No Refund of Retirement Fund for Re-entry After Law 7983 Effective DateImprocedencia de devolución del Fondo de Jubilaciones por reingreso posterior a vigencia de Ley 7983

"VI.- [...] The statement of reasons consists in the expression of the factual and legal grounds that have supported the administrative decision (at the level of justification), which includes the detail of the evidentiary elements from which it has derived or inferred the relevant facts that have served as the basis for the motive of the act, as well as the considerations from which the weighing of that evidence leads to a certain factual conclusion, assessment, or conjecture. Likewise, it requires expressing the legal foundations that have led, from those facts, to establish a certain decision, with the indication of the guidelines for assessment and interpretation of the legal rules applied. In acts of discretionary content, it imposes the clear reference to the relevant and determining circumstances from which the decision is adopted, as well as the reference to the convenience and pertinence of the decision adopted, to the exclusion of another equally legitimate one, in accordance with the general principles of law, unequivocal rules of science and technique, and the maxims of reasonableness and proportionality that make the administrative will valid in a specific circumstance. Defects in the statement of reasons may occur due to the following vices: a) lack of statement of reasons (omission), when the act does not express in any way the reasons that have given it support, such that the addressee is not in an objective position to know those antecedent and justificatory reasons; b) Improper statement of reasons: when the factual and legal reasons that the act sets forth as the basis of the decision are not pertinent to the matter analyzed, whether due to deficiency in the facts, or due to the application of rules that are not pertinent or relevant to the case, or when the legal arguments are contradictory on a rational level; and c) Insufficient Statement of Reasons: in cases where the grounds given in the act are not sufficient in themselves to rationally understand the reasons for its content. This is, in this instance, a defect that prevents the proper understanding of the reasons for the will adopted, whether due to imprecision or incompleteness. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the statement of reasons for the act may be carried out directly or indirectly. The first (direct) when the act itself contains the grounds that support it, or, Indirect, when the statement of reasons consists of references and/or remission to previous opinions, proposals, or resolutions that have determined the adoption of the act, provided that they are accompanied by the communication of the act. It should be emphasized that in cases where the administrative act not only refers or remits to opinions or views of advisory bodies that have issued inputs intended to guide the adoption of the final act, but takes specific references from those acts and mentions them within the literalness of its content, with the corresponding exposition of the logical reasons for which it takes that type of analysis as support for its decision, one is facing a direct statement of reasons, since in such cases the act exposes in its own content the logical reasons that would allow understanding the basis of the communicated will. [...]

VIII.- From the recount of proven facts, there is a series of relevant criteria that have been issued regarding the various consultations presented on the application of Article 75 of Law No. 7983 with respect to workers who began work with the Bank before the entry into force of the referenced Law, subsequently resigned before that effective date, or during the course of the law, but later re-entered to work with the Bank and contributed to the Special Fund. The claimant postulates the application of the single State employer theory, while the defendants consider that it is a new entry. In that sense, it is established that in official communication SP-340-2008 of February 7, 2008, SUPEN analyzed a consultation raised by an affiliate regarding Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law, in the sense of whether the periods previously worked at BCR granted the right to receive the savings accumulated in the Retirement Fund, generated since their re-entry to the entity’s service, given that they had worked from 1979 until December 2001 and re-entered in July 2003. In that act, it was expressed: “Thus, it follows that as of February 18, 2000, you were an employee of the Banco de Costa Rica and therefore were already covered by the Guarantee and Retirement Fund for Employees of said Institution. Now, given the temporary withdrawal from the Institution and your re-entry to it, it can be said that there was a suspension of the service relationship, and after complying with what is ordered by Article 586 of the Labor Code, the Bank considers March 16, 1979 as your date of entry to the Institution for all employment purposes.” (Images 159-161 of the main file) In that communication, the thesis of continuity of the employment relationship is adopted under the understanding that the temporary space in which the worker did not work for the Bank should be considered as a sort of suspension of the service relationship. Subsequently, in legal opinion PJD-14-2013 of August 23, 2013, SUPEN addressed consultations from the President of the Fund’s Administrative Board, pertinent to the recognition of time served within the Public Administration in order to determine the appropriateness of enjoying the fund’s benefits. On this occasion, in that analysis, it was stated: "1. In the case of those employees who began an employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica before February 18, 2000, and ended said relationship before or after that date to go into the service of another public institution, but re-entered the service of the Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law, and became newly affiliated to the FJEBCR, the time previously served must be recognized in accordance with the theory of the State as a single employer and center of imputation of labor rights. 2. In such cases, the previous affiliation and the new one must be considered as a single one for the purposes of what is indicated in Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law and, therefore, they are entitled to receive the accumulated assets in their individual account upon the termination of their current employment relationship. That is, the time previously served in the Bank must be recognized, therefore having the right to receive the accumulated assets of the Retirement Fund generated upon their re-entry. 3. The theory of the State as a single employer applies only when the worker has continued working for the State (a situation that arises when the worker’s transfer is to another public institution). Consequently, in cases where there is a termination of the employment relationship to go work in the private sector, the aforementioned theory no longer applies. (...)". (Images 162-167 of the main file) In this opinion, a new variable is introduced consisting of the application of the single State employer theory. This, given that, in the matter consulted, it was established that the workers who had been affiliated with the BCR Fund terminated their relationship to move to another public institution and later return to the banking entity. In light of that particularity, SUPEN considered that there was continuity in the employment relationship with the State as a single employer, from which, as an extensive application of that stance, it concluded that the Fund benefits should be maintained for those who had been affiliated prior to the entry into force of Law No. 7983, even when the relationship had ceased, but later they rejoined the service of the Bank and became affiliated to the Fund. It should be emphasized that in point 3 of the conclusions of that opinion, it was clearly stated that the aforementioned theory applied insofar as the worker continued working for the State (in a broad sense), but not when the termination of the employment relationship was to go work in the private sector. Note that unlike the previous opinion (SP-340-2008), in which the stance of suspension of the employment relationship was applied, in this last one, the figure of the single State employer and the continuity of a relationship with the State as employer is invoked. These applications turn out to be similar to those that were issued within the BCR’s internal venue on that matter. Indeed, in official communication DJ/GAG/234-2013 of July 17, 2013, the Legal Division of the Banco de Costa Rica issues an opinion regarding the consultation of the case of persons who had begun an employment relationship with the Bank before February 18, 2000, and terminated it before that date, but re-entered the service of the Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law. On that matter, the internal legal analysis concluded, in relevant part: “…Under the context of application of the theory of the State as a single employer, this Legal Division considers that effectively, the recognition of seniority in the public service (for the Public Administration –sic-, and even more so when that seniority corresponds to time served with the same public employer, allows one to validly accept that an employee of the Banco de Costa Rica who was affiliated with the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Banco de Costa Rica before the effectiveness of the Worker Protection Law, if they ended their employment relationship before such effectiveness or, after it, but later re-enters the service of the Bank and therefore, the time previously served is recognized, the single State employer theory is applicable to them for the corresponding legal purposes. / Then, if that employee becomes newly affiliated to the Retirement Fund, under the indicated theory it is valid to affirm that the previous affiliation and the new one must be considered as a single one for the purposes of application of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law and, therefore, they are entitled to receive the accumulated assets in their individual account upon the termination of the current employment relationship. / Thus, it is the opinion of the Legal Division that what was resolved by the Superintendency of Pensions in official communication No. SP-340-2008 of February 7, 2008, is in accordance with such theory and, therefore, is applicable for current affiliates of the Retirement Fund who had been affiliated during a previous employment relationship before the effectiveness of the Worker Protection Law. / The foregoing especially if they had reimbursed all or part of their severance pay received because upon re-entry to the service of the Bank, the period provided for in subsection b) of Article 586 of the Labor Code had not elapsed, as this is because the employee had an impediment to entering to work for the State during a period equal to that represented by the sum received for severance assistance. (…)”. (Images 87-92 of the main file) This harmonizes with what was indicated in official communication DJ/GAG/255-2015 of August 17, 2015, in which the Legal Division of the Banco de Costa Rica issues a legal opinion on the application of the principle of the State as a single employer for purposes of affiliation to the Retirement Fund for the Bank’s Employees. In that opinion, it was established: "III. CONCLUSIONS. 1. The theory of the State as a single employer applies to the entire Public Sector. 2. Its application is valid for all legal purposes, among them, the recognition of annual increments (anualidades), vacations, severance pay, pensions, and retirements. 3. Job continuity in the different public entities where one has worked is not required, since case law allows that separate periods, even for several years, may be considered as a single one for purposes of recognizing time served in the State, "(...) so that both form, together, a job continuity, temporally speaking". 4. When recognizing separate periods, even for years, it must be interpreted that for the application of the theory of the State as a single employer, it does not matter if in the interim, the person worked in the private sector, since only the periods effectively worked in the public sector will be taken into consideration. 5. The single State employer theory is applicable for purposes of recognizing the affiliation date to the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Banco de Costa Rica, as established by the Superintendency of Pensions. 6. The periods of affiliation to the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Banco de Costa Rica must be considered as a single one for all legal purposes. 7. The affiliation period of a person to a Retirement Fund other than that of the Banco de Costa Rica occurring before February 18, 2000, must be considered as continuous with the affiliation period of that person who had entered the BCR after that date, regardless of whether between both periods a break occurred or not (sic) it did not occur. 8. That continuity exists even when in the interim the person had worked in the private sector. 9. With greater reason, continuity exists if in that interim the person does not appear to be linked to a private contract since there are no social security contributions on record.". (Images 126-135 of the main file) IX.- However, that stance was subjected to modifications that have given basis to the present dispute. By official communication FEBCR-008-2015 of August 19, 2015, the President of the Fund Board again requested an opinion from SUPEN, accompanying the legal opinions just mentioned. By official communication SP-1121-2015 of October 8, 2015, SUPEN indicates: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, Article 75 of Law No. 7983 provides that in the case of new workers affiliated to the systems referred to in that article who, after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law, cease to belong to the special regime, for a reason other than a pension, the accumulated funds must be transferred to their individual ROP account, so that, like the rest of the workers, it is strengthened with that employer contribution. / The reason why those resources are not delivered to the worker, as is done with other “savings” that they receive when the employment relationship ends, lies in the purpose for which the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Banco de Costa Rica was created, given that what is sought with the resources accumulated in that fund is that the worker enjoy a complementary pension that improves their retirement income. (…) The foregoing is especially relevant if one takes into account that in this case it is a special fund, in which the employer, the State, makes a considerably high contribution of resources compared to other pension funds, with an express purpose: to supplement the workers' pension. This purpose cannot be ignored to the detriment of the future complementary pension of the workers who retire from the Banco de Costa Rica. / In this line of thought, it must be taken into consideration that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has qualified the establishment of complementary pension regimes as a matter of high public interest, because they concretize the constitutional principles of national solidarity and social justice (ruling no. 4636-99 of 3:39 p.m. on June 16, 1999). (…) Now, and in relation to your request, it is necessary to point out that it does not correspond to the Superintendency of Pensions to resolve the specific consultations and petitions of the affiliates to the Retirement Fund that you represent, since that task is the responsibility of the regime administrator. / However, this body considers that any interpretation given to what was indicated in opinion PJD-14-2013 must have a restrictive character and must be based on the purpose mentioned above, in such a way that the objective for which the fund was created is not distorted in any measure, which, as already stated, seeks nothing other than to improve the retirement income of the workers of the Banco de Costa Rica.” (Images 98-101 of the main file) As support for this new consideration, it stated that the current rule regulating the case of officials who cease to belong to a special complementary pension regime, for reasons other than a pension, such as the Retirement Fund for BCR employees, is Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law, No. 7983. It stated that it was necessary to keep in mind that the regimes referred to in that rule constitute an exception to the provisions of article 13, subsection c) of Law No. 7983, according to which the Mandatory Pension Regime (Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones, ROP) is financed, among other sources, by a contribution from employers corresponding to a monthly 1.5% on wages paid. It considered that in the case of complementary pension regimes existing before the entry into force of Law No. 7983, as was the case of the Retirement Fund for the Bank's Employees, the employer contribution of 1.5% monthly is replaced by the percentage provided in the law creating the special regime, and those resources are not administered as part of the ROP, but are administered by the institutions or companies for the benefit of whose workers the benefit was created, in a special fund. In response to this new stance, in session 16-15 of October 30, 2015, article XII, the Administrative Board of the Fund agreed: "- Having analyzed SUPEN's opinion, it is considered that the application of Article 75 is what must be indicated to respond to the pending requests, indicating to them that the Board's decision is that the refund does not apply to them. (...)". (Image 138 of the main file) It is based on those references that later, upon the specific request of the claimant, through official communication FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, the Administrative Board of the Retirement Fund for BCR Employees, responds to the claimant regarding their request dated August 27, 2015, concerning the application of the single State employer theory for purposes of affiliation to the Retirement Fund of the Banco de Costa Rica. That act indicates in relevant part: “…The Administrative Board, upon learning of such opinion (referring to official communication No. SP-1121-2015 of October 8, 2015, from SUPEN), assessed that SUPEN expressly points out that in matters of complementary pension funds, as is the case of the Retirement Fund of the Banco de Costa Rica, what applies is Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law, given that under that rule, except in the case of a pension, the resources of the Fund for those who began working at the Bank as of the effectiveness of said Law, must be transferred to the mandatory pension regime and cannot be delivered to the worker upon the termination of their employment relationship for any other cause. / Although the Superintendency of Pensions does not refer to the application of the Theory of the State as a single employer in matters of the Retirement Fund –whose analysis was sought by the Administrative Board in the cases consulted-, also making it clear that it does not correspond to it to resolve those cases consulted, the truth is that it does expressly mention that it will be the responsibility of the Fund administrator (the Administrative Board), to resolve each case, and in doing so, to always ensure that the principle of protection of the complementary pension is fulfilled, which in SUPEN's judgment is what the text of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law seeks to protect. / That being so, the Administrative Board, after assessing the scope of the opinion in question, arrived at the conclusion that it is not appropriate to deliver the monies accumulated in the individual account of the affiliate or former affiliate to the Fund, if the employment relationship with the Bank that gives rise to the affiliation to the Retirement Fund began on a date equal to or subsequent to the effectiveness of the Worker Protection Law. / In accordance with the foregoing, the Administrative Board resolved to reject all cases presented before that Collegiate Body for delivery of the monies accumulated in the Retirement Fund, insofar as the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to the request began on a date equal to or subsequent to February 18, 2000, the effective date of the Worker Protection Law. / That being so and given that in your case you began the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to your request on 06/26/2000, a date on which that Law was already in force, it is concluded that your request is not appropriate and it is rejected for the indicated reasons. (…)”. (Images 41-45 of the main file) Finally, it is established that by official communication PJD-1-2017 of March 16, 2017, the Legal Division of SUPEN informs the Superintendent that after several consultations raised by the Administrator of the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Banco de Costa Rica, they deem it prudent to reconsider the position stated in opinion PJD-14-2013 of August 23, 2013, in order to ensure that a possible recognition of time served does not prove contrary to Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law. In that regard, it stated: "III. Conclusions. Based on the foregoing, the provisions of opinion PJD-14-2013, of August 23, 2013, are reconsidered, in the following sense: Regarding the employees who began an employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica before February 18, 2000, and ended said relationship before or after that date, to go into the service of another public institution, but re-entered the service of that Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law: - These must be considered as a first entry to the Retirement Fund for employees of that institution, and in case of ceasing to belong to that Fund, for reasons other than those established in Article 20 of Law No. 7983, the accumulated resources must be transferred to their individual ROP account, as indicated in the third paragraph of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law. - The theory of the State as a single employer is not applicable in this case." (Images 223-231 of the main file) X.- The single State employer theory supposes that, for purposes of recognizing the seniority of the public servant in the provision of their services, it is necessary to recognize the time served in the State and its institutions, which, for all purposes, must be considered as a single employment relationship with the civil service. Thus, periods of time served with a public entity may be recognized for purposes of seniority in the employment relationship established with another public entity or, as the case may be, with the Central Administration. By way of normative reference, Article 12, subsection d) of the Public Administration Salary Law, No. 2166 of October 9, 1957, provided, before the reform recently carried out by the Public Finance Strengthening Law, No. 9635: "d) Public Sector employees, whether permanent or interim, shall be recognized, for purposes of the annual increases referred to in Article 5 above, the time of services rendered in other Public Sector entities. This provision is not retroactive in nature. This law does not negatively affect the right established in collective agreements and conventions, in matters of salary negotiation." (Thus added by Article 2 of Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982) This implies that the time served in other units of the Public Administration must be recognized by the new public employer, for purposes of recognizing the payment of the salary component of annual increments (anualidades) and other variables of the employment relationship that are based on seniority. In that sense, as the plaintiff indicates, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled on the application of that maxim. Among others, in precedent No. 43 of 9:00 a.m. on March 18, 1993, it indicated on the matter: “V- Article 12, subsection d), of the Public Administration Salary Law, which served as basis for that agreement, recognizes \"the time of services rendered in other Public Sector entities\", and not \"seniority\", understood as a concept referring to years of service, estimated in complete twelve-month periods, without counting fractions of a year. In that sense, if the plaintiff worked, in her first period of work for the Bank, from June 16, 1970, to April 27, 1979, eight years, ten months, and eleven days of service must be recognized for her, and not only eight years, as the Tribunal maintains, an aspect in which the appealed decision must be reversed, so that the totality of the plaintiff's service time in the Bank is recognized, which must be applied to all the items granted by the trial court’s decision, given that subsection d) of Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, and Article 5, 256, of nine o'clock on November 29, 1991). The service time of the first period of work must be joined with that of the second, which began on August 22, 1988, so that both form, together, a labor continuity, temporally speaking. This means that her date of entry into the second employment relationship should not be antedated to the date the plaintiff indicates, that is, October 11, 1979, but rather, the employment relationship must be understood as occurring in a single period and the conventionally agreed rules governing the different benefits must be applied to it. (...)". Likewise, in judgment No. 34 of 9:40 a.m. on March 5, 1993, it stated: "II.- The State's second objection has to do with the acceptance that the claimant's claims received, despite the fact that he is a former public servant who has been retired since September 1, 1984, and who claims the annual increments (anualidades) not recognized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, for retirement purposes. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Chamber issued its first rulings on the recognition of seniority, for the purpose of annual increases -annual increments (anualidades)-, based on the application of Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982, around the year eighty-five; it being later, with judgment number 58, of 2:30 p.m., on April 30, 1986, that public disclosure was given to the point and, henceforth, judicial proceedings directed at obtaining the merited recognition proliferated. After some time, the Chamber came to establish additional guidelines on the matter, highlighting in this respect judgments numbers 81, 82, 90, 92, and 162, of 9:00 a.m., 9:10 a.m., 3:10 p.m., 3:30 p.m., on July 5, and 10:20 a.m. on October 5, all from 1989. In the second of them, it was said: \"III. Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982, established a new salary scale for the Public Sector and provided in its second article, to add a subsection with the letter d) to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, which textually said: 'Public Sector employees, whether permanent or interim, shall be recognized, for purposes of the annual increases referred to in Article 5 above, the time of services rendered in other Public Sector entities. This provision is not retroactive in nature. This law does not negatively affect the right established in collective agreements and conventions, in matters of salary negotiation.' As of the month of January 1983, the different entities that make up the Public Sector began to recognize the years served in other centralized and decentralized public institutions, an aspect that had already been recognized by the then Cassation Chamber, the Superior Labor Tribunal, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Originally, the recognition of seniority was done by applying the theory of the SINGLE STATE EMPLOYER, but with no little weakness, above all, thinking of the principle of state unity as an employer and in some cases, relating it to the other theory of the statutory relationship, the latter based on Article 191 of the Political Constitution. On the matter, decisions No. 1388 of November 3, 1958, number 105 of January 12, 1973, and No. 1928 of November 28, 1974, from the Superior Labor Tribunal of San José, and judgment No. 95 of August 6, 1975, from the former Cassation Chamber can be seen." As stated, initially the recognition was made for purposes of vacations and statutory benefits, the latter being understood as notice (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and subsequently, seniority (antigüedad) is recognized for purposes of annual, biennial, and quinquennial increases, first when the services were continuous and later even covering those of a discontinuous nature; however, the situation was well defined in law, with the entry into force of Law No. 6835, when it provides for the recognition, for the purpose of annual increases, of time served in other public-sector entities. In other words, judicial case law had already admitted the recognition of seniority (antigüedad) in public service, as had administrative case law (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), opinions C-194-83 of 17 June 1983 and C-236-85 of 30 September 1985). Therefore, there is no doubt that the recognition of seniority (antigüedad) regarding the provision of services to the State and its institutions has been advancing in terms of the rights for which the corresponding recognition was made, namely: vacations, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), annual increases, and retirement and pensions (jubilaciones y pensiones); as well as making the leap from the acceptance of continuous seniority (antigüedad continua) to the admission of the provision of services with a break in continuity, so that in sound legal theory, it is no longer possible to uphold a criterion such as that of the first-instance judgment, confirmed by the ad-quem Tribunal, because that resolution accords neither with the case law nor with the national doctrine on this subject, since, as is clear, if seniority (antigüedad) in the Public Sector is recognized with respect to services rendered for other public entities, with much greater reason must services rendered in the same public entity be recognized, as is the case of the provision of public services made by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant institution...\". \" It is clear that the content of the aforementioned principle entails the unity of the times served in various public entities or the State, for purposes of being considered as a single relationship in temporal terms, with a view to the application and recognition of labor rights whose quantification requires that parameter. Within that scope are aspects such as seniority (antigüedad), vacations, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), notice (preaviso), severance pay (cesantía), and retirement and pensions (jubilaciones y pensiones). As regards these last two referents (retirement and pensions (jubilaciones y pensiones)), to the extent that the subjective parameters set by the Legal System usually require the concurrence of time served and retirement age, with a view to establishing the concurrence of the seniority (antigüedad) prerequisite, it is evident and logical that the relationships maintained with the public employers form a single line of temporality, to the extent that during the course of those relationships, contributions were made to the corresponding retirement and pensions (jubilaciones y pensiones) system.

XI.- Without prejudice to what is indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), although the theory of the Sole State Employer (Estado Patrono Único) allows the recognition of time served by the person exercising the public function in other public entities, in order to have a single margin of seniority (antigüedad), which applies equally to the pension and retirement (pensiones y jubilaciones) regime, in cases such as the present one, in which this principle is invoked as a legitimizing prerequisite for obtaining economic advantages derived from a Special Fund (Fondo Especial) of a complementary nature, it is not feasible to proceed from that generality, it being necessary and imperative to analyze the regulatory content of that special regime and the specific circumstances of the affiliate. In that line of reasoning, as has been indicated, there is no debate whatsoever that the Special Fund for Employees of the BCR (Fondo Especial de Empleados del BCR) is a regime complementary to the Disability, Old Age, and Death regime (régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), in force prior to the entry into force of Law No. 7983 (18 February 2000), and therefore, pursuant to section 75 of that legal source, it may continue to operate, under the supervision of SUPEN. As has been indicated, that same mandate requires that for those new workers affiliated with that regime who, after the entry into force of Law No. 7983, cease to belong to the regime for reasons other than those established in canon 20 of the same law, the accumulated funds must be transferred to their individual account in the mandatory complementary pension regime (ROP). Based on that regulation, the respondent Administration, as well as SUPEN, have interpreted that workers whose affiliation to that Special Fund (Fondo Especial) occurred prior to the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), by application a contrario sensu of the aforementioned precept 75 thereof, may request the refund of the sums contributed and accumulated in the aforementioned Fund. In that sense, it is held as established that Mr. Lissander Chacón Vargas began working for the Bank of Costa Rica (Banco de Costa Rica) on 01 December 1986, generating the affiliation to the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Bank of Costa Rica (Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica). The start of that employment relationship is recorded in the respective employment contract, visible on pages 3-4 of the administrative file. Subsequently, on 10 May 1999, Mr. Chacón Vargas submitted his resignation from his position at the BCR, effective from that date, in order to take up a work opportunity in the private sector. (Page 114 of the administrative file) This resignation was accepted by official letter of 02 June 1999 from the Directorate of the Division of Human Talent and Organizational Transformation of the BCR (Page 117 of the administrative file), as a result of which, together with the payment of the respective labor entitlements, in what is relevant to the case, he proceeded to withdraw what had been accumulated up to that moment in his corresponding account of the Retirement Fund (Fondo de Jubilación). For this concept of liquidation of individualized sums in the Pension Fund (Fondo de Pensiones), he was paid a total of ¢621,226.90 (six hundred twenty-one thousand two hundred twenty-six colones and 90/100), according to a settlement signed on 22 October 1999 and payment vouchers visible on pages 128-134 of the administrative folder. Despite that rupture of the employment relationship with the Bank, on 26 June 2000, Mr. Chacón Vargas rejoined as an employee of the BCR, according to an employment contract recorded on pages 138-140, 144-146 of the administrative file. By note of 27 June 2000, the plaintiff requested the BCR to recognize the time worked before rejoining the Bank, as well as the concept of exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) (Page 141 of the administrative file), a recognition of seniority (antigüedad) that was approved by the Human Capital Management of the Bank, with the date of entry to the Bank being held, for all purposes, as 01 December 1986. (Uncontested fact) From the foregoing account, it is evident that, in due course, at the time of the plaintiff's voluntary cessation on 10 May 1999, in accordance with what was indicated regarding the application of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), the Board of the Fund, at the request of the affiliate, reimbursed the individualized sums, in the amount already indicated. However, unlike what the applicant postulates, his re-entry, while allowing the application of the Sole State Employer (Estado Patrono Único) theory for the purpose of calculating the time served, does not generate the same effect he intends concerning the economic benefits derived from the Special Retirement Fund for Employees of the BCR (Fondo Especial de Jubilaciones de Empleados del BCR). Indeed, once the plaintiff, by his own decision, chose on 10 May 1999 to resign and withdraw the contributions accumulated in the Fund, which were effectively delivered to him, the de facto prerequisite provided for in Article 75 of Law No. 7983 was satisfied, in the sense that such withdrawal was feasible given that the plaintiff had affiliated with the said complementary regime prior to 18 February 2000. However, when he went to work for the said Bank again, on 26 June 2000, the rules and limitations of the aforementioned section were fully applicable to him, to the extent that it was a new legal employment relationship, and therefore, his new affiliation to the said Fund must be understood as having taken place from that moment onwards. In the judgment of this Chamber, the plaintiff seeks to extend the treatment of recognition of time previously served to an extreme that is not applicable to him. It is undeniable that the prior relationship, from December 1986 to May 1999, must be added to the seniority (antigüedad) of the time worked; even, for purposes of contribution to the Disability, Old Age, and Death retirement regime (régimen de jubilaciones de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), the contributions made during that relationship must be recognized together with those derived from the new relationship established in June 2000. But the foregoing does not imply, by automatism or logical derivation, as the plaintiff argues, that this recognition means, for all intents and purposes, that his date of affiliation to the fund is maintained as December 1986, notwithstanding that he previously withdrew the accumulated funds due to the termination of the employment relationship in October 1999. For this collegiate body, the applicant's position is respectable, but it is definitively not shared, to the extent that his consolidated legal situation was satisfied when he made said withdrawal, but once he signed a new employment contract with the defendant Bank in June 2000, it must be considered as a new entry of affiliation to the Fund, and given that date, Article 75 of Law No. 7983 was already in force, and it requires that cessation of membership in the special regime for reasons other than those referred to in canon 20 of the same law entails that the accumulated funds be transferred to the ROP, ruling out the possibility of individual reimbursement. It is clear that the plaintiff's new cessation, which occurred in 2015, after he rejoined in June 2000, occurred on grounds of voluntary resignation, and thus, in keeping with the aforementioned rules, the appropriate course was the transfer of those sums to his individual account in the mandatory complementary pension regime. From that angle of examination, the consolidated legal situation that the plaintiff claims is not violated, because although it is true that he held that situation by having entered in December 1986, which allowed him, in the event of cessation of work, to claim the withdrawal of the sums contributed, as has been indicated, that consequence materialized in May 1999, when he resigned for the first time and obtained the claimed refund. However, when he was reinstated in June 2000, his legal situation must conform to the provisions of the aforementioned rules. This is not a case of retroactive application to the detriment of the administrated party, prohibited by section 34 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna), but rather the application of the regulations in force to legal situations that emerge and originate within the scope of validity of those precepts. It is reiterated, the theory invoked by the plaintiff does not allow for the application now under debate, especially considering that, of his own volition, it was the plaintiff who submitted his resignation and claimed the withdrawal of the amounts accumulated in the Fund. Thus, in response to the plaintiff's request of 27 August 2015 to obtain that refund, although it is true that criteria had previously been issued applying the cited Sole State Employer (Estado Patrono Único) theory, the fact of the matter is that in this specific case, through official letter FJEBCR-00017-2015 of 10 November 2015, the Administrative Board of the Retirement Fund for Employees of the BCR (Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR), considered that said request was not admissible to the extent that the employment relationship with the Bank giving rise to the affiliation to the Retirement Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones) had begun in June 2000, a date on which the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador) was already in force. That position is also expressed in official letter PJD-1-2017 of 16 March 2017, from the Legal Division of SUPEN, an instrument in which the position expressed by that body in opinion PJD-14-2013 of 23 August 2013 is reconsidered, in order to ensure that a possible recognition of time served is not contrary to Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador). As has been stated, that criterion concluded that in the case of officials who began an employment relationship with the Bank of Costa Rica before 18 February 2000, and ended said relationship before or after that date, to transfer to the service of another public institution, but rejoined the service of that Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), they should be considered as first-time entrants to the Retirement Fund for Employees of that institution (Fondo de jubilaciones de los empleados de esa institución), and should they cease to belong to that Fund, for reasons other than those established in Article 20 of Law 7983, the accumulated resources had to be transferred to their individual ROP account. The content and analysis of that final act by the Board fully align with what has been appreciated by this Tribunal, and it is therefore considered that it fully conforms to the norms governing this type of specific relationship, under the factual terms in which they have occurred. Under that understanding, no deficiency is observed in the objective material element of the GROUNDS (MOTIVO). Certainly, this element consists of the factual or legal antecedent that legitimizes, demands, or imposes the administrative action. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 133 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), it must exist actually or legally at the time of issuing the act and throughout its term of validity, and must be proportionate to the content of the act. In this matter, it is undeniable that the grounds for the act (motivo del acto) lie in the fact that the plaintiff re-affiliated with the Fund on 26 June 2000, a date on which Law No. 7983 was already in force. This is a circumstance established in the case file, and therefore it cannot be said to be non-existent. Of course, the plaintiff's position in considering that this affiliation must be taken from the date of the plaintiff's first entry into the Fund in December 1986 would lead one to understand that the grounds on which the Board bases its decision are illegitimate; however, it is reiterated, such a position is not shared by this Tribunal, as a result of which it is considered that the grounds for the questioned act (motivo del acto cuestionado) do not present the deficiencies alleged in the claim. As regards the CONTENT (CONTENIDO) of the act, Precept 132 of the cited General Law (Ley General) requires that it be lawful, possible, clear, precise, and corresponding to the grounds. Likewise, it must encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds, even if they have not been debated by the parties. In this particular case, given that it has been established that as of the resignation so many times mentioned, made in May 1999, the re-entry in June 2000 is considered a new relationship of affiliation to the Special Fund of the BCR (Fondo Especial del BCR). Given those grounds, section 75 of Law No. 7983 establishes that the worker's cessation of functions for reasons other than those defined by canon 20 of that same legislation entails, as has been indicated on multiple occasions, the transfer of the contributed sums to the worker's individual ROP account; ergo, the reimbursement of those sums was inappropriate in the case of the plaintiff, considering the factual circumstances referred to. In that sense, the content of the act, which constitutes the effect that the act seeks to establish, i.e., what the act orders, insofar as it denies what was requested and resolves: “…This being so and considering that in your case you began the employment relationship with the Bank of Costa Rica giving rise to your request on 26/06/2000, a date on which that Law was already in force, it is concluded that your request is not admissible and it is rejected for the reasons indicated. (…)”, fully conforms to the legal norms that regulate the premise under examination, and thus the alleged inaccuracies are not observed. In summary, the plaintiff indeed entered the Fund for the first time in December 1986; however, in May 1999 he resigned from his position at the BCR, and in June of the same year, he obtained the reimbursement of the sums contributed to the Fund, in accordance with the exceptionality that, in that sense, was permitted by the framework of application of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador). His re-entry to the Bank (and to the Fund) in June 2000 does not allow for the continuity of affiliation that is sought. The Sole State Employer (Estado Patrono Único) theory is neither extendable nor applicable to the relationship maintained with the Fund, being an institute which, although it benefits the worker by recognizing the time served in other public entities and bodies, does not have the virtue of generating that same effect in this type of special relationships, typical of legal relationships that were extinguished, even when a new employment relationship is subsequently entered into. The resignation and withdrawal of those funds entail an extinction of the affiliation regime, so much so that the contributed sums were withdrawn, such that re-entry with the same employer to the said Fund must be considered, for purposes of membership in the Fund, as a new relationship. Given that the date of new affiliation was subsequent to the entry into force of Law No. 7983, the reimbursement of those contributions is legally unviable. This treatment is not incompatible with the recognition of time served for the plaintiff for purposes of seniority (antigüedad), vacations, the ordinary retirement regime (régimen ordinario de jubilaciones), for these are other types of circumstances that are not comparable to the particularities characterizing the special Fund of the BCR (Fondo especial del BCR). It is for this reason that the denial of what was requested by the claimant, which is challenged in this venue, does not violate the theory of consolidated legal situations that the plaintiff alleges either. His right to withdraw the amounts contributed to the complementary pension fund was realized in June 1999, in accordance with the legal permissibility that corresponded to him at that moment. With the withdrawal of those funds, that legal situation was fully satisfied. Later, upon re-entering in June 2000, his legal situation was different, having to adjust to the new parameters in force at that time, without this constituting a retroactive application of pernicious norms, and therefore the violation he proposes in this process does not exist. The interpretation given by the Board in the questioned act, official letter FJEBCR-00017-2015 of 10 November 2015 from the Administrative Board of the Retirement Fund for Employees of the BCR (Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR), does not incorrectly interpret the literal meaning or finalistic sense of canon 75 in relation to 20 of Law No. 7983, as the applicant claims. Consequently, the substantial deficiencies constituting the basis of this claim are not present, which is why the annulment petition must be rejected.\" Note that unlike the previous opinion (SP-340-2008), in which the stance of suspension of the employment relationship was applied, in this latter one, the concept of the State as Sole Employer (Estado Patrono Único) and the continuity of a relationship with the State as employer are invoked. These applications turn out to be similar to those issued internally by the BCR on this particular matter. Indeed, in official communication DJ/GAG/234-2013 of July 17, 2013, the Legal Division of the Banco de Costa Rica issued an opinion in response to the consultation regarding the case of individuals who had started an employment relationship with the Bank before February 18, 2000, and ended it before that date, but re-entered the Bank's service after the entry into force of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. On this particular matter, the internal legal analysis concluded, in the relevant part: "</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">…Under the context of application of the theory of the State as sole employer, this Legal Division considers that indeed, the recognition of seniority in public service (for the Public Administration –sic-, and even more so when that seniority corresponds to time served with the same public employer, allows for validly accepting that an employee of the Banco de Costa Rica who was affiliated with the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica before the effectiveness of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, if they ended their employment relationship before such effectiveness or, subsequently, after it, but later re-enters the Bank's service and, therefore, the previously served time is recognized, the Theory of the State as sole employer (Teoría de Estado patrono único) is applicable to them for the corresponding legal effects. / Then, if that employee affiliates again with the Fondo de Jubilaciones, under the indicated theory it is valid to affirm that the previous affiliation and the new one must be considered as a single one for the purposes of applying Article 75 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador and, therefore, they are entitled to receive the accumulated assets in their individual account upon the termination of the current employment relationship. / Thus, it is the opinion of the Legal Division that what was resolved by the Superintendencia de Pensiones in official communication No. SP-340-2008 of February 7, 2008, is in accordance with such theory and, therefore, is applicable to current affiliates of the Fondo de Jubilaciones who had been affiliated during a previous employment relationship before the effectiveness of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / The foregoing, especially if they had reimbursed all or part of their received severance pay (cesantía) because the re-entry into the Bank's service had not exceeded the period provided for in subsection b) of Article 586 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), as this is due to the employee having an impediment to enter work for the State during a period equal to that represented by the sum received as severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). (…)</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">". (Images 87-92 of the main file) This harmonizes with what was stated in official communication DJ/GAG/255-2015 of August 17, 2015, in which the Legal Division of the Banco de Costa Rica issued a legal opinion on the application of the principle of the State as sole employer for purposes of affiliation to the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco. That opinion established: "</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">III. CONCLUSIONS. 1. The theory of the State as sole employer applies to the entire Public Sector. 2. Its application is valid for all legal purposes, among them, the recognition of annual increments (anualidades), vacations, severance pay (cesantía), and pensions. 3. Employment continuity in the different public entities where one has worked is not required, because case law allows separate periods, even by several years, to be considered as a single one for purposes of recognizing time served with the State, \"(...) so that both form, temporally speaking, an employment continuity\". 4. When recognizing separate periods, even by years, it must be interpreted that for the application of the theory of the State as sole employer, it does not matter if in the interim, the person worked in the private sector, since only the periods effectively worked in the public sector will be taken into consideration. 5. The theory of the State as sole employer (Estado patrono único) is applicable for purposes of recognizing the affiliation date to the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica, as established by the Superintendencia de Pensiones. 6. The affiliation periods in the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica must be considered as a single one for all legal purposes. 7. The affiliation period of a person to a Pension Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones) other than the Banco de Costa Rica that occurred before February 18, 2000, must be considered as continuous with the affiliation period of that person who entered the BCR after that date, regardless of whether or not there was a break between both periods (sic). 8. This continuity exists even if in the interim the person had worked in the private sector. 9. Continuity is all the more reason if in that interim the person does not appear linked to a private contract since there are no social security contributions.</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">". (Images 126-135 of the main file)</span></span></p> <p><span class=\"example1 252002\" style=\"margin: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; text-indent: 35.5pt; font-size: 11pt;\" data-mce-style=\"margin: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; text-indent: 35.5pt; font-size: 11pt;\"><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: bold;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: bold;\">IX.- </span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">However, that stance was subjected to modifications that have given basis to the present dispute. By official communication FEBCR-008-2015 of August 19, 2015, the President of the Fund's Board again requested an opinion from SUPEN, attaching the recently indicated legal opinions. By official communication SP-1121-2015 of October 8, 2015, SUPEN indicates: “</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">Notwithstanding the foregoing, Article 75 of Law No. 7983 provides that in the case of new workers affiliated with the systems referred to in that article who, after the entry into force of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, cease to belong to the special regime, for a reason other than retirement, the accumulated funds must be transferred to their individual ROP account, so that, like the rest of the workers, it is strengthened with that employer contribution. / The reason why those resources are not delivered to the worker, as is done with other 'savings' that they receive when the employment relationship is terminated, lies in the purpose for which the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica was created, given that the resources accumulated in that fund are intended for the worker to enjoy a supplementary pension (pensión complementaria) that improves their retirement income. (…) The foregoing is especially relevant if one considers that in this case it is a special fund, in which the employer, the State, makes a considerably high contribution of resources compared to other pension funds, with an express purpose: to supplement the workers' pension. This purpose cannot be ignored to the detriment of the future supplementary pension of the workers who retire from the Banco de Costa Rica. / In this order of ideas, it must be taken into consideration that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has classified the establishment of supplementary pension regimes as a matter of high public interest, because they materialize the constitutional principles of national solidarity and social justice (Ruling No. 4636-99 of 3:39 p.m. on June 16, 1999). (…) Now, and in relation to your request, it is necessary to point out that it is not the responsibility of the Superintendencia de Pensiones to resolve the specific consultations and petitions of the affiliates to the Fondo de Jubilaciones that you represent, since that task is the responsibility of the regime's administrator. / However, this body considers that any interpretation given to what is indicated in opinion PJD-14-2013 must have a restrictive nature, and must be based on the aforementioned purpose, in such a way that the objective for which the fund was created is not distorted in any measure, which, as already stated, seeks nothing more than to improve the retirement income of the workers of the Banco de Costa Rica.</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">” (Images 98-101 of the main file) As support for that new consideration, it explained that the current rule regulating the case of officials who cease to belong to a special supplementary pension regime, for reasons other than retirement, such as the case of the Fondo de Jubilaciones of the BCR employees, is Article 75 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, No. 7983. It explained that it was necessary to keep in mind that the regimes referred to in that rule constitute an exception to the provisions of numeral 13 subsection c) of Law No. 7983, according to which the Mandatory Pension Regime (Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones, ROP) is financed, among others, with an employer contribution corresponding to 1.5% monthly on paid salaries. It considered that in the case of the supplementary pension regimes existing before the entry into force of Law No. 7983, as was the case of the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco, the employer contribution of 1.5% monthly is substituted by the percentage provided for in the law creating the special regime, and those resources are not administered as part of the ROP, but are administered by the institutions or companies for whose workers the benefit was created, in a special fund. In response to that new stance, in session 16-15 of October 30, 2015, article XII, the Administrative Board of the Fund (Junta Administrativa del Fondo) agreed: "</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">- Having analyzed SUPEN's opinion, it is considered that the application of Article 75 is what should be indicated to respond to the requests that are pending, informing them that the Board's decision is that the refund does not apply to them. (...)</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">". (Image 138 of the main file) It is based on those references that subsequently, in response to the specific request of the plaintiff, through official communication FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, the Administrative Board of the Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR responds to the plaintiff regarding their request dated August 27, 2015, concerning the application of the theory of the State as sole employer for purposes of affiliation to the Fondo de Jubilaciones del Banco de Costa Rica. That act states in the relevant part: “</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">…The Administrative Board, upon learning of such opinion (referring to SUPEN's official communication No. SP-1121-2015 of October 8, 2015), assessed that SUPEN expressly points out that in matters of supplementary pension funds, such is the case of the Fondo de Jubilaciones del Banco de Costa Rica, what applies is Article 75 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, and under that rule, except in the case of retirement, the Fund's resources for those who began working at the Bank after the effectiveness of said Law must be transferred to the mandatory pension regime (régimen obligatorio de pensiones) and cannot be delivered to the worker upon the termination of their employment relationship for any other cause. / Although the Superintendencia de Pensiones makes no reference to the application of the Theory of the State as sole employer in matters of the Fondo de Jubilaciones –an analysis which was sought by the Administrative Board in the consulted cases–, while also noting that it is not its responsibility to resolve those consulted cases, it is certain that it expressly mentions that it will be the responsibility of the Fund's administrator (the Administrative Board) to resolve each case, having to ensure, for that purpose, that the principle of protection of the supplementary pension (pensión complementaria) is always fulfilled, which in SUPEN's judgment is what the text of Article 75 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador intends to protect. / This being so, the Administrative Board, after evaluating the scope of the opinion in question, reached the conclusion that it is not appropriate to deliver the funds accumulated in the individual account of the affiliate or former affiliate to the Fund, if the employment relationship with the Bank that gives rise to the affiliation to the Fondo de Jubilaciones began on a date equal to or after the effectiveness of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / In accordance with the foregoing, the Administrative Board resolved to reject all the cases presented before that Collegiate Body for the delivery of funds accumulated in the Fondo de Jubilaciones, as long as the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to the request began on a date equal to or after February 18, 2000, the effective date of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / This being so, and given that in your case, you began the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to your request on 06/26/2000, a date on which that Law was already in effect, it is concluded that your request is not appropriate and is rejected for the reasons indicated. (…)</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">”. (Images 41-45 of the main file) Finally, it is noted that through official communication PJD-1-2017 of March 16, 2017, the Legal Division of SUPEN informed the Superintendent that after several consultations raised by the Administrator of the Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica, they deemed it prudent to reconsider the position set forth in opinion PJD-14-2013 of August 23, 2013, in order to ensure that a possible recognition of time served does not prove contrary to Article 75 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. In that sense, it stated: "</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">III. Conclusions. Based on the foregoing, the provisions of opinion PJD-14-2013, of August 23, 2013, are reconsidered in the following sense: Regarding employees who began an employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica before February 18, 2000, and ended said relationship before or after that date, to go to the service of another public institution, but re-entered the service of that Bank after the entry into force of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador: - These must be considered as first-time entrants (primer ingreso) to the Fondo de jubilaciones of the employees of that institution, and should they cease to belong to that Fund, for reasons other than those established in Article 20 of Law 7983, the accumulated resources must be transferred to their individual ROP account, as indicated in the third paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. - The theory of the State as sole employer is not applicable in this case.</span></span><span class=\"example1 252002\" style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">" (Images 223-231 of the main file)</span></p> <p><span class=\"example1 252002\" style=\"margin: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; text-indent: 35.5pt; font-size: 11pt;\" data-mce-style=\"margin: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; text-indent: 35.5pt; font-size: 11pt;\"><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: bold;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: bold;\">X.-</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\"> The theory of the State as Sole Employer (Estado Patrono Único) assumes that, for purposes of recognizing the seniority of the public employee in the provision of their services, it is necessary to recognize the time served in the State and its institutions, which, for all purposes, must be considered as a single employment relationship. Thus, periods of time served with a public entity are capable of being recognized for purposes of seniority in the employment relationship established with another public entity or with the Central Administration. As a normative reference, Article 12 subsection d) of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), No. 2166 of October 9, 1957, provided, prior to the reform recently carried out by the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances (Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas), No. 9635: "</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">d) Public Sector employees, whether permanent or interim, shall be recognized, for the purposes of the annual increases referred to in Article 5 above, the time of services rendered in other Public Sector entities. This provision does not have retroactive effect. This law does not negatively affect the right established in collective bargaining agreements and conventions, regarding salary negotiation.</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">" </span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;\">(Thus added by Article 2 of Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982) This implies that time served in other units of the Public Administration must be recognized by the new public employer, for purposes of recognizing the payment of the salary component of annual increments (anualidades) and other variables of the employment relationship based on seniority. In that sense, as indicated by the plaintiff, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled on the application of said maxim. Among others, in Precedent No. 43 of 9:00 a.m. on March 18, 1993, it indicated on the subject: </span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\" data-mce-style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-weight: normal;\">“V- Article 12, subsection d), of the Public Administration Salary Law, which formed the basis for that agreement, recognizes 'the time of services rendered in other Public Sector entities', and not 'seniority', understood as a concept referring to years of service, estimated in complete twelve months, without counting fractions of a year. In that sense, if the plaintiff worked, in her first period of service for the Bank, from June 16, 1970, to April 27, 1979, eight years, ten months, and eleven days of service must be recognized to her, and not only eight years, as the Court maintains, an aspect in which the appealed ruling must be revoked, so that the totality of the plaintiff's time of service in the Bank is recognized, which must be applied to all the items upheld by the lower court's ruling, since subsection d) of Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, and 5th.,256, of nine o'clock on November 29, 1991). The time of service from the first work period must be joined with that of the second, which began on August 22, 1988, so that both form, temporally speaking, an employment continuity.</span></span></p> This means that their start date in the second employment relationship should not be backdated to the date indicated by the plaintiff, that is, to October 11, 1979, but rather, the employment relationship should be considered as having unfolded in a single period and the conventionally agreed-upon rules that regulate the various benefits should be applied. (...)". Similarly, in Judgment No. 34 of 09:40 hours on March 5, 1993, it stated: "II. The State's second objection concerns the acceptance of the claimant's demands, despite the fact that he is a former public servant who has been retired since September 1, 1984, and who claims the annual increments (anualidades) not recognized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) for retirement purposes. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Chamber issued its first rulings on the recognition of seniority, for the purpose of annual increases—annual increments (anualidades)—based on the application of Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982, back in eighty-five; later, with Judgment number 58, of 14:30 hours on April 30, 1986, the point was publicly disclosed and, from then on, judicial processes aimed at obtaining such recognition proliferated. After some time, the Chamber came to set additional guidelines on the matter, notably Judgments numbers 81, 82, 90, 92, and 162, of 9:00 hours, 9:10 hours, 15:10 hours, 15:30 hours, of July 5 and 10:20 hours of October 5, all of 1989. In the second of these, it was stated: "III. Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982, established a new salary scale for the Public Sector and provided in its second article for the addition of a subparagraph d) to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, which stated verbatim: 'Public Sector servants, whether permanent or interim, shall be credited, for the purposes of the annual increases referred to in Article 5 above, with the time of service rendered in other Public Sector entities. This provision is not retroactive. This law does not negatively affect rights established in collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) and agreements, regarding salary negotiations.' Starting in January 1983, the various entities comprising the Public Sector began recognizing the years served in other centralized and decentralized public institutions, an aspect that had already been recognized by the then-Court of Cassation, the Superior Labor Tribunal, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Originally, seniority recognition was done by applying the theory of the SINGLE EMPLOYER STATE (ESTADO PATRONO UNICO), but with considerable weakness, particularly considering the principle of state unity as employer and, in some cases, relating it to the other theory of the statutory relationship, based on Article 191 of the Political Constitution. On this point, see Judgments No. 1388 of November 3, 1958, number 105 of January 12, 1973, and No. 1928 of November 28, 1974, from the Superior Labor Tribunal of San José, and Judgment No. 95 of August 6, 1975, from the former Court of Cassation. As stated, initially, recognition was given for the purposes of vacation, legal severance benefits, meaning notice (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and later, seniority was recognized for the purposes of annual, biennial, and quinquennial increases, first when the services were continuous and later even covering discontinuous ones; however, the situation was clearly defined in the law, with the entry into force of No. 6835, when it contemplates the recognition, for the purpose of annual increases, of the time served in other public sector entities. In other words, judicial precedent had already admitted the recognition of seniority in public service, as had administrative precedent (Attorney General's Office, opinions C-194-83 of June 17, 1983, and C-236-85 of September 30, 1985). Therefore, there is no doubt that the recognition of seniority regarding the provision of services to the State and its institutions has advanced in terms of the rights for which the corresponding recognition was made, namely: vacation pay, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), annual increases, retirement and pensions (jubilaciones y pensiones); as well as making the leap from the acceptance of continuous seniority to the admission of service provision with a break in continuity, so in sound legal theory, a criterion like that of the first instance judgment, confirmed by the lower court, can no longer be upheld, because that resolution is not in accordance with either the precedent or the national doctrine on this matter, since it is clear that if seniority in the Public Sector is recognized for services rendered to other public entities, then with much greater reason must the services rendered in the same public entity be recognized, as is the case of the public service provision made by the claimant for the benefit of the defendant institution..." " It is clear that the content of the aforementioned principle implies the unity of the time served in various public entities or the State, for the purposes of being considered as a single relationship in temporal terms, for the application and recognition of labor rights whose quantification requires that parameter. Aspects such as seniority, vacation pay, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), notice (preaviso), severance pay (cesantía), and retirement and pensions (jubilaciones y pensiones) fall within this scope. Regarding these last two referents (retirement and pensions), to the extent that the subjective parameters set by the Legal System usually require the concurrence of time served and retirement age, in order to establish the concurrence of the seniority requirement, it is evident and logical that the relationships maintained with public employers form a single line of temporality, to the extent that during the course of those relationships, contributions were made to the corresponding retirement and pension system.

XI.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, although the theory of the Single Employer State allows for the recognition of time served by a person performing a public function in other public entities, in order to have a single seniority margin, which is equally applicable to the pension and retirement system, in cases like the present one, where that principle is invoked as a legitimizing premise to obtain economic advantages derived from a Special Fund of a complementary nature, it is not viable to start from that generality, it being necessary and imperative to analyze the regulatory content of that special regime and the specific circumstances presented by the affiliate. Along those lines, as has been indicated, there is no debate whatsoever that the Special Fund for BCR Employees (Fondo Especial de Empleados del BCR) is a complementary regime to the Disability, Old Age, and Death regime of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), existing prior to the entry into force of Law No. 7983 (February 18, 2000), and therefore, by order of Article 75 of that legal source, it can continue to operate, under the supervision of SUPEN. As has been indicated, that same mandate imposes that those new workers affiliated with that regime who, after the entry into force of Law No. 7983, cease to belong to the regime for reasons other than those set out in canon 20 of the same law, must have their accumulated funds transferred to their individual account in the mandatory complementary pension system (ROP). Based on that regulation, the defendant Administration, as well as SUPEN, have interpreted that workers whose affiliation to that Special Fund occurred before the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), by application of the contrary meaning of the aforementioned precept 75 of the same law, may request the return of the sums contributed and accumulated in the aforementioned Fund. In that sense, it is established as proven that Mr. Lissander Chacón Vargas began working for the Bank of Costa Rica (Banco de Costa Rica) on December 1, 1986, generating affiliation to the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Bank of Costa Rica (Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica). The start of this employment relationship is recorded in the respective employment contract, visible at pages 3-4 of the administrative file. Subsequently, on May 10, 1999, Mr. Chacón Vargas tendered his resignation from his position at the BCR, effective from that date, in order to take a job opportunity in the private sector. (Page 114 of the administrative file) This resignation was accepted by official letter dated June 2, 1999, from the Direction of the Human Talent and Organizational Transformation Division of the BCR (Page 117 of the administrative file), as a result of which, along with the payment of the respective labor entitlements, in what is relevant to the case, he proceeded to withdraw the amount accumulated up to that moment in his corresponding Retirement Fund account. For this concept of settling individualized sums in the Pension Fund, a total of ¢621,226.90 (six hundred twenty-one thousand two hundred twenty-six colones and 90/100) was paid to him, according to the settlement signed on October 22, 1999, and payment receipts visible at pages 128-134 of the administrative folder. Despite that break in the employment relationship with the Bank, on June 26, 2000, Mr. Chacón Vargas rejoined as an employee of the BCR, according to the employment contract found at pages 138-140, 144-146 of the administrative file. By note of June 27, 2000, the claimant requested the BCR to recognize the time worked before rejoining the Bank, as well as what corresponds to the concept of exclusive dedication (Page 141 of the administrative file), a recognition of seniority that was approved by the Bank's Human Capital Management, establishing for all purposes that the date of entry to the Bank was December 1, 1986. (An uncontroversial fact) From the foregoing account, it is evident that, at the time when the claimant's voluntary cessation occurred on May 10, 1999, in accordance with what was stated regarding the application of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law, the Board of the Fund, at the affiliate's request, reimbursed the individualized sums, in the amount already indicated. However, unlike what the petitioner postulates, his re-entry, while allowing the application of the Single Employer State theory for the purposes of calculating time served, does not generate the same effect he intends for what concerns the economic benefits derived from the Special Retirement Fund for BCR Employees (Fondo Especial de Jubilaciones de Empleados del BCR). Indeed, once the claimant, by his own decision, opted on May 10, 1999, to resign and withdraw the accumulated contributions in the Fund, which were effectively delivered to him, the factual premise provided for in Article 75 of Law No. 7983 was satisfied, in the sense that such withdrawal was feasible given that the claimant had joined that complementary regime prior to February 18, 2000. However, when he returned to work for the aforementioned Bank on June 26, 2000, the rules and limitations of the article in question were fully applicable to him, to the extent that it involved a new legal employment relationship, and with it, his new affiliation to the aforementioned Fund must be understood as having taken place from that moment forward. In the judgment of this Chamber, the claimant seeks to extend the treatment of recognizing previously served time to an extreme that is not applicable to him. It is undeniable that the previous relationship, from December 1986 to May 1999, must be added to the seniority of the time worked; indeed, for the purposes of contribution to the Disability, Old Age, and Death retirement regime, the contributions made in that relationship must be recognized along with those derived from the new relationship established in June 2000. But the foregoing does not imply, by automatism or logical derivation, as the claimant indicates, that this recognition assumes that, for all purposes, his date of affiliation to the fund is maintained as December 1986, irrespective of the fact that he had previously withdrawn the accumulated funds due to the break in the employment relationship in October 1999. For this collegiate body, the petitioner's stance is respectable, but ultimately it is not shared, to the extent that his consolidated legal situation was satisfied when he made said withdrawal. However, once he signed a new employment contract with the defendant Bank in June 2000, it must be considered a new affiliate entry to the Fund, and considering that date, Article 75 of Law No. 7983 was already in force and imposes that cessation of membership in the special regime for reasons other than those referred to in Canon 20 of the same law entails that the accumulated funds be transferred to the ROP, discarding the possibility of individual reimbursement. It is clear that the new cessation of the claimant, which occurs in 2015, after having re-entered again in June 2000, occurs due to assumptions of voluntary resignation, whereby, in line with the aforementioned rules, the pertinent action was the transfer of those sums to his individual account in the mandatory complementary pension system. From this perspective of examination, the consolidated legal situation that the plaintiff alleges is not infringed, for while it is true he held this situation having started in December 1986, which allowed him, in the event of a cessation of work, to claim the withdrawal of the contributed sums, as has been indicated, this consequence materialized in May 1999, when he resigned for the first time and obtained the claimed refund. However, when he rejoined in June 2000, his legal situation must adjust to the provisions established in the aforementioned rules. This is not a case of retroactive application to the detriment of the administered party, prohibited by Article 34 of the Constitution (Carta Magna), but rather the application of the regulations in force to legal situations that emerge and originate within the scope of validity of those precepts. We reiterate, the theory invoked by the claimant does not permit the application now under debate, especially considering that, of his own free will, it was the claimant who formulated his resignation and claimed the withdrawal of the amounts accumulated in the Fund. Thus, in response to the claimant's petition dated August 27, 2015, to obtain that refund, while it is true that criteria had previously been issued applying the aforementioned theory of the Single Employer State, the truth of the matter is that in this specific case, through official letter FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, the Administrative Board of the BCR Employees' Retirement Fund (Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR) considered that this request was not admissible, to the extent that the employment relationship with the Bank that gave rise to the affiliation to the Retirement Fund had begun in June 2000, a date on which the Worker Protection Law was already in force. This stance is also expressed in official letter PJD-1-2017 of March 16, 2017, from the Legal Division of SUPEN, an instrument in which the stance expressed by that body in opinion PJD-14-2013 of August 23, 2013, is reconsidered, in order to ensure that a possible recognition of time served does not run counter to Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law. As has been set out, that criterion concluded that in the case of officials who began an employment relationship with the Bank of Costa Rica before February 18, 2000, and ended that relationship before or after that date, to go to the service of another public institution, but rejoined the service of that Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law, they were to be considered as first-time entrants to the Retirement Fund for the employees of that institution, and in the event of ceasing to belong to that Fund for reasons other than those established in Article 20 of Law 7983, the accumulated resources were to be transferred to their individual ROP account. The content and analysis of that final act of the Board fully engages with what is appreciated by this Tribunal, and it is therefore deemed to fully conform to the rules governing this type of specific relationships, in the factual terms in which they occurred. Under this understanding, no deficiency is observed in the objective material element of the GROUNDS (MOTIVO). Certainly, this element consists of the factual or legal antecedent that legitimizes, requires, or imposes the administrative action. In accordance with the provisions of Article 133 of the General Public Administration Law, it must exist de facto or legally at the time of issuing the act and throughout its validity, and must be proportionate to the content of the act. In this matter, it is unquestionable that the grounds for the act lie in the fact that the claimant re-affiliated with the Fund on June 26, 2000, a date on which Law No. 7983 was already in force. This is a circumstance proven in the records, so its non-existence cannot be claimed. Of course, the claimant's stance in considering that this affiliation must be taken from the date of the claimant's first entry to the Fund in December 1986 would lead to the understanding that the grounds on which the Board bases its decision are illegitimate; however, we reiterate, this position is not shared by this Tribunal, as a derivation of which it is deemed that the grounds of the challenged act do not present the deficiencies pointed out in the claim. Regarding the CONTENT of the act, Article 132 of the aforementioned General Law requires that it must be lawful, possible, clear, precise, and corresponding to the grounds. Likewise, it must cover all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds, even if they have not been debated by the parties. In this particular case, given that it has been established that as of the oft-commented resignation made in May 1999, the re-entry in June 2000 is considered a new affiliation relationship to the BCR Special Fund. Attending to that grounds, Article 75 of Law No. 7983 establishes that the cessation of the worker's functions for reasons other than those defined by Canon 20 of that same legislation implies, as has been indicated on multiple occasions, the transfer of the contributed sums to the worker's individual ROP account; ergo, the reimbursement of those sums was improper in the claimant's case, considering the referred factual circumstances. In this sense, the content of the act, which constitutes the effect the act seeks to establish, that is, what the act provides, insofar as it denies the request and resolves: “…This being so, and considering that in your case you began the employment relationship with the Bank of Costa Rica that gives rise to your petition on 06/26/2000, a date on which that Law was already in force, it is concluded that your petition is not admissible and is rejected for the reasons indicated. (…)”, fully conforms to the legal norms that regulate the assumption under examination, such that the alleged incorrectness is not observed. In summary, the claimant indeed entered the Fund for the first time in December 1986; however, in May 1999, he resigned from his position at the BCR and in June of the same year obtained the reimbursement of the sums contributed to the Fund, in accordance with the exceptionality that the application framework of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law made possible in that sense. His re-entry to the Bank (and to the Fund) in June 2000 does not permit the continuity of affiliation that is sought. The theory of the Single Employer State is not extendable or applicable to the relationship maintained with the Fund, being an institute that, while it benefits the worker by recognizing the time served in other public entities and bodies, does not have the virtue of generating that same effect in this type of special relationships, typical of legal relationships that were terminated, even when a new employment relationship is later signed. The resignation and withdrawal of those funds implies an extinction of the affiliation regime, so much so that the contributed sums were withdrawn, such that the re-entry with the same employer to the aforementioned Fund must be considered, for the purposes of belonging to the Fund, as a new relationship. Given that the date of the new affiliation was after the entry into force of Law No. 7983, the reimbursement of those contributions is legally unfeasible.

This treatment is not incompatible with the recognition of time served by the plaintiff for the purposes of seniority, vacations, and the ordinary retirement regime, as these are other types of circumstances that are not equivalent to the particularities imbuing the special Fund of the BCR. It is for this reason that the denial of what was requested by the claimant, which is challenged in this venue, also does not violate the theory of consolidated legal situations alleged by the plaintiff. His right to withdraw the amounts contributed to the supplementary pension fund materialized in June 1999, in accordance with the legal permissibility that applied to him at that moment. With the withdrawal of those funds, that legal situation was fully satisfied. Subsequently, upon rejoining in June 2000, his legal situation was different, and he had to conform to the new parameters in force at that time, without this constituting a retroactive application of harmful norms. Therefore, the violation he proposes in this proceeding does not exist. The interpretation given by the Board in the challenged act, official communication FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, by the Administrative Board of the Employees' Retirement Fund of the BCR, does not incorrectly interpret the letter or the purposive meaning of canon 75 in relation to 20 of Law No. 7983, as the petitioner alleges. Consequently, the substantial deficiencies that form the basis of this lawsuit do not occur, which is why the annulment claim must be dismissed."</span></p> In response to that new position, in session 16-15 of October 30, 2015, article XII, the Board of Directors (Junta Administrativa) of the Fund agreed: "- Having analyzed SUPEN's criterion, it is considered that the application of Article 75 is the one that must be indicated to respond to the pending requests, indicating to them that the Board's decision is that the refund does not apply to them. (...)". (Image 138 of the main file) It is based on those references that subsequently, in response to the specific request of the petitioner, by means of official letter FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, the Board of Directors of the BCR Employees' Retirement Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR) responded to the petitioner's request of August 27, 2015, regarding the application of the single State employer theory for purposes of affiliation to the Retirement Fund of the Banco de Costa Rica. That act states in relevant part: "...The Board of Directors, upon learning of such criterion (referring to official letter No. SP-1121-2015 of October 8, 2015, from SUPEN), assessed that SUPEN expressly indicates that in matters of supplementary pension funds, as is the case of the Retirement Fund of the Banco de Costa Rica, what applies is Article 75 of the Worker Protection Act (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), and that under that rule, except in the case of a pension, the Fund's resources for those who began working at the Bank after the effective date of said Law must be transferred to the mandatory pension regime and cannot be delivered to the worker upon termination of their employment relationship for any other cause. / Although the Superintendency of Pensions makes no reference to the application of the State as Single Employer Theory in matters of the Retirement Fund —whose analysis was sought by the Board of Directors in the cases consulted—, noting in turn that it is not its responsibility to resolve those cases, it is true that it does expressly mention that it will be the responsibility of the Fund's administrator (the Board of Directors) to resolve each case, for which it must always ensure compliance with the principle of protection of the supplementary pension, which in SUPEN's judgment is what the text of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Act seeks to protect. / This being so, the Board of Directors, after assessing the scope of the criterion in question, reached the conclusion that it is not appropriate to deliver the monies accumulated in the individual account of a member or former member of the Fund, if the employment relationship with the Bank that gives rise to affiliation with the Retirement Fund began on a date equal to or after the effective date of the Worker Protection Act. / In accordance with the foregoing, the Board of Directors resolved to reject all cases submitted to that Collegiate Body for delivery of the monies accumulated in the Retirement Fund, insofar as the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to the request began on a date equal to or after February 18, 2000, the effective date of the Worker Protection Act. / This being so, and considering that in your case you began the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to your request on 06/26/2000, a date on which that Law was already in effect, it is concluded that your request is not appropriate and is rejected for the reasons indicated. (...)". (Images 41-45 of the main file) Finally, it is established that by means of official letter PJD-1-2017 of March 16, 2017, the Legal Division of SUPEN communicated to the Superintendent that after several inquiries raised by the Administrator of the BCR Employees' Retirement Fund, they deemed it prudent to reconsider the position set forth in opinion PJD-14-2013 of August 23, 2013, in order to ensure that a possible recognition of time served is not contrary to Article 75 of the Worker Protection Act. In that sense, it stated: "III. Conclusions. Based on the foregoing, the provisions of opinion PJD-14-2013, of August 23, 2013, are reconsidered, in the following sense: Regarding employees who began an employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica before February 18, 2000, and ended said relationship before or after that date, to enter the service of another public institution, but re-entered the service of that Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Act: - These must be considered as first entry to the Retirement Fund of the employees of that institution, and if they cease to belong to that Fund, for reasons other than those established in Article 20 of Law 7983, the accumulated resources must be transferred to their individual ROP account, as indicated in the third paragraph of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Act. - The theory of the State as single employer is not applicable in this case." (Images 223-231 of the main file) X.- The single State employer theory (teoría del Estado Patrono Único) assumes that, for purposes of recognizing the public servant's seniority (antigüedad) in the provision of their services, it is necessary to recognize the time served in the State and its institutions, which, for all purposes, must be considered as a single employment relationship. Thus, the periods of time served with one public entity are capable of being recognized for purposes of seniority in the employment relationship established with another public entity or with the Central Administration. As a normative reference, Article 12, subsection d) of the Public Administration Salaries Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), No. 2166 of October 9, 1957, provided, prior to the reform recently carried out by the Public Finance Strengthening Law, No. 9635: "d) Public Sector employees, whether permanent or interim, shall be recognized, for purposes of the annual increases referred to in Article 5 above, the time of services provided in other Public Sector entities. This provision is not retroactive. This law does not negatively affect the right established in collective bargaining agreements and agreements, regarding salary negotiation." (Thus added by Article 2 of Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982) This implies that the time served in other units of the Public Administration must be recognized by the new public employer, for purposes of recognizing the payment of the salary component of annual increments and other variables of the employment relationship based on seniority. In that sense, as indicated by the plaintiff, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled on the application of said maxim. Among others, in precedent No. 43 of 9:00 a.m. on March 18, 1993, it indicated on the subject: "V- Article 12, subsection d), of the Public Administration Salaries Law, which provided the basis for that agreement, recognizes 'the time of services provided in other Public Sector entities', and not 'seniority,' understood as a concept referring to years of service, estimated in complete twelve-month periods, without counting fractions of a year. In that sense, if the plaintiff worked, in her first period of work for the Bank, from June 16, 1970, to April 27, 1979, she must be recognized eight years, ten months, and eleven days of service, and not only eight years, as the Tribunal maintains, an aspect in which the appealed decision must be revoked, so that the entirety of the plaintiff's time of service in the Bank is recognized, which must be applied to all the claims upheld by the lower court's decision, since subsection d) of Article 12 of the Public Administration Salaries Law, and No. 5, 256, of nine o'clock on November 29, 1991). The time of service of the first work period must be joined to that of the second, which began on August 22, 1988, so that both form a labor continuity, temporarily speaking. This means that her date of entry into the second employment relationship should not be backdated to the date indicated by the plaintiff, that is, to October 11, 1979, but rather, the employment relationship should be considered as deployed in a single period and the conventionally agreed rules that regulate the different benefits should be applied. (...)". Likewise, in judgment No. 34 of 9:40 a.m. on March 5, 1993, it stated: "II.- The State's second objection has to do with the acceptance of the plaintiff's claims, despite the fact that he is a former public servant who retired as of September 1, 1984, and who claims the annual increments, not recognized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, for retirement purposes. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the Chamber issued its first pronouncements on the recognition of seniority, for purposes of annual increases -annual increments-, based on the application of Law No. 6835, of December 22, 1982, back in the year eighty-five; later, with judgment number 58, at 2:30 p.m., on April 30, 1986, the point was publicly disseminated and, thereafter, judicial processes proliferated, aimed at obtaining the recognition of merit. After some time, the Chamber came to establish additional guidelines on the matter, highlighting in this regard judgments numbers 81, 82, 90, 92 and 162, at 9:00 a.m., 9:10 a.m., 3:10 p.m., 3:30 p.m., on July 5, and 10:20 a.m. on October 5, all of 1989. In the second of them, it was stated: 'III. Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982, established a new salary scale for the Public Sector and provided in its second article, to add a subsection with the letter d) to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salaries Law, which literally stated: "Public Sector employees, whether permanent or interim, shall be recognized, for purposes of the annual increases referred to in Article 5 above, the time of services provided in other Public Sector entities. This provision is not retroactive. This law does not negatively affect the right established in collective bargaining agreements and agreements, regarding salary negotiation." As of January 1983, the different entities that make up the Public Sector began recognizing the years served in other centralized and decentralized public institutions, an aspect that was already being recognized by the then Court of Cassation, the Superior Labor Tribunal, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Originally, the recognition of seniority was done by applying the theory of the SINGLE STATE EMPLOYER, but with considerable weakness, above all, considering the principle of state unity as the employer and, in some cases, relating it to the other theory of the statutory relationship, the latter based on Article 191 of the Political Constitution. On this matter, see judgments No. 1388 of November 3, 1958, number 105 of January 12, 1973, and No. 1928 of November 28, 1974, of the Superior Labor Tribunal of San José, and judgment No. 95 of August 6, 1975, of the former Court of Cassation. As was said, initially the recognition was made for purposes of vacation time, legal benefits, meaning thereby advance notice and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and later, seniority was recognized for purposes of annual, biennial, and quinquennial increases, first when the services were continuous and later even covering those of a discontinuous nature; however, the situation became well defined in the law, with the entry into force of number 6835, when it contemplates the recognition, for purposes of annual increases, of time served in other public sector entities. In other words, judicial jurisprudence had already admitted the recognition of seniority in the public service, as had administrative jurisprudence (Office of the Attorney General, opinions C-194-83 of June 17, 1983, and C-236-85 of September 30, 1985). Therefore, there is no doubt that the recognition of seniority regarding the provision of services for the State and its institutions has been advancing with respect to the rights for which the corresponding recognition was made, namely: vacation time, Christmas bonus, advance notice, severance pay, annual increases, retirements and pensions; as well as taking the leap from the acceptance of continuous seniority to the admission of the provision of services with a break in continuity, so that in good legal theory, it is no longer possible to sustain a criterion such as that of the first-instance judgment, confirmed by the ad-quem Tribunal, because that resolution is not consistent with either the jurisprudence or the national doctrine on this subject, since, as is clear, if seniority in the Public Sector is recognized with respect to services provided for other public entities, all the more reason must the services provided in the same public entity be recognized, as is the case of the provision of public services made by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant institution...'." It is clear that the content of the aforementioned principle supposes the unity of the times served in various public entities or the State, for purposes of being considered as a single relationship in temporal terms, with a view to the application and recognition of labor rights whose quantification requires that parameter. In that area are found aspects such as seniority, vacation time, Christmas bonus, advance notice, severance, and retirements and pensions. Regarding these last two references (retirements and pensions), to the extent that the subjective parameters set by the Legal System usually require the concurrence of time served and retirement age, in order to establish the concurrence of the seniority requirement, it is evident and logical that the relationships held with public employers form a single line of temporality, to the extent that in the course of those relationships, contributions have been made to the corresponding retirement and pension system.

XI.- Notwithstanding what was indicated in the preceding recital, although the single State employer theory allows the recognition of the time served by the person exercising public functions in other public entities, in order to have a single margin of seniority, which applies equally to the pension and retirement regime, in cases such as the present one, in which that principle is invoked as a legitimizing requirement to obtain economic advantages derived from a Special Fund that has a supplementary nature, it is not viable to start from that generality, it being necessary and imperative to analyze the regulatory content of that special regime and the specific circumstances presented by the member. In that line, as has been indicated, there is no debate whatsoever that the BCR Employees' Special Fund is a supplementary regime to the Invalidity, Old Age, and Death regime of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), in force prior to the entry into force of Law No. 7983 (February 18, 2000), and therefore, pursuant to Article 75 of that legal source, it may continue to operate, under the supervision of SUPEN. As has been indicated, that same mandate imposes that for those new workers affiliated with that regime, who after the entry into force of Law No. 7983 cease to belong to the regime for reasons other than those set forth in Article 20 of the same law, the accumulated funds must be transferred to their individual account of the mandatory supplementary pension regime (ROP). Based on that regulation, the respondent Administration, as well as SUPEN, have interpreted that workers whose affiliation to that Special Fund occurred prior to the effective date of the Worker Protection Act, by a contrario sensu application of the cited provision 75 ibidem, may request the refund of the sums contributed and accumulated in the cited Fund.

In that sense, it is considered proven that Mr. Lissander Chacón Vargas began working for the Banco de Costa Rica on December 1, 1986, generating his affiliation with the Retirement Fund for Employees of the Banco de Costa Rica (Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica). The commencement of this employment relationship is recorded in the respective employment contract, visible at folios 3-4 of the administrative file. Subsequently, on May 10, 1999, Mr. Chacón Vargas submitted his resignation from his position at BCR, effective from that date, in order to take up a job opportunity in the private sector. (Folio 114 of the administrative file) This resignation was accepted by official letter dated June 2, 1999, from the Directorate of the Human Talent and Organizational Transformation Division of BCR (Folio 117 of the administrative file), as a result of which, along with the payment of the respective employment entitlements, in what is relevant to the case, he proceeded to withdraw the amount accumulated up to that point in his corresponding account of the Retirement Fund. For this concept of liquidation of individualized sums in the Pension Fund, he was paid a total of ¢621,226.90 (six hundred twenty-one thousand two hundred twenty-six colones and 90/100), according to the settlement signed on October 22, 1999, and payment vouchers visible at folios 128-134 of the administrative folder. Despite that rupture of the employment relationship with the Bank, on June 26, 2000, Mr. Chacón Vargas rejoined as a worker of BCR, according to an employment contract recorded at pages 138-140, 144-146 of the administrative file. By note of June 27, 2000, the plaintiff requested from BCR the recognition of the time worked before rejoining the Bank, as well as the amount corresponding to the concept of exclusive dedication, (Folio 141 of the administrative file), a recognition of seniority that was approved by the Bank's Human Capital Management, with the entry date to the Bank being considered for all purposes as December 1, 1986. (Non-controversial fact) From the foregoing account, it is evident that, in its due time, at the moment of the plaintiff's voluntary termination, on May 10, 1999, in accordance with what was indicated regarding the application of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), the Fund's Board, at the request of the member, reimbursed him the individualized sums, in the amount already indicated. However, contrary to what the petitioner postulates, his rejoining, although allowing the application of the Single State Employer theory (teoría de Estado Patrono Único) for the purposes of calculating time served, does not generate the same effect he intends concerning the economic benefits derived from the Special Retirement Fund for Employees of BCR (Fondo Especial de Jubilaciones de Empleados del BCR). Indeed, once the plaintiff, by his own decision, chose on May 10, 1999, to resign and withdraw the accumulated contributions in the Fund, which were effectively delivered to him, the factual premise provided for in Article 75 of Law No. 7983 was satisfied, in the sense that such withdrawal was feasible given that the plaintiff had joined the said complementary regime prior to February 18, 2000. However, when he went to work again at the said Bank, on June 26, 2000, the rules and limitations of the aforementioned article were fully applicable to him, to the extent that it was a new legal employment relationship, and with it, his new affiliation to the said Fund must be understood as having occurred from that moment onward. In the opinion of this Chamber, the plaintiff seeks to extend the treatment of the recognition of previously served time to an extreme that is not applicable to him. There is no doubt that the previous relationship, from December 1986 to May 1999, must be added to the seniority of the time worked; even for the purposes of contributions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death (Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) pension regime, the contributions made during that relationship must be recognized along with those derived from the new relationship entered into in June 2000. But the foregoing does not imply, as a matter of automatism or logical derivation, as the plaintiff indicates, that such recognition means, for all purposes, that his date of affiliation to the fund remains December 1986, regardless of his having previously withdrawn the accumulated funds due to the rupture of the employment relationship in October 1999. For this collegiate body, the petitioner's stance is respectable, but it is ultimately not shared to the extent that his consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) was satisfied when he made that withdrawal, but once he signed a new employment contract with the respondent Bank in June 2000, it must be considered a new membership entry to the Fund, and considering that date, Article 75 of Law No. 7983 was already in force, and it stipulates that cessation of membership in the special regime for reasons other than those referred to in canon 20 ejusdem entails that the accumulated funds be transferred to the ROP, discarding the possibility of individual reimbursement. It is clear that the new cessation of the plaintiff, which occurred in 2015, after he rejoined again in June 2000, occurred under assumptions of voluntary resignation, with which, in line with the alluded norms, the pertinent action was the transfer of those sums to his individual account of the mandatory complementary pension regime. From this angle of examination, the consolidated legal situation that the plaintiff alleges is not violated, because, although it is certain he held said situation upon having entered in December 1986, which allowed him, in the event of cessation of work, to claim the withdrawal of the sums contributed, as has been indicated, such consequence materialized in May 1999, when he resigned for the first time and obtained the claimed refund. However, when he rejoined in June 2000, his legal situation must conform to what is prescribed in the alluded norms. It is not a case of retroactive application to the detriment of the administered party, prohibited by Article 34 of the Carta Magna, but rather the application of the regulations in force to legal situations that emerge and originate within the scope of validity of those precepts. It is insisted, the theory invoked by the plaintiff does not allow for the application now debated, especially considering that, of his own free will, it was the plaintiff himself who submitted his resignation and claimed the withdrawal of the amounts accumulated in the Fund. Thus, faced with the plaintiff's petition of August 27, 2015, to obtain that refund, although it is true that opinions had previously been issued applying the cited Single State Employer theory, the truth of the matter is that in this specific matter, by means of official letter FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, the Administrative Board of the Retirement Fund for Employees of BCR (Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR) considered that this petition was not admissible to the extent that the employment relationship with the Bank that gives rise to the affiliation to the Retirement Fund had begun in June 2000, a date on which the Worker Protection Law was already in force. This position is also expressed in official letter PJD-1-2017 of March 16, 2017, from the Legal Division of SUPEN, an instrument in which the position expressed by that body in opinion PJD-14-2013 of August 23, 2013, is reconsidered, in order to ensure that a possible recognition of time served does not prove contrary to Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law. As has been set forth, that opinion concluded that in the case of officials who began an employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica before February 18, 2000, and ended said relationship before or after that date, to go into the service of another public institution, but rejoined the service of that Bank after the entry into force of the Worker Protection Law, they must be considered as first-time entrants to the Retirement Fund for employees of that institution, and in the event of ceasing to belong to that Fund, for reasons other than those established in Article 20 of Law 7983, the accumulated resources must be transferred to their individual ROP account. The content and analysis of that final act of the Board fully mesh with what this Court has appreciated, and therefore it is deemed to fully conform to the norms that govern this type of specific relationships, in the factual terms in which they have occurred. Under this understanding, no deficiency is observed in the objective material element of the GROUNDS (MOTIVO). Certainly, this element consists of the factual or legal background that legitimizes, demands, or imposes the administrative action. By order of what is prescribed by Article 133 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), it must exist in reality or legally at the moment of issuing the act and throughout the course of its validity and must be proportionate to the content of the act. In this matter, there is no doubt that the grounds for the act lie in the fact that the plaintiff rejoined the Fund on June 26, 2000, a date on which Law No. 7983 was already in force. This is a circumstance accredited in the case file, and therefore it cannot be said to be non-existent. Of course, the plaintiff's stance in considering that this affiliation must be taken from the date of the plaintiff's first entry to the Fund in December 1986 would lead to the understanding that the grounds on which the Board bases its decision are illegitimate; however, it is reiterated, such a position is not shared by this Court, as a derivation of which, it is considered that the grounds for the questioned act do not present the deficiencies noted in the claim. Regarding the CONTENT of the act, precept 132 of the cited General Law stipulates that it must be lawful, possible, clear, precise, and corresponding to the grounds. Likewise, it must cover all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds, even if they have not been debated by the parties. In this particular case, given that it has been established that from the resignation so many times mentioned, made in the month of May 1999, the rejoining in June 2000 is considered a new affiliation relationship to the Special Fund of BCR (Fondo Especial del BCR). Considering these grounds, numeral 75 of Law No. 7983 establishes that the cessation of the worker's functions for reasons other than those defined by canon 20 of that same legislation implies, as has been indicated on multiple occasions, the transfer of the contributed sums to the worker's individual ROP account; ergo, the reimbursement of those sums was improper in the case of the plaintiff, considering the referred to factual circumstances. In that sense, the content of the act, which constitutes the effect the act seeks to establish, that is, what the act disposes, insofar as it denies what was petitioned and resolves: "…This being so and having that in your case you began the employment relationship with the Banco de Costa Rica that gives rise to your proceeding on 06/26/2000, a date on which that Law was already in force, it is concluded that your proceeding is not appropriate and is rejected for the reasons indicated. (…)", fully conforms to the legal norms that regulate the assumption under examination, so that the alleged incorrectnesses are not observed. In summary, it is true that the plaintiff entered the Fund for the first time in December 1986; however, in May 1999 he resigned from his position at BCR, and in October of the same year, he obtained the reimbursement of the sums contributed to the Fund, in accordance with the exceptionality that, in that sense, the application framework of Article 75 of the Worker Protection Law made possible. His rejoining the Bank (and the Fund) in June 2000 does not allow for the continuity of affiliation that is intended. The Single State Employer theory is neither extensible nor applicable to the relationship held with the Fund, being an institute that, although benefiting the worker by recognizing the time served in other public entities and bodies, does not have the virtue of generating that same effect in this type of special relationships, typical of legal relationships that were terminated, even when, later, a new employment relationship is signed. The resignation and withdrawal of those funds suppose an extinction of the affiliation regime, so much so that the contributed sums were withdrawn, such that rejoining with the same employer, to the cited Fund, must be considered, for the purposes of belonging to the Fund, as a new relationship. Given that the date of new affiliation was subsequent to the entry into force of Law No. 7983, the reimbursement of those contributions is legally unfeasible. This treatment is not incompatible with the recognition of time served to the plaintiff for the purposes of seniority, vacations, and the ordinary pension regime, as these are other types of circumstances that are not equivalent to the particularities that imbue the special Fund of BCR (Fondo especial del BCR). It is for this reason that the denial of what was requested by the claimant, which is challenged in this venue, also does not violate the theory of consolidated legal situations that the plaintiff alleges. His right to withdraw the amounts contributed to the complementary pension fund materialized in October 1999, according to the legal permissibility that corresponded to him at that instant. With the withdrawal of those funds, such legal situation was fully satisfied. Later, upon rejoining in June 2000, his legal situation was different, and he had to adjust to the new parameters in force at that moment, without this constituting a retroactive application of pernicious norms, and therefore the violation he proposes in this process does not exist. The interpretation given by the Board in the questioned act, official letter FJEBCR-00017-2015 of November 10, 2015, from the Administrative Board of the Retirement Fund for Employees of BCR, does not incorrectly interpret the literal wording or the purposive meaning of canon 75 in relation to 20 of Law No. 7983, as the petitioner alleges. Consequently, the substantial deficiencies that constitute the basis of this claim do not occur, for which reason, the annulment petition must be rejected.

"VI.- [...] La motivación consiste en la expresión de las razones de hecho y de derecho que han sustentado la decisión administrativa (a nivel de justificación), lo que incluye el detalle de los elementos de convicción a partir de los cuales ha derivado o desprendido los hechos relevantes que han servido de base al motivo del acto, así como las consideraciones a partir de las cuales, la ponderación de esas probanzas lleva a determinada conclusión fáctica, apreciación o conjetura. De igual manera, exige expresar los fundamentos jurídicos que han llevado, a partir de esos hechos, a establecer determinada decisión, con la indicación de las pautas de valoración e interpretación de las reglas jurídicas aplicadas. En los actos de contenido discrecional, impone la referencia diáfana de las circunstancias relevantes y determinantes a partir de las cuales se adopta la decisión, así como la referencia a la conveniencia y pertinencia de la decisión adoptada, con exclusión de otra igualmente legítima, atendiendo a los principios generales del derecho, reglas unívocas de la ciencia y de la técnica y las máximas de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que hacen válida la voluntad administrativa frente a una circunstancia específica. Los defectos de motivación pueden darse por los siguientes vicios: a) falta de motivación (omisión), cuando el acto no exprese en modo alguno las razones que le han dado respaldo, de suerte que el destinatario no se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer esas razones antecedentes y justificativas; b) Motivación indebida: cuando las razones de hecho y de derecho que expone el acto como base de la decisión, no sean atinentes al asunto analizado, sea por deficiencia en los hechos, o por aplicación de normas que no son atinentes o pertinentes al caso, o bien cuando las argumentaciones jurídicas sean contradictorias a nivel racional; y c) Motivación Insuficiente: en los casos en que el fundamento dado en el acto no se basta a sí mismo para comprender racionalmente las razones de su contenido. Se trata, en este supuesto, de un defecto que impide la comprensión debida de las razones de la voluntad adoptada, sea por imprecisión o por incompletitud. Con todo, cabe señalar que la motivación del acto puede realizarse de manera directa o indirecta. La primera (directa) cuando el acto mismo contiene la fundamentación que le da respaldo, o bien, Indirecta, cuando la motivación consista en referencias y/o remisión a dictámenes, propuestas o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado la adopción del acto, a condición de que se acompañen con la comunicación del acto. Cabe destacar que en los casos en que el acto administrativo no solamente refiera o remita a dictámenes u opiniones de órganos asesores que han emitido insumos que tienen por objeto orientar la adopción del acto final, sino que toma referencias concretas de esos actos y los menciona dentro de la literalidad de su contenido, con la correspondiente exposición de las razones lógicas por las cuales toma ese tipo de análisis como soporte de su decisión, se está frente a una motivación directa, pues en tales casos el acto expone en su propio contenido, las razones lógicas que permitirían comprender la base de la voluntad comunicada. [...]

VIII.- Del recuento de hechos probados se tiene una serie de criterios relevantes que se han emitido en torno a las diversas consultas presentadas sobre la aplicación del ordinal 75 de la Ley No. 7983 en cuanto a los trabajadores que iniciaron labores con el Banco antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de referencia, luego renunciaron antes de esa vigencia, o en el curso de la ley, pero luego reingresaron a trabajar con el Banco y cotizaron para el Fondo Especial. El reclamante postula la aplicación de la teoría del Estado patrono único, en tanto que los accionados estiman que se trata de un nuevo ingreso. En ese sentido, se tiene que en el oficio SP-340-2008 del 07 de febrero del 2008, la SUPEN analizó consulta planteada por un afiliado respecto del artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, en el sentido de si los períodos previamente laborados en el BCR le otorgaban el derecho a que se le entregara el ahorro acumulado en el Fondo de Jubilaciones, generado desde su reingreso al servicio de la entidad, siendo que había laborado desde 1979 hasta diciembre del 2001 y reingresado en julio del 2003. En ese acto se expresó: “Así las cosas, se desprende que al 18 de febrero del año 2000 usted era funcionario del Banco de Costa Rica y por ende ya se encontraba cubierto por el Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados de dicha Institución. Ahora bien, dado el retiro temporal de la Institución y su reingreso a la misma, se puede decir que existió una suspensión de la relación de servicio, y luego de cumplir con lo ordenado por el artículo 586 del Código de Trabajo, se considera por el Banco el día 16 de marzo de 1979 como su fecha de ingreso a la Institución para todos los efectos laborales." (Imágenes 159-161 del principal) En ese oficio, se adopta la tesis de continuidad de la relación laboral bajo la comprensión de que el espacio temporal en que el trabajador no se desempeñó con el Banco, se debía tener como una suerte de suspensión de la relación de servicio. Luego, en el criterio legal PJD-14-2013 del 23 de agosto del 2013, la SUPEN atendió consultas de la Presidenta de la Junta Administradora del Fondo, atinentes al reconocimiento del tiempo servido dentro de la Administración Pública a fin de determinar la procedencia del disfrute de los beneficios del fondo. En esta oportunidad, en ese análisis se expuso: "1. En el supuesto de aquellos servidores que iniciaron una relación laboral con el Banco de Costa Rica antes del 18 de febrero de 2000, y finalizaron dicha relación antes o después de esa fecha para pasar al servicio de otra institución pública, pero reingresaron al servicio del Banco posteriormente a la entrada de vigencia de la Ley de Protección del Trabajador, y se afiliaron nuevamente al FJEBCR, se les debe reconocer el tiempo servido de previo de conformidad con la teoría del Estado como patrono único y centro de imputación de derechos laborales. 2. En dichos casos, la afiliación anterior y la nueva se deben tener como una sola para los efectos de lo indicado en el artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador y, por ende, tienen derecho a que se les entregue el patrimonio acumulado en su cuenta individual al finalizar su relación laboral actual. Es decir, se les debe reconocer el tiempo servido de previo en el Banco, teniendo por consiguiente derecho a que se le entregue el patrimonio acumulado del Fondo de Jubilaciones generado con su reingreso. 3. La teoría del Estado como patrono único se aplica únicamente cuando el trabajador ha continuado trabajando con el Estado (situación que se presenta cuando el traslado del trabajador es a otra institución pública). Por consiguiente, en los casos en los que se dé una extinción de la relación laboral para pasar a laborar al sector privado, ya no se aplica la referida teoría. (...)". (Imágenes 162-167 del principal) En este dictamen, se introduce una nueva variable consistente en la aplicación de la teoría del Estado Patrono Único. Lo anterior dado que, en el tema consultado, se estableció que los trabajadores que se habían afiliado al Fondo del BCR cesaron su relación para pasar a otra institución pública y luego retornar al ente bancario. Atendiendo a esa particularidad, la SUPEN estimó que se daba una continuidad en la relación laboral con el Estado como patrono único, a partir de lo cual, como aplicación extensiva de esa postura, concluyó que los beneficios del Fondo debían mantenerse a quienes se habían afiliado de previo a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 7983, aún y cuando la relación hubiere cesado, pero luego se reintegraran al servicio del Banco y se afiliaran al Fondo. Cabe destacar que en el numeral 3 de las conclusiones de ese dictamen, se expuso con claridad que la teoría aludida aplicaba en la medida en que el trabajador continuara trabajando para el Estado (en sentido amplio), no así cuando la extinción de la relación de empleo fuese para pasar a desempeñarse en el sector privado. Nótese que a diferencia del dictamen previo (SP-340-2008), en el que se aplicó la postura de suspensión de la relación de trabajo, en este último se apela a la figura del Estado Patrono Único y la continuidad de una relación con el Estado como empleador. Estas aplicaciones resultan ser similares a las que en sede interna del BCR fueron emitidas sobre ese particular. En efecto, en oficio DJ/GAG/234-2013 del 17 de julio del 2013, la División Jurídica del Banco de Costa Rica emite criterio ante la consulta del supuesto de personas que habían iniciado una relación laboral con el Banco antes del 18 de febrero del 2000 y la finalizaron antes de esa fecha, pero reingresaron al servicio del Banco posteriormente a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. Sobre ese particular, el análisis jurídico interno concluyó en lo relevante: “…Bajo el contexto de aplicación de la teoría del Estado como patrono único, considera esta División Jurídica que efectivamente, el reconocimiento de la antigüedad en el servicio público (para la Administración Pública –sic-, y aún más cuando esa antigüedad corresponde a tiempo servido con el mismo patrono público, permite aceptar válidamente que un servidor del Banco de Costa Rica que se encontraba afiliado al Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica antes de la vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, si finalizó su relación laboral antes de tal vigencia o bien, posterior a ella, pero luego reingresa al servicio del Banco y por ende, se le reconoce el tiempo servido de previo, le resulta aplicable la Teoría de Estado patrono único para los efectos legales que correspondan. / Entonces, si ese servidor se afilia nuevamente al Fondo de Jubilaciones, bajo la teoría indicada es válido afirmar que la afiliación anterior y la nueva se deben tener como una sola para los efectos de aplicación del artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador y, por ende, tiene derecho a que se le entregue el patrimonio acumulado en su cuenta individual al finalizar la relación laboral actual. / Así, es criterio de la División Jurídica que lo resuelto por la Superintendencia de Pensiones en el oficio No. SP-340-2008 del 7 de febrero del 2008 es acorde con tal teoría y, por ende, resulta aplicable para los afiliados actuales del Fondo de Jubilaciones que hubieren estado afiliados durante una relación laboral anterior antes de la vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / Lo expuesto máxime si hubieren reintegrado en todo o en parte de su cesantía recibida debido a que el reingreso al servicio del Banco, no había pasado el plazo previsto en el inciso b) del artículo 586 del Código de Trabajo, pues ello obedece a que el servidor tenía un impedimento para ingresar a laborar para el Estado durante un lapso igual al representado por la suma recibida por concepto de auxilio de cesantía. (…)”. (Imágenes 87-92 del principal) Esto armoniza con lo señalado en el oficio DJ/GAG/255-2015 del 17 de agosto del 2015, en el que la División Jurídica del Banco de Costa Rica emite criterio legal sobre la aplicación del principio del Estado como patrono único para efectos de afiliación al Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco. En ese dictamen se estableció: "III. CONCLUSIONES. 1. La teoría del Estado como patrono único aplica para todo el Sector Público. 2. Su aplicación resulta válida para todos los efectos legales, entre ellos, el reconocimiento de anualidades, vacaciones, cesantía, pensiones y jubilaciones. 3. No se requiere de la continuidad laboral en las diferentes entidades públicas donde ha laborado, pues la jurisprudencia permite que los períodos separados, incluso por varios años, puedan ser tenidos como uno solo para efectos del reconocimiento del tiempo servido en el Estado, "(...) a fin de que conformen, ambas, una continuidad laboral, temporalmente hablando". 4. Al reconocerse períodos separados, incluso por años, debe interpretarse que para la aplicación de la teoría del Estado como patrono único, no importa si en el ínterin, la persona laboró en el sector privado, pues sólo se tomarán en consideración los períodos efectivamente laborados en el sector público. 5. La teoría del Estado patrono único resulta aplicable para efectos del reconocimiento de la fecha de afiliación al Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica, tal y como lo ha establecido la Superintendencia de Pensiones. 6. Los períodos de afiliación en el Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica se deben tener como uno solo para todo efecto legal. 7. El período de afiliación de una persona a un Fondo de Jubilaciones ajeno al Banco de Costa Rica acontecido antes del 18 de febrero del 2000, debe tenerse como continuo del período de afiliación de esa persona que hubiere ingresado al BCR luego de esa fecha, independientemente de si entre ambos períodos se presentó un corte o no (sic) éste no se dio. 8. Esa continuidad se presenta aún y cuando en el ínterin la persona hubiere laborado en el sector privado. 9. Con mayor razón se da la continuidad si en ese ínterin la persona no aparece ligada a un contrato privado pues no constan cotizaciones a la seguridad social.". (Imágenes 126-135 del principal) IX.- Sin embargo, esa postura se vio sometida a modificaciones que han dado base a la presente contienda. Por oficio FEBCR-008-2015 del 19 de agosto del 2015, el Presidente de la Junta del Fondo solicitó nuevamente criterio a la SUPEN, acompañando los dictámenes jurídicos recién señalados. Por oficio SP-1121-2015 del 08 de octubre del 2015, la SUPEN indica: “No obstante lo anterior, el artículo 75 de la Ley no. 7983 dispone que en el caso de los nuevos trabajadores afiliados a los sistemas referidos en ese artículo que, con posterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador dejen de pertenecer al régimen especial, por un motivo diferente a la pensión, los fondos acumulados deberán trasladarse a su cuenta individual del ROP, para que al igual que el resto de los trabajadores esta se vea fortalecida con ese aporte patronal. / La razón por la cual esos recursos no son entregados al trabajador, como se hace con otros “ahorros” que este recibe cuando se extingue la relación laboral, se encuentra en el fin para el cual fue creado el Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica, dado que con los recursos acumulados en ese fondo lo que se busca es que el trabajador disfrute de una pensión complementaria que mejore su ingreso jubilatorio. (…) Lo anterior resulta de especial relevancia si se toma en cuenta que en este caso se trata de un fondo especial, en el cual el patrono, el Estado, hace un aporte de recursos considerablemente alto respecto a otros fondos de pensiones, con una finalidad expresa: complementar la pensión de los trabajadores. Esta finalidad no puede ser obviada en perjuicio de la futura pensión complementaria de los trabajadores que se retiren del Banco de Costa Rica. / En este orden de ideas, debe tenerse en consideración que la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha calificado el establecimiento de los regímenes complementarios de pensiones como un asunto de alto interés público, porque concretizan los principios constitucionales de solidaridad nacional y justicia social (voto n°. 4636-99 de las 15:39 horas del 16 de junio de 1999). (…) Ahora bien, y en relación con su gestión, es necesario señalar que no corresponde a la Superintendencia de Pensiones resolver las consultas y peticiones concretas de los afiliados al Fondo de Jubilaciones que usted representa, ya que esa labor es responsabilidad del administrador del régimen. / Sin embargo, considera este órgano que cualquier interpretación que se dé a lo indicado en el criterio PJD-14-2013, debe tener un carácter restrictivo, y debe fundamentarse en la finalidad arriba mencionada, de tal manera que no se desnaturalice en ninguna medida el objetivo para el cual fue creado el fondo que, como ya se dijo, no busca otra cosa más que mejorar el ingreso jubilatorio de los trabajadores del Banco de Costa Rica.” (Imágenes 98-101 del principal) Como sustento de esa nueva consideración expuso que, la norma vigente que regula el caso de los funcionarios que dejan de pertenecer a un régimen complementario especial de pensiones, por motivos diferentes a la pensión, como el caso del Fondo de Jubilaciones de los empleados del BCR, es el artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, No. 7983. Expuso que era necesario tener presente que los regímenes a que se refiere esa norma, constituyen una excepción a lo dispuesto en el numeral 13 inciso c) de la Ley No. 7983, según el cual el Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones (ROP) se financia, entre otros, con un aporte de los patronos que corresponde a un 1.5% mensual sobre sueldos pagados. Consideró que en el caso de los regímenes de pensiones complementarios existentes antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 7983, como era el caso del Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco, el aporte patronal del 1.5% mensual se sustituye por el porcentaje previsto en la ley de creación del régimen especial, y esos recursos no son administrados como parte del ROP, sino que son administrados por las instituciones o empresas a favor de cuyos trabajadores fue creado el beneficio, en un fondo especial. Atendiendo a esa nueva postura, en sesión 16-15 del 30 de octubre del 2015, artículo XII, la Junta Administrativa del Fondo acordó: "- Analizado el criterio de la Supen se considera que la aplicación del artículo 75 es el que debe indicarse para dar respuesta a las gestiones que se encuentran pendientes, señalándoles que la decisión de la Junta es que no aplica la devolución para ellos. (...)". (Imagen 138 del principal) Es con sustento en esas referencias que luego, ante la gestión concreta del accionante, mediante el oficio FJEBCR-00017-2015 del 10 de noviembre del 2015, la Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR, da respuesta al accionante de su gestión de fecha 27 de agosto del 2015 relativa a la aplicación de la teoría del Estado patrono único para efectos de la afiliación al Fondo de Jubilaciones del Banco de Costa Rica. Ese acto indica en lo relevante: “…La Junta Administrativa, al conocer de tal criterio (se refiere al oficio No. SP-1121-2015 del 08 de octubre del 2015 de la SUPEN), valoró que la SUPEN señala de manera expresa que en materia de fondos de pensiones complementarias, tal es el caso del Fondo de Jubilaciones del Banco de Costa Rica, lo que aplica es el artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, siendo que bajo esa norma, salvo en caso de pensión, los recursos del Fondo para quienes ingresaron a laborar al Banco a partir de la vigencia de dicha Ley, deben ser trasladados al régimen obligatorio de pensiones y no pueden ser entregados al trabajador al finalizar su relación laboral por cualquier otra causa. / Si bien la Superintendencia de Pensiones no hace referencia a la aplicación de la Teoría del Estado como patrono único en materia del Fondo de Jubilaciones –cuyo análisis era pretendido por la Junta Administrativa en los casos consultados-, haciendo ver a su vez que no le corresponde resolver esos casos consultados-, haciendo ver a su vez que no le corresponde resolver esos casos, es lo cierto que si hace expresa mención que será responsabilidad del administrador del Fondo (la Junta Administrativa), el resolver cada caso debiendo para ello, el velar siempre porque se cumpla el principio de protección de la pensión complementaria, que a juicio de la SUPEN es lo que pretende proteger el texto del artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / Siendo así, la Junta Administrativa, luego de valorar el alcance del criterio en mención, arribó a la conclusión que no resulta procedente entregar los dineros acumulados en la cuenta individual de afiliado o ex afiliado al Fondo, si la relación laboral con el Banco que le da origen a la afiliación al Fondo de Jubilaciones, se inició en fecha igual o posterior a la vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / Conforme con lo anterior, la Junta Administrativa resolvió rechazar todos los casos presentados ante ese Órgano Colegiado para que se les haga entrega de los dineros acumulados en el Fondo de Jubilaciones, en tanto en la relación laboral con el Banco de Costa Rica que da origen a la gestión, haya iniciado en fecha igual o posterior al 18 de febrero del 2000, fecha de vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. / Siendo ello así y teniendo que en su caso usted inició la relación laboral con el Banco de Costa Rica que le da origen a su gestión el día 26/06/2000, fecha en la que ya estaba vigente aquella Ley, se concluye que no resulta procedente su gestión la cual es rechazada por los motivos indicados. (…)”. (Imágenes 41-45 del principal) Finalmente, se tiene que mediante oficio PJD-1-2017 del 16 de marzo del 2017, la División Jurídica de la SUPEN comunica al Superintendente que luego de varias consultas planteadas por la Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica, estiman prudente reconsiderar la posición planteada en el dictamen PJD-14-2013 del 23 de agosto del 2013, con el fin de asegurar que un posible reconocimiento de tiempo servido, no resulte contrario al artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. En ese sentido expuso: "III. Conclusiones. Con fundamento en lo expuesto, se reconsidera lo dispuesto en el dictamen PJD-14-2013, de 23 de agosto de 2013, en el siguiente sentido: Respecto a los servidores que iniciaron una relación laboral con el Banco de Costa Rica antes del 18 de febrero de 2000, y finalizaron dicha relación antes o después de esa fecha, para pasar al servicio de otra institución pública, pero reingresaron al servicio de ese Banco con posterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador: - Estos deben considerarse como de primer ingreso al Fondo de jubilaciones de los empleados de esa institución, y en caso de dejar de pertenecer a ese Fondo, por motivos diferentes a los establecidos en el artículo 20 de la Ley 7983, los recursos acumulados deberán trasladarse a su cuenta individual del ROP, según lo señalado en el párrafo tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. - No resulta aplicable en este caso la teoría del Estado como patrono único." (Imágenes 223-231 del principal) X.- La teoría del Estado Patrono Único supone que, para efectos del reconocimiento de la antigüedad del servidor público en la prestación de sus servicios, es menester reconocer el tiempo servido en el Estado y sus instituciones, que, para todos los efectos, ha de considerarse como una sola relación funcionarial. Así, los espacios de tiempo servidos con un ente público, son factibles de ser reconocidos para efectos de antigüedad en la relación de empleo que se entable con otro ente público o bien, con la Administración Central. A modo de referencia normativa, el artículo 12 inciso d) de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, No. 2166 del 09 de octubre de 1957, disponía, de previo a la reforma recientemente realizada por la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, No. 9635: "d) A los servidores del Sector Público, en propiedad o interinos, se les reconocerá, para efectos de los aumentos anuales a que se refiere el artículo 5º anterior, el tiempo de servicios prestados en otras entidades del Sector Público. Esta disposición no tiene carácter retroactivo. Esta ley no afecta en sentido negativo el derecho establecido en las convenciones colectivas y convenios, en materia de negociación salarial." (Así adicionado por el artículo 2 de la ley No.6835 de 22 de diciembre de 1982) Esto implica que el tiempo servido en otras unidades de la Administración Pública, debe ser reconocido en el nuevo empleador público, para efectos del reconocimiento del pago del componente salarial de anualidades y demás variables de la relación de empleo que se sustenten en la antigüedad. En ese sentido, tal y como lo indica la parte accionante, la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia se ha pronunciado sobre la aplicación de dicha máxima. Entre otros, en el precedente No. 43 de las 09 horas del 18 de marzo de 1993, sobre el tema indicó: “V- El artículo 12, inciso d), de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, que dio base a ese acuerdo, reconoce "el tiempo de servicios prestados en otras entidades del Sector Público", y no la "antigüedad", entendida como un concepto referido a los años de servicio, estimados en doce meses completos, sin contabilizar fracciones de año. En ese sentido, si la actora laboró, en su primer período de trabajo para el Banco, del 16 de junio de 1970 al 27 de abril de 1979, deben serle reconocidos ocho años, diez meses y once días de servicios, y no sólo ocho años, como lo sostiene el Tribunal, aspecto en el cual habrá que revocar el fallo recurrido, a fin de que se reconozca la totalidad del tiempo de servicio de la actora en el Banco, el que se deberá aplicar a todos los extremos acogidos por el fallo de instancia, toda vez que el inciso d) del artículo 12 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, y el 5o.,256, de las nueve horas del 29 de noviembre de 1991). El tiempo de servicio del primer período de trabajo, debe unirse al del segundo, que dio inicio el 22 de agosto de 1988, a fin de que conformen, ambos, una continuidad laboral, temporalmente hablando. Ello significa, que su fecha de ingreso en la segunda relación laboral, no debe antedatarse a la fecha que indica la actora, o sea, al 11 de octubre de 1979, sino, tenerse el vínculo de trabajo como desplegado en un sólo período y aplicarle las reglas convencionalmente pactadas, que regulan los distintos beneficios. (...)". De igual manera, en la sentencia No. 34 de las 09 horas 40 minutos del 05 de marzo de 1993 expresó: "II.- El segundo reparo del Estado, tiene que ver con la acogida que tuvieron las pretensiones del accionante, a pesar de que se trata de un ex-servidor público que se jubiló desde el 1° de setiembre de 1984 y que reclama las anualidades, no reconocidas por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, para efectos jubilatorios. Al respecto, conviene rememorar que la Sala emitió sus primeros pronunciamientos sobre el reconocimiento de la antigüedad, para efecto de aumentos anuales -anualidades-, con fundamento en la aplicación de la Ley N° 6835, de 22 de diciembre de 1982, por allá del año ochenta y cinco; siendo más adelante, con la sentencia número 58, de 14:30 horas, del 30 de abril de 1986, que se le dio divulgación pública al punto y, en adelante, proliferaron los procesos judiciales, dirigidos a obtener el reconocimiento de mérito. Pasado algún tiempo, la Sala vino a sentar pautas adicionales sobre la materia, destacándose al respecto las sentencias números 81, 82, 90, 92 y 162, de 9 horas, 9:10 horas, 15:10 horas, 15:30 horas, del 5 de julio y 10:20 horas del 5 de octubre, todas de 1989. En la segunda de ellas, se dijo: "III. La Ley N° 6835 del 22 de diciembre de 1982, estableció una nueva escala salarial para el Sector Público y dispuso en su artículo segundo, agregar un inciso con la letra d) al artículo 12 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, que dijo textualmente: "A los servidores del Sector Público, en propiedad o interinos, se les reconocerá, para efectos de los aumentos anuales a que se refiere el artículo 5° anterior, el tiempo de servicios prestados en otras entidades del Sector Público. Esta disposición no tiene carácter retroactivo. Esta ley no afecta en sentido negativo el derecho establecido en las convenciones colectivas y convenios, en materia de negociación salarial". A partir del mes de enero de 1983, las distintas entidades que componen el Sector Público, iniciaron el reconocimiento de los años servidos en otras instituciones públicas centralizadas y descentralizadas, aspecto que ya venía siendo reconocido por la entonces Sala de Casación, el Tribunal Superior de Trabajo y el Tribunal de Servicio Civil. Originalmente el reconocimiento de la antigüedad se hizo aplicando la teoría del ESTADO PATRONO UNICO, pero con no poca debilidad, sobre todo, pensando en el principio de la unidad estatal como patrono y en algunos casos, relacionándolo con la otra teoría de la relación estatutaria, fundamentada esta última en el artículo 191 de la Constitución Política. Sobre el particular, pueden verse las sentencias N° 1388 del 3 de noviembre de 1958, número 105 del 12 de enero de 1973 y la N° 1928 del 28 de noviembre de 1974, del Tribunal Superior de Trabajo de San José y la sentencia N° 95 del 6 de agosto de 1975 de la antigua Sala de Casación. Como se dijo, en un inicio el reconocimiento se hizo para efectos de vacaciones, prestaciones legales, entendiendo por tales el preaviso y el auxilio de cesantía y luego, se reconoce la antigüedad para efectos de aumentos anuales, bienales y quinquenales, primero cuando los servicios fueran continuos y luego incluso cubriendo los de carácter discontinuo; sin embargo, la situación quedó bien definida en la ley, con la vigencia de la número 6835, cuando contempla el reconocimiento para efecto de los aumentos anuales, el tiempo servido en otras entidades del sector público. En otros términos, ya la jurisprudencia judicial había admitido el reconocimiento de la antigüedad en el servicio público, lo mismo que la jurisprudencia administrativa (Procuraduría General de la República, dictámenes C-194-83 de 17 de junio de 1983 y C-236-85 del 30 de setiembre de 1985). Entonces, no cabe duda, que el reconocimiento de la antigüedad en cuanto a la prestación de servicios para el Estado y sus instituciones, ha venido avanzando en cuanto a los derechos respecto de los que se hacía el correspondiente reconocimiento, a saber: vacaciones, aguinaldo, preaviso, auxilio de cesantía, aumentos anuales, jubilaciones y pensiones; así como dando el salto de la aceptación de la antigüedad continua a la admisión de la prestación de servicios con solución de continuidad, por lo que en buena tesis jurídica, ya no cabe sostener un criterio como el de la sentencia de primera instancia, confirmada por el Tribunal ad-quem, porque esa resolución, no va acorde, ni con la jurisprudencia, ni con la doctrina nacional sobre este tema, pues como claro está, si se reconoce la antigüedad en el Sector Público respecto de los servicios prestados para otros entes públicos, con mucha más razón habrá que reconocer los servicios prestados en una misma entidad pública como es el caso de la prestación de servicios públicos hecha por el actor en beneficio de la institución demandada...". " Resulta claro que el contenido del aludido principio supone la unidad de los tiempos servidos en diversos entes públicos o el Estado, para efectos de ser considerados como una sola relación en términos temporales, de cara a la aplicación y reconocimiento de los derechos laborales para cuya cuantificación se requiera de ese parámetro. En ese ámbito se encuentran aspectos tales como la antigüedad, vacaciones, aguinaldo, preaviso, cesantía y las jubilaciones y pensiones. En cuanto a estos dos últimos referentes (jubilaciones y pensiones), en la medida en que los parámetros subjetivos que fija el Ordenamiento Jurídico, usualmente, requieren la concurrencia de tiempo servido y edad de retiro, de cara a establecer la concurrencia del presupuesto de antigüedad, es evidente y lógico que las relaciones que se han sostenido con los patronos públicos forman una sola línea de temporalidad, en la medida en que en el curso de esas relaciones, se ha aportado al sistema de jubilaciones y pensiones que corresponde.

XI.- Sin perjuicio de lo señalado en el considerando precedente, si bien la teoría del Estado Patrono Único permite el reconocimiento del tiempo servido por la persona que ejerce la función pública, en otros entes públicos, a fin de tener un solo margen de antigüedad, lo que se aplica, igualmente, al régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones, en casos como el presente, en el que ese principio se invoca como presupuesto legitimante para obtener ventajas económicas derivadas de un Fondo Especial que ostenta una naturaleza complementaria, no es viable partir de aquella generalidad, siendo necesario e imperativo, analizar el contenido regulatorio de ese régimen especial y las circunstancias concretas que presenta el afiliado. En esa línea, como se ha señalado, no existe debate alguno en que el Fondo Especial de Empleados del BCR, es un régimen complementario al de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, vigente de previo a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 7983 (18 de febrero del 2000), por lo que, en orden al numeral 75 de esa fuente legal, puede seguir operando, bajo la fiscalización de la SUPEN. Como se ha señalado, ese mismo mandato impone que aquellos nuevos trabajadores afiliados a ese régimen, que luego de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 7983, dejen de pertenecer al régimen por motivos diversos a los fijados en el canon 20 ejusdem, los fondos acumulados deben trasladarse a su cuenta individual del régimen obligatorio de pensiones complementarias (ROP). A partir de esa regulación, la Administración accionada, así como la SUPEN, han interpretado que los trabajadores cuya afiliación a ese Fondo Especial se hubiera producido de previo a la vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, por aplicación a contrario sensu del citado precepto 75 ibídem, pueden requerir la devolución de las sumas aportadas y acumuladas en el citado Fondo. En ese sentido, se tiene por acreditado que el señor Lissander Chacón Vargas, inició labores para el Banco de Costa Rica en fecha 01 de diciembre de 1986, generándose la afiliación al Fondo de Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica. El inicio de esa relación laboral consta en el respectivo contrato de trabajo, visible a folios 3-4 del administrativo. Luego, en fecha 10 de mayo de 1999, el señor Chacón Vargas presenta renuncia a su puesto en el BCR, aplicable desde esa data, a fin de asumir una oportunidad laboral en el sector privado. (Folio 114 del administrativo) Esta renuncia fue aceptada mediante oficio del 02 de junio de 1999 de la Dirección de la División de Talento Humano y Transformación Organizacional del BCR (Folio 117 del administrativo), producto de lo cual, junto con el pago de los respectivos extremos laborales, en lo que viene relevante al caso, procedió a retirar lo acumulado hasta el momento en su cuenta correspondiente del Fondo de Jubilación. Por este concepto de liquidación de sumas individualizadas en el Fondo de Pensiones, se le canceló un total de ¢621.226.90 (seiscientos veintiún mil doscientos veintiséis colones 90/100), según finiquito suscrito el 22 de octubre de 1999 y comprobantes de pago visibles a folios 128-134 de la carpeta administrativa. Pese a esa ruptura de la relación laboral con el Banco, en fecha 26 de junio del año 2000, el señor Chacón Vargas se reincorpora como trabajador del BCR, según contrato de trabajo que costa a planas 138-140, 144-146 del administrativo. Por nota del 27 de junio del 2000, el accionante solicita al BCR el reconocimiento del tiempo laborado antes de reingresar al Banco, así como lo correspondiente al concepto de dedicación exclusiva, (Folio 141 del administrativo), reconocimiento de antigüedad que fuese aprobada por la Gerencia de Gestión del Capital Humano del Banco, teniéndose para todos los efectos como fecha de ingreso al Banco el día 1 de diciembre del año 1986. (Hecho no controvertido) Del anterior recuento se pone en evidencia que, en su oportunidad, al momento de generarse el cese voluntario del accionante, en fecha 10 de mayo de 1999, acorde a lo señalado sobre la aplicación del artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, la Junta del Fondo, a petición del afiliado, le reintegró las sumas individualizadas, en la cuantía ya señalada. No obstante, a diferencia de lo que postula el petente, su reingreso, si bien permite la aplicación de la teoría de Estado Patrono Único para efectos del cómputo del tiempo servido, no genera el mismo efecto que pretende para lo concerniente a las prestaciones económicas derivadas del Fondo Especial de Jubilaciones de Empleados del BCR. En efecto, una vez que el actor, por su propia decisión, optó en fecha 10 de mayo de 1999, poner su renuncia y retirar los aportes acumulados en el Fondo, los que le fueron efectivamente entregados, el presupuesto de hecho previsto en el artículo 75 de la Ley No. 7983 fue satisfecho, en el sentido de que ese retiro era factible dado que el actor se había afiliado al citado régimen complementario de previo al 18 de febrero del 2000. Sin embargo, cuando ingresa a trabajar nuevamente al citado Banco, en fecha 26 de junio del 2000, ya las reglas y limitaciones del ordinal de marras le eran totalmente aplicables, en la medida en que se trata de una nueva relación jurídica de empleo, y con ello, su nueva afiliación al citado Fondo se debe entender realizada a partir de ese momento. A juicio de esta Cámara, el accionante pretende extender el tratamiento del reconocimiento del tiempo servido previamente a un extremo que no le resulta aplicable. Es indudable que la relación anterior, desde diciembre de 1986 a mayo de 1999 debe sumarse a la antigüedad del tiempo laborado; incluso, para efectos de la cotización al régimen de jubilaciones de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, las aportaciones realizadas en aquella relación han de ser reconocidas junto con las que derivaron de la nueva relación entablada en junio del 2000. Pero lo anterior no implica, por automatismo o derivación lógica, como señala el actor, que ese reconocimiento suponga que, para todos los efectos, que su fecha de afiliación al fondo se mantenga en diciembre de 1986, al margen de que previamente haya retirado los fondos acumulados por la ruptura de la relación de empleo en octubre de 1999. Para este cuerpo colegiado, la postura del petente es respetable, pero en definitiva no se comparte en la medida en que su situación jurídica consolidada fue satisfecha cuando realizó dicho retiro, pero una vez que en junio del 2000 suscribe un nuevo contrato de trabajo con el Banco accionado, se debe tener como un nuevo ingreso de afiliación al Fondo, y atendiendo a esa fecha, ya el numeral 75 de la Ley No. 7983 estaba vigente, e impone que la cesación de la pertenencia al régimen especial por motivos diversos a los referidos en el canon 20 ejusdem, conlleva a que los fondos acumulados sean trasladados al ROP, descartando la posibilidad de reintegro individual. Es claro que el nuevo cese del actor, que se produce en el año 2015, luego de que reingresara nuevamente en junio del 2000, se produce por supuestos de renuncia voluntaria, con lo cual, a tono con las normas aludidas, lo pertinente era el traslado de esas sumas a su cuenta individual del régimen obligatorio de pensiones complementarias. Desde esa arista de examen, la situación jurídica consolidada que aduce el demandante no se vulnera, pues si bien es cierto ostentaba dicha situación al haber ingresado en diciembre de 1986, lo que le permitía que, en caso de cese de labores, pudiera reclamar el retiro de las sumas aportadas, como se ha señalado, tal consecuencia se concretó en mayo de 1999, cuando renunció por primera vez y obtuvo la devolución reclamada. Empero, cuando se reintegra en junio del 2000, su situación jurídica debe ajustarse a lo preceptuado en las normas aludidas. No se trata de una aplicación retroactiva en perjuicio del administrado, vedada por el ordinal 34 de la Carta Magna, sino de la aplicación de la normativa vigente a situaciones jurídica que emergen y se originan dentro del ámbito de vigencia de esos preceptos. Se insiste, la teoría invocada por el accionante no permite realizar la aplicación que ahora se debate, máxime al considerar que, por su propia voluntad, fue el actor quien formuló su renuncia y reclamó el retiro de los montos acumulados en el Fondo. Así, ante la petición del accionante de fecha 27 de agosto del 2015 para obtener esa devolución, si bien es cierto previamente se habían emitido criterios aplicando la citada teoría de Estado Patrono Único, lo cierto del caso es que en este asunto concreto, mediante el oficio FJEBCR-00017-2015 del 10 de noviembre del 2015, la Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR, estimó que esa petición no era de recibo en la medida en que la relación laboral con el Banco que le da origen a la afiliación al Fondo de Jubilaciones, había iniciado en junio del 2000, fecha en la que ya se encontraba vigente la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. Esa postura se expresa además en el oficio PJD-1-2017 del 16 de marzo del 2017, la División Jurídica de la SUPEN, instrumento en el que se reconsidera la postura expresada por ese órgano en el dictamen PJD-14-2013 del 23 de agosto del 2013, con el fin de asegurar que un posible reconocimiento de tiempo servido, no resulte contrario al artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. Como se ha expuesto, ese criterio concluyó que en el caso de los funcionarios que iniciaron una relación laboral con el Banco de Costa Rica antes del 18 de febrero de 2000, y finalizaron dicha relación antes o después de esa fecha, para pasar al servicio de otra institución pública, pero reingresaron al servicio de ese Banco con posterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, debían considerarse como de primer ingreso al Fondo de jubilaciones de los empleados de esa institución, y en caso de dejar de pertenecer a ese Fondo, por motivos diferentes a los establecidos en el artículo 20 de la Ley 7983, los recursos acumulados debían trasladarse a su cuenta individual del ROP. El contenido y análisis de ese acto final de la Junta engarza a plenitud con lo apreciado por este Tribunal, por lo que se estima, se ajusta plenamente a las normas que rigen este tipo de relaciones concretas, en los términos fácticos en que se han producido. Bajo esa comprensión, no se observa la deficiencia en el elemento material objetivo del MOTIVO. Ciertamente este elemento consiste en el antecedente de hecho o de derecho que legitima, exige o impone la actuación administrativa. En orden a lo preceptuado por el artículo 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, debe existir real o jurídicamente al momento de dictar el acto y en todo el curso de su vigencia y debe ser proporcionado al contenido del acto. En este asunto, es indudable que el motivo del acto estriba en que el accionante se afilió nuevamente al Fondo en fecha 26 de junio del 2000, fecha en la que ya se encontraba vigente la Ley No. 7983. Se trata de una circunstancia acreditada en autos, por lo que no se puede decir de su inexistencia. Desde luego que la postura del accionante en cuanto a considerar que esa afiliación debe tenerse desde la fecha de primer ingreso del actor al Fondo en diciembre de 1986 llevaría a entender que el motivo en que la Junta ampara su decisión es ilegítima, sin embargo, se reitera, tal posición no es compartida por este Tribunal, derivación de lo cual, se estima que el motivo del acto cuestionado no presenta las deficiencias apuntadas en la demanda. En cuanto al CONTENIDO del acto, impone el precepto 132 de la citada Ley General que ha de ser lícito, posible, claro, preciso y correspondiente al motivo. De igual manera, ha de abarcar todas las cuestiones de hecho y de derecho surgidas del motivo, aún y cuando no hayan sido debatidas por las partes. En este caso en particular, siendo que se ha establecido que a partir de la renuncia tantas veces comentada, realizada en el mes de mayo de 1999, el reingreso en junio del 2000 se tiene como una nueva relación de afiliación al Fondo Especial del BCR. Atendiendo a ese motivo, el numeral 75 de la Ley No. 7983 establece que el cese de funciones del trabajador por motivos diversos a los definidos por el canon 20 de esa misma legislación, supone, como se ha indicado en múltiples ocasiones, el traslado de las sumas aportadas a la cuenta individual del ROP del trabajador; ergo, el reintegro de esas sumas resultaba improcedente en el caso del accionante, considerando las circunstancias de hecho referidas. En ese sentido, el contenido del acto, que constituye el efecto que el acto pretende establecer, sea, lo que el acto dispone, en tanto deniega lo peticionado y resuelve: “…Siendo ello así y teniendo que en su caso usted inició la relación laboral con el Banco de Costa Rica que le da origen a su gestión el día 26/06/2000, fecha en la que ya estaba vigente aquella Ley, se concluye que no resulta procedente su gestión la cual es rechazada por los motivos indicados. (…)”, se ajusta a plenitud a las normas jurídicas que regulan el supuesto bajo examen, de manera que no se observan las incorrecciones alegadas. En resumen, ciertamente el accionante ingresó al Fondo, por primera vez en diciembre de 1986, empero, en mayo de 1999 renunció a su puesto en el BCR y en junio del mismo año, obtuvo el reintegro de las sumas aportadas al Fondo, acorde a la excepcionalidad que en ese sentido posibilitaba el marco de aplicación del artículo 75 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. Su reingreso al Banco (y al Fondo) en junio del 2000, no permite dar la continuidad de afiliación que se pretende. La teoría de Estado Patrono Único no es extensible ni aplicable a la relación sostenida con el Fondo, siendo un instituto que, si bien beneficia al trabajador, reconociendo el tiempo servido en otros entes y órganos públicos, no tiene la virtud de generar ese mismo efecto en este tipo de relaciones especiales, propias de relaciones jurídicas que fueron fenecidas, aún y cuando luego, se suscriba una nueva relación de empleo. La renuncia y retiro de esos fondos supone una extinción del régimen de afiliación, tanto así que se retiraron las sumas aportadas, de suerte que el reingreso con el mismo patrono, al citado Fondo, debe tenerse, para efectos de pertenencia al Fondo, como una nueva relación. Siendo que la fecha de nueva afiliación fue ulterior a la vigencia de la Ley No. 7983, el reintegro de esos aportes es jurídicamente inviable. Este tratamiento no es incompatible con el reconocimiento de tiempo servido al accionante para efectos de la antigüedad, vacaciones, régimen ordinario de jubilaciones, pues se trata de otro tipo de circunstancias que no equiparan a las particularidades que impregnan el Fondo especial del BCR. Es por ello que la denegatoria de lo pedido por el reclamante que se impugna en esta sede, tampoco vulnera la teoría de las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas que alega el accionante. Su derecho de retiro de los montos aportados al Fondo de pensión complementaria se concretó en junio de 1999, acorde a la permisibilidad jurídica que a ese instante le correspondía. Con el retiro de esos fondos, tal situación jurídica fue satisfecha plenamente. Luego, al reingresar en junio del 2000, su situación jurídica era diversa, debiendo ajustarse a los nuevos parámetros vigentes a ese momento, sin que ello constituye una aplicación retroactiva de normas perniciosas, por lo que no existe la vulneración que propone en este proceso. La interpretación dada por la Junta en el acto cuestionado, oficio FJEBCR-00017-2015 del 10 de noviembre del 2015, la Junta Administrativa del Fondo Jubilaciones de los Empleados del BCR, no interpreta de manera incorrecta la literalidad ni sentido finalista del canon 75 en relación al 20 de la Ley No. 7983, como alega el petente. En consecuencia, no se producen las deficiencias sustanciales que constituyen la base de esta demanda, razón por la cual, la pretensión anulatoria debe ser rechazada."