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Res. 00108-2019 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · 2019
OutcomeResultado
The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section VI, held that under the police disciplinary regime the prescription period for initiating proceedings is two years for serious misconduct, one month for issuing the final decision, and one year for expiration of the sanction's execution.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, estableció que en el régimen disciplinario policial el plazo de prescripción para iniciar el procedimiento es de dos años para faltas graves, un mes para adoptar el acto final y un año de caducidad para ejecutar la sanción impuesta.
SummaryResumen
This ruling by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Section VI) provides a comprehensive analysis of the temporal limits on the disciplinary power over public employees. It holds that the passage of time can extinguish such power through prescription or expiration depending on the procedural stage. Four distinct stages are identified: (1) initiating disciplinary proceedings—prescription periods vary with the seriousness of the offense and the need for a preliminary investigation (two years for serious police misconduct from the date the authority learns of the facts); (2) adopting and communicating the sanction—the Tribunal sets a maximum one-month prescription period, rejecting the Court of Cassation's two-year standard; (3) executing the sanction, subject to a one-year expiration period; and (4) processing the case, governed by non-binding timelines, though unjustified delays may render the proceeding void for violating the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice. The ruling also details causes for interrupting and suspending the prescription period, emphasizing that notification of the proceeding's initiation interrupts the count.La sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, aborda de forma exhaustiva el elemento temporal en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria sobre funcionarios públicos. Establece que el transcurso del tiempo puede extinguir dicha potestad por prescripción o caducidad dependiendo de la etapa procedimental. Identifica cuatro estadios distintos: 1) para iniciar la potestad disciplinaria, donde el plazo de prescripción varía según la gravedad de la falta y la necesidad de investigación preliminar —en el régimen policial analizado, faltas graves prescriben a los dos años desde que el jerarca conoce los hechos—; 2) para adoptar y comunicar la sanción, fase para la cual el tribunal fija un plazo máximo de prescripción de un mes, apartándose de la tesis del Tribunal de Casación que aplicaba un plazo bianual; 3) para ejecutar la sanción impuesta, sujeta a un año de caducidad; y 4) para el trámite del procedimiento, regido por plazos ordenatorios, aunque dilaciones injustificadas pueden acarrear nulidad por violación al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida. La resolución detalla además las causales de interrupción y suspensión de la prescripción, destacando que la notificación del inicio del procedimiento interrumpe el plazo.
Key excerptExtracto clave
VII.- ON THE TEMPORAL ELEMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINARY POWER.- In public employment relationships, the exercise of the hierarchical superior's disciplinary power (Article 102 LGAP) is subject to a temporal limitation, after which such power may no longer be invoked. This temporal limit varies according to the legal rules provided by each public employment statute, though some general regulations remain as will be seen below. This temporal feature distinguishes this power from other public powers that are per se imprescriptible—e.g., protection of public domain assets—perhaps precisely because it constitutes one of the manifestations of the Administration's sanctioning power (ius puniendi). [...] In any event, the primary instrument on which our public employment legislation has settled is negative prescription, which may thus be raised as a ground for annulment of the final punitive act, because it prevents the exercise of jurisdiction in the specific case, even if that defense was not raised prior to the issuance of the public will. IX.- CONT.- 2) Time limit for the adoption and notification of the sanction by the decision-making body: [...] Thus, as this Tribunal has repeatedly held, the holder of the power would have a maximum (prescription) period of one month to issue that final act, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 414 of the Labor Code: "…the month shall begin to run anew from the moment the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is able to issue a decision…"; this prescription period would be more in line with that reality and with the procedural timeframes provided in the LGAP cited above, particularly the two-month non-binding limit of Article 261, designed as a deadline for concluding the entire ordinary procedure.—VII.- SOBRE EL ELEMENTO TEMPORAL EN EL EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA.- En las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria del jerarca (102 LGAP) se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal varía según las reglas jurídicas que al respecto disponga cada régimen jurídico de empleo público, no obstante lo cual, se mantienen algunas regulaciones generales como veremos más adelante. Este rasgo temporal es un aspecto que diferencia ésta, de otras potestades públicas que, per se, se consideran imprescriptibles -v.gr., tutela de bienes demaniales-, quizás precisamente por constituir una de las manifestaciones del poder sancionador de la Administración (ius puniendi). [...] Con todo, el principal instrumento por el cual se ha decantado nuestra legislación en materia de empleo público ha sido el de la prescripción negativa, que de esta manera bien puede ser alegada como causal de nulidad del acto final sancionatorio, porque impide el ejercicio de la competencia en el caso concreto, aún y cuando esa defensa no hubiere sido ejercitada de previo a la emisión de la voluntad pública. IX.- CONT.- 2) Término para la adopción y comunicación de la sanción por parte del órgano decisor: [...] De esta manera y como lo ha sostenido reiteradamente este Tribunal, el titular de la potestad contaría entonces con un plazo máximo (de prescripción) de un mes para adoptar ese acto final, en atención al contenido del párrafo segundo del ordinal 414 CdeT: “…el mes comenzará a correr de nuevo en el momento en que la persona empleadora o el órgano competente, en su caso, esté en posibilidad de resolver…”, este plazo de prescripción estaría más acorde esa realidad y con los tiempos procedimentales previstos en la LGAP antes citados, en particular el bimensual ordenatorio del numeral 261, diseñado como límite para culminar todo el procedimiento ordinario.-
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"con la pérdida del presupuesto temporal como requisito para el ejercicio de la competencia disciplinaria, el órgano público estaría impedido para actuar en el caso concreto y por ende, el acto sancionatorio así emitido carecería fundamentalmente de legitimación y de competencia"
"with the loss of the temporal prerequisite as a requirement for the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction, the public body would be barred from acting in the specific case and, therefore, the sanctioning act thus issued would fundamentally lack legitimacy and jurisdiction"
Considerando VII
"con la pérdida del presupuesto temporal como requisito para el ejercicio de la competencia disciplinaria, el órgano público estaría impedido para actuar en el caso concreto y por ende, el acto sancionatorio así emitido carecería fundamentalmente de legitimación y de competencia"
Considerando VII
"un plazo de dos años sólo para adoptar el acto final carece de razonabilidad y atenta contra el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida"
"a two-year period merely to issue the final act lacks reasonableness and violates the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice"
Considerando IX
"un plazo de dos años sólo para adoptar el acto final carece de razonabilidad y atenta contra el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida"
Considerando IX
"la ejecución de las así impuestas caduca, para todo efecto, en un año desde la firmeza del acto"
"the execution of sanctions so imposed expires, for all purposes, one year after the act becomes final"
Considerando X (citando Art. 415 Código de Trabajo)
"la ejecución de las así impuestas caduca, para todo efecto, en un año desde la firmeza del acto"
Considerando X (citando Art. 415 Código de Trabajo)
"El efecto de la interrupción es inutilizar para la prescripción todo el tiempo corrido anteriormente"
"The effect of interruption is to render all time previously elapsed useless for prescription purposes"
Considerando XI (citando Art. 878 Código Civil)
"El efecto de la interrupción es inutilizar para la prescripción todo el tiempo corrido anteriormente"
Considerando XI (citando Art. 878 Código Civil)
Full documentDocumento completo
**VII.- ON THE TEMPORAL ELEMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINARY POWER.-** In employment relationships, the exercise of the hierarchical superior's disciplinary power (Article 102 of the LGAP) is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit varies according to the legal rules provided for in each public employment legal regime; however, some general regulations remain, as we shall see below. This temporal feature is an aspect that differentiates this power from other public powers that are, *per se*, considered imprescriptible—e.g., the protection of public domain assets (tutela de bienes demaniales)—perhaps precisely because it constitutes one of the manifestations of the Administration's sanctioning power (*ius puniendi*). This variety in the regulatory framework is due to the fact that the legal determination of this temporal limitation on disciplinary power is a matter left to the discretion of the legislator, who has established particular rules in each legal regime, whether subjecting it to a statute of limitations (prescripción) regime or a lapse (caducidad) regime. However, and from that standpoint, the expiration due to the passage of time in either of these two scenarios presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental factors, namely: **a)** inaction by the holder of a right in its exercise, **b)** the passage of the time period set by the legal system amid that holder's inaction, and; **c)** the allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship. To which, in the case of the statute of limitations, one more aspect must be added: **d)** the concurrence or not of grounds for suspension or interruption of the time limit. All in all, the main instrument for which our legislation in public employment matters has opted has been that of negative prescription (prescripción negativa), which may thus be alleged as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act because it prevents the exercise of competence in the specific case, even if that defense was not raised prior to the issuance of the public will.
**VIII.- CONTINUES.-** Now, regarding disciplinary power in public employment matters, Costa Rican law has provided that the extinction or expiration of its temporal prerequisite can occur according to various moments or stages of the procedure, as can be seen in different regulations, including the general legal framework provided in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), specifically in its articles 414 and 415 (as of the reform enacted by Ley N° 9343), this being in the absence of an administrative norm that, in equally general terms, regulates the statute of limitations in public employment relationships. Specifically, it has been established that the passage of time may affect, by statute of limitations or by lapse, the exercise of disciplinary power at four different stages of the procedure: 1) To initiate the disciplinary power; 2) For the adoption of the sanction by the deciding body; 3) For the execution of the imposed sanction; and 4) For the processing of the procedure. These divisions have been upheld by this Section through various rulings, among which it is worth citing some, such as rulings No. 25-2019-VI of 10:20 a.m. on February 28, 2019, No. 075-2018-VI of 2:05 p.m. on June 22, 2018, among others. We will begin the analysis in the order indicated above. 1) To initiate the disciplinary power: This phase occurs when administrative self-protection (autotutela administrativa) aimed at determining whether or not the events constituting the disciplinary administrative sanctions have occurred has not yet been exercised, as a derivation of the provisions in articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. This power to verify the facts is understood, for the purposes of calculating the statute of limitations, as part of the disciplinary power and its exercise, and consequently, it is subject to a legal time limit, which in turn will depend in its definition on the special or general regulations applicable to the specific case. In the *sub examine* case, the disciplinary regime of the police statute provides in article 83 of the LGP the following: "…Article 83°-Statutes of limitations (Prescripciones). Minor offenses (faltas leves) shall prescribe in one month and serious offenses (faltas graves), in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated…". Now, to set the starting point for calculating this time limit, both the Labor Code (CdeT), according to the reform enacted by Ley N° 9343 in its article 414, and the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), Ley N° 7428 of September 7, 1994, coincide that this moment occurs when the hierarchical superior is in an objective position to know of the offense and therefore undertake the exercise of his power, a situation that in reality will depend on the notorious or evident nature of the facts constituting the infraction, that is, according to whether or not it merits the development of a preliminary investigation and knowledge of its results. Thus, it is possible to assert that the time limit could begin with the "occurrence of the event" (Art 71.a LOCGR) or "from the time the cause for separation or sanction arose" (Art. 414 CdeT), when the act to be sanctioned is notorious or evident; or in a second scenario, when, given the complexity of the circumstances, it becomes essential to first conduct a preliminary investigation, in which case the statute of limitations count would begin "from the time the causal events were known" (Art. 414 CdeT), or "from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is made known to the hierarchical superior or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding" (Art 71.b LOCGR). In such a scenario, the indicated time limit is calculated from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the hierarchical superior, since it is only at that moment that the holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. All in all, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be discerned in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the relevance or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not. In the case of the police disciplinary regime, from reading articles 78 and 84 of the LGP, it can be inferred that this second scenario necessarily applies to all cases of serious offenses. The first paragraph of this last article states: "…The legal department of the respective ministry shall be responsible for preliminarily investigating any accusation that implies the temporary suspension or dismissal of the servant covered by this Statute…" (Emphasis is not from the original).
**IX.- CONT.-** 2) Term for the adoption and communication of the sanction by the deciding body: This corresponds to the maximum temporal limit that can elapse between the moment when the directing body concludes its investigative work, by making the administrative file known to the deciding body or holder of the competence—whether or not through a conclusive report or opinion (whether containing recommendations or not)—and the adoption and communication of the respective decision, that is, the declaration of the administrative will through the issuance of the final act of the proceeding and its respective notification, necessary so that this will may deploy its effectiveness as stipulated in article 140 of the LGAP. Being a maximum threshold, this limit does not have to coincide, nor is it imposed to the detriment of the fifteen-day time limit regulated by article 319 of the LGAP, which would consequently be of a directory nature. Having reached this point, given its relevance for the specific case, it is essential to state that this Court respects but does not share the position held by the Court of Cassation of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo) in rulings 168-F-TC-2018 of 10:10 a.m. and 169-F-TC-2018 of 10:15 a.m., both from November 28, 2018; in these rulings, it is held that given the normative gap in the regulation of the "…statute of limitations periods to apply in the different stages of the administrative sanctioning procedure […] this Chamber considers that this eventual normative gap must be filled by applying the referred two-year period. This, considering that said provision indicates, generically, that serious offenses prescribe in two years. That is, the legislator provided that, in the case of serious offenses, the prescriptive period to apply is two years…". As we set forth in this Chamber's ruling number 96-2019 – VI of 4:10 p.m. on July 31, 2019, integration as a hermeneutical technique allows, in a situation of normative anomie, the Judge, by imperative of *iura novit curia*, to provide a response to the judicial case brought before him, by recourse to various sources, written and unwritten, whether in the face of normative lack of foresight or the deficient formulation (due to insufficiency) of a norm, which leaves factual situations that have legal significance without regulation. However, carrying out this task presents unavoidable limits for the legal operator, who must guarantee that the normative integration achieves a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of the individual, precisely as stipulated in articles 8 and 10 of the LGAP: "…Article 8º.- The administrative legal system shall be understood as integrated by the unwritten norms necessary to guarantee a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of the individual. […] Article 10.- 1. The administrative norm must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect due to the rights and interests of the individual. 2. It must be interpreted and integrated taking into account the other related norms and the nature and value of the conduct and facts to which it refers…" (Emphasis is not from the original), and equally, that this task conforms to the constitutional precepts derived from the doctrine of the "reasonableness test" (test de razonabilidad) developed by the Constitutional Chamber (see rulings No. 2013-1276 of 2:50 p.m. on January 29, 2013, 2016-2706 of 4:15 p.m. on February 23, 2016, and 2019-04582 of 9:15 a.m. on March 15, 2019, among others). Thus, this Section considers that, although it respects it, it cannot share the position held by the Court of Cassation referring to the fact that the normative gap regarding the time limit, both for adopting and for executing the act, will be governed by the provisions of article 83 of the LGP, for the reason that it opts for the most harmful, unnecessary, and disproportionate alternative, without considering other scenarios or the factual circumstances that justify the prolonged periods of the first phase mentioned above and, therefore, unbalances the administrative legal relationship to the detriment of the rights of the administrated parties. In this regard, we appreciate that a period of two years just to adopt the final act lacks reasonableness and violates the constitutional principle of prompt and fulfilled justice, and this can be deduced simply by comparing the solution proposed by that High Court with other normative responses, specifically, article 319 of the LGAP, which provides a directory period of fifteen days for this phase, likewise, with the two-month period provided in article 261 ibidem to conclude the entire ordinary proceeding and one month to resolve the ordinary appeal, (in the same sense, article 31.6 of the CPCA), and even the lapse term for inaction by the Administration in article 340 of the LGAP, which is six months. Consequently, allowing the deciding body to paralyze the proceeding for a period exceeding several times any of these temporal limits, we consider to be excessive and unjustified, also based on the fact that the extension of the time limit to initiate is supported by the Administration's reaction times, particularly in the face of offenses involving complex facts, which can effectively take several years to become known to institutional hierarchies or to be subjected to a proper preliminary inquiry; however, this is not the case for this stage, in which a decision must simply be made according to the findings of the directing body in the administrative proceeding. In this manner, and as this Court has repeatedly held, the holder of the power would then have a maximum (statute of limitations) period of one month to adopt that final act, in accordance with the content of the second paragraph of article 414 of the CdeT: "…the month shall begin to run again from the moment the employer or the competent body, as applicable, is in a position to resolve…", this statute of limitations period would be more in line with that reality and with the procedural times provided in the LGAP cited above, in particular the two-month directory period of article 261, designed as a limit to conclude the entire ordinary proceeding.
**X.- CONT.-** 3) For the execution of the imposed sanction: This refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application of the issued sanction, that is, for the material execution of the act providing as its content a disciplinary sanction. On this point, given the anomie or normative gap we face and in the same terms we set forth in the previous point, this Chamber considers that recourse must be had, by integration, to the provisions of article 415 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) which, unlike the other stages where the temporal prerequisite is governed by the statute of limitations, imposes on the execution of the disciplinary sanction a lapse (caducidad) period of one year: "…When it is necessary to follow a procedure and record the disciplinary sanctions in a written act, the execution of those thus imposed lapses, for all purposes, one year from the finality (firmeza) of the act…" (Emphasis is not from the original). Let us recall that in this sense, despite the norm causing the period to run from finality, the execution of an unfavorable act, which is precisely what a disciplinary sanction is, is necessarily subject to prior communication to its addressee, pursuant to the doctrine of articles 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, among others, of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). 4) For the processing of the procedure: As a limit, this threshold refers to the maximum period that the administrative proceeding initiated to establish the facts allowing for the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can last. This issue finds general regulation in the provisions of article 261, in relation to 319 and 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), Ley N° 6227, particularly the latter, since it subjects this phase to a lapse scenario as a form of abnormal termination thereof, due to the Administration's inaction. Thus, and unless a special norm applies (as is the case of the procedure provided in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch for the officials of that Branch, pursuant to article 211 of that legal framework), this stage does not have regulations on the statute of limitations for disciplinary power, given that the two-month period provided in the LGAP—as we anticipated earlier—consists of one of a directory, not peremptory, nature, which of course does not include or permit proceedings with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to injury to the maxim of prompt and fulfilled administrative justice. Therefore, as a starting thesis, the excess of two months does not per se lead to the nullity of the proceeding due to preclusion of competence, even though it is necessary to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether such durations violate the celerity and efficiency that should, from a rational and proportional standpoint, prevail in these matters. In this sense, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, of 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011. At this point, reference must also be made to the provisions of article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the concept of the lapse of the proceeding (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the investigating Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. Given that in this case the debate is formulated regarding the application or not of the aggravated statute of limitations regime for the alleged concurrence of effects on the probity regime, it is necessary to make some considerations in order to specify the content and implications of such a regime. All in all, this Section has established that unjustified and disproportionate delay of the proceeding, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that *iter*, due to injury to the principle of prompt and fulfilled administrative justice.
**XI.- CONT.-** Regarding the interruption and suspension of statutes of limitations periods.- As we have seen so far, the regulations on the temporal prerequisite affecting the exercise of competence are developed through the concepts of lapse or the statute of limitations. Likewise, we determine that the exercise of disciplinary power is limited in time differently according to the stage or phase of the procedure in question, so that in the initial phase and in the adoption of the act, it is regulated according to the concept of the statute of limitations, while in the execution phase, it is regulated by lapse. In the investigation phase, it is regulated according to the concept of lapse of the proceeding or, alternatively, by the constitutional principle of prompt and fulfilled justice. It is in the scenarios regulated by the statute of limitations that it is possible to subject the time limit to grounds for suspension or interruption. The fundamental distinction between the two lies in the fact that, in cases of interruption, the passage of time prior to the event giving rise to such cases becomes non-existent; that is, a legal fiction is created whereby the elapsed time ceases to exist for all legal purposes, so that the prescriptive period begins to run anew. Article 878 of the Civil Code states: "…The effect of interruption is to render useless for the statute of limitations all the time previously elapsed…". On the other hand, regarding grounds for suspension, the occurrence of the event merely momentarily inhibits the passage of time, so that once it disappears, the calculation of the period resumes at the exact point at which it was paralyzed. The First Chamber has indicated: "…First of all, it is necessary to recall that the statute of limitations is subject to causes of suspension and interruption. On this subject, this Chamber has indicated that, by virtue of the former, when any cause having this effect arises, the period ceases to run, and when the reason for its paralysis ceases, it runs again from the point at which it was suspended. In interruption, on the contrary, once the cause arises, the period runs anew; that is, the course of time elapsed in favor of prescriptibility ceases to exist, and another begins to be counted from the event or circumstance that induced this situation. Consequently, the time that had already elapsed cannot be counted…" (Ruling No. 348-F-2007 of 10:25 a.m. on May 11, 2007). Of these categories, the one of interest for disciplinary statute of limitations purposes is that of interruption, given that it is this that has been expressly regulated in the various regulatory frameworks to which we have referred in this ruling: article 83 of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), or article 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (reformed by Ley N° 9343). The first two norms, however, provide a single ground for interruption, provided only for the initial stage of the proceeding: the initial communication of the disciplinary proceeding or notification of charges (traslado de cargos): "…The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated…" (Art. 83 LGP); and "…The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding…" (Art. 71 LOCGR). According to these norms, therefore, it is unquestionable that the notification of the opening of the proceeding aimed at establishing the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act generates a continued effect of interruption of that temporal margin, insofar as it consists of an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. By inhibiting the time previously elapsed and keeping the passage of time paralyzed until the matter reaches the knowledge of the hierarchical superior, it could not then be considered that it is the final act that is capable of interrupting the statute of limitations in relation to this stage, since, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary that the Administration first order the opening and then the processing of the administrative case, as a derivation of the provisions in articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Meanwhile, the general rule of the Labor Code provides: "…In the event that the employer must follow a sanctioning procedure, the intention to sanction must be notified to the employee within that period and, from that moment on, the month shall begin to run again from the moment the employer or the competent body, as applicable, is in a position to resolve, unless the procedure is paralyzed or stopped due to fault exclusively attributable to the employer, a situation in which the statute of limitations is applicable, if the paralysis or suspension covers that entire period…". The wording of this norm suggests the existence of two one-month prescriptive periods: one for the initiation of the procedure, which is interrupted by the notification to the worker of the "intention to sanction" and which yields to the special cases mentioned above, and another for the adoption of the final act, which will be interrupted after the sanctioning act is issued, specifically, with its proper communication, given that according to articles 140, 142, 239, and 240 of the LGAP, the effectiveness of the act—which includes the interrupting effect on the statute of limitations—arises with notification. Likewise, given that such effectiveness can only be prospective in nature (*ex nunc*) in light of the sanctioning nature of the act, it could not then be validly maintained that the interrupting effect can extend retroactively to the date of adoption of the conduct.
Likewise, regarding actions of the Public Administration in sanctioning administrative proceedings, the provision established by Article 329.3 of the LGAP is fundamental, which states: "…3. The final act issued after the deadline shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless a law provides otherwise…", so that when a legal provision establishes the loss or preclusion (preclusión) of the exercise of competence due to the passage of time, it means that the act issued untimely cannot be considered valid due to the disappearance of that constitutive element. In this manner, with the loss of the temporal prerequisite as a requirement for the exercise of disciplinary competence, the public body would be prevented from acting in the specific case and, therefore, the sanctioning act thus issued would fundamentally lack legitimacy and competence.- **VIII.-** **CONTINUES.-** Now, regarding the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) in matters of public employment, Costa Rican law has provided that the extinction or termination of its temporal prerequisite can occur at various moments or stages of the proceeding, as can be observed in different regulations, including the general legal framework set forth in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), specifically in its Articles 414 and 415 (following the reform enacted by Law No. 9343), in the absence of an administrative norm that regulates, in equally general terms, the statute of limitations (prescripción) in public employment relationships. Specifically, it has been established that the passage of time can affect, by statute of limitations (prescripción) or by expiration (caducidad), the exercise of disciplinary power at four different stages of the proceeding: **1)** *To initiate the disciplinary power*; **2)** *For the adoption of the sanction by the deciding body*; **3)** *For the execution of the imposed sanction*; and **4)** *For the processing of the proceeding*. These divisions have been upheld by this Section through various judgments, among which it is worth citing some, such as No. 25-2019-VI at 10:20 a.m. on February 28, 2019, No. 075-2018-VI at 2:05 p.m. on June 22, 2018, among others. We will begin the analysis, according to the order indicated above. **1)** *To initiate the disciplinary power:* This phase occurs when the administrative self-protection (autotutela administrativa) aimed at determining whether or not the facts constituting disciplinary administrative sanctions have occurred has not yet been exercised, as a derivation of the provisions set forth in Articles 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. This power to verify the facts is understood to be included, for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations (prescripción), as part of the disciplinary power and its exercise, and consequently, it is subject to a legal deadline, which in turn will depend, in its definition, on the special or general regulations applicable to the specific case. In the *sub examine*, the disciplinary regime of the police statute provides in Article 83 of the LGP the following: *“…Article 83°-Statutes of Limitations (Prescripciones). Minor offenses (faltas leves) shall prescribe (prescribirán) in one month and serious offenses (faltas graves), in two years. The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated…”* Now, to determine the starting point for calculating this deadline, both the Labor Code (CdeT), according to the reform enacted by Law No. 9343, in its Article 414, and the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994, coincide in that this moment occurs when the Head of the entity (Jerarca) is in an objective position to know of the offense and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of his power, a situation that in reality will depend on the notoriety or obviousness of the facts constituting the infraction, that is, according to whether or not a preliminary investigation and knowledge of its results are warranted. Thus, it is possible to assert that the deadline could begin with the *“occurrence of the event”* (Art 71.a LOCGR) or *“from when the cause for separation or sanction arose”* (Art. 414 CdeT), when the fact to be sanctioned is notorious or obvious; or in a second hypothesis, when given the complexity of the circumstances, it becomes essential to first carry out a preliminary investigation, in which case the calculation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) would begin *“from when the causal facts were known”* (Art. 414 CdeT), or *“from the date on which the respective inquiry or audit report is brought to the knowledge of the Head of the entity (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding”* (Art 71.b LOCGR). In such a scenario, the indicated deadline is calculated from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the Head of the entity (jerarca), since it is only at that moment that said head can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary actions. However, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be discriminated in each case, since otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only those in which, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning proceeding, or else, to gather evidence that tends to clarify its necessity or not. In the case of the police disciplinary regime, from the reading of Articles 78 and 84 of the LGP, it is inferred that this second scenario necessarily applies to all cases of serious offenses (faltas graves). The first paragraph of this latter article states: *“…The legal department of the respective ministry shall be responsible for preliminarily investigating any accusation that implies the temporary suspension or dismissal of the employee covered by this Statute...”* (Emphasis not in the original).- **IX.-** **CONT.- 2)** *Term for the adoption and communication of the sanction by the deciding body:* This corresponds to the maximum temporal limit that can elapse between the moment when the directing body concludes its investigative work, by bringing the administrative file to the attention of the deciding body or the holder of the competence, whether or not by means of a conclusive report or opinion (whether or not it contains recommendations), and the adoption and communication of the respective decision, that is, the declaration of administrative will through the issuance of the final act of the proceeding and its respective notification, necessary so that said will can deploy its effectiveness as stipulated in Article 140 of the LGAP. As it is a maximum threshold, this limit does not have to coincide with, nor is it imposed to the detriment of, the fifteen-day deadline regulated by Article 319 of the LGAP, which consequently would be of a directory nature. Having reached this point, given its relevance to the specific case, it is fundamental to state for the record that this Tribunal respects but does not share the position held by the Cassation Court of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo) in judgments 168-F-TC-2018 at 10:10 a.m. and 169-F-TC-2018 at 10:15 a.m., both issued on November 28, 2018; in these judgments, it is held that given the normative gap (laguna normativa) in the regulation of the *“…statute of limitations periods (plazos de prescripción) to be applied at the different stages of the administrative sanctioning proceeding […] this Chamber considers that this eventual normative gap must be filled by applying the referred two-year period. This, considering that this provision indicates, generically, that serious offenses (faltas graves) prescribe (prescriben) in two years. That is, the legislator provided that, in the case of serious offenses (faltas graves), the applicable statute of limitations period (plazo prescriptivo) is two years…”* As we stated in this Chamber’s judgment number 96-2019 – VI at 4:10 p.m. on July 31, 2019, integration (integración) as a hermeneutic technique allows that, faced with a situation of normative anomie, the Judge, by imperative *iura novit curia*, can provide an answer to the judicial case brought to his attention, through recourse to various sources, written and unwritten, whether before normative lack of foresight or the deficient formulation (due to insufficiency) of a norm, which leaves unregulated factual assumptions that have significance for the Law. However, the carrying out of this task presents unavoidable limits for the legal operator, who must guarantee that in normative integration, a balance is achieved between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of the individual, precisely as stipulated in Articles 8 and 10 of the LGAP: *“…Article 8º.-The administrative legal order (ordenamiento administrativo) shall be understood to be integrated by the unwritten norms necessary to guarantee a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of the individual.* […] *Article 10.- 1. The administrative norm shall be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect owed to the rights and interests of the private individual. 2. It shall be interpreted and integrated taking into account the other related norms and the nature and value of the conduct and facts to which it refers…”* (Emphasis not in the original), and equally, that this task conforms to the constitutional precepts derived from the doctrine of the *“reasonableness test”* developed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (see judgments No. 2013-1276 at 2:50 p.m. on January 29, 2013, 2016-2706 at 4:15 p.m. on February 23, 2016, and 2019-04582 at 9:15 a.m. on March 15, 2019, among others). Thus, this Section considers that, although it respects it, it cannot share the position held by the Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación) stating that the normative gap regarding the deadline, both for adopting and for executing the act, will be governed by the provisions of Article 83 of the LGP, for the reason that it opts for the most harmful, unnecessary, and disproportionate alternative, without considering other scenarios or the factual circumstances that justify the prolonged deadlines of the first phase mentioned above and, therefore, unbalances the legal-administrative relationship to the detriment of the rights of the individuals subject to the administration. In this sense, we appreciate that a two-year deadline just to adopt the final act lacks reasonableness and violates the constitutional principle of swift and complete justice, and this can be inferred simply by confronting the solution proposed by that High Court with other normative responses, specifically, Article 319 of the LGAP, which provides for a directory deadline for this phase of a term of fifteen days, likewise, with the two-month deadline set forth in Article 261 thereof to complete the entire ordinary proceeding and one month to resolve the ordinary appeal, (in the same sense, Article 31.6 of the CPCA), and even the expiration period (caducidad) due to inaction of the Administration in Article 340 of the LGAP, which is six months. Consequently, allowing the deciding body to paralyze the proceeding for a period that exceeds by several times any of these temporal limits, we consider to be excessive and unjustified, also starting from the point that the extension of the deadline to initiate is supported by the reaction times of the Administration, particularly, in the face of offenses that involve complex facts, which can effectively take several years to become known to institutional hierarchies or to be subjected to a proper prior inquiry, however, this is not the case at this stage, in which a decision must simply be made according to the findings of the directing body in the administrative proceeding.- Thus, and as this Court has repeatedly held, the holder of the power would then have a maximum (statute of limitations) period of one month to adopt that final act, in accordance with the content of the second paragraph of Article 414 of the Labor Code (CdeT): <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">the month shall begin to run again from the moment the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to decide</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">, </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">this statute of limitations period would be more in line with that reality and with the procedural timeframes provided for in the LGAP cited above, particularly the two-month ordering period of Article 261, designed as a limit for completing the entire ordinary proceeding.- **X.-** **CONT.- 3)** <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration: underline;">For the execution of the imposed sanction</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">: This refers to the period available to the administrative head to order the application of the sanction issued, that is, for the material execution of the act whose content provides for a disciplinary sanction. On this point, given the anomie or legal gap we face and in the same terms we set out in the previous point, this Chamber considers that we must turn, by integration, to the provisions of Article 415 of the Labor Code, which, unlike the other stages where the temporal parameter is governed by a statute of limitations, imposes a one-year expiration (caducidad) period for the execution of the disciplinary sanction: </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">When it is necessary to follow a proceeding and record the disciplinary sanctions in a written act, the execution of those thus imposed </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline;">expires (caduca), for all purposes, one year from the finality of the act</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> (Emphasis not in the original). Let us remember that in this sense, although the rule makes the period run from finality, the execution of an unfavorable act, such as a disciplinary sanction, is necessarily subject to prior communication to its addressee, according to the doctrine of Articles 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, among others, of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: bold;">4)</span> <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration: underline;">For the processing of the proceeding</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration: underline;">:</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> As a limit, this threshold refers to the maximum period that the administrative proceeding initiated to establish the facts enabling the holder of the public punitive power to adopt the final decision can last. This matter</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> finds general regulation in the provisions of Article </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> 261, in relation to Articles 319 and 340</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> of </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">the General Law on Public Administration, Law N°6227, </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">particularly the latter, as it subjects this phase to a case of expiration as a form of abnormal termination thereof, given the Administration's inertia.</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> Thus, and </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">unless a special rule exists (as is the case of the proceeding provided in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch for officials of that Branch, according to Article 211 of that legal framework), </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">this stage </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">has no statute of limitations regulations for the disciplinary power</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">, since </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">the two-month period provided </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">in the LGAP </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">-as we previously mentioned-, is of an ordering, not peremptory, nature, which certainly does not include or permit proceedings with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to violation of the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice. Thus, as a starting thesis, exceeding two months does not </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">per se</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> lead to the nullity of the proceeding for preclusion of competence, although it is necessary to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether such durations undermine the speed and efficiency that must prevail in these matters from a rational and proportional standpoint. In this regard, see Judgment No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, of </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">the</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> 16:20 hours of September 12, 2011. On this point, reference must also be made to the provisions of Article 340 of the LGAP regulating the doctrine of expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding, in cases where the investigating Administration that initiated it</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it.</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> Given that in the present case the debate is framed around the application or not of the aggravated statute of limitations regime due to the alleged concurrence of impacts on the probity regime, it is necessary to make some considerations in order to specify the content and implications of such a regime.</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> With all of this, this Section has established that the unjustified and disproportionate delay of the proceeding, even with that ordering connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that path, for violation of the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice.- **XI.-** **CONT.-** <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration: underline;">On the interruption and suspension of statute of limitations periods</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: bold;">.- </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">As we have seen so far, the regulations on the temporal parameter that affects the exercise of competence,</span> <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">operate through the figures of expiration (caducidad) or statute of limitations. Likewise, we determined that the exercise of disciplinary power is limited in time in different ways depending on the stage of the proceeding at issue, so that in the initial phase and in the adoption of the act, it is regulated according to the doctrine of statute of limitations, while in the execution phase, by that of expiration. In the investigation phase, it is regulated according to the figure of expiration of the proceeding or, alternatively, by the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice. It is in scenarios regulated by statute of limitations that the period can be subjected to grounds for suspension or interruption. The fundamental distinction between the two is that, in interruption cases, the course of time prior to the event giving rise to such cases becomes non-existent, that is, a legal fiction is generated whereby the time elapsed</span> <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">ceases to exist for all legal purposes, such that the prescriptive period begins to run again. Article 878 of the Civil Code states: </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">The effect of interruption is to render useless for the statute of limitations all the time previously elapsed</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">.</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> On the other hand, in suspension grounds, the occurrence of the event momentarily inhibits the course of time, so that once it disappears, the calculation of the period resumes precisely at the point it was paralyzed. The First Chamber has stated: </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">First of all, it is necessary to recall that the statute of limitations is subject to grounds for suspension and interruption. On the subject, this Chamber has indicated that, by virtue of the former, when any of those having this effect occurs, the period stops running, and when the reason for its paralysis ceases, it runs again from the point at which it was suspended. In interruption, on the contrary, once the ground arises, the period runs anew, that is, the course of time elapsed in favor of prescriptibility ceases to exist; and another period begins to be computed from the fact or circumstance that induced this situation. Consequently, the time that had already elapsed cannot be counted</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span> <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">(Judgment No. 348-F-2007 of 10:25 hours of May 11, 2007). Of these categories, the one relevant for purposes of disciplinary statute of limitations is that of interruption, since it is this one that has been expressly regulated in the various normative frameworks we have referred to in this ruling: Article 83 of the General Law of Police (Ley General de Policía), Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), or Article 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (amended by Law N° 9343). The first two rules, however, provide for a single case of interruption, established only for the initial stage of the proceeding: the initial communication of the disciplinary proceeding or notice of charges: </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">The statute of limitations shall be interrupted </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline;">when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> (</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: bold;">Art. 83 LGP</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">); and </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline;">notification to the presumed responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span> <span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">(</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: bold;">Art. 71 LOCGR</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">). According to these rules, therefore, it is undeniable that the notification of the opening of the proceeding aimed at establishing the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the motive of the act generates a continued interruption effect on that temporal margin, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure directly aimed at the exercise of that power. By nullifying the time previously elapsed and paralyzing the course of time until the matter comes to the knowledge of the head, it could not therefore be considered that the final act is capable of interrupting the statute of limitations in relation to this stage, since, as a derivation of the due process principle, the Administration must first order the opening and then the processing of the administrative case, as a derivation of the provisions of Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 LGAP. For its part, the general rule of the Labor Code provides: </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">“…</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">In the event that the employer must fulfill a sanctioning proceeding, </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline;">the intention to sanction must be notified to the employee within that period and, from that moment, the month shall begin to run again from the moment the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to decide</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">, unless the proceeding is paralyzed or stopped through fault attributable exclusively to the employer, a situation in which the statute of limitations is applicable, if the paralysis or suspension reaches to cover that period</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">…”</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;">. </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">The wording of this rule suggests the existence of two one-month prescriptive periods, one for the initiation of the proceeding, which is interrupted by the notification to the worker of the </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">“</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">intention to sanction</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;">”</span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS'; font-size: 12pt;"> and which yields to the special cases previously discussed, and another, for the adoption of the final act, which shall be interrupted after the sanctioning act is issued, specifically, with its due communication, since according to Articles 140, 142, 239, and 240 LGAP, the effectiveness of the act -which includes the interrupting effect on the statute of limitations- arises with notification.</span> Likewise, given that such effectiveness can only be prospective in nature (*ex nunc*) due to the punitive nature of the act, it could not then be validly maintained that the interrupting effect can extend retroactively to the date the conduct was adopted.-" In such a scenario, the specified period is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the head of the agency, since it is only at that moment that that official can validly adopt decisions regarding whether or not to open disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the need or not for that phase (preliminary investigation) must be determined on a case-by-case basis, since otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only those in which, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable for determining the relevance or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or else, for gathering indications that tend to clarify its necessity or not. In the case of the police disciplinary regime, from a reading of Articles 78 and 84 LGP, it follows that this second scenario applies necessarily to all cases of serious offenses. The first paragraph of this latter article states: "…The legal department of the respective ministry shall be responsible for preliminarily investigating any accusation that implies the temporary suspension or dismissal of the employee covered by this Statute.." (Highlighting not in original).- **IX.-** **CONT.- 2)** <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Time limit for the adoption and communication of the sanction by the decision-making body</span>: This corresponds to the maximum time limit that may elapse between the moment in which the directing body concludes its investigative work, by making the administrative file known to the decision-making body or the holder of the competence, whether or not by means of a conclusive report or opinion (whether or not it contains recommendations), and the adoption and communication of the respective decision, that is, the declaration of administrative will through the issuance of the final act of the procedure and its respective notification, necessary so that that will can deploy its effectiveness as stipulated in Article 140 LGAP. Being a maximum threshold, this limit does not have to coincide with, nor does it override, the prejudice of the fifteen-day period regulated by Article 319 LGAP, which consequently would be of a directory nature. Having reached this point, given its relevance to the specific case, it is fundamental to state that this Court respects but does not share the position held by the Court of Cassation of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction in rulings 168-F-TC-2018 of 10:10 hours and 169-F-TC-2018 of 10:15, both on November 28, 2018; in these rulings, it is held that in the face of a normative gap in the regulation of the "…statutes of limitations (plazos de prescripción) to be applied in the different stages of the administrative sanctioning procedure […] this Chamber considers that said eventual normative gap must be filled by applying the referred-to two-year period. This, considering that this provision indicates, in a generic manner, that serious offenses prescribe after two years. That is, the legislator provided that, in the case of serious offenses, the applicable prescriptive period is two years…". As we set forth in this Chamber's judgment number 96-2019 – VI of 16:10 hours on July 31, 2019, integration as a hermeneutical technique allows that in the face of a situation of normative anomie, the Judge, by imperative of *iura novit curia*, can provide an answer to the judicial cause that has been brought to his attention, through the use of diverse sources, written and unwritten, whether in the face of normative lack of foresight or the deficient formulation (due to insufficiency) of a norm, which leaves unregulated factual situations that have significance for the Law. However, carrying out this task presents unavoidable limits for the legal operator, who must guarantee that in normative integration a balance is achieved between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, liberty, and other fundamental rights of the individual, precisely as stipulated in Articles 8 and 10 LGAP: "…Article 8.-The administrative legal order shall be understood as integrated by the unwritten norms necessary to guarantee a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, liberty, and other fundamental rights of the individual. […] Article 10.- 1. The administrative norm shall be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the due respect owed to the rights and interests of the private citizen. 2. It shall be interpreted and integrated taking into account the other connected norms and the nature and value of the conduct and facts to which it refers…" (Highlighting not in original), and equally, that this task conforms to the constitutional precepts derived from the doctrine of the "reasonableness test (test de razonabilidad)" developed by the Constitutional Chamber (see judgments No. 2013-1276 of 14:50 hours on January 29, 2013, 2016-2706 of 16:15 hours on February 23, 2016, and 2019-04582 of 09:15 hours on March 15, 2019, among others). Thus, this Section considers that, although it respects it, it cannot share the position held by the Court of Cassation regarding the fact that the normative gap with respect to the period, both for adopting and for executing the act, shall be governed by the provisions of Article 83 LGP, for the reason that it opts for the most harmful, unnecessary, and disproportionate alternative, without considering other scenarios or the factual circumstances that justify the prolonged periods of the first phase previously mentioned, and thereby, unbalances the administrative legal relationship to the detriment of the rights of the administered individuals. In this sense, we appreciate that a period of two years just to adopt the final act lacks reasonableness and violates the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice, and this can be inferred merely by confronting the solution proposed by that High Court with respect to other normative responses, specifically, Article 319 LGAP, which provides as a directory period for this phase a term of fifteen days, equally, with the two-month period provided in Article 261 *ibidem* to conclude the entire ordinary procedure and one month to resolve the ordinary appeal, (in the same sense, Article 31.6 CPCA), and even the time limit for expiry due to inertia of the Administration in Article 340 LGAP, which is one of six months. Consequently, allowing the decision-making body to paralyze the procedure for a period that exceeds several times over any of these time limits, we consider to be excessive and unjustified, also based on the fact that the extension of the period to initiate has support in the reaction times of the Administration, particularly, in the face of offenses that involve complex facts, which can indeed take several years to become known to institutional hierarchies or to be subjected to a proper prior inquiry; however, this is not the case in this stage, in which a decision must simply be made according to the findings of the directing body in the administrative procedure. In this manner, and as this Court has repeatedly held, the holder of the power would then have a maximum period (statute of limitations) of one month to adopt that final act, in consideration of the content of the second paragraph of Article 414 CdeT: "…the month shall begin to run anew at the moment in which the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to decide…", this prescriptive period would be more in accordance with that reality and with the procedural time limits provided in the LGAP cited above, particularly the directory two-month period of Article 261, designed as a limit to conclude the entire ordinary procedure.- **X.-** **CONT.- 3)** <span style="text-decoration: underline;">For the execution of the imposed sanction</span>: This refers to the period available to the administrative head to order the application of the dictated sanction, that is, for the material execution of the act that contains a disciplinary sanction as its content. On this point, given the anomie or normative gap we face and in the same terms we set forth in the previous point, this Chamber considers that recourse must be made, by integration, to the provisions of Article 415 of the Labor Code which, unlike the other stages where the temporal parameter is governed by prescription, imposes on the execution of the disciplinary sanction a time limit for expiry (caducidad) of one year: "…When it is necessary to follow a procedure and record the disciplinary sanctions in a written act, the execution of those so imposed expires (caduca), for all purposes, in one year from the finality of the act…" (Highlighting not in original). Let us recall in that sense, that despite the norm counting the period from finality, the execution of an unfavorable act, such as precisely a disciplinary sanction, is necessarily contingent upon prior communication to its recipient, according to the doctrine of Articles 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, among others, of the General Law on Public Administration. **4)** <span style="text-decoration: underline;">For the proceedings of the procedure</span>: As a limit, this threshold refers to the maximum period that the administrative procedure established to determine the facts that allow the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can last. This matter finds general regulation in the provisions of Article 261, in relation to Article 319 and Article 340 of the General Law on Public Administration, Law No. 6227, particularly the latter, since it subjects this phase to a case of expiry as a form of abnormal termination thereof, in the face of the Administration's inertia. Thus, and except for a special norm (as is the case of the procedure provided in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch for the officials of that Branch, according to Article 211 of that legal framework), this stage has no regulations on the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power, since the two-month period provided in the LGAP -as we anticipated previously- consists of one of a directory nature, not peremptory, which of course does not include nor permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to harm to the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice. Thus, as an initial thesis, an excess of two months does not *per se* lead to the nullity of the procedure due to preclusion of competence, even though it is necessary to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether such durations violate the speed and efficiency that must prevail on a rational and proportional level in these matters. In this sense, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, of 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011. On this point, reference must also be made to the statute of Article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institution of the expiry of the procedure, in cases where the investigating Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. Since in the present case the debate is formulated in order regarding the application or not of the aggravated statute of limitations regime due to the supposed concurrence of harm to the probity regime, it is necessary to make some considerations in order to specify the content and implications of such a regime. Nevertheless, this Section has established that unjustified and disproportionate delay of the procedure, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that *iter*, due to harm to the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice.- **XI.-** **CONT.-** <span style="text-decoration: underline;">On the interruption and suspension of the periods of statute of limitations (plazos de prescripción)</span>**.-** As we have seen so far, the regulations on the temporal parameter that affects the exercise of competence are developed through the figures of expiry (caducidad) or statute of limitations (prescripción). Likewise, we determined that the exercise of the disciplinary power is limited in time in different ways according to the stage or phase of the procedure in question, so that in the initial phase and in the adoption of the act, it is regulated according to the institution of prescription, while in the execution phase by that of expiry. In the instruction phase, it is regulated according to the figure of the expiry of the procedure or else, by the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice. It is in the scenarios regulated by prescription, that it is possible to subject the period to grounds for suspension or interruption. The fundamental distinction between the two lies in the fact that, in cases of interruption, the course of time prior to the event giving rise to such cases becomes non-existent, that is, a legal fiction is generated whereby the elapsed time ceases to exist for all legal purposes, so that the prescriptive period begins to run anew. Article 878 of the Civil Code states: "…The effect of interruption is to render useless for the prescription all the time previously elapsed…". On the other hand, in grounds for suspension, the occurrence of the event momentarily inhibits the passage of time, so that once it disappears, the computation of the period resumes just at the same point at which it was paralyzed. The First Chamber has indicated: "…In the first place, it is necessary to recall that prescription is subject to causes of suspension and interruption. On the subject, this Chamber has indicated that, by virtue of the first, when one of those having this effect occurs, the period ceases to run and when the reason for its paralysis ceases, it runs again from the point at which it was suspended.
In the case of interruption, by contrast, once the cause has arisen, the time period starts to run anew; that is, the course of time that had elapsed in favor of the statute of limitations ceases to exist, and a new period begins to be calculated from the event or circumstance that gave rise to this situation. Consequently, the time that had already elapsed cannot be counted…” (Judgment No. 348-F-2007 of 10:25 a.m. on May 11, 2007). Of these categories, the one relevant for the purposes of disciplinary prescription (prescripción disciplinaria) is interruption, since it is this one that has been expressly regulated in the various normative frameworks to which we have referred in this ruling: Article 83 of the Ley General de Policía, Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, or Article 414 of the Código de Trabajo (as amended by Ley N° 9343). The first two provisions, however, provide for a single ground for interruption, applicable only to the initial stage of the procedure: the initial communication of the disciplinary proceeding or notice of charges: “…The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated…” (Art. 83 LGP); and “…The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding…” (Art. 71 LOCGR). According to these provisions, therefore, it is beyond doubt that the notification of the opening of the proceeding seeking to establish the facts (substantive truth) that serve as the basis for the purpose of the act generates a continuing effect of interruption of that time margin, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure directly aimed at the exercise of that authority. By nullifying the time previously elapsed and keeping the passage of time suspended until the matter reaches the knowledge of the head of the agency, it could not therefore be considered that the final act is capable of interrupting the statute of limitations in relation to this stage, given that, as a derivation of the principle of due process (debido proceso), it is necessary for the Administration to first order the opening and then the course of the administrative case, as a derivation of the provisions in Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 LGAP. For its part, the general rule of the Código de Trabajo provides: “…In the event that the employer must follow a disciplinary procedure, the intention to sanction must be notified to the employee within that period, and from that moment, the month shall begin to run anew at the time when the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to decide, unless the proceeding is halted or stopped due to fault attributable exclusively to the employer, in which case the statute of limitations applies, if the stoppage or suspension extends to cover that period…”. The wording of this provision suggests the existence of two statutory limitation periods of one month, one for the initiation of the proceeding, which is interrupted by the notification to the worker of the “intention to sanction” and which yields to the special cases previously discussed, and another for the adoption of the final act, which will be interrupted after the disciplinary act is issued, specifically, upon its proper communication, since according to Articles 140, 142, 239, and 240 LGAP, the effectiveness of the act—which includes the interrupting effect on the statute of limitations—arises upon notification. Likewise, given that such effectiveness can only be prospective (ex nunc) in view of the disciplinary nature of the act, it could not therefore be validly maintained that the interrupting effect can extend retroactively to the date the conduct was adopted.-"
"VII.- SOBRE EL ELEMENTO TEMPORAL EN EL EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA.- En las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria del jerarca (102 LGAP) se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal varía según las reglas jurídicas que al respecto disponga cada régimen jurídico de empleo público, no obstante lo cual, se mantienen algunas regulaciones generales como veremos más adelante. Este rasgo temporal es un aspecto que diferencia ésta, de otras potestades públicas que, per se, se consideran imprescriptibles -v.gr., tutela de bienes demaniales-, quizás precisamente por constituir una de las manifestaciones del poder sancionador de la Administración (ius puniendi). Esta variedad en el marco normativo, se debe a que la determinación jurídica de esta limitación temporal de la potestad disciplinaria, es un asunto librado a la discrecionalidad del legislador, quien ha establecido en cada régimen jurídico reglas particulares, sea sujetando ésta a un régimen de prescripción o uno de caducidad. Sin embargo y desde ese plano, el fenecimiento por el paso del tiempo en cualquiera de estos dos supuestos, supone la concurrencia de tres factores fundamentales, a saber: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio, b) transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico en esa inercia del titular y; c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica. A lo que se debe sumar en el caso de la prescripción, un aspecto más: d) la concurrencia o no de hipótesis de suspensión o interrupción del plazo. Con todo, el principal instrumento por el cual se ha decantado nuestra legislación en materia de empleo público ha sido el de la prescripción negativa, que de esta manera bien puede ser alegada como causal de nulidad del acto final sancionatorio, porque impide el ejercicio de la competencia en el caso concreto, aún y cuando esa defensa no hubiere sido ejercitada de previo a la emisión de la voluntad pública. Asimismo, tratándose de actuaciones de la Administración Pública en procedimientos administrativos sancionatorios, resulta fundamental lo estatuido por el ordinal 329.3 de la LGAP que señala: “…3. El acto final recaído fuera del plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo disposición en contrario de la ley…”, de suerte que cuando una disposición legal fije la pérdida o preclusión del ejercicio de la competencia por el paso del tiempo, hace que el acto que hubiese dictado extemporáneamente, no pueda ser tenido como válido por la desaparición de ese elemento constitutivo. De esta manera, con la pérdida del presupuesto temporal como requisito para el ejercicio de la competencia disciplinaria, el órgano público estaría impedido para actuar en el caso concreto y por ende, el acto sancionatorio así emitido carecería fundamentalmente de legitimación y de competencia.- VIII.- CONTINÚA.- Ahora bien, tratándose de la potestad disciplinaria en materia de empleo público, el Derecho costarricense ha dispuesto que la extinción o fenecimiento del presupuesto temporal de ésta puede acontecer según diversos momentos o etapas del procedimiento, tal y como se puede apreciar en diferentes normativas, incluso en el marco jurídico general dispuesto en el Código de Trabajo, específicamente en sus artículos 414 y 415 (a partir de la reforma operada por Ley N° 9343), esto a falta de norma administrativa que en iguales términos generales regule la prescripción en las relaciones de empleo público. Concretamente, se ha establecido que el decurso del tiempo puede afectar, por prescripción o por caducidad, el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria en cuatro estadios diferentes del procedimiento: 1) Para iniciar el poder de disciplina; 2) Para la adopción de la sanción por parte del órgano decisor; 3) Para la ejecución de la sanción impuesta; y 4) Para el trámite del procedimiento. Estas divisiones, han sido sostenidas por esta Sección a través de diversas sentencias, de las cuales valga citar algunas, tales como las n° 25-2019-VI de las 10:20 horas del 28 de febrero de 2019, n° 075-2018-VI de las 14:05 horas del 22 de junio del 2018, entre otras. Comenzaremos el análisis, según el orden antes señalado. 1) Para iniciar la potestad disciplinaria: Esta fase acontece cuando aún no se ha ejercitado la autotutela administrativa encaminada a determinar si han ocurrido o no los hechos que configuran las sanciones administrativas disciplinarias, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297, 308 LGAP. Esta potestad para verificar los hechos se entiende comprendida para efectos del cómputo de la prescripción, como parte de la potestad disciplinaria y su ejercicio, y consecuentemente, está sujeta a un plazo legal, el cual a su vez dependerá en su definición de las regulaciones especiales o generales aplicables al caso concreto. En el sub examine, el régimen disciplinario del estatuto policial prevé en el artículo 83 LGP lo siguiente: “…Artículo 83°-Prescripciones. Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario…”. Ahora bien, para fijar el punto de inicio del cómputo de este plazo, tanto el Código de Trabajo (CdeT) según la reforma operada por la Ley N° 9343, en su artículo 414, como la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), Ley N° 7428 del 7 de setiembre de 1994, coinciden en que este momento acaece cuando el Jerarca se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad, situación que en la realidad dependerá del carácter notorio o evidente de los hechos constitutivos de la infracción, esto es, según amerite o no el desarrollo de una investigación preliminar y del conocimiento de sus resultados. Así, es posible aseverar que el plazo podría iniciarse con el “acaecimiento del hecho” (Art 71.a LOCGR) o “desde que se dio la causa para la separación o sanción” (Art. 414 CdeT), cuando el hecho a sancionar es notorio o evidente; o en una segunda hipótesis, cuando dada la complejidad de las circunstancias, se torna indispensable realizar previamente una investigación preliminar, en cuyo caso el conteo de la prescripción iniciaría “desde que fueran conocidos los hechos causales” (Art. 414 CdeT), o “a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo” (Art 71.b LOCGR). En tal escenario, el plazo señalado se computa desde el momento de la recepción o comunicación efectiva al jerarca de dicho informe, pues es hasta ese momento que ese titular puede válidamente adoptar las decisiones respecto de la apertura o no de disposiciones disciplinarias. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase (investigación preliminar), pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino solo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no. En el caso del régimen disciplinario policial, de la lectura de los artículos 78 y 84 LGP, se desprende que este segundo supuesto aplica necesariamente para todos los casos de faltas graves. Dice el párrafo primero de este último numeral: “…El departamento legal del ministerio respectivo se encargará de investigar preliminarmente toda acusación que implique la suspensión temporal o el despido del servidor amparado por este Estatuto..” (Resaltado no es del original).- IX.- CONT.- 2) Término para la adopción y comunicación de la sanción por parte del órgano decisor: Corresponde al límite máximo temporal que puede discurrir entre el momento en que el órgano director concluye con su labor instructora, mediante la puesta en conocimiento del expediente administrativo al órgano decisor o titular de la competencia, sea o no por medio de informe o dictamen conclusivo (contenga o no recomendaciones), y la adopción y comunicación de la respectiva decisión, esto es, de la declaración de la voluntad administrativa a través del dictado del acto final del procedimiento y su respectiva notificación, necesaria a fin de que esa voluntad pueda desplegar su eficacia conforme lo estipula el artículo 140 LGAP. Al tratarse de un umbral máximo, no tiene que coincidir este límite, ni se impone, en perjuicio del plazo de quince días regulado por el numeral 319 LGAP, que consecuentemente sería de carácter ordenatorio. Llegados a este punto, dada su relevancia para el caso concreto, resulta fundamental dejar asentado que este Tribunal respeta mas no comparte, la posición sostenida por parte del Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo en los votos 168-F-TC-2018 de las 10:10 horas y 169-F-TC-2018 de las 10:15, ambos del día 28 de noviembre de 2018; en estos votos se sostiene que ante la laguna normativa en la regulación de los “…plazos de prescripción a aplicar en las diferentes etapas del procedimiento administrativo sancionador […] esta Cámara estima que esa eventual laguna normativa debe llenarse aplicando el referido plazo bianual. Esto, considerando que esa disposición indica, de modo genérico, que las faltas graves prescriben a los dos años. Es decir, el legislador dispuso que, tratándose de las faltas graves, el plazo prescriptivo a aplicar es de dos años…”. Tal y como lo expusimos en la sentencia de esta Cámara número 96-2019 – VI de las 16:10 horas del 31 de julio del 2019, la integración como técnica hermenéutica permite que ante una situación de anomia normativa, el Juzgador por imperativo iura novit curia pueda dar respuesta a la causa judicial que le ha sido puesta en conocimiento, mediante el recurso a diversas fuentes, escritas y no escritas, sea ante la imprevisión normativa o la deficiente formulación (por insuficiencia) de una norma, que deja sin regulación supuestos de hecho que poseen trascendencia para el Derecho. Sin embargo, la realización de esta labor presenta límites insoslayables para el operador jurídico, quien debe garantizar que en la integración normativa se logre un equilibrio entre la eficiencia de la Administración y la dignidad, la libertad y los otros derechos fundamentales del individuo, precisamente como lo estipulan los numerales 8 y 10 LGAP: “…Artículo 8º.-El ordenamiento administrativo se entenderá integrado por las normas no escritas necesarias para garantizar un equilibrio entre la eficiencia de la Administración y la dignidad, la libertad y los otros derechos fundamentales del individuo. […] Artículo 10.- 1. La norma administrativa deberá ser interpretada en la forma que mejor garantice la realización del fin público a que se dirige, dentro del respeto debido a los derechos e intereses del particular. 2. Deberá interpretarse e integrarse tomando en cuenta las otras normas conexas y la naturaleza y valor de la conducta y hechos a que se refiere…” (Resaltado no es del original), e igualmente, que esta labor se conforme a los preceptos constitucionales derivados de la doctrina del “test de razonabilidad” desarrollado por la Sala Constitucional (ver sentencias n° 2013-1276 de las 14:50 horas del 29 de enero de 2013, 2016-2706 de las 16:15 horas del 23 de febrero de 2016 y 2019-04582de las 09:15 horas del 15 de marzo de 2019, entre otras). Así las cosas, considera esta Sección que, aunque la respeta, no puede compartir la posición sostenida por el Tribunal de Casación referida a que la laguna normativa respecto del plazo, tanto para adoptar como para ejecutar el acto, se regirán por lo dispuesto en el artículo 83 LGP, por la razón de que opta por la alternativa más lesiva, innecesaria y desproporcionada, sin considerar otros escenarios o las circunstancias de hecho que justifican los plazos prolongados de la primera fase antes comentada y por ende, desequilibra con ello la relación jurídico administrativa en demérito de los derechos de los administrados. En este sentido, apreciamos que un plazo de dos años sólo para adoptar el acto final carece de razonabilidad y atenta contra el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida, y esto se puede colegir con sólo confrontar la solución propuesta por aquel Alto Tribunal respecto de otras respuestas normativas, concretamente, el artículo 319 LGAP, que prevé como plazo ordenatorio para esta fase un término de quince días, igualmente, con el plazo de dos meses que se dispone en el 261 ibídem para culminar todo el procedimiento ordinario y un mes para resolver el recurso ordinario, (en igual sentido, el artículo 31.6 CPCA), e incluso el término de caducidad por inercia de la Administración en el 340 LGAP, que es uno de seis meses. Consecuentemente, permitir al órgano decisor paralizar el procedimiento por un período que supera varias veces cualquiera de estos límites temporales, consideramos que resulta excesivo e injustificado, partiendo también de que la extensión del plazo para iniciar tiene sustento en los tiempos de reacción de la Administración, particularmente, frente a faltas que implican hechos complejos, que pueden efectivamente tardar varios años en ser de conocimiento de las jerarquías institucionales o para ser sometidas a una debida indagación previa, sin embargo, esto no es el caso de esta etapa, en la cual simplemente se debe tomar una decisión conforme los hallazgos del órgano director en el procedimiento administrativo. De esta manera y como lo ha sostenido reiteradamente este Tribunal, el titular de la potestad contaría entonces con un plazo máximo (de prescripción) de un mes para adoptar ese acto final, en atención al contenido del párrafo segundo del ordinal 414 CdeT: “…el mes comenzará a correr de nuevo en el momento en que la persona empleadora o el órgano competente, en su caso, esté en posibilidad de resolver…”, este plazo de prescripción estaría más acorde esa realidad y con los tiempos procedimentales previstos en la LGAP antes citados, en particular el bimensual ordenatorio del numeral 261, diseñado como límite para culminar todo el procedimiento ordinario.- X.- CONT.- 3) Para la ejecución de la sanción impuesta: Se refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca administrativo para disponer la aplicación de la sanción dictada, es decir, para la ejecución material del acto que dispone como contenido una sanción disciplinaria. Sobre este punto, dada la anomia o laguna normativa ante la que nos encontramos y en los mismo términos que expusimos en el punto anterior, esta Cámara considera que se debe acudir por integración, a lo preceptuado en el artículo 415 del Código de Trabajo que, a diferencia de las otras etapas donde el presupuesto temporal se rige por prescripción, impone en la ejecución de la sanción disciplinaria un término de caducidad de un año: “…Cuando sea necesario seguir un procedimiento y consignar las sanciones disciplinarias en un acto escrito, la ejecución de las así impuestas caduca, para todo efecto, en un año desde la firmeza del acto…” (Resaltado no es del original). Recordemos que en ese sentido, pese a que la norma hace contar el plazo a partir de la firmeza, la ejecución de un acto desfavorable, como lo es precisamente una sanción disciplinaria, está supeditada necesariamente a la comunicación previa a su destinatario, a tenor de la doctrina de los artículos 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, entre otros, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. 4) Para el trámite del procedimiento: Como límite, este umbral esta referido al plazo máximo que puede durar el procedimiento administrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la decisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema encuentra una regulación general en lo dispuesto en el artículo 261, en relación con el 319 y el 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, Ley N°6227, en particular éste último, ya que somete esta fase a un supuesto de caducidad como forma de terminación anormal de éste, ante la inercia de la Administración. Así las cosas y salvo norma especial, (como es el caso, del procedimiento dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial para los funcionarios de ese Poder, al tenor del ordinal 211 de ese marco legal), esta etapa no tiene regulaciones de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, toda vez que el plazo bimensual que se dispone en la LGAP -tal y como lo adelantamos anteriormente-, consiste en uno de naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria, lo que desde luego no incluye ni permite procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas, arbitrarias y desproporcionadas, los que serían inválidos por lesión a la máxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Así, en tesis de inicio, el exceso de dos meses, no lleva per se a la nulidad del procedimiento por preclusión de la competencia, aun cuando es necesario analizar de manera casuística, si tales duraciones atentan contra la celeridad y la eficiencia que desde el plano racional y proporcional deben imperar en estas lides. En este sentido, puede verse el fallo No. 199-2011-VI de esta Sección VI, de las las 16: 20 horas del 12 de septiembre del 2011. En este punto ha de remitirse además a lo estatuido por el precepto 340 de la LGAP que regula el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento, en los casos en que la Administración instructora que lo inició, lo someta a estado de abandono por un plazo igual o superior de seis meses por causas imputables a aquella. Siendo que en la especie el debate se formula en orden a la aplicación o no del régimen agravado de prescripción por la supuesta concurrencia de afectaciones al régimen de probidad, se hace necesario realizar algunas consideraciones en orden a precisar el contenido e implicaciones de tal régimen. Con todo, esta Sección ha establecido que la dilación injustificada y desproporcionada del procedimiento, aún esa connotación ordenatoria del elemento temporal, puede llevar a la nulidad de ese iter, por lesión al principio de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida.- XI.- CONT.- Sobre la interrupción y suspensión de los plazos de prescripción.- Como hemos visto hasta ahora, las regulaciones sobre el presupuesto temporal que incide en el ejercicio de la competencia, se desarrollan a través de las figuras de la caducidad o de la prescripción. Igualmente, determinamos que el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se limita en el tiempo de diferente manera conforme el estadio o etapa del procedimiento de la que se trate, por lo que en la fase inicial y en la de adopción del acto, se regula según el instituto de la prescripción, mientras que en la de ejecución por la de caducidad. En la de instrucción, se regula según la figura del caducidad del procedimiento o bien, por el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida. Es en los escenarios regulados por prescripción, que es posible someter el plazo a causales de suspensión o interrupción. La distinción fundamental entre ambas radica en que, en los supuestos de interrupción, el decurso del tiempo anterior al hecho que da lugar a tales supuestos deviene en inexistente, es decir, se genera una ficción jurídica por la cual el tiempo transcurrido deja de existir para todo efecto legal, de modo que nuevamente comienza a correr el plazo prescriptivo. El artículo 878 del Código Civil dice: “…El efecto de la interrupción es inutilizar para la prescripción todo el tiempo corrido anteriormente…”. Por otra parte, en las causales de suspensión, el acaecimiento del hecho lo que hace es inhibir momentáneamente el transcurso del tiempo, por lo que una vez desaparecido, se reanuda el cómputo del plazo justo en el mismo punto en el que fue paralizado. La Sala Primera ha señalado: “…En primer término, precisa recordar que la prescripción está sujeta a causas de suspensión y de interrupción. Sobre el tema, esta Sala ha indicado que, en virtud de la primera, cuando se produce alguna de las que tengan este efecto, el plazo deja de correr y cuando cesa el motivo de su paralización, corre de nuevo desde el punto en que se suspendió. En la interrupción, por el contrario, sobrevenida la causal, el plazo corre nuevamente, es decir, el curso del tiempo transcurrido a favor de la prescriptibilidad deja de existir; y comienza a computarse otro a partir del hecho o circunstancia que indujo esta situación. En consecuencia, no puede contarse el que ya había transcurrido…” (Sentencia n° 348-F-2007 de las 10:25 horas del 11 de mayo de 2007). De estas categorías, la que interesa para efectos de la prescripción disciplinaria es la de la interrupción, toda vez que es ésta, la que expresamente se ha regulado en los diversos marcos normativos a los que hemos hecho referencia en este fallo: el artículo 83 de la Ley General de Policía, en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, o en el artículo 414 del Código de Trabajo (reformado por Ley N° 9343). Las dos primeras normas, sin embargo, prevén un único supuesto de interrupción, dispuesto sólo para el estadio inicial del procedimiento: la comunicación inicial del procedimiento disciplinario o traslado de cargos: “…La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario…” (Art. 83 LGP); y “…La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo…” (Art. 71 LOCGR). Conforme entonces estas normas, es indudable que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto continuad de interrupción de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que consiste en un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad. Al inhibir el tiempo transcurrido anteriormente y mantener paralizado el decurso del tiempo hasta que el asunto llegue a conocimiento del jerarca, no podría considerarse entonces que sea el acto final el que sea susceptible de interrumpir la prescripción en relación a esta etapa, ya que, como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración disponga primero la apertura y luego el trámite de la causa administrativa, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297 y 308 LGAP. Por su parte, la regla general del Código de Trabajo dispone: “…En caso de que la parte empleadora deba cumplir un procedimiento sancionador, la intención de sanción debe notificarse al empleado dentro de ese plazo y, a partir de ese momento, el mes comenzará a correr de nuevo en el momento en que la persona empleadora o el órgano competente, en su caso, esté en posibilidad de resolver, salvo que el procedimiento se paralice o detenga por culpa atribuible exclusivamente a la parte empleadora, situación en la cual la prescripción es aplicable, si la paralización o suspensión alcanza a cubrir ese plazo…”. La redacción de esta norma deja entrever la existencia de dos plazos prescriptivos de un mes, uno para el inicio del procedimiento, que se interrumpe con la notificación al trabajador de la “intención de sanción” y que cede frente a los supuestos especiales antes comentados, y otro, para la adopción del acto final, que se interrumpirá después de dictado el acto sancionatorio, en concreto, con su debida comunicación, toda vez que según los artículos 140, 142, 239 y 240 LGAP, la eficacia del acto -que incluye el efecto interruptor de la prescripción- surge con la notificación. Asimismo, dado que esa eficacia sólo puede ser de carácter prospectiva (ex nunc) en atención a la naturaleza sancionatoria del acto, no podría entonces sostenerse válidamente, que el efecto interruptor puede extenderse de manera retroactiva a la fecha de adopción de la conducta.-"
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