Partial nullification of TFA-559-2011 for lesividad regarding Banco Popular's financial expensesNulidad parcial TFA-559-2011 por lesividad en gastos financieros del Banco Popular

IVo.- PREREQUISITES FOR THE LESIVITY PROCEEDING. In this case, the State seeks a declaration of nullity of resolution number 559-2011 issued by the First Chamber of the Tax Administrative Court (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), First Chamber at 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, for being contrary to law and harmful (lesiva) to the public, fiscal, and economic interests of the State, only with respect to the reversal of what was decided by the then Large Taxpayers Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria de Grandes Contribuyentes), regarding the adjustment: for Non-deductible Expenses associated with non-taxable income: financial expenses associated with liquidity reserves (reservas de liquidez). From this standpoint, it is necessary, briefly, to establish compliance with the various prerequisites imposed by the legal system for the filing of a lesivity proceeding (proceso de lesividad), given that the absence of one of these elements would preclude and render unnecessary the examination of the merits. In general, lesivity is a jurisdictional mechanism by virtue of which the Administration seeks the elimination of one of its own acts, which, in principle, generates a favorable effect for a third-party recipient. From that standpoint, in this type of dispute, lesivity is of a subjective nature, insofar as it seeks the annulment of a conduct that grants a right or, in general, a beneficial situation to a person. This figure is established in canon 34 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), a rule that sets out the prior elements and procedural regulations of this figure. However, it is also referenced in numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). From the perspective of procedural prerequisites, subjective, objective, procedural, and temporal conditions are imposed. Regarding the subjective aspect, standing to sue is granted to the Administration that issued the challenged act, while the passive party with standing is the recipient of the effects of the conduct, that is, the one who obtains its benefits. Regarding the objective aspect, lesivity is constituted as a mechanism for the legal elimination of administrative acts that are substantially non-compliant with the legal system, that is, acts that suffer from some level of invalidity, whether absolute or relative, in any of their typologies (articles 128, 158, 165 and concordant articles of the aforementioned General Law No. 6227). In this line, the Administration must declare that conduct harmful to public interests, which must be established within a framework of internal actions of the administration that are essential to formulate the action. Indeed, in the procedural order, it is required that the supreme maximum head of the respective Public Administration declare the lesivity of the act, whether due to harm to economic, fiscal, or other interests arising from the public interest, for which purpose, they must have an underlying legal-technical opinion that supports that determination. Unlike other figures for the elimination of public conducts, it does not require a hearing for the third party, but only actions within the Administration, it being within the judicial process that the third party may present their defense arguments. However, when the act emanates from the State (see article 1 of the aforementioned General Law), that is, from the Central Administration, the lawsuit may only be filed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) (canon 16 of Law No. 8508), upon prior request of the supreme maximum head and prior internal declaration of lesivity, with details of the reasons for that opinion. Regarding the temporal dimension, the procedural regulations establish a period of one year counted from the issuance of the act (not from its notification) to declare it harmful to public interests, and after that declaration (and not from the expiration of that first year) a period of one year is granted to file the contentious-administrative action as a fatal statute of limitations period (plazo fatal de caducidad), except in cases of acts with absolute nullity, in which case, the declaration of lesivity may be made as long as its effects persist, with the aforementioned year running from the definitive cessation of said effects. In that scenario, any eventual favorable judgment will order nullity only for the future inapplicability of the act, constituting an express exception to the regime of retroactivity of absolute nullities established by ordinal 171 of the General Law of Public Administration. The exception to that one-year temporal aspect is configured in the protection of public domain, in which case the lesivity action is not subject to any time limit due to the application of the general clause of imprescriptibility of that type of property as derived from canon 261 of the Civil Code. Now, in tax matters, the statute of limitations action, in addition to the referred rules, is regulated in article 165 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (in force at that time). In this fiscal matter, pursuant to canon 41 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the maximum period to file the proceeding shall be the same as the statute of limitations period imposed by the legal system for the respective substantive right, that is, 3 or 5 years (numeral 51 of the Tax Code (Código Tributario), in force at that time) for assessment powers and 4 years for sanctioning matters (precept 71 ibidem, version in force at that time). In addition to this, in this fiscal dynamic, since the natural head is barred from the power to review the conducts of the lower Tax Administrations (numeral 102 subsections b and d of Law No. 6227), a competence that has been granted by legal imperative to the Tax Administrative Court, as derived from ordinal 156 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (in force at that time), the appeal phase constituting an improper monophasic hierarchy (non-hierarchical control), it is clear that the period to declare lesivity that runs against the Minister of the Treasury portfolio (a competence sustained by the fact that they hold the condition of supreme maximum head of both the reviewed body and the non-hierarchical controller, both part of the same structure of that Administration), is computed from the moment in which that improper monophasic controlling body notifies the Administration A quo of what was ordered by virtue of its appellate competence. Prior to that moment, the natural head is in a material and legal impossibility to become aware of an act that may be potentially harmful to the fiscal, economic, or public interests they must protect and, therefore, unable to exercise their powers to declare that action harmful. Of course, when the act deemed irregular derives from a lower administration, as we are not dealing with the aforementioned assumption of improper monophasic hierarchy, such exceptionality is not applicable, and the period is computed from the adoption of the act. In this case , from the analysis of the case file, it is concluded that the internal declaration of lesivity meets the indicated prerequisites.

Vo.- REGARDING THE FINANCIAL EXPENSES FOR LIQUIDITY RESERVES RECOGNIZED BY THE TAX ADMINISTRATIVE COURT IN FAVOR OF BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL. This Court resolves as follows: a) The erroneous use of the term liquidity reserve (reserva de liquidez) as a synonym for minimum liquidity factor (factor mínimo de liquidez), as support for the decision adopted by the TFA .

In the first instance and based on numerals 62 and 117 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica), as well as the documents visible on folios 316 to 325 of the judicial file and the testimony of the expert witness Mario Alfaro Navarro -see digital recording of the trial hearing held on November 20, 2019, contained in the associated documents folder of the virtual file-, this collegiate body considers that both the liquidity reserve and the minimum legal reserve (encaje mínimo legal) correspond to an amount that must be "reserved" by financial intermediation institutions to guarantee their liquidity, and that the difference between the two lies in which type of institution must maintain one or the other, so that, technically, a Bank could not be obligated to maintain both the minimum legal reserve and the liquidity reserve, at least not the one understood in accordance with the provisions of numeral 117 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank. In the same sense, this Court considers that the term matching (calce de plazos) corresponds to a methodology to establish a minimum liquidity factor for financial entities, which allows them to meet their obligations within the agreed terms in the exercise of their ordinary activity, through liquid assets that generate both taxable and non-taxable income (either because they are not subject to income tax or because they are subject to another tax) and that, therefore, are not related from a technical point of view to the so-called liquidity reserve (digital recording of the statements of the expert witnesses Sergio Morales Sáenz and Mario Alfaro Navarro, given at the trial hearing of November 20, 2019, visible in the associated documents folder of the virtual file; folios 310 to 339 of the administrative file of the working papers). Based on the foregoing, it is considered that Whereas Clause (Considerando) VII of resolution TFA-559-2011 issued by the First Chamber of the Tax Administrative Court, titled “Liquidity Reserve”, is contradictory to what was stated by that same body in Whereas Clause VI of that same ruling, regarding the considerations it makes regarding the issue of proportionality, and its application as established in numerals 7 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) and 11 of its Regulations (Reglamento) On the other hand, that monophasic non-hierarchical legality controller also incurs a technical inaccuracy, as it is evident how it uses the terms liquidity reserve and minimum legal reserve, as if they were the same concept, since it even maintains that “…all the arguments of this Court regarding the admissibility of those financial expenses related to the constitution of liquidity reserves, are based on the same tax principles that the administration has used for the purposes of the minimum legal reserve…” (folios 49 verso in fine and 50 of volume II of the administrative file), an assertion that would be acceptable only if the Tax Administrative Court were referring to the liquidity reserve that must be maintained by those financial intermediation entities that are not required to maintain the immobilized funds of the minimum legal reserve; but the truth is that in this case, it refers to term matching or the minimum liquidity factor, which is not the same as a liquidity reserve. This collegiate body considers that a technical inaccuracy of this nature cannot be overlooked, even less so when dealing with the administrative body that, due to the nature of the function it performs (monophasic non-hierarchical legality controller in tax matters), is obligated to be technically and conceptually precise. Consequently, the discussion about whether or not it is appropriate to recognize the minimum liquidity factor or the term matching related to the one- or three-month investments made by BPDC from an excess of liquidity as deductible expenses, and whether said recognition must be carried out through the proportionality established by articles 7 of the Income Tax Law and 11 of its regulations, is in principle of no interest, since the Tax Administrative Court does not refer to those points but to the liquidity reserve; without prejudice to the fact that said body also omitted to indicate in its resolution whether the minimum liquidity factor or the term matching were or were not contemplated in the assumptions to which the Tax Administration had already applied proportionality (see in a similar sense, judgment number 95-2009-V of 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 2019, issued by the Fifth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court) Consequently, while it is true that the Tax Administration could recognize the expenses related to the compliance with the minimum liquidity factor, in a proportion different from that established in the final part of article 11 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law; it is also true that these expenses must be duly justified in the accounting records of the taxpayer, in order to determine which are the non-deductible expenses associated with non-taxable income and which correspond to deductible expenses associated with taxable income, which is essential in those scenarios -such as the one at hand- in which BPDC has indistinctly produced taxable or exempt income.

The foregoing becomes relevant in the specific case, since in this type of tax, it is the taxpayer itself that, through its declaration, determines the amount to be paid for said tax. However, within the framework of the liquidation of a tax obligation such as the one under examination, the Tax Administration proceeds to verify the data in order to confirm the elements of the declaration filed, against the data in the hands of the taxpayer, and it is on the latter that the burden of proof falls regarding those facts related to the reduction of the taxable base.

In this way, given the omission by BPDC to have a methodology in accordance with the parameters required by the legal system, that is, one that has the support to clearly determine the totality of the expenditures linked to non-taxable income, and therefore those linked to taxable income, during the fiscal periods from 1999 to 2005, the concerned Administration was obligated to apply the challenged system provided for in numerals 7 of the Income Tax Law and 11 of its Regulations, for those taxpayers who indistinctly generate income taxed or not taxed with said tax .

• d)Corollary. Based on the foregoing, this collegiate body considers that resolution number TFA-559-2011 of 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, regarding Whereas Clause VII and the operative part related to that aspect, contains defects generating absolute nullity in both the grounds and the content, insofar as the premises from which it started -grounds- to resolve in the aforementioned manner -content- were not in conformity with the legal system. This is because it is contradictory to the thesis that the Tax Administrative Court itself put forward regarding the application of the proportionality criterion; imprecise in its terminology, by referring to diverse legal figures indiscriminately, generating uncertainty for the Administration and the administered party; and omissive in recognizing, regarding a liquidity reserve that is not such, deductible expenses, ignoring that regarding the minimum legal reserve, the respective percentage had already been recognized for each of the fiscal years audited and regarding the other financial expenses, the proportionality of article 7 of the Income Tax Law and article 11 of its regulations had been applied to them, so that, pursuant to the terms of what was decided in the challenged formal conduct number TFA 559-2011, a double recognition of the financial expenses was made. Consequently, the partial absolute nullity is declared for being harmful to the public, fiscal, and economic interests of the State, of resolution number TFA-559 issued by the First Chamber of the Tax Administrative Court at 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, only insofar as it orders the acceptance as necessary, useful, and pertinent expenses for the generation of taxable income, of the percentages of 41.62% in 1999, 43.69% in 2000, 43.88% in 2001, 42.05% in 2002, 40.36% in 2003, 40.84% in 2004 and 37.115 in 2005, for the concept of “financial expenses interests” for the raising of resources to constitute liquidity reserves in favor of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (see in a similar sense, judgment 95-2019-V of 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 2019 and 44-2019-IV of 08:27 a.m. on June 6, 2019).

In that scenario, the eventual favorable ruling will decree annulment only for the future inapplicability of the act, constituting an express exception to the retroactivity regime for absolute nullities established by section 171 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). The exception to that one-year temporal aspect is configured for the protection of the public domain, in which case the action of lesividad is not subject to a time limit due to the application of the general clause of imprescriptibility for such types of property as derived from canon 261 of the Civil Code. That said, in tax matters, the action of caducidad, in addition to the aforementioned rules, is regulated in Article 165 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (in force at that time). In this fiscal area, pursuant to canon 41 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, the maximum period to initiate the proceeding shall be the same period imposed by law as the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the respective substantive right, that is, 3 or 5 years (numeral 51 of the Tax Code, in force at that time) for assessment powers and 4 years for sanctioning matters (precept 71 ibid., version in force at that time). In addition to this, in this fiscal dynamic, since the authority to review the conduct of the lower Tax Administrations is forbidden to the natural superior (numeral 102 subsections b and d of Law No. 6227), a competence that has been granted by legal mandate to the Tax Administrative Court (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), as derived from section 156 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (in force at that time), constituting in that appeal phase an improper single-phase hierarchy (non-hierarchical review), it is clear that the period for declaring lesividad running against the Minister of the Treasury portfolio (a competence based on the fact that the Minister holds the status of supreme maximum superior of both the reviewed body and the non-hierarchical reviewer, both part of the same structure of that Administration), is computed from the moment when that improper single-phase reviewing body brings to the knowledge of the Administration A quo what was decided by virtue of its appellate competence. Prior to that moment, the natural superior is in a material and legal impossibility of knowing of an act that may be potentially harmful to the fiscal, economic, or public interests that must be protected and therefore, unable to exercise powers to declare that action harmful. Of course, when the act deemed irregular derives from a lower administration, not being in the aforementioned scenario of an improper single-phase hierarchy, such exceptionality is not applicable, and the period is computed from the adoption of the act. In the instant case, from the analysis of the case file, it is concluded that the internal declaration of lesividad meets the indicated requirements.

Vo.- REGARDING THE FINANCIAL EXPENSES FOR LIQUIDITY RESERVES RECOGNIZED BY THE TAX ADMINISTRATIVE COURT TO THE BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL. This Court resolves as follows: a) The erroneous use of the term liquidity reserve as a synonym for minimum liquidity factor, as support for the decision adopted by the TFA.

In the first instance and based on numerals 62 and 117 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica), as well as on the documents visible on folios 316 to 325 of the judicial file and the testimony of the expert witness Mario Alfaro Navarro -see the digital recording of the trial hearing held on 11-20-2019, which appears in the associated documents folder of the virtual file-, this collegiate body considers that both the liquidity reserve and the minimum legal reserve requirement correspond to an amount that must be "reserved" by financial intermediation institutions to guarantee their liquidity, and that the difference between the two lies in which type of institution must hold one or the other, so that, technically, a Bank could not be obligated to maintain both the minimum legal reserve requirement and the liquidity reserve, at least not as understood under the provisions of numeral 117 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank. In the same sense, this Court considers that maturity matching corresponds to a methodology to establish a minimum liquidity factor for financial entities, which allows them to meet their obligations within the agreed terms in the exercise of their ordinary activity, through liquid assets that generate both taxable and non-taxable income (either because they are not subject to income tax or because they are taxed with another tax) and that, therefore, bear no relationship from a technical point of view with the so-called liquidity reserve (digital recording of the statements of expert witnesses Sergio Morales Sáenz and Mario Alfaro Navarro, rendered in the trial hearing of 11-20-2019, visible in the associated documents folder of the virtual file; folios 310 to 339 of the administrative file of the work papers). Based on the foregoing, it is considered that considering VII of resolution TFA-559-2011 issued by the First Chamber of the Tax Administrative Court, titled “Liquidity Reserve,” is contradictory to what that same body stated in considering VI of that same ruling, regarding the considerations it makes concerning the issue of proportionality, and its application according to what is established in numerals 7 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) and 11 of its Regulations.

Furthermore, this non-hierarchical single-phase legality reviewer also incurs a technical imprecision, as it is evident how it uses the terms liquidity reserve and minimum legal reserve requirement as if they were the same concept, since it even maintains that “…all the arguments of this Court regarding the admissibility of those financial expenses related to the constitution of liquidity reserves are based on the same tax principles that the administration has used for the purposes of the minimum legal reserve requirement…” (folios 49 back in fine and 50 of Volume II of the administrative file), an assertion that would only be acceptable if the Tax Administrative Court were referring to the liquidity reserve that must be maintained by those financial intermediation entities that are not obligated to maintain the immobilized funds of the minimum legal reserve requirement; but the truth is that in the instant case, it refers to maturity matching or the minimum liquidity factor, which is not the same as a liquidity reserve. This collegiate body considers that a technical imprecision of this nature cannot be ignored, even less so when it concerns the administrative body that, by the nature of its function (non-hierarchical single-phase legality reviewer in tax matters), is obliged to be technically and conceptually precise. Consequently, the discussion about whether or not it is appropriate to recognize as deductible expenses the minimum liquidity factor or the maturity matching related to the one- or three-month investments made by the BPDC from an excess of liquidity, and whether such recognition should be carried out through the proportionality established by Articles 7 of the Income Tax Law and 11 of its regulations, lacks in principle any interest, since the Tax Administrative Court does not refer to those points but to the liquidity reserve; without prejudice to the fact that said body also omitted to indicate in its resolution whether or not the minimum liquidity factor or the maturity matching were contemplated in the assumptions to which the Tax Administration had already applied proportionality (see in a similar sense, judgment number 95-2009-V of 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 2019, issued by the Fifth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court).

In consequence, while it is true that the Tax Administration could recognize the expenses related to compliance with the minimum liquidity factor in a different proportion than that established in the final part of Article 11 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law; it is also true that those expenses must be duly justified in the accounting records of the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), in order to determine which are the non-deductible expenses associated with non-taxed income and which correspond to deductible expenses associated with taxed income, which is essential in those scenarios -such as the one at hand- in which the BPDC has indistinctly produced taxed or exempt income.

The foregoing gains relevance in the specific case, since in this type of tax, it is the taxpayer itself that, through its declaration, determines the amount to be paid for said tax. However, within the framework of the liquidation of a tax obligation such as the one under examination, the Tax Administration proceeds to verify the data in order to confirm the elements of the declaration rendered with the data held by the taxpayer, and it is upon this latter party that the burden of proof falls for those facts related to the reduction of the tax base.

In this manner, given the omission by the BPDC to have a methodology in accordance with the parameters required by the legal system, that is, one with the support that allows for clearly determining all the expenditures linked to non-taxable income, and therefore those linked to taxable income, during the fiscal periods from 1999 to 2005, the concerned Administration was obligated to apply the questioned system provided for in numerals 7 of the Income Tax Law and 11 of its Regulations, for those taxpayers that indistinctly generate income taxed or not with said tax.

• d)Corollary. Based on the foregoing, this collegiate body considers that resolution number TFA-559-2011 of 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, regarding considering VII and the operative part related to that aspect, contains defects generating absolute nullity both in the reason and the content, insofar as the premises from which it started -reason- to resolve in the manner indicated above -content- were not in accordance with the legal system.

This is because, it is contradictory to the very thesis expounded by the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo regarding the application of the proportionality criterion; imprecise in its terminology, by referring to different legal concepts indiscriminately, generating uncertainty for the Administration and the taxpayer; and omission in recognizing, regarding a liquidity reserve that is not such, deductible expenses, overlooking that with respect to the minimum legal reserve requirement, the respective percentage had already been recognized for each of the audited fiscal years, and regarding the other financial expenses, the proportionality of Article 7 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta and Article 11 of its regulation had been applied, such that, according to the terms of the ruling in the challenged formal conduct number TFA 559-2011, a double recognition of financial expenses was made. Consequently, the partial absolute nullity is declared, for being harmful to the public, fiscal, and economic interests of the State, of resolution number TFA-559 issued by the First Chamber of the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo at 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, only insofar as it orders accepting as necessary, useful, and pertinent expenses for the generation of taxable income, the percentages of 41.62% in 1999, 43.69% in 2000, 43.88% in 2001, 42.05% in 2002, 40.36% in 2003, 40.84% in 2004, and 37.115% in 2005, for the item "financial expenses interest" for the raising of funds to constitute liquidity reserves in favor of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (see, in a similar vein, judgment 95-2019-V of 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 2019, and 44-2019-IV of 8:27 a.m. on June 6, 2019).

Of course, when the act deemed irregular derives from a lower administration, since we are not dealing with the aforementioned scenario of monophasic improper hierarchy, such exceptionality is not applicable, and the time limit is computed from the adoption of the act. In the specific case, from the analysis of the case records, it is concluded that the internal declaration of detrimental effect meets the indicated prerequisites.

Vo.- REGARDING THE FINANCIAL EXPENSES FOR LIQUIDITY RESERVES RECOGNIZED BY THE TRIBUNAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATIVO (TFA) TO THE BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL. This Court resolves as follows: a) The erroneous use of the term liquidity reserve as a synonym for minimum liquidity factor, as support for the decision adopted by the TFA.

In the first instance and based on articles 62 and 117 of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, as well as on the documents visible on folios 316 to 325 of the judicial expediente and the testimony of expert witness Mario Alfaro Navarro —see digital recording of the trial hearing held on 20-11-2019, which appears in the associated documents folder of the virtual expediente—, this collegiate body considers that both the liquidity reserve and the minimum legal reserve requirement (encaje mínimo legal) correspond to an amount that must be "reserved" by financial intermediation institutions to guarantee their liquidity, and that the difference between the two lies in which type of institution must hold one or the other, so that, technically, a Bank could not be obligated to maintain both the minimum legal reserve requirement and the liquidity reserve, at least not as understood in accordance with the provisions of article 117 of the Organic Law of the Banco Central. In the same vein, this Court considers that the maturity matching (calce de plazos) corresponds to a methodology for establishing a minimum liquidity factor for financial entities, which allows them to meet their obligations within the agreed terms in the exercise of their ordinary activity, through liquid assets that generate both taxable and non-taxable income (either because they are not subject to income tax or because they are subject to another tax) and that, therefore, they bear no relation from a technical point of view to the so-called liquidity reserve (digital backup of the statements of expert witnesses Sergio Morales Sáenz and Mario Alfaro Navarro, rendered at the trial hearing of 20-11-2019, visible in the associated documents folder of the virtual expediente; folios 310 to 339 of the administrative expediente of the working papers). Based on the foregoing, it is considered that recital VII of resolution TFA-559-2011 issued by the First Chamber of the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, titled "Liquidity Reserve," is contradictory to what that same body stated in recital VI of that same pronouncement, regarding the considerations it makes on the subject of proportionality, and its application as established in articles 7 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) and 11 of its Regulations.

Furthermore, this monophasic non-hierarchical controller of legality also incurs in a technical inaccuracy, as it is evident how it uses the terms liquidity reserve and minimum legal reserve requirement as if they were the same concept, even holding that "…all the arguments of this Court regarding the admissibility of those financial expenses related to the constitution of liquidity reserves are based on the same tax principles that the administration has used for the purposes of the minimum legal reserve requirement…" (folios 49 verso in fine and 50 of volume II of the administrative expediente), an assertion that would only be acceptable if the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo were referring to the liquidity reserve that must be maintained by those financial intermediation entities that are not obligated to keep the immobilized funds of the minimum legal reserve requirement; but the truth is that in the specific case, it refers to maturity matching or the minimum liquidity factor, which is not the same as a liquidity reserve. This collegiate body considers that a technical inaccuracy of this nature cannot be overlooked, even less so when dealing with the administrative body that, due to the nature of the function it performs (monophasic non-hierarchical controller of legality in tax matters), is obliged to be technically and conceptually precise. Consequently, the discussion regarding whether or not it is appropriate to recognize, as deductible expenses, the minimum liquidity factor or the maturity matching related to one- or three-month investments made by the BPDC from an excess of liquidity, and whether such recognition must be carried out through the proportionality established by articles 7 of the Income Tax Law and 11 of its regulations, lacks interest in principle, since the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo does not refer to those points but to the liquidity reserve; without prejudice that said body also omitted to indicate in its resolution whether the minimum liquidity factor or the maturity matching were or were not contemplated in the assumptions to which the Tax Administration had already applied proportionality (see in a similar sense, judgment number 95-2009-V of 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 2019, issued by Section Five of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda).

Consequently, while it is true the Tax Administration could recognize the expenses related to the fulfillment of the minimum liquidity factor, in a proportion different from that established in the final part of article 11 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law; it is also true that those expenses must be duly justified in the accounting records of the taxable person (sujeto pasivo), in order to determine which are the non-deductible expenses associated with non-taxed income and which correspond to deductible expenses associated with taxed income, which is essential in those cases —such as the one before us— in which the BPDC has indistinctly produced taxed or exempt income.

The foregoing gains relevance in the specific case, because in this type of tax, it is the taxable person who, through their declaration, determines the amount to pay for said tribute. However, within the framework of the settlement of a tax obligation such as the one under examination, the Tax Administration proceeds to verify the data in order to confirm the elements of the rendered declaration with the data held by the taxpayer, and it is upon the latter that the burden of proof falls for those facts related to the reduction of the taxable base.

In this way, given the omission by the BPDC of having a methodology in accordance with the parameters required by the legal system, that is, one with the backing that allows for the clear determination of all the expenditures linked to non-taxable income, and therefore those linked to taxable income, during the fiscal periods between 1999 and 2005, the Administration concerned was compelled to apply the questioned system provided for in articles 7 of the Income Tax Law and 11 of its Regulations, for those taxpayers who indistinctly generate income taxed or not with said tribute.

• d)Corollary. Based on the foregoing, this collegiate body considers that resolution number TFA-559-2011 of 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, regarding recital VII and the operative part related to that aspect, contains defects generating absolute nullity both in the grounds and the content, as the premises from which it started —grounds— to resolve in the manner indicated above —content— were not in conformity with the legal system.

This is because it is contradictory to the very thesis that the Fiscal Administrative Tribunal set forth regarding the application of the proportionality criterion; imprecise in its terminology, by referring to diverse legal figures indiscriminately, generating uncertainty for the Administration and the taxpayer; and omissive in recognizing, regarding a liquidity reserve that is not such, deductible expenses, overlooking that with respect to the minimum legal reserve requirement, the respective percentage had already been recognized for each of the audited tax years, and with respect to the other financial expenses, the proportionality of Article 7 of the Income Tax Law and Article 11 of its regulation had already been applied, such that pursuant to the terms of what was resolved in the formal conduct challenged under number TFA 559-2011, a double recognition of financial expenses was made. Consequently, partial absolute nullity is declared, as it is harmful to the public, fiscal, and economic interests of the State, of resolution number TFA-559 issued by the First Chamber of the Fiscal Administrative Tribunal at 10:00 a.m. on October 3, 2011, only insofar as it orders the acceptance as necessary, useful, and pertinent expenses for the generation of taxable income, of the percentages of 41.62% in 1999, 43.69% in 2000, 43.88% in 2001, 42.05% in 2002, 40.36% in 2003, 40.84% in 2004, and 37.115 in 2005, for the item “financial expenses interest” for the raising of resources to constitute liquidity reserves in favor of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (see in a similar vein, judgment 95-2019-V of 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 2019, and 44-2019-IV of 8:27 a.m. on June 6, 2019).

IVo.- PRESUPUESTOS PARA EL PROCESO DE LESIVIDAD. En la especie, el Estado pretende se declare la nulidad de la resolución número 559-2011 dictada por la Sala Primera del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, Sala Primera a las 10:00 horas del 03 de octubre del 2011, por ser contraria a derecho y lesiva a los intereses públicos, fiscales y económicos del Estado, únicamente en lo que se refiere a la revocatoria de lo resuelto por la entonces Administración Tributaria de Grandes Contribuyentes, respecto del ajuste: por Gastos no deducibles asociados a ingresos no gravables: gastos financieros asociados a reservas de liquidez. Desde este plano, es menester, de manera breve, establecer el cumplimiento de los diversos presupuestos que impone el ordenamiento jurídico para la interposición de un proceso de lesividad, siendo que la ausencia de uno de estos elementos vedaría y haría innecesario el examen de fondo. De manera general, la lesividad se constituye en un mecanismo jurisdiccional en virtud del cual la Administración pretende la supresión de un acto suyo, que en tesis de principio, genera un efecto favorable a un tercero destinatario. Desde ese plano, en este tipo de contiendas, la lesividad es de corte subjetivo, en tanto pretende la anulación de una conducta que concede un derecho o en general, una situación de beneficio a una persona. Tal figura se encuentra positivizada en el canon 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, norma que fija los elementos previos y regulaciones procesales de esta figura. Empero, se encuentra referenciada además en el numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Desde la óptica de los presupuestos procesales, se imponen condiciones subjetivas, objetivas, procedimentales y temporales. En cuanto a la arista subjetiva, la legitimación activa se concede a la Administración emisora del acto cuestionado, en tanto que el legitimado pasivo es el receptor de los efectos de la conducta, sea, quien obtiene sus bondades. En lo atinente a la arista objetiva, la lesividad se constituye como un mecanismo de eliminación jurídica de actos administrativos que sean disconformes sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico, sea, los actos que padezcan de algún nivel de invalidez, sea absoluta o relativa, en cualquiera de sus tipologías (artículos 128, 158, 165 y concordantes de la citada Ley General No. 6227). En esa línea, la Administración debe declarar lesivo a los intereses públicos esa conducta, lo que debe ser establecido dentro de un marco de acciones internas de la administración que son impostergables para formular la acción. En efecto, en el orden procedimental, se impone que el jerarca máximo supremo de la Administración Pública respectiva declare la lesividad del acto, sea por lesión a intereses económicos, fiscales o de otra índole que se desprendan del interés público, para lo cual, ha de contar con un criterio jurídico-técnico de base que sustente esa determinación. A diferencia de otras figuras de supresión de conductas públicas, no requiere de audiencia al tercero, sino solo de acciones a lo interno de la Administración, siendo que es dentro del proceso judicial que el tercero podrá establecer sus alegatos de defensa. Ahora bien, cuando el acto emane del Estado (ver artículo 1 de la citada Ley General), sea, de la Administración Central, la demanda solo podrá ser incoada por la Procuraduría General de la República (canon 16 de la Ley No. 8508), previo pedimento del jerarca máximo supremo y previo declaratoria interna de lesividad, con detalle de los motivos de ese criterio. En cuanto a la dimensión temporal, la normativa procesal establece un plazo de un año contado a partir de la emisión del acto (que no de su comunicación) para declararlo lesivo a los intereses públicos, y luego de esa declaratoria (y no a partir del vencimiento de ese primer año) se otorga un plazo de un año para plantear la acción contenciosa administrativa a modo de plazo fatal de caducidad, salvo en casos de actos con nulidad absoluta, en cuyo caso, la declaratoria de lesividad puede realizarse en tanto perduren sus efectos, corriendo el año aludido desde el cese definitivo de dichos efectos. En esa hipótesis, la eventual sentencia estimatoria dispondrá la nulidad únicamente para la inaplicabilidad futura del acto, constituyéndose en una excepción expresa al régimen de retroactividad de las nulidades absolutas establecido por el ordinal 171 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. La excepción a ese aspecto temporal de un año se configura en tutela de dominio público, caso en el que la acción de lesividad no está sujeta a plazo por la aplicación de la cláusula general de imprescriptibilidad de ese tipo de bienes según se deriva del canon 261 del Código Civil. Ahora bien, en materia tributaria, la acción de caducidad, además de las normas referidas, se encuentra regulada en el artículo 165 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios(vigente en ese momento) . En esta materia fiscal, conforme al canon 41 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el plazo máximo para incoar el proceso será el mismo que imponga el ordenamiento como plazo de prescripción para el respectivo derecho de fondo, sea, 3 o 5 años (numeral 51 del Código Tributario, vigente en ese momento) en potestades determinativas y 4 años en menesteres sancionatorios (precepto 71 ibídem, versión vigente en ese momento). Aunado a ello, en esta dinámica fiscal, al estar vedada del jerarca natural la potestad de revisión de las conductas de las Administraciones Tributarias inferiores (numeral 102 incisos b y d de la Ley No. 6227), competencia que ha sido otorgada por imperativo de ley al Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, según se desprende del ordinal 156 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (vigente en ese momento), constituyéndose en esa fase recursiva una jerarquía impropia monofásica (control no jerárquico), es claro que el plazo para declarar la lesividad que corre en contra del Ministro de la cartera de Hacienda (competencia que se sustenta en que reúne la condición de jerarca máximo supremo tanto del órgano revisado como del contralor no jerárquico, ambos parte de la misma estructura de esa Administración), se computa desde el momento en que ese órgano contralor impropio monofásico, pone en conocimiento de la Administración A quo, lo dispuesto en virtud de su competencia apelativa. Previo a ese instante, el jerarca natural se encuentra en imposibilidad material y jurídica de conocer de un acto que puede resultar potencialmente lesivo a los intereses fiscales, económicos o públicos que debe tutelar y por ende, incapacitado para ejercitar sus potestades para declarar lesiva esa actuación. Desde luego que cuando el acto que se estima irregular derive de una administración inferior, al no estarse ante el aludido supuesto de jerarquía impropia monofásica, tal excepcionalidad no es aplicable, y el plazo se computa desde la adopción del acto. En la especie , del análisis de los autos, se concluye que la declaratoria de lesividad interna cumple los presupuestos señalados.

Vo.- RESPECTO A LOS GASTOS FINANCIEROS POR RESERVAS DE LIQUIDEZ RECONOCIDOS POR EL TRIBUNAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATIVO AL BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL. Este Tribunal resuelve lo que de seguido se expone: a) La utilización errónea del término reserva de liquidez como sinónimo de factor mínimo de liquidez, como sustento de la decisión adoptada por el TFA .

En primera instancia y con fundamento en los numerales 62 y 117 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, así como, en los documentos visibles de folios 316 a 325 del expediente judicial y en la declaración del testigo perito Mario Alfaro Navarro -ver respaldo digital de la audiencia de juicio celebrada el 20-11-2019, que consta en la carpeta de documentos asociados del expediente virtual-, este órgano colegiado estima que tanto la reserva de liquidez como el encaje mínimo legal corresponden a un monto que debe ser "reservado" por las instituciones de intermediación financiera para garantizar su liquidez, y que la diferencia entre ambos radica en qué tipo de institución debe guardar uno u otro, por lo que, técnicamente no podría un Banco estar obligado a mantener tanto el encaje mínimo legal como la reserva de liquidez, cuando menos no la entendida conforme a lo dispuesto en el numeral 117 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central. En igual sentido, considera este Tribunal que el calce de plazos corresponde a una metodología para establecer un factor de liquidez mínima de las entidades financieras, que les permite cumplir sus obligaciones en los plazos pactados en el ejercicio de su actividad ordinaria, mediante activos líquidos que generan tanto ingresos gravables como no gravables (ya sea porque no están afectados al impuesto sobre la renta o bien, porque están gravados con otro impuesto) y que por ende, no guardan relación desde un punto de vista técnico con la denominada reserva de liquidez (respaldo digital de las declaraciones de los testigos peritos Sergio Morales Sáenz y Mario Alfaro Navarro, rendidas en la audiencia de juicio del 20-11-2019, visible en la carpeta de documentos asociados del expediente virtual; folios 310 a 339 del expediente administrativo de las hojas de trabajo). A partir de lo anteriormente expuesto, se estima que el considerando VII de la resolución TFA-559-2011 dictada por la Sala Primera del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, titulado “Reserva de Liquidez”, es contradictorio con lo señalado por ese mismo órgano en el considerando VI de ese mismo pronunciamiento, respecto a las consideraciones que realiza en cuanto al tema de la proporcionalidad, y su aplicación según lo establecido en los numerales 7 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta y 11 su Reglamento Por otra parte, también incurre dicho contralor monofásico no jerárquico de legalidad, en una imprecisión técnica, pues salta a la vista como utiliza los términos de reserva de liquidez y del encaje mínimo legal, como si se tratara de un mismo concepto, ya que incluso sostiene que “…todos los argumentos de este Tribunal en cuanto a la admisibilidad de aquellos gastos financieros relacionados con la constitución de reservas de liquidez,, se sustentan en los mismos principios tributarios que la administración ha utilizado a los efectos del encaje mínimo legal…” (folios 49 vuelto in fine y 50 del tomo II del expediente administrativo), afirmación que sería aceptable sólo si el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo se estuviera refiriendo a la reserva de liquidez que deben mantener aquellas entidades de intermediación financiera que no están obligadas a mantener los fondos inmovilizados del encaje mínimo legal; pero lo cierto es que en la especie, se refiere al calce de plazos o al factor mínimo de liquidez, que no es igual a reserva de liquidez. Considera este órgano colegiado que una imprecisión técnica de esta naturaleza no puede ser obviada, menos aun tratándose del órgano administrativo que por la naturaleza de la función que realiza (contralor monofásico no jerárquico de legalidad en materia tributaria) está obligado a ser técnica y conceptualmente preciso. En consecuencia, la discusión acerca de si procede o no reconocer como gastos deducibles, el factor mínimo de liquidez o los calces de plazos relacionados con las inversiones a uno o tres meses realizadas por el BPDC a partir de un exceso de liquidez, y si dicho reconocimiento debe realizarse por medio de la proporcionalidad que establecen los artículos 7 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la renta y 11 de su reglamento, carece en principio de interés, ya que el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo no se refiere a esos extremos sino a la reserva de liquidez; sin perjuicio de que dicho órgano también omitió indicar en su resolución, si el factor mínimo de liquidez o los calces de plazos, estaban o no contemplados en los supuestos a los que la Administración Tributaria ya había aplicado la proporcionalidad (ver en sentido similar, la sentencia número 95-2009-V de las 10:30 horas del 18 de noviembre del 2019, dictada por la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) En consecuencia, si bien es cierto la Administración Tributaria podría reconocer los gastos relacionados con el cumplimiento del factor mínimo de liquidez, en una proporción diferente a la establecida en la parte final del artículo 11 del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta; también lo es, que esos gastos deberán estar debidamente justificados en los registros contables del sujeto pasivo, a fin de determinar cuáles son los gastos no deducibles asociados a rentas no gravadas y cuáles corresponden a gastos deducibles asociados a rentas gravadas, lo cual, es esencial en aquellos supuestos -como el que nos ocupa- en que el BPDC ha producido indistintamente rentas gravadas o exentas.

