← Environmental Law Center← Centro de Derecho Ambiental
Res. 00095-2019 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · 2019
OutcomeResultado
The Court denies the annulment petition against the one-month suspension sanction imposed on the official, confirming that the disciplinary power had not expired, the act was duly reasoned, and the sanction was proportionate.El Tribunal rechaza la demanda de nulidad contra la sanción de suspensión de un mes impuesta a la funcionaria, confirmando que la potestad disciplinaria no había prescrito, que el acto estaba debidamente motivado y que la sanción era proporcionada.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Court, Section VI, reviews an appeal against a one-month suspension imposed on an INDER official who, as Human Resources Coordinator, executed orders from the Executive Presidency to grant salary supplements for downward reassignments without requiring prior technical and legal studies. The ruling examines three axes: the applicable statute of limitations, the scope of the duty of hierarchical obedience, and the validity of the sanctioning decision's reasoning. It holds that, as the case involves a breach of the duty of probity linked to the management of public funds, the special five-year limitation period set by the anti-corruption (Law No. 8422) and internal control (Law No. 8292) laws applies, not the one-month term from the Labor Code. Regarding the duty of obedience, it establishes that the official, given her technical profile and advisory role, was obliged to warn the hierarchy about the lack of technical support and, if appropriate, to object to the orders; by failing to do so, she assumed responsibility for executing acts that granted illegitimate benefits. Finally, it holds that the final decision was duly reasoned and the sanction is proportionate.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, analiza la impugnación de una sanción de suspensión de un mes impuesta a una funcionaria del INDER que, en su rol de Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos, ejecutó órdenes de la Presidencia Ejecutiva para otorgar pluses salariales por reasignación descendente sin exigir los estudios técnicos y legales previos. El fallo examina tres ejes: el régimen de prescripción aplicable, el alcance del deber de obediencia jerárquica y la validez de la motivación del acto sancionatorio. Sostiene que, al tratarse de una infracción al deber de probidad vinculada con la gestión de fondos públicos, el plazo de prescripción es el especial de cinco años previsto en las leyes contra la corrupción (N° 8422) y de control interno (N° 8292), y no el plazo mensual del Código de Trabajo. En cuanto al deber de obediencia, establece que la funcionaria, debido a su perfil técnico y cargo de asesoría, tenía la obligación de advertir a la jerarquía sobre la falta de sustento técnico y, en su caso, objetar las órdenes; al no hacerlo, asumió responsabilidad por la ejecución de actos que concedieron beneficios ilegítimos. Finalmente, declara que el acto final estuvo debidamente motivado y que la sanción resulta proporcional.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In this context, the facts imputed to the plaintiff, namely having allowed the adoption of behaviors that resulted in an undue recognition of salary supplements to two INDER officials through downward reassignment, even if they do not refer to a direct disposition of Public Treasury funds, nevertheless constitute actions that led to the ordering of salary expenditures covered with public resources, which, as alleged in the ordinary disciplinary proceeding, were illegitimately granted. In this Chamber's view, the substantial content of the acts charged and subject to the proceeding constitute manifestations deemed antagonistic to the internal control regime and the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of public function. From this perspective, the plaintiff seems to confuse the responsibility of those who directly administer public treasury, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate holders, with the responsibility that is her own merely by her condition as a public servant, and therefore subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that regard, the time margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power applicable in this case is the one imposed by Law No. 8422 in its article 44, which refers to the five-year prescription rule established by article 71 of Law No. 7428.En ese contexto, los hechos que le fueron imputados a la accionante, como es el caso de haber permitido la adopción de conductas que generaron un reconocimiento indebido de pluses salariales a dos funcionarios del INDER por reasignación descendente. Si bien no se refieren a una disposición directa de Hacienda Pública, en definitiva componen conductas que llevaron a disponer de erogaciones de orden salarial, cubiertas con recursos públicos, las que, se aduce dentro del procedimiento ordinario de corte disciplinario, fueron ilegítimamente otorgados. A juicio de esta Cámara, el contenido sustancial de las conductas intimadas y objeto del procedimiento constituyen manifestaciones que se estiman antagónicas del régimen de control interno y del deber de probidad que se impone en el ejercicio de la función pública. Desde este plano, la accionante parece confundir la responsabilidad de quienes administran hacienda pública de manera directa, denominados superiores jerárquicos o titulares subordinados, con la responsabilidad que le resulta propia por su sola condición de servidora pública, y por tanto, sujeto a las regulaciones del deber de probidad. En ese sentido, el margen de temporalidad para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que aplica en este caso, es el que impone la Ley No. 8422 en su numeral 44, que remite a la norma quinquenal de prescripción que estatuye el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La potestad correctiva no puede considerarse como una imprescriptible, tratando de justificar esa deducción en la regla del numeral 66.1 de la LGAP, sino que se trata de una sujeta a reglas de preclusión por factores temporales."
"The corrective power cannot be considered as imprescriptible by attempting to justify such a deduction on the rule of article 66.1 of the LGAP; rather, it is subject to preclusion rules due to temporal factors."
Considerando V
"La potestad correctiva no puede considerarse como una imprescriptible, tratando de justificar esa deducción en la regla del numeral 66.1 de la LGAP, sino que se trata de una sujeta a reglas de preclusión por factores temporales."
Considerando V
"La alegación de aplicación automática y sin reparo alguno de lo ordenado por la Presidencia Ejecutiva, por derivación del deber de obediencia, no supone la liberación de responsabilidad que se pretende."
"The allegation of automatic and unquestioning application of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, as a derivation of the duty of obedience, does not entail the release from liability that is sought."
Considerando IX
"La alegación de aplicación automática y sin reparo alguno de lo ordenado por la Presidencia Ejecutiva, por derivación del deber de obediencia, no supone la liberación de responsabilidad que se pretende."
Considerando IX
"La accionante parece confundir la responsabilidad de quienes administran hacienda pública de manera directa... con la responsabilidad que le resulta propia por su sola condición de servidora pública, y por tanto, sujeto a las regulaciones del deber de probidad."
"The plaintiff seems to confuse the liability of those who directly manage public treasury... with the liability that is her own merely by her condition as a public servant, and therefore subject to the regulations of the duty of probity."
Considerando VII
"La accionante parece confundir la responsabilidad de quienes administran hacienda pública de manera directa... con la responsabilidad que le resulta propia por su sola condición de servidora pública, y por tanto, sujeto a las regulaciones del deber de probidad."
Considerando VII
Full documentDocumento completo
V.- On the temporal element in the exercise of corrective administrative powers of a disciplinary nature. The analysis of the validity of the conduct subject to this proceeding has as its fundamental point determining the statute of limitations (prescripción) regime applicable to the disciplinary administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff. In this regard, the following must be indicated. In employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the superior over officials who have committed sanctionable offenses is subject to a temporal factor, after which such exercise may no longer be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the subject matter regulated and the existence of a special legal regime that establishes particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of Article 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic reasons, are considered imprescriptible—e.g., the protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales)—those referring to internal sanctioning authority—such as that examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may expire due to the passage of time established by the legal system without being exercised. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, the official's ability to request recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power arises. This is a matter left to the discretion of the legislator, who determines in each case whether it involves a statute of limitations (prescripción) or a lapse (caducidad) of the potential exercise of those powers. From this standpoint, in liberatory prescription, the concurrence of three fundamental factors is required, namely: a) inertia of the holder of a right (or power) in its exercise, b) passage of the time set by the legal system during that inertia of the holder, and; c) claim or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship asserting the statute of limitations. However, in matters of public employment, the negative prescription may well be alleged as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act, even if that defense was not exercised prior to the issuance of the public will. Thus, the corrective power cannot be considered imprescriptible, attempting to justify that deduction based on the rule of Article 66.1 of the LGAP; rather, it is subject to preclusion rules due to temporal factors, as seen in subsection 3) of that same Article 66 of Law No. 6227/78. In the case of actions by the Public Administration in sanctioning administrative procedures, what is established by Article 329.3 of the LGAP is fundamental, which states: "3. The final act issued after the deadline shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless otherwise provided by law." Therefore, when a legal provision establishes the loss or preclusion of competence, the act issued in exercise of that already-expired power could not be considered valid. Now, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary procedures, in all of which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with different nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for purposes of clarity, of demarcation criteria that allow addressing the issues discussed, depending on the scenario in question. In order to analyze the temporal element of the procedure, the temporal progression of different stages must be distinguished: 1) Statute of limitations (prescripción) (or lapse (caducidad)) of the exercise of the disciplinary power: this refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case to allow issuing the final decision. At this level, it concerns the maximum period initiated by the legal system for the administrative superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at establishing the appropriateness or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that notification of the opening of the procedure seeking to establish the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act generates an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure directly aimed at exercising that power. It could not be considered that the aforementioned period for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, the Administration must order the opening of an administrative case, it is insisted, to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions of Articles 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative superior is subject to a prescriptive period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the figure of lapse (caducidad) to the extent that in certain scenarios it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by mandate 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), a rule that establishes a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). Prior to the reform made by Law No. 9343, called "Labor Procedural Reform" ("Reforma Procesal Laboral"), of January 25, 2016, effective as of July 26, 2017, such period was regulated by precept 603 of the Labor Code. In this specific case, given the date of the alleged offenses, in the plaintiff's theory, that would be the applicable rule. The foregoing is without prejudice to offenses that are regulated by special rules, such as those expressed by the internal control regime, probity (probidad) in public function, and public finance management, in which, according to the regulations of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (Art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública), No. 8422 (Art. 44), and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, a special period of five years operates (according to the scenarios and from the moments those rules provide). In such cases, the special period prevails, not the monthly one established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now, the starting point for the calculation of that prescriptive period is decisive. On this matter, Article 603 of the Labor Code—in force at the date of the facts—(Art. 414 currently) states that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction became known. In this sense, the monthly period is calculated from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know the offense and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require carrying out a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the knowledge of the superior. This is the case, for example, of offenses evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose pursuit for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective superior. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the superior, since it is only at that moment that the holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. However, the need or not for that phase (preliminary investigation) must be determined on a case-by-case basis, as otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the appropriateness or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather indications that help clarify its necessity or not. 2) Statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure: this refers to the maximum temporal limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction once the case file (expediente) has been submitted to their knowledge by the directing body (órgano director), in which case, what remains is the issuance of the final act. In this hypothesis, the superior or holder has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, from the moment the directing body of the case formally brings its recommendation to their knowledge. In this case, without prejudice to what is regulated by Article 319 of the LGAP, the holder of the power would have a maximum period (of prescription) of one month to adopt that final act, upon the expiration of which, the statute of limitations for that power would inevitably occur and, therefore, the final act would be null due to injury to the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the specific dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of Article 603 of the Labor Code (current 414), constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is established by canon 329.3 of the LGAP. At this point, it does not refer to the two-month period imposed by Article 261 of the LGAP to conclude the ordinary procedure, a period that is in any case directory and not peremptory, but rather the specific power to issue the final act once the holder of the repressive competence has the objective possibility to do so. Nevertheless, this Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Section VI, has established that the unjustified and disproportionate delay of the procedure, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that procedural path (iter), due to injury to the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice, in the manner established by Article 41 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). However, at this point, the period commented on above refers to that held by the superior so that once the report of the directing body has been rendered, the final decision is imposed. 3) Statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power to execute the imposed sanction: This refers to the period available to the administrative superior to order the application of the dictated sanction. It therefore consists of the material execution of the act containing a disciplinary sanction. In the absence of express regulation, this Chamber had applied the monthly period previously provided in Article 603 of the aforementioned labor regulation. Likewise, in ruling (voto) No. 69-2015-VI, the application of the period provided in Article 340 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) had been postulated. However, currently, following the reform of Law No. 9343, Article 415 of the Labor Code establishes that the execution phase of the imposed disciplinary sanction lapses (caduca) in a term of one year, consequently clarifying the potential preclusion of that power according to those new parameters. 4) Another element subject to temporality rules is that referring to the Processing of the procedure. This refers to the maximum time the administrative procedure established to determine the facts that allow adopting the final decision of the holder of the public repressive power can last. This matter, except for a special rule, (as is the case of the procedure provided in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch for officials of that Branch, pursuant to Article 211 of that legal framework) is regulated by Article 261, in relation to Articles 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that two-month period provided therein consists of a directory, not peremptory, period, which of course does not include or permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. Thus, in principle, the excess of two months does not per se lead to the nullity of the procedure due to preclusion of competence, although it is necessary to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether such durations violate the speed and efficiency that, from a rational and proportional standpoint, must prevail in these matters. In this sense, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011. At this point, reference must also be made to what is established by precept 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of the lapse (caducidad) of the procedure, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. Given that in this specific case the debate is formulated regarding the application or not of the aggravated statute of limitations regime due to the supposed concurrence of effects on the probity regime, it is necessary to make some considerations in order to specify the content and implications of such a regime.
VI.- On the duty of probity (deber de probidad). Scope. Concerning the duty of probity in the exercise of public office, the following must be indicated. Article 111 of the General Public Administration Law defines the public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf of and for the account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence from the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 of the same law clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coinciding interest of the administered. For this purpose, the public servant is inescapably bound to the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive vision, as inferred, at the legal level, from Articles 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and from Article 11 of the Constitution. As part of this orientation, the performance of the official is guided and limited by rules of transparency and probity, whose legal basis is expressly found in Article 3 of Law No. 8422. Said rule states: "Duty of probity (Deber de probidad). The public official shall be obligated to orient their management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in compliance with their duties conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives where they serve; and, finally, by administering public resources with adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily." From this angle, as a complement to the finalistic orientation of the public official that requires prioritizing the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibid.), which is proper to the service-oriented nature of their competencies, the duty of probity aims to provide aspects of greater concreteness, which somehow guide the actions of the public official (or are guidelines that should do so), so that their conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not only at the result level, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in their actions. That is, that public moral requires that, in the event of conflicts of interest, they must withdraw from the knowledge of the matter, in order not to "pollute" or jeopardize the objectivity that must characterize the conduct, but, additionally, in their actions, they must tend toward the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in Article 3 of Law No. 8422 obligates every public servant to exercise their position with adherence to the principle of impartiality concerning personal, family, economic, or other nature-related interests, so that in their performance they must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This indeed follows from canon one of the Regulations to the cited Law No. 8422, which, regarding the cited duty of probity, states it is expressed, among other actions, in "abstaining from hearing and deciding a matter when the same grounds for disqualification (impedimento) and recusal (recusación) exist as established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in the Civil Procedure Code, and in other laws." Therefore, it is clear that the condition of a public agent implies subjection to and due compliance with moral and ethical orientation duties that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, requiring them to conduct themselves in their management with rectitude and solidity. To safeguard that purpose, the rules that permeate the activities of public officials impose a regime of impediments, establishing grounds under which the servant is prevented, either ex officio or upon party's motion, from hearing a specific matter in which, due to the concurrence of certain situations, their objectivity in the performance of their functions may be injured or threatened and, with it, the inherent risk in the proper weighting of the public interest. This is the case of the grounds imposed by canon 230 of the General Law previously referenced, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and the grounds referenced in canons 12 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as those imposed by the Administrative Contracting Law, all of which seek to avoid a possible conflict of interest. It is clear at this point that, at a preventive level, those conditions of disqualification seek to maintain objectivity and transparency in the conduct of the public official, preventing the proper fulfillment of the tasks inherent to their investiture and, consequently, the satisfaction of the public interest as the north of their behavior, from being threatened or relegated by personal interests. In this dynamic, the concept of conflict of interest must be defined, which presupposes the confrontation between a personal interest and a public interest. The proper handling of this type of conflict requires preventive frameworks and a posteriori control. In the first stage, it concerns eliminating any possibility that the conflict may produce an effective collision of interests in the person of the official, depriving them of freedom or objectivity when intervening in a specific public matter. Meanwhile, in the case of a posteriori control, it consists of determining an undue act of favoritism or, at least, behavior aimed at obtaining a personal benefit or one in favor of a third party, which may lead to imposing a sanction. Under this prism, at a preventive level, pointing out a conflict of interest does not logically imply determining the existence of a concrete, undue act of favoritism. Quite the opposite, the intention is to warn of the existence of a risk that could objectively allow a collision of interests to arise. Hence, the infringement of the aforementioned duty of probity is not immune from the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the mentioned Law No. 8422 establishes: "Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infringement of the duty of probity, duly proven and after prior defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability." Such conditioned effect finds meaning, in the context analyzed, for acts of open improvisation, mismanagement of resources, or total evidence of conflicts of interest perfectly inferable from a certain situation, without the official having adopted voluntary recusal actions. Of course, the application and interpretation of that rule must travel the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. To this end, mandate 38 of the cited legislation (Law No. 8422) establishes grounds for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the letter of rule 39 of the same law, which, to that extent, would be applicable to infringements of the duty of probity under the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows the liability of an official to arise upon the commission of conduct violating ethical rules. However, the correct application of this system implies the necessary instruction of an administrative procedure, as a prior and insurmountable step to applying a sanction for the injuries to that framework of public service obligations, with full and complete respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which is fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions.
VII.- Analysis of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the specific case. Having said this, although the duty of probity imposes a behavioral framework in accordance with public service duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is aimed at preventing, detecting, and punishing corruption in the exercise of public function, as follows from Article 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely in the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the official's offense involves an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury (hacienda pública). Otherwise, if the duty of probity were deemed infringed by any action or omission of the public agent that constitutes a neglect or non-compliance with deontological rules of behavior that are characteristic or inherent to their exercise of competence, and in general, to their investiture, in a broad and extreme sense, without making that judgment of association to the purposes of the cited law, every public service offense would fall within the scope of injury to the duty of probity. The foregoing would lead to imposing a general regime of prescriptibility of offenses of five years in all cases, which, in the judgment of this Sentencing Chamber, is not the purpose or ratio of the reference law. Therefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary procedure, the content of the alleged conduct be analyzed in order to establish whether the legal regime specifying the period for the exercise of the statute of limitations for the internal corrective power is the common one of one month imposed by the doctrine of current Article 414 of the Labor Code, former Article 603 of the same source, the same period established by remission of precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), or whether, on the contrary, because it involves the scenarios that Law No. 8422, or Law No. 8292, seeks to protect, the cited period is expanded by the application of the rule provided in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the facts that were attributed to the plaintiff, such as having permitted the adoption of conduct that generated an undue recognition of salary bonuses (pluses salariales) to two INDER officials due to downward reassignment (reasignación descendente). Although they do not refer to a direct disposition of the Public Treasury, they ultimately comprise conduct that led to the ordering of salary-related expenditures, covered with public resources, which, it is argued within the ordinary disciplinary procedure, were illegitimately granted. In the judgment of this Chamber, the substantial content of the alleged conduct subject to the procedure constitutes manifestations deemed antagonistic to the internal control regime and the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of public function. From this standpoint, the plaintiff seems to confuse the responsibility of those who directly administer the public treasury, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate heads, with the responsibility that is inherent to her by her mere condition as a public servant, and therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that sense, the temporal margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power applicable in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its Article 44, which refers to the five-year rule of prescription established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. From that perspective, in the case at hand, it is found that, although the preparation of the respective personnel actions leading to the opening of the disciplinary case date back to the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the truth of the matter is that such facts were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the relevance of which is not challenged, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for calculating the prescriptive period referred to in Article 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to Article 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment in which the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective position to exercise it that the cited period must begin to run. Thus, in cases like the present, where the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and collecting evidentiary indications, so as to allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges (traslado de cargos), the starting point of the statute of limitations operates with the notification of the aforementioned report. From the analysis of the case file, it is evident that after that referral of the preliminary report in official communication URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit (Unidad de Relaciones Laborales), via official communication PE-5050-2016 of April 27, 2016, the administrative superior designated the directing body (órgano director), an instance that on June 28, 2016, issued the respective statement of charges, which was notified on that same date. Therefore, from the date on which the superior could validly order disciplinary actions until the moment the opening of the internal case was communicated to the plaintiff, the five-year period governing this type of conflict had not expired. On the other hand, it is evident that by an act at 15:45 on October 14, 2016, the Directing Body issued conclusions report No. 023-2016. By official communication URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, that report was forwarded to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), for its consideration. In minutes No. 002-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the INDER Labor Relations Board, that body issued its opinion departing from the recommendation of the directing body, since there is no evidence in the case file indicating that the investigated officials, including the plaintiff, availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 and following of the LGAP regarding alleging the duty of obedience. This decision was brought to the knowledge of the Executive Presidency by official communication RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017. Ultimately, through resolution No. 037-2017 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the Executive Presidency of INDER issued the final act within administrative procedure No. URL-002-2015, an act brought to the plaintiff's knowledge on that same date. As INDER postulates, it is clear that the statute of limitations for issuing the final act must be calculated from the moment the holder of the decision-making power is in an objective position to exercise it. This occurred on March 31, 2017, when the Labor Relations Board forwarded the case file to the Executive Presidency. Subsequently, on April 28, 2017, the final act of the procedure was issued and communicated. Between both phases, the inertia claimed by the plaintiff is not observed, to the extent that between the referral of the case file by the Labor Relations Board and the final decision of the case, not even the period of one month elapsed.
Therefore, the expiration of that exercise has not occurred, which means the rejection of the charge under examination.
VIII.- On the content of the duty of obedience. As part of the internal relations that arise in the provision of public competencies, hierarchy implies the power of one body to govern and verify the conduct of other bodies that are subordinate. As established by section 101 of the LGAP, the administrative hierarchy relationship implies that the competencies of the superior encompass those of the inferior by reason of territory or subject matter, and that they hold functions of the same nature. Canon 102 of the same law sets forth the generic powers of the hierarchical superior in the following manner:
"Article 102.- The hierarchical superior shall have the following powers:
IX.- Analysis of the defenses relating to the duty of obedience of the plaintiff. The defense formulated in this case, and upon which the invalidity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, she limited herself to complying with the orders issued by the person who on those dates served as Executive President. In order to what has been stated, such an allegation requires analysis of the circumstances in which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience regarding that conduct. In this matter, at the date of the issuance of the personnel actions in the month of April of 2010 and June of 2011, the plaintiff held the position of Human Resources Coordination of the defendant entity. As stated by INDER and reiterated by co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero, the Institution's Manual of Positions assigns the following details to that position: "Nature of the work. Planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, as well as the execution of the corresponding activities. Positions that make up this class: Human Resources Coordinator. (...) General Activities of the Human Resources Coordinator. Advises the institution's department heads on personnel administration matters. Consequences of error. Errors committed may cause highly considerable losses, damages, or delays, therefore activities must be carried out with extreme care and precision. Personal characteristics of the occupant. Capacity for analysis, critical thinking, and synthesis." Considering these particularities, this Tribunal deems that the very condition of Human Resources Coordinator places the plaintiff under the duty, or at least, the possibility of knowing the set of antecedents and regulations that are inherent to downward personnel movements. This leads one to suppose that faced with a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue the personnel actions that recognized the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn of the necessary existence of the due technical and legal prerequisites for that recognition, and if applicable, to inform that hierarchy of the need to require the internal opinions that would give legitimate support to that decision. Just as the Manual of Positions mentions in the section cited above, part of the plaintiff's general activities was to advise department heads on personnel administration matters. Hence, it follows from that profile a functional duty that imposed upon her the obligation to warn her superior that the issued conduct found no support in the regime applicable to that type of movement. The allegation of automatic application without any objection of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, derived from the duty of obedience, does not imply the release from liability sought, when the LGAP itself indicates the scenarios in which the public agent should disobey, but also when the internal regulations themselves and the profile of her tasks imposed on her the knowledge of the need to have prior technical and/or legal analyses that would demonstrate the pertinence, in the cases charged, of the actions ordered by her superior. In any case, even if one finds that it has not been proven that any of the conditions that imposed the duty to disregard the order existed, given her knowledge and responsibilities in Human Management matters, it was her duty to warn that in downward reassignments (reasignaciones descendentes) it was not appropriate to grant the salary bonus assigned in those personnel actions, based on the lack of technical analyses that would support those decisions. This was so that the superior authority could weigh those objections and, if persisting in their conduct, allow the plaintiff to release herself from liability regarding the execution of those conducts. However, it is not recorded in the case file that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and, on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders issued by issuing the respective personnel actions, ultimately conferring illegitimate benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the INDER budget. By not having expressed these disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the plaintiff assumes liability for the negligence in fulfilling these legally assigned duties, which are congruent with her functions, and therefore, enforceable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the position profile she occupied.
X.- Thus seen, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the normative provision charged to the plaintiff, specifically, numeral 38 subsection d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of section 13 subsection c) of Executive Decree N° 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the sanction applied is based on the duty to have required the technical and legal inputs that would support the order issued and that she chose to execute, dispensing with compliance with minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules of imputation of liability established by canon 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the greater the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the act issued and the conducts adopted. From that standpoint, the position of Human Management coordinator implies a degree of technical specialization on the basis of which the plaintiff's claim regarding dispensation from liability for simple obedience of orders issued by the then head of the Executive Presidency regarding personnel actions that recognized a right to the payment of a salary supplement for downward reassignment, which did not satisfy the procedural or substantive requirements pertaining to the case, is not admissible. Gross negligence is therefore observed in that course of action, implying liability for the issuance and permissiveness of acts that improperly created rights of a financial nature, with the corresponding economic harm to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by committing public funds without the proper verification of conformity of the procedures that led to the issuance of the cited personnel actions. Therefore, no legal excuse or permissiveness to disregard the deficiencies that later formed the basis for the imposed sanction is observed. This is a matter that was fully verifiable a priori and that obliged the adoption of corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuing this type of conduct or, in any case, to state the reasons for disagreement by way of warning, in order to thus generate a release from liability. By failing to do so, she incurs in the factual prerequisite (conditioning antecedent) that was charged to the plaintiff and that allows the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the statement of charges. Such assessment of the conduct attributable to the plaintiff was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017). In relevant part, within the reasons given by the Executive Presidency, it was stated: "In accordance with what is described in the previous point, it is evident that the position of Human Resources Coordinator is in charge of controlling the technical tasks that arise in the different administrative processes within its purview; among its activities is that of advising the institution's department heads in the matters of its charge, this includes ensuring the proper oversight of the procedures that must be carried out in the department, not overlooking decision-making without having a justification (technical report) that precedes it. (...) It must be clear that in light of what is explained above, it is not a justification for the official to allege ignorance of the department's internal procedures, much less to indicate that the review of the orders issued to them is not their responsibility; since, it is clear from what has been analyzed that the person occupying a public post must be suitable to perform the technical and professional functions brought to their attention. (...)". Then, when weighing the plaintiff's negligence in the specific case, it stated: "...In the case at hand, it was possible to show that there was an omission in questioning why an order was issued without a respective supporting administrative act; which reveals that the conduct at that moment of the Human Resources Coordination was contrary to the powers granted by the Administration; since a personnel action was approved that had no justification and due technical study; therefore, it is not known if it was the most correct one at the time, contravening with its conduct the adequate and efficient management of public resources and in general the assets assigned for the performance of its functions, violating the principle of efficiency that the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office seeks to protect. (...)". And with even greater forcefulness to support the imputation made, later in that same act it is expressed: "...It must be clear that what is reprehensible in this case regarding the conduct of the accused is her lack of duty of care when carrying out her functions, omitting to prepare the technical reports and respective administrative procedures, and that although it is true she was complying with a superior order from the institutional superior authority, the official, as part of her technical knowledge in the area of personnel administration, should have questioned the lack of a technical report that supported said request; which, it is evident in the present procedure never occurred, her degree of responsibility being equal to that of the superior authority at that time; since, in addition to not questioning, she signed the personnel action and participated at that time in a meeting where the agreements for the reassignment of Mr. Novo were arranged between the administration (sic) and him without a due technical foundation. For the foregoing, in the previous points and the reasoning provided, this decision-making body considers that the conduct of Mrs. Chaves Morales constitutes gross negligence within her assigned functions at that time; since she failed in the duty of probity and violated the principles of efficiency and efficacy of public service, by failing to oversee the procedures for the reassignment of downward positions as she should have at the time, affecting the public budget allocated for her position. Therefore, liability existed on the part of the official at the time of carrying out the downward position reassignments of Messrs. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, she being in violation of articles 3, 4 and 38 subsection d) of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office; therefore, a sanction must be imposed in accordance with said sections. (...)". Those references reveal the considerations on the basis of which the defendant entity found that the plaintiff's conduct violated the rules of Law No. 8422, due to the omission of control regarding the due technical analyses for the granting of the downward reassignments and the respective recognition of the salary supplement granted to both referred officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures inherent to her position, pertaining to personnel administration procedures and processes, which speaks to the disregard of those duties and, consequently, the liability that derives from those conducts. As observed, that analysis is linked and harmonizes with the reasoning provided by this Tribunal in the present ruling, a treatment in which, consequently, the denounced errors are not observed.
XI.- On the alleged lack of reasoning. On the other hand, an improper grounding of the final act of the proceeding is alleged. The reasoning (motivación) as a formal element implies the expression of the questions of fact and of law that support and underpin the administrative decision. Regarding the factual aspects, it implies not only the reference to proven or not demonstrated facts, but also the evidence or elements of conviction on which the logical deduction of a factual nature is based, as well as the explanation of the analytical process that has led to those derivations or inferences. In the field of law, it implies the mention and reasoned explanation of the analysis that allows (rationally) deducing the reasons why the law used is applicable to the specific case, so that, before a determined set of preceding circumstances, that legal treatment proves pertinent and adequate, giving support to the adopted decision. The commented rule itself indicates that this reasoning may be DIRECT, when the act contains in its own literal text the detail of that framework of grounds, or, INDIRECT, when the administrative conduct refers, explicitly and unequivocally, as support for its content, to proposals, opinions, or prior resolutions that have determined the adoption of the act, provided that a copy of them is attached with the notification of the act. Defects or deficiencies regarding this element may be configured: by omission (the act completely lacks the exposition of the due grounds), improper reasoning (among others, the factual and legal references are inapplicable to the case analyzed, the weighing of relevant aspects of the proceeding is set aside), or, insufficient reasoning (the grounds set forth in the act are not sufficient to logically and rationally sustain its content), which must be analyzed in each specific case. In an integral sense, the reasoning enables the understanding of the reasons and rational process by which the motive for the act is deemed proven, but also, the analysis of legitimacy that, before that prerequisite, has led to the decision adopted, as the content of the act, as the best way to satisfy the involved public interest. If the primary purpose of the proceeding is the determination of the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the motive (art. 221, 217 LGAP), it is clear that the reasoning demands the clear exposition of relevant findings, determining facts, evidentiary support, and analysis of the evidence, which have led to the factual conclusion or inference. Otherwise, the material right of defense of the governed person against whom a negative outcome is imposed within a case would be injured, when those matters are not offered, as they would be unable to refute the elements that have led to the configuration of the motive for the act. The same occurs with the legal considerations that lead to adopting the final decision (content), since the omission of reference to the normative framework that supports the administrative will prevents refutation or criticism of the analysis carried out by the Administration in order to weigh the pertinence of the rule applied to the specific case, its correspondence with the motive, and its proportion to the legally imposed purpose. Thus, the conditions imposed by canon 132.1 LGAP, to the effect that the content must be licit, possible, clear, precise, and encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the motive, even as an ex officio duty, could not be contrasted should the act fail to set forth the reasons why it assumes a certain position. Therefore, the reasoning is the element that enables the substantive understanding of the decision and that reveals the objective bases upon which the Administration has derived the objective material elements of the act. Its relevance also lies in the fact that it enables the defense of the governed person, since only by knowing the substance of what has been decided can it be debated, unless the argument itself is solely the disregard for the duty of reasoning. Well then, in the case at hand, the act does not present the deficiencies of reasoning that are alleged. As has been set forth supra, in what has been a matter of objection, the contested conducts clearly offer the set of antecedent circumstances on which it has based its decision. The final act indicates the reasons of fact and of law on which it bases the content of the act. In the section of proven facts, that act refers to the elements of conviction from which each factual assertion was derived. For its part, in the substantive analysis, it evaluates the evidence incorporated into the proceeding, while also specifying the reasons why it deemed the charged conducts proven, the considerations why it concluded that it was a breach of the probity regime, with details of the obligations inherent to the position held by the plaintiff at the time of the events, as well as the value judgment that led it to establish the sanction ultimately imposed. In that particular, in section "V.V. On the sanction to be imposed", it stated: "Analyzing the degree of culpability of the official in her omission of action, this body considers it to be relevant; since, there was serious and pernicious damage to the institution's budget by granting benefits to officials for whom due process was not carried out to determine whether or not they qualified for the reassignment of downward positions; for this reason, in order not to overlook said action, but at the same time to invite the official to reflect on her negligent conduct in the functions she performed, this decision-making body imposes the sanction of SUSPENSION OF ONE MONTH WITHOUT PAY. Said quantum is considered adequate, estimating the gravity of the facts, that the official has a long career in the Institution, and considering that the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding is corrective (...)". In this way, the contested final resolution duly sets forth the set of precedents of the case, lists the facts that were deemed proven with detail of the elements of conviction from which they were deduced. Such development enables the understanding of the reasons supporting the motive for the act. Then, it addressed the various arguments presented by the involved parties and elaborates on the legal reasons why, in light of the determined facts, it obtained the assessments and legal consequences ultimately adopted. Strictly speaking, that exposition shows logical congruence between the facts and the law applied, as support for the final decision, which allows the (logical) understanding of the reasons forming the basis of the administrative will. It should be noted that, in accordance with the provisions of section 136 subsection c) of the LGAP, that reasoning allows supporting the decision in light of the recommendation report issued by the investigating body and the considerations made by the Junta de Relaciones Laborales, both criteria of a non-binding nature according to the tenor of precept 303 of the cited LGAP, but which, ultimately, imposed the duty of due reasoning, as was concretized in this case. Certainly, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with those considerations and development, but that does not imply that the defect she points to is concretized. From that standpoint, the claim under examination must be rejected.
XII.- On the sanction imposed. On the other hand, it is reproached that the applied sanction is disproportionate given that the Código de Trabajo, in article 68 subsection e), provides for a maximum sanction of 8 days. In this regard, it must be indicated that the relations that arise between the plaintiff and INDER are typical of a bond under a special public-law subjection regime, which is governed by its own sources and only in a supplementary manner is nourished by the regulations of the Código de Trabajo. Section 191 of the Magna Carta itself establishes that public employment relations shall be governed by their own statute, that is, by special rules of public law that embody and regulate the content of that type of relations, at the level of selection mechanism, remuneration, rights and obligations of the parties, disciplinary regime, among other aspects.
V.- On the temporal element in the exercise of administrative corrective powers of a disciplinary nature. The analysis of the validity of the conduct subject to this process has as a fundamental point the determination of the statute of limitations applicable to the administrative disciplinary procedure brought against the plaintiff. On this subject, the following must be stated. In public employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarch against officials who have committed punishable offenses is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated subject matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of article 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, due to finalistic aspects, are considered imprescriptible—e.g., the protection of public domain assets—those referring to internal sanctioning exercise—such as the one examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may expire due to the passage of time established by the legal system without having been executed. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarch and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which their right to require recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. This is a matter left to the discretion of the legislator, who determines in each case whether it is a statute of limitations or a lapse (caducidad) of the eventual exercise of those powers. From this perspective, in the liberating statute of limitations, the concurrence of three fundamental factors is required, namely: a) inertia of the holder of a right (or power) in its exercise, b) passage of the time set by the legal system in that inertia of the holder and; c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations. However, in matters of public employment, the negative statute of limitations may well be alleged as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act, even if that defense had not been exercised prior to the issuance of the public will. Thus, the corrective power cannot be considered imprescriptible, trying to justify that deduction based on the rule of article 66.1 of the LGAP; rather, it is subject to rules of preclusion due to temporal factors, as seen in subsection 3) of that same article 66 of Law No. 6227/78. Regarding actions of the Public Administration in administrative sanctioning procedures, what is established by article 329.3 of the LGAP is fundamental, which states: "3. The final act issued outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless otherwise provided by law." Thus, when a legal provision establishes the loss or preclusion of competence, the act issued in exercise of that already-expired power could not be considered valid. Now, it is necessary to differentiate between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary procedures, in all of which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with different nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity purposes, of demarcation criteria that allow addressing the discussed issues, depending on the scenario in question. In order to analyze the temporal element of the procedure, the passage of time in different stages must be distinguished: 1) Statute of limitations (or lapse) of the exercise of the disciplinary power: refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the appropriate procedural measures that allow issuing the final decision. At this level, it is the maximum period established by the legal system for the administrative hierarch to order the opening of the relevant procedure, aimed at establishing the appropriateness or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking to establish the facts (real truth) that serve as the basis for the act’s motive generates an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly aims toward the exercise of that power. The aforementioned period for exercising the power could not be considered interrupted by the issuance of the final act, because as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative proceeding, it is insisted, to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions in articles 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative hierarch is subject to a prescriptive period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the figure of lapse, to the extent that in certain scenarios, it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by article 414 of the Labor Code, a rule that sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the statement of charges. Prior to the reform made by Law No. 9343, called "Labor Procedural Reform," of January 25, 2016, in force since July 26, 2017, such period was regulated in article 603 of the Labor Code. In the specific case, given the date of the alleged offenses, according to the plaintiff's theory, that would be the applicable rule. The foregoing is without prejudice to offenses that are regulated by special rules, such as those expressed by the internal control, probity in public function, and public finance management regime, in which, in accordance with the regulations set by the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 (art. 43), the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function, No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic, No. 7428, a special period of five years applies (according to the scenarios and from the moments those rules establish). In such cases, the special period prevails, not the monthly period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is special and subsequent legislation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now, the starting point for computing that prescriptive period is decisive. On this subject, article 603 of the Labor Code—in force at the date of the facts—(art. 414 currently) states that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose, or alternatively, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility to know the offense and, consequently, to undertake the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require conducting a prior preliminary investigation stage, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are made known to the hierarch. This is the case, for example, of offenses that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective hierarch. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication of that report to the hierarch, since it is only at that moment that this holder can validly make decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. However, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be differentiated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios is that investigation necessary, but only those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is essential to determine the appropriateness or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not. 2) Statute of limitations of the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure: refers to the maximum temporal limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction once the file has been submitted to their knowledge by the directing body, in which case what remains is the issuance of the final act. In this hypothesis, the hierarch or holder has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, from the moment the directing body of the proceeding formally brings its recommendation to their attention. In this case, without prejudice to the provisions of article 319 of the LGAP, the holder of the power would have a maximum (prescriptive) period of one month to adopt that final act, after which the expiration of that power would inevitably occur and, therefore, the final act would be null for injury to the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the concrete dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of article 603 of the Labor Code (current 414), constitutes a special treatment that overrides the provisions of article 329.3 of the LGAP. This point does not concern the two-month period imposed by article 261 of the LGAP to conclude the ordinary procedure, a period that in any case is directory (ordenatorio) and not peremptory (perentorio), but rather the specific power to issue the final act once the holder of the repressive competence has the objective possibility to do so. However, this Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section VI, has established that the unjustified and disproportionate delay of the procedure, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that iter, for injury to the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice, in the manner established by article 41 of the Magna Carta. Nonetheless, at this point, the period discussed above refers to that which the hierarch has to impose the final decision once the report of the directing body has been rendered. 3) Statute of limitations of the power to execute the imposed sanction: Refers to the period available to the administrative hierarch to order the application of the issued sanction. It consists, therefore, in the material execution of the act whose content orders a disciplinary sanction. In the absence of express regulation, this Chamber had applied the monthly period previously provided for in article 603 of the aforementioned labor regulations. Similarly, in vote No. 69-2015-VI, the application of the period provided for in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública had been postulated. However, currently, following the reform of Law No. 9343, article 415 of the Labor Code imposes that the execution phase of the issued disciplinary sanction lapses in a term of one year, consequently clarifying the eventual preclusion of that power according to these new parameters. 4) Another element subject to temporality rules refers to the Processing of the procedure. It refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure established to determine the facts allowing the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can last. This matter, unless special rule applies, (as is the case of the procedure provided in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch for officials of that Branch, according to article 211 of that legal framework) is regulated by article 261, in relation to articles 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that two-month period stipulated there is a period of a directory (ordenatoria) nature, not peremptory (perentoria), which of course does not include nor permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. Thus, as an initial thesis, exceeding two months does not per se lead to the nullity of the procedure for preclusion of competence, although it is necessary to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether such durations violate the celerity and efficiency that, from a rational and proportional perspective, must prevail in these matters. In this regard, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011. At this point, reference must also be made to the provisions of article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of lapse of the procedure, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months due to causes attributable to it. Given that in the specific case the debate is formulated regarding the application or not of the aggravated statute of limitations regime due to the alleged concurrence of effects on the probity regime, it is necessary to make some considerations in order to specify the content and implications of such a regime.
VI.- On the duty of probity. Scope. Regarding the duty of probity (deber de probidad) within the exercise of public positions, the following must be stated. Article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública defines the public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, article 113 ejusdem clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coincident interest of the administered. To this end, the public servant is inescapably subject to the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive vision, as inferred, at the legal level, from articles 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and article 11 of the Magna Carta. As part of this orientation, the performance of the official is oriented and delimited by rules of transparency and probity, whose legal support is expressly found in article 3 of Law No. 8422. Said rule states: "Duty of probity (Deber de probidad). The public official shall be obligated to orient their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall fundamentally manifest itself by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; by ensuring that the decisions they adopt in fulfillment of their duties conform to impartiality and to the objectives inherent to the institution in which they serve, and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, efficacy, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily." From this perspective, as a complement to the finalistic orientation of the public official that requires them to prioritize the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is characteristic of the service-oriented nature of their competencies, the duty of probity aims to provide aspects of greater concreteness, which in some way guide the actions of the public official (or are lines that should guide them), so that their conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not only at the result level, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in their conduct. That is, that public morality requires that, in cases of conflicts of interest, they must recuse themselves from the knowledge of the matter, in order not to "pollute" or jeopardize the objectivity that must be inherent in their conduct, but, moreover, in their actions, they must tend towards the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in article three of Law No. 8422 obliges every public servant to exercise their position in adherence to the principle of impartiality against personal, family, economic, or other interests, for which reason, in their performance, they must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This is indeed inferred from article one of the Regulation (Reglamento) to the cited Law No.
8422, which states regarding the aforementioned duty of probity that it is expressed, among other actions, in “refraining from hearing and resolving a matter when the same grounds for disqualification (impedimento) and recusal (recusación) exist as established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the Civil Procedure Code, and other laws.” Therefore, it is clear that the status of a public agent entails subjection to and due compliance with the duties of moral and ethical guidance that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, which require them to conduct their management with rectitude and soundness. To safeguard that purpose, the norms that permeate the activities of public officials impose a system of disqualifications (impedimentos), which establish causes under which the public servant is disabled, either ex officio or at the request of a party, from hearing a specific matter in which, due to the concurrence of certain situations, their objectivity in the performance of their duties may be harmed or threatened, and with it, the inherent risk to the due weighing of the public interest. Such is the case of the causes imposed by canon 230 of the aforementioned General Law of Public Administration, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and the grounds referenced in canons 12 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as those imposed by the Law on Administrative Contracting, all of which seek to prevent a possible conflict of interest (conflicto de intereses). It is clear at this point that, on a preventive level, those conditions of disqualification seek to maintain objectivity and transparency in the conduct of the public official, preventing the correct fulfillment of the duties inherent to their office and, consequently, the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of their behavior, from being threatened or relegated by personal interests. In this dynamic, the concept of conflict of interest must be specified, which involves the confrontation between a personal interest and a public interest. Due attention to this type of conflict requires preventive frameworks and a posteriori control. In the first stage, it is a matter of eliminating any possibility that the conflict may produce an effective collision of interests on the part of the official, which may reduce their freedom or objectivity when intervening in a specific public matter. In turn, in the case of subsequent control, it consists of the determination of an improper act of favoritism or, at least, behavior aimed at obtaining a personal benefit or one in favor of a third party, which may lead to the imposition of a sanction. Under that prism, at the preventive level, the identification of a conflict of interest does not logically determine the existence of a specific improper act of favoritism. On the contrary, it is intended to warn of the existence of a risk that could objectively give rise to a collision of interests. Hence, the infraction of the aforementioned duty of probity is not immune to the framework of disciplinary responsibility of the public agent. Precept 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 8422 establishes: "Without prejudice to any applicable civil and criminal liabilities, the infraction of the duty of probity, duly proven and after a defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability." Such conditional effect makes sense, in the context under analysis, for acts of clear improvisation, mismanagement of resources, or total evidence of conflicts of interest clearly inferable from a given situation, without the official having adopted actions for voluntary recusal. Of course, the application and interpretation of that norm must traverse the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be evaluated in each specific case. To that end, mandate 38 of the cited legislation (Law No. 8422) establishes causes for administrative responsibility, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the letter of norm 39 ius ibíd., which, in that sense, would be applicable to infractions of the duty of probity under the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows for the emergence of an official's responsibility for the issuance of conduct that violates the norms of ethics. Nevertheless, the correct application of this system implies the necessary instruction of an administrative procedure, as an unavoidable previous step for applying a sanction for injuries to that framework of official obligations, with full and complete respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which is fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions.
**VII.- Analysis of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the specific case.** That said, although the duty of probity imposes a framework of behavior in accordance with official duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is aimed at preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of public function, as deduced from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely within the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant's fault involves an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury. Otherwise, if the duty of probity were understood to have been infringed by any action or omission of the public agent that constitutes a disregard for or non-compliance with deontological rules of behavior, which are specific or inherent to their competence exercise, and in general to their office, in a broad and extreme sense, without making that judgment of association with the purposes of the cited law, any official fault would fall within the scope of injury to the duty of probity. The foregoing would lead to imposing a general five-year statute of limitations system for all faults, which, in the judgment of this Sentencing Chamber, is not the purpose or ratio of the referenced law. Therefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary procedure, the content of the charged conduct be analyzed, in order to determine whether the legal regime that specifies the term for exercising the statute of limitations for the internal corrective power is the common one-month period imposed by the doctrine of the current ordinal 414 of the Labor Code, former 603 of that same source, the same period fixed by referral of precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute, or whether, on the contrary, due to facing the assumptions that Law No. 8422, or likewise No. 8292, seeks to protect, the cited period is extended by the application of the rule provided in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the acts that were imputed to the plaintiff, such as having permitted the adoption of conduct that generated an undue recognition of salary bonuses to two INDER officials due to downward reassignment, although they do not refer to a direct disposition of Public Treasury funds, ultimately constitute conduct that led to the disposition of salary-level disbursements, covered with public resources, which, it is alleged within the ordinary disciplinary procedure, were illegitimately granted. In the judgment of this Chamber, the substantial content of the charged conduct and the subject matter of the proceeding constitute manifestations that are considered antagonistic to the internal control system and to the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of public function. From this standpoint, the plaintiff seems to confuse the responsibility of those who directly administer public treasury, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate heads, with the responsibility that is specific to her solely due to her status as a public servant, and therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that sense, the temporal margin for the exercise of disciplinary power that applies in this case is the one imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44, which refers to the five-year norm of the statute of limitations established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. Under that perspective, in the case at hand, it is noted that, although the preparation of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary cause date back to the month of April of the year 2010 and June of 2011, the fact of the matter is that those acts were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the pertinence of which is not contested, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on the date of March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the prescriptive period referred to by ordinal 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to numeral 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment when the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective possibility of exercising it, that the cited period must start to run. Thus, in cases like the present, where the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for the definition of relevant facts and the collection of evidentiary indicia, so as to allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges (traslado de cargos), the starting point of the statute of limitations operates with the communication of the aforementioned report. From the analysis of the case file, it is evident that after that referral of the preliminary report in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit, through official letter PE-5050-2016 of April 27, 2016, the administrative head appointed the directing body, an instance that on June 28, 2016, issued the respective statement of charges, which was notified on that same date. Therefore, from the date when the head could validly order the disciplinary actions until the moment when the opening of the internal cause was communicated to the plaintiff, the five-year period that governs this type of conflicts had not expired. On the other hand, it is evident that by the act issued at 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the Directing Body issued conclusions report No. 023-2016. By official letter URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, that report was sent to the Labor Relations Board, for its knowledge. In minutes No. 002-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the INDER Labor Relations Board, the opinion of that body was issued in the sense of departing from the recommendation of the directing body, insofar as there is no evidence in the case file indicating that the investigated officials, among them, the plaintiff, availed themselves of the procedure established in articles 107 and following of the LGAP regarding invoking the duty of obedience. This decision was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency by official letter RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017. Ultimately, through resolution No. 037-2017 issued at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the Executive Presidency of INDER issued the final act within administrative procedure No. URL-002-2015, an act brought to the attention of the plaintiff on that same date. As INDER posits, it is clear that the statute of limitations for the issuance of the final act must be computed from the moment when the holder of the decision-making power is in an objective possibility of exercising it. This occurred on March 31, 2017, when the Labor Relations Board sent the file to the Executive Presidency. Subsequently, on April 28, 2017, the final act of the procedure was issued and communicated. Between both phases, the inertia that the plaintiff accuses is not observed, to the extent that, between the sending of the file from the Labor Relations Board and the final decision of the case, not even a one-month period elapsed. Therefore, the expiration of that exercise has not occurred, which means the rejection of the charge under examination.
**VIII.- On the content of the duty of obedience.** As part of the internal relationships that occur in the provision of public powers, hierarchy involves the power of an organ to govern and verify the conduct of other organs that are inferior. As established by ordinal 101 of the LGAP, the relationship of administrative hierarchy implies that the powers of the superior encompass those of the inferior by reason of territory or subject matter, and they hold functions of the same nature. Canon 102 ejusdem establishes the generic powers of the hierarchical superior in the following sense:
"**Article 102.-** The hierarchical superior shall have the following powers:
Thus, while the duty of obedience arises in the face of orders from the superior, the LGAP itself imposes criteria under which the public official must disregard those orders. As a general rule, the subordinate must obey the orders, instructions, or circulars issued by their immediate superior. However, when any of the following circumstances are present, the duty of disobedience is imposed upon the official: a) That the act does not originate from a hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (art. 107.2 LGAP). If the duty of obedience is grounded in relationships of subordination, it is evident that an organ that does not hold hierarchical authority over another cannot validly issue an order, and therefore, it is clear that it cannot be imposed upon another organ that is not subordinate with respect to that act; b) That the act has as its object the performance of conduct manifestly outside the official’s competence (art. 108.1.a) idem). Competence constitutes a fundamental subjective material element for the legitimate exercise of powers and competencies, such that, in the absence of competence, the invalidity of the act is unquestionable. This is clearly derived from precept 129 of the LGAP, so the ordering of behavior outside the competence of the subordinate is conduct that is in itself irregular, and which, therefore, is not covered by the duty of obedience; c) That the act is openly arbitrary, because its execution constitutes an abuse of authority or any other crime (art. 108.1.b) ejusdem). Abuse of authority as an improper and/or excessive exercise of administrative power represents a pathology in the delivery of public competencies, which determines the invalidity of the action. This is imposed by the relationship of subsections 3) and 4) of numeral 146 of the LGAP. Precept 108 subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in stating that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the official's liability, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and potentially criminal spheres. It should be noted that this norm refers to the liability of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the order given, which does not exclude the liability of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those indicated circumstances. However, by virtue of the duty under analysis, as has been pointed out, the same law establishes scenarios in which what is imposed upon the public agent is a negative behavior, that is, to disregard the order given, because it constitutes a pathological manifestation, vitiated by nullity due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the liability derived from the execution and compliance with those null acts. Now, when none of the indicated exceptional circumstances are present in the act, precept 109 of the cited law imposes upon the official the duty to obey the act, even when it is deemed that such conduct is contrary to the Legal Order, for any other reason. However, in this scenario, the same norm imposes a new duty, this time consisting of warning and communicating to the administrative superior about the official's objections. This requirement implies a release from any potential liability that could arise from the execution of the invalid act, but with the survival of the duty of execution. In urgent cases, mandate 110 of the LGAP provides that the subordinate may reserve their liability verbally, for which the presence of two witnesses is required. In this sense, the same canon 109 ejusdem complements that when it is a matter of avoiding serious damages of impossible or difficult reparation that the immediate execution of the issued act could produce, the subordinate may suspend the execution thereof, subject to the liability that could result if the justifying causes were, in the end, non-existent or unfounded. It should be noted that such execution of null acts constitutes a distortion of the principle of non-executability of conduct with absolute nullity imposed by ordinals 146.3 and 169 of the same legal source, for which reason, the communication of objections justifies the dispensation of the subordinate's liability, reserving that framework of imputation to the superior. That said, in order to define the cases in which the duty of obedience or disobedience is present, it is necessary to specify that the notoriety of the causes of illegitimacy that oblige one to disassociate from the conduct of a superior is an aspect that must be assessed in each case, for which purpose it is primary to analyze whether the public agent was in a position to know or had an objective duty to know the irregularity of the conduct they were required to execute. To this end, the doctrine of ordinal 213 of the LGAP establishes guidelines to follow in these disputes, imposing the criterion that the framework of liability is proportional to the level of hierarchy of the public servant and the technical nature of their functions. In this way, the greater the hierarchy and technical level of competence, the greater the duty to know and assess the defects of the act, and, consequently, the more intense the duty of disobedience. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze, in each situation, the position held, the profile of functions, and the inherent technical level of the post, as prior parameters for weighing the existence (a priori) of a duty or power to know the illegitimacy of the conduct ordered by the superior and, based on that, to either opt for disobedience or for obedience under protest, with the due expression of the reasons constituting the objection. On that basis, it must be defined whether the subordinate has incurred or not within the framework of liability imposed by law, either by disobeying unduly, or by obeying an order that, by legal imperative, they should have disregarded. Therefore, the release from liability is not configured by the simple obedience of an act that does not present the circumstances indicated above, it being the subordinate's duty to communicate their own objections to the content of the order given to the superior, as a cause for dispensation of their liability regarding the adoption or execution of those acts. When such a reproach is not recorded in the administrative file of the respective action, the subordinate equally assumes liability for that execution, when they had the power or duty to make evident the deficiencies of the act. Having made these necessary clarifications, we proceed to the analysis of the specific case.
**IX.- Analysis of the defenses relating to the duty of obedience of the claimant.** The defense formulated in this case, and on which the nullity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, the claimant limited herself to complying with the orders issued by the person who, on those dates, served as Executive President. In order of what has been discussed, such allegation demands an analysis of the circumstances in which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience regarding that conduct. In the case at hand, on the date of the issuance of the personnel actions in the month of April of the year 2010 and June of 2011, the claimant held the position of Human Resources Coordinator of the defendant entity. As stated by INDER and reiterated by co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero, the Institution's Position Manual assigns the following details to that post: "***Nature of work.** Planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, as well as the execution of the corresponding activities.* ***Positions that integrate this class:** Human Resources Coordinator. (...)* ***General Activities of the Human Resources Coordinator.** Advises the institution's heads in matters of personnel administration.* ***Consequences of error.** The errors committed can cause losses, damages, or delays of high consideration, so the activities must be carried out with extreme care and precision.* ***Personal characteristics of the occupant.** Analytical, critical, and synthesis skills.*" In view of these particularities, this Tribunal considers that the very condition of Human Resources Coordinator places the claimant under the duty, or at least, the possibility of knowing the set of background information and regulations inherent to downward personnel movements. This suggests that, faced with a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue the personnel actions recognizing the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn of the necessary existence of the technical and legal prerequisites owed for that recognition, and if applicable, to bring to the attention of that authority the need to request the internal opinions that would give legitimate support to that decision. As mentioned in the Position Manual in the section indicated above, part of the claimant's general activities was to advise the heads in matters of personnel administration. Hence, it follows from that profile a functional duty that obliged her to warn her superior that the conduct issued did not find support in the regime applicable to that type of movement. The allegation of the automatic and unqualified application of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, by derivation of the duty of obedience, does not constitute the intended release from liability, when the LGAP itself indicates the scenarios in which the female public agent had to disobey, but also when the internal regulations themselves and the profile of her tasks obliged her to know the need to have prior technical and/or legal analyses that made evident the pertinence, in the charged cases, of the actions ordered by her superior. In any case, even considering that it has not been proven that any of the conditions imposing the duty to disregard the order occurred, given her knowledge and responsibilities in Human Management matters, it was her duty to warn that in downward reassignments it was not possible to grant the additional salary assigned in those personnel actions, based on the lack of technical analyses supporting those decisions. This was so that the superior could weigh those objections and, if he persisted in his conduct, allow the plaintiff to release her liability regarding the execution of those acts. However, there is no record in the case file that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and, on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders given by issuing the respective personnel actions, conferring, in the end, illegitimate benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the budget of INDER. By not having expressed those disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the claimant assumes liability for the indolence in fulfilling these legally assigned duties, which are consistent with her functions and, therefore, demandable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the position profile she held.
**X.-** Thus seen, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the normative provision that was charged to the claimant, specifically, numeral 38 subsection d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of ordinal 13 subsection c) of Executive Decree N° 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the sanction applied is sustained by the duty to have required the technical and legal inputs that supported the order given and that she chose to execute, dispensing with compliance with minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules of imputation of liability established by canon 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the greater the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the act ordered and the conduct adopted. From that perspective, the position of Human Management coordinator supposes a degree of technical specialization by virtue of which, the plaintiff's argument regarding the dispensation of liability for the simple obedience of orders issued by the then head of the Executive Presidency concerning the personnel actions that recognized a right to payment of an additional salary for downward reassignment, which did not satisfy the procedural or substantive requirements relevant to the case, is not admissible. Gross negligence is therefore observed in that proceeding, which implies liability for the issuance and permissibility of acts that created patrimonial rights improperly, with the corresponding economic harm to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by committing public funds without the due verification of conformity of the procedures leading to the issuance of the cited personnel actions. Therefore, no legal excuse or permissibility to ignore the shortcomings that later served as the basis for the sanction imposed is observed. This was a matter that was fully verifiable a priori and that obliged the adoption of corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuing this type of conduct or, in any case, to set down the reasons for disagreement as a warning, in order to generate a release from liability. By not doing so, the factual prerequisite (conditioning antecedent) that was charged to the claimant is incurred, and which permits the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the notification of charges. Such assessment of the behavior attributable to the claimant was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017). In relevant part, within the reasons given by the Executive Presidency, it was stated: "*According to what is described in the previous point, it is evident that the position of Human Resources Coordinator is in charge of controlling the technical tasks presented in the different administrative processes under its charge; among its activities is to advise the institution's heads in the matter of its charge, this includes ensuring the adequate supervision of the procedures that must be carried out in the department, not overlooking decision-making without having a justification (technical report) that precedes it. (...) It must be clear that, given the above explanation, it is not a justification for the official to allege ignorance of the department's internal procedures, much less to indicate that reviewing the orders given is not their responsibility; since, it is clear from what was previously analyzed that the person occupying a public position must be suitable to perform the technical and professional functions brought to their attention. (...)*". Then, when weighing the claimant’s indolence in the specific case, it stated: "*...In the case at hand, it is evident that there was an omission in questioning why an order was issued without a respective supporting administrative act; which makes it evident that the acting of the Human Resources Coordination at that time was contrary to the powers granted by the Administration; since, a personnel action was approved that had no justification or due technical study; therefore, it is not known if it was the most correct at the time, contravening with its acting the proper and efficient management of public resources and, in general, the patrimony assigned for the development of its functions, violating the principle of efficiency that the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office seeks to safeguard. (...)*". And with even greater force to sustain the imputation made, later in that same act it states: "*...It must be clear that what is reprehensible in this case regarding the conduct of the accused is her lack of the duty of care when carrying out her functions, omitting to perform the respective technical reports and administrative procedures, and while it is true she was complying with a superior order from the institutional head, the official, as part of her technical knowledge in personnel administration matters, should have questioned the lack of the technical report supporting said request; which, it becomes evident in this procedure, never happened, her degree of liability being equal to that of the head at that time; since, in addition to not questioning it, she signed the personnel action and participated at that time in a meeting where the agreements for the reassignment of Mr. Novo were agreed upon between the administration (sic) and him without a due technical basis. For the foregoing, in the previous points and the reasoning issued, this deciding body considers that the acting of Ms. Chaves Morales constitutes gross negligence within her assigned functions at that time; since, she failed in her duty of probity and violated the principles of efficiency and effectiveness of public service, by not supervising the procedures for downward position reassignments as she should have at the time, affecting the public budget assigned for her position. Therefore, there was liability on the part of the official at the time the downward position reassignments of Messrs. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz were carried out, she failing to comply with articles 3, 4 and 38 subsection d) of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office; therefore, a sanction must be imposed on her in adherence to said ordinals. (...)*". These references make evident the considerations from which the defendant entity considered that the claimant's conduct violated the norms of Law No. 8422, for the omission of control regarding the technical analyses required for the granting of the downward reassignments and the respective recognition of the additional salary granted to both referred officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures specific to her position, relative to personnel administration procedures and formalities, which speaks of the neglect of those duties and, consequently, the liability arising from that conduct. As can be seen, that analysis meshes and harmonizes with the reasoning given by this Tribunal in the present ruling, treatment in which, consequently, the denounced inaccuracies are not observed.
**XI.- On the alleged lack of motivation.** On the other hand, an improper grounding of the final act of the procedure is alleged. Motivation as a formal element involves the expression of the questions of fact and law that protect and sustain the administrative decision. Regarding the factual aspects, it involves not only the reference to proven or unproven facts, but also the evidence or elements of conviction on which the logical deduction of a factual nature is based, and also the explanation of the analytical process that has led to those derivations or inferences. In the field of law, it involves the mention and reasoned explanation of the analysis that permits (rationally) deducing the reasons why the law used is applicable to the specific case, so that, given a certain set of preceding circumstances, that legal treatment is pertinent and adequate, giving support to the decision adopted. The same commented norm indicates that this motivation may be DIRECT, when the act itself contains, in its own literal text, the detail of that framework of foundation, or INDIRECT, when the administrative conduct refers, as support for its content, explicitly and unequivocally, to proposals, opinions, or prior resolutions that have determined the adoption of the act, provided that a copy of those is attached with the notification of the act. Defects or flaws regarding this element may be configured: by omission (the act completely lacks the exposition of the required grounds), improper motivation (among others, the factual and legal references are inapplicable to the case analyzed, the weighing of relevant aspects of the procedure is left aside), or insufficient motivation (the grounds set forth in the act are not sufficient to logically and rationally sustain its content), which must be analyzed in each specific case. In a comprehensive sense, motivation allows for the understanding of the reasons and rational process by which the basis for the act is considered proven, and, additionally, the analysis of legitimacy that, given that prerequisite, has led to the decision adopted, as the content of the act, as the best way to satisfy the public interest involved. If the primary object of the procedure is the determination of the real truth of the facts serving as a basis for the cause (art. 221, 217 LGAP), it is clear that motivation demands the clear exposition of the relevant findings, determining facts, evidentiary support, and analysis of the evidence, which have led to the factual conclusion or inference. Otherwise, the right of material defense of the administered party, who is imposed a negative result within a case, would be harmed when those questions are not provided, as they would be unable to refute the elements that have led to the configuration of the basis for the act. The same applies to the legal considerations leading to the adoption of the final decision (content), since the omission of reference to the normative framework supporting the administrative will prevents the refutation or critique of the analysis carried out by the Administration in order to weigh the pertinence of the norm applied to the specific case, its correspondence with the basis, and its proportionality with the legally imposed purpose.
Thus, the conditions imposed by canon 132.1 LGAP, to the effect that the content must be lawful, possible, clear, precise, and cover all questions of fact and law arising from the matter, even as an ex officio duty, could not be satisfied if the act fails to set forth the reasons why it assumes a particular position. Therefore, the statement of reasons (motivación) is the element that makes possible the substantive understanding of the decision and that highlights the objective bases upon which the Administration has derived the objective material elements of the act. Its relevance also lies in the fact that it enables the defense of the administered party, since only by knowing the substance of what has been ordered can it be debated, unless the argument itself is solely the disregard of the duty to state reasons. Well then, in the case at hand, the act does not present the deficiencies in its statement of reasons (motivación) that are alleged. As has been set forth supra, in what has been the subject of objection, the challenged conducts clearly offer the set of antecedent circumstances upon which the decision was based. The final act indicates the reasons of fact and law upon which the content of the act is based. In the section on proven facts, that act refers to the evidentiary elements from which each factual assertion was derived. For its part, in the analysis of the merits, it carries out an assessment of the evidence incorporated into the procedure, while at the same time setting forth the reasons why the charged conducts were deemed accredited, the considerations for which it concluded that it was a breach of the probity regime, with detail of the obligations inherent to the position held by the plaintiff at the time of the facts, as well as the value judgment that led it to ultimately establish the sanction imposed. On that point, in section "V.V. On the sanction to be imposed", it indicated: "*Analyzing the degree of culpability of the official in her omission to act, this body considers it to be relevant; since there was serious and pernicious damage to the institution's budget by granting benefits to officials who were not afforded due process to determine whether they qualified for downward position reassignment; for this reason, in order not to overlook said action, but at the same time to invite the official to reflect on her negligent conduct in the functions she performed, this deciding body imposes the sanction of ONE-MONTH SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY. Said quantum is considered adequate, considering the seriousness of the facts, that the official has a long career in the Institution, and considering that the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding is corrective (...)*". In this way, the contested final resolution duly reflects the set of precedents of the case, lists the facts that were deemed accredited with detail of the evidentiary elements upon which they were deduced. Such development makes possible the understanding of the reasons that support the grounds for the act. Subsequently, it addressed the various arguments presented by the parties involved and elaborates on the reasons of law by which, in view of the determined facts, it reached the assessments and legal consequences ultimately adopted. Strictly speaking, that exposition shows logical consistency between the facts and the applied law, as support for the final decision, which allows the (logical) understanding of the reasons underlying the administrative will. It should be noted that in accordance with the provisions of article 136, subsection c) of the LGAP, that statement of reasons (motivación) allows the decision to be supported against the recommendation report issued by the investigating body and against the considerations made by the Junta de Relaciones Laborales, both criteria being non-binding in nature pursuant to precept 303 of the cited LGAP, but which, ultimately, imposed the duty of a proper statement of reasons (motivación), as was realized in this case. Certainly, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with those considerations and development, but that does not imply that the defect she points out is realized. From that standpoint, the argument under examination must be rejected.
**XII.- On the imposed sanction.** Furthermore, it is reproached that the applied sanction is disproportionate given that the Código de Trabajo, in article 68, subsection e), provides for a maximum sanction of 8 days. On that point, it must be indicated that the relations arising between the plaintiff and INDER are characteristic of a bond under a special public-law subjection regime (régimen de sujeción especial), which is governed by its own sources and only on a supplementary basis is nourished by the regulations of the Código de Trabajo. Article 191 of the Constitution itself establishes that public employment relations shall be governed by their own statute, that is, by special public-law norms that reflect and regulate the content of this type of relations, at the level of selection mechanisms, remuneration, rights and obligations of the parties, disciplinary regime, among other aspects. This special regulation is also recognized in the doctrine of canon 112, first subsection, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a norm that since 1978 indicates that the referred service relations shall be governed by Administrative Law. It is noteworthy that the Código de Trabajo itself, in its version prior to the issuance of Ley No. 9343, in its section 585, referred to special provisions for State employees and its institutions, highlighting the specificity of that employment or service regime. In its current and in-force version, the Código de Trabajo recognizes said regime from canon 682 onwards, with that precept stating, in its second paragraph: "*Public nature employees are governed by the corresponding statutory norms, special laws and applicable regulatory norms and by this Code, in everything not contemplated in those other provisions. (...)*". Thus, these are distinct relations governed by specific norms and principles of Administrative Law, which, pursuant to articles 7 and 9 of the LGAP, is autonomous and self-integrative, leading to the conclusion of only supplementary (and not primary) application of the provisions of the Código de Trabajo. As part of that regulatory specialty and autonomy, as has been stated, Ley No. 8422 establishes a legal framework that regulates matters relating to the duty of probity, which sets out the principles that must govern the public function for the protection of the objectives and purposes of that legislation, while also setting out grounds for infraction and disciplinary sanctions that are applicable in the event of a breach of the duties that said source imposes. As has been indicated, that norm is complemented and integrated with Ley No. 7428, by the same express referral made by the former. Therefore, neither the rules of prescription, nor the guidelines for disciplinary sanctions to be applied in this type of relations are those addressed by labor regulations, to the extent that the cited legislation contains its own regulations that, by the criterion of specialty, hold a higher level of force and resistance than that labor legal framework. Hence, the source to be used, as the primary reference for resolving the dispute arising between the parties, is precisely the set of norms that make up the higher oversight regime of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). That being the case, it is reiterated, from the very statement of charges it was indicated that part of the applicable legal regime was precisely section 38 of Ley No. 8422. In that order, the applied sanctions find legal provision in canon 39 ejusdem, given that, as was set forth above, the final act provides the reasons (motiva) why the one-month suspension was deemed adequate, taking into account the particularities of the case under examination. On the other hand, the liability attributed being for infractions of the duty of probity, the analysis of the validity or not of those personnel actions number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010 and 3841-2011 granted in favor of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, respectively, does not constitute a preliminary question (cuestión prejudicial) upon which the possibility of initiating the corresponding disciplinary proceeding is conditioned. While the preliminary investigation report suggests evaluating the possibility of initiating proceedings to suppress the effects of those personnel actions that grant the salary supplement (sobresueldo) for downward reassignment, that is not an obstacle to the analysis of the indolences charged against the plaintiff. These are actions that, in order to provide a comprehensive solution to the procedural deficiencies detected regarding the processing of salary supplements (sobresueldos) in downward reassignments, INDER must consider, but which in no way limit or condition the validity of the disciplinary actions adopted against the plaintiff herein. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in the exercise of the powers of the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) (pursuant to Transitory I in relation to Article 136 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, Ley No. 8508), has already ruled on this independence of subject matter between both proceedings, among others, in resolutions numbers 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017 and 000003-F-TC-2018.
Therefore, the deficiency upon which the claimant bases her criticisms is not observed."</span></p> 9343, called "Reforma Procesal Laboral", of January 25, 2016, effective as of July 26, 2017, such term was regulated in precept 603 of the Labor Code. In the present case, given the date of the alleged infractions, in the plaintiff's theory, that would be the applicable norm. The foregoing is without prejudice to infractions that are regulated by special norms, such as those expressed by the internal control regime, probity (probidad) in public service, and management of the public treasury, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 (art. 43), Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, a special term of five years operates (according to the assumptions and from the moments that those norms provide). In such cases, the special term prevails and not the monthly term established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, being a special and subsequent regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now then, the starting point for the computation of that prescriptive term is decisive. On the matter, numeral 603 of the Labor Code -in force at the date of the facts- (art. 414 currently) indicates that the term runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly term is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know the infraction and, therefore, undertake the exercise of their power. Consequently, when the particularities of the case require the completion of a prior preliminary investigation stage, the aforementioned monthly term runs from the moment when the results of that exercise are brought to the knowledge of the hierarch (jerarca). It is the case, for example, of infractions that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose pursuit for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective hierarch. In such a scenario, the indicated term is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the hierarch, since it is only at that moment that said holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. However, the need or not for that phase (preliminary investigation) must be determined in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence that tends to clarify its necessity or not. 2) Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure: it refers to the maximum time limit that the holder of the corrective power has to adopt the sanction once the file has been submitted for their knowledge by the directing body, in which case, what remains is the issuance of the final act. In this hypothesis, the hierarch or holder has a maximum term of one month to decide the applicable sanction, from the moment when the directing body of the case formally brings their recommendation to their knowledge. In this case, without prejudice to what is regulated by numeral 319 of the LGAP, the holder of the power would have a maximum term (of prescription) of one month to adopt that final act, after which the statute of limitations (prescripción) of that power would inevitably occur and, therefore, the final act would be null due to injury to the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such an assumption, in the concrete dynamic of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of ordinal 603 of the Labor Code (current 414), constitutes a special treatment that is superimposed on what is established by canon 329.3 of the LGAP. It is not about, at this point, the two-month term that ordinal 261 LGAP imposes to conclude the ordinary procedure, a term that is in any case directory and not peremptory, but rather the specific power to issue the final act once the holder of the repressive competence has the objective possibility to do so. However, this Administrative Litigation Court, Section VI, has established that the unjustified and disproportionate delay of the procedure, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that iter, due to injury to the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice, in the manner established by article 41 of the Magna Carta. However, at this point, the term commented on above refers to the one held by the hierarch so that, once the report of the directing body is rendered, the final decision is imposed. 3) Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of the power to execute the imposed sanction: It refers to the term that the administrative hierarch has to order the application of the dictated sanction. It consists, therefore, of the material execution of the act that provides a disciplinary sanction as its content. In the absence of express regulation, this Chamber had applied the monthly term previously provided in ordinal 603 of the aforementioned labor regulations. Likewise, in vote No. 69-2015-VI, the application of the term provided in ordinal 340 of the General Law of Public Administration had been postulated. However, currently, as of the reform of Law No. 9343, ordinal 415 of the Labor Code imposes that the execution phase of the dictated disciplinary sanction expires in a term of one year, consequently clarifying the eventual preclusion of that power according to those new parameters. 4) Another element that is subject to temporality rules is that referring to the Processing of the procedure. It refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure established to determine the facts that allow the final decision of the holder of the public repressive power to be adopted can last. This issue, save for a special norm (as is the case of the procedure provided in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch for the officials of that Branch, in accordance with ordinal 211 of that legal framework), is regulated by ordinal 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that two-month term provided therein consists of a term of a directory nature, not peremptory, which certainly does not include nor permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. Thus, in principle, an excess of two months does not per se lead to the nullity of the procedure due to preclusion of competence, even though it is necessary to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether such durations violate the celerity and efficiency that, from a rational and proportional standpoint, must prevail in these matters. In this sense, see judgment No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011. At this point, reference must also be made to what is established by precept 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a term equal to or greater than six months for reasons attributable to it. Given that in the present case the debate is formulated regarding the application or not of the aggravated statute of limitations (prescripción) regime due to the alleged concurrence of affectations to the probity regime, it becomes necessary to make some considerations in order to specify the content and implications of such a regime.
VI.- On the duty of probity (deber de probidad). Scope. Regarding the duty of probity within the exercise of public office, it is pertinent to indicate what follows. Numeral 111 of the General Law of Public Administration defines the public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with entire independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 ejusdem clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coincident interest of the administered parties. To that end, the public servant is unavoidably subject to the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive vision, as is inferred, at a legal level, from ordinals 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and from article 11 of the Magna Carta. As part of this orientation, the official's performance is oriented and delimited by norms of transparency and probity (probidad), whose legal support is expressly found in numeral 3 of Law No. 8422. Said norm states: "Duty of probity (Deber de probidad). The public official shall be obliged to orient their management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions they adopt in compliance with their attributions conform to impartiality and to the proper objectives of the institution in which they serve and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily." From this perspective, as a complement to the finalist orientation of the public official that requires them to promote the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is proper to the service nature of their competencies, the duty of probity (deber de probidad) seeks to provide aspects of greater concreteness, which in some way, guide the actions of the public official (or are lines that must do so), so that their conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not only at the result level, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in their behavior. That is, that public morality requires that, in case of conflicts of interest, they must recuse themselves from knowledge of the matter, in order not to "pollute" or put at risk the objectivity that must be proper to the conduct, but, in addition, in their actions, must tend toward the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity (deber de probidad) regulated in article three of Law No. 8422 obliges every public servant to exercise their office in adherence to the principle of impartiality in the face of personal or family interests, economic, and of another nature, for which reason in their performance they must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This in effect is derived from canon one of the Regulation to the cited Law No. 8422, which regarding the cited duty of probity (deber de probidad) states it is expressed, among other actions, in “refraining from knowing and resolving a matter when the same causes for disqualification and recusal exist as established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in the Procedural Civil Code, and in other laws.” Therefore, it is clear that the condition of a public agent entails the subjection and due compliance with duties of moral and ethical orientation that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, which demand they conduct themselves in their management with rectitude and solidity. For the safeguarding of that mandate, the norms that permeate the activities of public officials impose a regime of impediments, which establish causes in which the servant is disabled, whether ex officio or at the request of a party, from hearing a certain matter in which, due to the concurrence of certain situations, their objectivity in the development of their functions may be injured, or threatened, and with it, the inherent risk in the due weighting of the public interest. This is the case of the causes imposed by canon 230 of the General Law previously referenced, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and the grounds referenced in canons 12 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as those imposed by the Law of Administrative Procurement, all of which seek to avoid a possible conflict of interest (conflicto de intereses). It is clear at this point that, at a preventive level, those conditions of impediment seek to maintain objectivity and transparency in the conduct of the public official, preventing the correct fulfillment of the tasks proper to their investiture and, consequently, the satisfaction of the public interest as the north of their behavior, from being threatened or relegated by personal interests. In this dynamic, the concept of conflict of interest (conflicto de intereses) must be specified, which entails the confrontation between a personal interest and a public interest. The due attention to this type of conflict requires preventive and a posteriori control frameworks. In the first stage, it is about eliminating all possibility that the conflict may produce an effective collision of interests on the part of the official, which would deprive them of freedom or objectivity at the moment of intervening in a certain public matter. For its part, in the case of subsequent control, it consists of the determination of an undue act of favoritism or at least, the behavior oriented to obtaining a personal benefit or in favor of a third party, and that may lead to the imposition of a sanction. Under that prism, at a preventive level, the identification of a conflict of interest (conflicto de intereses) does not logically determine the existence of a concrete undue act of favoritism. Quite the contrary, it aims to warn of the existence of a risk that objectively would allow a collision of interests to arise. Hence, the infraction of the mentioned duty of probity (deber de probidad) is not immune to the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the mentioned Law No. 8422 establishes: "Without prejudice to any civil and criminal liabilities that may proceed, the infraction of the duty of probity (infracción del deber de probidad), duly proven and following a defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability." Such a conditioned effect makes sense, in the context being analyzed, for acts of open improvisation, poor administration of resources, or total evidence of conflicts of interest (conflictos de intereses) perfectly deducible from a given situation, without the official having adopted voluntary recusal actions. Of course, the application and interpretation of that norm must travel the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. To that end, mandate 38 of the cited legislation (Law No. 8422) establishes causes for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the letter of norm 39 ius ibíd., which, in that regard, would be applicable to infractions of the duty of probity (deber de probidad) in the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows the liability of an official to arise upon the emission of conduct that violates ethical norms. However, the correct application of this system implies the necessary instruction of an administrative procedure, as an unavoidable prior step to applying a sanction for the injuries to that framework of official obligations, with full and integral respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which is fundamental to elude arbitrary and illegal actions.
VII.- Analysis of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the specific case. That said, although the duty of probity (deber de probidad) imposes a behavioral framework in accordance with official duties, as well as with the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is oriented toward preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of public service, as is deduced from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity (probidad) must be carried out precisely in the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant's infraction entails an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illegitimate enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury. Otherwise, if the duty of probity (deber de probidad) were understood to be infringed by any action or omission of the public agent that implies a disregard or non-compliance with deontological behavioral rules, which are proper or inherent to their competency exercise, and in general to their investiture, in a broad and extreme sense, without performing that judgment of association with the purposes of the cited law, every official infraction would fit within the scope of injury to the duty of probity (deber de probidad). The foregoing would lead to imposing a general regime of prescriptibility of infractions of five years, in all cases, which, in the judgment of this Sentencing Chamber, is not the purpose or ratio of the reference law.
Therefore, in every disciplinary dismissal proceeding, the content of the notified conduct must be analyzed to determine whether the legal regime that specifies the statute of limitations period for exercising the internal corrective power is the standard one-month period imposed by the doctrine of current Article 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), formerly Article 603 of the same source, the same period set by remission from precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), or whether, on the contrary, because it involves the situations that Law No. 8422, or Law No. 8292, seeks to protect, the aforementioned period is expanded by the application of the rule established in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In this context, the facts imputed to the plaintiff, such as having permitted the adoption of conduct that generated an improper recognition of salary pluses (pluses salariales) to two INDER officials by downward reassignment, although they do not refer to a direct disposition of Public Funds, ultimately constitute conduct that led to the disposition of salary-related expenditures, covered with public resources, which, it is argued within the ordinary disciplinary dismissal proceeding, were illegitimately granted. In the judgment of this Chamber, the substantial content of the conduct charged and subject to the proceeding constitutes manifestations deemed antagonistic to the internal control regime (régimen de control interno) and the duty of probity (deber de probidad) imposed in the exercise of public function. From this perspective, the plaintiff seems to confuse the responsibility of those who directly administer public funds, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate heads, with the responsibility that is her own due to her sole condition as a public servant (servidora pública), and therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. Accordingly, the temporal margin for exercising the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its Article 44, which refers to the five-year statute of limitations rule established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. From this perspective, in the instant case, it is held that, although the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary case date from the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the truth is that such facts were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the relevance of which is not challenged, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for calculating the statutory limitations period referred to in Article 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to Article 44 of Law No. 8422, the said period must run from the moment the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective position to exercise it. Thus, in cases such as this one, where the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and collecting evidentiary indications, so as to allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges (traslado de cargos), the starting point of the statute of limitations operates with the communication of the aforementioned report. From the analysis of the case records, it is held that after that submission of the preliminary report in official document URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit, via official document PE-5050-2016 of April 27, 2016, the administrative head appointed the directing body, an authority that on June 28, 2016, issued the respective statement of charges, which was notified on that same date. Therefore, from the date on which the head could validly order disciplinary actions until the moment the opening of the internal case was communicated to the plaintiff, the five-year period governing this type of conflict had not expired. Furthermore, it is held that by the act at 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the Directing Body issued conclusions report No. 023-2016. By official document URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, that report was submitted to the Labor Relations Board for their consideration. In Minutes No. 002-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the INDER Labor Relations Board, that body's opinion was issued, deciding to depart from the directing body's recommendation, because there is no evidence in the case file indicating that the investigated officials, including the plaintiff, availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 et seq. of the LGAP regarding pleading the duty of obedience (deber de obediencia). This decision was communicated to the Executive Presidency by official document RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017. Ultimately, by resolution No. 037-2017 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the INDER Executive Presidency issued the final act within administrative proceeding No. URL-002-2015, an act communicated to the plaintiff on that same date. As INDER postulates, it is clear that the statute of limitations for issuing the final act must be calculated from the moment the holder of the decision-making power is in an objective position to exercise it. This occurred on March 31, 2017, when the Labor Relations Board sent the file to the Executive Presidency. Subsequently, on April 28, 2017, the final act of the proceeding was issued and communicated. Between both phases, the inertia that the plaintiff alleges is not observed, insofar as, between the submission of the file by the Labor Relations Board and the final decision of the case, not even one month elapsed. Therefore, the expiration of that exercise has not occurred, which means the rejection of the charge under examination.
VIII.- On the content of the duty of obedience. As part of the internal relations that arise in the provision of public competences, hierarchy entails the power of one body to direct and verify the conduct of other bodies that are inferior. As established in Article 101 of the LGAP, the administrative hierarchy relationship implies that the competences of the superior encompass those of the inferior by reason of territory or subject matter, and they hold functions of the same nature. Canon 102 ejusdem establishes the generic powers of the hierarchical superior in the following sense:
"Article 102.- The hierarchical superior shall have the following powers:
IX.- Analysis of the defenses related to the plaintiff's duty of obedience. The defense formulated in this case, and on which the invalidity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, she limited herself to complying with the orders issued by the person who on those dates served as Executive President. In accordance with what has been stated, such an allegation requires an analysis of the circumstances in which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience regarding that conduct. In the case at hand, on the date the personnel actions were issued in the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the plaintiff held the position of Human Resources Coordinator of the respondent entity. As stated by INDER and reiterated by the co-respondent Rodríguez Barquero, the Institution's Position Manual assigns the following details to that position: "Nature of the work. Planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of the Institute of Agrarian Development, as well as the execution of the corresponding activities. Positions comprising this class: Human Resources Coordinator. (...) General Activities of the Human Resources Coordinator. Advises the heads of the institution on personnel administration matters. Consequences of error. Errors committed may cause losses, damages, or delays of high consideration, for which activities must be carried out with extreme care and precision. Personal characteristics of the occupant. Analytical, critical, and synthesis capacity." Considering these particularities, this Court deems that the very condition of Human Resources Coordinator places the plaintiff under the duty, or at least, the possibility of knowing the set of background information and regulations inherent to downward personnel movements.
This leads to the inference that, faced with a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue the personnel actions that recognized the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn of the necessary existence of the technical and legal prerequisites required for that recognition, and, as the case may be, to inform that hierarchy of the need to request the internal opinions that would give legitimate support to that decision. As the Manual de Puestos mentions in the section indicated above, part of the general activities of the plaintiff was to advise the heads of department on matters of personnel administration. Hence, a functional duty emerges from that profile that imposed upon her the obligation to warn her superior that the conduct issued lacked support in the regime applicable to that type of movement. The claim of <span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">automatic and unquestioning application</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, by derivation of the duty of obedience, does not entail the release from liability that is sought, when the LGAP itself indicates the cases in which the public agent should disobey, but also when the internal regulations themselves and the profile of her duties imposed upon her the duty to be aware of the need to have prior technical and/or legal analyses that would demonstrate the pertinence, in the cases in question, of the actions ordered by her superior. In any event, even if it were deemed that it has not been proven that any of the conditions that imposed the duty to disregard the order existed, given her knowledge and responsibilities in Human Resources Management matters, it was her duty to warn that, in descending reassignments, it was not feasible to grant the salary supplement assigned in those personnel actions, based on the lack of technical analyses that would support those decisions. This was so that the hierarchical superior could weigh those objections and, if he persisted in his conduct, allow the plaintiff to release herself from liability for the execution of those acts. However, it is not evident in the case file that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders given by issuing the respective personnel actions, ultimately conferring illegitimate benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the budget of INDER. By not having expressed those disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the plaintiff assumes liability for the negligence in the fulfillment of these legally assigned duties, which are congruent with her functions and, therefore, demandable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the position profile she held. </span></span></p>\n<p><span class="example1 274396" style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 150%; margin: 0pt; text-align: justify;" idextracto="274396"><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;">X.- </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">Seen thus, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the regulatory provision that was notified to the plaintiff, specifically, subsection 38 (d) of Ley No. 8422, and the violation of the content of subsection 13 (c) of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the sanction applied is based on the duty to have required the technical and legal inputs that would give support to the order given and which she chose to execute, dispensing with the fulfillment of minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules for the imputation of liability established by canon 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the higher the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the act issued and the conduct adopted. From that perspective, the position of Human Resources Management coordinator implies a degree of technical specialization by virtue of which the plaintiff's argument regarding the exemption from liability due to simple obedience to orders given by the then head of the Executive Presidency is not acceptable, regarding the personnel actions that recognized a right to the payment of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for descending reassignment, which did not satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements pertinent to the case. Gross negligence (culpa grave) is therefore observed in that proceeding, which entails liability for the issuance and permissibility of acts that improperly created patrimonial rights, with the corresponding economic harm to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by committing public funds without the proper verification of the conformity of the procedures that led to the issuance of the cited personnel actions. Therefore, no legal excuse or permissibility to ignore the deficiencies that later formed the basis of the imposed sanction is observed. This is an issue that was fully verifiable a priori and that required adopting corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuing this type of conduct or, in any case, stating the reasons for disagreement by way of warning, so as to generate a release from liability. By not doing so, the factual prerequisite (conditioning antecedent) that was notified to the plaintiff, and which allows the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the statement of charges, is incurred. Such assessment of the behavior attributable to the plaintiff was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017). In the relevant part, within the reasons given by the Executive Presidency, it was stated: "</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">According to what is described in the previous point, it is evident that the position of Human Resources Coordinator is in charge of controlling the technical tasks that arise in the different administrative processes under its responsibility; among its activities is that of advising the institution's heads of department in the matter under its charge, which includes ensuring the proper supervision of the procedures that must be carried out in the department, not overlooking decision-making without having a justification (informe técnico) that precedes it. (...) It must be clear that, given the foregoing, it is not a justification for the official to claim ignorance of the department's internal procedures, much less to indicate that the review of the orders given to her is not her responsibility; since it is clear from what has been analyzed above that the person holding a public position must be suitable to perform the technical and professional functions brought to their attention. (...)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">". Then, when weighing the plaintiff's negligence (indolencia) in the specific case, it pointed out: "</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">...In the case at hand, it is possible to demonstrate that there was an omission in questioning why an order was given without a respective supporting administrative act; which reveals that the Human Resources Coordination's actions at that time were contrary to the powers granted by the Administration; since a personnel action is approved that lacks justification and proper technical study; therefore, it is unknown whether it was the most correct at the time, contravening by its actions the adequate and efficient management of public resources and, in general, the assets assigned for the performance of its functions, violating the principle of efficiency that the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública seeks to protect. (...)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">". And with even greater force to support the imputation made, later in the same act it is stated: "</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">...It must be clear that the reprehensible aspect in this case regarding the conduct of the accused is her lack of duty of care when carrying out her functions, omitting to prepare the technical reports (informes técnicos) and the respective administrative procedures, and that, although it is true that she was fulfilling a superior order from the institutional hierarchical superior, the official, as part of her technical knowledge in the field of personnel administration, should have questioned the lack of the technical report (informe técnico) that would support said request; which, as is evident in the present process, never occurred, her degree of responsibility being equal to that of the hierarchical superior at that time; since, in addition to not questioning it, she signed the personnel action and participated at that time in a meeting where the agreements for the reassignment of Mr. Novo were arranged between the administration </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">(sic) </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and him without proper technical foundation. Therefore, based on the foregoing points and the reasoning issued, this decision-making body considers that the actions of Mrs. Chaves Morales constitute gross negligence (culpa grave) within her assigned functions at that time; since she failed in the duty of probity and violated the principles of efficiency and effectiveness of the public service, by not supervising the procedures for descending position reassignments as she should have at the time, affecting the public budget allocated for her position. Therefore, there was liability on the part of the official at the time the descending position reassignments of Messrs. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz were carried out, with her violating Articles 3, 4 and 38 (d) of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública; therefore, a sanction must be imposed on her in accordance with said ordinances. (...)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">". These references demonstrate the considerations based on which the defendant entity considered that the plaintiff's conduct violated the rules of Ley No. 8422, due to the omission of control regarding the technical analyses (análisis técnicos) required for the granting of the descending reassignments and the respective recognition of the salary supplement (sobresueldo) granted to both referred officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures inherent to her position, pertaining to personnel administration procedures and processes, which speaks to the neglect of those duties and, consequently, the liability that stems from that conduct. As observed, that analysis meshes and harmonizes with the reasoning given by this Court in the present ruling, a treatment in which, consequently, the reported inaccuracies are not observed. </span></span></p>\n<p><span class="example1 274396" style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 150%; margin: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36pt;" idextracto="274396"><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;">XI.- Regarding the alleged lack of reasoning (motivación).</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> On the other hand, an inadequate basis for the final act of the proceeding is alleged. </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">Reasoning (motivación) as a formal element entails the expression of the questions of fact and of law that support and sustain the administrative decision. Regarding the factual aspects, it entails not only the reference to the proven or unproven facts but also the evidence or elements of conviction on which the logical deduction of a factual nature is based, as well as the explanation of the analytical process that has led to those derivations or inferences. In the field of law, it entails the mention and well-founded explanation of the analysis that allows (rationally) inferring the reasons why the law used is applicable to the specific case, such that, given a certain set of preceding circumstances, that legal treatment is pertinent and adequate, providing support for the decision adopted. The same rule commented on indicates that this reasoning (motivación) may be DIRECT, when the act contains in its own text the detail of that framework of foundation, or INDIRECT, when the administrative conduct refers, explicitly and unequivocally, as support for its content, to prior proposals, opinions (dictámenes) or resolutions that have determined the adoption of the act, provided that a copy of those is attached with the communication of the act. The defects or flaws regarding this element may be configured: </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration: underline;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration: underline;">by omission</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> (the act completely lacks the exposition of the required foundations), </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration: underline;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration: underline;">improper reasoning (motivación indebida)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> (among others, the factual and legal references are inapplicable to the case analyzed, the weighing of relevant aspects of the proceeding is set aside), or else, </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration: underline;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration: underline;">insufficient reasoning (motivación insuficiente)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> (the foundations set forth in the act are not sufficient to logically and rationally sustain its content), which must be analyzed in each specific case. In an integral sense, reasoning (motivación) allows for the understanding of the reasons and rational process by which the grounds (motivo) for the act are deemed accredited, and also the analysis of legitimacy that, given that prerequisite, has led to the decision adopted, as the content of the act, as the best way to satisfy the public interest involved. If the primary object of the proceeding is the determination of the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the grounds (motivo) (Articles 221, 217 LGAP), it is clear that reasoning (motivación) requires the clear exposition of the relevant findings, determining facts, evidentiary support, and analysis of the evidence, which have led to the factual conclusion or inference. Otherwise, the right to a material defense of the administered party would be harmed, when a negative result is imposed within a case, if those questions are not offered, since they would be unable to refute the elements that have led to the configuration of the grounds (motivo) of the act. The same occurs with the legal considerations that lead to the adoption of the final decision (content), since the omission of reference to the regulatory framework that supports the administrative will prevents the refutation or criticism of the analysis carried out by the Administration in order to weigh the pertinence of the rule applied to the specific case, its correspondence with the grounds (motivo) and its proportionality to the legally imposed purpose. Thus, the conditions imposed by canon 132.1 LGAP, to the effect that the content must be licit, possible, clear, precise, and cover all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds (motivo), even as an unofficial duty, could not be verif</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">i</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">ed </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">if the act fails to set forth the reasons why it assumes a certain position. Therefore, reasoning (motivación) is the element that enables the substantive understanding of the decision and which demonstrates the objective bases upon which the Administration has derived the objective material elements of the act. Its relevance also lies in the fact that it enables the defense of the administered party, since only by knowing the substance of what has been decided can it be debated, unless the claim itself is solely the neglect of the duty to provide reasoning (motivación). Well then, in the case at hand,</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> the act does not present the deficiencies in reasoning (motivación) that are alleged. As has been set forth ut supra, in what has been the subject of objection, the challenged conduct clearly offers the set of antecedent circumstances on which it has based its decision. The final act points out the reasons of fact and of law on which the content of the act is based. In the section on proven facts, that act refers to the elements of conviction from which each factual assertion was derived. For its part, in the analysis of the merits, it carries out an assessment of the evidence incorporated into the proceeding, while also explaining the reasons why the notified conduct was deemed accredited, the considerations for which it concluded that it constituted a breach of the probity regime, with detail of the obligations inherent to the position held by the plaintiff at the time of the facts, as well as the value judgment that led it to establish the sanction that was ultimately applied. In that regard, in section "V.V. On the sanction to be imposed", it pointed out: "</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Analyzing the degree of culpability of the official in her omission of action, this body considers it to be relevant; since there was serious and pernicious damage to the institution's budget by granting benefits to officials who were not subjected to the proper process to determine whether or not they qualified for descending position reassignments; for this reason, in the interest of not overlooking said action, but at the same time to invite the official to reflect on her negligent actions in the functions she performed, this decision-making body imposes the sanction of SUSPENSION FOR ONE MONTH WITHOUT PAY. Said quantum is considered adequate, taking into account the seriousness of the facts, that the official has a long career in the Institution, and considering that the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding is corrective (...)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">". In this way, the final resolution under attack duly captures the set of precedents of the case, lists the facts that were deemed accredited with detail of the elements of conviction from which they were deduced. Such development enables the understanding of the reasons supporting the grounds (motivo) of the act. It then addressed the various arguments presented by the parties involved and elaborates on the legal reasons for which, given the determined facts, it obtained the assessments and legal consequences that were ultimately adopted. Strictly speaking, that exposition shows logical congruence between the facts and the applied law, as support for the final decision, which allows the (logical) understanding of the basic reasons for the administrative will. It is worth noting that, in accordance with what is prescribed by subsection 136 (c) of the LGAP, that reasoning (motivación) allows the decision to be sustained in light of the advisory report issued by the investigating body and in light of the considerations made by the Junta de Relaciones Laborales, both criteria being non-binding in nature according to precept 303 of the cited LGAP, but which, ultimately, imposed the duty of proper reasoning (motivación), as was made concrete in this case. Certainly, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with those considerations and development, but this does not imply that the defect she points to materializes. From that perspective, the claim under examination must be rejected.</span></span></p>\n<p><span class="example1 274396" style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 150%; margin: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36pt;" idextracto="274396"><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;">XII.- </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold;">On the sanction imposed. </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">On the other hand, it is objected that the applied sanction is disproportionate given that the Código de Trabajo, in article 68 (e), provides for a maximum sanction of 8 days. On that point, it must be indicated that the relations arising between the plaintiff and INDER are characteristic of a bond proper to a special public-law </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">subjection regime (régimen de sujeción especial)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">, which is regulated by its own sources and only in a complementary manner draws from the regulations of the Código de Trabajo. The same subsection 191 of the Carta Magna establishes that public employment relations shall be governed by their own statute, that is, by special public-law norms that shape and regulate the content of that type of relations, at the level of the selection mechanism, remuneration, rights and obligations of the parties, disciplinary regime, among other aspects. This special regulation is also recognized in the doctrine of canon 112, first paragraph, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a norm that since 1978 indicates that the referred service relations shall be regulated by Administrative Law. It is worth noting that the Código de Trabajo itself, in its version prior to the enactment of Ley No. 9343, in its subsection 585, referred to special provisions for State servants and its institutions, demonstrating the specificity of that employment or service regime. In its current and effective version, the Código de Trabajo recognizes said regime starting from canon 682 and following, with that precept indicating, in its second paragraph: "</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Servants of a public nature are governed by the corresponding statutory norms, special laws, and applicable regulatory norms, and by this Code, in everything not contemplated in those other provisions. (...)</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">". Thus, these are proprietary relations governed by specific norms and principles of Administrative Law, which, according to what is established in Articles 7 and 9 of the LGAP, is autonomous and self-integrating, which leads to the conclusion that the provisions of the Código de Trabajo are only complementary (and not primary) in their application. As part of that regulatory specialty and autonomy, as has been stated, Ley No. 8422 establishes a legal framework that regulates matters related to the duty of probity, which sets forth the principles that must govern the public function for the protection of the objectives and purposes of that legislation, while also establishing cases of infraction and disciplinary sanctions that are applicable </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">in the </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">event of a breach of the duties that said source imposes. As has been indicated, that norm is complemented and integrated with Ley No. 7428, by the same express reference made by the former. Therefore, neither the statute of limitations rules, nor the guidelines for disciplinary sanctions to be applied in this type of relations are those dealt with by labor regulations, to the extent that the cited legislation contains its own regulations which, by the criterion of specialty (especialidad), hold a higher level of potency and resistance than that labor legal framework. Hence, the source to be used, as the primary reference for resolving the conflict that arose between the parties, is precisely the set of norms that compose the regime for the superior supervision of the Hacienda Pública. Thus, it is reiterated, from the very statement of charges it was indicated that part of the applicable legal regime was precisely numeral 38 of Ley No. 8422. In that order, the sanctions applied find legal provision in canon 39 ejusdem, and as was set forth above, the final act justifies the reasons why the suspension for a period of one month was deemed adequate, considering the particularities of the case under examination. On the other hand, the liability attributed being for infractions to the duty of probity, the analysis of the validity or not of those personnel actions </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;">numbers 792-2010 of February 25, 2010, and 3841-2011 granted in favor of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, respectively, does not constitute a preliminary question (cuestión prejudicial) to which the possibility of initiating the corresponding disciplinary proceeding is subordinated. Although the preliminary investigation report suggests assessing the possibility of initiating proceedings to eliminate the effects of those personnel actions that grant the salary supplement (sobresueldo) for descending reassignment, this is not an obstacle to the analysis of the acts of negligence (indolencias) notified to the plaintiff. These are actions that, in order to provide a comprehensive solution to the procedural deficiencies detected concerning the processing of salary supplements (sobresueldos) in descending reassignments, INDER must weigh, but which in no way limit or condition the validity of the disciplinary actions adopted</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;"> against the plaintiff herein</span></span><span class="example1 274396" style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt;" idextracto="274396">. On this independence of object between both proceedings, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has already ruled, in exercise of the powers of the Tribunal de Casación (in accordance with Transitory Provision I in relation to Article 136 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, Ley No. 8508), among others, in resolutions numbers 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017, and 000003-F-TC-2018. Ergo, the flaw on which the plaintiff bases her objections is not observed."</span></p>\n\r\n"
"V.- Sobre el elemento temporal en el ejercicio de las potestades correctivas administrativas de corte disciplinario. El análisis de validez de las conductas objeto de este proceso tiene como punto fundamental determinar el régimen de prescripción aplicable al procedimiento administrativo disciplinario instaurado contra la accionante. Sobre el particular debe indicarse lo que de seguido se expone. En las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido faltas sancionables, se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se verá, varía según se trate de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un régimen jurídico especial que configure reglas particulares para tipos específicos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 de la LGAP) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras potestades públicas que, por aspectos finalistas, se consideran imprescriptibles -v.gr., tutela de bienes demaniales-, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno -como el que se examina en este caso- están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud de lo cual, puede fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de relaciones, el titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo el funcionario público, quien, en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Se trata de un asunto librado a la discrecionalidad del legislador, quien determina en cada caso si se trata de una prescripción o de una caducidad del eventual ejercicio de esas potestades. Desde este plano, en la prescripción liberatoria, se impone la concurrencia de tres factores fundamentales, a saber: a) inercia del titular de un derecho (o potestad) en su ejercicio, b) transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico en esa inercia del titular y; c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica de hacer valer la prescripción. Con todo, en materia de empleo público, la prescripción negativa bien puede ser alegada como causal de nulidad del acto final sancionatorio, aún y cuando esa defensa no hubiere sido ejercitada de previo a la emisión de la voluntad pública. Así, la potestad correctiva no puede considerarse como una imprescriptible, tratando de justificar esa deducción en la regla del numeral 66.1 de la LGAP, sino que se trata de una sujeta a reglas de preclusión por factores temporales, según se visualiza en el inciso 3) de ese mismo numeral 66 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Tratándose de actuaciones de la Administración Pública en procedimientos administrativos sancionatorios, resulta fundamental lo estatuido por el ordinal 329.3 de la LGAP que señala: "3. El acto final recaído fuera del plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo disposición en contrario de la ley." De suerte que cuando una disposición legal fije la pérdida o preclusión de competencia, el acto dictado en ejercicio de esa potestad ya fenecida, no podría ser tenido como válido. Ahora bien, es necesario discriminar entre diversos supuestos que se producen en este tipo de procedimientos disciplinarios, todos en los cuales, aplican reglas de ejercicio temporal de facultades o potestades, pero con matices diversos. Se trata del establecimiento necesario, para fines de claridad, de criterios de demarcación que permitan el abordaje de los temas discutidos, según el supuesto de que se trate. De cara a analizar el elemento temporal del procedimiento, ha de distinguirse el decurso temporal de etapas diversas: 1) Prescripción (o caducidad) del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria: se refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo incoado por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo disponga la apertura del procedimiento pertinente, direccionado a establecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso, es claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que consiste un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad. No podría considerarse que el citado plazo del ejercicio de la potestad se interrumpe con el dictado del acto final pues como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración disponga la apertura de una causa administrativa, se insiste, para establecer si corresponde la sanción, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297, 308 de la LGAP. En esta hipótesis analizada, la potestad disciplinaria del jerarca administrativo se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo (cuyo tratamiento en la praxis es en realidad muy próximo a la figura de la caducidad en la medida en que en determinados supuestos se estila declarar ese aspecto ex officio), genéricamente regulado por el mandato 414 del Código de Trabajo, norma que fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva, el que se insiste, se interrumpe con la comunicación del traslado de cargos. De previo a la reforma realizada por la Ley No. 9343, denominada "Reforma Procesal Laboral", del 25 de enero del 2016, vigente desde el 26 de julio del 2017, tal plazo se encontraba regulado en el precepto 603 del Código de Trabajo. En la especie, dada la fecha de las faltas intimadas, en la teoría de la accionante, esa sería la norma aplicable. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de las faltas que se encuentren reguladas por las normas especiales, tales como las expresadas por el régimen de control interno, probidad en la función pública y gestión de la hacienda pública, en los cuales, acorde a lo regulado por la Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, opera un plazo especial de cinco años (según los supuestos y desde los momentos en que esas normas disponen). En tales casos, se impone el plazo especial y no el mensual estatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se insiste, al ser una normativa especial y posterior que prevalece sobre el régimen general laboral. Ahora bien, resulta determinante el punto de partida del cómputo de ese plazo prescriptivo. Sobre el particular, el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo -vigente a la fecha de los hechos- (art. 414 a la fecha) señala que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y, por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Por ende, cuando las particularidades del caso exijan la realización de una etapa previa de investigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Es el caso, por ejemplo, de faltas que sean evidenciadas en informes de Auditoria Interna, pero cuya prosecución para efectos de sancionar, deban ser sometidas al jerarca respectivo. En tal escenario, el plazo señalado se computa desde el momento de la recepción o comunicación efectiva al jerarca de dicho informe, pues es hasta ese momento que ese titular puede válidamente adoptar las decisiones respecto de la apertura o no de disposiciones disciplinarias. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase (investigación preliminar), pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino solo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no. 2) Prescripción de la potestad de adoptar la sanción dentro del procedimiento: se refiere al límite máximo temporal con que cuenta el titular de la potestad correctiva para adoptar la sanción una vez que el expediente ha sido sometido a su conocimiento por el órgano director, en cuyo caso, lo que resta es la emisión del acto final. En esta hipótesis, el jerarca o titular cuenta con un plazo máximo de un mes para decidir la sanción aplicable, desde el momento en que el órgano director de la causa le ponga formalmente en conocimiento de su recomendación. En este caso, sin perjuicio de lo regulado por el numeral 319 de la LGAP, el titular de la potestad contaría con un plazo máximo (de prescripción) de un mes para adoptar ese acto final, vencido el cual, ocurría indefectiblemente la prescripción de esa potestad y, por ende, el acto final sería nulo por lesión al elemento competencial, condicionado en ese caso por factores de preclusión. Tal supuesto, en la dinámica concreta de los procedimientos de corte sancionatorio disciplinario, dado el contenido del ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo (actual 414), constituye un tratamiento especial que se sobrepone a lo estatuido por el canon 329.3 de la LGAP. No se trata en este punto del plazo bimensual que impone el ordinal 261 LGAP para culminar el procedimiento ordinario, plazo que en todo caso es ordenatorio y no perentorio, sino del poder específico de emitir el acto final una vez que el titular de la competencia represiva cuenta con la posibilidad objetiva para ello. Con todo, este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, ha establecido que la dilación injustificada y desproporcionada del procedimiento, aún con esa connotación ordenatoria del elemento temporal, puede llevar a la nulidad de ese iter, por lesión al principio de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, en la forma establecida por el artículo 41 de la Carta Magna. Empero, en este punto, el plazo arriba comentado se refiere al que ostenta el jerarca para que una vez rendido el informe del órgano director, se imponga la decisión final. 3) Prescripción de la potestad de ejecutar la sanción impuesta: Se refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca administrativo para disponer la aplicación de la sanción dictada. Consiste por ende en la ejecución material del acto que dispone como contenido una sanción disciplinaria. Ante la falta de regulación expresa, esta Cámara había aplicado el plazo mensual previsto anteriormente en el ordinal 603 de la normativa laboral aludida. De igual manera, en el voto No. 69-2015-VI se había postulado la aplicación del plazo previsto en el ordinal 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Empero, actualmente, a partir de la reforma de la Ley No. 9343, el ordinal 415 del Código de Trabajo impone que la fase de ejecución de la sanción disciplinaria dictada, caduca en un término de un año, aclarando en consecuencia la preclusión eventual de esa potestad acorde a esos nuevos parámetros. 4) Otro elemento que se encuentra sujeto a reglas de temporalidad es el referente a la Tramitación del procedimiento. Se refiere al tiempo máximo que puede durar el procedimiento administrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la decisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema, salvo norma especial, (como es el caso, del procedimiento dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial para los funcionarios de ese Poder, al tenor del ordinal 211 de ese marco legal) se encuentra regulado por el ordinal 261, en relación con el 319 y el 340, todos de la Ley No. 6227. Sin embargo, ese plazo bimensual que allí se dispone consiste en un plazo de naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria, lo que desde luego no incluye ni permite procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas, arbitrarias y desproporcionadas, los que serían inválidos por lesión a la máxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Así, en tesis de inicio, el exceso de dos meses, no lleva per se a la nulidad del procedimiento por preclusión de la competencia, aun cuando es necesario analizar de manera casuística, si tales duraciones atentan contra la celeridad y la eficiencia que desde el plano racional y proporcional deben imperar en estas lides. En este sentido, puede verse el fallo No. 199-2011-VI de esta Sección VI, de las las 16: 20 horas del 12 de septiembre del 2011. En este punto ha de remitirse además a lo estatuido por el precepto 340 de la LGAP que regula el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento, en los casos en que la Administración instructora que lo inicio, lo someta a estado de abandono por un plazo igual o superior de seis meses por causas imputables a aquella. Siendo que en la especie el debate se formula en orden a la aplicación o no del régimen agravado de prescripción por la supuesta concurrencia de afectaciones al régimen de probidad, se hace necesario realizar algunas consideraciones en orden a precisar el contenido e implicaciones de tal régimen.
VI.- Sobre el deber de probidad. Alcances. Sobre el deber de probidad dentro del ejercicio de los cargos públicos, cabe indicar lo que de seguido se expone. El numeral 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública define al funcionario público como la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia de su carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. Por su parte, el canon 113 ejusdem, establece con claridad que el marco funcional del agente público ha de realizarse de manera que satisfaga primordialmente el interés público, entendido como el interés coincidente de los administrados. Para tal efecto, el servidor público se encuentra impostergablemente afecto al principio de legalidad, tanto en su visión negativa como positiva, según se colige, a nivel legal, de los ordinales 11, 12, 13, 59 y 66 de la citada Ley General y del artículo 11 de la Carta Magna. Como parte de esta orientación, el desempeño del funcionario se encuentra orientado y delimitado por normas de transparencia y probidad, cuyo sustento legal se encuentra expreso en el numeral 3 de la Ley no. 8422. Dicha norma señala: "Deber de probidad. El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente." Desde esta arista, como complemento de la orientación finalista del funcionario público que le exige potenciar la satisfacción de los intereses públicos por encima de los personales, incluso de los intereses de la Administración (113.2 ibídem), lo que es propio de la naturaleza servicial de sus competencias, el deber de probidad pretende aportar aspectos de mayor concreción, que de alguna manera, orientan las acciones del funcionario público (o son líneas que deben hacerlo), a fin de que su conducta responda a esa dimensión teleológica, ya no solo a nivel de resultado, sino mediante la incorporación de deberes morales y éticos que garantizan transparencia y objetividad en su proceder. Es decir, esa moral pública exige que, en caso de conflictos de intereses, deba separarse del conocimiento del asunto, a efecto de no "polucionar" o poner en riesgo la objetividad que ha de ser propia de la conducta, pero, además, en sus acciones, ha de propender a la satisfacción de aquel interés mayor. Más simple, el deber de probidad regulado en el artículo tercero de la Ley No.8422 obliga a todo servidor público a ejercer su cargo con apego al principio de imparcialidad frente a intereses personales o familiares, económicos, y de otra naturaleza, por lo que en su desempeño debe demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley. Así en efecto se desprende del canon primero del Reglamento a la citada Ley No. 8422, que sobre el citado deber de probidad manifiesta se expresa, entre otras acciones, en “abstenerse de conocer y resolver un asunto cuando existan las mismas causas de impedimento y recusación que se establecen en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en el Código Procesal y Civil y en otras leyes”. Por tanto, es claro que la condición de agente público supone la sujeción y el debido cumplimiento de deberes de orientación moral y ética que el mismo ordenamiento jurídico consagra e impone, que le exigen conducirse en su gestión con rectitud y solidez. Para el resguardo de ese cometido, las normas que impregnan las actividades de los funcionarios públicos imponen un régimen de impedimentos, que fijan causas en las cuales se imposibilita al servidor, sea de oficio o a gestión de parte, el conocimiento de un determinado asunto en el cual, por la concurrencia de determinadas situaciones, pueda ver lesionada, o amenazada su objetividad en el desarrollo de sus funciones y con ello, el consustancial riesgo en la ponderación debida del interés público. Es este el caso de las causas impuestas por el canon 230 de la Ley General de previa referencia, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y los motivos referenciados en los cánones 12 y siguientes del Código Procesal Civil, así como las impuestas por la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, todas las cuales buscan evitar un posible conflicto de intereses. Es claro en este punto, que, a nivel preventivo, esas condiciones de impedimento buscan mantener la objetividad y transparencia en el proceder del funcionario público, evitando que el correcto cumplimiento de los cometidos que son propios de su investidura y, en consecuencia, la satisfacción del interés público como norte de su comportamiento, se vea amenazado o sea relegado por intereses personales. En esta dinámica, debe precisarse el concepto de conflicto de intereses, que supone la confrontación entre un interés personal y un interés público. La debida atención de este tipo de conflictos exige marcos preventivos y de control a posteriori. En el primer estadio, se trata de eliminar toda posibilidad de que el conflicto llegue a producir una efectiva colisión de intereses en cabeza del funcionario, que le reste libertad u objetividad al momento de intervenir en un determinado asunto público. Por su parte, en el caso del control posterior, consiste en la determinación de un acto indebido de favorecimiento o al menos, el comportamiento orientado a obtener un beneficio personal o a favor de un tercero, y que puede llevar a imponer una sanción. Bajo ese prisma, a nivel preventivo, el señalamiento de un conflicto de intereses no tiene por lógica determinar la existencia de un acto concreto indebido de favorecimiento. Todo lo contrario, se pretende advertir la existencia de un riesgo que objetivamente permitiría surgir una colisión de intereses. De ahí que la infracción al mencionado deber de probidad no se encuentra inmune al marco de responsabilidad disciplinaria del agente público. El precepto 4 de la mencionada Ley No. 8422 establece: "Sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades civiles y penales que procedan, la infracción del deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada y previa defensa, constituirá justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad patronal." Tal efecto condicionado encuentra sentido, en el contexto que se analiza, para actos de abierta improvisación, mala administración de recursos o total evidencia de conflictos de intereses perfectamente desprendibles de una determinada situación, sin que hayan adoptado las acciones de separación voluntaria del funcionario. Desde luego que la aplicación e interpretación de esa norma ha de transitar por las sendas de la racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, parámetros que deben ser valorados en cada caso concreto. Para ello, el mandato 38 de la citada legislación (Ley No. 8422) establece causales de responsabilidad administrativa, que luego, encuentran sus correlativas sanciones posibles en la letra de la norma 39 ius ibíd., la que en ese tanto, sería aplicable ante las infracciones al deber de probidad en los términos ya desarrollados. La sinergia de estas disposiciones incorpora un sistema flexible que permite hacer surgir la responsabilidad de un funcionario ante la emisión de conductas transgresoras de las normas de la ética. Con todo, la aplicación correcta de este sistema, implica la necesaria instrucción de un procedimiento administrativo, como paso previo e infranqueable para aplicar una sanción por las lesiones a ese marco de obligaciones funcionariales, con respeto pleno e íntegro de las garantías de defensa y el debido proceso, lo que viene a ser fundamental para eludir actuaciones arbitrarias e ilegales.
VII.- Análisis de la prescripción en el caso concreto. Dicho esto, si bien el deber de probidad impone un marco de comportamiento acorde a los deberes funcionariales, así como a las reglas que modulan las conductas del agente público, esa regulación se orienta a prevenir, detectar y sancionar la corrupción en el ejercicio de la función pública, según se desprende del ordinal 1 de la citada Ley No. 8422, de manera que la comprensión del concepto de probidad, ha de realizarse precisamente en el contexto de esa finalidad legal, sea, cuando la falta del servidor suponga un aspecto vinculable (directamente) a la corrupción, el enriquecimiento ilegítimo y la inadecuada gestión de fondos públicos o la hacienda pública. De otro modo, si se entendiera infringido el deber de probidad por cualquier acción u omisión del agente público que suponga una desatención o incumplimiento a reglas deontológicas de comportamiento, que le son propias o inherentes a su ejercicio competencial, y en general a su investidura, en sentido amplio y extremo, sin realizar ese juicio de asociación a los fines de la citada ley, toda falta funcionarial cabría dentro del ámbito de lesión al deber de probidad. Lo anterior llevaría a imponer un régimen general de prescriptibilidad de las faltas de cinco años, en todos los casos, lo que, a juicio de esta Cámara Sentenciadora, no es la finalidad o ratio de la ley de referencia. Por ende, es necesario que en cada procedimiento de corte disciplinario, se analice el contenido de las conductas intimadas, de cara a establecer si el régimen jurídico que precisa el plazo para el ejercicio de la prescripción de la potestad correctiva interna, es el común de un mes que impone la doctrina del actual ordinal 414 del Código de Trabajo, anterior 603 de esa misma fuente, mismo plazo fijado por remisión del precepto 51 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, o si por el contrario, por estar frente a los supuestos que busca tutelar la Ley No. 8422, o bien la No. 8292, el citado plazo se ensancha por la aplicación de la regla prevista en el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. En ese contexto, los hechos que le fueron imputados a la accionante, como es el caso de haber permitido la adopción de conductas que generaron un reconocimiento indebido de pluses salariales a dos funcionarios del INDER por reasignación descendente. Si bien no se refieren a una disposición directa de Hacienda Pública, en definitiva componen conductas que llevaron a disponer de erogaciones de orden salarial, cubiertas con recursos públicos, las que, se aduce dentro del procedimiento ordinario de corte disciplinario, fueron ilegítimamente otorgados. A juicio de esta Cámara, el contenido sustancial de las conductas intimadas y objeto del procedimiento constituyen manifestaciones que se estiman antagónicas del régimen de control interno y del deber de probidad que se impone en el ejercicio de la función pública. Desde este plano, la accionante parece confundir la responsabilidad de quienes administran hacienda pública de manera directa, denominados superiores jerárquicos o titulares subordinados, con la responsabilidad que le resulta propia por su sola condición de servidora pública, y por tanto, sujeto a las regulaciones del deber de probidad. En ese sentido, el margen de temporalidad para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que aplica en este caso, es el que impone la Ley No. 8422 en su numeral 44, que remite a la norma quinquenal de prescripción que estatuye el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. Bajo esa perspectiva, en el caso de marras, se tiene que, si bien la confección de las respectivas acciones de personal que llevaron a la apertura de la causa disciplinaria datan del mes de abril del año 2010 y junio del 2011, lo cierto del caso es que tales hechos fueron objeto de una investigación preliminar, cuya pertinencia no se reprocha, fase previa dentro de la cual, el respectivo informe fue comunicado al Presidente Ejecutivo en fecha 16 de marzo del 2016. De conformidad con las reglas del cómputo del plazo prescriptivo a que refiere el ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428 en relación al numeral 44 de la Ley No. 8422, es a partir del momento en que el titular de la potestad disciplinaria se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de ejercerla, que se han de hacer correr el citado lapso. Así, en casos como el presente en el que la fase de investigación preliminar era necesaria para la definición de hechos relevantes y recolección de indicios de prueba, de suerte que permitan la emisión de un traslado de cargos debidamente sustentado, el punto de partida de la prescripción opera con la puesta en conocimiento del informe aludido. Del análisis de los autos se tiene que luego de esa remisión del informe preliminar en oficio URL-032-2016 del 15 de marzo del 2016 de la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, mediante el oficio PE-5050-2016 del 27 de abril del 2016, el jerarca administrativo designó el órgano director, instancia que en fecha 28 de junio del 2016 emite el respectivo traslado de cargos, mismo que fuese notificado en esa misma data. Por ende, desde la fecha en que el jerarca podía válidamente disponer las acciones disciplinarias hasta el momento en que se comunica a la actora la apertura de la causa interna, no había fenecido el plazo quinquenal que rige este tipo de conflictos. Por otro lado, se tiene que por acto de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 14 de octubre del 2016, el Órgano Director rinde informe de conclusiones No. 023-2016. Por oficio URL-143-2016 del 18 de octubre del 2016, ese informe es remitido a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, para su conocimiento. En acta No. 002-2017 de la sesión realizada el 15 de marzo del 2017 de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales del INDER, se emite la opinión de esa instancia en el sentido de separarse de la recomendación del órgano director, por cuanto no existe en el expediente ninguna prueba que indique que las funcionarias investigadas, dentro de ellas, la accionante, se acogieron al procedimiento establecido en los artículos 107 y siguientes de la LGAP en cuanto a alegar el deber de obediencia. Esta decisión fue puesta en conocimiento de la Presidencia Ejecutiva por oficio RL-032-2017 del 31 de marzo del 2017. En definitiva, mediante resolución No. 037-2017 de las 10 horas 37 minutos del 28 de abril del 2017, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER emitió acto final dentro del procedimiento administrativo No. URL-002-2015, acto puesto en conocimiento de la accionante en esa misma fecha. Tal y como lo postula el INDER, es claro que la prescripción para el dictado del acto final ha de ser computada desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad decisora se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de su ejercicio. Esto acontece en fecha 31 de marzo del 2017, cuando la Junta de Relaciones Laborales remite a la Presidencia Ejecutiva el expediente. Luego, el 28 de abril del 2017, se emite y comunica el acto final del procedimiento. Entre ambas fases no se observa la inercia que acusa la actora, en la medida en que, entre la remisión del expediente de parte de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales y la decisión final de la causa, no transcurrió siquiera el plazo de un mes. Por ende, no se ha producido el fenecimiento de ese ejercicio, lo que se supone el rechazo del cargo bajo examen.
VIII.- Sobre el contenido del deber de obediencia. Como parte de las relaciones internas que se producen en la prestación de las competencias públicas, la jerarquía supone el poder de un órgano para regir y verificar las conductas de otros órganos que son inferiores. Según lo establece el ordinal 101 de la LGAP, la relación de jerarquía administrativa supone que las competencias del superior abarcan la del inferior por razón de territorio o materia, y ostenten funciones de la misma naturaleza. El canon 102 ejusdem fija las potestades genéricas del superior jerárquico en el siguiente sentido:
"Artículo 102.- El superior jerárquico tendrá las siguientes potestades:
IX.- Análisis sobre las defensas relativas al deber de obediencia de la accionante. La defensa que se formula en esta causa, y sobre la cual alega la invalidez de la sanción impuesta, fue que, a ese momento, se limitó a acatar las órdenes emitidas por quien para esas fechas fungía como Presidente Ejecutivo. En orden a lo que se ha venido exponiendo, tal alegación exige el análisis de las circunstancias en que se emitió esa orden y la concurrencia o no del deber de obediencia frente a esa conducta. En la especie, a la fecha del dictado de las acciones de personal en el mes de abril del año 2010 y junio del 2011, la accionante ocupaba la Coordinación de Recursos Humanos del ente accionado. Según lo manifiesta el INDER y reitera el co-accionado Rodríguez Barquero, el Manual de Puestos de la Institución asigna a ese puesto los siguientes detalles: "Naturaleza del trabajo. Planeamiento, organización, coordinación, control y evaluación de labores técnicas, científicas y administrativas que se prestan en los servicios o procesos administrativos, financieros y técnicos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, así como la ejecución de las actividades correspondientes. Cargos que integran esta clase: Coordinador (a) de Recursos Humanos. (...) Actividades Generales del Coordinador de Recursos Humanos. Asesora a las jefaturas de la institución en materia de administración de personal. Consecuencias del error. Los errores cometidos pueden causar pérdidas, daños o atrasos de alta consideración, por lo que las actividades deben ser realizadas con sumo cuidado y precisión. Características personales del ocupante. Capacidad analítica, crítica y de síntesis." Atendiendo a estas particularidades, estima este Tribunal que la condición misma de Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos coloca a la accionante en el deber, o al menos, en la posibilidad de conocer el conjunto de antecedentes y regulaciones que son inherentes a los movimientos descendentes de personal. Esto hace suponer que frente a una decisión unilateral de la Presidencia Ejecutiva en el sentido de emitir las acciones de personal que reconocieran a los dos funcionarios a quienes se aplicó ese tipo de movimiento, era deber de esa Coordinación, advertir la necesaria existencia de los presupuestos técnicos y jurídicos debidos para ese reconocimiento, y de ser el caso, poner en conocimiento de esa jerarquía la necesidad de requerir los dictámenes internos que dieran soporte legítimo a esa decisión. Tal y como menciona el Manual de Puestos en el aparte arriba señalado, parte de las actividades generales de la accionante era la de asesorar a las jefaturas en materia de administración de personal. De ahí que se desprende de ese perfil un deber funcional que le imponía advertir a su jefatura que la conducta emitida no encontraba respaldo en el régimen aplicable a ese tipo de movimientos. La alegación de aplicación automática y sin reparo alguno de lo ordenado por la Presidencia Ejecutiva, por derivación del deber de obediencia, no supone la liberación de responsabilidad que se pretende, cuando la misma LGAP señala los supuestos en que la agente pública debía desobedecer, pero además cuando la misma normativa interna y el perfil de sus tareas, le imponían conocer de la necesidad de contar con análisis técnicos y/o jurídicos antecedentes que pusieran en evidencia la pertinencia, en los casos intimados, de las acciones ordenadas por su jefatura. En todo caso, aún de estimar que no se ha acreditado que se diera alguna de las condiciones que imponían el deber de desatender la orden, dado su conocimiento y responsabilidades en materia de Gestión Humana, era su deber advertir que en reasignaciones descendentes no era dable conceder el plus salarial asignado en aquellas acciones de personal, a partir de la carencia de los análisis técnicos que dieran respaldo a esas decisiones. Esto a fin de que el jerarca pudiera ponderar esas objeciones y si persistía en su conducta, permitir que la demandante liberara su responsabilidad frente a la ejecución de esas conductas. Sin embargo, no consta en autos que la actora haya realizado dichas advertencias u objeciones al Presidente Ejecutivo, y, por el contrario, sin reserva alguna, procedió a ejecutar las órdenes dictadas mediante la emisión de las respectivas acciones de personal, confiriendo, en definitiva, beneficios ilegítimos que comprometieron los fondos públicos asignados al presupuesto del INDER. Al no haber expresado esas disconformidades, pese a tener el deber de hacer, la accionante asume la responsabilidad por la indolencia en el cumplimiento de estos deberes legalmente asignados, y que son congruentes con sus funciones, por tanto, exigibles como derivación de su conocimiento y experiencia en el perfil de puesto que ocupaba.
X.- Así visto, la antijuridicidad material y formal se concreta en la previsión normativa que le fue intimada a la accionante, en concreto, numeral 38 inciso d) de la Ley No. 8422, y la vulneración del contenido del ordinal 13 inciso c) del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 del 16 de marzo de 2004. De igual manera, el componente subjetivo de la sanción aplicada se sustenta en el deber de haber requerido los insumos técnicos y legales que dieran respaldo a la orden dictada y que optó por ejecutar, dispensando del cumplimiento de requisitos mínimos. En ese sentido, de conformidad con las reglas de imputación de responsabilidad que establece el canon 213 de la LGAP, en virtud de la cual, a mayor jerarquía de funciones y mayor ámbito técnico de las mismas, mayor el deber de considerar el vicio potencial del acto dictado y las conductas adoptadas. Desde ese plano, la posición de coordinadora de Gestión Humana supone un grado de especialización técnica en función de la cual, no es de recibo el alegato de la demandante en cuanto a la dispensa de responsabilidad por la simple obediencia de órdenes dictadas por el entonces titular de la Presidencia Ejecutiva en cuanto a las acciones de personal que reconocían un derecho al pago de un sobresueldo por reasignación descendente, que no satisfacía las exigencias procedimentales ni sustantivas atinentes al caso. Se observa por ende una culpa grave en ese proceder que supone una responsabilidad por la emisión y permisibilidad de actos que crearon derechos de orden patrimonial de manera indebida, con el correspondiente perjuicio económico para el presupuesto del ente co-accionado, al comprometer fondos públicos sin la debida constatación de conformidad de los trámites que llevaron a la emisión de las citadas acciones de personal. No se observa por ende una excusa legal o una permisibilidad de desconocer las falencias que luego dieron base a la sanción impuesta. Se trata de un tema que era plenamente verificable a priori y que obligaba a adoptar acciones correctivas para reducir los riesgos de emisión de este tipo de conductas o, en todo caso, sentar las razones de disconformidad a modo de advertencia, para así, generar una liberación de responsabilidad. Al no hacerlo, se incurre en el presupuesto de hecho (antecedente condicionante) que fuese intimado a la accionante y que permite la aplicación de la consecuencia jurídica anticipada en el traslado de cargos. Tal valoración del comportamiento referible a la accionante fue debidamente expresada en el acto final (resolución No. 037-2017). En lo relevante, dentro de las razones dadas por la Presidencia Ejecutiva se expuso: "De acuerdo a lo descrito en el punto anterior queda en evidencia que el puesto de Coordinador de Recursos Humanos tiene a su cargo el control de las labores técnicas que se presentan en los diferentes procesos administrativos que competen a su cargo, dentro de sus actividades tiene la de asesorar a las jefaturas de la institución en la materia de su cargo, esto incluye el velar por la adecuada fiscalización de los procedimientos que deban de realizarse en el departamento no dejando pasar por alto la toma de decisiones sin tener una justificación (informe técnico) que antecede a la misma. (...) Debe quedar claro que ante lo explicado anteriormente no es justificación para el funcionario el alegar desconocimiento de los procedimientos internos del departamento y mucho menos el indicar que no es responsabilidad la revisión de las órdenes que se le giran; ya que, queda claro con lo analizado anteriormente que la persona que ocupe un puesto público debe de ser idóneo para desempeñar las funciones técnicas y profesionales que pongan en su conocimiento. (...)". Luego, al ponderar la indolencia de la accionante en el caso específico, señaló: "...En el caso de marras se logra evidenciar que existió una omisión del cuestionamiento del porque se giraba una orden sin un respectivo acto administrativo de respaldo; lo que, deja en evidencia que el actuar en ese momento de la Coordinación de Recursos Humanos fue contrario a las potestades adjudicadas por la Administración; ya que, se aprueba una acción de personal que no tiene justificación y estudio técnico debido; por lo que, no se sabe si fue la más correcta en su momento, contraviniendo con su actuar el manejo adecuado y eficiente de los recursos públicos y en general el patrimonio asignado para el desarrollo de sus funciones, violando el principio de eficiencia que busca resguardar la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. (...)". Y aún con mayor contundencia para sustentar la imputación realizada, más adelante en ese mismo acto se expresa: "...Debe quedar claro que lo reprochable en este caso hacia la conducta de la imputada es su falta al deber de cuidado a la hora de llevar a cabo sus funciones omitiendo realizar los informes técnicos y los procedimientos administrativos respectivos, y que si bien es cierto se encontraba cumpliendo una orden superior del jerarca institucional, la funcionaria como parte de su conocimiento técnico en la materia de administración de personal, debió de cuestionar la falta del informe técnico que respaldara dicha solicitud; lo cual, queda en evidencia en el presente procedimiento nunca se dio, siendo su grado de responsabilidad igual al del jerarca en aquel momento; ya que, además de no cuestionar firmó la acción de personal y participó en su momento en una reunión donde se pactó los acuerdos de la reasignación del Sr. Novo entre la administración (sic) y este sin un fundamento técnico debido. Por lo expuesto, en los puntos anteriores y los razonamientos emitidos considera este órgano decisor que el actuar de la Sra. Chaves Morales constituye culpa grave dentro de sus funciones asignadas en aquel momento; ya que, faltó al deber de probidad y violó los principios de eficiencia y eficacia del servicio público, al no fiscalizar los procedimientos de reasignación de puestos descendentes como debía en su momento, afectando el presupuesto público asignado para su cargo. Por lo que, existió responsabilidad por parte de la funcionaria a la hora de realizarse las reasignaciones de puesto descendente de los señores Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz, faltando esta a los artículos 3, 4 y 38 inciso d) de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública; por lo que, se le deberá imponer una sanción en apego a dichos ordinales. (...)". Dichas referencias ponen en evidencia las ponderaciones a partir de las cuales el ente accionado consideró que la conducta de la accionante lesionaba las normas de la Ley No. 8422, por la omisión de control respecto de los análisis técnicos debidos para el otorgamiento de las reasignaciones descendentes y el respectivo reconocimiento del sobresueldo otorgado a ambos funcionarios referidos, enfatizando en la ausencia de medidas de contingencia propias de su cargo, atinentes a procedimientos y trámites de administración de personal, lo que dice de la desatención a esos deberes y en consecuencia de la responsabilidad que le deriva de esas conductas. Como se observa, ese análisis engarza y armoniza con los razonamientos dados por este Tribunal en el presente fallo, tratamiento en el que, en consecuencia, no se observan las incorrecciones denunciadas.
XI.- Sobre la falta de motivación alegada. Por otro lado, se alega una indebida fundamentación del acto final del procedimiento. La motivación como elemento formal, supone la expresión de las cuestiones de hecho y de derecho que amparan y sustentan la decisión administrativa. Respecto de los aspectos fácticos supone no solamente la referencia de los hechos probados o no demostrados, sino además las pruebas o elementos de convicción en los que se ampara la deducción lógica de orden fáctico, pero además la explicación del proceso analítico que ha llevado a esas derivaciones o inferencias. En el campo del derecho, supone la mención y explicación fundamentada del análisis que permite (racionalmente) colegir las razones por las cuales el derecho utilizado es aplicable al caso concreto, de suerte que, ante determinado conjunto de circunstancias precedentes, ese tratamiento jurídico resulte pertinente y adecuado, dando respaldo a la decisión adoptada. La misma norma comentada indica que esa motivación puede ser DIRECTA, cuando el acto contenga en su propia literalidad, el detalle de ese marco de fundamento, o bien, INDIRECTA, cuando la conducta administrativa refiera como respaldo de su contenido, de manera explícita e inequívoca, a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado la adopción del acto, a reserva de que se acompañe copia de aquellos con la comunicación del acto. Los vicios o defectos respecto de este elemento pueden configurarse: por omisión (el acto carece por completo de la exposición de los fundamentos debidos), motivación indebida (entre otros, las referencias fácticas y jurídicas son inaplicables al caso analizado, se deja de lado la ponderación de aspectos relevantes del procedimiento), o bien, motivación insuficiente (los fundamentos expuestos en el acto no son suficientes para sostener lógica y racionalmente su contenido), lo que corresponde analizar en cada caso concreto. En sentido integral, la motivación permite la comprensión de las razones y proceso racional por el cual se tiene por acreditado el motivo del acto, pero, además, el análisis de legitimidad que, ante ese presupuesto, ha llevado a la decisión adoptada, a modo de contenido del acto, como mejor manera de satisfacer el interés público involucrado. Si el procedimiento tiene como objeto primordial la determinación de la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de base al motivo (art. 221, 217 LGAP), es claro que la motivación exige la exposición clara de los hallazgos relevantes, hechos determinantes, soporte probatorio y análisis de las probanzas, que han llevado a la conclusión o inferencia fáctica. De otro modo, se lesionaría el derecho de defensa material al administrado a quien, se impone un resultado negativo dentro de una causa, cuando no se ofrecen esas cuestiones, pues estaría imposibilitado de refutar los elementos que han llevado a la configuración del motivo del acto. Lo mismo acontece con las consideraciones jurídicas que llevan a adoptar la decisión final (contenido), ya que, la omisión de referencia al marco normativo que respalda la voluntad administrativa, impide la refutación o crítica del análisis realizado por la Administración a fin de ponderar la pertinencia de la norma aplicada al caso concreto, su correspondencia con el motivo y su proporción con el fin legalmente impuesto. Así, las condiciones que impone el canon 132.1 LGAP, en cuanto a que el contenido deberá ser lícito, posible, claro, preciso y abarcar todas las cuestiones de hecho y de derecho surgidas del motivo, incluso como deber oficioso, no podrían ser contrastadas en el caso de no exponer el acto las razones por las cuales asume determinada postura. Por ende, la motivación es el elemento que posibilita la comprensión sustantiva de la decisión y que pone en evidencia las bases objetivas sobre las cuales la Administración ha derivado los elementos materiales objetivos del acto. Su relevancia estriba además en que posibilita la defensa del administrado, pues solamente conociendo la sustancia de lo dispuesto, es que puede debatirse, salvo que el alegato en sí sea, únicamente, la desatención al deber motivacional. Pues bien, en el caso de marras, el acto no presenta las deficiencias de motivación que se alegan. Como se ha expuesto ut supra, en lo que ha sido motivo de objeción, las conductas impugnadas ofrecen con claridad el conjunto de circunstancias antecedentes sobre las cuales ha sustentado su decisión. El acto final señala las razones de hecho y de derecho sobre las cuales sustenta el contenido del acto. En el aparte de hechos probados, ese acto refiere a los elementos de convicción sobre los cuales desprendió cada aserto fáctico. Por su lado, en el análisis de fondo, realiza una valoración de las pruebas incorporadas al procedimiento, a la vez que explicita las razones por las cuales tuvo por acreditadas las conductas intimadas, las consideraciones por las cuales concluyó que se trataba de una falta al régimen de probidad, con detalle de las obligaciones propias del cargo que ocupaba la actora al momento de los hechos, así como el juicio valorativo que le llevó a establecer la sanción en definitiva aplicada. En ese particular, en el numeral "V.V. Sobre la sanción a imponer", señaló: "Analizando el grado de culpabilidad de la funcionaria en su omisión de actuación, considera este órgano que es relevante; ya que, existió un daño grave y pernicioso al presupuesto de la institución otorgando beneficios a funcionarios que no se les llevó el debido proceso para determinar si cumplían o no para la reasignación de puestos descendentes; por tal motivo, en aras de no dejar pasar por alto dicha acción; pero a la vez para invitar a la funcionaria a meditar sobre su actuar negligente en las funciones que desempeñaba, este órgano decisor impone la sanción de SUSPENSIÓN DE UN MES SIN GOCE DE SALARIO. Dicho quantum se considera adecuado, estimando la gravedad de los hechos, que la funcionaria tiene una larga trayectoria en la Institución y, considerando que el fin del procedimiento disciplinario es correctivo (...)". De esa manera, la resolución final atacada, plasma de manera debida el conjunto de precedentes del caso, enlista los hechos que fueron tenidos por acreditados con detalle de los elementos de convicción sobre los que fueron deducidos. Tal desarrollo posibilita la comprensión de las razones que amparan el motivo del acto. Luego, abordó los diversos alegatos presentados por las partes involucradas y abunda sobre las razones de derecho por las cuales, frente a los hechos determinados, obtuvo las valoraciones y consecuencias jurídicas en definitiva adoptadas. En rigor, esa exposición muestra congruencia lógica entre los hechos y el derecho aplicado, como soporte de la decisión final, lo que permite la comprensión (lógica) de las razones base de la voluntad administrativa. Cabe destacar que en orden a lo preceptuado por el ordinal 136 inciso c) de la LGAP, esa motivación permite sustentar la decisión frente al informe de recomendación vertido por el órgano instructor y frente a las consideraciones realizadas por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, ambos criterios de naturaleza no vinculante al tenor del precepto 303 de la citada LGAP, pero que, en definitiva, imponían el deber de motivación debida, como en este caso fue concretado. Ciertamente, es comprensible que la petente disienta de esas consideraciones y desarrollo, pero ello no implica que se concrete el defecto que apunta. Desde ese plano, el alegato bajo examen debe ser rechazado.
XII.- De la sanción impuesta. Por otra parte, se reprocha que la sanción aplicada es desproporcionada dado que, el Código de Trabajo, en el artículo 68 inciso e), dispone una sanción máxima de 8 días. Sobre ese particular, debe indicarse que las relaciones que se producen entre la accionante y el INDER son propias de un vínculo propio un régimen de sujeción especial de derecho público, que se regula por sus propias fuentes y solo de manera complementaria, se nutre de las regulaciones del Código de Trabajo. El mismo ordinal 191 de la Carta Magna establece que las relaciones de empleo público estarán regidas por un estatuto propio, sea, por normas especiales de derecho público que plasman y regulan el contenido de ese tipo de relaciones, a nivel de mecanismo de selección, remuneración, derechos y obligaciones de las partes, régimen disciplinario, entre otros aspectos. Esta regulación especial se reconoce además en la doctrina del canon 112 inciso primero de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, norma que desde 1978 señala que las relaciones de servicio aludidas se regularán por el Derecho Administrativo. Cabe destacar que el mismo Código de Trabajo, en su versión previa a la emisión de la Ley No. 9343, en su ordinal 585, refería a disposiciones especiales para los servidores del Estado y sus instituciones, poniendo en evidencia la especificidad de ese régimen de empleo o de servicio. En su versión actual y vigente, el Código de Trabajo reconoce dicho régimen a partir del canon 682 y siguientes, señalando aquel precepto, en su párrafo segundo: "Los servidores de naturaleza pública se rigen por las normas estatutarias correspondientes, leyes especiales y normas reglamentarias aplicables y por este Código, en todo lo no contemplado en esas otras disposiciones. (...)". Así, se trata de relaciones propias que se rigen por normas y principios concretos del Derecho Administrativo, que en orden a lo fijado en los artículos 7 y 9 de la LGAP, es autónomo y auto-integrativo, lo que hace concluir sobre la aplicación solamente complementaria (y no primaria) de las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo. Como parte de esa especialidad y autonomía regulatoria, como se ha expuesto, la Ley No. 8422 fija un marco legal que regula lo relativo al deber de probidad, que plasma los principios que han de regir la función pública para la tutela de los objetivos y fines de esa legislación, a la vez que plasma supuestos de infracción y sanciones disciplinarias que son aplicables en caso de quebranto de los deberes que dicha fuente impone. Como se ha señalado, esa norma se complementa e integra con la Ley No. 7428, por la misma remisión que de manera expresa realiza aquella primera. Por ende, ni las reglas de prescripción, como tampoco las pautas de sanciones disciplinarias a aplicar en este tipo de relaciones son las tratadas por la normativa laboral, en la medida en que la citada legislación contiene regulaciones propias que, por criterio de especialidad, ostentan mayor nivel de potencia y resistencia que ese marco legal laboral. De ahí que la fuente a utilizar, como primera referencia para resolver el conflicto suscitado entre las partes, es precisamente el conjunto de normas que componen el régimen de fiscalización superior de la Hacienda Pública. Así las cosas, se reitera, desde el mismo traslado de cargos se señaló que parte del régimen jurídico aplicable era precisamente el numeral 38 de la Ley No. 8422. En ese orden, las sanciones aplicadas encuentran previsión legal en el canon 39 ejusdem, siendo que como fue expuesto arriba, el acto final motiva las razones por las cuales se estimó adecuada la suspensión por el plazo de un mes, atendiendo a las particularidades del caso bajo examen. Por otro lado, siendo la responsabilidad endilgada por infracciones al deber de probidad, el análisis de validez o no de esas acciones de personal números 792-2010 del 25 de febrero del 2010 y 3841-2011 otorgadas a favor de Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz, respectivamente, no se constituye en una cuestión prejudicial a la cual se supedita la posibilidad de instruir el correspondiente procedimiento disciplinario. Si bien el informe de la investigación preliminar sugiere valorar la posibilidad de instruir procedimientos para suprimir los efectos de esas acciones de personal que conceden el sobresueldo por reasignación descendente, ello no es óbice para el análisis de las indolencias intimadas a la demandante. Se trata de acciones que, en orden a dar una solución integral a las deficiencias procedimentales detectadas en torno al trámite de sobresueldos en reasignaciones descendentes, debe ponderar el INDER, pero que en modo alguno limitan o condicionan la validez de las acciones disciplinarias adoptadas en contra de la aquí actora. Sobre esta independencia de objeto entre ambos procedimientos se ha pronunciado ya la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en ejercicio de las competencias del Tribunal de Casación (conforme al transitorio I en relación al artículo 136 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, Ley No. 8508), entre otras, en las resoluciones números 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017 y 000003-F-TC-2018. Ergo, no se observa la falencia sobre la cual la accionante sustenta sus reproches."
Document not found. Documento no encontrado.