Press freedom prevails over honor of public official investigated for use of state vehiclePrevalece la libertad de prensa sobre el honor de un funcionario investigado por uso de vehículo estatal

"I. Attorney Juan Luis Vargas Alfaro, special judicial representative of the complainant and civil plaintiff, José Francisco Vargas Núñez, files an appeal in cassation against judgment No. 174-2001, issued by the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Ciudad Quesada seat, at 5:00 p.m. on October 11, 2001. By means of said ruling, visible at folio 284, Sonia Jiménez González, Karla María Herrera Masís, Virginia Patricia Luna Salas (also known as Vicky), Juan Vicente Muñoz Ramírez, Jorge Gutiérrez Espeleta, and Jorge Eduardo Rojas Bolaños were acquitted of all liability and penalty for the offenses of slander (calumnias), defamation (difamación), and publication of offenses (publicación de ofensas) attributed to them to the detriment of José Francisco Vargas Núñez. Likewise, the civil action for damages brought against the defendants, as well as against the Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), Noticias del Norte Noti-Catorce, S.A., and T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A., was dismissed. It was also ordered that the complainant pay the personal and procedural costs incurred by the defendants Muñoz Ramírez, Gutiérrez Espeleta, Rojas Bolaños, as well as the civil defendants Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. and T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.

II.As a first substantive ground, Attorney Vargas Alfaro alleges the violation, by improper application, of Articles 11, 28, 29, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as numerals 1, 25, 30, 31, 145, 146, and 147 of the Penal Code and 7 of the Press Law (Ley de Imprenta). Likewise, he contends that Article 17, subsection d) of the Radio and Television Law, as well as numerals 18, 22, 45, 71, 73, 74, 76, 152, and 155 of the Penal Code, were not applied. After summarizing the facts that the lower court deemed proven, as well as the reasoning set forth by the adjudicating body to credit said factual framework and that referring to the legal consequences thereof, the appellant proceeds to present the arguments supporting his disagreement. First, he argues that the Press Law was erroneously applied in this case, despite the fact that a television medium is involved, which is not covered by that legal text. Then, he states that the complained-of facts indeed occurred and constitute the offenses of insults (injurias), defamation, and publication of offenses. He contends that the information broadcast by Noti-Catorce on November 1 and 3, as well as December 2, all in 1999, is harmful to his client's honor. He considers that the exercise of journalism does not exempt reporters or the media from the duty to answer for the damages they cause in the course of their activity. He affirms that the directors of the television channel hold a guarantor position regarding the truthfulness of the information transmitted through that medium. The claim is unfounded. Before setting forth the reasons why this Chamber considers that the defects pointed out by Attorney Vargas Alfaro are not present, it is pertinent to recall—in summary form—the facts that the lower court deemed proven. Starting at folio 341, it can be seen that, for the trial court, the following was proven: a) Due to complaints from residents of the region about the misuse of public property, referring particularly to vehicles parked in front of establishments where liquor is sold, the management of Noti-Catorce decided to produce a report on the problem; b) Before October 7, 1999, Noti-Catorce received complaints from neighbors in Cedral, who affirmed that a vehicle from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) was located in front of Bar Las Cañitas, which is why on that October 7, the management of said news program sent cameraman William Murillo Cordero to film the location, as a result of which it was verified that indeed the motor vehicle, license plate 202-463, belonging to said ministerial portfolio, was parked alongside the bar, which was open; it was subsequently learned that the mentioned vehicle was assigned to the complainant herein; c) After the aforementioned filming was carried out and before November 1 and 2, 1999, the defendants Jiménez González, Herrera Masís, and Luna Salas tried to obtain the version of engineer René Quirós Alpízar, Chief of Zone 2-3 of the San Carlos office of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, as well as that of the complainant José Francisco Vargas Núñez, without it being possible to contact the latter, although the former was reached, who was the one who said that the vehicle in question was assigned to Vargas Núñez; d) On Monday the 1st and Wednesday the 3rd, both in November 1999, with the presentation of defendants Herrera Masís and Jiménez González, Noti-Catorce broadcast the images filmed on the previous October 7 in the news program shown Monday through Friday between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., on television channels 14 and 16; the broadcast of these images—in which the aforementioned Ministry of Public Works and Transport vehicle can be seen parked alongside Bar Las Cañitas—was due to the fact that they illustrated information disseminated by that television medium; it was indicated in the news program that, following a complaint from several neighbors of Cedral, Noti-Catorce went to film the evidence and found a vehicle from the oft-mentioned ministerial portfolio parked next to the already indicated establishment; it was said—on one of those two days—that there is a regulation for the use of motor vehicles and it was added that on a previous occasion, as a result of a complaint from neighbors of Cedral, two officials of the Ministry of Environment and Energy were dismissed after being seen in Bar Biriteca; e) Vargas Núñez could not be found—despite being sought—before November 3, 1999, the date this topic was addressed for the second time on Noti-Catorce, but on the 4th of said month he appeared at the television channel to exercise his right of reply and thus presented his version to the effect that on the day the filming took place, he was conducting an inspection of a water tank that was overflowing, causing damage to the asphalt road, but he did not deny the location of the vehicle; f) On December 2, 1999, Noti-Catorce reported on the imminent dismissal of the complainant as an employee of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, news it illustrated with the filming carried out on October 7 of that same year.

III.In accordance with the list of facts that the adjudicating body deemed proven (summarized in the preceding Recital (Considerando)), this Chamber considers that the lower court is correct in determining that in this case no offense whatsoever has been committed to the detriment of the complainant José Francisco Vargas Núñez, and therefore the acquittal issued is in accordance with the Law. The conflict between the right to honor and the freedoms of information and press is one of the most difficult to resolve, since we are dealing with fundamental rights of the person and this requires a very clear definition of when one of them takes precedence over the others. The problem is not resolved considering only what is provided in the Penal Code, but must start directly from the Constitution and international human rights regulations in order to understand the scope of punitive legislation. In that regard, the first thing that must be said is that honor is included as one of the moral interests referred to in constitutional Article 41 and is expressly provided for in Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which establishes that every person has the right to have their honor respected. Thus, it is evident that we are dealing with an essential legal interest of the human condition, and therefore—based on the foregoing—its protection through Criminal Law is in accordance with the legal system. What happens is that the freedoms of information and the press are equally fundamental for human beings, the latter being a derivation of the former. Both freedoms are recognized in the Constitution, specifically in Article 29, which recognizes the possibility of every person to communicate their thoughts by word or in writing, and even to make them public. Furthermore, they are also included in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As is obvious, we are in the presence of legal interests deserving of equal protection by the legal system. By virtue of what has just been indicated, the problem to be addressed in this case is when the right to honor prevails over the indicated freedoms. In accordance with constitutional and international humanitarian provisions, that conflict between fundamental rights can only be resolved in favor of the right to honor when an abusive exercise of the freedoms of information and the press is verified. The foregoing is due to the fact that the Costa Rican legal system contemplates as a general rule (enshrined in Article 22 of the Civil Code) not protecting the abuse of right or its antisocial use. This is precisely because if a right is abused, it implies that the scope of protection it contemplates has been exceeded or overstepped, such that said excess is not covered by it and lacks protection. Thus, if no abuse is incurred, but rather the freedoms of information and the press are legitimately exercised, then there is absolutely no possibility of criminally punishing the communicator, since they would not have committed any offense against honor. This is what explains the reason for the acquittal issued in this case.

IV.The events of interest here—namely, the video recording of the complainant's vehicle, as well as the information broadcast by Noti-Catorce and the response given by Vargas Núñez to said news program's reports—occurred between October and December 1999. At that time, the Political Constitution provided in its Article 11 the following: "Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and cannot arrogate to themselves powers that the law does not grant them. They must swear an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public." (It should be noted that after the constitutional reform effected through Law No. 8003 of June 8, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of June 30, 2000, said article of the Constitution was amended and a provision was added to the effect that public officials must fulfill the duties that the law imposes upon them; furthermore, the principle of accountability was formally established, aspects that this Chamber considers—as will be seen throughout this Recital—could be extracted from the previous wording combined with provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, although certainly the reform makes it easier to appreciate the constitutional rank of said principle). As can be observed, the Fundamental Law (as it is applicable to the specific case) clearly establishes that public servants are subject to the legal system; that is what derives from their being classified as mere "depositaries of authority"; in other words, they are not above the Law. In that context, it follows from the constitutional provision under discussion (a precept that is revitalized with the aforementioned reform of the year 2000) that public officials are bound by permissive, ordering, and prohibitive norms, adding in addition that they can only do that which the law expressly authorizes them to do. Thus, in Costa Rica, every public official (whether popularly elected, appointed by another or by a collegiate body, or having obtained the position through competitive examination; whether a permanent appointee, substitute, or interim; whether appointed indefinitely or for a fixed term; whether holding a position of trust or enjoying employment stability; whether a career official or not; etc.) is exposed, from the moment they assume office, to the oversight of their actions in the performance of their duties. This is due to the fact that everything that person does in connection with the public position they hold is of interest to the general population of the Republic, since the objective is to ensure that they act, as a servant, in strict accordance with the legal system. This constant supervision of their actions is one of the consequences of being a public servant, so that whoever assumes a position of this nature implicitly accepts that their conduct be publicly examined. By virtue of their investiture, the official is subject to the principle of legality, according to which they are only authorized to do that which the law—in a broad sense and in accordance with the normative hierarchy—expressly permits, and everything else is prohibited. Thus, holding a public function entails for the person a subjection to controls, which have been conceived to verify that the exercise of the powers derived from the position is correct, as well as to prevent the breach of the duties inherent to the office. Now, among these controls are included not only the institutionalized ones (such as those proper to the Public Administration, as well as the judicial ones), but in a democratic State—the Constitution defines Costa Rica as such in its Article 1—it is also necessary to consider the role of communicators. If every human being has the right to be informed, if there is also freedom to communicate thoughts and opinions, including publishing them, and if it is considered that communicators have as a profession to gather data, analyze them, and based on them inform others about topics that interest them, then it is evident that the practice of journalism is a perfect manifestation of the freedoms of information and the press. In that context, it is irrefutable that the mass media, journalists, and other communicators have the right to inform—making the data they handle public—the inhabitants. That is the premise that must prevail in a democratic society. The foregoing requires certain clarifications when dealing with a matter of public interest related to the conduct of a state servant. The first is that a matter of public interest is anything that can reasonably be presumed to coincidentally attract the individual interest of the governed (administrados) (Article 113, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration); note that by speaking of the "governed," it becomes evident that it concerns topics related to the governance of the State (in a broad sense, that is, the Government of the Republic—described in constitutional Article 9—and the other public entities) and the management of its resources, aspects that it can be validly presumed are of interest to the general population of a country, since they are the ones who contribute to defraying the State's expenses. The second is that it is normal, when dealing with matters of public interest, for a state official to be involved, although it is also possible (an aspect that will be addressed at the end of this Recital) that there are subjects not vested as public servants who carry out a task that is indeed public in nature, and therefore they would also be subject to scrutiny of their actions in the exercise of that public function. Thus, when dealing with matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and the press that protect communicators are so important—for constituting one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State—that if confronted with the right to honor that those who perform a public function also hold as persons, the latter can yield to the former, only in what pertains to the public facet of their conduct. In accordance with that proposition, only when the communicator abuses their position when informing will it be possible to place the official's right to honor above the freedoms of information and the press that protect the communicator, as well as above the right to be informed that assists every person. There is a large number of norms that support this position. For example, note that constitutional Article 26 guarantees the country's inhabitants the right to assemble peacefully and without arms to examine the public conduct of officials. This is important, as it is evident that the constitutional framers were aware that there are public and private aspects to the behavior of State servants, with only the former being susceptible to open examination and discussion by society. Those public acts of the officials are precisely those that have been established here as related to the performance of their duties; the private ones—and therefore not susceptible to public debate—are those proper to personal and family intimacy not connected to the exercise of the function. If aspects of the public conduct of state servants can be publicly debated at a meeting, then it is undeniable that it must be possible to report on their acts so that they can be examined by the inhabitants of the national territory. Furthermore, it must be remembered that pursuant to constitutional Article 28, no one can even be disturbed for the expression of their opinions, nor for acts that do not violate the law. As a corollary to the foregoing, it must be observed that Article 29 of the Constitution expressly provides for the possibility of every person communicating (directing to another) their thoughts, by word or in writing, and even publishing them (making them publicly known) without prior censorship, and that they will only be liable if they abuse these rights. In that context, it turns out that the exercise of the activity of communicators, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the right to be informed that assists every person, allows for freely reporting on aspects related to the exercise of a public function, as this is a matter of evident public interest. Only when the freedoms of information and the press are abused (as could be the case if false data are knowingly disseminated, if one does not attempt to obtain the official's version in order to offer balanced information, if the servant is denied their rights of rectification and/or reply, if strictly private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position held by the person are involved, if it is presented as certain before the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial sentence to that effect, if the sole intention is to offend someone—an aspect that must be examined on a case-by-case basis and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which information is disseminated, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news is presented or the commentary surrounding it, or similar situations) can the communicator be held liable, since the abuse of a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding its scope of protection. That abuse is not protected by the legal system (constitutional Article 29 related to Article 22 of the Civil Code), and therefore any communicator who engages in abusive conduct must answer for their actions (which could even eventually entail the liability of the medium that disseminated the information). Now, the aforementioned constitutional norms are complemented by provisions of International Humanitarian Law. For example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that every person can disseminate information, while at the same time guaranteeing the right of every individual to be informed. Note that this international instrument only protects human beings from arbitrary interference in their private life (Article 12); meaning that what could be understood as public life (that related to the performance of a public office) is susceptible to examination by the general public and therefore free information can be given regarding it. For its part, the American Convention on Human Rights is broader in its regulation of these issues. Thus, Article 13 guarantees the right to receive and disseminate information, with the communicator being liable only after the information is disseminated and for the situations established by law. In turn, Article 11 provides that every person has the right to have their honor and dignity respected, adding later that no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in the sphere of their private life. It is clear that the coexistence of these two provisions in the same normative text reveals that they are complementary. In that sense, the freedoms of information and the press related to matters of public interest would displace the protection of honor and dignity insofar as it relates to public officials; note right away that this rule would not apply to persons who do not hold such status. This is because in these scenarios (when dealing with a case of public relevance related to state servants), the issue is not the intimacy of a person, but rather the manner in which they perform in the exercise of a public office, an aspect that—in light of the conflict of the legal interests in question, namely the right to honor and the freedoms of information and the press—is the most important from the standpoint of the national community. If what was disseminated is correct and indeed corresponds to a matter of public interest, then there is absolutely no possibility for the official to claim that their honor has been harmed (in any case, if the news deals with some inappropriate act, it would be the servant themselves who harmed their own honor and not the communicator, so the latter could not be held liable for the former's responsibility). Of course, if the information is false or is not related to a matter of public interest, then it could eventually be one of the scenarios of abusive conduct mentioned above (which could even constitute offenses) that do entail a declaration of liability for the communicator. In that context, the two international provisions under discussion (Articles 11 and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights), viewed together, reveal that in matters of public interest relating to the way servants perform their duties, the right to honor yields to the freedoms of information and the press, as well as to the right to be informed. To understand that it does not displace them would be akin to creating a very broad sphere of topics in which the referenced freedoms could not be exercised, which would be an attack against the democratic regime contemplated in the Costa Rican Constitution. In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also address the problem that concerns us. The first of these establishes that no one may be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their private life, nor to unlawful attacks on their honor or reputation. This wording is important to highlight because—examined a contrario sensu—it shows that honor can be legally affected, which reinforces the thesis that there are cases (such as those of interest here) in which despite an impact on said legal interest, no one can be held liable for it. This Chamber considers that the foregoing occurs precisely in cases where information is published about matters of public interest related to questionable conduct by public officials (or even by persons performing a public function), scenarios in which the honor of the persons involved is evidently affected (as a consequence and not as an intention). In those scenarios, where the disseminated information will inevitably affect some public servant, and where furthermore a sole intent to offend should not be present, the freedoms of information and the press must prevail over the right to honor, since the communicator acts in compliance with their right to inform and does not become liable for the resulting impact on the honor of the officials (which in any case, as already stated, would have its cause in their own acts and not in what is published) related to the news. Of course—it is worth reiterating—that if the information is not of public interest, is intended solely to offend someone, or what is reported is false, then the communicator (and eventually the medium) does become liable for the abuse committed. In summary, both in the Political Constitution and in the international Human Rights provisions applicable in Costa Rica, there are norms that allow for the assertion that public officials (but not private individuals, except in cases where they perform a public function) are subject to public scrutiny of their actions in the exercise of their office, and therefore the freedom to disseminate information about their acts in relation to matters of public interest displaces their right to honor, so that no communicator can be criminally liable for that type of information, unless they acted in an abusive manner. This is because, in accordance with what is established in Article 25 of the Penal Code, a person who legitimately exercises a right does not commit an offense. To what has already been set forth, it must be added that there are also legal provisions that reinforce the criterion upheld here. Of special importance is what is established in Articles 113 and 114 of the General Law of Public Administration. The first of them provides: "1. The public servant must perform their duties in such a way that they primarily satisfy the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the governed. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may conflict. 3. In assessing the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, to which mere convenience can never be placed above." For its part, the second of the mentioned numerals stipulates: "1. The public servant shall be a servant of the governed, in general, and in particular of each individual or governed person who interacts with them by virtue of the function they perform; each governed person must be considered in the individual case as a representative of the community upon which the official depends and for whose interests they must ensure. 2. Without prejudice to what other laws establish for the servant, any act, fact, or omission that, through their fault or negligence, causes unjustified or arbitrary hindrances or obstacles to the governed shall be considered, especially, irregular performance of their function." As can be seen, the legislator grants great importance to the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of administrative activity, so much so that it formulates the principle of objectivity of public service as acting for the sake of satisfying said interest.

Furthermore, the duty of public servants to render accounts is evident; they must consider themselves—in each specific case—servants of the person with whom they interact by virtue of the position they hold (it should be noted that these provisions have existed since 1978, so that if they were linked to the prior wording of Article 11 of the Constitution, the enshrinement in the Costa Rican legal system of the principle of accountability was evident, even before the constitutional reform of the year 2000 alluded to previously). This further highlights the public nature of officials' actions concerning the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the position they occupy.

In this context, it is unthinkable—unless one disregards the democratic principle established in the Political Constitution—to criminally sanction a person who acts in accordance with their right to disseminate information related to the actions of state officials in matters of public interest, unless they have incurred some abuse (such as those set forth above) when making the information public.

It is appropriate to mention that the thesis set forth throughout these lines is complemented by the provisions of the second part of Article 389 of the Penal Code. In that legal text, despite referring to a contravention, it is observed that the legislator provided not to sanction reasoned criticism (insults are another matter) of persons and institutions when it concerns matters of public interest, as this Chamber has set forth in this judgment. The foregoing reinforces the point that the legitimate exercise (that is, without incurring abuses) of the freedoms of information and the press in these cases does not permit the punishment of the person who expresses themselves. Finally, it is important to reiterate that although the problem of the clash of rights has been referred to here in the case of public servants in the exercise of their duties, it is also possible—depending on the significance of each specific case—that the freedoms of information and the press justify public discussion (and therefore the dissemination of information on the subject) of actions by persons who are not vested as state officials but who perform a function that is indeed public, as could be the case of concessionaires of public services or works and notaries, only, that is, in what pertains to the public facet of their behavior and without the communicators incurring abuses.

V.

In the present case, the Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela determined that the proven facts do not generate any criminal liability for the defendants. From folio 367 onward, the reasons why the judging body reached that conclusion are set forth. It is evident that the public interest involved in the use of state vehicles was considered. It is precisely for this reason that the journalistic investigation was conducted, to determine whether the complaint by neighbors of Cedral stating that a vehicle from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport had been seen days earlier parked next to a bar, which they deem as improper use of the motor vehicle, had any basis. Due to this unease, on October 7, 1999, a cameraman from Noti-Catorce was sent to confirm—by video recording—whether the vehicle was indeed at that location. This turned out to be true, and for that reason, explanations were sought from the Regional Chief of the aforementioned ministerial portfolio, who was the one who revealed the name of the servant using said vehicle.

Based on these elements, the court of instance—with good judgment—discarded any purely offensive intent on the part of the defendants. Rather, what the lower court did was highlight the rectitude in the actions of the latter, who at all times adhered to their right to disseminate information pertaining to matters of public interest. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, his name came to light, and it is understandable that he did not like being questioned. But he was a public official at the time of the events, so he was subject to the duty to render accounts for his actions. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 221 through 243 of the Traffic Law, there are certain restrictions on the use of state vehicles (which vary depending on whether they are motor vehicles for administrative use, discretionary use, or use by police forces), among which is included (Article 234, subsection a) of the last cited normative text) using vehicles for administrative use in activities other than the normal ones of the institution. Therefore, observing one of these motor vehicles next to a bar during working hours is something that reasonably generates concerns and warrants the development of an investigation. Moreover, the intervention of the press in these cases is completely legitimate in a democratic State, since the aim is to verify that public resources are used appropriately by the servants, so it is indeed a matter of public interest, given that the issue at hand concerns the community.

It should be added that at no time did the communicators attribute to Vargas Núñez the commission of a fault, much less a crime, but simply asked for explanations as to why the aforementioned motor vehicle was at that site at the time it was filmed. This last point reveals that this is nothing more than the exercise of the right to inform the community about a matter of public interest. The aim was never to injure the plaintiff's honor; he was only asked to render accounts, without any abuse whatsoever on the part of the representatives of Noti-Catorce. In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber indeed does not perceive that the defendants have committed any crime for which they must answer, and in that sense, the decision of the Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela is in accordance with the Law. It must be added that although the judgment cites the Press Law and not the Radio and Television Law, the point is irrelevant, since in any case we are in the presence of a ground for justification (the legitimate exercise of a right, regulated in Article 25 of the Penal Code) which, in any scenario, would exonerate the accused from criminal liability. Furthermore, it should be noted that the existence of the journalistic information is deemed accredited, but—for the reasons already mentioned, that is, due to the concurrence of a ground for justification—it does not constitute any crime.

It is also necessary to highlight that certainly the exercise of journalism is not per se a permit to affect the honor of persons, but it must also be recognized that in any case communicators are liable only when they abuse their profession (Article 29 of the Constitution), and moreover, said legal interest is not affected when it concerns truthful information (such as the fact that the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was parked next to a bar during working hours, which warranted the investigation) related to matters of public interest in which State servants are involved.

Finally, it must be said that in this case, the truthfulness of the information disseminated by Noti-Catorce has been verified by the sentencing body, so there is no reason whatsoever to think that the servants of the television medium (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) or of the company owning that enterprise, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), did not verify that what was broadcast by the newscast was true, and therefore the claim regarding this point becomes unfounded. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber considers that in the present case, no breach of substantive law has occurred, since the conduct of the defendants finds support in the ground for justification provided for in Article 25 of the Penal Code, based on which this ground of the appeal is declared without merit."

IV.The events of interest here – namely, the video recording of the plaintiff's vehicle, as well as the information disclosed by Noti-Catorce and the response given by Vargas Núñez to said newscast's reports – occurred between October and December 1999. At that time, the Political Constitution provided in its Article 11 as follows: "*Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and may not arrogate powers the law does not grant them. They must swear an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public.*" (It should be noted that following the constitutional reform carried out by Law No. 8003 of June 8, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of June 30, 2000, said article of the Constitution was amended and a provision was added to the effect that public officials must fulfill the duties the law imposes on them; moreover, the principle of accountability was formally established, aspects which this Chamber considers – as will be seen throughout this Recital – could be inferred from the prior wording combined with provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, although the reform certainly makes the constitutional rank of said principle easier to appreciate). As can be observed, the Fundamental Law (as applicable to the specific case) clearly establishes that public servants are subject to the legal system; that is what derives from them being described as mere "depositaries of authority"; in other words, they are not above the Law. In that vein, it follows from the constitutional provision under discussion (a precept revitalized by the aforementioned 2000 reform) that public officials are bound by permissive norms, as well as by mandatory and prohibitive ones, it being added that they may only do that which the law expressly authorizes them to do. Thus, *in Costa Rica every public official* (whether popularly elected, appointed by another or by a collegial body, or having obtained the position through competition; whether permanent, substitute, or interim; appointed indefinitely or for a term; holding a position of trust or enjoying employment stability; whether a career official or not; etc.) *is exposed, from the moment they assume office, to the oversight of their acts in the performance of said office*. This is because everything that person does by reason of the public post they occupy is of interest to the generality of the inhabitants of the Republic, since the objective is to ensure that they act, as a servant, in strict conformity with the legal system. That constant supervision of their acts is one of the consequences entailed by being a public servant, so that whoever assumes a position of this nature implicitly accepts that their performance will be publicly examined. By virtue of their investiture, the official is subject to the principle of legality, according to which they are only authorized to do that which the law – in a broad sense and in accordance with the normative hierarchy – expressly permits, everything else being prohibited. *Thus, holding a public office entails for the person a subjection to controls, which have been conceived to verify that the exercise of the powers deriving from the post is correct, as well as to prevent non-compliance with the duties inherent to the office*. Now, these controls include not only the institutionalized ones (such as those pertaining to the Public Administration itself, as well as the judicial ones), but in a democratic State – the Constitution defines Costa Rica as such in its Article 1 – it is also necessary to consider the role of communicators. If every human being has the right to be informed, if there furthermore exists the freedom to communicate thoughts and opinions, even by publishing them, and if it is considered that communicators have the profession of gathering data, analyzing them, and based on them informing others about topics of interest to them, then it is evident that the practice of journalism is a perfect manifestation of the freedoms of information and of the press. In that regard, *it is irrefutable that the mass media, journalists, and other communicators have the right to inform – by making public the data they handle – the inhabitants*. That is the premise that must prevail in a democratic society. The foregoing requires certain clarifications when dealing with a matter of public interest related to the performance of a state servant. The first is that a *matter of public interest* is anything that can reasonably be presumed to coincidentally attract the individual interest of the administered persons (Article 113(1) of the General Law of Public Administration); note that by speaking of "administered persons," it becomes evident that this refers to topics related to the running of the State (in a broad sense, that is, the Government of the Republic – described in Article 9 of the Constitution – and the other public entities) and the management of its resources, aspects that can validly be presumed to interest the generality of a country's inhabitants, since it is they who contribute to defraying the State's expenses. The second is that normally, in matters of public interest, the intervention of a state official occurs, although it is also possible (an aspect that will be seen at the end of this Recital) that there are subjects not invested as public servants who carry out a task that is indeed public, for which reason they would also be subject to the oversight of their actions in the exercise of that public function. Thus, *in the case of matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and of the press that protect communicators are so important, as they constitute one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State, that if confronted with the right to honor that those who perform a public function also hold as persons, the latter may yield to the former, solely regarding the public facet of their conduct. In accordance with that approach, only when abuse is incurred by the communicator when informing will it be possible to place the official's right to honor ahead of the freedoms of information and the press that protect the communicator, as well as the right to be informed that assists every person*. There is a great number of norms that support this position. For example, note that Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the country's inhabitants the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed to examine the public conduct of officials. This is important, since it is obvious that the framers were aware that there are public and private aspects in the behavior of State servants, with only the former being susceptible to open examination and discussion by society. Those public acts of officials are precisely those that have been established here as being related to the performance of the office; the private ones – and therefore not susceptible to being publicly debated – are those pertaining to personal and family privacy not connected with the exercise of the function. If aspects of the public performance of state servants can be publicly debated in a meeting, it is then undeniable that it must be possible to report on their acts so that they may be examined by the inhabitants of the national territory. Moreover, it must be remembered that according to Article 28 of the Constitution, no one may even be disturbed for the expression of their opinions, nor for acts that do not violate the law. As a corollary to the above, it must be observed that Article 29 of the Constitution expressly provides for the possibility for every person to communicate (to direct to another) their thoughts, orally or in writing, and even to publish them (to make them known to the public) without prior censorship, so that they will only be responsible if they abuse these rights. In that vein, it follows that the exercise of the communicators' activity, which is indispensable to guarantee the right to be informed that assists every person, allows for freely informing about aspects related to the development of the public function, this being a matter of evident public interest. *Only when the freedoms of information and the press are abused (as could be the case when false data is knowingly disclosed, when no attempt is made to obtain the official's version to offer balanced information, when the servant is denied their rights of rectification and/or reply, when merely private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position the person holds are involved, when it is stated as certain to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial sentence to that effect, when the sole intention is to offend someone – an aspect that must be examined on a case-by-case basis and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which some information is disclosed, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news or the commentary surrounding it is presented, or similar situations) can the communicator be held liable, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding its scope of protection*. Such abuse is not protected by the legal system (Article 29 of the Constitution in relation to Article 22 of the Civil Code), so that communicator who engages in abusive conduct must answer for their acts (which could even eventually entail the liability of the medium that disseminated the information). Now, the aforementioned constitutional norms are complemented by provisions of International Human Rights Law. For example, Article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* provides that every person may disseminate information, while at the same time guaranteeing the right of every individual to be informed. Note that this international instrument only protects human beings from arbitrary interference in their private life (Article 12); that is, what could be understood as public life (that related to the performance of a public office) is susceptible to examination by the generality of persons, and therefore free information regarding it may be given. For its part, the *American Convention on Human Rights* is broader in the regulation of these topics. Thus, Article 13 guarantees the right to receive and disseminate information, with the communicator being liable only after the dissemination of the information and for the situations established by law. For its part, Article 11 provides that every person has the right to have their honor respected and their dignity recognized, adding later that no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in the sphere of their private life. It is clear that the coexistence of these two provisions in the same normative text reveals that they are complementary. In that sense, *the freedoms of information and of the press related to matters of public interest would displace the protection of honor and dignity as regards public officials; note immediately that this rule would not apply to persons who do not hold such status*. This is because in these cases (when dealing with a matter of public significance related to state servants) what is at issue is not a person's privacy, but rather the manner in which they perform in the exercise of a public office, an aspect which – given the conflict of the legal interests in question, namely the right to honor and the freedoms of information and of the press – is the most important from the viewpoint of the national community. If what is disclosed is correct and indeed corresponds to a matter of public interest, then there is no possibility whatsoever for the official to claim that their honor has been harmed (in any case, if the news concerns some inappropriate act, it would be the servant themselves who harmed their own honor and not the communicator, so that the latter could not be transferred the responsibility of the former). Of course, if the information is false or is not related to a matter of public interest, then one could eventually be faced with one of the cases of abusive conduct mentioned above (which could even constitute a crime) that do entail a finding of liability on the part of the communicator. In that vein, the two international provisions under discussion (Articles 11 and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights), viewed together, reveal that in matters of public interest related to the way servants perform their offices, the right to honor yields before the freedoms of information and of the press, as well as before the right to be informed. To understand that it does not displace it would be tantamount to creating a very broad sphere of topics in which the referred freedoms could not be exercised, which would be an attack on the democratic regime contemplated in the Costa Rican Constitution. In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that Articles 17 and 19 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* also address the problem at hand. The first of them establishes that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, nor to unlawful attacks on their honor or reputation. This wording is important to highlight because – examined *a contrario sensu* – it shows that honor can be legally affected, which reinforces the thesis that there are cases (such as those of interest here) where, despite there being an impact on said legal interest, no one can be held liable for it. This Chamber considers that the foregoing occurs precisely in cases where information is published on matters of public interest related to questionable actions by public officials (or even by persons performing a public function), cases in which the honor of the persons involved is evidently affected (as a consequence and not as an intention). In those cases where what is disclosed will inevitably affect some public servant, and in which no sole intent to offend exists, the freedoms of information and of the press must prevail over the right to honor, since the communicator acts in fulfillment of their right to inform and does not become liable for the consequent impact on the honor of the officials (which in any case, as already stated, would have its cause in their own acts and not in what is published) related to the news. It is clear – it is worth reiterating – that if the information is not of public interest, if the sole purpose is to offend someone, or if what is reported is false, then the communicator (and eventually the medium) becomes liable for the abuse committed. *In summary, both in the Political Constitution and in the applicable international Human Rights provisions in Costa Rica, there are norms that allow for affirming that public officials (but not private individuals, except in cases where they perform a public function) are subjected to public examination of their actions in the exercise of their office, such that the freedom to disseminate information about their acts in relation to matters of public interest displaces their right to honor, meaning that no communicator can be criminally liable for that type of information, unless they acted abusively*. This is because, in accordance with the provisions of Article 25 of the Criminal Code, one who legitimately exercises a right does not commit a crime. To what has already been stated, it must be added that there are also provisions of legal rank that reinforce the criterion upheld here. The provisions of Articles 113 and 114 of the General Law of Public Administration are of special importance. The first of them provides: "*1. The public servant must perform their duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, before which mere convenience can in no case be placed.*" For its part, the second of the mentioned articles stipulates: "*1. The public servant shall be a servant of the administered persons, in general, and in particular of each individual or administered person who interacts with them by virtue of the function they perform; each administered person must be considered in the individual case as a representative of the collectivity on which the official depends and for whose interests they must watch. 2. Without prejudice to what other laws establish for the servant, any act, deed, or omission that through their fault or negligence causes unjustified or arbitrary obstacles or hindrances to the administered persons shall be especially considered irregular performance of their function.*" As can be appreciated, the legislator grants great importance to the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of administrative activity, so much so that it formulates the principle of objectivity of the public function as acting for the sake of satisfying said interest. Moreover, the duty of accountability on the part of public servants is evident; they must consider themselves – in each specific case – servants of the person with whom they interact by virtue of the office they hold (it should be noted that these provisions have existed since 1978, such that if they were related to the previous wording of Article 11 of the Constitution, the enshrinement in the Costa Rican legal system of the principle of accountability was evident, even before the constitutional reform of the year 2000 previously alluded to). This further enhances the public nature of the officials' performance regarding the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the position they occupy. *In that vein, it is unthinkable – unless the democratic principle established in the Political Constitution is ignored – to criminally sanction a person who acts in accordance with their right to disseminate information related to the actions of state officials in matters of public interest, unless they incurred some abuse (such as those set forth above) when making the information public*. It is opportune to mention that the thesis set forth throughout these lines is complemented by the provision in the second part of Article 389 of the Criminal Code. In that legal text, despite referring to a contravention, it is observed that the legislator provided not to sanction reasoned criticism (insults are another matter) of persons and institutions when dealing with matters of public interest, as this Chamber has set forth in this judgment. The foregoing reinforces the point that the legitimate exercise (that is, without incurring abuse) of the freedoms of information and of the press in these cases does not permit the punishment of the person expressing themselves. Lastly, it is important to reiterate that although the problem of the clash of rights has been addressed here with respect to public servants in the exercise of their duties, it is also possible – depending on the significance of each specific case – for the freedoms of information and of the press to justify the public discussion (and therefore the dissemination of information on the topic) of actions by persons who are not invested as state officials but who perform a function that is indeed public, as could be the case with concessionaires of public services or works and notaries, that is, only regarding the public facet of their behavior and provided the communicators do not incur abuse.

V.In the present case, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela determined that the proven facts do not generate any criminal liability for the defendants. Beginning at folio 367, the reasons why the judging body reached that conclusion are set forth. It is readily apparent that the public interest regarding the use of state vehicles was considered. It is precisely for this reason that the journalistic investigation was carried out: to determine whether the complaint from residents of Cedral—that a vehicle of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport had been seen days earlier parked next to a bar, which they considered an improper use of the vehicle—had any basis. Because of that unease, on October 7, 1999, a cameraman from Noti-Catorce was sent to confirm—by video recording—whether the vehicle was indeed at the place. This turned out to be true, and for that reason, explanations were sought from the Regional Chief of the aforementioned ministry, who was the one who revealed the name of the public servant using that vehicle. Based on these elements, the lower court—with good judgment—dismissed any purely offensive intent on the part of the defendants. Rather, what the a-quo did was highlight the uprightness in the actions of the latter, who at all times adhered to their right to disseminate information relevant to matters of public interest. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, his name came to light, and it is logical that he did not appreciate being questioned. But he was a public official at the time of the facts, and therefore he was subject to the duty of being accountable for his acts. Moreover, pursuant to articles 221 through 243 of the Ley de Tránsito, there are certain restrictions on the use of state vehicles (which vary depending on whether the vehicles are for administrative use, discretionary use, or use by police forces), among which is included (article 234, subsection a) of the last-cited regulatory text) using vehicles for administrative use in activities that are not the normal activities of the institution. For this reason, observing one of these vehicles beside a bar during working hours is something that reasonably generates concerns and warrants an investigation. Furthermore, the intervention of the press in these cases is completely legitimate in a democratic State, since what is at issue is verifying that public resources are being used properly by public servants, so that it is indeed a matter of public interest, inasmuch as the problem at hand concerns the community. It should be added that at no time did the communicators accuse Vargas Núñez of having committed a fault, much less a crime, but rather they simply asked for explanations as to why the aforementioned vehicle was at that location at the time it was filmed. This last point reveals that this is nothing more than the exercise of the right to inform the community about a matter of public interest. There was never any intent to injure the plaintiff's honor; he was only asked to be accountable, without any abuse whatsoever by the representatives of Noti-Catorce. In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber indeed finds no appreciation that the defendants committed any crime for which they must answer, and in that sense, the decision of the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela is legally appropriate. It must be added that although the judgment indeed cites the Ley de Imprenta and not the Ley de Radio y Televisión, the point is irrelevant, since in any case this involves a ground for justification (the legitimate exercise of a right, regulated in Article 25 of the Código Penal) which in any scenario would exonerate the accused from criminal liability. Moreover, it should be noted that the existence of the journalistic reports is considered proven, but—for the reasons already mentioned, that is, due to the concurrence of a ground for justification—they do not constitute any crime. It is also necessary to emphasize that certainly the exercise of journalism is not per se a license to affect the honor of individuals, but it must also be recognized that in any case, communicators are only liable when they abuse their profession (Article 29 of the Constitution) and furthermore, that legal interest is not affected when dealing with truthful information (such as the fact that the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was parked next to a bar during working hours, which warranted the investigation) related to matters of public interest involving state public servants. Finally, it must be said that in this case, the truthfulness of the information broadcast by Noti-Catorce has been verified by the sentencing court, so there is no reason whatsoever to think that the employees of the television medium (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) or of the company that owns that enterprise, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), did not verify that what was disclosed by the news program was true, and therefore the claim regarding this point becomes unfounded. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber finds that in the instant case, no violation of substantive law has occurred, since the conduct of the defendants finds support in the ground for justification provided for in Article 25 of the Código Penal, on the basis of which **this aspect of the appeal is declared without merit**.

IV.The events of interest here—namely, the video recording of the plaintiff's vehicle, as well as the information disseminated by Noti-Catorce and the response given by Vargas Núñez to said newscast's reports—occurred between October and December 1999. At that time, the Political Constitution provided in its article 11 the following: "*Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and cannot arrogate to themselves powers the law does not grant them. They must swear an oath to observe and uphold this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public.*" (It should be noted that after the constitutional reform enacted through Law No. 8003 of June 8, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of June 30, 2000, said article of the Constitution was modified and a provision was added to the effect that public officials must fulfill the duties the law imposes on them; furthermore, the principle of accountability was formally established, aspects that this Chamber considers—as will be seen throughout this Considerando—could be inferred from the prior wording in conjunction with provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, although certainly the reform makes it easier to appreciate the constitutional rank of said principle). As can be observed, the Fundamental Law (as applicable to the specific case) clearly establishes that public servants are subject to the legal system; that is what derives from their being characterized as mere "depositaries of authority"; in other words, they are not above the Law. In this regard, it follows from the constitutional provision under discussion (a precept that is revitalized with the aforementioned reform of the year 2000) that public officials are bound by both permissive norms, as well as mandating and prohibitive ones, it also being added that they may only do that which the law expressly authorizes them. Thus, *in Costa Rica, every public official* (whether popularly elected, appointed by another or a collegiate body, or having won the position through competitive examination; whether permanent, substitute, or interim; appointed indefinitely or for a term; whether holding a position of trust or enjoying employment stability; whether a career official or not; etc.) *is exposed, from the moment they assume office, to the oversight of their acts in the performance of their duties*. This is because everything that person does by reason of the public office they hold is of interest to the general populace of the Republic, since the objective is to ensure that they act, as a servant, in strict conformity with the legal system. That constant supervision of their acts is one of the consequences of being a public servant, so that whoever assumes a position of this nature implicitly accepts that their conduct will be publicly examined. By virtue of their investiture, the official is subject to the principle of legality, according to which they are only authorized to do what the law—in a broad sense and in accordance with the normative hierarchy—expressly permits, everything else being prohibited. *Thus, performing a public function entails for the person a subjection to controls, which have been conceived to verify that the exercise of the powers deriving from the position is correct, as well as to prevent non-compliance with the duties inherent to the office*. Now, these controls include not only the institutionalized ones (such as those belonging to the Public Administration itself, as well as the judicial ones), but in a democratic State—the Constitution defines Costa Rica as such in its article 1—it is also necessary to consider the role of communicators. If every human being has the right to be informed, if there also exists the freedom to communicate thoughts and opinions, even publishing them, and if it is considered that communicators have as their profession the gathering of data, analyzing them, and, based on them, informing others about topics that interest them, then it is evident that the practice of journalism is a perfect manifestation of the freedoms of information and of the press. In this regard, *it is irrefutable that the mass media, journalists, and other communicators have the right to inform—by making public the data they handle—the inhabitants*. That is the premise that must prevail in a democratic society. The foregoing requires certain clarifications when one is faced with a matter of public interest related to the actions of a state servant. The first is that a *matter of public interest* is anything that can reasonably be presumed to coincidentally attract the individual interest of the administered persons (article 113, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration); note that by speaking of "administered persons," it is evidenced that these are matters related to the running of the State (in a broad sense, that is, the Government of the Republic—described in article 9 of the Constitution—and the other public entities) and the management of its resources, aspects that can validly be presumed to interest the generality of the inhabitants of a country, since they are the ones who contribute to defraying the State's expenses. The second is that what is normal, in the case of matters of public interest, is that the intervention of a state official is involved, although it is also possible (an aspect that will be seen at the end of this Considerando) that there are subjects not vested as public servants who carry out a task that is indeed public, for which reason they would also be subject to the oversight of their actions in the exercise of that public function. Thus, *in the case of matters of public interest, the freedoms of information and of the press that protect communicators are so important, as they constitute one of the means of controlling public management in a democratic State, that if they are confronted with the right to honor that those who perform a public function also hold as persons, the latter may yield to the former, but only insofar as the public facet of their conduct is concerned. In accordance with this approach, only when abuse is incurred by the communicator when informing will it be possible to place the official's right to honor above the freedoms of information and of the press that protect the communicator, as well as above the right to be informed that every person possesses*. There is a vast number of norms that support this position. For example, observe that article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the country's inhabitants the right to assemble peacefully and without arms to examine the public conduct of officials. This is important, as it is evident that the framers were aware that there are public and private aspects in the behavior of State servants, only the former being susceptible to open examination and discussion by society. Those public acts of officials are precisely those that have been established here as related to the fulfillment of their office; the private ones—and therefore not susceptible to public debate—are those pertaining to personal and family privacy not connected with the exercise of the function. If aspects of the public actions of state servants can be publicly debated in a meeting, then it is undeniable that it must be possible to inform about their acts so they can be examined by the inhabitants of the national territory. Furthermore, it must be remembered that according to article 28 of the Constitution, no one may even be disturbed for expressing their opinions, nor for acts that do not violate the law. As a corollary to the foregoing, it should be observed that article 29 of the Constitution expressly provides for the possibility that every person may communicate (that is, direct to another) their thoughts, by word or in writing, and even publish them (make them known publicly) without prior censorship, so that they will only be liable if they abuse these rights. In this regard, it turns out that the exercise of the activity of communicators, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the right to be informed that every person possesses, allows for freely informing about aspects related to the exercise of public functions, this being a matter of evident public interest. *Only when the freedoms of information and of the press are abused (as could be the case if false data are disclosed knowingly, if an attempt is not made to obtain the official's version to offer balanced information, if the servant's rights of rectification and/or reply are denied, if it concerns purely private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position the person holds, if it is presented as certain to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial sentence to that effect in place, if the sole intention is to offend someone—an aspect that must be examined case by case and in which various factors could be relevant, such as the context in which some information is disclosed, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news or comments surrounding it are presented, or similar situations) may the communicator be held liable, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding its scope of protection*. That abuse is not protected by the legal system (article 29 of the Constitution in relation to article 22 of the Civil Code), so that communicator who incurs in abusive conduct shall be held answerable for their acts (which could even eventually entail the liability of the media outlet that disseminated the information). Now, the aforementioned constitutional regulations are complemented by provisions of International Humanitarian Law. For example, article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* provides that every person may disseminate information, while simultaneously guaranteeing the right of every individual to be informed. Note that this international instrument only protects the human being from arbitrary interference in their private life (article 12); meaning that what could be understood as public life (that related to the performance of a public office) is susceptible to examination by the general populace and, therefore, free information regarding it may be given. For its part, the *American Convention on Human Rights* is broader in its regulation of these matters. Thus, article 13 guarantees the right to receive and disseminate information, the communicator being liable only after the dissemination of the information and for the situations established by law. For its part, article 11 provides that every person has the right to have their honor and dignity respected, it being added later that no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in the sphere of their private life. It is clear that the coexistence of these two provisions in the same normative text reveals that they are complementary. In that sense, *the freedoms of information and of the press related to matters of public interest would displace the protection of honor and dignity insofar as public officials are concerned; it is noted immediately that this rule would not apply to persons who do not hold such a status*. This is because in these cases (when one is faced with a matter of public significance related to state servants), what is involved is not the privacy of a person, but rather the manner in which they perform in the exercise of a public office, an aspect that—in light of the conflict of the legal interests in question, namely the right to honor and the freedoms of information and of the press—is the most important from the perspective of the national community. If what is disseminated is correct and indeed corresponds to a matter of public interest, then there is no possibility whatsoever for the official to claim that their honor has been injured (in any case, if the news is about some inappropriate act, the one who would have injured their honor would be the servant themselves and not the communicator, so that the liability of the former could not be transferred to the latter). Of course, if the information is false or is not related to a matter of public interest, then one could eventually be faced with one of the cases of abusive conduct mentioned supra (which could even constitute a crime) that do entail a declaration of liability for the communicator. In this regard, the two international provisions under discussion (articles 11 and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights), viewed together, reveal that in the case of matters of public interest relating to the manner in which servants perform their offices, the right to honor yields to the freedoms of information and of the press, as well as to the right to be informed. To understand that it does not displace it would be tantamount to creating a very broad sphere of topics in which the referred freedoms could not be exercised, which would be an attack against the democratic regime contemplated in the Costa Rican Constitution. In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that articles 17 and 19 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* also address the problem before us. The first of these establishes that no one may be subjected to arbitrary or illegal interference in their private life, nor to illegal attacks on their honor or reputation. This wording is important to highlight because—examined *a contrario sensu*—it shows that honor can be legally affected, which reinforces the thesis that there are cases (such as those of interest here) where, despite an impact on said legal interest, no one can be held liable for it. This Chamber considers that the foregoing occurs precisely in cases where information is published about matters of public interest related to questionable actions by public officials (or even by persons performing a public function), cases in which the honor of the persons involved is evidently affected (as a consequence and not as an intention). In those cases where what is disclosed will inevitably affect some public servant, and in which, moreover, a sole intent to offend is not involved, the freedoms of information and of the press must prevail over the right to honor, since the communicator acts in compliance with their right to inform and does not become liable for the consequent impact on the honor of the officials (which, in any case, as already stated, would have its cause in their own acts and not in what is published) related to the news. Of course—it is worth reiterating—that if the information is not of public interest, the only aim is to offend someone, or what is reported is false, then the communicator (and eventually the media outlet) does become liable for the abuse committed. *In summary, both in the Political Constitution and in the international Human Rights provisions applicable in Costa Rica, there is a legal framework that allows affirming that public officials (but not private individuals, except in cases where they perform a public function) are subject to the public examination of their actions in the exercise of their office, so that the freedom to disseminate information about their acts in relation to matters of public interest displaces their right to honor, meaning that no communicator can be criminally liable for that type of information, unless they had acted abusively*. This is because, in accordance with the provisions of article 25 of the Penal Code, whoever legitimately exercises a right does not commit a crime. To what has already been set forth, it must be added that there are also provisions of legal rank that reinforce the criterion upheld here. Of special importance are the provisions of articles 113 and 114 of the General Law of Public Administration. The first of these provides: "*1. The public servant shall perform their functions in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, which may in no case be superseded by mere convenience.*" For its part, the second of the mentioned articles stipulates: "*1. The public servant shall be a servant of the administered persons, in general, and in particular of each individual or administered person who relates to them by virtue of the function they perform; each administered person shall be considered in the individual case as a representative of the collectivity upon which the official depends and for whose interests they must watch. 2. Without prejudice to what other laws establish for the servant, any act, deed, or omission that through their fault or negligence causes unjustified or arbitrary obstacles or hindrances to the administered persons shall be considered, especially, irregular performance of their function.*" As can be appreciated, the legislator grants great importance to the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of administrative activity, so much so that it formulates the principle of objectivity of the public function as acting for the sake of satisfying said interest. Moreover, the duty of accountability on the part of public servants is evident; they must consider themselves—in each specific case—servants of the person with whom they relate by virtue of the position they hold (it should be noted that these provisions have existed since 1978, so that if they were related to the prior wording of article 11 of the Constitution, the enshrinement in the Costa Rican legal system of the principle of accountability was evident, even before the constitutional reform of the year 2000 previously alluded to). This further enhances the public nature of officials' actions regarding the fulfillment of the powers inherent to the position they occupy. *In this regard, it is unthinkable—unless the democratic principle established in the Political Constitution is disregarded—to criminally sanction a person who acts in accordance with their right to disseminate information related to the actions of state officials in matters of public interest, unless they have incurred in some abuse (such as those set forth above) when making the information public*. It is opportune to mention that the thesis set forth throughout these lines is complemented by the provisions of the second part of article 389 of the Penal Code. In that legal text, despite referring to a contravention, it is observed that the legislator provided for not sanctioning reasoned criticism (insults being another matter) of persons and institutions when it concerns matters of public interest, as this Chamber has set forth in the present judgment. The foregoing reinforces the point that the legitimate exercise (that is, without incurring in abuses) of the freedoms of information and of the press in these cases does not permit the punishment of the person expressing themselves. Finally, it is important to reiterate that while it is true that the problem of the clash of rights has been referred to here in the case of public servants in the exercise of their powers, it is also possible—depending on the significance of each specific case—that the freedoms of information and of the press justify the public discussion (and therefore the dissemination of information on the subject) of actions by persons who are not vested as state officials but who perform a function that is indeed public, as could be the case with concessionaires of public services or works and notaries, being understood, of course, only insofar as the public facet of their behavior is concerned and without communicators incurring in abuses.

V.In the present case, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela determined that the proven facts do not generate any criminal liability for the defendants. From page 367 onward, the reasons why the adjudicating body reached that conclusion are set forth. It is readily apparent that the public interest involved in the use of state vehicles was considered. It was precisely for that reason that the journalistic investigation was carried out: to determine whether the complaint by residents of Cedral had any basis, namely that a vehicle of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport had been seen days earlier parked next to a bar, which they considered to be improper use of the motor vehicle. Due to that discontent, on October 7, 1999, a cameraman from Noti-Catorce was sent to confirm—by video recording—whether the vehicle was indeed in that location. This proved to be true, and therefore explanations were sought from the Regional Chief of the aforementioned ministry, who was the one who revealed the name of the public servant using said vehicle. Based on those elements, the lower court—with sound judgment—ruled out any purely offensive intent on the part of the defendants. Rather, the a-quo highlighted the rectitude of the latter’s actions, who at all times adhered to their right to disseminate information pertaining to matters of public interest. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, his name came to light, and it is logical that he did not like being questioned. But he was a public official at the time of the facts, and therefore he was subject to the duty to account for his actions. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 221 through 243 of the Transit Law, there are certain restrictions on the use of state vehicles (which vary depending on whether they are motor vehicles for administrative use, discretionary use, or use by police forces), among which is included (Article 234, subsection a) of the last cited regulatory text) using vehicles for administrative use in activities other than the normal activities of the institution. For that reason, seeing one of these motor vehicles next to a bar during working hours is something that reasonably raises concerns and warrants the development of an investigation. Moreover, the intervention of the press in these cases is completely legitimate in a democratic State, since what is at stake is verifying that public resources are used appropriately by public servants, so that it is indeed a matter of public interest, given that the issue under discussion concerns the community. It should be added that at no time did the communicators accuse Vargas Núñez of having committed a fault, much less a crime, but rather they simply asked for explanations as to why the aforementioned motor vehicle was at that site at the time it was filmed. This last point reveals that this is nothing more than the exercise of the right to inform the community about a matter of public interest. It was never intended to harm the plaintiff's honor; he was only asked to render accounts, with no abuse whatsoever on the part of Noti-Catorce’s personnel. In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber indeed does not find that the defendants committed any crime for which they must answer, and in that sense, the decision of the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela is in accordance with the Law. It must be added that, although it is true that the judgment cites the Press Law and not the Radio and Television Law, this point is irrelevant, since in any case we are in the presence of a ground for justification (the legitimate exercise of a right, regulated in Article 25 of the Penal Code) that would, in any scenario, exonerate the accused from criminal liability. Furthermore, it should be noted that the existence of the journalistic reports is taken as proven, but—for the reasons already mentioned, that is, due to the concurrence of a ground for justification—they do not constitute any crime. It is also necessary to emphasize that certainly the practice of journalism is not per se a license to harm people's honor, but it must also be recognized that in any case the communicators answer only when they abuse their profession (Article 29 of the Constitution), and furthermore, said legal right is not harmed when it concerns true information (such as the fact that the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was parked next to a bar during working hours, which warranted the investigation) related to matters of public interest involving State servants. Finally, it must be said that in this case, the truthfulness of the information disseminated by Noti-Catorce has been verified by the sentencing body, so there is no reason to believe that the employees of the television medium (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) or of the company that owns that enterprise, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), failed to verify that what was broadcast by the newscast was true, and therefore the claim on this point is unfounded. By virtue of all the above, this Chamber considers that in the case at hand there has been no violation whatsoever of the substantive law, given that the defendants' conduct finds support in the ground for justification provided for in Article 25 of the Penal Code, on the basis of which **this ground of the appeal is declared without merit**.

"I. El licenciado Juan Luis Vargas Alfaro, apoderado especial judicial del querellante y actor civil, José Francisco Vargas Núñez, interpone recurso de casación contra la sentencia N° 174-2001, dictada por el Tribunal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sede Ciudad Quesada, a las 17:00 horas del 11 de octubre de 2001. Mediante dicho fallo, visible a folio 284, se absolvió de toda responsabilidad y pena a Sonia Jiménez González, Karla María Herrera Masís, Virginia Patricia Luna Salas (c.c. Vicky), Juan Vicente Muñoz Ramírez, Jorge Gutiérrez Espeleta y Jorge Eduardo Rojas Bolaños por los delitos de calumnias, difamación y publicación de ofensas que se les atribuían en perjuicio de José Francisco Vargas Núñez. Asimismo, se declaró sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria promovida contra los querellados, así como contra la Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), Noticias del Norte Noti-Catorce, S.A. y T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A. También se dispuso la condena del querellante al pago de las costas personales y procesales en que incurrieron los querellados Muñoz Ramírez, Gutiérrez Espeleta, Rojas Bolaños, así como los demandados civiles Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. y T.V. Norte Canal Catorce, S.A. II. Como primer motivo por el fondo, el licenciado Vargas Alfaro acusa el quebranto, por aplicación indebida, de los artículos 11, 28, 29, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, así como los numerales 1, 25, 30, 31, 145, 146 y 147 del Código Penal y 7 de la Ley de Imprenta. Asimismo, estima que se dejaron de aplicar los artículos 17 inciso d) de la Ley de Radio y Televisión, así como los numerales 18, 22, 45, 71, 73, 74, 76, 152 y 155 del Código Penal. Luego de resumir los hechos que el a-quo tuvo por demostrados, así como el razonamiento expuesto por el cuerpo juzgador para acreditar dicho cuadro fáctico y el referido a las consecuencias jurídicas de éste, procede el recurrente a exponer los argumentos para sustentar su disconformidad. Primero sostiene que se aplicó erróneamente la Ley de Imprenta en esta causa, pese a que se trata de un medio televisivo el involucrado, el cual no está cubierto por aquel texto legal. Luego, dice que los hechos querellados efectivamente se dieron y son constitutivos de los delitos de injurias, difamación y publicación de ofensas. Estima que las informaciones divulgadas por Noti-Catorce los días 1 y 3 de noviembre, así como el 2 de diciembre, todos de 1999, son lesivas del honor de su patrocinado. Considera que el ejercicio del periodismo no exime a los reporteros ni a los medios de comunicación del deber de responder por los daños y perjuicios que causan con ocasión de su actividad. Afirma que los directores del canal de televisión tienen una posición de garante respecto de la veracidad de las informaciones que se transmiten por dicho medio. El reclamo es improcedente. De previo a exponer las razones por las cuales estima esta Sala que no se configuran los vicios apuntados por el licenciado Vargas Alfaro, es pertinente recordar –de forma resumida- los hechos que el a-quo tuvo por demostrados. A partir del folio 341 puede apreciarse que para el Tribunal de instancia, se pudo probar lo siguiente: a) Debido a denuncias de habitantes de la región sobre mal uso de bienes públicos, referidas en particular a vehículos estacionados frente a locales donde se vende licor, la dirección de Noti-Catorce decidió realizar un reportaje sobre el problema; b) Antes del 7 de octubre de 1999, Noti-Catorce recibió denuncias de vecinos de Cedral, quienes afirmaron que un vehículo del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes se ubicaba frente al Bar Las Cañitas, por lo que ese 7 de octubre la dirección del noticiero indicado envió al camarógrafo William Murillo Cordero a realizar tomas del lugar, en virtud de lo cual se logró verificar que ciertamente el automotor placas 202-463 de dicha cartera ministerial estaba estacionado a un costado del bar, que se encontraba abierto; posteriormente se supo que el vehículo mencionado estaba asignado al aquí querellante; c) Luego de que se efectuaron las tomas supra indicadas y antes de los días 1 y 2 de noviembre de 1999, las querelladas Jiménez González, Herrera Masís y Luna Salas trataron de obtener la versión del ingeniero René Quirós Alpízar, Jefe de la Zona 2-3 de la sede del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes en San Carlos, así como la del querellante José Francisco Vargas Núñez, sin que fuera posible contactar a este último, aunque sí al primero, quien fue el que dijo que el vehículo en mención estaba asignado a Vargas Núñez; d) El lunes 1 y el miércoles 3, ambos de noviembre de 1999, con la presentación de las querelladas Herrera Masís y Jiménez González, Noti-Catorce difundió las imágenes grabadas el 7 de octubre anterior en el noticiero que se proyecta de lunes a viernes entre las 19:00 y las 20:00 horas, por los canales 14 y 16 de televisión; la difusión de estas imágenes –en las que se observa el vehículo del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes supra mencionado estacionado a un costado del Bar Las Cañitas- obedecía a que con ellas se ilustraba una información divulgada por ese medio televisivo; se indicó en el noticiero que ante la denuncia de varios vecinos de Cedral, Noti-Catorce acudió a grabar la prueba y encontró un vehículo de la cartera ministerial tantas veces mencionada, estacionado a la par del local ya indicado; se dijo –alguno de esos dos días- que existe un reglamento para el uso de los automotores y se agregó que ya en una oportunidad, con ocasión de una denuncia de vecinos de Cedral, se despidió a dos funcionarios del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía que fueron vistos en el Bar Biriteca; e) Vargas Núñez no pudo ser habido –pese a que se le buscó- antes del 3 de noviembre de 1999, fecha en que se trató este tema por segunda vez en Noti-Catorce, pero el 4 de dicho mes se presentó al canal de televisión para ejercer su derecho de respuesta y así expuso su versión en el sentido de que el día en que se efectuaron las tomas, él estaba realizando una inspección de un tanque de agua que se rebalsaba, causando daños a la vía asfáltica, mas no desmintió la ubicación del vehículo; f) El 2 de diciembre de 1999, Noti-Catorce informa sobre la inminente destitución del querellante como servidor del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, noticia que ilustra con las tomas efectuadas el 7 de octubre de ese mismo año. III. De conformidad con el elenco de hechos que el cuerpo juzgador tuvo por probados (resumido en el Considerando anterior), estima esta Sala que lleva razón el a-quo al determinar que en la especie no se ha producido delito alguno en perjuicio del querellante José Francisco Vargas Núñez, por lo que la absolutoria dictada resulta conforme a Derecho. El conflicto entre el derecho al honor y las libertades de información y prensa es uno de los más difíciles de resolver, pues se está ante derechos fundamentales de la persona y ello obliga a definir muy bien cuándo alguno de ellos tiene primacía sobre los otros. El problema no se resuelve teniendo en cuenta solamente lo dispuesto en el Código Penal, sino que debe partirse directamente de la Constitución y de la normativa internacional sobre derechos humanos para así comprender los alcances de la legislación punitiva. En ese sentido, lo primero que debe decirse es que el honor está comprendido como uno de los intereses morales a los que se refiere el artículo 41 constitucional y está expresamente previsto en el artículo 11 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en el que establece que toda persona tiene derecho a que se respete su honra. Así, es evidente que se está ante un bien jurídico esencial de la condición humana, por lo que –partiendo de lo anterior- su tutela mediante el Derecho Penal resulta conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico. Lo que sucede es que igualmente fundamentales para el ser humano son las libertades de información y de prensa, siendo esta última una derivación de la primera. Ambas libertades se encuentran reconocidas en la Constitución, específicamente en el artículo 29, en el cual se reconoce la posibilidad que tiene toda persona de comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, e incluso hacerlos públicos. Además, están también comprendidas en el artículo 19 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, en el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y en el artículo 19 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Como salta a la vista, se está en presencia de bienes jurídicos merecedores de igual tutela por parte del ordenamiento. En virtud de lo recién indicado, el problema que debe abordarse en este caso es el de cuándo prevalece el derecho al honor sobre las libertades indicadas. De conformidad con las disposiciones constitucionales e internacionales humanitarias, ese conflicto entre derechos fundamentales sólo puede resolverse a favor del derecho al honor cuando se constata un ejercicio abusivo de las libertades de información y de prensa. Lo anterior obedece a que el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense contempla como regla general (consagrada en el artículo 22 del Código Civil) el no amparar el abuso del derecho ni el uso antisocial de éste. Ello se debe precisamente a que si se abusa de un derecho, eso implica que se ha excedido o extralimitado el ámbito de protección que el mismo contempla, de modo que dicho exceso no queda cubierto por éste y carece de tutela. Así, si no se incurre en abuso alguno, sino que se ejercen legítimamente las libertades de información y de prensa, entonces no hay posibilidad alguna de sancionar penalmente al comunicador, pues no habría cometido ningún delito contra el honor. Esto es lo que explica el por qué de la absolutoria dictada en este caso. IV. Los acontecimientos que aquí interesan –sea la grabación en video del vehículo del querellante, así como la información divulgada por Noti-Catorce y la respuesta dada por Vargas Núñez a los reportajes de dicho noticiero- ocurrieron entre octubre y diciembre de 1999. En aquel entonces la Constitución Política disponía en su artículo 11 lo siguiente: “Los funcionarios públicos son simples depositarios de la autoridad y no pueden arrogarse facultades que la ley no les concede. Deben prestar juramento de observar y cumplir esta Constitución y las leyes. La acción para exigirles la responsabilidad penal de sus actos es pública.” (Cabe acotar que tras la reforma constitucional efectuada mediante Ley N° 8003 de 8 de junio de 2000, publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 126 de 30 de junio de 2000, se modificó dicho artículo de la Constitución y se agregó una disposición en el sentido de que los funcionarios públicos deben cumplir los deberes que la ley les impone; además, se instauró formalmente el principio de rendición de cuentas, aspectos que estima esta Sala –como se verá a lo largo de este Considerando- podían extraerse de la redacción anterior aunada a disposiciones de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, aunque ciertamente la reforma hace más fácil de apreciar el rango constitucional de dicho principio). Como puede observarse, la Ley Fundamental (tal cual es aplicable al caso concreto) claramente establece que los servidores públicos están sujetos al ordenamiento jurídico, eso es lo que se deriva de que se les califique como simples “depositarios de la autoridad”; en otras palabras, no están por encima del Derecho. En esa tesitura, se desprende de la disposición constitucional de comentario (precepto que se revitaliza con la reforma del año 2000 ya aludida) que los funcionarios públicos se ven vinculados tanto por las normas permisivas, como por las ordenatorias y las prohibitivas, agregándose además que sólo pueden hacer aquello que la ley expresamente les autoriza. Así las cosas, en Costa Rica todo funcionario público (sea que haya sido elegido popularmente, haya sido designado por otro o algún cuerpo colegiado, o haya ganado la plaza mediante concurso; sea propietario, suplente o interino; esté nombrado indefinidamente o a plazo; sea de confianza o goce de estabilidad laboral; sea funcionario de carrera o no; etc.) está expuesto, desde que asume el cargo, a la fiscalización de sus actos en el desempeño del cargo. Ello obedece a que todo lo que haga esa persona con ocasión del puesto público que ocupa es de interés para la generalidad de habitantes de la República, ya que de lo que se trata es de velar porque actúe, como servidor, en estricta conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico. Esa supervisión constante de sus actos es una de las consecuencias que acarrea el ser servidor público, de modo que quien asume un cargo de esta naturaleza acepta de forma implícita que se examine públicamente su actuación. Por la investidura, el funcionario está sujeto al principio de legalidad, según el cual sólo le está autorizado hacer aquello que la ley –en sentido amplio y en adecuación de la escala normativa- expresamente le permite, estándole prohibido todo lo demás. Así las cosas, desempeñar una función pública conlleva para la persona una sujeción a controles, los cuales han sido concebidos para verificar que el ejercicio de las atribuciones que derivan del puesto sea correcto, así como para evitar que se incumplan los deberes inherentes al cargo. Ahora bien, dentro de estos controles se cuentan no sólo los institucionalizados (como lo son los propios de la Administración Pública, al igual que los judiciales), sino que en un Estado democrático –la Constitución define a Costa Rica como tal en su artículo 1- es necesario considerar también el papel de los comunicadores. Si todo ser humano tiene el derecho de ser informado, si existe además la libertad para comunicar pensamientos y opiniones, incluso publicándolos, y si se considera que los comunicadores tienen como profesión el recabar datos, analizarlos y con base en ellos informar a los demás sobre los temas que les interesan, entonces es evidente que la práctica del periodismo es una manifestación perfecta de las libertades de información y de prensa. En esa tesitura, es irrebatible que los medios de comunicación colectiva, los periodistas y demás comunicadores tienen el derecho de informar –haciendo públicos los datos que manejan- a los habitantes. Esa es la premisa que debe prevalecer en una sociedad democrática. Lo anterior requiere de ciertas precisiones cuando se está ante un asunto de interés público relacionado con la actuación de un servidor estatal. Lo primero es que asunto de interés público es todo aquello que de manera razonablemente presumible atrae de forma coincidente el interés individual de los administrados (artículo 113 inciso 1) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública); obsérvese que al hablarse de “administrados” se pone en evidencia que se trata de temas relacionados con la conducción del Estado (en sentido amplio, es decir, el Gobierno de la República –descrito en el artículo 9 constitucional- y los demás entes públicos) y el manejo de sus recursos, aspectos que se puede válidamente presumir interesan a la generalidad de habitantes de un país, pues son ellos quienes contribuyen a sufragar los gastos del Estado. Lo segundo es que lo normal, tratándose de asuntos de interés público, es que medie la intervención de un funcionario estatal, aunque también es posible (aspecto que se verá al final de este Considerando) que haya sujetos no investidos como servidores públicos que llevan a cabo una tarea que sí es pública, por lo que también estarían sujetos a la fiscalización de sus actuaciones en el ejercicio de esa función pública. Así, tratándose de asuntos de interés público, las libertades de información y de prensa que amparan a los comunicadores es tan importante, por constituir uno de los medios de control de la gestión pública en un Estado democrático, que si se le enfrenta con el derecho al honor que como personas también ostentan quienes cumplen una función pública, este último puede ceder ante las primeras, sólo en lo que atañe a la faceta pública de su conducta. De conformidad con ese planteamiento, únicamente cuando se incurra en abuso por parte del comunicador a la hora de informar, será posible anteponer el derecho al honor del funcionario frente a las libertades de información y prensa que amparan al comunicador, así como al derecho de ser informado que le asiste a toda persona. Hay gran cantidad de normas que respaldan esta posición. Por ejemplo, obsérvese que el artículo 26 constitucional garantiza a los habitantes del país el reunirse pacíficamente y sin armas para examinar la conducta pública de los funcionarios. Esto es importante, pues salta a la vista que el constituyente tuvo conciencia de que hay aspectos públicos y privados en el comportamiento de los servidores del Estado, siendo sólo los primeros susceptibles de examen y discusión abiertos por parte de la sociedad. Esos actos públicos de los funcionarios son precisamente los que aquí se ha establecido se relacionan con el cumplimiento del cargo; los privados –y por ende no susceptibles de ser debatidos públicamente- son los propios de la intimidad personal y familiar no conexos con el ejercicio de la función. Si se puede debatir públicamente, en una reunión, aspectos de la actuación pública de los servidores estatales, es entonces innegable que ha de poderse informar sobre sus actos para que sean examinados por los habitantes del territorio nacional. Además, debe recordarse que al tenor del artículo 28 constitucional, nadie puede ser siquiera inquietado por la manifestación de sus opiniones, ni por actos que no infrinjan la ley. Como corolario de lo anterior, debe observarse que el artículo 29 de la Constitución otra) sus pensamientos, de palabra o por escrito, e incluso que los publique (que los haga de conocimiento público) sin previa censura, de modo que sólo serán responsables si abusan de estos derechos. En esa tesitura, resulta que el ejercicio de la actividad de los comunicadores, que es indispensable para garantizar el derecho de ser informado que le asiste a toda persona, permite informar libremente aspectos relacionados con el desarrollo de la función pública, por ser éste un asunto de evidente interés público. Sólo cuando se abuse de las libertades de información y de prensa (como podría ser el caso de que se divulguen datos falsos a sabiendas de que lo son, que no se trate de obtener la versión del funcionario para ofrecer una información balanceada, que se le niegue al servidor sus derechos de rectificación y/o respuesta, que se trate de asuntos meramente privados o información sensible que no se relacionen con el cargo que ocupa la persona, que se dé por cierto ante el público que la conducta del servidor es delictiva sin que medie sentencia judicial en ese sentido, que se tenga como intención únicamente el ofender a alguna persona –aspecto que ha de examinarse caso por caso y en el que podrían tener relevancia varios factores, tales como el contexto en que se divulgue alguna información, la forma como se manejen fotografías o imágenes, la manera como se presente la noticia o los comentarios en torno a la misma, o situaciones semejantes) se podrá responsabilizar al comunicador, pues el abusar de un derecho (situación que habrá de verificarse en cada caso concreto) implica que se excede el ámbito de protección del mismo. Ese abuso no es amparado por el ordenamiento jurídico (artículo 29 constitucional relacionado con el 22 del Código Civil), por lo que aquel comunicador que incurra en una conducta abusiva habrá de responder por sus actos (lo cual podría incluso acarrear eventualmente la responsabilidad del medio que difundió la información). Ahora bien, la normativa constitucional supra mencionada se complementa con disposiciones del Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Por ejemplo, el artículo 19 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos prevé que toda persona puede difundir informaciones, al mismo tiempo que garantiza el derecho de todo individuo de ser informado. Adviértase que este instrumento internacional sólo protege al ser humano de las injerencias arbitrarias en su vida privada (artículo 12); sea que la que podría entenderse como vida pública (la relacionada con el desempeño de un cargo público) es susceptible de examen por la generalidad de las personas y por ende puede darse libre información en cuanto a ésta. Por su parte, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos es más amplia en la regulación de estos temas. Así, en el artículo 13 se garantiza el derecho de recibir y difundir informaciones, siendo responsable el comunicador sólo de manera posterior a la divulgación de la información y por las situaciones fijadas en la ley. Por su parte, en el artículo 11 se dispone que toda persona tiene derecho a que se respete su honra y su dignidad, agregándose luego que nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en el ámbito de su vida privada. Claro está que la coexistencia de esas dos disposiciones en el mismo texto normativo revela que son complementarias. En ese sentido, las libertades de información y de prensa relacionadas con asuntos de interés público desplazaría la protección de la honra y la dignidad en lo que se refiere a los funcionarios públicos; adviértase de una vez que esta regla no se aplicaría a las personas que no ostentan tal carácter. Ello se debe a que en estos supuestos (cuando se está ante un caso de trascendencia pública relacionado con servidores estatales) de lo que se trata no es de la intimidad de una persona, sino de la forma como ella se desempeña en el ejercicio de un cargo público, aspecto que –ante el conflicto de los bienes jurídicos en cuestión, a saber el derecho al honor y las libertades de información y de prensa- es el más importante desde el punto de vista de la comunidad nacional. Si lo difundido es correcto y en efecto corresponde a un asunto de interés público, entonces no hay posibilidad alguna por parte del funcionario de reclamar que su honor se ha visto lesionado (en todo caso, si de lo que trata la noticia es de algún acto inapropiado, quien habría lesionado su honor sería el propio servidor y no el comunicador, de modo que a este último no podría trasladársele la responsabilidad de aquél). Claro que si la información es falsa o no se relaciona con un asunto de interés público, entonces eventualmente podría estarse ante alguno de los supuestos de conducta abusiva mencionados supra (que incluso podrían ser constitutivos de delito) que sí conllevan la declaratoria de responsabilidad del comunicador. En esa tesitura, las dos disposiciones internacionales de comentario (artículos 11 y 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), vistas en conjunto, revelan que tratándose de asuntos de interés público relativos a la forma como los servidores desempeñan sus cargos, el derecho al honor cede ante la libertades de información y de prensa, así como ante el derecho de ser informado. Entender que no lo desplaza sería tanto como crear una esfera muy amplia de temas en la que no podrían ejercerse las libertades referidas, lo cual sería un atentado contra el régimen democrático que se contempla en la Constitución costarricense. Aunado a lo anterior debe indicarse que en los artículos 17 y 19 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos también se aborda el problema que nos ocupa. En el primero de ellos se establece que nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o ilegales en su vida privada, ni de ataques ilegales a su honra o reputación. Esta redacción es importante destacarla porque –examinada a contrario sensu- evidencia que el honor puede verse afectado legalmente, lo cual refuerza la tesis de que hay casos (como los que aquí interesan) en que pese a existir una afectación de dicho bien jurídico no se puede responsabilizar a nadie por ello. Estima esta Sala que lo anterior se da precisamente en los casos en que se publican informaciones sobre asuntos de interés público relacionados con actuaciones cuestionables por parte de funcionarios públicos (o incluso de personas que cumplen una función pública), supuestos en los que evidentemente se ve afectado (como consecuencia y no como intención) el honor de las personas involucradas. En esos supuestos en que lo divulgado inevitablemente afectará a algún servidor público, en los cuales además no ha de mediar un único ánimo de ofender, las libertades de información y de prensa deben prevalecer sobre el derecho al honor, ya que el comunicador actúa cumpliendo con su derecho de informar y no deviene responsable por la consecuente afectación del honor de los funcionarios (que en todo caso, como ya se dijo, tendría su causa en sus propios actos y no en lo que se publica) relacionados con la noticia. Claro está –vale la pena reiterarlo- que si la información no es de interés público, se quiere solamente ofender a alguna persona, o lo que se informa es falso, ahí sí deviene responsable el comunicador (y eventualmente el medio) por el abuso cometido. En síntesis, tanto en la Constitución Política como en las disposiciones internacionales de Derechos Humanos aplicables en Costa Rica hay normativa que permite afirmar que los funcionarios públicos (no así los particulares, salvo en los supuestos en que cumplen una función pública) están sometidos al examen público de sus actuaciones en el ejercicio del cargo, por lo que la libertad de difundir informaciones sobre sus actos en relación con asuntos de interés público desplaza su derecho al honor, de modo que ningún comunicador puede ser penalmente responsable por ese tipo de informaciones, salvo que hubiese actuado de manera abusiva. Esto obedece a que, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 25 del Código Penal, quien ejerce legítimamente un derecho no delinque. A lo ya expuesto debe agregarse que también existen disposiciones de rango legal que refuerzan el criterio que aquí se sostiene. Reviste especial importancia lo establecido en los artículos 113 y 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. El primero de ellos dispone: “1. El servidor público deberá desempeñar sus funciones de modo que satisfagan primordialmente el interés público, el cual será considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados. 2. El interés público prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración Pública cuando pueda estar en conflicto. 3. En la apreciación del interés público se tendrá en cuenta, en primer lugar, los valores de seguridad jurídica y justicia para la comunidad y el individuo, a los que no puede en ningún caso anteponerse la mera conveniencia.” Por su parte, el segundo de los numerales mencionados estipula: “1. El servidor público será un servidor de los administrados, en general, y en particular de cada individuo o administrado que con él se relacione en virtud de la función que desempeña; cada administrado deberá ser considerado en el caso individual como representante de la colectividad de que el funcionario depende y por cuyos intereses debe velar. 2. Sin perjuicio de lo que otras leyes establezcan para el servidor, considérese, en especial, irregular desempeño de su función todo acto, hecho u omisión que por su culpa o negligencia ocasione trabas u obstáculos injustificados o arbitrarios a los administrados.” Como puede apreciarse, el legislador otorga gran importancia a la satisfacción del interés público como eje rector de la actividad administrativa, tanto que formula el principio de objetividad de la función pública como el actuar en aras de satisfacer dicho interés. Además, salta a la vista el deber de rendición de cuentas por parte de los servidores públicos, quienes deben considerarse –en cada caso concreto- servidores de la persona con la que se relacionen en virtud del cargo que desempeñan (cabe acotar que estas disposiciones existen desde 1978, de modo que si se les relacionaba con la redacción anterior del artículo 11 constitucional era evidente la consagración en el ordenamiento costarricense del principio de rendición de cuentas, aún antes de la reforma constitucional del año 2000 a la que se aludió previamente). Esto realza aún más el carácter público de la actuación de los funcionarios en lo que se refiere al cumplimiento de las atribuciones propias del puesto que ocupan. En esa tesitura, es impensable –salvo que se desconozca el principio democrático establecido en la Constitución Política- sancionar penalmente a una persona que actúe de conformidad con su derecho de divulgar informaciones relacionadas con las actuaciones de funcionarios estatales en asuntos de interés público, salvo que haya incurrido en algún abuso (como los expuestos líneas atrás) a la hora de hacer pública la información. Es oportuno mencionar que la tesis expuesta a lo largo de estas líneas se complementa con lo dispuesto en la segunda parte del artículo 389 del Código Penal. En ese texto legal, pese a estar referido a una contravención, se observa que el legislador dispuso no sancionar la crítica razonada (otra cosa son los insultos) de personas e instituciones cuando se trate de asuntos de interés público, tal como lo ha punto de que el ejercicio legítimo (sea, sin incurrir en abusos) de las libertades de información y de prensa en estos casos no permite la punición de quien se expresa. Por último, es importante reiterar que si bien es cierto aquí se ha referido el problema del choque de derechos al caso de los servidores públicos en el ejercicio de sus atribuciones, también es posible –dependiendo de la trascendencia de cada caso concreto- que las libertades de información y de prensa justifiquen la discusión pública (y por ende la divulgación de informaciones sobre el tema) de actuaciones de personas que no están investidas como funcionarios estatales pero que cumplen una función que sí es pública, como podría ser el caso de concesionarios de servicios u obras públicas y notarios, eso sí, sólo en lo que atañe a la faceta pública de su comportamiento y sin que los comunicadores incurran en abusos. V. En la presente causa, el Tribunal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela determinó que los hechos demostrados no generan responsabilidad penal alguna para los querellados. A partir del folio 367 se exponen las razones por las cuales llegó el cuerpo juzgador a dicha conclusión. Salta a la vista que se consideró el interés público que reviste el uso de los vehículos estatales. Precisamente por ello es que se efectuó la investigación periodística, para determinar si tenía algún fundamento la queja de vecinos de Cedral en el sentido de que un vehículo del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes había sido visto días antes aparcado a la par de un bar, lo que ellos estiman como uso indebido del automotor. Debido a ese malestar es que el 7 de octubre de 1999 se envió a un camarógrafo de Noti-Catorce a confirmar –mediante la grabación en video- si efectivamente se encontraba el vehículo en el lugar. Esto resultó ser cierto y por ello se buscaron fue el que reveló el nombre del servidor que utilizaba dicho vehículo. Con base en esos elementos es que el órgano de instancia –con buen criterio- descartó cualquier ánimo puramente ofensivo por parte de los querellados. Más bien, lo que hizo el a-quo fue destacar la rectitud en la actuación de estos últimos, quienes en todo momento se apegaron a su derecho de divulgar informaciones atinentes a asuntos de interés público. Desafortunadamente para el querellante su nombre salió a la luz y es lógico que no le agradase ser cuestionado. Pero él era funcionario público al momento de los hechos, de modo que estaba sujeto al deber de rendir cuentas de sus actos. Además, de conformidad con los artículos del 221 al 243 de la Ley de Tránsito, hay ciertas restricciones en el uso de los vehículos estatales (las cuales varían según se trate de automotores de uso administrativo, de uso discrecional o de uso por las fuerzas de policía), entre las que se comprende (artículo 234 inciso a) del último texto normativo de cita) el utilizar vehículos de uso administrativo en actividades que no sean las normales de la institución. Por ello, el observar uno de estos automotores al costado de un bar en horas laborales es algo que razonablemente genera inquietudes y que amerita el desarrollo de una investigación. Además, la intervención de la prensa en estos casos es completamente legítima en un Estado democrático, pues de lo que se trata es de verificar que los recursos públicos sean utilizados adecuadamente por parte de los servidores, de modo que en efecto es un tema de interés público, toda vez que el problema de comentario atañe a la colectividad. Cabe agregar que en ningún momento los comunicadores achacaron a Vargas Núñez el haber cometido una falta y mucho menos un delito, sino que simplemente pidieron sitio a la hora que fue filmado. Esto último revela que no se está más que ante el ejercicio del derecho de informar a la comunidad sobre un asunto de interés público. Nunca se ha perseguido lesionar el honor del querellante; solamente se le ha pedido que rinda cuentas, sin que medie abuso alguno por parte de los personeros de Noti-Catorce. De conformidad con lo expuesto, efectivamente no aprecia esta Sala que los querellados hayan cometido delito alguno por el que deban responder y en ese sentido resulta adecuada a Derecho la decisión del Tribunal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela. Debe agregarse que si bien es cierto en sentencia se cita la Ley de Imprenta y no la de Radio y Televisión, el punto es irrelevante, pues en todo caso se está en presencia de una causa de justificación (el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho, regulado en el artículo 25 del Código Penal) que en cualquier supuesto exoneraría de responsabilidad penal a los encartados. Además, debe advertirse que la existencia de las informaciones periodísticas se tiene por acreditada, pero –por las razones ya mencionadas, es decir, por la concurrencia de una causa de justificación- no son constitutivas de delito alguno. También es necesario resaltar que ciertamente el ejercicio del periodismo no es per sé un permiso para afectar el honor de las personas, pero también debe reconocerse que en cualquier caso los comunicadores responden sólo cuando abusan de su profesión (artículo 29 constitucional) y además dicho bien jurídico no se afecta cuando se trata de informaciones verdaderas (como lo es el que el vehículo conducido por el querellante estaba estacionado a la par de un bar en horas laborales, lo cual ameritaba la investigación) relacionadas con asuntos de interés público en los que intervienen servidores del Estado. Finalmente, debe decirse que en este caso la veracidad de la información difundida por Noti-Catorce ha sido constatada por el órgano sentenciador, de modo que no hay razón alguna para pensar que los servidores del medio televisivo (TV Norte Canal Catorce, S.A.) o de la compañía dueña de esa empresa, Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de San Carlos, R.L. (COOPELESCA), no verificaron que lo divulgado por el noticiero fuese cierto, por lo que el reclamo en cuanto a este extremo deviene infundado. En virtud de todo lo anterior, estima esta Sala que en la especie no se ha producido quebranto alguno de la ley sustantiva, toda vez que la conducta de los querellados encuentra respaldo en la causa de justificación prevista en el artículo 25 del Código Penal, con base en lo cual se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso."