Denial of possessory information claim in Tenorio Volcano National Park for lack of decennial ecological possessionRechazo de información posesoria en Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio por falta de posesión ecológica decenal

III.- As to the merits of the matter. First, it must be noted that the argument of the trial judge is not based on the application of the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, as it refers to a general ten-year possession in its findings of proven facts. Regarding this rule, the following has been stated: IV.- On the subject of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), the Tribunal in repeated rulings has expressed: “The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, in its Article 7, as well as the Leyes Forestales have sought to protect forest resources from human action, subjecting them to various forms of forest management. Although the titling of such areas, which once declared as conservation areas become part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), has been permitted, compliance with other more qualified requirements is demanded. This leads us directly to the concept of ecological possession (posesión ecológica), and to the criterion of the ecological function of forest property. In repeated judgments, both of the Sala Primera de Casación and of this Superior Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Agrario), the principles that must govern to resolve this type of agro-environmental situation have been established. Our country has been a pioneer in the construction of the institutes of agrarian possession (posesión agraria) and ecological possession (posesión ecológica). The same jurisprudence has recognized and developed these institutes, as well as the life cycle of agrarian possession and, recently, of ecological possession (within the broader criterion of the ecological function of forest property). The same Jurisprudence has sought to distinguish enterprise property and possession where an activity directed at forest cultivation is exercised, from that where an extractive activity or merely a conservational one is carried out. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of forest property or possession (without enterprise). It is precisely in these cases that the Ley Forestal comes to establish an entire juridical regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner obligatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. In this way, in forest possession (posesión forestal), the de facto power is exercised over a property of forest vocation or mostly destined to protect forest resources, without a view to its exploitation or, alternatively, dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve the natural regeneration of the forest. In either case, there would be no development of a biological vegetative or animal cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, but on the contrary represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. Furthermore, it denies the possibility of acquiring possessory rights over lands of the national reserves when a harmful action has been exercised against the forest resources. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a Forest Law (Derecho forestal), with the particularities of an organic and complete system, where the institutes of forest property and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest property, and also forest possession (posesión forestal) as a real right derived from the former, or independently conceived, begins to take shape from the 1885 Código Fiscal, which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests whose regulations tend toward their conservation. Subsequently, the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 6, 1939, incorporates said principles. Then, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización in its Article 7 expands the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- VII. The special legislation regarding the protection of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second is opened through better-conceived regulations via Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of Ley Forestal No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended, by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in Alcance 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). In them, various regimes of forest property are contained, and the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals are limited. It is not possible to acquire title over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) if it is not demonstrated that the forest resource has been protected. Its constitutional basis is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institute of forest property and possession is protected. This is not equal to civil possession, nor to agrarian possession; it is a property to conserve, and therefore the possessory acts carried out therein must have that purpose.- VIII. Forest possession (posesión forestal) has had its juridical regime in the aforementioned Leyes Forestales. It falls upon a specific asset: lands covered by forests or of forest aptitude. The owner or possessor of such assets has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and can only exploit them economically under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the juridical resolution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, that special juridical regime and the principles of Forest Law (Derecho forestal) must be applied. The Ley Forestal establishes as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All lands of forest aptitude and the forests of the country, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime is the set of provisions, among others, of a juridical, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the forests and lands of forest aptitude of the country. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion (usucapión), the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, amended by the Ley Forestal, established, before its reform: \"Article 7.- When the immovable property to which the information refers is included within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree by which the respective wild area was created. Properties that are outside these areas and have forests may only be titled if the promoter demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and having protected said natural resource, on the understanding that the property must be duly demarcated with fences or lanes.\" In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession falls upon the natural resource \"forests\" or \"lands of forest aptitude\", and the possessory acts must be directed toward their protection and conservation. Only if this is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would remain forming part of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) (Article 13 of the new Ley Forestal), with an unseizable and inalienable character, and their possession will not create any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Ley Forestal).- IX. The Agrarian Tribunal had interpreted Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, before being amended by the new Ley Forestal, in the sense of requiring a personal possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this regard Votos No. 169 of 9:40 a.m. on March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 1991)...”. However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley Forestal was challenged as \"unconstitutional\" by the title applicant here, and the Sala Constitucional, in Voto No. 4587-97 (published in the Boletín Judicial No. 188 dated October 1, 1997), declared, in the relevant part, the following: \"The action is partially granted and, consequently, the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the reform produced by the Ley Forestal No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, according to which, in order to title lands comprised within national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the protected wild area, and which does not favor, in these cases, possession transmitted by previous possessors, is unconstitutional. This judgment is declarative and its effects retroactive, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith...\". In such a way that current possessors may benefit from transmitted possession...X. Ley Forestal No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias for titling lands comprised within protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: \"Article 7.- When the immovable property to which the information refers is comprised within a protected wild area, whatever its management category, the title applicant must demonstrate being the holder of the legal rights over decennial possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree by which that wild area was created.\" (The bold is ours). That is, the legislature's intention is that these areas have been maintained protected, conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas...\". (Resolution of 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Voto No. 113). V.- In more recent cases, the Tribunal has rejected the arguments now reiterated by the appellant, regarding the supposed interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Ley Forestal. In a case similar to the one at hand, it was stated: V.- Regarding what the appellant alleges, that the trial court commits an error in applying Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which he considers was declared unconstitutional, and that therefore the proceedings must be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers he is not correct, because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional; rather, what was declared unconstitutional was the interpretation the Tribunal had been making insofar as it did not count the possession exercised by previous transferors. Hence, with ordinal 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias being in force, the promoter must demonstrate decennial possession before the declaration of the protected wild area, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional in Voto No. 4587-97 (published in Boletín Judicial No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law would also not be applied retroactively as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion (usucapión) is established in the Código Civil, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion (usucapión) that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion (usucapión). In that sense, it is important to point out what the Sala Constitucional said on the matter in the cited vote: “…Article 7, first paragraph, of the challenged Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text predates the last reform by Ley Forestal No.7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of titling immovable properties comprised within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article states that the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wild area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling an immovable property that has been affected to the public domain by the declaration of a protected wild area, whatever its specificity. It is now appropriate to determine whether, according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged rule, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion (usucapión) and the possession necessary for usucapion, set forth above, the questioned rule regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership over immovable properties, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe the right of property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated juridical situations, regulated in the Constitution. First, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year period of possession necessary for usucapion (usucapión), set in Article 860 of the Código Civil for the generality of cases in which it is intended to acquire ownership of immovable properties by positive prescription. The extension of the period that the claimant alleges as infringing the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the property sought to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the affectation of the property to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and impedes the fulfillment of the requirements of usucapion (usucapión) if at that moment the right has not been acquired, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) have not elapsed under the conditions established by law. The foregoing is solely the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as holder, necessary for possessio ad usucapionem. Recall that properties affected to the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion (usucapión), if before the affectation occurred, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right were not met. In that sense, the questioned provision, despite apparently regulating a specific case of usucapion (usucapión), does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Código Civil for the generality of cases. In that sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm does not occur either, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion (usucapión) is established in the Código Civil, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion (usucapión) that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion (usucapión). That is, the norm does not come to establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion (usucapión). It simply specifies the way in which those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of demanial property of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the reform to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion (usucapión), which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possessio ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest. (Tribunal Agrario, No. 173 of 4:29 p.m. on March 31, 2003). V.