Lo anterior adquiere relevancia en el caso concreto, pues en este tipo de impuesto, es el propio sujeto pasivo el que, a través de su declaración, determina el monto a pagar por concepto de dicho tributo. No obstante, en el marco de la liquidación de una obligación tributaria como la que es objeto de examen, la Administración Tributaria procede a verificar los datos a fin de constatar los elementos de la declaración rendida, con los datos que obra en manos del contribuyente, y es sobre este último en quien recae la carga probatoria de aquellos hechos relacionados con la disminución de la base imponible.

De esta manera, ante la omisión por parte del BPDC, de contar con una metodología acorde con los parámetros que exige el ordenamiento jurídico, esto es, de uno que cuente con el respaldo que permita determinar con claridad la totalidad de las erogaciones vinculadas a ingresos no gravables, y por ende las vinculadas a ingresos gravables, durante los períodos fiscales comprendidos entre 1999 a 2005, se obligó a la Administración concernida a aplicar el sistema cuestionado previsto en los numerales 7 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta y 11 de su Reglamento, para aquellos contribuyentes que generen de manera indistinta ingresos gravados o no con dicho tributo .

• d)Corolario. A partir de lo expuesto, este órgano colegiado considera que la resolución número TFA-559-2011de las 10:00 horas del 03 de octubre del 2011, respecto al considerando VII y a la parte dispositiva relacionada con ese aspecto, contiene vicios generadores de nulidad absoluta tanto en el motivo y contenido, en tanto las premisas de la cuales partió -motivo- para resolver de la forma antes señalada -contenido- no resultaban conformes con el ordenamiento jurídico. Ello por cuanto, resulta contradictoria con la propia tesis que expuso el Tribunal Fiscal Administración respecto a la aplicación del criterio de proporcionalidad; imprecisa en su terminología, al referirse a figuras jurídicas diversas de forma indiscriminada, generando incertidumbre a la Administración y al administrado; y omisa al reconocer sobre una reserva de liquidez que no lo es tal, gastos deducibles obviando que en cuanto al encaje mínimo legal ya se había reconocido el respectivo porcentaje para cada uno de los años fiscales auditados y sobre los demás gastos financieros se les había aplicado la proporcionalidad del artículo 7 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta y el 11 de su reglamento, por lo que conforme a los términos de lo resuelto en la conducta formal cuestionada número TFA 559-2011, se hizo un doble reconocimiento de los gastos financieros. En consecuencia, se declara la nulidad absoluta parcial por ser lesiva a los intereses públicos, fiscales y económicos del Estado, de la resolución número TFA-559 dictada por la Sala Primera del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo de las 10:00 horas del 03 de octubre del 2011, únicamente en cuanto dispone aceptar como gastos necesarios, útiles y pertinentes para la generación de rentas gravables, los porcentajes de 41.62% en 1999, 43.69% en 2000, 43.88% en 2001, 42.05% en 2002, 40.36% en 2003, 40.84% en 2004 y 37.115 en 2005, por concepto de “gastos financieros intereses” por la captación de recursos para constituir reservas de liquidez a favor del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (ver en sentido similar, la sentencia 95-2019-V de las 10:30 horas del 18 de noviembre del 2019 y 44-2019-IV de las 08:27 horas del 06 de junio del 2019).