CONAVI Liability for Failure to Maintain National RoadsResponsabilidad del CONAVI por incumplimiento en el mantenimiento de vías nacionales

VI.- SOME GENERALITIES REGARDING THE PATRIMONIAL LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: On repeated occasions, this Section of the Court has indicated regarding the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration that it constitutes a guarantee for the administered party and the justiciable, which can be derived, in our legal system, through a series of constitutional precepts, among them, those established in Articles 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, and 49 of the Fundamental Charter (to mention only some of those that refer to said guarantee). Said articles contain principles related to efficiency, accountability, distributive justice, the right to patrimonial integrity, the right to compensation for injuries suffered, and judicial control of administrative action, whose jurisprudential and normative development, especially by Articles 190 and following of the General Law of the Public Administration, imply the establishment in our legal system of a liability system that attempts to cover damages derived from administrative conduct originating in a legal relationship of a contractual and extracontractual nature, and that responds to the undeniable reality that life in society necessarily entails the intervention of public powers in many areas of the life of a country's inhabitants, which opens the possibilities for the conduct of the Public Administration to generate damages and create risk situations for individuals (and even for the Administration's own components), which they are not obligated to bear. Aspects that, moreover, it is necessary to point out, are not only recognized by the domestic legal system; on the contrary, it finds its bases in the international legal system, to which our Rule of Law is subject. We are faced with a liability scheme that aims to guarantee coverage for an unlawful injury suffered on the occasion of the legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the Administration (in its different types of personifications and whether acting in the sphere of administrative law or subject to private law), in which the existence of the damage stands as the central axis, since it will be compensable when there is no legal duty to bear it, regardless of the normality or abnormality, lawfulness or unlawfulness of the conduct (Art. 190 LGAP), and regardless of its nature, since liability can arise on the occasion of actions of a legal nature, as well as purely material ones, and even omissions. Thus, unlawfulness refers to a detriment suffered by a person, in their vital or patrimonial assets, that is not bearable, since otherwise, when the damage must be tolerated, it loses its unlawful character. "Thus, following constitutional jurisprudence, it has been pointed out that this meaning of unlawful damage as the foundation of the state's duty to repair harmonizes fully with the principles and values inherent to the social state of law because it is the State's responsibility to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the administered parties against the administration itself (...) Likewise, it is considered that Article 90 of the Charter, considering jurisprudential constructions, gave a new normative approach to the patrimonial liability of the State, shifting its foundation from lack of service to unlawful damage. This implies the expansion of the space in which the State's patrimonial liability can be declared, since the starting point for determining that liability is no longer determined by irregular state action -whether due to the non-provision of the service, irregular provision, or delayed provision-, but by the production of an unlawful damage that the victim is not under a duty to bear, independently of the regularity or irregularity of its action." (Santofimio Gamboa Orlando. Conventionality and State Responsibility: From Classical Individualism to Victims' Law. The Protection of Rights Against the Power of the Administration). Editorial TEMIS, Bogotá. Colombia, 2014, p. 476). Regarding the unlawfulness of the damage, the First Chamber, in judgment number 000584-F-2005, at 10:45 on August eleventh, two thousand five, stated: "Indeed, civil liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while at other times, from the basic principle translated as the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to the detriment to a third party contrary to the legal system. If it does not exist, repair is not appropriate. This results, even in liability for lawful conduct, where despite the full lawfulness of the conduct adopted, an injury is produced that, because it is not mandatory to bear, is unlawful in its basis, in accordance with what has been said. Thus, if the duty to endure the injury does not exist (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration), assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent. The breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person then occurs, and in that regard, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim must be considered unlawful, and therefore, subject to mandatory repair. In this way, it can be affirmed that only the injury that, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be considered unlawful in its basis is compensable, because the contrary would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified. It must be reiterated then, that for the existence in Law of a due repair, there must be antecedent and underlying unlawfulness, which in no way points to the nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of the conduct deployed by the agent producing the damage, nor to the result that said action or omission produces. Indeed, even in cases of legitimate and normal functioning, in which there is no unlawfulness in the behavior, a harmful consequence is produced, which with certain characteristics (exceptional intensity or a small proportion of affected persons), is considered subject to mandatory repair, which speaks of its unlawfulness, so much so that with the injury itself arises the civil obligation and its consequent right to sue. It can be maintained, then, that the underlying unlawfulness, to which reference is made as the substratum and global and essential precondition for liability, is something distinct and independent from the attribution parameter used by the Legal System, since even in the event of a strict regime (that excludes the subjective elements of fault and intent, to give way to a simple economic transfer aimed at restoring the imbalance produced in the equality of public burdens), there is unlawfulness, to the extent that the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit assumption of an injury contrary to Law, which must not be borne by the victim. That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in compensable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning." It is, then, a system of strict liability that aims to protect the person who is injured as a consequence of the Administration's conduct directly, provided that that injury, not the conduct that generates it, is illegitimate from the perspective of the person who has suffered the damage. In summary, the characteristic features of this liability scheme are that it is direct and strict. The first element implies that the Administration responds directly and not subsidiarily, for the damage it causes on the occasion of its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, making it consequently unnecessary to establish the agent or official causing the damage, based on the thesis that, when the official acts, the Administration acts. The above, of course, without prejudice to the recourse action that can be brought against the responsible official. Regarding the strict nature, as already indicated, the imputability of the damage does not depend on the demonstration of fault, intent, or negligence, because it is sufficient that the damage originates in the normal or abnormal functioning of the service, or in legitimate or illegitimate conduct of the Administration, to attribute liability. Ergo, it is sufficient that an unlawful damage exists that is attributable to the Administration, for liability to be configured. Consequently, the concept of injury is the center of the system, and for the purpose of determining whether it is compensable, the concurrence of certain elements is necessary. One of them is the unlawfulness of the damage, to which reference was already made above, affirming that it must be an injury that the victim does not have to bear according to the law, so there must not exist causes that justify and legitimize the injury, since it must be of an unlawful nature in reference to the injured party, not to the author of the damage (as it is not required that the conduct be contrary to legality). It is also necessary that the damage be effective, assessable, compensable, and individualizable (Art. 196 LGAP), which means that it must produce a real and current affectation to the assets and/or rights of the damaged person, which must be susceptible to quantification in economic terms, and must refer to a person or group. On the other hand, from the position of the subject responsible for the damage, it is also indispensable to consider some necessary elements in order to determine their obligation to compensate. We refer to the imputation of the damage, which is possible not only when there is a causal relationship between the fact and the damage (which occurs when the conduct is the suitable one to produce the patrimonial injury), but also in addition to this condition, the attribution of the duty to repair can arise from other reasons such as the ownership of the object that has generated the damage, a situation of dependence, or the creation of a risky situation, among others, but in any case, derived from the existence of a reparatory duty. Imputation is therefore composed of two spheres, one factual and the other legal (related to the different titles of imputation established in the legal system, such as, for example, lack of service or the creation of a risk.) More simply, the attribution of liability can occur both before legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal conduct of the administrative organization, provided that compensable damage is caused, insofar as the affected party does not have the duty to bear it, and it is assessable, compensable, and individualizable, and the conduct of the Administration was the adequate one to generate the damage (causal nexus), that is, when a causal nexus exists between the conduct of the Administration and the damage; and equally, when other presuppositions concur, such as, for example, the creation of risk, and ultimately, when the Administration is chargeable with the legal duty to repair, derived from a liability system based on the victim, grounded in a just and equitable society, subject to the legal system and respect for the pro homine principle, VII.- ON THE CAUSAL NEXUS AS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT FOR THE IMPUTATION OF LIABILITY TO THE ADMINISTRATION: When analyzing the imputation of the damage, it must necessarily be understood that it comprises a factual sphere and a legal sphere. The first refers to causality, which is the link that connects a cause to an effect, it is the bond between the unlawful damage and the conduct of the Administration; and that presents the problem of the criteria that must be used for establishing the existence of that nexus, especially when, around the damage, there is a diversity of facts or conditions that could have caused the injury, which undoubtedly speaks of the complexity for the legal operator in the exercise of their function in order to determine the existence of the causal nexus. On this matter, various theories have been handled, such as that of adequate causality, which starts from the premise that the Administration's conduct must be the appropriate one, according to the circumstances, to produce the injury; or the theory of the equivalence of conditions, according to which, if the fact or condition contributes to producing the final result, it should be considered a cause. "An abstract consideration of the problem thus posed could lead to the response that any of these facts or conditions, to the extent that they all contribute to producing the final result (since if only one of them were missing it would not occur, at least in the same way...) must be qualified as causes. This is how the theory of the equivalence of conditions understands it, which has special roots in the field of Criminal Law. It is obvious, however, that a rigid application of this thesis would often lead to results difficult to accept in terms of justice. Therefore, it is usually affirmed that for a fact to deserve to be considered a cause of the damage, it is necessary that it be in itself suitable for producing it according to common experience, that is, that it has a special aptitude to produce the harmful effect. Only in these cases (adequate causality) can it be said, with rigor, that the activity taken into consideration constitutes the efficient cause, the proximate cause of the damage (in iure nom remota causa, sed proxima espectatur), the true cause of the same. The question, however, is not so easy to resolve (...). It is not possible to forget, indeed, that several causes can contribute to the production of a specific harmful result." (García De Enterría Eduardo. Course of Administrative Law II. Ninth Edition. Civitas. Madrid. 2004. p.400). In the case of the national Courts, the First Chamber has repeatedly expressed its leaning toward the theory of adequate causality: "Another essential aspect is the existence of a causal nexus, which is assessed by the judges in accordance with the evidence that the parties, or the same jurisdictional body, in accordance with its ordering powers, have provided to the process. For these purposes, as this Chamber has provided on other occasions, the most convenient theory for determining if it is possible to link the damage to the conduct is that of adequate causality, which postulates that this occurs 'when the former originates, if not necessarily, at least with a high probability according to the specific circumstances that affect the matter, from the latter' (resolution 300-F-2009 at 11 hours 25 minutes of March 26, 2009). However, this nexus can be eliminated in case the defendant demonstrates the concurrence of a cause exempting liability (force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party). This because its presence rules out that the injury suffered by the affected party was produced by the conduct of the State under trial. Finally, according to what has already been stated, it is feasible to affirm that Costa Rican legislation opts for a scheme of moderate strict liability, which, recognizing the particularities of the functions and tasks entrusted to the Administration, obliges that the conduct deployed by the state apparatus be assessed for the purpose of determining if there was normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning." (First Chamber, No. 1367-2012, at 08:40, of October 18, 2012) (In the same sense see, among others, judgments No. 467-F-2008, at 14:25, of July four, 2008 and 1008-F-2006, at 09:30, of December twenty-first, two thousand six). Then, when analyzing the causal nexus, it must be elucidated whether there is any link between the conduct of the Administration and the damage alleged by the individual, which implies establishing whether that conduct is the adequate cause that produced the injury giving rise to the claim, insofar as it potentiated the detriment suffered. However, as already indicated, this is by no means simple, especially if we consider that a harmful result frequently takes place with the concurrence of several causes, which can even originate in the conduct of different subjects, among which, besides the Administration, the victim themselves may be counted.

VIII.- ON THE LIABILITY OF THE SUED ADMINISTRATION IN THE SPECIFIC CASE: In the case under examination, the liability of the sued Administration is discussed regarding the injury suffered by the plaintiff on the occasion of a traffic accident. This mishap took place on national route 206, in the vicinity of Higuito de Desamparados, about two hundred meters from the plaza. Despite the fact that the representatives of the defendants argue that the site of the accident does not exist, which they base on the technical report PLI-10-15-0093, of January twenty-second, two thousand fifteen, issued by Geologist Pablo Arguedas Castro, of the Information Systems Unit, and Engineer Rolando Arias Herrera, Head of the Information Systems Unit of CONAVI, according to which "400 meters east of the Higuito plaza," "...said address does not exist according to the official IGN cartographic sheet at a scale of 1:50,000 and even in the Google Earth viewer a path is not visible that could be congruent with said orientation.", as well as on the pronouncement of the Road and Bridge Conservation Management in report GCSV-09-2016-0630 of February sixteenth, two thousand fifteen, subscribed by Engineer Maurio Sojo Quesada, who indicated: "... with the address provided, the mentioned bridge cannot be located, occurring on a national road, as a consequence of the alleged poor condition in which a bridge slab was found"; the truth is that from the photographs that appear in the file, from the proof of the news report that exists in digital format, as well as from the statement of witness Johana Menard Dormond, and witness Mauricio Sojo Quesada, it is possible to determine the site of the accident. In this sense, from the photographs and the report it is clearly observed that the mishap took place on a public road where there is a culvert and a wall. From the statement of witness Menard Dormond, -who accompanied the plaintiff on the day the events occurred, which this Court considers duly accredited, not only by Mrs. Johana's own statement, but also because in the video of the report it is observed that she was at the site, and it is even clearly seen that she has one of the two protective helmets that appear in the video in her hand-, and from the statement of Mr. Sojo Quesada, it is concluded that the accident took place on national route No. 206, in the vicinity of Higuito de Desamparados, near the park. Thus, the Engineer from CONAVI, when shown the photographs and before several questions posed by the Court, said he recognized the site, indicating moreover that it was national route No. 206, and that he identified it by the type of culvert. Therefore, this Deciding Body, considers it duly accredited that the event occurred on a national route, and specifically on No. 206. This leads us, in order to carry out the imputability analysis, to determine precisely the title of imputation, which in this case would correspond to the duty of the defendants in order to provide maintenance to public roads. In our country, Article 2 of Law No. 5060, General Law of Public Roads, of August twenty-second, nineteen hundred seventy-two, amended by Law No. 6676, of September eighteenth, nineteen hundred eighty-one, provides that highways and public roads are assets of a demanial nature: "All lands occupied by existing public highways and roads or those built in the future are the property of the State. The municipalities have ownership of the streets within their jurisdiction. Highways and public roads may only be built and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport." On the other hand, subsection a of Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, No. 3155 of August fifth, nineteen hundred sixty-three establishes that the MOPT is responsible for: "a) Planning, building, and improving highways and roads. Maintaining the highways and collaborating with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. Regulating and controlling the rights of way of existing or projected highways and roads. Regulating, controlling, and monitoring traffic and transport on public roads." (said competence must be harmonized with the provisions of Law No. 7798). And Article 1 of the General Law of Roads, previously cited, establishes the different classifications of public roads, while indicating that their administration corresponds to the MOPT: "NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK: Its administration corresponds to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which will define it according to the requirements determined for that purpose by the Executive Branch, by way of agreement. This network will be constituted by the following classes of public roads: a) Primary highways: Network of trunk routes, to serve corridors, characterized by relatively high volumes of traffic and with a high proportion of international, interprovincial, or long-distance trips (..)." The cited norm also indicates secondary highways, tertiary highways, local roads, and local streets, among others. For its part, Law No. 7798 (Law Creating the National Road Council, of April 30, 1998), in its Articles 3 and 4 provides: "ARTICLE 3.- The National Road Council is created, an organ with maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council shall have instrumental and budgetary legal personality to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to sign the contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law. This Council shall be administered by the Administrative Board, integrated according to the following Article 5." ARTICLE 4.- The objectives of the National Road Council shall be the following: a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs elaborated by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. b) To administer its assets. c) To execute, through contracts, the works, supplies, and services required for the conservation and construction process of the entirety of the national road network. d) To oversee the correct execution of the works, including quality control. e) To promote research, development, and technological transfer in the field of road construction and conservation. f) To enter into contracts or provide the services necessary for the fulfillment of its objectives and functions." From the cited regulations, it is inferred that the administration of the roads that are classified by Law as national, are under the administration of the MOPT, but through CONAVI (a question to which we will refer later, when addressing the issue of passive standing). Consequently, the maintenance and conservation of those highways corresponds to the Administration, and falls upon CONAVI, which implies that, as provided by Law No. 7798 in its Article 1, it comprises the execution of all those activities necessary to preserve "in a continuous and sustained manner, the good condition of the roads, so as to guarantee optimal service to the user". Furthermore, the following activities correspond to CONAVI: "Routine maintenance: Set of tasks of cleaning drainage systems, vegetation control, minor and localized pavement repairs, and the restoration of markings, which must be carried out continuously and sustained over time, to preserve the operational condition, the level of service, and the safety of the roads. It also includes the cleaning and minor and localized repairs of bridge structures. Periodic maintenance: Set of activities programmable every certain period, tending to renew the original condition of the pavements through the application of additional layers of ballast, gravel, surface treatments, or asphalt overlays or concrete sections, depending on the case, without altering the structure of the underlying pavement layers. The periodic maintenance of bridges includes the cleaning, painting, and repair or replacement of damaged structural or protection elements. Rehabilitation: Selective repair and reinforcement of the pavement or roadway, after partial demolition of the existing structure, for the purpose of reestablishing the original structural solidity and driving quality. Moreover, for a single time in each case, it may include the construction or reconstruction of the drainage system that does not involve building major bridges or culverts. Before any rehabilitation activity on the driving surface, it must be verified that the drainage system functions well. The rehabilitation of bridges refers to major repairs, such as the replacement of main structural elements or components or the replacement of the floor slab. Reconstruction: Complete renewal of the road structure, with prior partial or total demolition of the pavement structure or the bridge structures." Once established, in accordance with the cited regulations, that it is the authority of CONAVI, the conservation of national routes, and that this basically implies that the routes are in good condition, and that continuous and quality service is provided to the user, as provided in Article 1 of Law 7798, harmonized with precept 4 of the General Law of the Public Administration No. 6227, insofar as it indicates that "The activity of public entities must be subject as a whole to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need it satisfies, and equality in the treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries."; it is evident that the execution of road conservation, maintenance, or reconstruction works, that do not adhere to technical criteria, or simply the omission in order to execute those tasks, implies a lack of service, contrary to the most elementary principles that govern the conduct of the Public Administration, and that this manner of proceeding not only violates the principle of continuity in the provision of the service, but also constitutes a threat against the integrity and safety of the persons who travel on those roads.

In the matter under examination, it has been deemed duly proven that Mr. Ramírez Badilla suffered an accident on National Route No. 206, and it was also proven that, on the occasion of this mishap which caused him to lose control of his motorcycle, he crashed into a wall located in the right-of-way (as declared by the CONAVI Engineer), which had several exposed rebar rods protruding from that structure, and that one of these metal pieces became embedded in the plaintiff's left thigh. Furthermore, it is proven that this fact: remaining embedded in one of those rods, required the work of the fire department to extract him from the site, and also caused him acute pain, a disability lasting two weeks, and resulted in a four percent general disability. As can be seen, the Administration in this specific case created a risk, which cannot be attributed to the victim, as the defendants intend by invoking this ground for exclusion of liability. It must be clearly understood that the damage which is the subject of this dispute is that which was produced on the occasion of those metal pieces that were on the structure forming part of the right-of-way, and that evidently give rise to a dangerous situation. Thus, the injury claimed is very specific and corresponds to that which was generated when that rebar rod became embedded in the plaintiff's left thigh. It is precisely from that fact that the requirement of unlawfulness arises in this case, for it was that condition of the structure on the public road that generated the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) claimed, and it is this characteristic, this element of danger originating from a lack of road maintenance by CONAVI, that the administered party, in this case Mr. Ramírez Badilla, has no duty to assume. Thus, the Administration in this case created a risk, and the administered party does not have to bear the injuries suffered on the occasion of that risk, of that dangerous situation caused by the Administration's conduct, which gives rise to liability, since the plaintiff, nor any other person using that road, should be a victim of a risk situation arising from an omission on the part of the administrative body that has the responsibility for maintaining public roads and ensuring their safety for users. Consequently, the Court considers that the final consequence of the Administration's omission was the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, without any involvement in the creation of that risk condition created by the Administration being attributable to him, thus rendering the injury unlawful, and consequently giving rise to the duty to compensate for the Administration. Now, in light of the foregoing, that compensatory liability must fall on CONAVI, and only in the event that this body fails to fulfill its compensatory obligation, subsidiarily on the State. The foregoing is in accordance with the new position regarding the passive standing of the State in relation to bodies that have instrumental legal personality, which the First Chamber has been upholding and which this Court shares, and in which it has been noted: "The judges' conclusion, according to what was set forth in Considerando IV, appears to be a direct effect of this Chamber's jurisprudence prevailing at the time the ruling was issued. But as was correctly indicated, the State's liability for the conduct of Person Bodies is subsidiary in nature, since both constitute a single sphere of action, merely organized under a different functional and budgetary structure. Endorsing the Court's criterion would involve a direct violation of Articles 9, 41, and 49 of the Political Constitution, and 190 and 194 of the LGAP. The error of the judgment would lie in affirming that in cases where the impairments were caused by the Person Body in the exercise of its legal powers, the State's liability is neither joint and several nor subsidiary, and, therefore, it lacks passive standing. It is insisted, if the actions and the damages claimed were originated within the powers of the Person Body, this confirms the liability of the State or the parent entity to which it belongs. But this liability will be subsidiary, never joint and several, unless the law so provides, the only exception to the rule analyzed. The normative source of the foregoing, it is repeated, is found in canon 161 of the CPCA. Contrary to what was indicated by the judges, the State's lack of passive standing does not arise because the damage was caused by CONAVI in the exercise of its powers; on the contrary, that event would confirm that it did have standing to answer subsidiarily for the damages caused. However, it turns out that in this matter a particularity arose that renders the co-plaintiffs' appeal useless. In favor of CONAVI, the primary obligor for ensuring the maintenance of the roads and bridges of the national road network (including the provisional bridge that caused the accident described in this process), the Court decreed the statute of limitations on liability under the terms of canon 198 of the LGAP. The appellant has not challenged this point, so this Chamber cannot analyze whether such a determination is in accordance with the law. Therefore, if a statute of limitations was decreed regarding the primary obligor for preserving the safety of the bridge in question, this Chamber considers that this measure directly benefited the State, since the only way to maintain the aforementioned subsidiarity is if CONAVI's actions had been confirmed by the ad quem. The contrary would imply speaking of joint and several liability, which is not stipulated in the Law. In other words, in the specific case, the Council is the direct responsible party for ensuring the safety and proper functioning of the "provisional bridge" located over the Río de las Vueltas de Pocares. The foregoing according to the provisions of the mandates of Law 7798, where it is clearly established that CONAVI is the obligated party to plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network; to execute, through contracts, the works, supplies, and services required for the conservation and construction process of the entirety of that road network; to supervise the correct execution of the works, including quality control (ordinals 3, 5, and 6). However, the liability of that person body could not be defined or confirmed by the Court because a statute of limitations on the plaintiff's right to file her claim against that Body occurred (numeral 198 of the LGAP); consequently, it is not possible for the State to answer subsidiarily for damages that were not determined. Let it be remembered, the subsidiarity of the State or the parent entity commented on works under the premise that the Person Body has been condemned, and that it, for any reason, fails to comply with its payment obligation or has no budget for it. But it is not the same that for conduct of the Person Body within its own powers, the State is sued and answers exclusively as the appellant intends, because this would imply joint and several liability, which is not legally regulated as is required in such cases. In summary, since the Council's liability could not be determined because the statute of limitations regulated in cardinal 198 of the LGAP had taken effect, the subsidiary liability of the State could not arise either. First, CONAVI's liability had to be declared, that is, analyzing whether those damages and losses claimed by the co-plaintiffs were caused in the exercise of its powers and functions, which did not happen due exclusively to the fault of the plaintiff by allowing the legally established time for this to pass. It is for all the foregoing reasons that assessing the State's liability is futile, for if the claim was dismissed regarding CONAVI, it must also have been dismissed regarding the State, but for the reasons indicated herein. Before this, that co-defendant indeed lacks passive standing, but for the reasons extensively explained in this ruling; that is, because there is an "uncertainty" as to whether it was responsible for the alleged damages, which makes it improper for it to answer alone and in the absence of the potential direct obligor. If it were determined that it must assume any obligation, this would have a subsidiary character, based on what was decided against the possible direct responsible party who was initially sued. Even in this matter, it can also be determined that there has been a lack of right regarding the claims of the lawsuit against the State. Ergo, the grounds for cassation invoked must be dismissed, for nothing is gained by analyzing the subsidiary liability of the State if the primary obligor was not sued within the four-year legal deadline set forth in canon 198 of the LGAP." Judgment No. 840-F-SI-2016, of 09:50 hours on August 11, two thousand sixteen. In the same vein, Judgment No. 0293-F-SI-2016, of 09:40 hours on April 7, two thousand sixteen.

