Requirements for titling properties in protected wildlife areas: ten-year possession and forest resource protectionRequisitos para titular inmuebles en áreas silvestres protegidas: posesión decenal y protección del recurso forestal

"IV. This Court has repeatedly held that "... The Información Posesoria is a non-contentious judicial proceeding for the formalization of a registrable title over a property right that has been acquired through usucapion (usucapión), having fulfilled the corresponding legal requirements. It is required to demonstrate possession (posesión) as owner, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner (articles 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 856 of the Civil Code). The applicant (titulante), apart from lacking a title registered or registrable in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the property has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to avoid a double registry inscription over the same property, or to protect third parties with a better right than the applicant, the Law requires notifying certain subjects. It also established an opposition procedure within the Información Posesoria, in case any interested party feels harmed by the titling (article 8). The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias orders the Judge to include as parties and therefore personally notify them from the start of the proceedings, the adjoining owners, because the titling could encompass part of the lands belonging to them... it is ordered to notify the co-owners or joint owners. Likewise, to safeguard the State's interests, it is ordered to include as parties the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, to protect property subject to public domain, and state Agrarian Property (article 5). Finally, the Law orders that all interested parties, who may have a legitimate interest in the process, be summoned through the publication of an Edict in the Boletín Judicial. (See numeral 5 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias).- The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, in its article 7, as well as the Leyes Forestales have sought to protect forest resources from human action, subjecting them to various forms of forest management. Although the titling of such areas has been permitted, which once declared as conservation areas become part of the State's Forest Patrimony (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), compliance with other, more qualified requirements is demanded. This leads us directly to the concept of ecological possession (posesión ecológica), and to the criterion of the ecological function of forest property. In repeated rulings, both from the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) and from this Superior Agrarian Tribunal itself, the principles that must govern to resolve these types of agro-environmental situations have been established. Our country has been a pioneer in the construction of the institutes of agrarian possession (posesión agraria) and ecological possession. The same jurisprudence has recognized and developed these institutes, as well as the life cycle of agrarian possession and, recently, of ecological possession (within the broader criterion of the ecological function of forest property). The same Jurisprudence has sought to distinguish business property and possession, where an activity aimed at cultivating the forest is carried out, from that where an extractive activity is simply carried out or one that is merely conservationist. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of a property or forest possession (without enterprise). It is precisely in these cases where the Ley Forestal establishes a whole legal regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner mandatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. In this way, in forest possession the de facto power is exercised over a property of forest vocation or mostly destined to protect forest resources, without aiming for its exploitation, or dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve the natural regeneration of the forest. In both cases, there would be no development of a plant or animal biological cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, but rather represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. Furthermore, it denies the possibility of acquiring possessory rights over lands of the national reserves when a harmful action has been exercised against the forest resources. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a Forestry Law (Derecho forestal), with particularities of an organic and complete system, where the institutes of forest property and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest property, and also forest possession as a real right derived from it, or conceived independently, began to take shape since the Código Fiscal of 1885, which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests whose regulations tend toward their conservation. Subsequently, the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 6, 1939, incorporates such principles. Later, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización in its article 7 expands the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- VII. Special legislation regarding the protection of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second opens through better-conceived regulations through Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was later declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of the Ley Forestal No.

7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in supplement 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). These contain various forest property regimes and limit the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals. It is not possible to acquire ownership over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) unless one demonstrates having protected the forest resource. Its constitutional basis is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institution of forest property and possession is protected. This is neither the same as civil nor agrarian property; it is a property meant to be conserved, and therefore the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.- VIII. Forest possession has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forestry Laws. It applies to a specific asset: lands covered by forests or of forest aptitude (aptitud forestal). The owner or possessor of such assets has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and may not exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal resolution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, that special legal regime and the principles of Forestry Law must be applied. The Forestry Law establishes as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources (recursos forestales), in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All lands of forest aptitude (terrenos de aptitud forestal) and forests (bosques) in the country, whether state-owned or reduced to private ownership, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime (régimen forestal) is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other norms, which regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country's forests and lands of forest aptitude (bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal). Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion, the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law, amended by the Forestry Law, stated, before its amendment: "Article 7.- When the property referred to in the information is located within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the title applicant (titulante) must demonstrate having exercised ten-year possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree that created the respective wild area. Farms that are outside these areas and that have forests (bosques) may only be titled if the applicant demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and having protected said natural resource, with the understanding that the property must be properly demarcated with fences or lanes." In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession applies to the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be directed toward their protection and conservation. Only if this is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the natural heritage of the state (Article 13 of the new Forestry Law), with the character of unseizable and inalienable, and their possession will not give rise to any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Forestry Law).- IX. The Agrarian Tribunal had interpreted Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law, before being amended by the new Forestry Law, as requiring personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this regard Votes No. 169 of 9:40 a.m. on March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 1991)..." However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forestry Law was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the title applicant here, and the Constitutional Chamber, in Vote No. 4587-97 (published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997) declared, in relevant part, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, it is declared that the interpretation of Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the amendment made by Forestry Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, according to which, to title lands located within national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree creating the protected wild area, and that this does not favor, in these cases, possession transmitted by previous possessors, is unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and has retroactive effects, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith..." Thus, current possessors can benefit from transmitted possession... X. Forestry Law No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Possessory Information Law for the titling of lands located within protected areas. In this regard, the current provision states: "Article 7.- When the property referred to in the information is located within a protected wild area, whatever its management category, the title applicant (titulante) must demonstrate being the holder of legal rights over the ten-year possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree in which that wild area was created." (The bold is ours). That is, the legislator's intention is that these areas have been maintained protected and conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas..." (Resolution of 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Vote No. 113). V.- Regarding the appellant's claim that the lower court judge committed an error by applying Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law, which he considers was declared unconstitutional and therefore the proceedings must be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal finds he is not correct, because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional; rather, it was the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making, in that the possession exercised by previous transferors was not counted. Hence, since Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law is in force, the applicant must demonstrate ten-year possession prior to the declaration of the protected wild area, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in vote No. 4587-97 (published in Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law is not being applied retroactively either, as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Civil Code, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. In this sense, it is important to point out what the Constitutional Chamber stated in this regard in the cited vote: "The challenged Article 7, first paragraph, of the Possessory Information Law, whose text predates the last amendment by Forestry Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of the titling of real property located within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article states that the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised ten-year possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wild area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling a real property that has been affected into the public domain by the declaration of a protected wild area, whatever its specificity. It is now necessary to determine whether, in accordance with the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged norm, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion and the possession necessary for usucapion, set forth above, the questioned norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire property over real property, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe upon the right to property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. In the first place, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year period of possession necessary for usucapion, established in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases in which one seeks to acquire ownership of real property by adverse possession (prescripción positiva). The extension of the period that the appellant alleges violates the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the asset being titled (public property), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the asset is affected into the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and prevents concretizing the requirements of usucapion if, at that time, the right has not been acquired, i.e., if ten years of possession suitable for usucapion have not elapsed under the conditions established by law. The foregoing is simply the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise in the capacity of owner, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. Remember that assets affected into the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion if, before the affectation occurred, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right were not met. In this sense, the questioned provision, although it apparently regulates a specific case of usucapion, does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In this sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm does not occur either, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Civil Code, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. That is, the norm does not establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion. It simply specifies the manner in which these rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the status of the asset to be titled as property of the public domain (bien demanial). Hence, it is not considered that the amendment to Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion, which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest..." Although the appellant's claim that he has cared for a part of the farm subject to this process, since it has forest (montaña), is true, the fact is that he acknowledges having exploited the timber for extraction purposes, making pastures in said areas, without demonstrating that he did so with the corresponding permits, as was his duty. VI.- The appellant alleges the witnesses speak of a time longer than that required by law, such as the ten years established by Article 1 of the Possessory Information Law, and that the lower court assumes specific dates, which in his view violates freedom of expression and thought; he is also not correct, because the ten-year possession that the applicant must demonstrate is that which occurred before the creation of the protected wild area, in this particular case, ten years before July twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-five, the date on which the Barra del Colorado National Wildlife Refuge was created, which takes us back to July twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-five. Upon analysis of the testimonial evidence presented, it is determined that this requirement is not met, because the witness [Name1] has known the properties sought to be titled since approximately nineteen seventy-eight, according to his statement (folio 58). Furthermore, he stated that when he got to know the lands, they belonged to the State. The deponent [Name2] indicated he has known the property for eighteen years, and since his statement was made on March twentieth, two thousand, this takes us back to the year nineteen eighty-two, which also does not demonstrate the ten-year possession prior to the declaration of the cited protected wild area. Finally, the deponent [Name3] (folio 94) stated he has known the lands for thirty years, giving references to the former transferors thereof, which is contrary to the appellant's claim that his represented party is an original possessor for more than fifteen years (see brief with the character of sworn statement at folio 27), because according to what the cited witness said, it was derived, which makes this testimony unworthy of credibility. The witness [Name1] (folio 58) testified similarly, stating that Mr. [Name4] bought one of the properties from [Name5], another from [Name6], and then he donated it to Maderas San Rafael. Regardless of what is stated in this section, the fact is that the applicant had to prove ten-year possession before July twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-five, and it has been demonstrated she did not do so, therefore the appealed judgment must be confirmed. It is important to mention the fact that none of the deponents whose testimony was presented refers to whether the title applicant or the previous possessors have protected the resource, which is another requirement that must be met to title lands in this type of area, where an ecological possession must exist, because the de facto power in forest possession applies to the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be directed toward their protection and conservation. Only if this is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of such possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the natural heritage of the state. In this case, exactly the opposite has occurred, as the property has been dedicated to pasture for approximately fifty percent, an area from which the timber was extracted, as stated by the representative of the applicant, and this property is located within a protected wild area destined for the conservation and protection of natural resources and environmental conservation. In summary, the applicant is not correct regarding the categorical demonstration of ten-year possession prior to the creation of the protected wild area; nor has he demonstrated the protection of the resource; hence, the decision of the lower court judge must be confirmed." The same case law has sought to distinguish corporate property and possession where an activity directed at forest cultivation is carried out, from that where an extractive activity is simply conducted, or a merely conservational one. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of forest property or possession (without an enterprise). It is precisely in these cases that the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) comes to establish an entire legal regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner obligatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. Thus, in forest possession, the de facto power is exercised over a property of forest vocation or largely destined to protect forest resources, without a view to its exploitation, or by dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve the natural regeneration of the forest. In both cases, there would be no development of a plant or animal biological cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, but instead represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. Furthermore, it denies the possibility of acquiring possessory rights over lands in national reserves when a harmful action has been exercised against the forest resources. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a Forest Law (Derecho forestal), with the particularities of an organic and complete system, where the institutes of forest property and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest property, and also forest possession as a real right derived from it, or even conceived independently, began to take shape from the 1885 Tax Code (Código Fiscal de 1885), which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests whose regulations tend toward their conservation. Subsequently, the Law of Vacant Lands (Ley de Terrenos Baldíos) No. 13 of January 6, 1939, incorporated said principles. Then the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), in its Article 7, expanded the national reserves for the protection of such resources.— VII. The special legislation regarding the guardianship of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second opens through better-conceived regulations through Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of the Forest Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in supplement 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). In them, various forest property regimes are contained, and they limit the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals. It is not possible to acquire title over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) if one does not demonstrate having protected the forest resource. Its constitutional basis is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institute of forest property and possession is protected. This is not the same as civil or agrarian property; it is a property to conserve, and therefore the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.— VIII. Forest possession has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forest Laws. It falls upon a specific good: lands covered with forests or of forest aptitude (aptitud forestal). The owner or possessor of such goods has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and cannot exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal solution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, that special legal regime and the principles of Forest Law must be applied. The Forest Law establishes as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources (recursos forestales), in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All lands of forest aptitude (terrenos de aptitud forestal) and forests (bosques) in the country, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime (régimen forestal) is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country's forests and lands of forest aptitude. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion (usucapión), the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), amended by the Forest Law, established, before its amendment: "Article 7.— When the property to which the information refers is included within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession for at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree in which the respective wild area was created. Farms that are outside these areas and that have forests may only be titled if the promoter demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and having protected said natural resource, on the understanding that the property must be duly demarcated with fences or lanes." In other words, the de facto power in forest possession falls upon the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be directed toward their protection and conservation. Only if that is demonstrated can lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would remain forming part of the natural heritage of the state (Article 13 of the new Forest Law), with unseizable and inalienable character, and their possession shall not create any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Forest Law).— IX. The Agrarian Tribunal had interpreted Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, before being amended by the new Forest Law, in the sense of requiring personal possession, exercised with ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this sense Voto No. 169 at 9 hours 40 minutes of March 22, 1991, and No. 251 at 14 hours of April 17, 1991)..." However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forest Law was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the title applicant herein, and the Constitutional Chamber, in Voto No. 4587-97 (published in Boletín Judicial No. 188 dated October 1, 1997) declared, in what is relevant, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, it is unconstitutional the interpretation of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the amendment produced by Forest Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, according to which, to title lands included in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required with ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree creating the protected wild area, and that does not favor, in these cases, the possession transmitted by previous possessors. This judgment is declaratory and its effects retroactive, without prejudice to acquired rights in good faith..." Such that current possessors can benefit from transmitted possession... X. Forest Law No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Law of Possessory Informations, in order to title lands included in protected areas. In this regard, the current provision states: "Article 7.— When the property to which the information refers is included within a protected wild area, whatever its management category, the title applicant must demonstrate being the holder of the legal rights over the decennial possession, exercised for at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree in which that wild area was created." (Emphasis is ours). That is, the legislator's intention is that those areas have been maintained protected, conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas..." (Resolution at 14:50 hours of February 20, 1998, corresponding to Voto No. 113). V.— Regarding what the appellant alleges that the trial court judge commits an error by applying Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, which he considers was declared unconstitutional and therefore the proceedings must be analyzed in light of what is provided in Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers he is not correct because cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional, but rather the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making was, regarding not counting the possession exercised by previous transferors. Hence, since Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations is in force, the promoter must demonstrate decennial possession before the declaration of the protected wild area as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in Voto No. 4587-97 (published in Boletín Judicial No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law would also not be applied retroactively as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Civil Code and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. In that sense, it is important to note what the Constitutional Chamber said in this regard in the cited vote: "The challenged first paragraph of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, whose text is prior to the last amendment by Forest Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of titling of real property included within an area declared national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article indicates that the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession for at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wild area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling a real property that has been affected for public domain with the declaration of a protected wild area, whatever its specificity. It is now appropriate to determine whether, in accordance with the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged norm, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion and of the possession necessary for usucapion, set forth above, the questioned norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership over real property, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe the right of property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. In the first place, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year period of possession necessary for usucapion, fixed in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases in which one seeks to acquire ownership of real property by positive prescription. The extension of the period that the plaintiff alleges as an infringer of the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the property to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the affectation of the property to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession after the affectation from counting, and prevents the requirements of usucapion from being realized if, at that time, the right has not been acquired, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion have not elapsed under the conditions established by law. The foregoing is only the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as a holder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. Remember that properties affected for public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion, if before the affectation the conditions necessary for the acquisition of the right did not occur. In that sense, the questioned provision, despite the fact that it apparently regulates a specific case of usucapion, does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In that sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm does not occur either, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Civil Code and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. That is, the norm does not come to establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion. It simply specifies the way in which those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of the object to be titled as a public domain good. Hence, it is not considered that the amendment to Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, whose text is challenged, has introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion, which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest..." While it is true what the appellant stated regarding having taken care of a part of the farm object of this process, since it has mountain, the fact of the matter is that he acknowledges having exploited the timber for extraction purposes by creating pastures in said areas, without demonstrating he did so with the corresponding permits, as was his duty to do so. VI.— The appellant alleges the witnesses speak of a time greater than that required by law, such as the ten years established by Article 1 of the Law of Possessory Informations, and the a quo supposes concrete dates, which in his view violates freedom of expression and thought; he is also incorrect, because the decennial possession that the promoter must demonstrate is before the creation of the protected wild area, in this particular case it must be ten years before July twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-five, the date on which the Barra del Colorado National Wildlife Refuge was created, which takes us back to July twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-five. Making an analysis of the testimonial evidence presented, it is possible to determine that such requirement is not met, because the witness [Nombre1] has known the farms sought to be titled since approximately nineteen seventy-eight, according to what he indicated (folio 58). Furthermore, he said that when he knew the lands they belonged to the State. The deponent [Nombre2] indicated knowing the property for eighteen years and when the statement was given on March twentieth, two thousand, this takes us back to the year nineteen eighty-two, with which, the decennial possession before the declaration of the cited protected wild area would also not be demonstrated. Finally, the deponent [Nombre3] (folio 94), stated he had known the lands for thirty years, giving references to the previous transferors thereof, which is contrary to what the appellant alleged in that his represented party is an original possessor for more than fifteen years (see brief with the character of a sworn statement on folio 27), because according to what the cited witness said, it was derived, which makes such testimony not credible. The witness [Nombre1] (folio 58) declared in the same sense, regarding that Mr. [Nombre4] bought one of the properties from [Nombre5], another from [Nombre6], and then the latter donated to Maderas San Rafael. Regardless of what was said in this section, the fact of the matter is that the promoter had to prove decennial possession before July twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-five, and it is demonstrated she did not do so, therefore the confirmation of the appealed judgment must be imposed. It is important to make mention of the fact that none of the deponents whose testimonies were presented referred to whether the title applicant or the previous possessors have protected the resource, which is another requirement that must be fulfilled to be able to title when dealing with this type of areas in which an ecological possession must exist, because the de facto power in forest possession falls upon the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be directed toward their protection and conservation. Only if that is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would remain forming part of the natural heritage of the state. In this case, quite the opposite has occurred, because the property has been dedicated to pastures in a percentage of fifty percent, an area from which the timber was extracted, according to what was said by the representative of the promoter, the same being within a protected wild area destined for the conservation and protection of natural resources and the conservation of the environment. In synthesis, the promoter is not correct regarding the categorical demonstration of the decennial possession prior to the creation of the protected wild area; and he has also not demonstrated the protection of the resource, hence, what was resolved by the trial court judge must be confirmed."

"IV. Este Tribunal de forma reiterada ha considerado que "... La Información Posesoria es un trámite de actividad judicial no contenciosa para la formalización de un título registrable sobre un derecho de propiedad que se ha llegado a adquirir por la usucapión, cumpliendo para ello con los requisitos legales correspondientes. Se exige demostrar la posesión a título de dueño, en forma quieta, pública, pacífica e ininterrumpida (artículos 1 Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y 856 del Código Civil). El titulante, aparte de carecer de título inscrito o inscribible en el Registro Público, debe manifestar expresamente que la finca no ha sido inscrita en el Registro Público anteriormente. Por razones de interés público, y para evitar una doble inscripción registral sobre un mismo bien, o bien, para tutelar a terceros de mejor derecho que el titulante, la Ley exige notificar a ciertos sujetos. También estableció un trámite de oposición dentro de la Información Posesoria, en caso de que alguno de los interesados se sienta perjudicado por la titulación (artículo 8). La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias ordena al Juez tener como partes y por tanto notificarles personalmente desde el inicio de las diligencias, a los colindantes, ello por cuanto la titulación podría abarcar parte de las tierras que les pertenecen... se ordena notificar a los condueños o condóminos. Igualmente, en resguardo de los intereses del Estado, se ordena tener como parte a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, para el resguardo de la propiedad sujeta al dominio público, y de la Propiedad Agraria estatal (artículo 5). Finalmente, la Ley manda a citar a todos los interesados, mediante la publicación de un Edicto en el Boletín Judicial, que puedan tener un interés legítimo en el proceso.(Ver numeral 5 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias).- La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, en su artículo 7, así como las Leyes Forestales han procurado proteger los recursos forestales de la acción humana, sometiéndolos a diversas formas de manejo forestal. Aunque se ha permitido la titulación de dichas áreas, que ya declaradas como áreas de conservación pasan a formar parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, se exige el cumplimiento de otros requisitos más calificados. Eso nos conduce, directamente al concepto de posesión ecológica, y al criterio de la función ecológica de la propiedad forestal. En reiteradas sentencias, tanto de la Sala Primera de Casación, como del mismo Tribunal Superior Agrario, se han establecido los principios que deben regir para resolver éste tipo de situaciones agro-ambientales. Nuestro país ha sido pionero en la construcción de los institutos de la posesión agraria y la posesión ecológica. La misma jurisprudencia ha reconocido y desarrollado estos institutos, así como el ciclo de vida de la posesión agraria y, recientemente de la posesión ecológica (dentro del más amplio criterio de la función ecológica de la propiedad forestal). La misma Jurisprudencia ha querido distinguir la propiedad y posesión empresarial donde se ejercita una actividad dirigida al cultivo del bosque, de aquella donde simplemente se realiza una actividad extractiva o bien, meramente conservativa. En estos últimos casos se estaría en presencia de una propiedad o posesión forestal (sin empresa). Precisamente es en estos casos donde la Ley Forestal viene a establecer todo un régimen jurídico para la protección de los recursos forestales, sometiendo algunas veces al propietario en forma obligatoria al régimen forestal y en otros casos en forma voluntaria. De esa forma, en la posesión forestal el poder de hecho se ejerce sobre un bien de vocación forestal o en su mayor parte destinado a proteger los recursos forestales, sin miras a su explotación o bien, dedicándolo a la simple extracción de especies maderables, a través de planes de manejo para lograr la regeneración natural del bosque. En uno y otro caso no existiría el desarrollo de un ciclo biológico vegetal o animal, ni asumiría el hombre ningún riesgo. Es por eso que la ley no tutela, al contrario reprime, la posesión a través de la cual se destruyan los recursos forestales de áreas protegidas. Además niega la posibilidad de adquirir derechos de posesión sobre tierras de las reservas nacionales cuando se ha ejercido una acción dañina en contra de los recursos forestales. Hoy, parte de la doctrina agrarista afirma la existencia de un Derecho forestal, con particularidades de sistema orgánico y completo, donde ocupan un lugar importante los institutos de la propiedad y posesión forestal. En Costa Rica la propiedad forestal, y también la posesión forestal como derecho real derivado de aquella, o bien concebido en forma independiente, se comienza a perfilar desde el Código Fiscal de 1885, que establece todo un capítulo en cuanto a bosques cuyas regulaciones tienden a su conservación. Posteriormente la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 del 6 de enero de 1939 incorpora dichos principios. Luego la Ley de Tierras y Colonización en su artículo 7 amplía las reservas nacionales para la protección de tales recursos.- VII. La legislación especial en cuanto a la tutela de la propiedad y posesión forestales tiene tres etapas en nuestro país. La primera etapa de la propiedad forestal se enmarca con la Ley No. 4465 del 35 de noviembre de 1969. La segunda se abre a través de una normativa mejor concebida a través de la Ley No. 7032 del 7 de abril de 1986, la cual fue posteriormente declarada inconstitucional. La última opera con la promulgación de la Ley Forestal No. 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, reformada recientemente, por Ley No. 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996 (publicada en el alcance 21 de La Gaceta No. 72 del martes 16 de abril de 1996). En ellas, se contienen diversos regímenes de propiedad forestal, y limita el uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos por los particulares. No es posible adquirir la titularidad sobre terrenos con cobertura boscosa si no se demuestra haber protegido el recurso forestal. Su fundamento constitucional se encuentra en el párrafo segundo del artículo 45 de la Constitución. A través de limitaciones de interés social se protege el instituto de la propiedad y la posesión forestal. Esta no es igual a la civil, ni a la agraria, se trata de una propiedad para conservar, y por tanto los actos posesorios que en ella se realicen deben tener esa finalidad.- VIII. La posesión forestal ha tenido su régimen jurídico en las Leyes Forestales mencionadas. Recae sobre un bien específico: los terrenos cubiertos de bosques o de aptitud forestal. El propietario o poseedor de tales bienes tiene la obligación de conservar los recursos forestales y no los puede aprovechar económicamente sino bajo las restricciones o limitaciones impuestas por la ley. Para la solución jurídica de conflictos que nazcan del ejercicio de la posesión forestal, se debe aplicar ese régimen jurídico especial y los principios del Derecho forestal. La Ley Forestal establece como función esencial y prioridad del Estado, velar por la protección, la conservación, el aprovechamiento, la industrialización, la administración y el fomento de los recursos forestales del país, de acuerdo con el principio de uso racional de los recursos naturales renovables.(Artículo 1). Todos los terrenos de aptitud forestal y los bosques del país, ya sea estatales o que estén reducidos a dominio particular, quedan sometidos a los fines de la ley. El régimen forestal es el conjunto de disposiciones, entre otras, de carácter jurídico, económico y técnico, establecidas por la ley, su reglamento y demás normas, que regulen la conservación, la renovación, el aprovechamiento y el desarrollo de los bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal del país. Por ello, para adquirir la propiedad forestal por usucapión, se requiere el ejercicio de la posesión forestal. El artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones posesorias, reformado por la Ley Forestal, establecía, antes de su reforma: "Artículo 7.- Cuando el inmueble a que se refiere la información esté comprendido dentro de una zona declarada parque nacional, reserva biológico, reserva forestal o zona protectora, el titulante tendrá que demostrar haber ejercido la posesión decenal con por lo menos diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la respectiva ley o decreto en que se creó la respectiva área silvestre. Las fincas que estén fuera de esas áreas y que tengan bosques, solo podrán ser tituladas si el promovente demuestra haberlas poseído por diez años o más y haber protegido dicho recurso natural, en el entendido de que el inmueble tendrá que estar debidamente deslindado con cercas o carriles." En otros términos, el poder de hecho en la posesión forestal recae sobre el recurso natural "bosques" o "terrenos de aptitud forestal", y los actos posesorios deben ir encaminados a su protección y conservación. Sólo si se demuestra eso podría adquirirse o inscribirse terrenos a favor de dichos poseedores. De lo contrario, quedarían formando parte del patrimonio natural del estado (artículo 13 de la nueva Ley Forestal), con carácter inembargable e inalienable, y su posesión no causará ningún derecho a favor de los particulares (artículo 14 de la nueva Ley Forestal).- IX. El Tribunal Agrario, había interpretado el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, antes de ser reformado por la nueva Ley Forestal, en el sentido de exigir una posesión personal, ejercida con diez años de antelación a la creación de la reserva forestal o área protegida (Véase en tal sentido los Votos No. 169 de las 9 horas 40 minutos del 22 de marzo de 1991 y No. 251 de las 14 horas del 17 de abril de 1991)...". Sin embargo, esa interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley Forestal, fue cuestionada de "inconstitucional", por la aquí titulante, y la Sala Constitucional, en Voto No. 4587-97 (publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 188 de fecha 1 de octubre de 1997) declaró, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: "Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción y, en consecuencia, que es inconstitucional la interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley de informaciones Posesorias No. 139 del 14 de julio de 1941, cuyo texto corresponde a la reforma producida por la Ley Forestal No. 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, de acuerdo con la cual para titular terrenos comprendidos en parques nacionales, reservas biológicas, reservas forestales o zonas protectoras, se requiere posesión personal con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto que crea el área silvestre protegida, y que no favorece en estos casos la posesión transmitida por anteriores poseedores. Esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe...". De manera tal que los poseedores actuales pueden aprovechar la posesión trasmitida...X. La Ley Forestal No. 7575, también mantuvo las restricciones en la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, para poder titular terrenos comprendidos en áreas protegidas. Al respecto dispone el actual numeral: "Artículo 7.-Cuando el inmueble al que se refiera la información esté comprendido dentro de un área silvestre protegida, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, el titulante deberá demostrar ser titular de los derechos legales sobre la posesión decenal, ejercida por lo menos con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto en que se creó esa área silvestre."(La negrita es nuestra). Es decir, la intención del legislador es que esas áreas se hayan mantenido protegidas, conservadas durante todo este tipo, incluso antes de la creación de las Reservas y áreas protegidas...". (Resolución de las 14:50 horas del 20 de febrero de 1998 que responde al Voto No. 113). V.- En cuanto a lo alegado por el recurrente respecto a que el juzgador de instancia comete un error al aplicar el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, el cual considera fue declarado inconstitucional por lo que debe analizarse las diligencias a la luz de lo dispuesto por el artículo 1 de dicha Ley, considera este Tribunal no lleva razón pues el artículo 7 citado no fue declarado inconstitucional, sino lo fue la interpretación que venía haciendo el Tribunal en cuanto no se contabilizaba la posesión ejercida por los anteriores transmitentes. De ahí, al estar vigente el ordinal 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, debe el promovente demostrar una posesión decenal antes de la declaratoria del área silvestre protegida según lo indicó la Sala Constitucional en el voto No. 4587-97 (publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 188 de fecha 1 de octubre de 1997). Es importante mencionar que tampoco se estaría aplicando retroactivamente la ley como lo indica el recurrente, porque el plazo de diez años de posesión para usucapir se encuentra establecido en el Código Civil y la disposición cuestionada simplemente destaca ciertos elementos propios de la usucapión que también están definidos en la normativa general, como son: el objeto de la posesión y las condiciones en que ésta se debe ejercer para ser apta para la usucapión. En ese sentido es importante señalar lo dicho por la Sala Constitucional al respecto en el voto citado “El artículo 7 párrafo primero de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias impugnado, cuyo texto es anterior a la última reforma por Ley Forestal No.7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, regula el caso de la titulación de bienes inmuebles comprendidos dentro de un área declarada parque nacional, reserva biológica, reserva forestal o zona protectora. Señala ese artículo que el titulante tendrá que demostrar haber ejercido la posesión decenal con por lo menos diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o el decreto que creó el área silvestre. La disposición cuestionada regula el caso de titulación de un bien inmueble que ha sido afectado al dominio público con la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida, cualquiera que sea su especificidad. Corresponde ahora determinar si de acuerdo con la hipótesis que contempla la norma impugnada, a la luz de los criterios doctrinarios y jurisprudenciales que informan los institutos de la usucapión y de la posesión necesaria para usucapir, expuestos anteriormente, la norma cuestionada regula un tipo especial de posesión necesaria para adquirir la propiedad sobre los bienes inmuebles, que impone requisitos específicos que pueden infringir el derecho de propiedad o el principio de irretroactividad de la ley en perjuicio de derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, regulados en la Constitución. En primer término, debe señalarse que el artículo cuestionado no modifica -aumenta o disminuye- el plazo de diez años de posesión necesario para usucapir, fijado en el artículo 860 del Código Civil para la generalidad de los casos en que se pretende adquirir la propiedad de los bienes inmuebles por prescripción positiva. La ampliación del plazo que alega el accionante como infractor del derecho a la propiedad no se produce, porque dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público. Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley. Lo anterior es únicamente el resultado natural de aplicar los conceptos sobre el objeto de la posesión y su condición de ejercicio en calidad de titular, necesarios para la posesión ad usucapionem. Recuérdese que los bienes afectados al dominio público, tengan las especificaciones que tengan, no son susceptibles de adquisición por usucapión, si antes de producirse la afectación no se dieron las condiciones necesarias para la adquisición del derecho. En ese sentido, la disposición cuestionada, a pesar de que en apariencia regula un caso específico de usucapión, no crea un régimen con requisitos diferentes a los establecidos en el Código Civil para la generalidad de los casos. En ese sentido, tampoco se produce el alegado efecto retroactivo de la norma, porque el plazo de diez años de posesión para usucapir se encuentra establecido en el Código Civil y la disposición cuestionada simplemente destaca ciertos elementos propios de la usucapión que también están definidos en la normativa general, como son: el objeto de la posesión y las condiciones en que ésta se debe ejercer para ser apta para la usucapión. Es decir, la norma no viene a establecer ningún principio diferente -o requisito más riguroso- en relación con la aplicación de las reglas generales de la usucapión. Simplemente especifica la forma en que deben aplicarse esas reglas, lo que coincide con un resultado lógico dada la condición de bien demanial del objeto a titular. De ahí que no se considere que la reforma al artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, cuyo texto se impugna, haya introducido un régimen diferente en relación con los requisitos de la usucapión, que haya podido agravar la situación de personas que se encontraban ejerciendo posesión ad usucapionem en terrenos que fueron declarados de interés público. ..”. Si bien es cierto lo manifestado por el recurrente en cuanto a que ha cuidado una parte de la finca objeto de este proceso, al tener ésta montaña, lo cierto del caso es que reconoce ha explotado la madera con fines de extracción haciendo pastos en dichas áreas, sin demostrar lo hizo con los permisos correspondientes como era su deber hacerlo.VI.- Alega el recurrente los testigos hablan de un tiempo mayor al requerido por ley, como lo son los diez años que establece el artículo 1 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, y el a quo supone fechas concretas lo que a su criterio viola la libertad de expresión y de pensamiento, tampoco lleva razón, pues la posesión decenal que ha de demostrar el promovente lo es antes de la creación del área silvestre protegida, en este caso particular debe ser diez años antes del veintiséis de julio de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, fecha en que se creó el Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Barra del Colorado, lo que nos retrotrae al veintiséis de julio de mil novecientos setenta y cinco. Haciendo un análisis de la prueba testimonial evacuada se logra determinar que no se cumple con tal requisito, pues el testigo [Nombre1] conoce las fincas que se pretenden titular desde mil novecientos setenta y ocho aproximadamente según éste indicó (folio 58). Además, éste dijo que cuando conoció los terrenos éstos pertenecían al Estado. El deponente [Nombre2] indicó conocer la propiedad desde hace dieciocho años y al rendirse declaración en fecha veinte de marzo del dos mil, esto nos retrotrae al año de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, con lo cual, tampoco se estaría demostrando la posesión decenal antes de la declaratoria del área silvestre protegida citada. Por último, el deponente [Nombre3] (folio 94), manifestó conocer los terrenos desde hace treinta años, dando referencias de los antiguos transmitentes de los mismos, lo cual es contrario a lo alegado por el recurrente en cuanto a que su representada es poseedora originaria por más de quince años (ver memorial con carácter de declaración jurada a folio 27), pues según lo dicho por el testigo citado fue derivada, lo cual hace tal testimonio no merezca credibilidad. En igual sentido declaró el testigo [Nombre1] (folio 58), en cuanto a que don [Nombre4] le compró una de las propiedades a [Nombre5] , otra a [Nombre6] y luego éste le donó a Maderas San Rafael. Independientemente de lo dicho en este aparte, lo cierto del caso es que la promovente debía probar la posesión decenal antes del veintiséis de julio de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, y está demostrado no lo hizo, por lo que deberá imponerse la confirmatoria a la sentencia apelada. Es importante hacer mención al hecho de que ninguno de los deponentes cuyos testimonios fueron evacuados se refieren a si el titulante o los anteriores poseedores han protegido el recurso, el cual es otro requisito debe ser cumplido para poder titular tratándose de este tipo de áreas en la que debe existir una posesión ecológica, pues el poder de hecho en la posesión forestal recae sobre el recurso natural "bosques" o "terrenos de aptitud forestal", y los actos posesorios deben ir encaminados a su protección y conservación. Sólo si se demuestra eso podría adquirirse o inscribirse terrenos a favor de dichos poseedores. De lo contrario, quedarían formando parte del patrimonio natural del estado. En este caso ha sucedido todo lo contrario, pues el inmueble se ha dedicado a pastos en un porcentaje de un cincuenta por ciento, área de la cual se extrajo la madera, según lo dicho por el representante de la promovente, estando el mismo dentro de una área silvestre protegida destinada a la conservación y protección de los recursos naturales y a la conservación del ambiente. En síntesis, no lleva razón el promovente en cuanto a la demostración categórica de la posesión decenal previa a la creación del área silvestre protegida; y tampoco ha demostrado la protección del recurso, de ahí, deba confirmarse lo resuelto por el juzgador de instancia."