obligor, that is, it does not form part of the entirety of the inheritance, by virtue of the provisions of Article 521 of the Civil Code, since succession does not comprise personal rights or obligations, as they are extinguished with the death of the obligor." However, just because the support obligation is strictly personal (personalísima) does not mean a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) must be required to litigate in a support proceeding, and that includes requesting body attachment (apremio corporal). The undersigned believes that the issue has been defined by constitutional jurisprudence. For example, in Judgment No. 989-1991, 16:08 of June 4, 1991, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice ordered: "I.- The claimant's grievance consists of denying legitimacy to the actions filed by the judicial representative in the support proceeding being processed before the Alcaldía de Faltas y Contravenciones of Goicoechea. The Chamber disagrees with the opinion of Mr. (...), as it is not true that a judicial special attorney-in-fact (apoderado especial judicial) cannot request that body attachment (apremio) be decreed when there is non-compliance with the payment of the installments set by the court. It must be kept in mind that the procedure in these cases is that, upon the petitioner's request, the Alcaldía verifies whether there is effectively a default in the payment of the installments and then issues the corresponding resolution decreeing the body attachment (apremio corporal). Thus, the request in question does not have special characteristics so as to maintain that it is a 'strictly personal' (personalísima) action, for which only the holder of the right is legitimated. II.- The provisions of Articles 1289 in relation to 1290, both of the Civil Code, allow establishing that a judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial) provides scope to file a request such as the one under discussion, which simply has the claim that, once the default in support payment is verified, the Office issue the attachment (apremio) order. The legal system itself is what, for exceptional cases, expressly establishes the need for representation in a specific act to be by means of a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo). This is evidently not the case, so the recourse must be declared without merit." This criterion was reiterated through Resolution No. 6956-1999, 14:48 of September 8, 1999, and in Judgment No. 13817-2008, 10:05 of September 9, 2008, in which it indicated: "(...) the judicial special attorney-in-fact (apoderada especial judicial) of the support creditor is fully empowered to sign body attachment (apremio corporal) requests on behalf of her represented party. The strictly personal (personalísimo) nature of the support obligation (Articles 167 of the Family Code and 2 of the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) is due to the fact that it depends exclusively on the individual circumstances of the support debtor and creditor, so the support obligation and right are not susceptible to transmission, neither inter vivos nor by death of either of the subjects of the relationship; this is so given that support is conferred exclusively to a specific person by reason of their particular needs and, correlatively, is imposed only on a specific person, taking into account their character as a relative or spouse as well as their economic means. Such quality does not prevent both the support creditor and debtor, in a support allowance proceeding, from filing the actions they deem appropriate through judicial attorneys-in-fact (apoderados judiciales) or judicial special attorneys-in-fact (especiales judiciales), as these precisely have the function of doing everything that their represented party would do if they appeared personally to defend their interests in a judicial proceeding. Hence, this habeas corpus is rejected." Now, in Vote No. 8314-2002, 14:38 of August 27, 2002, said Chamber determined that the issue must be defined by the ordinary jurisdiction. The same criterion was held in Resolutions No. 1685-2005, 9:13 of December 2, 2005, and No. 13703-2010, 14:34 of August 18, 2010. Therefore, in at least three resolutions, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled on the issue, and, based on the regulation of the agency contract (contrato de mandato), it is evident that the strictly personal (personalísimo) nature of the obligation does not entail that its execution must be strictly personal regarding the creditor party. In fact, requiring a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo), in addition to not being provided for in legislation nor deriving from the strictly personal nature of the obligation, is evidently contrary to the procedural simplicity provided for in Article 2 of the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, and, considering the new regulation of the Family Procedural Code, would be contrary to the celerity and gratuity to require a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) and consequently, for it to be granted in a public deed, to request body attachment (apremio corporal), since the attachment (apremio) does not take effect against the person granting the power of attorney—the support creditor—but against the obligor, and furthermore, if attachment (apremio) is being requested, it is because the debtor has not complied with the support obligation; hence it would also be violative of access to justice and the fundamental right to the material effectiveness of a resolution, to cause expenses to be incurred by the person claiming unpaid support.

5. Mandates derived by legal provision. In this case, it concerns those roles or positions that, by virtue of an express statute and the verification of the role, as well as by the express acceptance of the position and even its registration—if so required by law—acquire or entail the powers of a specific mandate. For example, Articles 548, 636, and 718 of the Civil Code. In those cases, it is not required that the power of attorney be formally granted, but rather, by law, the role or position entails the powers of the type of mandate that the same law attributes. Thus, it is a mandate that derives from the law itself, and there is no agreement of wills or trust, which are distinguishing features of the agency contract (contrato de mandato).

Now, regarding the form of expressing the will of the person granting the power of attorney, the mandate can be formal, that is, it must be recorded in such a way that its existence and scope can be demonstrated. Thus, the general mandate (mandato general), the generalísimo mandate (mandato generalísimo), and the special mandate (mandato especial)—for an act or contract with registration effects—by application of Articles 1251 and 1256 of the Civil Code, are evidently formal mandates. On another note, regarding the absence of formality and, consequently, the consensuality of the agency contract (contrato de mandato), Article 1251 of the Civil Code states: "The agency contract (contrato de mandato) may be concluded between present and absent parties, by public or private deed and even by word; but witness evidence shall not be admitted in court, except in conformity with the general rules, nor shall a private deed be admitted when the laws require a public document./ The instrument in which the mandate is recorded is called a power of attorney (poder)./ General powers of attorney (poderes generales) or generalísimo powers of attorney (poderes generalísimos) must be granted in a public deed and registered in the corresponding section of the Property Registry (Registro de la Propiedad) and shall have no effect with respect to a third party except from the date of registration." Furthermore, Article 466, subparagraph 6) of the Civil Code provides: "In the Persons Registry (Registro de Personas) shall be registered: (...) 6) Every general power of attorney (poder general) or generalísimo power of attorney (poder generalísimo)." As a complement, according to the second paragraph of Article 1256 of the Civil Code: "The special power of attorney (poder especial) granted for an act or contract with registration effects must be executed in a public deed and it will not be necessary to register it in the Registry." Thus, it is the law that determines the formality requirements of the mandate for it to be valid and, furthermore, effective. Additionally, it is the law that also determines the scope of the agency contract (contrato de mandato). In this sense, the judicial special mandate (mandato especial judicial)—Article 1256 of the Civil Code—and the judicial general mandate (mandato general judicial)—Articles 1289 and 1290 of the Civil Code—are similar because both are of a formal nature, but they differ in that the former, the judicial special mandate, as its name indicates, is special, that is, it refers to a particular judicial case, while the judicial general mandate (mandato general judicial) authorizes the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) to represent the principal in all judicial business as plaintiff or defendant, unless there is some limitation in the power of attorney.

For greater clarity, "it is called 'judicial mandate' (mandato judicial), the one whose purpose is to empower the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) to intervene in the judicial business in which the principal is actively or passively interested. (...) According to the extension of the power of attorney, the mandate is general or particular. The former confers broad powers for the handling of all the business of the principal (poderdante); the latter, although also comprising broad attributions, as they are the same as those of the general mandate, is limited to the business or businesses expressly mentioned in the power of attorney." (Alberto Brenes Córdoba (1985). Tratado de los contratos, San José: Editorial Juricentro, first edition revised and updated by Gerardo Trejos and Marina Ramirez, 1985, p. 224).

Regarding the special mandate (mandato especial), it is clear that it can be judicial or extrajudicial, but it has limitations. Thus, Article 1256 of the Civil Code establishes that, the "special power of attorney (poder especial) for a specific judicial and extrajudicial legal act shall only empower the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) for the acts specified in the mandate, without being able to extend even to those considered a natural consequence of those that the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) is charged with executing./ The special power of attorney (poder especial) granted for an act or contract with registration effects must be executed in a public deed and it will not be necessary to register it in the Registry." Then, the special power of attorney (poder especial) is subject to the limits established by Article 1256 transcribed, and, when it is a judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial), it must comply with the necessary formality requirements to have full procedural validity and effectiveness.

Thus, nothing prevents a judicial special mandate (mandato especial judicial) from being granted before a judge for a specific case. Along these lines, it may be granted on plain paper. In this regard, Article 118 of the Civil Procedural Code, Law No. 7130, states: "Granting of power of attorney. It shall not be necessary for the power of attorney of a person representing another in a proceeding to be recorded in a testimonial copy of a public deed, as it may be done on plain paper, provided it is signed by the grantor, or if the grantor does not know how to or is impeded from writing, by a person at their request; in both cases duly authenticated by an attorney, who is not the one to whom the power of attorney is granted." Regarding that authentication, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Judgment No. 8464-2014, 14:45 of June 11, 2014, stated: “Indeed, it is clear that in procedural matters, the legislator enjoys a freedom of configuration to design jurisdictional proceedings in attention to the interests of the parties involved in the litigation, provided that on account of said activity the right of defense and due process are not violated, in strict adherence to the rights protected in Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. In the specific case, it is clearly evident that the challenged provision, by establishing that: 'it shall not be necessary for the power of attorney of a person representing another in a proceeding to be recorded in a testimonial copy of a public deed, as it may be done on plain paper, provided it is signed by the grantor, or if the grantor does not know how to or is impeded from writing, by a person at their request; in both cases duly authenticated by an attorney, who is not the one to whom the power of attorney is granted', has the purpose of precisely protecting the interests of the principal (poder-dante), particularly of those who do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, with respect to the attorney-in-fact (apoderado), by requiring that the power of attorney be authenticated by an attorney, but, that is, different from the person to whom the power of attorney is granted, in all of which the Constitutional Chamber does not appreciate any irregularity, or any situation contrary to the Law of the Constitution. It is clear that the challenged norm does not constitute a gross impediment to the right of access to justice, taking into account that the parties, in case the principal (poderdante) does not have the economic means to cover the costs of the attorney's authentication, can perfectly resort to one of the legal clinics of any university that offers the Law Degree, which provide that service free of charge. In this vein, the Chamber observes that the challenged norm's purpose is to protect the interests of the principal (poderdante) who finds themselves in a situation of disadvantage with respect to their attorney-in-fact (apoderado), or to avoid some type of abuse of the latter with respect to the former, for which reason the Chamber concludes that the challenged norm is not unconstitutional. Furthermore, it must be warned that the fact that some different consequence might be extracted from Article 283 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública with respect to administrative matters does not imply any discrimination with respect to the specific case, nor does it nullify or render unconstitutional the challenged norm, precisely taking into account the nature of the interests or ends that the last sentence of Article 118 of the Civil Procedural Code protects or pursues. No irregularity is therefore verified in the content of the challenged norm, which is why the action must be rejected on the merits." At this point, it is appropriate to indicate that the Civil Code does not establish a particular form regarding the judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial). Furthermore, the Family Procedural Code, Law No. 9747, does not contemplate any provision on formality requirements of the judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial), but rather, attributes the position of attorney-in-fact (mandatario) to the person acting as legal director with a limitation in case of termination of the proceeding. Regarding this, Article 51 of that Code states: "Article 51. Powers of legal professionals and legal directors and their substitutes. The person designated to act in the legal direction of the proceeding shall have the powers given by a judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial), except when it concerns actions petitioning for the termination of the proceeding. In the event of attending without the party at a conciliation hearing, they may participate in it and make the agreements they consider; but, in order to make this effective in acts involving the disposition of rights, the party must ratify the agreement, either in writing or personally, before the judicial authority, within a period of one month counted from the holding of the hearing. Once that period has expired and there is no manifestation from the represented party, the prior conciliation stage shall be deemed exhausted and the proceeding shall continue." Then, in summary: the judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial), as to its form, is currently governed by Article 118 of the Civil Procedural Code Law No. 7130, but as to its content, it is governed by Articles 1256 and 1257 of the Civil Code. This last norm also applies because it states: "The attorney-in-fact (mandatario) to whom their powers have not been specified or limited, shall have those that the law grants to the generalísimo attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo), general attorney-in-fact (apoderado general), or special attorney-in-fact (apoderado especial), according to the designation given to them in the power of attorney." As observed, the judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial) focuses on a single judicial proceeding and has the scope indicated by Article 1256 of the Civil Code, but, in addition, also has the scope detailed in numeral 1289 of the cited Code.

Note that, whoever is an attorney-in-fact (apoderado/a) by virtue of a judicial general mandate (mandato general judicial) regulated in Article 1289 of the Civil Code can do the following regarding all the judicial proceedings of their principal: "By virtue of the judicial power of attorney for all business, the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) may appear as plaintiff or defendant on behalf of their principal (poderdante), in any business that interests the latter, follow the lawsuit or lawsuits in their various instances, use all ordinary and extraordinary recourses, settle, submit to arbitration or arbitrators (árbitros o arbitradores), request and answer interrogatories, acknowledge documents, receive money and give the corresponding receipt, grant and cancel the deeds that the business or businesses require, waive any procedural step, challenge judicial officials and complain about them, or accuse them on account of the lawsuits, and do everything that the owner would do if they were present, to bring the business to a conclusion." Thus, if these powers are granted by the judicial general mandate (mandato general judicial) for all judicial proceedings of the principal, by identity of reason, it is understood that, a judicial special attorney-in-fact (mandatario especial judicial) also has those same powers regarding the single judicial proceeding entrusted to them. In fact, Article 1290 clearly indicates that, "if the general power of attorney were only for some judicial business or businesses, the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) shall have, for the business or businesses to which their power of attorney refers, the same powers that, according to the previous article, the general attorney-in-fact (apoderado general) has for all the judicial business of a person." Lastly and no less importantly, regarding a power of attorney—the instrument recording the mandate—it is relevant who grants it, to whom it is granted—primarily if they are a legal professional, or to determine if there is conflicting interest, as well as incompatibility or impossibility of being an attorney-in-fact (mandatario)—the designation and its legal basis, as well as the description of the powers attributed, if such description is recorded in the instrument. In the case of a judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial), all this information is very important because these are differentiating elements with respect to other types of mandates and allow for clarity in case the text of the instrument generates any doubt about the type of mandate and its extension. That is, it is not the case that all and each of the powers of the agency contract (contrato de mandato) must be indicated in a power of attorney, as there is no norm requiring it, but if they are so recorded, they represent a great input for resolving any difficulty associated with the scope of the mandate. Furthermore, as already explained, depending on the type of power of attorney concerned, a specific formality will be required for reasons of validity and effectiveness. Consequently, a power of attorney must not be "read" but studied, and therefore, it is very important not to solely rely on the designation, the regulations cited in it, or the description of the powers, but rather, it must be studied as a whole to determine what type of agency contract (contrato de mandato) is involved.[...]." Certainly, the legislator could have chosen another scheme; however, the one chosen does not impinge upon Constitutional Law and judges must apply it as it is, since, furthermore, the content of the norm leaves no room for doubt or confusion. In this regard, the Chamber considers that the circumstance that the petitioner is dissatisfied with the design chosen by the legislator to regulate this matter, as well as with the way in which the jurisdictional bodies apply the norm, does not raise a problem of constitutionality.” Although the constitutional ruling refers especially to Article 1280 of the Civil Code, it is important to highlight the definition of mandate (mandato) that said judgment contemplates and how the consensual character of that contract stands out.

It is therefore very important to consider the content of a power of attorney (poder) as a whole, in order to determine the will of the person who granted it. As a complement, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through the landmark judgment No. 069-1993, 3:00 p.m. of 3 November 1993, stated: "III.- The mandate (mandato) is a classic topic. Gaius divided contracts according to their social economic function into four different types: emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas and mandatum. For all of them he pointed out their lack of perfection by consent alone if at the same time the interests in the legal system, that is to say the justa causa, were not provided for; consequently, the relationship between the agreement of the parties (consensus) and the typical aim of interests configured by the legal system (justa causa) acquires a particular meaning, ultimately forming the fundamental qualifying element of the contract's structure. There should be few doubts about the mandate, however the legislation charged with informing the reasoning for the granting and substitution of powers of attorney shows a wide range of possibilities - as also happens with doctrine and jurisprudence (the second voice of the law: the first on the theoretical plane, the second on the practical plane) - which sometimes invites confusion.

**IV.-** It is appropriate to begin by addressing the argument of substitution of the mandate (sustitución del mandato). Even where an express rule exists, resorting to doctrines and case law from legal systems where substitution is not prohibited, or is expressly authorized, naturally generates interpretations different from those authorized by Article 1264 of the Civil Code, especially if it is analyzed in light of the provisions of the repealed General Code. To determine the true character of the national rule on the subject, it is advisable, even if briefly, to mention the different possible theses in foreign doctrine and case law.

**V-.** In France, agency (mandato) is regulated in the **Code Civil** of 1804 (Articles 1984-2010), where it is found that—within the agent’s (mandatario) obligations—the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) has no prohibition whatsoever on substituting his power. This thesis comes from Canon Law, where substitution of the power is fully authorized. In that manner it is provided: **"Article 1994. The agent is liable for the person who substitutes for him in the management: 1º. When he has not received the power to substitute another; 2º. When this power was conferred upon him without the designation of a person, and the one he chose was notoriously incapable or insolvent. In all cases, the principal (mandante) may proceed directly against the persons the agent has substituted for himself."** From the interpretation of this rule has derived the principle that powers are susceptible to substitution by the attorney-in-fact, save for an express prohibition by the of the principal. But the scope of that rule must also be interpreted in relation to the responsibility of the agent. Indeed, the mandate is granted **intuito personae**, which excludes the possibility of exemption from liability; consequently, if the agent substitutes—in whole or in part, in this last case sharing it—his power, the assistance or substitution in no way affects his liability to the principal. Furthermore, substitution would be impossible, and ineffective, regarding the mandate, when it involves the performance of functions personally reserved to the agent. On the subject, however, there is no consensus in classical French doctrine; for authors such as Josserand and even for Planiol and Rippert, the mandate may be substituted, but there are others such as Colin and Capitant who do not agree with this thesis. In modern French civil law, the two currents also exist.

**VI.-** In Spanish law, the **Civil Code (Código civil)** of 1889 —following in general terms the French model— when regulating the mandate (Articles 1709 to 1739), departs from its predecessor regarding the substitution of the mandate since this can occur unless prohibited by the principal (poderdante), with which the canonical thesis becomes more evident. This is clear from the letter of the law. **"Article 1721. The agent (mandatario) may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited it; but he is responsible for the management of the substitute: 1st. When he was not given the authority to appoint one. 2nd. When he was given this authority, but without designating the person, and the appointee was notoriously incompetent or insolvent. What is done by the substitute appointed against the principal's prohibition shall be null."** The liability of the substitute to the original principal is also defined in Spanish law. **"Article 1722. In the cases included in the two numbers of the preceding article, the principal may also bring his action against the substitute."** The vision of the Spanish codifier is clear, who departed …or criteria of friendship, trust, affection, affinity, between principal and agent characteristic of French law, to allow any third party the possibility of providing some service or doing something on behalf of or by order of another (Article 1709).

***VII.-* In the German Civil Code, **B.G.B.**, of 1900, the mandate (mandato) is also regulated within contracts (Articles 662 to 676), following criteria somewhat different from those of other legal systems regarding substitution (sustitución). **"Article 664. The agent (mandatario) may not, in case of doubt, entrust the execution of the mandate to a third party. If the transfer (transmisión) is permitted, the agent shall only be liable for fault imputable to him in the transfer. He is liable for the fault of an assistant according to paragraph 278. The claim to the execution of the mandate is, in case of doubt, not transferable."** The author Enneccerus— in the well-known Treatise on Civil Law by Enneccerus, Kipp, and Wolff— maintains that since the Code does not stipulate whether the principal's (mandante) claim to the execution of the mandate is transferable or not, it must be understood as unauthorized; however, the non-transferability would be subject to an agreement to the contrary. Regarding the scope of this orientation, the well-known author Joseph Hupka— Voluntary Representation in Legal Transactions, Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1930— considers it a departure by modern codifications from canon law criteria, since— as in almost all contracts— in the mandate, substitution is inadmissible unless expressly authorized in the contract by the principal, taking into account the special circumstances of the case.

VIII.- In Costa Rica, the Código General of 1841 also gave special attention to the mandate (Articles 1328 to 1353), following almost literally the rule of the Code Civil regarding the authorization of substitution. "Article 1338. The agent answers for the one he substitutes in the administration: 1. When he has not received the power to substitute another; 2. When this power has been conferred upon him without designation of a person, and the one he has chosen is notoriously incompetent or insolvent." But this criterion was radically changed in the Código Civil of 1886, where—while still maintaining the general principles of the contract in question (Articles 1251 to 1300)—the substitution of the mandate can only be carried out by the agent if expressly authorized by the principal. "Article 1264. The agent may substitute the charge, if in the power of attorney he is expressly empowered to do so, and shall only be liable for the acts of the substitute in the event that the principal had not designated to him the person upon whom he made the substitution of the power, and that the substitute was notoriously incompetent or insolvent. When it concerns a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo), the substitution may only be made in the person or persons that the principal indicates in the same power." In like manner, the same agent is limited with respect to the substitution of the substitute, following the principle of prior authorization.

<span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">"Article 1265.</span><span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp;</span><span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp;</span><span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">The previous mandatary may not revoke the substitution (sustitución) that he has made, except when he is authorized to do so and expressly reserves that power when making the substitution (sustitución)."</span> **IX.-** As principles of the substitution of the power of attorney (mandato) in Costa Rican law, the following may be cited: **A)** The attorney-in-fact (apoderado) has a legal prohibition against substituting his power of attorney (mandato). The granting is **intuito personae**, since in the contract the authority conferred to represent the principal (mandante) operates based on ties of friendship, trust, affinity, or affection between the grantor (poderdante) and the attorney-in-fact (apoderado). Since the functions of the power of attorney (mandato) concern both the patrimonial and personal spheres, the law does not authorize the agent (mandatario) to substitute, by his will alone, the power of attorney (mandato) conferred. **B)** The substitution of the power of attorney (mandato) is possible only if the grantor (poderdante) expressly authorizes it in the power of attorney (poder). The non-transferability of the power of attorney (mandato), as a general rule, derives from the law, since the law weighs the will of the principal (mandante) over that of the agent (mandatario) or the power of attorney (mandato) itself. Consequently, this other principle is constituted by the idea of subordinating non-transferability to an agreement to the contrary, that is, emphasizing the interest of the will of the principal (mandante) over any other interest, as protection of that bond of trust, from which patrimonial or personal consequences may derive for the latter. Whether the authorization to substitute the power of attorney (mandato) is open, i.e., empowering the agent (mandatario) to designate the substitute, or whether, on the contrary, the will of the grantor (poderdante) binds it to a specific substitute, has legal effects in the sphere of liability.

**X.-** Originally the mandate was deemed gratuitous; however, today the rule is the inverse: it is not presumed gratuitous unless so stipulated (Article 1258), since even though its etymology is linked to trust, in modern law it has more of a transactional character where the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) performs, in the name of the principal (poderdante), the businesses or tasks entrusted, with direct legal effects on the principal’s assets or personal sphere. The principal, in this manner, is liable for the actions taken in his name by the attorney-in-fact, unless the latter’s conduct violated the law or involved fault or fraud, in which case the principal may demand liability. One such case could be when a substitute has been appointed without the express authorization of the principal, allowing the principal to proceed against both the attorney-in-fact and the substitute.

**XI.-** In all legal systems, as a general principle of law, the termination of the mandate occurs upon the death of the principal or the attorney-in-fact. This rule is expressly found in Article 1278, subsection 5), of the Costa Rican Civil Code. Likewise, in the 2003 French *Code Civil*, in subsection 3) of Article 1732 of Spain, in the rule of 672 of the German *B.G.B.*, in 1722 subsection 4) of the Italian *Codice civile*, and in 1346 subsection 3) of the *Código General de Carrillo*. Even in many of these systems, reference is also made to civil death, or to states of bankruptcy and insolvency.

XII.- For all the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed, because the plaintiff's claims contravene the most basic principles of the mandate. In effect, the holder of the dollar savings account number (…) at Banco (…) was (…) and not the plaintiff. She was his attorney-in-fact insofar as she was authorized to withdraw funds from the account. Said power of attorney legally had two limitations. The first consists of the non-transferability of the power because its substitution to a third party not expressly authorized by the principal is legally prohibited (Article 1264). The second, due to its legal non-existence arising from the death of the principal (Article 1278, subsection 5). From the foregoing, the ineffectiveness of said mandate is clear, both for withdrawing funds once the holder of the savings account has died, and for substituting the power to a third party. (…).” Based on all of the foregoing, it is pertinent to analyze the general provisions on the mandate, as well as the different types of mandates that exist, since the mandate contract is determined both by its scope —powers— and by the manner in which the will of the person granting it must be expressed. Regarding the scope of the mandate, there are four representative mandates —because the person acting does so in the name and on behalf of the principal— and a fifth scenario derived from various laws, as will be explained: 1) Generalísimo. This type of mandate is regulated in Articles 1253 and 1254 of said Code and is a power of disposition and administration. Furthermore, it may be granted for all, for one, or for some specific businesses.

In accordance with Article 253 of the Code of Commerce (Código de Comercio), it must be registered in the Mercantile Registry (Registro Mercantil) if granted by a merchant, and the revocation, substitution, modification, or extension (prórroga) of the mandate must also be registered. Furthermore, if the grantor is not a merchant, it must be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) in accordance with Article 466(6) of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Such registrations constitute requirements for validity and efficacy.

It is important to note that a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) of a judicial nature does not permit litigation when personal claims are being asserted. In this regard, the content of Article 1253 of the Civil Code must be observed, which states: “By virtue of the mandate or power of attorney (poder generalísimo) for all the affairs of a person, the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) may sell, mortgage, and in any other manner alienate or encumber all types of property; accept or repudiate inheritances, litigate judicially, enter into all types of contracts, and execute all other legal acts that the principal (poderdante) could perform, except those that by law must be executed by the owner in person and those acts for which the law expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo).” That is, the rule clearly excepts from the powers of a general attorney-in-fact claims of a personal nature, as well as those acts for which the law requires a special power of attorney. Thus, for example, it is not possible for an attorney-in-fact, through a power of attorney (poder generalísimo), to grant marriage agreements (capitulaciones matrimoniales) since this is a matter of a personal nature.

Since a power of attorney (poder generalísimo) may be granted for one or several specific affairs, or for all of the principal's affairs, Article 1254 of the Civil Code states: “If the power of attorney (poder generalísimo) is only for one or several affairs, the attorney-in-fact (mandatario) shall have, with respect to the affair or affairs to which his power refers and the assets they comprise, the same powers as a general attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo) for all the affairs of a person has under the preceding article.” In other words, a power of attorney (poder generalísimo) for one or several affairs grants the attorney-in-fact the same powers as a power of attorney granted for all affairs.

• 2)General (General). The general mandate (mandato general) is regulated in Article 1255 of that Code and is a power of administration, not of disposition. Similarly, it may be granted for all, some, or one of the principal's affairs. Also, in accordance with Article 253 of the Code of Commerce, it must be registered in the Mercantile Registry if granted by a merchant, and the revocation, substitution, modification, or extension (prórroga) of the mandate must also be registered.

Furthermore, also if the person granting it is not a merchant, it must be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) in accordance with article 466, subsection 6) of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Such registrations are requirements for validity and effectiveness. With respect to the powers granted by a general power of attorney (mandato general) for all, some, or one of the principal's (mandante) businesses, article 1255 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states: "By the general power for all, some, or one businesses, the agent (mandatario) has, regarding the business or businesses to which his power refers, broad and general administration, with such administration comprising the following powers: 1st.- To enter into agreements and execute the acts necessary for the conservation or exploitation of the assets. 2nd.- To bring and maintain possessory actions and those necessary to interrupt the statute of limitations (prescripción) regarding the things covered by the power of attorney (mandato). 3rd.- To rent or lease movable property for up to one year; but, if the power is limited to a certain time, the period of the lease must not exceed that term. To lease real property, a generalísimo or special power of attorney is required. (Thus amended the preceding subsection by article 132 of the Urban and Suburban Leases Law, law No.7527 of July 10, 1995). 4th.- To sell the fruits as well as the other movable property that by its nature is intended to be sold or is at risk of being lost or deteriorating. 5th.- To judicially or extrajudicially demand payment of credits and give the corresponding receipts. 6th.- To execute all legal acts that according to the nature of the business are virtually comprised within it as means of execution or as necessary consequences of the power of attorney." Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that, based on the third paragraph of article 1251 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), both the generalísimo power and the general power must be granted by public deed (escritura pública) and be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) as already stated, but, furthermore, they do not produce effect regarding third parties except from the date of their registration. That is, not from their filing.

**3) Special** This power of attorney contract is regulated in article 1256 also of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and according to the second paragraph of that rule, it can be granted with or without registry purposes. This type of power of attorney —special— must not be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público), but it must be drawn up by public deed (escritura pública) if it has registry effects. Therefore, as a general rule, this type of power of attorney must not be granted by public deed (escritura pública) except as already stated.

Furthermore, it may be a special power of attorney (mandato especial) for judicial or extrajudicial matters. It is appropriate to note that bill No. 15.617 was once processed with the aim of authentically interpreting Article 1256 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), specifically the phrase that states: "The special power of attorney granted for an act or contract with registration effects must be executed in a public deed." In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution No. 8424-2005, at 18:19 on June 28, 2005, held: "The interpreted numeral expresses the minimum content that every special power of attorney must have for a specific, concrete judicial or extrajudicial act, and establishes the rules to be observed for granting a mandate for an act or contract with registration effects. In this sense, the normative content of Article 1256 of the Civil Code is clear and precise and, therefore, requires no precision or clarification." It is appropriate to note that a special judicial power of attorney and a general judicial power of attorney must necessarily be granted to a lawyer. Likewise, it is appropriate to highlight that a special judicial power of attorney is not always sufficient to litigate in family matters, since some matters, as will be explained, require a most special power of attorney (poder especialísimo). 4) Most Special Power of Attorney (Especialísimo). This power of attorney essentially arises from what is regulated in the last two lines of Article 1253, since that norm indicates that, by virtue of a most special general power of attorney (mandato generalísimo) for all the principal's business, the agent may perform all those "legal acts that the principal could perform, except for those that according to the law must be executed by the principal in person and the acts for which the law expressly requires a most special power of attorney." In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 690-E-13, at 11:25 on June 4, 2013, regarding the exceptions contemplated in Article 1253 with respect to the most special general power of attorney, held: "However, this must be interpreted restrictively and never extensively, given the public interest that assists said normative doctrine, so as not to create odious limitations that come to impede or affect, on a case-by-case basis, its function, for the interest of the community in avoiding surprising discussions, disturbing to social order and the legal certainty surrounding the exercise of this type of power of attorney must prevail." Regarding the irrational and unfounded requirement of a special or most special power of attorney, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution 16868-2008, at 13:26 on November 7, 2008, stated: "III.- ON THE MERITS: The claim for the alleged violation of the protected party's right of petition is based, on one hand, on the fact that they did not accept the documents to register the marriage of the protected party's daughter and, on the other, on the cause of that refusal, in that the most special general power of attorney granted by her daughter was not admitted as sufficient power of attorney to request the registration of her marriage, celebrated abroad.

Regarding the mere fact that the documents were not received, this Chamber has considered that if an application does not meet the established legal and regulatory requirements and the interested party is informed of how to remedy the defects, it may be rejected ad portas, in order to avoid unnecessary administrative and processing expenses (see, among others, judgment number 2007-006167 of eighteen hours and eleven minutes of May eight, two thousand seven).-IV.- However, the interpretation made by the respondents, regarding the scope of the mandate granted through a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), limits the exercise of the fundamental right of petition of the petitioner and the legal right of the interested party to the registration of her marriage. The law does not require a special or very special power (poder especial ni especialísimo) to request the registration of a marriage celebrated abroad, but rather, solely, the request of an interested party (Article 55 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal). While it is true that the law imposes the requirement of a very special power (poder especialísimo) for the celebration of marriage, this requirement is not provided for in the request for marriage registration. The Civil Code establishes the scope of the general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), as follows: "Article 1253.- By virtue of a mandate or general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) for all of a person's business, the agent may sell, mortgage, and in any other way alienate or encumber all kinds of property; accept or repudiate inheritances, litigate judicially, enter into all kinds of contracts, and execute all other legal acts that the principal could perform, except those that by law must be executed by the owner in person and those acts for which the law expressly requires a very special power (poder especialísimo)."- This type of empowerment, as has been said, allows the agent to execute all legal acts that the principal could perform, except those acts for which the law requires execution by the owner himself, in person, or those for which the law expressly requires a very special power (poder especialísimo). It is paradoxical that the Registry grants greater legal value to an authenticated request from one of the spouses than to a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), registered in the Public Registry. The protection of the amparo will proceed (sic) not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms (Art. 20 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law) and this is, precisely, one of those cases, in which a fundamental right is violated or, perhaps, limited, by an improperly interpreted and applied norm.

When Article 55 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and of the Civil Registry refers to “request by an interested party,” understanding that a general power of attorney (apoderado generalísimo) is not such constitutes an interpretation contrary to the right of citizens to petition and to obtain a prompt resolution, as well as access to administrative justice and public services; the Administration cannot invent unnecessary obstacles to hinder access to public services. Therefore, the amparo should be granted, and the respondents ordered to accept the filing and process the registration of the marriage of the amparo applicant's daughter, provided that the applicant complies with the other legal requirements demanded for this purpose.” Now, the special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) does not require any registration; it is very specific, as it refers to a particular act and will be required when the regulations expressly so provide, such as, for example, to donate on behalf of another person —Article 1408 of the Civil Code—, to challenge paternity —Article 72 of the Family Code—, or to adopt and to grant prenuptial agreements, among other matters. Because it is a specific mandate, it is not possible for the attorney-in-fact to act by alleging implied powers. Likewise, a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) —granted in a public deed— will be required when, through jurisprudential development, it has been understood that the nature of the right sought to be exercised by using the power so requires. Furthermore, because it is a specific mandate, the act for which it was granted must be detailed. In this regard, this entire jurisprudential line has emerged basically from the content of Article 30 of the Family Code, since that provision requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) to contract marriage. In this respect, the provision states: “Marriage may be celebrated by means of an attorney-in-fact with a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) contained in a public deed, which expresses the name and particulars of the person with whom it is to be celebrated; but the other contracting party must always appear in person at the ceremony./ There shall be no marriage if, at the time of celebration, the power had already been legally revoked.” This with the observation that the Family Procedural Code, Law No. 9747, reformed Article 30 of the Family Code as follows: “Marriage. Impossibility of marriage by power of attorney." Under no circumstances shall a marriage be verified with a power of attorney granted by one of the contracting parties. Furthermore, this reform shall enter into force on October 1, 2024. The requirement of a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) –and in a public deed (escritura pública)– has existed for decades in Family Law regarding divorce by mutual consent, given that the nature of the situation imposes it, such that whoever represents either spouse to execute the respective deed must not only have a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) granted in a public deed (escritura pública), but said power must also contain each and every one of the clauses of the divorce agreement. Note that the clauses of the divorce deed are those that will govern the terms of the dissolution of the marital bond; hence, a person holding a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) cannot decide the terms under which their principal divorces. That is an example where the nature of the substantive right being asserted obligates the requirement of a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) –and in a public deed (escritura pública)– if the attorney-in-fact is to execute the divorce deed, because if such act is performed personally by the principal, under current legislation, only a special judicial power is required to file the approval request. Thus, the Family Procedural Code, Law No. 9747, which shall enter into force, expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) in a public deed (escritura pública) for the processing of divorce by mutual consent, as it reforms Article 48 of the Family Code. That is, the jurisprudential criterion that has governed for decades has now become a statute. Moreover, this new Code states in Article 55: “Special power of attorney (Poder especialísimo). In cases where a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) is necessary, it must be granted in a public deed (escritura pública) and shall set forth the acts for which authorization is given within the proceeding; in the event of conciliation or mediation, the exact clauses of the eventual settlement must be specified in a concrete manner, all under penalty of nullity of the agreement reached. The power may be revoked at any stage using the same form as its grant, except if done orally in a hearing, for which no formality shall be required.” Therefore, with the cited reform, the special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) in Family Law matters must be granted in a public deed (escritura pública), and furthermore, must detail the content, or rather, the purpose for which the agent is authorized. Now, it is clear that the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is extremely personal.

That characteristic is expressly contemplated in Article 167 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) through resolution No. 9580-2001, 16:17 of September 25, 2001, regarding the support obligation (obligación alimentaria), stated: “(…) it is of a personal, inter vivos nature, that is, it is «intuitu personae», so that its effects do not transcend the death of the obligor, that is, it does not form part of the universality of the inheritance, by virtue of the provisions of Article 521 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), since succession does not include rights or obligations of a personal nature, as they are extinguished with the death of the obligor.” However, just because the support obligation is highly personal does not mean that a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) must be required to litigate in a support proceeding, and that includes requesting personal arrest (apremio corporal). The undersigned considers that the issue has been defined by constitutional jurisprudence. For example, in ruling No. 989-1991, 16:08 of June 4, 1991, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice ordered: “I.- The plaintiff's claim consists of denying legitimacy to the actions filed by the judicial attorney-in-fact in the support proceeding before the Municipal Court for Misdemeanors and Contraventions of Goicoechea (Alcaldía de Faltas y Contravenciones de Goicoechea). The Chamber disagrees with the opinion of Mr. (…), as it is not true that the special judicial attorney-in-fact cannot request that personal arrest be ordered, when there is a failure to pay the installments set by the court. It must be borne in mind that the procedure in these cases is that, upon the plaintiff's request, the Municipal Court verifies whether there is indeed default in the payment of the installments and then issues the corresponding resolution ordering personal arrest. Thus, the request in question does not possess special characteristics such as to maintain that it is a «highly personal» action, for which only the right holder is legitimized. II.- The provisions of Articles 1289 in relation to 1290, both of the Civil Code, allow for the conclusion that a special judicial power of attorney provides room to file a request such as the one under comment, which simply seeks that, once the default in the payment of support is verified, the Court issues the arrest order. The legal system itself is the one that, for exceptional cases, expressly establishes the need for representation in a specific act to be through a special power of attorney. This is evidently not the case, so the appeal must be dismissed.” This criterion was reiterated through resolution No. 6956-1999, 14:48 of September 8, 1999, and in ruling No. 13817-2008, 10:05 of September 9, 2008, in which it stated: “(…) the special judicial attorney-in-fact of the support creditor is fully empowered to sign requests for personal arrest on behalf of her principal.” The highly personal nature (carácter personalísimo) of the maintenance obligation (articles 167 of the Family Code and 2 of the Maintenance Pensions Law) is due to the fact that it depends exclusively on the individual circumstances of the maintenance debtor and creditor, such that the obligation and the right to support are not transferable, neither inter vivos nor by reason of the death of either of the parties to the relationship; this is so because support is conferred exclusively on a specific person by reason of their particular needs and, correlatively, is imposed only on a specific person, taking into account their status as a relative or spouse as well as their economic means. This quality does not prevent either the maintenance creditor or the debtor, in a maintenance pension proceeding, from raising the actions they deem appropriate through judicial representatives or special judicial representatives, for, precisely, these representatives have the function of doing everything that their principal would do, were they to appear personally to defend their interests in a judicial proceeding. Consequently, this habeas corpus is denied.” Now, in ruling No. 8314-2002, 14:38 of August 27, 2002, said Chamber determined that the matter must be defined by the ordinary jurisdiction. It upheld the same criterion in resolutions No. 1685-2005, 9:13 of December 2, 2005, and No. 13703-2010, 14:34 of August 18, 2010. Thus, in at least three resolutions the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has so ruled on the subject and, based on the regulation of the mandate contract, it is evident that the highly personal nature of the obligation does not imply that its enforcement must be highly personal as regards the creditor party. Indeed, requiring a special power of attorney, beyond it not being provided for in legislation nor deriving from the highly personal nature of the obligation, is clearly contrary to the procedural simplicity provided for in article 2 of the Maintenance Pensions Law; likewise, considering the new regulation of the Family Procedural Code, it would be contrary to speed and gratuity to require a special power of attorney, and consequently, that it be granted in public deed, in order to request bodily constraint, since the constraint does not take effect on the person granting the power—the maintenance creditor—but on the obligated person; moreover, if constraint is being requested it is because the debtor has not fulfilled the maintenance obligation, hence it would also violate access to justice and the fundamental right to the material efficacy of a ruling, to make someone claiming support that has not been fulfilled incur expenses.

5. Mandates derived by operation of law In this case, it concerns those roles or positions that, by virtue of an express norm and the verification of the role, as well as by the express acceptance of the position and even its registration —if so required by law— acquire or entail the faculties of a specific mandate. For example, articles 548, 636, and 718 of the Civil Code. In those cases, it is not required that the power be formally granted; rather, by law, the role or position entails the faculties of the type of mandate that the law itself attributes. Thus, it is a mandate that derives from the law itself, and there is no agreement of wills or trust, which are distinctive features of the mandate contract.

Now, regarding the form of expressing the will on the part of the person granting the power, the mandate can be formal, meaning it must be recorded in such a way that its existence and scope can be demonstrated. Thus, both the general mandate, the generalísimo mandate, and the special mandate —for an act or contract with registry effects—, by application of articles 1251 and 1256 of the Civil Code, are evidently formal mandates.

In another respect, in the case of the absence of formality and consequently the consensuality of the mandate contract, Article 1251 of the Civil Code states: “The mandate contract may be entered into between parties present or absent, by public deed or private document and even by word; but witness testimony shall not be admitted in court, except in accordance with the general rules, nor shall a private document be admitted when the laws require a public document./ The instrument in which the mandate is recorded is called a power of attorney./ General or generalísimo powers must be granted by public deed and registered in the corresponding section of the Property Registry and do not produce effect with respect to third parties except from the date of registration.” Furthermore, Article 466, subsection 6) of the Civil Code provides: “The following shall be registered in the Person Registry: (…) 6) Every general or generalísimo power.” As a complement, according to the second paragraph of Article 1256 of the Civil Code: “The special power granted for an act or contract with registry effects must be executed by public deed and it shall not be necessary to register it in the Registry.” As things stand, it is the law that determines the form requirements for the mandate to be valid and also effective. Additionally, it is also the law that determines the scope of the mandate contract.

In this sense, the special judicial mandate —Article 1256 of the Civil Code— and the general judicial mandate —Article 1289 and 1290 of the Civil Code— are similar in that both are of a formal nature, but they differ in that the former, the special judicial mandate, as its name indicates, is special, that is, it refers to a particular judicial case, while the general judicial mandate authorizes the agent to represent the principal in all judicial business as plaintiff or defendant, unless there is some limitation in the power. For greater clarity, "it is called a 'judicial mandate' that which has the object of empowering the agent to intervene in judicial business in which the principal has an active or passive interest. (...) According to the extent of the power, the mandate is general or particular.

The former grants broad powers to manage all of the principal's affairs; the latter, although also encompassing broad powers—since they are the same as those of a general power of attorney (mandato general)—are limited to the business or businesses expressly mentioned in the power." (Alberto Brenes Córdoba (1985). Tratado de los contratos, San José: Editorial Juricentro, first revised and updated edition by Gerardo Trejos and Marina Ramirez, 1985, p. 224).

Regarding the special power of attorney (mandato especial), it is clear that it can be judicial or extrajudicial, but it has limitations. Thus, Article 1256 of the Civil Code establishes that "a special power for a specific judicial and extrajudicial juridical act will only empower the agent (mandatario) for the acts specified in the mandate, without being able to extend even to those considered a natural consequence of those the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) is charged with executing./ The special power granted for an act or contract with registrable effects must be executed in a public deed (escritura pública) and it will not be necessary to register it in the Registry." Therefore, the special power of attorney is subject to the limits established by Article 1256 transcribed above and, when it is a special judicial power of attorney, it must comply with the necessary formal requirements for it to have full validity and procedural effectiveness. That being the case, nothing prevents a special judicial power of attorney from being granted before a judicial officer (persona juzgadora) for a specific case. In this vein, it may be granted on plain paper. In this regard, Article 118 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) Law No. 7130 states: "Granting of the power. It will not be necessary for the power of attorney of whoever represents another in a proceeding to be recorded in a certified copy of a public deed, since it may be done on plain paper, provided it is signed by the grantor, or if they do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, by a person at their request; in both cases duly authenticated by a lawyer, who is not the one to whom the power is granted." Regarding this authentication, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Judgment No. 8464-2014, 14:45 of June 11, 2014, stated: "In effect, it is clear that in procedural matters the legislator has freedom of configuration to design jurisdictional procedures in view of the interests of the parties involved in the litigation, provided that such activity does not violate the right of defense or due process, in strict adherence to the rights protected in Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. In the specific case, it is clearly evident that the challenged provision, by establishing that: 'it will not be necessary for the power of attorney of whoever represents another in a proceeding to be recorded in a certified copy of a public deed, since it may be done on plain paper, provided it is signed by the grantor, or if they do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, by a person at their request; in both cases duly authenticated by a lawyer, who is not the one to whom the power is granted', has the purpose of precisely protecting the interests of the principal (poder-dante), particularly those who do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, with respect to the attorney-in-fact, by requiring that the power be authenticated by a lawyer, but, that is, one distinct from the person to whom the power is granted, in all of which the Constitutional Chamber does not perceive any irregularity, or any situation contrary to the Law of the Constitution. It is clear that the challenged rule does not constitute a gross impediment to the right of access to justice, taking into account that the parties, in the event the principal does not have the economic means to cover the lawyer's authentication costs, may well resort to one of the legal clinics of any university that offers the Law Degree, which provide that service free of charge. In this line of thought, the Chamber observes that the challenged rule has the purpose of protecting the interests of the principal who finds themselves in a disadvantaged situation with respect to their attorney-in-fact, or else avoiding some type of abuse of the latter against the former, for which reason the Chamber concludes that the challenged rule is not unconstitutional." Moreover, it must be noted that the fact that a different consequence is drawn from article 283 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública regarding administrative matters does not entail any discrimination with respect to the specific case, nor does it nullify or render unconstitutional the challenged provision, taking into account precisely the nature of the interests or purposes protected or pursued by the last sentence of article 118 of the Código Procesal Civil. No irregularity is therefore found in the content of the challenged provision, which is why the appropriate course is to dismiss the action on the merits.” At this point, it is worth noting that the Código Civil does not establish a particular form for the special power of attorney for judicial proceedings (poder especial judicial). Furthermore, the Código Procesal de Familia, Ley N.° 9747, does not contain any provision regarding the formal requirements of the special power of attorney for judicial proceedings; rather, it attributes the role of attorney-in-fact (mandatario) to the person acting as judicial director, with a limitation in the event of the termination of the process. In this regard, article 51 of that Code states: “Article 51. Powers of legal professionals and principal and alternate judicial directors. The person designated to act in the legal direction of the process shall have the powers granted by a special power of attorney for judicial proceedings, except in cases of petitions for termination of the process. If attending a conciliation hearing without the party, they may participate in it and make such agreements as they consider; but, in order to give it effect in acts involving the disposition of rights, the party must ratify the agreement, either in writing or in person, before the judicial authority, within a period of one month from the holding of the hearing. Once that period has expired and there is no manifestation from the represented party, the prior conciliation stage shall be deemed exhausted and the process shall continue.” So, in summary: the special power of attorney for judicial proceedings, as to its form, is currently governed by article 118 of the Código Procesal Civil, Ley N.° 7130, but as to its content, it is governed by articles 1256 and 1257 of the Código Civil. This latter provision also applies because it states: “The attorney-in-fact (mandatario) whose powers have not been specified or limited shall have those that the law grants to the generalísimo, general, or special attorney-in-fact (apoderado), according to the denomination given to them in the power of attorney (poder).” As can be observed, the special power of attorney for judicial proceedings is focused on a single judicial process and has the scope indicated by article 1256 of the Código Civil, but also has the scope detailed in numeral 1289 of said Code.

Note that a person who is an agent by virtue of a general judicial mandate (mandato general judicial) governed by Article 1289 of the Civil Code may do the following with respect to all judicial proceedings of their principal: “By virtue of a judicial power of attorney for all matters, the agent may appear as plaintiff or as defendant on behalf of their principal, in any matter that interests the latter, pursue the proceeding or proceedings in their various instances, make use of all ordinary and extraordinary remedies, settle, submit to arbitrators or amiable compounders, request and answer interrogatories, acknowledge documents, receive money and give the corresponding receipt, execute and cancel the deeds that the matter or matters require, waive any procedural step, recuse judicial officers and complain about them, or accuse them on account of the proceedings, and do everything that the owner would do if he himself were present, to bring the matters to a conclusion.” Therefore, if these powers are granted by the general judicial mandate for all judicial proceedings of the principal, by parity of reasoning it is understood that a person who is a special judicial agent (mandatario especial judicial) also has those same powers with respect to the single judicial proceeding that has been entrusted to them. Moreover, Article 1290 clearly states that, “if the general power of attorney is only for one or some judicial matters, the agent shall have for the matter or matters to which their power refers the same powers that, according to the preceding article, the general agent has for all the judicial matters of a person.” Lastly, and no less importantly, regarding a power of attorney —the instrument containing the mandate— what matters is who grants it, to whom it is granted —primarily whether the person is a legal professional or to determine if there is a conflict of interest, as well as incompatibility or impossibility of being an agent— the designation and its legal basis, as well as the description of the powers conferred, if such description appears in the instrument. In the case of a special judicial power of attorney, all of these details are very important because they are differentiating elements with respect to other types of mandates and make it possible to have clarity in case the text of the instrument raises any doubt about the type of mandate and its scope. That is to say, it is not a question of having to indicate each and every power of the mandate contract in a power of attorney, since there is no rule requiring it, but if they do appear, they represent a valuable resource for resolving any difficulty associated with the scope of the mandate. Furthermore, as already explained, depending on the type of power of attorney involved, a specific formality will be required for purposes of validity and effectiveness. Consequently, a power of attorney should not be merely “read,” but rather studied, and for this reason it is very important not to be guided solely by the designation, the regulations cited therein, or the description of the powers, but rather, it must be studied as a whole to determine what type of mandate contract is involved.[...].

**I. MANDATE GRANTED BY THE RESPONDENT PARTY:** Regarding the mandate contract (contrato de mandato), the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in resolution No. 6395-2011, 15:19 of May 18, 2011, stated: *"A power of attorney (poder), in this case a special judicial power of attorney (poder especial judicial), is a mandate contract (contrato de mandato) that requires an express manifestation of will from the principal (mandatario). The challenged rule provides that if a power of attorney has been issued for a specific business or act, it is automatically revoked if another is issued for that same business or act. However, and given that it is a problem of the party's expression of will, it is clear that if the principal's will is for the first power of attorney to subsist, a manifestation by the latter to that effect will suffice. The rule does not cause a violation of the right of access to justice, since it would be enough for the principal (mandante) to take the necessary precautions so that this tacit revocation does not occur. For legal certainty, the issuance of a new power of attorney has restrictive effects; however, that circumstance does not violate any fundamental right. Certainly, the legislator could have chosen another scheme; however, the chosen one does not touch upon Constitutional Law and judges must apply it as is, because furthermore, the content of the rule leaves no room for doubt or confusion. In this sense, the Chamber considers that the circumstance that the petitioner is dissatisfied with the design chosen by the legislator to regulate this matter, as well as with the way in which the jurisdictional bodies apply the rule, does not pose a constitutional problem."* Although the constitutional resolution refers especially to Article 1280 of the Civil Code, it is important to highlight the definition that said judgment contemplates regarding mandate (mandato) and how the consensual nature of that contract stands out.

It is therefore very important to consider the content of a power of attorney (poder) as a whole, in order to determine the will of the person who granted it. As a complement, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through the landmark judgment No. 069-1993, 3:00 p.m. of 3 November 1993, stated: "III.- The mandate (mandato) is a classic topic. Gaius divided contracts according to their social economic function into four different types: emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas and mandatum. For all of them he pointed out their lack of perfection by consent alone if at the same time the interests in the legal system, that is to say the justa causa, were not provided for; consequently, the relationship between the agreement of the parties (consensus) and the typical aim of interests configured by the legal system (justa causa) acquires a particular meaning, ultimately forming the fundamental qualifying element of the contract's structure. There should be few doubts about the mandate, however the legislation charged with informing the reasoning for the granting and substitution of powers of attorney shows a wide range of possibilities - as also happens with doctrine and jurisprudence (the second voice of the law: the first on the theoretical plane, the second on the practical plane) - which sometimes invites confusion.

**IV.-** It is appropriate to begin by addressing the argument of substitution of the mandate (sustitución del mandato). Even where an express rule exists, resorting to doctrines and case law from legal systems where substitution is not prohibited, or is expressly authorized, naturally generates interpretations different from those authorized by Article 1264 of the Civil Code, especially if it is analyzed in light of the provisions of the repealed General Code. To determine the true character of the national rule on the subject, it is advisable, even if briefly, to mention the different possible theses in foreign doctrine and case law.

**V-.** In France, agency (mandato) is regulated in the **Code Civil** of 1804 (Articles 1984-2010), where it is found that—within the agent’s (mandatario) obligations—the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) has no prohibition whatsoever on substituting his power. This thesis comes from Canon Law, where substitution of the power is fully authorized. In that manner it is provided: **"Article 1994. The agent is liable for the person who substitutes for him in the management: 1º. When he has not received the power to substitute another; 2º. When this power was conferred upon him without the designation of a person, and the one he chose was notoriously incapable or insolvent. In all cases, the principal (mandante) may proceed directly against the persons the agent has substituted for himself."** From the interpretation of this rule has derived the principle that powers are susceptible to substitution by the attorney-in-fact, save for an express prohibition by the of the principal. But the scope of that rule must also be interpreted in relation to the responsibility of the agent. Indeed, the mandate is granted **intuito personae**, which excludes the possibility of exemption from liability; consequently, if the agent substitutes—in whole or in part, in this last case sharing it—his power, the assistance or substitution in no way affects his liability to the principal. Furthermore, substitution would be impossible, and ineffective, regarding the mandate, when it involves the performance of functions personally reserved to the agent. On the subject, however, there is no consensus in classical French doctrine; for authors such as Josserand and even for Planiol and Rippert, the mandate may be substituted, but there are others such as Colin and Capitant who do not agree with this thesis. In modern French civil law, the two currents also exist.

**VI.-** In Spanish law, the **Civil Code (Código civil)** of 1889 —following in general terms the French model— when regulating the mandate (Articles 1709 to 1739), departs from its predecessor regarding the substitution of the mandate since this can occur unless prohibited by the principal (poderdante), with which the canonical thesis becomes more evident. This is clear from the letter of the law. **"Article 1721. The agent (mandatario) may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited it; but he is responsible for the management of the substitute: 1st. When he was not given the authority to appoint one. 2nd. When he was given this authority, but without designating the person, and the appointee was notoriously incompetent or insolvent. What is done by the substitute appointed against the principal's prohibition shall be null."** The liability of the substitute to the original principal is also defined in Spanish law. **"Article 1722. In the cases included in the two numbers of the preceding article, the principal may also bring his action against the substitute."** The vision of the Spanish codifier is clear, who departed …or criteria of friendship, trust, affection, affinity, between principal and agent characteristic of French law, to allow any third party the possibility of providing some service or doing something on behalf of or by order of another (Article 1709).

***VII.-* In the German Civil Code, **B.G.B.**, of 1900, the mandate (mandato) is also regulated within contracts (Articles 662 to 676), following criteria somewhat different from those of other legal systems regarding substitution (sustitución). **"Article 664. The agent (mandatario) may not, in case of doubt, entrust the execution of the mandate to a third party. If the transfer (transmisión) is permitted, the agent shall only be liable for fault imputable to him in the transfer. He is liable for the fault of an assistant according to paragraph 278. The claim to the execution of the mandate is, in case of doubt, not transferable."** The author Enneccerus— in the well-known Treatise on Civil Law by Enneccerus, Kipp, and Wolff— maintains that since the Code does not stipulate whether the principal's (mandante) claim to the execution of the mandate is transferable or not, it must be understood as unauthorized; however, the non-transferability would be subject to an agreement to the contrary. Regarding the scope of this orientation, the well-known author Joseph Hupka— Voluntary Representation in Legal Transactions, Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1930— considers it a departure by modern codifications from canon law criteria, since— as in almost all contracts— in the mandate, substitution is inadmissible unless expressly authorized in the contract by the principal, taking into account the special circumstances of the case.

VIII.- In Costa Rica, the Código General of 1841 also gave special attention to the mandate (Articles 1328 to 1353), following almost literally the rule of the Code Civil regarding the authorization of substitution. "Article 1338. The agent answers for the one he substitutes in the administration: 1. When he has not received the power to substitute another; 2. When this power has been conferred upon him without designation of a person, and the one he has chosen is notoriously incompetent or insolvent." But this criterion was radically changed in the Código Civil of 1886, where—while still maintaining the general principles of the contract in question (Articles 1251 to 1300)—the substitution of the mandate can only be carried out by the agent if expressly authorized by the principal. "Article 1264. The agent may substitute the charge, if in the power of attorney he is expressly empowered to do so, and shall only be liable for the acts of the substitute in the event that the principal had not designated to him the person upon whom he made the substitution of the power, and that the substitute was notoriously incompetent or insolvent. When it concerns a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo), the substitution may only be made in the person or persons that the principal indicates in the same power." In like manner, the same agent is limited with respect to the substitution of the substitute, following the principle of prior authorization.

<span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">"Article 1265.</span><span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp;</span><span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp;</span><span data-mce-style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub;">The previous mandatary may not revoke the substitution (sustitución) that he has made, except when he is authorized to do so and expressly reserves that power when making the substitution (sustitución)."</span> **IX.-** As principles of the substitution of the power of attorney (mandato) in Costa Rican law, the following may be cited: **A)** The attorney-in-fact (apoderado) has a legal prohibition against substituting his power of attorney (mandato). The granting is **intuito personae**, since in the contract the authority conferred to represent the principal (mandante) operates based on ties of friendship, trust, affinity, or affection between the grantor (poderdante) and the attorney-in-fact (apoderado). Since the functions of the power of attorney (mandato) concern both the patrimonial and personal spheres, the law does not authorize the agent (mandatario) to substitute, by his will alone, the power of attorney (mandato) conferred. **B)** The substitution of the power of attorney (mandato) is possible only if the grantor (poderdante) expressly authorizes it in the power of attorney (poder). The non-transferability of the power of attorney (mandato), as a general rule, derives from the law, since the law weighs the will of the principal (mandante) over that of the agent (mandatario) or the power of attorney (mandato) itself. Consequently, this other principle is constituted by the idea of subordinating non-transferability to an agreement to the contrary, that is, emphasizing the interest of the will of the principal (mandante) over any other interest, as protection of that bond of trust, from which patrimonial or personal consequences may derive for the latter. Whether the authorization to substitute the power of attorney (mandato) is open, i.e., empowering the agent (mandatario) to designate the substitute, or whether, on the contrary, the will of the grantor (poderdante) binds it to a specific substitute, has legal effects in the sphere of liability.

**X.-** Originally the mandate was deemed gratuitous; however, today the rule is the inverse: it is not presumed gratuitous unless so stipulated (Article 1258), since even though its etymology is linked to trust, in modern law it has more of a transactional character where the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) performs, in the name of the principal (poderdante), the businesses or tasks entrusted, with direct legal effects on the principal’s assets or personal sphere. The principal, in this manner, is liable for the actions taken in his name by the attorney-in-fact, unless the latter’s conduct violated the law or involved fault or fraud, in which case the principal may demand liability. One such case could be when a substitute has been appointed without the express authorization of the principal, allowing the principal to proceed against both the attorney-in-fact and the substitute.

**XI.-** In all legal systems, as a general principle of law, the termination of the mandate occurs upon the death of the principal or the attorney-in-fact. This rule is expressly found in Article 1278, subsection 5), of the Costa Rican Civil Code. Likewise, in the 2003 French *Code Civil*, in subsection 3) of Article 1732 of Spain, in the rule of 672 of the German *B.G.B.*, in 1722 subsection 4) of the Italian *Codice civile*, and in 1346 subsection 3) of the *Código General de Carrillo*. Even in many of these systems, reference is also made to civil death, or to states of bankruptcy and insolvency.

XII.- For all the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed, because the plaintiff's claims contravene the most basic principles of the mandate. In effect, the holder of the dollar savings account number (…) at Banco (…) was (…) and not the plaintiff. She was his attorney-in-fact insofar as she was authorized to withdraw funds from the account. Said power of attorney legally had two limitations. The first consists of the non-transferability of the power because its substitution to a third party not expressly authorized by the principal is legally prohibited (Article 1264). The second, due to its legal non-existence arising from the death of the principal (Article 1278, subsection 5). From the foregoing, the ineffectiveness of said mandate is clear, both for withdrawing funds once the holder of the savings account has died, and for substituting the power to a third party. (…).” Based on all of the foregoing, it is pertinent to analyze the general provisions on the mandate, as well as the different types of mandates that exist, since the mandate contract is determined both by its scope —powers— and by the manner in which the will of the person granting it must be expressed. Regarding the scope of the mandate, there are four representative mandates —because the person acting does so in the name and on behalf of the principal— and a fifth scenario derived from various laws, as will be explained: 1) Generalísimo. This type of mandate is regulated in Articles 1253 and 1254 of said Code and is a power of disposition and administration. Furthermore, it may be granted for all, for one, or for some specific businesses.

Pursuant to Article 253 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio), it must be registered in the Mercantile Registry (Registro Mercantil) if granted by a merchant, and the revocation (revocación), substitution (sustitución), modification (modificación), or extension (prórroga) of the mandate (mandato) must also be registered. Furthermore, if the grantor is not a merchant, it must be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) pursuant to Article 466, subsection 6) of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Such registrations constitute validity and efficacy requirements. It is important to point out that a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) of a judicial nature does not permit litigation when personal claims are being ventilated. In this regard, the content of Article 1253 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) must be observed, which states: “By virtue of the general power of attorney (mandato or poder generalísimo) for all of a person’s affairs, the agent (mandatario) may sell, mortgage, and in any other manner dispose of or encumber all types of property; accept or repudiate inheritances; manage judicially; enter into all types of contracts; and execute all other legal acts (actos jurídicos) that the principal (poderdante) could execute, except those that by law must be executed by the owner in person and those acts for which the law expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo).” That is, the rule clearly exempts from the faculties of the general agent claims of a personal nature, as well as those acts for which the law requires a special power of attorney. Thus, for example, it is not possible, by means of a general power of attorney, for the agent to grant matrimonial agreements (capitulaciones matrimoniales) since this is a matter of a personal nature. Since a general power of attorney may be granted for one or some affairs or for all of the principal’s affairs, Article 1254 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states: “If the general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) is only for one or some affairs, the agent shall have, with respect to the affair or affairs to which his power refers and the property they comprise, the same faculties that, according to the previous article, a general agent (apoderado generalísimo) has for all of a person’s affairs.” In other words, a general power of attorney for one affair or several affairs grants the agent the same faculties as a general power of attorney granted for all of the affairs. 2) General (General). The general mandate (mandato general) is regulated in Article 1255 of that Code and is a power of administration, but not of disposition (disposición). In the same way, it may be granted for all, one, or some of the principal’s affairs. Also, pursuant to Article 253 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio), it must be registered in the Mercantile Registry (Registro Mercantil) if granted by a merchant, and the revocation (revocación), substitution (sustitución), modification (modificación), or extension (prórroga) of the mandate (mandato) must also be registered.

Furthermore, also if the person granting it is not a merchant, it must be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) in accordance with article 466, subsection 6) of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Such registrations are requirements for validity and effectiveness. With respect to the powers granted by a general power of attorney (mandato general) for all, some, or one of the principal's (mandante) businesses, article 1255 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states: "By the general power for all, some, or one businesses, the agent (mandatario) has, regarding the business or businesses to which his power refers, broad and general administration, with such administration comprising the following powers: 1st.- To enter into agreements and execute the acts necessary for the conservation or exploitation of the assets. 2nd.- To bring and maintain possessory actions and those necessary to interrupt the statute of limitations (prescripción) regarding the things covered by the power of attorney (mandato). 3rd.- To rent or lease movable property for up to one year; but, if the power is limited to a certain time, the period of the lease must not exceed that term. To lease real property, a generalísimo or special power of attorney is required. (Thus amended the preceding subsection by article 132 of the Urban and Suburban Leases Law, law No.7527 of July 10, 1995). 4th.- To sell the fruits as well as the other movable property that by its nature is intended to be sold or is at risk of being lost or deteriorating. 5th.- To judicially or extrajudicially demand payment of credits and give the corresponding receipts. 6th.- To execute all legal acts that according to the nature of the business are virtually comprised within it as means of execution or as necessary consequences of the power of attorney." Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that, based on the third paragraph of article 1251 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), both the generalísimo power and the general power must be granted by public deed (escritura pública) and be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) as already stated, but, furthermore, they do not produce effect regarding third parties except from the date of their registration. That is, not from their filing.

**3) Special** This power of attorney contract is regulated in article 1256 also of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and according to the second paragraph of that rule, it can be granted with or without registry purposes. This type of power of attorney —special— must not be registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público), but it must be drawn up by public deed (escritura pública) if it has registry effects. Therefore, as a general rule, this type of power of attorney must not be granted by public deed (escritura pública) except as already stated.

Furthermore, it may be a special power of attorney (mandato especial) for judicial or extrajudicial matters.

It is appropriate to note that bill No. 15.617 was formerly processed with the aim of authentically interpreting Article 1256 of the Civil Code, specifically the phrase that reads: *“The special power of attorney granted for an act or contract with registration effects must be executed in a public deed.”* In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution No. 8424-2005, at 18:19 on June 28, 2005, ruled: *“The interpreted numeral expresses the minimum content that every special power of attorney must have for a specific, concrete judicial or extrajudicial act and establishes the rules that must be observed for granting a mandate for an act or contract with registration effects. In this sense, the normative content of Article 1256 of the Civil Code is clear and precise and, therefore, requires no further precision or clarification whatsoever.”* It is appropriate to note that a special judicial power of attorney and a general judicial power of attorney must necessarily be granted to a lawyer. Likewise, it is appropriate to highlight that a special judicial power of attorney is not always sufficient to litigate in family matters, since some matters, as will be explained, require a very special power of attorney (poder especialísimo).

**4) Very Special Power of Attorney (Especialísimo).** This power basically arises from what is regulated in the last two lines of Article 1253, since that norm indicates that, by virtue of a very general power of attorney (mandato generalísimo) for all the business of the principal, the agent may carry out all *“legal acts that the principal could do, except those that according to the law must be executed by the owner himself in person and the acts for which the law expressly requires a very special power of attorney (poder especialísimo).”* In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 690-E-13, at 11:25 on June 4, 2013, regarding the exceptions contemplated in Article 1253 with respect to the very general power of attorney, ruled: *“However, this must be interpreted restrictively and never extensively, given the public interest that accompanies said normative doctrine, so as not to create odious limitations that come to prevent or casuistically affect its occupation, since the interest of the community in avoiding surprise discussions, disruptive of the social order and legal certainty that revolves around the exercise of this type of power must prevail.”* Regarding the irrational and unfounded requirement of a special or very special power of attorney, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through resolution 16868-2008, at 13:26 on November 7, 2008, stated: *“III.- ON THE MERITS: The claim for the alleged violation of the petitioner’s right of petition is based, on the one hand, on the fact that they did not receive the documents to register the marriage of the petitioner’s daughter and, on the other, on the cause of that refusal, insofar as the very general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) granted by her daughter was not admitted as sufficient power to request the registration of her marriage, held abroad.”* Regarding the mere fact that the documents were not received, the Chamber has considered that if an application does not meet the established legal and regulatory requirements and the interested party is informed how to remedy the defects, it can be rejected at the outset (ad portas), in order to avoid unnecessary administrative and procedural costs (see, among others, judgment number 2007-006167 of eighteen hours and eleven minutes of May eight, two thousand seven).-IV.- However, the respondents' interpretation regarding the scope of the mandate granted through a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) limits the exercise of the petitioner's fundamental right of petition and the interested party's legal right to the registration of her marriage. The law does not require a special power of attorney (poder especial) or a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) to request the registration of a marriage celebrated abroad, but rather, solely, the request of an interested party (Article 55 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal [Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones]). While it is true that the Law imposes the requirement of a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) for the celebration of marriage, such a requirement is not provided for the request for marriage registration. The Civil Code establishes the scope of the general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), as follows: "Article 1253.- By virtue of the mandate or general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) for all of a person's business, the attorney-in-fact may sell, mortgage, and in any other way alienate or encumber all kinds of property; accept or repudiate inheritances, litigate, enter into all kinds of contracts, and perform all other legal acts that the principal could perform, except those that according to law must be executed by the owner in person and the acts for which the law expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo)." -This type of authorization, as has been stated, allows the attorney-in-fact to execute all legal acts that the principal could perform, except those acts for which the law requires them to be performed by the owner in person, or those for which the law expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo). It is paradoxical that the Registry grants greater legal weight to a notarized request from one of the spouses than to a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) registered in the Public Registry. The protection of amparo shall proceed (sic) not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied rules (Article 20 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law [Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional]), and this is precisely one of those cases where a fundamental right is violated or, perhaps, limited by a rule that has been improperly interpreted and applied.

When Article 55 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and of the Civil Registry refers to “request by an interested party,” understanding that a general power of attorney (apoderado generalísimo) is not such constitutes an interpretation contrary to the right of citizens to petition and to obtain a prompt resolution, as well as access to administrative justice and public services; the Administration cannot invent unnecessary obstacles to hinder access to public services. Therefore, the amparo should be granted, and the respondents ordered to accept the filing and process the registration of the marriage of the amparo applicant's daughter, provided that the applicant complies with the other legal requirements demanded for this purpose.” Now, the special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) does not require any registration; it is very specific, as it refers to a particular act and will be required when the regulations expressly so provide, such as, for example, to donate on behalf of another person —Article 1408 of the Civil Code—, to challenge paternity —Article 72 of the Family Code—, or to adopt and to grant prenuptial agreements, among other matters. Because it is a specific mandate, it is not possible for the attorney-in-fact to act by alleging implied powers. Likewise, a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) —granted in a public deed— will be required when, through jurisprudential development, it has been understood that the nature of the right sought to be exercised by using the power so requires. Furthermore, because it is a specific mandate, the act for which it was granted must be detailed. In this regard, this entire jurisprudential line has emerged basically from the content of Article 30 of the Family Code, since that provision requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) to contract marriage. In this respect, the provision states: “Marriage may be celebrated by means of an attorney-in-fact with a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) contained in a public deed, which expresses the name and particulars of the person with whom it is to be celebrated; but the other contracting party must always appear in person at the ceremony./ There shall be no marriage if, at the time of celebration, the power had already been legally revoked.” This with the observation that the Family Procedural Code, Law No. 9747, reformed Article 30 of the Family Code as follows: “Marriage. Impossibility of marriage by power of attorney." Under no circumstances shall a marriage be celebrated with a power of attorney from one of the contracting parties.” Furthermore, this reform shall enter into force on October 1, 2024. The requirement of a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) —and in a public deed (escritura pública)— has existed for decades in Family Law regarding divorce by mutual consent, since the nature of the situation demands it, such that whoever represents one of the spouses to execute the respective deed must not only have a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) granted in a public deed (escritura pública), but said power must also contain each and every one of the clauses of the divorce agreement. Note that the clauses of the divorce deed are those that will govern the terms of the dissolution of the matrimonial bond, hence a person holding a special power of attorney (poder especialísima) cannot decide on what terms their principal divorces. That is an example in which the nature of the substantive right sought to be enforced obliges the requirement of a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) —and in a public deed (escritura pública)— if the attorney-in-fact is to execute the divorce deed, since if such act is performed personally by their principal, at this moment, under current legislation, only a special judicial power of attorney (poder especial judicial) is required to file the petition for approval.

Thus, the Family Procedural Code (Código Procesal de Familia), Law No. 9747, which is about to enter into force, expressly requires a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) and in a public deed (escritura pública) for the processing of divorce by mutual consent, as it reforms Article 48 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). That is to say, the jurisprudential criterion that has governed for decades has now become a statute. In addition, this new Code states in Article 55: “Special power of attorney (Poder especialísimo). In cases where a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) is necessary, it must be granted in a public deed (escritura pública) and the acts for which authorization is given within the process shall be recorded; in the event of conciliation or mediation, the exact clauses of the eventual settlement must be specifically detailed, all under penalty of nullity of the agreement reached. The power may be revoked at any stage using the same form as its granting, except if done orally in the hearing, for which no formality shall be required.” Therefore, with the aforementioned reform, the special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) in matters of Family Law must be granted in a public deed (escritura pública), but in addition, it must detail the content, or rather, for what purpose the agent is authorized. Having said that, it is clear that the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria) is strictly personal (personalísima).

That characteristic is expressly contemplated in Article 167 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), and the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), through resolution No. 9580-2001, 16:17 of September 25, 2001, regarding the support obligation, stated: "(…) it is personal in nature, inter vivos, that is, it is ' ', meaning its effects do not survive the death of the obligor, that is, it does not form part of the universality of the inheritance, by virtue of the provisions of Article 521 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), since succession does not encompass rights or obligations of a personal nature, as they are extinguished with the death of the obligor." However, it is not because the support obligation is highly personal that a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo) must be required to litigate in a support proceeding, and that includes requesting bodily constraint. The undersigned considers that the issue has been defined by constitutional case law. For example, in judgment No. 989-1991, 16:08 of June 4, 1991, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice ruled: "I.- The plaintiff's claim consists of denying legitimacy to the actions taken by the judicial attorney in the support proceeding being heard before the Misdemeanor and Infractions Court of Goicoechea (Alcaldía de Faltas y Contravenciones de Goicoechea). The Chamber disagrees with Mr. (…)'s opinion, for it is not true that the special judicial attorney cannot request that contempt be ordered, when there is a breach in the payment of the installments set by the court. It must be kept in mind that the procedure in these cases is that, upon the plaintiff's request, the Court verifies whether there is indeed default in the payment of the installments, and then the corresponding resolution ordering bodily constraint is issued. Thus, the request in question does not have special characteristics to sustain that it is a 'highly personal' action, for which only the right holder is legitimized. II.- The provisions of Articles 1289 in relation to 1290, both of the Civil Code, allow establishing that the special judicial power of attorney provides leeway to file a request like the one in question, which simply seeks that, once the default in payment of support is confirmed, the Court issue the contempt order. It is the legal system itself which, for exceptional cases, expressly establishes the need for representation in a specific act to be conferred by a special power of attorney (poder especialísimo). This is evidently not the case, so the appeal must be denied." This criterion was reiterated through resolution No. 6956-1999, 14:48 of September 8, 1999, and in judgment No. 13817-2008, 10:05 of September 9, 2008, in which it stated: "(…) the special judicial attorney of the support creditor is fully empowered to sign requests for bodily constraint on behalf of her represented party." The highly personal nature of the maintenance obligation (Articles 167 of the Family Code and 2 of the Pensiones Alimentarias Law) is due to the fact that it depends exclusively on the individual circumstances of the maintenance debtor and creditor, such that the obligation and the right to maintenance are not susceptible to transfer, neither inter vivos, nor by reason of the death of either of the subjects of the relationship; this is so because maintenance is conferred exclusively on a specific person by reason of their particular needs and, correlatively, imposed only on a specific person, taking into account their character as a relative or spouse as well as their economic possibilities. Such a quality does not prevent either the maintenance creditor or the maintenance debtor, in a maintenance proceeding, from filing such actions as they deem appropriate through judicial representatives or special judicial representatives, since, precisely, these have the function of doing everything that their principal would do, if he himself were to appear to defend his interests in a judicial process. Hence, this habeas corpus is denied." That being said, in Voto N.° 8314-2002, 14:38 of August 27, 2002, the Chamber determined that the matter must be defined by the ordinary jurisdiction. It held the same criterion in resolutions N.° 1685-2005, 9:13 of December 2, 2005, and N.° 13703-2010, 14:34 of August 18, 2010. Thus, in at least three resolutions the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has in fact pronounced on the matter and, given the regulation on the contract of mandate, it is evident that the highly personal nature of the obligation does not mean that its enforcement must be highly personal as far as the creditor party is concerned. Indeed, requiring a special power of attorney, in addition to not being provided for in the legislation nor deriving from the highly personal nature of the obligation, is evidently contrary to the procedural simplicity provided for in Article 2 of the Pensiones Alimentarias Law, just as, considering the new regulation of the Código Procesal de Familia, it would be contrary to swiftness and gratuity to require a special power of attorney and, consequently, that it be granted by public deed, in order to request a corporeal coercive measure (apremio corporal), since the coercive measure does not take effect on the person who would grant the power of attorney —the maintenance creditor— but on the obligated person, and furthermore, if a coercive measure is being requested, it is because the debtor person has not complied with the maintenance obligation, hence it would also violate access to justice and the fundamental right to the material effectiveness of a resolution, to cause expenses to be incurred by one who claims maintenance that has not been fulfilled. 5. Mandates derived by legal provision.

In this case, it concerns those roles or positions which, by virtue of an express legal provision and the verification of the role, as well as by the express acceptance of the position and even its registration—if so required by law—acquire or entail the powers of a specific mandate. For example, articles 548, 636, and 718 of the Civil Code. In those cases, it is not required that the power be formally granted; rather, by law, the role or position entails the powers of the type of mandate that the law itself attributes. Thus, it is a mandate that derives from the law itself, and there is no agreement of wills or trust, which are distinctive features of the mandate contract.

Now, with regard to the form of expressing the will by the person granting the power, the mandate may be formal, that is, it must be recorded in such a way that its existence and scope can be demonstrated. Thus, both the general mandate, the generalísimo mandate, and the special mandate—for an act or contract with registration effects—by application of articles 1251 and 1256 of the Civil Code, are evidently formal mandates.

In another vein, in the case of the absence of formality and, consequently, the consensual nature of the mandate contract, article 1251 of the Civil Code states: “The mandate contract may be entered into between parties who are present or absent, by public deed, private document, or even orally; but the testimony of witnesses shall not be admitted in court except in accordance with the general rules, nor shall a private document be admitted when the laws require a public document./ The instrument in which the mandate is recorded is called a power of attorney./ General or generalísimo powers of attorney must be granted in a public deed and registered in the corresponding section of the Property Registry and shall have no effect with respect to third parties except from the date of registration.” Furthermore, article 466, subsection 6) of the Civil Code provides: “The following shall be registered in the Registry of Persons: (...) 6) Every general or generalísimo power of attorney.” As a complement, according to the second paragraph of article 1256 of the Civil Code: “The special power of attorney granted for an act or contract with registration effects must be executed in a public deed and it shall not be necessary to register it in the Registry.” Thus, it is the law that determines the formality requirements for a mandate to be valid and, furthermore, effective. Additionally, it is also the law that determines the scope of the mandate contract.

In this sense, the special judicial mandate—1256 of the Civil Code—like the general judicial mandate—articles 1289 and 1290 of the Civil Code—are similar in that both are formal in nature, but they differ in that the former, the special judicial mandate, as its name indicates, is special, that is, it refers to a particular judicial case, while the general judicial mandate authorizes the agent to represent the principal in all judicial business as plaintiff or defendant, unless there is some limitation in the power of attorney. For greater clarity, “it is called a 'judicial mandate,' one whose purpose is to empower the agent to intervene in judicial business in which the principal is actively or passively interested. (...) According to the extent of the power, the mandate is general or particular.” The former confers broad authority for managing all of the principal’s affairs; the latter, while also encompassing broad powers, being the same as those of a general power of attorney (mandato general), is limited to the transaction or transactions expressly mentioned in the power of attorney (poder).” (Alberto Brenes Córdoba (1985). Tratado de los contratos, San José: Editorial Juricentro, first edition revised and updated by Gerardo Trejos and Marina Ramirez, 1985, p. 224).

Regarding the special power of attorney (mandato especial), it is clear that it can be judicial or extrajudicial, but it has limitations. Thus, Article 1256 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) establishes that, “a special power of attorney (poder especial) for a specific judicial or extrajudicial legal act shall only empower the agent (mandatario) for the acts specified in the mandate (mandato), without being able to extend even to those considered a natural consequence of those the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) is charged with executing./ A special power of attorney (poder especial) granted for an act or contract with registration effects shall be executed in public deed (escritura pública) and it shall not be necessary to register it in the Registry (Registro).” Therefore, the special power of attorney (poder especial) is subject to the limits established by the transcribed Article 1256 and, when it concerns a judicial special power of attorney (poder especial judicial), it must comply with the necessary formal requirements for its full procedural validity and effectiveness. That being said, nothing prevents a judicial special mandate (mandato especial judicial) from being granted before a judge (persona juzgadora) for a specific case. In this vein, it may be granted on plain paper (papel simple). In this regard, Article 118 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) Law No. 7130 states: “Granting of the power of attorney (poder). It shall not be necessary for the power of attorney (poder) of one who represents another in a proceeding to be recorded in a certified copy of a public deed (testimonio de escritura pública), as it may be done on plain paper (papel simple), provided it is signed by the grantor (otorgante), or if they do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, by a person at their request; in both cases duly authenticated by an attorney, who is not the one to whom the power of attorney (poder) is granted.” Regarding such authentication (autenticación), the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), through judgment No. 8464-2014, 2:45 p.m. of June 11, 2014, stated: “Indeed, it is clear that in procedural matters the legislature has the freedom to design jurisdictional proceedings in consideration of the interests of the parties involved in the litigation, provided that such activity does not violate the right of defense or due process, in strict adherence to the rights protected in Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. In the specific case, it is patently obvious that the challenged provision, by establishing that: ‘it shall not be necessary for the power of attorney (poder) of one who represents another in a proceeding to be recorded in a certified copy of a public deed (testimonio de escritura pública), as it may be done on plain paper (papel simple), provided it is signed by the grantor (otorgante), or if they do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, by a person at their request; in both cases duly authenticated by an attorney, who is not the one to whom the power of attorney (poder) is granted’, aims precisely to protect the interests of the principal (poder-dante), particularly those who do not know how to write or are impeded from doing so, with respect to the attorney-in-fact (apoderado), by requiring that the power of attorney (poder) be authenticated by an attorney, but, that is, a person distinct from the one to whom the power of attorney (poder) is granted, in all of which the Constitutional Chamber does not perceive any irregularity, or any situation contrary to the Law of the Constitution. It is clear that the challenged provision does not constitute a gross impediment to the right of access to justice, taking into account that the parties, in case the principal (poderdante) lacks the economic means to cover the costs of the attorney’s authentication (autenticación), may well turn to one of the legal clinics of any university that offers a Law Degree program, which provide this service free of charge. In this vein, the Chamber observes that the challenged provision aims to protect the interests of the principal (poderdante) who is in a position of disadvantage with respect to their attorney-in-fact (apoderado), or to avoid any type of abuse of the latter with respect to the former, for which reason the Chamber concludes that the challenged provision is not unconstitutional.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the fact that article 283 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) yields some different consequence with respect to administrative matters does not imply any discrimination with respect to the specific case, nor does it void or render unconstitutional the challenged provision, taking into account precisely the nature of the interests or purposes that the last sentence of article 118 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) protects or pursues. No irregularity is therefore observed in the content of the challenged provision, which is why the appropriate course is the rejection on the merits of the action.” On this point, it is worth indicating that the Civil Code (Código Civil) does not establish a particular form regarding the special judicial power-of-attorney (poder especial judicial). Moreover, the Family Procedure Code (Código Procesal de Familia), Law No. 9747, does not contemplate any provision on formal requirements of the special judicial power-of-attorney (poder especial judicial), but rather attributes the capacity of mandatary (mandatario) to whoever acts as a judicial director (persona directora judicial) with a limitation in the event of the termination of the proceeding. In this regard, article 51 of that Code states: “Article 51. Faculties of legal professionals (profesionales en abogacía) and judicial directors (personas directoras judiciales) and substitutes. The person designated to act in the legal direction of the proceeding shall have the faculties given by a special judicial power-of-attorney (poder especial judicial), except when it concerns petitions for termination of the proceeding. In the event of attending a conciliation hearing without the party, the person may participate in it and make whatever agreements they consider; but, in order to give effect to this in acts that imply the disposition of rights, the party must ratify the agreement, either in writing or in person, before the judicial authority, within a period of one month counted from the holding of the hearing. Once that period has expired and there being no manifestation from the represented party, the prior conciliation stage shall be deemed exhausted and the proceeding shall continue.” So, in summary: the special judicial power-of-attorney (poder especial judicial) as to its form is currently governed by article 118 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), Law No. 7130, but as to its content, it is governed by articles 1256 and 1257 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). This last provision also applies because it states: “The mandatary (mandatario) for whom faculties have not been specified or limited shall have those that the law grants to the generalísimo (apoderado generalísimo), general (general), or special (especial) attorney-in-fact, according to the denomination given to them in the power-of-attorney.” As observed, the special judicial power-of-attorney (poder especial judicial) is focused on a single judicial proceeding and has the scope indicated in article 1256 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), but also has the scope detailed in numeral 1289 of the cited Code.

Note that whoever is empowered as attorney-in-fact (apoderado (a)) by virtue of a general judicial mandate (mandato general judicial) regulated in article 1289 of the Civil Code can do the following with respect to all judicial processes of their principal: “By virtue of the judicial power for all businesses the mandatary (mandatario) can appear as plaintiff or as defendant on behalf of their grantor, in any business that interests the latter, pursue the proceeding or proceedings in their various instances, use all ordinary and extraordinary remedies, settle, submit to arbitrators or amiable compositeurs, request and answer interrogatories, acknowledge documents, receive money and give the corresponding receipt, grant and cancel the deeds that the business or businesses require, waive any procedural step, challenge judicial officials and complain about them, or accuse them on account of the proceedings, and do everything that the owner himself would do if he were present, to bring the businesses to a conclusion.” Therefore, if the general judicial mandate grants these powers for every judicial process of the principal, by parity of reasoning it is understood that whoever is a special judicial mandatary (mandatario especial judicial) also has those same powers with respect to the sole judicial process entrusted to them. Indeed, article 1290 clearly indicates that, “if the general power is only for one or some judicial businesses, the attorney-in-fact (apoderado) shall have for the business or businesses to which his power refers the same powers that, according to the preceding article, the general attorney-in-fact has for all the judicial businesses of a person.” Finally and no less importantly, from a power (poder) —the instrument containing the mandate (mandato)— what matters is who grants it, to whom it is granted —primarily whether the person is a legal professional or in order to determine if there is a conflict of interest, as well as incompatibility or impossibility of being a mandatary— the designation and its legal basis, as well as the description of the powers conferred, if such description is set forth in the instrument. In the case of a special judicial power (poder especial judicial), all these pieces of information are very important because they are differentiating elements with respect to other types of mandates and, allow for clarity in the event that the text of the instrument raises any doubt about the type of mandate and its scope. That is, it is not a matter of a power having to indicate each and every one of the powers of the mandate contract, since there is no rule that so requires, but if they are indeed set forth, they represent a significant input for resolving any difficulty associated with the scope of the mandate. Furthermore, as already explained, depending on the type of power involved, a specific formality will be required for reasons of validity and effectiveness. Consequently, a power should not be “read” but rather, studied and, therefore, it is very important not to be guided solely by the designation, the regulations cited therein, or the description of powers, but rather, it must be studied as a whole to determine what type of mandate contract is involved.[...]."

"I.MANDATO OTORGADO POR LA PARTE ACCIONADA: Sobre el contrato de mandato, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante resolución N.°6395-2011, 15:19 de 18 de mayo de 2011 dijo: “Un poder, en este caso un poder especial judicial, es un contrato de mandato que supone una manifestación de voluntad expresa del mandatario. La norma impugnada dispone que si se ha emitido un poder para un negocio o acto determinado, este queda automáticamente revocado si se emite otro para ese mismo negocio o acto. Sin embargo, y dado que se trata de un problema de expresión de voluntad de la parte, es claro que si la voluntad del mandante es que el primer poder subsista, bastará una manifestación suya en ese sentido. La norma no provoca una violación al derecho de acceso a la justicia, pues bastaría con que el mandante tome las previsiones del caso, para que esa revocatoria tácita no se produzca. Por seguridad jurídica la emisión de un nuevo poder tiene efectos restrictivos; sin embargo, esa circunstancia no viola ningún derecho fundamental. Ciertamente, el legislador podría haber escogido otro esquema; sin embargo, el escogido no roza con el Derecho de la Constitucional y los jueces deben aplicarlo tal cual, pues además, el contenido de la norma no deja margen para duda o confusión. En este sentido, la Sala considera que la circunstancia de que el accionante esté inconforme con el diseño que escogió el legislador para regular este tema así como con la forma en que los órganos jurisdiccionales aplican la norma, no plantea un problema de constitucionalidad.” Si bien la resolución constitucional se refiere especialmente al artículo 1280 del Código Civil, es importante destacar la definición que dicha sentencia contempla sobre mandato y, cómo sobresale el carácter consensual de ese contrato. Por ello, es muy importante considerar el contenido de un poder como un todo, a efecto de determinar cuál es la voluntad de quien lo otorgó. Como complemento, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia mediante la emblemática sentencia N.°069-1993, 15:00 de 3 de noviembre de 1993 dijo: “ III.- El mandato es un tema clásico. Gaio dividía los contratos según la función económica social en cuatro tipos diferentes: emptiovenditio, locatio condutio, societas y mandatum. Para todos ellos señalaba su falta de perfeccionamiento con el solo consentimiento si a la vez no estaban previstos los intereses en el ordenamiento jurídico, es decir la justa causa, en consecuencia adquiere un particular significado la relación entre el acuerdo de las partes (consensus) y el fin típico de intereses configurados por el ordenamiento (justa causa), hasta conformar el elemento fundamental calificante de la estructura del contrato. Sobre el mandato deberían existir pocas dudas, sin embargo la legislación encargada de informar el argumento del otorgamiento y sustitución de poderes muestra una amplia gama de posibilidades -así sucede también con la doctrina y la jurisprudencia (segunda voz de la ley: la primera en el plano teórico, la segunda en el plano práctico)- lo cual a veces llama a confusión. IV.- Conviene iniciar mencionando el argumento de la sustitución del mandato. Aún cuando existe norma expresa, el recurrir a doctrinas y jurisprudencias de ordenamientos jurídicos donde la sustitución no es prohibida, o bien es autorizada expresamente, genera naturalmente interpretaciones distintas de las autorizadas por el artículo 1264 del Código Civil, sobre todo si el mismo es analizado al tenor de lo dispuesto en el derogado Código General. Para determinar la verdadera personalidad de la norma patria sobre el tema, bien conviene, aún cuando sea someramente, mencionar las diferentes tesis posibles en la doctrina y jurispruden­cia extranjera. V-. En Francia el mandato tiene su regulación en el Code Civil de 1804 (Artículos 1984-2010), encontrándose con que -dentro de las obligaciones del mandatario- el apoderado no tiene prohibición alguna para sustituir su poder. Esta tesis proviene del Derecho Canónico donde la sustitución del poder es plenamente autorizada. En esa forma se dispone "Artículo 1994. El mandatario responde de aquél que lo sustituye en la gestión: 1º. Cuando no ha recibido el poder de sustituir a otro; 2o. Cuando este poder se le ha conferido sin designación de una persona, y la que él ha elegido era notoriamente incapaz o insolvente. En todos los casos, el mandante puede actuar directamente contra las personas en que el mandatario se ha sustituido". De la interpretación de esta norma ha derivado el principio según el cual los poderes son susceptibles de sustitución por el apoderado, salvo prohibición expresa del poderdante. Pero también los alcances de esa norma deben interpretar­se en relación a la responsabilidad del mandatario. En efecto, el mandato es otorgado intuito personae, ello excluye la posibilidad de eximirse de responsabilidad, en consecuencia si el mandatario sustituye -en todo o en parte, en este último caso compartiéndolo- su poder, el auxilio o sustitución, en nada afectan su responsabili­dad frente al mandante. Además, la sustitución sería imposible, e ineficaz, respecto del mandato, cuando se trate del cumplimiento de funciones reservadas personalmente al mandatario. Sobre el tema, sin embargo, no existe consenso en la doctrina francesa clásica; para autores como Josserand e incluso para Planiol y Rippert el mandato puede sustituirse, pero hay otros como Colin y Capitant quienes no están de acuerdo con esta tesis. En el moderno derecho civil francés también existen las dos corrientes. VI.- En el Derecho español el Código civil de 1889 -siguiendo en términos generales el modelo francés- al regular el mandato (Artículos 1709 a 1739), se aparta de su predecesor en cuanto a la sustitución del mandato pues ésto puede acontecer salvo prohibición del poderdante, con lo cual la tesis canónica resulta más evidente. Ello queda claro de la letra de la ley. "Artículo 1721. El mandatario puede nombrar sustituto si el mandante no se lo ha prohibido; pero responde de la gestión del sustituto: 1º. Cuando no se le dio facultad para nombrarlo. 2º. Cuando se le dio esta facultad, pero sin designar la persona, y el nombrado era notoriamente incapaz o insolvente. Lo hecho por el sustituto nombrado contra la prohibición del mandante será nulo". La responsabilidad del sustituto frente al poderdante original también se encuentra definida en el Derecho español. "Artículo 1722. En los casos comprendidos en los dos números del artículo anterior puede además el mandante dirigir su acción contra el sustituto". Queda clara la visión del codificador español quien se apartó de los criterios de amistad, confianza, afecto, afinidad, entre poderdante y apoderado característicos del Derecho francés, para permitir a cualquier tercero la posibilidad de prestar algún servicio o hacer alguna cosa por cuenta o encargo de otra (Artículo 1709). VII.- En el Código civil alemán, B.G.B., de 1900, dentro de los contratos se encuentra también regulado el mandato (Artículos 662 a 676), siguiéndose criterios algo distintos de los de otros ordenamientos jurídicos respecto de la sustitución. "Artículo 664. El mandatario no puede, en la duda, encomendar a un tercero la realización del mandato. Si la transmisión está permitida, el mandatario ha de responder solamente de una culpa que le sea imputable en la transmisión. Por la culpa de un ayudante es responsable según el parágrafo 278. La pretensión a la realización del mandato, en la duda, no es transmisible". El autor Enneccerus -en el conocido Tratado de Derecho Civil, de Enncecerus, Kipp y Wolff- sostiene que como en el Código no se estatuye si la pretensión del mandante a la ejecución del mandato es o no transmisible, debe entenderse como no autorizada, sin embargo la intransmisibilidad estaría subordinada al pacto en contrario. Sobre los alcances de esta orientación el conocido autor Joseph Hupka -La representación voluntaria en los negocios jurídicos, Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1930- considera que se trata de la separación de los modernas codificaciones de los criterios canónicos pues -como en casi todos los contratos- en el mandato la sustitución es inadmisible salvo autorización expresa en el contrato, por parte del mandante, atendiendo a las especiales circunstancias del caso. VIII.- En Costa Rica el Código General, de 1841, también le dio especial atención al mandato (Artículos 1328 a 1353) siguiendo casi literalmente la norma del Code Civil, en cuanto a la autorización de la sustitución. "Artículo 1338. El mandatario responde de aquél que sustituye en la administración: 1. Cuando no ha recibido la facultad de sustituir a otro; 2. Cuando esta facultad se le ha conferido sin designación de una persona, y la que él ha elegido es notoriamente incapaz o insolvente". Pero este criterio fue radicalmente cambiado en el Código Civil, de 1886, donde -aún manteniendo los principios generales del contrato de referencia (Artículos 1251 a 1300)- la sustitución del mandato solo la puede realizar el mandatario si se encuentra expresamente autorizado por el mandante. "Artículo 1264. El mandatario podrá sustituir el encargo, si en el poder se le faculta expresamente para ello, y solo responderá de los actos del sustituto en caso de que el mandante no le hubiere designado la persona en quien hizo la sustitución del poder, y que el sustituto fuere notoriamente incapaz o insolvente. Cuando se trata de poder especialísimo, la sustitución solo podrá hacerse en la persona o personas que el mandante señale en el mismo poder." En igual forma el mismo mandatario se encuentra limitado para disponer respecto de la sustitución del sustituto, siguiendo el principio de la autorización previa. "Artículo 1265. El anterior mandatario no podrá revocar la sustitución que hubiere hecho, sino cuando estuviere autorizado para ello y se reservare expresamente esa facultad al hacer la sustitución". IX.- Como principios de la sustitución del mandato en el Derecho costarricense podrían referirse los siguientes: A) El apoderado tiene prohibición legal para sustituir su mandato. El otorgamiento es intuito personae , pues en el contrato la potestad conferida para representar al mandante opera en función de lazos de amistad, confianza, afinidad o afecto entre el poderdante y el apoderado. Como las funciones del mandato se refieren tanto al ámbito patrimonial como personal la ley no autoriza al mandatario a sustituir, con su sola voluntad, el mandato conferido. B) La sustitución del mandato es posible solo si el poderdante lo autoriza expresamente en el poder. La instransferibilidad del mandato, como norma general, deriva de la ley, pues ésta pondera la voluntad del mandante respecto de la del mandatario o el mandato mismo. En consecuencia este otro principio se encuentra constituido por la idea de subordinar la intransmisibilidad al pacto en contrario, es decir destacar el interés de la voluntad del mandante respecto de cualquier otro interés, como protección a aquél vínculo de confianza, del cual pueden derivar consecuencias patrimoniales o personales para él. Si la autorización para sustituir el mandato es abierta, es decir facultando al mandatario a designar el sustituto, o si por el contrario la voluntad del poderdante la vincula a un sustituto específico, ello tiene sus efectos jurídicos en el ámbito de la responsabilidad. X.- Originalmente el mandato se reputaba gratuito, sin embargo hoy la regla es la inversa: no se presume gratuito salvo si así se hubiere estipulado (Artículo 1258), pues aún cuando su etimología se vincula a la confianza, en el Derecho moderno tiene más un carácter negocial donde el apoderado realiza, a nombre del poderdante, los negocios o gestiones encomendadas, con efectos jurídicos directos en su patrimonio o el ámbito personal. El mandante, en esta forma, responde por lo actuado en su nombre por el apoderado, salvo si en su gestión éste infringiera la ley o actuara con culpa o dolo, caso en el cual el mandante puede exigir las responsabilidades. Uno de estos casos podría ser cuando se hubiera designado un sustituto sin autorización expresa del mandante, pudiendo dirigirse tanto contra el apoderado como contra el sustituto. XI.- En todos los ordenamientos jurídicos, como principio general de Derecho, la terminación del mandato opera con la muerte del poderdante o del apoderado. En sentido expreso se encuentra la norma en el artículo 1278, inciso 5), del Código civil costarricense. En igual forma en el 2003 del Code Civil francés, en el inciso 3) del artículo 1732 de España, en la norma del 672 del B.G.B. alemán, en el 1722 inciso 4) del Codice civile italiano, y en el 1346 inciso 3) del Código General de Carrillo. Incluso en muchos de estos ordenamientos se refiere también a la muerte civil, o a los estados de quiebra e insolvencia. XII.- Por todo lo dicho el recurso debe rechazarse, pues las pretensiones de la actora contravienen los principios más elementales del mandato. En efecto el titular de la cuenta de ahorro en dólares número (…) en el Banco (…) lo fue (…) y no la actora. Ella fue su apoderada en cuanto se le autorizó a retirar dineros de la misma. Dicho poder tenía legalmente dos limitaciones. La primera consiste en la intransmisibilidad del poder por ser prohibido jurídicamente su sustitución en un tercero no autorizado expresamente por el poderdante (Artículo 1264). La segunda por su inexistencia jurídica producida a raíz de la muerte del mandante (Artículo 1278 inciso 5). De lo anterior queda clara la ineficacia de dicho mandato tanto para retirar dineros una vez muerto el titular de la cuenta de ahorros, como la de sustituir el poder en un tercero. (…).”A partir de todo lo expuesto, resulta pertinente analizar las disposiciones generales sobre el mandato, así como los diferentes tipos de mandatos que existen, pues el contrato de mandato se determina tanto por la extensión -facultades- como por la forma en la que debe ser expresada la voluntad de quien lo otorga. En cuanto a la extensión del mandato, existen cuatro mandatos de orden representativo -porque quien gestiona lo hace en nombre y por cuenta del mandante- y un quinto supuesto derivado por leyes varias como se explicará: 1) Generalísimo. Ese tipo de mandato está regulado en los artículos 1253 y 1254 de ese Código y, es un poder de disposición y administración. Además, puede ser otorgado para todos, alguno o algunos negocios específicos. Conforme al artículo 253 del Código de Comercio, debe ser inscrito en el Registro Mercantil si es otorgado por una persona comerciante, así como también debe ser inscrita la revocación, sustitución, modificación o prórroga del mandato. Además, si quien lo otorga no es comerciante, debe ser inscrito en el Registro Público conforme el artículo 466 incido 6) del Código Civil. Tales inscripciones constituyen requisitos de validez y eficacia. Es importante indicar que, un poder generalísimo de carácter judicial no permite litigar cuando se ventilan pretensiones personales. Al respecto, debe observarse el contenido del artículo 1253 del Código Civil que dice: “En virtud del mandato o poder generalísimo para todos los negocios de una persona, el mandatario puede vender, hipotecar y de cualquier otro modo enajenar o gravar toda clase de bienes; aceptar o repudiar herencias, gestionar judicialmente, celebrar toda clase de contratos y ejecutar todos los demás actos jurídicos que podría hacer el poderdante, excepto los que conforme a la ley deben ser ejecutados por el mismo dueño en persona y los actos para los cuales la ley exige expresamente poder especialísimo.” Es decir, la norma claramente exceptúa de las facultades del mandante generalísimo, las pretensiones de carácter personal, así como aquellos actos para los que la ley exige poder especialísimo. Entonces, por ejemplo, no es posible que, mediante poder generalísimo, el mandatario otorgue capitulaciones matrimoniales puesto que se trata de un tema de orden personal. Como el poder generalísimo puede ser otorgado para alguno o algunos negocios o bien, para todos los negocios del mandante, el artículo 1254 del Código Civil dice: “Si el poder generalísimo fuere sólo para alguno o algunos negocios, el mandatario tendrá respecto del negocio o negocios a que su poder se refiere y de los bienes que ellos comprendan, las mismas facultades que según el artículo anterior, tiene el apoderado generalísimo para todos los negocios de una persona.” En otras palabras, un poder generalísimo para un negocio o varios negocios otorga al mandatario las mismas facultades que un poder generalísimo otorgado para todos los negocios. 2) General. El mandato general está regulado en el artículo 1255 de ese Código y es un poder de administración, pero no de disposición. De igual forma, puede ser otorgado para todos, alguno o algunos de los negocios del mandante. También conforme al artículo 253 del Código de Comercio, debe ser inscrito en el Registro Mercantil si es otorgado por una persona comerciante, así como también debe ser inscrita la revocación, sustitución, modificación o prórroga del mandato. Además, también si quien lo otorga no es comerciante, debe ser inscrito en el Registro Público conforme el artículo 466 incido 6) del Código Civil. Tales inscripciones son requisitos de validez y eficacia. Con respecto a las facultades que otorga un mandato general para todos, alguno o algunos negocios del mandante, el artículo 1255 del Código Civil dice: “Por el poder general para todos, alguno o algunos negocios, tiene el mandatario respecto del negocio o negocios a que su poder se refiere, amplia y general administración, comprendiendo ésta las facultades siguientes: 1ª.- Celebrar los convenios y ejecutar los actos necesarios para la conservación o explotación de los bienes. 2ª.- Intentar y sostener judicialmente las acciones posesorias y las que fueren necesarias para interrumpir la prescripción respecto de las cosas que comprende el mandato. 3ª.- Alquilar o arrendar bienes muebles hasta por un año; pero, si el poder se limita a cierto tiempo, el período del arrendamiento no debe exceder de ese plazo. Para arrendar bienes inmuebles, se requiere poder generalísimo o especial. (Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 132 de la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, ley No.7527 del 10 de julio de 1995). 4ª.- Vender los frutos así como los demás bienes muebles que por su naturaleza están destinados a ser vendidos o se hallen expuestos a perderse o deteriorarse. 5ª.- Exigir judicial o extrajudicialmente el pago de los créditos y dar los correspondientes recibos. 6ª.- Ejecutar todos los actos jurídicos que según la naturaleza del negocio se encuentren virtualmente comprendidos en él como medios de ejecución o como consecuencias necesarias del mandato.” Además, conviene resaltar que, con fundamento en el tercer párrafo del artículo 1251 del Código Civil, tanto el poder generalísimo como el general deben ser otorgados en escritura pública y ser inscritos en el Registro Público como ya se dijo, pero, además, no producen efecto respecto de terceros sino desde la fecha de su inscripción. Es decir, no desde su presentación. 3) Especial. Este contrato de mandato está regulado en el artículo 1256 también del Código Civil y según el segundo párrafo de esa norma, puede ser otorgado con o sin fines registrales. Este tipo mandato -especial- no debe ser inscrito en el Registro Público, pero sí debe ser confeccionado en escritura pública si tiene efectos registrales. Entonces, por regla general, este tipo de mandato no debe ser otorgado en escritura pública salvo lo ya dicho. Además, puede tratarse de un mandato especial para temas judiciales o extrajudiciales Es oportuno indicar que, otrora fue tramitado el proyecto de ley N.°15.617 con el fin de interpretar auténticamente el artículo 1256 del Código Civil, específicamente la frase que dice: “El poder especial otorgado para un acto o contrato con efectos registrales deberá realizarse en escritura pública.” Al respecto, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia mediante resolución N.°8424-2005, 18:19 de 28 de junio de 2005 dispuso: “El numeral interpretado expresa el contenido mínimo que debe tener todo poder especial para un acto judicial o extrajudicial concreto y específico y establece las reglas que deben observarse para otorgar el mandato para un acto o contrato con efectos registrales. En este sentido, el contenido normativo del artículo 1256 del Código Civil es claro y preciso y, por ende, no requiere de precisión o aclaración alguna.” Es oportuno indicar que, el poder especial judicial y el general judicial necesariamente deben ser otorgados a una persona abogada. De igual forma, es oportuno resaltar que, el poder especial judicial no siempre alcanza para litigar en asuntos de familia, puesto que, algunos asuntos tal como se explicará, requieren poder especialísimo. 4) Especialísimo. Este poder básicamente surge de lo regulado en los dos últimos renglones del artículo 1253, pues esa norma indica que, en virtud de un mandato generalísimo para todos los negocios del mandante, el mandatario puede hacer todos los “actos jurídicos que podría hacer el poderdante, excepto los que conforme a la ley deben ser ejecutados por el mismo dueño en persona y los actos para los cuales la ley exige expresamente poder especialísimo”. Al respecto, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en la sentencia N.°690-E-13, 11:25 de 4 de junio de 2013, en cuanto a las excepciones que contempla el artículo 1253 con respecto al poder generalísimo dispuso: “Sin embargo, ello ha de interpretarse en forma restrictiva y jamás en forma extensiva, habida cuenta del interés público que asiste a dicha doctrina normativa, para con ello no crear limitaciones odiosas que vengan a impedir o a afectar casuísticamente su ocupación, pues ha de prevalecer el interés de la comunidad en evitar discusiones sorpresivas, perturbadoras del orden social y de la seguridad jurídica que gira en torno al ejercicio de este tipo de poder.” Sobre la exigencia irracional e infundada de poder especial o especialísimo, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia mediante resolución 16868-2008, 13:26 de 7 de noviembre de 2008 dijo: “III.- SOBRE EL FONDO: El reclamo por la presunta vulneración del derecho de petición de la amparada se fundamenta, por una parte, en el hecho de que no le recibieron los documentos para inscribir el matrimonio de la hija de la amparada y, por otra, en la causa de esa negativa, en cuanto que no se le admitió el poder generalísimo otorgado por su hija, como poder suficiente para solicitar la inscripción de su matrimonio, celebrado en el extranjero. En cuanto al mero hecho de que no se le recibieran los documentos, la Sala ha considerado que si una gestión no reúne los requisitos legales y reglamentarios establecidos y se le indica al interesado cómo subsanar los defectos, puede ser rechazada ad portas, con el fin de evitar gastos administrativos y de gestión innecesarios (v., entre otras, la sentencia número 2007- 006167 de dieciocho horas y once minutos del ocho de mayo del dos mil siete).-IV.- Sin embargo, la interpretación de los recurridos, en cuanto a los alcances del mandato otorgado mediante un poder generalísimo, limita el ejercicio del derecho fundamental de petición de la amparada y el derecho legal de la interesada a la inscripción de su matrimonio. La ley no exige un poder especial ni especialísimo para solicitar la inscripción de un matrimonio celebrado en el extranjero, sino, únicamente, la solicitud de parte interesada (artículo 55 de la Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones). Si bien es cierto que la Ley impone la exigencia del poder especialísimo para la celebración del matrimonio, tal exigencia no está prevista para la solicitud de inscripción del matrimonio. El Código Civil establece los alcances del poder generalísimo, así: “Artículo 1253.-En virtud del mandato o poder generalísimo para todos los negocios de una persona, el mandatario puede vender hipotecar y de cualquier otro modo enajenar o gravar toda clase de bienes; aceptar o repudiar herencias, gestionar judicialmente, celebrar toda clase de contratos y ejecutar todos los demás actos jurídicos que podría hacer el poderdante, excepto los que conforme a la ley deben ser ejecutados por el mismo dueño en persona y los actos para los cuales la ley exige expresamente poder especialísimo”.-Esta clase de apoderamiento, como se ha dicho, permite al mandatario ejecutar todos los actos jurídicos que podría hacer el poderdante, excepto aquellos actos para los cuales la ley exige que sean realizados por el mismo dueño, en persona, o aquellos para los cuales la ley exija expresamente un poder especialísimo. Resulta paradójico que el Registro otorgue mayor valor jurídico a una solicitud autenticada de alguno de los cónyuges que a un poder generalísimo, inscrito en el Registro Público. La tutela del amparo procede procederá (sic) no sólo contra los actos arbitrarios, sino también contra las actuaciones u omisiones fundadas en normas erróneamente interpretadas o indebidamente aplicadas (art. 20 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) y éste es, precisamente, uno de esos casos, en que el derecho fundamental es vulnerado o, acaso, limitado, por una norma indebidamente interpretada y aplicada. Cuando el artículo 55 de la Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y del Registro Civil se refiere a “solicitud de parte interesada”, entender que el apoderado generalísimo no es tal, resulta una interpretación contraria al derecho de los ciudadanos de petición y de obtener pronta resolución, así como de acceso a la justicia administrativa y a los servicios públicos; la Administración no puede inventar obstáculos innecesarios para dificultar el acceso a los servicios públicos. Por lo anterior, procede declarar con lugar el amparo y ordenar a los recurridos el recibo de la gestión y la tramitación de la inscripción del matrimonio de la hija de la amparada, siempre y cuando la amparada cumpla los demás requisitos legales exigidos al efecto.” Ahora bien, el poder especialísimo no necesita inscripción alguna; es muy concreto, pues se refiere a un acto específico y, será requerido cuando la normativa así lo establezca expresamente como, por ejemplo, para donar en nombre de otra persona -artículo 1408 del Código Civil-, para impugnar la paternidad -artículo 72 del Código de Familia- o para adoptar y para otorgar capitulaciones matrimoniales, entre otros asuntos. Por tratarse de un mandato concreto, no es posible que el mandatario pueda actuar alegando facultades implícitas. Igualmente, se requerirá poder especialísimo -y otorgado en escritura pública- cuando por el desarrollo jurisprudencial se haya entendido que así lo requiere la naturaleza del derecho que se pretende hacer valer haciendo uso del poder. Además, por tratarse de un mandato concreto, debe detallarse el acto para el cual fue otorgado. En este sentido, toda esta línea jurisprudencial ha surgido básicamente por el contenido del artículo 30 del Código de Familia, pues esa norma exige poder especialísimo para contraer matrimonio. Al respecto, la norma dice: “El matrimonio podrá celebrarse por medio de apoderado con poder especialísimo constante en escritura pública y que exprese el nombre y generales de la persona con quien éste haya de celebrar el matrimonio; pero siempre ha de concurrir a la celebración en persona el otro contrayente./ No habrá matrimonio si en el momento de celebrarse estaba ya legalmente revocado el poder.” Esto con la observación de que el Código Procesal de Familia Ley N.°9747 reformó el artículo 30 del Código de Familia así: “Matrimonio. Imposibilidad de matrimonio por poder. Bajo ninguna circunstancia se verificará un matrimonio con poder de alguno de los contrayentes.” Además, esta reforma entrará a regir el 1° de octubre de 2024. La exigencia de poder especialísimo -y en escritura pública- ha ocurrido por décadas en el Derecho de las Familias en cuanto al divorcio por mutuo acuerdo, puesto que, la naturaleza de la situación lo impone, de forma que, quien represente a alguno de los cónyuges para otorgar la escritura respectiva, debe no solamente contar con poder especialísimo y otorgado en escritura pública, sino que, el mismo debe contener todas y cada una de las cláusulas del acuerdo de divorcio. Nótese que, las cláusulas de la escritura de divorcio son las que regirán los términos de la ruptura del vínculo matrimonial, de ahí que, no puede una persona apoderada especialísima decidir en qué términos se divorcia su mandante. Ese es un ejemplo en el que, la naturaleza del derecho de fondo que se pretende hacer valer obliga a exigir poder especialísimo -y en escritura pública- si es que la persona apoderada otorgará la escritura de divorcio, pues si tal acto lo realiza personalmente su mandante, en este momento, con la legislación vigente, solamente se requiere poder especial judicial para formular la solicitud de homologación. De suerte es que, el Código Procesal de Familia Ley N.°9747 que entrará a regir, expresamente exige poder especialísimo y en escritura pública para la tramitación del divorcio por mutuo acuerdo, pues reforma el artículo 48 del Código de Familia. Es decir, el criterio jurisprudencial que ha regido por décadas, ahora se ha convertido en una norma. Además, ese nuevo Código en el artículo 55 dice: “Poder especialísimo. En los casos en que sea necesario poder especialísimo, deberá ser otorgado en escritura pública y se consignarán los actos para los cuales se da la autorización dentro del proceso; en caso de conciliación o mediación, se deberán especificar de forma concreta las cláusulas exactas del eventual arreglo, todo bajo pena de nulidad del acuerdo que se tome. El poder podrá ser revocado en cualquier estado mediante la misma forma de su otorgamiento, salvo que sea de forma oral en la audiencia, para lo cual no se exigirá ninguna formalidad.” Entonces, con la citada reforma, el poder especialísimo en materia de Derecho de las Familias debe ser otorgado en escritura pública, pero, además, debe detallar el contenido o mejor dicho para qué se faculta al mandatario. Ahora bien, es claro que la obligación alimentaria es personalísima. Esa característica está expresamente contemplada en el artículo 167 del Código de Familia y, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia mediante resolución N.°9580-2001, 16:17 de 25 de setiembre de 2001, sobre la obligación alimentaria dijo: “(…) es de naturaleza personal, intervivos, esto es, que es " , de manera que no trasciende sus efectos al fallecimiento del obligado, es decir, no forma parte de la universalidad de la herencia, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 521 del Código Civil, toda vez que la sucesión no comprende derechos ni obligaciones de orden personal, toda vez que se extinguen con la muerte del obligado.” No obstante, no porque la obligación alimentaria sea personalísima debe exigirse poder especialísimo para litigar en un proceso alimentario y eso incluye solicitar el apremio corporal. Estima la suscrita que el tema ha sido definido por la jurisprudencia constitucional. Por ejemplo, en la sentencia N.°989-1991, 16:08 de 4 de junio de 1991, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia dispuso: “I.- El reclamo del actor consiste en negarle legitimidad a las gestiones que ha formulado la apoderada judicial en el proceso que por alimentos se sigue ante la Alcaldía de Faltas y Contravenciones de Goicoechea. La Sala discrepa de la opinión del señor (…), pues no es cierto que el apoderado especial judicial no pueda solicitar se decrete apremio, cuando haya incumplimiento del pago de las cuotas fijadas por el tribunal. Debe tenerse presente que la forma en que se procede en estos casos es que ante la solicitud de la actora la Alcaldía constata si efectivamente hay mora en el pago de las cuotas y entonces se dicta la correspondiente resolución que decreta el apremio corporal. Así la solicitud de marras no reviste características especiales como para sostener que se trate una gestión "personalísima", para la que solamente esté legitimado el titular del derecho. II.- Lo preceptuado por los artículos 1289 en relación con el 1290, ambos del Código Civil, permiten establecer que el poder especial judicial da margen para formular una solicitud como la de comentario que simplemente tiene la pretensión de que, constatada la mora en el pago de alimentos, el Despacho dicte la orden de apremio. El propio ordenamiento jurídico es el que, para casos excepcionales, expresamente establece la necesidad de que la representación en un determinado acto, lo sea por medio de poder especialísimo. No es este el caso, evidentemente, por manera que el recurso debe declararse sin lugar.” Este criterio fue reiterado mediante resolución N.°6956-1999, 14:48 de 8 de setiembre de 1999 y, en la sentencia N.°13817-2008, 10:05 de 9 de setiembre de 2008 en la que indicó: “(…) la apoderada especial judicial del acreedor alimentario está plenamente facultada para firmar solicitudes de apremio corporal en nombre de su representado. El carácter personalísimo de la obligación alimentaria (artículos 167 del Código de Familia y 2 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) se debe a que depende exclusivamente de las circunstancias individuales del deudor y acreedor alimentarios, por lo que la obligación y el derecho de alimentos no son susceptibles de transmisión, ni inter vivos, ni por causa de muerte de alguno de los sujetos de la relación; esto es así dado que los alimentos se confieren exclusivamente a una persona determinada en razón de sus necesidades particulares y, correlativamente, se imponen solo a una persona determinada, tomando en cuenta su carácter de pariente o cónyuge así como sus posibilidades económicas. Tal cualidad no obsta para que tanto el acreedor como el deudor alimentario, en un proceso de pensión alimentaria, planteen las gestiones que estimen oportunas a través de apoderados judiciales o especiales judiciales, pues, precisamente, estos tienen la función de efectuar todo lo que su representado haría, si él mismo se apersonase para defender sus intereses en un proceso judicial. De ahí que este hábeas corpus se rechace.” Ahora bien, en el voto N.°8314-2002, 14:38 de 27 de agosto de 2002 dicha Sala determinó que el tema debe ser definido por la jurisdicción ordinaria. Igual criterio sostuvo en las resoluciones N.°1685-2005, 9:13 de 2 de diciembre de 2005 y N.°13703-2010, 14:34 de 18 de agosto de 2010. Entonces, en al menos tres resoluciones la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia sí se ha pronunciado sobre el tema y, por la regulación sobre el contrato de mandato, es evidente que, el carácter personalísimo de la obligación no genera que su ejecución deba ser personalísima en lo que a la parte acreedora se refiere. Incluso, exigir poder especialísimo además de que no está previsto en la legislación ni deriva del carácter personalísimo de la obligación, evidentemente es contrario a la sencillez procesal prevista en el artículo 2 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, así como, considerando la nueva regulación del Código Procesal de Familia, sería contrario a la celeridad y gratuidad, que se exija un poder especialísimo y por consiguiente, que sea otorgado en escritura pública, para solicitar un apremio corporal, puesto que, el apremio no surte efecto en quien otorgaría el poder -acreedor (a) alimentario- sino, en la persona obligada y además, si se está solicitando un apremio es porque la persona deudora no ha cumplido con la obligación alimentaria, de ahí que también sería violatorio del acceso a la justicia y del derecho fundamental a la eficacia material de una resolución, que se haga incurrir en gastos a quien reclama alimentos que no han sido cumplidos. 5. Mandatos derivados por disposición legal. En este caso, se trata de aquellos roles o cargos que, en virtud de norma expresa y de la constatación del rol, así como por la aceptación expresa del cargo e incluso de su inscripción -si así se requiere por ley- adquieren o conllevan las facultades de un determinado mandato. Por ejemplo, los artículos 548, 636 y 718 del Código Civil. En esos casos, no se requiere que el poder sea otorgado formalmente, sino que, por ley, el rol o cargo conlleva las facultades del tipo de mandato que la misma ley atribuye. Entonces, es un mandato que deriva de la propia ley y, no hay acuerdo de voluntades ni confianza, que son rasgos distintivos del contrato de mandato. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la forma de expresar la voluntad por parte de quien otorga el poder, el mandato puede ser formal, es decir, debe constar de tal manera que su existencia y alcance pueda ser demostrado. Así, tanto el mandato general, el generalísimo como el especial -para un acto o contrato con efectos registrales-, por aplicación de los artículos 1251 y 1256 del Código Civil, evidentemente son mandatos formales. En otro orden, en el caso de la ausencia de formalidad y por consiguiente, la consensualidad del contrato de mandato, el artículo 1251 del Código Civil dice: “El contrato de mandato puede celebrarse entre presentes y ausentes, por escritura pública o privada y aun de palabra; pero no se admitirá en juicio la prueba de testigos, sino en conformidad con las reglas generales, ni la escritura privada cuando las leyes exijan documento público./ El instrumento en que se hace constar el mandato se llama poder./Los poderes generales o generalísimos deben otorgarse en escritura pública e inscribirse en la sección correspondiente del Registro de la Propiedad y no producen efecto respecto de tercero sino desde la fecha de inscripción.” Además, el artículo 466 inciso 6) del Código Civil dispone: “En el Registro de Personas se inscribirán: (…) 6) Todo poder general o generalísimo.” Como complemento, según el segundo párrafo del artículo 1256 del Código Civil: “El poder especial otorgado para un acto o contrato con efectos registrales deberá realizarse en escritura pública y no será necesario inscribirlo en el Registro.” Así las cosas, es la ley la que determina los requisitos de forma del mandato para que sea válido y, además, eficaz. Adicionalmente, es la ley la que determina también el alcance del contrato de mandato. En este sentido, el mandato especial judicial -1256 del Código Civil- al igual que el mandato general judicial -artículo 1289 y 1290 del Código Civil- se parecen porque ambos son de carácter formal, pero se diferencian en que, el primero, sea el mandato especial judicial, como su denominación lo indica, es especial, es decir, se refiere a un caso judicial en particular, mientras que el mandato general judicial autoriza al mandatario para representar al mandante en todo negocio judicial como actor o demandado, salvo que exista alguna limitación en el poder. Para mayor claridad, "se denomina 'mandato judicial', el que tiene por objeto facultar al mandatario para que intervenga en los negocios judiciales en que activa o pasivamente este interesado el mandante. (...) Según la extensión del poder, el mandato es general o particular. El primero confiere amplias facultades para el manejo de todos los negocios del poderdante; el segundo, aunque comprende también amplias atribuciones, pues son las mismas que las del mandato general, se limitan al negocio o negocios que expresamente se mencionan en el poder." (Alberto Brenes Córdoba (1985). Tratado de los contratos, San José: Editorial Juricentro, primera edición revisada y actualizada por Gerardo Trejos y Marina Ramirez, 1985, p. 224).

Con respecto al mandato especial, es claro que puede ser judicial o extrajudicial, pero tiene limitaciones. Así, el artículo 1256 del Código Civil establece que, el “poder especial para determinado acto jurídico judicial y extrajudicial, solo facultará al mandatario para los actos especificados en el mandato, sin poder extenderse ni siquiera a los que se consideren consecuencia natural de los que el apoderado esté en cargado de ejecutar./ El poder especial otorgado para un acto o contrato con efectos registrales deberá realizarse en escritura pública y no será necesario inscribirlo en el Registro.” Entonces, el poder especial está sometido a los límites establecidos por el artículo 1256 transcrito y, cuando se trata de un poder especial judicial debe cumplir con los requisitos de forma necesarios para que tenga plena validez y eficacia procesal. Así las cosas, nada impide que un mandato especial judicial pueda ser otorgado ante una persona juzgadora para un caso concreto. En esta línea, puede ser otorgado en papel simple. Al respecto, el artículo 118 del Código Procesal Civil Ley N.°7130 dice: “Otorgamiento del poder. No será necesario que el poder de quien represente a otro en proceso conste en testimonio de escritura pública, pues podrá hacerse en papel simple, con tal de que esté firmado por el otorgante, o si no supiere escribir o estuviere impedido para hacerlo, por una persona a ruego; en ambos casos debidamente autenticado por un abogado, que no sea aquel a quien se otorga el poder.” Sobre dicha autenticación, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia mediante sentencia N.°8464-2014, 14:45 de 11 de junio de 2014 dijo: “En efecto, es claro que en materia procesal el legislador goza de una libertad de configuración para diseñar los procedimientos jurisdiccionales en atención de los intereses de las partes involucradas en el litigio, siempre que con motivo de dicha actividad no se viole el derecho de defensa ni al debido proceso, en estricto apego a los derechos protegidos en los artículos 39 y 41 constitucionales. En el caso concreto, a todas luces es evidente que la disposición impugnada, al establecer que: “no será necesario que el poder de quien represente a otro en proceso conste en testimonio de escritura pública, pues podrá hacerse en papel simple, con tal de que esté firmado por el otorgante, o si no supiere escribir o estuviere impedido para hacerlo, por una persona a ruego; en ambos casos debidamente autenticado por un abogado, que no sea aquél a quien se otorga el poder”, tiene por fin justamente proteger los intereses del poder-dante, particularmente de quienes no supieren escribir o estuviesen impedidos para hacerlo, con respecto al apoderado, al exigirse que el poder sea autenticado por un abogado, pero, eso sí, distinto de la persona a quien se otorga el poder, en todo lo cual la Sala Constitucional no aprecia ninguna irregularidad, o alguna situación contraria al Derecho de la Constitución. Es claro que la norma impugnada no constituye un impedimento grosero del derecho de acceso a la justicia, teniendo en cuenta que las partes, en caso que el poderdante no posea los medios económicos para cubrir los costos de la autenticación del abogado, bien pueden acudir a uno de los consultorios jurídicos de cualquier universidad que imparte la Carrera de Derecho, los cuales suministran ese servicio de manera gratuita. En este orden de ideas, la Sala observa que la norma impugnada tiene por fin proteger los intereses del poderdante que se encuentre en una situación de desventaja con respecto a su apoderado, o bien evitar algún tipo de abuso del segundo con respecto al primero, por lo cual la Sala concluye que la norma impugnada no es inconstitucional. Por demás, se debe advertir, que el hecho que del artículo 283 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública se extraiga alguna consecuencia distinta con respecto a la materia administrativa, ello no supone ninguna discriminación con respecto al caso concreto, ni vuelve o hace inconstitucional la norma impugnada, teniendo en cuenta justamente la naturaleza de los intereses o fines que protege o persigue la última frase del artículo 118 del Código Procesal Civil. Ninguna irregularidad se constata entonces en el contenido de la norma impugnada, razón por la cual lo procedente es el rechazo por el fondo de la acción.” En este punto, conviene indicar qué, el Código Civil no establece una forma particular respecto del poder especial judicial. Además, el Código Procesal de Familia Ley N.°9747 no contempla ninguna disposición sobre requisitos de forma del poder especial judicial, sino que, más bien, atribuye el cargo de mandatario a quien actúe como persona directora judicial con una limitación en caso de terminación del proceso. Al respecto, el artículo 51 de ese Código dice: “Artículo 51. Facultades de los profesionales en abogacía y personas directoras judiciales y suplentes. La persona designada para actuar en la dirección legal del proceso tendrá las facultades dadas por un poder especial judicial, salvo cuando se trate de gestiones de petición de terminación del proceso. En caso de acudir sin la parte a una audiencia de conciliación, podrá participar en ella y tomar los acuerdos que considere; pero, a fin de darle eficacia a este en los actos que impliquen la disposición de derechos, la parte deberá ratificar el acuerdo, ya sea de forma escrita o de forma personal, ante la autoridad judicial, dentro del plazo de un mes contado a partir de la celebración de la audiencia. Vencido ese plazo y no existiendo ninguna manifestación de la parte representada, se tendrá por agotada la etapa previa de conciliación y continuará el proceso.” Entonces, en resumen: el poder especial judicial en cuanto a su forma, en este momento está regido por el artículo 118 del Código Procesal Civil Ley N.°7130, pero en cuanto a su contenido, se rige por el artículo 1256 y 1257 del Código Civil. Esta última norma también aplica porque dice: “El mandatario a quien no se hubiere señalado o limitado sus facultades, tendrás las que la ley otorga al apoderado generalísimo, general o especial, según la denominación que se le diera en el poder.” Como se observa, el poder especial judicial se centra en un único proceso judicial y, tiene los alcances que indica el artículo 1256 del Código Civil, pero, además también tiene los alcances que detalla en numeral 1289 del citado Código. Véase que, quien sea apoderado (a) en virtud de mandato general judicial regulado en el artículo 1289 del Código Civil puede hacer lo siguiente respecto a todos los procesos judiciales de su mandante: “En virtud del poder judicial para todos los negocios el mandatario puede apersonarse como actor o como reo a nombre de su poderdante, en cualquier negocio que interese a éste, seguir el juicio o juicios en sus diversas instancias, usar de todos los recursos ordinarios y extraordinarios, transigir, comprometer en árbitros o arbitradores, pedir y absolver posiciones, reconocer documentos, recibir dinero y dar el correspondiente recibo, otorgar y cancelar las escrituras que el negocio o negocios exijan, renunciar cualquier trámite, recusar a los funcionarios judiciales y quejarse de ellos, o acusarlos por motivo de los juicios, y hacer todo lo que el dueño haría si él mismo estuviese, para llevar a término los negocios.” Entonces, si estas facultades las otorga el mandato general judicial para todo proceso judicial del mandante, por identidad de razón se entiende que, quien sea mandatario especial judicial también tiene esas mismas facultades respecto del único proceso judicial que le ha sido encomendado. Incluso, el artículo 1290 claramente indica que, “si el poder general sólo fuere para alguno o algunos negocios judiciales, el apoderado tendrá para el negocio o negocios a que su poder se refiera las mismas facultades que, según el artículo anterior, tiene el apoderado general para todos los negocios judiciales de una persona.” Por último y no menos importante, de un poder -el instrumento donde consta el mandato- interesa quién lo otorga, a quién es otorgado -primordialmente si se trata de una persona profesional en Derecho o bien para determinar si existe opuesto interés, así como incompatibilidad o imposibilidad de ser mandatario- la denominación y su fundamento legal, así como, la descripción de las facultades que se atribuyen, si es que tal descripción consta en el instrumento. En el caso de un poder especial judicial todos estos datos son muy importantes porque se trata de elementos diferenciadores respecto de otro tipo de mandatos y, permite tener claridad en caso de que el texto del instrumento genere alguna duda sobre el tipo de mandato y su extensión. Es decir, no se trata de que, en un poder deben indicarse todas y cada una de las facultades del contrato de mandato, pues no hay norma que lo exija, pero si así constan, representan un gran insumo para resolver cualquier dificultad asociada al alcance del mandato. Además, como ya se explicó, dependiendo del tipo de poder que se trate, así será requerida una determinada formalidad por temas de validez y eficacia. En consecuencia, un poder no debe ser “leído” sino, estudiado y por ello, es muy importante no guiarse solamente por la denominación, la normativa que se cita en él o bien, la descripción de las facultades, sino que, debe ser estudiado como un todo para determinar de qué tipo de contrato de mandato se trata.[...]."