Suspension Sanction on Mayor by Comptroller General Is Constitutional and Not Comparable to Political DisqualificationSanción de suspensión a Alcalde por la Contraloría General es constitucional y no equiparable a inhabilitación política

**IV. GROUNDS OF THE CLAIM AND THEIR ASSESSMENT BY THIS TRIBUNAL:** [...]: 1) The plaintiff questioned the competence of the *Contraloría General de la República* to sanction him under the following argument: [...]. **Tribunal's Opinion:** The Chamber does not share that position, as it is clear that what was addressed in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the *López Mendoza vs. Venezuela* case concerns a case diametrically different from the one at hand, since in that case what the Inter-American Court analyzed was an act restricting a citizen's access to submit their name for a popularly elected position (passive vote), and here what occurred was a sanction, once due process had been exhausted, of temporary suspension due to the administrative fault incurred by the plaintiff in the exercise of his duties as Mayor of the Central Canton of Limón, within the framework of the national legal system, which ensures the proper administration of public funds in protection of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). Protection that, pursuant to Article 183 of the Political Constitution (C.P.), corresponds to the *Contraloría General de la República*, as a body of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). In this way, the original constituent vested in that body the oversight and protection of public funds. A competence that has been developed over the years in national sub-constitutional regulations. Thus, a sanction of an administrative nature for violation of the regulatory framework protecting such funds cannot be equated with a sanction restricting civil and political rights, such as those established in the American Convention on Human Rights to elect and be elected to public office. Therefore, the sanction to which he alludes, such as disqualification from holding a popularly elected public office, must indeed be imposed by a jurisdictional body and not an administrative one (Resolution No. 3869-E-2006 of thirteen hours forty-five minutes on December fifteenth, two thousand six, issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal interpreting and establishing the scope of section 72 of the Organic Law of the *Contraloría General de la República*), however, it is reiterated that we are dealing with absolutely different scenarios, since the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was the result of an administrative proceeding in which he was investigated for administrative faults in the performance of his duties as Mayor and not a disqualification from holding a popularly elected public office. Likewise, the administrative sanction cannot be equated with a suppression or withdrawal of credentials, not even temporarily, since he never lost his status as Mayor because once the sanction was completed, the plaintiff continued and continues in the duties of the office. In this vein, regarding a constitutional challenge action in which that same argument was invoked, the Constitutional Chamber indicated: "...That is, it is not possible to apply the grounds of the *López Mendoza vs. Venezuela* case to the specific case of the interested parties in this action, since the challenged norm bears no relation whatsoever to the restriction of the political right to hold a popularly elected office, but rather to the sanctions that may be applicable to Municipal Mayors. Ergo, the precedent of the IACHR that the complaining party intends cannot be applied. Thus, as indicated by the PGR in its report on this action, it is not appropriate to invoke, as a parameter of interpretation, the judgment issued by the Inter-American Court in the *López Mendoza* case because, as explained in paragraph 104 of that judgment, what it addressed at that time was the non-conformity with the Convention of a disqualification sanction, imposed administratively, which deprived a person of their right to run for popularly elected public office. Evidently, the object of control of that judgment is substantially different from the matter examined here, which concerns the sanction of suspension of Mayors. Equally, it should be noted that another main reason supporting the *López Mendoza* case refers to a violation of the right to due process, which is also not related to the present case. If the State has already guaranteed a person access under conditions of equality to a specific public office of their interest, what occurs subsequently during the exercise of those functions is not covered by the guarantees established in section 23 of the Convention, nor is it covered if the interested party's argument does not relate to access under 'conditions of equality' guaranteed by the conventional norm. Consequently, a judgment issued through the jurisdictional channel, by a competent judge, need not necessarily be required to restrict continuity in that same public office, since from a simple reading of numeral 23.1.c it is observed that, at least that specific norm, protects access to public office only insofar as such access is under conditions of equality. It is absolutely feasible for instances other than the ordinary jurisdiction (such as the *Contraloría General de la República*) to sanction public officials with suspension, whether or not elected by popular suffrage, if they incur in any cause contrary to Law. By virtue of all the foregoing, we consider that there is no infringement of the conventionality parameter of the challenged norm, since, by virtue of the national margin of appreciation to achieve convergence between local and Inter-American law, the legal system must be weighed in a systematic and integral manner..." (SCV 2015-1780). (Highlighting not in original). Also, in Vote No. 2015-14973, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the C.G.R., with respect to its sanctioning power. The plaintiff also argued that since the sanction imposed is a derivation of criminal law, ---because he was attributed with the violation of norms to the detriment of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)---, it was the criminal jurisdiction that should have sanctioned him and not the *Contraloría General de la República*, with the latter assuming jurisdictional functions. An argument that the Chamber also does not share, because the regulations that make up the "Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury (Ordenamiento de Control y de Fiscalización Superiores de la Hacienda Pública)", among which we have the "Organic Law of the *Contraloría General*", "Law on the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets", the "General Law of Internal Control", the "Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office", the "Law on Administrative Procurement", the General Law of Public Administration, etc.; are clear in pointing out the types of liability that public officials have in the exercise of their functions, namely, administrative, civil, and criminal liability. Now, regarding the sanctioning competence of the *Contraloría General de la República*, there is reiterated jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber where it has stated that said power conforms to constitutional law, thus, for example, it stated: "...In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized the CGR's sanctioning power, not disciplinary or hierarchical, which it can exercise against all public officials, in the exercise of its oversight and control functions of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). This has been established when it indicates that: '...the sanctioning power recognized to this constitutional body does not derive from a hierarchical or labor relationship; that is, the sanctions it exercises are not disciplinary sanctions, but rather the power of superior oversight and control of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública).' (SCV 2003-13140) The sanctioning competence of the CGR is related to the foundation that created it, since it was created: 'to judge acts of public agents and to oppose resolutions issued by the same power on which they depend, insofar as these go against the correct use of public funds. The extensive work of the *Contraloría General de la República* has already been made manifest by this Tribunal in countless judgments...' (SCV 2009-008920). Now then, the sanctioning power of the CGR being indisputable, it is now appropriate to specify that the passive subject that can be sanctioned by the CGR is very broad, ranging from public servants in a broad sense to private natural and legal persons. Specifically regarding municipal officials, these can also be passive subjects, and therefore, subject to sanctions by the CGR, which in no way violates the governmental autonomy of Local Governments, as this same Chamber established in the previously mentioned vote, when it states: 'The officials of Local Governments do not escape this oversight, because the Constituent, although it wanted in Article 169 of the Constitution for the Administration of local interests and services in each canton to be in charge of the Local Government and Article 170 ibidem places these entities in the category of autonomous entities, the recognition that the Political Charter gave to Municipalities as autonomous bodies in charge of local administration did not elevate them to the category of sovereign entities, nor did it mean by this that the administrative activity, and therefore that of the municipal official, even the popularly elected one, was exempt or free from control by any other authority, but rather remains subject to what the laws provide in specific cases. In other words, the Democratic state cannot exist if the limits of all public functions are not clearly determined by law and if the liability of all officials is not assured' (SCV 2009-008920). In this way, if the *Contraloría* imposed on the plaintiff a sanction of an administrative nature (suspension from his duties) and a civil one (patrimonial), in accordance with the legal system, which grants it powers and competence for those purposes, it never assumed jurisdictional functions, because in the eventual case that the *Contraloría*, through the administrative proceeding, also considers that an illicit act against the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) was committed by the investigated official, in such cases, it must refer the proceedings to the criminal court, but not to impose administrative and/or civil sanctions as was the case at hand. Furthermore, another point that the plaintiff must bear in mind is that these liabilities are not mutually exclusive, and a violation of the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) may well entail those three types of liabilities, a condition that will be analyzed infra. Therefore, that argument is rejected. 2) He asserted that his right to a double instance was violated in his case: [...]. **Tribunal's Opinion:** Argument that the Chamber also does not share for the reasons stated below. Starting from Article 308 of the LGAP, the ordinary procedure applied in public institutions is regulated as a prerequisite for imposing a sanction, when no special procedure exists for that purpose. In this vein, in administrative procedural law, we have two types of proceedings: one of a linear nature, in which the acting Administration accuses and charges the individual, evacuates the evidence, and issues the final act, with the remedy of revocation (recurso de revocatoria) available against the final act before the body that issued the act, and appeal (apelación) before the highest authority of the organization, and in cases where that highest authority was the one who issued the final act, the remedy of reconsideration (recurso de reposición). (See Art. 345 of the LGAP. It is clear, of course, that regarding the appeal regime thus described, there are certainly exceptions, such as the so-called "municipal appeals ladder (escalerilla recursiva en materia municipal)"). Note that in this type of proceeding, the Administration acts as judge and party, as it is the one that accuses, processes the proceeding, and finally resolves. Now, we also find triangular proceedings, in which the Administration accuses an individual before an Administrative Tribunal (such as, for example, the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo)), and that Tribunal is the one that instructs the case, evacuates the evidence, and finally issues the final act. The appeal phase proceeds against what was resolved by the Administrative Tribunal. (Although exceptions may arise, as occurs with the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), since the resolution or final act issued by it is unappealable and exhausts the administrative channel, as established by section 111.d of the Organic Law of the Environment). In the case at hand, a linear proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff, in which the *Contraloría General de la República* charged him with administrative faults for violation of the administrative procurement system. Having analyzed the administrative file, it is established that for these purposes a body was appointed, that this body, once it had instructed the case, issued a final act, and that the plaintiff filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Office of the Comptroller General (Despacho de la Contralora), and she rejected it, confirming what was resolved. The plaintiff accuses the appeal procedure of violating his right to a double instance, under the argument that the Deciding Body was composed of officials from the Legal Division, who in turn are the advisors to the Comptroller General (Contralora), and that the Comptroller General (Contralora) lacks technical knowledge regarding the matter. Accepting such an argument, ---with deep respect for the plaintiff---, would be to ignore the basic principles of Administrative Procedural Law and particularly Book II of the General Law of Public Administration, published in Gazette No. 15 of January 22, 1979. And it is that according to said Law, the proceeding followed against the plaintiff was of a linear nature, as applied in the vast majority of public institutions, except in the case of triangular processes entrusted to Administrative Tribunals or resolutions that have an appeal (recurso de apelación) before an improper higher authority (jerarca impropio). Thus, according to the procedure regulated in the LGAP, the remedy of revocation (recurso de revocatoria) is filed before the body that issued the act (in this case, the deciding body) and the appeal (recurso de apelación) before the highest authority, in this case the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralora General de la República), without this constituting any defect in the guarantee of the double instance. And regarding the double instance as a fundamental right, the Constitutional Chamber has long reiterated in its votes that this right contemplated in Article 8.h of the American Convention on Human Rights only operates in criminal matters, when the convicted person has been sentenced for the commission of a crime, such that in administrative proceedings ---like the one challenged---, said requirement does not operate. In this sense it indicated: "...VI. Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of double instance, contrary to what has been said for double jeopardy, it is a principle that has the character of a fundamental right only in criminal matters. Administratively, it is possible to sanction in a single instance, a typical case being the act emanating from the highest authority, where only the remedy of reconsideration (recurso de reposición) would be available. The less grievous consequences of the administrative sanction compared to the criminal one and the possibility of subsequently challenging it in the jurisdictional channel justify the difference..." (VSC 7637-2005, 4887-05 and 1434-05). Furthermore, the allegations that the Office of the Comptroller General (Despacho de la Contralora) is advised by officials from the Legal Division where the members of the deciding body work, or that the Comptroller General (Contralora) lacks technical knowledge on the matter, are subjective assessments by the plaintiff, lacking legal content to analyze. The second argument made by the plaintiff in this section is that the constitutional guarantee of the double instance is circumvented by obliging the *Contraloría* to execute the sanction even when resorting to the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, since if the judgment is declared with merit, the sanction has already been executed. Accepting such a thesis would lead to the disregard of basic principles of Administrative Law. And it is that under a principle of administrative self-tutelage (autotutela administrativa), Public Administrations are permitted to execute their acts without needing to resort to a judge for those purposes. Thus, principles arose in administrative law doctrine regarding the presumption of validity of the administrative act, its enforceability (ejecutividad), and its execution power (ejecutoriedad). These principles were incorporated in our LGAP, and for example, Article 146 states: "1. The Administration shall have the power to execute by itself, without resorting to the Courts, administrative acts that are effective, valid, or voidable, even against the will or resistance of the obligor, subject to any resulting liability. 2. The use of administrative enforcement means shall be without prejudice to other liabilities incurred by the individual for their refusal. 3. Administrative execution of ineffective or absolutely null acts shall not proceed, and such execution, if it occurs, shall produce criminal liability for the public servant who ordered it, without prejudice to other resulting liabilities. 4. Execution under these circumstances shall be deemed an abuse of power." For its part, its Article 149 provides for the mechanisms of execution of the administrative act: "1. The means of administrative execution shall be the following: a) Forced execution by compulsion against the individual's assets, when it involves a liquid debt owed to the Administration, all with the application of the pertinent rules of the Code of Civil Procedure on seizure and auction, with the exception that the enforceable title (título ejecutivo) may be the certification of the act constituting the debt issued by the body competent to order the execution; b) Substitute execution, when it involves obligations whose fulfillment can be achieved by a third party in place of the obligor, in which case the costs of the execution shall be borne by the latter and may be collected according to the procedure indicated in the preceding subsection; and c) Forced compliance, when the obligation is highly personal, to give, to do, or to tolerate or not do, with the alternative of converting it into damages and losses at the prudent discretion of the Administration, and collecting them through the procedure indicated in subsection a). 2. In case of forced compliance, the Administration shall obtain the assistance of the police and may employ public force within the limits of what is strictly necessary. The Administration may, for this purpose, seize property and close commercial establishments." And even more, Article 151 establishes: "Violent resistance to the execution of the administrative act is prohibited, under penalty of civil liability, and, where applicable, criminal liability." In the same sense, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "...To maintain that the sanctioning and disciplinary power is contrary to the conventionality parameter, besides undermining the foundations of a classic institution of Administrative Law, not only denies this, but also the power of declarative and executive self-tutelage (auto-tutela) of public administrations, as well as the concepts of enforceability (ejecutividad) and execution power (ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts, institutions that have been peacefully accepted by all ius-administrativist doctrine and are contemplated in the General Law of Public Administration of 1978 itself in its sections 146 to 151, which have never been declared unconstitutional...." (SCV 2015-1780) (Highlighting not in original). Thus, it is absolutely clear that the Administration can execute (make effective) by itself and before itself its administrative acts, under a presumption of validity, and that for these purposes it can use the mechanisms that the law grants it, and that violent resistance to their execution is prohibited. Then, it is clear that, if the individual considers their rights harmed, they may file a contentious-administrative action if they deem it appropriate, but in no way does the fact that the Administration executes its own acts constitute a violation of the double instance. By reason of the foregoing, this other argument is also rejected. 3) He alleged a violation of due process, for violation of the principle of equality: [...]. **Chamber's Opinion:** For the plaintiff, the fact that the Legislator has endowed the *Contraloría General de la República* with disciplinary powers through laws such as the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), Article 42 of the Law of Internal Control; Article 18.d of the Municipal Code; Articles 40, paragraph 1; 43 and 66 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), Article 68 of the Organic Law of the C.G.R and at the regulatory level such as Articles 7, 11 subsection g), 49 and 52 of resolution No. R-DC-199-2011 of the Regulation on Organization and Service of the Disciplinary and Annulment Powers in Public Treasury (Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinarias y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública) of the *Contraloría General de la República*; violates the principle of equality, since Mayors are popularly elected officials, just like Deputies, the President of the Republic, and their Vice Presidents, and while for these latter, although there is a prior process for the withdrawal of credentials; the sanction is applied only after finalizing the judicial proceeding, while to Mayors, an administrative sanction is applied and then afterwards they must resort to the judicial channel. And that the Legislator, by giving different treatment without reason or foundation, to equals among equals, thereby violates the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness. Thus, what the plaintiff questions in this argument is a legislative decision embodied in various laws that is beyond the legality control corresponding to this jurisdiction, and the criticism he makes constitutes matter proper to constitutional control and not legality control, for which reason a ruling on this matter is omitted, and the plaintiff must raise said situation before that jurisdiction and not this one. Next, he questions the content of Articles 7, 11, 49 and 52 of resolution No. R-DC-199-2011 of the Regulation on Organization and Service of the Disciplinary and Annulment Powers in Public Treasury (Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinarias y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública) of the *Contraloría General de la República*, which the Constitutional Chamber, already hearing the action processed under file No. 15-010969-0007-CO, in which the Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Ana questioned the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the *Contraloría General de la República* No. 7428 of September 7, 1994 (Power to order and recommend sanctions); and Articles 7 (Integration of the deciding body), 11 (Functions of the deciding body); 49 (Final act) and 52 (Binding recommendation of the sanction) of the "Regulation on Organization and Service of the Disciplinary and Annulment Powers in Public Treasury of the *Contraloría General de la República*" (Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinaria y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República), of resolution No. R-DC-199-2015; pronounced itself, reiterating that the exercise of the challenged power entrusted in the cited regulations to the C.G.R., "conforms to the Law of the Constitution, in particular, to the control and oversight functions of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) that Articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution attribute to the Auxiliary Body of the Legislative Assembly. Indeed, as set forth in the transcribed judgment, the administrative autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not violated when the *Contraloría General de la República* proceeds in accordance with the power contained in Article 68 of its Organic Law. Nor is it considered that when the *Contraloría General de la República* recommends –with a binding nature (carácter vinculante)- the disciplinary sanction of a public official, it exercises active administration functions." And that what the Regulation does, is develop competences that the Constitution gives to the comptroller body in the oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). (VSC 2015-014973). 4) He alleged a violation of the principle of legal reserve and of the American Convention on Human Rights in its Articles 8 and 25: [...]. **Tribunal's Opinion:** This argument essentially refers to the issue of the effectiveness and execution power (ejecutoriedad) of the administrative act analyzed in the previous point. At this point, however, the plaintiff's argument starts from a false premise, and that is he affirms that according to Article 176 of the LGAP, all acts are presumed legitimate until a judicial judgment declares otherwise, and that nevertheless, there are a series of norms that allow their annulment in administrative proceedings and their respective execution, without being able to challenge them before their execution in the judicial channel, which in his opinion violates Article 49 of the Constitution and 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights in that they enshrine access to justice as a fundamental right. As explained supra, the administrative act ---which is technically defined as the unilateral manifestation of the will of the Administration capable of producing legal effects, that is, imposing obligations or granting rights---, (See Art. 130 of the LGAP), is enforceable (ejecutivo) and has execution power (ejecutorio) by the Administration itself without needing to resort to a judge to request its execution. Then, Article 49 of the Constitution enshrines legality control as a mechanism for access to justice, in accordance with what Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights state. Now, the plaintiff confuses the scope of Article 176 of the LGAP and extends it to all administrative acts, when this is not the case. Let us see, according to administrative law, an administrative act may have two types of defects that lead to its relative or absolute nullity. Thus, there is absolute nullity when one or more of its constitutive elements are completely missing, namely, motive, content, purpose, procedure, subject, or form. (See Arts. 131, 132, 133 and 166 of the LGAP) and there is relative nullity when one of its constitutive elements is imperfect. (See Art. 167). Thus, regarding the execution of an absolutely null act, that law states in its Article 170 that ordering an act under such conditions will produce administrative, civil, and eventually criminal liability for the public servant, if the execution were to take place. Therefore, the Chamber does not share the assertion that all acts are presumed legitimate until a judge provides otherwise, since the Administration is prohibited from issuing absolutely null acts and even less so from ordering their execution. Thus, the Administration is obliged, in its own venue, to declare the nullity of absolutely null acts in the exercise of the power of administrative self-tutelage (auto-tutela administrativa), that is, to review itself regarding what was acted upon and prevent its execution. Finally, the presumption of legitimacy referred to in Article 176 of the LGAP, is exclusively with respect to relatively null acts. Therefore, the plaintiff's argument is not well-founded and is consequently rejected. 5) He accused that there was an invasion of competencies between powers: [...]. **Tribunal's Opinion:** Regarding the arguments expressed in this section, the Chamber refrains from ruling as it concerns information that the plaintiff indicates to the Chamber about the norms he accused of being unconstitutional for infringement of Article 49 of the Constitution, a matter that, as indicated, escapes the competence of this jurisdiction. 6) That there was a violation of the principle of *non bis in idem*: He contended that the appealed resolutions violated the principle of *non bis in idem*, since a double sanction was imposed on him, namely, one month of suspension without pay and the payment of compensation to the Municipal Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública Municipal). **Tribunal's Opinion:** In the Chamber's opinion, the plaintiff confuses the criminal liability of every person, guaranteed to him under Article 42 of the Constitution—that he cannot be tried twice for the same act when there is identity of subject, act, and grounds—with the triple liability that public officials hold under the legal system. And it is that from a technical-legal point of view, public officials must account for all their actions (See Article 11 of the Constitution), and the commission of conduct contrary to the legal framework may entail liability of an administrative (disciplinary), civil (patrimonial), and/or eventually criminal nature, without this constituting a double sanction for the same act. For example, an official who illegitimately appropriates public resources may incur these types of liabilities without them being illegal, illegitimate, or mutually exclusive.

