Res judicata between criminal judgment and civil action on fraudulent ownershipCosa juzgada entre sentencia penal y acción civil sobre dominio fraudulento

I.- In 1975, before the Consul of Costa Rica in New York, United States of America, Mr. Nombre10808 acquired the farm in the Partido de San José, real folio registration number 187992-000. This transfer was duly registered in the Public Property Registry on January 23, 1976. On August 26, 1991, an unidentified third party, pretending to be Mr. Nombre10809, transferred the aforementioned property to Mr. Nombre10810. On September 5 of that same year, Mr. Nombre10818 placed a first-degree mortgage on the aforesaid farm as security for a loan of ¢1,300,000. Upon his default, the creditors filed a mortgage enforcement proceeding in the Third Civil Court of San José. The debtor did not oppose the enforcement. The public auction was held at 8:00 a.m. on May 4, 1992, with Mr. Nombre10811 being the successful bidder. That same day, he assigned his rights to Lucara S.A. On June 22, said company sold the indicated property to Printy S.A. In early 1993, Mr. Nombre10812 returned to Costa Rica. Upon realizing what had happened, he filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor's Office for the commission of a crime by unknown third parties. The then Second Superior Criminal Court, Second Section of San José, in judgment number 121-B-97 of 4:15 p.m. on September 9, 1997, declared Mr. Nombre10818 the responsible author of two crimes of ideological falsehood and two of use of a false document in ideal concurrence with fraud, committed to the detriment of public faith, Nombre10808, and Printy S.A. Likewise, it partially granted the respective civil compensatory actions filed by Mr. Nombre10809 and Printy S.A. against the civil defendant Nombre10813. Regarding the action filed by Mr. Nombre4965, it ordered the restitution of the aforementioned farm. It annulled the public deeds containing the transfer in favor of Mr. Nombre10818, the constitution of the mortgage credit, and the sale in favor of Printy S.A., as well as all acts dependent on those public instruments. Regarding the action filed by the indicated company, it sentenced him in the abstract to pay the damages caused, subject to what might ultimately be resolved in civil court regarding the definitive declaration of the property right of the aforementioned property. In judgment number 346-98 of 9:30 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, regarding the respective cassation appeals filed by Mr. Nombre10812 and the representative of Printy S.A., Nombre10814, granted the first and declared the second without merit. It ordered the lifting of the immobilization order on the litigious farm. In all other respects, it upheld what was decided.

II.- With the sub-judice matter, Printy S.A. principally seeks a declaration that it is the legitimate owner –legally and registrally– of the litigious property in place of Mr. Nombre10808. In the alternative, it requests that, since it was unaware of the circumstances of the act by which Mr. Nombre10815 bought the property in litigation, and since its represented party acquired ownership of the property through the transfer from Lucara S.A., it is protected by the presumption of registral legitimacy contemplated in articles 456 and 472 of the Civil Code; therefore, it is a third-party acquirer and possessor in good faith. Consequently, prior to delivering the litigious lot to the defendant, the latter must recognize the following items and legal situations: a) It is not obligated to pay the defendant any type of damage or harm due to the return of the property; b) Nor to pay or return any type of fruits, nor to be liable for deterioration caused to the litigious property without fault; c) It must recognize, prior to returning the property, the current and actual value represented, at the time of said payment, by the sum of ¢2,500,000, or, failing that, said amount plus its legal interest until effective payment, all calculated from June 22, 1992, the date of its acquisition of the litigious farm; d) Likewise, it must recognize the value of useful and necessary improvements; ¢90,000 for the land clearing (tractoreo) of the lot; ¢375,421 for the payment of territorial and municipal taxes; ¢110,000 for the transfer expenses, fees, and registration of the property in its name; plus legal interest on said sums from the date of their payment until their reimbursement; e) Its right of retention until the determination and payment, in execution of the judgment, of all of these; and, f) That the defendant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding. Mr. Nombre4965 opposed the complaint. He raised the defenses of necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasiva necesaria) and res judicata (cosa juzgada). The Court partially granted the principal complaint. Where relevant, it declared the plaintiff company the legitimate owner, legally and registrally, of the litigious property. It omitted any ruling on the alternative claim. It ruled without a special award of costs. The Appellate Court revoked the appealed judgment. In its place, it granted the exception of res judicata. It declared the complaint without merit in all its aspects. It imposed the payment of the proceeding's costs on the plaintiff company.

III.- The special judicial attorney of the plaintiff company files a cassation appeal on the merits. He alleges that the ruling was contrary to res judicata. He asserts a direct violation of law, due to the improper application of articles 42 of the Political Constitution; 162, paragraph 2, and 163 of the Civil Procedure Code. As well as the lack of application of articles 165 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 431, 450 of the Criminal Procedure Code; 459 and 482 of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedures.

IV.- In the first place, it is necessary to point out an evident contradiction accused by the appeal under consideration. On page 279, the appellant cites article 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the limitation of the effects of material res judicata to the operative part of the judgment, not to its grounds. However, on page 280, which he reiterates on page 285, he states, "... the purpose of this ordinary civil trial is to bring to a successful conclusion the decision of the controversy regarding to whom the property in dispute definitively belongs, and in doing this we are precisely giving effect and content to what was resolved by the Superior Criminal Court, when it justified the 'POR TANTO' of its judgment in the cited phrase ...". Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Chamber addresses its consideration in the following terms.

V.- As the first ground of disagreement, the appellant asserts that the indicated defect is configured, with the violation of the cited norms, because, according to the operative part of the judgment issued by the Second Superior Criminal Court, the civil compensatory action filed by his represented party was partially granted. The civil defendant, Nombre10810, was sentenced in the abstract to pay the damages caused, which remained subject to what might ultimately be resolved in civil court regarding the definitive declaration of the property right of the litigious property. In turn, he adds, what was challenged by Mr. Nombre10809 before the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice was only what was resolved regarding the immobilization of the litigious property. Therefore, he asserts, the aspect that it would be in civil court where the definitive declaration of the property right of the litigious property would be made became final. The effects of material res judicata, he states, are limited to the operative part of the judgment, not to its grounds, which makes the existence or non-existence of the legal relationship it declares indisputable in another proceeding (article 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The Civil Court erred, he indicates, in applying the referenced institute to the sub-judice matter. The principal claim advanced by his represented party, he asserts, was not definitively resolved in the criminal court. Furthermore, he notes, with the sub-litem, no litigation already sealed by the sepulchral weight of res judicata is improperly reopened. As is evident from a simple reading of the criminal judgments, he affirms, his represented party and Mr. Nombre10809 did not sue each other, neither in the criminal process nor in any other venue, in a claim for the property in litigation. The criminal litis and the civil compensatory action, derived from the unlawful act tried there and the discussion of its consequences, were carried out by Printy S.A. and Mr. Nombre10812, each on their own behalf, against the accused Nombre10816. Never, he insists, was the dispute in criminal court integrated between the one against the other; therefore, the current protagonists have not been procedural antagonists. The constitutional guarantee under discussion, he points out, prevents reopening discussions already conducted between the same parties, with the same object (objeto), and for the same legal cause (causa jurídica). In the sub-judice matter, he notes, the principal claim of his represented party, because registral good faith protects it at the time of acquiring the litigious property, is to be the sole and formal owner of the property in dispute. This, he insists, has not been previously discussed between the current parties. For this reason, he hammers home, they have not been antagonists in any proceeding, civil or criminal, whose object is to declare his represented party the owner of the litigious property, as it is protected by the legal principle of a third-party acquirer in good faith. This being the legal cause of its principal claim, he adds, the procedural relationship established here is new or original. The claims of one against the rights of the other have not been discussed in a proper contradictory proceeding, he repeats. Consequently, he points out, the Court violates the identity of parties, object, and cause of the procedural relationship in controversy, which is a sine qua non requirement for the existence of material res judicata. The object of the sub-judice matter, he asserts, is to bring to a successful conclusion the decision of the controversy regarding to whom the property in dispute definitively belongs. With this, he warns, effect and content are given to what was considered by the Criminal Court to justify the operative part of the judgment. Nombre3956, lacking the requirements of identity of parties, object, and cause, what was resolved in the civil compensatory venue in the criminal proceeding against Nombre10815 does not constitute material res judicata in the sub-judice matter.

VI.- In accordance with its formulation, the crux of the issue debated in this ground of disagreement lies in establishing whether what was sought by the plaintiff in its principal complaint had already been definitively resolved in the referenced criminal process and, therefore, whether the exception of res judicata raised by the defendant is proper. Regarding the institute in question, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated: "III... The administration of justice is exercised through the Supreme Court of Justice and the other courts established by law (article 152 of the Political Constitution and 1st, paragraph 1, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). It corresponds to the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions indicated by the Magna Carta, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and contentious-administrative conflicts, as well as others established by law, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved; to resolve them definitively and to order the execution of its resolutions (article 153 of the Political Constitution and 1st, paragraph 2, of the cited Organic Law). By definitively resolving the controversies submitted for its consideration, the State, through the Judicial Branch, assumes and puts into operation one of the most important functions vested in it: the jurisdictional function. So that such a function may be carried out effectively, the decisions inherent to the power concurrently granted bear two fundamental characteristics: absolute immutability and definitiveness. Only in exceptional cases, contemplated by law, can such characteristics be relative. This particularity of the jurisdictional function has been called in doctrine and jurisprudence, RES JUDICATA. Through it, it is established that the will of the State, contained in the law, is definitive and immutable for the specific case, which is fundamental for legal certainty and security. That will is declared by the Judge in a judgment. In this way, the aim is to put an end to matters decided in a judicial ruling, to prevent the successive re-raising of the conflict, thus avoiding legal uncertainty, all of which promotes the effectiveness of the State's jurisdictional function. In our legal system, judgments issued in ordinary or abbreviated proceedings, as well as those other resolutions exhaustively listed, produce the authority of material res judicata. This is limited –with the exception that will be noted below– to the operative part of the judgment. That is, it does not include its grounds. For the judgment to affect another proceeding through res judicata, it is essential that there be identity of parties, cause, and object in both proceedings. This figure is regulated in articles 162 to 165 of the Civil Procedure Code. IV.- Res judicata has a strictly procedural nature, because it is a consequence of the proceeding and the will expressed in the procedural law. But its effects transcend the proceeding indirectly, to fall upon the substantive legal relationships. That is, as a consequence of the immutability of the decision: its direct effect, which guarantees the legal certainty of those relationships. Both elements, namely, the immutability of the decision and the definitiveness of the right declared or its rejection or denial, constitute legal effects of res judicata. The first is direct and procedural; the second is indirect and substantive. The first imposes on judges the prohibition to enter into a decision on the merits of the claims subject to debate and confers on them the power to halt the action exercised, either upon the motion of a party or ex officio, and on the parties, the right to obtain the definitive suspension of the proceeding in whole or in part. For the latter, it also implies the obligation to refrain from reviving, through another proceeding, those claims resolved positively or negatively. The second of the elements, that is, definitiveness, seeks to ensure that the declaration of certainty contained in the judgment is indisputable in other proceedings. In relation to this, it grants the parties the same rights and obligations that the procedural effect or immutability grants. For this reason, res judicata has a negative function or efficacy by prohibiting judges from deciding again on what has already been resolved. But it also has a positive one, represented by the security conferred on the substantive legal relationships decided. The foundation of res judicata lies, then, in the jurisdictional power of the State, from which emanates the sufficient power to ensure the effectiveness and the effects of the judgment. V.- Res judicata is subject to two limits: the objective one, due to the object upon which the proceeding was based, as well as the cause or title from which the claim was deduced; and the subjective one, due to the persons who have been parties in the proceeding. The object of the claim refers to what was recognized or denied in the final judgment. That is, to the thing or legal relationship upon which its binding force is applied. The object of the proceeding is the right recognized, declared, or modified in the judgment, in relation to one or several determined things, or the legal relationship declared, as the case may be. Furthermore, res judicata, regarding the object, extends to those points that, without having been an express subject of the jurisdictional decision, by necessary consequence or by being indispensably dependent on such a decision, are tacitly resolved. Thus, when a judgment has decided on a whole of which the thing that is the object of the new complaint forms a part, there will undoubtedly be identity of object. The second aspect of the objective limit is the identity of the causa petendi, that is, the foundation or reason alleged by the plaintiff to obtain the object of the claim contained in the complaint. The causa petendi must be sought exclusively within the framework of the complaint, with a broad criterion that leads to its logical interpretation. Not by simply referring to its literal wording. It configures the factual reason stated in the complaint as the basis of the claim. It is formed by the set of facts alleged as the basis of the complaint. Not for each one of them in isolation. The subjective limit or identity of parties refers to the subjects of the proceeding, parties in the formal sense: plaintiffs, defendants, and intervening third parties; and it must be kept in mind that the successors in title of the parties, whether universal or singular, are bound by the judgment, as if they were the parties themselves. In this regard, what is important is the juridical identity of the parties, not their physical identity. Consequently, anyone who has not been a party to the proceeding cannot be bound by the judgment rendered; that is, the constraints and obligations derived from it cannot be imposed on them. VI.- The former First Civil Chamber, in Judgment of 10:30 a.m. on December 27, 1972, stated: ' ... V.- Article 723 of the Civil Code establishes that the authority of res judicata is limited to the operative part of the judgment, but not to its grounds. But even so, doctrine and jurisprudence have established that "although the principle that the authority of res judicata is limited to the operative part of the judgment is true, it is also true that the motives or considerations of the ruling must be taken into account to determine and complete the meaning of the operative part." (Cassation Judgments of 3:15 p.m. on December 16, 1924; 2:15 p.m. on June 17, 1926; 3:45 p.m. on April 13, 1944; 16th of May 6, 1947; and 101 of 2:30 p.m. on September 4, 1968, Considering VI). In this last judgment and in the cited considering, the following was said: "It is necessary to emphasize that the existence and scope of res judicata depend not only on the triple identity of object, cause, and parties, but also on the nature of the ruling rendered, because res judicata is, above all, what the very words mean, that is, what has already been judged in the final ruling; because otherwise, if the judgment does not decide the merits of the issues proposed and debated in the lawsuit, or in other words, if what was claimed in the second trial was not granted or denied in the first, there can be no res judicata. Article 723 of the Civil Code provides that the authority of res judicata is limited to the operative part of the judgment, but not to its grounds; however, it is often necessary to turn to the motivations of the ruling to clarify what the judges actually resolved, especially when the judgment, being dismissive, is limited to declaring in its operative part that the complaint was denied". (The underlining does not belong to the original). Regarding the integral unity of judgments, one may consult, among others, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 2 of 3:00 p.m. on January 6 and 77 of 2:20 p.m. on November 19, both of 1993) and, on the institute of res judicata, among others, rulings numbers 93 of 3:00 p.m. on June 26, 1991, and 740 of 2:45 p.m. on December 1, 1999. ..." (Judgment number 180 of 9:25 a.m. on February 23, 2001. In the same sense, in addition to the rulings cited in the preceding transcript, one may consult number 740 of 2:45 p.m. on December 1, 1999).

VII.- In light of what is stated in the preceding considering and, having analyzed judgments numbered 121-B-97 of the then Second Superior Criminal Court, Second Section of San José, of 4:15 p.m. on September 9, 1997, and 346-98 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of 9:30 a.m. on April 3, 1998, this Court arrives at the same conclusion as the Ad-quem. That is, in the sub-judice matter, the institute of res judicata is configured. In that regard, the Superior Criminal Court partially granted the civil compensatory actions filed both by Mr. Nombre10808 and by the plaintiff company. Regarding the first, as stated above, and where relevant, it ordered the restitution in favor of Mr. Nombre4965 of the farm in litigation. As a consequence of the foregoing, and of the falsehood decreed, it annulled the various public deeds, starting with that dated August 26, 1991, by which the transfer of the farm in litigation to Mr. Nombre10810 was documented; also that in which the first-degree mortgage was constituted, and that in which Printy S.A. acquired ownership of the litigious property. Furthermore, it declared the nullity of all acts dependent on those public instruments. As a basis for the foregoing, it considered: "CIVIL COMPENSATORY ACTIONS.- In the Court's opinion, from the perspective of Criminal Law, it is not possible to keep any sale and purchase, mortgage, auction adjudication, or other related acts in force in the Public Registry that have their origin in an instrumental falsehood, even if those acts were carried out in good faith and under the protection of the Registry –which does not mean any interference with what the civil judges may finally resolve in a declarative proceeding regarding the possession and ownership of the property– because this would lead to greater legal insecurity for society than that which may be caused, individually, to the persons who, in each case, constitute the last link in the fraud and who are the ones who ultimately suffer the patrimonial damage that the author or authors of the act intended. It is also the Court's opinion that an act that began with an instrumental falsehood cannot, over time, acquire an effective legal life, without the pronouncement of an authority with jurisdiction to declare rights, such as the jurisdictional authority of the civil law. ... Unlike the Public Prosecutor's Office, which states in the accusation as one of the facts that Mr. Nombre10812 was deprived of the property, the Court sees the case as a fraud that is consummated with the damage suffered by Nombre10817.- The protection that must be given to those who acquire under the protection of the Registry is understood by the Court, for those situations where no instrumental falsification intervenes in the chain of transfers, as occurs, for example, in cases of negligence of the parties in presenting the testimonies of the deeds to the Registry, because in cases of falsehoods the law is very clear: "When a judgment declares a public instrument false, the court that issued it shall order that the act be reconstructed, suppressed, or reformed." (Articles 539 and 541 of the Code of Criminal Procedures). In the present case, what is required is to suppress from the public registry the instrumental falsehoods and subsequent ones, for which purpose the cancellation of all registry entries that may be necessary is ordered so that the property is registered in the name of Mr. Nombre10808, whose right does not have a spurious origin. It must be clear that in this judgment, no right of possession and/or ownership is being declared, as this is the jurisdiction of another court in case Nombre10817 decides to resort to that venue to request a determination of who has the better right to the property. ..." (The underlining does not belong to the original). Despite the evident contradiction incurred by the Superior Criminal Court, since, on one hand, it states that from the perspective of Criminal Law it is not possible to keep any sale and purchase, mortgage, auction adjudication, or other related acts in force in the Public Registry whose origin is an instrumental falsehood, adding that the protection of third parties in good faith, protected by registry publicity, operates provided that a crime does not intervene in the chain of transfers, as occurs in the sub-judice matter. On the other hand, it affirms that this does not mean interference with what the civil judges may ultimately resolve in a declarative proceeding, as they are the only ones competent to determine the right of possession and the right of ownership over the property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that said jurisdictional authority left open the possibility for Printy S.A. to resort to the ordinary civil venue in claim of its right over the litigious property. This is confirmed by what will be noted next. Regarding the civil compensatory action filed by the referenced company, as indicated, the indicated criminal authority also partially granted it. It sentenced the accused to pay the damages inflicted. It expressly indicated "a sentence which is made in the abstract, subject to what may ultimately be resolved in civil court regarding the definitive declaration of the property right of the property in question, if the plaintiff decides to resort to that venue. Otherwise, it could directly opt, without any subjection, to collect from the civil defendant the damages caused by the accused acts. ..." (The underlining does not belong to the original). The non-lifting of the registry entry by which the litigious farm was immobilized also confirms the stated conclusion.

VIII.- However, despite the foregoing, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, upon rejecting the cassation appeal filed by the attorney of Printy S.A. and, therefore, definitively deciding what was sought by it in the civil compensatory action, considered the following, in what is relevant: "III.- ... It is not alien to reality that the traffic and commerce of goods are fertile ground for generating situations that, besides exceeding the limits of good faith, prove to be criminal. And once entered into the criminal field, into the repressive sector of the State, we are in an area of eminently public order, since Criminal Law, in a State of Law, being conceived as the ultima ratio, is directed at protecting, with the full weight of state repressive power, the essential legal interests (bienes jurídicos) of the community. ... From the foregoing, it stands out that both spheres of the legal system –private law and criminal law– although they form a normative unity, this does not mean that the principles that, in one, are directed at ensuring the traffic of goods and good faith, prevail over or contradict the one that repressively protects the injury to essential legal interests and that, by reason of the criminal act, have also intensely injured the rights of the directly offended party, a victim who, constitutionally, has the right to 'find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests' -article 41 of the Political Constitution-, a protection that exists in all spheres of the legal system, but which is reflected more intensely when it comes to the victim of a criminal act, due to the injury to fundamental interests and property that this implies. Therefore, it is the criterion of this Chamber that, as occurs in the specific case, the victim of a dispossession of their property, an act carried out under the protection of false documents that are successfully registered in the Public Registry, has the right to recover the property that has been fraudulently taken from them in this way, even when there are third-party acquirers in good faith, who in turn trusted in the registry publicity. What has been said in no way implies disregarding third parties in good faith or the protection and defense of their interests, because they retain the mechanisms provided for in civil legislation to claim, against the seller, the guarantee and, in any case, the payment of damages, as well as the corresponding other indemnities –payment of improvements, for example–, according to the principles established therein. In the judgment of this Chamber, the protection of the third party in good faith cannot imply that their situation prevails over that of someone who has been, in a fraudulent, surreptitious, and defenseless manner, surprised by the dispossession of the legal title to the property that belongs to them and which, by imposition of the State, they are obligated to register. ... If the functioning of that entity is defective or insufficient to guarantee that owner, who must register their property, respect for their legitimately acquired rights, that cannot be used as an excuse to legitimize frauds that, through false public documents and using the registry structure itself, achieve the legal dispossession of property or even legitimize the spurious acquisition of the same. ... In the case of real estate, there are many occasions on which the legitimate registered owner, still retaining possession of the property, is legally dispossessed of it, under the protection of falsified documents that distort the information the Registry provides to third parties, who later, protected by that data, acquire rights over it. Even though the transparency of a transaction, in which a property is acquired that has not even been seen, is highly dubious, the truth is that this may occur in good faith, protected solely by the publicity of the registry data. What consequences does this have in reality?

The protection of third-party good-faith acquirers, in the terms sought by the appellant, in cases such as the one described, implies stripping the legitimate owner and current possessor of the property that belongs to them, in order to give it to a third party, in the name of the principles of registry publicity (publicidad registral). Such a solution is, without a doubt, excessive, disproportionate, and ultimately unjust. In the opinion of this Chamber, the importance of registry publicity (publicidad registral) and its principles cannot prevail over the right of the first victim—the legitimate owner, originally dispossessed in a fraudulent manner—to maintain full title over their property, or in any case, the right to be restored to its enjoyment. ... when a transaction arises, is modified, or is structured based on documentary falsehoods, it is Criminal Law (Derecho Penal) that is competent to declare the existence of the act, its perpetrator, and determine the legal consequences it entails, not only strictly penal ones—such as the sanction—but also the civil and other consequences that are inextricably linked to the criminal matter and its object of protection, as it is the criminal judgment that will seek to restore social peace, insofar as possible, by returning things to the state they were in before the act. Preserving, in the case of restitution, "the rights of third parties," as stated in article 123 of the 1941 Criminal Code (Código Penal de 1941), means that they shall retain the rights to bring action against the person who transferred to them, in claim for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused and for any other compensation that may be due, which they may well do by exercising the civil indemnity action (acción civil resarcitoria) in the criminal venue, when their seller and the accused in the case are the same person, or in the civil jurisdiction (jurisdicción civil), through the corresponding procedures. IV.- The challenger considers, at the same time, that article 456 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) has been disregarded, and that an erroneous connection has been made with article 472 of the same Code. The cited article 456 is clear when it establishes that ... Although subsection 2 of the indicated article 472 establishes that total cancellation of the registry entries may and shall be ordered when the title by virtue of which the registration was made is declared null, this must be related to article 456 and understood to mean that one who acquired under the protection of registry publicity (publicidad registral) shall always be protected, as they shall be considered a third party of good faith. In reality, the Chamber understands that, as analyzed, registry publicity (publicidad registral) is an instrument established and erected by the State to secure the traffic of goods, providing security and backing to the information recorded therein. But it is precisely that, one more instrument, of undeniable value and importance for protecting the rights of those who are harmed by errors, omissions in the recorded information, or for those who have been victims of those who, using that instrument, utilize it to secure, in turn, the result of a criminal project, through the use of false documents, to the detriment of the true registered owners, and, under its protection, carry out, among other things, false transfers that then, under the pretext of the security that registry publicity itself represents, extend the effects of the crime to third persons who act, in most cases, in good faith, although there is no lack of cases in which the person who acquires "under the protection of the registry" also knows of the fraudulent maneuver and precisely expects to obtain benefit from it, to "legalize" their situation and, from that point forward, initiate the chain of harm to the true good-faith acquirers, trusting in the information of registry publicity (publicidad registral). In summary: registry publicity (publicidad registral) protects the right of third parties of good faith who have been taken by surprise by fraudulent maneuvers, enabling them to claim compensation for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused, as established in the civil sphere. But it cannot, in any way, constitute a screen for legitimizing criminal acts, to the point of being an obstacle for the victim of a crime—the original owner, stripped of their property by a false document that has been successfully registered—to recover it—in fact and in law. Therefore, in these cases, the provisions of article 539 of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973) (article 468 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal de 1996)) find full application, when it provides that in the judgment declaring a documentary falsehood, “the Court that issued it shall order the act to be reconstructed, suppressed, or reformed,” and article 541, by establishing that “If it concerns a notarized document (documento protocolizado), the declaration made in the judgment shall be noted, by means of a marginal notation, on the original (matriz), on the certified copies (testimonios) that have been presented, and in the respective registry.” Suppressing the document means eliminating the act carried out by its means, as well as its effects. As a logical consequence, subsequent acts that depend upon it must also be annulled, with the rights of third parties of good faith being preserved to claim the compensation that may be appropriate. The protection granted by article 456 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is understood to govern in those cases where the nullity or rescission of the title arises from legal situations whose illegality is strictly of a civil nature, but not to oppose the person who was the original victim of a fraudulent dispossession, carried out under the protection of false public documents and registry entries and registrations achieved under their mantle, even if, subsequent to that act, other transactions have been carried out involving third parties of good faith, who may also be victims of some criminal enterprise. ... Allowing registry publicity (publicidad registral) to protect an anti-social exercise of the rights enshrined by its means is to consent to the persistence of abuse, and therefore, the criminal judgment must, when ordering the suppression of the act generated from a false document, restore the victim to the full enjoyment of their rights, while preserving for the third parties of good faith their rights to claim the corresponding compensation before the civil jurisdiction (jurisdicción civil), or within the criminal process, in cases where this is appropriate. V.- The jurisprudence of the First Civil Chamber (Sala Primera Civil) has recognized the importance and scope of registry publicity (publicidad registral) in the traffic of goods, while also pointing out that registration does not validate acts that are voidable or null, in accordance with the law. Thus, it has indicated that: ... (judgment 060-F-91, of 3:00 p.m. on April 24, 1991, First Civil Chamber (Sala Primera Civil)). The effort to clarify, based on legal texts, made by jurisprudence to remedy situations of conflicting rights, giving priority to the protection of the third-party good-faith acquirer, is evident. This Chamber shares that interpretation, although it does not consider it applicable to the case in which the nullity of the registered title is due to the falsehood of the document that supports it, for in such a scenario, when not only the identity, but, as a logical consequence, the will and consent of the registered owner of the property, have been fraudulently usurped to carry out transactions and registry movements of the property, which imply a dispossession of legal title and, on occasion, of actual possession. In such a case, one cannot speak of a transaction, of a sale, and under the protection of such a fraudulent act, valid legal effects cannot be generated, even when third parties of good faith have intervened in the chain of transmissions and movements. ... However, another interpretation is the one given to the issue by the First Chamber (Sala Primera), which this Chamber respects, but, for the reasons stated, does not share. Thus, the former has indicated: ... (judgment 53-97, of 2:30 p.m. on July 2, 1997, First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia)). ... However, the cited precedent clearly sets forth the preeminence of the protection of third-party good-faith acquirers over the original owner, a criterion that, for cases in which the existence of the documentary falsehood and its authorship have been settled, to the detriment of the dispossessed original owner, this Chamber does not share, for the reasons stated. Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged judgment does not suffer from the substantive defect attributed to it by the appellant. Its represented party retains the right to claim, against the appropriate party, the corresponding liabilities for the loss of the property, as well as the compensations that may be appropriate, but the property must be restituted to the original and legitimate owner, dispossessed by the fraudulent action of the accused. Therefore, the claim must be rejected. ... VI.- ... Therefore, the rights of the referenced company have not been injured, aside from the fact that it could, on its own, have exercised the civil indemnity action (acción civil resarcitoria) against the accused, still having the possibility of going to the civil courts for the determination of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) suffered, as well as to establish the corresponding execution. The appeal is dismissed on its merits." IX.- Under the shelter of the foregoing transcription (despite not sharing the considerations set forth by said Chamber, as they conflict with the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court regarding the scope and application of the institute of acquisition from a non-owner (adquisición a non domino). On this topic, one may consult, among many others, judgments number 82 of 2:30 p.m. on May 22, 1992, 56 of 1:50 p.m. on August 4, 1994, 45 of 10:05 a.m. on May 22, 1996, 53 of 2:30 p.m. on July 2, 1997, 417 of 3:10 p.m. on June 2, 530 of 3:30 p.m. on July 19, both of 2000, 162 of 8:15 a.m. on February 16, 352 of 10:20 a.m. on May 18, both of 2001) and from what is set forth in considerando V of this judgment, regarding the integral unity of judgments, it is undoubtedly established that in the criminal venue, the ownership (dominio) of the litigious property was discussed, considered, and definitively resolved. This is confirmed, moreover, by what was considered by that Chamber upon granting the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the special judicial representatives of Mr. Nombre10809. In this regard, and in what is pertinent, it stated: “...The appellant is correct in his objection. There is no legal provision preventing the Trial Court from lifting said precautionary measure, which was effectively requested by the victim. In any case, when applying article 539 of the Code of Procedure in what refers to the suppression of the false act, and of those subsequently carried out, it is necessary to order the full restitution of the right, as it would serve no purpose to maintain it after the judgment becomes res judicata. In other words, if said measure were maintained, the owner would be unable to freely dispose of their right as guaranteed by articles 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 266 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). The objection must consequently be upheld. The judgment is partially annulled and, resolving on the merits, it is ordered to lift the immobilization order encumbering the cited property, a measure that shall be communicated by writ (mandamiento) to the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad). ...” (The underlining is not from the original). It is clear, then, that in said venue it was definitively established that the sole and legitimate owner of the litigious property is the defendant herein. Furthermore, that the company Printy S.A., as a third-party good-faith acquirer, lacks standing (legitimación) to claim from Mr. Nombre10808 recognition of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused, as well as the other corresponding compensation, because he is the legitimate owner, illegally dispossessed of the property in dispute. It can only do so against its transferor. On the other hand, and in accordance with what was considered in the criminal venue, this Chamber, for the same reasons stated by the Ad-quem, considers that in the sub-júdice the triple identity of object, cause, and parties converges. X.- Secondly, the appellant in cassation asserts, in the subsidiary action his represented party requests that a series of subjective rights be respected for her, in her capacity as a third-party good-faith acquirer, defeated in a reivindicatory action (juicio de reivindicación). It suffices to read the claims deduced, he indicates, to understand that they have not been the subject of any procedural relationship between the current parties and, therefore, the material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) also does not cover these aspects. The object and cause of the subsidiary claim, he adds, have not been brought in a process where a judicial determination is made for or against them. Consequently, he concludes, it is not appropriate to declare, as the Ad-quem did, res judicata (cosa juzgada) against what was requested therein. XI.- The majority of the claims sought in the subsidiary complaint, in accordance with what was noted in considerandos VIII and IX of this judgment and, contrary to what was affirmed by the appellant in cassation, are not receivable. This is because they are subsumed within what was expressly considered by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), and therefore, covered by res judicata (cosa juzgada). In what is relevant, it is repeated, in its judgment that high Court indicated: “... Therefore, it is the criterion of this Chamber that, as occurs in the concrete case, the victim of a dispossession of their property, carried out under the protection of false documents that are successfully registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público), has the right to recover the property that has been, in this way, fraudulently taken from them, even when there are third-party good-faith acquirers who, in turn, trusted in registry publicity (publicidad registral). The foregoing does not imply, in any way, disregarding the protection and defense of the interests of third parties of good faith, because they retain the mechanisms provided in civil legislation to claim, against the seller, the guarantee and, in any event, the payment of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), as well as the other compensation that may correspond—payment for improvements (mejoras), for example—according to the principles established therein. In the opinion of this Chamber, the protection of the third party of good faith cannot imply that their situation prevails over that of the person who has been, fraudulently, surreptitiously, and defenselessly, taken by surprise by the dispossession of the legal title to the property that belongs to them and that, by imposition of the State, they are obligated to register. ... it is Criminal Law (Derecho Penal) that is competent to declare the existence of the act, its perpetrator, and determine the legal consequences it entails, not only strictly penal ones—such as the sanction—but also the civil and other consequences that are inextricably linked to the criminal matter and its object of protection, as it is the criminal judgment that will seek to restore social peace, insofar as possible, by returning things to the state they were in before the act. ... Preserving, in the case of restitution, "the rights of third parties," as stated in article 123 of the 1941 Criminal Code (Código Penal de 1941), means that they shall retain the rights to bring action against the person who transferred to them, in claim for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused and for any other compensation that may be due, which they may well do by exercising the civil indemnity action (acción civil resarcitoria) in the criminal venue, when their seller and the accused in the case are the same person, or in the civil jurisdiction (jurisdicción civil), through the corresponding procedures. ... Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged judgment does not suffer from the substantive defect attributed to it by the appellant. Its represented party retains the right to claim, against the appropriate party, the corresponding liabilities for the loss of the property, as well as the compensations that may be appropriate, but the property must be restituted to the original and legitimate owner, dispossessed by the fraudulent action of the accused. Therefore, the claim must be rejected. ... VI.- ... Therefore, the rights of the referenced company have not been injured, aside from the fact that it could, on its own, have exercised the civil indemnity action (acción civil resarcitoria) against the accused, still having the possibility of going to the civil courts for the determination of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) suffered, as well as to establish the corresponding execution.” (The highlighting is not from the original). According to what has been transcribed, and as stated in considerando IX of this judgment, the plaintiff company can only claim the majority of what is sought in the subsidiary action from its transferor, not from Mr. Nombre10809, as he is the original owner, illegally dispossessed of the litigious property. XI.- It is indeed receivable, as the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) itself so establishes, to declare the plaintiff a third-party acquirer and possessor of good faith, having acquired the disputed property under the protection of registry publicity (publicidad registral). Likewise, regarding what it terms "economic aspects and legal situations," specifically, what is claimed in the point identified with the letter C.d), pursuant to what was resolved in the criminal venue, it can only recover what was paid for territorial (impuestos territoriales) and municipal taxes (impuestos municipales) on the litigious land. This is because, being this a legal encumbrance, if the property had not illegally left the defendant's estate, he maintained the duty to fulfill that obligation. However, as the defendant acknowledges in his deposition, folio 99, after the year 1993, since the litigious property was not in his name, he has not paid the indicated taxes. Consequently, failing to recognize this aspect would imply fostering illicit enrichment in his favor. As this is a monetary obligation, it is also appropriate to recognize interest at the legal rate, from the time of its payment until its effective reimbursement. The determination of the definitive amount is deferred to the judgment execution stage. Regarding the points identified with the letters C.a), C.b), C.c), and C.e), despite being covered in articles 327 and 328 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), it is not appropriate to grant them. This is because, it is insisted, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) expressly indicated that, since Mr. Nombre10812 was dispossessed of the litigious property as a consequence of a crime, he must be restored to the full enjoyment of his rights. That is, the situation existing before the commission of the illicit act must be returned to. Likewise, it indicated, as a third-party good-faith acquirer, it can only claim the corresponding compensation from its seller. XII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal (recurso) filed is partially upheld on its merits. Consequently, the appealed judgment must also be partially annulled, insofar as it granted the res judicata (cosa juzgada) defense regarding the subsidiary complaint. In its place, said action must be partially granted, with it being understood as denied for what is not expressly indicated. The plaintiff company must be declared a third-party acquirer and possessor of good faith. Likewise, the defendant must be ordered to recognize the amount paid by the plaintiff company for municipal and territorial taxes on the litigious property, plus interest at the legal rate on that amount from its payment until its effective reimbursement, for which purpose it shall be limited to what Mr. Nombre4965 was obligated to pay. The determination of this item is deferred to the judgment execution stage." The purpose of the sub-judice matter, it asserts, is to bring to a successful conclusion the decision of the controversy regarding to whom the property of the disputed asset definitively corresponds. By doing so, it warns, effect and content are given to what was considered by the Criminal Court to justify the operative part of the judgment. Nombre3956, lacking the requirements of identity of parties, object, and cause, the matter resolved in the civil compensatory venue in the criminal proceeding brought against Nombre10815 does not constitute material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) in the sub-judice matter.

VI.- According to its formulation, the crux of the issue debated in this present ground of disagreement lies in establishing whether what was sought by the plaintiff in his main claim has already been finally resolved in the aforementioned criminal proceeding and, therefore, whether the defense of res judicata (cosa juzgada) raised by the defendant is admissible. Regarding the institute in question, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated: “III... The administration of justice is exercised through the Supreme Court of Justice and the other courts established by law (article 152 of the Political Constitution and article 1, paragraph 1, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). It corresponds to the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions assigned to it by the Constitution, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and administrative contentious disputes, as well as those others established by law, whatever their nature and the capacity of the persons involved; to resolve them definitively and to order the execution of its resolutions (article 153 of the Political Constitution and article 1, paragraph 2, of the cited Organic Law). In resolving definitively the controversies submitted to its jurisdiction, the State, through the Judicial Branch, assumes and puts into operation one of the most important functions vested in it: the jurisdictional function. For this function to be carried out effectively, the decisions inherent to the power simultaneously granted bear two fundamental characteristics: absolute immutability and finality. Only in exceptional cases, contemplated by law, can these characteristics be relative. This particularity of the jurisdictional function has been called, in doctrine and jurisprudence, RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA). Through it, it is established that the will of the State, contained in the law, is definitive and immutable for the specific case, which is basic for legal certainty and security. That will is declared by the Judge in a final judgment (sentencia). In this way, the aim is to put an end to matters decided in a judicial ruling, to prevent the successive re-litigation of the conflict, thus avoiding legal uncertainty, all of which contributes to the effectiveness of the jurisdictional function of the State. In our system, final judgments (sentencias) issued in ordinary or abbreviated proceedings, as well as those other resolutions exhaustively listed, produce the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). This is limited —with the exception to be noted below— to the operative part of the judgment. That is, it does not encompass its reasoning. For the judgment to affect another proceeding through res judicata (cosa juzgada), it is essential that in both proceedings there exists identity of parties, cause, and object. This figure is regulated in articles 162 to 165 of the Code of Civil Procedure. IV.- Res judicata (cosa juzgada) has a strictly procedural nature, because it is a consequence of the proceeding and of the will manifested in the procedural law. But its effects indirectly transcend the proceeding, to fall upon the substantive legal relationships. This, as a consequence of the immutability of the decision: its direct effect, thereby guaranteeing the legal certainty of those relationships. Both elements, namely, the immutability of the decision and the finality of the declared right or of its rejection or denial, constitute legal effects of res judicata (cosa juzgada). The first is direct and procedural; the second is indirect and substantive. The first imposes the prohibition on judges from resolving the merits of the claims that were the subject of debate and grants them the power to halt the exercised action, either at the request of a party or ex officio, and grants the parties the right to obtain the definitive suspension of the proceeding in whole or in part. It also implies for the latter the obligation to refrain from reviving, through another proceeding, those claims resolved positively or negatively. The second element, that is, finality, seeks to make the declaration of certainty contained in the final judgment (sentencia) indisputable in other proceedings. In this regard, it grants the parties the same rights and obligations conferred by the procedural effect or immutability. For that reason, res judicata (cosa juzgada) has a negative function or effect by prohibiting judges from deciding anew on what has already been resolved. But it also has a positive one, represented by the security conferred on the settled substantive legal relationships. The foundation of res judicata (cosa juzgada) lies, then, in the jurisdictional power of the State, from which emanates sufficient power to ensure the effectiveness and the effects of the final judgment (sentencia). V.- Res judicata (cosa juzgada) is subject to two limits: the objective limit, by reason of the object upon which the proceeding turned as well as the cause or title from which the claim was deduced; and the subjective limit, by reason of the persons who have been parties in the proceeding. The object of the claim refers to what was recognized or denied in the final unappealable judgment (sentencia ejecutoriada). That is, to the thing or legal relationship upon which its binding force is applied. The object of the proceeding is constituted by the right recognized, declared, or modified in the final judgment (sentencia), in relation to one or several specific things, or the declared legal relationship, as the case may be. Furthermore, res judicata (cosa juzgada) regarding the object extends to those points which, without having been the express subject of the jurisdictional decision, are tacitly resolved by necessary consequence or by depending indispensably on such decision. Thus, when a final judgment (sentencia) has decided upon a whole of which the thing that is the object of the new claim forms a part, there will undoubtedly exist identity of object. The second aspect of the objective limit is the identity of the cause petendi (causa petendi), that is, the ground or reason alleged by the plaintiff to obtain the object of the claim contained in the lawsuit. The cause petendi (causa petendi) must be sought exclusively within the framework of the lawsuit, with a broad criterion leading to its logical interpretation, not merely adhering to its literal wording. It constitutes the factual basis stated in the lawsuit as the foundation of the claim. It is formed by the set of facts alleged as the basis of the lawsuit, not for each of them in isolation. The subjective limit or identity of parties refers to the subjects of the proceeding, parties in a formal sense: plaintiffs, defendants, and intervening third parties; and it must be taken into account that the successors in interest (causahabientes) of the parties, by universal or singular title, are bound by the final judgment (sentencia), as if they were the parties themselves. In this regard, what matters is the legal identity of the parties, not their physical identity. Consequently, a person who was not a party in the proceeding cannot be bound by the final judgment (sentencia) issued; that is, the constraints and obligations derived from it cannot be imposed upon them. VI.- The former First Civil Chamber, in a Final Judgment (Sentencia) at 10:30 a.m. on December 27, 1972, stated: " ... V.- Article 723 of the Civil Code establishes that the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is limited to the operative part of the final judgment (sentencia), but not to its reasoning. But even so, doctrine and jurisprudence have established that 'although it is true that the principle is that the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is limited to the operative part of the final judgment (sentencia), it is also true that the reasons or considerations of the ruling must be taken into account to determine and complete the meaning of the operative part.' (Cassation Judgments at 3:15 p.m. on December 16, 1924, 2:15 p.m. on June 17, 1926, 3:45 p.m. on April 13, 1944, 16 of May 6, 1947, and 101 at 2:30 p.m. on September 4, 1968, Considerando VI). In this last final judgment (sentencia) and in the cited Considerando, the following was stated: 'It is necessary to emphasize that the existence and scope of res judicata (cosa juzgada) depend not only on the triple identity in the object, cause, and parties, but also on the nature of the pronouncement made, because res judicata (cosa juzgada) is, above all, what the very words mean, that is, what was already adjudged in the final unappealable ruling; because otherwise, if the final judgment (sentencia) does not decide the merits of the questions proposed and debated in the litigation, or in other words, if what was claimed in the second suit was not granted or denied in the first, there can be no res judicata (cosa juzgada). Article 723 of the Civil Code provides that the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is limited to the operative part of the final judgment (sentencia), but not to its reasoning; however, it is frequently necessary to resort to the reasoning of the ruling to clarify what it is that the judges actually resolved, especially when the final judgment (sentencia), being dismissive, is limited to declaring in its operative part that the claim was denied.' (The underlining is not from the original). Regarding the integral unity of final judgments (sentencias), one may consult, among others, resolutions of this Chamber numbers 2 at 3:00 p.m. on January 6 and 77 at 2:20 p.m. on November 19, both of 1993) and, on the institute of res judicata (cosa juzgada), among others, rulings numbers 93 at 3:00 p.m. on June 26, 1991, and 740 at 2:45 p.m. on December 1, 1999. ...” (Final Judgment number 180 at 9:25 a.m. on February 23, 2001. In the same vein, in addition to the rulings cited in the preceding transcript, one may consult number 740 at 2:45 p.m. on December 1, 1999).

VII.- In light of the foregoing Considerando and, having analyzed final judgments (sentencias) numbers 121-B-97 of the then Second Criminal Superior Court, Second Section of San José, at 4:15 p.m. on September 9, 1997, and 346-98 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:30 a.m. on April 3, 1998, this Court reaches the same conclusion as the Ad-quem. That is, in the sub-judice matter, the institute of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is configured. In this regard, the Criminal Superior Court partially upheld the civil compensatory actions filed both by Mr. Nombre10808 and by the plaintiff company. Regarding the first, as was stated, and as pertinent, it ordered the restitution in favor of Mr. Nombre4965 of the property in litigation. As a consequence of the foregoing, and of the falsity declared, it annulled the various notarial deeds (escrituras públicas), starting from the one dated August 26, 1991, by which the transfer to Mr. Nombre10810 of the property in litigation was documented; also the one in which the first-degree mortgage was constituted, and in which Printy S.A. acquired ownership of the litigious real estate property. Furthermore, it declared the nullity of all acts dependent on those public instruments. As the reasoning for the foregoing, it considered: “CIVIL COMPENSATORY ACTIONS.- In the Court's opinion, from the perspective of Criminal Law, it is not possible to maintain subsistent any purchase-sale, mortgage, auction adjudication, or other related acts in the Public Registry that have their origin in an instrumental forgery (falsedad instrumental), even if those acts were performed in good faith and under the protection of the Registry –which does not mean any interference with what the civil judges may definitively resolve in the declaratory venue regarding possession and property of the asset- because that would lead to greater legal insecurity for society than what can be caused, individually, to the persons who come to constitute, in each case, the last link in the fraud and who are the ones who ultimately suffer the patrimonial harm that the perpetrator or perpetrators of the act intended. It is also the Court's opinion that an act that began with an instrumental forgery (falsedad instrumental) cannot, over time, acquire effective legal life without the pronouncement of an authority competent to declare rights, such as the jurisdictional civil authority. ... Unlike the Public Prosecutor's Office, which states in the accusation as one of the facts that Mr. Nombre10812 was dispossessed of the real estate property, the Court sees the case as a fraud that is consummated with the harm suffered by Nombre10817.- The protection that must be given to those who acquire under the protection of the Registry is understood by the Court for those situations where no instrumental forgery (falsificación instrumental) occurs in the chain of transfers, as happens, for example, in cases of the parties' negligence in presenting the testimonies of the deeds (escrituras) to the Registry, because in cases of forgeries (falsedades) the law is very clear: 'When a final judgment (sentencia) declares a public instrument to be false, the court that issued it shall order that the act be reconstructed, suppressed, or reformed.' (Articles 539 and 541 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In the present case, what is required is to suppress from the public registry the instrumental and subsequent forgeries (falsedades instrumentales y subsiguientes), for which the cancellation of all registry entries (asientos registrales) necessary is ordered so that the property is registered in the name of Mr. Nombre10808, whose right does not have a spurious origin. It must be clear that in this final judgment (sentencia) no right of possession and/or property is being declared, as that is the competence of another jurisdiction in case Nombre10817 decides to resort to that venue to request a determination of who has a better right to the asset. ...” (The underlining is not from the original). Despite the evident contradiction incurred by the Criminal Superior Court, because, on one hand, it points out that from the perspective of Criminal Law it is not possible to maintain subsistent any purchase-sale, mortgage, auction adjudication, or other related acts in the Public Registry whose origin is an instrumental forgery (falsedad instrumental), adding that the protection of third parties in good faith, protected by registry publicity, operates provided there is no crime in the chain of transfers, as occurs in the sub-judice matter. On the other hand, it affirms that this does not mean interference with what the civil judges ultimately resolve in the declaratory venue, who are solely competent to determine the right of possession and the right of property over the asset. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that said jurisdictional authority left open the possibility for Printy S.A. to resort to the ordinary venue in claim of its right over the litigious asset. This is confirmed by what will be noted below. Regarding the civil compensatory action filed by the referred company, as indicated, the indicated criminal authority also partially upheld it. It sentenced the accused to pay the damages inflicted. It expressly indicated “sentence which is rendered in the abstract, subject to what may definitively be resolved in the civil venue regarding the definitive declaration of the right of property of the real estate property in question, if the plaintiff decides to resort to that venue. Otherwise, it could directly opt, without any subjection, to collect from the civil defendant the damages caused by the acts charged. ...” (The underlining is not from the original). The non-lifting of the registry entry (asiento registral) by which the litigated property was immobilized also confirms the conclusion set forth.

