Non-entitlement to additional pay for teaching surcharge after administrative reassignmentImprocedencia del pago de sobresueldos por recargo docente tras reubicación administrativa

V.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE JULIA VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority opinion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff's payment of the additional salary for the Preschool Education surcharge (recargo de Educación Preescolar) as of February 1, 2014, and for as long as she remains in a reassigned condition. It has been duly accredited that, in 2013, the plaintiff earned that surcharge and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions as of June 17, 2013; for which reason that additional salary ceased to be paid to her (proven facts 2, 3, and 4 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as is evident from official letter number DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible at image 153, respectively, of the complete view of the Court's electronic file, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon in response to a medical recommendation, based on Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability (incapacidad) strictly speaking. Before the Chamber, it is argued that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), and therefore may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and that the public servant is not within the factual prerequisites provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), since she is not disabled by illness as was established, which would make her entitled to what is sought. After a re-evaluation of the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct.

Ordinances 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain surcharges (recargos), which do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of their regular duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: “a) If the servant, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for \"alternate schedule\" (horario alterno), or any additional salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy (subsidio) equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. /b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive the corresponding salary increases. (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy, and the aids referred to in Article 167, shall have the character of salary, and shall, consequently, be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may be applicable. / (The foregoing subsection added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that a public servant who is disabled due to illness, or a female public servant on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary from additional salaries (sobresueldos), has the right for these to be considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave; therefore, her situation does not fall within the factual prerequisite of the norm.

Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that, pursuant to the provisions set forth in numerals 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses (pluses) are granted when the public servant performs additional functions to those ordinarily carried out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these additional salaries (sobresueldos) depends on whether the circumstances warrant it, and for this reason, they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates governed by ordinance 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the temporary service would be denatured and would become an ordinary one. In line with the foregoing, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as a surcharge (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those surcharges (recargos) that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the worker's total salary, permanently and regardless of the service they provide, as is sought in this case. There is vast jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that function surcharges (in this case, for alternate schedule) cannot be considered a vested right of the public servant. Thus, in ruling No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that can be classified as a function surcharge (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it obligate the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges—because it is due to the need for service provision at a specific moment—is temporary in nature and is paid for a specific amount of work, being that, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly of its interest and competence (see in this sense ruling number 2003-09533 at twelve hours and twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours and forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the surcharge (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on the fact of whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right (derecho subjetivo) in favor of the interested party for them to continue being paid such item, or for the surcharge or alternate schedule (horario alterno) to be maintained for them” (emphasis supplied; see also rulings numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013).

Similarly, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which an additional salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such a benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (ruling No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same decision, reference was made to ruling No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “It is likewise appropriate to pronounce on the matter of the salary difference that the appellant claims they cease to receive on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited surcharge (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit, which depends on the fact of whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right (derecho subjetivo) in favor of the interested party, for them to continue being paid such item, or for the indicated surcharge to be maintained for them, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also unfounded…”.

Lastly, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that additional salaries (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) that is incorporated as such into the salary strictly speaking, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which it was recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an additional salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such a benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met.” Pursuant to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for surcharges (recargos) constitute temporary additional salaries (sobresueldos temporales), annexed to the salary structure, which although they form part of the final remuneration received by the public servant, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on said servant being in the prerequisites established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each school period. It is worth highlighting that the payment of these surcharges (recargos) is appropriate by reason of the position and the functions performed by the public servant, and may therefore be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear.

Based on the norms cited, the jurisprudence cited, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remuneration when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as those in the present case (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obligating the State to pay a remuneration for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing the functions with some type of surcharge (recargo), since they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. In addition, the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same surcharge, when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated previously, the Preschool Education surcharge (recargo de Educación Preescolar), as occurs in the case under study, does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), besides which, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, it cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that in order to demand payment of the surcharge (recargo), it is necessarily required that a norm so authorizes it (the principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and that the conditions and prerequisites established by it be met; which does not occur in this instance. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the additional salary (sobresueldo) in question, upon the plaintiff transitioning from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with law.

V.- DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATE JULIA VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority opinion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff's right to payment of the additional salary (sobresueldo) for the Preschool Education surcharge (recargo) as of February 1, 2014, and for as long as she remains in a reassigned condition. It has been duly accredited that, in 2013, the claimant was earning that surcharge and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned (reubicada) to administrative functions as of June 17, 2013; for which reason that additional salary ceased to be paid (proven facts 2, 3, and 4 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as is evident from official communication number DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible at image 153, respectively, of the complete view of the electronic case file of the Trial Court, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, pursuant to Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability (incapacidad) properly speaking. Before this Chamber, it is maintained that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and that the employee does not fall within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), since she is not disabled due to illness, as was established, which would make her entitled to what is sought. After reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the rules applicable to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct. Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain surcharges, which do not constitute an acquired right (derecho adquirido) and, consequently, payment of these must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their regular duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: "a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, were earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for 'alternate schedule' (horario alterno), or any additional salary, they shall be entitled to an allowance equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. / b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). / c) For all legal purposes, both the allowance and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond. / (The preceding subsection thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)" (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that an employee who is disabled due to illness, or a female employee on maternity leave, who had been earning additional salary for additional salaries, has the right for these to be considered when setting the amount of the allowance to be paid. In the case before us, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave, and therefore her situation does not fall within the factual circumstances of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that according to the provisions of Articles 118, subsection j), of the Education Code and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses are granted when the employee carries out additional functions to those ordinarily performed in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, either by needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these additional salaries depends on the circumstances warranting it, and therefore they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each academic year (curso lectivo), according to the start and end dates regulated in Article 176 of the Civil Service Statute; otherwise, the eventual service would be distorted and become an ordinary one. In line with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that "the excess shall be maintained as a surcharge, therefore, of a temporary nature." Consequently, those surcharges that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is being sought in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that surcharges for functions (in this case for alternate schedule) cannot be considered an acquired right of the employee. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: "It must be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that can be classified as a surcharge of functions does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned that obliges the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges - because they owe to the need for service provision at a given time - has a temporary character and is paid for a quantity of specific tasks, and, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly of its interest and competence (see in that sense judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes of September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes of May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the surcharge constitutes a 'bonus' (plus) or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such item continues to be paid, or so that the surcharge or alternate schedule is maintained for them" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions number 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: "...if the assumptions under which an additional salary was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled (judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006)." This same ruling referred to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: "The same can be said regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the questioned act, since the compensation for the cited surcharge constitutes a 'bonus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such item continues to be paid, or so that the indicated surcharge is maintained for them, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…". Lastly, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: "This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that additional salaries that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which it was recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an additional salary was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled." In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for surcharges constitute temporary additional salaries, annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final compensation received by the employee, are not a substantial permanent component, but an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the conditions established in the legal system for their granting and on the needs that arise in each academic period. It should be noted that the payment of these surcharges is appropriate by reason of the position and the functions performed by the employee, and can therefore be denied when the original conditions for their granting disappear. Based on the rules brought to bear, the cited jurisprudence, and the principles of the primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of compensation when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as those in the case at hand (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to compensate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obliging the State to pay compensation for a service not being rendered is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and exercising the functions for a surcharge of some type, as they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides, the State would be paying double (to two employees) for the same surcharge, when it has been necessary for the person replacing the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated before, the Preschool Education surcharge, as occurs in the case under study, does not constitute an acquired right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixed) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to be able to demand the payment of the surcharge, a rule must necessarily authorize it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and the conditions and assumptions established by it must be fulfilled; which does not occur in this instance. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the additional salary in question, when the plaintiff moved from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions by reassignment, is in accordance with the law."

"V.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA JULIA VARELA ARAYA: La suscrita se aparta del criterio de mayoría en cuanto reconoce a la actora el pago del sobresueldo por recargo de Educación Preescolar a partir del 1 de febrero de 2014 y mientras se mantenga en condición de reubicada. Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que, en el año 2013, la demandante devengaba aquel recargo y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas a partir del 17 de junio de 2013; razón por la cual aquel sobresueldo se le dejó de pagar (hechos probados 2, 3 y 4 de la sentencia de primera instancia, ratificados por el Tribunal). Asimismo, según se desprende del oficio número DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible a imagen 153, respectivamente, de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado, está claro que la reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. Ante la Sala se sostiene que la Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y que la servidora no se encuentra dentro de los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no se encuentra incapacitada por enfermedad como se estableció, que la hagan acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluyo que lleva razón quien recurre. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por "horario alterno", o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)” (el resaltado es agregado). Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada ni disfrutando de aquella licencia, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, antes citados, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones (en este caso por horario alterno) no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno" (énfasis suplido; véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…”. Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por recargos constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede en razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Con base en las normas traídas a colación, la jurisprudencia citada y los principios de primacía de la realidad, razonabilidad e igualdad salarial, considero que la representación del Estado lleva razón cuando manifiesta que no es factible mantener el pago de retribuciones cuando no se da la prestación real del servicio, por motivos como el de autos (persona reubicada en un puesto administrativo), pues no existe sustento fáctico ni jurídico para retribuir un servicio que no se está prestando. Además, obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes, el recargo de Educación Preescolar, como ocurre en el caso de estudio, no constituye un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión del sobresueldo en cuestión, al pasar la actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho."