Prevalence of a modified start order for qualified reasons in administrative contractingPrevalencia de la orden de inicio modificada por razones calificadas en contratación administrativa

**V.- GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING:** The dispute having been joined in this manner, before proceeding to analyze the arguments of the parties, the issue of contracting in general terms will be analyzed. In this regard, we have that the Public Administration employs various means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not exhausted in mere material actions or formal administrative acts, insofar as it also resorts to the mechanism of administrative contracting, in which the fulfillment of an object is agreed upon with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the public interest sought. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative contracting there are a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills signed in a document and that condition its creation, development, and extinction. This aspect is central and determines an unquestionable difference with respect to a private contract, where the particular interests of the parties are decisive, whereas in this case, the public interest pervades the entire contracting. It is thus that the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and termination to the specific legal framework governing the matter and the specific contracting. In this sense, the free and sovereign act of will of the contractor is filtered by the administrative legal framework, and fundamentally by the contracting regulations, whether it be the tender conditions or specifications (cartel), which form the basis of the contract. Although doctrine has oscillated in a discussion on whether it should be considered a complex act or a contracting modality, even viewing it as a type of accepted unilateral promise 68, the discussion, while interesting from an academic standpoint, is irrelevant for the resolution of the dispute now before us.

Ordinance one hundred and eighty-two of the Political Constitution provides: “Contracts for the execution of public works entered into by the Powers of the State, the Municipalities, and the autonomous institutions, purchases made with funds from those entities, and the sales or leases of property belonging to them, shall be made through a tender process (licitación), in accordance with the law regarding the respective amount.” In accordance with said norm, the Public Administration, to achieve the purposes established in the legal framework and with the purpose of satisfying its requirements efficiently and timely, must resort to administrative contracting procedures in order to select the offer that best suits public needs. This activity is subject to a series of principles, defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its Voto 998 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, which stated, as is of interest here: “ ...VI. THE PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING. By virtue of the foregoing, it must be understood that Article 182 of the Political Constitution gives rise to all the constitutional principles and parameters that govern the contractual activity of the State. Some of these principles that guide and regulate the tender (licitación) are: ... 2.-of equality of treatment among all possible bidders, ...has a dual purpose, that of being a guarantee for the citizens (administrados) in the protection of their interests and rights as contractors, bidders, and as private individuals, which translates into a prohibition for the State to impose restrictive conditions for access to the contest, whether through the promulgation of legal or regulatory provisions with that object, or in its concrete action; and that of constituting a guarantee for the administration, insofar as it increases the possibility of a better selection of the contractor; all of the foregoing, within the constitutional framework provided by Article 33 of the Fundamental Charter; 3.-of publicity, which constitutes the prerequisite and guarantee of the commented principles, since it seeks to assure the citizens the broadest certainty of free participation under conditions of absolute equality in the administrative contracting procedures, and which consists of the invitation to the tender contest being made in a general, open, and as broad as possible manner to all potential bidders, with the tender specifications (cartel) being given the widest dissemination, as well as the broadest access to the administrative file, reports, resolutions, and in general to the entire process in question; 4.-of legality or transparency of procedures, insofar as the contractor selection procedures must be defined a priori in a precise, certain, and concrete manner, so that the administration cannot circumvent the predefined rules in the legal norm that determines the framework of action, as a development of what is provided to that effect in the Political Constitution; 5.-of legal certainty, which is derived from the previous one, since by subjecting the administrative contracting procedures to the rules contained in the normative provisions, security and guarantee are given to bidders of their participation; ... 8.-principle of good faith, in that in the processing of tenders and in general, in everything concerning administrative contracting, it is considered a basic moral principle that the administration and bidders act in good faith, where the actions of both parties are characterized by clear ethical standards, where the public interest prevails over any other.” These principles permeate the subject matter of administrative contracting.

From the standpoint of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both the contracting entities and the contracting companies is contemplated in the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and fully developed in its regulation, without prejudice to the existence of special norms in the matter. Article 15 of said regulatory body expressly indicates the following obligation of every contracting Administration: "The Administration is obligated to comply with all commitments, validly acquired, in administrative contracting and to provide collaboration so that the contractor executes the agreed-upon object in a suitable manner." On the other hand, correlatively to said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following obligation for contractors: "Contractors are obligated to fully comply with what was offered in their proposal and in any formal documented manifestation that they may have additionally provided during the course of the procedure or in the formalization of the contract." Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in contracting, through which both parties have, as a reference in fulfilling their obligations, a duty of mutual compliance and collaboration.

For its part, Article 51 of the Regulation to the Law provides: “The tender specifications (cartel) constitute the specific regulation of the contracting being promoted, and all the legal norms and constitutional principles applicable to the respective procedure are understood to be incorporated into its clauses. It must constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad regarding the opportunity to participate. For its preparation, the Administration may contract or request the assistance of individuals or legal entities specialized in the matter in question, provided they have no direct or indirect particular interest in the business, when it does not have the necessary technical resources within its organization. In those contracting processes that are exceptions to the ordinary contracting procedures, the Administration may, optionally, prepare tender specifications (cartel) with the essential elements in attention to the contractual object, in harmony with the principles of administrative contracting.” It is worth stating that the principles of administrative contracting must be reflected in the stipulations of the tender specifications (cartel). This document is considered the concrete regulation of the contracting, insofar as it clearly establishes what is intended by the Administration, its general and specific conditions, and the manner in which the eventual winning bidder (adjudicatario) will be selected. For this reason, it must be a sufficient, specific, clear, and objective instrument, so that potential bidders are clearly informed of the object and conditions of the contracting. Consequently, it defines the context in which the contest will be carried out and precisely for this reason, the predetermined terms will be binding on the bidder. Thus, it becomes part of the regulations applicable to that specific contracting. The tender specifications (cartel) can be defined as the set of clauses that make up each contracting process, in which the essential elements of the business must be established, that is, the delimitation of the contest object, the description of the good or service to be acquired, the date for receipt of bids, general bases for selection and minimum requirements for the bids, documentation to be submitted, form of quotation, validity of bids, delivery term, form of payment, among others (Article 42 of the Administrative Contracting Law and complemented by the different regulations that have existed). The basic content of tender specifications (cartel) constantly changes according to the needs each contracting process intends to satisfy, hence the relevance of the document.

It is affirmed that it has a regulatory nature because it contains a series of mandatory compliance rules and is the basic instrument of the public contractor selection procedure, coming to constitute the true specific regulation of the contracting, both for the procedures to be followed and for the conditions contained therein. It is also a source of interpretation because the clauses or conditions creating rights and duties for the parties are established therein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is hierarchically subordinate to the Law and the Regulation of Administrative Contracting, as well as other specific regulations, insofar as it is subject to the general scope norms that establish transversal provisions for the contracting system. In this sense, the specifications (pliego de condiciones) may contain different types of clauses depending on the object of each contracting process. Doctrine normally distinguishes between variable and invariable clauses. The former are those in which the individual offers the Administration what is requested by it, and the contracting entity will weigh and choose the offer that best suits the public interests. They may vary or change from one offer to another, but their compliance is necessary and mandatory, since otherwise, the offer is excluded from the contest. Examples of these are those referring to the price, the form of payment, or the delivery term for the goods or services. Normally, this type of clause allows the victorious bidder to be chosen from among its peers. The invariable clauses are of mandatory compliance for the bidder, and adherence to them is binding, as the bidder cannot change them, and if they fail to comply, they are excluded from the tender (licitación). Some of these describe the contractual object. In most of them, the mere presentation of the offer presumes its acceptance. Due to its regulatory nature, the specifications (pliego) are a source of interpretation of the agreement between wills, given that it is based on these that the bidder prepares their offer, which has the characteristic of being integral in all its components, that is, both in the content of the main document and in any attached document. It must be clear that the definition of the conditions of the tender specifications (cartel) should not be understood as a discretionary act in the strict sense, in that each of the provisions must present its due basis, which allows any interested party to request information justifying them or even to file the motion in opposition (recurso de objeción). The latter is the power of any interested party to express opposition to a provision of the specifications (pliego), so that the administrative superior or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) itself (depending on the type of contracting and the object of the contest) may assess the objection and define its relevance, through a fully reasoned act. The bidder, based on the tender specifications (cartel), prepares their sealed bid (plica), obtaining a parameter of legal certainty, where the promoting administration guarantees the observance of the principle of legitimate expectation for potential participants, who know in advance the conditions that govern the contest of their interest. In the face of contracting, each of the bidders is nothing more than a legitimate interested party that the tender specification rules will be fully complied with; such that there is no right to be awarded the contract, but merely an expectation. Even the legal framework guarantees administrative and judicial actions exclusively available to that bidder who could have been the winning bidder in compliance with the tender specifications (cartel), and who, due to illegitimate or illegal situations, was not; so that a person who detects breaches of the tender specifications (cartel) but without the possibility that, even if corrected, they would be the winning bidder, lacks all interest and would have no action whatsoever; except for the possibility of reporting to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which, being the guardian of the public treasury, is called upon to serve as the comptroller of legality of administrative conduct. It must be remembered that the mere presentation of the sealed bid (plica) implies submission to each and every one of the conditions of the specifications (pliego), as it is logical to think that if a person participated in the contest, it was with the interest of offering their goods or services and eventually becoming the winning bidder; naturally, this is except in cases where the will to depart from the tender specifications (cartel) is clearly evident.

Regarding the nature of the offer in this matter, it is understood as a unilateral, free, and voluntary promise by the participant, in order to enter into the contract in the event they are selected. In accordance with the preceding provision, the offer must strictly comply with the content of the tender specifications (cartel), both in the rules of the procedure to be followed, the documents, and above all the requested requirements; if the offer does not comply with what is stipulated in the tender specifications (cartel), it must be excluded from the contest, as already indicated. Not without warning that by the principle of free participation and in satisfaction of the public interest, the greatest number of bidders is sought, which entails that exclusion is the exception and not the rule; provided that this does not promote the generation of discriminatory treatment in favor of some bidder(s), as one cannot go to the extreme of accepting non-compliance just to allow participation. The offer binds the bidder, since in the event of being the winning bidder (adjudicatario), they must submit not only to the tender specification conditions established for that purpose but also to the terms they offered in said document, and binds the Administration, in that its acceptance will mean admitting the delimitation of the terms and conditions of the contracting according to what was proposed by the contractor. That is, the tender specifications (cartel) and the offer must be seen in an integral and integrated manner, such that in the analysis of the latter, one cannot lose sight of what is established in the former. Due to the foregoing, contracting cannot be viewed in its components in an isolated manner, nor abstracted from the legal framework, nor without taking into consideration the integrality of the offer and the tender specifications (cartel) to which it refers.

The legal framework provides as contracting modalities: the Public Tender (Licitación Pública) and the Abbreviated Tender (Licitación Abreviada) (at the time divided into Registry-based and Restricted), in addition to some derivations of these (Auction, tender with financing, with prequalification, and reverse auction), to which are added activities exempt from the contracting procedure (which include -among others- the so-called direct contracting), without prejudice to the fact that numeral 146 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law empowers the authorization of regulations for different contracting modalities in order to address diverse mechanisms, allowing the Administration to establish other contractual modalities not foreseen by the legislator. These regulations can be permanent (until their revocation) or even subject to a term (normally to verify the convenience of maintaining the mechanism). As for the procedure as such, the legal and regulatory norms indicate deadlines and procedural aspects in direct relation to the particular type of contracting; the idea is essentially that the public tender fully guarantees the principles that inform contracting, while in the remaining modalities, certain appeal powers are reduced, the form is made more flexible, among other aspects, since it is possible to guarantee the principles without meeting these requirements. Regarding the latter, the most relevant is the generation of a technical verification and a legal one, the first being the verification of the specific requirements of what the contracting Administration desires, and on the other hand, the legal verification of requirements to make the bidders eligible for award. In this regard, it is worth noting that the tender specifications (cartel) establish admissibility requirements and assessable elements; the former correspond to those whose breach causes the offer to be rejected, such as the participation bond (garantía de participación), identification of the bidder, signature of the offer, indication of price, among many others. The assessable elements allow for the selection among the offers of the one that proves victorious. The former, by their very essence, are subject to prevention, except in expressly regulated cases; the latter, as a matter of principle, are not, to the extent that they would breach the principle of equality between the parties, since by virtue of knowing the other offers at that moment, any additional documentation would vary the eventual qualification, except in cases of historical facts, that is, those that, although they could affect the score, the interested party has no way of manipulating them, typical examples being academic credentials, marital status, experience in an activity, among many others. So that once the offers are received, the Administration must proceed to carry out two analyses (whether simultaneously or successively), the first of them of a legal nature, which aims to verify compliance with the non-technical invariable clauses, and the second, verifying the variable or technical aspects, generating a recommendation. It should be noted that the Public Administration is authorized to request clarifications to the offer (as long as this does not generate unequal treatment) and eventually it is possible to request additional information, based on the doctrine of historical facts, even when this affects the qualification, insofar as these are situations that occurred prior to the contest, were timely invoked by the interested party, and what is missing is only at the level of accreditation. Always under the understanding that said data are not manipulable by the interested party. It is based on this recommendation that the head of the entity or the subordinate officer with competence to do so proceeds to make the award (adjudicación). Here again, the tender specifications (cartel) become important, since the evaluation parameters are set therein, it is on that basis that the qualification is assigned to the bidders, and consequently, it is the foundation for determining the winner. After the award (adjudicación), the appeal stage opens, which can be internal or external, depending on the contractual object or its amount; where the existence of re-awards is possible, which would empower new appeal actions. Once the decision is final, the execution stage opens, which begins with the purchase order and/or the contract; such that the latter is a document where the agreement of wills is formalized, where the specifications (pliego cartelario) and the offer (in addition to all internal regulations) are integrated, while the former is a financial document. Once these are resolved, a final act is generated in favor of a specific contractor. Subsequently, based on the tender specifications (cartel) and the contents of the awarded offer, the respective administrative contract is founded, which must be interpreted based on the legal instruments that comprise it, that is, the tender specifications or conditions (cartel o pliego de bases), the awarded offer, and the regulations and principles specific to administrative contracting; based on the logic that from the technical and legal reports, the contracting Administration rejects the ineligible offers, whether for non-compliance with admissibility requirements, or for abusive or ruinous prices, in order to subsequently assign the score according to the qualification table indicated in the specifications (plica). Beginning the appeal process.

In light of the above, in matters of administrative contracting, the determination of the effective fulfillment of the obligation by both contracting parties must refer to both the tender specifications (cartel) and the offer considered in an integral manner, and always oriented towards compliance with the principle of good faith between the subscribing parties and in attention to the public interest that guided the Administration's decision to carry out the respective contracting. It is normal that, depending on the clarity of the contractual object and/or its amount, the contract is dispensed with, using only the purchase order.

**Contractual Breach:** From a civil standpoint, the most common or traditional definition of a contract is that which describes it as an agreement of wills, freely expressed and without any defect, of a patrimonial nature, from which reciprocal rights and obligations arise. Said agreement, as indicated by Article 1008 of our Civil Code, “must be free and clearly manifested. The manifestation can be made by word, in writing, or by acts from which it is necessarily deduced.” From the perspective of Administrative Law, for the Argentine author José Roberto Dromi, the contract is “every bilateral manifestation or common will, producing legal effects between two persons, one of whom acts in the exercise of the administrative function. It is an agreement creating legal relationships through the simple consent of adhesion of the individual to relationships previously established by the Administration.” The essential elements of the administrative contract are: subject, consent, and object -which we will develop for the purposes of this lawsuit cause, purpose, and form.- As for the object of the contract, we must indicate that this term refers not only to the thing that will eventually be the material point of reference of the contract or to the promised performance but, in general, to the clauses of the contract and its terms and conditions. However, in a more precise technical-legal sense, it is understood that the object of the obligation refers to the performance owed, that is, a behavior of the obligor, whether an active conduct or an omission of the obligor, “as stated in Article 629 of the Civil Code that 'every obligation has as its object to give, to do, or to refrain from doing something, thereby affirming that the object is constituted by the act of giving, doing, or not doing something, which denotes that a conduct is the object of the obligation, that is, the performance'” (underlined in the original, Casafont Romero, Pablo, Ensayos de Derecho Contractual, Colegio de Abogados, Second edition 1979, San José, Costa Rica, p. 15).

It is also worth noting the almost unanimous doctrinal opinion that the contract with the Public Administration and, consequently, the offer made to it, are adhesion contracts, which is partially true, given the necessary freedom of the contestant to determine for themselves, at least, the price of the offer. The phenomenon arises from two fundamental facts: 1- The individual's offer is delimited by the particular conditions (cartel o convocatoria de licitación), unilaterally prepared by the Public Administration, without discussion with the contracting party nor an opportunity for the latter to influence its content. 2- The latter is largely complemented, in turn, by the so-called general conditions, which are true model contract projects aimed at formulating, in the most abstract and comprehensible way possible, the conditions, terms, obligations, and rights of the parties in the contract. The object, in a general sense, of a contract is the consequence or effect it produces and that is pursued when entering into it. Dugüit makes a lengthy distinction between the immediate object and the mediate object of the will. The immediate object is always a material act consisting of a physical movement, sometimes a transfer of ownership (tradición), sometimes a verbal or written declaration. The mediate object is the legal situation produced by the immediate object. The actually desired material act is desired as a means to achieve the creation of a legal situation. The object must be certain, possible, lawful, and moral. It is not essential that it possesses a patrimonial content, but it must necessarily be assessable and be transformed into a pecuniary performance in case of breach. In summary, the object of the contract is constituted by the contractually imposed obligation, which implies a performance (prestación), which always constitutes a conduct of giving, doing, or not doing something. Now, if the object of the contract is always the obligation of a performance owed (prestación debida), then the object of the contract is fulfilled by performing the required conduct or behavior, under a principle of contractual good faith [...]