VIII.- However, despite what has been stated, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in rejecting the appeal for cassation filed by the legal representative of Printy S.A. and, therefore, in definitively deciding what was sought by it in the civil compensatory action, in what is relevant, considered the following: “III.- ... It is not foreign to reality that the traffic and commerce of goods are fertile ground for generating situations that, besides exceeding the limits of good faith, turn out to be criminal. And having entered the criminal field, the repressive sector of the State, we are in an area of utmost public order, since Criminal Law, in a State of Law, being conceived as the ultima ratio, is aimed at protecting, with all the weight of repressive state power, the essential legal interests of the community. ... From what has been said, it stands out that both spheres of the legal system –private law and criminal law- although they form a normative unity, that does not mean that the principles that in one are aimed at ensuring the traffic of goods and good faith, prevail over or contradict that which repressively protects injury to essential legal interests and which, on account of the criminal act, have further intensely injured the rights of the directly offended party, a victim who, constitutionally, has the right to 'find reparation for the insults or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests' -article 41 of the Political Constitution-, a protection that exists in all spheres of the legal system, but which is reflected more intensely when it involves a victim of a criminal act, due to the injury to fundamental interests and assets that this entails. Therefore, it is the opinion of this Chamber that, as occurs in the specific case, the victim of a dispossession of their assets, an act done under the cover of false documents that manage to be registered in the Public Registry, has the right to recover the asset that has been, in this manner, fraudulently taken from them, even when there are third-party acquirers in good faith, who in turn trusted in the registry publicity. What has been said does not imply, in any way, ignoring the protection and defense of their interests for third parties in good faith, because they retain the mechanisms provided in civil legislation to claim, against the seller, the guarantee and, in any case, the payment of damages, as well as the remaining indemnifications that may correspond –payment for improvements, for example-, according to the principles established therein. In the judgment of this Chamber, the protection of the third party in good faith cannot imply that their situation prevails over that of the one who has been, in a fraudulent, surreptitious, and defenseless manner, surprised by the dispossession of the legal ownership of the assets that belong to them and who, by imposition of the State, is obligated to register and record them. ... If the functioning of that entity is defective or insufficient to guarantee that owner, who must register their assets, respect for their legitimately acquired rights, that cannot be used as an excuse to legitimize frauds that, through false public documents and using the very registry structure, achieve the legal dispossession of assets or even legitimize the spurious acquisition thereof. ... In the case of real estate property, there are many occasions in which the legitimate registered owner, even while retaining possession of the asset, is legally dispossessed of it, under the cover of falsified documents that distort the information the Registry provides to third parties, who subsequently, protected by that data, acquire rights over them. Even when the transparency of a transaction, in which real estate property is acquired without even having been seen, is highly dubious, it is true that it may occur in good faith, protected solely by the publicity of the registry data. What consequences does this have in reality? The protection of third-party acquirers in good faith, in the terms sought by the appellant, in cases such as the one described, implies dispossessing the legitimate owner and the current possessor of the asset that belongs to them, to give it to a third party, in the name of the principles of registry security. Such a solution is, without a doubt, excessive, disproportionate, and, ultimately, unjust. In the judgment of this Chamber, the importance of registry publicity and its principles cannot prevail over the right of the first victim -the legitimate owner, originally fraudulently dispossessed- to maintain full ownership of their assets or, in any case, the right to be restored in the enjoyment thereof. ... when a negotiation arises, is modified, or is structured on the basis of documentary forgeries (falsedades documentales), it is Criminal Law that is competent to declare the existence of the act, the responsible party, and to determine the legal consequences it entails, not only strictly criminal ones -such as the penalty-, but civil ones and those of another nature that are indissolubly linked to the criminal matter and its object of protection, for it is the criminal final judgment (sentencia penal) that will attempt to restore social peace, as far as possible restoring things to the state they were in before the act. To leave safe, in the case of restitution, 'the rights of third parties,' as stated in numeral 123 of the Criminal Code of 1941, means that these parties shall retain the rights to proceed against the one who transferred to them, in claim of the damages caused and of the remaining indemnifications that might correspond, which they may well do by exercising the civil compensatory action in the criminal venue, when their seller and the accused in the case are the same person, or in the civil jurisdiction, through the corresponding procedures. IV.- The challenger also estimates that numeral 456 of the Civil Code has been disregarded, of which an erroneous relationship has been made with article 472 of the same Code. The cited article 456 is clear when it establishes that ... Although subsection 2 of the cited article 472 establishes that total cancellation of registry entries (asientos registrales) may and must be ordered when the title by virtue of which the registration was made is declared null, this must be related to article 456 and understood that whoever acquired under the protection of registry publicity will always be protected, as they will be considered a third party in good faith. In reality, the Chamber understands that, as analyzed, registry publicity is an instrument established and erected by the State to ensure the traffic of goods, giving security and backing to the information recorded there. But it is just that, one more instrument, of undeniable value and importance for protecting the rights of those who are harmed by errors or omissions in the recorded information, or for those who have been victims of those who, using that instrument, utilize it to ensure, in turn, the result of a criminal project, through the use of false documents, to the detriment of the true registered owners, and to carry out under its protection, among other things, false transfers that then, under the pretext of the security that the publicity itself represents, extend the effects of the crime to third persons who act, most of the time, in good faith, although there is no shortage of cases in which the person who will acquire 'under the protection of the registry' also knows of the fraudulent maneuver and precisely hopes to obtain profit from it, to 'legalize' their situation and, from then on, initiate the chain of harm to the true acquirers in good faith, trusting in the information of the registry publicity. In summary: registry publicity protects the right of third parties in good faith who have been surprised by fraudulent maneuvers, so they can claim indemnification for the damages caused, as established in the civil field. But it cannot, in any way, be constituted as a screen for legitimizing criminal acts, to the point of being an obstacle for the victim of a crime –the original owner, dispossessed of their asset by a false document that has managed to be registered- to recover it –in fact and in law-. Therefore, in these cases, the provisions of numerals 539 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 (468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1996) find full application, when it provides that in the final judgment (sentencia) declaring a documentary forgery 'the Court that issued it shall order that the act be reconstructed, suppressed, or reformed' and 541, in establishing that 'If it pertains to a protocolized document, the declaration made in the final judgment (sentencia) shall be noted, by means of a marginal notation, on the original document, on the certified copies that have been presented, and in the respective registry.' Suppressing the document means eliminating the act that was carried out through it, as well as its effects. As a logical consequence, the subsequent acts that depend on it must also be annulled, leaving the rights of third parties in good faith safe for the claim of the indemnifications that may be appropriate. The protection granted by numeral 456 of the Civil Code is understood to govern against those cases in which the nullity or rescission of the title occurs due to legal situations whose illegality is strictly of a civil nature, but not to oppose one who has been the original victim of a fraudulent dispossession, an act done under the cover of false public documents and registration entries (asientos registrales) obtained under their cloak, even if after that act, other transactions have been carried out in which third parties in good faith are involved, perhaps also victims of some criminal enterprise. ... Allowing registry publicity to protect an antisocial exercise of the rights enshrined through it is to consent to the persistence of abuse and, therefore, the criminal final judgment (sentencia penal) must, in ordering the suppression of the act originating from a false document, restore the victim to the full enjoyment of their rights, leaving, for third parties in good faith, their rights safe to claim the corresponding indemnifications before the civil jurisdiction, or, within the criminal proceeding, in cases where that is appropriate. V.- The jurisprudence of the First Civil Chamber has recognized the importance and scope of registry publicity in the traffic of goods, while also pointing out that registration does not validate acts that are voidable or null, in accordance with the law. Thus, it has indicated that: ... (final judgment (sentencia) 060-F-91, at 3:00 p.m. on April 24, 1991, First Civil Chamber). The effort of clarification that, based on legal texts, jurisprudence makes to remedy situations of collision of rights, giving priority to the protection of the third-party acquirer in good faith, is evident. This Chamber shares that interpretation, although it does not consider it applicable to the case in which the nullity of the registered title is due to the falsity of the document that supports it, because in that case, when not only the identity, but, as a logical consequence, the will and consent of the registered owner of the asset have been fraudulently usurped, to carry out transactions and registry movements of the asset that imply a dispossession of legal ownership and, on occasions, of actual possession. In that case, one cannot speak of a transaction, of a sale, and under the protection of such a fraudulent act, valid legal effects cannot be generated, even when third parties in good faith have intervened in the chain of transmissions and movements. ... However, the interpretation given to the matter by the First Chamber is another, and this Chamber respects it, but, for the reasons stated, does not share it. Thus, the former has indicated: ... (final judgment (sentencia) 53-97, at 2:30 p.m. on July 2, 1997, First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). ... However, the cited precedent clearly sets forth the preeminence of the protection of third-party acquirers in good faith over the original owner, a criterion that, for cases in which the existence of the documentary forgery and its authorship, to the detriment of the original dispossessed owner, is established, this Chamber does not share, for the reasons set forth. For all of the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged final judgment (sentencia) does not suffer from the substantive defect attributed to it by the appellant. Its represented party retains the right to claim, against whomever corresponds, the corresponding responsibilities for the loss of the real estate property, as well as the indemnifications that may be appropriate, but the property must be restored to the original and legitimate owner, dispossessed by the fraudulent action of the accused. Therefore, the claim must be rejected. ... VI.- ...

Therefore, the rights of the referred company have not been harmed, besides the fact that it could, for its part, exercise the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) against the accused, still having the possibility of resorting to civil courts for the determination of the damages (daños y perjuicios) suffered, as well as to establish the corresponding execution. The appeal is declared without merit." IX.- Under the protection of the foregoing transcription (despite not sharing the considerations expressed by that Chamber, since they conflict with the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court, regarding the scope and application of the institute of acquisition a non domino (adquisición a non domino). On this topic, one may consult, among many others, rulings number 82 of 2:30 p.m. of May 22, 1992, 56 of 1:50 p.m. of August 4, 1994, 45 of 10:05 a.m. of May 22, 1996, 53 of 2:30 p.m. of July 2, 1997, 417 of 3:10 p.m. of June 2, 530 of 3:30 p.m. of July 19, both of 2000, 162 of 8:15 a.m. of February 16, 352 of 10:20 a.m. of May 18, both of 2001) and of what was set forth in considering V of this ruling, regarding the integral unity of rulings, it is indubitably established that the ownership (dominio) over the disputed property was discussed, considered, and definitively resolved in the criminal venue. This is confirmed, furthermore, by what was considered by that Chamber upon granting the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the special judicial attorneys-in-fact of Mr. Nombre10809. In this regard, and as pertinent, it indicated: "...The appellant is correct in his objection. There is no legal provision that prevents the Trial Court from lifting said precautionary measure (medida cautelar), which was effectively requested by the offended party. <span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">In any case, upon applying Article 539 of the Code of Procedure (Código de rito) regarding the suppression of the false act, and of those subsequently carried out, it is necessary to order the full restitution of the right, because there would be no purpose in maintaining the same after the judgment becomes final. In other words, if said measure were maintained, the titleholder would be prevented from freely disposing of his right as guaranteed by Articles 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 266 of the Civil Code (Código Civil).</span><span> The objection must consequently be granted. The ruling is partially annulled and, resolving on the merits, the immobilization order (orden de inmovilización) placed on the cited property is ordered lifted, a measure that must be communicated by writ to the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad). ..." (The underlining is not from the original). It is clear, then, that it was definitively established in that venue that the sole and legitimate owner of the disputed property is the defendant here. Furthermore, that the company Printy S.A., as a third-party acquirer in good faith (tercero adquirente de buena fe), lacks standing to claim against Mr. Nombre10808 the recognition of the damages caused, as well as the other corresponding compensations, because he is the legitimate owner, illegally dispossessed of the property in dispute. It can only do so against its transferor. On the other hand, and in accordance with what was considered in the criminal venue, this Chamber, for the same reasons set forth by the Ad-quem, finds that in the sub-júdice the triple identity of object, cause, and parties converges. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">X.-</span><span style=\"letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> Secondly, the appellant affirms that in the subsidiary action (acción subsidiaria), his represented party requests that a series of subjective rights be respected in her capacity as a third-party acquirer in good faith defeated in a reivindicatory action (juicio de reivindicación). It suffices to read the claims (pretensiones) raised, he indicates, to understand that they have not been the object of any procedural relationship between the current parties and, therefore, the material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) does not cover these aspects either. The object and cause of the subsidiary claim, he adds, have also not been raised in a process where they are judicially determined for or against them. Consequently, he concludes, it is not appropriate to declare, as the Ad-quem did, res judicata against what was petitioned therein. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">XI.-</span><span style=\"letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> The majority of the claims raised in the subsidiary complaint, in accordance with what was noted in considerandos VIII and IX of this ruling and, contrary to what was affirmed by the appellant, are not admissible. This is because they are subsumed within what was expressly considered by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), therefore, covered by res judicata. As relevant, it is repeated, that high Court indicated in its ruling: "... </span><span>For this reason, it is the criterion of this Chamber that, as occurs in the specific case, the victim of a dispossession of his property, carried out under the protection of false documents that were successfully registered in the Public Registry, has the right to recover the property that has been, in this manner, fraudulently taken from him, even when there are third-party acquirers in good faith, who in turn trusted in the registry publicity (publicidad registral).</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span>The foregoing does not imply, in any way, denying third parties in good faith the protection and defense of their interests, because they retain the mechanisms provided for in civil legislation to claim, </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">against the seller</span><span>, the warranty and, in any case, the payment of damages, as well as the other compensations that correspond –payment for improvements (mejoras), for example–, according to the principles established therein.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span>In the judgment of this Chamber, the protection of the third party in good faith cannot imply that their situation prevails over that of the person who has been, in a fraudulent, surreptitious, and defenseless manner, surprised by the dispossession of the legal ownership of the property belonging to them and which, by imposition of the State, they are obligated to register.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span>... it is for Criminal Law to declare the existence of the act, its responsible party, and to determine the legal consequences it entails, not only properly criminal ones –such as the sanction–, but the civil ones and those of another nature that are inextricably linked to the criminal one and its object of protection, since </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">it is the criminal ruling that will attempt</span><span> </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">to re-establish social peace,</span><span> </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">as far as possible restoring things to the state they were in before the act</span><span>.</span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span>... To preserve, in the case of restitution, \"the rights of third parties,\" as numeral 123 of the Criminal Code of 1941 (Código Penal de 1941) states,</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span>means that they shall retain the rights </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">to bring an action against whoever transferred to them</span><span>,</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span>claiming the damages caused and the other compensations that may correspond, which they can well do by exercising the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) in the criminal venue,</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">when their seller and the accused</span><span> in the case are the same person, or in the civil jurisdiction, through the corresponding procedures.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span>... For all the foregoing, it is clear that the impugned ruling does not suffer from the substantive defect attributed to it by the appellant. </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">His represented party retains the right to claim, against whoever corresponds, </span><span>the relevant liabilities for the loss of the property, as well as the compensations that may be appropriate, but the property must be restored to the original and legitimate owner, dispossessed by the fraudulent action of the accused. For the foregoing, the claim must be rejected. ... </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VI.-</span><span> ... Therefore, the rights of the referred company have not been harmed, besides the fact that it could, for its part, </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">exercise the civil action for damages against the accused</span><span>, still having the possibility of resorting to civil courts for the determination of the damages suffered, as well as to establish the corresponding execution.” (The highlighting is not from the original). According to the transcribed text, and as set forth in considerando IX of this ruling, the plaintiff company can only claim the majority of what was sought in the subsidiary action against its transferor, not against Mr. Nombre10809, as he is the original owner, illegally dispossessed of the disputed property.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> XI.- </span><span>It is admissible, inasmuch as the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice itself so establishes, to declare the plaintiff a third-party acquirer and possessor in good faith (poseedora de buena fe), having acquired the disputed property under the protection of registry publicity. Likewise, regarding what she denominated "economic aspects and legal situations," specifically, the claim in the point identified with the letter C.d), according to what was resolved in the criminal venue, she can only recover what was paid for territorial and municipal taxes (impuestos territoriales y municipales) on the disputed property. This is because, as this is a legal charge, if the property had not illegally left the defendant's estate, he maintained the duty to fulfill that obligation. However, as she acknowledges in her testimony, folio 99, after 1993, because the disputed property was not in her name, she has not paid the indicated taxes. Consequently, failing to recognize this point would imply fostering illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito) in his favor. As this involves a monetary obligation, it is also appropriate to recognize legal interest (intereses al tipo legal), from the time of payment until its effective reimbursement. The determination of the definitive amount is deferred to the execution of judgment stage (etapa de ejecución de sentencia). Regarding the points identified with letters C.a), C.b), C.c), and C.e), despite being covered by numerals 327 and 328 of the Civil Code, it is not appropriate to grant them. This is so because, it is insisted, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice expressly indicated that, Mr. Nombre10812 having been dispossessed of the disputed property as a consequence of a crime, he must be restored to the full enjoyment of his rights. That is, one must return to the situation existing before the commission of the illicit act. Likewise, it indicated, as a third-party acquirer in good faith, she can only claim the corresponding compensations from her seller.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> XII.- </span><span>By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal formulated is partially appropriate. Consequently, the appealed ruling must also be partially annulled, for having granted the res judicata exception with respect to the subsidiary complaint. In its place, said action must be partially granted, understood as denied in what is not expressly indicated. The plaintiff company must be declared a third-party acquirer and possessor in good faith. Likewise, the defendant must be ordered to recognize the amount </span><span style=\"letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">paid by the plaintiff company for municipal and territorial taxes on the disputed property, plus legal interest on that amount from its payment until its effective reimbursement, for which it must be limited to what Mr. Nombre4965 was obligated to pay. The determination of this item is deferred to the execution of judgment stage."</span></p></div></body></html> The Civil Tribunal erred, it argues, by applying the referenced doctrine to the sub-judice matter. The main claim made by its client, it contends, was not definitively resolved in the criminal court. In addition, it notes, the sub-litem matter does not improperly reopen any litigation already sealed by the tombstone of res judicata. As can be verified from a simple reading of the criminal judgments, it asserts, its client and Mr. Nombre10809 did not sue each other in the criminal process, nor in any other venue, claiming the property in dispute. The criminal case and the civil action for damages, derived from the unlawful act judged therein and the discussion of its consequences, were brought by Printy S.A. and Mr. Nombre10812, each on their own behalf, against the defendant Nombre10816. Never, it insists, was an adversarial proceeding integrated in the criminal venue between one and the other; therefore, the current protagonists have not been procedural antagonists. The constitutional guarantee under discussion, it points out, prevents reopening discussions already aired between the same parties, with the same object, and for the same legal cause. In the sub-judice matter, it notes, the main claim of its client, because she is protected by good faith registration at the time of acquiring the disputed property, is to be the sole and formal owner of the property in dispute. This, it insists, has not been aired between the current parties previously. Therefore, it hammers home, they have not been antagonists in any proceeding, civil or criminal, whose object is to declare its client the owner of the disputed property, as she is protected by the legal principle of the good faith third-party acquirer. This being the legal cause of its main claim, it adds, the procedural relationship established here is new and original. The claims of one against the rights of the other, it repeats, have not been aired in a proper adversarial proceeding. Consequently, it argues, the Tribunal violated the identity of parties, object, and cause of the procedural relationship in dispute, which is a sine qua non requirement for the existence of material res judicata. The object of the sub-judice matter, it asserts, is to bring to a successful conclusion the decision of the dispute regarding who definitively owns the property in dispute. By doing so, it warns, effect and content are given to what the Criminal Tribunal considered to justify the operative part of the ruling. Nombre3956, because it lacks the requirements of identity of parties, object, and cause, what was resolved in the civil damages venue within the criminal process brought against Nombre10815 does not constitute material res judicata in the sub-judice matter. VI.- In accordance with its formulation, the core of the issue debated in this present ground of disagreement lies in establishing whether what the plaintiff sought in his main complaint was already firmly resolved in the referenced criminal proceeding and, therefore, whether the defense of res judicata raised by the defendant is admissible. Regarding the doctrine in question, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated: "III... The administration of justice is exercised through the Supreme Court of Justice and the other courts established by law (Article 152 of the Political Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). It is the responsibility of the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions assigned to it by the Magna Carta, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and administrative contentious disputes, as well as others established by law, whatever their nature and the quality of the persons involved; to definitively resolve them and order the execution of its rulings (Article 153 of the Political Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 2, of the cited Organic Law). By definitively resolving the disputes submitted for its consideration, the State, through the Judicial Branch, assumes and activates one of the most important functions vested in it: the jurisdictional function. For this function to be carried out effectively, the decisions inherent to the power concurrently granted take on two fundamental characteristics: absolute immutability and definitiveness. Only in exceptional cases, contemplated by law, can these characteristics be relative. This particularity of the jurisdictional function has been called, in doctrine and jurisprudence, RES JUDICATA. Through it, it is established that the will of the State, contained in the law, is definitive and immutable for the specific case, which is fundamental for legal certainty and security. This will is declared by the Judge in a judgment. In this way, it seeks to put an end to matters decided in a judicial ruling, to prevent the successive re-submission of the conflict, thus avoiding legal uncertainty, all of which tends toward the effectiveness of the State's jurisdictional function. In our system, judgments issued in ordinary or abbreviated proceedings, as well as those other resolutions exhaustively listed, produce the authority of material res judicata. This is limited - with the exception that will be noted below - to the operative part of the ruling. That is, it does not include its reasoning. For the judgment to have an impact on another proceeding through res judicata, it is essential that there be identity of parties, cause, and object in both processes. This doctrine is regulated in Articles 162 to 165 of the Code of Civil Procedure. IV.- Res judicata has a strictly procedural nature, because it is a consequence of the proceeding and the will manifested in the procedural law. But its effects indirectly transcend the proceeding, to fall upon the substantive legal relationships. This, as a consequence of the immutability of the decision: its direct effect, thereby guaranteeing the legal certainty of those relationships. Both elements, namely, the immutability of the decision and the definitiveness of the right declared or its rejection or denial, constitute the juridical effects of res judicata. The first direct and procedural; the second indirect and substantive. The first imposes a prohibition on judges to enter into a decision on the merits of the claims under debate and grants them the power to stop the action exercised, either at the request of a party or sua sponte, and grants the parties the right to obtain the definitive suspension of the proceeding in whole or in part. For the latter, it also implies the obligation to refrain from reviving, through another proceeding, those claims resolved positively or negatively. The second element, that is, definitiveness, seeks to make the declaration of certainty contained in the judgment indisputable in other proceedings. In relation to this, it grants the parties the same rights and obligations as the procedural effect or immutability. For that reason, res judicata has a negative function or efficacy by prohibiting judges from deciding anew on what has already been resolved. But it also has a positive one, represented by the security conferred on the substantive legal relationships decided. The foundation of res judicata lies, then, in the jurisdictional power of the State, from which emanates sufficient power to ensure the efficacy and effects of the judgment. V.- Res judicata is subject to two limits: the objective limit, by reason of the object on which the proceeding was based as well as the cause or title from which the claim was deduced; and the subjective limit, by reason of the persons who were parties to the proceeding. The object of the claim refers to what was recognized or denied in the final judgment. That is, the thing or legal relationship over which its binding force is applied. The object of the proceeding is constituted by the right recognized, declared, or modified in the judgment, in relation to one or more specific things, or the legal relationship declared, as the case may be. Furthermore, res judicata, as regards the object, extends to those points which, although not expressly the subject matter of the jurisdictional decision, are tacitly resolved as a necessary consequence or as indispensably dependent on that decision. Thus, when a judgment has decided on a whole of which the thing that is the object of the new complaint forms a part, there will be, without a doubt, identity of object. The second aspect of the objective limit is the identity of the cause petendi, that is, the ground or reason alleged by the plaintiff to obtain the object of the claim contained in the complaint. The cause petendi must be sought exclusively within the framework of the complaint, with a broad criterion leading to its logical interpretation, without referring simply to its literal wording. It configures the reason of fact stated in the complaint as the basis of the claim. It is formed by the set of facts alleged as the basis of the complaint, not for each of them in isolation. The subjective limit or identity of parties refers to the subjects of the proceeding, parties in a formal sense: plaintiffs, defendants, and intervening third parties; and it must be borne in mind that the successors in interest of the parties, by universal or singular title, are bound by the judgment, as if they were the parties themselves. In this regard, what matters is the juridical identity of the parties, not their physical identity. Consequently, a person who was not a party to the proceeding cannot be bound by the judgment rendered; that is, the impositions and obligations derived from it cannot be imposed on them. VI.- The former First Civil Chamber, in a Judgment of 10:30 a.m. on December 27, 1972, stated: " ... V.- Article 723 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes that the authority of res judicata is limited to the operative part of the judgment, but not to its reasoning. But even so, doctrine and jurisprudence have established that 'although it may be true the principle that the authority of res judicata is limited to the operative part of the judgment, it is also true that the grounds or considerations of the ruling must be taken into account to determine and complete the meaning of the dispositive part.' (Cassation Judgments of 3:15 p.m. on December 16, 1924, 2:15 p.m. on June 17, 1926, 15:45 hours on April 13, 1944, 16 of May 6, 1947, and 101 of 14:30 hours on September 4, 1968, Considering VI). In this last judgment, and in the cited considering paragraph, the following was stated: 'It is necessary to emphasize that the existence and scope of res judicata not only depend on the triple identity of the object, the cause, and the parties, but also on the nature of the ruling rendered, because res judicata is, above all, what the very words signify, that is, what was already judged in the final ruling; because, otherwise, if the judgment does not decide the merits of the issues proposed and debated in the lawsuit, or in other words, if what was claimed in the second trial was not granted or denied in the first, there can be no res judicata. Article 723 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the authority of res judicata is circumscribed to the operative part of the judgment, but not to its reasoning; however, it is often necessary to resort to the motivations of the ruling to clarify what it was that the judges actually resolved, especially when the judgment, being dismissive, limits itself to declaring in its dispositive part that the complaint was denied.' (The underlining is not in the original). Regarding the integral unity of judgments, reference can be made, among others, to resolutions of this Chamber numbers 2 of 15:00 hrs. on January 6 and 77 of 14:20 hrs. on November 19, both of 1993) and, regarding the doctrine of res judicata, among others, rulings numbers 93 of 15:00 hrs. on June 26, 1991, and 740 of 14:45 hrs. on December 1, 1999. ...” (Judgment number 180 of 9:25 a.m. on February 23, 2001. In the same sense, in addition to the rulings cited in the transcribed precedent, reference can be made to number 740 of 14:45 hrs. on December 1, 1999). VII.- In light of what was set out in the preceding considering paragraph, and having analyzed judgments number 121-B-97 of the then Second Superior Criminal Tribunal, Second Section of San José, of 16:15 hrs. on September 9, 1997, and 346-98 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of 9:30 hrs. on April 3, 1998, this Tribunal reaches the same conclusion as the Ad-quem. That is, in the sub-judice matter, the doctrine of res judicata is established. In this regard, the Superior Criminal Tribunal partially granted the civil actions for damages filed both by Mr. Nombre10808 and by the plaintiff company. Regarding the first, as stated, and as relevant, it ordered the restitution in favor of Mr. Nombre4965 of the property in litigation. As a consequence of the foregoing, and of the falsehood decreed, it annulled the various public deeds, starting with that of August 26, 1991, by which the transfer of the property in litigation to Mr. Nombre10810 was documented; also that in which the first-degree mortgage was constituted, and in which Printy S.A. acquired ownership of the disputed property. In addition, it declared the nullity of all acts dependent upon those public instruments. As a basis for the foregoing, it considered: "CIVIL ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES.- In the Tribunal's opinion, from the perspective of Criminal Law, it is not possible to maintain the validity of any purchase and sale, mortgage, auction award, or other related acts in the Public Registry that have their origin in a forgery of an instrument, even if those acts were carried out in good faith and under the protection of the Registry – which does not mean any interference whatsoever with what the civil judges may ultimately resolve in a declaratory action regarding the possession and ownership of the good - because this would lead to greater legal insecurity for society than that which may be caused, individually, to the persons who come to constitute, in each case, the last link in the fraud and who are ultimately the ones who suffer the financial harm that the perpetrator or perpetrators of the act intended. It is also the Tribunal's opinion that an act that began with a forgery of an instrument cannot, over time, acquire effective legal life without the pronouncement of an authority competent to declare rights, such as the civil jurisdictional authority. ... Unlike the Public Prosecutor's Office, which sets out in its accusation as one of the facts that Mr. Nombre10812 was dispossessed of the property, the Tribunal sees the case as a fraud that is consummated with the harm suffered by Nombre10817.- The Tribunal understands the protection that must be afforded to those who acquire under the protection of the Registry as applying to those situations where no falsification of instruments occurs in the chain of transfers, as occurs, for example, in cases of negligence by the parties in presenting to the Registry the testimonies of deeds, because in the case of falsehoods, the law is very clear: 'When a judgment declares a public instrument to be false, the court that rendered it shall order that the act be reconstructed, suppressed, or reformed.' (Articles 539 and 541 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In the present case, what is required is to suppress from the public registry the forgeries of instruments and subsequent ones, for which the cancellation of all necessary registry entries is ordered so that the property is registered in the name of Mr. Nombre10808, whose right has no spurious origin. It must be clear that in this judgment, no right of possession and/or property is being declared, as that is the competence of another jurisdiction in the event that Nombre10817. decides to resort to that venue to request a determination of who has the better right to the good. ..." (The underlining is not in the original). Despite the evident contradiction incurred by the Superior Criminal Tribunal, because, on the one hand, it points out that from the perspective of Criminal Law it is not possible to maintain the validity of any purchase and sale, mortgage, auction award, or other related acts in the Public Registry whose origin is a forgery of an instrument, adding that the protection of good faith third parties, protected by registry publicity, operates provided no crime occurs in the chain of transfers, as happened in the sub-judice matter. On the other hand, it states that this does not mean interference with what the civil judges may ultimately resolve in a declaratory action, who are uniquely competent to determine the right to possession and the right to property over the good. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that this jurisdictional authority left open the possibility for Printy S.A. to resort to the ordinary civil proceeding claiming its right to the disputed property. This is confirmed by what will be noted below. Regarding the civil action for damages filed by the referred company, as indicated, the said criminal authority also partially granted it. It ordered the defendant to pay the damages caused. It expressly stated "a conviction made in the abstract, subject to what may ultimately be resolved in a civil venue regarding the definitive declaration of the property right to the related property, if the plaintiff decides to resort to that venue. Otherwise, she could opt directly, without any subjection, to collect from the civil defendant the damages caused by the accused acts. ..." (The underlining is not in the original). Also confirming the conclusion stated is the non-removal of the registry entry through which the litigated property was immobilized. VIII.- However, despite what was stated, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, upon rejecting the cassation appeal filed by the legal representative of Printy S.A. and, therefore, definitively deciding what was sought by it in the civil action for damages, considered the following, as relevant: "III.- ... It is not alien to reality that the traffic and commerce of goods is fertile ground for generating situations which, in addition to exceeding the limits of good faith, turn out to be criminal. And once entering the criminal field, the repressive sector of the State, we are in an area of highly preeminent public order, since Criminal Law, in a State governed by Law, being conceived as the ultima ratio, is directed to protecting, with all the weight of state repressive power, the legal interests essential for the community. ... From what has been said, it stands out that, both spheres of the legal system –private law and criminal law- although they form a normative unity, this does not mean that the principles which, in one, are directed to ensuring the traffic of goods and good faith, prevail over or contradict the one that repressively protects the injury to essential legal interests and which, by reason of the criminal act, have also intensely injured the rights of the directly offended party, a victim who, constitutionally, has the right to 'find reparation for the injuries or damages they may have received to their person, property, or moral interests' -Article 41 of the Political Constitution-, protection that exists in all spheres of the legal system, but which is reflected more intensely when it concerns the victim of a criminal act, because of the injury to fundamental interests and goods that this implies. Therefore, it is the opinion of this Chamber that, as occurs in the specific case, the victim of a dispossession of their goods, under the cover of false documents that are successfully registered in the Public Registry, has the right to recover the good that has been, in this manner, fraudulently taken from them, even if there are good faith third-party acquirers who, for their part, relied on the registry publicity. What has been said does not imply, in any way, denying to good faith third parties the protection and defense of their interests, because they retain the mechanisms provided in civil legislation to claim, against the seller, the guarantee and, in any case, the payment of damages, as well as the other corresponding compensation –payment for improvements, for example-, according to the principles established therein. In the judgment of this Chamber, the protection of the good faith third party cannot imply that their situation prevails over that of the person who has fraudulently, surreptitiously, and defenselessly been surprised by the dispossession of the legal title to the goods belonging to them and who, by imposition of the State, is obliged to register and record them. ... If the functioning of that entity is defective or insufficient to guarantee that owner, who must register their goods, the respect of their legitimately acquired rights, this cannot be used as an excuse to legitimize frauds that, by means of false public documents and by using the very registry structure, achieve the legal dispossession of the goods or even legitimize the spurious acquisition thereof. ... In the case of real property, there are many occasions on which the legitimate registered owner, still retaining possession of the good, is legally dispossessed of it, under the cover of falsified documents that distort the information that the Registry gives to third parties, who later, protected by that data, acquire rights over them. Even though the transparency of a transaction in which a property is acquired without even having been seen is highly dubious, the truth is that this may happen in good faith, protected solely by the publicity of the registry data. What consequences does this have in reality? The protection of good faith third-party acquirers, in the terms intended by the appellant, in cases like the one described, implies dispossessing the legitimate owner and current possessor of the good that belongs to them, to give it to a third party, for the sake of the principles of registry security. Such a solution is, without a doubt, excessive, disproportionate, and, ultimately, unjust. In the judgment of this Chamber, the importance of registry publicity and its principles cannot prevail over the right of the first victim -the legitimate owner, originally dispossessed in a fraudulent manner- to maintain full title to their goods or, in any case, the right to be restored to the enjoyment of them. ... when a transaction arises, is modified, or is structured on the basis of documentary falsehoods, it is Criminal Law that has the competence to declare the existence of the act, its perpetrator, and determine the legal consequences it entails, not only strictly criminal ones -such as the sanction-, but also civil ones and those of another nature that are indissolubly linked to the criminal one and to its object of protection, since it is the criminal judgment that will attempt to restore social peace, so far as possible restoring things to the state they were in before the act. To protect, in the case of restitution, 'the rights of third parties', as Article 123 of the Penal Code of 1941 states, means that they will retain the rights to take action against the person who transferred it to them, claiming the damages caused and the other compensation that may correspond, which they can well do by bringing the civil action for damages in the criminal venue, when their seller and the defendant in the case are the same person, or in the civil jurisdiction, through the corresponding procedures. IV.- The challenger considers, at the same time, that Article 456 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been disregarded, of which an erroneous relationship with Article 472 of the same Code has been made. Article 456 cited is clear when it establishes that ... Although subsection 2 of the indicated Article 472 establishes that total cancellation of the registry entries may and must be ordered when the title by virtue of which the registration was made is declared null, this must be related to Article 456 and understood that whoever acquired under the protection of registry publicity will always be protected, because they will be considered a good faith third party. In reality, the Chamber understands that, as was analyzed, registry publicity is an instrument established and erected by the State to ensure the traffic of goods, giving security and backing to the information recorded there. But it is that, one more instrument, of undeniable value and importance for protecting the rights of those who are harmed by errors, omissions in the recorded information, or for those who have been victims of those who, availing themselves of that instrument, use it to ensure, in turn, the result of a criminal scheme, through the use of false documents, to the detriment of the true registered owners and, under its cover, carry out, among other things, false transfers that later, under the pretext of the security that the publicity itself represents, extend the effects of the crime to third persons who act, the majority of the time, in good faith, although there are indeed cases in which the person who will acquire 'under the protection of the registry' also knows of the fraudulent maneuver and precisely expects to profit from it, to 'legalize' their situation and, from then on, initiate the chain of harm to the true good faith acquirers, relying on the information of the registry publicity. In short: registry publicity protects the right of good faith third parties who have been surprised by fraudulent maneuvers, to be able to claim compensation for the damages caused, as established in the civil field. But it cannot, in any way, serve as a shield for the legitimation of criminal acts, to the point of being an obstacle for the victim of a crime – the original owner, dispossessed of their good by a false document that has been successfully registered – to be able to recover it – de facto and de jure -. Therefore, in these cases, the provisions of Articles 539 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 (468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1996) find full application, when it provides that in a judgment declaring a documentary falsehood 'the Court that rendered it shall order that the act be reconstructed, suppressed, or reformed' and 541, by establishing that 'If it concerns a protocolized document, the declaration made in the judgment shall be noted, by means of a notation, at the margin of the original, in the testimonies that have been presented, and in the respective registry.' Suppressing the document means eliminating the act performed by its means, as well as its effects. As a logical consequence, the subsequent acts dependent upon it must also be annulled, while the rights of good faith third parties are protected for the claim of the compensation that may be appropriate. The protection granted by Article 456 of the Code of Civil Procedure is understood to apply in those cases where the nullity or rescission of the title supervenes by reason of legal situations whose illegality is strictly civil in nature, but not to oppose the person who has been the original victim of a fraudulent dispossession, carried out under the cover of false public documents and registrations and registry entries obtained under its mantle, even if subsequent to that act, other transactions have been carried out involving good faith third parties, who are perhaps also victims of some criminal enterprise. ... Allowing registry publicity to protect an antisocial exercise of the rights enshrined through it is to consent to the persistence of the abuse, and therefore, the criminal judgment must, upon ordering the suppression of the act generated by a false document, restore the victim to the full enjoyment of their rights, while protecting the rights of good faith third parties to claim the corresponding compensation before the civil jurisdiction, or within the criminal proceeding, in cases where that is appropriate. V.- The jurisprudence of the First Civil Chamber has recognized the importance and scope of registry publicity in the traffic of goods, while at the same time pointing out that registration does not validate acts that are voidable or null, in accordance with the law. Thus, it has pointed out that: ... (judgment 060-F-91, of 3:00 p.m. on April 24, 1991, First Civil Chamber). The effort of clarification that, based on the legal texts, the jurisprudence makes to remedy situations of collision of rights is evident, giving priority to the protection of the good faith third-party acquirer.

This Chamber shares that interpretation, although it does not consider it applicable to the case in which the nullity of the registered title is due to the falsity of the document that supports it, since in that scenario, not only the identity, but, as a logical consequence, the will and consent of the registered owner of the property, have been fraudulently usurped to carry out transactions and registry movements of the property, which entail a dispossession of legal ownership and, at times, of actual possession. In that case, one cannot speak of a transaction, of a sale, and under the protection of such a fraudulent act, valid legal effects cannot be generated, even when good-faith third parties have intervened in the chain of transfers and movements. ... However, the interpretation given to the matter by the First Chamber is different, and while this Chamber respects it, it does not share it for the reasons stated. Thus, the former has indicated: ... (judgment 53-97, of 14:30 hrs. on July 2, 1997, First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). ... However, the cited precedent clearly sets forth the preeminence of the protection of good-faith third-party acquirers over the original owner, a criterion that, in cases where the existence of documentary falsity and its authorship have been settled, to the detriment of the dispossessed original owner, this Chamber does not share, for the reasons set forth. Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged judgment does not suffer from the substantive defect attributed to it by the appellant. Its represented party retains the right to claim, against whomever may be appropriate, the corresponding liabilities for the loss of the real property, as well as the indemnifications that may be applicable, but the property must be restored to the original and legitimate owner, dispossessed by the fraudulent action of the accused. Therefore, the claim must be rejected. ... VI.- ... For this reason, the rights of the aforementioned corporation have not been infringed, besides which it could, for its part, exercise the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) against the accused, still retaining the possibility of resorting to the civil courts to determine the damages suffered, as well as to establish the corresponding execution. The appeal is dismissed." IX.- Under the shelter of what has been transcribed above (despite not sharing the considerations expressed by that Chamber, as they conflict with the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court concerning the scope and application of the concept of acquisition a non domino. On this subject, one may consult, among many others, judgments numbers 82 of 14:30 hrs. on May 22, 1992, 56 of 13:50 hrs. on August 4, 1994, 45 of 10:05 hrs. on May 22, 1996, 53 of 14:30 hrs. on July 2, 1997, 417 of 15:10 hrs. on June 2, 530 of 15:30 hrs. on July 19, both of 2000, 162 of 8:15 hrs. on February 16, 352 of 10:20 hrs. on May 18, both of 2001) and of what was stated in Considerando V of this judgment, regarding the integral unity of judgments, it is undoubtedly established that in the criminal venue, the ownership of the litigious real property was discussed, considered, and definitively resolved. This is confirmed, moreover, by what was considered by that Chamber when granting the cassation appeal filed by the special judicial representatives of Mr. Nombre10809. In this regard, and in what is pertinent, it stated: "... The appellant is correct in its objection. There is no legal provision that prevents the Trial Court from lifting said precautionary measure, which was effectively requested by the victim. In any case, when applying Article 539 of the Code of Procedure regarding the suppression of the false act, and of those subsequently carried out, it is necessary to order the full restitution of the right, since there would be no purpose in maintaining the measure after the judgment becomes final. In other words, if said measure were maintained, the owner would be unable to freely dispose of his right as guaranteed by Articles 45 of the Political Constitution and 266 of the Civil Code. The objection must therefore be granted. The judgment is partially annulled, and resolving on the merits, the immobilization order placed on the aforementioned real property is ordered lifted, a measure that must be communicated by mandate to the Public Property Registry. ..." (The underlining is not from the original). It is clear, then, that in that venue it was definitively established that the sole and legitimate owner of the litigious real property is the defendant herein. Furthermore, that the company Printy S.A., as a good-faith third-party acquirer, lacks standing to claim from Mr. Nombre10808 recognition of the damages incurred, as well as the other corresponding indemnifications, because he is the legitimate owner, illegally dispossessed of the farm (finca) in litigation. It can only do so against its transferor. On the other hand, and in accordance with what was considered in the criminal venue, this Chamber, for the same reasons expressed by the Ad-quem, considers that in the case at bar, the triple identity of object, cause, and parties converges. X.- Secondly, the cassation appellant asserts that in the subsidiary action, its represented party requests that a series of subjective rights be respected in its capacity as a good-faith third-party acquirer, defeated in a claim for recovery of possession (reivindicación). It suffices to read the claims asserted, it indicates, to understand that they have not been the subject of any procedural relationship between the current parties and, therefore, the material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) does not cover these extremes either. The object and cause of the subsidiary claim, it adds, have also not been asserted in a process where they are judicially determined for or against them. Consequently, it concludes, it is not appropriate to declare, as the Ad-quem did, the res judicata against what was petitioned therein. XI.- The majority of the claims asserted in the subsidiary complaint, in accordance with what was noted in Considerandos VIII and IX of this judgment and, contrary to what was affirmed by the cassation appellant, are not admissible. This is because they are subsumed within what was expressly considered by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, therefore, covered by the res judicata. In what is relevant, it is repeated, that high Court stated in its judgment: "... Therefore, it is the criterion of this Chamber that, as occurs in the specific case, the victim of a dispossession of their property, carried out under the protection of false documents that succeed in being registered in the Public Registry, has the right to recover the property that has been, in this manner, fraudulently taken from them, even when there are good-faith third-party acquirers, who in turn trusted in the registry publicity. The foregoing does not imply, in any way, ignoring the protection and defense of the good-faith third parties' interests, because they retain the mechanisms provided for in civil legislation to claim, against the seller, the guarantee and, in any case, the payment of damages, as well as the remaining indemnifications that may apply –payment for improvements (mejoras), for example–, according to the principles established therein. In the judgment of this Chamber, the protection of the good-faith third party cannot imply that their situation prevails over that of the one who has been, in a fraudulent, surreptitious, and defenseless manner, surprised by the dispossession of the legal ownership of the property belonging to them and which, by imposition of the State, they are obligated to register. ... it is up to Criminal Law to declare the existence of the act, its responsible party, and to determine the legal consequences it entails, not only strictly criminal ones –such as the sanction–, but the civil ones and those of another nature that are indissolubly linked to the criminal case and its object of protection, for it is the criminal judgment that will attempt to restore social peace, insofar as possible restoring things to the state they were in before the act. ... To safeguard, in the case of restitution, 'the rights of third parties,' as Numeral 123 of the Criminal Code of 1941 states, means that they shall retain the rights to bring action against whomever transferred to them, in claim for the damages caused and the remaining indemnifications that may apply, which they may well do by exercising the civil action for damages in the criminal venue, when their seller and the accused in the case are the same person, or in the civil jurisdiction, through the corresponding procedures. ... Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged judgment does not suffer from the substantive defect attributed to it by the appellant. Its represented party retains the right to claim, against whomever may be appropriate, the corresponding liabilities for the loss of the real property, as well as the indemnifications that may be applicable, but the property must be restored to the original and legitimate owner, dispossessed by the fraudulent action of the accused. Therefore, the claim must be rejected. ... VI.- ... For this reason, the rights of the aforementioned corporation have not been infringed, besides which it could, for its part, exercise the civil action for damages against the accused, still retaining the possibility of resorting to the civil courts to determine the damages suffered, as well as to establish the corresponding execution." (The highlighting is not from the original). According to what was transcribed, and as stated in Considerando IX of this judgment, the plaintiff corporation can only claim the majority of what was sought in the subsidiary action from its transferor, not from Mr. Nombre10809, because he is the original owner, illegally dispossessed of the litigious farm (finca). XI.- It is admissible, as the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice itself so establishes, to declare the plaintiff a good-faith third-party acquirer and possessor, having acquired the property in dispute under the protection of registry publicity. Likewise, regarding what it called "economic extremes and legal situations," specifically, what was claimed in the point identified with letter C.d), in accordance with what was resolved in the criminal venue, it can only recover what was paid for territorial and municipal taxes on the litigious land. This is because, being a legal charge, if the property had not illegally left the defendant's estate, he maintained the duty to comply with that obligation. However, as it acknowledges in its deposition, folio 99, after the year 1993, because the litigious property was not in its name, it has not paid the indicated taxes. Consequently, failing to recognize this point would imply favoring an illicit enrichment at his expense. Being a monetary obligation, it is also appropriate to recognize interest at the legal rate, from the moment of its payment until its effective reimbursement. The determination of the definitive amount is deferred to the judgment enforcement stage. Regarding the points identified with letters C.a), C.b), C.c), and C.e), despite being covered in numerals 327 and 328 of the Civil Code, it is not appropriate to grant them. This is because, it is insisted, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice expressly indicated that, since Mr. Nombre10812 was dispossessed of the litigious real property as a consequence of a crime, he must be restored to the full enjoyment of his rights. That is, the situation must return to the state existing before the commission of the illicit act. Likewise, it indicated that, as a good-faith third-party acquirer, it can only claim the corresponding indemnifications from its seller. XII.- Bearing in mind the foregoing, the appeal filed is partially granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment must also be partially annulled, in declaring the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) granted regarding the subsidiary complaint. In its place, said action must be partially granted, understood as denied in what is not expressly indicated. The plaintiff corporation must be declared a good-faith third-party acquirer and possessor. Likewise, the defendant must be ordered to recognize the amount paid by the plaintiff corporation for municipal and territorial taxes on the litigious real property, plus interest at the legal rate on that amount from its payment until its effective reimbursement, for which purpose it must be limited to what Mr. Nombre4965 was obligated to pay. The determination of this item is deferred to the judgment enforcement stage."

"I.- En el año 1975, ante el cónsul de Costa Rica en Nueva York, Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, don Nombre10808 adquirió la finca del Partido de San José, matrícula de folio real número 187992-000. Este traspaso fue debidamente inscrito en el Registro Publico de la Propiedad el 23 de enero de 1976. El 26 de agosto de 1991, un tercero no identificado, simulando ser el señor Nombre10809, le traspasó el referido inmueble al señor Nombre10810. El 5 de setiembre de ese mismo año, don Nombre10818 impone hipoteca de primer grado sobre la susodicha finca como garantía de un préstamo por ¢1.300.000. Ante su incumplimiento, los acreedores interponen proceso ejecutivo hipotecario en el Juzgado Tercero Civil de San José. El deudor no se opuso a la ejecución. La subasta pública se realizó a las 8 hrs. del 4 de mayo de 1992, resultando adjudicatario don Nombre10811. Ese mismo día cedió sus derechos a Lucara S.A.. El 22 de junio, dicha empresa vende el indicado inmueble a Printy S.A.. A inicios de 1993 don Nombre10812 regresa a Costa Rica. Al percatarse de lo sucedido formula acusación ante el Ministerio Público por la comisión de un delito por terceros ignorados. El entonces Tribunal Superior Segundo Penal, Sección Segunda de San José, en sentencia número 121-B-97 de las 16:15 hrs. del 9 de setiembre de 1997, declaró a don Nombre10818 autor responsable de dos delitos de falsedad ideológica y dos de uso de documento falso en concurso ideal con el de estafa, cometidos en perjuicio de la fe pública, Nombre10808 y Printy S.A.. Asimismo, acogió parcialmente las respectivas acciones civiles resarcitorias interpuestas por el señor Nombre10809 y Printy S.A., en contra del demandado civil Nombre10813. Tocante con la acción formulada por don Nombre4965, ordenó la restitución de la referida finca. Anuló las escrituras públicas en donde se consignan el traspaso a favor de don Nombre10818, la constitución del crédito hipotecario y, la venta a favor de Printy S.A., así como todos los actos dependientes de esos instrumentos públicos. Respecto a la acción interpuesta por la indicada empresa, lo condenó en abstracto al pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados, sujeto a lo que en definitiva pudiera resolverse en sede civil, sobre la declaratoria definitiva del derecho de propiedad del susodicho inmueble. En sentencia número 346-98 de las 9:30 hrs. del 3 de abril de 1998, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ante sendos recursos de casación formulados por don Nombre10812 y el representante de Printy S.A., Nombre10814, acogió el primero y declaró sin lugar el segundo. Ordenó levantar la orden de inmovilización sobre la finca litigiosa. En lo demás, mantuvo lo resuelto. II.- Con el sub-júdice, Printy S.A. pretende principalmente, se le declare legítima propietaria -legal y registralmente- del inmueble litigioso en lugar de don Nombre10808. En subsidio solicita, al ignorar las circunstancias del acto por el cual don Nombre10815 compró el inmueble en litigio, y al adquirir el dominio del bien su representada por enajenación de Lucara S.A., la ampara la presunción de legitimidad registral contemplada en los artículos 456 y 472 del Código Civil, por lo tanto, es tercera adquirente y poseedora de buena fe. En consecuencia, de previo a entregarle el lote litigioso al demandado, éste debe reconocerle los siguiente extremos y situaciones jurídicas: a) No está obligada a pagarle al demandado ningún tipo de daño ni perjuicio con motivo de la devolución del bien; b) Tampoco a pagarle ni devolverle ningún tipo de fruto, ni a responder por los deterioros causados sin culpa al inmueble en litigio; c) Debe reconocer, de previo a devolverle el inmueble, el valor real y actual que represente, al momento de dicho pago, la suma de ¢2.500.000, o, en su defecto, ese monto más sus intereses legales hasta su efectivo pago, todo a contar desde el 22 de junio de 1992, fecha de su adquisición de la finca litigiosa; d) Asimismo, debe reconocerle el valor de las mejoras útiles y necesarias; ¢90.000 por el tractoreo del lote; ¢375.421 por el pago de los impuestos territoriales y municipales; ¢110.000 por los gastos de traspaso, honorarios e inscripción del bien a su nombre; más los intereses legales sobre dichas sumas desde su pago y hasta su reintegro; e) Su derecho de retención hasta la fijación y cancelación, en ejecución del fallo, de todos esos; y, f) Se condene al demandado al pago de las costas del proceso. Don Nombre4965 se opuso a la demanda. Formuló las defensas de litis consorcio pasiva necesaria y cosa juzgada. El Juzgado declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda principal. En lo conducente, declaró a la sociedad actora legítima propietaria, legal y registralmente, del inmueble litigioso. Omitió pronunciamiento sobre la pretensión subsidiaria. Resolvió sin especial condenatoria en costas. El Tribunal revocó la sentencia apelada. En su lugar, acogió la excepción de cosa juzgada. Declaró sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Le impuso a la sociedad actora el pago de las costas del proceso. III.- El apoderado especial judicial de la sociedad actora formula recurso de casación por el fondo. Alega haberse resuelto en contra a la cosa juzgada. Aduce violación directa de ley, por indebida aplicación de los artículos 42 de la Constitución Política; 162 párrafo 2do., 163 del Código Procesal Civil. Así como falta de aplicación de los artículos 165 del Código de rito civil; 431, 450 del Código Procesal Penal; 459 y 482 del Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973. IV.- En primer lugar, es menester señalar una contradicción evidente acusada por el recurso de mérito. A folio 279, el casacionista cita el artículo 162 del Código de rito sobre la limitación de los efectos de la cosa juzgada material a lo resolutivo del fallo, no a sus fundamentos. Empero, a folio 280, lo cual reitera en el 285, afirma, “... el objeto de este juicio ordinario civil es llevar a buen fin la decisión de la controversia de a quién corresponde en definitiva la propiedad del bien en disputa y al hacer esto estamos precisamente dándole actuación y contenido a lo resuelto por el Tribunal Superior Penal, cuando justificó el “POR TANTO” de su fallo en la citada frase ...”. No obstante lo anterior, se avoca esta Sala a su conocimiento en los siguientes términos. V.- Como primer motivo de disconformidad, afirma el casacionista, se configura el vicio apuntado, con violación de las normas señaladas, por cuanto, conforme a la parte dispositiva de la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal Superior Segundo Penal, la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta por su representada fue acogida parcialmente. Se condenó en abstracto al demandado civil, Nombre10810, a pagar los daños y perjuicios irrogados, lo cual quedó sujeto a lo que en definitiva se resolviese en sede civil, tocante a la declaratoria definitiva del derecho de propiedad del inmueble litigioso. A su vez, agrega, lo protestado por el señor Nombre10809 ante la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, fue únicamente lo resuelto sobre la inmovilización del bien litigioso. Por ello, asevera, quedó firme el aspecto de que sería en sede civil donde se haría la declaratoria definitiva del derecho de propiedad del inmueble litigioso. Los efectos de la cosa juzgada material, manifiesta, se limitan a lo resolutivo de la sentencia, no a sus fundamentos, lo cual hace indiscutible en otro proceso la existencia o inexistencia de la relación jurídica que ella declara (artículo 162 del Código de rito). Mal hizo el Tribunal Civil, indica, al aplicarle al sub-júdice el instituto referido. La pretensión principal esgrimida por su representada, asevera, no fue resuelta en forma definitiva en la sede penal. Además, acota, con el sub-lítem no se reabre indebidamente ningún litigio ya sellado por la loza sepulcral de la cosa juzgada. Como se constata de la simple lectura de las sentencias penales, afirma, su representada y el señor Nombre10809 no se demandaron entre sí en el proceso penal, ni en ninguna otra sede, en reclamo del inmueble en litigio. La litis penal y la acción civil resarcitoria, derivada del hecho ilícito allí juzgado y la discusión sobre sus consecuencias, se llevó a cabo por parte de Printy S.A. y don Nombre10812, cada uno por su parte, en contra del imputado Nombre10816. Nunca, insiste, se integró el contencioso en sede penal del uno contra el otro, por lo tanto, los protagonistas de ahora no han sido antagonistas procesales. La garantía constitucional en comentario, señala, impide reabrir discusiones ya ventiladas entre las mismas partes, con el mismo objeto y por la misma causa jurídica. En el sub-júdice, apunta, la pretensión principal de su representada, por ampararla la buena fe registral al momento de adquirir el bien litigioso, es la de ser la única y formal propietaria del bien en disputa. Esto, insiste, no ha sido ventilado entre las actuales partes anteriormente. Por ello, machaca, no han sido antagonistas en ningún proceso, ni civil ni penal, el cual tenga por objeto declarar a su representada como propietaria del bien litigioso, al estar amparada por el principio jurídico de tercer adquirente de buena fe. Siendo ésta la causa jurídica de su pretensión principal, agrega, la relación procesal aquí establecida es nueva u originaria. No se han ventilado en contradictorio propio, repite, las pretensiones del uno contra los derechos del otro. En consecuencia, señala, el Tribunal viola la identidad de partes, objeto y causa de la relación procesal en controversia, lo cual es requisito sine qua nom para la existencia de la cosa juzgada material. El objeto del sub-júdice, asevera, es llevar a buen fin la decisión de la controversia de a quién corresponde en definitiva la propiedad del bien en disputa. Con ello, advierte, se le da actuación y contenido a lo considerado por el Tribunal Penal para justificar la parte resolutiva del fallo. Nombre3956, por carecer de los requisitos de identidad de partes, objeto y causa, lo resuelto en sede civil resarcitoria en el proceso penal seguida contra Nombre10815 no constituye cosa juzgada material en el sub-júdice. VI.- Al tenor de su formulación, el meollo de la cuestión debatida en el presente motivo de disconformidad radica en establecer si lo pretendido por el actor en su demanda principal ya fue resuelto en firme en el proceso penal referido y, por ende, si es procedente la excepción de cosa juzgada opuesta por el demandado. Sobre el instituto de mérito, reiteradamente ha indicado esta Sala: “III... La administración de justicia se ejerce a través de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y de los demás tribunales que establezca la ley (artículo 152 de la Constitución Política y 1º, párrafo 1º, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). Corresponde al Poder Judicial, además de las funciones que la Carta Magna le señale, conocer de los conflictos civiles, penales, comerciales, laborales y contenciosos administrativos, así como de los otros establecidos por ley, cualquiera sea su naturaleza y la calidad de las personas que intervengan; resolver en definitiva sobre ellos y ordenar la ejecución de sus resoluciones (artículo 153 de la Constitución Política y 1º, párrafo 2º, de la Ley Orgánica citada). Al resolver en forma definitiva de las controversias sometidas a su conocimiento, el Estado, a través del Poder Judicial, asume y pone en operación una de las más importantes funciones en él recaídas: la jurisdiccional. Para que tal función pueda efectuarse en forma eficaz, las decisiones inherentes a la potestad paralelamente otorgada, revisten dos características fundamentales: inmutabilidad y definitividad absolutas. Solamente en casos de excepción, contemplados por la ley, tales características pueden ser relativas. A esta particularidad de la función jurisdiccional, se le ha denominado en doctrina y en jurisprudencia, COSA JUZGADA. Por medio de ella se establece que la voluntad del Estado, contenida en la ley, es definitiva e inmutable para el caso concreto, lo cual es básico para la certeza y seguridad jurídicas. Esa voluntad es declarada por el Juez en sentencia. De esa manera se busca ponerle fin a los asuntos decididos en fallo judicial, impedir el sucesivo replanteamiento del conflicto, evitando así la incertidumbre jurídica, todo lo cual propende a la eficacia de la función jurisdiccional del Estado. En nuestro medio, las sentencias emitidas en proceso ordinario o abreviado, así como aquellas otras resoluciones señaladas en forma taxativa, producen la autoridad de la cosa juzgada material. Esta se halla limitada -con la salvedad que adelante se consignará- a la parte resolutiva del fallo. Sea, no comprende sus fundamentos. Para que la sentencia incida en otro proceso mediante la cosa juzgada, es imprescindible que en ambos procesos exista identidad de partes, causa y objeto. Esta figura se encuentra regulada en los artículos 162 a 165 del Código Procesal Civil. IV.- Tiene la cosa juzgada naturaleza estrictamente procesal, porque es una consecuencia del proceso y de la voluntad manifestada en la ley de rito. Pero sus efectos trascienden indirectamente el proceso, para recaer sobre las relaciones jurídicas sustanciales. Ello, como consecuencia de la inmutabilidad de la decisión: su efecto directo, con lo cual se garantiza la certeza jurídica de aquéllas. Ambos elementos, a saber, la inmutabilidad de la decisión y la definitividad del derecho declarado o de su rechazo o denegación, constituyen efectos jurídicos de la cosa juzgada. El primero directo y procesal; el segundo indirecto y sustancial. El primero impone la prohibición a los jueces de entrar a resolver sobre el fondo de las pretensiones objeto de debate y les confiere la facultad de detener la acción ejercitada, ya sea a gestión de parte o de oficio, y a las partes, el derecho de obtener la suspensión definitiva del proceso en forma total o parcial. A estas últimas les implica además la obligación de abstenerse de revivir, mediante otro proceso, esas pretensiones resueltas positiva o negativamente. El segundo de los elementos, sea, la definitividad, busca que la declaración de certeza contenida en la sentencia sea indiscutible en otros procesos. En relación, otorga a las partes los mismos derechos y obligaciones que concede el efecto procesal o inmutabilidad. Por esa razón, la cosa juzgada tiene una función o eficacia negativa al prohibir a los jueces decidir de nuevo sobre lo ya resuelto. Pero también, tiene otra positiva, representada por la seguridad conferida a las relaciones jurídicas sustanciales decididas. El fundamento de la cosa juzgada está, entonces, en la potestad jurisdiccional del Estado, de la cual emana el poder suficiente para asegurar la eficacia y los efectos de la sentencia. V.- La cosa juzgada está sujeta a dos límites: el objetivo, en razón del objeto sobre el cual versó el proceso al igual que la causa o título del cual se dedujo la pretensión; y el subjetivo, en razón de las personas que han sido partes en el proceso. El objeto de la pretensión está referido a lo reconocido o negado en la sentencia ejecutoriada. Sea, a la cosa o relación jurídica sobre la cual se aplica su fuerza vinculante. El objeto del proceso lo constituye el derecho reconocido, declarado o modificado en la sentencia, en relación con una cosa o varias cosas determinadas, o la relación jurídica declarada, según el caso. Además, la cosa juzgada en cuanto al objeto se refiere, se extiende a aquellos puntos que sin haber sido materia expresa de la decisión jurisdiccional, por consecuencia necesaria o por depender indispensablemente de tal decisión, resultan resueltos tácitamente. Así, cuando una sentencia ha decidido sobre un todo del cual forma parte la cosa objeto de la nueva demanda, existirá sin duda, identidad de objeto. El segundo aspecto del límite objetivo es la identidad de la causa petendi, sea, el fundamento o razón alegada por el demandante para obtener el objeto de la pretensión contenida en la demanda. La causa petendi debe ser buscada exclusivamente dentro del marco de la demanda, con un criterio amplio el cual conduzca a su interpretación lógica. No remitiéndose a su simple tenor literal. Ella configura la razón de hecho enunciada en la demanda como fundamento de la pretensión. Está formada por el conjunto de hechos alegados como base de la demanda. No para cada uno de ellos aisladamente. El límite subjetivo o identidad de partes se refiere a los sujetos del proceso, partes en sentido formal: demandantes, demandados y terceros intervinientes; y debe tenerse en cuenta que los causahabientes de las partes a título universal o singular están obligados por la sentencia, como si se tratara de ellas. Al respecto, lo importante es la identidad jurídica de las partes, no su identidad física. En consecuencia, a quien no ha sido parte en el proceso no se le puede vincular con la sentencia dictada; es decir, no se le pueden imponer las sujeciones y obligaciones derivadas de ella. VI.- La antigua Sala Primera Civil, en Sentencia de las 10:30 horas del 27 de diciembre de 1972 señaló: " ... V.- El artículo 723 del Código Civil establece que la autoridad de la cosa juzgada se limita a la parte resolutiva de la sentencia, mas no a sus fundamentos. Pero aún así, la doctrina y la jurisprudencia han establecido que "si bien es cierto el principio de que la autoridad de la cosa juzgada se limita a lo resolutivo de la sentencia, también lo es que los motivos o consideraciones del fallo hay que tomarlos en cuenta para determinar y completar el sentido de la parte dispositiva". (Sentencias de Casación de 3:15 p.m. del 16 de diciembre de 1924, 2:15 p.m. del 17 de junio de 1926, 15.45 horas del 13 de abril de 1944, 16 del 6 de mayo de 1947 y 101 de 14,30 horas del 4 de setiembre de 1968, Considerando VI). En esta última sentencia y en el considerando citado se dijo lo siguiente: "Es necesario hacer hincapié en que la existencia y los alcances de la cosa juzgada, no sólo dependen de la triple identidad en el objeto, la causa y las partes, sino también de la índole del pronunciamiento recaído pues la cosa juzgada es, sobre todo, lo que las mismas palabras significan, es decir, lo que ya se juzgó en el fallo firme; porque de lo contrario, si la sentencia no decide el fondo de las cuestiones propuestas y debatidas en el pleito, o en otras palabras, si lo que se reclamaba en el segundo juicio no fue concedido o denegado en el primero, no podrá haber cosa juzgada. El artículo 723 del Código Civil dispone que la autoridad de la cosa juzgada se circunscribe a lo resolutivo de la sentencia, mas no a sus fundamentos; sin embargo, con frecuencia hay que acudir a las motivaciones del fallo para esclarecer qué es lo que en realidad resolvieron los jueces, máxime cuando la sentencia, por ser desestimatoria, se limita a declarar en su parte dispositiva que la demanda fue denegada". (Lo subrayado no es del original). Tocante a la unidad integral de las sentencias, pueden consultarse, entre otras, las resoluciones de esta Sala números 2 de las 15 hrs. del 6 de enero y 77 de las 14:20 hrs. del 19 de noviembre, ambas de 1993) y, sobre el instituto de la cosa juzgada, entre otros, los fallos números 93 de las 15 hrs. del 26 de junio de 1991 y 740 de las 14:45 hrs. del 1 de diciembre de 1999. ...” (Sentencia número 180 de las 9:25 hrs. del 23 de febrero del 2001. En igual sentido, además de los fallos citados en el precedente transcrito, puede consultarse la número 740 de las 14:45 hrs. del 1 de diciembre de 1999). VII.- A la luz de lo expuesto en el considerando anterior y, analizadas las sentencias números 121-B-97 del entonces Tribunal Superior Segundo Penal, Sección Segunda de San José, de las 16:15 hrs. del 9 de setiembre de 1997 y, 346-98 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 9:30 hrs. del 3 de abril de 1998, este Tribunal arriba a la misma conclusión del Ad-quem. Sea, en el sub-júdice se configura el instituto de la cosa juzgada. Al respecto, el Tribunal Superior Penal acogió parcialmente las acciones civiles resarcitorias formuladas tanto por don Nombre10808, cuanto por la empresa actora. Tocante a la primera, según se expuso, y en lo conducente, ordenó la restitución a favor de don Nombre4965 de la finca en litigio. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, y de la falsedad decretada, anuló las diferentes escrituras públicas, a partir de la de fecha 26 de agosto de 1991, mediante la cual se documentó el traspaso a don Nombre10810 de la finca en litigio; también aquella en donde se constituyó la hipoteca de primer grado, y en la cual Printy S.A. adquirió la propiedad del inmueble litigioso. Además, declaró la nulidad de todos los actos dependientes de esos instrumentos públicos. Como fundamento de lo anterior consideró: “ACCIONES CIVILES RESARCITORIAS.- En criterio del Tribunal, desde la óptica del Derecho Penal, no es posible mantener subsistente ninguna compra venta, hipoteca, adjudicación de remate u otros actos afines en el Registro Público que tengan su origen en una falsedad instrumental, aunque esos actos se hayan realizado de buena fe y al amparo del Registro –lo cual no viene a significar interferencia alguna con lo que en definitiva puedan resolver en la vía declarativa los jueces civiles en cuanto a la posesión y la propiedad del bien- pues ello conduciría a una inseguridad jurídica mayor para la sociedad que la que puede ocasionarse, en forma individual, a las personas que llegan a constituir en cada caso el último eslabón de la estafa y que son las que en definitiva sufren el perjuicio patrimonial que el autor o los autores del hecho se propusieron. Es también criterio del Tribunal que un acto que se inició con una falsedad instrumental no puede con el tiempo adquirir vida jurídica eficaz, sin el pronunciamiento de una autoridad con competencia para declarar derechos, como es la autoridad jurisdiccional de lo civil. ... A diferencia del Ministerio Público, que plantea en la acusación como uno de los hechos que don Nombre10812 fue despojado del inmueble, el Tribunal ve el caso como una estafa que se consuma con el perjuicio sufrido por Nombre10817.- La protección que se debe dar a quienes adquieren al amparo del Registro la entiende el Tribunal, para aquellas situaciones en donde no medie ninguna falsificación instrumental en la cadena de traspasos, como ocurre por ejemplo en los casos de incuria de las partes en presentar al Registro los testimonios de las escrituras, porque en caso de falsedades la ley es muy clara: “Cuando una sentencia declare falso un instrumento público, el tribunal que la dictó ordenará que el acto sea reconstruido, suprimido o reformado.” (Artículos 539 y 541 del Código de Procedimientos Penales). En el caso presente lo que se impone es suprimir del registro público las falsedades instrumentales y subsiguientes, para lo cual se ordena la cancelación de todos los asientos registrales que sean necesarios a fin de que la propiedad quede registralmente a nombre de don Nombre10808, cuyo derecho no tiene origen espurio. Debe quedar claro que en esta sentencia no se está declarando derecho alguno de posesión y/o propiedad, pues ello es competencia de otra jurisdicción en caso de que Nombre10817. decida recurrir a esa vía a solicitar que se determine quién tiene mejor derecho sobre el bien. ...” (Lo subrayado no es del original). A pesar de la evidente contradicción incurrida por el Tribunal Superior Penal, pues, por un lado, señala que desde la óptica del Derecho Penal no es posible mantener subsistente ninguna compra venta, hipoteca, adjudicación de remate u otros actos afines en el Registro Público, cuyo origen sea una falsedad instrumental, agregando que, la protección a los terceros de buena fe, amparados a la publicidad registral, opera siempre y cuando no medie un delito en la cadena de traspasos, tal y como acontece en el sub-júdice. Por el otro, afirma que esto no significa interferencia con lo que, en definitiva, resuelvan, en vía declarativa, los jueces civiles, únicos competentes para determinar el derecho de posesión y el de propiedad sobre el bien. No obstante lo anterior, es claro que dicha autoridad jurisdiccional dejó abierta la posibilidad para que Printy S.A. acudiera a la vía ordinaria en reclamo de su derecho sobre el bien litigioso. Esto se confirma con lo que se anotará de seguido. Respecto a la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta por la referida empresa, según se indicó, la indicada autoridad penal también la acogió parcialmente. Condenó al imputado a pagarle los daños y perjuicios infligidos. Indicó expresamente “condena que se hace en abstracto sujeta a lo que en definitiva pueda resolverse en sede civil en lo tocante a la declaratoria definitiva del derecho de propiedad del inmueble de relación, si es que la actora se decide recurrir a esa vía. De lo contrario podría optar directamente, sin sujeción alguna, a cobrarle al demandado civil los daños y perjuicios ocasionados con los hechos acusados. ...” (Lo subrayado no es del original). También confirma la conclusión expuesta el no levantamiento del asiento registral mediante el cual se inmovilizó la finca litigiosa. VIII.- Sin embargo, a pesar de lo expuesto, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, al rechazar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el apoderado de Printy S.A. y, por lo tanto, decidir en definitiva lo pretendido por ella en la acción civil resarcitoria, en lo que interesa, consideró lo siguiente: “III.- ... No es ajeno a la realidad, que el tráfico y comercio de bienes, sean el terreno fértil para que se generen situaciones que, además de rebasar los límites de la buena fe, resultan ser delictivas. Y ya entrados al campo penal, al sector represivo del Estado, estamos en un área de eminentísimo orden público, desde que el Derecho Penal, en un Estado de Derecho, al ser concebido como la última ratio, se dirige a tutelar, con todo el peso del poder represivo estatal, los bienes jurídicos esenciales para la colectividad. ... De lo dicho resalta que, ambas esferas del ordenamiento jurídico –el derecho privado y el derecho penal- si bien conforman una unidad normativa, ello no significa que los principios que en uno, se dirigen a asegurar el tráfico de bienes y la buena fe, prevalezcan o se contradigan con aquél que tutela en forma represiva, la lesión a los bienes jurídicos esenciales y que, con motivo del hecho delictivo, han lesionado, además, en forma intensa los derechos del directamente ofendido, una víctima que, constitucionalmente, tiene el derecho a “encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales” -artículo 41 de la Constitución Política-, tutela que existe en todas las esferas del ordenamiento jurídico, pero que se refleja en forma más intensa cuando se trata de la víctima de un hecho delictivo, por la lesión a bienes e intereses fundamentales que eso implica. Por eso, es criterio de esta Sala que, como sucede en el caso concreto, la víctima de un despojo de sus bienes, hecho al amparo de documentos falsos que logran ser inscritos en el Registro Público, tiene derecho a recuperar el bien que le ha sido, de esta manera, sustraído en forma fraudulenta, aún cuando haya terceros adquirentes de buena fe, que a su vez confiaron en la publicidad registral. Lo dicho no implica, en forma alguna, desconocer a los terceros de buena fe, la tutela y defensa de sus intereses, porque ellos conservan los mecanismos previstos en la legislación civil para reclamar, contra el vendedor, la garantía y, en todo caso, el pago de los daños y perjuicios, así como las restantes indemnizaciones que correspondan –pago de mejoras, por ejemplo-, según los principios que allí se establecen. A juicio de esta Sala, la tutela del tercero de buena fe, no puede implicar que su situación prevalezca sobre la de quien ha sido, en forma fraudulenta, subrepticia e indefensa, sorprendido con el despojo de la titularidad jurídica de los bienes que le pertenecen y que, por imposición del Estado, está obligado a inscribir y registrar. ... Si el funcionamiento de esa entidad es defectuoso o insuficiente para garantizarle a ese propietario, que debe inscribir sus bienes, el respeto de sus derechos legítimamente adquiridos, eso no puede ser utilizado como excusa para legitimar los fraudes que por medio de documentos públicos falsos y que, utilizando la propia estructura registral, logran el despojo jurídico de los bienes o incluso, legitimar la adquisición espuria de los mismos. ... En el caso de los bienes inmuebles, son muchas las ocasiones en que, el legítimo propietario registral, aún conservando la posesión del bien, es jurídicamente despojado del mismo, al amparo de documentos falsificados que, tergiversan la información que el Registro da a los terceros, que luego, amparados en esos datos, adquieren derechos sobre ellos. Aún cuando es muy dudosa la transparencia de un negocio, en el que se adquiere un inmueble que ni siquiera se ha visto, lo cierto es que puede ser que de buena fe eso suceda, amparado únicamente en la publicidad de los datos registrales. ¿Qué consecuencias tiene esto en la realidad? La tutela de los terceros adquirentes de buena fe, en los términos que se pretenden por el recurrente, en casos como el narrado, implican despojar al legítimo propietario y al actual poseedor, del bien que le pertenece, para darlo a un tercero, en aras de los principios de seguridad registral. Tal solución resulta, sin duda alguna, desmedida, desproporcionada y, finalmente, injusta. A juicio de esta Sala, la importancia de la publicidad registral y sus principios, no pueden prevalecer sobre el derecho de la primer víctima -el legítimo propietario, originariamente despojado en forma fraudulenta- de mantener la titularidad plena sobre sus bienes o en todo caso, el derecho a ser restituido en el goce de los mismos. ... cuando una negociación surge, se modifica o se estructura sobre la base de falsedades documentales, es al Derecho Penal al que compete declarar la existencia del hecho, su responsable y determinar las consecuencias jurídicas que conlleva, no sólo penales propiamente -como sería la sanción-, sino las civiles y las de otra índole que se encuentren indisolublemente ligadas a la penal y a su objeto de tutela, pues es la sentencia penal la que tratará de restablecer la paz social, en lo posible restaurando las cosas al estado en que se encontraban antes del hecho. Dejar a salvo, en el caso de la restitución “los derechos de terceros”, como reza el numeral 123 del Código Penal de 1941, significa que éstos conservarán los derechos para accionar contra quien les trasmitió, en reclamo de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados y de las restantes indemnizaciones que pudieran corresponder, lo que bien pueden hacer, ejerciendo la acción civil resarcitoria en sede penal, cuando su vendedor y el imputado de la causa, sean la misma persona, o en la jurisdicción civil, mediante los procedimientos que correspondan. IV.- El impugnante estima, al propio tiempo, que se ha inobservado el numeral 456 del Código Civil, del que se ha hecho una errónea relación con el artículo 472 del mismo Código. El artículo 456 citado es claro cuando establece que ... Si bien el inciso 2 del artículo 472 señalado, establece que podrá y deberá ordenarse cancelación total de los asientos registrales, cuando se declare nulo el título en virtud del cual se ha hecho la inscripción, esto debe relacionarse con el artículo 456 y entender, que quien adquirió al amparo de la publicidad registral, estará siempre protegido, pues se considerará tercero de buena fe. En realidad, la Sala entiende que, según se analizó, la publicidad registral, es un instrumento establecido y erigido por el Estado, para asegurar el tráfico de bienes, dándole seguridad y respaldo a la información allí consignada. Pero es eso, un instrumento más, de innegable valor e importancia para amparar los derechos de quienes se ven perjudicados por errores, omisiones en la información consignada o bien para quienes han sido víctimas de aquellos que, valiéndose de ese instrumento, lo utilizan para asegurar, a su vez, el resultado de un proyecto delictivo, mediante la utilización de documentos falsos, en perjuicio de los propietarios registrales verdaderos y, realizar a su amparo, entre otros, falsos traspasos que luego, so pretexto de la seguridad que la propia publicidad representa, extender los efectos del delito, a terceras personas que actúan, la mayoría de ocasiones, de buena fe, si bien no faltan casos en los que, quien adquirirá “al amparo del registro”, también conoce la maniobra fraudulenta y de ello precisamente, espera obtener provecho, para “legalizar” su situación y, de allí en adelante, iniciar la cadena de perjuicios, a los verdaderos adquirentes de buena fe, confiados en la información de la publicidad registral. En suma: la publicidad registral protege el derecho de los terceros de buena fe que han sido sorprendidos con maniobras fraudulentas, para poder reclamar la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados, según se establece en el campo civil. Pero no puede, en forma alguna, constituirse como mampara de legitimación de los hechos delictivos, al punto de ser un obstáculo para que la víctima de un delito –el propietario original, despojado de su bien por un documento falso que ha logrado inscribirse- pueda recuperarlo –de hecho y de derecho-. Por ello, en estos casos encuentra plena aplicación lo dispuesto por los numerales 539 del Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973 (468 del Código Procesal Penal de 1996), cuando dispone que en la sentencia declarativa de una falsedad documental “el Tribunal que la dictó ordenará que el acto sea reconstruido, suprimido o reformado” y el 541, al establecer que “Si se tratare de un documento protocolizado, la declaración hecha en la sentencia se anotará, mediante razón, al margen de la matriz, en los testimonios que se hubieren presentado y en el registro respectivo”. Suprimir el documento significa eliminar el acto que por su medio se realizó, así como sus efectos. Como lógica consecuencia, los actos posteriores que de él dependan, deben anularse también, quedando salvos los derechos de los terceros de buena fe para el reclamo de las indemnizaciones que procedan. La protección que concede el numeral 456 del Código Civil, se entiende que rige frente a aquellos casos en que la nulidad o rescisión del título sobrevengan por situaciones jurídicas cuya ilicitud sea de índole civil estrictamente, mas no para oponerse a quien ha sido la víctima original de un despojo fraudulento, hecho al amparo de documentos públicos falsos y de inscripciones y asientos registrales logrados bajo su manto, aún si con posterioridad a ese acto, se hayan realizado otras transacciones en que se vean comprometidos terceros de buena fe, quizás también víctimas de alguna empresa delictiva. ... Permitir que la publicidad registral ampare un ejercicio antisocial de los derechos por su medio consagrados, es consentir la persistencia del abuso y por ello, la sentencia penal debe, al ordenar la supresión del acto generado en un documento falso, restablecer a la víctima en el pleno goce de sus derechos, quedando, para los terceros de buena fe, salvos sus derechos de reclamar las indemnizaciones correspondientes ante la jurisdicción civil, o bien, dentro del proceso penal, en los casos en que ello sea procedente. V.- La jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera Civil ha reconocido la importancia y los alcances de la publicidad registral en el tráfico de bienes, al tiempo que ha puntualizado que la inscripción no convalida actos que sean anulables o nulos, de conformidad con la ley. Así, ha señalado que: ... (sentencia 060-F-91, de las 15:00 hrs. del 24 de abril de 1991, Sala Primera Civil). Es evidente el esfuerzo de puntualización que, a partir de los textos legales, hace la jurisprudencia para remediar las situaciones de colisión de derechos, dando prioridad a la tutela del tercero adquirente de buena fe. Esta Sala comparte esa interpretación, si bien no la considera aplicable para el caso en que, la nulidad del título inscrito se deba a la falsedad del documento que lo ampara, pues en ese supuesto, cuando no sólo la identidad, sino, como lógica consecuencia, la voluntad y el consentimiento del titular registral del bien, han sido usurpadas fraudulentamente, para realizar negocios y movimientos registrales del bien, que implican un despojo de la titularidad jurídica y, en ocasiones, de la posesión real. En ese caso no puede hablarse de negocio, de venta y, al amparo de tal acto fraudulento, no pueden generarse efectos jurídicos válidos, aún cuando hayan intervenido, en la cadena de transmisiones y movimientos, terceros de buena fe. ... Sin embargo, otra es la interpretación que, al tema, ha dado la Sala Primera y que, esta Sala respeta, pero que, por las razones dichas, no comparte. Así, aquélla ha señalado: ... (sentencia 53-97, de las 14:30 hrs. del 2 de julio de 1997, Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). ... Sin embargo, el antecedente citado expone con claridad la preeminencia de la protección de los terceros adquirentes de buena fe, sobre el propietario original, criterio que, para los casos en los que esté zanjada la existencia de la falsedad documental y su autoría, en perjuicio del propietario original despojado, esta Sala no comparte, por las razones expuestas. Por todo lo expuesto, es claro que la sentencia impugnada no adolece del vicio sustantivo que le achaca el recurrente. Su representada conserva el derecho de reclamar, contra quien corresponda, las responsabilidades del caso ante la pérdida del inmueble, así como las indemnizaciones que resulten procedentes, pero la propiedad debe restituirse al original y legítimo propietario, despojado por la acción fraudulenta del acusado. Por lo expuesto, el reclamo debe rechazarse. ... VI.- ... Por ello, no se han lesionado los derechos de la referida sociedad, amén de que esta pudo por su lado ejercer la acción civil resarcitoria en contra del acusado, quedándole aún la posibilidad de acudir a los tribunales civiles para la determinación de los daños y perjuicios sufridos, así como de establecer la correspondiente ejecución. Se declara sin lugar el recurso.”. IX.- Al socaire de lo anteriormente transcrito (a pesar de no compartirse las consideraciones expuestas por dicha Sala, por cuanto riñen con la jurisprudencia reiterada de este Tribunal, tocante a los alcances y aplicación del instituto de la adquisición a non domino. Sobre este tema, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias números 82 de las 14,30 hrs. del 22 de mayo de 1992, 56 de las 13:50 hrs. del 4 de agosto de 1994, 45 de las 10:05 hrs. del 22 de mayo de 1996, 53 de las 14:30 hrs. del 2 de julio de 1997, 417 de las 15:10 hrs. del 2 de junio, 530 de las 15:30 hrs. del 19 de julio, ambas del 2000,162 de las 8:15 hrs. del 16 de febrero, 352 de las 10:20 hrs. del 18 de mayo, ambas del 2001) y de lo expuesto en el considerando V de esta sentencia, respecto a la unidad integral de las sentencias, queda indubitablemente establecido que en sede penal se discutió, consideró y resolvió en definitiva acerca del dominio sobre el inmueble litigioso. Esto se confirma, además, con lo considerado por esa Sala al acoger el recurso de casación interpuesto por las apoderadas especiales judiciales del señor Nombre10809. Al respecto, y en lo conducente, señaló: “...Lleva razón el recurrente en su reparo. No existe ninguna disposición legal que impida al Tribunal de mérito levantar dicha medida cautelar, la cual fue efectivamente solicitada por el ofendido. En todo caso al aplicarse el artículo 539 del Código de rito en lo que se refiere a la supresión del acto falso, y de los que posteriormente se realizaron, es necesario que se ordene la restitución plena del derecho, pues no tendría ninguna finalidad mantener la misma después de que la sentencia adquiera la firmeza. En otras palabras, si dicha medida se mantuviera, el titular quedaría imposibilitado para disponer libremente de su derecho conforme se lo garantizan los artículos 45 de la Constitución Política y 266 del Código Civil. Debe en consecuencia declararse con lugar el reproche. Se anula parcialmente la sentencia y resolviendo en cuanto al fondo se ordena levantar la orden de inmovilización que pesa sobre el citado inmueble, medida que deberá ser comunicada mediante mandamiento al Registro Público de la Propiedad. ...” (Lo subrayado no es del original). Queda claro, entonces, en dicha sede se estableció en definitiva que el único y legítimo propietario del inmueble litigioso es el aquí demandado. Además, que la empresa Printy S.A., como tercero adquirente de buena fe, carece de legitimación para reclamarle a don Nombre10808 el reconocimiento de los daños y perjuicios irrogados, así como las demás indemnizaciones correspondientes, por ser éste el legítimo propietario, despojado ilícitamente de la finca en litigio. Sólo puede hacerlo en contra de su trasmitente. Por otro lado, y de conformidad con lo considerado en sede penal, esta Sala, por las mismas razones expuestas por el Ad-quem, estima que en el sub-júdice converge la triple identidad de objeto, causa y partes. X.- En segundo termino, afirma el casacionista, en la acción subsidiaria su representada pide se le respeten, en su condición de tercera adquirente de buena fe, vencida en un juicio de reivindicación, una serie de derechos subjetivos. Basta leer las pretensiones deducidas, indica, para entender que no han sido objeto de ninguna relación procesal entre las actuales partes y, por ende, la cosa juzgada material tampoco cubre estos extremos. El objeto y la causa de la pretensión subsidiaria, añade, tampoco han sido deducidos en un proceso donde se determine judicialmente a favor o en contra de ellas. En consecuencia, concluye, no resulta procedente declarar, como lo hizo el Ad-quem, la cosa juzgada en contra de lo ahí peticionado. XI.- La mayoría de las pretensiones reclamadas en la demanda subsidiaria, de conformidad con lo apuntado en los considerandos VIII y IX de esta sentencia y, contrario a lo afirmado por el casacionista, no resultan de recibo. Ello, por cuanto, se subsumen dentro de lo considerado expresamente por la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por lo tanto, cobijadas por la cosa juzgada. En lo que interesa, se repite, en su sentencia señaló ese alto Tribunal: “... Por eso, es criterio de esta Sala que, como sucede en el caso concreto, la víctima de un despojo de sus bienes, hecho al amparo de documentos falsos que logran ser inscritos en el Registro Público, tiene derecho a recuperar el bien que le ha sido, de esta manera, sustraído en forma fraudulenta, aún cuando haya terceros adquirentes de buena fe, que a su vez confiaron en la publicidad registral. Lo dicho no implica, en forma alguna, desconocer a los terceros de buena fe, la tutela y defensa de sus intereses, porque ellos conservan los mecanismos previstos en la legislación civil para reclamar, contra el vendedor, la garantía y, en todo caso, el pago de los daños y perjuicios, así como las restantes indemnizaciones que correspondan –pago de mejoras, por ejemplo-, según los principios que allí se establecen. A juicio de esta Sala, la tutela del tercero de buena fe, no puede implicar que su situación prevalezca sobre la de quien ha sido, en forma fraudulenta, subrepticia e indefensa, sorprendido con el despojo de la titularidad jurídica de los bienes que le pertenecen y que, por imposición del Estado, está obligado a inscribir y registrar. ... es al Derecho Penal al que compete declarar la existencia del hecho, su responsable y determinar las consecuencias jurídicas que conlleva, no sólo penales propiamente -como sería la sanción-, sino las civiles y las de otra índole que se encuentren indisolublemente ligadas a la penal y a su objeto de tutela, pues es la sentencia penal la que tratará de restablecer la paz social, en lo posible restaurando las cosas al estado en que se encontraban antes del hecho. ... Dejar a salvo, en el caso de la restitución “los derechos de terceros”, como reza el numeral 123 del Código Penal de 1941, significa que éstos conservarán los derechos para accionar contra quien les trasmitió, en reclamo de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados y de las restantes indemnizaciones que pudieran corresponder, lo que bien pueden hacer, ejerciendo la acción civil resarcitoria en sede penal, cuando su vendedor y el imputado de la causa, sean la misma persona, o en la jurisdicción civil, mediante los procedimientos que correspondan. ... Por todo lo expuesto, es claro que la sentencia impugnada no adolece del vicio sustantivo que le achaca el recurrente. Su representada conserva el derecho de reclamar, contra quien corresponda, las responsabilidades del caso ante la pérdida del inmueble, así como las indemnizaciones que resulten procedentes, pero la propiedad debe restituirse al original y legítimo propietario, despojado por la acción fraudulenta del acusado. Por lo expuesto, el reclamo debe rechazarse. ... VI.- ... Por ello, no se han lesionado los derechos de la referida sociedad, amén de que esta pudo por su lado ejercer la acción civil resarcitoria en contra del acusado, quedándole aún la posibilidad de acudir a los tribunales civiles para la determinación de los daños y perjuicios sufridos, así como de establecer la correspondiente ejecución.” (Lo resaltado no es del original). De acuerdo con lo transcrito, y según se expuso en el considerando IX de esta sentencia, la sociedad actora sólo puede reclamar la mayoría de lo pretendido en la acción subsidiaria a su trasmitente, no al señor Nombre10809, por ser éste el propietario original, despojado ilícitamente de la finca litigiosa. XI.- Sí es de recibo, por cuanto así lo establece la propia Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, declarar a la actora tercera adquirente y poseedora de buena fe, al haber adquirido la propiedad en disputa al amparo de la publicidad registral. Asimismo, respecto a lo denominado por ella “extremos económicos y situaciones jurídicas”, específicamente, lo reclamado en el punto identificado con la letra C.d), conforme a lo resuelto en sede penal, sólo puede repetir lo pagado por concepto de impuestos territoriales y municipales del terreno litigioso. Ello por cuanto, al ser ésta una carga legal, si el bien no hubiera salido ilícitamente del patrimonio del demandado, mantenía el deber de cumplir con esa obligación. Empero, como lo reconoce en su deposición, folio 99, después del año 1993, por no estar la propiedad litigiosa a su nombre, no ha cancelado los indicados impuestos. En consecuencia, de no reconocer este extremo, implicaría prohijar un enriquecimiento ilícito a su favor. Al estarse ante una obligación dineraria, también resulta procedente reconocer los intereses al tipo legal, desde el momento de su cancelación y hasta su efectivo pago. La fijación del monto definitivo se difiere para la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Respecto a los puntos identificados con las letras C.a), C.b), C.c) y, C.e), a pesar de estar recogidos en los numerales 327 y 328 del Código Civil, no resulta procedente otorgarlos. Ello, por cuanto, se insiste, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia expresamente indicó que, al haber sido despojado don Nombre10812 del inmueble litigioso como consecuencia de un delito, debe restablecérsele en el pleno goce de sus derechos. Sea, debe volverse a la situación existente antes de la comisión del ilícito. Asimismo, señaló, como tercero adquirente de buena fe, sólo puede reclamar las indemnizaciones correspondientes a su vendedor. XII.- En mérito de lo expuesto, resulta procedente, en forma parcial, el recurso formulado. En consecuencia, debe anularse también parcialmente la sentencia recurrida, al declarar con lugar la excepción de cosa juzgada respecto a la demanda subsidiaria. En su lugar, debe acogerse parcialmente dicha acción, entendiéndose denegada en lo no expresamente indicado. Debe declararse a la sociedad actora tercera adquirente y poseedora de buena fe. Asimismo, condenarse al accionado a reconocer el monto cancelado por la sociedad actora por concepto de impuestos municipales y territoriales del inmueble litigioso, más los intereses al tipo legal sobre ese monto desde su pago y hasta su efectivo reintegro, para lo cual deberá limitarse a lo que don Nombre4965 estaba en obligación de pagar. Se difiere la fijación de este rubro para la etapa de ejecución de la sentencia."