IX.- ON THE DAMAGES TO BE COMPENSATED: With regard to material damage, the Court deems it duly proven that Mr. Ramírez Badilla, as a consequence of the accident, was disabled for two weeks, and that he also presents a loss of his general capacity of four percent. That injury, for compensatory purposes, must be translated into economic terms, for which, once this judgment becomes final, and already in its execution stage, an expert professional must be appointed to determine the amount of the injury. As for moral damage (daño moral), this consists of the injury to the plaintiff's internal and subjective sphere. This type of damage, precisely because of its nature, allows the adjudicator, in light of the evidence in the case file, to establish its existence based on the principles governing logic and common sense. Regarding this type of damage, it is necessary to indicate that it is assessed in re ipsa, according to the Court's assessment of the situations that may affect each person in their extra-patrimonial sphere. When we speak of moral damage, we refer to an injury to the individual's internal sphere, which causes them impairment, a detriment to their state of mind causing anguish, pain, suffering, discouragement. It is precisely that impairment which is susceptible to compensation. In the case under examination, the Court reaches the conclusion that it has been sufficiently demonstrated at trial that Mr. Ramírez Badilla indeed suffered anguish on the occasion of the accident. This is derived from the video of the news report, from his statements before the Forensic Medicine expert, as well as from the statements of the witness and partner of the plaintiff. It must also be noted that it is plausible that a person, faced with an accident such as that suffered by the plaintiff, and with the aftermath he experienced, tends to feel anguish, feelings of pain and worry. However, this Body considers that the amount requested by the plaintiff is excessive, and therefore sets the amount of compensation for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) in the amount of one million colones. The amount finally set in the execution of judgment stage for material damage, as well as the one million colones established as compensation for moral damage, must be updated for their purchasing power, in accordance with the rules established in numeral 123 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code." This is how the theory of equivalence of conditions understands it, a theory with special roots in the field of Criminal law. It is obvious, however, that a rigid application of this thesis would often lead to results that are difficult to accept in terms of justice. For this reason, it is usually affirmed that for an act to deserve being considered the cause of the damage, it must be, in itself, suitable for producing it according to common experience, that is, it must have a special aptitude for producing the harmful effect. Only in these cases (adequate causation) can it be said, with rigor, that the activity taken into consideration constitutes the efficient cause, the proximate cause of the damage (in iure nom remota causa, sed proxima espectatur), its true cause. The question, however, is not so easy to resolve (...). It is not possible to forget, indeed, that several causes can contribute to the production of a specific harmful result." (García De Enterría Eduardo. Curso de Derecho Administrativo II. Novena Edición. Civitas. Madrid. 2004. p.400). In the case of the national Courts, the First Chamber has repeatedly expressed its inclination towards the theory of adequate causation: "Another essential aspect is the existence of a causal link (nexo de causalidad), which is assessed by the judges in accordance with the evidence that the parties, or the jurisdictional body itself, in accordance with its powers of ordering, have brought to the process. For these purposes, as this Chamber has stated on other occasions, the theory that is most suitable for determining whether it is possible to link the damage with the conduct is that of adequate causation, which postulates that this occurs 'when the former originates, if not necessarily, at least with a high probability according to the specific circumstances affecting the matter, from the latter' (resolution 300-F-2009 of 11 hours 25 minutes of March 26, 2009). However, this link can be eliminated if the defendant demonstrates the concurrence of an exonerating cause of liability (force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party). This is because its presence rules out that the injury suffered by the affected party was produced by the State's conduct that is the subject of the process. Finally, according to what has already been stated, it is fair to affirm that Costa Rican legislation opts for a scheme of moderate objective liability, which, recognizing the particularities of the functions and tasks entrusted to the Administration, requires that the conduct deployed by the state apparatus be assessed for the purpose of determining if there was normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning." (First Chamber, No. 1367-2012, at 08:40, of October 18, 2012) (In the same sense see, among others, judgments No. 467-F-2008, at 14:25, of July four, 2008 and 1008-F-2006, at 09:30, of December twenty-first, two thousand six). Subsequently, when analyzing the causal link, it must be elucidated whether there is any connection between the Administration's conduct and the damage alleged by the individual, which implies establishing whether that conduct is the adequate cause that produced the injury giving rise to the claim, insofar as it may have potentiated the impairment suffered. Notwithstanding, as already indicated, this is not at all simple, especially if we consider that a harmful result frequently occurs with the concurrence of several causes, which may even originate in the conduct of different subjects, among which, in addition to the Administration, the victim themselves may be counted.

            **VIII.- ON THE LIABILITY OF THE SUED ADMINISTRATION IN THE SPECIFIC CASE:** In the case under examination, the liability of the sued Administration is discussed regarding the injury suffered by the plaintiff on the occasion of a traffic accident. This mishap took place on National Route 206, in the vicinity of Higuito de Desamparados, approximately two hundred meters from the square. Although the representatives of the defendants argue that the accident site does not exist, which they base on the technical report PLI-10-15-0093, of January twenty-second, two thousand fifteen, issued by Geologist Pablo Arguedas Castro, from the Information Systems Unit and Engineer Rolando Arias Herrera, Head of the Information Systems Unit of CONAVI, according to which *"400 meters east of the plaza de Higuito," ... "said address does not exist according to the official IGN cartographic sheet at scale 1.50:00 and even in the Google Earth viewer, a road that could be congruent with said orientation is not visible."*, as well as on the pronouncement of the Road and Bridge Conservation Management in report GCSV-09-2016-0630 of February sixteen, two thousand fifteen, signed by Engineer Maurio Sojo Quesada, who indicated: *"... with the address provided, the mentioned bridge cannot be located, occurring on a national road, as a consequence of the supposed poor condition in which a bridge slab was found"*; the truth is that from the photographs in the case file, from the evidence of the news report on digital format, as well as from the statement of witness Johana Menard Dormond, and witness Mauricio Sojo Quesada, it is possible to determine the accident site. In this sense, from the photographs and the report, it is clearly observed that the mishap took place on a public road where there is a culvert and a wall. From the statement of witness Menard Dormond, -who was accompanying the plaintiff on the day the events occurred, which this Court considers accredited, not only by Ms. Johana's own statement, but also because in the video of the report it is observed that she was at the site, and it is even clearly seen that she has one of the two protective helmets that appear in the video in her hand-, and from the statement of Mr. Sojo Quesada, it is concluded that the accident took place on National Route No. 206, in the vicinity of Higuito de Desamparados, near the park. Thus, the CONAVI Engineer, when shown the photographs and asked several questions by the Court, said he recognized the site, further indicated that it was National Route No. 206, and that he identified it by the type of the culvert. Therefore, this Deciding Body considers it duly accredited that the event occurred on a national route, and specifically on Route No. 206. This leads us, in order to carry out the analysis of imputability, to precisely determine the basis of imputation, which in this case would correspond to the duty of the defendants to maintain public roads. In our country, Article 2 of Law No. 5060, General Law of Public Roads, of August twenty-second, nineteen seventy-two, amended by Law No. 6676, of September eighteenth, nineteen eighty-one, provides that highways and public roads are public domain assets: *"All lands occupied by existing public roads and highways or those constructed in the future are property of the State. The municipalities have ownership of the streets within their jurisdiction. Public roads and highways may only be constructed and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport."* On the other hand, subsection a) of Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, No. 3155 of August fifth, nineteen sixty-three, establishes that the MOPT is responsible for: *"a) Planning, constructing, and improving roads and highways. Maintaining roads and collaborating with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. Regulating and controlling the rights-of-way of existing or projected roads and highways. Regulating, controlling, and monitoring traffic and transport on public roads." (said competence must be reconciled with the provisions of Law No. 7798).* And Article 1 of the General Law of Roads, previously cited, establishes the different classifications of public roads, while indicating that their administration corresponds to the MOPT: *"NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK: Its administration corresponds to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which will define it according to the requirements determined by the Executive Branch, by way of decree. This network will be constituted by the following classes of public roads: a) Primary roads: Network of trunk routes, to serve corridors, characterized by relatively high traffic volumes and a high proportion of international, interprovincial, or long-distance trips (...)."* The cited norm further indicates secondary roads, tertiary roads, local roads, and local streets, among others. For its part, Law No. 7798 (Law for the Creation of the National Road Council, of April 30, 1998), in its numerals 3 and 4, provides: *"ARTICLE 3.- The National Road Council is created, an organ with maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council will have instrumental legal personality and budgetary authority to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to sign the contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law. This Council will be administered by the Administration Council, integrated in accordance with the following Article 5." "ARTICLE 4.- The objectives of the National Road Council will be the following: a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs elaborated by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. b) To administer its assets. c) To execute, through contracts, the works, supplies, and services required for the conservation and construction process of the entirety of the national road network. d) To supervise the correct execution of the works, including quality control. e) To promote research, development, and technology transfer in the field of road construction and conservation. f) To enter into contracts or provide the necessary services for the fulfillment of its objectives and functions."* From the cited regulations, it is deduced that the administration of the roads classified by Law as national is under the administration of the MOPT, but through CONAVI (a matter to which we will refer later, when dealing with the issue of standing to be sued). Consequently, the maintenance and conservation of these roads corresponds to the Administration, and falls upon CONAVI, which implies that, as provided in Article 1 of Law No. 7798, it comprises the execution of all those activities necessary to preserve *"in a continuous and sustained manner, the good condition of the roads, so that optimal service to the user is guaranteed"*. In addition, the following activities correspond to CONAVI: *"Routine maintenance: Set of tasks of cleaning drains, vegetation control, minor and localized pavement repairs, and demarcation restoration, which must be carried out continuously and sustained over time, to preserve the operational condition, service level, and safety of the roads. Also includes cleaning and minor and localized repairs of bridge structures. Periodic maintenance: Set of programmable activities every certain period, aimed at renewing the original condition of the pavements through the application of additional layers of ballast, gravel, surface treatments, or asphalt or concrete section overlays, as the case may be, without altering the structure of the underlying pavement layers. Periodic maintenance of bridges includes cleaning, painting, and repair or replacement of damaged structural or protective elements. Rehabilitation: Selective repair and reinforcement of the pavement or roadway, after partial demolition of the existing structure, in order to restore the original structural solidity and ride quality. Additionally, for one time only in each case, it may include the construction or reconstruction of the drainage system that does not imply building bridges or major culverts. Before any rehabilitation activity on the running surface, it must be verified that the drainage system functions well. Bridge rehabilitation refers to major repairs, such as the replacement of main structural elements or components or the replacement of the floor slab. Reconstruction: Complete renewal of the road structure, with prior partial or total demolition of the pavement structure or bridge structures."* Once established, according to the cited regulations, that it is the authority of CONAVI to conserve national routes, and that this basically implies that the routes are in good condition, and that continuous, quality service is provided to the user, as provided in Article 1 of Law 7798, reconciled with precept 4 of the General Law of Public Administration No. 6227, insofar as it indicates that *"The activity of public entities must be subject, as a whole, to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries."*; it is evident that carrying out conservation, maintenance, or road reconstruction works that do not adhere to technical criteria, or simply the omission of executing these tasks, implies a failure of service, contrary to the most elementary principles governing the conduct of the Public Administration, and that this manner of proceeding not only undermines the principle of continuity in the provision of service but also constitutes a threat against the integrity and safety of the people who transit those roads. In the matter under examination, it has been considered duly accredited that Mr. Ramírez Badilla suffered an accident on National Route No. 206, and it was also accredited that on the occasion of this mishap that caused him to lose control of his motorcycle, he crashed into a wall that was located in the right-of-way (as declared by the CONAVI Engineer), which had several exposed reinforcing bars protruding from that structure, and that one of these metal pieces embedded itself in the plaintiff's left thigh. Furthermore, it is proven that this fact: being embedded in one of those bars, required the work of the fire department to extract him from the site, as well as that it caused him acute pain, a temporary disability for two weeks, and produced a permanent general disability of four percent. As can be seen, the Administration in this specific case created a risk, which cannot be imputed to the victim, as the defendants intend to do, by referring to this cause for exclusion of liability. It must be clear that the damage that is the object of this dispute is that which has been produced on the occasion of those metal pieces that were in the structure that forms part of the right-of-way, and that evidently create a dangerous situation. Thus, the injury for which claim is made is very specific and corresponds to that generated from the moment that reinforcing bar embedded itself in the plaintiff's left thigh. It is precisely from this fact that the prerequisite of wrongfulness arises in this case, since it was that condition of the structure in the public road that generated the claimed damages, and it is that characteristic, that element of danger originating from a lack of maintenance of the road by CONAVI that the administered party, in this case Mr. Ramírez Badilla, does not have the duty to assume. Thus, the Administration in this case created a risk, and the administered party does not have to bear the injuries suffered on the occasion of that risk, of that dangerous situation fostered by the Administration's conduct, which gives rise to liability, since the plaintiff, nor any other person who uses that road, should be a victim of a risk situation that arises from an omission by the administrative organ that has the responsibility to maintain public roads and ensure they are safe for users. Consequently, the Court considers that the final consequence of the Administration's omission was the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, without any interference being attributable to him in the creation of that risky condition created by the Administration, thus rendering the injury wrongful, and consequently, the duty to compensate arises for the Administration. Now then, based on the foregoing, that compensatory liability must fall upon CONAVI, and only in the event that this organ fails to comply with its obligation to provide compensation, subsidiarily on the State. The foregoing in accordance with the new position regarding the State's standing to be sued in relation to organs that have instrumental legal personality, which the First Chamber has been maintaining and which this Court shares, and in which it has been indicated: *"The conclusion of the judges, according to what was stated in Considerando IV, seems to be a direct effect of this Chamber's prevailing jurisprudence at the time the judgment was issued. But as was well indicated, the State's liability for the conduct of Organs-Persons is subsidiary in nature, as both constitute a single sphere of action, merely organized under a different functional and budgetary structure. To uphold the Court’s criterion would involve a direct violation of norms 9, 41, and 49 of the Political Constitution, 190 and 194 of the LGAP. The error of the judgment would lie in affirming that in cases where the impairments were caused by the Organ-Person in the exercise of its legal competencies, the liability of the State is neither joint and several nor subsidiary and, therefore, it lacks standing to be sued. It is insisted, if the actions and the claimed damages have been originated within the competencies of the Organ-Person, this confirms the liability of the State or the entity to which it belongs. But this liability will be subsidiary, never joint and several, unless the law so provides, the only exception to the analyzed rule. The normative source of the foregoing, it is repeated, is found in canon 161 of the CPCA. Contrary to what was indicated by the judges, the lack of standing to be sued on the part of the State does not arise by virtue of the damage being caused by CONAVI in the exercise of its competencies; on the contrary, that event would ratify that it indeed had standing to respond subsidiarily for the damages caused. However, it turns out that in this matter a particularity arose that renders the co-plaintiffs' appeal useless. In favor of CONAVI, the main party obliged to ensure the maintenance of the roads and bridges of the national road network (including the temporary bridge that originated the accident described in this process), the Court decreed the statute of limitations on liability pursuant to canon 198 of the LGAP. The appellant has not questioned that point, so this Chamber cannot analyze whether such determination is in accordance with law. Therefore, if the statute of limitations was decreed regarding the main party obliged to conserve the safety of the bridge in question, this Chamber considers that this measure directly benefited the State, because the only way to maintain the commented subsidiarity is if CONAVI's actions had been confirmed by the ad quem. The contrary would imply speaking of joint and several liability, which is not stipulated in the Law. In other words, in the specific case, the Council is the direct party responsible for ensuring the safety and proper functioning of the 'temporary bridge' located over the Río de las Vueltas de Pocares. The foregoing according to the provisions of the mandates of Law 7798, where it is clearly established that CONAVI is the party obliged to plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network; to execute, through contracts, the works, supplies, and services required for the conservation and construction process of the entirety of that road network; to supervise the correct execution of the works, including quality control (ordinals 3, 5, and 6). However, the liability of that organ-person could not be defined or confirmed by the Court because the plaintiff's right to file her claim against that Organ expired due to the statute of limitations (numeral 198 of the LGAP); consequently, it is not possible for the State to respond subsidiarily for damages that were not determined. Let it be remembered, the commented subsidiarity of the State or the larger entity functions under the premise that the Organ-Person has been condemned, and this, for any reason, does not comply with its payment obligation or does not have the budget for it. But it is not the same that, for conduct by the Organ-Person proper to its competencies, the State is sued and it responds exclusively as the appellant intends, because that would imply joint and several liability, which is not legally regulated as is rigorous in such cases. In summary, as the Council's liability could not be determined because the statute of limitations regulated in cardinal 198 of the LGAP had operated, the subsidiary liability of the State could not arise either. First, the liability of CONAVI had to be declared, that is, by analyzing whether those damages sought by the co-plaintiffs were caused in the exercise of its competencies and functions, which did not occur due to the exclusive fault of the plaintiff in letting the legal time provided for this pass. It is for all the foregoing that it is useless to assess the liability of the State, for if the claim was dismissed regarding CONAVI, it should also have been dismissed regarding the State, but for the reasons indicated herein. Given this, said co-defendant indeed lacks standing to be sued, but for the reasons amply explained in this judgment; that is, because there is 'uncertainty' as to whether it was liable for the attributed damages, which makes it improper for it to answer alone and in the absence of the potential direct obligor. If it were determined that it must assume any obligation, this would have a subsidiary character, based on what was decided against the possible direct party responsible who was initially claimed against. Even in this matter it can also be determined that there has been a lack of right in the claims of the lawsuit regarding the State. Ergo, the invoked grounds for cassation must be dismissed because nothing is gained by analyzing the subsidiary liability of the State if the main obligor was not sued within the legal period of four years provided in canon 198 of the LGAP."* Judgment No. 840-F-SI-2016, at 09:50 hours of August eleven, two thousand sixteen. In the same sense, judgment No. 0293-F-SI-2016, at 09:40 hours of April seven, two thousand sixteen.

**IX.- ON THE DAMAGES THAT MUST BE COMPENSATED:** Regarding the material damage (daño de índole material), the Court considers it duly accredited that Mr. Ramírez Badilla, as a consequence of the accident, was incapacitated for two weeks, and that he also presents a loss of his general capacity of four percent. That injury, for compensation purposes, must be translated into economic terms, for which, once this judgment is final, and at the execution stage, a professional expert must be appointed to determine the amount of the injury. As for the moral damage (daño moral), this consists of the injury to the internal and subjective sphere of the plaintiff. This type of damage, precisely due to its nature, allows the adjudicator, in light of the evidence in the case file, to establish its existence based on the principles governing logic and common sense. It is necessary to point out that this type of damage is assessed in re ipsa, according to the assessment the Court makes of the situations that may affect each person in their non-material sphere. When we talk about moral damage, we refer to an injury to the internal sphere of the individual, which causes impairment, a detriment in their mood, causing anguish, pain, suffering, discouragement. It is precisely that impairment that is susceptible to compensation. In the case under examination, the Court reaches the conclusion that it has been sufficiently demonstrated at trial that Mr. Ramírez Badilla indeed suffered anguish on the occasion of the accident. This is derived from the video of the news report, from his statements before the Forensic Medicine expert, as well as from the statements of the witness and partner of the plaintiff. It must also be indicated that it is plausible that a person, faced with an accident like the one suffered by the plaintiff, and with the after-effects it had, would tend to feel anguish, feelings of pain, and worry. However, this Organ considers that the amount requested by the plaintiff is excessive, and therefore sets the amount of compensation for subjective moral damage at the sum of one million colones. The amount finally set at the judgment execution stage for material damage, as well as the sum of one million colones established as compensation for moral damage, must be updated for purchasing power, according to the rules established in numeral 123 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code." **VI.- SOME GENERALITIES REGARDING THE PATRIMONIAL LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:** On repeated occasions, this Section of the Tribunal has indicated regarding the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration, that it constitutes a guarantee for the administered party and the justiciable, which can be derived, in our legal system, through a series of constitutional precepts, among them, those established in articles 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45 and 49 of the Fundamental Charter (to mention only some of those that refer to the cited guarantee). These articles contain principles related to efficiency, accountability, distributive justice, the right to patrimonial integrity, the right to compensation for injuries suffered, and judicial control of administrative action, whose jurisprudential and normative development, especially by articles 190 and following of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, imply the establishment in our legal system of a liability system that attempts to cover damages derived from administrative conduct originating in a legal relationship of a contractual and extracontractual nature, and which responds to the undeniable reality that life in society necessarily entails the intervention of public powers in many areas of the lives of a country's inhabitants, which opens the possibilities for the conduct of the Public Administration to generate damages and create risk situations for individuals (and even for the Administration's own members), which they are not obliged to bear. Aspects that, moreover, it is necessary to point out, are not only recognized by the domestic legal system, and on the contrary, find their bases in the international legal system, to which our rule of law is subject. We are faced with a liability scheme that seeks to guarantee coverage for an unlawful injury (lesión antijurídica) suffered on the occasion of the legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the Administration (in its different types of personifications and whether acting in the field of administrative law or subject to private law), in which the existence of the damage is established as the central axis, since it will be compensable when there is no legal duty to bear it, regardless of the normality or abnormality, lawfulness or unlawfulness of the conduct (art. 190 LGAP), and independently of its nature, since liability may arise on the occasion of actions of a legal nature, as well as purely material ones, and even omissions. Therefore, unlawfulness refers to a detriment suffered by a person, in their vital or patrimonial assets, which is not bearable, since otherwise, when the damage must be tolerated, it loses its unlawful character. *"Thus, and following constitutional jurisprudence, it has been pointed out that this meaning of unlawful damage (daño antijurídico) as the basis for the duty of state reparation fully harmonizes with the principles and values inherent to the social state of law because the State is responsible for safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the administered against the Administration itself (...) Likewise, it is considered that "article 90 of the Charter, taking into account jurisprudential constructions, gave a new normative approach to the State's patrimonial liability by shifting its foundation from the lack of service to unlawful damage. This implies the expansion of the space in which the State's patrimonial liability can be declared, since the starting point for determining that liability is no longer determined by irregular state action - whether due to non-provision of the service, irregular provision, or late provision - but by the production of an unlawful damage that the victim is not under a duty to bear, independently of the regularity or irregularity of its action".* (Santofimio Gamboa Orlando. Convencionalidad y responsabilidad del Estado: Del Individualismo Clásico al Derecho de Víctimas. La Protección de los Derechos Frente al Poder de la Administración). Editorial TEMIS, Bogotá, Colombia, 2014, p. 476). Regarding the unlawfulness of the damage, the Sala Primera, in judgment number 000584-F-2005, at 10:45 on August 11, two thousand five, stated: *"Indeed, civil liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while in others, from the basic principle embodied in the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to detriment to a third party against the grain of the legal system. If this does not exist, there is no room for reparation. This results even in liability for lawful conduct, in which, despite the full lawfulness of the conduct adopted, an injury is produced which, not being of obligatory support, is unlawful at its base, according to what has been said. Thus, if there is no duty to endure the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of article 194 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) assume the reparation consequences for that which it could not prevent. Then, *the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person* occurs, and in that regard, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. In this way, it can be affirmed that only the injury that, when confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful at its base is compensable, since to state the contrary would be to affirm compensation through harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified. It must be reiterated then, that for the existence in Law of a due reparation, there must be antecedent and base unlawfulness, which in no way points to the nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of the conduct deployed by the agent producing the damage, nor to the result that said action or omission produces. Indeed, even in cases of legitimate and normal functioning, in which there is no illegality in the behavior, a harmful consequence is produced, which with certain characteristics (exceptional intensity or small proportion of those affected), is deemed of obligatory reparation, which speaks of its unlawfulness, so much so that with the injury itself the civil obligation and its consequent right to sue arise. It can be maintained then, that the base unlawfulness, to which reference is made as the substrate and global, essential prerequisite for liability, is something different and independent from the imputation parameter used by the Legal System, since even in the event of an objective regime (which excludes the subjective elements of fault and intent, to give way to a simple economic transfer aimed at restoring the imbalance produced in the equality of public burdens), there is unlawfulness, to the extent that the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit assumption of an injury contrary to Law, which should not be borne by the victim. That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in the compensable damage, whether by normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning."* It is, therefore, a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) that seeks to protect the person who is injured as a direct consequence of the Administration's conduct, provided that this injury, and no longer the conduct that generates it, is illegitimate from the perspective of the person who suffered the damage. In summary, the characteristic notes of this liability scheme are that it is direct and strict (objetiva). The first element implies that the Administration responds directly and not subsidiarily, for the damage it causes on the occasion of its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, making it consequently unnecessary to establish the agent or official causing the damage, based on the thesis that, when the official acts, the Administration acts. The foregoing, of course, without prejudice to the recourse action that may be brought against the responsible official. Regarding the strict nature, as already indicated, the imputability of the damage does not depend on the demonstration of fault, intent, or negligence, since it is enough that the damage originates in the normal or abnormal functioning of the service, or in legitimate or illegitimate conduct of the Administration, to impute liability. Ergo, it suffices that there is an unlawful damage that is attributable to the Administration, for liability to be configured. Consequently, the concept of injury is the center of the system, and in order to determine if it is compensable, the concurrence of certain elements is necessary. One of them is the unlawfulness of the damage, to which reference was already made above, by affirming that it must be an injury that the victim does not have to bear according to the law, so there must be no causes that justify and legitimize the injury, since it must be of an unlawful nature in reference to the injured party, not to the author of the damage (since it is not required that the conduct be contrary to legality). It is also necessary that the damage be effective, assessable (evaluable), compensable (indemnizable), and individualizable (art. 196 LGAP), which means that a real and current affectation must occur to the assets and/or rights of the damaged person, which must be susceptible to quantification in economic terms, and must refer to a person or group. On the other hand, from the position of the subject responsible for the damage, it is also essential to consider some necessary elements in order to determine their obligation to compensate. We refer to the imputation of the damage, which is possible not only when there is a causal relationship between the fact and the damage (which occurs when the conduct is the suitable one to produce the patrimonial injury), but also, besides this condition, the attribution of the duty to repair may arise from other reasons such as the ownership of the object that generated the damage, a situation of dependence, or the creation of a risk situation, among others, but in any case, derived from the existence of a reparatory duty. Imputation is therefore composed of two spheres, one factual and one legal (related to the different titles of imputation established in the legal system, such as, for example, lack of service or the creation of a risk.) More simply, the attribution of liability can occur both due to legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal conduct of the administrative organization, provided that a compensable damage is caused, insofar as the affected party does not have the duty to bear it, and it is assessable, compensable, and individualizable, and that the Administration's conduct has been adequate to generate the damage (causal link), that is, when there is a causal link between the Administration's conduct and the damage; and equally, when other assumptions concur, such as, for example, the creation of risk, and ultimately, when the legal duty to repair is attributable to the Administration, derived from a liability system based on the victim, founded on a just and equitable society, subject to the legal system and respect for the pro homine principle, **VII.- ON THE CAUSAL LINK AS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE IMPUTATION OF LIABILITY TO THE ADMINISTRATION:** When analyzing the imputation of damage, it must necessarily be understood that it comprises a factual sphere and a legal sphere. The first refers to causality, which is the link that unites a cause to an effect, it is the connection between the unlawful damage and the Administration's conduct; and which presents the problem of the criteria to be used for establishing the existence of that link, especially when, around the damage, there exists a diversity of facts or conditions that could have caused the injury, which undoubtedly speaks to the complexity for the legal operator in the exercise of their function in order to determine the existence of the causal link. In this regard, various theories have been used, such as that of adequate causation (causalidad adecuada), which posits that the Administration's conduct must be the appropriate one, according to the circumstances, to produce the injury; or the theory of equivalence of conditions, according to which, if the fact or condition contributes to producing the final result, it must be considered a cause. *"An abstract consideration of the problem thus posed could lead one to answer that any of these facts or conditions, to the extent that all of them contribute to producing the final result (since if just one of them were missing it would not occur, at least in the same way ...), must be qualified as causes. So understood by the theory of the equivalence of conditions, which has special roots in the field of Criminal law. It is obvious, however, that a rigid application of this thesis would often lead to results difficult to accept in terms of justice. Therefore, it is usually affirmed that for a fact to deserve being considered as the cause of the damage, it must be in itself suitable to produce it according to common experience, that is, it must have a special aptitude to produce the harmful effect. Only in these cases (adequate causation) can it be said, with rigor, that the activity taken into consideration constitutes the efficient cause, the proximate cause of the damage (in iure non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur), the true cause of it. The question, however, is not so easy to resolve (...). It is not possible to forget, indeed, that several causes may contribute to the production of a specific harmful result."* (García De Enterría Eduardo. Curso de Derecho Administrativo II. Ninth Edition. Civitas. Madrid. 2004. p.400). In the case of the national Courts, the Sala Primera has repeatedly expressed its inclination towards the theory of adequate causation: *"Another essential aspect is the existence of a causal link, which is assessed by the judges in accordance with the evidence that the parties, or the jurisdictional body itself, in accordance with its powers of ordering, have brought to the process. For such purposes, as this Chamber has determined on other occasions, the most convenient theory for determining whether it is possible to link the damage to the conduct is that of adequate causation, which postulates that this occurs "when the former originates, if not necessarily, at least with a high probability according to the specific circumstances affecting the matter, from the latter" (resolution 300-F-2009 at 11 hours 25 minutes on March 26, 2009). However, this link can be eliminated if the defendant demonstrates the concurrence of a cause exempting liability (force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party). This is because its presence rules out that the injury suffered by the affected party was produced by the State's conduct that is the object of the process. Finally, according to what has already been stated, it is feasible to affirm that Costa Rican legislation opts for a scheme of moderate strict liability, which, recognizing the particularities of the functions and tasks entrusted to the Administration, obliges that the conduct deployed by the state apparatus be assessed in order to determine if there was normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning."* (Sala Primera, N°1367-2012, at 08:40, on October 18, 2012) (In the same sense see, among others, judgments N°467-F-2008, at 14:25, on July 4, 2008 and 1008-F-2006, at 09:30, on December 21, two thousand six). Then, when analyzing the causal link, it must be elucidated whether there is any connection between the Administration's conduct and the damage alleged by the individual, which implies establishing whether that conduct is the adequate cause that produced the injury giving rise to the claim, insofar as it may have enhanced the detriment suffered.

Nonetheless, as already indicated, this is not at all simple, especially if we consider that a harmful result frequently occurs with the concurrence of several causes, which may even originate in the conduct of different subjects, among whom, besides the Administration, the victim themselves may be counted.

**VIII.- ON THE LIABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION SUED IN THE SPECIFIC CASE:** In the case under examination, the liability of the Administration sued is discussed regarding the injury suffered by the plaintiff on the occasion of a traffic accident. That mishap took place on National Route 206, in the vicinity of Higuito de Desamparados, about two hundred meters from the plaza. Despite the fact that the representatives of the defendants argue that the accident site does not exist, which they base on technical report PLI-10-15-0093, of January twenty-second, two thousand fifteen, issued by Geologist Pablo Arguedas Castro, of the Information Systems Unit and Engineer Rolando Arias Herrera, Head of the Information Systems Unit of CONAVI, according to which *"400 meters east of the Higuito plaza," ... "that address does not exist according to the official IGN cartographic sheet at scale 1.50:00 and even in the Google Earth viewer a road that could be consistent with that orientation is not visible."*, as well as on the pronouncement of the Road and Bridge Conservation Management in report GCSV-09-2016-0630 of February sixteenth, two thousand fifteen, signed by Engineer Maurio Sojo Quesada, who indicated: *"... with the address provided, the mentioned bridge cannot be located,* *occurred on a national road, as a consequence of the supposed poor condition in which a bridge slab was found"*; the truth is that from the photographs contained in the file, from the evidence of the news report that exists in digital format, as well as from the testimony of the witness Johana Menard Dormond, and the witness Mauricio Sojo Quesada, it is possible to determine the site of the accident. In this sense, from the photographs and the report it is clearly observed that the mishap took place on a public road on which there is a culvert and a wall. From the testimony of the witness Menard Dormond, -who was accompanying the actor on the day the events occurred, which this Court takes as accredited, not only from Mrs. Johana's own testimony, but also because in the video of the report it is observed that she was at the site, and it is even clearly seen that she has one of the two protective helmets that appear in the video in her hand-, and from the testimony of Mr. Sojo Quesada, it is concluded that the accident took place on National Route No. 206, in the vicinity of Higuito de Desamparados, near the park. Thus, the CONAVI Engineer, when shown the photographs and faced with several questions posed by the Court, said he recognized the site, also indicated that it was National Route No. 206, and that he identified it by the type of culvert. Therefore, this Deciding Body takes as duly accredited that the event occurred on a national route, and specifically on No. 206. This leads us, in order to carry out the imputability analysis, to precisely determine the title of imputation, which in this case would correspond to the duty of the defendants to provide maintenance to public roads. In our country, Article 2 of Law No. 5060, General Law of Public Roads, of August twenty-second, nineteen seventy-two, amended by Law No. 6676, of September eighteenth, nineteen eighty-one, provides that highways and public roads are assets of a public domain nature: *"All lands occupied by existing public highways and roads or those built in the future are property of the State. Municipalities own the streets within their jurisdiction. Highways and public roads may only be built and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport."* On the other hand, subsection a) of Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, No. 3155 of August fifth, nineteen sixty-three establishes that it corresponds to MOPT: *"a) Plan, build and improve highways and roads. Maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of neighborhood roads. Regulate and control the rights of way of existing or planned highways and roads. Regulate, control and monitor traffic and transport on public roads." (this competence must be harmonized with the provisions of Law No. 7798).* And Article 1 of the General Law of Roads, previously cited, establishes the different classifications of public roads, while indicating that their administration corresponds to MOPT: *"NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK: Its administration corresponds to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which will define it according to the requirements determined for this purpose by the Executive Branch, by way of agreement. This network will be constituted by the following classes of public roads: a) Primary highways: Trunk route network, to serve corridors, characterized by relatively high traffic volumes and with a high proportion of international, interprovincial or long-distance trips (...)."* In the cited norm, secondary highways, tertiary roads, neighborhood roads and local streets, among others, are also indicated. Meanwhile, Law No. 7798 (Law Creating the National Road Council, of April 30, 1998), in its numerals 3 and 4, provides: *"ARTICLE 3.- The National Road Council is created, an organ with maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council shall have instrumental and budgetary legal personality to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to sign the contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law. This Council shall be administered by the Administrative Council, integrated according to Article 5 below." ARTICLE 4.- The objectives of the National Road Council shall be the following: a) Plan, program, administer, finance, execute and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in concordance with the programs elaborated by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. b) Administer its patrimony. c) Execute, through contracts, the works, supplies and services required for the conservation and construction process of the entirety of the national road network. d) Supervise the correct execution of works, including quality control. e) Promote research, development and technology transfer in the field of road construction and conservation. f) Enter into contracts or provide the necessary services for the fulfillment of its objectives and functions."* From the cited regulations, it is inferred that the administration of the roads classified by Law as national are under the administration of MOPT, but through CONAVI (an issue to which we will refer later, when addressing the matter of standing to be sued). Consequently, the maintenance and conservation of those highways corresponds to the Administration, and falls upon CONAVI, which implies that, as established by Law No. 7798 in its Article 1, it comprises the execution of all those activities necessary to preserve *"in a continuous and sustained manner, the good condition of the roads, so as to guarantee an optimal service to the user"*. Furthermore, the following activities correspond to CONAVI: *"Routine maintenance: Set of tasks of drainage cleaning, vegetation control, minor and localized pavement repairs and demarcation restitution, which must be carried out continuously and sustained over time, to preserve the operative condition, the level of service and safety of the roads. It also includes the cleaning and minor and localized repairs of bridge structures. Periodic maintenance: Set of programmable activities every certain period, aimed at renewing the original condition of the pavements through the application of additional layers of ballast, gravel, surface treatments or asphalt overlays or concrete sections, as the case may be, without altering the structure of the underlying pavement layers. The periodic maintenance of bridges includes the cleaning, painting and repair or replacement of damaged or protective structural elements. Rehabilitation: Selective repair and reinforcement of the pavement or roadway, after partial demolition of the existing structure, in order to restore the original structural solidity and riding quality. Additionally, for one time only in each case, it may include the construction or reconstruction of the drainage system that does not involve building bridges or major culverts. Before any rehabilitation activity on the riding surface, it must be verified that the drainage system works well. The rehabilitation of bridges refers to major repairs, such as the replacement of main structural elements or components or the replacement of the floor slab. Reconstruction: Complete renovation of the road structure, with prior partial or total demolition of the pavement structure or bridge structures."* Once established, according to the cited regulations, that it is the authority of CONAVI to conserve national routes, and that this basically implies that the routes are in good condition, and that continuous and quality service is provided to the user, as established by Article 1 of Law 7798, harmonized with precept 4 of the General Law of Public Administration No. 6227, in that it indicates *"The activity of public entities must be subjected in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy and equality in the treatment of the recipients, users or beneficiaries."*; it is evident that the performance of road conservation, maintenance, or reconstruction works that do not adhere to technical criteria, or simply the omission to execute those tasks, implies a lack of service, contrary to the most elementary principles governing the conduct of the Public Administration, and that this way of proceeding not only undermines the principle of continuity in the provision of service, but also constitutes a threat to the integrity and safety of the people who travel on those roads. In the matter under examination, it has been taken as duly accredited that Mr. Ramírez Badilla suffered an accident on National Route No. 206, and it was also accredited that on the occasion of that mishap that made him lose control of his motorcycle, he crashed into a wall that was located in the right of way (as declared by the CONAVI Engineer), which had several exposed rebar rods, protruding from that structure, and that one of those metal pieces embedded itself in the plaintiff's left thigh. Furthermore, it is proven that this event: becoming embedded in one of those rods, required the work of the fire department to extract him from the site, as well as causing him acute pain, a disability for two weeks and produced a general disability of four percent. As can be seen, the Administration in this specific case created a risk, which cannot be attributed to the victim, as the defendants intend to do, by referring to this ground for exclusion of liability. It must be clear that the damage that is the object of this dispute is that which occurred on the occasion of those metal pieces that were on the structure that forms part of the right of way, and that evidently create a dangerous situation. Thus, the injury claimed is very specific and corresponds to that generated from that rod embedding itself in the plaintiff's left thigh. It is precisely from that event that the presupposition of unlawfulness (antijuricidad) arises in this case, since it was that condition of the structure on the public road that generated the damages claimed, and it is that characteristic, that element of danger originated in a lack of maintenance of the road by CONAVI, that the administered individual, in this case Mr. Ramírez Badilla, has no duty to assume. Thus, the Administration in this case created a risk, and the administered individual does not have to bear the injuries suffered on the occasion of that risk, of that dangerous situation caused by the conduct of the Administration, which gives rise to liability, because the actor nor any other person using that road should be a victim of a risk situation that arises from an omissive conduct of the administrative organ that has the responsibility of providing maintenance to public roads and ensuring they are safe for users. Consequently, the Court considers that the final consequence of the omissive conduct of the Administration was the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, without any interference being attributable to him in the creation of that risk condition created by the Administration, thus making the injury unlawful (antijurídica), and consequently giving rise to the duty to compensate for the Administration. Now then, in accordance with the above, that compensatory liability must fall upon CONAVI, and only in the event that this organ fails to comply with its compensatory obligation, subsidiarily on the State. The foregoing is in accordance with the new position regarding the standing to be sued of the State in relation to organs that have instrumental legal personality, which the First Chamber has been maintaining and which this Court shares, and in which it has been indicated: *"The conclusion of the judges, according to what was set out in considerando IV, seems to be a direct effect of the jurisprudence of this Chamber prevailing at the time the ruling was issued. But as was well indicated, the liability of the State regarding the conduct of the Organ-Persons is of a subsidiary nature, since both constitute a single sphere of action, only organized under a different functional and budgetary structure. Endorsing the Court's criterion would involve a direct violation of norms 9, 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, 190 and 194 of the LGAP. The error of the judgment would lie in affirming that in cases where the impairments were caused by the Organ-Person in the exercise of its legal competencies, the State's liability is neither joint and several (solidaria) nor subsidiary and, therefore, it lacks standing to be sued. It is insisted, if the actions and the claimed damages have been originated within the competencies of the Organ-Person, this confirms the liability of the State or the entity to which it belongs. But this liability will be subsidiary, never joint and several (solidaria), unless the law so provides, the sole exception to the analyzed rule. The normative source of the above, it is repeated, is found in canon 161 of the CPCA. Contrary to what the judges indicated, the lack of standing to be sued of the State does not arise by virtue of the fact that the damage was caused by the Conavi in the exercise of its competencies; on the contrary, that event would ratify that it was indeed legitimate to respond subsidiarily for the damages caused. Now then, it turns out that in this matter a particularity arose that renders the co-plaintiffs' appeal useless. In favor of the Conavi, the principal obligor to ensure the maintenance of the highways and bridges of the national road network (including the provisional bridge that originated the accident described in this process), the Court decreed the statute of limitations on liability in accordance with canon 198 of the LGAP. The appellant has not challenged that point, so this Chamber cannot analyze whether such determination is in accordance with the law. Therefore, if a statute of limitations was decreed regarding the principal obligor to preserve the safety of the bridge in question, this Chamber considers that this measure directly benefited the State, because the only way to maintain the mentioned subsidiarity is if the actions of the Conavi had been confirmed by the ad quem. The contrary would imply speaking of a joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria), which is not stipulated in the Law. In other terms, in the specific case, the Council is the party directly responsible for ensuring the safety and proper functioning of the "provisional bridge" located over the Río de las Vueltas de Pocares. The foregoing according to the provisions in the mandates of Law 7798, where it is clearly established that the Conavi is the party obliged to plan, program, administer, finance, execute and control the conservation and construction of the national road network; execute, through contracts, the works, supplies and services required for the conservation and construction process of the entirety of that road network; supervise the correct execution of the works, including quality control (ordinals 3, 5 and 6). However, the liability of that organ-person could not be defined or confirmed by the Court because a statute of limitations occurred on the plaintiff's right to file their claim against that Organ (numeral 198 of the LGAP); consequently, it is not possible for the State to respond subsidiarily for damages that were not determined. It is remembered, the subsidiarity of the State or the larger entity commented on functions under the premise that the Organ-Person has been condemned, and it, for any reason, does not comply with its payment obligation or lacks the budget for it. But it is not the same that for conduct of the Organ-Person proper to its competencies, the State is sued and it responds exclusively as the appellant intends, because that would imply joint and several liability (solidaridad), which is not legally regulated as is required in those cases. In sum, since the Council's liability could not be determined as the statute of limitations regulated in cardinal 198 of the LGAP had operated, the subsidiary liability of the State could not be generated either. First, the liability of the Conavi had to be declared, that is, by analyzing whether those damages claimed by the co-plaintiffs were caused in the exercise of its competencies and functions, which did not occur due to the exclusive fault of the plaintiff party in letting the legal time established for that pass. It is due to all the foregoing that assessing the liability of the State is useless, for if the claim was declared without merit regarding the Conavi, it should also have been so regarding the State, but for the reasons indicated herein. Given this, that co-defendant in effect lacks standing to be sued, but for the reasons amply explained in this ruling; that is, because there exists an "uncertainty" as to whether it was liable for the alleged damages, which makes it improper for it to respond alone and in the absence of the eventual direct obligor. If it were determined that it must assume any obligation, this would have a subsidiary nature, based on what was decided against the possible direct responsible party who was initially claimed against. Indeed, in this matter it can also be determined that there has been a lack of legal basis for the claims of the lawsuit regarding the State. Ergo, the cassation grounds invoked must be dismissed because nothing is gained by analyzing the subsidiary liability of the State if the principal obligor was not sued within the four-year legal period established in canon 198 of the LGAP."* Judgment No. 840-F-SI-2016, at 09:50 hours on August eleventh, two thousand sixteen. In the same sense, Judgment No. 0293-F-SI-2016, at 09:40 hours on April seventh, two thousand sixteen.

**IX.- ON THE DAMAGES THAT MUST BE COMPENSATED:** Regarding material damage, the Court takes as duly accredited that Mr. Ramírez Badilla, as a consequence of the accident, was incapacitated for two weeks, and that he also presents a four percent loss of his general capacity. That injury, for compensatory purposes, must be translated into economic terms, for which, once this judgment is final, and already in its execution stage, an expert professional must be appointed to determine the amount of the injury. As for moral damage (daño moral), this consists of the injury to the internal and subjective sphere of the plaintiff. This type of damage, precisely due to its nature, allows the adjudicator, in light of the evidence in the case file, to establish its existence based on the principles governing logic and common sense. Regarding this type of damage, it is necessary to indicate that it is valued in re ipsa, according to the Court's assessment of the situations that may affect each person in their extra-patrimonial sphere. When we speak of moral damage (daño moral), we refer to an injury to the internal sphere of the individual, which causes them a detriment, a deterioration in their state of mind causing anguish, pain, suffering, discouragement. It is precisely that detriment that is susceptible to compensation. In the case under examination, the Court arrives at the conclusion that it has been sufficiently demonstrated in trial that Mr. Ramírez Badilla indeed suffered anguish on the occasion of the accident. This is derived from the video of the news report, from his statements before the Forensic Medicine expert, as well as from the statements of the witness and partner of the actor. It must also be indicated that it is plausible that a person, faced with an accident like the one suffered by the plaintiff, and with the sequelae he had, tends to feel anguish, feelings of pain and worry. Nonetheless, this Body estimates that the amount requested by the plaintiff is excessive, and therefore sets the amount of compensation for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) at the sum of one million colones. The amount finally set in the judgment execution stage for material damage, as well as the one million colones established as compensation for moral damage (daño moral), must be updated in their purchasing power, in accordance with the rules established in numeral 123 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code."

“VI.- ALGUNAS GENERALIDADES EN RELACIÓN CON LA RESPONSABILIDAD PATRIMONIAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLICA: En reiteradas ocasiones, esta Sección del Tribunal ha indicado sobre la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública, que ésta constituye una garantía para el administrado y el justiciable, que es posible derivar, en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, a través de una serie de preceptos constitucionales, entre ellos, los establecidos en los artículos 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45 y 49 de la Carta Fundamental (para mencionar sólo algunos de los que refieren la citada garantía). Dichos numerales contienen principios relacionados con la eficiencia, la rendición de cuentas, la justicia distributiva, el derecho a la integridad patrimonial, el derecho al resarcimiento de las lesiones sufridas y el control judicial de la actuación administrativa, cuyo desarrollo jurisprudencial y normativo, especialmente por los numerales 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, implican la instauración en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico de un sistema de responsabilidad que intenta cubrir los daños derivados de la conducta administrativa originados en una relación jurídica de naturaleza contractual y extracontractual, y que responde a la realidad innegable de que la vida en sociedad conlleva necesariamente la intervención de los poderes públicos en muchos ámbitos de la vida de los habitantes de un país, lo cual abre las posibilidades a que la conducta de la Administración Pública genere daños y cree situaciones de riesgo para los particulares (y aún para los mismos componentes de la Administración), que éstos no están obligados a soportar. Aspectos que además, es preciso indicar, no solamente están reconocidos por el ordenamiento jurídico interno, y por el contrario, encuentra sus bases en el ordenamiento jurídico internacional, al cual se encuentra sujeto nuestro Estado de derecho. Nos encontramos ante un esquema de responsabilidad que pretende garantizar cobertura ante una lesión antijurídica sufrida con ocasión del funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal de la Administración (en sus diferentes tipos de personificaciones y tanto si actúan en el ámbito del derecho administrativo o con sujeción al derecho privado), en el que la existencia del daño se erige como el eje central, pues éste será indemnizable cuando no exista el deber jurídico de soportarlo, sin reparar en la normalidad o anormalidad, licitud o ilicitud de la conducta (art. 190 LGAP), y con independencia de la naturaleza de ésta, pues la responsabilidad puede surgir con ocasión de actuaciones de índole jurídico, así como de las puramente materiales, e incluso de las omisiones. Luego, la antijuricidad refiere a un menoscabo sufrido por una persona, en sus bienes vitales o patrimoniales, que no es soportable, pues en caso contrario, cuando el daño debe ser tolerado, pierde su carácter de antijurídico. "Así pues, y siguiendo la jurisprudencia constitucional, se ha señalado que esta acepción del daño antijurídico como fundamento del deber de reparación estatal armoniza plenamente con los principios y valores propios del Estado social de derecho debido a que al Estado corresponde la salvaguarda de los derechos y libertades de los administrados frente a la propia administración (...) Así mismo, se considera que el "artículo 90 de la Carta, atendiendo las construcciones jurisprudenciales, le dio un nuevo enfoque normativo a la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado desplazando su fundamento desde la falta del servicio hasta el daño antijurídico. Ello implica la ampliación del espacio en el que puede declararse la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado, pues el punto de partida para la determinación de esa responsabilidad ya no está determinado por la irregular actuación estatal -bien sea por la no prestación del servicio, por la prestación irregular o por la prestación tardía-, sino por la producción de un daño antijurídico que la víctima no está en el deber de soportar, independientemente de la regularidad o irregularidad de su actuación". (Santofimio Gamboa Orlando. Convencionalidad y responsabilidad del Estado: Del Individualismo Clásico al Derecho de Víctimas. La Protección de los Derechos Frente al Poder de la Administración). Editorial TEMIS, Bogotá.Colombia, 2014, pág. 476). Sobre la antijuridicidad del daño, la Sala Primera, en la sentencia número 000584-F-2005, de las 10:45 del once de agosto del dos mil cinco, señaló: "En efecto, la responsabilidad civil nace de la antijuricidad, que a su vez se constituye en su fundamento (derivado algunas veces de una norma positiva, mientras que en otras, del principio básico traducido en el deber de no dañar a otro), y que para esta materia particular se concreta en la inexistencia de ese deber para soportar el daño. Siempre que la víctima no tenga ese deber de soportar la lesión, se convierte en antijurídica, por menoscabo a un tercero a contrapelo del ordenamiento. De no existir ésta, no cabe reparación. Resulta de esta forma incluso en la responsabilidad por conducta lícita, en la que pese a la juricidad plena de la conducta adoptada, se produce una lesión que por no ser de obligado soporte, es antijurídica en su base, conforme a lo que va dicho. Así las cosas, si no existe el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (entendida como la consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias (requisitos del artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir. Se produce entonces, el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial de la persona, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión a la esfera jurídica de la víctima como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación. De esta manera, puede afirmarse que sólo es indemnizable la lesión que confrontada con la globalidad del Ordenamiento, pueda reputarse como antijurídica en su base, pues lo contrario sería afirmar la compensación por acción dañosa frente a un menoscabo que el Ordenamiento no reprocha y que, por el contrario, tolera y conciente como normal y justificado. Debe reiterarse entonces, que para la existencia en Derecho de una reparación debida, ha de existir antijuricidad antecedente y de base, lo que en modo alguno apunta a la naturaleza (legítima o ilegítima) de la conducta desplegada por el agente productor del daño, ni por el resultado que produce dicha acción u omisión. En efecto, aún en los supuestos de funcionamiento legítimo y normal, en los que no existe ilicitud en el comportamiento, se produce una consecuencia dañosa, que con determinadas características (intensidad excepcional o pequeña proporción de afectados), se reputa como de obligada reparación, lo cual dice de su antijuricidad, tanto así, que con la lesión misma surge la obligación civil y su consecuente derecho de accionar. Se puede sostener entonces, que la antijuricidad de base, a la que se hace referencia como sustrato y presupuesto global e imprescindible para la responsabilidad, es cosa distinta e independiente del parámetro de imputación utilizada por el Sistema Jurídico, pues aún en el evento de un régimen objetivo (que excluya los elementos subjetivos de la culpa y dolo, para dar paso a una simple transferencia económica dirigida a restaurar el desequilibrio producido en la igualdad de las cargas públicas), hay antijuricidad, en la medida en que la norma declara la obligación existente bajo el presupuesto implícito de una lesión contraria a Derecho, que no debe ser soportada por la víctima. Esa reiterada antijuricidad estará siempre presente en el daño indemnizable, bien sea por funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo." Se trata entonces, de un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva que pretende proteger a la persona que resulte lesionada como consecuencia de la conducta de la Administración en forma directa, siempre que esa lesión, ya no la conducta que la genera, sea ilegítima desde la perspectiva de quien ha sufrido el daño. En resumen, las notas características de este esquema de responsabilidad es que ésta es directa y objetiva. El primer elemento, implica que la Administración responde directamente y no de forma subsidiaria, por el daño que cause con ocasión de su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, resultando por consiguiente innecesario establecer el agente o funcionario causante del daño, partiendo de la tesis en el sentido de que, al actuar el funcionario, actúa la Administración. Lo anterior, claro está, sin perjuicio de la acción de regreso que se pueda ejercer contra el funcionario responsable. En lo que se refiere al carácter objetivo, como ya se indicó, la imputabilidad del daño no depende de la demostración de culpa, dolo o negligencia, pues basta con que el daño se origine en el funcionamiento normal o anormal del servicio, o en una conducta legítima o ilegítima de la Administración, para imputar la responsabilidad. Ergo, basta con que exista un daño antijurídico que sea imputable a la Administración, para que se configure la responsabilidad. En consecuencia, el concepto de lesión es el centro del sistema, y a efecto de determinar si ésta es indemnizable, es necesario la concurrencia de ciertos elementos. Uno de ellos es la antijuricidad del daño, a lo cual ya se hizo referencia líneas atrás, al afirmar que debe tratarse de una lesión que la víctima no tenga que soportar de acuerdo con la ley, por lo que no deben existir causas que justifiquen y legitimen la lesión, pues ésta debe ser de naturaleza antijurídica en referencia con el perjudicado, no con el autor del daño (pues no se requiere que la conducta sea contraria a la legalidad). Es necesario además, que el daño sea efectivo, evaluable, indemnizable e individualizable (art. 196 LGAP), lo cual significa que debe producirse una afección real y actual a los bienes y/ó derechos de la persona dañada, la cual ha de ser susceptible de cuantificarse en términos económicos, y debe referirse a una persona o grupo. Por otro lado, desde la posición del sujeto responsable del daño, también resulta indispensable considerar algunos elementos necesarios a fin de determinar su obligación de resarcir. Nos referimos a la imputación del daño, lo cual es posible no solamente cuando hay una relación de causalidad entre el hecho y el daño (lo que ocurre cuando la conducta es la idónea para producir la lesión patrimonial), sino que además de esta condición, la atribución del deber de reparar puede surgir de otras razones tales como la propiedad del objeto que ha generado el daño, una situación de dependencia o la creación de una situación de riesgo, entre otras, pero en todo caso, derivada de la existencia de un deber reparatorio. La imputación está conformada entonces por dos ámbitos, uno fáctico y otro jurídico (relacionado con los diferentes títulos de imputación establecidos en el ordenamiento, como por ejemplo, la falta de servicio o la creación de un riesgo.) Más simple, la atribución de la responsabilidad puede ocurrir tanto ante una conducta legítima o ilegítima, normal o anormal de la organización administrativa, siempre que se cause un daño resarcible, en cuanto que el afectado no tenga el deber de soportarlo, y éste sea evaluable, indemnizable e individualizable y que la conducta de la Administración haya sido la adecuada para generar el daño (nexo causal), es decir, cuando exista un nexo causal entre la conducta de la Administración y el daño; e igualmente, cuando concurren otros presupuestos, como por ejemplo, la creación de riesgo, y en definitiva, cuando le resulta atribuible a la Administración el deber jurídico de reparar, derivado de un sistema de responsabilidad fundado en la víctima, con fundamento en una sociedad justa y equitativa, sujeta al ordenamiento jurídico y al respeto del principio pro homine, VII.- SOBRE EL NEXO CAUSAL COMO REQUISITO INDISPENSABLE PARA LA IMPUTACIÓN DE RESPONSABILIDAD A LA ADMINISTRACIÓN: Al analizar la imputación del daño, necesariamente debe entenderse que ésta comprende un ámbito fáctico y un ámbito jurídico. El primero refiere a la causalidad, que es el vínculo que une a la causa a un efecto, es el ligamen entre el daño antijurídico y la conducta de la Administración; y que presenta el problema de los criterios que habrán de utilizarse para el establecimiento de la existencia de ese nexo, sobre todo cuando, alrededor del daño existe una diversidad de hechos o de condiciones que pudieron ocasionar la lesión, lo cual indudablemente dice sobre la complejidad para el operador jurídico en el ejercicio de su función en orden a determinar la existencia del nexo causal. Sobre el particular, se han manejado diversas teorías, como la de la causalidad adecuada, la cual parte de que la conducta de la Administración debe ser la apropiada, de acuerdo con las circunstancias, para producir la lesión; o la teoría de la equivalencia de condiciones, conforme a la cual, si el hecho o la condición contribuye a producir el resultado final, deberá considerarse causa. "Una consideración abstracta del problema así planteado podría llevar a responder que cualquiera de estos hechos o condiciones, en la medida en que todos ellos contribuyen a producir el resultado final (ya que si faltara uno sólo de ellos no se produciría, al menos de la misma manera ...) deben ser calificados como causas. Así lo entiende la teoría de la equivalencia de condiciones, que cuenta con especial raigambre en el campo del derecho Penal. Es obvio, sin embargo, que una aplicación rígida de esta tesis conduciría muchas veces a resultados difíciles de aceptar en términos de justicia. Por ello se suele afirmar que para que un hecho merezca ser considerado como causa del daño es preciso que sea en sí mismo idóneo para producirlo según la experiencia común, es decir, que tenga una especial aptitud para producir el efecto lesivo. Sólo en estos casos (causalidad adecuada) puede decirse, con rigor, que la actividad tomada en consideración constituye la causa eficiente, la causa próxima del daño (in iure nom remota causa, sed proxima espectatur), la causa verdadera del mismo. La cuestión, sin embargo, no es tan fácil de resolver (...). No es posible olvidar, en efecto, que a la producción de un resultado lesivo determinado pueden contribuir varias causas." (García De Enterría Eduardo. Curso de Derecho Administrativo II. Novena Edición. Civitas. Madrid. 2004. p.400). En el caso de los Tribunales nacionales, la Sala Primera ha expresado de forma reiterada, decantarse por la teoría de la causalidad adecuada: "Otro aspecto esencial es la existencia de un nexo de causalidad, el cual es valorado por los jueces de conformidad con las probanzas que las partes, o el mismo órgano jurisdiccional, de conformidad con sus poderes de ordenación, hayan allegado al proceso. Para tales efectos, tal y como lo ha dispuesto esta Sala en otras ocasiones, la teoría que resulta más conveniente para determinar si es posible vincular el daño con la conducta es la de causalidad adecuada, la cual postula que esto se da “cuando el primero se origine, si no necesariamente, al menos con una alta probabilidad según las circunstancias específicas que incidan en la materia, de la segunda” (resolución 300-F-2009 de las 11 horas 25 minutos del 26 de marzo de 2009). Sin embargo, este nexo puede ser eliminado en caso de que el demandado demuestre la concurrencia de una causa eximente de responsabilidad (fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de tercero). Esto por cuanto su presencia descarta que la lesión sufrida por el afectado fuera producida por la conducta del Estado objeto del proceso. Finalmente, según lo ya expuesto, es dable afirmar que la legislación costarricense opta por un esquema de responsabilidad objetiva moderada, el cual reconociendo las particularidades de las funciones y tareas encomendadas a la Administración, obliga a que se valore la conducta desplegada por el aparato estatal con la finalidad de determinar si existió un funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo”. (Sala Primera, N°1367-2012, de las 08:40, del 18 de octubre del 2012) (En igual sentido ver, entre otras, las sentencias N°467-F-2008, de las 14:25, del cuatro de julio del 2008 y 1008-F-2006, de las 09:30, del 21 de diciembre del dos mil seis). Luego, al analizar el nexo de causalidad, debe dilucidarse si hay algún vínculo entre la conducta de la Administración y el daño alegado por el particular, lo que implica establecer si aquella conducta es la causa adecuada que produjo la lesión que da origen al reclamo, en cuanto haya potenciado el menoscabo sufrido. No obstante, como ya se indicó, ello no resulta para nada sencillo, sobre todo si consideramos que un resultado dañoso, frecuentemente tiene lugar con la concurrencia de varias causas, que pueden incluso originarse en la conducta de sujetos distintos, entre los cuales, además de la Administración, puede contarse la propia victima.

VIII.- SOBRE LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ACCIONADA EN EL CASO CONCRETO: En el caso bajo examen, se discute la responsabilidad de la Administración accionada respecto de la lesión sufrida por el demandante con ocasión de un accidente de tránsito. Ese percance tuvo lugar en la ruta nacional 206, en las inmediaciones de Higuito de Desamparados, a unos doscientos metros de la plaza. A pesar de que los representantes de los accionados argumentan que el sitio del accidente no existe, lo cual fundamentan en el informe técnico PLI-10-15-0093, de veintidós de enero del dos mil quince, emitido por el Geólogo Pablo Arguedas Castro, de la Unidad de Sistemas de Información y el Ingeniero Rolando Arias Herrera, Jefe de la Unidad de Sistemas de Información del CONAVI, conforme al cual "400 metros este de la plaza de Higuito , "...dicha dirección no existe según la hoja cartográfica oficial IGN a escala 1.50:00 e inclusive en el visor de Google Earth no es visible un camino que pueda ser congruente con dicha orientación.", así como en el pronunciamiento de la Gerencia de Conservación de Vías y Puentes en informe GCSV-09-2016-0630 de dieciséis de febrero del dos mil quince, suscrito por el Ingeniero Maurio Sojo Quesada, quien indicó: "... con la dirección brindada no se puede localizar el puente mencionado ocurrido en una vía nacional, como consecuencia del supuesto mal estado en el que se encontraba una losa de un puente"; lo cierto es que de las fotografías que constan en el expediente, de la prueba del reportaje noticioso que obra en formato digital, así como de la declaración de la testigo Johana Menard Dormond, y del testigo Mauricio Sojo Quesada, sí es posible determinar el sitio del accidente. En este sentido, de las fotografías y el reportaje se observa claramente que el percance tuvo lugar en una vía pública en la que hay una alcantarilla y un muro. De la declaración de la testigo Menard Dormond, -quien acompañaba al actor el día en el que ocurrieron los hechos, lo cual tiene por acreditado este Tribunal, no solamente por la propia declaración de doña Johana, sino además por que en el video del reportaje se observa que ella estaba en el sitio, e incluso se ve claramente que tiene uno de los dos cascos protectores que aprecen en el video en su mano-, y de la declaración del señor Sojo Quesada, se concluye que el accidente tuvo lugar sobre la ruta nacional N°206, en las inmediaciones de Higuito de Desamparados, en las cercanías del parque. Así, el Ingeniero del CONAVI, al mostrarle las fotografías y ante varias preguntas planteadas por el Tribunal, dijo reconocer el sitio, indicó además que se trataba de la ruta nacional N°206, y que la identificaba por el tipo de la alcantarilla. Luego, este Órgano Decisor, tiene como debidamente acreditado que el hecho ocurrió en una ruta nacional, y concretamente en la N°206. Esto nos lleva, a fin de realizar el análisis de imputabilidad, a determinar precisamente el título de imputación, que en este caso correspondería al deber de los accionados en orden a brindar mantenimiento a las vías públicas. En nuestro país, el artículo 2 de la Ley N°5060, Ley General de Caminos Públicos, de veintidós de agosto de mil novecientos setenta y dos, reformado mediante Ley N°6676, de dieciocho de septiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno, dispone que las carreteras y caminos públicos son bienes de naturaleza demanial: "Son propiedad del Estado, todos los terrenos ocupados por carreteras y caminos públicos existentes o que se construyan en el futuro. Las municipalidades tienen la propiedad de las calles de su jurisdicción. Las carreteras y caminos públicos, únicamente podrán ser construidos y mejorados por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte." Por otra parte, el inciso a del artículo 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, N°3155 de cinco de agosto de mil novecientos sesenta y tres establece que le corresponde al MOPT: "a) Planificar, construir y mejorar las carreteras y caminos. Mantener las carreteras y colaborar con las Municipalidades en la conservación de los caminos vecinales. Regular y controlar los derechos de vía de las carreteras y caminos existentes o en proyecto. Regular, controlar y vigilar el tránsito y el transporte por los caminos públicos." (dicha competencia debe concordarse con lo dispuesto en al Ley N° 7798). Y el artículo 1° de la Ley General de Caminos, anteriormente citada, establece las distintas clasificaciones de los caminos públicos, al tiempo que señala que su administración corresponde al MOPT: "RED VIAL NACIONAL: Corresponde su administración al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el cual la definirá según los requisitos que al efecto determine el Poder Ejecutivo, por vía de acuerdo. Esta red estará constituida por las siguientes clases de caminos públicos: a) Carreteras primarias: Red de rutas troncales, para servir a corredores, caracterizados por volúmenes de tránsito relativamente altos y con una alta proporción de viajes internacionales, interprovinciales o de larga distancia (..)." En la norma citada, se indican a demás las carreteras secundarias, las terciarias, caminos vecinales y calles locales, entre otros. Por su parte, la Ley N°7798 (Ley de Creación del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, de 30 de abril de 1998), en sus numerales 3 y 4 disponen: "ARTÍCULO 3.- Créase el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, órgano con desconcentración máxima, adscrito al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. El Consejo tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental y presupuestaria para administrar el Fondo de la red vial nacional, así como para suscribir los contratos y empréstitos necesarios para el ejercicio de sus funciones, de conformidad con la presente ley. Este Consejo será administrado por el Consejo de Administración, integrado conforme al artículo 5 siguiente." ARTÍCULO 4.- Serán objetivos del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad los siguientes: a) Planear, programar, administrar, financiar, ejecutar y controlar la conservación y la construcción de la red vial nacional, en concordancia con los programas que elabore la Dirección de Planificación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. b) Administrar su patrimonio. c) Ejecutar, mediante contratos, las obras, los suministros y servicios requeridos para el proceso de conservación y construcción de la totalidad de la red vial nacional. d) Fiscalizar la ejecución correcta de los trabajos, incluyendo el control de la calidad. e) Promover la investigación, el desarrollo y la transferencia tecnológica en el campo de la construcción y conservación vial. f) Celebrar contratos o prestar los servicios necesarios para el cumplimiento de sus objetivos y funciones." De la normativa citada se colige que la administración de las vías que son clasificadas por la Ley como nacionales, están bajo la administración del MOPT, pero a través del CONAVI (cuestión esta a la que referiremos más adelante, al tratar el tema de la legitimación pasiva). En consecuencia el mantenimiento y conservación de esas carreteras corresponde a la Administración, y recae sobre el CONAVI, lo cual implica que, tal y como lo dispone la Ley N° 7798 en su artículo 1°, comprende la ejecución de todas aquellas actividades necesarias para preservar "en forma continua y sostenida, el buen estado de las vías, de modo que se garantice un servicio óptimo al usuario". Además, corresponden al CONAVI las siguientes actividades: "Mantenimiento rutinario: Conjunto de labores de limpieza de drenajes, control de vegetación, reparaciones menores y localizadas del pavimento y la restitución de la demarcación, que deben efectuarse de manera continua y sostenida a través del tiempo, para preservar la condición operativa, el nivel de servicio y seguridad de las vías. Incluye también la limpieza y las reparaciones menores y localizadas de las estructuras de puentes. Mantenimiento periódico: Conjunto de actividades programables cada cierto período, tendientes a renovar la condición original de los pavimentos mediante la aplicación de capas adicionales de lastre, grava, tratamientos superficiales o recarpeteos asfálticos o de secciones de concreto, según el caso, sin alterar la estructura de las capas del pavimento subyacente. El mantenimiento periódico de los