Validity of AyA employee dismissal for improper per diem claimsValidez del despido de funcionario del AyA por cobros indebidos de viáticos

"IV.- Regarding the review of legality of the formal conduct challenged. As we indicated ut supra, the plaintiff questions the legality of the resolution by which AyA ordered his dismissal with employer liability as of March 10, 2017. First, we will analyze the defect claimed in relation to the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) carried out in the specific case. For a better understanding of what will be decided, we must point out that this is a stage prior to the opening of the administrative procedure, which constitutes a power (facultad) of the Administration and whose purpose is to gather the indispensable elements to establish whether or not there is merit for the opening of the former. That is, its purpose (when it is necessary to resort to it) is to determine the degree of probability of the existence of a fault, to have clarity about the facts that will be charged and that constitute the object of the administrative case, to identify the person presumably responsible and against whom the procedure will be directed, or, to gather the evidentiary elements that allow for an adequate, suitable charging (Sala Constitucional, judgment No. 8841-01 of 9:03 a.m. on August 31, 2001). That is, it is a preliminary phase that is sometimes necessary (and sometimes not) in order to define, in essence, what the object of the process will be and the facts about which the real truth must be investigated, as well as to identify the subjects that will be part of the case, indispensable aspects for determining whether there is merit to initiate a useful administrative procedure or not to initiate it (Sala Constitucional, judgment No. 9125-03 of 9 hours 21 minutes on August 29, 2003), which is of course based on principles of economy, efficiency, and administrative rationality. It is also possible to carry out this optional phase when one is in the presence of complaints that only give notice of supposedly irregular facts and there is imprecision in the identification of the subject or circumstances of the factual situation. In this way, the findings that are documented will necessarily form part of the subsequent procedure, having to be incorporated into the respective file, where the person prosecuted may access them, bearing in mind that the evidence gathered in that investigative phase must later be reproduced in the procedure so that it is subjected to adversarial proceedings (contradictorio). It is for this reason that, as constitutional jurisprudence has admitted in the cited judgments, in the preliminary investigation the person prosecuted does not have a right to due process (debido proceso) or defense, because the exercise of these guarantees is reserved or deferred for the procedure that will be ordered in the future and in which adversarial proceedings must be guaranteed, we reiterate, regarding the evidence gathered there. This means, for example, that the testimonies that may be gathered there must be subjected to adversarial proceedings and reproduced within the administrative procedure, so that they can be incorporated into the final decision, all in order to safeguard such fundamental rights and guarantees. Otherwise, it is not possible to use them in the final act or resolution (Sala Constitucional, judgments No. 598-95 of 5:12 p.m. on February 1, 1995, No. 8841-01 of 9:03 a.m. on August 31, 2001, the aforementioned, No. 9125-03 and No. 1030-06 of 2:35 p.m. on February 1, 2006, among others). [...]

Then, from articles 36 and 37 it is clearly inferred that when those reports are sent to the subordinate heads and hierarchical superiors, they must order the implementation of the respective recommendations. On this point, it has been accredited here that the AyA Internal Audit (Auditoría Interna) issued the Report of Facts (Relación de Hechos) AU-2015-620 titled "For improper collection, processing, and payment of travel allowances (viáticos) made by an official of the Chorotega Region in contravention of what is stipulated in article 20 of the Regulation on Travel and Transportation Expenses for Public Officials of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Reglamento de Gastos de Viaje y Transporte para Funcionarios Públicos de la Contraloría General de la República)"; and that it ordered there that it was necessary to determine the real truth of the facts through a disciplinary and collection procedure, for the acts derived from the actions of the plaintiff here, for allegedly having made different improper collections of travel allowances between May 15 and November 8, 2012 (proven fact 2). The foregoing allows us to conclude that in the specific case, the preliminary investigation was carried out by the AyA Internal Audit, an body that was indeed competent for such purposes, in accordance with the rules already cited. Therefore, it did not require any internal act of the hierarchical superior because, we reiterate, the Internal Audit acted in the exercise of the powers that have been granted by the legal system. In these cases, it is the respective report that is brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior so that he verifies compliance with the recommendations issued therein. Precisely, it was also accredited that the respective report was communicated to the AyA General Manager on November 11, 2015 (proven fact 2) and that he appointed the directing body (órgano director) to open a disciplinary and collection procedure against the plaintiff here Chavarría Jiménez, in order to investigate the real truth of the facts reported by the Internal Audit of that entity (proven fact 3). Therefore, we consider that the plaintiff is not correct in his argument. Even more, it was also accredited that the act of opening the procedure communicated to the plaintiff here, informed him of the administrative file and the documentary evidence gathered, where the report in question was recorded (proven fact 4), an additional reason to reject the plaintiff's argument given that, nor was any defenselessness caused to him because the report of the preliminary investigation carried out by the Audit Office in legitimate use of its powers was brought to his attention from the notification of charges (traslado de cargos).

V.- Irregularities related to the temporal element of the procedure are also claimed. First, the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the exercise of the sanctioning power is claimed; specifically regarding the time limit regulated for the initiation of the procedure. The plaintiff party indicates that in accordance with article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (hereinafter CT), today numeral 414 ibidem, the defendant party had one month, counted from when the competent body became aware of the facts, to initiate the disciplinary power and open the respective procedure. He accuses that, in this case, the directing body was appointed on November 25, 2015 and the notification of charges was communicated to him until June 2, 2016; that is, more than six months later. However, after the corresponding analysis, we consider that this argument must be rejected for the following reasons. As a starting point, we must indicate that, as the plaintiff affirms, this is a topic that has already been extensively developed by this Section, among others, in judgments No. 25-2019-VI of 10 hours 20 minutes on February 28, 2019 and No. 075-2018-VI of 14 hours five minutes on June 22, 2018. There it has been indicated, as far as this case concerns, that the statute of limitations for initiating the disciplinary power refers to the time limit set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow him, definitively, to issue the final decision. On this plane, it is about the maximum time limit admitted by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, directed at establishing the pertinence or not of the imposition of a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks to establish the facts that serve as the basis for the motive of the act, generates an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act that directly tends toward the exercise of that power; an interrupting effect that will be maintained while the administrative procedure is in process, in course, active and has not lapsed. We have also indicated that in accordance with numerals 9 and 13 of the LGAP, in the absence of an administrative norm that generally regulates the statute of limitations in public employment relations, one must resort, without prejudice to a special norm, to the provisions established in that sense in the CT, first in article 603 and later, as of the reform operated by Law No. 9343 (Ley N° 9343), in numerals 414 and 415; norms that establish a prescriptive time limit of one month for such purposes. However, it has also been warned that this is a general norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme [...]

Thus, if the prescriptive time limit is five years and the hierarchical superior became aware of the facts with the notification of the audit report (which happened on November 11, 2015), the time limit to open the procedure against the plaintiff here expired on November 11, 2020, which is why it is evident that the alleged statute of limitations did not occur; which is reinforced by the fact that the final act of dismissal was communicated to the plaintiff on March 9, 2017. Finally, it draws the Court's attention that upon answering the complaint, the representation of AyA was clear in indicating that the prescriptive time limit was that indicated by article 71 subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) because, additionally, a collection action was being carried out; an argument that was never refuted by the plaintiff party, who even in his conclusions clung to the application of numeral 603 of the CT, omitting any reference to the reasons why the special prescriptive time limit alleged by the defendant was inapplicable. For all the foregoing, the alleged statute of limitations must be rejected, as is indeed done [...]

XII.- In short, the defects to due process, right of defense, or irregularities in the procedure that are alleged are not observed. The plaintiff was notified of an initial act of the procedure that clearly established its character and purposes, with the due charging of facts and imputation of charges and possible sanctions (proven fact 4). He was also guaranteed the right to be heard in an appearance in which he offered the evidence he deemed pertinent, had the opportunity to question and subject to adversarial proceedings the evidence offered by the Administration and to render conclusive arguments (proven facts 4, 9 and 11) and he was guaranteed the opportunity to prepare his allegations and theory of the case (proven fact 6) with access to the information contained in the administrative file (proven fact 4). Also, his right to be represented and advised by a lawyer was guaranteed, who participated on his behalf both in the constitutive phase of the procedure and in the appeal phase (proven fact 4). The final decision that was issued was communicated to him (proven fact 16), which is not challenged on the merits in this process, and his right to appeal it was guaranteed, as he indeed did (proven fact 17). Ergo, due process and his right of defense were amply protected, without any of the alleged violations claimed being observed.

XIII.- Regarding the remaining claims. The plaintiff party also requests that his reinstatement to the position he held be ordered and that the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) be ordered, as well as all labor benefits such as year-end bonuses (aguinaldos), vacations, school bonus (salario escolar) and respective interest from the moment of his dismissal until his effective reinstatement. In the logical framework of this action, the recently mentioned claims are directly linked to the request for the declaration of invalidity of the conduct that ordered the plaintiff's dismissal. These are items regarding which there is an undeniable relationship of accessority with the nullity claim. Therefore, upon establishing in this judgment the validity of what was acted upon in the administrative venue and with it, the substantial conformity with the legal system of the conduct subject to challenge, it is evident that the indicated requests are improper. Consequently, said items must be denied." This optional phase may also be carried out when faced with complaints that merely report allegedly irregular events and where there is imprecision in the identification of the subject or the circumstances of the factual situation. In this way, the findings that are documented will necessarily form part of the subsequent procedure, and must be incorporated into the respective file, where the charged party may access them, bearing in mind that the evidence gathered in that investigative phase must later be reproduced in the procedure so that it may be subjected to adversarial examination (contradictorio). It is for this reason that, as constitutional jurisprudence has admitted in the cited rulings, during the preliminary investigation the charged party does not have a right to due process (debido proceso) or defense (defensa), because the exercise of these guarantees is reserved or deferred for the procedure to be ordered in the future and in which, we reiterate, adversarial examination must be guaranteed regarding the evidence gathered there. This means, for example, that any testimonies that might be gathered there shall have to be subjected to adversarial examination and reproduced within the administrative procedure, so that they may be incorporated into the final decision, all in the interest of safeguarding such fundamental rights and guarantees. Otherwise, it is not possible to use them in the final act or resolution (Constitutional Chamber, rulings No. 598-95 of 17:12 hours of February 1, 1995, No. 8841-01 of 9:03 hours of August 31, 2001, the aforementioned No. 9125-03 and No. 1030-06 of 14:35 hours of February 1, 2006, among others). [...]

Then, from Articles 36 and 37 it is clearly inferred that when those reports are sent to the subordinate heads and hierarchical superiors, they must order the respective recommendations to be implemented. On this point, it has been established here that the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna) of AyA issued Report of Facts AU-2015-620 titled "For improper collection, processing and payment of travel allowances (viáticos) made by an official of the Chorotega Region in contravention of the provisions of Article 20 of the Travel and Transportation Expense Regulations for Public Officials of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Reglamento de Gastos de Viaje y Transporte para Funcionarios Públicos de la Contraloría General de la República)"; and that it ordered there that it was necessary to determine the real truth of the facts through a disciplinary and collection procedure, for the acts derived from the actions of the plaintiff herein, for allegedly having made various improper collections of travel allowances between May 15 and November 8, 2012 (proven fact 2). The foregoing allows us to conclude that in the specific case, the preliminary investigation was carried out by the Internal Audit Office of AyA, an body that was indeed competent for such purposes, in accordance with the rules already cited. Therefore, it did not require any internal act by the hierarchical superior because, we reiterate, the Internal Audit Office acted in the exercise of the powers that have been granted by the legal system. In these cases, it is the respective report that is brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior so that he or she may verify compliance with the recommendations issued therein. Precisely, it was also established that the respective report was communicated to the General Manager of AyA on November 11, 2015 (proven fact 2) and that he appointed the directing body to open a disciplinary and collection procedure against the plaintiff herein Chavarría Jiménez, in order to ascertain the real truth of the facts reported by the Internal Audit Office of that entity (proven fact 3). Therefore, we consider that the plaintiff's argument is unfounded.

Furthermore, it was also proven that the act of opening the procedure communicated to the plaintiff here made him aware of the administrative file and the documentary evidence gathered, where the report in question was recorded *(proven fact 4)*, an additional reason to reject the plaintiff's argument given that no defenselessness (indefensión) was caused to him either, because the report of the preliminary investigation carried out by the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría) in legitimate use of its powers was made known to him from the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) onwards.

**V.-** Irregularities related to the temporal element of the procedure are also claimed. First, the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the exercise of the sanctioning power is claimed; specifically regarding the deadline regulated for the initiation of the procedure. The plaintiff points out that, in accordance with article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (hereinafter CT), now number 414 *ibidem*, the defendant party had one month, counted from when the competent body became aware of the facts, to initiate the disciplinary power and open the respective procedure. It accuses that, in this case, the directing body (órgano director) was appointed on November 25, 2015, and the notice of charges was communicated to him only on June 2, 2016; that is, more than six months later. However, after the corresponding analysis, we consider that this argument must be rejected for the following reasons. As a starting point, we must indicate that, as affirmed by the plaintiff, this is an issue that has already been extensively developed by this Section, among others, in judgments No. 25-2019-VI of 10 hours 20 minutes of February 28, 2019 and No. 075-2018-VI of 14 hours five minutes of June 22, 2018. There it has been indicated, as far as this case is concerned, that the statute of limitations to initiate the disciplinary power refers to the deadline set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the relevant procedural measures that allow them, ultimately, to issue the final decision. In this sense, it is the maximum time limit admitted by the legal system for the administrative head to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, directed at establishing the pertinence or not of the imposition of a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks the establishment of the facts serving as the basis for the act's motive generates an interrupting effect of that temporal margin, insofar as it constitutes an express act that directly tends toward the exercise of that power; an interrupting effect that will be maintained while the administrative procedure is pending, ongoing, active, and has not expired. We have also indicated that in accordance with numbers 9 and 13 of the LGAP, in the absence of an administrative rule that generally regulates the statute of limitations in public employment relations, one must resort, without prejudice to special rules, to the provisions that in that sense are established in the CT, first in article 603 and later, as of the reform operated by Law No. 9343, in numbers 414 and 415; rules that establish a prescriptive period of one month for such purposes. However, it has also been warned that this is a general rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that matter [...]

Thus, if the prescriptive period is five years and the head became aware of the facts with the notification of the audit report (which occurred on November 11, 2015), the deadline to open the procedure for the plaintiff here would expire until November 11, 2020, a reason why it is evident that the alleged statute of limitations did not occur; which is reinforced by the fact that the final act of dismissal was communicated to the plaintiff on March 9, 2017.

Finally, the Court's attention was drawn to the fact that, when answering the complaint, the AyA's representation was clear in pointing out that the statute of limitations period was that indicated by article 71 subsection b) of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República because, furthermore, a collection action was being carried out; an argument that was never refuted by the plaintiff, who even in their conclusions clung to the application of section 603 of the CT (Código de Trabajo), omitting any reference to the reasons why the special prescriptive period alleged by the defendant was inapplicable. For all the foregoing reasons, the alleged statute of limitations must be rejected, as it is hereby [...]

XII.- In definitiva, the alleged defects in due process, right of defense, or irregularities in the proceeding are not observed. The plaintiff was notified of an initial act of the proceeding that clearly established its character and purposes, with the proper notification of facts and charges and possible sanctions (proven fact 4). The right to be heard was also guaranteed in a hearing in which he offered the evidence he deemed pertinent, had the opportunity to question and submit to cross-examination the evidence offered by the Administration, and to present concluding arguments (proven facts 4, 9 and 11), and he was guaranteed the opportunity to prepare his allegations and theory of the case (proven fact 6) with access to the information contained in the administrative file (proven fact 4). Likewise, his right to be represented and advised by an attorney was guaranteed, who participated on his behalf both in the constitutive phase of the proceeding and in the review phase (proven fact 4). The final decision rendered was communicated to him (proven fact 16), which is not challenged on the merits in this proceeding, and his right to appeal it was guaranteed, as he indeed did so (proven fact 17). Ergo, due process and his right of defense were amply protected, without observing any of the supposed violations claimed.

XIII.- Regarding the remaining claims. The plaintiff also requests that his reinstatement to the position he held be ordered and that the payment of lost wages be ordered, as well as all labor entitlements such as year-end bonuses, vacations, school salary, and respective interest from the moment of his dismissal until his effective reinstatement. Within the logical framework of this action, the just-mentioned claims are directly linked to the request for a declaration of invalidity of the conduct that ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff. These are matters for which there is an undeniable relationship of accessoriness with the claim for nullity. Therefore, by establishing in this judgment the validity of the actions taken in the administrative forum and, with it, the substantial conformity with the legal order of the conduct challenged, it is evident that the indicated petitions are unfounded.

**"IV.- Regarding the legality review of the formal conduct challenged.** As we indicated *ut supra*, the plaintiff challenges the legality of the resolution by which AyA ordered his dismissal with employer liability effective March 10, 2017. First, we will analyze the defect claimed in relation to the **preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar)** conducted in the specific case. For a better understanding of what will be resolved, we must point out that this is a stage prior to the opening of the administrative procedure, which constitutes a power of the Administration and whose purpose is to gather the indispensable elements to establish whether or not there is merit for the opening of the latter. That is, its purpose (when it is necessary to resort to it) is to determine the degree of probability of the existence of a fault, to have clarity regarding the facts that will be alleged and that constitute the subject matter of the administrative case, to identify the person presumably responsible and against whom the procedure will be directed, or to gather the evidentiary elements that allow for an adequate, suitable accusation (*Sala Constitucional*, judgment No. 8841-01 of 9:03 a.m. on August 31, 2001). That is, it is a preliminary phase that is sometimes necessary (and sometimes not) for the purpose of defining, in essence, what the subject matter of the process will be and the facts regarding which the real truth must be investigated, as well as to identify the subjects who will form part of the case, indispensable aspects for determining whether there is merit to initiate a useful administrative procedure or not to initiate it (*Sala Constitucional*, judgment No. 9125-03 of 9:21 a.m. on August 29, 2003), which is undoubtedly based on principles of economy, efficiency, and administrative rationality. It is also possible to carry out this optional phase when faced with complaints that merely report supposedly irregular facts and there is imprecision in the identification of the subject or circumstances of the factual situation. In this way, the findings that are documented will necessarily form part of the subsequent procedure, and must be incorporated into the respective file, where the person prosecuted may access them, bearing in mind that the evidence gathered in that investigative phase must later be reproduced in the procedure so that it may be subjected to adversarial proceedings. This is why, as constitutional jurisprudence has admitted in the cited judgments, in the preliminary investigation the person prosecuted does not have a right to due process or defense, because the exercise of these guarantees is reserved or deferred for the procedure that will be agreed upon in the future and in which the adversarial proceedings must be guaranteed, we reiterate, regarding the evidence gathered there. This means, for example, that any testimony that might be gathered there must be subjected to adversarial proceedings and reproduced within the administrative procedure, so that it can be incorporated into the final decision, all in the interest of safeguarding such fundamental rights and guarantees.

In another manner, it is not possible to use them in the final act or resolution *(Sala Constitucional, judgments No. 598-95 of 17:12 hours of February 1, 1995, No. 8841-01 of 9:03 hours of August 31, 2001, the aforementioned, No. 9125-03 and No. 1030-06 of 14:35 hours of February 1, 2006, among others). [...]* Then, from Articles 36 and 37 it is clearly inferred that when those reports are sent to the subordinate heads and senior officials (jerarcas), the latter must order that the respective recommendations be implemented. On this point, it has been established here that the AyA Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna) issued the Statement of Facts (Relación de Hechos) AU-2015-620 entitled "Regarding the collection, processing, and undue payment of travel allowances (viáticos) made by an official of the Chorotega Region in contravention of the provisions of Article 20 of the Regulation on Travel and Transportation Expenses for Public Officials of the Contraloría General de la República"; and that therein it ordered that it was necessary to determine the real truth of the facts through a disciplinary and collection proceeding, for acts derived from the own actions of the plaintiff herein, for allegedly having made different undue collections of travel allowances (viáticos) between May 15 and November 8, 2012 *(proven fact 2)*. The foregoing allows us to conclude that in the specific case, the preliminary investigation was carried out by the AyA Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna), a body that was indeed competent for such purposes, in accordance with the rules already cited. Therefore, it did not require any internal act by the senior official (jerarca) because, we reiterate, the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna) acted in the exercise of the powers that have been granted by the legal system. In these cases, it is the respective report that is brought to the attention of the senior official (jerarca) so that he verifies compliance with the recommendations issued therein. Precisely, it was also established that the respective report was communicated to the General Manager of AyA on November 11, 2015 *(proven fact 2)* and that he appointed the directing body to open a disciplinary and collection proceeding against the plaintiff herein Chavarría Jiménez, in order to ascertain the real truth of the facts reported by the Internal Audit Office (Auditoria Interna) of that entity *(proven fact 3)*. Therefore, we consider that the plaintiff's argument is not correct. Furthermore, it was also established that the act of opening the proceeding communicated to the plaintiff herein made him aware of the administrative file and the documentary evidence collected, which included the report in question *(proven fact 4)*, an additional reason to reject the plaintiff's argument given that no defenselessness (indefensión) was caused to him because the report of the preliminary investigation carried out by the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría) in legitimate use of its powers was brought to his attention upon the notification of charges (traslado de cargos).

**V.-** Irregularities related to the temporal element of the proceeding are also claimed. Initially, the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the exercise of the sanctioning power is claimed; specifically regarding the term regulated for the initiation of the proceeding. The plaintiff indicates that, in accordance with Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo (hereinafter CT), now numeral 414 ibidem, the defendant had one month, counted from when the competent body became aware of the facts, to initiate the disciplinary power and open the respective proceeding. He accuses that, in this case, the directing body was appointed on November 25, 2015 and the notification of charges (traslado de cargos) was not communicated to him until June 2, 2016; that is, more than six months later. However, after the corresponding analysis, we consider that this argument must be rejected for the following reasons. As a starting point, we must indicate that, as the plaintiff affirms, this is an issue that has already been extensively developed by this Section, among others, in judgments No. 25-2019-VI of 10 hours 20 minutes of February 28, 2019 and No. 075-2018-VI of 14 hours five minutes of June 22, 2018.

It has been indicated, regarding what pertains to this case, that the statute of limitations (prescripción) for initiating disciplinary authority refers to the period established by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the pertinent procedural measures that allow them, ultimately, to issue the final decision. On this level, it concerns the maximum period allowed by the legal system for the administrative head to order the opening of the relevant procedure, aimed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks to establish the facts serving as the basis for the reason for the act generates an interrupting effect on that time margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act that directly promotes the exercise of that authority; an interrupting effect that will be maintained as long as the administrative procedure is being processed, is ongoing, is active, and has not lapsed. We have also indicated that, in accordance with Articles 9 and 13 of the LGAP, in the absence of an administrative norm that generally regulates the statute of limitations (prescripción) in public employment relations, one must resort, without prejudice to special norms, to the provisions established in that regard in the CT, first in Article 603 and subsequently, following the reform effected by Law No. 9343, in Articles 414 and 415; norms that establish a prescriptive period of one month for such purposes. However, it has also been noted that this is a general norm that yields to particular and special regulations that incorporate different rules regarding this aspect [...]

This being the case, if the prescriptive period is five years and the head became aware of the facts upon notification of the audit report (which occurred on November 11, 2015), the period to open the procedure against the plaintiff here expired on November 11, 2020, which is the reason it is evident that the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) did not occur; this is reinforced by the fact that the final act of dismissal was communicated to the plaintiff on March 9, 2017. Finally, the Court’s attention was drawn to the fact that, in answering the claim, the representation of AyA was clear in pointing out that the limitation period was that indicated by Article 71, subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, because, moreover, a collection action was being carried out; an argument that was never refuted by the plaintiff, who even in their conclusions clung to the application of Article 603 of the CT, omitting any reference to the reasons why the special prescriptive period alleged by the defendant was inapplicable. For all the foregoing, the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) must be rejected, as is hereby done [...]

XII.- Ultimately, the alleged defects in due process, right of defense, or irregularities in the procedure are not observed.

The claimant was notified of an initial act of the procedure that clearly established its nature and purposes, with the due notice of facts and statement of charges and possible sanctions *(proven fact 4).* He was also guaranteed the right to be heard in a hearing in which he offered the evidence he deemed pertinent, had the opportunity to challenge and subject to cross-examination the evidence offered by the Administration, and to present closing arguments *(proven facts 4, 9, and 11)* and was guaranteed the opportunity to prepare his allegations and theory of the case *(proven fact 6)* with access to the information contained in the administrative file *(proven fact 4).* Likewise, he was guaranteed his right to be represented and advised by an attorney, who participated on his behalf both in the constitutive phase of the procedure and in the appellate phase *(proven fact 4).* The final decision that was issued was communicated to him (proven fact 16), which is not challenged on the merits in this proceeding, and he was guaranteed the right to appeal it, as he in fact did *(proven fact 17).* Ergo, due process and his right of defense were amply protected, without observing any of the alleged violations claimed.

**XIII.- Regarding the remaining claims.** The plaintiff also requests that his reinstatement to the position he held be ordered, and that payment of lost wages be ordered, as well as all employment entitlements including Christmas bonuses, vacations, school salary, and respective interest, from the moment of his dismissal until his effective reinstatement. Within the logical framework of this action, the just-mentioned claims are directly linked to the request for a declaration of invalidity of the conduct that ordered the plaintiff's dismissal. These are items regarding which there is an undeniable relationship of accessoriness with the nullity claim. Therefore, as this judgment establishes the validity of the actions taken at the administrative level and, with that, the substantial conformity with the legal system of the conduct subject to challenge, it is evident that the indicated petitions are unfounded. Consequently, said items must be denied."

"IV.- Sobre el examen de legalidad de la conducta formal impugnada. Como indicamos ut supra, el actor cuestiona la legalidad de la resolución mediante la cual el AyA dispuso su despido con responsabilidad patronal a partir del 10 de marzo del 2017. De inicio, analizaremos el vicio que se reclama en relación con la investigación preliminar efectuada en el caso concreto. Para una mejor comprensión de lo que se resolverá, debemos señalar que ésta es una etapa previa a la apertura del procedimiento administrativo, que constituye una facultad de la Administración y cuya finalidad es recabar los elementos indispensables para establecer si existe o no mérito para la apertura de aquel. Es decir, su objeto (cuando resulta necesario acudir a ella) es determinar el grado de probabilidad de la existencia de una falta, tener claridad de los hechos que serán intimados y que constituyen el objeto de la causa administrativa, para identificar a la persona presuntamente responsable y contra quien se dirigirá el procedimiento, o bien, para hacer acopio de los elementos probatorios que permitan acordar una intimación adecuada, idónea (Sala Constitucional, sentencia No. 8841-01 de 9:03 horas de 31 de agosto de 2001). Sea, es una fase preliminar que en ocasiones resulta necesaria (y en otras no) a efectos de definir, en lo medular, cuál será el objeto del proceso y los hechos sobre los que debe averiguarse la verdad real, así como para identificar los sujetos que habrán de formar parte de la causa, aspectos indispensables para determinar si existe mérito para iniciar un procedimiento administrativo útil o no iniciarlo (Sala Constitucional, sentencia No. 9125-03 de 9 horas 21 minutos de 29 de agosto de 2003), lo que desde luego se funda en principios de economía, eficiencia y racionalidad administrativa. También es posible realizar esta fase facultativa, cuando se está en presencia de denuncias que únicamente dan noticia de hechos supuestamente irregulares y exista imprecisión en la identificación del sujeto o circunstancias de la situación fáctica. De esta forma, los hallazgos que se documenten necesariamente formarán parte del procedimiento posterior, debiendo incorporarse a la carpeta respectiva, donde podrá accesarlos la persona encausada, teniendo presente que las pruebas que en esa fase investigativa se recaben, deberán luego ser reproducidas en el procedimiento a efectos de que sean sometidas al contradictorio. Es por ello que, tal y como lo ha admitido la jurisprudencia constitucional en las sentencias citadas, en la investigación preliminar la persona encausada no tiene un derecho al debido proceso o de defensa, porque el ejercicio de estas garantías queda reservado o diferido para el procedimiento que habrá de acordarse en el futuro y en el que debe garantizarse, reiteramos, el contradictorio respecto de las pruebas allá recabadas. Esto significa, por ejemplo, que los testimonios que allí pudieran recabarse, habrán de someterse al contradictorio y reproducirse dentro del procedimiento administrativo, para que puedan incorporarse en la decisión final, todo en aras de resguardar tales derechos y garantías fundamentales. De otro modo, no es posible utilizarlos en el acto o resolución final (Sala Constitucional, sentencias No. 598-95 de 17:12 horas de 1 de febrero de 1995, No. 8841-01 de 9:03 horas de 31 de agosto de 2001, la precitada, No. 9125-03 y la No. 1030-06 de 14:35 horas de 1 de febrero de 2006, entre otras). [...]

Luego, de los artículos 36 y 37 se infiere claramente que cuando esos informes sean remitidos a los titulares subordinados y jerarcas, éstos deben ordenar que se implanten las recomendaciones respectivas. Sobre el punto, aquí se ha tenido por acreditado que la Auditoría Interna del AyA emitió la Relación de Hechos AU-2015-620 titulada "Por cobro, trámite y pago indebido de viáticos realizados por un funcionario de la Región Chorotega en contravención con lo estipulado en el artículo 20 del Reglamento de Gastos de Viaje y Transporte para Funcionarios Públicos de la Contraloría General de la República"; y que ahí dispuso que era necesario determinar la verdad real de los hechos mediante un procedimiento disciplinario y de cobro, por los actos derivados del accionar propio del aquí actor, por presuntamente haber realizado diferentes cobros indebidos de viáticos entre el 15 de mayo y el 8 de noviembre del 2012 (hecho probado 2). Lo expuesto permite concluir que en el caso concreto, la investigación preliminar fue efectuada por la Auditoría Interna del AyA, órgano que sí resultaba competente para tales efectos, de conformidad con las normas ya citadas. Por ello, no requería de ningún acto interno del jerarca porque, reiteramos, la Auditoría Interna actuó en el ejercicio de las potestades que han sido otorgadas por el ordenamiento jurídico. En estos casos, es el informe respectivo el que es puesto en conocimiento del jerarca para que verifique el cumplimiento de las recomendaciones que ahí se emiten. Precisamente, también se acreditó que el respectivo informe fue comunicado al Gerente General del AyA el 11 de noviembre del 2015 (hecho probado 2) y que él nombró el órgano director que abriera un procedimiento disciplinario y de cobro en contra del aquí actor Chavarría Jiménez, a efecto de averiguar la verdad real de los hechos denunciados por la Auditoria Interna de ese ente (hecho probado 3). Por ello, estimamos que no lleva razón el accionante en su argumento. Incluso, también se acreditó que el acto de apertura de procedimiento comunicado al aquí actor, lo puso en conocimiento del expediente administrativo y la prueba documental recabadas, donde constaba el informe en cuestión (hecho probado 4), razón adicional para rechazar el argumento del accionante dado que, tampoco se le causó ninguna indefensión porque el informe de la investigación preliminar efectuada por la Auditoría en uso legítimo de sus potestades, le fue puesto en conocimiento desde el traslado de cargos.

V.- Se reclaman también irregularidades relacionadas con el elemento temporal del procedimiento. De inicio, se reclama la prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad sancionatoria; específicamente en cuanto al plazo regulado para el inicio del procedimiento. La parte actora señala que de conformidad con el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (en adelante CT), hoy numeral 414 ibídem, la parte demandada tenía un mes, contado a partir de que el órgano competente tuviera conocimiento de los hechos, para iniciar la potestad disciplinaria y abrir el procedimiento respectivo. Acusa que, en este caso, el órgano director fue nombrado el 25 de noviembre del 2015 y el traslado de cargos se le comunicó hasta el 2 de junio del 2016; sea, más de seis meses después. Sin embargo, luego del análisis correspondiente, estimamos que este argumento debe ser rechazado por las siguientes razones. Como punto de partida, debemos indicar que, tal y como afirma el demandante, se trata de un tema que ya ha sido ampliamente desarrollado por esta Sección, entre otras, en las sentencias No. 25-2019-VI de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 28 de febrero de 2019 y No. 075-2018-VI de las 14 horas cinco minutos del 22 de junio del 2018. Ahí se ha indicado, en lo que a este caso atañe, que la prescripción para iniciar la potestad disciplinaria refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan, en definitiva, emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo admitido por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo disponga la apertura del procedimiento pertinente, direccionado a establecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso, es claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que constituye un acto expreso que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad; efecto interruptor que se mantendrá mientras el procedimiento administrativo esté en trámite, en curso, activo y no haya caducado. También hemos indicado que de conformidad con los numerales 9 y 13 de la LGAP, a falta de norma administrativa que regule de manera general la prescripción en las relaciones de empleo público, se debe recurrir, sin perjuicio de norma especial, a las disposiciones que en ese sentido se establecen en el CT, primero en el artículo 603 y posteriormente, a partir de la reforma operada por Ley N° 9343, en los numerales 414 y 415; normas que establecen un plazo prescriptivo de un mes para tales efectos. Sin embargo, también se ha advertido que ésta es una norma general que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo [...]

Así las cosas, si el plazo prescriptivo es de cinco años y el jerarca tuvo conocimiento de los hechos con la notificación del informe de auditoría (que sucedió el 11 de noviembre del 2015), el plazo para abrir el procedimiento al aquí accionante prescribía hasta el 11 de noviembre del 2020, razón por la cual es evidente que no acaeció la prescripción alegada; lo que se refuerza con el hecho de que el acto final del despido fue comunicado al accionante el 9 de marzo del 2017. Finalmente, llama la atención del Tribunal que al contestar la demanda, la representación del AyA fue clara en señalar que el plazo de prescripción era el que señalaba el artículo 71 inciso b) de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República porque, además, se estaba efectuando una acción de cobro; argumento que nunca fue desvirtuado por la parte actora, quien aún en sus conclusiones se aferró a la aplicación del numeral 603 del CT, omitiendo referencia alguna a las razones por las cuales el plazo especial prescriptivo alegado por la demandada resultaba inaplicable. Por todo lo expuesto, la prescripción alegada debe ser rechazada, como en efecto se hace [...]

XII.- En definitiva, no se observan los vicios al debido proceso, derecho de defensa o irregularidades en el procedimiento que se alegan. Al accionante se le notificó un acto inicial del procedimiento que establecía claramente su carácter y fines, con la debida intimación de hechos e imputación de cargos y posibles sanciones (hecho probado 4 ). También se le garantizó el derecho de ser oído en una comparecencia en la cual ofreció las pruebas que estimó pertinentes, tuvo oportunidad de cuestionar y someter al contradictorio la prueba ofrecida por la Administración y de rendir argumentos conclusivos (hechos probados 4, 9 y 11) y se le garantizó la oportunidad para preparar sus alegaciones y teoría del caso (hecho probado 6) con acceso a la información contenida en el expediente administrativo (hecho probado 4). También, se le garantizó su derecho de hacerse representar y asesorar por un abogado, quien participó en su nombre tanto en la fase constitutiva del procedimiento como en la recursiva (hecho probado 4). Se le comunicó la decisión final que se dictó (hecho probado 16), la cual no es cuestionada por el fondo en este proceso y se le garantizó el derecho a recurrirla, como en efecto lo hizo (hecho probado 17). Ergo, se tuteló ampliamente el debido proceso y su derecho de defensa, sin que se observe ninguna de las supuestas violaciones que se reclaman.

XIII.- Sobre las restantes pretensiones. La parte actora solicita, también, que se ordene su reincorporación al cargo que ejercía y se ordene el pago de los salarios caídos, así como a todos los extremos laborales sea aguinaldos, vacaciones, salario escolar y respectivos intereses desde el momento de su despido hasta su efectiva reinstalación. En el marco lógico de esta acción, las pretensiones recién mencionadas se vinculan de manera directa con la solicitud de declaratoria de invalidez de la conducta que dispuso el despido del actor. Se trata de extremos respecto de los cuales existe una innegable relación de accesoriedad con la pretensión de nulidad. Por ende, al establecerse en esta sentencia la validez de lo actuado en sede administrativa y con ello, la conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico de la conducta objeto de impugnación, es evidente que resultan improcedentes los pedimentos indicados. En consecuencia, dichas partidas deben ser denegadas".