Note that Article 170 of the LGAP indicates that ordering the execution of an absolutely null act shall give rise to civil, administrative, and potentially criminal liability for the public servant who orders its execution. Then, regarding the necessary recovery for the patrimonial damages suffered by these due to the responsibility of their officials, this same regulatory body in its Seventh Title states: "On the Liability of the Administration and the Public Servant," Second Chapter, "On the liability of the public servant," Second Section, "On the internal distribution of liabilities," Article 203: "1. The Administration shall fully recover what it has paid to repair damages caused to a third party due to fraud or gross negligence (culpa grave) of its servant, taking into account its own participation in the production of the damage, if any. 2. The recovery shall also include the damages and losses caused to the Administration by the respective disbursement." For its part, Article 210 indicates: "1. The public servant shall be liable to the Administration for all damages caused to it by fraud or gross negligence (culpa grave), even if no damage to a third party has been produced. 2. To enforce this liability, the preceding articles shall apply with the pertinent exceptions. 3. The recovery action shall be executive and the title shall be the certification of the amount of the damage issued by the head of the respective entity." Finally, Article 213): "...For the purpose of determining the existence and degree of fault or negligence of the official, when assessing the alleged defect of the act he opposes, or that he issues or executes, the nature and hierarchy of the functions performed must be taken into account, it being understood that the higher the hierarchy of the official and the more technical his functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater his duty to know and assess it properly." From the harmonious integration of the articles, the types of liability that fall upon public officials are more than clear, none of which are exclusive, nor do they constitute a double penalty, which is why this allegation is also rejected." "IV.- ON THE BASIS OF THE CLAIM AND ITS ASSESSMENT BY THIS TRIBUNAL: [...] : **1) The plaintiff challenged the competence of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) to sanction him under the following allegation**: [...]. **Opinion of the Tribunal**: The Chamber does not share this position, as it is clear that what was referred to in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of López Mendoza vs. Venezuela corresponds to a case diametrically different from the one before us, because in that case what the Inter-American Court analyzed was an act restricting a citizen's access to running for a popularly elected position (passive vote), and here what occurred was a sanction once due process had been exhausted, a temporary suspension due to the administrative fault committed by the plaintiff in the exercise of his office as Mayor of the Central Canton of Limón, within the framework of the national legal order that ensures the proper administration of public funds in protection of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). Protection that, according to Article 183 of the C.P., corresponds to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, as a body of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the oversight of the Public Treasury. In this way, the original constituent deposited in said body the surveillance and protection of public funds. A competence that has been developed over the years in national regulations of infra-constitutional rank. Thus, one cannot equate an administrative sanction for violation of the regulatory block protecting said funds to a restrictive sanction of civil and political rights, such as those established in the American Convention on Human Rights to elect and be elected to public office. So the sanction to which he alludes, such as disqualification from holding a popularly elected public office, must indeed be imposed by a jurisdictional body and not an administrative one (Resolution No. 3869-E-2006 of thirteen hours and forty-five minutes of December fifteenth, two thousand six, issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) in which it interprets and establishes the scope of ordinal 72 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República)), however it is reiterated that we are facing completely different scenarios, because the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was the result of an administrative procedure, in which he was investigated for administrative faults in the performance of his duties as Mayor and not a disqualification from holding a popularly elected public office. Furthermore, the administrative sanction cannot be equated to a suppression or withdrawal of credentials, not even temporarily, because he never lost his status as Mayor since once the sanction was served, the plaintiff continued and continues in the functions of the office. Along these lines, in response to an unconstitutionality action where this same argument was invoked, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicated: "...That is, it is not possible to apply the foundations of the López Mendoza vs. Venezuela case to the specific case of the interested parties in this action, since the challenged rule has no relation whatsoever to the restriction of the political right to hold a popularly elected office, but rather to the sanctions that may be applicable to Municipal Mayors. Ergo, the Inter-American Court precedent that the plaintiff intends cannot be applied. Thus then, as indicated by the PGR in its report to this action, it is not appropriate to invoke, as a parameter of interpretation, the judgment issued by the Inter-American Court in the López Mendoza case because, as explained in paragraph 104 of that judgment, what it heard at that time was the non-conformity with the Convention of a disqualification sanction, imposed administratively, which deprived a person of their right to run for popularly elected public office. Evidently, the object of review of that judgment is substantially different from the matter examined here, where what is at issue is the sanction of suspension for Mayors. Likewise, it should be noted that another main reason underpinning the López Mendoza case refers to a violation of the right to due process, which is also unrelated to the present case. If the State has already guaranteed a person access under conditions of equality to a certain public office of interest to them, what happens subsequently during the exercise of those functions is not covered by the guarantees established in ordinal 23 of the Convention, nor is it covered if the interested party's argument does not concern access under 'conditions of equality' guaranteed by the conventional rule. Consequently, a judgment in the jurisdictional channel, by a competent judge, need not necessarily be required to restrict continuity in that same public office, since a simple reading of numeral 23.1.c shows that, at least that specific rule, protects access to public offices only as far as ensuring such access is under conditions of equality. It becomes absolutely feasible that other instances distinct from the ordinary jurisdiction (such as the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic) may sanction public officials with suspension, whether or not they are elected by popular suffrage, if they incur a cause contrary to Law. By virtue of all the foregoing, we consider that there is no violation of the conventionality parameter of the challenged rule, since, by virtue of the national margin of appreciation to achieve convergence between domestic and Inter-American law, the legal system must be weighed in a systematic and integral manner..." (SCV 2015-1780). (Highlighting is not in the original). Also in Vote No. 2015-14973, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated the constitutionality of the provisions in Article 68 of the Organic Law of the C.G.R., regarding its sanctioning power. The plaintiff also alleged that since the imposed sanction was a derivation of criminal law, ---as he was accused of violating rules to the detriment of the Public Treasury---, it was the criminal jurisdiction that was called to sanction him and not the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the latter assuming jurisdictional functions. An allegation that the Chamber also does not share, because the regulations that make up the "Superior Ordering on Control and Oversight of the Public Treasury (Ordenamiento de Control y de Fiscalización Superiores de la Hacienda Pública)", among which we have the "Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General)", the "Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos)", the "General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno)", the "Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública)", the "Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa)", the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), etc.; are clear in pointing out the types of liability that public officials have in the exercise of their functions, namely, administrative, civil, and criminal liability. Now, regarding the sanctioning competence of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, there is reiterated jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber where it has stated that said power conforms to constitutional law, for example it stated: "...In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized the CGR's sanctioning power, not disciplinary, nor hierarchical, which it can exercise against all public officials, in the exercise of its powers of surveillance and oversight of the Public Treasury. Thus it has been established when it indicates that: '...the sanctioning power recognized to this constitutional body does not derive from a hierarchical or labor relationship; that is, the sanctions it exercises are not disciplinary, but rather the power of superior surveillance and oversight of the Public Treasury.' (SCV 2003-13140) The sanctioning competence of the CGR is related to the foundation that gives it creation because it was created: 'to judge acts of public agents and to oppose resolutions issued by the same power on which they depend, insofar as these go against the correct use of public funds. The broad work of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has already been highlighted by this Court in countless judgments…' (SCV 2009-008920). Now then, the sanctioning power of the CGR being indisputable, it is now appropriate to specify that the passive subject who can be subject to sanctions by the CGR is very broad, ranging from public servants in a broad sense to private individuals and legal entities. Specifically regarding municipal officials, these may also be passive subjects, and therefore, subject to sanctions by the CGR, which in no way violates the governmental autonomy of Local Governments, as this same Chamber established in the previously mentioned vote, when it indicates: 'The officials of Local Governments do not escape this surveillance, because the Constituent Power, although it desired in Article 169 of the Constitution that the Administration of local interests and services in each canton be in charge of the Local Government and Article 170 ibid places these entities in the category of autonomous entities, the recognition that the Political Charter granted to Municipalities as autonomous bodies in charge of local administration, did not elevate them to the category of sovereign entities, nor did it mean that administrative activity, and therefore that of the municipal official, even the one of popular election, was exempt from or lacked control by any other authority; rather, they remain subject to what laws provide in specific cases. In other words, the Democratic State cannot exist if the limits of all public functions are not clearly determined by law and if the liability of all officials is not assured' (SCV 2009-008920). In this way, if the Office of the Comptroller imposed on the plaintiff a sanction of an administrative nature (suspension from his work) and a civil one (patrimonial), in accordance with the legal system that grants it powers and competence for those purposes, it never assumed jurisdictional functions, because in the eventual case that the Office of the Comptroller, through the administrative process, considers that a crime was also committed against the Public Treasury by the investigated official, in those cases, it must forward the proceedings to the criminal instance, but not to impose administrative and/or civil sanctions as was the case at hand. Then, another point the plaintiff must bear in mind is that these liabilities are not exclusive, and a single infringement of the ordering on control and oversight of the Public Treasury may well entail these three types of liabilities, a condition that will be analyzed below. For the reasons stated, this allegation is rejected. **2) He asserted that in his case his right to a second instance was violated**: [...]. **Opinion of the Tribunal**: An allegation that the Chamber also does not share for the reasons indicated below. Starting from Article 308 of the LGAP, the ordinary procedure applied in public institutions as a prerequisite to the imposition of a sanction is regulated, when no special procedure exists for those purposes. Along these lines, in administrative procedural law we have two types of procedures, one of a linear nature, in which the acting Administration demands and imputes the accusation against the administered party, processes the evidence, and issues the final act, proceeding against the final act with the appeal for reversal before the instance that issued the act and the appeal before the highest head of the organization, and in those cases where the head is the one who issued the final act, the appeal for reconsideration. (See Art. 345 of the LGAP. It is clear, of course, that regarding the described appeal regime, there are indeed exceptions, such as, for example, the so-called "recursive ladder in municipal matters"). Note that in this type of procedure the Administration acts as judge and party, because it is the one that accuses, processes the procedure, and finally resolves. Now, we also find triangular procedures, where the Administration accuses an administered party before an Administrative Tribunal (such as, for example, the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo)), and that Tribunal is the one that instructs the case, processes the evidence, and finally issues the final act.

The appellate phase proceeds against the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. (Although exceptions may arise, as occurs with the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, insofar as the final resolution or act issued by it is unappealable and exhausts the administrative channel, as established by Article 111.d of the Organic Law of the Environment). In the case at hand, we have that a linear procedure was initiated against the plaintiff, in which the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) charged and summoned him for administrative offenses for violating the regulations on administrative contracting. Having analyzed the administrative file, it is found that, for these purposes, a body was appointed, that this body, once the cause was instructed, issued a final act, and that the plaintiff filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Office of the Comptroller, and she rejected it, confirming the decision. The plaintiff asserts that the appellate procedure violates his right to a two-tiered instance, under the argument that the Deciding Body (Órgano Decisor) was composed of officials from the Legal Division, who are in turn the advisors to the Comptroller, and that the Comptroller lacks technical knowledge regarding the subject matter. Accepting such an argument—with deep respect for the plaintiff—would be to disregard the basic principles of Administrative Procedural Law and particularly Book II of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), published in Gazette No. 15 of January 22, 1979. Indeed, according to said Law, the procedure followed against the plaintiff was of a linear nature, as applied in the vast majority of public institutions, except in the case of triangular procedures entrusted to Administrative Tribunals or resolutions that have an appeal before an improper superior. Thus, according to the procedure regulated in the LGAP, the motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) is filed before the instance that issued the act (in this case the deciding body) and the appeal (recurso de apelación) before the highest authority, in this case the Comptroller General of the Republic, without this constituting any defect in the guarantee of the two-tiered instance. Indeed, regarding the two-tiered instance as a fundamental right, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has, for a long time, reiterated in its votes that this right contemplated in Article 8.h of the American Convention on Human Rights only operates in criminal matters, when the convicted person has been sentenced for the commission of a crime, so that in administrative procedures—such as the one challenged—this requirement does not apply. In this regard, it stated: "...VI. Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of the two-tiered instance, contrary to what has been said for double jeopardy, this is a principle that has the character of a fundamental right only in criminal matters. Administratively, it is possible to sanction in a single instance, a typical case being the act emanating from the highest authority, where only the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) would be applicable. The less burdensome consequences of the administrative sanction compared to the criminal one and the possibility of subsequently discussing it in the jurisdictional channel justify the difference..." (VSC 7637-2005, 4887-05 and 1434-05). Consequently, the allegations that the Office of the Comptroller is advised by officials from the Legal Division where the members of the deciding body work, or that the Comptroller lacks technical knowledge on the subject, are subjective assessments by the plaintiff, lacking legal content to analyze. The second argument made by the plaintiff in this section is that the constitutional guarantee of the two-tiered instance is circumvented by obliging the Office of the Comptroller to execute the sanction even when an appeal is filed before the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, since if the judgment is upheld, the sanction has already been executed. Accepting this thesis would lead to disregarding basic principles of Administrative Law. Indeed, under a principle of administrative self-enforcement (autotutela administrativa), Public Administrations are permitted to enforce their own acts without needing to resort to a judge for such purposes. Thus, in administrative law doctrine, principles were established around the presumption of validity of the administrative act, its enforceability (ejecutividad), and its enforceability by the administration (ejecutoriedad). These principles were taken up in our LGAP, and for example, Article 146 states: "1. The Administration shall have the power to enforce by itself, without resorting to the Courts, effective, valid, or voidable administrative acts, even against the will or resistance of the obligated party, subject to any liability that may result. 2. The use of administrative enforcement means shall be without prejudice to the other liabilities incurred by the administered party for its defiance. 3. Administrative enforcement of ineffective or absolutely null acts shall not proceed, and if it occurs, it shall produce criminal liability for the official who ordered it, without prejudice to other resulting liabilities. 4. Enforcement under these circumstances shall be considered an abuse of power." For its part, Article 149 provides for the enforcement mechanisms of the administrative act: "1. The means of administrative enforcement shall be the following: a) Forced execution via compulsion on the assets of the administered party, when it involves a liquid credit of the Administration, all with application of the pertinent rules of the Code of Civil Procedure on seizure and auction, with the exception that the executory title may be the certification of the act constituting the credit issued by the body competent to order the execution; b) Substitute execution, when it involves obligations whose fulfillment can be achieved by a third party instead of the obligated party, in which case the costs of execution shall be borne by the latter and may be charged according to the procedure indicated in the preceding subsection; and c) Forced compliance, when the obligation is strictly personal, to give, to do, or to tolerate or refrain from doing, with the alternative of converting it into damages at the prudent discretion of the Administration, to be charged through the procedure indicated in subsection a). 2. In case of forced compliance the Administration shall obtain the assistance of the police and may employ public force within the limits of what is strictly necessary. The Administration may for this purpose confiscate goods and close down commercial establishments." And even further, Article 151 establishes: "Violent resistance to the enforcement of the administrative act is prohibited, under penalty of civil, and where appropriate, criminal liability." In the same vein, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "...To maintain that the sanctioning and disciplinary power are contrary to the conventionality parameter, in addition to undermining the bases of a classic institute of Administrative Law, not only denies it, but also denies the power of declarative and executive self-enforcement of public administrations, as well as the concepts of enforceability and enforceability by the administration of administrative acts, institutes that have been peacefully accepted by all ius-administrativist doctrine and are contemplated in the General Law of Public Administration of 1978 in its articles 146 to 151, which have never been declared unconstitutional...." (SCV 2015-1780) (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, it is absolutely clear that the Administration can enforce (make effective) by itself and before itself its administrative acts, under a presumption of validity, and that for these effects it can use the mechanisms that the law grants it and that violent resistance to its enforcement is prohibited. Consequently, it is clear that if the administered party considers its rights harmed, it may file a contentious-administrative action if it sees fit, but in no way does the fact that the Administration enforces its own acts constitute a violation of the two-tiered instance. For the foregoing reason, this other argument is also rejected. 3) Alleged a violation of due process, for violation of the principle of equality: [...]. Criterion of the Chamber: For the plaintiff, the fact that the Legislator endowed the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic with disciplinary powers through laws such as the "Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", Article 42 of the Ley de Control Interno; Article 18.d of the Código Municipal; Articles 40 paragraph 1; 43 and 66 of the "Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", Article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la C.G.R and at the regulatory level such as Articles 7, 11 subsection g), 49 and 52 of resolution No. R-DC-199-2011 of the Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinarias y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República; violates the principle of equality, since Mayors are popularly elected officials, just like Deputies, the President of the Republic and his Vice Presidents, and while for these, although there is a prior process for the removal of credentials, the sanction is applied to them only upon the conclusion of the judicial procedure, whereas Mayors are subjected to an administrative sanction and then, after that, they must resort to the judicial instance. And that the Legislator, by giving different treatment without any reason or basis, to equals among equals, thereby violates the principle of interdiction of arbitrariness. Thus, in this argument, what the plaintiff questions is a legislative decision embodied in various laws that escapes the legality control corresponding to this jurisdiction, and the reproach he makes constitutes a matter proper to constitutional control and not legality review, which is why a pronouncement on this matter is omitted, and the plaintiff must raise this situation before that jurisdiction and not in this one. Subsequently, he questions the content of Articles 7, 11, 49 and 52 of resolution No. R-DC-199-2011 of the Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinarias y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República, which the Constitutional Chamber already addressed when hearing the action processed under file No. 15-010969-0007-CO, in which the Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Ana questioned the constitutionality of the provisions in Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic No. 7428 of September 7, 1994 (Power to order and recommend sanctions); and Articles 7 (Integration of the deciding body), 11 (Functions of the deciding body); 49 (Final act) and 52 (Binding recommendation of the sanction) of the "Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinaria y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República", of resolution No. R-DC-199-2015; it stated, reiterating that the exercise of the challenged power entrusted in the cited regulations to the C.G.R., "conforms to the Law of the Constitution, in particular, to the functions of control and oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), which Articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution attribute to the Auxiliary Body of the Legislative Assembly. Indeed, as stated in the transcribed judgment, the administrative autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not violated when the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic proceeds in accordance with the attribution contained in Article 68 of its Organic Law. Neither is it considered that when the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic recommends—with binding effect—the disciplinary sanction of a public official, it exercises functions of active administration." And that what the Regulation does is develop competencies that the Constitution grants to the comptroller body in the oversight of the public treasury. (VSC 2015-014973). 4) Alleged a violation of the principle of legal reservation and of the American Convention on Human Rights in its Articles 8 and 25: [...]. Criterion of the Tribunal: This argument refers essentially to the issue of the efficacy and the enforceability by the administration (ejecutoriedad) of the administrative act analyzed in the preceding point. On this point, however, the plaintiff's argument starts from a false premise, as he affirms that according to Article 176 of the LGAP, all acts are presumed legitimate until a judicial judgment declares otherwise and that, nevertheless, there are a series of rules that permit their annulment in the administrative channel and their respective enforcement, without being able to challenge them before their enforcement in the judicial channel, which in his view violates Article 49 of the Constitution and 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights as they enshrine access to justice as a fundamental right. As explained supra, the administrative act—which is technically defined as the unilateral declaration of will of the Administration capable of producing legal effects, that is, imposing obligations or granting rights— (See Art. 130 of the LGAP), is enforceable (ejecutivo) and enforceable by the administration (ejecutorio) by the Administration itself without needing to resort to a judge to request its enforcement. Consequently, Article 49 of the C.P. enshrines legality control as a mechanism of access to justice, in accordance with what Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights refer to. Now, the plaintiff confuses the scope of Article 176 of the LGAP and extends it to all administrative acts, when this is not so. Let us see: according to administrative law, an administrative act can contain two types of defects that lead to its relative or absolute nullity (nulidad relativa o absoluta). Thus, there shall be absolute nullity when one or more of its constitutive elements are completely missing, namely, reason (motivo), content, purpose, procedure, subject or form. (See Arts. 131, 132, 133 and 166 of the LGAP) and there shall be relative nullity when one of its constitutive elements is imperfect. (See Art. 167). Thus, regarding the enforcement of an absolutely null act, that law indicates in Article 170 that ordering an act under such conditions shall produce administrative, civil, and eventually criminal liability for the official, if the enforcement were to take place. In this way, the Chamber does not share the assertion that all acts are presumed legitimate until a judge rules otherwise, since the Administration is prohibited from issuing absolutely null acts, much less ordering their enforcement. Thus, the Administration is obligated, in its own channel, to declare the nullity of absolutely null acts in the exercise of the power of administrative self-enforcement, that is, to review itself with respect to what has been done and prevent its enforcement. Finally, the presumption of legitimacy referred to in Article 176 of the LGAP applies exclusively with respect to relatively null acts. Thus, the plaintiff is not correct in his argument, and it is therefore rejected. 5) Alleged that there was an invasion of competencies between powers: [...]. Criterion of the Tribunal: Regarding the arguments expressed in this section, the Chamber refrains from making a pronouncement since it involves information that the plaintiff provides to the Chamber about the norms accused of being unconstitutional for infringement of Article 49 of the C.P., a matter that, as indicated, exceeds the jurisdiction of this court.

• 6)That there was a violation of the principle of non bis in idem: He argued that the appealed resolutions violated the non bis in idem principle, since a double sanction was imposed upon him, namely, one month of suspension without pay and the payment of compensation to the Municipal Public Treasury. Criteria of the Court: In the Chamber’s opinion, the plaintiff confuses the criminal liability of every person, which is guaranteed under Article 42 of the Constitution that an individual cannot be pursued twice for the same act when there is identity of subject, act, and basis, with the triple liability that public officials possess under the legal system. For, from a technical-legal point of view, public officials must account for all their actions (See Article 11 of the Constitution), and the commission of conduct contrary to the block of legality may entail liability of an administrative (disciplinary), civil (patrimonial), and/or potentially criminal nature, without this constituting a double sanction for the same act. Thus, for example, an official who illegitimately appropriates public resources may incur such types of liabilities without them being illegal, illegitimate, or mutually exclusive. Note that Article 170 of the LGAP indicates that ordering the execution of an absolutely null act shall produce civil, administrative, and potentially criminal liability for the public servant who orders its execution.

Then, regarding the necessary recovery for patrimonial damages suffered by the Administration due to the liability of its officials, this same regulatory body in its Seventh Title states: "On the liability of the Administration and the Public Servant" Chapter Two, "On the liability of the public servant" Section Two, "On the internal distribution of liabilities" Article 203: "1. The Administration shall fully recover what was paid by it to repair damages caused to a third party by the fraud or gross negligence of its servant, taking into account its participation in the production of the damage, if any. 2. The recovery shall also include the damages caused to the Administration by the respective expenditure." For its part, Article 210 indicates: "1. The public servant shall be liable to the Administration for all damages caused to it by fraud or gross negligence, even if no damage to a third party has occurred. 2. To enforce this liability, the preceding articles shall apply with the appropriate exceptions. 3.

**IV.- THE BASIS OF THE CLAIM AND ITS ASSESSMENT BY THIS COURT:** [...]: **1) The plaintiff questioned the authority (competencia) of the Contraloría General de la República to sanction him, under the following argument**: [...] . **Court's Opinion**: The Chamber does not share this position, as it is clear that what was discussed in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the López Mendoza vs. Venezuela case pertains to a case diametrically different from the one before us. In that case, the Inter-American Court analyzed an act restricting a citizen's access to submitting their name for a popularly elected position (passive vote), whereas here, what occurred was a sanction—after exhausting due process—of temporary suspension due to the administrative fault incurred by the plaintiff in the exercise of his office as Mayor of the Cantón Central de Limón, within the framework of national law that ensures the proper administration of public funds in protection of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). Protection that, pursuant to Article 183 of the C.P., is the responsibility of the Contraloría General de la República, as an organ of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the oversight of the Public Treasury. Thus, the original constituent vested said organ with the oversight and protection of public funds. This authority has been developed over the years in national legislation of infra-constitutional rank. In this way, an administrative sanction for a violation of the regulatory framework protecting said funds cannot be equated with a sanction restricting civil and political rights, such as those established in the American Convention on Human Rights to elect and be elected to public office. Therefore, the sanction to which it alludes—such as the disqualification (inhabilitación) from holding a popularly elected public office—must indeed be imposed by a judicial and not an administrative body (Resolution No. 3869-E-2006 of one forty-five in the afternoon of December fifteen, two thousand six, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in which it interprets and establishes the scope of section 72 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). However, it is reiterated that we are faced with absolutely different scenarios, since the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was the result of an administrative proceeding in which administrative faults in the performance of his duties as Mayor were investigated, and not a disqualification from holding a popularly elected public office. Furthermore, the administrative sanction cannot be equated with a suppression or withdrawal of credentials, not even temporarily, since he never lost his status as Mayor, given that once the sanction was served, the plaintiff continued and continues in the functions inherent to the position. Along these lines, in response to an action of unconstitutionality in which this same argument was invoked, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "...That is, it is not possible to apply the reasoning of the López Mendoza vs. Venezuela case to the specific case of the parties in this action, since the challenged norm bears no relation whatsoever to the restriction of the political right to hold a popularly elected office, but rather relates to the sanctions that may be applicable to Municipal Mayors. Ergo, the precedent of the IACHR that the plaintiff seeks cannot be applied. Thus then, as the PGR indicates in its report on this action, it is not appropriate to invoke, as a parameter of interpretation, the judgment issued by the Inter-American Court in the López Mendoza case because, as explained in paragraph 104 of that judgment, what it heard at that time was the non-conformity with the Convention of a sanction of disqualification, imposed administratively, that deprived a person of their right to stand for popularly elected public offices. Evidently, the object of review in said judgment is substantially different from the species examined here, which concerns the sanction of suspension for Mayors. Likewise, it should be noted that another main reason underpinning the López Mendoza case relates to a breach of the right to due process, which also has no bearing on the present case. If the State has already guaranteed a person access under equal conditions to a certain public office of their interest, what happens subsequently during the exercise of those functions is not covered by the guarantees established in section 23 of the Convention, nor if the party's argument has nothing to do with access under 'equal conditions' guaranteed by the conventional norm. Consequently, it is not necessarily required that a judgment be issued through the judicial route, by a competent judge, to restrict continuity in that same public office, since a simple reading of subsection 23.1.c shows that, at least that specific norm, protects access to public offices only in terms of such access being under equal conditions. It is thus absolutely feasible that other instances distinct from the ordinary jurisdiction (such as the Contraloría General de la República) may sanction public officials with suspension, whether or not they are elected by popular vote, if they incur some cause contrary to law." By virtue of all the foregoing, we consider that there is no violation of the conventionality parameter of the challenged rule, since, by virtue of the national margin of appreciation to achieve convergence between local law and inter-American law, the legal system must be weighed in a systematic and integral manner.." (SCV 2015-1780). (Highlighting not in the original). Also in vote No. 2015-14973, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the C.G.R., with respect to its sanctioning power. The plaintiff also alleged that since the sanction imposed was a derivation of criminal law, ---because he was attributed with the violation of rules to the detriment of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)---, it was the criminal jurisdiction that was called to sanction him and not the Contraloría General de la República, the latter thereby assuming jurisdictional functions. A claim that the Chamber also does not share, since the regulations that make up the "Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury (Ordenamiento de Control y de Fiscalización Superiores de la Hacienda Pública)", among which we have the "Organic Law of the Contraloría General (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General)", the "Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos)", the "General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno)", the "Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office (Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública)", the "Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa)", the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), etc.; are clear in pointing out the types of liability that public officials have in the exercise of their functions, namely, administrative, civil, and criminal liability. Now, regarding the sanctioning competence of the Contraloría General de la República, there is reiterated jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber where it has stated that said power is in accordance with constitutional law, thus for example it pointed out: "...In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized the CGR's sanctioning power, not disciplinary, nor hierarchical, which it may exercise against all public officials, in the exercise of its surveillance and oversight competences of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). It has so established when indicating that: '... the sanctioning power recognized to this constitutional body does not derive from a hierarchical or labor-related relationship; that is, the sanctions it exercises are not disciplinary, but the power of superior surveillance and oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública).' (SCV 2003-13140) The sanctioning competence of the CGR is related to the foundation that creates it, since it was created: 'to judge acts of public agents and to oppose the resolutions dictated by the same power on which they depend, insofar as these go against the correct use of public funds. The extensive work of the Contraloría General de la República has already been made manifest by this Tribunal in innumerable rulings...' (SCV 2009-008920). Now, the sanctioning power of the CGR being indisputable, it is now appropriate to specify that the passive subject that can be the object of sanctions by the CGR is very broad, encompassing from public servants in a broad sense to private individuals and legal entities. Specifically regarding municipal officials, these can also be passive subjects, and therefore, the object of sanctions by the CGR, which in no way violates the governmental autonomy of the Local Governments, as this same Chamber established in the previously mentioned vote, when it indicated: 'The officials of the Local Governments do not escape this surveillance, because the Constituent, although it desired in Article 169 of the Constitution that the Administration of local interests and services in each canton be in charge of the Local Government and Article 170 ibid places these entities in the category of autonomous entities, the recognition that the Political Charter made to the Municipalities as autonomous bodies in charge of local administration, did not elevate them to the category of sovereign entities, nor did it mean that the administrative activity, therefore that of the municipal official, even the popularly elected one, was exempt from or dispensed with control from any other authority, but rather that they are subject to what the laws provide in specific cases. In other words, Democratic listing cannot exist if the limits of all public functions are not clearly determined by law and if the responsibility of all officials is not ensured.' (SCV 2009-008920). In this way, if the Contraloría imposed on the plaintiff a sanction of an administrative nature (suspension of his duties) and civil nature (pecuniary), in accordance with the legal system, which grants it powers and competence for those purposes, it never assumed jurisdictional functions, since in the eventual case that the Contraloría, through the administrative process, considers that an illicit act against the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) was also committed by the investigated official, in those cases, it must forward the proceedings to the criminal instance, but not to impose administrative and/or civil sanctions as was the case at hand. Moreover, another point that the plaintiff must keep in mind is that said liabilities are not mutually exclusive, and a violation of the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) may well entail those three types of liability, a condition that will be analyzed infra. For the foregoing reasons, said claim is rejected. 2) He asserted that in his case his right to a double instance was violated: [...]. Criterion of the Tribunal: A claim that the Chamber also does not share for the reasons indicated below. Starting from Article 308 of the LGAP, the ordinary procedure that is applied in public institutions as a prerequisite to the imposition of a sanction is regulated, when no special procedure exists for those purposes. In this line, in administrative procedural law we have two types of procedures, one of a linear nature, in which the acting Administration intimates and imputes the accusation to the administrated party, evacuates the evidence, and dictates the final act, with the motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) proceeding against the final act before the instance that issued the act and the appeal (apelación) before the highest-ranking official (jerarca) of the organization, and in those cases where the highest-ranking official (jerarca) is the one who issued the final act, the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición). (See Art. 345 of the LGAP. Of course, regarding the remedy regime thus described, there certainly exist exceptions such as, for example, the so-called "remedy ladder in municipal matters (escalerilla recursiva en materia municipal)"). Note that in this type of procedure, the Administration acts as judge and party, since it is the one that accuses, processes the procedure, and ultimately resolves. Now, we also find triangular procedures, in which the Administration accuses an administrated party before an Administrative Tribunal (Administrative Court) (as is, for example, the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo)), and that Tribunal is the one that instructs the case, evacuates the evidence, and ultimately issues the final act. The remedy phase proceeding against what was resolved by the Administrative Tribunal. (Although exceptions may arise, as occurs with the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), insofar as the resolution or final act dictated by it is unappealable and exhausts the administrative route, as established by ordinal 111.d of the Organic Law of the Environment). In the case at hand, we have that a linear procedure was initiated against the plaintiff, in which the Contraloría General de la República imputed and intimated administrative faults for violation of the administrative contracting system. Having analyzed the administrative file, it is held that, for these purposes, an organ was appointed, that this organ, once the case was instructed, issued a final act, and that the plaintiff filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Office of the Comptroller (Despacho de la Contralora), and she rejected it, confirming what was resolved. The plaintiff accuses that the remedy procedure violates his right to a double instance, under the argument that the Deciding Organ was composed of officials from the Legal Division, who in turn are the advisors of the Comptroller (Contralora), and that the Comptroller (Contralora) lacks technical knowledge regarding the matter. To accept such a claim, --with profound respect for the plaintiff--, would be to ignore the basic principles of Administrative Procedural Law and particularly Book II of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), published in Gazette No. 15 of January 22, 1979. And it is that according to said Law, the procedure followed against the plaintiff was of a linear nature, just as it is applied in the vast majority of public institutions, except in the case of triangular processes entrusted to Administrative Tribunals or resolutions that have recourse for appeal (apelación) before an improper highest-ranking official (jerarca impropio). In this way, according to the procedure regulated in the LGAP, the motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) is presented before the instance that dictated the act (in this case the deciding organ) and the appeal (recurso de apelación) before the highest-ranking official (jerarca), in this case the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralora General de la República), without this constituting any defect to the guarantee of the double instance. And as for the double instance as a fundamental right, the Constitutional Chamber, for a long time, has reiterated in its votes that this right contemplated in Article 8.h of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos) only operates in criminal matters, when the convicted person has been sentenced for the commission of a crime, so that in administrative procedures ---such as the one questioned---, said requirement does not operate. In this sense, it indicated: "...VI. Regarding the accused violation of the principle of double instance, contrary to what has been said for double incrimination, this is a principle that has the character of a fundamental right only in criminal matters. Administratively, it is possible to sanction in a single instance, a typical case being the act emanating from the highest-ranking official (jerarca), where only the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) would be admissible. The less onerous consequences of the administrative sanction compared to the criminal one and the possibility of discussing it later through the judicial route, justify the difference..." (VSC 7637-2005, 4887-05 and 1434-05) Moreover, the allegations that the Office of the Comptroller is advised by officials of the Legal Division where the members of the deciding organ work, or that the Comptroller lacks technical knowledge on the matter, are subjective assessments by the plaintiff, lacking legal content to analyze. The second claim that the plaintiff made in this section is that the constitutional guarantee to the double instance is mocked by obliging the Contraloría to execute the sanction even when appealing to the Contentious Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso), since if the judgment is upheld, the sanction has already been executed. To accept such a thesis would entail displacing basic principles of Administrative Law. And it is that under a principle of administrative self-enforcement (autotutela administrativa), Public Administrations are permitted to execute their own acts without needing to go to a judge for such purposes. Thus, in administrative doctrine, principles were established around the presumption of validity of the administrative act, its enforceability (ejecutividad), and its self-executing force (ejecutoriedad). These principles were taken up in our LGAP, and for example Article 146 states: "1. The Administration shall have the power to execute by itself, without resorting to the Courts, effective, valid, or voidable administrative acts, even against the will or resistance of the obligated party, subject to any resulting liability. 2. The use of administrative enforcement measures shall be without prejudice to other liabilities incurred by the administrated party for his defiance. 3. Administrative execution of ineffective or absolutely null acts shall not proceed, and such execution, if it occurs, shall produce criminal liability of the official who ordered it, without prejudice to the other liabilities resulting. 4. Execution in these circumstances shall be deemed an abuse of power." Meanwhile, its Article 149 provides the mechanisms for executing the administrative act: "1. The means of administrative enforcement shall be the following: a) Forced execution through compulsion against the administrated party's assets, when dealing with a liquid claim of the Administration, all with the application of the relevant norms of the Code of Civil Procedure on seizure and auction, with the exception that the executive title may be the certification of the act constituting the claim, issued by the body competent to order its execution; b) Substitutory execution, when dealing with obligations whose fulfillment can be achieved by a third party in place of the obligated party, in which case the execution costs shall be borne by the latter and may be collected according to the procedure indicated in the preceding subparagraph; and c) Forced compliance, when the obligation is strictly personal, to give, to do, or to tolerate or not do, with the alternative of converting it into damages at the prudential discretion of the Administration, to be collected through the procedure indicated in subparagraph a). 2. In the event of forced compliance, the Administration shall obtain the assistance of the police and may use public force within the limits of what is strictly necessary." For this purpose, the Administration may seize property and close commercial establishments." And furthermore, Article 151 establishes: "Violent resistance to the execution of the administrative act is prohibited, under penalty of civil liability, and, where applicable, criminal liability." Along the same lines, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "...To maintain that the sanctioning and disciplinary power is contrary to the conventionality parameter, in addition to undermining the foundations of a classic institute of Administrative Law, not only denies it but also denies the declarative and executive self-tutelage power of public administrations, as well as the concepts of enforceability and self-executing nature of administrative acts, institutes that have been peacefully accepted by all administrative law doctrine and are contemplated in the General Law of Public Administration of 1978 itself in its sections 146 to 151, which have never been declared unconstitutional...." (SCV 2015-1780) (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, it is absolutely clear that the Administration can execute (make effective) its administrative acts by itself and before itself, under a presumption of validity, and that for these purposes it can use the mechanisms granted by law and that violent resistance to its execution is prohibited. Then, it is clear that, if the administered party considers their rights harmed, they may file a contentious-administrative action if they deem it appropriate, but in no way does the fact that the Administration executes its own acts constitute a violation of the right to appeal. The reason for the above is the rejection regarding this other argument as well. 3) Alleged a violation of due process, for violation of the principle of equality: [...]. Opinion of the Chamber: For the plaintiff, the fact that the Legislature has endowed the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic with disciplinary powers through laws such as the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, Article 42 of the Internal Control Law; Article 18.d of the Municipal Code; Articles 40, paragraph 1; 43 and 66 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, Article 68 of the Organic Law of the C.G.R. and at the regulatory level such as Articles 7, 11 subsection g), 49 and 52 of resolution No. R-DC-199-2011 of the Regulations on Organization and Service of Disciplinary and Annulment Powers in Public Finance of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic; violates the principle of equality, since Mayors are popularly elected officials, just like Deputies, the President of the Republic and their Vice Presidents, and while for the latter, although there is a prior process for the withdrawal of credentials, it is until the conclusion of the judicial procedure that the sanction is applied to them, whereas for Mayors an administrative sanction is applied and thereafter they may resort to the judicial instance. And that the Legislature, by giving different treatment without reason or basis, to equals among equals, thereby violates the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness. Thus, what the plaintiff questions in this argument is a legislative decision embodied in various laws that falls outside the legality control corresponding to this jurisdiction, and the reproach made constitutes matter proper to constitutional control and not legality control, which is why a pronouncement in this regard is omitted, and the plaintiff must allege said situation before that jurisdiction and not in this one. Then, it questions the content of Articles 7, 11, 49 and 52 of resolution No. R-DC-199-2011 of the Regulations on Organization and Service of Disciplinary and Annulment Powers in Public Finance of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which the Constitutional Chamber already addressed when hearing the action processed under file No. 15-010969-0007-CO, in which the Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Ana questioned the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic No. 7428 of September 7, 1994 (Power to order and recommend sanctions); and Articles 7 (Integration of the deciding body), 11 (Functions of the deciding body); 49 (Final act) and 52 (Binding recommendation of the sanction) of the "Regulations on Organization and Service of Disciplinary and Annulment Powers in Public Finance of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic", of resolution N° R-DC-199-2015; it stated, reiterating that the exercise of the contested power entrusted in the cited regulations to the C.G.R., "conforms to the Law of the Constitution, in particular, to the functions of control and oversight of the Public Finance, which Articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution attribute to the Auxiliary Body of the Legislative Assembly. In effect, according to what was set forth in the transcribed judgment, the administrative autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not violated when the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic proceeds in accordance with the attribution contained in Article 68 of its Organic Law. Nor is it considered that when the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic recommends –with binding effect– the disciplinary sanction of a public official, it exercises active administration functions." And that what the Regulations do is develop competencies that the Constitution itself provides to the comptroller body in the oversight of public finance. (VSC 2015-014973). 4) Alleged a violation of the principle of legal reservation and the American Convention on Human Rights in its Articles 8 and 25: [...]. Opinion of the Tribunal: This argument refers fundamentally to the issue of the efficacy and the self-executing nature of the administrative act analyzed in the preceding point. In this regard, the plaintiff's argument, however, is based on a false premise, as it states that according to Article 176 of the LGAP, all acts are presumed legitimate until a judicial ruling declares otherwise, and yet there are a series of norms that allow their annulment in administrative proceedings and their respective execution, without being able to challenge them before their execution in judicial proceedings, which in their opinion violates constitutional Article 49 and Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights insofar as they enshrine access to justice as a fundamental right. As explained above, the administrative act ---which is technically defined as the unilateral manifestation of the Administration's will capable of producing legal effects, that is, imposing obligations or granting rights--- (See Art. 130 of the LGAP), is enforceable and self-executing by the Administration itself without needing to resort to a judge to request its execution. Then, Article 49 of the Political Constitution enshrines legality control as a mechanism for access to justice, in accordance with what Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights state. Now, the plaintiff confuses the scope of Article 176 of the LGAP and extends it to all administrative acts, when this is not the case. Let us see, according to administrative law, an administrative act can have two types of defects that lead to its relative nullity or absolute nullity. Thus, there will be absolute nullity when one or several of its constitutive elements are completely missing, namely, motive, content, purpose, procedure, subject, or form. (See Arts. 131, 132, 133 and 166 of the LGAP) and there will be relative nullity when one of its constitutive elements is imperfect. (See Art. 167). Thus, regarding the execution of an absolutely null act, that law indicates in its Article 170 that ordering an act under such conditions will produce administrative, civil, and eventually criminal liability of the servant, if the execution were to take place. Therefore, the Chamber does not share the statement that all acts are presumed legitimate until a judge orders otherwise, since the Administration is forbidden from issuing absolutely null acts and even less so from ordering their execution. In this way, the Administration is obliged in its own proceedings to declare the nullity of absolutely null acts in the exercise of the power of administrative self-tutelage, that is, to review itself regarding the actions taken and prevent their execution. Finally, the presumption of legitimacy referred to in Article 176 of the LGAP applies exclusively to relatively null acts. Thus, the plaintiff is not correct in their argument and it is therefore rejected. 5) Accused an invasion of powers among branches of government: [...]. Opinion of the Tribunal: Regarding the arguments expressed in this section, the Chamber refrains from ruling as it concerns information that the plaintiff indicates to the Chamber about the norms that were challenged as unconstitutional for violation of Article 49 of the Political Constitution, a matter which, as indicated, falls outside the jurisdiction of this court. 6) That there was a violation of the principle of non bis in idem: It maintained that the appealed resolutions violated the principle of non bis in idem, since a double sanction was imposed, namely, one month of suspension without pay and the payment of compensation to the Municipal Public Finance. Opinion of the Tribunal: In the opinion of the Chamber, the plaintiff confuses the criminal liability of every person, which is guaranteed under Article 42 of the Constitution so that they cannot be prosecuted twice for the same act when there is identity of subject, act, and basis, with the triple liability that public officials hold under the legal system. For from a technical-legal point of view, public officials must account for all their actions (See Article 11 of the Constitution), and the commission of conduct contrary to the legality framework may entail administrative (disciplinary), civil (patrimonial) and/or eventually criminal liability, without this constituting a double sanction for the same act. Thus, for example, an official who illegitimately appropriates public resources may incur these types of liabilities without them being illegal, illegitimate, or mutually exclusive. Note that Article 170 of the LGAP indicates that ordering the execution of an absolutely null act will produce civil, administrative, and eventually criminal liability on the servant who orders its execution. Then, regarding the necessary recovery for patrimonial damages suffered by these entities due to the responsibility of their officials, this same regulatory body in its Seventh Title indicates: "On the liability of the Administration and the Public Servant" Chapter Two, "On the liability of the public servant" Section Two, "On the internal distribution of liabilities" Article 203 "1. The Administration must fully recover what it has paid to repair the damages caused to a third party by the willful misconduct or gross negligence of its servant, taking into account its own participation in the production of the damage, if any. 2. The recovery must also include the damages and losses caused to the Administration by the respective disbursement." For its part, Article 210 indicates: "1. The public servant shall be liable before the Administration for all damages caused to it by willful misconduct or gross negligence, even if no damage to a third party has occurred. 2. To enforce this liability, the preceding articles shall be applied with the appropriate exceptions." The recovery action shall be executive and the title shall be the certification of the amount of damage issued by the head of the respective entity." Finally, Article 213): "...For the purposes of determining the existence and degree of fault or negligence of the official, when assessing the alleged defect of the act to which they object, or that they issue or execute, the nature and hierarchy of the functions performed must be taken into account, it being understood that the higher the official's rank and the more technical their functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater their duty to be aware of it and assess it properly." From the harmonious integration of the articles, the types of liability that fall upon public officials are more than clear, without these being mutually exclusive or constituting a double penalty, which is why this argument is also rejected."

"IV.- DEL FUNDAMENTO DE LA DEMANDA Y SU VALORACIÓN POR PARTE DE ESTE TRIBUNAL: [...]: 1) Cuestionó el actor la competencia de la Contraloría General de la República para sancionarlo bajo el siguiente alegato: [...]. Criterio del Tribunal: La Cámara no comparte dicha posición, pues es claro que lo referido en la sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derecho Humanos en el caso López Mendoza vs Venezuela responde a un caso diametralmente distinto al que nos ocupa, pues en ese caso lo que analizó la Corte Interamericana fue un acto de restricción al acceso de un ciudadano a postular su nombre a un puesto de elección popular (voto pasivo), y acá lo que se dio fue una sanción una vez agotado el debido proceso, de suspensión temporal en razón de la falta administrativa en que incurrió el actor en el ejercicio de su cargo como Alcalde del Cantón Central de Limón, en el marco del ordenamiento nacional, que vela por la recta administración de los fondos públicos en tutela de la Hacienda Pública. Tutela que conforme al artículo 183 de la C.P. le corresponde a la Contraloría General de la República, como órgano de relevancia constitucional, auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa en la vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública. De esta forma el constituyente originario depositó en dicho órgano la vigilancia y tutela de los fondos públicos. Competencia que ha sido desarrollado a lo largo de los años en la normativa nacional de rango infraconstitucional. De esta forma, no se puede equiparar una sanción de naturaleza administrativa por violación al bloque normativo que tutela dichos fondos, a una sanción restrictiva de los derechos civiles y políticos, tales como los establecidos en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos a elegir y ser electo a un cargo público. De manera que la sanción a la que alude, como lo sería la inhabilitación para ocupar un cargo público de elección popular, efectivamente deberá ser impuesta por un órgano jurisdiccional y no administrativo (Resolución No. 3869-E-2006 de las trece horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del quince de diciembre del dos mil seis, emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en la que interpreta y establece los alcances del ordinal 72 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), sin embargo se reitera que estamos frente a supuestos absolutamente distintos, pues la sanción impuesta al actor, fue el resultado de un procedimiento administrativo, en el que se investigó por faltas administrativas en el desempeño de sus funciones como Alcalde y no una inhabilitación para ocupar un cargo público de elección popular. Luego, tampoco se puede equiparar la sanción administrativa a una supresión o retiro de credenciales, ni siquiera temporal, pues nunca perdió su condición de Alcalde ya que una vez cumplida la sanción; el actor continuó y continúa en las funciones propias del cargo. En esta línea, ante una acción de inconstitucionalidad en la que se invocó ese mismo argumento, la Sala Constitucional indicó: "...Es decir, no es posible aplicar los fundamentos del caso López Mendoza vs. Venezuela al caso concreto de los interesados en esta acción, toda vez que la norma impugnada no tiene relación alguna con la restricción del derecho político a ocupar un cargo de elección popular, sino más bien con las sanciones que pueden ser aplicables a los Alcaldes Municipales. Ergo, no puede aplicarse el antecedente de la CIDH que la parte accionante pretende. Así entonces, tal como lo indica la PGR en su informe a esta acción, no es procedente invocar, como parámetro de interpretación, la sentencia dictada por la Corte Interamericana en el caso López Mendoza pues, tal y como se explica en el párrafo 104 de esa sentencia, lo que conoció en ese momento fue la disconformidad con la Convención de una sanción de inhabilitación, impuesta administrativamente, que privaba a una persona de su derecho a postularse para cargos públicos de elección popular. Evidentemente, el objeto de control de dicha sentencia es sustancialmente diferente de la especie que aquí se examina, donde de lo que se trata es de la sanción de suspensión a Alcaldes. Igual, debe advertirse que, otra razón principal que sustenta el caso López Mendoza se refiere a un quebrantamiento del derecho al debido proceso, lo cual tampoco se relaciona con el presente caso. Si el Estado ya le ha garantizado a una persona el acceso en condiciones de igualdad a determinado cargo público de su interés, lo que ocurra posteriormente durante el ejercicio de dichas funciones no queda cubierto por las garantías establecidas en el ordinal 23 de la Convención, ni tampoco si el alegato del interesado no tiene que ver con el acceso en “condiciones de igualdad" que garantiza la norma convencional. En consecuencia, no necesariamente debe exigirse el dictado de una sentencia en la vía jurisdiccional, por juez competente, para restringirse la continuidad en ese mismo cargo público, ya que de la simple lectura del numeral 23.1.c se observa que, al menos esa norma en concreto, protege el acceso a cargos públicos solo en lo atinente a que dicho acceso sea en condiciones de igualdad. Vuelve absolutamente factible que otras instancias distintas a la jurisdicción ordinaria (como lo sería la Contraloría General de la República) puedan sancionar con suspensión a funcionarios públicos, sean o no elegidos mediante sufragio popular, si incurren en alguna causal contraria a Derecho. En virtud de todo lo expuesto, consideramos que no existe infracción del parámetro de convencionalidad de la norma impugnada, toda vez que, en virtud del margen de apreciación nacional para lograr la convergencia entre el derecho local y el interamericano, se debe ponderar el ordenamiento jurídico de una manera sistemática e integral..." (SCV 2015-1780). (Resaltado no corresponde al original). También en el voto No. 2015-14973, la Sala Constitucional reiteró la constitucionalidad de los dispuesto en el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la C.G.R., con respecto a su potestad sancionatoria. El actor también alegó que al ser la sanción impuesta una derivación del derecho penal, ---pues se le atribuyó la infracción de normas en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública---, era la jurisdicción penal la llamada a sancionarle y no la Contraloría General de la República, asumiendo ésta funciones jurisdiccionales. Alegato que tampoco comparte la Cámara, pues la normativa que integra el "Ordenamiento de Control y de Fiscalización Superiores de la Hacienda Pública", dentro de las cuales tenemos a la "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General", "Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos", la "Ley General de Control Interno", la "Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública", la "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", la Ley General de la Administración Pública, etc; es clara al señalar los tipos de responsabilidad que tienen los funcionarios públicos en el ejercicio de sus funciones, a saber, responsabilidad administrativa, civil y penal. Ahora, en cuanto a la competencia sancionatoria de la Contraloría General de la República, existe reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional donde ha manifestado que dicha potestad es conforme al derecho de la constitución, así por ejemplo señaló: "...En este sentido, la Sala Constitucional le ha reconocido a la CGR potestad sancionadora, no disciplinaria, ni jerárquica, que puede ejercer en contra de todos los funcionarios públicos, en ejercicio de sus competencias de vigilancia y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública. Así lo ha establecido cuando indica que: “... la facultad sancionadora reconocida a este órgano constitucional no deriva de una relación jerárquica o de orden laboral; es decir, no son sanciones disciplinarias las que ejercita, sino la facultad de vigilancia y fiscalización superior de la Hacienda Pública.” (SCV 2003-13140) La competencia sancionadora de la CGR está relacionada con el fundamento que le da creación pues esta fue creada: “para juzgar actos de los agentes públicos y para oponerse a las resoluciones dictadas por el mismo poder del que dependen, en cuanto estos vayan en contra de la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos. La amplia labor de la Contraloría General de la República ya ha sido puesta de manifiesto por este Tribunal en innumerables sentencias…” (SCV 2009-008920). Ahora bien, siendo indiscutible la potestad sancionadora de la CGR, conviene ahora precisar, que el sujeto pasivo que puede ser objeto de sanciones por parte de la CGR es muy amplio, abarcando desde servidores públicos en sentido amplio hasta personas físicas y jurídicas privadas. En concreto sobre los funcionarios municipales, estos también están pueden ser sujetos pasivos, y por tanto, objeto de sanciones por parte de la CGR. lo cual, en nada vulnera la autonomía de gobierno de los Gobiernos Locales, tal como esta misma Sala lo estableció en el voto anteriormente mencionado, cuando se indica: “De esta vigilancia no escapan los funcionarios de los Gobiernos Locales, pues el Constituyente, si bien quiso en el artículo 169 constitucional que la Administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón estuviera a cargo del Gobierno Local y el artículo 170 ibídem coloca a estas entidades en la categoría de entidades autónomas, el reconocimiento que la Carta Política hizo a las Municipalidades como organismos autónomos encargados de la administración local, no las elevó a la categoría de entes soberanos, ni quiso decir con ello que la actividad administrativa, por ende la del funcionario municipal, aún el de elección popular, estuviera exenta o se prescindiera de control de cualquier otra autoridad, sino que queda sujetos a lo que las leyes dispongan en casos específicos. En otras palabras, el listado Democrático no puede existir si los límites de las todas las funciones públicas no están claramente determinadas por la ley y si la responsabilidad de todos los funcionarios no está asegurada” (SCV 2009-008920). De esta forma, si la Contraloría impuso al actor una sanción de naturaleza administrativa (suspensión de sus labores) y civil (patrimonial), conforme al ordenamiento jurídico, que le otorga facultades y competencia para esos efectos, nuca asumió funciones jurisdiccionales, pues en el eventual caso, que la Contraloría a través del proceso administrativo considere que también se cometió un ilícito contra la Hacienda Pública por parte del funcionario investigado, en esos casos, deberá remitir las diligencias ante la instancia penal, mas no para imponer sanciones administrativas y/o civiles como lo fue en el caso que nos ocupa. Luego, otro punto que debe tener presente el actor es que dichas responsabilidades no son excluyentes, y bien puede una infracción al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública acarrear esos tres tipos de responsabilidades, condición que se analizará infra. Por lo expuesto se rechaza dicho alegato. 2) Aseguró que en su caso se violó su derecho a la doble instancia: [...]. Criterio del Tribunal: Alegato que tampoco comparte la Cámara en razón de lo que de seguido se indica. A partir del artículo 308 de la LGAP, se regula el procedimiento ordinario que se aplica en las instituciones públicas como requisito previo a la imposición de una sanción, cuando no existe un procedimiento especial para esos efectos. En esta línea, en el derecho procesal administrativo tenemos dos tipos de procedimientos, uno de naturaleza lineal, en el que la Administración actuante intima e imputa la acusación al administrado, evacua la prueba y dicta el acto final, procediendo contra el acto final, el recurso de revocatoria ante la instancia que emitió el acto y la apelación ante el jerarca máximo de la organización y en aquellos casos en el que jerarca sea quien emitió el acto final, el recurso de reposición. (Ver art. 345 de la LGAP. Claro está, que sobre el régimen recursivo así descrito, ciertamente existen excepciones como por ejemplo, la llamada "escalerilla recursiva en materia municipal"). Nótese que en este tipo de procedimiento la Administración actúa como juez y parte, pues es la que acusa, tramita el procedimiento y finalmente resuelve. Ahora, también encontramos los procedimientos triangulares, en los que la Administración acusa ante un Tribunal Administrativo (como lo es por ejemplo el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), a un administrado, y ese Tribunal es el que instruye la causa, evacua la prueba y finalmente emite el acto final. Procediendo la fase recursiva contra lo resuelto por el Tribunal Administrativo. (Aunque pueden presentarse excepciones, como ocurre con el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, en tanto la resolución o acto final dictado por el mismo es irrecurrible y agota la vía administrativa, conforme lo establece el ordinal 111.d de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). En el caso que nos ocupa, tenemos que al actor se le inició un procedimiento lineal, en el que la Contraloría General de la República le imputó e intimó faltas administrativas por violación al ordenamiento de la contratación administrativa. Analizado que ha sido el expediente administrativo, se tiene, que para los efectos se nombró a un órgano, que este órgano una vez instruida la causa emitió un acto final y que el actor planteó recurso de apelación ante el Despacho de la Contralora, y esta lo rechazó confirmando lo resuelto. El actor acusa que el procedimiento recursivo violenta su derecho a la doble instancia, bajo el argumento de que el Órgano Decisor se compuso de funcionarios de la División Jurídica, que a su vez son los asesores de la Contralora, y que la Contralora carece de conocimientos técnicos en razón de la materia. Aceptar tal alegato, --con profundo respeto para el actor--, sería desconocer los principios básicos del Derecho Procesal Administrativo y en particular el Libro II de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, publicada en la Gaceta No. 15 del 22 de enero de 1979. Y es que conforme a dicha Ley, el procedimiento seguido al actor, lo fue de naturaleza lineal, tal y como se aplica en la gran mayoría de las instituciones públicas, salvo en el caso de los proceso triangulares encargados a los Tribunales Administrativos o las resoluciones que tienen recurso de apelación ante jerarca impropio. De esta forma, conforme al procedimiento regulado en la LGAP, el recurso de revocatoria se presenta ante la instancia que dictó el acto (en este caso el órgano decisor) y el recurso de apelación ante el jerarca máximo, en este caso la Contralora General de la República, sin que ello constituya vicio alguno a la garantía de la doble instancia. Y es que en cuanto a la doble instancia como derecho fundamental, la Sala Constitucional de vieja data ha reiterado en sus votos que este derecho contemplado en el artículo 8.h de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, sólo opera en materia penal, cuando el condenado ha sido sentenciado por la comisión de un delito, de forma que en los procedimientos administrativos ---como el cuestionado---, no opera dicha exigencia. En este sentido indicó: "...VI. Sobre la acusada violación del principio de la doble instancia, contrario a lo que se ha dicho para la doble incriminación, se trata de un principio que tiene carácter de derecho fundamental sólo en sede penal. Administrativamente es posible sancionar en única instancia, caso típico del acto emanado del jerarca, donde cabría tan sólo el recurso de reposición. Las consecuencias menos gravosas de la sanción administrativa frente a la penal y a la posibilidad de discutirla posteriormente en vía jurisdiccional, justifican la diferencia..." (VSC 7637-2005, 4887-05 y 1434-05) Luego, las alegaciones de que el Despacho de la Contralora es asesorada por funcionarios de la División Jurídica donde laboran los miembros del órgano decisor, o que la Contralora carece de conocimiento técnico sobre la materia, son apreciaciones subjetivas del actor, carentes de contenido jurídico que analizar. El segundo alegato que hizo el actor en este apartado es que la garantía constitucional a la doble instancia es burlada al obligar la Contraloría a ejecutar la sanción aún cuando se recurra al Tribunal Contencioso, ya que si la sentencia es declarada con lugar, ya se ha ejecutado la sanción. Aceptar tal tesis, conllevaría a desaplicar principios básicos del Derecho Administrativo. Y es que bajo un principio de autotutela administrativa, a las Administraciones Públicas les está permitido la ejecución de sus actos sin necesidad de acudir a un juez para dichos fines. Así en la doctrina administrativista se constituyeron principios en torno a la presunción de validez del acto administrativo, su ejecutividad y su ejecutoriedad. Estos principios fueron retomados en nuestra LGAP, y por ejemplo el artículo 146 señala: "1. La Administración tendrá potestad de ejecutar por sí, sin recurrir a los Tribunales, los actos administrativos eficaces, válidos o anulables, aún contra la voluntad o resistencia del obligado, sujeta a la responsabilidad que pudiera resultar. 2. El empleo de los medios de ejecución administrativa se hará sin perjuicio de las otras responsabilidades en que incurra el administrado por su rebeldía. 3. No procederá la ejecución administrativa de los actos ineficaces o absolutamente nulos y la misma, de darse, producirá responsabilidad penal del servidor que la haya ordenado, sin perjuicio de las otras resultantes. 4. La ejecución en estas circunstancias se reputará como abuso de poder." Por su parte su artículo 149 prevee los mecanismos de ejecución del acto administrativo: "1. Los medios de la ejecución administrativa serán los siguientes: a) Ejecución forzada mediante apremio sobre el patrimonio del administrado, cuando se trate de un crédito líquido de la Administración, todo con aplicación de las normas pertinentes del Código de Procedimientos Civiles sobre embargo y remate, con la salvedad de que el título ejecutivo podrá ser la certificación del acto constitutivo del crédito expedida por el órgano competente para ordenar la ejecución; b) Ejecución sustitutiva, cuando se trate de obligaciones cuyo cumplimiento puede ser logrado por un tercero en lugar del obligado, en cuyo caso las costas de la ejecución serán a cargo de éste y podrán serle cobradas según el procedimiento señalado en el inciso anterior; y c) Cumplimiento forzoso, cuando la obligación sea personalísima, de dar, de hacer o de tolerar o no hacer, con la alternativa de convertirla en daños y perjuicios a prudencial criterio de la Administración, cobrarles mediante el procedimiento señalado en el inciso a). 2. En caso de cumplimiento forzoso la Administración obtendrá el concurso de la policía y podrá emplear la fuerza pública dentro de los límites de lo estrictamente necesario. La Administración podrá a este efecto decomisar bienes y clausurar establecimientos mercantiles." Y mas aún el artículo 151 establece: "Queda prohibida la resistencia violenta a la ejecución del acto administrativo, bajo sanción de responsabilidad civil, y, en su caso, penal." En igual sentido señaló la Sala Constitucional: "...Sostener que la potestad sancionadora y disciplinaria son contrarias al parámetro de convencionalidad, además de socavar las bases de un instituto clásico del Derecho Administrativo, no solo niega ésta, sino, también, la potestad de auto-tutela declarativa y ejecutiva de las administraciones públicas, así como los conceptos de ejecutividad y ejecutoriedad de los actos administrativos, institutos que han sido pacíficamente aceptados por toda la doctrina ius-administrativista y se encuentran contemplados en la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública de 1978 en sus ordinales 146 a 151, que nunca han sido declarados inconstitucionales...." (SCV 2015-1780) (Resaltado no es del original). De esta forma es absolutamente claro que la Administración puede ejecutar (hacer eficaz) por sí y ante sí sus actos administrativos, bajo una presunción de validez, y que para esos efectos puede utilizar los mecanismos que la ley le otorga y que queda prohibido la resistencia violenta a su ejecución. Luego, claro está que, si el administrado considera lesionados sus derechos podrá interponer la acción contenciosa administrativa si a bien lo considera, pero de modo alguno, el hecho de que la Administración ejecute sus propios actos constituye una violación a la doble instancia. Razón de lo anterior, es el rechazo en cuanto a este otro alegato también. 3) Acusó una violación al debido proceso, por violación al principio de igualdad: [...]. Criterio de la Cámara: Para el actor, el que el Legislador haya dotado de competencia a la Contraloría General de la República de potestades disciplinarias mediante leyes tales como la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", el artículo 42 de la Ley de Control Interno; el artículo 18.d del Código Municipal; los artículos 40 párrafo 1; 43 y 66 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la C.G.R y a nivel reglamentario como los artículos 7, 11 inciso g), 49 y 52 de la resolución No. R-DC-199-2011 del Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinarias y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República; violentan el principio de igualdad, ya que los Alcaldes son funcionarios electos popularmente, al igual que los Diputados, el Presidente de la República y sus Vicepresidentes, y mientras a estos, si bien hay un proceso previo para el retiro de credenciales; es hasta finalizar el procedimiento judicial que se les aplica la sanción, mientras que a los Alcaldes se les aplica una sanción administrativa y luego de ello recurrir a la instancia judicial. Y que el Legislador al dar un trato diferente sin razón y fundamento alguno, a iguales entre iguales con ello violenta el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad. De esta forma, el actor en el presente alegato lo que cuestiona es una decisión legislativa plasmada en diversas leyes que escapa al control de legalidad correspondiente a esta jurisdicción, y el reproche que hace constituye materia propia del control de constitucionalidad y no de legalidad, razón por la cual se omite pronunciamiento al respecto, debiendo el actor alegar dicha situación ante aquella jurisdicción y no en esta. Luego, cuestiona el contenido de los artículos 7, 11, 49 y 52 de la resolución No. R-DC-199-2011 del Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinarias y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República, lo que ya la Sala Constitucional conociendo de la acción tramitada bajo expediente No. 15-010969-0007-CO, en la que se cuestionó por parte del Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, la constitucionalidad de lo dispuesto en el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República No. 7428 de 7 de setiembre de 1994 (Potestad para ordenar y recomendar sanciones); y los artículos 7 (Integración del órgano decisor), 11 (Funciones del órgano decisor); 49 (Acto final) y 52 (Recomendación vinculante de la sanción) del "Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Potestades Disciplinaria y Anulatoria en Hacienda Pública de la Contraloría General de la República", de la resolución N° R-DC-199-2015; se manifestó reiterando que el ejercicio de la potestad impugnada encargada en la normativa citada a la C.G.R., "se adecua al Derecho de la Constitución, en particular, a las funciones de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, que los artículos 183 y 184 de la Constitución Política le atribuyen al Órgano Auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa. En efecto, según se expuso en la sentencia transcrita, la autonomía administrativa de que gozan las instituciones autónomas no es vulnerada cuando la Contraloría General de la República procede de acuerdo con la atribución contenida en el artículo 68 de su Ley Orgánica. Tampoco se considera que cuando la Contraloría General de la República recomienda –con carácter vinculante- la sanción disciplinaria de un funcionario público ejerce funciones de administración activa." Y que lo que hace el Reglamento, es desarrollar competencias que desde la Constitución se le dotan al órgano contralor en la vigilancia de la hacienda pública. (VSC 2015-014973). 4) Alegó una violación al principio de reserva legal y a la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos en sus artículos 8 y 25: [...]. Criterio del Tribunal: Este alegato se refiere en el fondo al tema de la eficacia y a la ejecutoriedad del acto administrativo analizado en el punto trasanterior. En este punto eso sí, el alegato del actor, parte de una falsa premisa, y es que afirma que conforme al artículo 176 de la LGAP, todos los actos se presumen legítimos hasta tanto una sentencia judicial no declare lo contrario y que sin embargo hay una serie de normas que permiten su anulación en sede administrativa y su respectiva ejecución, sin poder impugnarlos antes de su ejecución, en sede judicial, lo que en su criterio violenta el artículo 49 constitucional y 8 y 25 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos en cuanto consagran el acceso a la justicia como derecho fundamental. Conforme se explicó supra, el acto administrativo ---que técnicamente se define como la manifestación unilateral de la voluntad de la Administración capaz de producir efectos jurídicos, estos es, imponer obligaciones u otorgar derechos---, (Ver art. 130 de la LGAP), es ejecutivo y ejecutorio, por la misma Administración sin necesidad de recurrir a un juez para pedir su ejecución. Luego, el artículo 49 de la C.P. consagra el control de legalidad como mecanismo de acceso a la justicia, acorde con lo que refieren los artículos 8 y 25 de la Convención Americana de Derecho Humanos. Ahora, el actor confunde los alcances del artículo 176 de la LGAP y lo extiende a todos los actos administrativos, cuando ello no es así. Veamos, conforme al derecho administrativo en el acto administrativo se pueden dar dos tipos de vicios que conllevan a su nulidad relativa o absoluta. Así, habrá nulidad absoluta cuando falte totalmente uno o varios de sus elementos constitutivos, a saber, motivo, contenido, fin, procedimiento, sujeto o forma. (Ver arts. 131, 132, 133 y 166 de la LGAP) y habrá nulidad relativa cuando uno de sus elementos constitutivos sea imperfecto. (Ver art. 167). Así, en cuanto a la ejecución del acto absolutamente nulo, esa ley señala en su artículo 170 que el ordenar un acto en tales condiciones producirá responsabilidad administrativa, civil y eventualmente penal del servidor, si la ejecución llegare a tener lugar. De esta forma, no comparte la Cámara la afirmación de que todos los actos se presumen legítimos hasta tanto un juez disponga lo contrario, ya que a la Administración, le está vedado emitir actos absolutamente nulos y menos aun ordenar su ejecución. De esta forma la Administración está obligada en propia sede, a declarar la nulidad de los actos absolutamente nulos en el ejercicio de la potestad de auto-tutela administrativa, esto es revisarse así misma con respecto a lo actuado e impedir su ejecución. Finalmente, la presunción a la legitimidad a la que se refiere el artículo 176 de la LGAP, lo es exclusivamente con respecto a los actos relativamente nulos. De esta forma, no lleva razón el actor en su alegato y por ende se rechaza. 5) Acusó que hubo una invasión de competencias entre poderes: [...]. Criterio del Tribunal: Sobre los alegatos expresados en el presente apartado, la Cámara omite pronunciarse ya que se trata de una información que el actor le indica a la Cámara, sobre las normas que acusaron de inconstitucionales por infracción al artículo 49 de la C.P., materia que como se indicó escapa a la competencia de esta jurisdicción. 6) Que hubo una violación al principio del non bis in idem: Sostuvo que las resoluciones recurridas violentaron el principio non bis in ídem, ya que se le impuso una doble sanción, a saber, un mes de suspensión sin goce de salario y al pago de una indemnización a la Hacienda Pública Municipal. Criterio del Tribunal: En criterio de la Cámara, el actor confunde la responsabilidad penal de toda persona, y que se le garantiza conforme al artículo 42 constitucional que por un mismo hecho no puede ser perseguido dos veces, cuando exista identidad de sujeto, hecho y fundamento, con la triple responsabilidad que poseen los funcionarios públicos conforme al ordenamiento jurídico. Y es que desde el punto de vista técnico-jurídico, los funcionarios públicos deben rendir cuentas de todas sus actuaciones (Ver artículo 11 constitucional), y la comisión de una conducta contraria al bloque de la legalidad puede acarrearle responsabilidad de naturaleza administrativa (disciplinaria), civil (patrimonial) y/o eventualmente penal, sin que ello constituya una doble sanción por un mismo hecho. Así por ejemplo, el funcionario que se adueñe ilegítimamente de recursos públicos, puede incurrir en ese tipo de responsabilidades sin que estas resulten ilegales o ilegítimas o excluyentes. Nótese que el artículo 170 de la LGAP indica que el ordenar la ejecución de un acto absolutamente nulo producirá responsabilidad civil, administrativa y eventualmente penal en el servidor que ordene su ejecución. Luego, en cuanto a la necesaria recuperación por los daños patrimoniales sufridas éstas por responsabilidad de sus funcionarios, este mismo cuerpo normativo en su Título Sétimo señala: "De la responsabilidad de la Administración y del Servidor Público" Capítulo Segundo, "De la responsabilidad del servidor público" Sección Segunda, "De la distribución interna de responsabilidades" Artículo 203 "1. La Administración deberá recobrar plenariamente lo pagado por ella, para reparar los daños causados a un tercero por dolo o culpa grave de su servidor, tomando en cuenta la participación de ella en la producción del daño, si la hubiere. 2. La recuperación deberá incluir también los daños y perjuicios causados a la Administración por la erogación respectiva." Por su parte, el artículo 210 indica: "1. El servidor público será responsable ante la Administración por todos los daños que cause a ésta por dolo o culpa grave, aunque no se haya producido un daño a tercero. 2. Para hacer efectiva esta responsabilidad se aplicarán los artículos anteriores con las salvedades que procedan. 3. La acción de recuperación será ejecutiva y el título será la certificación sobre el monto del daño expedida por el jerarca del ente respectivo." Finalmente el artículo 213): "...A los efectos de determinar la existencia y el grado de la culpa o negligencia del funcionario, al apreciar el presunto vicio del acto al que se opone, o que dicta o ejecuta, deberá tomarse en cuenta la naturaleza y jerarquía de las funciones desempeñadas, entendiéndose que cuanto mayor sea la jerarquía del funcionario y más técnicas sus funciones, en relación al vicio del acto, mayor es su deber de conocerlo y apreciarlo debidamente." De la integración armónica de los artículos resulta más que claro los tipos de responsabilidad que recaen en los funcionarios públicos sin que estas sean excluyentes, ni constituya una doble sanción, razón por la cual se rechaza este alegato también".