puentes incluye la limpieza, pintura y reparación o cambio de elementos estructurales dañados o de protección. Rehabilitación: Reparación selectiva y refuerzo del pavimento o la calzada, previa demolición parcial de la estructura existente, con el objeto de restablecer la solidez estructural y la calidad de ruedo originales. Además, por una sola vez en cada caso, podrá incluir la construcción o reconstrucción del sistema de drenaje que no implique construir puentes o alcantarillas mayores. Antes de cualquier actividad de rehabilitación en la superficie de ruedo, deberá verificarse que el sistema de drenaje funcione bien. La rehabilitación de puentes se refiere a reparaciones mayores, tales como el cambio de elementos o componentes estructurales principales o el cambio de la losa del piso. Reconstrucción: Renovación completa de la estructura del camino, con previa demolición parcial o total de la estructura del pavimento o las estructuras de puente." Una vez establecido, a tenor de la normativa citada, que es potestad del CONAVI, la conservación de las rutas nacionales, y que básicamente ello implica que las rutas se encuentren en buen estado, y que se preste un servicio continuo y de calidad al usuario, según lo dispone el artículo 1° de la Ley 7798, concordado con el precepto 4° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública N°6227, en cuanto señala que "La actividad de los entes públicos deberá estar sujeta en su conjunto a los principios fundamentales del servicio público, para asegurar su continuidad, su eficiencia, su adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad en el trato de los destinatarios, usuarios o beneficiarios."; resulta evidente que la realización de obras de conservación, mantenimiento, o reconstrucción vial, que no se apeguen a criterios técnicos, o simplemente la omisión en orden a ejecutar esas labores, implica una falta de servicio, contraria a los principios más elementales, que rigen la conducta de la Administración Pública, y que esta forma de proceder no solo atenta contra el principio de continuidad en la prestación del servicio, sino que además se constituye en una amenaza contra la integridad y la seguridad de las personas que transitan por esas vías. En el asunto bajo examen, se ha tenido como debidamente acreditado que el señor Ramírez Badilla sufrió un accidente en la Ruta Nacional N°206, y también fue acreditado que con ocasión de ese percance que le hizo perder el control de su moto, fue a estrellarse contra un muro que estaba localizado en el derecho de vía (así lo declaró el Ingeniero del CONAVI), que presentaba varias varillas expuestas, que sobresalían de esa estructura, y que una de esas piezas de metal se incrustó en el muslo izquierdo del demandante. Además, está probado que ese hecho: el quedar incrustado en una de esas varillas, ameritó la labor del cuerpo de bomberos, para extraerlo del sitio, así como que le causó un dolor agudo, una incapacidad por dos semanas y le produjo una incapacidad general del cuatro por ciento. Como puede verse, la Administración en este caso concreto creó un riesgo, que no puede ser imputado a la víctima, como pretenden hacerlo los demandados, al referir a esta causal de exclusión de la responsabilidad. Debe tenerse claro que el daño que es objeto de esta contienda es el que se ha producido con ocasión de esas piezas de metal que estaban en la estructura que forma parte del derecho de vía, y que evidentemente originan una situación de peligro. Así, la lesión por la que se reclama es muy concreta y corresponde a la que se generó a partir de que esa varilla se incrustó en el muslo izquierdo del demandante. Es precisamente a partir de ese hecho que se presenta en este caso el presupuesto de la antijuricidad, pues fue esa condición de la estructura en la vía pública la que generó los daños y perjuicios reclamados, y es esa característica, ese elemento de peligrosidad originado en una falta de mantenimiento de la vía por parte del CONAVI el que el administrado, en este caso el señor Ramírez Badilla no tiene el deber de asumir. Así, la Administración en este caso creó un riesgo, y el administrado no tiene que soportar las lesiones sufridas con ocasión de ese riesgo, de esa situación de peligrosidad propiciada por la conducta de la Administración, lo cual hace surgir la responsabilidad, pues el actor ni ninguna otra persona que utilice esa vía, debe ser víctima de una situación de riesgo que surge a partir de una conducta omisiva del órgano administrativo que tiene la responsabilidad de brindar mantenimiento de las vías públicas y de que éstas resulten seguras para los usuarios. En consecuencia, el Tribunal considera que la consecuencia final de la conducta omisiva de la Administración, fueron las lesiones sufridas por el demandante, sin que pueda atribuirse a éste ninguna injerencia en la creación de esa condición de riesgo creada por la Administración, resultando de este modo antijurídica la lesión, y surgiendo por consiguiente, el deber indemnizatorio para la Administración. Ahora bien, a tenor de lo dicho anteriormente, esa responsabilidad indemnizatoria debe recaer en el CONAVI, y solamente en caso de que éste órgano incumpla con su obligación resarcitoria, de forma subsidiaria en en el Estado. Lo anterior de conformidad con la nueva posición respecto de la legitimación pasiva del Estado en relación con órganos que cuentan con personalidad jurídica instrumental, que ha venido sosteniendo la Sala Primera y que este Tribunal comparte, y en la cual se ha señalado: "La conclusión de los jueces, según lo que se expuso en el considerando IV, parece que es efecto directo de la jurisprudencia de esta Sala imperante en el momento de dictarse el fallo. Pero como bien se indicó, la responsabilidad del Estado respecto de las conductas de los Órganos Personas es de carácter subsidiario, pues ambos constituyen una sola esfera de actuación, nada más que organizados bajo una estructura funcional y presupuestaria distinta. Amparar el criterio del Tribunal, involucraría una violación directa de las normas 9, 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política, 190 y 194 de la LGAP. El yerro de la sentencia radicaría en afirmar que en los casos donde los menoscabos fueron ocasionados por el Órgano Persona en ejercicio de sus competencias legales, la responsabilidad del Estado no es ni solidaria ni subsidiaria y, por ende, carece de legitimación pasiva. Se insiste, si las actuaciones y los daños reclamados han sido originados dentro de las competencias del Órgano Persona, ello confirma la responsabilidad del Estado o del ente al cual pertenece. Pero esta responsabilidad será subsidiaria, nunca solidaria, salvo que la ley así lo disponga, única excepción a la regla analizada. La fuente normativa de lo anterior, se repite, se encuentra en el canon 161 del CPCA. Contrario a lo indicado por los jueces, la falta de legitimación pasiva del Estado, no deviene en virtud de que el daño fue ocasionado por el Conavi en ejercicio de sus competencias, por el contrario, ese evento ratificaría que sí estaba legitimado para responder subsidiariamente por los daños causados. Ahora bien, resulta que en este asunto se presentó una particularidad que torna inútil el recurso de las coactoras. A favor el Conavi, principal obligado de velar por el mantenimiento de las carreteras y puentes de la red vial nacional (incluido el puente provisional que originó el accidente descrito en este proceso), el Tribunal decretó la prescripción de la responsabilidad al tenor del canon 198 de la LGAP. La recurrente no ha cuestionado tal extremo, por lo que esta Sala no puede analizar si tal determinación es acorde a derecho. Por ende, si se decretó una prescripción sobre el principal obligado de conservar la seguridad del puente en cuestión, considera esta Sala, esta medida beneficiaba directamente al Estado, pues la única forma de mantener la subsidiariedad comentada es si las actuaciones del Conavi hubiesen sido confirmadas por el ad quem. Lo contrario implicaría hablar de una responsabilidad solidaria, la cual no se encuentra estipulada en la Ley. En otros términos, en el caso concreto, el Consejo es el responsable directo de velar por la seguridad y buen funcionamiento del “puente provisional” ubicado sobre el Río de las Vueltas de Pocares. Lo anterior según lo dispuesto en los mandatos de la Ley 7798, donde claramente se establece que el Conavi es el obligado de planear, programar, administrar, financiar, ejecutar y controlar la conservación y la construcción de la red vial nacional; ejecutar, mediante contratos, las obras, los suministros y servicios requeridos para el proceso de conservación y construcción de la totalidad de esa red vial; fiscalizar la ejecución correcta de los trabajos, incluyendo el control de la calidad (ordinales 3, 5 y 6). Empero, la responsabilidad de ese órgano persona no pudo ser definida o confirmada por el Tribunal porque acaeció una prescripción del derecho de la actora de presentar su demanda contra ese Órgano (numeral 198 de la LGAP); consecuentemente, no es posible que el Estado responda subsidiariamente por daños que no fueron determinados. Recuérdese, la subsidiariedad del Estado o del ente mayor comentada, funciona bajo la premisa de que el Órgano Persona haya sido condenado, y este, por cualquier razón no cumpla con su obligación de pago o no tenga presupuesto para ello. Pero no es lo mismo que por conductas del Órgano Persona propias de sus competencias se demande al Estado y este responda de forma exclusiva como pretende el recurrente, porque ello implicaría solidaridad, la cual no está regulada legalmente como es de rigor en esos supuestos. En suma, como no se ha podido determinar la responsabilidad del Consejo al haber operado la prescripción regulada en el cardinal 198 de la LGAP, tampoco podría generarse la responsabilidad subsidiaria del Estado. Antes debía declararse la responsabilidad del Conavi, sea analizando si aquellas daños y perjuicios reclamados por las coactoras, fueron ocasionados en ejercicio de sus competencias y funciones, lo cual no sucedió por culpa exclusiva de la parte demandante al dejar pasar el tiempo legal dispuesto para ello. Es por todo lo anterior que resulta inútil valorar la responsabilidad del Estado, pues si la demanda fue declarada sin lugar en torno al Conavi, también lo debió ser respecto del Estado, pero por las razones aquí indicadas. Ante ello, ese codemandado en efecto carece de legitimación pasiva, pero por los motivos explicados ampliamente en este fallo; sea porque existe una “incertidumbre” si era responsable de los daños endilgados, lo cual hace improcedente que responda por sí solo y en ausencia del eventual obligado directo. Si se determinara que debe asumir alguna obligación, esta tendría un carácter de subsidiaria, a partir de lo que se decidiera contra el posible responsable directo a quien se le reclamó de manera inicial. Incluso, en este asunto también se puede determinar que ha existido una falta de derecho de las pretensiones de la demanda respecto del Estado. Ergo, los motivos de casación invocados deben ser desestimados pues a nada conduce analizar la responsabilidad subsidiaria del Estado si el principal obligado no fue demandado dentro del plazo legal de cuatro años dispuesto en el canon 198 de la LGAP." Sentencia N°840-F-SI-2016, de las 09:50 horas del once de agosto del dos mil dieciséis. En igual sentido la sentencia N°0293-F-SI-2016, de las 09:40- horas del siete de abril del dos mil dieciséis.

IX.- SOBRE LOS DAÑOS QUE CORRESPONDE INDEMNIZAR: En lo que concierne al daño de índole material, el Tribunal tiene como debidamente acreditado que el señor Ramírez Badilla, como consecuencia del accidente, estuvo incapacitado por dos semanas, y que además presenta una pérdida de su capacidad general del cuatro por ciento. Esa lesión para efectos indemnizatorios debe traducirse en términos económicos, para lo cual, una vez firme esta sentencia, y ya en la etapa de su ejecución, deberá nombrarse un profesional experto que permita determinar el monto de la lesión. En cuanto al daño moral, este consiste en la lesión en el fuero interno y subjetivo del demandante. Este tipo de daño, precisamente por su naturaleza, permite al juzgador, a la luz de la prueba que obra en autos, establecer con fundamento en los principios que rigen la lógica y el sentido común establecer su existencia. Este tipo de daño es preciso indicar que el mismo es valorado in re ipsa, de acuerdo a la valoración que hace el Tribunal de las situaciones que puedan afectar a cada persona en su esfera extrapatrimonial. Cuando hablamos de daño moral, hacemos referencia a una lesión en el fuero interno del individuo, que le causa un menoscabo, un detrimento en su estado de ánimo ocasionado angustia, dolor, sufrimiento, desánimo. Es precisamente ese menoscabo, el que resulta susceptible de compensación. En el caso bajo examen, el Tribunal arriba a la conclusión de que ha sido suficientemente demostrado en juicio, que el señor Ramírez Badilla efectivamente sufrió angustia con ocasión del accidente. Ello se deriva del video del reportaje, noticioso, de sus manifestaciones ante la pareja del actor. Debe indicarse además que resulta plausible que una persona, ante un accidente como el sufrido por el demandante, y con las secuelas que éste tuvo, tienda a sentir angustia, sentimientos de dolor y de preocupación. No obstante, este Órgano estima que la cantidad requerida por el demandante resulta excesiva, y por lo que fija el monto de la indemnización por daño moral subjetivo en la cantidad de un millón de colones. El monto que finalmente se fije en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia por concepto de daño material, así como el de un millón de colones establecido como indemnización del daño moral, deberán actualizarse en su poder adquisitivo, conforme a las reglas establecidas en el numeral 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.”