Statute of limitations on property tax and urban services after property acquisitionPrescripción de impuesto inmobiliario y servicios urbanos tras adquisición de fincas

III.On the merits. As provided by the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of this tax is, for the specific purposes of Article 6, subsection a) of said law, every owner with a title registered in the Public Property Registry (Registro Público de la Propiedad). Therefore, if the property rights over farm 82024 were acquired during the course of 2015 and farm 165223-000 was registeredly inscribed in the name of Mrs. Herrera Zamora on April 5, 2016, the appellant is undoubtedly the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of that obligation, and must honor the payment of the sums legally corresponding to her on her account. Now, she claims that she is being charged the debts of other owners, but as can be deduced from reading the evidence in the case file, specifically from the record obtained from the collection system as of June 13, 2019, the debt is listed exclusively in her name, without it even being possible to suppose that she is being charged any tax from other co-owners. Furthermore, it is clear that payment is being demanded for the concept of real estate from the second quarter of 2015 to the second quarter of 2019, which corresponds solely to matters related to the farms and rights that are her property. Numeral 7 of the cited Law provides that each owner must pay the tax proportionally to their right, so the grievance alleging the collection of tax obligations of other holders of the property is not admissible. Likewise, ordinal 8 also provides a rule in favor of the treasury, since it imposes on the current owner joint and several liability for the payment of the debts of previous owners, leaving a right of recourse (acción de regreso) in their favor to recover what was paid. Therefore, any collection action for the Property Tax against the current owner, falling on periods prior to the acquisition of their farms, is valid.

IV.- For its part, in the matter of Urban Services (Servicios Urbanos), the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) is defined in Article 83, second paragraph, of the Código Municipal, which provides that it is the "user" who assumes the obligation. From the moment of acquisition of the property, the appellant assumes all the attributes of the right of ownership, which includes the free use and disposal of the good, holding the legal status of user of the services. Note that the collection of urban services, as deduced from the last report of the collection system in the case file, runs from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 2019. As is clear, since the lady acquired the two farms during the years 2015 and 2016, the collections relating to the periods prior to the transfer cannot be made, as she does not legally assume the status of taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of such obligations. Therefore, this grievance is admissible, making it necessary to partially annul the actions of the Municipality, solely with respect to the calculation of the periods put to collection for the concept of these fees, and any collection for periods prior to the acquisition of the goods and rights must be eliminated. The case file must be returned to the local government so that the local authorities proceed to make the accounting adjustments for this item, as indicated herein.

V.- Regarding the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción), Article 35, subsection e), of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios regulates the statute of limitations as a means of extinguishing "tax obligations, by which the Administration's inactivity in demanding payment of the tax is sanctioned, and which is regulated generally in numerals 51 and following of that same normative body. It finds its basis in the principle of legal certainty, as it avoids the indefinite protection of rights that are not exercised by their holder, nor recognized by the obligor, so that according to what has been stated, no obligation—and even less so those of a tax nature—can be classified as imprescriptible.— In this matter, the Administration has a period determined by law to recover the monies not paid for this concept, after which, it is subject to the will of the administered party, who may well invoke this cause in their defense...."— (resolution No. 00166 of eleven o'clock on March twenty-sixth, two thousand eight, issued by this same Section). The Property Tax (Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles) has a statute of limitations period of three years, as provided by Article 8 of its respective Law. Neither of the two indicated laws—Código Municipal and Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles—establishes the manner in which said period is to be computed or accounted for. For this reason, the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios must be applied supplementarily, from which the text in force at the time each tax obligation was generated must be applied, since it underwent a reform on December 14, 2016, with Ley 9416, which literally stated:

"ARTICULO 52.- Computation of terms.

The statute of limitations period must be counted from the first of January of the calendar year following the one in which the tax must be paid." Currently, said numeral states the following:

“Article 52.- Computation of terms.

The statute of limitations period must be counted from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax must be paid.” Thus, the accounting of the statute of limitations for the collection of taxes and fees, until the year 2016, ran from the following year. Starting in the year 2017, its count occurs from the month following the date on which the tax should have been paid. These rules must be applied in relation to numeral 8 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles and Article 53 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which regulates the grounds for interruption of the statute of limitations. According to the now-repealed text of the law, the fact that these taxes were paid quarterly did not affect the computation of the statute of limitations, so it did not matter if a tax should have been paid in January, April, July, or October of each year, because under the law applicable to this case, the statute of limitations always began to run from the following year, which allows the conclusion that this legal institution affected all annual tax charges, regardless of quarterly subdivisions (fraccionamientos trimestrales). This calculation methodology changed for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations for all taxes starting in 2017.

V.- The Municipality maintains that there were acts interrupting the statute of limitations (actos interruptores de la prescripción), such as the payment arrangement of January 2016 and the collections made in the years 2017 and 2018 (not contested by the appellant). This assertion is true, as it is so regulated by numeral 53, subsections d) and e) of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. It is noted, however, that said arrangement could only relate to the taxes that fell on the ownership of the rights of farm 82024, since on the date said agreement was signed she had not yet acquired the other farm, registered under the real folio registration number 165223-000. In the present case, the collection of Property Tax is being computed from the year 2015, without being able to determine which farm it corresponds to, because the collection in the municipal system, according to the evidence in the case file, appears unified. In application of Articles 8 and 22 of the Ley del Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles, the periods that the local government may properly put to collection are the taxes of the same year in which the statute of limitations was interrupted with the payment arrangement, which was the first interrupting act. For farm 82024, the statute of limitations was interrupted in 2016—since it had not yet begun to be computed—as well as for the three previous years, meaning it can collect the years 2015, 2014, and 2013. Regarding farm 165223-000, it must be understood that the collection communicated in December 2017 is the act interrupting the statute of limitations, so it must go back three years from the moment the tax should have been honored. Therefore, given that this tax is being collected starting from the second quarter of 2015, for either of the two farms, the collection is correct. The accrued interest for these same periods must follow the same fate. Regarding Urban Services, the statute of limitations period is five years, as indicated by ordinal 82 of the Código Municipal. As explained in Considering IV, the collection can be made from the acquisition date of each good or right, thus resulting that, the statute of limitations having been interrupted with the arrangement and the collection of the year 2017, the specific periods from the years 2015 to 2019 can indeed be claimed by the local government, under the understanding that, in all cases, its count must start from the date of registral inscription of each farm or right, eliminating any additional prior item. Under this understanding, the appeal (recurso) must be partially granted, annulling the appealed resolution solely with respect to the collection of fees for the concept of Urban Services for any period prior to the acquisition of the ownership right of each farm or right, which the local government must adjust and recalculate. Regarding the rest, the appealed act is confirmed. As there is no further recourse, the administrative process must be deemed exhausted.

**III. On the merits.** As provided by the Real Estate Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles), the passive subject of this tax is, for the specific purposes of article 6 subsection a) of said regulation, any owner with a title registered in the Public Property Registry (Registro Público de la Propiedad). Therefore, if the property rights over farm 82024 were acquired during the course of 2015 and farm 165223-000 was registered in the name of Mrs. Herrera Zamora on April 5, 2016, the appellant is undoubtedly the passive subject of that obligation, and must honor the payment of the sums legally corresponding to her account. Now, she claims that debts of other owners are being charged to her, but as can be deduced from reading the evidence in the case file, specifically from the record obtained from the collection system as of June 13, 2019, the debt is recorded exclusively in her name, without it even being possible to suppose that any tax from other co-owners is being charged to her. Furthermore, it is clear that for the concept of real estate, payment is being demanded from the second quarter of 2015 to the second quarter of 2019, which corresponds only to matters related to the farms and rights that are her property. Numeral 7 of the cited Law provides that each owner must pay the tax proportionally to their right, so the grievance alleging the collection of tax obligations of other holders of the property is not admissible. Likewise, ordinal 8 also provides a rule in favor of the treasury, since it imposes on the current owner the joint and several payment of the debts of previous owners, leaving in their favor a recourse action aimed at recovering what was paid. For this reason, any management for the collection of the Real Estate Tax from the current owner, which falls on periods prior to the acquisition of their farms, is valid.

**IV.-** For its part, in the matter of **Urban Services**, the passive subject is defined in article 83, second paragraph of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), which provides that it is the "user" who assumes the obligation. From the moment of acquisition of the property, the appellant assumes all the attributes of the property right, which includes the free use and disposal of the good, holding the legal status of user of the services. Note that the collection of urban services, as deduced from the last report of the collection system in the case file, goes from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 2019. As is evident, given that the lady acquired the two farms during the years 2015 and 2016, the collections related to the periods prior to the transfer cannot be made, insofar as she does not legally assume the status of passive subject of such obligations. Therefore, this grievance is admissible, making it necessary to partially annul the actions of the Municipality, solely regarding the calculation of the periods placed for collection for the concept of these taxes (tasas), eliminating any collection for periods prior to the acquisition of the goods and rights. The case file must be returned to the town council so that the local authorities proceed to make the accounting adjustments for this item, as indicated herein.

**V.-** Regarding the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción), article 35 subsection e) of the Tax Code (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) regulates the statute of limitations as a means of extinguishing "the tax obligations, which, through it, penalizes the Administration's inactivity in demanding payment of the tax, and which is generally regulated in numerals 51 and following of that same regulatory body. It finds its basis in the principle of legal certainty, as it avoids the indefinite protection of rights that are not exercised by their holder, nor recognized by the obligor, so that according to what has been expressed, no obligation—and even less those of a tax nature—can be classified as imprescriptible.— In this matter, the Administration has a period determined by law to recover the monies not paid for that concept, after which, it is subject to the will of the administered party, who may well invoke that cause in their defense...."—(resolution No. 00166 of eleven o'clock on March twenty-sixth, two thousand eight, issued by this same Section). The Real Estate Tax has a statute of limitations period of three years, as provided in article 8 of its respective Law. Neither of the two indicated laws—Municipal Code and Real Estate Tax Law—establishes the manner in which said period must be computed or accounted for. For this reason, the Tax Code must be applied supplementarily, from which the text in force at the time each tax obligation was generated must be applied, since it underwent a reform on December 14, 2016, with Law 9416), which literally stated:

"**ARTICLE 52.- Computation of terms.** The statute of limitations period must be counted from January first of the calendar year following the one in which the tax must be paid." Currently, said numeral states the following:

"**Article 52.- Computation of terms.** The statute of limitations period must be counted from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax must be paid." Thus, the accounting of the statute of limitations for the collection of taxes and rates, until the year 2016, ran from the following year. Starting in the year 2017, its count occurs from the month following the date on which the tax should have been paid. These rules must be applied in relation to numeral 8 of the Real Estate Tax Law and article 53 of the Tax Code, which regulates the causes for interruption of the statute of limitations. According to the now-repealed text of the norm, the fact that these taxes were paid quarterly did not affect the computation of the statute of limitations, so it did not matter if a tax was due in January, April, July, or October of each year, since with the law applicable to this case, the statute of limitations always began to run from the following year, which allows concluding that this institute affected the entirety of the annual tax burdens, regardless of the quarterly installments. Such calculation methodology changed for the purposes of calculating the statute of limitations for all taxes starting in 2017.

**V.-** The Municipality maintains that there were acts interrupting the statute of limitations, such as the payment arrangement of January 2016 and the collections made in the years 2017 and 2018 (not contested by the appellant). Such assertion is true, as regulated by numeral 53 subsections d) and e) of the Tax Code. It is noted, however, that said arrangement could only pertain to the taxes that fell on the ownership of the rights of farm 82024, since at the date said agreement was signed, she had not yet acquired the other farm, registered under the folio real registration number 165223-000. In the present case, the collection of the Real Estate Tax is being computed from the year 2015, without being able to specify which farm it corresponds to, as the collection in the municipal system, according to the evidence in the case file, appears unified. In application of articles 8 and 22 of the Real Estate Tax Law, the periods that the town council may well put up for collection are the taxes of the same year in which the statute of limitations was interrupted with the payment arrangement, which was the first interrupting act. For farm 82024, the statute of limitations was interrupted in 2016—since it had not yet begun to be computed—as well as the three previous years, that is, it can collect the years 2015, 2014, and 2013. Regarding farm 165223-000, it must be understood that the collection notified in December 2017 is the act interrupting the statute of limitations, so three years must be counted back from the moment the tax should have been honored. Therefore, given that for that tax collection is being made from the second quarter of 2015, for either farm the collection is correct. The accrued interest must carry the same fate, with respect to those same periods. Regarding Urban Services, the statute of limitations period is five years, as indicated in ordinal 82 of the Municipal Code. As explained in Considering IV, the collection can be made starting from the date of acquisition of each good or right, resulting then that having interrupted the statute of limitations with the arrangement and the collection of the year 2017, the specific periods from the years 2015 to 2019 can indeed be claimed by the local government, under the understanding that, in all cases, its count must begin from the date of registry inscription of each farm or right, eliminating any additional previous item. Under this reasoning, the appeal must be partially granted, annulling the resolution subject to appeal solely regarding the collection of rates for Urban Services for any period prior to the acquisition of the property right of each farm or right, which the town council must adjust and recalculate. Regarding the rest, the act subject to appeal is confirmed. As there is no further recourse, the administrative proceeding must be considered exhausted.".

"III. Sobre el fondo. Conforme lo dispone la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, el sujeto pasivo de este tributo es, para los efectos específicos del artículo 6 inciso a) de dicha norma, todo propietario con título inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. Entonces, si los derechos de propiedad sobre la finca 82024 fueron adquiridos durante el transcurso del 2015 y la finca 165223-000 registralmente fue inscrita a nombre de la señora Herrera Zamora, el 5 de abril del 2016, sin duda es la recurrente el sujeto pasivo de esa obligación, debiendo honrar el pago de las sumas que legalmente le correspondan sobre su cuenta. Ahora bien, ella reclama que se le pone al cobro los adeudos de otros propietarios, mas según se desprende de la lectura de la prueba que obra en autos, específicamente del registro obtenido del sistema de cobros para el 13 de junio del 2019, el adeudo está consignado a su nombre exclusivamente, sin que se pueda siquiera suponer, que se le esté cobrando algún tributo de otros copropietarios. Además, se desprende que por concepto de bienes inmuebles se está exigiendo el pago desde el segundo trimestre de 2015 al segundo trimestre del 2019, lo cual corresponde únicamente a lo relacionado con las fincas y derechos que son de su propiedad. El numeral 7 de la citada Ley, dispone que cada dueño ha de pagar el impuesto de manera proporcional a su derecho, de modo que no es de recibo el agravio que alega el cobro de obligaciones tributarias de otros titulares del bien. Asimismo, el ordinal 8 también dispone una norma en favor del fisco, puesto que impone al actual propietario el pago solidario de los adeudos de anteriores dueños, dejando a su favor una acción de regreso tendiente a recuperar los pagado. Por ello, es válida cualquier gestión del cobro del Impuesto sobre la Renta al propietario actual, que recaiga sobre períodos anteriores a la adquisición de sus fincas.

IV.- Por su parte, en materia de Servicios Urbanos, el sujeto pasivo está definido en el artículo 83 párrafo segundo del Código Municipal, que dispone que es el "usuario" el que asume la obligación. A partir del momento de adquisición del inmueble, la señora recurrente asume todos los atributos del derecho de propiedad, lo que incluye el libre uso y disposición del bien, ostentando la condición jurídica de usuaria de los servicios. Nótese que el cobro de los servicios urbanos según se desprende del último reporte del sistema de cobro que consta en autos, al primer trimestre del 1994 y hasta el segundo trimestre del 2019. Como se desprende, siendo que la señora adquirió las dos fincas durante los años 2015 y 2016, los cobros relativos a los períodos previos al traspaso, no pueden ser realizados, en el tanto ella no asume legalmente la condición de sujeto pasivo de tales obligaciones. Por ende, este agravio es de recibo, siendo necesario anular parcialmente las actuaciones de la Municipalidad, únicamente respecto del cálculo de los períodos puestos al cobro por concepto de estas tasas, debiendo eliminarse todo cobro de períodos anteriores a la adquisición de los bienes y derechos. Deberá devolverse los autos al ayuntamiento a efecto de que las autoridades locales procedan a hacer los ajustes contables por este rubro, conforme lo aquí indicado.

V.- En lo que se refiere a la prescripción alegada, el artículo 35 inciso e) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios regula la prescripción como un medio de extinción de "las obligaciones tributarias, que, mediante ella, se sanciona la inactividad de la Administración para exigir el pago del tributo, y que se regula en general, en los numerales 51 y siguientes de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. Encuentra su fundamento en el principio de seguridad jurídica, pues evita la protección indefinida de derechos que no se ejercen por su titular, ni se reconocen por el obligado, de forma que según lo expresado, ninguna obligación -y menos aún las de orden tributario-, puede calificarse como imprescriptible.- En esta materia, la Administración cuenta con un plazo determinado por ley, para recuperar los dineros no pagados por ese concepto, transcurrido el cual, queda sujeto a la voluntad del administrado, que bien puede invocar esa causal en su defensa...."- (resolución No. 00166 de las once horas del veintiséis de marzo de dos mil ocho emitida por esta misma Sección). El Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles tiene un plazo de prescripción de tres años, según lo dispone el artículo 8 de su Ley respectiva. Ninguna de las dos leyes señaladas -Código Municipal y Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles- establece la forma en que ha de computarse o contabilizarse dicho plazo. En razón de ello, ha de aplicarse supletoriamente el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, del cual debe aplicarse es texto vigente al momento en que se generó cada obligación tributaria, puesto que éste sufrió una reforma el 14 de diciembre del 2016 con la Ley 9416), que literalmente dictaba:

"ARTICULO 52.- Cómputo de los términos.

El término de prescripción se debe contar desde el primero de enero del año calendario siguiente a aquel en que el tributo debe pagarse." En la actualidad dicho numeral dicta lo siguiente:

“Artículo 52.- Cómputo de los términos.

El término de prescripción se debe contar a partir del primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que el tributo debe pagarse.” Así las cosas, la contabilización de la prescripción para el cobro de los impuestos y tasas, hasta el año 2016, corría a partir del año siguiente. A partir del año 2017 su conteo se produce a partir del mes siguiente a la fecha en que el tributo debió pagarse. Estas normas deben aplicarse en relación con el numeral 8 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles y el artículo 53 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, que regula las causales de interrupción de la prescripción. Conforme al texto hoy derogado de la norma, el hecho de que esos tributos se pagaban de forma trimestral no afectaba el cómputo de la prescripción, de modo que no importaba si un tributo debió pagarse en enero, abril, julio u octubre de cada año, pues con la ley aplicable a este caso, la prescripción empezaba a correr siempre a partir del año siguiente, lo que permite concluir que este instituto afectaba la totalidad de las cargas tributarias anuales, sin importar los fraccionamientos trimestrales. Tal metodología de cálculo cambió para efectos de cálculo de la prescripción de todos los tributos a partir del 2017.

V.- La Municipalidad sostiene que hubo actos interruptores de la prescripción, como el arreglo de pago de enero del 2016 y los cobros realizados en los años 2017 y 2018 (no controvertidos pro la apelante). Tal aseveración es cierta, pues así lo regula el numeral 53 incisos d) y e) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, Se advierte, eso sí, que dicho arreglo únicamente podía versar sobre los impuestos que recaían sobre la propiedad de los derechos de la finca 82024, puesto que para la fecha en que se suscribió dicho convenio aún no había adquirido la otra finca, registrada bajo el número de matrícula de folio real 165223-000. En el caso presente caso el cobro de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, se está computando desde el año 2015, sin lograrse precisar a cuál finca corresponde pues el cobro en el sistema municipal conforme a la prueba que consta en autos, aparece unificado. En aplicación de los artículos 8 y 22 de la Ley del Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles, los períodos que bien puede poner al cobro el ayuntamiento, son los tributos del mismo año en que se interrumpió la prescripción con el arreglo de pago que fue el primer acto interruptor. Para la finca 82024, se interrumpió la prescripción en el 2016 -puesto que aún no había empezado a computarse-, así como los tres años anteriores, o sea, puede cobrar los años 2015, 2014 y 2013. En lo que corresponde a la finca 165223-000, debe entenderse que el cobro comunicado en diciembre el 2017 es el acto interruptor de la prescripción, de modo que debe echarse tres años para atrás a partir del momento en que debió honrarse el tributo. Por ende, siendo que por ese tributo se está cobrando a partir del segundo trimestre del 2015, para cualquiera de ambas fincas el cobro es correcto. Misma suerte han de llevar los intereses corridos, respecto de esos mismos períodos. En lo que refiere a Servicios Urbanos, el término de la prescripción es de cinco años, según lo señala el ordinal 82 del Código Municipal. Como se explicó en el Considerando IV, el cobro puede ser realizado a partir de la fecha de adquisición de cada bien o derecho, resultando entonces que habiéndose interrumpido la prescripción con el arreglo y el cobro de año 2017, los períodos específicos de los años 2015 al 2019 sí pueden ser reclamados por parte del gobierno local, bajo el entendido que, en todos los supuestos, se ha de partir su conteo desde la fecha de inscripción registral de cada finca o derecho, eliminándose cualquier rubro adicional anterior. Bajo esta inteligencia, el recurso debe ser declarado parcialmente con lugar, anulándose la resolución venida en alzada, únicamente respecto del cobro de tasas por concepto de Servicios Urbanos por cualquier período previo a la adquisición del derecho de propiedad de cada finca o derecho, lo cual deberá ajustar y recalcular el ayuntamiento. Respecto de lo demás, se confirma el acto venido en alzada. Al no haber ulterior recurso, se ha de dar por agotada la vía administrativa.".