**Criteria of the Tribunal:** This Chamber considers that the Municipal representation is not correct in this argument, since although Article 155 of the Municipal Code states “Appeals in matters of administrative contracting shall be governed by the provisions established in the law regulating administrative contracting”; the Administrative Contracting Law reserves in its Chapter IX the applicable appeals (recursos) in administrative contractual matters, establishing as the first appeal the motion in opposition (recurso de objeción) against the Tender Specifications (Cartel) and, depending on the amount, the appeal or revocation appeal against the award act. These are the appeals in the contracting phase reserved for the instances indicated therein, without considering appeals before those instances in the contract execution phase. Thus, the content of the contested agreement addressed the communication of the termination of the contract due to the expiry of its term, with the municipal corporation expressing its decision not to extend it. Consequently, what was contested was neither against the objection to the tender specifications (cartel) nor its award (adjudicación), so Section III could indeed proceed to hear the challenge to the cited agreement. Regarding the argument put forth by the Municipal representation that if Section Three considered that it was a unilateral termination (rescisión) of the contract, since it had already been extended and in that case the plaintiff should have resorted to the appeals provided for in Articles 206 and 208 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law; said argument is also not admissible, since it was never the Municipality's intent to terminate (rescindir) the contract, but rather the contested agreement was basically to communicate that, in accordance with the provisions of clause five of the signed contracts, the contract was considered terminated due to the expiry of its term and not terminated (rescindido). It is for the foregoing that the argument of the municipal corporation alleging a lack of competence for Section III to hear the contested agreement by reason of the subject matter is incorrect. The second point to analyze is therefore whether Section III is correct or not in maintaining in resolution 490-2015 that the Municipality was mistaken in attempting to simply substitute the official letters DP-171-2013 and DP-172-2013 of July 31, 2013, with other documents bearing the same official letter numbers issued on October 4, 2013, with contradictory content regarding the start order, without respect for formalities, to the detriment of legal certainty, and ignoring the provisions of Articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP, regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of administrative acts, and that the second start order was issued outside the term indicated in Article 32 of the Administrative Contracting Law and 192 of its Regulation, and that therefore, the start orders dated July 31, 2013 must prevail, and since the contested agreement regarding the will not to extend the contract was issued until September 1, 2014, the automatic extension had been fulfilled; concluding that Section that the manifestations made by the Municipal Corporation in that venue constituted mere subjective or argumentative assessments, without an objective basis that could be analyzed.

Court's Reasoning: Pursuant to Article 49) of the Political Constitution, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is responsible for ensuring the legality of the administrative function of the State and its institutions, so that all their actions conform to the legal system. For its part, the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code seeks as its goal the real truth of the facts submitted to this Court's knowledge. The contentious proceeding is therefore a plenary proceeding, whose guiding principle is the search for the real truth of the facts submitted to its knowledge. Under these premises, this Court will analyze the conflict submitted to its knowledge. For the Chamber and the parties, the debate revolves around determining which start order must prevail, whether those issued by official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13, both dated July 31, 2013, and which indicated the start order for the day of August 12, 2013, or those issued under those same official letter numbers but dated October 4, 2013, and which established the start order for the day of October 7, 2013. According to the provisions of resolution No. 490-2015, the Third Section annulled the agreement because it considered that the municipal corporation, by issuing the start orders for the day of October 7, 2013, disregarded the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of the administrative act, without respect for formalities and to the detriment of legal certainty, and that in any case the second start order was issued outside the 15-business-day period after the countersignature or internal approval of the contract, as provided by Article 32 of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación) and 192 of its Regulations. For its part, the State representation indicated in the response to the complaint and in the trial hearing that the start orders dated July 31, 2013, constituted administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights in favor of Mrs. González Arguedas, which could not be disregarded by the municipal corporation without resorting to their annulment in accordance with the mechanisms provided for in the LGAP. For her part, Mrs. González Arguedas in her response to the complaint indicated only that the start order was issued for August 12, 2013, such that by the date on which the Municipality's decision not to extend the contract was communicated to her, the automatic extension had already become effective. In accordance with what was indicated by the State representation, the point to be elucidated is therefore to determine if the start order indeed constitutes a declaratory act of subjective rights, and therefore if said right arose from its issuance. For this Chamber, the start order is basically a document in which the contractor is told from what moment the agreed-upon period for providing or performing the contractual object begins to be computed (in this case, the operational service of the CECUDI centers in Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí). The start order is not a complex document, nor does it require any specific formality; rather, it is a logical and necessary consequence of effectiveness (not validity) of what was already provided for in the Tender Specifications (Cartel) and in the contract, and it does need to be notified to the contractor. As a general principle, according to the provisions of Article 32 of the LCA and 192 of its Regulations, the start order must be issued within 15 business days following the countersignature or internal approval of the contract, although for qualified reasons, said period may be extended, so it is not a peremptory period but a regulatory one, and competence is not lost by the passage of time. Let us recall that article 329 of the LGAP states that an administrative act issued outside the time limit is valid for all purposes, unless a contrary rule exists, which is not the case here. Thus, the contractor is obligated to fulfill the contracted service within the established period, and the start order constitutes the "starting signal" for the material provision of the service or contract object, and the period established in the Tender Specifications (Cartel) or in the contract is computed from the start order date. However, it may well be the case that, for reasons beyond the Administration's or the contractor's control, the period must be extended, such that the start signal is halted or the deadline for fulfilling what was agreed is extended due to delays not attributable to the contractor, as for example when the Administration has not obtained the necessary permits in time to begin its execution. It is important to take into account that in such a scenario, it is not that the contract is suspended (which is only suspended due to force majeure or act of God), but rather only the calendar dates are extended and what is suspended is the deadline for the start of its execution, but the calendar term of the contract remains the same. Said suspension, provided it is justified, can occur ex officio or at the request of a party, under a principle of contractual good faith. Now then, the suspension of the deadline may occur due to supervening events after the start order has been issued, and if it is for reasons attributable to the Administration, the latter's duty to indemnify the contractor for the damages and losses proven to have been caused by the suspension arises. For the Chamber, from a technical legal standpoint, the start order does not constitute an act declaratory of a subjective right (as the State representation understands it), since the subjective right arises from the awarded bidding process and the respective contract, and the start order constitutes only a requirement for effectiveness, without being in itself capable of generating a subjective right in the understanding that this right is to start on the date indicated in the start order, because it is clear that the LCA in its Article 32 provides for the possibility of extending said period for qualified reasons. It is for this reason that, contrary to what Section III of this Court, acting as an improper hierarchical authority, stated in its resolution 490-2015, for the Chamber, the change of date in the start order does not produce a defect that contravenes the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of the administrative act. And it is that, as was stated above, the start order is not a complex document nor does it require any formality; rather, it is a logical and necessary consequence of what was already stipulated regarding the computation of the period established in the Tender Specifications (Cartel) and in the contract. Hence, what must be analyzed is whether the Municipality suspended the originally issued start order (official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13, both dated July 31, 2013), for qualified reasons as required by Article 32 of the LCA, and the manner in which it modified the start orders. Let us recall that the Third Section, in its resolution 490-2015, indicated with respect to the claims made at that instance by the municipal corporation, that its statements remained mere subjective or argumentative assessments without an objective basis that could be analyzed at that instance. Now, as indicated above, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction must ensure the legality of administrative actions, and the goal of the plenary proceeding in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional venue, in accordance with the CPCA, is the search for the real truth of the facts. In pursuit of achieving this real truth, in the preliminary hearing, documentary evidence was admitted consisting of File I and II corresponding to Bidding Processes No. 2013LN-000002-01 and No. 2013LN-000003-01 and the administrative file referring to the agreement of the Municipal Council through which both contracts were terminated due to the expiration of the term and the Municipality's will not to extend them was communicated. As testimonial evidence, the statement of the witness-official Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, ID number 1-1135-0949, was admitted, who at the time of the events worked for the Municipal Corporation as Municipal Provider and was the one who issued official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of July 31 and October 4, 2013, recording in the first ones August 12 as the start order date and later in the second ones the date of October 7, 2013, which is the subject of controversy in the present Litis. Now then, from the documentary evidence, the existence of both official letters with different start orders is indeed confirmed. Thus, at pages 89 and 90 of the administrative file, we have official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of July 31, 2013, in which Mr. Hernández Arguedas recorded August 12, 2013, as the start order date. Said official letters were personally notified to Mrs. González Arguedas on the same July 31, 2013, in which the start order was for August 12, 2013. Then, at pages 100 and 101 of the same file, official letters DP-171 and DP-172, but dated October 4, 2013, also personally notified that same day to Mrs. González Arguedas, appear, but in which the start order was indicated for October 7, 2013. Faced with both actions, the plaintiff remained silent in the administrative venue. Now then, from the statement of the cited witness, it became clear that the reason for which the start order date was changed was that, prior to putting the CECUDI program into operation in Puerto Viejo and in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, approval from the Comprehensive Care Council (Consejo de Atención Integral) of the Ministry of Health was required, an approval that was not available for August 12, 2013, a reason for which the execution of both contracts could not begin on that day. He indicated before this Chamber that he communicated that situation to Mrs. González Arguedas and that she expressly indicated her consent to wait until the approvals from the CAI were given to begin executing what was agreed. In response to questions from this Court, he answered that it was due to this that, before October 7, 2013, there are no lists of children attended at both Centers and there are no payments corresponding to the months of August, September, and October, with the first payment being not until the month of November 2013 for services provided as of October 7, which proves that the operationalization of the CECUDI centers in both districts did not occur until the month of October 2013, reiterating that this situation was always communicated to Mrs. González Arguedas, who accepted the change in the start order date, without presenting any complaint or claim regarding the matter. At this point, we can affirm that the plaintiff adapted her conduct to the second start order without formulating any objection thereto, unlike the first one. Said testimony coincides with the evidence contained in the administrative file at pages 38, 39, 77, and 78, in which Dr. Francisco Oviedo Gómez, President of the Comprehensive Care Council (Consejo de Atención Integral) of the Ministry of Health, informed the Directorate of the Governing Health Area of Sarapiquí that, through official letters CAI-0926-2013 and CAI-0927-2013, both dated September 23, 2013, that Council, in ordinary session No. 9, Minutes No. 14 of September 20, 2013, authorized the facilities of the Child Care and Development Center (Centro de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil) of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí for a period of 3 years, from September 20, 2013, to September 19, 2016, to serve up to 75 children aged 0 to 12 years from 6:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Thus, for the Chamber, there was a qualified reason to extend the start order date, since the CECUDI centers in Puerto Viejo and Horquetas could not operate until their approval was given by the CAI of the Ministry of Health, an approval that was not given until September 20, 2013. In addition to this, there is no evidence that the service was provided before October 7, 2013; there are no lists of children attended as of August 12, nor invoice processing corresponding to the months of August and September, or any evidence that would suggest that both CECUDI centers began operating as of August 12, 2013, nor any claim by Mrs. González Arguedas regarding the change in the start date that would suggest she did not agree with said change, even though both official letters were personally notified to her. Finally, the validity under Administrative Law of the provisions in official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of October 4, 2013, in which the start order was given for the day of October 7, 2013, remains to be analyzed. According to what was provided in resolution No. 490-2015, for the Third Section, the official letters dated July 31, in which the start orders for August 12, 2013, were recorded, must prevail because the Municipality erred when it replaced the originally issued ones with others having contradictory content regarding the start order, without respect for formalities, to the detriment of legal certainty, and disregarding the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of administrative acts. Firstly, it must be noted that said Section did not indicate which formalities were missed or how said change generated legal insecurity for the contractor. In this regard, it must be indicated that according to Article 130 of the LGAP, the administrative act consists of the unilateral manifestation of will of the Administration, capable of producing legal effects, that is, capable of granting, denying, or cancelling subjective rights or legitimate interests of the administered party; in this case, of the contractor. According to what was indicated above, it is clear that the subjective right of the contractor originated with the awarding of both contracts and with the signing of the contract, and not in the start order, which is identical to an act inherent to the execution phase of the effects of a procurement, and not with a constitutive act that declares a subjective right in the contractor's favor. Furthermore, the start order is not a complex document, and for qualified reasons, the period to issue the start order can be extended beyond the 15 business days. (Article 32 of the LCA). In the case under examination, it has become clear that there was a qualified reason that prevented the start order from being given or observed for the day of August 12, 2013, which was that on that date the facilities of the CECUDI centers in the districts of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí had not been authorized by the CAI of the Ministry of Health. A situation that, according to the testimony of the witness-official Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, Municipal Provider at that time, was communicated to Mrs. González Arguedas, who agreed to the change in the start order date, testimony that was not discredited by the indicated lady, such that there was neither legal insecurity nor uncertainty because she was always informed of the actions taken regarding the change of date, and despite being personally notified, the contractor did not present any claim in this regard. Now then, according to Article 133 and 136 of the LGAP, every administrative act must have a basis (motivo), as one of its constitutive elements, and in its absence the act is null, because that law requires that the basis be legitimate, that is, in accordance with the legal system, and that it exists. Furthermore, the administrative act must state its reasons (motivado), meaning that the justifications for which it is adopted in a specific sense must be explained. Now, although Article 134 of the LGAP indicates that the administrative act must be expressed in writing, for the Chamber, Mr. Hernández Arguedas certainly explained to Mrs. González Arguedas the reasons or justifications for which the change in the start order date had to be made, and although they were not recorded in an official letter, the truth is that the indicated lady never opposed the change of date, nor contested such a situation, nor presented any claim regarding it, and it was not until they notified her of the termination of the contracts signed due to the expiration of the term and the Municipality's will not to extend them, that she claimed—compromising the principle of good faith—that the start order was given for August 12, 2013, and that therefore the intention not to extend it should have been notified to her no later than July 12, 2014. The truth of the matter is that she herself adapted her conduct in execution of the contract to the second start order and not the first, which she now seems to want to vindicate. Thus, from the documentary and testimonial evidence presented and which the Court has deemed proven, the start order that, in accordance with the real truth of the facts, must be computed for the purposes of the contract term was the one issued by official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of October 4, 2013, with functions beginning on October 7, 2013. A situation that, in the Court's opinion, is demonstrated since there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that between August 12 and October 7, 2013, children were attended at the CECUDI centers in the districts of Horquetas and Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí. Furthermore, it is also not evident that Mrs. González Arguedas presented any claim until before September 5, 2014, which was the date on which she filed the appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal against Municipal Council agreement No. 35-2014, in which it was resolved to terminate the signed contracts due to the expiration of the term and the Council's will not to extend them was communicated, maintaining that the start date was August 12 and not October 7, 2013, that is, 11 months after official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13 of October 4, 2013, were notified to her, arguing that the automatic extension according to the contract had become effective as of August 12, 2014, which in this Court's opinion is unfounded, as there is no evidence that she began the operationalization of the CECUDI centers in the indicated districts as of August 12, 2013, and on the contrary, the Municipal Corporation did prove that, as a result of what was set forth above, the authorizations for the facilities of the CECUDI centers in both districts were obtained only until September 20, 2013, and hence the start orders were given only until October 7, 2013. And it is that accepting that the start orders were given as of August 12, 2013, as Mrs. González Arguedas affirmed, would lead us to the conclusion that the plaintiff breached what was agreed upon from that date until October 7, 2013, as it is reiterated that there is no evidence that allows arriving at the conclusion that the start order and the material operationalization of the CECUDI centers occurred before October 7, 2013, and that in this case the start order had to be extended until October 7, 2013, for the qualified reason indicated above. A situation of which the plaintiff was notified and with which she agreed, according to the testimony of the Municipal Provider. Now, in accordance with the principles that enshrine the contractual activity of the Administration mentioned above, Article 15 of the LCA establishes the Administration's obligation to fully comply with what was agreed and to collaborate with the contractor so that the latter can fulfill what was agreed in a suitable manner. For its part, Article 20 indicates that the contractor is obliged to fulfill what was offered in the proposal and in any formal manifestation during the procedure or formalization. For the Constitutional Chamber, both articles rest upon a fundamental principle, which is that of good faith, which it defines as a basic moral principle upon which the actions of the subscribing parties to the contract rest. For this Court, according to the evidence in the case file, the municipal corporation acted in good faith by having to vary the start order dates, since the facilities of the CECUDI centers in the districts of Horquetas and Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí had not been authorized by the CAI of the Ministry of Health by August 12, 2013, which made it legally impossible to put them into operation, since doing so would constitute a violation by lacking said requirement. Subsequently, the Municipality at all times communicated this situation to the contractor, and this is evident from the testimony of Mr. Hernández Arguedas, who indicated before the Court ---under oath--- that he, as Municipal Provider, informed the contractor of the situation and that, having the CAI's approval of the CECUDI centers as of September 20, 2013, he personally notified the contractor of the new start orders dated October 7, 2013, with which she agreed. Thus, the situation that prevented the first start orders from becoming effective was a qualified reason, and the contractor was informed of it, meaning there was no bad faith on the part of the Municipal Administration in its actions. And it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 20 of the LCA, the contractor is obliged to verify the correctness of the administrative procurement procedure and contractual execution, and that by virtue of this obligation, to support her petitions she may not allege ignorance of the legal system or of the consequences of the administrative conduct. In this way, if the contractor considered, under a principle of good faith, that the Administration was acting illegally with the change of date in the start order, moving from August 12 to October 7, 2013, she should have contested that situation at the time it was communicated to her what was happening; however, she accepted the change in the start order date and it is not until they notify her of the Municipality's will to terminate the contract due to the expiration of the term and not to extend it, that she indicates that the change in the start order date did not take effect and that the start orders dated August 12, 2013, communicated by official letters of July 31, 2013, must be considered for legal purposes. Thus, this Chamber reaches the conclusion that the agreement adopted in ordinary session No. 35-2014 held on September 1, 2014, Article 5, whereby the Municipal Council concluded that the contracts signed with Mrs. González Arguedas expired due to the expiration of the term, was in accordance with the law, and said agreement was notified to the contractor within the period provided for in the fifth clause of both contracts, such that the provisions of resolution No. 490-2015 of the Third Section did not conform to the real truth of the facts, and upholding it would generate an impact on the public interest and the Municipality's patrimonial interests, since a plenary analysis of what occurred leads to the conclusion that the Third Section's fundamental arguments are unfounded, for which reason its nullity is ordered." Some of these principles that guide and regulate the bidding process are: ... 2.- of equal treatment among all potential bidders, ...it has a dual purpose: to be a guarantee for the administered in the protection of their interests and rights as contractors, bidders, and as private individuals, which translates into a prohibition for the State to impose restrictive conditions for access to the competition, whether through the enactment of legal or regulatory provisions for that purpose, or in its specific actions; and to constitute a guarantee for the administration, insofar as it increases the possibility of a better selection of the contractor; all of the foregoing, within the constitutional framework provided by Article 33 of the Fundamental Charter; 3.- of publicity, which constitutes the prerequisite and guarantee of the principles discussed, since it seeks to ensure the administered the broadest certainty of free concurrence under conditions of absolute equality in public procurement procedures, and which consists of making the invitation to the bidding competition in a general, open, and as broad as possible manner to all possible bidders, giving the tender specifications (cartel) the widest dissemination, as well as the broadest access to the file, reports, resolutions, and in general to the entire process in question; 4.- of legality or transparency of procedures, insofar as the contractor selection procedures must be defined a priori in a precise, certain, and concrete manner, so that the administration cannot circumvent the predefined rules in the legal norm that determines the framework of action, as a development of the provisions to that effect in the Political Constitution; 5.- of legal certainty, which derives from the previous one, since by subjecting the public procurement procedures to the rules contained in the normative provisions, security and guarantee are given to the bidders regarding their participation; ... 8.- principle of good faith (principio de buena fe), in that in the procedures of biddings and, in general, in everything concerning public procurement, it is considered a basic moral principle that the administration and bidders act in good faith, where the actions of both parties are characterized by clear ethical standards, where the public interest prevails over any other." These principles permeate the field of public procurement. From the perspective of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both contracting entities and contracting companies is set forth in the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and fully developed in its regulations, without prejudice to the existence of special rules on the matter. Article 15 of said normative body expressly states the following obligation for every contracting Administration: "The Administration is obliged to comply with all commitments, validly acquired, in public procurement and to provide collaboration so that the contractor executes the agreed-upon object in a suitable manner." On the other hand, correlatively to said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following obligation for contractors: "Contractors are obliged to fully comply with what was offered in their bid and in any formal documented manifestation that they have additionally provided during the procedure or in the execution of the contract." Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in procurement, through which both parties have, as a reference in the fulfillment of their obligations, a duty of mutual compliance and collaboration. For its part, Article 51 of the Regulations to the Law provides: "the tender specifications (cartel) constitutes the specific regulations for the procurement being promoted, and all applicable legal norms and constitutional principles are understood to be incorporated into its clauses. It shall constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad in terms of the opportunity to participate. For its preparation, the Administration may contract or request the assistance of specialized individuals or legal entities in the matter in question, provided they have no particular direct or indirect interest in the business, when the Administration does not have the necessary technical resources within its organization. In those procurements that are exceptions to ordinary procurement procedures, the Administration may, at its discretion, prepare a tender specifications with the essential elements considering the contractual object, in harmony with the principles of public procurement." It is worth stating that the principles of public procurement must be reflected in the stipulations of the tender specifications (cartel). This document is considered the specific regulations for the procurement, insofar as it clearly establishes what is sought by the Administration, the general and specific conditions thereof, and the manner in which the eventual awardee will be selected. Therefore, it must be a sufficient, specific, clear, and objective instrument, so that potential bidders clearly understand the object and conditions of the procurement. Consequently, it defines the context in which the competition will take shape, and precisely for this reason, the predetermined terms will be binding on the bidder. Thus, it becomes part of the regulations applicable to that specific procurement. The tender specifications can be defined as the set of clauses that make up each procurement, in which the essential elements of the business must be established, that is, the delimitation of the competition object, the description of the good or service to be acquired, the date of receipt of bids, general bases for selection and minimum requirements of the bids, documentation to be submitted, quotation method, validity of bids, delivery period, payment method, among others (Article 42 of the Public Procurement Law and complemented by the various regulations that have existed). The basic content of a tender specifications constantly changes according to the needs that each procurement seeks to satisfy, hence the relevance of the document. It is affirmed that it has a regulatory nature because it contains a series of mandatory compliance rules and is the basic instrument of the public contractor selection procedure, becoming the true specific regulations of the procurement, both for the procedures to be followed and for the conditions contained therein. It is also a source of interpretation because the clauses or conditions creating rights and duties for the parties are established therein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, hierarchically it is subordinate to the Law and the Public Procurement Regulations, as well as other specific regulations, insofar as it is subject to the general scope rules that establish cross-cutting provisions for the procurement system. In this sense, the bidding terms (pliego de condiciones) may contain various types of clauses depending on the object of each procurement. Normally, doctrine distinguishes between variable (cláusulas variables) and invariable (cláusulas invariables) clauses. The former are those in which the individual offers the Administration what it requested, and the contracting entity will weigh and choose the offer that best suits the public interests. They may vary or change from one offer to another, but they are of necessary and compulsory compliance, since otherwise the offer is disqualified. Examples of these are those referring to price, payment method, or delivery period of the goods or services. Normally, this type of clause is what allows the winning bidder to be chosen over its peers. The invariable clauses are mandatory for the bidder, and compliance with them is binding, insofar as the bidder cannot change them, and if it fails to comply, it is excluded from the bidding. Some of these are those that describe the contractual object. In most of them, the mere submission of the bid presumes its acceptance. Due to its regulatory nature, the bidding terms are a source of interpretation of the agreement between wills, given that it is based on this that the bidder prepares its sealed bid (plica), which has the characteristic of being comprehensive in all its components, that is, both in the content of the main document and in any attached document.

It must be clear that the definition of the conditions of the tender specifications should not be understood as a discretionary act in the strict sense, as each of the provisions must present its due basis, which allows any interested party to request information justifying them or even to file an objection (recurso de objeción). The latter is the power of any interested party to express opposition to a provision of the bidding terms, so that the administrative superior or the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) itself (depending on the type of procurement and the object of the competition) proceeds to evaluate the objection and define its relevance, through a fully reasoned act. Based on the tender specifications, the bidder prepares its sealed bid, obtaining a parameter of legal certainty, where the promoting administration guarantees the observance of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) for potential participants, who know in advance the conditions governing the competition of their interest. In the face of the procurement, each of the bidders is nothing more than a party with a legitimate interest in ensuring that the tender specifications rules are fully complied with; so there is no right to be awarded, but merely an expectation. Even the legal system guarantees administrative and judicial actions subject exclusively to that bidder who could have been awarded in compliance with the tender specifications, and due to illegitimate or illegal situations was not; so that any person who detects non-compliance with the tender specifications but without having the possibility that, even if corrected, they would be the awardee, lacks any interest and would have no action whatsoever; except for the possibility of a complaint before the Comptroller General of the Republic, which, as guardian of the public treasury (hacienda pública), is called upon to serve as a comptroller of legality of administrative conduct.

It must be remembered that the mere submission of the sealed bid implicitly entails submission to each and every one of the conditions of the bidding terms, insofar as it is logical to think that if the person participated in the competition, it was with the interest of offering their goods or services and eventually being awarded; the foregoing naturally, except in cases where the will to depart from the tender specifications is manifestly clear. Regarding the nature of the bid in this matter, it is understood as a unilateral, free, and voluntary promise by the participant, in order to enter into the contract should they be selected. In accordance with the foregoing provision, the bid must strictly comply with the content of the tender specifications, both in the rules of procedure to be followed, documents, and especially the requirements requested. If the bid does not comply with what is stipulated in the tender specifications, it must be excluded from the competition, as already indicated. Not without warning that, due to the principle of free participation and in satisfaction of the public interest, the greatest number of bidders is sought, which entails that exclusion is the exception and not the rule; provided that this does not promote the generation of discriminatory treatment in favor of any bidder(s), as it also cannot go to the extreme of accepting non-compliance just to allow participation.

The bid binds the bidder, since if they are awarded the contract, they must submit not only to the tender conditions established for that purpose but also to the terms offered by them in said document, and the Administration, insofar as its acceptance will mean admitting the delimitation of the terms and conditions of the procurement as proposed by the contractor. That is, the tender specifications and the bid must be viewed integrally and integrated, so in the analysis of the second, what is established in the first cannot be overlooked. Therefore, the procurement cannot be viewed in its components in isolation, nor abstracted from the legal system, nor without taking into consideration the comprehensiveness of the bid and the tender specifications to which it refers.

The legal system provides for the following procurement modalities: Public Bidding (Licitación Pública) and Abbreviated Bidding (Licitación Abreviada) (once divided into Registry Bidding and Restricted Bidding), plus some derivations of these (Auction, bidding with financing, with prequalification, and reverse auction), to which are added the activities exempt from the procurement procedure (which includes, among others, the so-called direct procurement), without prejudice that numeral 146 of the Regulations to the Public Procurement Law authorizes regulations towards different procurement modalities in order to know diverse mechanisms, allowing the Administration to establish other contractual modalities not foreseen by the legislator. These regulations can be definitive (until their revocation) or even subject to a term (normally to verify the convenience of maintaining the mechanism).

Regarding the procedure as such, the legal and regulatory norms indicate deadlines and procedural aspects in direct relation to the particular type of procurement; the essential idea is that public bidding fully guarantees the principles that inform procurement, while in the remaining modalities, certain appeals (recursivas) are reduced, the form is made more flexible, among other aspects, since it is possible to guarantee the principles without complying with these requirements. Regarding the latter, the most relevant aspect is the generation of a technical verification and a legal one; the first being the verification of the specific requirements of what the contracting Administration desires, and on the other hand, the legal one being the verification of requirements to make the bidders eligible for award. In this regard, it should be noted that tender specifications establish admissibility requirements (requisitos de admisibilidad) and evaluable elements (elementos ponderables). The former correspond to those whose non-compliance results in the bid's exclusion, such as the participation guarantee (garantía de participación), identification of the bidder, signature of the bid, indication of price, among many others. The evaluable elements allow for selecting among the bids the one that is victorious. The former, by their very essence, are preventable (prevenibles), except in expressly regulated cases; the latter, as a general rule, are not, to the extent that doing so would breach the principle of equality between the parties, because by virtue of knowing the other bids at that moment, any additional documentation would vary the eventual qualification, except in cases of historical facts (hechos históricos), that is, those that, although they could affect the score, offer the interested party no way to manipulate them, a typical example being academic records, marital status, experience in an activity, among many others.

So, once the bids are received, the Administration must proceed to carry out two analyses (either simultaneously or successively), the first of a legal nature, which seeks to verify compliance with the non-technical invariable clauses, and the second, verifying the variable or technical aspects, generating a recommendation. It should be noted that the Public Administration is empowered to request clarifications to the bid (as long as it does not generate unequal treatment), and eventually, it is possible to request additional information, based on the doctrine of historical facts, even when this affects the qualification, provided that they are situations that occurred prior to the competition, were timely invoked by the interested party, and what is missing is only in terms of its accreditation. Always under the understanding that such data are not manipulable by the interested party.

It is based on the recommendation that the head of the entity or the subordinate official with the competence to do so proceeds to make the award (adjudicación). Here again, the tender specifications regain importance, because as the evaluation parameters are fixed therein, it is on that basis that the qualification is assigned to the bidders and consequently, it is the basis for determining the winner. From the award, the appeal (recursiva) stage opens, which can be internal or external, depending on the contractual object or its amount; where the existence of re-awards is possible, which would empower new appeals. Once the act is final, the execution stage begins, which starts with the purchase order (orden de compra) and/or the contract; such that the second is a document where the meeting of the minds is formalized, integrating the bidding terms and the bid (in addition to all internal regulations), while the first is a financial document. Once these are resolved, a final act is generated in favor of a specific contractor. Subsequently, based on the tender specifications and the contents of the awarded bid, the respective administrative contract is founded, which must be interpreted from the basis of the legal instruments that comprise it, that is, the tender specifications or bidding terms, the awarded bid, and the regulations and principles specific to public procurement; based on the logic that from the technical and legal reports, the contracting Administration discards the ineligible offers either for non-compliance with admissibility requirements, or for abusive or ruinous prices, in order to subsequently assign the score according to the qualification table indicated in the sealed bid. Thus beginning the appeal process.

By reason of the foregoing, in matters of public procurement, the determination of the effective fulfillment of the obligation by both contracting parties must refer both to the tender specifications and to the bid considered comprehensively, and always oriented towards fulfilling the principle of good faith between the subscribing parties and in attention to the public interest that guided the Administration's decision to carry out the respective procurement. It is normal that, depending on the clarity of the contractual object and/or its amount, the contract is dispensed with, using only the purchase order.

Contractual Breach (Incumplimiento contractual): Civilly, the most common or traditional definition of the contract is that which describes it as a meeting of the minds, freely expressed and without any defect, of patrimonial content, from which reciprocal rights and obligations arise. Said agreement, as indicated by Article 1008 of our Civil Code, "must be free and clearly manifested. The manifestation may be made by word, in writing, or by acts from which it necessarily follows." From the perspective of Administrative Law, for the Argentine author José Roberto Dromi, the contract is "any bilateral manifestation or common will, producing legal effects between two persons, one of whom acts in the exercise of the administrative function. It is an agreement creating legal relationships through the simple consent of adhesion of the individual to relationships previously established by the Administration." The essential elements of the administrative contract are: subject, consent, and object —which we will develop for the purposes of this Litis causa— purpose and form. Regarding the object of the contract, we must indicate that this is the name given not only to the thing that will eventually be the material point of reference of the contract or the committed provision, but, in general, to the contractual clauses and its terms and conditions. However, in a more precise legal technical sense, it is understood that the object of the obligation refers to the due performance, that is, a behavior of the debtor, whether an active or omissive conduct of the obligor, "as stated in Article 629 of the Civil Code that 'every obligation has as its object to give, to do, or to refrain from doing something, it thereby affirms that the object is constituted by the act of giving, doing, or not doing something, which denotes that the object of the obligation is a conduct, that is, the performance'" (underlined in the original, Casafont Romero, Pablo, Ensayos de Derecho Contractual, Colegio de Abogados, Second Edition 1979, San José, Costa Rica, p. 15). It is also worth noting the almost unanimous doctrinal opinion that the contract with the Public Administration, and consequently the offer to it, are adhesion contracts, which is partially true, given the necessary freedom of the competitor to determine for itself, at least, the price of the offer. The phenomenon comes from two fundamental facts: 1- The individual's offer is delimited by the specific bidding terms (tender specifications or call for bids), unilaterally prepared by the Public Administration, without discussion with the contracting party or opportunity for the latter to influence its content. 2- The latter is complemented in large part, in turn, by the so-called general bidding terms, true standard contract designs intended to formulate, in the most abstract and comprehensible way possible, the conditions, terms, obligations, and rights of the parties in the contract. The object, in a general sense, of a contract is the consequence or effect it produces and which is pursued upon its celebration. Duguit makes a meticulous distinction between the immediate object and the mediate object of the will.

The immediate object is always a material act consisting of a physical movement, sometimes a delivery (tradición), sometimes a verbal or written declaration. The mediate object is the legal situation produced by the immediate object. The material act immediately intended is intended as a means to bring about the creation of a legal situation. The object must be certain, possible, lawful, and moral. It is not essential that it have pecuniary content, but it must necessarily be assessable and convertible into a pecuniary obligation in the event of non-performance. In summary, the object of the contract is constituted by the contractually imposed obligation, which implies a performance, which always constitutes conduct of giving, doing, or not doing something. Now, if the object of the contract is always the obligation of a due performance, then the object of the contract is fulfilled by carrying out the obligated conduct or behavior, under a principle of contractual good faith [...]</span></span></p> <p><span idextracto="275555" class="example1 275555" style="margin: 0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: underline;">Court's Criterion</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">: This Chamber considers that the Municipal representation is not correct in this argument, since although article 155 of the Municipal Code states </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">“</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Recursos in matters of administrative procurement shall be governed by the provisions of the law regulating administrative procurement</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">”</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">; the Administrative Procurement Law reserves in its Chapter IX the available remedies (recursos) in administrative contractual matters, establishing as the first remedy the objection against the Tender Document (Cartel) and according to the amount, the appeal or revocation remedy against the award act. These are the remedies in the procurement phase reserved for the instances indicated therein, without considering remedies before those instances in the contract execution phase. Thus, the content of the challenged agreement concerned the communication of the contract's termination by the expiration of the term, with the municipal corporation stating its decision not to extend it. In this way, the challenged act was neither against the objection of the Tender Document (Cartel) nor its award, so Section III could well have heard the challenge to said agreement. Regarding the argument raised by the Municipal representation, that Section III considered it to be a unilateral termination (rescisión) of the contract, since it had already been extended and in that case the plaintiff should have resorted to the remedies provided in articles 206 and 208 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law; said argument is also not receivable, since it was never the Municipality's purpose to declare the contract terminated (rescindido), but rather the challenged agreement was basically to communicate that, in accordance with the provisions of the fifth clause of the signed contracts, the contract was considered finalized by the expiration of the term and not terminated (rescindido). It is for the foregoing reasons that the municipal corporation's argument, accusing Section III of lacking competence to hear the challenged agreement by reason of subject matter, is not correct. The second point to analyze is whether or not Section III is correct in holding in resolution 490-2015, that </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">the Municipality erred in attempting to simply replace official letters DP-171-2013 and DP-172-2013 of July 31, 2013, with other documents bearing the same official letter numbers issued on October 4, 2013, with contradictory content regarding the commencement order, without respecting formalities, to the detriment of legal certainty and disregarding the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP, regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability (ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts, and that the second commencement order was issued beyond the deadline indicated in articles 32 of the Procurement Law and 192 of its Regulation and that therefore the commencement orders of July 31, 2013, must prevail, and since the challenged agreement regarding the will not to extend the contract was issued only on September 1, 2014, the automatic extension was fulfilled; with that Section concluding that the statements made by the Municipal Corporation in that venue constituted mere subjective or argumentative assessments, without an objective basis that could be analyzed. </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: bold;">Court's Criterion</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">: In accordance with article 49) of the Political Constitution, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is responsible for ensuring the legality of the administrative function of the State and its institutions, so that all their actions conform to the legal system. For its part, the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code seeks as its end the real truth of the facts submitted to this Court's knowledge. The contentious process is therefore a plenary process, whose guiding principle is the search for the real truth of the facts submitted to its knowledge. Under these premises, this Court will analyze the conflict submitted to its knowledge. For the Chamber and the parties, the debate revolves around determining which commencement order must prevail, whether those issued through official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13, both dated July 31, 2013, and which indicated the commencement order for August 12, 2013, or those issued under those same official letter numbers but dated October 4, 2013, and which established the commencement order for October 7, 2013. According to the provisions of resolution No. 490-2015, Section III annulled the agreement because it considered that the municipal corporation, by issuing the commencement orders for October 7, 2013, disregarded the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability (ejecutoriedad) of the administrative act without respecting formalities and to the detriment of legal certainty, and that in any case the second commencement order was issued outside the 15-business-day period after the internal approval (refrendo) or approval of the contract, as provided in article 32 of the Procurement Law and 192 of its Regulation. For its part, the State representation stated in the response to the complaint and at the trial hearing, that the commencement orders dated July 31, 2013, constituted administrative acts declaratory of individual rights (derechos subjetivos) in favor of Mrs. González Arguedas, which could not be disregarded by the municipal corporation without resorting to their annulment according to the mechanisms provided in the LGAP. For her part, Mrs. González Arguedas in her response to the complaint indicated only that the commencement order was issued for August 12, 2013, so that by the date on which the Municipality's decision not to extend the contract was communicated to her, the automatic extension had already operated. According to what was indicated by the State representation, the point to be elucidated is therefore to determine if the commencement order effectively constitutes an act declaratory of individual rights (derechos subjetivos), and therefore if such right was born upon its issuance. For this Chamber, the commencement order is basically a document in which the contractor is informed from what moment the agreed term to provide or perform the contractual object begins to be calculated (in this case, the operational service of the CECUDI of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí). The commencement order is not a complex document, nor does it require a specific formality, but rather it is the logical and necessary consequence of the effectiveness (not validity) of what was already provided in the Tender Document (Cartel) and in the contract, and it does require being notified to the contractor. In principle, in accordance with the provisions of article 32 of the LCA and 192 of its Regulation, the commencement order must be issued within 15 business days following the internal approval (refrendo) or internal approval of the contract, although for qualified reasons, this period may be extended, so that it is not a peremptory term but an ordinating one, and competence is not lost by the passage of time. Let us recall that article 329 of the LGAP indicates that an administrative act issued outside the term is valid for all purposes, unless there is a rule to the contrary, which is not the case here. Thus, the contractor is obligated to fulfill the contracted service within the established period and the commencement order constitutes the </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">“</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">starting signal</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">”</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;"> (banderillazo de salida) for the material provision of the service or object of the contract, and it is from the date of the commencement order that the term established in the Tender Document (Cartel) or in the contract is calculated. However, it may well happen that for reasons beyond the Administration's or the contractor's control, the term must be extended, stopping the start signal or extending the deadline to fulfill what was agreed, due to delays not attributable to the contractor, such as, for example, when the Administration has not obtained in time the necessary permits to begin its execution. It is important to consider that in such a scenario, it is not that the contract is suspended (which is only suspended due to force majeure or fortuitous event), but rather only the calendar dates are extended and what is suspended is the deadline for its execution to begin, but the contractual calendar term remains the same. Such suspension, provided it is justified, may occur ex officio or at the request of a party, under a principle of contractual good faith. Now, the suspension of the term may occur due to supervening events after the issuance of the commencement order, and if it is for reasons attributable to the Administration, the duty arises for it to compensate the contractor for the damages and losses proven to have been caused by the suspension. For the Chamber, from a technical legal standpoint, the commencement order does not constitute an act declaratory of an individual right (derecho subjetivo) (as the State representation understands it), since the individual right arises from the awarded tender and the respective contract, and the commencement order constitutes only a requirement of effectiveness, without being capable in itself of generating an individual right in the understanding that such right is to begin on the date indicated in the commencement order, since it is clear that the LCA in its article 32 foresees the possibility of extending said period for qualified reasons. This is why, contrary to what Section III of this Court, acting as improper superior (jerarca impropio), indicated in its resolution 490-2015; for the Chamber, the change of date in the commencement order does not produce a defect that violates the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability (ejecutoriedad) of the administrative act. And as stated above, the commencement order is not a complex document nor does it require a formality, but rather it is the logical and necessary consequence of what was already stipulated regarding the calculation of the term established in the Tender Document (Cartel) and in the contract. Hence, what must be analyzed is whether the Municipality suspended the originally issued commencement order (official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13, both dated July 31, 2013), for qualified reasons as required by article 32 of the LCA, and the manner in which it modified the commencement orders. </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; text-decoration: underline;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; text-decoration: underline;">Let us recall that Section III, in its resolution 490-2015, indicated with respect to the arguments raised in that instance by the municipal corporation, that its statements remained mere subjective or argumentative assessments without an objective basis that could be analyzed in that instance</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">. Now, as indicated above, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction must ensure the legality of administrative actions and the end of the plenary procedure in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional venue, in accordance with the CPCA, is the search for the real truth of the facts. In pursuit of achieving this real truth, at the preliminary hearing, the documentary evidence was admitted, consisting of files I and II corresponding to Tenders No. 2013LN-000002-01 and No. 2013LN-000003-01 and the administrative file referring to the agreement of the Municipal Council by which both contracts were terminated due to the expiration of the term and the Municipality's will not to extend them was communicated. As testimonial evidence, the statement of the witness-official Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, identity card 1-1135-0949, was admitted, who at the time of the events worked for the Municipal Corporation as Municipal Provider and who issued official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of July 31 and October 4, 2013, setting forth in the first ones the commencement order date as August 12 and later in the second ones the date of October 7, 2013, which is the subject of controversy in the present Litis. Now, from the documentary evidence, the existence of both official letters with different commencement orders is indeed established. Thus, at folios 89 and 90 of the administrative file, we have official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of July 31, 2013, in which Mr. Hernández Arguedas set forth the commencement order date as August 12, 2013. Said official letters were personally notified to Mrs. González Arguedas on the very day of July 31, 2013, in which the commencement order was for August 12, 2013. Then, at folios 100 and 101 of the same file, official letters DP-171 and DP-172 but of October 4, 2013, are filed, likewise personally notified on that same day to Mrs. González Arguedas, but in which the commencement order was indicated for October 7, 2013. In the face of both actions, the plaintiff remained silent in the administrative venue. Now, from the statement of the cited witness, it was clear that the reason the commencement order date was changed was because, prior to putting the CECUDI program into operation in Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí, the approval of the Comprehensive Care Council (Consejo de Atención Integral) of the Ministry of Health was required, approval which was not available for August 12, 2013, which is why the execution of both contracts could not begin on that day. He indicated before this Chamber that he communicated that situation to Mrs. González Arguedas and that she expressly stated her consent to wait for the approvals from the CAI to start executing what was agreed. In response to questions from this Court, he stated that it was due to this that before October 7, 2013, there are no lists of children attended at both Centers and that there are no payments corresponding to the months of August, September, and October, with the first payment being until November 2013 for the services provided as of October 7, which certifies that the operationality of the CECUDI in both districts only began in October 2013, reiterating that this situation was always communicated to Mrs. González Arguedas, who accepted the change in the commencement order date, without presenting any complaint or claim in this regard. At this point, we can affirm that the plaintiff adapted her conduct to the second commencement order without formulating any objection whatsoever to it, unlike the first one. Said testimony is consistent with the evidence contained in the administrative file at folios 38, 39, 77, and 78, in which </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">Dr. Francisco Oviedo Gómez, President of the Comprehensive Care Council of the Ministry of Health, informed the Directorate of the Governing Health Area of Sarapiquí that, through official letters CAI-0926-2013 and CAI-0927-2013, both dated September 23, 2013, said Council, in ordinary session No. 9, Minutes No. 14 of September 20, 2013, enabled the facilities of the Child Care and Development Center of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí for a period of 3 years, from September 20, 2013, to September 19, 2016, to care for up to 75 children aged 0 to 12 years from 6:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Thus, for the Chamber, there was a qualified reason for </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">extending the date of </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">the commencement order, since the CECUDI of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas could not operate until their approval was given by the CAI of the Ministry of Health, approval that was only given on September 20, 2013. Added to this, there is no evidence that the service was provided before October 7, 2013; there are no lists of children attended as of August 12, nor invoice procedures corresponding to the months of August and September, or any evidence to suggest that both CECUDI became operational as of August 12, 2013, nor any claim whatsoever by Mrs. González Arguedas for the change in the start date, which would suggest </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">she did</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;"> not agree with said change</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">,</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;"> even though both official letters </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">were</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">notified</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">to her</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;"> personally</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">. Finally, it remains to analyze the validity, in the eyes of Administrative Law, of what was provided in official letters </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">DP-171 and DP-172 of October 4, 2013, in which the commencement order was given for October 7, 2013. As provided in resolution No. 490-2015, for Section III, the official letters of July 31, in which the commencement orders for August 12, 2013, were set forth, must prevail, on the grounds that the Municipality erred in replacing the originally issued ones with others containing contradictory content regarding the commencement order, without respecting formalities, to the detriment of legal certainty and disregarding the provisions of articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP, regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability (ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">In the first place, it must be noted that said Section did not indicate which formalities were missed or that such change generated legal uncertainty for the contractor. In this regard, it should be noted that according to article 130 of the LGAP, the administrative act consists of the unilateral manifestation of the will of the Administration, capable of producing legal effects, that is, capable of granting, denying, or canceling individual rights (derechos subjetivos) or legitimate interests of the administered party; in this case, of the contractor. According to what was indicated above, it is clear that the individual right of the contractor originated with the award of both contracts and with the signing of the contract, and not in the commencement order, which bears identity with an act proper to the execution phase of the effects of a procurement, not with a constitutive act that declares an individual right in the contractor's favor. Furthermore, the commencement order is not a complex document and for qualified reasons, the period to issue the commencement order can be extended beyond 15 business days (Article 32 of the LCA). In the case under examination, it has been clear that there was a qualified reason that prevented the commencement order from being given or observed for August 12, 2013, which was that on that date the facilities of the CECUDI in the districts of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí had not been authorized by the CAI of the Ministry of Health. A situation that, according to the testimony of the witness-official Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, Municipal Provider at that time, was communicated to Mrs. González Arguedas, who agreed to the change in the commencement order date, testimony that was not discredited by the indicated lady, so that there was neither insecurity nor legal uncertainty because the action regarding the change of date was always communicated to her and despite being personally notified, the contractor did not present any claim in this regard. Now, in accordance with articles 133 and 136 of the LGAP, every administrative act must have a motive, as one of its constitutive elements, and in its absence the act is null, as that law requires that the motive be legitimate, that is, conforming to the legal system, and that it exist. Additionally, the administrative act must be motivated, meaning that the motivations for which it is adopted in a particular sense must be explained. Now, although article 134 of the LGAP indicates that the administrative act must be expressed in writing, for the Chamber, Mr. Hernández Arguedas certainly explained to Mrs. González Arguedas the motivations or reasons why the change in the commencement order date had to be made, and although they were not recorded in an official letter, the truth is that the indicated lady never opposed the change of date, nor challenged such situation, nor presented any claim in this regard, and it was not until they communicated to her the termination of the signed contracts by the expiration of the term and the Municipality's will not to extend them, that she alleged - compromising the principle of good faith - that the commencement order was given for August 12, 2013, and that therefore she should have been notified of the intention not to extend them no later than July 12, 2014. The truth of the matter is that she herself adapted her conduct in the execution of the contract to the second commencement order and not to the first, which she now appears to want to claim. Thus, from the documentary and testimonial evidence presented and which the Court has considered proven, the commencement order that, in accordance with the real truth of the facts, must be used for purposes of the contract term, was the one issued through official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of October 4, 2013, with functions starting on October 7, 2013. A situation that in the Court's criteria is demonstrated since there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that between August 12 and October 7, 2013, children were attended at the CECUDI in the districts of Horquetas and Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mrs. González Arguedas presented any claim before September 5, 2014, which was the date on which she filed the revocation remedy (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal against the Municipal Council agreement No. 35-2014, in which it was ordered to terminate the signed contracts by the expiration of the term and the Council's will not to extend them was communicated, arguing that the start date was August 12 and not October 7, 2013, that is, 11 months after official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13 of October 4, 2013, were notified to her, maintaining that the automatic extension according to the contract had operated as of August 12, 2014, which in this Court's criteria is not correct, since there is no evidence that she began the operationality of the CECUDI of the indicated districts as of August 12, 2013, and on the contrary, the Municipal Corporation did prove that, due to what was stated above, the authorizations for the facilities of the CECUDI of both districts were only obtained on September 20, 2013, and hence the commencement orders were only given for October 7, 2013. And accepting that the commencement orders were given as of August 12, 2013, as Mrs. González Arguedas asserted, would lead us to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to comply with what was agreed from that date until October 7, 2013, as it is reiterated that there is no evidence allowing the conclusion that the commencement order and the material operationality of the CECUDI occurred before October 7, 2013, and that in this case the commencement order had to be extended until October 7, 2013, for a qualified reason indicated above. A situation of which the plaintiff was notified and with which she agreed according to the testimony of the Municipal Provider. Now, in accordance with the principles that enshrine the contractual activity of the Administration mentioned above, article 15 of the LCA establishes the Administration's obligation to fully comply with what was agreed and to collaborate with the contractor, so that the latter can comply with what was agreed in a suitable manner. For its part, article 20 indicates that the contractor is obligated to comply with what was offered in the proposal, and in any formal manifestation during the course of the procedure or formalization. For the Constitutional Chamber, both articles rest on a fundamental principle, which is that of good faith, which it defines as a basic moral principle, on which the actions of the subscribing parties to the contract rest. For this Court, according to the evidence in the record, the municipal corporation acted in good faith, by having to vary the commencement order dates, since the facilities of the CECUDI in the districts of Horquetas and Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí had not been authorized by the CAI of the Ministry of Health by August 12, 2013, which made it legally impossible to put them into operation, since doing so would incur a violation, lacking said requirement. Furthermore, the Municipality at all times communicated said situation to the contractor, and this is evident from the testimony of Mr. Hernández Arguedas, who indicated before the Court ---under sworn oath---, that he, as Municipal Provider, informed the contractor of the situation and that having the CAI's approval of the CECUDI as of September 20, 2013, he personally notified the contractor of the new commencement orders with the date of October 7, 2013, with which she agreed.

Thus, the situation that prevented the first start orders from becoming effective was a qualified reason, and the contractor was informed of this, meaning there was no bad faith on the part of the Municipal Administration in its actions. And it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to article 20 of the LCA, the contractor is obliged to verify the correctness of the administrative contracting procedure and contractual execution, and that by reason of that obligation, it may not, in support of its claims, allege ignorance of the legal system or of the consequences of administrative conduct. In this way, if the contractor considered, under a principle of good faith, that the Administration was acting illegally by changing the date on the start order, moving it from August 12 to October 7, 2013, it should have challenged that situation at the moment it was informed of what was happening; however, it accepted the change in the start order date and it was not until it was notified of the Municipality's intention to terminate the contract due to the expiration of the term and not to extend it, that it indicated that the change in the start order date did not take effect and that the orders dated August 12, 2013, communicated by official letters of July 31, 2013, should be used for all purposes. Accordingly, this Chamber reaches the conclusion that the agreement adopted in ordinary session No. 35-2014 held on September 1, 2014, Article 5, whereby the Municipal Council deemed the contracts signed with Ms. González Arguedas to have expired due to the lapse of the term, was in accordance with the law, and said agreement was notified to the contractor within the period provided for in clause five of both contracts, so that the provisions of resolution No. 490-2015 of the Third Section did not conform to the actual truth of the facts and upholding it would cause harm to the public interest and the Municipality's patrimonial interests, since a plenary analysis of what occurred leads to the conclusion that the Third Section is not correct in its substantive arguments, which is why its annulment is ordered."</span></span></p> Due to its regulatory nature, the solicitation documents (pliego) are a source of interpretation of the agreement between the parties, given that it is based on these documents that the bidder prepares its bid, which has the characteristic of being integral in all its components, that is, both in the content of the main document and in any attached document. It must be clear that the definition of the conditions of the bidding terms (cartel) should not be understood as a strictly discretionary act, as each one of the provisions must present its due basis, which allows any interested party to request information justifying them or even to file the objection remedy (recurso de objeción). The latter is the power of any interested party to express opposition to a provision of the solicitation documents, so that the administrative superior or the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) itself (depending on the type of contracting and the object of the tender) evaluates the objection and defines its pertinence, through a fully motivated act. The bidder, based on the bidding terms, prepares its sealed bid (plica), obtaining a parameter of legal certainty, where the promoting administration guarantees the observance of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) for the potential participants, who know in advance the conditions governing the tender of their interest. In the face of the contracting process, each one of the bidders is nothing more than a legitimate interested party in ensuring that the bidding terms' rules are fully complied with; such that no right to be awarded the contract exists, but rather a mere expectation. Even so, the legal system guarantees administrative and judicial actions subject exclusively to that bidder who could have been awarded the contract in compliance with the bidding terms, and who, due to illegitimate or illegal situations, was not; such that a person who detects breaches of the bidding terms but without having the possibility that, in the event of correction, they would also not be awarded the contract, lacks any interest and would have no action whatsoever; except for the possibility of a complaint before the Comptroller General of the Republic, which, as a safeguard of the public treasury (hacienda pública), is called to serve as a controller of the legality of the administrative conduct. It must be remembered that the mere submission of the sealed bid implicitly entails submission to each and every one of the conditions of the solicitation documents, since it is logical to think that if the person entered the tender, it was with the interest of offering their goods or services and eventually being awarded the contract; the foregoing naturally, except in cases where the will to depart from the bidding terms is manifestly clear. Regarding the nature of the bid in this matter, it is understood as a unilateral, free, and voluntary promise by the participant, in order to enter into the contract in the event they are selected. In accordance with the preceding provision, the bid must strictly comply with the content of the bidding terms, both in the procedural rules to follow, documents, and especially the required specifications; if the bid does not comply with what is stipulated in the bidding terms, it must be excluded from the tender, as already indicated. Not without warning that, by the principle of free participation and in satisfaction of the public interest, the greatest number of bidders is sought, which entails that exclusion is the exception and not the rule; provided that this does not promote the generation of discriminatory treatment in favor of some bidder(s), as one cannot go to the extreme of accepting non-compliance just to allow participation. The bid binds the bidder, since in the event of being awarded the contract, they must submit not only to the bidding terms' conditions established for that purpose, but also to the terms offered by them in said document, and to the Administration, insofar as its acceptance will mean admitting the delimitation of the terms and conditions of the contracting according to what was proposed by the contractor. That is, the bidding terms and the bid must be seen in an integral and integrated manner, such that in the analysis of the latter, what is established in the former cannot be lost sight of. Therefore, the contracting cannot be viewed in its components in an isolated manner, nor abstracted from the legal system, nor without taking into consideration the integrality of the bid and the bidding terms to which it refers. The legal system provides for the following contracting modalities: Public Tender (Licitación Pública) and Abbreviated Tender (Licitación Abreviada) (at the time divided into Registry and Restricted), added to some derivatives of these (Auction, Tender with Financing, with Pre-qualification, and Reverse Auction), to which are added the activities exempt from the contracting procedure (where the so-called direct contracting is included, among others), without prejudice that numeral 146 of the Regulation to the Law on Contracting empowers the authorization of regulations for different contracting modalities in order to know diverse mechanisms, allowing the Administration to establish other contractual modalities that were not foreseen by the legislator. These regulations may be definitive (until their revocation) or even subject to a term (normally to verify the convenience of maintaining the mechanism). As for the procedure as such, the legal and regulatory norms indicate timeframes (plazos) and procedural aspects in direct relation to the particular type of contracting; the essential idea is that the public tender fully guarantees the principles that inform the contracting, while in the remaining modalities certain appeal powers are reduced, the form is made more flexible, among other aspects, since it is possible to guarantee the principles without fulfilling these requirements. Regarding the latter, the most relevant aspect is the generation of a technical verification and a legal one, the first being the verification of the specific requirements of what the contracting Administration desires, and on the other hand, the legal one being the verification of requirements to make the bidders eligible for award. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the bidding terms establish admissibility requirements and scorable elements; the former correspond to those whose non-compliance leads to the bid being rejected, such as the participation bond (garantía de participación), identification of the bidder, signature of the bid, indication of price, among many others. The scorable elements allow selection among the bids of the one that proves victorious. The former, by their very essence, are preventable, except in the expressly regulated cases; the latter, as a general rule, are not, insofar as they would violate the principle of equality among the parties, since by virtue of knowing the other bids at that moment, any additional documentation would vary the eventual score, except in the cases of historical facts (hechos históricos), that is, those that, while they could affect the score, the interested party has no way of manipulating, the typical example being academic credentials, marital status, experience in an activity, among many others. In this way, once the bids are received, the Administration must proceed to carry out two analyses (whether simultaneously or successively), the first of them of a legal nature, which seeks to verify compliance with the invariable non-technical clauses, and the second, verifying the variable or technical aspects, generating a recommendation. It is worth warning that the Public Administration is empowered to request clarifications to the bid (as long as it does not generate unequal treatment) and eventually it is possible to request additional information, based on the doctrine of historical facts, even when this affects the score, insofar as it concerns situations that occurred prior to the tender, were timely invoked by the interested party, and what is missing is solely at the level of its accreditation. Always under the understanding that said data are not manipulable by the interested party. It is based on the recommendation that the head or the subordinate official with competence to do so proceeds to make the award. Here again, the bidding terms regain importance, as the evaluation parameters are set within them; it is on that basis that the score is assigned to the bidders and consequently it is the foundation for determining the winner. From the award, the appeal stage opens, which can be internal or external, according to the contractual object or its amount; where the existence of re-awards is possible, which would empower new appeal actions. Once the decision is final, the execution stage opens, which begins with the purchase order (orden de compra) and/or the contract; such that the second is a document where the agreement of wills is formalized, where the solicitation documents and the bid are integrated (in addition to the entirety of the internal regulations), while the former is a financial document. Once these are resolved, a final act is generated in favor of a specific contractor. Subsequently, based on the bidding terms and the contents of the awarded bid, the respective administrative contract is founded, which must be interpreted from the basis of the legal instruments that comprise it, that is, the bidding terms or base document, the awarded bid, and the regulations and principles specific to administrative contracting; on the logic that based on the technical and legal reports, the contracting Administration discards the ineligible bids, whether for non-compliance with admissibility requirements, or for abusive or ruinous prices, in order to subsequently assign the score according to the scoring table indicated in the sealed bid. Starting the appeal process. By reason of the foregoing, in the matter of administrative contracting, the determination of the effective fulfillment of the obligation by both contracting parties must refer both to the bidding terms and to the bid considered integrally, and always oriented towards the fulfillment of the principle of good faith between the subscribing parties and in attention to the public interest that guided the Administration's decision to carry out the respective contracting. Normally, depending on the clarity of the contractual object and/or its amount, the contract is dispensed with, using only the purchase order. **Contractual Breach:** In civil law, the most common or traditional definition of the contract is that which designates it as an agreement of wills, freely expressed and without any defect, of a patrimonial content, from which reciprocal rights and obligations arise. Said agreement, as indicated by Article 1008 of our Civil Code, *"must be free and clearly manifested. The manifestation may be made by word, in writing, or by deeds from which it can necessarily be deduced."* From the perspective of Administrative Law, for the Argentine author José Roberto Dromi, the contract is *"any bilateral manifestation or common will, producing legal effects between two persons, of which one acts in the exercise of the administrative function. It is an agreement creating legal relationships by the simple consent of adhesion of the individual to relationships previously established by the Administration."* The essential elements of the administrative contract are: subject, consent, and object—which we will develop for the purposes of this Litis causa, purpose, and form.— Regarding the object of the contract, we must indicate that this is the name given, not only to the thing that will eventually be the material reference point of the contract or to the committed provision, but, in general, to the clauses of the contract and to its terms and conditions. However, in a more precise technical legal sense, it is understood that the object of the obligation refers to the due provision, that is, a behavior of the debtor, either an active or an omissive conduct of the obligor, *"as stated by Article 629 of the Civil Code that 'every obligation has as its object to give, to do, or to refrain from doing something, affirming thereby that the object is constituted by the **act** of giving, doing, or not doing something, which denotes a conduct being the object of the obligation, that is, the provision'"* (underlined from the original, Casafont Romero, Pablo, Ensayos de Derecho Contractual, Colegio de Abogados, Second edition 1979, San José, Costa Rica, p. 15). It is also worth pointing out the almost unanimous doctrinal opinion that the contract with the Public Administration and, consequently, the bid to it, are adhesion contracts, which is partially true, given the necessary freedom of the bidder to determine for themselves, at least, the price of the bid. The phenomenon stems from two fundamental facts: 1- The individual's bid is delimited by the specific conditions document (bidding terms or tender call), unilaterally elaborated by the Public Administration, without discussion with the contracting party nor opportunity for the latter to influence its content. 2- The latter is complemented in large part, in turn, by the so-called general conditions documents, true standard contract projects intended to formulate, in the most abstract and comprehensive manner possible, the conditions, terms, obligations, and rights of the parties in the contract. The object, in a general sense, of a contract is the consequence or effect that it produces and that is pursued upon its conclusion. Dugüit makes a thorough distinction between the immediate object and the mediate object of the will. The immediate object is always a material act consisting of a physical movement, sometimes a tradition, sometimes a verbal or written declaration. The mediate object is the legal situation produced by the immediate object. The immediately desired material act is desired as a means to achieve the birth of a legal situation. The object must be certain, possible, lawful, and moral. It is not essential that it possesses a patrimonial content, but it necessarily must be assessable and transformable into a pecuniary provision in case of breach. In summary, the object of the contract is constituted by the contractually imposed obligation, which implies a provision, which always constitutes a conduct of giving, doing, or refraining from doing something. Now then, if the object of the contract is always the obligation of a due provision, then the object of the contract is fulfilled by carrying out the obligated conduct or behavior, under a principle of contractual good faith [...]</span></span></p> **Criterion of the Court**: This Chamber considers that the Municipal representation is not correct in this argument, since although Article 155 of the Municipal Code states *"**Appeals in matters of administrative contracting shall be governed by what is established in the law regulating administrative contracting**"* ; the Law on Administrative Contracting reserves in its Chapter IX the appropriate appeals in administrative contractual matters, establishing as the first appeal the objection against the Bidding Terms and, according to the amount, the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de apelación) or revocation (revocatoria) against the award act. These are the appeals in the contracting phase reserved for the instances indicated therein, without considering appeals before those instances in the contract execution phase. Thus, the content of the challenged agreement concerned the communication of the termination of the contract due to the advent of the term, with the municipal corporation expressing its decision not to extend it. In this way, what was challenged was neither against the objection of the bidding terms nor its award, so Section III could well then hear the challenge to the cited agreement. Regarding the argument indicated by the Municipal representation, that Section Three considered it was a unilateral termination (rescisión unilateral) of the contract, because it had already been extended and in that case the plaintiff should have resorted to the appeals provided for in Articles 206 and 208 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Contracting; said argument is also not acceptable, since it was never the Municipality's purpose to terminate the contract, but rather the challenged agreement was to basically communicate that, in accordance with what was established in the fifth clause of the signed contracts, the contract was considered finalized due to the advent of the term and not terminated. It is for the foregoing that the municipal corporation's argument is incorrect in accusing a lack of competence for Section III to hear the challenged agreement by reason of the matter. The second point to analyze is then whether or not Section III is correct in maintaining in resolution 490-2015, that the Municipality was mistaken in attempting to simply substitute the official letters (oficios) DP-171-2013 and DP-172-2013 of July 31, 2013, with other documents bearing the same official letter numbers issued on October 4, 2013, with contradictory content regarding the commencement order (orden de inicio), without respect for formalities to the detriment of legal certainty and disregarding what is established in Articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP, regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability (presunción de validez y ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts, and that the second commencement order was issued outside the term indicated in Articles 32 of the Law on Contracting and 192 of its Regulation and that therefore the commencement orders dated July 31, 2013 must prevail, and since the challenged agreement referring to the will not to extend the contract was issued until September 1, 2014, the automatic extension was fulfilled; concluding that Section, that the statements made by the Municipal Corporation in that venue constituted mere subjective or argumentative appreciations, without an objective basis that could be analyzed. **Criterion of the Court**: Pursuant to Article 49) of the Political Constitution, it corresponds to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction to guarantee the legality of the administrative function of the State and its institutions, so that all its actions conform to the legal system. For its part, the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code seeks as its end the real truth of the facts submitted to the knowledge of this Court. The contentious process is therefore a plenary process, whose north is the search for the real truth of the facts submitted to its knowledge. Under these premises, this Court will analyze the conflict submitted to its knowledge. For the Chamber and the parties, the debate revolves around determining which commencement order should prevail, whether those issued by official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13 both of July 31, 2013, and which indicated the commencement order for August 12, 2013, or those issued under those same official letter numbers but dated October 4, 2013, and which established the commencement order for October 7, 2013. According to the provisions of resolution No. 490-2015, Section Three annulled the agreement because it considered that the municipal corporation, upon issuing the commencement orders for October 7, 2013; disregarded what is established in Articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of the administrative act without respect for formalities and to the detriment of legal certainty, and that in any case the second commencement order was issued outside the 15-business-day term after the endorsement (refrendo) or internal approval of the contract, as provided by Article 32 of the Law on Contracting and 192 of its Regulation. For its part, the state representation indicated in the response to the claim and in the trial hearing, that the commencement orders dated July 31, 2013, constituted administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights in favor of Mrs. González Arguedas, which could not be disregarded by the municipal corporation without resorting to their annulment in accordance with the mechanisms provided in the LGAP. For her part, Mrs. González Arguedas in the response to the claim indicated only that the commencement order was issued for August 12, 2013, so that by the date on which the Municipality's decision not to extend the contract was communicated to her, the automatic extension had already occurred. In accordance with what was indicated by the state representation, the point to elucidate is therefore to determine if the commencement order indeed constitutes an act declaratory of subjective rights, and therefore if said right arose from its issuance. For this Chamber, the commencement order is basically a document in which the contractor is indicated from what moment the agreed-upon term to provide or carry out the contractual object begins to be computed, (in this case the operational service of the CECUDI of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí). The commencement order is not a complex document, nor does it require a specific formality, but rather it is a logical and necessary consequence of the effectiveness (not validity) of what was already provided in the Bidding Terms and in the contract, and it does require being notified to the contractor. In principle, according to the provisions of Article 32 of the LCA and 192 of its Regulation, the commencement order must be issued within 15 business days following the endorsement or internal approval of the contract, although for qualified reasons, said term may be extended, such that it is not a peremptory term but an ordering one, and competence is not lost by the passage of time. Let us remember that ordinal 329 of the LGAP states that the administrative act issued outside the term is valid for all purposes, unless a rule states otherwise, which is not the case here. Thus, the contractor is obliged to fulfill the contracted service within the established term and the commencement order constitutes the "starting shot" ("banderillazo de salida") for the material provision of the service or object of the contract, and it is from the date of the commencement order that the term established in the bidding terms or in the contract is computed. However, the case may well arise where, for reasons beyond the control of the Administration or the contractor, the term must be extended such that the start order is stopped or the term to fulfill what was agreed is extended, for delays not attributable to the contractor, as for example when the Administration has not obtained the necessary permits in time to begin its execution. It is important to take into account that in said scenario, it is not that the contract is suspended (which is only suspended due to force majeure or fortuitous event), but rather only the calendar dates are extended and what is suspended is the term for the start of its execution, but the calendar term of the contract remains the same. Said suspension, as long as it is justified, can occur ex officio or at the request of a party, under a principle of contractual good faith. Now then, the suspension of the term may occur due to supervening events after the commencement order is issued, and if it is for reasons attributable to the Administration, the latter's duty arises to compensate the contractor for the damages that they can prove were caused by the suspension. For the Chamber, from a technical legal point of view, the commencement order does not constitute an act declaratory of a subjective right (as understood by the state representation), since the subjective right arises from the awarded tender and the respective contract, and the commencement order merely constitutes a requirement of effectiveness, without in itself being capable of generating a subjective right in the understanding that said right is to begin on the date indicated in the commencement order, since it is clear that the LCA in its Article 32 provides for the possibility of extending said term for qualified reasons. It is for this reason that, contrary to what Section III of this Court indicates, hearing as improper head in its resolution 490-2015; for the Chamber, the change of date in the commencement order does not produce a defect that violates the provisions of Articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of the administrative act.

And as stated above, the start order is not a complex document nor does it require any particular formality; rather, it is a logical and necessary consequence of what was already stipulated regarding the calculation of the term established in the Tender Documents and in the contract. Hence, what must be analyzed is whether the Municipality suspended the originally issued start order (official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13, both dated July 31, 2013), for qualified reasons as required by Article 32 of the LCA, and the manner in which it modified the start orders. <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; text-decoration: underline;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt; text-decoration: underline;">Let us recall that Section Three, in its resolution 490-2015, indicated with respect to the arguments raised at that instance by the municipal corporation that its statements remained mere subjective or argumentative assessments without any objective basis that could be analyzed at that instance</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">. Now, as indicated above, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction must ensure the legality of administrative actions, and the purpose of the plenary proceeding in the Contentious-Administrative judicial venue, in accordance with the CPCA, is the search for the real truth of the facts. In pursuit of this real truth, the documentary evidence consisting of files I and II corresponding to Tender No. 2013LN-000002-01 and No. 2013LN-000003-01, as well as the administrative file referring to the Municipal Council’s agreement by which both contracts were terminated due to the expiry of the term and the Municipality's will not to extend them was communicated, was accepted at the preliminary hearing. As testimonial evidence, the statement of the witness-official Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, identification number 1-1135-0949, was admitted; at the time of the facts, he worked for the Municipal Corporation as Municipal Provider and was the one who issued official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of July 31 and October 4, 2013, recording in the first ones the start order date as August 12, and later in the second ones, the date of October 7, 2013, which is the subject of controversy in the present dispute. Now, from the documentary evidence, the existence of both official letters with different start orders is indeed confirmed. Thus, at pages 89 and 90 of the administrative file, we have official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of July 31, 2013, in which Mr. Hernández Arguedas recorded the start order date as August 12, 2013. These official letters were personally notified to Ms. González Arguedas on that same July 31, 2013, in which the start order was for August 12, 2013. Subsequently, at pages 100 and 101 of the same file, official letters DP-171 and DP-172 but dated October 4, 2013, are found, likewise personally notified on that same day to Ms. González Arguedas, but in which the start order was indicated for October 7, 2013. Faced with both actions, the plaintiff remained silent at the administrative venue. Now, from the statement of the aforementioned witness, it became clear that the reason for changing the start order date was that, prior to putting the CECUDI program into operation in Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí, approval from the Comprehensive Care Council of the Ministry of Health had to be obtained, an approval that was not available by August 12, 2013, which is why the execution of both contracts could not begin on that day. He indicated before this Chamber that he communicated this situation to Ms. González Arguedas and that she expressly gave her consent to wait for the approvals from the CAI before beginning to execute what was agreed upon. In response to questions from this Tribunal, he answered that it was due to this that before October 7, 2013, there are no lists of children attended at either Center and no payments corresponding to the months of August, September, and October, the first payment being made in November 2013 for services rendered starting October 7, which accredits that the operation of the CECUDI in both districts only began in October 2013, reiterating that this situation was always communicated to Ms. González Arguedas, who accepted the change in the start order date, without filing any complaint or claim regarding it. At this point, we can affirm that the plaintiff adapted her conduct to the second start order without formulating any objection thereto, unlike the first. Said testimony coincides with the evidence in the administrative file at pages 38, 39, 77, and 78, in which </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">Dr. Francisco Oviedo Gómez, President of the Comprehensive Care Council of the Ministry of Health, informed the Directorate of the Governing Health Area of Sarapiquí that, through official letters CAI-0926-2013 and CAI-0927-2013, both dated September 23, 2013, said Council, in ordinary session No. 9, Minutes No. 14 of September 20, 2013, authorized the facilities of the Child Care and Development Center of Puerto Viejo and of Horquetas de Sarapiquí for a period of 3 years, from September 20, 2013, to September 19, 2016, to care for up to 75 children from 0 to 12 years old, from 6:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Thus, for this Chamber, there was indeed a qualified reason to </span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">extend the start order date, since the CECUDI of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas could not operate until their approval by the CAI of the Ministry of Health was granted, an approval that was only given on September 20, 2013. In addition, there is no evidence that the service was provided before October 7, 2013, there are no lists of children attended starting August 12, nor any invoice procedures corresponding to the months of August and September, nor any proof to suggest that both CECUDI began operating as of August 12, 2013, nor any claim by Ms. González Arguedas regarding the change of start date, which would suggest that she did not agree with said change, despite both official letters being personally notified to her. Finally, what remains to be analyzed is the validity, from an Administrative Law perspective, of the provisions in official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of October 4, 2013, in which the start order was given for October 7, 2013. According to the provisions in resolution No. 490-2015, for Section Three, the official letters dated July 31, in which the start orders were recorded for August 12, 2013, must prevail, on the grounds that the Municipality erred in substituting the originally issued ones with others containing contradictory content regarding the start order, without respecting the formalities, to the detriment of legal certainty and disregarding the provisions of Articles 140 and 146 of the LGAP regarding the presumption of validity and enforceability of administrative acts.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 10pt;">In the first place, it must be noted that said Section did not indicate which formalities were found lacking and that said change generated legal uncertainty for the contractor. In this regard, it must be indicated that according to Article 130 of the LGAP, an administrative act consists of the unilateral declaration of will of the Administration, capable of producing legal effects, that is, capable of granting, denying, or canceling the subjective rights or legitimate interests of the administered party; in this case, the contractor. In accordance with what was indicated above, it is clear that the contractor’s subjective right originated with the award of both contracts and with the signing of the contract, and not in the start order, which is identical to an act typical of the execution phase of a contract's effects, rather than a constitutive act declaring a subjective right in the contractor’s favor. Furthermore, the start order is not a complex document, and for qualified reasons, the term to issue the start order can be extended beyond the 15 business days. (Article 32 of the LCA). In the case under examination, it has become clear that there was a qualified reason that prevented the start order from being given or observed by August 12, 2013, which was that, by that date, the CECUDI facilities in the districts of Puerto Viejo and Horquetas de Sarapiquí had not been authorized by the CAI of the Ministry of Health. This situation, according to the testimony of the witness-official Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, Municipal Provider at that time, was communicated to Ms. González Arguedas, who agreed to the change in the start order date, a testimony that was not discredited by the indicated lady, so there was neither legal uncertainty nor insecurity because she was always informed of the actions regarding the date change, and despite being personally notified, the contractor did not file any claim in this regard. Now, according to Articles 133 and 136 of the LGAP, every administrative act must have a reason (motivo) as one of its constitutive elements, and in its absence, the act is null, because said law requires that the reason be legitimate, that is, in accordance with the legal system, and that it exists. Moreover, the administrative act must be reasoned (motivado), meaning that the motivations for adopting it in a certain sense must be explained. Now, although Article 134 of the LGAP indicates that the administrative act must be expressed in writing, for this Chamber, Mr. Hernández Arguedas certainly explained to Ms. González Arguedas the motivations or reasons why the change in the start order date had to be made, and although they were not recorded in an official letter, the fact is that the indicated lady never opposed the date change, nor challenged such situation, nor filed any claim regarding it, and it was not until she was informed of the termination of the signed contracts due to the expiry of the term and the Municipality's will not to extend them, that she alleged – compromising the principle of good faith – that the start order was given for August 12, 2013, and that therefore, she should have been notified of the intention not to extend it no later than July 12, 2014. The truth of the matter is that she herself adapted her conduct in the execution of the contract to the second start order and not to the first, which she now seems to want to claim. Thus, from the documentary and testimonial evidence presented and which the Tribunal has taken as proven, the start order that, in accordance with the real truth of the facts, must be computed for the purposes of the contract term was the one issued by official letters DP-171 and DP-172 of October 4, 2013, with functions commencing on October 7, 2013. A situation that, in the Tribunal's opinion, is demonstrated since there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that between August 12 and October 7, 2013, children were cared for in the CECUDI of the districts of Horquetas and Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí. Furthermore, it is also not established that Ms. González Arguedas filed any claim before September 5, 2014, which was the date she filed the appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal against Municipal Council Agreement No. 35-2014, which ordered the termination of the signed contracts due to the expiry of the term and communicated the Council's will not to extend them, maintaining that the start date was August 12 and not October 7, 2013, that is, 11 months after she was notified of official letters DP-171-13 and DP-172-13 of October 4, 2013, maintaining that the automatic extension according to the contract had operated as of August 12, 2014, which, in this Tribunal’s opinion, is not correct, because there is no proof that the operation of the CECUDI in the indicated districts began on August 12, 2013, and on the contrary, the Municipal Corporation did prove that, due to what was set forth above, the authorizations for the CECUDI facilities in both districts were only obtained on September 20, 2013, and hence, the start orders were only given on October 7, 2013. And indeed, to accept that the start orders took effect as of August 12, 2013, as Ms. González Arguedas asserted, would lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff breached what was agreed upon from that date until October 7, 2013, for it is reiterated that there is no proof that would allow reaching the conclusion that the start order and the material operation of the CECUDI occurred before October 7, 2013, and that in this case, the start order had to be extended until October 7, 2013, for a qualified reason indicated above. A situation of which the plaintiff was notified and with which she agreed, according to the Municipal Provider’s testimony. Now, pursuant to the principles governing the Administration’s contractual activity mentioned above, Article 15 of the LCA establishes the Administration’s obligation to fully comply with what was agreed upon and to collaborate with the contractor, so that the latter can fulfill what was agreed upon in a suitable manner. For its part, Article 20 indicates that the contractor is obliged to comply with what was offered in the proposal, and in any formal manifestation during the course of the procedure or formalization. For the Constitutional Chamber, both articles rest upon a fundamental principle, which is good faith, which it defines as a basic moral principle upon which the actions of the contracting parties rest. For this Tribunal, according to the evidence in the file, the municipal corporation acted in good faith in having to change the start order dates, since the CECUDI facilities in the districts of Horquetas and Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí had not been authorized by the CAI of the Ministry of Health by August 12, 2013, which made it legally impossible to put them into operation, as doing so would constitute a violation, lacking said requirement. Moreover, the Municipality communicated this situation to the contractor at all times, as is evident from the testimony of Mr. Hernández Arguedas, who stated before the Tribunal —under oath— that he, as Municipal Provider, informed the contractor of the situation and that, having the CAI approval for the CECUDI dated September 20, 2013, he personally notified the contractor of the new start orders dated October 7, 2013, with which she agreed. Therefore, the situation that prevented the first start orders from becoming effective was a qualified reason, and the contractor was informed of it, so there was no bad faith on the part of the Municipal Administration in its actions. And it must be kept in mind that pursuant to Article 20 of the LCA, the contractor is obliged to verify the correctness of the administrative contracting procedure and the contractual execution, and that by reason of this obligation, to support any actions, they may not allege ignorance of the legal system or the consequences of the administrative conduct. Thus, if the contractor considered, under the principle of good faith, that the Administration was acting illegally by changing the start order date from August 12 to October 7, 2013, she should have challenged this situation at the moment she was informed of what was happening; however, she accepted the change in the start order date, and it was not until she was notified of the Municipality's will to terminate the contract due to the expiry of the term and not to extend it, that she indicated that the change in the start order date did not apply and that the start orders dated August 12, 2013, communicated by official letters of July 31, 2013, should be used for these purposes. Thus, this Chamber reaches the conclusion that the agreement reached in ordinary session No. 35-2014 held on September 1, 2014, Article 5, insofar as the Municipal Council declared that the contracts signed with Ms. González Arguedas were concluded due to the expiry of the term, was lawful, and said agreement was notified to the contractor within the period provided in the fifth clause of both contracts, such that the provisions of resolution No. 490-2015 of Section Three did not conform to the real truth of the facts, and upholding it would generate an impact on the public interest and the property interests of the Municipality, since a plenary analysis of what occurred leads to the conclusion that Section Three is incorrect in its substantive arguments, which is why its annulment is ordered".</span></span>

"V.- CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES SOBRE LA CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA: Trabada así la litis, de previo a entrar a analizar los argumentos de las partes, se procederá a analizar el tema de la contratación en términos generales. Al respecto tenemos que la Administración Pública emplea diversos medios para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos, que no se agotan en las meras actuaciones materiales o en actos administrativos formales, en tanto que también se recurre al mecanismo de la contratación administrativa, en la cual, se pacta el cumplimiento de un objeto con un contratista, como sujeto colaborador del logro del interés público buscado. No obstante, a diferencia de un contrato privado, en la contratación administrativa existe una serie de elementos que trascienden el mero acuerdo de voluntades rubricado en un documento y que condicionan su nacimiento, desarrollo y extinción. Ese aspecto es medular y determina una diferencia incuestionable con respecto al contrato privado, donde los intereses particulares de las partes son determinantes, mientras que en este caso el interés público reviste toda la contratación. Es así como el contrato administrativo está condicionado en su origen, evolución y finalización al ordenamiento propio que rige la materia y la contratación en específico. En este sentido, el acto de voluntad, libre y soberano del contratista, queda filtrado por el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, y fundamentalmente por la reglamentación de la contratación, sea el cartel o pliego de condiciones, base de la misma. Si bien la doctrina ha oscilado en una discusión sobre si debe ser considerado un acto complejo o una modalidad de contratación, incluso viéndola como una especie de promesa unilateral 68 aceptada, la discusión aun cuando es interesante desde el plano académico, resulta intrascendente para la resolución de la litis que ahora nos ocupa. El ordinal ciento ochenta y dos de la Constitución Política, dispone: “Los contratos para la ejecución de obras públicas que celebren los Poderes del estado, las Municipalidades y las instituciones autónomas, las compras que se hagan con fondos de esas entidades y las ventas o arrendamientos de bienes pertenecientes a la mismas, se harán mediante licitación, de acuerdo con la ley en cuanto al monto respectivo”. De conformidad con dicha norma, la Administración Pública para alcanzar los fines establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico y con el propósito de satisfacer de modo eficiente y oportuno sus requerimientos, habrá de acudir a los procedimientos de contratación administrativa con el fin de seleccionar la oferta que mejor se adecue a las necesidades públicas. Esta actividad se encuentra sujeta a una serie de principios, definidos por la Sala Constitucional desde su voto 998 de las 11 horas con 30 minutos del 16 de febrero de 1998, que en lo que es de interés expresó: “ ...VI. LOS PRINCIPIOS DE LA CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. En virtud de lo anterior, debe entenderse que del artículo 182 de la Constitución Política se derivan todos los principios y parámetros constitucionales que rigen la actividad contractual del Estado. Algunos de estos principios que orientan y regulan la licitación son: ... 2.-de igualdad de trato entre todos los posibles oferentes, ...tiene una doble finalidad, la de ser garantía para los administrados en la protección de sus intereses y derechos como contratistas, oferentes y como particulares, que se traduce en la prohibición para el Estado de imponer condiciones restrictivas para el acceso del concurso, sea mediante la promulgación de disposiciones legales o reglamentarias con ese objeto, como en su actuación concreta; y la de constituir garantía para la administración, en tanto acrece la posibilidad de una mejor selección del contratista; todo lo anterior, dentro del marco constitucional dado por el artículo 33 de la Carta Fundamental; 3.-de publicidad, que constituye el presupuesto y garantía de los principios comentados, ya que busca asegurar a los administrados la más amplia certeza de la libre concurrencia en condiciones de absoluta igualdad en los procedimientos de la contratación administrativa, y que consiste en que la invitación al concurso licitatorio se haga en forma general, abierta y lo más amplia posible a todos los oferentes posibles, dándosele al cartel la más amplia divulgación, así como el más amplio acceso al expediente, informes, resoluciones y en general a todo el proceso de que se trate; 4.-de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, en tanto los procedimientos de selección del contratista deben estar definidos a priori en forma precisa, cierta y concreta, de modo que la administración no pueda obviar las reglas predefinidas en la norma jurídica que determina el marco de acción, como desarrollo de lo dispuesto al efecto en la Constitución Política; 5.-de seguridad jurídica, que es derivado del anterior, puesto que al sujetarse los procedimientos de la contratación administrativa a las reglas contenidas en las disposiciones normativas, se da seguridad y garantía a los oferentes de su participación; ... 8.-principio de buena fe, en cuanto en los trámites de las licitaciones y en general, en todo lo concerniente a la contratación administrativa, se considera como un principio moral básico que la administración y oferentes actúen de buena fe, en donde las actuaciones de ambas partes estén caracterizadas por normas éticas claras, donde prevalezca el interés público sobre cualquier otro ”. Estos principios permean la materia de contratación administrativa. Desde el punto de vista del derecho positivo, el marco general regulador de las obligaciones tanto de los entes contratantes como de las empresas contratistas se encuentra contemplado en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y desarrollada a cabalidad en su reglamento, sin perjuicio de la existencia de normas especiales en la materia. En el artículo 15 de dicho cuerpo normativo, expresamente se señala como obligación de toda Administración contratante, lo siguiente: "La Administración está obligada a cumplir con todos los compromisos, adquiridos válidamente, en la contratación administrativa y a prestar colaboración para que el contratista ejecute en forma idónea el objeto pactado". Por otra parte, de manera correlativa a dicho deber, el artículo 20 de la misma ley, establece la siguiente obligación para los contratistas: "Los contratistas están obligados a cumplir, cabalmente, con lo ofrecido en su propuesta y en cualquier manifestación formal documentada, que hayan aportado adicionalmente, en el curso del procedimiento o en la formalización del contrato". Ambas obligaciones surgen de un principio de buena fe en la contratación, mediante el cual, ambas partes, tienen como referente en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones un deber de cumplimiento y colaboración mutuos. Por su parte el artículo 51 del Reglamento a la Ley dispone: “l cartel, constituye el reglamento específico de la contratación que se promueve y se entienden incorporadas a su clausulado todas las normas jurídicas y principios constitucionales aplicables al respectivo procedimiento. Deberá constituir un cuerpo de especificaciones técnicas, claras, suficientes, concretas, objetivas y amplias en cuanto a la oportunidad de participar. Para su confección, la Administración podrá contratar o solicitar la asistencia de personas físicas o jurídicas, especializadas en la materia de que se trate, siempre que no tengan ningún interés particular directo ni indirecto en el negocio, cuando no tuviere en su organización los recursos técnicos necesarios para ello. En aquellas contrataciones de excepción a los procedimientos ordinarios de contratación, la Administración, facultativamente podrá elaborar un cartel con los elementos esenciales atendiendo al objeto contractual, en armonía con los principios de contratación administrativa". Merece manifestarse que los principios de la contratación administrativa han de reflejarse en las estipulaciones del cartel. Este documento se considera el reglamento concreto de la contratación, en cuanto establece con claridad que es lo pretendido por la Administración, las condiciones generales y específicas de éste y la forma en la cual se seleccionará el eventual adjudicatario. Por ello debe ser un instrumento suficiente, específico, claro y objetivo, de modo que los potenciales oferentes se enteren con claridad del objeto y condiciones de la contratación. Por consiguiente, define el contexto en que se concretará el concurso y precisamente en razón de esto, serán vinculantes para el oferente los términos predeterminados. Así, se constituye en parte de las regulaciones aplicables a esa específica contratación. El cartel puede definirse como el conjunto de cláusulas que integran cada contratación, en el que deben fijarse los elementos esenciales del negocio, esto es, la delimitación del objeto concursal, la descripción del bien o servicio por adquirir, la fecha de recepción de ofertas, bases generales para la selección y requisitos mínimos de las ofertas, documentación a presentar, forma de cotización, vigencia de las ofertas, plazo de entrega, forma de pago, entre otras (artículo 42 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y complementado por los diferentes reglamentos que han existido). El contenido básico de un cartel muta constantemente según sean las necesidades que cada contratación pretenda satisfacer de allí la relevancia del documento. Se afirma que tiene carácter reglamentario porque contiene una serie de normas de acatamiento obligatorio y es el instrumento básico del procedimiento de selección del contratista público, llegando a constituir el verdadero reglamento específico de la contratación, tanto de los trámites por seguir, como de las condiciones contenidas en éstos. Es también fuente de interpretación porque en él quedan establecidas las cláusulas o condiciones creadoras de derechos y deberes de las partes. No obstante lo anterior, jerárquicamente está subordinado a la Ley y al Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa, así como la demás normativa específica, en cuanto se encuentra supeditado a las normas de alcance general que establecen disposiciones transversales para el sistema de contratación. En este sentido, el pliego de condiciones puede contener diversos tipos de cláusulas dependiendo del objeto de cada contratación. Normalmente la doctrina distingue entre cláusulas variables e invariables. Las primeras son aquellas en las que el particular ofrece a la Administración lo solicitado por ella y la entidad contratante ponderará y escogerá la oferta que más convenga a los intereses públicos. Pueden variar o cambiar de una oferta a otra, pero son de cumplimiento necesario y obligado, ya que de lo contrario queda fuera de concurso. Ejemplo de éstas son las referidas al precio, la forma de pago o plazo de entrega de los bienes o servicios. Normalmente este tipo de cláusulas son las que permiten escoger al oferente victorioso de sus iguales. Las invariables son de obligado cumplimiento para el oferente y su sujeción a éstas es vinculante, en tanto no puede cambiarlas y si las incumple queda excluido de la licitación. Algunas de éstas son las que describen el objeto contractual. En la mayoría de ellas, la sola presentación de la oferta presume su aceptación. Por el carácter reglamentario, el pliego, es fuente de interpretación del acuerdo entre voluntades, dado que es con base en este, que el oferente elabora su oferta, la cual tiene la característica de ser integral en todos sus componentes, sea, tanto en el contenido del escrito principal, como en cualquier documento anexo. Si debe quedar claro que la definición de las condiciones del cartel no debe ser entendido como un acto discrecional en sentido estricto, en cuando cada una de las disposiciones debe presentar su debida fundamento, lo que permite a cualquier interesado requerir información justificándolas o incluso acreditar el recurso de objeción. Este último es la facultad de cualquier interesado de manifestar oposición a una disposición del pliego, para que el superior administrativo o la misma Contraloría General de la República (dependiendo del tipo de contratación y el objeto del concurso) entre a valorar la objeción y defina la pertinencia de la misma, mediante un acto plenamente motivado. El oferente con fundamento en el cartel confecciona su plica, obteniendo un parámetro de seguridad jurídica, donde la administración promovente garantiza la observancia del principio de confianza legítima para los potenciales participantes, quienes conocen con anterioridad las condiciones que gobiernan el concurso de su interés. Frente a la contratación cada uno de los oferentes, no es más que un interesado legítimo de que las reglas cartelarias se cumplirá a cabalidad; de manera que no existe un derecho a ser adjudicado sino una mera expectativas. Incluso, el ordenamiento garantiza acciones administrativas y judiciales supeditadas exclusivamente hacia aquel oferente que pudiera resultar adjudicatario en cumplimiento del pliego cartelario, y que por situaciones ilegitimas o ilegales no lo fue; de manera que aquella persona que detecta incumplimientos del cartel pero sin tener la posibilidad de que en el supuesto de corregirse tampoco sería adjudicatario carece de todo interés y no tendría acción alguna; salvo la posibilidad de la denuncia ante la Contraloría General de la República que es resguardo de la hacienda pública está llamada a servir de contralor de legalidad de la conducta administrativa. Debe recordarse que la sola presentación de la plica lleva implícito el sometimiento a todas y cada una de las condiciones del pliego, en cuanto es lógico pensar que si la persona concurrió al concurso fue con el interés de ofrecer sus bienes o servicios y eventualmente resultar adjudicatario; lo anterior naturalmente, salvo en los supuestos que manifiestamente resulte clara la voluntad de apartarse del cartel. Con respecto a la naturaleza de la oferta en esta materia, esta es entendida como una promesa unilateral, libre y voluntaria del participante, a fin de celebrar el contrato en el supuesto que resulte electo. De conformidad con la anterior disposición, la oferta debe cumplir de forma estricta el contenido del cartel, tanto en las reglas del procedimiento a seguir, documentos y sobre todo requisitos solicitados, si la oferta no cumple lo estipulado en el cartel, ésta debe ser excluida del concurso, como ya se indicó. No sin advertir que por el principio de libre participación y en satisfacción del interés público, se procura la mayor cantidad de oferentes, lo que lleva aparejado que la exclusión es la excepción y no la regla; siempre que con ello no se promueva la generación de un trato discriminatoria a favor de algún (os) oferentes), pues tampoco puede llegar al extremo de aceptar incumplimientos con tal de permitir la participación. La oferta vincula al oferente, pues en caso de resultar adjudicatario, deberá someterse no sólo a las condiciones cartelarias al efecto establecidas, sino también a los términos por él ofertados en dicho documento y a la Administración, en tanto que su aceptación significará admitir la delimitación de los términos y condiciones de la contratación según lo propuesto por el contratista. Es decir, cartel y oferta deben ser vistos de manera integral e integrada, siendo así que en el análisis de la segunda no se puede perder de vista lo establecido en el primero. Por lo anterior, la contratación no puede ser vista en sus componentes de manera aislada, ni abstraída del ordenamiento jurídico ni sin tomar en consideración la integralidad de la oferta y el cartel al cual se refiere. El ordenamiento prevé como modalidades de contratación: la Licitación Pública y la Abreviada (en su momento dividida en Registro y Restringida), sumado a unas derivaciones de estas (Remate, licitación con financiamiento, con precalificación y subasta a la baja) a lo que se agrega las actividades exentas del procedimiento de contratación (donde se incluye -entre otras- la denominada contratación directa), sin perjuicio que el numeral 146 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación faculta a autorizar reglamentos hacia modalidades diferentes de contratación a fin de conocer mecanismos diversos, permitiendo a la Administración establecer otras modalidades contractuales que no fueran previstas por el legislador. Estas reglamentaciones pueden ser definitivas (hasta su revocación) o incluso supeditadas a plazo (normalmente para verificar la conveniencia de mantener el mecanismo). En cuanto al procedimiento como tal, las normas legales y reglamentarias lo que vienen a señalar son plazos y aspectos de trámite en directa relación al tipo de contratación en particular; la idea en esencia es que la licitación pública garantiza plenamente los principios que informan la contratación, mientras que en las restantes modalidades se reducen ciertas facultades recursivas, se flexibilizan la forma, entre otros aspectos, pues es posible garantizar los principios sin cumplir estos requerimientos. En cuanto a los últimos lo más relevante es la generación de una verificación técnica y otra jurídica, siendo la primera la constatación de los requisitos específicos de aquello que la Administración contratante desea y por otro lado, la jurídica la verificación de requisitos para hacer adjudicable a los oferentes. Al respecto es de rescatar que los carteles establecen requisitos de admisibilidad y elementos ponderables, los primeros corresponden a aquellos que su incumplimiento lleva aparejado la oferta, como podrían ser garantía de participación, señalamiento del ofertante, firma de la oferta, señalamiento de precio, entre muchos otros. Los ponderables, vienen a permitir seleccionar entre las ofertas aquella que resulta victoriosa. Los primeros por su misma esencia son prevenibles, salvo en los supuestos expresamente regulados, los segundos como regla de principio no lo son en la medida que quebrantarían el principio de igualdad entre las partes, pues en virtud de conocer para ese momento las otras ofertas cualquier documentación adicional variaría la eventual calificación, salvo en los supuestos de los hechos históricos, es decir aquellos que si bien podrían afectar la puntuación no presenta el interesado forma alguna de manipularlos, siendo el ejemplo típico los atestados académicos, el estado civil, la experiencia en una actividad, entre muchos otros. De manera que recibidas las ofertas, la Administración debe proceder a realizar dos análisis (sea de manera simultánea o sucesiva), el primero de ellos de naturaleza legal, que pretende verificar el cumplimiento de las cláusulas invariables no técnicas y el segundo, constatando los aspectos variables o técnicos, generando una recomendación. Cabe advertir que la Administración Pública se encuentra facultada para solicitar aclaraciones a la oferta (en cuanto no genere un trato desigual) y eventualmente es posible requerir información adicional, sobre la doctrina de los hechos históricos, aun cuando esta afecte la calificación, en cuanto se trate de situaciones que ocurrieran con anterioridad al concurso, fueran invocadas oportunamente por el (la) interesado (a) y lo faltante sea solo en el plano de su acreditación. Siempre bajo el entendido que dichos datos no son manipulables por el interesado. Es a partir de la recomendación, que el jerarca o el titular subordinado con competencia para ello procede a realizar la adjudicación. Nuevamente allí vuelve a cobrar importancia el cartel, pues como en él se fijan los parámetros de evaluación, es sobre esa base que se asigna la calificación a los oferentes y consecuentemente es el fundamento para la determinación del victorioso. A partir de la adjudicación, se abre la etapa recursiva, que puede ser interna o externa, según el objeto contractual o el monto de la misma; donde es posible la existencia de re adjudicaciones, lo que facultaría a nuevas acciones recursivas. Una vez firme el acuerdo, se abre la etapa de ejecución que inicia con la orden de compra y/o el contrato; de suerte que el segundo es un documento donde se formaliza el acuerdo de voluntades, adonde se integra el pliego cartelario y la oferta (además de la totalidad de la normativa interna), mientras que el segundo es un documento financiero. Resueltos estos, se genera un acto firme a favor de un contratista en concreto. Posteriormente, con base en el cartel y los contenidos de la oferta adjudicada, es que se funda el respectivo contrato administrativo, el cual, debe interpretarse, desde la base de los instrumentos legales que lo integran, sea, el cartel o pliego de bases, la oferta adjudicada y la normativa y principios propios de la contratación administrativa; sobre la lógica que a partir de los informes técnicos y legales, la Administración contratante desecha las ofertas inelegibles sea por incumplimiento de requisitos de admisibilidad, o por precios abusivos o ruinosos, para poder asignar de manera posterior el puntaje según la tabla de calificación señalada en la plica. Iniciando el proceso recursivo. En razón de lo anterior, en materia de contratación administrativa, la determinación del cumplimiento efectivo de la obligación por ambas partes contratantes, debe hacer referencia tanto al cartel como a la oferta considerada de manera integral, y siempre orientado al cumplimiento del principio de buena fe entre las partes suscribientes y en atención al interés público que orientó la decisión de la Administración de realizar la respectiva contratación. Lo normal es que dependiendo de la claridad del objeto contractual y/o de la cuantía de la misma, se prescinde del contrato, utilizando únicamente la orden de compra. Incumplimiento contractual: Civilmente la definición más común o tradicional del contrato, es la que lo señala como un acuerdo de voluntades, expresado libremente o sin ningún vicio, de contenido patrimonial, del cual nacen derechos y obligaciones reciprocas. Dicho acuerdo, como lo señala el artículo 1008 de nuestro Código Civil, “debe ser libre y claramente manifestado. La manifestación puede ser hecha de palabra, por escrito o por hechos de que necesariamente se deduzca”. Desde la óptica del Derecho Administrativo, para el autor argentino José Roberto Dromi, el contrato es “toda manifestación bilateral o de voluntad común, productora de efectos jurídicos entre dos personas, de las cuales una actúa en ejercicio de la función administrativa. Es un acuerdo creador de relaciones jurídicas por el simple consentimiento de adhesión del particular a relaciones previamente establecidas por la Administración”. Los elementos esenciales del contrato administrativo son: sujeto, consentimiento y objeto -el que desarrollaremos para efectos de esta Litis causa, finalidad y la forma.- En cuanto al objeto del contrato, hemos de indicar que se denomina así, no sólo, a la cosa que eventualmente será el punto material de referencia del contrato o a la prestación comprometida, sino, en general, al clausulado del contrato y a sus términos y condiciones. Sin embargo, en un sentido técnico jurídico más preciso, se entiende que el objeto de la obligación se refiere a la prestación debida, es decir, un comportamiento del deudor, por una conducta activa u omisiva del obligado, “al decir del artículo 629 del Código Civil que 'toda obligación tiene por objeto dar, hacer o dejar de hacer alguna cosa, afirma con ello que el objeto está constituido por el acto de dar, hacer o no hacer alguna cosa, lo que denota ser una conducta el objeto de la obligación, es decir, la prestación” (subrayado del original, Casafont Romero, Pablo, Ensayos de Derecho Contractual, Colegio de Abogados, Segunda edición 1979, San José, Costa Rica, pág. 15). Cabe apuntar, además, la casi unánime opinión doctrinal de que el contrato con la Administración Pública y, consiguientemente, la oferta a ella, son de adhesión, lo que es parcialmente cierto, dada la necesaria libertad del concursante para determinar por sí, al menos, el precio de la oferta. El fenómeno proviene de dos hechos fundamentales: 1- La oferta del particular viene delimitada por el pliego de condiciones particulares (cartel o convocatoria de licitación), unilateralmente elaborado por la Administración Pública, sin discusión con el contratante ni oportunidad para éste de influir sobre su contenido. 2- Este último viene complementado en gran parte, a su vez, por los llamados pliegos de condiciones generales, verdaderos proyectos de contrato tipo destinados a formular, de la manera más abstracta y comprensible posible, las condiciones, términos, obligaciones y derechos de las partes en el contrato. El objeto, en un sentido general, de un contrato es la consecuencia o efecto que produce y que se persigue al celebrarlo. Dugüit hace una prolija distinción entre el objeto inmediato y el objeto mediato de la voluntad. El objeto inmediato es siempre un acto material consistente en un movimiento físico, a veces una tradición, a veces una declaración verbal o escrita. El objeto mediato es la situación de derecho que produce el objeto inmediato. El acto material inmediatamente querido, es querido como medio para llegar al nacimiento de una situación de derecho. El objeto debe ser cierto, posible, lícito y moral. No es indispensable que posea contenido patrimonial, pero necesariamente debe ser evaluable y transformarse en una prestación pecuniaria en caso de incumplimiento. En síntesis, el objeto del contrato, está constituido por la obligación impuesta contractualmente, que implica una prestación, que constituye siempre una conducta de dar, hacer no hacer algo. Ahora bien, si el objeto del contrato es siempre la obligación de una prestación debida, entonces, se cumple con el objeto del contrato, realizando la conducta o comportamiento obligado, bajo un principio de buena fe contractual [...]

Criterio del Tribunal: Esta Cámara considera que no lleva razón la representación Municipal en este alegato, ya que si bien el artículo 155 del Código Municipal señala “Los recursos en materia de contratación administrativa se regirán por lo establecido en la ley reguladora de contratación administrativa”; la Ley de Contratación Administrativa reserva en su Capítulo IX los recursos procedentes en materia contractual administrativa, estableciendo como primer recurso el de objeción contra el Cartel y según la cuantía, el recurso de apelación o revocatoria contra el acto de adjudicación. Estos son los recursos en fase de contratación reservados para las instancias ahí señaladas, sin considerar recursos ante esas instancias en fase de ejecución del contrato. Así, el contenido del acuerdo impugnado versó sobre la comunicación de la finalización del contrato por el advenimiento del plazo, manifestando la corporación municipal su decisión de no prorrogarlo. De esta forma lo impugnado no lo fue ni contra la objeción del cartel ni de su adjudicación, por lo que bien podía entonces la Sección III entrar a conocer sobre la impugnación al citado acuerdo. Sobre el alegato señalado por la representación Municipal, en cuanto a que si la Sección Tercera consideró que se trató de una rescisión unilateral del contrato, por cuanto éste ya se había prorrogado y en ese caso la actora debió acudir a los recursos previstos en los artículos 206 y 208 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa; dicho argumento tampoco resulta de recibo, ya que nunca fue el cometido de la Municipalidad dar por rescindido el contrato, sino que el acuerdo impugnado fue comunicar básicamente que conforme a lo establecido en la cláusula quinta de los contratos suscritos que se tenía por finalizado el contrato por el advenimiento del plazo y no por rescindido. Es por lo anterior que no lleva razón el alegato de la corporación municipal al acusar una falta de competencia para conocer la Sección III del acuerdo impugnado en razón de la materia. El segundo punto a analizar es entonces si la Sección III lleva o no razón al sostener en la resolución 490-2015, que la Municipalidad se equivocó al pretender sustituir simplemente los oficios DP-171-2013 y DP-172-2013 del 31 de julio de 2013, con otros documentos con los mismos números de oficios emitidos el 04 de octubre de 2013, con contenido contradictorio sobre la orden de inicio, sin respeto a las formalidades en perjuicio de la seguridad jurídica y desconociendo lo establecido en los artículos 140 y 146 de la LGAP, sobre la presunción de validez y ejecutoriedad de los actos administrativos y que la segunda orden de inicio se emitió fuera del plazo indicado en los artículos 32 de la Ley de Contratación y 192 de su Reglamento y que por tanto deben prevalecer las ordenes de inicio de fecha 31 de julio de 2013 y siendo que el acuerdo impugnado referente a la voluntad de no prorrogar el contrato se expidió hasta el 01 de setiembre de 2014, se cumplió con la prórroga automática; concluyendo esa Sección, que las manifestaciones hechas por la Corporación Municipal en esa sede, constituían meras apreciaciones subjetivas o argumentativas, sin un asidero objetivo que pudiese ser analizado. Criterio del Tribunal: Conforme al artículo 49) de la Constitución Política, le corresponde a la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado y de sus instituciones, de manera que todas sus actuaciones se ajusten al ordenamiento jurídico. Por su parte el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo busca como fin la verdad real de los hechos sometidos a conocimiento de este Tribunal. El proceso contencioso se trata entonces de un proceso plenario, cuyo norte es la búsqueda de la verdad real de los hechos sometidos a su conocimiento. Bajo estos presupuestos analizará este Tribunal el conflicto sometido a su conocimiento. Para la Cámara y las partes, el debate gira en torno a determinar cuál orden de inicio debe prevalecer, si las que se emitieron por oficios DP-171-13 y DP-172-13 ambas del 31 de julio de 2013 y que señalaron la orden de inicio para el día 12 de agosto de 2013 o las que se emitieron bajo esos mismos números de oficios pero de fecha 04 de octubre de 2013 y que establecieron la orden de inicio para el día 07 de octubre de 2013. De acuerdo a lo dispuesto en la resolución No. 490-2015, la Sección Tercera anuló el acuerdo porque consideró que la corporación municipal al emitir las ordenes de inicio para el día 07 de octubre de 2013; desconoció lo establecido en los artículos 140 y 146 de la LGAP en cuanto a la presunción de validez y ejecutoriedad del acto administrativo sin respeto a las formalidades y en perjuicio de la seguridad jurídica y que en todo caso la segunda orden de inició se emitió fuera del plazo de los 15 días hábiles luego del refrendo o aprobación interna del contrato, según lo dispone el artículo 32 de la Ley de Contratación y 192 de su Reglamento. Por su parte la representación estatal señaló en la contestación de la demanda y en la audiencia de juicio, que las órdenes de inicio de fecha 31 de julio de 2013, constituyeron actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos a favor de la señora González Arguedas, los cuales no podían ser desconocidos por la corporación municipal sin acudir a su anulación conforme a los mecanismos previstos en la LGAP. Por su parte la señora González Arguedas en la contestación de la demanda indicó únicamente que la orden de inicio se emitió para el 12 de agosto de 2013, de manera que a la fecha en que se le comunicó la decisión de la Municipalidad de no prorrogar el contrato, ya había operado la prórroga automática. Conforme a lo indicado por la representación estatal, el punto dilucidar es pues determinar si efectivamente la orden de inicio constituye un acto declarativo de derechos subjetivos, y por ende si desde su emisión nació dicho derecho. Para esta Cámara, la orden de inicio es básicamente un documento en el que se le indica al contratista a partir de qué momento se empieza a computar el plazo convenido para prestar o realizar el objeto contractual, (en este caso el servicio de operacionalidad de los CECUDI de Puerto Viejo y de Horquetas de Sarapiquí). La orden de inicio no se trata de un documento complejo, ni requiere de una determinada formalidad, sino que es consecuencia lógica y necesaria de eficacia (no de validez) de lo que ya se dispuso en el Cartel y en el contrato, y sí requiere ser notificada al contratista. En tesis de principio, de acuerdo a lo que dispone el artículo 32 de la LCA y 192 de su Reglamento, la orden de inicio se debe emitir dentro de los 15 días hábiles posteriores al refrendo o a la aprobación interna del contrato, aunque por razones calificadas, dicho plazo puede ampliarse, de manera que no se trata de un plazo perentorio sino ordenatorio, y por el transcurso del tiempo la competencia no se pierde. Recordemos que el ordinal 329 de la LGAP señala que el acto administrativo dictado fuera del plazo es válido para todos los efectos, salvo norma en contrario, lo cual no sucede en el presente caso. Así, el o la contratista queda obligado a cumplir con el servicio contratado en el plazo establecido y la orden de inició constituye el “banderillazo de salida” de la prestación material del servicio u objeto del contrato, y a partir de la fecha de orden de inicio es que se computa el plazo establecido en el cartel o en el contrato. Sin embargo bien puede darse el caso en que por razones ajenas a la Administración o al contratista, el plazo deba extenderse de manera que se detenga la orden de salida o se le amplíe el plazo para cumplir con lo pactado, por demoras no imputables al contratista, como por ejemplo cuando la Administración no ha obtenido a tiempo los permisos necesarios para iniciar con su ejecución. Es importante tomar en cuenta que en dicho supuesto, no es que se suspende el contrato (el cual solo se suspende por fuerza mayor o caso fortuito), sino solamente se amplía las fechas calendario y lo que se suspende es el plazo de inicio de su ejecución, pero el plazo calendario del contrato sigue siendo el mismo. Dicha suspensión, siempre que esté justificada puede darse de oficio o a petición de parte, bajo un principio de buena fe contractual. Ahora bien, la suspensión del plazo puede darse por hechos sobrevinientes luego de emitida la orden de inicio, y si es por razones imputables a la Administración, surge el deber de esta de indemnizar al contratista por los daños y perjuicios que acredite le ocasionó la suspensión. Para la Cámara desde el punto de vista técnico jurídico, la orden de inicio no constituye un acto declaratorio de un derecho subjetivo (tal y como lo entiende la representación estatal), ya que el derecho subjetivo surge de la licitación adjudicada y del contrato respectivo, y la orden de inicio constituye solamente un requisito de eficacia, sin que en sí misma sea capaz de generar un derecho subjetivo en el entendido de que ese derecho es a iniciar en la fecha indicada en la orden de inicio, pues es claro que la LCA en su artículo 32 prevé la posibilidad de extender dicho plazo por razones calificadas. Es por ello que a contario a lo que señala la Sección III de este Tribunal conociendo como jerarca impropio en su resolución 490-2015; para la Cámara el cambio de fecha en la orden de inicio no produce un vicio que atente contra lo dispuesto en los artículos 140 y 146 de la LGAP en cuanto a la presunción de validez y ejecutoriedad del acto administrativo. Y es que como se dijo supra, la orden de inicio no se trata de un documento complejo ni requiere de una formalidad, sino que es consecuencia lógica y necesaria de lo que ya se estipuló en cuanto al cómputo del plazo establecido en el Cartel y en el contrato. De ahí que lo que se debe analizar es si la Municipalidad suspendió la orden de inicio originalmente emitida (oficios DP-171-13 y DP-172-13 ambos del 31 de julio de 2013), por razones calificadas como lo exige el artículo 32 de la LCA, y la forma en que modificó las órdenes de inicio. Recordemos que la Sección Tercera en su resolución 490-2015, indicó con respecto a los alegatos señalados en esa instancia por parte de la corporación municipal, que sus manifestaciones quedaban en meras apreciaciones subjetivas o argumentativas sin un asidero objetivo que pudiese ser analizado en esa instancia. Ahora, tal y como se indicó supra, la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa debe velar por la legalidad de las actuaciones administrativas y el fin del procedimiento plenario en sede jurisdiccional contencioso-Administrativa conforme al CPCA es la búsqueda de la verdad real de los hechos. En aras de alcanzar esta verdad real, en la audiencia preliminar se aceptó la prueba documental que consiste en los legajos I y II correspondiente a las Licitaciones No. 2013LN-000002-01 y de la No. 2013LN-000003-01 y el expediente administrativo referido al acuerdo del Concejo Municipal mediante el que se dio por terminado ambos contratos por el advenimiento del plazo y se comunicó la voluntad de la Municipalidad de no prorrogarlo. Como prueba testimonial se admitió la declaración del testigo-funcionario Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, cédula 1-1135-0949, quien para el momento de los hechos laboraba para la Corporación Municipal como Proveedor Municipal y fue el que emitió los oficios DP-171 y DP-172 del 31 de julio y del 04 de octubre del 2013, consignado en los primeros como fecha de orden de inicio el 12 de agosto y luego en los segundos la fecha del 07 de octubre del 2013 y que es objeto de controversia en la presente Litis. Ahora bien, de la prueba documental se tiene efectivamente la existencia de ambos oficios con órdenes de inicio distintas. Así, a folios 89 y 90 del expediente administrativo tenemos los oficios DP-171 y DP-172 del 31 de julio del 2013, en los que el señor Hernández Arguedas consignó como fecha de orden de inicio el 12 de agosto de 2013. Dichos oficios le fueron notificados personalmente a la señora González Arguedas el mismo 31 de julio de 2013, en los que la orden de inicio lo fue para el 12 de agosto de 2013. Luego, a folios 100 y 101, del mismo expediente rolan los oficios DP-171 y DP-172 pero del 04 de octubre de 2013, igualmente notificados personalmente ese mismo día a la señora González Arguedas, pero en los que la orden de inicio se indicó para el 07 de octubre de 2013. Frente a ambas actuaciones la actora guardó silencio en sede administrativa. Ahora bien, de la declaración del citado testigo, quedó claro que el motivo por el cual se cambió la fecha de la orden de inició se debió a que de previo a poner en funcionamiento el programa de los CECUDI en Puerto Viejo y en Horquetas de Sarapiquí, se debía de contar con la aprobación del Consejo de Atención Integral del Ministerio de Salud, aprobación con la que no se contaba para el 12 de agosto de 2013, motivo por el cual no se podía iniciar la ejecución de ambos contratos para ese día. Indicó ante esta Cámara que le comunicó esa situación a la señora González Arguedas y que ella expresamente le manifestó su anuencia a esperar a que se dieran las aprobaciones por parte del CAI para iniciar a ejecutar lo pactado. A preguntas de este Tribunal respondió, que fue debido a ello que antes del 07 de octubre de 2013, no hay listas de niños atendidos en ambos Centros y que no hay pagos correspondientes a los meses de agosto, setiembre y octubre, siendo el primer pago hasta el mes de noviembre del 2013 por los servicios prestados a partir del 07 de octubre, con lo que se acredita que la operacionalidad de los CECUDI en ambos distritos se dio hasta el mes de octubre de 2013, reiterando que esa situación siempre le fue comunicada a la señora González Arguedas quien aceptó el cambio en la fecha de la orden de inicio, sin que presentara queja, ni reclamo al respecto. A este punto podemos afirmar que la actora adecuó su conducta a la segunda orden de inicio sin formular objeción alguna al respecto, no así a la primera. Dicho testimonio es coincidente con la prueba que obra en el expediente administrativo a folios 38, 39, 77 y 78, en los que el Dr. Francisco Oviedo Gómez, Presidente del Consejo de Atención Integral del Ministerio de Salud, informó a la Dirección del Área Rectora de Salud de Sarapiquí, que por oficios CAI-0926-2013 y CAI-0927-2013 ambos del 23 de setiembre de 2013, ese Consejo en la sesión ordinaria No. 9 Acta No. 14 del 20 de setiembre de 2013, habilitó las instalaciones del Centro de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil de Puerto Viejo y de Horquetas de Sarapiquí por un plazo de 3 años, del 20 de setiembre del 2013 al 19 de setiembre de 2016, para atender hasta 75 niños de 0 a 12 años en horario de las 6.30 am a 5.00 pm. De forma que para la Cámara si hubo una razón calificada para extender la fecha de la orden de inicio, pues los CECUDI de Puerto Viejo y de Horquetas no podían operar hasta que no se diera su aprobación por parte del CAI del Ministerio de Salud, aprobación que se dio hasta el 20 de setiembre de 2013. Aunado a ello, no existe evidencia de que el servicio se haya prestado antes del 07 de octubre de 2013, no existen listas de niños atendidos a partir del 12 de agosto, ni trámites de facturas correspondientes a los meses de agosto y setiembre, o prueba alguna que haga suponer que desde el 12 de agosto de 2013 entraron en funcionamiento ambos CECUDI, ni tampoco reclamo alguno por parte de la señora González Arguedas por el cambio de fecha de inicio, que haga pensar que no estuvo de acuerdo con dicho cambio, a pesar que ambos oficios le fueron notificados personalmente. Finalmente queda por analizar la validez de cara al Derecho Administrativo de lo dispuesto, en los oficios DP-171 y DP-172 del 04 de octubre de 2013, en los que se dio la orden de inicio para el día 07 de octubre de 2013. Según se dispuso en la resolución No. 490-2015, para la Sección Tercera deben prevalecer los oficios de fecha 31 de julio en los que se consignó las órdenes de inicio, para el 12 de agosto de 2013, en razón de que la Municipalidad se equivocó al sustituir originalmente emitidos, con otros con contenido contradictorio sobre la orden de inicio, sin respeto a las formalidades en perjuicio de la seguridad jurídica y desconociendo lo establecido en los artículos 140 y 146 de la LGAP, sobre la presunción de validez y ejecutoriedad de los actos administrativos. En primer término se debe hacer ver que dicha Sección no indicó cuales fueron las formalidades que se echaron de menos y que dicho cambio haya generado inseguridad jurídica en la contratista. Al respecto se debe indicar que conforme al artículo 130 de la LGAP el acto administrativo consiste en la manifestación unilateral de la voluntad de la Administración, capaz de producir efectos jurídicos, esto es, capaz de otorgar, denegar o cancelar derechos subjetivos o intereses legítimos del administrado; en este caso de la contratista. De acuerdo a lo indicado supra, es claro que el derecho subjetivo de la contratista se originó con la adjudicación de ambos contratos y con la suscripción del contrato y no en la orden de inicio, que guarda identidad con un acto propio de la fase de ejecución de los efectos de una contratación, no así con un acto constitutivo que declare un derecho subjetivo en cabeza de la contratista. Luego, la orden de inicio no se trata de un documento complejo y ante razones calificadas el plazo para emitir la orden de inicio se puede extender más allá de los 15 días hábiles. (Artículo 32 de la LCA). En el caso subexámine ha quedado claro que hubo una razón calificada, que impidió a que la orden de inicio se diera u observara para el día 12 de agosto de 2013 y que fue que para esa fecha las instalaciones de los CECUDI en los distritos de Puerto Viejo y de Horquetas de Sarapiquí no habían sido autorizadas por el CAI del Ministerio de Salud. Situación que conforme al testimonio del testigo-funcionario Rodrigo Andrés Hernández Arguedas, Proveedor Municipal en ese momento, le fue comunicada a la señora González Arguedas, quien estuvo de acuerdo en el cambio de fecha en la orden de inicio, testimonio que no fue desacreditado por la indicada señora, de forma que no hubo ni inseguridad ni incerteza jurídica porque de lo actuado en el cambio de fecha, siempre se le comunicó y a pesar de que fue notificada personalmente, la contratista no presentó reclamo alguno en tal sentido. Ahora bien, de acuerdo al artículo 133 y 136 de la LGAP, todo acto administrativo debe tener un motivo, como uno de sus elementos constitutivos, y ante su ausencia el acto es nulo, pues esa ley exige que el motivo sea legítimo, esto es ajustado al ordenamiento, y que exista. Además el acto administrativo debe ser motivado, esto es que se expliquen las motivaciones por los que se adopta en un determinado sentido. Ahora, si bien el artículo 134 de la LGAP indica que el acto administrativo debe expresarse por escrito, para la Cámara el señor Hernández Arguedas ciertamente le explicó a la señora González Arguedas las motivaciones o razones por la que se debió realizar el cambio en la fecha de orden de inicio, y si bien no quedaron plasmadas en un oficio, lo cierto es que la indicada señora nunca se opuso al cambio de fecha, ni impugnó tal situación, ni presentó reclamo alguno al respecto y fue hasta que le comunicaron la finalización de los contratos suscritos por el advenimiento del plazo y la voluntad de la Municipalidad de no prorrogarlos, en que alegó -comprometiendo el principio de buena fe- que la orden de inicio se dio para el día 12 de agosto de 2013 y que por tanto se le debió notificar la intención de no prorrogarlo a más tardar el 12 de julio de 2014. Lo cierto del caso es que ella misma adecuó su conducta en ejecución del contrato a la segunda orden de inicio y no a la primera, que parece ahora querer reivindicar. Así las cosas de la prueba documental y testimonial evacuada y que ha tenido el Tribunal por demostrada, la orden de inicio que de conformidad con la verdad real de los hechos, se debe computar para efectos del plazo del contrato lo fue la emitida por oficios DP-171 y DP-172 del 04 de octubre de 2013, iniciando las funciones el día 07 de octubre de 2013. Situación que en criterio del Tribunal se demuestra ya que no hay prueba alguna que haga pensar que entre el 12 de agosto y el 07 de octubre de 2013, se hayan atendido niños en los CECUDI de los distritos de Horquetas y Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí. Luego tampoco se tiene que la señora González Arguedas haya presentado reclamo alguno hasta antes del 05 de setiembre de 2014, que fue la fecha en que planteó el recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra el acuerdo del Concejo Municipal No. 35-2014, en el que se dispuso dar por terminado por el advenimiento del plazo los contratos firmados y se comunicó la voluntad del Concejo de no prorrogarlos, sosteniendo que la fecha de inicio lo fue el 12 de agosto y no el 07 de octubre de 2013, es decir 11 meses después de que le fue notificado los oficios DP-171-13 y DP-172-13 del 04 de octubre de 2013, sosteniendo que la prórroga automática conforme al contrato había operado desde el 12 de agosto de 2014, lo cual en criterio de este Tribunal no lleva razón, pues no existe prueba que haya iniciado la operacionalidad de los CECUDI de los indicados distritos desde el 12 de agosto de 2013 y por el contrario la Corporación Municipal si acreditó que en razón de lo que se expuso supra, las autorizaciones de las instalaciones de los CECUDI de ambos distritos, se obtuvieron hasta el 20 de setiembre de 2013 y de ahí que las ordenes de inicio se dieran hasta el día 07 de octubre de 2013. Y es que de aceptar que las ordenes de inicio se dieron a partir del 12 de agosto de 2013 como lo afirmó la señora González Arguedas, nos llevaría a la conclusión de que la actora incumplió lo pactado a partir de esa fecha y hasta el 07 de octubre de 2013, pues se reitera que no hay prueba que permita arribar a la conclusión que la orden de inicio y la operacionalidad material de los CECUDI se haya dado antes del 07 de octubre de 2013, y que en este caso la orden de inicio se debió extender hasta el día 07 de octubre de 2013 por una razón calificada supra indicada. Situación de la que fue notificada la actora y quien estuvo de acuerdo según el testimonio del Proveedor Municipal. Ahora, conforme a los principios que consagran la actividad contractual de la Administración señalados supra, el artículo 15 de la LCA establece la obligación de la Administración de cumplir cabalmente con lo pactado y a colaborar con el contratista, de forma que este pueda cumplir con lo pactado en forma idónea. Por su parte el artículo 20, indica que el contratista está obligado a cumplir con lo ofrecido en la propuesta, y en cualquier manifestación formal en el curso del procedimiento o formalización. Para la Sala Constitucional ambos artículos descansan, sobre un principio fundamental que es el de la buena fe, el cual define como un principio moral básico, en el que descansan las actuaciones de las partes suscribientes del contrato. Para este Tribunal, de acuerdo a la prueba que obra en autos, la corporación municipal actuó de buena fe, al tener que variar las fechas de orden de inicio, ya que las instalaciones de los CECUDI de los distritos de Horquetas y Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí no habían sido autorizados por el CAI del Ministerio de Salud al 12 de agosto de 2013, lo que hacía que legalmente fuera imposible ponerlos en funcionamiento, ya que de hacerlo incurrían en una falta, al carecer de dicho requisito. Luego, la Municipalidad en todo momento comunicó a la contratista dicha situación y así se desprende del testimonio del señor Hernández Arguedas, quien indicó ante el Tribunal ---bajo fe de juramento---, que él como Proveedor Municipal, le manifestó la situación a la contratista y que contando con la aprobación del CAI de los CECUDI del día 20 de setiembre de 2013, personalmente le notificó a la contratista las nuevas órdenes de inicio con fecha del 07 de octubre de 2013, con las que estuvo de acuerdo. De manera que la situación que impidió que las primeras órdenes de inicio se tornaran eficaces, fue un motivo calificado, y que de ello se le comunicó a la contratista, por lo que no hubo mala fe de la Administración Municipal, en su actuación. Y es que debe tenerse presente que conforme al artículo 20 de la LCA, el contratista está obligado a verificar la corrección del procedimiento de contratación administrativa y la ejecución contractual, y que en razón de esa obligación, para fundamentar gestiones no podrá alegar desconocimiento del ordenamiento, ni de las consecuencias de la conducta administrativa. De esta forma, si la contratista consideró bajo un principio de buena fe, que la Administración actuaba ilegalmente con el cambio de fecha en la orden de inició, pasando del 12 de agosto al 7 de octubre del 2013, debió impugnar dicha situación al momento en que se le comunicó lo que estaba pasando, sin embargo aceptó el cambio en la fecha de orden de inicio y no es sino hasta que le comunican la voluntad de la Municipalidad de dar por terminado el contrato por el advenimiento del plazo y de no prorrogarlo que indica que el cambio de fecha en la orden de inicio no operó y que se debe tener para los efectos las ordenes de fecha del 12 de agosto de 2013, comunicadas por oficios del 31 de julio de 2013. Así las cosas, esta Cámara arriba a la conclusión de que el acuerdo tomado en la sesión ordinaria No. 35-2014 celebrada el día 01 de setiembre de 2014, artículo 5, en cuanto el Concejo Municipal dio por concluido los contratos suscritos con la señora González Arguedas fenecieron por el advenimiento del plazo, se ajustó a derecho, y dicho acuerdo fue notificado a la contratista dentro del plazo previsto en la cláusula quinta de ambos contratos, de manera que lo dispuesto en la resolución No. 490-2015 de la Sección Tercera, no se ajustó a la verdad real de los hechos y de mantenerla se genera una afectación al interés público y a los intereses patrimoniales de la Municipalidad, ya que de un análisis plenario de lo sucedido se llega a la conclusión que no lleva razón la Sección Tercera en sus alegatos de fondo, motivo por el cual se dispone su nulidad".