- Therefore, the possessor who intends to acquire by usucapion (usucapión) a forest-covered land that formed part of the national reserves must demonstrate decennial possession (original or transmitted) and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation of the Protected Area; in this case, it concerns the Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, which has been affected to the public domain since the creation of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste by Decreto No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, meaning that a decennial possession prior to that date must be demonstrated, and that the possessory acts consist, truly, of the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the title applicants present as proof of their possession, from a documentary standpoint, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Nombre1] sells them the possession of a mountain and pasture land of slightly more than fifty-eight hectares. In said deed, reference is made to a decennial possession exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Nombre2] (folio 65); in addition, he presented the notarial certification of certain date, at 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 1987, of the private sale-purchase letter executed by [Nombre2], selling to [Nombre1] a lot of land measuring approximately sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It should be noted that, according to the plan originally provided, the portion of pasture was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90), and approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered by \"mountain,\" which undoubtedly responds to the affectation carried out since 1976 of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Despite this, in one of the plans presented at the time, pastureland exists on soil categories IV and VII (4.67 and 6.50 hectares, respectively). If the testimonial declarations are observed, the witness [Nombre3] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which could somehow coincide with a part of the property. However, the Tribunal is greatly concerned that the plan indicated, as a fact distinct from reality, the existence of a public road, when in reality it was an access through private properties, but even more, it is concerning to observe the aerial photograph (orthophoto, from folio 239), where it is observed how the area of pastures has been gradually expanding on the property being titled, which is not a good sign of an ecological possession (posesión ecológica); quite the contrary, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the area of pasture and corral is widened, and the mountain area is restricted. But additionally, a third plan was presented, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the nature of the entire property was changed, indicating on all its perimeters that it is \"pasture,\" which cannot favor, in any way, the \"animus\" of exercising a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the State representative, in an official letter of July 17, 2017, brought this circumstance to the Court’s attention. Hence, the title applicant had to correct and present a fourth plan. Adding to all this is the fact that none of the witnesses truly give a coherent account regarding the possessory chain. Although all claim to have known the property since 1960, that is not sufficient to demonstrate, or worse, to take for granted, the existence of an agro-environmental possession ten years before the creation of the Reserve, as it was necessary to demonstrate effective possession, at least since 1967, as well as the chain of transfers, and the first documented transmission is the one existing as of the year 1984, which would send us back to ten years prior, that is, to 1976. The public documents presented speak of at least two transmissions; the one who transmitted possession to the title applicants in 1993, [Nombre1], acquired in turn from [Nombre2] on May 14, 1984, by means of a private sale-purchase letter protocolized on June 15, 1987 (see deed on folio 50-51). See that [Nombre4] first mentioned that the owner was [Nombre5], and then says that [Nombre6] [was the owner], that there were fruit trees, oranges, and lemons, and that the property was dedicated to cattle maintenance, and that later Mr. [Nombre6] sold to the title applicants. That is, he does not refer to [Nombre1] nor to [Nombre2]. Much less to other possessory acts. The witness [Nombre7] also speaks of [Nombre5], saying that about twenty years ago the promoters acquired the property, but he does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of a possessory chain and possessory acts. Finally, [Nombre8] also speaks of [Nombre5]; he says that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember, and that twenty years ago the promoters acquired it. In such a way that it is not possible to determine, truly, from whom [Nombre2] acquired it, and in the sale that he makes in 1984 to [Nombre1], no mention is made (folio 51) of the duration of possession, nor from whom he acquired it. In the judicial inspection report, nothing is said about fruit trees, to which one of the witnesses referred, nor about the existence of a dwelling house. It speaks of the existence of corrals, cattle, and the rest as protected forest, but the stable and continuous possessory acts in that sense are also not indicated. From all the foregoing, it is evident that there are clear contradictions among the witnesses. All of this leads the Tribunal to believe that none of the three witnesses truly knows the property sought to be titled, or if they knew it, they stopped visiting it a long time ago, as the description they give of the property does not correspond to what is observed at present. On the other hand, this Tribunal must point out that, according to the report of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, these territories are important for the reserve of the existing water resource, especially because it presents high hydrological fragility, and therefore they recommend strictly respecting and protecting the waters and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140). VI.- For greater abundance, this Tribunal cites the precedent of the Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51-95, by which various possessors claimed possessory rights over the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste, and in whose judgment it stated: \"XVI. The creation of the Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste is part of the ecological history of our country. It is a response of the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It aimed from long ago to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and to bequeath it to future generations. It was born under the validity of the 1969 Ley Forestal and was created by Decreto Nº 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, private possessors in said areas were to be indemnified for their property and improvements, as they could not carry out agrarian activities to the detriment of the forest resources. To compensate for that situation, and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decreto Nº 8473-A of April 24, 1978, established the possibility of relocating them to properties of the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Many of them were relocated, but others continued possessing within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within an area declared inalienable. Some plaintiffs demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession without being relocated. Among them are [Nombre9], [Nombre10], [Nombre11], [Nombre12], and [Nombre13]. Their claims, consequently, are admissible. This results from a free assessment of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary. And the latter was correctly appreciated by the Tribunal in accordance with numeral 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. The remaining possessors were either relocated or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts aimed at conserving the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is proper to the ecosystem.\" (Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51 of 3:15 p.m. on May 26, 1995). VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, since the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias are not complied with, it is appropriate to REVOKE the judgment and dismiss the present Información Posesoria proceedings. Given the State's opposition, considering that it is part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the interested parties must resort to the corresponding declaratory proceeding, if they see fit to assert their rights.\" 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second opens through a better-conceived regulation via Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was later declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of Forest Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in supplement 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). These contain various regimes of forest property and limit the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals. It is not possible to acquire ownership over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) without demonstrating protection of the forest resource. Its constitutional basis is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institution of forest property and possession is protected. This is not the same as civil or agrarian property; it is property for conservation, and therefore the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.

VIII.Forest possession (posesión forestal) has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forest Laws. It applies to a specific good: lands covered by forests or of forestry suitability. The owner or possessor of such goods has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and may not exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal resolution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, this special legal regime and the principles of Forest Law must be applied. The Forest Law establishes as an essential function and priority of the State, to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources. (Article 1). All lands of forestry suitability and the country's forests, whether state-owned or under private ownership, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulation, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country's forests and lands of forestry suitability. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion (usucapión), the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), amended by the Forest Law, established, before its reform: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is located within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree that created the respective wild area. Farms that are outside these areas and have forests may only be titled if the applicant demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and having protected said natural resource, with the understanding that the property must be properly demarcated with fences or lanes." In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession applies to the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forestry suitability," and possessory acts must be aimed at its protection and conservation. Only if this is demonstrated can lands be acquired or registered in favor of such possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the natural heritage of the State (Article 13 of the new Forest Law), with the character of unattachable and inalienable, and their possession will give rise to no right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Forest Law).

IX.The Agrarian Tribunal had interpreted Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, before being amended by the new Forest Law, in the sense of requiring personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this regard Votes No. 169 of 9:40 a.m. on March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 1991)...". However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forest Law was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the applicant here, and the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Vote No. 4587-97 (published in Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) No. 188 dated October 1, 1997) declared, in relevant part, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, it is declared that the interpretation of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the amendment produced by Forest Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, is unconstitutional, according to which, to title lands located in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree creating the protected wild area, and which does not favor, in these cases, possession transmitted by previous possessors. This judgment is declaratory and its effects retroactive, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith...". So that current possessors can avail themselves of transmitted possession...

X.Forest Law No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Law of Possessory Informations for being able to title lands located in protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is located within a protected wild area, whatever its management category, the applicant must demonstrate being the holder of the legal rights over decennial possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created that wild area." (Bold is ours). That is, the legislator's intent is that these areas have been maintained protected, conserved throughout all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas...". (Resolution of 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Vote No. 113).

V.- In more recent cases, the Tribunal has rejected the claims now reiterated by the appellant regarding the supposed interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Forest Law. In a case similar to the one before us, it was stated: V.- Regarding what was alleged by the appellant that the judge of first instance made an error by applying Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, which he considers was declared unconstitutional and therefore the proceedings must be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers he is not correct, because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional, rather it was the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making insofar as it did not account for the possession exercised by previous transferors. Hence, with Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations being in force, the applicant must demonstrate decennial possession prior to the declaration of the protected wild area, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in vote No. 4587-97 (published in Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that neither would the law be applied retroactively as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year possession period for usucapion is established in the Civil Code and the provision in question simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. In that sense, it is important to note what the Constitutional Chamber stated on the matter in the cited vote: "...The challenged first paragraph of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, whose text predates the last amendment by Forest Law No.7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of titling real property located within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article states that the applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wild area. The challenged provision regulates the case of titling a real property that has been affected to the public domain by the declaration of a protected wild area, whatever its specificity. It is now necessary to determine whether, according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged norm, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion and the possession necessary for usucapion, set forth previously, the challenged norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership over real property, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe the right of property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. In the first place, it must be pointed out that the challenged article does not modify - increase or decrease - the ten-year possession period necessary for usucapion, set in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases in which it is sought to acquire ownership of real property by positive prescription. The extension of the period that the petitioner alleges infringes the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the good being titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the good is affected to the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and impedes the fulfillment of the requirements of usucapion if the right has not been acquired by that time, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion under the conditions established by law have not passed. The foregoing is simply the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as the holder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. Remember that goods affected to the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion if, before the affectation occurs, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right did not occur. In that sense, the challenged provision, despite apparently regulating a specific case of usucapion, does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In that sense, neither does the alleged retroactive effect of the norm occur, because the ten-year possession period for usucapion is established in the Civil Code and the challenged provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. That is, the norm does not come to establish any different principle - or more rigorous requirement - in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion. It simply specifies the manner in which these rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of public domain good of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the amendment to Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion, that could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest. (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 173 of 4:29 p.m. on March 31, 2003).

V.- So that the possessor who intends to acquire by usucapion a forest-covered land, which formed part of the national reserves, must demonstrate decennial possession (original or transmitted), and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation of the Protected Area, being that in this case it involves the Volcán Tenorio National Park, which has been affected to the public domain since the creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve by Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, meaning that decennial possession prior to that date must be demonstrated and that the possessory acts truly consist of the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the applicants present as proof of their possession, from a documentary standpoint, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Name1] sells them the possession, of a mountain and pasture land of a little more than fifty-eight hectares. Said deed refers to decennial possession exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Name2] (folio 65); moreover, they presented the notarial certification of a fixed date, at 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 1987, of the private sale contract signed by [Name2], selling to [Name1], a plot of land measuring approximately sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It must be noted that, according to the plan originally provided, the portion of pastureland was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90), approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered with "mountain," which undoubtedly corresponds to the affectation carried out since 1976 of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Despite this, in one of the plans they presented at the time, there is pastureland in soil categories IV and VII (4.67 and 6.50 hectares respectively). If we observe the testimonial statements, witness [Name3] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which could somehow coincide with a part of the property. However, the Tribunal is very concerned that it was indicated on the plan, as a fact different from reality, that a public road existed, when in reality it was access through private farms, but even more concerning is observing the aerial photograph (orthophoto, from folio 239), where it can be seen how the pasture area has been gradually expanded on the farm sought to be titled, which is not a good sign of an ecological possession (posesión ecológica); quite the contrary, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the pasture and corral area is widened, and the mountain area is restricted. But additionally, a third plan was presented, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the nature of the entire property was changed, indicating on all its perimeters that it is "pastureland," which cannot favor, in any way, the "animus" of exercising a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the representative of the State, in an official communication dated July 17, 2017, brought this circumstance to the attention of the Court. As a result, the applicant had to correct and present a fourth plan. Added to all this is the fact that none of the witnesses really provide a coherent account of the possessory chain. Although all claim to have known the farm since 1960, that is not sufficient to demonstrate, or worse, to take for granted, the existence of an agri-environmental possession (posesión agroambiental) ten years before the creation of the Reserve, as it was necessary to demonstrate effective possession, at least since 1967, as well as the chain of transfers, and the first transmission that is documented is that which existed starting in 1984, which would refer us back ten years, that is, to 1976. The public documents presented speak of at least two transmissions; the one who transmitted possession to the applicants in 1993, [Name1], acquired in turn from [Name2], on May 14, 1984, by means of a private sale contract and notarized on June 15, 1987 (see deed at folios 50-51). Note that [Name4] first mentioned that the owner was [Name5], and later says that [Name6], that there were fruit trees, oranges, and lemons, and that they dedicated the property to cattle maintenance, and that subsequently Mr. [Name6] sold to the applicants. That is, he does not refer to [Name1] nor [Name2]. Much less to other possessory acts. Witness [Name7] also speaks of [Name5], saying that about twenty years ago the applicants acquired the property, but he does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of a possessory chain and possessory acts. Finally, [Name8] also speaks of [Name5], says that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember and that twenty years ago the applicants acquired it. Therefore, it is not possible to determine, really, from whom [Name2] acquired it, and in the sale that the latter makes in 1984 to [Name1], mention is not made (folio 51) of the time of possession, nor from whom he acquired it. In the judicial inspection report, nothing is said about fruit trees, to which one of the witnesses referred, nor about the existence of a dwelling house. It speaks of the existence of cattle-handling facilities, cattle, and the rest protected forest, but the stable and continuous possessory acts in that sense are also not indicated. From all the foregoing, it is clear that there are evident contradictions among the witnesses. All of the above leads the Tribunal to believe that none of the three witnesses really knows the property sought to be titled, or if they knew it, they stopped visiting it a long time ago, because the description they give of the property does not correspond to what is currently observed. On the other hand, it must be indicated by this Tribunal that according to the report from the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), these territories are important for the reserve of the existing water resource, especially because it presents high water fragility, so they recommend rigorously respecting and protecting the waters, and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140).

VI.- For greater abundance, this Tribunal cites the precedent of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), No. 51-95, by which several possessors claimed possessory rights over the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve, and in whose judgment it stated: "XVI. The creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve is part of the ecological history of our country. It is a response of the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It aimed since long ago to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. And to bequeath it to future generations. It was born under the validity of the Forest Law of 1969 and was created by Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, private possessors in said areas were to be compensated for their property and improvements, as they could not conduct agrarian activities to the detriment of the forest resources. To compensate that situation, and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decree No. 8473-A of April 24, 1978, established the possibility of relocating them to farms of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización). Many of them were relocated but others continued to possess within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within a zone declared inalienable. Some plaintiffs demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession (posesión agraria) without being relocated. Among them are [Name9], [Name10], [Name11], [Name12] and [Name13]. Their claims, consequently, are admissible. This results from a free assessment of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary. And this was correctly assessed by the Tribunal in accordance with numeral 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria). The remaining possessors were either relocated, or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts aimed at conserving the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is inherent to the ecosystem." (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 51 of 3:15 p.m. on May 26, 1995).

VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, since what is provided in Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations has not been fulfilled, the appropriate course is to REVOKE the judgment and reject the present Possessory Information proceedings (diligencias de Información Posesoria). Given the State's opposition, considering that it is part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the interested parties must resort to the corresponding declaratory route, if they deem it appropriate to assert their rights." First, it must be noted that the first-instance judge's argument is not based on applying the provisions of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, since it refers to a general possession of ten years in its relation of proven facts. Regarding this rule, the following has been stated: IV.- On the subject of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, and the State Natural Heritage, the Tribunal has repeatedly expressed in its decisions: “The Law of Possessory Informations, in its Article 7, as well as the Forest Laws, have sought to protect forest resources from human action, subjecting them to various forms of forest management. Although the titling of such areas has been permitted, which, once declared conservation areas, become part of the State Forest Heritage, compliance with other more qualified requirements is demanded. This leads us directly to the concept of ecological possession, and to the criterion of the ecological function of forest ownership. In repeated judgments, both of the First Chamber of Cassation and the Superior Agrarian Tribunal, the principles that must govern the resolution of these types of agro-environmental situations have been established. Our country has been a pioneer in the construction of the institutions of agrarian possession and ecological possession. The same case law has recognized and developed these institutions, as well as the life cycle of agrarian possession and, recently, of ecological possession (within the broader criterion of the ecological function of forest ownership). The same case law has sought to distinguish business ownership and possession, where an activity directed at forest cultivation is exercised, from that where an extractive activity is simply carried out, or a merely conservational one. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of forest ownership or possession (without a business). It is precisely in these cases where the Forest Law establishes a whole legal regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner obligatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. Thus, in forest possession, the power of fact is exercised over a good of forest vocation or mostly intended to protect forest resources, without a view to its exploitation, or dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve natural regeneration of the forest. In both cases, there would be no development of a plant or animal biological cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, but rather represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. Furthermore, it denies the possibility of acquiring possession rights over lands of national reserves when harmful action has been exercised against forest resources. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a Forest Law, with characteristics of an organic and complete system, where the institutions of forest ownership and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest ownership, and also forest possession as a real right derived from it, or independently conceived, began to take shape from the Fiscal Code of 1885, which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests, whose regulations tend toward their conservation. Subsequently, Law of Vacant Lands No. 13 of January 6, 1939, incorporates said principles. Later, the Law of Lands and Colonization, in its Article 7, extends the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- VII. The special legislation regarding the protection of forest ownership and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest ownership is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second opens up through a better-conceived regulation through Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of Forest Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in Scope 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). In them, various regimes of forest ownership are contained, and the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals is limited. It is not possible to acquire ownership over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) unless one demonstrates having protected the forest resource. Its constitutional basis is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institution of forest ownership and possession is protected. This is not the same as civil or agrarian ownership; it is a type of ownership for conservation, and therefore, the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.- VIII. Forest possession has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forest Laws. It falls upon a specific good: lands covered by forests or of forest aptitude. The owner or possessor of such goods has the obligation to conserve forest resources and cannot exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal solution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, this special legal regime and the principles of Forest Law must be applied. The Forest Law establishes it as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All lands of forest aptitude and the forests of the country, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulation, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the forests and lands of forest aptitude of the country. Therefore, to acquire forest ownership by adverse possession, the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, amended by the Forest Law, established, before its amendment: "Article 7.- When the immovable property to which the information refers is located within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the titling applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession for at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree that created the respective wild area. Properties outside these areas that have forests may only be titled if the applicant demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and having protected said natural resource, with the understanding that the immovable property must be duly demarcated with fences or lanes." In other terms, the power of fact in forest possession falls upon the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be directed toward its protection and conservation. Only if that is demonstrated can lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the State Natural Heritage (Article 13 of the new Forest Law), with an unattachable and inalienable character, and their possession will not create any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Forest Law).- IX. The Agrarian Tribunal had interpreted Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, before it was amended by the new Forest Law, as requiring personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this regard, Votes No. 169 of 9:40 a.m. on March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 1991)...". However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forest Law was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the title applicant here, and the Constitutional Chamber, in Vote No. 4587-97 (published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997), declared, in what is relevant, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, the interpretation of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the amendment produced by Forest Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, is unconstitutional, according to which, to title lands located in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession with ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree creating the protected wild area is required, and which does not favor, in these cases, possession transmitted by previous possessors. This judgment is declarative and has retroactive effects, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith...". Such that current possessors can take advantage of transmitted possession... X. Forest Law No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Law of Possessory Informations for titling lands located in protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: "Article 7.- When the immovable property to which the information refers is located within a protected wild area, whatever its management category, the titling applicant must demonstrate being the holder of legal rights over the decennial possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree by which that wild area was created." (Our emphasis). That is, the legislator's intention is that these areas have been kept protected, conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas...". (Resolution of 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Vote No. 113). V.- In more recent cases, the Tribunal has rejected the arguments that the appellant now reiterates, regarding the alleged interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Forest Law. In a case similar to the one at hand, it was said: V.- Regarding what was alleged by the appellant, that the first-instance judge commits an error in applying Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, which he considers was declared unconstitutional and therefore the proceedings should be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers that he is not correct, because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional; rather, it was the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making, regarding not counting the possession exercised by previous transferors, that was declared unconstitutional. Hence, as Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations is in force, the applicant must demonstrate decennial possession before the declaration of the protected wild area, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 4587-97 (published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law would not be applied retroactively either, as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year period of possession for adverse possession is established in the Civil Code, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to adverse possession that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of the possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for adverse possession. In this sense, it is important to note what the Constitutional Chamber stated in this regard in the cited vote: “… The challenged first paragraph of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, whose text predates the latest amendment by Forest Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of titling immovable property located within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. This article states that the titling applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession for at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wild area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling an immovable property that has been affected to the public domain by the declaration of a protected wild area, whatever its specificity. It is now necessary to determine if, according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged rule, in light of the doctrinal and case law criteria that inform the institutions of adverse possession and the possession necessary for adverse possession, set forth above, the questioned norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership of immovable property, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe upon the right of property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. Firstly, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year period of possession necessary for adverse possession, set forth in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases in which one seeks to acquire ownership of immovable property by positive prescription. The extension of the period that the appellant alleges infringes upon the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the good to be titled (a public thing), the period of possession suitable for adverse possession must elapse before the property is affected to the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and prevents the requirements for adverse possession from being completed if the right has not been acquired by that moment, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for adverse possession have not elapsed under the conditions established by law. The foregoing is only the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as the title holder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. It is recalled that goods affected to the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by adverse possession, if the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right did not occur before the affectation occurred. In this sense, the questioned provision, although it apparently regulates a specific case of adverse possession, does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In this sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm does not occur either, because the ten-year period of possession for adverse possession is established in the Civil Code, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to adverse possession that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for adverse possession. That is, the norm does not come to establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of adverse possession. It simply specifies how those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition as a public domain good of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the amendment to Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of adverse possession, which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands declared of public interest. (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 173 of 4:29 p.m. on March 31, 2003). V.- So that the possessor who intends to acquire by adverse possession a forest-covered land that formed part of the national reserves must demonstrate the decennial possession (original or transmitted), and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation of the Protected Area, with this case involving the Volcán Tenorio National Park, which has been affected to the public domain since the creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve by Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, meaning that decennial possession prior to that date must be demonstrated, and that the possessory acts consist, truly, in the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the title applicants present as proof of their possession, from a documentary standpoint, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Name1] sells them the possession of a piece of land consisting of mountain and pasture of a little over fifty-eight hectares. Said deed makes reference to a decennial possession exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Name2] (folio 65); furthermore, the notarial certification of a fixed date was presented, at 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 1987, of the private sale letter signed by [Name2], selling to [Name1], a plot of land measuring more or less sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It must be noted that, according to the plan originally provided, the pasture portion was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90); approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered by "mountain", which undoubtedly results from the affectation carried out since 1976 of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Despite this, in one of the plans they presented at the time, pasture exists on the Category IV and VII soils (4.67 and 6.50 hectares respectively). If the testimonial statements are observed, witness [Name3] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which in some way could coincide with a part of the immovable property. However, the Tribunal is greatly concerned that the plan indicated, as a fact different from reality, the existence of a public road, when in reality there was access through private properties; but even more so, it is concerning to observe the aerial photograph (orthophoto, folio 239), where one can observe how the pasture area has been gradually expanded on the property being titled, which is not a good sign of ecological possession; quite the opposite, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how, in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the pasture and corral area is widened, and the mountain area is restricted. But in addition, a third plan was presented, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the nature of the entire immovable property was changed, indicating in all its perimeters that it is "pasture", which cannot in any way favor the "animus" of exercising a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the State representative, in an official letter dated July 17, 2017, brought this circumstance to the attention of the Court. Hence, the title applicant had to correct and present a fourth plan. Adding to all this is the fact that none of the witnesses actually provide a coherent account of the possessory chain. Despite all of them affirming they have known the property since 1960, that is not sufficient to demonstrate, or worse, to take for granted, the existence of agro-environmental possession ten years before the creation of the Reserve, since effective possession had to be demonstrated, at least from 1967, as well as the chain of transfers; the first transmission that is documented is the one existing from the year 1984, which would send us back ten years, i.e., to 1976. The public documents presented speak of at least two transmissions; the person who transferred the possession to the title applicants in 1993, [Name1], acquired it in turn from [Name2] on May 14, 1984, through a private sale letter and protocolized on June 15, 1987 (see deed at folios 50-51). See that [Name4] first mentioned that the owner was [Name5], and later says [Name6]; that there were fruit trees, oranges, and lemons, and that they dedicated the property to maintaining cattle, and that later Mr. [Name6] sold to the title applicants. That is, he does not refer to [Name1] nor to [Name2]. Much less to other possessory acts. Witness [Name7] also speaks of [Name5], saying that the applicants acquired the property about twenty years ago, but does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of a possessory chain and possessory acts. Finally, [Name8] also speaks of [Name5], says that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember, and that the applicants acquired it twenty years ago. Thus, it is not possible to determine, really, from whom [Name2] acquired it, and in the sale he made in 1984 to [Name1], the deed (folio 51) does not speak of the time of possession, nor from whom he acquired it. In the judicial inspection record, nothing is said about fruit trees, to which one of the witnesses referred, nor about the existence of a dwelling house. There is talk of the existence of cattle-handling facilities, cattle, and the rest as protected forest, but stable and continuous possessory acts in that sense are not indicated either. From all the foregoing, it is clear that there are evident contradictions among the witnesses. All of the above leads this Tribunal to think that none of the three witnesses really knows the property they seek to title, or if they knew it, they stopped visiting it a long time ago, because the description they give of the immovable property does not correspond to what is observed today. On the other hand, this Tribunal must indicate that according to the report of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, these territories are of importance for the reserve of the existing water resource, especially because they exhibit high water fragility, and therefore they recommend rigorously respecting and protecting the waters and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140). VI.- For greater abundance, this Tribunal cites the precedent of the First Chamber of Cassation, No. 51-95, through which various possessors claimed possessory rights over the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve, and in whose judgment it stated: "XVI. The creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve is part of the ecological history of our country. It is a response of the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It sought since long ago to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and to bequeath it to future generations. It was born under the validity of the Forest Law of 1969 and was created by Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, the private possessors in said areas were to be compensated for their property and improvements, since they could not carry out agrarian activities to the detriment of the forest resources. To compensate this situation and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decree No. 8473-A of April 24, 1978, established the possibility of relocating them to properties of the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Many of them were relocated, but others continued possessing within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within an area declared inalienable. Some plaintiffs demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession without being relocated. Among them are [Name9], [Name10], [Name11], [Name12], and [Name13]. Their claims, consequently, are accepted. This results from a free assessment of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, and it was correctly assessed by the Tribunal in accordance with numeral 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction. The remaining possessors were either relocated or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts tending to conserve the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is inherent to the ecosystem." (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 51 of 3:15 p.m. on May 26, 1995). VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, since the provisions of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations are not fulfilled, the appropriate action is to REVOKE the judgment and dismiss the present Possessory Information proceedings. By virtue of the State's opposition, considering that it is part of the State Forest Heritage, the interested parties must resort to the corresponding declaratory proceeding, if they deem it appropriate, to assert their rights."

"III.- En cuanto al fondo del asunto. En primer lugar, debe indicarse que el argumento del Juez de primera instancia no se basa en la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, pues se refiere a una posesión general de diez años en su relación de hechos probados. Sobre esta norma se ha indicado lo siguiente: IV.- Sobre al tema de la interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, y el Patrimonio Natural del Estado el Tribunal en reiteradas resoluciones ha expresado: “La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, en su artículo 7, así como las Leyes Forestales han procurado proteger los recursos forestales de la acción humana, sometiéndolos a diversas formas de manejo forestal. Aunque se ha permitido la titulación de dichas áreas, que ya declaradas como áreas de conservación pasan a formar parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, se exige el cumplimiento de otros requisitos más calificados. Eso nos conduce, directamente al concepto de posesión ecológica, y al criterio de la función ecológica de la propiedad forestal. En reiteradas sentencias, tanto de la Sala Primera de Casación, como del mismo Tribunal Superior Agrario, se han establecido los principios que deben regir para resolver éste tipo de situaciones agro-ambientales. Nuestro país ha sido pionero en la construcción de los institutos de la posesión agraria y la posesión ecológica. La misma jurisprudencia ha reconocido y desarrollado estos institutos, así como el ciclo de vida de la posesión agraria y, recientemente de la posesión ecológica (dentro del más amplio criterio de la función ecológica de la propiedad forestal). La misma Jurisprudencia ha querido distinguir la propiedad y posesión empresarial donde se ejercita una actividad dirigida al cultivo del bosque, de aquella donde simplemente se realiza una actividad extractiva o bien, meramente conservativa. En estos últimos casos se estaría en presencia de una propiedad o posesión forestal (sin empresa). Precisamente es en estos casos donde la Ley Forestal viene a establecer todo un régimen jurídico para la protección de los recursos forestales, sometiendo algunas veces al propietario en forma obligatoria al régimen forestal y en otros casos en forma voluntaria. De esa forma, en la posesión forestal el poder de hecho se ejerce sobre un bien de vocación forestal o en su mayor parte destinado a proteger los recursos forestales, sin miras a su explotación o bien, dedicándolo a la simple extracción de especies maderables, a través de planes de manejo para lograr la regeneración natural del bosque. En uno y otro caso no existiría el desarrollo de un ciclo biológico vegetal o animal, ni asumiría el hombre ningún riesgo. Es por eso que la ley no tutela, al contrario reprime, la posesión a través de la cual se destruyan los recursos forestales de áreas protegidas. Además niega la posibilidad de adquirir derechos de posesión sobre tierras de las reservas nacionales cuando se ha ejercido una acción dañina en contra de los recursos forestales. Hoy, parte de la doctrina agrarista afirma la existencia de un Derecho forestal, con particularidades de sistema orgánico y completo, donde ocupan un lugar importante los institutos de la propiedad y posesión forestal. En Costa Rica la propiedad forestal, y también la posesión forestal como derecho real derivado de aquella, o bien concebido en forma independiente, se comienza a perfilar desde el Código Fiscal de 1885, que establece todo un capítulo en cuanto a bosques cuyas regulaciones tienden a su conservación. Posteriormente la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 del 6 de enero de 1939 incorpora dichos principios. Luego la Ley de Tierras y Colonización en su artículo 7 amplía las reservas nacionales para la protección de tales recursos.- VII. La legislación especial en cuanto a la tutela de la propiedad y posesión forestales tiene tres etapas en nuestro país. La primera etapa de la propiedad forestal se enmarca con la Ley No. 4465 del 35 de noviembre de 1969. La segunda se abre a través de una normativa mejor concebida a través de la Ley No. 7032 del 7 de abril de 1986, la cual fue posteriormente declarada inconstitucional. La última opera con la promulgación de la Ley Forestal No. 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, reformada recientemente, por Ley No. 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996 (publicada en el alcance 21 de La Gaceta No. 72 del martes 16 de abril de 1996). En ellas, se contienen diversos regímenes de propiedad forestal, y limita el uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos por los particulares. No es posible adquirir la titularidad sobre terrenos con cobertura boscosa si no se demuestra haber protegido el recurso forestal. Su fundamento constitucional se encuentra en el párrafo segundo del artículo 45 de la Constitución. A través de limitaciones de interés social se protege el instituto de la propiedad y la posesión forestal. Esta no es igual a la civil, ni a la agraria, se trata de una propiedad para conservar, y por tanto los actos posesorios que en ella se realicen deben tener esa finalidad.- VIII. La posesión forestal ha tenido su régimen jurídico en las Leyes Forestales mencionadas. Recae sobre un bien específico: los terrenos cubiertos de bosques o de aptitud forestal. El propietario o poseedor de tales bienes tiene la obligación de conservar los recursos forestales y no los puede aprovechar económicamente sino bajo las restricciones o limitaciones impuestas por la ley. Para la solución jurídica de conflictos que nazcan del ejercicio de la posesión forestal, se debe aplicar ese régimen jurídico especial y los principios del Derecho forestal. La Ley Forestal establece como función esencial y prioridad del Estado, velar por la protección, la conservación, el aprovechamiento, la industrialización, la administración y el fomento de los recursos forestales del país, de acuerdo con el principio de uso racional de los recursos naturales renovables.(Artículo 1). Todos los terrenos de aptitud forestal y los bosques del país, ya sea estatales o que estén reducidos a dominio particular, quedan sometidos a los fines de la ley. El régimen forestal es el conjunto de disposiciones, entre otras, de carácter jurídico, económico y técnico, establecidas por la ley, su reglamento y demás normas, que regulen la conservación, la renovación, el aprovechamiento y el desarrollo de los bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal del país. Por ello, para adquirir la propiedad forestal por usucapión, se requiere el ejercicio de la posesión forestal. El artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones posesorias, reformado por la Ley Forestal, establecía, antes de su reforma: "Artículo 7.- Cuando el inmueble a que se refiere la información esté comprendido dentro de una zona declarada parque nacional, reserva biológico, reserva forestal o zona protectora, el titulante tendrá que demostrar haber ejercido la posesión decenal con por lo menos diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la respectiva ley o decreto en que se creó la respectiva área silvestre. Las fincas que estén fuera de esas áreas y que tengan bosques, solo podrán ser tituladas si el promovente demuestra haberlas poseído por diez años o más y haber protegido dicho recurso natural, en el entendido de que el inmueble tendrá que estar debidamente deslindado con cercas o carriles." En otros términos, el poder de hecho en la posesión forestal recae sobre el recurso natural "bosques" o "terrenos de aptitud forestal", y los actos posesorios deben ir encaminados a su protección y conservación. Sólo si se demuestra eso podría adquirirse o inscribirse terrenos a favor de dichos poseedores. De lo contrario, quedarían formando parte del patrimonio natural del estado (artículo 13 de la nueva Ley Forestal), con carácter inembargable e inalienable, y su posesión no causará ningún derecho a favor de los particulares (artículo 14 de la nueva Ley Forestal).- IX. El Tribunal Agrario, había interpretado el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, antes de ser reformado por la nueva Ley Forestal, en el sentido de exigir una posesión personal, ejercida con diez años de antelación a la creación de la reserva forestal o área protegida (Véase en tal sentido los Votos No. 169 de las 9 horas 40 minutos del 22 de marzo de 1991 y No. 251 de las 14 horas del 17 de abril de 1991)...". Sin embargo, esa interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley Forestal, fue cuestionada de "inconstitucional", por la aquí titulante, y la Sala Constitucional, en Voto No. 4587-97 (publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 188 de fecha 1 de octubre de 1997) declaró, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: "Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción y, en consecuencia, que es inconstitucional la interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley de informaciones Posesorias No. 139 del 14 de julio de 1941, cuyo texto corresponde a la reforma producida por la Ley Forestal No. 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, de acuerdo con la cual para titular terrenos comprendidos en parques nacionales, reservas biológicas, reservas forestales o zonas protectoras, se requiere posesión personal con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto que crea el área silvestre protegida, y que no favorece en estos casos la posesión transmitida por anteriores poseedores. Esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe...". De manera tal que los poseedores actuales pueden aprovechar la posesión trasmitida...X. La Ley Forestal No. 7575, también mantuvo las restricciones en la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, para poder titular terrenos comprendidos en áreas protegidas. Al respecto dispone el actual numeral: "Artículo 7.-Cuando el inmueble al que se refiera la información esté comprendido dentro de un área silvestre protegida, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, el titulante deberá demostrar ser titular de los derechos legales sobre la posesión decenal, ejercida por lo menos con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto en que se creó esa área silvestre."(La negrita es nuestra). Es decir, la intención del legislador es que esas áreas se hayan mantenido protegidas, conservadas durante todo este tipo, incluso antes de la creación de las Reservas y áreas protegidas...". (Resolución de las 14:50 horas del 20 de febrero de 1998 que responde al Voto No. 113). V.- En casos más recientes, el Tribunal ha rechazado los alegatos que ahora reitera el apelante, sobre la supuesta interpretación o aplicación retroactiva del artículo 7 de la Ley Forestal. En un caso similar al que nos ocupa se dijo: V.- En cuanto a lo alegado por el recurrente respecto a que el juzgador de instancia comete un error al aplicar el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, el cual considera fue declarado inconstitucional por lo que debe analizarse las diligencias a la luz de lo dispuesto por el artículo 1 de dicha Ley, considera este Tribunal no lleva razón pues el artículo 7 citado no fue declarado inconstitucional, sino lo fue la interpretación que venía haciendo el Tribunal en cuanto no se contabilizaba la posesión ejercida por los anteriores transmitentes. De ahí, al estar vigente el ordinal 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, debe el promovente demostrar una posesión decenal antes de la declaratoria del área silvestre protegida según lo indicó la Sala Constitucional en el voto No. 4587-97 (publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 188 de fecha 1 de octubre de 1997). Es importante mencionar que tampoco se estaría aplicando retroactivamente la ley como lo indica el recurrente, porque el plazo de diez años de posesión para usucapir se encuentra establecido en el Código Civil y la disposición cuestionada simplemente destaca ciertos elementos propios de la usucapión que también están definidos en la normativa general, como son: el objeto de la posesión y las condiciones en que ésta se debe ejercer para ser apta para la usucapión. En ese sentido es importante señalar lo dicho por la Sala Constitucional al respecto en el voto citado “…El artículo 7 párrafo primero de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias impugnado, cuyo texto es anterior a la última reforma por Ley Forestal No.7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, regula el caso de la titulación de bienes inmuebles comprendidos dentro de un área declarada parque nacional, reserva biológica, reserva forestal o zona protectora. Señala ese artículo que el titulante tendrá que demostrar haber ejercido la posesión decenal con por lo menos diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o el decreto que creó el área silvestre. La disposición cuestionada regula el caso de titulación de un bien inmueble que ha sido afectado al dominio público con la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida, cualquiera que sea su especificidad. Corresponde ahora determinar si de acuerdo con la hipótesis que contempla la norma impugnada, a la luz de los criterios doctrinarios y jurisprudenciales que informan los institutos de la usucapión y de la posesión necesaria para usucapir, expuestos anteriormente, la norma cuestionada regula un tipo especial de posesión necesaria para adquirir la propiedad sobre los bienes inmuebles, que impone requisitos específicos que pueden infringir el derecho de propiedad o el principio de irretroactividad de la ley en perjuicio de derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, regulados en la Constitución. En primer término, debe señalarse que el artículo cuestionado no modifica -aumenta o disminuye- el plazo de diez años de posesión necesario para usucapir, fijado en el artículo 860 del Código Civil para la generalidad de los casos en que se pretende adquirir la propiedad de los bienes inmuebles por prescripción positiva. La ampliación del plazo que alega el accionante como infractor del derecho a la propiedad no se produce, porque dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público. Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley. Lo anterior es únicamente el resultado natural de aplicar los conceptos sobre el objeto de la posesión y su condición de ejercicio en calidad de titular, necesarios para la posesión ad usucapionem. Recuérdese que los bienes afectados al dominio público, tengan las especificaciones que tengan, no son susceptibles de adquisición por usucapión, si antes de producirse la afectación no se dieron las condiciones necesarias para la adquisición del derecho. En ese sentido, la disposición cuestionada, a pesar de que en apariencia regula un caso específico de usucapión, no crea un régimen con requisitos diferentes a los establecidos en el Código Civil para la generalidad de los casos. En ese sentido, tampoco se produce el alegado efecto retroactivo de la norma, porque el plazo de diez años de posesión para usucapir se encuentra establecido en el Código Civil y la disposición cuestionada simplemente destaca ciertos elementos propios de la usucapión que también están definidos en la normativa general, como son: el objeto de la posesión y las condiciones en que ésta se debe ejercer para ser apta para la usucapión. Es decir, la norma no viene a establecer ningún principio diferente -o requisito más riguroso- en relación con la aplicación de las reglas generales de la usucapión. Simplemente especifica la forma en que deben aplicarse esas reglas, lo que coincide con un resultado lógico dada la condición de bien demanial del objeto a titular. De ahí que no se considere que la reforma al artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, cuyo texto se impugna, haya introducido un régimen diferente en relación con los requisitos de la usucapión, que haya podido agravar la situación de personas que se encontraban ejerciendo posesión ad usucapionem en terrenos que fueron declarados de interés público. (Tribunal Agrario, No. 173 de las 16:29 horas del 31 de marzo del 2003). V.- De manera que el poseedor que pretenda adquirir por usucapión un terreno cubierto de bosque, que formaba parte de las reservas nacionales, deberá demostrar la posesión decenal (originaria o trasmitida), y haber conservado el recurso forestal, al menos diez años antes de la creación del área Protegida, siendo que en este caso se trata del Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, que está afectado al dominio público desde la creación de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste mediante Decreto No. 5836-A del 16 de marzo de 1976, siendo que debería de demostrarse una posesión decenal anterior a esa fecha y que los actos posesorios consistan, verdaderamente, en la protección del recurso forestal. En el presente caso, los titulantes presentan como prueba de su posesión, desde el punto de vista documental, la escritura No. 136 del 11 de agosto de 1993, por la cual [Nombre1] les vende la posesión, de un terreno de montaña y pasto de poco más de cincuenta y ocho hectáreas. En dicha escritura se hace referencia a una posesión decenal ejercida por él y su anterior trasmitente, [Nombre2] (folio 65); además, presentó la razón notarial de fecha cierta, de las 10 horas del 15 de junio de 1987, de la carta venta privada suscrita por [Nombre2] , vendiéndole a [Nombre1] , un lote de terreno que mide más o menos sesenta manzanas (folios 50 y 51). Debe hacerse notar, que según el plano originalmente aportado, la porción de potrero era menor (ver Plano A-878231-90), aproximadamente el 70 % (39.40 hectáreas) del terreno está cubierto de "montaña", lo que sin duda alguna obedece a la afectación que se realizó desde el año 1976 de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Pese a ello, en uno de los planos que presentaron en su momento, siendo que en los suelos categorías IV y VII existe potrero (4,67 y 6,50 hectáreas respectivamente). Si se observan las declaraciones testimoniales, el testigo [Nombre3] , indica que el área aproximada mide treinta hectáreas y es mixta, lo que de alguna manera podía coincidir con una parte del inmueble. Sin embargo, al Tribunal le preocupa mucho que se haya indicado en el plano, como un dato distinto de la realidad, que existiera calle pública, cuando en realidad era un acceso por fincas privadas, pero más aún, es preocupante observar la fotografía aérea (ortofoto, de folio 239), donde se observa cómo, paulatinamente, se ha ido ampliando el área de repastos, en la finca que se pretende titular, lo que no es buen signo de una posesión ecológica, todo lo contrario, ha existido una invasión al territorio del Parque Nacional. Véase cómo en el plano del 2013 (folio 240), se ensancha el área de potrero y corral, y se restringe el área de montaña. Pero además, se presentó un el tercer plano, a saber el Número A-1954148-2017, en donde se le cambió a la totalidad del inmueble su naturaleza, indicando en todos sus perímetros que se trata de "potrero", lo cual no puede favorecer, en modo alguno, el "animus" de ejercicio de una posesión que debe ser ecológica. De ahí que el representante del Estado, en oficio del 17 de julio del 2017, hizo ver esa circunstancia al Juzgado. De ahí que el titulante debió corregir y presentar un cuarto plano. A todo eso, se suma el hecho de que ninguno de los testigos, realmente hacen una relación coherente respecto la cadena posesoria. Pese a que todos afirman conocer la finca desde 1960, eso no es suficiente para demostrar, o peor, dar por sentada, la existencia de una posesión agroambiental diez años antes de la creación de la Reserva, pues debía demostrarse una posesión efectiva, al menos desde 1967, así como la cadena de traspasos, y la primera transmisión que se encuentra documentada es la que existiera a partir del año 1984, que nos reenviaría a diez años anteriores, sea a 1976. Los documentos públicos presentados hablan de al menos dos transmisiones; quien le trasmitió la posesión a los titulantes, en 1993, [Nombre1] , adquirió a su vez de [Nombre2] , el 14 de mayo de 1984, mediante carta de venta privada y protocolizada el 15 de junio de 1987 (ver escritura de folio 50-51). Véase que [Nombre4] , primero mencionó que el dueño era [Nombre5] , y después dice que [Nombre6] , que habían árboles frutales, naranjas y limones, y que la propiedad la dedicaban al mantenimiento de ganado, y que posteriormente el señor [Nombre6] vendió a los titulantes. Es decir, no se refiere a [Nombre1] ni a [Nombre2] . Mucho menos a otros actos posesorios. El testigo [Nombre7] , también habla de [Nombre5] , diciendo que hace como veinte años los promoventes adquirieron la propiedad, pero no recuerda quién les vendió. Hay también una ausencia de cadena posesoria y de actos posesorios. Finalmente, [Nombre8] habla también de [Nombre5] , dice que él le traspasó a otra persona que no recuerda el nombre y que hace veinte años los promoventes adquirieron. De modo tal que no es posible determinar, realmente, de quién adquirió [Nombre2] , y en la venta que éste hace en 1984 a [Nombre1] , no se habla (folio 51) de tiempo de posesión, ni de quién adquirió. En el acta de reconocimiento judicial no se dice nada sobre árboles frutales, a los que se refirió uno de los testigos, y tampoco a la existencia de una casa de habitación. Se habla de la existencia de apartos, ganado, y el resto de bosque protegido, pero tampoco se indican los actos posesorios estables y continuos en ese sentido. De todo lo anterior se desprende que existen contracciones evidentes de los testigos. Todo lo anterior hace pensar al Tribunal que ninguno de los tres testigos realmente conoce la propiedad que se pretende titular, o si la conocieron dejaron de visitarla hace mucho tiempo, pues la descripción que dan del inmueble no corresponde a lo que se observa en la actualidad. Por otra parte, debe indicarse por parte de este Tribunal, que según el informe del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, estos territorios son de importancia para la reserva del recurso hídrico existente, sobre todo porque presenta una alta fragilidad hídrica, por lo que recomiendan respetar y proteger rigurosamente las aguas, y sus zonas de recarga y protección (ver folios 139 y 140). VI.- A mayor abundamiento, este Tribunal cita el antecedente de la Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51-95, mediante el cual varios poseedores reclamaron derechos posesorios sobre al Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guancaste, y en cuya sentencia señaló: "XVI. La creación de la Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste es parte de la historia ecológica de nuestro país. Es una respuesta del legislador costarricense a la conservación de los recursos naturales. Pretendió desde antaño garantizar el ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Y heredárselo a las futuras generaciones. Nació bajo la vigencia de la Ley Forestal de 1969 y fue creada por Decreto Nº 5836-A del 16 de marzo de 1976. Con su creación los particulares poseedores en dichas áreas debían ser indemnizados en su propiedad y mejoras, pues no podían realizar actividades agrarias en detrimento de los recursos forestales. Para compensar esa situación, y no dejar desprotegidos a muchos poseedores, el Decreto Nº 8473-A del 24 de abril de 1978 estableció la posibilidad de reubicarlos en fincas del Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Muchos de ellos fueron reubicados pero otros continuaron poseyendo dentro de la Reserva Forestal. Es decir poseían dentro de una zona declarada inalienable. Algunos actores demostraron el ejercicio de la posesión agraria sin ser reubicados. Dentro de ellos están [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] . Sus pretensiones, en consecuencia, son de recibo. Ello resulta de una libre valoración de la prueba, tanto testimonial como documental. Y ésta apreciada correctamente por el Tribunal conforme al numeral 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. Los restantes poseedores, o fueron reubicados, o no demostraron el ejercicio de actos posesorios efectivos e intencionales tendientes a conservar el bosque. Sus terrenos estaban total y prácticamente cubiertos por bosques naturales cuya conservación es propia del ecosistema." (Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51 de las 15:15 horas del 26 de mayo de 1995). VI.- En virtud de todo lo anterior, al no cumplirse lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones posesorias, lo procedente es REVOCAR la sentencia y rechazar las presentes diligencias de Información Posesoria. En virtud de la oposición del Estado, al considerarse que es parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, deberán los interesados acudir a la vía declarativa correspondiente, si a bien lo tienen a hacer valer sus derechos."