Prescription of disciplinary power for breaches of public probityPrescripción de la potestad disciplinaria por faltas a la probidad

**V.- ON THE MERITS: [...]** This Chamber considers that the alleged expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento) and the statute of limitations on the disciplinary power must be addressed first, because if the plaintiff’s representation were correct, it would entail a declaration of nullity of the proceedings and it would therefore be unnecessary to analyze the alleged violation of due process. **A) REGARDING THE EXPIRATION OF THE PROCEDURE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE SANCTIONING POWER:** **1) ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE PROCEDURE:** In general terms, the plaintiff stated in his claim that he raised this allegation within the administrative procedure and that it was not addressed during its processing, despite the fact that it had not concluded as the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) was still pending. **Opinion of the Court:** [...]. Thus, although mention is made of the expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), it must be pointed out to the plaintiff that before the issuance of the final administrative act, this institute was not invoked, and it has been the reiterated opinion of the First Chamber in this regard that: "... however, the procedural effects of expiration (caducidad) require that it have been requested or declared within the procedure, precisely to put an end to it. This means that the administrative decision issued after a six-month period of inactivity exclusively attributable to the Administration, when the expiration (caducidad) has not been alleged or declared, is completely valid. (...)." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-SI-2011). Consequently, given that said allegation was not raised at the appropriate procedural moment, as required by the administrative procedure according to what was indicated by the First Chamber; it must be noted that the resolution rejecting the expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in the ruling at 1:05 p.m. on November 8, 2017, conformed to the applicable legal framework and the referenced case law. **2) ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE DISCIPLINARY POWER:** [...] **Opinion of the Court:** This Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff's argument is unfounded, because Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) ---in force at the date of the facts--- (current Art. 414), stated: *“The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their offenses prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the date the cause for the separation arose or, as the case may be, from the date the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known.”* And along these lines, this Court has reiterated regarding the calculation of the time limit for the exercise of the disciplinary power: *“…However, the starting point for the calculation of this prescriptive time limit is decisive. On this matter, Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) -in force at the date of the facts- (Art. 414 currently) indicates that the time limit runs from the date the cause for the separation arose or, failing that, from the date the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly time limit is calculated from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power has the objective possibility of knowing the offense and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly time limit runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the head of the office…*" (Judgment No. 46-2020-I of the Contentious-Administrative Court at 2:00 p.m. on April 23, 2020). [...]. Thus, even though the facts subject to the disciplinary procedure concerned irregular conduct carried out in the years 2005 and 2010; these were not known until April 13, 2016, which gave cause for opening a preliminary investigation that concluded according to official communication No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94, of August 24, 2016, sent to the Office of the Minister, and the Minister, by resolution No. 1497 at 2:35 p.m. on September 23, 2016, ordered the opening of the administrative disciplinary procedure against the plaintiff. This is the reason why said argument must be rejected. Furthermore, the plaintiff maintained that the resolution issued by the Minister No. 1497 at 2:35 p.m. on September 23, 2016, does not have the virtue of suspending the statute of limitations period, but rather it is the “Initial Procedure Order (Auto Inicial del Procedimiento)” that does so, and that in this case it was issued by the investigating body only on November 28, 2016, more than 2 months beyond the one-month statute of limitations provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), since resolution No. 1497 did not have the virtue of suspending the statute of limitations period. [...] It is clear to this Court that the offense relates to a matter of administrative probity (probidad administrativa), as it is unthinkable to issue an identity card, a passport, or a driver's license under such conditions, as they are official documents, just as the plaintiff did in this case. Therefore, since the offense relates to a matter of probity in the function entrusted to the public official, the statute of limitations for this type of offense is not governed by the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), but by the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). In this sense, this Court has indicated in this regard: *“…This is without prejudice to offenses regulated by special rules, such as those expressed by the internal control regime, probity in public service (probidad en la función pública) and public treasury management, in which, according to the provisions of the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 (Art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422 (Art. 44) and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, a special five-year time limit applies (according to the assumptions and from the moments those rules establish). The same occurs with the police regime, for which, according to the General Police Law, No. 7410, the statute of limitations is two years for serious offenses and one month for minor ones, according to Article 83 of the aforementioned Law. In such cases, the special time limit prevails over the monthly one established by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), it is reiterated, as it is a special and subsequent regulation that prevails over the general labor regime…*" (Judgment No. 46-2020-I of the Contentious-Administrative Court at 2:00 p.m. on April 23, 2020). Now, Article 44 of the “Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública)”, No. 8422, regarding the statute of limitations, states: “Statute of limitations on administrative responsibility. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe, according to Article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.” In this way, offenses against administrative probity (probidad administrativa) prescribe in 5 years and not in the one month provided for in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) for offenses of a purely labor nature. Therefore, it is clear that between the acknowledgement of receipt of the Preliminary Investigation Report by the Minister (official communication No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94) on August 24, 2016, and the issuance of the “Initial Procedure Order (Auto Inicial del Procedimiento)” by the investigating body on November 28, 2016, the 5-year period did not elapse. This is the reason why the alleged statute of limitations on administrative responsibility and the disciplinary power is rejected. **B) ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS:** [...] Regarding these defects, this Chamber disagrees that they constitute a violation of due process. The plaintiff must understand that the preliminary investigation is one thing, where the summoned persons appear neither as witnesses nor as defendants in a specific case, but rather the preliminary investigation serves to determine the probable commission of an offense and its subsequent instruction through a disciplinary procedure. And once the recommendation is made by whoever conducts that investigation, the administrative disciplinary procedure technically begins, with the formalities and guarantees established in Book Two of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) starting from Article 308 thereof. Thus, the formalities required within an administrative disciplinary procedure are not necessary within the preliminary investigation, such as the appointment of the investigating body, the swearing-in, or being accompanied by a legal professional, as such requirements, it is reiterated, are specific to the administrative disciplinary procedure, as occurred in his case. [...]. The other point alleged was that having raised the exception of statute of limitations in the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición), he was told that he should have done so before the issuance of the final act, identified as resolution No. 1512, at 11:30 a.m. on August 28, 2017. This Chamber disagrees with this statement, and upon review of the resolution that heard the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición), he was told: “Likewise, it must be considered that in this matter, the investigated party was attributed with a possible violation of the duty of probity, contemplated in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). Therefore, although it is true that Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes a one-month statute of limitations, there are several exceptions contemplated in the legislation, such as the cases regulated in Article 44 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, which, in concordance with Article 71 (b) of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, provide for a five-year statute of limitations.” Note, then, that the rejection of the alleged statute of limitations was because he was told that under the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), in concordance with the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the statute of limitations period was 5 years and not the one month provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (current Art. 414). Therefore, no right of the plaintiff was violated by the ruling, because effectively, as indicated supra, due to the characteristics and nature of the offense, the applicable statute of limitations was 5 years and not one month. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that in the case of Mr. Christian Granados Segura, ---against whom an administrative procedure was initiated for the same facts---, he raised the exception of statute of limitations on the disciplinary power and, by resolution at 2:27 p.m. on March 8, 2017, the Minister of MOPT, upon recommendation of the Legal Directorate of MOPT No. DAJ-2017-1035 of March 1, 2017, accepted the statute of limitations and ordered the case closed, and that in his case, he raised this exception and it was rejected. On this point, it suffices to note that the object of this proceeding refers to the requested nullity of resolution No. 1512, at 11:30 a.m. on August 28, 2017, and the resolution at 1:05 p.m. on November 8, 2017, and since the resolution at 2:27 p.m. on March 8, 2017, was not challenged, it is futile to make any statement about it and its validity. The corollary of the foregoing is the rejection of the claim in its entirety.

It is clear to this Tribunal that the offense relates to a matter of administrative probity (probidad administrativa), as it is unthinkable to issue an identity card, a passport, or a driver's license under such conditions, since these are official documents, just as the plaintiff did in that case. Therefore, since the offense refers to a matter of probity in the function entrusted to the public official, the statute of limitations for this type of offense is not governed by the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), but rather by the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). In this regard, this Tribunal has stated: "...The foregoing is without prejudice to those offenses that are regulated by special rules, such as those set forth in the internal control regime, probity in public service (probidad en la función pública) and public finance management, in which, in accordance with the provisions of the General Internal Control Law No. 8292 (Art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service No. 8422 (Art. 44), and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) No. 7428, a special five-year period applies (according to the circumstances and from the moments those rules stipulate). The same occurs with the police regime, for which, as established by the General Police Law No. 7410, the statute of limitations is two years for serious offenses and one month for minor offenses, pursuant to Article 83 of the aforementioned Law. In such cases, the special period prevails, and not the monthly one established by the Labor Code, we insist, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime...." (Judgment No. 46-2020-I of the Administrative Contentious Process Tribunal of the 14:00 hours on April 23, 2020). Now, Article 44 of the "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service" (Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública) No. 8422, regarding the statute of limitations, states: "Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury, shall prescribe according to Article 43 of the General Internal Control Law and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994." Thus, offenses against administrative probity prescribe in 5 years and not in the one-month period provided in the Labor Code for offenses of an eminently labor nature. In this way, it is clear that between the acknowledgment of receipt of the Report of the Body that conducted the Preliminary Investigation by the Minister (official letter No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94) on August 24, 2016, and the issuance of the "Initial Order of Procedure" (Auto Inicial del Procedimiento) by the investigating body dated November 28, 2016, the 5-year period did not elapse. For this reason, the alleged prescription of administrative liability and disciplinary power is rejected. B) REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS: [...] Regarding such defects, this Chamber differs that they constitute a violation of due process; the plaintiff must understand that one thing is the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar), where the persons who are summoned do so neither as witnesses nor as accused in a specific case, but rather the preliminary investigation serves to determine the probable commission of an offense and its subsequent instruction through a disciplinary procedure. And once the recommendation is made by the person conducting that investigation, the administrative disciplinary procedure technically begins, with the formalities and guarantees established by Book Two of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) starting from its Article 308. Therefore, within the preliminary investigation, the formalities required within an administrative disciplinary procedure, such as the appointment of the investigating body, the swearing-in, or being accompanied by a legal professional, are not required, as such requirements, we reiterate, are characteristic of the administrative disciplinary procedure, as happened in your case. [...] The other point alleged was that, having filed the statute of limitations defense in the motion to reconsider, he was told that he should have done so before the issuance of the final act, identified as resolution No. 1512, of 11:30 hours on August 28, 2017. This Chamber also differs with that statement, for upon reviewing the resolution that heard the motion to reconsider, he was told: "Likewise, it must be considered that in the present matter, the investigated party was attributed with a possible violation of the duty of probity (deber de probidad) provided in the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service. Thus, while it is true that provision 603 of the Labor Code establishes a one-month statute of limitations, there are several exceptions provided for in the legislation, such as the cases regulated in provisions 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, which, in accordance with section 71, subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, provide for a five-year statute of limitations." Notice then that the rejection of the alleged statute of limitations was due to the fact that he was told that, pursuant to the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the statute of limitations was 5 years and not the one-month period provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code (current Art. 414). So, the plaintiff's rights were not violated by what was resolved, because indeed, as indicated supra, due to the characteristics and nature of the offense, the applicable statute of limitations was the 5-year period and not the one-month period. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that in the case of Mr. Christian Granados Segura, ---against whom an administrative procedure was initiated for the same facts---, he filed the defense of the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power, and by resolution of 14:27 hours on March 08, 2017, the Minister of MOPT, by recommendation of the Legal Directorate of MOPT No. DAJ-2017-1035 of March 01, 2017, accepted the statute of limitations and ordered the dismissal of the procedure, and that in his case, he filed said defense and it was rejected. Regarding this point, it suffices to note that the purpose of this proceeding refers to the requested nullity of resolution No. 1512, of 11:30 hours on August 28, 2017, and the resolution of 13:05 hours on November 08, 2017. Therefore, as the resolution of 14:27 hours on March 08, 2017, has not been challenged, any statement about it and its validity is futile. As a corollary of the foregoing, the lawsuit is dismissed in all its aspects." 414), stated: "The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the moment the cause for the separation arose or, as the case may be, from the moment the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known." And in this vein, this Tribunal on the calculation of the time limit for the exercise of disciplinary power has reiterated: "...However, the starting point for calculating that prescriptive period is determinative. On this subject, numeral 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) –in force on the date of the facts– (art. 414 to date) indicates that the period runs from the moment the cause for the separation arose or failing that, from the moment the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is calculated from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know of the fault and therefore, begin the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a prior preliminary investigation stage, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are made known to the head of the entity..." (Judgment No. 46-2020-I of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Tribunal of 2:00 p.m. on April 23, 2020). [...] Therefore, even though the facts that were the subject of the disciplinary procedure concerned irregular conduct deployed in the years 2005 and 2010; these were not known until April 13, 2016, which gave cause for opening a preliminary investigation that concluded according to official communication No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94, dated August 24, 2016, sent to the Office of the Minister, and the Minister, by resolution No. 1497 of 2:35 p.m. on September 23, 2016, ordered the opening of the disciplinary administrative procedure against the plaintiff. For this reason, said allegation must be rejected. Furthermore, the plaintiff maintained that the resolution issued by the Minister, No. 1497 of 2:35 p.m. on September 23, 2016, does not have the virtue of suspending the prescriptive period, but rather that it is the "Initial Procedural Order (Auto Inicial del Procedimiento)" that does, and that in this case it was issued by the investigating body only on November 28, 2016, more than 2 months exceeding the one-month prescriptive period provided for in article 603 of the Labor Code, since resolution No. 1497 did not have the virtue of suspending the prescriptive period. [...] It is clear for this Tribunal that the fault is related to a matter of administrative probity, since it is unthinkable to issue an identity card, a passport, or a driver's license under such conditions, as they are official documents, just as the plaintiff did in that case. Thus, since the fault is related to a matter of probity in the management entrusted to the public official, the prescription of this type of fault is not governed by the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code, but rather by the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). In this regard, this Tribunal has indicated: "...The foregoing without prejudice to faults that are regulated by special norms, such as those expressed by the internal control regime, probity in public functions (probidad en la función pública), and management of public finances, in which, according to the regulations of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions, No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, a special five-year period operates (according to the assumptions and from the moments those norms establish). The same occurs with the police regime, in which, according to the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410, the prescriptive period is two years for serious faults and one month for minor ones, according to ordinal 83 of the aforementioned Law. In such cases, the special period is imposed and not the monthly one established by the Labor Code; it is insisted, it being a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime." (Judgment No. 46-2020-I of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Tribunal of 2:00 p.m. on April 23, 2020). Now, article 44 of the "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions," No. 8422, regarding the prescriptive period states: "Prescription of administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulations relating to Public Finances, shall prescribe, according to article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994." In this way, faults against administrative probity prescribe in 5 years and not in the month provided for in the Labor Code for faults of an eminently labor nature. Thus, it is clear that between the acknowledgment of receipt of the Preliminary Investigation Body's Report by the Minister (official communication No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94) on August 24, 2016, and the issuance of the "Initial Procedural Order" by the investigating body dated November 28, 2016, the 5-year period did not elapse. For this reason, the prescription of administrative liability and the alleged disciplinary power is rejected. B) ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS: [...] Regarding said defects, this Chamber disagrees that they constitute a violation of due process, and the plaintiff must understand that the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) is one thing, where the persons who are summoned appear neither as witnesses nor as defendants in a specific cause, but rather what the preliminary investigation serves is to determine the probable commission of a fault and its subsequent formal commencement via a disciplinary procedure. And once the recommendation is made by the person conducting that investigation, the disciplinary administrative procedure technically begins, with the formalities and guarantees established by Book Two of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) starting from its article 308. In this way, within the preliminary investigation, the formalities required within a disciplinary administrative procedure are not required, such as the appointment of the investigating body, being sworn in, or being accompanied by a legal professional, since such requirements, it is reiterated, are characteristic of the disciplinary administrative procedure, as occurred in his case. [...] The other point alleged was that, having raised the prescription exception (excepción de prescripción) in the motion to reconsider (recurso de reposición), he was told that he should have done so before the issuance of the final act identified as resolution No. 1512, of 11:30 a.m. on August 28, 2017. This Chamber also disagrees with that assertion, since upon reviewing the resolution that addressed the motion to reconsider, it indicated: "Likewise, it must be considered that in the present matter, the investigated individual was attributed with a possible violation of the duty of probity, contemplated in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions. Thus, while it is true that numeral 603 of the Labor Code establishes a prescriptive period of one month, there are several exceptions contemplated in the legislation, such as the cases regulated in ordinals 44 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions, which in concordance with section 71 subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, provide for a prescriptive period of five years." It should be noted then that the rejection of the alleged prescription was due to the fact that he was told that, according to the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions, in concordance with the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the prescriptive period was 5 years and not the one-month period provided for in article 603 of the Labor Code (current art. 414). Thus, no right of the plaintiff was violated by what was decided, given that effectively, as indicated supra, due to the characteristics and nature of the fault, the applicable prescription was the 5-year one and not the one-month one. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that in the case of Mr. Christian Granados Segura, —against whom an administrative procedure was initiated for the same facts—, he raised the prescription exception of the disciplinary power and, by resolution of 2:27 p.m. on March 8, 2017, the Minister of MOPT, upon recommendation of the Legal Directorate of MOPT No. DAJ-2017-1035 of March 1, 2017, accepted the prescription and ordered the closure of the procedure, and that in his case, he raised said exception and it was rejected. Regarding this point, it is sufficient to point out that the object of the present process refers to the requested nullity of resolution No. 1512, of 11:30 a.m. on August 28, 2017, and the resolution of 1:05 p.m. on November 8, 2017, thus, since the resolution of 2:27 p.m. on March 8, 2017 has not been challenged, it is sterile to make any statement regarding it and its validity. A corollary of the foregoing is the rejection of the claim in all its aspects".

"V.- SOBRE EL FONDO: [...] Estima esta Cámara que se debe conocer en primer lugar la alegada caducidad del procedimiento y la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, ya que de llevar razón la representación del actor, ello conllevaría la declaratoria de nulidad de lo actuado y por ende se tornaría innecesario entrar a analizar la acusada violación al debido proceso. A) ACERCA DE LA CADUCIDAD DEL PROCEDIMIENTO Y DE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA: 1) SOBRE LA CADUCIDAD DEL PROCEDIMIENTO: En términos generales indicó el actor en su demanda, que opuso esta alegación dentro del procedimiento administrativo y que no le fue atendida durante la tramitación del mismo, a pesar de que este no había terminado al estar pendiente de conocer el recurso de reposición. Criterio del Tribunal: [...]. De esta forma, si bien se hace mención a la caducidad del procedimiento, hay que hacerle ver al actor, que antes del dictado del acto final administrativo, no se invocó este instituto, y que ha sido criterio reiterado de la Sala Primera al respecto que: "... empero, los efectos procedimentales de la caducidad requiere que se haya solicitado o declarado dentro del procedimiento, precisamente para ponerle fin. Ello conlleva a que la decisión administrativa dictada luego de una inercia de seis meses atribuible con exclusividad a la Administración, cuando no se haya alegado o declarado la caducidad, sea totalmente válida. (...)." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el fallo 34-F-SI-2011). En consecuencia, no habiendo sido dicha alegación opuesta en el momento procesal oportuno, y que el procedimiento administrativo demanda conforme a lo indicado por la Sala Primera; se debe señalar que lo así resuelto respecto al rechazo de la caducidad del procedimiento, en la resolución 13:05 horas del 08 de noviembre del 2017, se ajustó al ordenamiento jurídico aplicable y a la jurisprudencia referenciada. 2) SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA: [...] Criterio del Tribunal: En criterio del Tribunal no lleva razón el actor en su alegato por cuanto el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo ---vigente a la fecha de los hechos---, (actual art. 414), indicaba: "Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria." Y en esta línea, este Tribunal sobre el computo del plazo para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria ha reiterado: "...Ahora bien, resulta determinante el punto de partida del cómputo de ese plazo prescriptivo. Sobre el particular, el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo -vigente a la fecha de los hechos- (art. 414 a la fecha) señala que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Por ende, cuando las particularidades del caso exijan la realización de una etapa previa de investigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio..." (Sentencia No. 46-2020-I de las Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo de las 14:00 horas del 23 de abril de 2020). [...]. De forma que aún cuando los hechos objeto del procedimiento disciplinario versaran sobre conductas irregulares desplegadas en los años 2005 y 2010; estos se conocieron hasta el día 13 de abril de 2016, lo que dio causa a que se abriera una investigación preliminar que culminó según oficio No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94, del 24 de agosto de 2016, remitido al Despacho del señor Ministro y el Ministro por resolución No. 1497 de las 14:35 horas del día 23 de setiembre de 2016, ordenó la apertura del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario en contra del actor. Razón por la cual se debe rechazar dicho alegato. Además sostuvo el actor que la resolución emitida por el señor Ministro No. 1497 de las 14:35 horas del día 23 de setiembre de 2016 no tiene la virtud de suspender el plazo de prescripción, sino que lo es el "Auto Inicial del Procedimiento" y que en este caso se dictó por parte del órgano instructor hasta el día 28 de noviembre de 2016, más de 2 meses sobrepasando el plazo del mes de prescripción previsto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, ya que la resolución No. 1497, no tenía la virtud de suspender el plazo de prescripción. [...] Es claro para este Tribunal, que la falta se encuentra referida a un tema de probidad administrativa, pues resulta impensable, emitir una cédula de identidad, un pasaporte, o una licencia de conducir en dichas condiciones, pues son documentos oficiales, tal y como lo hizo el actor en ese caso. De manera que al estar referida la falta a un tema de probidad en la gestión encomendada al funcionario público, la prescripción de este tipo de falta no se regula por lo previsto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, sino por la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. En este sentido este Tribunal ha indicado al respecto: "...Lo anterior sin perjuicio de las faltas que se encuentren reguladas por las normas especiales, tales como las expresadas por el régimen de control interno, probidad en la función pública y gestión de la hacienda pública, en los cuales, acorde a lo regulado por la Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, opera un plazo especial de cinco años (según los supuestos y desde los momentos en que esas normas disponen). Lo mismo ocurre con el régimen policial, el cual, según lo establecido por la Ley General de Policía, No. 7410, el plazo de prescripción es de dos años, tratándose de faltas graves y de un mes, en el caso de las leves, según ordinal 83 de la Ley aludida. En tales casos, se impone el plazo especial y no el mensual estatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se insiste, al ser una normativa especial y posterior que prevalece sobre el régimen general laboral..." (Sentencia No. 46-2020-I Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo de las 14:00 horas del 23 de abril de 2020). Ahora bien, el artículo 44 de la "Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública", No. 8422 en cuanto al plazo de prescripción señala: "Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá, según el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994." De esta forma, las faltas a la probidad administrativa prescriben en 5 años y no en el mes previsto en el Código de Trabajo, para las falta de naturaleza eminentemente laboral. De esta forma es claro que entre el acuse del recibo del Informe del Órgano que realizó la Investigación Preliminar por parte del Ministro (oficio No. DVA DGIRH-RL-2016-94) el día 24 de agosto de 2016, y la emisión del "Auto Inicial del Procedimiento" por parte del órgano instructor de fecha 28 de noviembre de 2016, no transcurrió el plazo de los 5 años. Razón por la cual se rechaza la prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa y de la potestad disciplinaria alegada. B) SOBRE LA ALEGADA VIOLACIÓN AL DEBIDO PROCESO: [...] En cuanto a dichos vicios, esta Cámara difiere que constituyan una violación al debido proceso, y es que el actor debe entender que una cosa es la investigación preliminar, donde las personas que son convocadas, no lo hacen ni como testigos, ni como imputados en una determinada causa, sino que la investigación preliminar lo que sirve es para determinar la probable comisión de una falta y su posterior instrucción mediante un procedimiento disciplinario. Y una vez hecha la recomendación por quien realiza esa investigación es que se inicia técnicamente el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario, con los formalismos y garantías que establece el Libro Segundo de la Ley General de la Administración Pública a partir de su artículo 308. De esta forma, dentro de la investigación preliminar no se requiere de las formalidades exigidas dentro de una procedimiento administrativo disciplinario, como es el nombramiento del órgano instructor, la juramentación o hacerse acompañar de un profesional en derecho, pues tales exigencias, se reitera, son propias del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario, tal y como sucedió en su caso. [...]. El otro punto alegado, lo fue en el sentido de que habiendo interpuesto la excepción de prescripción en el recurso de reposición, se le indicó que debió hacerlo antes del dictado del acto final identificado este como la resolución No. 1512, de las 11:30 horas del 28 de agosto del 2017, esta Cámara también difiere de dicha afirmación y es que revisada la resolución que conoció el recurso de reposición se le indicó: "Asimismo, debe considerarse que en el presente asunto se le atribuyó al investigado una eventual vulneración a deber de probidad. contemplado en la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. De tal manera que, si bien es cierto el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo establece un plazo de prescripción de un mes, existen varias excepciones contempladas en la legislación, como son los casos regulados en los ordinales 44 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, que en concordancia con el aparte 71 inciso b) de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, disponen de un plazo de prescripción de cinco años." Nótese entonces que el rechazo de la prescripción alegada se debió a que se le indicó que conforme a la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, en concordancia con la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, el plazo de prescripción lo era de 5 años y no el del mes que prevee el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (actual art. 414). De manera que al actor tampoco se le violentó derecho alguno con lo resuelto en razón de que efectivamente, tal y como se indicó supra, por las características y naturaleza de la falta, la prescripción aplicable era la de los 5 años y no la del mes. Finalmente, alegó el actor que en el caso del señor Christian Granados Segura, ---a quien se le inició un procedimiento administrativo por los mismos hechos---, interpuso la excepción de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria y por resolución de las 14:27 horas del 08 de marzo de 2017, el Ministro del MOPT por recomendación de la Dirección Jurídica del MOPT No. DAJ-2017-1035 del 01 de marzo de 2017, acogió la prescripción y ordenó el archivo del procedimiento y que en su caso, interpuso dicha excepción y le fue rechazada. En cuanto a este punto basta con señalar que el objeto del presente proceso se refiere a la nulidad solicitada de la resolución No. 1512, de las 11:30 horas del 28 de agosto del 2017, y la resolución de las 13:05 horas del día 08 de noviembre del 2017, por lo que no habiéndose impugnado la resolución de las 14:27 horas del 08 de marzo de 2017, resulta estéril hacer cualquier manifestación sobre la misma y su validez. Corolario de lo expuesto es el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos".