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Res. 01050-2002 Sala Tercera de la Corte · Sala Tercera de la Corte · 25/10/2002
OutcomeResultado
The Third Chamber confirmed the acquittal of the journalists and dismissed the plaintiff's cassation appeal, considering that the report on the use of a state vehicle was a matter of public interest protected by freedom of information and press, with no abuse of rights.La Sala Tercera confirmó la sentencia absolutoria de los comunicadores y rechazó el recurso de casación del querellante, al considerar que el reportaje sobre el uso de un vehículo estatal constituía un asunto de interés público amparado por las libertades de información y prensa, sin que mediara abuso del derecho.
SummaryResumen
The Third Chamber of the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal and upheld the acquittal of the journalists. The court held that when reporting on the conduct of public officials in matters of public interest, freedom of information and the press prevail over the right to honor, unless there is an abusive exercise of those freedoms. In this case, the Noti-Catorce report about a MOPT vehicle parked next to a bar during working hours was truthful and clearly in the public interest, so there was no crime against honor or civil liability. The court confirmed the order for the plaintiff to pay costs. The judgment includes an extensive constitutional and international analysis of the prevalence of press freedom in citizen oversight of public administration.La Sala Tercera rechazó el recurso de casación y confirmó la absolución de los comunicadores. El tribunal sostuvo que, cuando se informa sobre actuaciones de funcionarios públicos en asuntos de interés público, las libertades de información y de prensa desplazan el derecho al honor, salvo que se demuestre un ejercicio abusivo de dichas libertades. En este caso, el reportaje de Noti-Catorce sobre un vehículo del MOPT estacionado junto a un bar en horario laboral era veraz y de claro interés público, por lo que no había delito contra el honor ni responsabilidad civil. La condena en costas al querellante fue confirmada. La sentencia realiza un extenso análisis constitucional e internacional sobre la prevalencia de la libertad de prensa en la fiscalización ciudadana de la función pública.
Key excerptExtracto clave
when dealing with matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and press that protect communicators are so important—as one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State—that when confronted with the right to honor that those performing a public function also hold as individuals, the latter may yield to the former, but only regarding the public facet of their conduct. According to this approach, only when the communicator abuses their right when reporting will it be possible to place the official's right to honor above the freedoms of information and press that protect the communicator, as well as the right to be informed that every person has. In summary, both the Constitution and the applicable international human rights provisions in Costa Rica provide a legal basis to affirm that public officials (but not private citizens, except when performing a public function) are subject to public scrutiny of their actions in the performance of their duties, and therefore the freedom to disseminate information about their acts relating to matters of public interest overrides their right to honor, so no communicator can be held criminally liable for such information, unless they have acted abusively.tratándose de asuntos de interés público, las libertades de información y de prensa que amparan a los comunicadores es tan importante, por constituir uno de los medios de control de la gestión pública en un Estado democrático, que si se le enfrenta con el derecho al honor que como personas también ostentan quienes cumplen una función pública, este último puede ceder ante las primeras, sólo en lo que atañe a la faceta pública de su conducta. De conformidad con ese planteamiento, únicamente cuando se incurra en abuso por parte del comunicador a la hora de informar, será posible anteponer el derecho al honor del funcionario frente a las libertades de información y prensa que amparan al comunicador, así como al derecho de ser informado que le asiste a toda persona. En síntesis, tanto en la Constitución Política como en las disposiciones internacionales de Derechos Humanos aplicables en Costa Rica hay normativa que permite afirmar que los funcionarios públicos (no así los particulares, salvo en los supuestos en que cumplen una función pública) están sometidos al examen público de sus actuaciones en el ejercicio del cargo, por lo que la libertad de difundir informaciones sobre sus actos en relación con asuntos de interés público desplaza su derecho al honor, de modo que ningún comunicador puede ser penalmente responsable por ese tipo de informaciones, salvo que hubiese actuado de manera abusiva.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"ese conflicto entre derechos fundamentales sólo puede resolverse a favor del derecho al honor cuando se constata un ejercicio abusivo de las libertades de información y de prensa."
"this conflict between fundamental rights can only be resolved in favor of the right to honor when an abusive exercise of the freedoms of information and press is proven."
Considerando III
"ese conflicto entre derechos fundamentales sólo puede resolverse a favor del derecho al honor cuando se constata un ejercicio abusivo de las libertades de información y de prensa."
Considerando III
"si no se incurre en abuso alguno, sino que se ejercen legítimamente las libertades de información y de prensa, entonces no hay posibilidad alguna de sancionar penalmente al comunicador, pues no habría cometido ningún delito contra el honor."
"if there is no abuse, but the freedoms of information and press are legitimately exercised, there is no possibility of criminally sanctioning the communicator, as they would not have committed any crime against honor."
Considerando III
"si no se incurre en abuso alguno, sino que se ejercen legítimamente las libertades de información y de prensa, entonces no hay posibilidad alguna de sancionar penalmente al comunicador, pues no habría cometido ningún delito contra el honor."
Considerando III
"tratándose de asuntos de interés público, las libertades de información y de prensa que amparan a los comunicadores es tan importante, por constituir uno de los medios de control de la gestión pública en un Estado democrático, que si se le enfrenta con el derecho al honor que como personas también ostentan quienes cumplen una función pública, este último puede ceder ante las primeras, sólo en lo que atañe a la faceta pública de su conducta."
"when dealing with matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and press that protect communicators are so important—as one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State—that when confronted with the right to honor that those performing a public function also hold as individuals, the latter may yield to the former, but only regarding the public facet of their conduct."
Considerando IV
"tratándose de asuntos de interés público, las libertades de información y de prensa que amparan a los comunicadores es tan importante, por constituir uno de los medios de control de la gestión pública en un Estado democrático, que si se le enfrenta con el derecho al honor que como personas también ostentan quienes cumplen una función pública, este último puede ceder ante las primeras, sólo en lo que atañe a la faceta pública de su conducta."
Considerando IV
Full documentDocumento completo
"I. Attorney Juan Luis Vargas Alfaro, special judicial representative of the complainant and civil plaintiff, José Francisco Vargas Núñez, files an appeal in cassation against judgment No. 174-2001, issued by the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Ciudad Quesada seat, at 5:00 p.m. on October 11, 2001. By means of said ruling, visible at folio 284, Sonia Jiménez González, Karla María Herrera Masís, Virginia Patricia Luna Salas (also known as Vicky), Juan Vicente Muñoz Ramírez, Jorge Gutiérrez Espeleta, and Jorge Eduardo Rojas Bolaños were acquitted of all liability and penalty for the offenses of slander (calumnias), defamation (difamación), and publication of offenses (publicación de ofensas) attributed to them to the detriment of José Francisco Vargas Núñez. Likewise, the civil action for damages brought against the defendants, as well as against the Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), Noticias del Norte Noti-Catorce, S.A., and T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A., was dismissed. It was also ordered that the complainant pay the personal and procedural costs incurred by the defendants Muñoz Ramírez, Gutiérrez Espeleta, Rojas Bolaños, as well as the civil defendants Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. and T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.
As a first substantive ground, Attorney Vargas Alfaro alleges the violation, by improper application, of Articles 11, 28, 29, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as numerals 1, 25, 30, 31, 145, 146, and 147 of the Penal Code and 7 of the Press Law (Ley de Imprenta). Likewise, he contends that Article 17, subsection d) of the Radio and Television Law, as well as numerals 18, 22, 45, 71, 73, 74, 76, 152, and 155 of the Penal Code, were not applied. After summarizing the facts that the lower court deemed proven, as well as the reasoning set forth by the adjudicating body to credit said factual framework and that referring to the legal consequences thereof, the appellant proceeds to present the arguments supporting his disagreement. First, he argues that the Press Law was erroneously applied in this case, despite the fact that a television medium is involved, which is not covered by that legal text.
Then, he states that the complained-of facts indeed occurred and constitute the offenses of insults (injurias), defamation, and publication of offenses. He contends that the information broadcast by Noti-Catorce on November 1 and 3, as well as December 2, all in 1999, is harmful to his client's honor. He considers that the exercise of journalism does not exempt reporters or the media from the duty to answer for the damages they cause in the course of their activity. He affirms that the directors of the television channel hold a guarantor position regarding the truthfulness of the information transmitted through that medium. The claim is unfounded. Before setting forth the reasons why this Chamber considers that the defects pointed out by Attorney Vargas Alfaro are not present, it is pertinent to recall—in summary form—the facts that the lower court deemed proven. Starting at folio 341, it can be seen that, for the trial court, the following was proven:
III.In accordance with the list of facts that the adjudicating body deemed proven (summarized in the preceding Recital (Considerando)), this Chamber considers that the lower court is correct in determining that in this case no offense whatsoever has been committed to the detriment of the complainant José Francisco Vargas Núñez, and therefore the acquittal issued is in accordance with the Law. The conflict between the right to honor and the freedoms of information and press is one of the most difficult to resolve, since we are dealing with fundamental rights of the person and this requires a very clear definition of when one of them takes precedence over the others. The problem is not resolved considering only what is provided in the Penal Code, but must start directly from the Constitution and international human rights regulations in order to understand the scope of punitive legislation. In that regard, the first thing that must be said is that honor is included as one of the moral interests referred to in constitutional Article 41 and is expressly provided for in Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which establishes that every person has the right to have their honor respected.
Thus, it is evident that we are dealing with an essential legal interest of the human condition, and therefore—based on the foregoing—its protection through Criminal Law is in accordance with the legal system. What happens is that the freedoms of information and the press are equally fundamental for human beings, the latter being a derivation of the former. Both freedoms are recognized in the Constitution, specifically in Article 29, which recognizes the possibility of every person to communicate their thoughts by word or in writing, and even to make them public. Furthermore, they are also included in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As is obvious, we are in the presence of legal interests deserving of equal protection by the legal system.
By virtue of what has just been indicated, the problem to be addressed in this case is when the right to honor prevails over the indicated freedoms. In accordance with constitutional and international humanitarian provisions, that conflict between fundamental rights can only be resolved in favor of the right to honor when an abusive exercise of the freedoms of information and the press is verified. The foregoing is due to the fact that the Costa Rican legal system contemplates as a general rule (enshrined in Article 22 of the Civil Code) not protecting the abuse of right or its antisocial use. This is precisely because if a right is abused, it implies that the scope of protection it contemplates has been exceeded or overstepped, such that said excess is not covered by it and lacks protection. Thus, if no abuse is incurred, but rather the freedoms of information and the press are legitimately exercised, then there is absolutely no possibility of criminally punishing the communicator, since they would not have committed any offense against honor. This is what explains the reason for the acquittal issued in this case.
IV.The events of interest here—namely, the video recording of the complainant's vehicle, as well as the information broadcast by Noti-Catorce and the response given by Vargas Núñez to said news program's reports—occurred between October and December 1999. At that time, the Political Constitution provided in its Article 11 the following: "Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and cannot arrogate to themselves powers that the law does not grant them. They must swear an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public." (It should be noted that after the constitutional reform effected through Law No. 8003 of June 8, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of June 30, 2000, said article of the Constitution was amended and a provision was added to the effect that public officials must fulfill the duties that the law imposes upon them; furthermore, the principle of accountability was formally established, aspects that this Chamber considers—as will be seen throughout this Recital—could be extracted from the previous wording combined with provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, although certainly the reform makes it easier to appreciate the constitutional rank of said principle).
As can be observed, the Fundamental Law (as it is applicable to the specific case) clearly establishes that public servants are subject to the legal system; that is what derives from their being classified as mere "depositaries of authority"; in other words, they are not above the Law. In that context, it follows from the constitutional provision under discussion (a precept that is revitalized with the aforementioned reform of the year 2000) that public officials are bound by permissive, ordering, and prohibitive norms, adding in addition that they can only do that which the law expressly authorizes them to do. Thus, in Costa Rica, every public official (whether popularly elected, appointed by another or by a collegiate body, or having obtained the position through competitive examination; whether a permanent appointee, substitute, or interim; whether appointed indefinitely or for a fixed term; whether holding a position of trust or enjoying employment stability; whether a career official or not; etc.) is exposed, from the moment they assume office, to the oversight of their actions in the performance of their duties.
This is due to the fact that everything that person does in connection with the public position they hold is of interest to the general population of the Republic, since the objective is to ensure that they act, as a servant, in strict accordance with the legal system. This constant supervision of their actions is one of the consequences of being a public servant, so that whoever assumes a position of this nature implicitly accepts that their conduct be publicly examined. By virtue of their investiture, the official is subject to the principle of legality, according to which they are only authorized to do that which the law—in a broad sense and in accordance with the normative hierarchy—expressly permits, and everything else is prohibited. Thus, holding a public function entails for the person a subjection to controls, which have been conceived to verify that the exercise of the powers derived from the position is correct, as well as to prevent the breach of the duties inherent to the office.
Now, among these controls are included not only the institutionalized ones (such as those proper to the Public Administration, as well as the judicial ones), but in a democratic State—the Constitution defines Costa Rica as such in its Article 1—it is also necessary to consider the role of communicators. If every human being has the right to be informed, if there is also freedom to communicate thoughts and opinions, including publishing them, and if it is considered that communicators have as a profession to gather data, analyze them, and based on them inform others about topics that interest them, then it is evident that the practice of journalism is a perfect manifestation of the freedoms of information and the press. In that context, it is irrefutable that the mass media, journalists, and other communicators have the right to inform—making the data they handle public—the inhabitants. That is the premise that must prevail in a democratic society.
The foregoing requires certain clarifications when dealing with a matter of public interest related to the conduct of a state servant. The first is that a matter of public interest is anything that can reasonably be presumed to coincidentally attract the individual interest of the governed (administrados) (Article 113, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration); note that by speaking of the "governed," it becomes evident that it concerns topics related to the governance of the State (in a broad sense, that is, the Government of the Republic—described in constitutional Article 9—and the other public entities) and the management of its resources, aspects that it can be validly presumed are of interest to the general population of a country, since they are the ones who contribute to defraying the State's expenses. The second is that it is normal, when dealing with matters of public interest, for a state official to be involved, although it is also possible (an aspect that will be addressed at the end of this Recital) that there are subjects not vested as public servants who carry out a task that is indeed public in nature, and therefore they would also be subject to scrutiny of their actions in the exercise of that public function.
Thus, when dealing with matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and the press that protect communicators are so important—for constituting one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State—that if confronted with the right to honor that those who perform a public function also hold as persons, the latter can yield to the former, only in what pertains to the public facet of their conduct. In accordance with that proposition, only when the communicator abuses their position when informing will it be possible to place the official's right to honor above the freedoms of information and the press that protect the communicator, as well as above the right to be informed that assists every person. There is a large number of norms that support this position. For example, note that constitutional Article 26 guarantees the country's inhabitants the right to assemble peacefully and without arms to examine the public conduct of officials.
This is important, as it is evident that the constitutional framers were aware that there are public and private aspects to the behavior of State servants, with only the former being susceptible to open examination and discussion by society. Those public acts of the officials are precisely those that have been established here as related to the performance of their duties; the private ones—and therefore not susceptible to public debate—are those proper to personal and family intimacy not connected to the exercise of the function. If aspects of the public conduct of state servants can be publicly debated at a meeting, then it is undeniable that it must be possible to report on their acts so that they can be examined by the inhabitants of the national territory. Furthermore, it must be remembered that pursuant to constitutional Article 28, no one can even be disturbed for the expression of their opinions, nor for acts that do not violate the law.
As a corollary to the foregoing, it must be observed that Article 29 of the Constitution expressly provides for the possibility of every person communicating (directing to another) their thoughts, by word or in writing, and even publishing them (making them publicly known) without prior censorship, and that they will only be liable if they abuse these rights. In that context, it turns out that the exercise of the activity of communicators, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the right to be informed that assists every person, allows for freely reporting on aspects related to the exercise of a public function, as this is a matter of evident public interest. Only when the freedoms of information and the press are abused (as could be the case if false data are knowingly disseminated, if one does not attempt to obtain the official's version in order to offer balanced information, if the servant is denied their rights of rectification and/or reply, if strictly private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position held by the person are involved, if it is presented as certain before the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial sentence to that effect, if the sole intention is to offend someone—an aspect that must be examined on a case-by-case basis and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which information is disseminated, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news is presented or the commentary surrounding it, or similar situations) can the communicator be held liable, since the abuse of a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding its scope of protection.
That abuse is not protected by the legal system (constitutional Article 29 related to Article 22 of the Civil Code), and therefore any communicator who engages in abusive conduct must answer for their actions (which could even eventually entail the liability of the medium that disseminated the information). Now, the aforementioned constitutional norms are complemented by provisions of International Humanitarian Law. For example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that every person can disseminate information, while at the same time guaranteeing the right of every individual to be informed. Note that this international instrument only protects human beings from arbitrary interference in their private life (Article 12); meaning that what could be understood as public life (that related to the performance of a public office) is susceptible to examination by the general public and therefore free information can be given regarding it.
For its part, the American Convention on Human Rights is broader in its regulation of these issues. Thus, Article 13 guarantees the right to receive and disseminate information, with the communicator being liable only after the information is disseminated and for the situations established by law. In turn, Article 11 provides that every person has the right to have their honor and dignity respected, adding later that no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in the sphere of their private life. It is clear that the coexistence of these two provisions in the same normative text reveals that they are complementary. In that sense, the freedoms of information and the press related to matters of public interest would displace the protection of honor and dignity insofar as it relates to public officials; note right away that this rule would not apply to persons who do not hold such status.
This is because in these scenarios (when dealing with a case of public relevance related to state servants), the issue is not the intimacy of a person, but rather the manner in which they perform in the exercise of a public office, an aspect that—in light of the conflict of the legal interests in question, namely the right to honor and the freedoms of information and the press—is the most important from the standpoint of the national community. If what was disseminated is correct and indeed corresponds to a matter of public interest, then there is absolutely no possibility for the official to claim that their honor has been harmed (in any case, if the news deals with some inappropriate act, it would be the servant themselves who harmed their own honor and not the communicator, so the latter could not be held liable for the former's responsibility). Of course, if the information is false or is not related to a matter of public interest, then it could eventually be one of the scenarios of abusive conduct mentioned above (which could even constitute offenses) that do entail a declaration of liability for the communicator.
In that context, the two international provisions under discussion (Articles 11 and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights), viewed together, reveal that in matters of public interest relating to the way servants perform their duties, the right to honor yields to the freedoms of information and the press, as well as to the right to be informed. To understand that it does not displace them would be akin to creating a very broad sphere of topics in which the referenced freedoms could not be exercised, which would be an attack against the democratic regime contemplated in the Costa Rican Constitution. In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also address the problem that concerns us. The first of these establishes that no one may be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their private life, nor to unlawful attacks on their honor or reputation.
This wording is important to highlight because—examined a contrario sensu—it shows that honor can be legally affected, which reinforces the thesis that there are cases (such as those of interest here) in which despite an impact on said legal interest, no one can be held liable for it. This Chamber considers that the foregoing occurs precisely in cases where information is published about matters of public interest related to questionable conduct by public officials (or even by persons performing a public function), scenarios in which the honor of the persons involved is evidently affected (as a consequence and not as an intention). In those scenarios, where the disseminated information will inevitably affect some public servant, and where furthermore a sole intent to offend should not be present, the freedoms of information and the press must prevail over the right to honor, since the communicator acts in compliance with their right to inform and does not become liable for the resulting impact on the honor of the officials (which in any case, as already stated, would have its cause in their own acts and not in what is published) related to the news.
Of course—it is worth reiterating—that if the information is not of public interest, is intended solely to offend someone, or what is reported is false, then the communicator (and eventually the medium) does become liable for the abuse committed. In summary, both in the Political Constitution and in the international Human Rights provisions applicable in Costa Rica, there are norms that allow for the assertion that public officials (but not private individuals, except in cases where they perform a public function) are subject to public scrutiny of their actions in the exercise of their office, and therefore the freedom to disseminate information about their acts in relation to matters of public interest displaces their right to honor, so that no communicator can be criminally liable for that type of information, unless they acted in an abusive manner. This is because, in accordance with what is established in Article 25 of the Penal Code, a person who legitimately exercises a right does not commit an offense.
To what has already been set forth, it must be added that there are also legal provisions that reinforce the criterion upheld here. Of special importance is what is established in Articles 113 and 114 of the General Law of Public Administration. The first of them provides: "1. The public servant must perform their duties in such a way that they primarily satisfy the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the governed. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may conflict. 3. In assessing the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, to which mere convenience can never be placed above." For its part, the second of the mentioned numerals stipulates: "1. The public servant shall be a servant of the governed, in general, and in particular of each individual or governed person who interacts with them by virtue of the function they perform; each governed person must be considered in the individual case as a representative of the community upon which the official depends and for whose interests they must ensure. 2.
Without prejudice to what other laws establish for the servant, any act, fact, or omission that, through their fault or negligence, causes unjustified or arbitrary hindrances or obstacles to the governed shall be considered, especially, irregular performance of their function." As can be seen, the legislator grants great importance to the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of administrative activity, so much so that it formulates the principle of objectivity of public service as acting for the sake of satisfying said interest.
Furthermore, the duty of public servants to render accounts is evident; they must consider themselves—in each specific case—servants of the person with whom they interact by virtue of the position they hold (it should be noted that these provisions have existed since 1978, so that if they were linked to the prior wording of Article 11 of the Constitution, the enshrinement in the Costa Rican legal system of the principle of accountability was evident, even before the constitutional reform of the year 2000 alluded to previously). This further highlights the public nature of officials' actions concerning the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the position they occupy.
In this context, it is unthinkable—unless one disregards the democratic principle established in the Political Constitution—to criminally sanction a person who acts in accordance with their right to disseminate information related to the actions of state officials in matters of public interest, unless they have incurred some abuse (such as those set forth above) when making the information public.
It is appropriate to mention that the thesis set forth throughout these lines is complemented by the provisions of the second part of Article 389 of the Penal Code. In that legal text, despite referring to a contravention, it is observed that the legislator provided not to sanction reasoned criticism (insults are another matter) of persons and institutions when it concerns matters of public interest, as this Chamber has set forth in this judgment. The foregoing reinforces the point that the legitimate exercise (that is, without incurring abuses) of the freedoms of information and the press in these cases does not permit the punishment of the person who expresses themselves. Finally, it is important to reiterate that although the problem of the clash of rights has been referred to here in the case of public servants in the exercise of their duties, it is also possible—depending on the significance of each specific case—that the freedoms of information and the press justify public discussion (and therefore the dissemination of information on the subject) of actions by persons who are not vested as state officials but who perform a function that is indeed public, as could be the case of concessionaires of public services or works and notaries, only, that is, in what pertains to the public facet of their behavior and without the communicators incurring abuses.
V.
In the present case, the Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela determined that the proven facts do not generate any criminal liability for the defendants. From folio 367 onward, the reasons why the judging body reached that conclusion are set forth. It is evident that the public interest involved in the use of state vehicles was considered. It is precisely for this reason that the journalistic investigation was conducted, to determine whether the complaint by neighbors of Cedral stating that a vehicle from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport had been seen days earlier parked next to a bar, which they deem as improper use of the motor vehicle, had any basis. Due to this unease, on October 7, 1999, a cameraman from Noti-Catorce was sent to confirm—by video recording—whether the vehicle was indeed at that location. This turned out to be true, and for that reason, explanations were sought from the Regional Chief of the aforementioned ministerial portfolio, who was the one who revealed the name of the servant using said vehicle.
Based on these elements, the court of instance—with good judgment—discarded any purely offensive intent on the part of the defendants. Rather, what the lower court did was highlight the rectitude in the actions of the latter, who at all times adhered to their right to disseminate information pertaining to matters of public interest. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, his name came to light, and it is understandable that he did not like being questioned. But he was a public official at the time of the events, so he was subject to the duty to render accounts for his actions. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 221 through 243 of the Traffic Law, there are certain restrictions on the use of state vehicles (which vary depending on whether they are motor vehicles for administrative use, discretionary use, or use by police forces), among which is included (Article 234, subsection a) of the last cited normative text) using vehicles for administrative use in activities other than the normal ones of the institution.
Therefore, observing one of these motor vehicles next to a bar during working hours is something that reasonably generates concerns and warrants the development of an investigation. Moreover, the intervention of the press in these cases is completely legitimate in a democratic State, since the aim is to verify that public resources are used appropriately by the servants, so it is indeed a matter of public interest, given that the issue at hand concerns the community.
It should be added that at no time did the communicators attribute to Vargas Núñez the commission of a fault, much less a crime, but simply asked for explanations as to why the aforementioned motor vehicle was at that site at the time it was filmed. This last point reveals that this is nothing more than the exercise of the right to inform the community about a matter of public interest. The aim was never to injure the plaintiff's honor; he was only asked to render accounts, without any abuse whatsoever on the part of the representatives of Noti-Catorce. In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber indeed does not perceive that the defendants have committed any crime for which they must answer, and in that sense, the decision of the Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela is in accordance with the Law. It must be added that although the judgment cites the Press Law and not the Radio and Television Law, the point is irrelevant, since in any case we are in the presence of a ground for justification (the legitimate exercise of a right, regulated in Article 25 of the Penal Code) which, in any scenario, would exonerate the accused from criminal liability.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the existence of the journalistic information is deemed accredited, but—for the reasons already mentioned, that is, due to the concurrence of a ground for justification—it does not constitute any crime.
It is also necessary to highlight that certainly the exercise of journalism is not per se a permit to affect the honor of persons, but it must also be recognized that in any case communicators are liable only when they abuse their profession (Article 29 of the Constitution), and moreover, said legal interest is not affected when it concerns truthful information (such as the fact that the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was parked next to a bar during working hours, which warranted the investigation) related to matters of public interest in which State servants are involved.
Finally, it must be said that in this case, the truthfulness of the information disseminated by Noti-Catorce has been verified by the sentencing body, so there is no reason whatsoever to think that the servants of the television medium (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) or of the company owning that enterprise, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), did not verify that what was broadcast by the newscast was true, and therefore the claim regarding this point becomes unfounded. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber considers that in the present case, no breach of substantive law has occurred, since the conduct of the defendants finds support in the ground for justification provided for in Article 25 of the Penal Code, based on which this ground of the appeal is declared without merit."
IV.The events of interest here – namely, the video recording of the plaintiff's vehicle, as well as the information disclosed by Noti-Catorce and the response given by Vargas Núñez to said newscast's reports – occurred between October and December 1999. At that time, the Political Constitution provided in its Article 11 as follows: "*Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and may not arrogate powers the law does not grant them. They must swear an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public.*" (It should be noted that following the constitutional reform carried out by Law No. 8003 of June 8, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of June 30, 2000, said article of the Constitution was amended and a provision was added to the effect that public officials must fulfill the duties the law imposes on them; moreover, the principle of accountability was formally established, aspects which this Chamber considers – as will be seen throughout this Recital – could be inferred from the prior wording combined with provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, although the reform certainly makes the constitutional rank of said principle easier to appreciate).
As can be observed, the Fundamental Law (as applicable to the specific case) clearly establishes that public servants are subject to the legal system; that is what derives from them being described as mere "depositaries of authority"; in other words, they are not above the Law. In that vein, it follows from the constitutional provision under discussion (a precept revitalized by the aforementioned 2000 reform) that public officials are bound by permissive norms, as well as by mandatory and prohibitive ones, it being added that they may only do that which the law expressly authorizes them to do. Thus, *in Costa Rica every public official* (whether popularly elected, appointed by another or by a collegial body, or having obtained the position through competition; whether permanent, substitute, or interim; appointed indefinitely or for a term; holding a position of trust or enjoying employment stability; whether a career official or not; etc.) *is exposed, from the moment they assume office, to the oversight of their acts in the performance of said office*.
This is because everything that person does by reason of the public post they occupy is of interest to the generality of the inhabitants of the Republic, since the objective is to ensure that they act, as a servant, in strict conformity with the legal system. That constant supervision of their acts is one of the consequences entailed by being a public servant, so that whoever assumes a position of this nature implicitly accepts that their performance will be publicly examined. By virtue of their investiture, the official is subject to the principle of legality, according to which they are only authorized to do that which the law – in a broad sense and in accordance with the normative hierarchy – expressly permits, everything else being prohibited. *Thus, holding a public office entails for the person a subjection to controls, which have been conceived to verify that the exercise of the powers deriving from the post is correct, as well as to prevent non-compliance with the duties inherent to the office*.
Now, these controls include not only the institutionalized ones (such as those pertaining to the Public Administration itself, as well as the judicial ones), but in a democratic State – the Constitution defines Costa Rica as such in its Article 1 – it is also necessary to consider the role of communicators. If every human being has the right to be informed, if there furthermore exists the freedom to communicate thoughts and opinions, even by publishing them, and if it is considered that communicators have the profession of gathering data, analyzing them, and based on them informing others about topics of interest to them, then it is evident that the practice of journalism is a perfect manifestation of the freedoms of information and of the press. In that regard, *it is irrefutable that the mass media, journalists, and other communicators have the right to inform – by making public the data they handle – the inhabitants*.
That is the premise that must prevail in a democratic society. The foregoing requires certain clarifications when dealing with a matter of public interest related to the performance of a state servant. The first is that a *matter of public interest* is anything that can reasonably be presumed to coincidentally attract the individual interest of the administered persons (Article 113(1) of the General Law of Public Administration); note that by speaking of "administered persons," it becomes evident that this refers to topics related to the running of the State (in a broad sense, that is, the Government of the Republic – described in Article 9 of the Constitution – and the other public entities) and the management of its resources, aspects that can validly be presumed to interest the generality of a country's inhabitants, since it is they who contribute to defraying the State's expenses. The second is that normally, in matters of public interest, the intervention of a state official occurs, although it is also possible (an aspect that will be seen at the end of this Recital) that there are subjects not invested as public servants who carry out a task that is indeed public, for which reason they would also be subject to the oversight of their actions in the exercise of that public function.
Thus, *in the case of matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and of the press that protect communicators are so important, as they constitute one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State, that if confronted with the right to honor that those who perform a public function also hold as persons, the latter may yield to the former, solely regarding the public facet of their conduct. In accordance with that approach, only when abuse is incurred by the communicator when informing will it be possible to place the official's right to honor ahead of the freedoms of information and the press that protect the communicator, as well as the right to be informed that assists every person*. There is a great number of norms that support this position. For example, note that Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the country's inhabitants the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed to examine the public conduct of officials.
This is important, since it is obvious that the framers were aware that there are public and private aspects in the behavior of State servants, with only the former being susceptible to open examination and discussion by society. Those public acts of officials are precisely those that have been established here as being related to the performance of the office; the private ones – and therefore not susceptible to being publicly debated – are those pertaining to personal and family privacy not connected with the exercise of the function. If aspects of the public performance of state servants can be publicly debated in a meeting, it is then undeniable that it must be possible to report on their acts so that they may be examined by the inhabitants of the national territory. Moreover, it must be remembered that according to Article 28 of the Constitution, no one may even be disturbed for the expression of their opinions, nor for acts that do not violate the law.
As a corollary to the above, it must be observed that Article 29 of the Constitution expressly provides for the possibility for every person to communicate (to direct to another) their thoughts, orally or in writing, and even to publish them (to make them known to the public) without prior censorship, so that they will only be responsible if they abuse these rights. In that vein, it follows that the exercise of the communicators' activity, which is indispensable to guarantee the right to be informed that assists every person, allows for freely informing about aspects related to the development of the public function, this being a matter of evident public interest. *Only when the freedoms of information and the press are abused (as could be the case when false data is knowingly disclosed, when no attempt is made to obtain the official's version to offer balanced information, when the servant is denied their rights of rectification and/or reply, when merely private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position the person holds are involved, when it is stated as certain to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial sentence to that effect, when the sole intention is to offend someone – an aspect that must be examined on a case-by-case basis and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which some information is disclosed, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news or the commentary surrounding it is presented, or similar situations) can the communicator be held liable, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding its scope of protection*.
Such abuse is not protected by the legal system (Article 29 of the Constitution in relation to Article 22 of the Civil Code), so that communicator who engages in abusive conduct must answer for their acts (which could even eventually entail the liability of the medium that disseminated the information). Now, the aforementioned constitutional norms are complemented by provisions of International Human Rights Law. For example, Article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* provides that every person may disseminate information, while at the same time guaranteeing the right of every individual to be informed. Note that this international instrument only protects human beings from arbitrary interference in their private life (Article 12); that is, what could be understood as public life (that related to the performance of a public office) is susceptible to examination by the generality of persons, and therefore free information regarding it may be given.
For its part, the *American Convention on Human Rights* is broader in the regulation of these topics. Thus, Article 13 guarantees the right to receive and disseminate information, with the communicator being liable only after the dissemination of the information and for the situations established by law. For its part, Article 11 provides that every person has the right to have their honor respected and their dignity recognized, adding later that no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in the sphere of their private life. It is clear that the coexistence of these two provisions in the same normative text reveals that they are complementary. In that sense, *the freedoms of information and of the press related to matters of public interest would displace the protection of honor and dignity as regards public officials; note immediately that this rule would not apply to persons who do not hold such status*.
This is because in these cases (when dealing with a matter of public significance related to state servants) what is at issue is not a person's privacy, but rather the manner in which they perform in the exercise of a public office, an aspect which – given the conflict of the legal interests in question, namely the right to honor and the freedoms of information and of the press – is the most important from the viewpoint of the national community. If what is disclosed is correct and indeed corresponds to a matter of public interest, then there is no possibility whatsoever for the official to claim that their honor has been harmed (in any case, if the news concerns some inappropriate act, it would be the servant themselves who harmed their own honor and not the communicator, so that the latter could not be transferred the responsibility of the former). Of course, if the information is false or is not related to a matter of public interest, then one could eventually be faced with one of the cases of abusive conduct mentioned above (which could even constitute a crime) that do entail a finding of liability on the part of the communicator.
In that vein, the two international provisions under discussion (Articles 11 and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights), viewed together, reveal that in matters of public interest related to the way servants perform their offices, the right to honor yields before the freedoms of information and of the press, as well as before the right to be informed. To understand that it does not displace it would be tantamount to creating a very broad sphere of topics in which the referred freedoms could not be exercised, which would be an attack on the democratic regime contemplated in the Costa Rican Constitution. In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that Articles 17 and 19 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* also address the problem at hand. The first of them establishes that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, nor to unlawful attacks on their honor or reputation.
This wording is important to highlight because – examined *a contrario sensu* – it shows that honor can be legally affected, which reinforces the thesis that there are cases (such as those of interest here) where, despite there being an impact on said legal interest, no one can be held liable for it. This Chamber considers that the foregoing occurs precisely in cases where information is published on matters of public interest related to questionable actions by public officials (or even by persons performing a public function), cases in which the honor of the persons involved is evidently affected (as a consequence and not as an intention). In those cases where what is disclosed will inevitably affect some public servant, and in which no sole intent to offend exists, the freedoms of information and of the press must prevail over the right to honor, since the communicator acts in fulfillment of their right to inform and does not become liable for the consequent impact on the honor of the officials (which in any case, as already stated, would have its cause in their own acts and not in what is published) related to the news.
It is clear – it is worth reiterating – that if the information is not of public interest, if the sole purpose is to offend someone, or if what is reported is false, then the communicator (and eventually the medium) becomes liable for the abuse committed. *In summary, both in the Political Constitution and in the applicable international Human Rights provisions in Costa Rica, there are norms that allow for affirming that public officials (but not private individuals, except in cases where they perform a public function) are subjected to public examination of their actions in the exercise of their office, such that the freedom to disseminate information about their acts in relation to matters of public interest displaces their right to honor, meaning that no communicator can be criminally liable for that type of information, unless they acted abusively*. This is because, in accordance with the provisions of Article 25 of the Criminal Code, one who legitimately exercises a right does not commit a crime.
To what has already been stated, it must be added that there are also provisions of legal rank that reinforce the criterion upheld here. The provisions of Articles 113 and 114 of the General Law of Public Administration are of special importance. The first of them provides: "*1. The public servant must perform their duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, before which mere convenience can in no case be placed.*" For its part, the second of the mentioned articles stipulates: "*1.
The public servant shall be a servant of the administered persons, in general, and in particular of each individual or administered person who interacts with them by virtue of the function they perform; each administered person must be considered in the individual case as a representative of the collectivity on which the official depends and for whose interests they must watch. 2. Without prejudice to what other laws establish for the servant, any act, deed, or omission that through their fault or negligence causes unjustified or arbitrary obstacles or hindrances to the administered persons shall be especially considered irregular performance of their function.*" As can be appreciated, the legislator grants great importance to the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of administrative activity, so much so that it formulates the principle of objectivity of the public function as acting for the sake of satisfying said interest.
Moreover, the duty of accountability on the part of public servants is evident; they must consider themselves – in each specific case – servants of the person with whom they interact by virtue of the office they hold (it should be noted that these provisions have existed since 1978, such that if they were related to the previous wording of Article 11 of the Constitution, the enshrinement in the Costa Rican legal system of the principle of accountability was evident, even before the constitutional reform of the year 2000 previously alluded to). This further enhances the public nature of the officials' performance regarding the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the position they occupy. *In that vein, it is unthinkable – unless the democratic principle established in the Political Constitution is ignored – to criminally sanction a person who acts in accordance with their right to disseminate information related to the actions of state officials in matters of public interest, unless they incurred some abuse (such as those set forth above) when making the information public*.
It is opportune to mention that the thesis set forth throughout these lines is complemented by the provision in the second part of Article 389 of the Criminal Code. In that legal text, despite referring to a contravention, it is observed that the legislator provided not to sanction reasoned criticism (insults are another matter) of persons and institutions when dealing with matters of public interest, as this Chamber has set forth in this judgment. The foregoing reinforces the point that the legitimate exercise (that is, without incurring abuse) of the freedoms of information and of the press in these cases does not permit the punishment of the person expressing themselves. Lastly, it is important to reiterate that although the problem of the clash of rights has been addressed here with respect to public servants in the exercise of their duties, it is also possible – depending on the significance of each specific case – for the freedoms of information and of the press to justify the public discussion (and therefore the dissemination of information on the topic) of actions by persons who are not invested as state officials but who perform a function that is indeed public, as could be the case with concessionaires of public services or works and notaries, that is, only regarding the public facet of their behavior and provided the communicators do not incur abuse.
V.In the present case, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela determined that the proven facts do not generate any criminal liability for the defendants. Beginning at folio 367, the reasons why the judging body reached that conclusion are set forth. It is readily apparent that the public interest regarding the use of state vehicles was considered. It is precisely for this reason that the journalistic investigation was carried out: to determine whether the complaint from residents of Cedral—that a vehicle of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport had been seen days earlier parked next to a bar, which they considered an improper use of the vehicle—had any basis. Because of that unease, on October 7, 1999, a cameraman from Noti-Catorce was sent to confirm—by video recording—whether the vehicle was indeed at the place. This turned out to be true, and for that reason, explanations were sought from the Regional Chief of the aforementioned ministry, who was the one who revealed the name of the public servant using that vehicle.
Based on these elements, the lower court—with good judgment—dismissed any purely offensive intent on the part of the defendants. Rather, what the a-quo did was highlight the uprightness in the actions of the latter, who at all times adhered to their right to disseminate information relevant to matters of public interest. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, his name came to light, and it is logical that he did not appreciate being questioned. But he was a public official at the time of the facts, and therefore he was subject to the duty of being accountable for his acts. Moreover, pursuant to articles 221 through 243 of the Ley de Tránsito, there are certain restrictions on the use of state vehicles (which vary depending on whether the vehicles are for administrative use, discretionary use, or use by police forces), among which is included (article 234, subsection a) of the last-cited regulatory text) using vehicles for administrative use in activities that are not the normal activities of the institution.
For this reason, observing one of these vehicles beside a bar during working hours is something that reasonably generates concerns and warrants an investigation. Furthermore, the intervention of the press in these cases is completely legitimate in a democratic State, since what is at issue is verifying that public resources are being used properly by public servants, so that it is indeed a matter of public interest, inasmuch as the problem at hand concerns the community. It should be added that at no time did the communicators accuse Vargas Núñez of having committed a fault, much less a crime, but rather they simply asked for explanations as to why the aforementioned vehicle was at that location at the time it was filmed. This last point reveals that this is nothing more than the exercise of the right to inform the community about a matter of public interest. There was never any intent to injure the plaintiff's honor; he was only asked to be accountable, without any abuse whatsoever by the representatives of Noti-Catorce.
In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber indeed finds no appreciation that the defendants committed any crime for which they must answer, and in that sense, the decision of the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela is legally appropriate. It must be added that although the judgment indeed cites the Ley de Imprenta and not the Ley de Radio y Televisión, the point is irrelevant, since in any case this involves a ground for justification (the legitimate exercise of a right, regulated in Article 25 of the Código Penal) which in any scenario would exonerate the accused from criminal liability. Moreover, it should be noted that the existence of the journalistic reports is considered proven, but—for the reasons already mentioned, that is, due to the concurrence of a ground for justification—they do not constitute any crime. It is also necessary to emphasize that certainly the exercise of journalism is not per se a license to affect the honor of individuals, but it must also be recognized that in any case, communicators are only liable when they abuse their profession (Article 29 of the Constitution) and furthermore, that legal interest is not affected when dealing with truthful information (such as the fact that the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was parked next to a bar during working hours, which warranted the investigation) related to matters of public interest involving state public servants.
Finally, it must be said that in this case, the truthfulness of the information broadcast by Noti-Catorce has been verified by the sentencing court, so there is no reason whatsoever to think that the employees of the television medium (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) or of the company that owns that enterprise, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), did not verify that what was disclosed by the news program was true, and therefore the claim regarding this point becomes unfounded. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber finds that in the instant case, no violation of substantive law has occurred, since the conduct of the defendants finds support in the ground for justification provided for in Article 25 of the Código Penal, on the basis of which this aspect of the appeal is declared without merit.
IV.The events of interest here—namely, the video recording of the plaintiff's vehicle, as well as the information disseminated by Noti-Catorce and the response given by Vargas Núñez to said newscast's reports—occurred between October and December 1999. At that time, the Political Constitution provided in its article 11 the following: "*Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and cannot arrogate to themselves powers the law does not grant them. They must swear an oath to observe and uphold this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public.*" (It should be noted that after the constitutional reform enacted through Law No. 8003 of June 8, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of June 30, 2000, said article of the Constitution was modified and a provision was added to the effect that public officials must fulfill the duties the law imposes on them; furthermore, the principle of accountability was formally established, aspects that this Chamber considers—as will be seen throughout this Considerando—could be inferred from the prior wording in conjunction with provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, although certainly the reform makes it easier to appreciate the constitutional rank of said principle).
As can be observed, the Fundamental Law (as applicable to the specific case) clearly establishes that public servants are subject to the legal system; that is what derives from their being characterized as mere "depositaries of authority"; in other words, they are not above the Law. In this regard, it follows from the constitutional provision under discussion (a precept that is revitalized with the aforementioned reform of the year 2000) that public officials are bound by both permissive norms, as well as mandating and prohibitive ones, it also being added that they may only do that which the law expressly authorizes them. Thus, *in Costa Rica, every public official* (whether popularly elected, appointed by another or a collegiate body, or having won the position through competitive examination; whether permanent, substitute, or interim; appointed indefinitely or for a term; whether holding a position of trust or enjoying employment stability; whether a career official or not; etc.) *is exposed, from the moment they assume office, to the oversight of their acts in the performance of their duties*.
This is because everything that person does by reason of the public office they hold is of interest to the general populace of the Republic, since the objective is to ensure that they act, as a servant, in strict conformity with the legal system. That constant supervision of their acts is one of the consequences of being a public servant, so that whoever assumes a position of this nature implicitly accepts that their conduct will be publicly examined. By virtue of their investiture, the official is subject to the principle of legality, according to which they are only authorized to do what the law—in a broad sense and in accordance with the normative hierarchy—expressly permits, everything else being prohibited. *Thus, performing a public function entails for the person a subjection to controls, which have been conceived to verify that the exercise of the powers deriving from the position is correct, as well as to prevent non-compliance with the duties inherent to the office*.
Now, these controls include not only the institutionalized ones (such as those belonging to the Public Administration itself, as well as the judicial ones), but in a democratic State—the Constitution defines Costa Rica as such in its article 1—it is also necessary to consider the role of communicators. If every human being has the right to be informed, if there also exists the freedom to communicate thoughts and opinions, even publishing them, and if it is considered that communicators have as their profession the gathering of data, analyzing them, and, based on them, informing others about topics that interest them, then it is evident that the practice of journalism is a perfect manifestation of the freedoms of information and of the press. In this regard, *it is irrefutable that the mass media, journalists, and other communicators have the right to inform—by making public the data they handle—the inhabitants*.
That is the premise that must prevail in a democratic society. The foregoing requires certain clarifications when one is faced with a matter of public interest related to the actions of a state servant. The first is that a *matter of public interest* is anything that can reasonably be presumed to coincidentally attract the individual interest of the administered persons (article 113, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration); note that by speaking of "administered persons," it is evidenced that these are matters related to the running of the State (in a broad sense, that is, the Government of the Republic—described in article 9 of the Constitution—and the other public entities) and the management of its resources, aspects that can validly be presumed to interest the generality of the inhabitants of a country, since they are the ones who contribute to defraying the State's expenses.
The second is that what is normal, in the case of matters of public interest, is that the intervention of a state official is involved, although it is also possible (an aspect that will be seen at the end of this Considerando) that there are subjects not vested as public servants who carry out a task that is indeed public, for which reason they would also be subject to the oversight of their actions in the exercise of that public function. Thus, *in the case of matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and of the press that protect communicators are so important, as they constitute one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State, that if they are confronted with the right to honor that those who perform a public function also hold as persons, the latter may yield to the former, but only insofar as the public facet of their conduct is concerned. In accordance with this approach, only when abuse is incurred by the communicator when informing will it be possible to place the official's right to honor above the freedoms of information and of the press that protect the communicator, as well as above the right to be informed that every person possesses*.
There is a vast number of norms that support this position. For example, observe that article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the country's inhabitants the right to assemble peacefully and without arms to examine the public conduct of officials. This is important, as it is evident that the framers were aware that there are public and private aspects in the behavior of State servants, only the former being susceptible to open examination and discussion by society. Those public acts of officials are precisely those that have been established here as related to the fulfillment of their office; the private ones—and therefore not susceptible to public debate—are those pertaining to personal and family privacy not connected with the exercise of the function. If aspects of the public actions of state servants can be publicly debated in a meeting, then it is undeniable that it must be possible to inform about their acts so they can be examined by the inhabitants of the national territory.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that according to article 28 of the Constitution, no one may even be disturbed for expressing their opinions, nor for acts that do not violate the law. As a corollary to the foregoing, it should be observed that article 29 of the Constitution expressly provides for the possibility that every person may communicate (that is, direct to another) their thoughts, by word or in writing, and even publish them (make them known publicly) without prior censorship, so that they will only be liable if they abuse these rights. In this regard, it turns out that the exercise of the activity of communicators, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the right to be informed that every person possesses, allows for freely informing about aspects related to the exercise of public functions, this being a matter of evident public interest. *Only when the freedoms of information and of the press are abused (as could be the case if false data are disclosed knowingly, if an attempt is not made to obtain the official's version to offer balanced information, if the servant's rights of rectification and/or reply are denied, if it concerns purely private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position the person holds, if it is presented as certain to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial sentence to that effect in place, if the sole intention is to offend someone—an aspect that must be examined case by case and in which various factors could be relevant, such as the context in which some information is disclosed, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news or comments surrounding it are presented, or similar situations) may the communicator be held liable, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding its scope of protection*.
That abuse is not protected by the legal system (article 29 of the Constitution in relation to article 22 of the Civil Code), so that communicator who incurs in abusive conduct shall be held answerable for their acts (which could even eventually entail the liability of the media outlet that disseminated the information). Now, the aforementioned constitutional regulations are complemented by provisions of International Humanitarian Law. For example, article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* provides that every person may disseminate information, while simultaneously guaranteeing the right of every individual to be informed. Note that this international instrument only protects the human being from arbitrary interference in their private life (article 12); meaning that what could be understood as public life (that related to the performance of a public office) is susceptible to examination by the general populace and, therefore, free information regarding it may be given.
For its part, the *American Convention on Human Rights* is broader in its regulation of these matters. Thus, article 13 guarantees the right to receive and disseminate information, the communicator being liable only after the dissemination of the information and for the situations established by law. For its part, article 11 provides that every person has the right to have their honor and dignity respected, it being added later that no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in the sphere of their private life. It is clear that the coexistence of these two provisions in the same normative text reveals that they are complementary. In that sense, *the freedoms of information and of the press related to matters of public interest would displace the protection of honor and dignity insofar as public officials are concerned; it is noted immediately that this rule would not apply to persons who do not hold such a status*.
This is because in these cases (when one is faced with a matter of public significance related to state servants), what is involved is not the privacy of a person, but rather the manner in which they perform in the exercise of a public office, an aspect that—in light of the conflict of the legal interests in question, namely the right to honor and the freedoms of information and of the press—is the most important from the perspective of the national community. If what is disseminated is correct and indeed corresponds to a matter of public interest, then there is no possibility whatsoever for the official to claim that their honor has been injured (in any case, if the news is about some inappropriate act, the one who would have injured their honor would be the servant themselves and not the communicator, so that the liability of the former could not be transferred to the latter). Of course, if the information is false or is not related to a matter of public interest, then one could eventually be faced with one of the cases of abusive conduct mentioned supra (which could even constitute a crime) that do entail a declaration of liability for the communicator.
In this regard, the two international provisions under discussion (articles 11 and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights), viewed together, reveal that in the case of matters of public interest relating to the manner in which servants perform their offices, the right to honor yields to the freedoms of information and of the press, as well as to the right to be informed. To understand that it does not displace it would be tantamount to creating a very broad sphere of topics in which the referred freedoms could not be exercised, which would be an attack against the democratic regime contemplated in the Costa Rican Constitution. In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that articles 17 and 19 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* also address the problem before us. The first of these establishes that no one may be subjected to arbitrary or illegal interference in their private life, nor to illegal attacks on their honor or reputation.
This wording is important to highlight because—examined *a contrario sensu*—it shows that honor can be legally affected, which reinforces the thesis that there are cases (such as those of interest here) where, despite an impact on said legal interest, no one can be held liable for it. This Chamber considers that the foregoing occurs precisely in cases where information is published about matters of public interest related to questionable actions by public officials (or even by persons performing a public function), cases in which the honor of the persons involved is evidently affected (as a consequence and not as an intention). In those cases where what is disclosed will inevitably affect some public servant, and in which, moreover, a sole intent to offend is not involved, the freedoms of information and of the press must prevail over the right to honor, since the communicator acts in compliance with their right to inform and does not become liable for the consequent impact on the honor of the officials (which, in any case, as already stated, would have its cause in their own acts and not in what is published) related to the news.
Of course—it is worth reiterating—that if the information is not of public interest, the only aim is to offend someone, or what is reported is false, then the communicator (and eventually the media outlet) does become liable for the abuse committed. *In summary, both in the Political Constitution and in the international Human Rights provisions applicable in Costa Rica, there is a legal framework that allows affirming that public officials (but not private individuals, except in cases where they perform a public function) are subject to the public examination of their actions in the exercise of their office, so that the freedom to disseminate information about their acts in relation to matters of public interest displaces their right to honor, meaning that no communicator can be criminally liable for that type of information, unless they had acted abusively*. This is because, in accordance with the provisions of article 25 of the Penal Code, whoever legitimately exercises a right does not commit a crime.
To what has already been set forth, it must be added that there are also provisions of legal rank that reinforce the criterion upheld here. Of special importance are the provisions of articles 113 and 114 of the General Law of Public Administration. The first of these provides: "*1. The public servant shall perform their functions in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, which may in no case be superseded by mere convenience.*" For its part, the second of the mentioned articles stipulates: "*1.
The public servant shall be a servant of the administered persons, in general, and in particular of each individual or administered person who relates to them by virtue of the function they perform; each administered person shall be considered in the individual case as a representative of the collectivity upon which the official depends and for whose interests they must watch. 2. Without prejudice to what other laws establish for the servant, any act, deed, or omission that through their fault or negligence causes unjustified or arbitrary obstacles or hindrances to the administered persons shall be considered, especially, irregular performance of their function.*" As can be appreciated, the legislator grants great importance to the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of administrative activity, so much so that it formulates the principle of objectivity of the public function as acting for the sake of satisfying said interest.
Moreover, the duty of accountability on the part of public servants is evident; they must consider themselves—in each specific case—servants of the person with whom they relate by virtue of the position they hold (it should be noted that these provisions have existed since 1978, so that if they were related to the prior wording of article 11 of the Constitution, the enshrinement in the Costa Rican legal system of the principle of accountability was evident, even before the constitutional reform of the year 2000 previously alluded to). This further enhances the public nature of officials' actions regarding the fulfillment of the powers inherent to the position they occupy. *In this regard, it is unthinkable—unless the democratic principle established in the Political Constitution is disregarded—to criminally sanction a person who acts in accordance with their right to disseminate information related to the actions of state officials in matters of public interest, unless they have incurred in some abuse (such as those set forth above) when making the information public*.
It is opportune to mention that the thesis set forth throughout these lines is complemented by the provisions of the second part of article 389 of the Penal Code. In that legal text, despite referring to a contravention, it is observed that the legislator provided for not sanctioning reasoned criticism (insults being another matter) of persons and institutions when it concerns matters of public interest, as this Chamber has set forth in the present judgment. The foregoing reinforces the point that the legitimate exercise (that is, without incurring in abuses) of the freedoms of information and of the press in these cases does not permit the punishment of the person expressing themselves. Finally, it is important to reiterate that while it is true that the problem of the clash of rights has been referred to here in the case of public servants in the exercise of their powers, it is also possible—depending on the significance of each specific case—that the freedoms of information and of the press justify the public discussion (and therefore the dissemination of information on the subject) of actions by persons who are not vested as state officials but who perform a function that is indeed public, as could be the case with concessionaires of public services or works and notaries, being understood, of course, only insofar as the public facet of their behavior is concerned and without communicators incurring in abuses.
V.In the present case, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela determined that the proven facts do not generate any criminal liability for the defendants. From page 367 onward, the reasons why the adjudicating body reached that conclusion are set forth. It is readily apparent that the public interest involved in the use of state vehicles was considered. It was precisely for that reason that the journalistic investigation was carried out: to determine whether the complaint by residents of Cedral had any basis, namely that a vehicle of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport had been seen days earlier parked next to a bar, which they considered to be improper use of the motor vehicle. Due to that discontent, on October 7, 1999, a cameraman from Noti-Catorce was sent to confirm—by video recording—whether the vehicle was indeed in that location. This proved to be true, and therefore explanations were sought from the Regional Chief of the aforementioned ministry, who was the one who revealed the name of the public servant using said vehicle.
Based on those elements, the lower court—with sound judgment—ruled out any purely offensive intent on the part of the defendants. Rather, the a-quo highlighted the rectitude of the latter’s actions, who at all times adhered to their right to disseminate information pertaining to matters of public interest. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, his name came to light, and it is logical that he did not like being questioned. But he was a public official at the time of the facts, and therefore he was subject to the duty to account for his actions. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 221 through 243 of the Transit Law, there are certain restrictions on the use of state vehicles (which vary depending on whether they are motor vehicles for administrative use, discretionary use, or use by police forces), among which is included (Article 234, subsection a) of the last cited regulatory text) using vehicles for administrative use in activities other than the normal activities of the institution.
For that reason, seeing one of these motor vehicles next to a bar during working hours is something that reasonably raises concerns and warrants the development of an investigation. Moreover, the intervention of the press in these cases is completely legitimate in a democratic State, since what is at stake is verifying that public resources are used appropriately by public servants, so that it is indeed a matter of public interest, given that the issue under discussion concerns the community. It should be added that at no time did the communicators accuse Vargas Núñez of having committed a fault, much less a crime, but rather they simply asked for explanations as to why the aforementioned motor vehicle was at that site at the time it was filmed. This last point reveals that this is nothing more than the exercise of the right to inform the community about a matter of public interest. It was never intended to harm the plaintiff's honor; he was only asked to render accounts, with no abuse whatsoever on the part of Noti-Catorce’s personnel.
In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber indeed does not find that the defendants committed any crime for which they must answer, and in that sense, the decision of the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela is in accordance with the Law. It must be added that, although it is true that the judgment cites the Press Law and not the Radio and Television Law, this point is irrelevant, since in any case we are in the presence of a ground for justification (the legitimate exercise of a right, regulated in Article 25 of the Penal Code) that would, in any scenario, exonerate the accused from criminal liability. Furthermore, it should be noted that the existence of the journalistic reports is taken as proven, but—for the reasons already mentioned, that is, due to the concurrence of a ground for justification—they do not constitute any crime. It is also necessary to emphasize that certainly the practice of journalism is not per se a license to harm people's honor, but it must also be recognized that in any case the communicators answer only when they abuse their profession (Article 29 of the Constitution), and furthermore, said legal right is not harmed when it concerns true information (such as the fact that the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was parked next to a bar during working hours, which warranted the investigation) related to matters of public interest involving State servants.
Finally, it must be said that in this case, the truthfulness of the information disseminated by Noti-Catorce has been verified by the sentencing body, so there is no reason to believe that the employees of the television medium (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) or of the company that owns that enterprise, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), failed to verify that what was broadcast by the newscast was true, and therefore the claim on this point is unfounded. By virtue of all the above, this Chamber considers that in the case at hand there has been no violation whatsoever of the substantive law, given that the defendants' conduct finds support in the ground for justification provided for in Article 25 of the Penal Code, on the basis of which this ground of the appeal is declared without merit.
"I. El licenciado Juan Luis Vargas Alfaro, apoderado especial judicial del querellante y actor civil, José Francisco Vargas Núñez, interpone recurso de casación contra la sentencia N° 174-2001, dictada por el Tribunal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sede Ciudad Quesada, a las 17:00 horas del 11 de octubre de 2001. Mediante dicho fallo, visible a folio 284, se absolvió de toda responsabilidad y pena a Sonia Jiménez González, Karla María Herrera Masís, Virginia Patricia Luna Salas (c.c. Vicky), Juan Vicente Muñoz Ramírez, Jorge Gutiérrez Espeleta y Jorge Eduardo Rojas Bolaños por los delitos de calumnias, difamación y publicación de ofensas que se les atribuían en perjuicio de José Francisco Vargas Núñez. Asimismo, se declaró sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria promovida contra los querellados, así como contra la Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), Noticias del Norte Noti-Catorce, S.A. y T.V.
Norte Canal Catorce, S.A. También se dispuso la condena del querellante al pago de las costas personales y procesales en que incurrieron los querellados Muñoz Ramírez, Gutiérrez Espeleta, Rojas Bolaños, así como los demandados civiles Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. y T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A. II. Como primer motivo por el fondo, el licenciado Vargas Alfaro acusa el quebranto, por aplicación indebida, de los artículos 11, 28, 29, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, así como los numerales 1, 25, 30, 31, 145, 146 y 147 del Código Penal y 7 de la Ley de Imprenta. Asimismo, estima que se dejaron de aplicar los artículos 17 inciso d) de la Ley de Radio y Televisión, así como los numerales 18, 22, 45, 71, 73, 74, 76, 152 y 155 del Código Penal. Luego de resumir los hechos que el a-quo tuvo por demostrados, así como el razonamiento expuesto por el cuerpo juzgador para acreditar dicho cuadro fáctico y el referido a las consecuencias jurídicas de éste, procede el recurrente a exponer los argumentos para sustentar su disconformidad.
Primero sostiene que se aplicó erróneamente la Ley de Imprenta en esta causa, pese a que se trata de un medio televisivo el involucrado, el cual no está cubierto por aquel texto legal. Luego, dice que los hechos querellados efectivamente se dieron y son constitutivos de los delitos de injurias, difamación y publicación de ofensas. Estima que las informaciones divulgadas por Noti-Catorce los días 1 y 3 de noviembre, así como el 2 de diciembre, todos de 1999, son lesivas del honor de su patrocinado. Considera que el ejercicio del periodismo no exime a los reporteros ni a los medios de comunicación del deber de responder por los daños y perjuicios que causan con ocasión de su actividad. Afirma que los directores del canal de televisión tienen una posición de garante respecto de la veracidad de las informaciones que se transmiten por dicho medio. El reclamo es improcedente. De previo a exponer las razones por las cuales estima esta Sala que no se configuran los vicios apuntados por el licenciado Vargas Alfaro, es pertinente recordar –de forma resumida- los hechos que el a-quo tuvo por demostrados. A partir del folio 341 puede apreciarse que para el Tribunal de instancia, se pudo probar lo siguiente:
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