Evidentiary value of cadastral plans in agrarian reivindicationValor probatorio del plano catastrado en reivindicación agraria

VI.The first claim concerns the system for the assessment of evidence (valoración de la prueba). The appeal alleges an infringement of canon 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, by characterizing the judgment as extensive in theoretical explanations but meager in the analysis of the points debated. A reading of the appealed decision reveals that the judge, in each of the points developed, explained, pursuant to the rule cited above, the reasons taken into consideration for giving the weight granted to each piece of evidence presented in the case file. Consideration must be given to the explanation provided by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in Voto 60-2011 at 9:15 a.m. on January 27, 2011, which stated: "Pursuant to numeral 54 of the LJA, in agrarian matters, evidence must be assessed 'conscientiously and without strict adherence to the rules of common law, but, in all cases, when analyzing the result of the evidence gathered in the proceedings, it shall express the principles of equity or of law on which it bases its criterion.' In turn, mandate 61 ibid. determines 'The Sala de Casación, when appraising the evidence and resolving the matter, shall be governed by the provisions of Article 54 and, in general, by the principles that inform this law.' Regarding this issue, this Chamber indicated: 'IV. In the sub júdice, the discussion revolves around a specific point: the appreciation of the evidentiary material, as to which of the parties breached the contract. The way in which judges must appreciate evidence has varied throughout the history of Procedural Law. In a first stage, prior to the nineteenth-century codifications, a weighted system (sistema tasado) was used to discern the demonstrative force of each element. Thus, the law imposed a value on each piece of evidence beforehand, without the judge being able to decide, for himself, which elements better informed his conviction to resolve the specific case. In this manner, specific means were required to demonstrate each right, varying their quantity regarding each one, as well as establishing, a priori, discriminations on the declarants based on their gender, age, occupation, or social class. That system was overcome in the Spanish Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, of 1855, which served as the basis for the procedural codes of Latin America, including Costa Rica. In said Spanish legislation, the model of appreciating the demonstrative material in light of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) was adopted. This is the intermediate figure between legally weighted evidence (prueba legal) and free conviction (libre convicción). Based on sound criticism, the judge can reach a conviction by himself about the certainty of the facts on which he bases his decision, through his own assessment, but this is not entirely free; rather, it is subject to the rules of formal logical thought and, simultaneously, to human experience. On this point, doctrine has expressed, especially Couture, that the judge is not a reasoning machine, but essentially a human being who takes knowledge of the world around him and knows it through his sensitive and intellectual processes. Sound criticism is, in addition to logic, the correct appreciation of certain propositions of experience that every person uses in life. Therefore, the judicial authority will be in charge of appraising the evidence with due logical concatenation and, in addition, under the circumstances of its environment, observed through experience. The purpose of the foregoing is that the judge cannot rely solely on his discretion, but must substantiate, based on logic and experience, the reasons for his conviction. This, in addition, will allow the superior, if the ruling is challenged, to review whether the criteria of the a quo adhered to such rules of correct human understanding. A third system is that which is called free conviction. In this system, what the judge decides should not necessarily be subject to the evidence provided by the parties to the proceedings. It could even be resolved against the proven facts and be grounded solely in the private knowledge of the judge. It will be sufficient for the judge to affirm having the moral certitude that the events occurred in such a way, without being required to set out the logical development of his reasoning. The Costa Rican Código Procesal Civil is framed within a hybrid between the rules of sound criticism and the weighted evidence (prueba tasada). Such a conclusion is drawn from precept 330, as well as from various regulations, remnants of the former system, regarding the value of demonstrative means such as confession, public instruments, documents that prevail over testimonial statements, and the impossibility of proving some facts only with the latter. On the other hand, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, in its Article 54, second paragraph, provides the following: "When deciding on the merits of the matter, the judge shall assess the evidence (prueba) conscientiously and without strict adherence to the rules of common law, but, in all cases, when analyzing the result of the evidence gathered in the proceedings, he must express the principles of equity or law on which he bases his criterion." Although, due to similarity of terminology, in principle, it could be interpreted as conforming to the free conviction system, in reality, it is not so, because the rule itself orders the judge to give arguments of law or equity to justify his appreciation. Likewise, there was a pronouncement on the subject, when the Sala Constitucional, in its judgment No. 11932 at 3:37 p.m. on November 21, 2001, explained that evidence cannot be assessed at the mere discretion of the judicial authority. Rather, said numeral 54 obliges it “...to analyze the result of the evidence gathered in the proceedings and express the principles of equity or law on which it bases its criterion; thus respecting the minimum contents of the right of defense.” Said Chamber, in the cited vote, refers to its judgment No. 4448 at 9:00 a.m. on August 30, 1996, where it expressed: “In this way, the conscientious assessment of evidence does not imply resolving in an arbitrary manner, because every judge –as a public official– is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adequacy of public action, not only to the specific norms on a determined object, but to the entire block of legality; therefore, he cannot rule with contempt for constitutional principles and rights, since he is limited by the rules of sound criticism and principles of reasonableness, which, duly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional appreciation with the Constitución Política.” Then, it must be concluded, in reality, ordinal 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria does not allow the judge to avail himself of a free conviction system. Even more, based on the duties to provide reasons that are imposed and, in light of what has been interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence, it subjects him to the rules of sound criticism, insofar as he must seek logical reasoning in accordance with intersubjective human experience to justify what he orders. For lack of subjection to common law, as the precept itself regulates, will have to be understood that, unlike civil proceedings, there will be no weighted evidence whatsoever. To that extent, when an improper evidentiary assessment by the agrarian judges is alleged, what is really being alleged is the non-observance of the rules of logic and experience, which inform correct human understanding, when substantiating their conviction.” (See judgment No. 712, at 3:15 p.m. on September 26, 2005, the underlining does not correspond to the original). Based on these normative premises and in accordance with the legal system, we will proceed to analyze the charges raised regarding the appealed judgment rendered." As noted, the judgment expresses the principles of equity or law on which it bases its criterion to reach the given conclusion. From the reading of the appeal brief, it is apparent that the claim is directed at the value of the documentary evidence, which, in the opinion of that party, contains elements capable of making the matter favorable to its interests. In the following recitals (considerandos), we will proceed to the analysis of the evidence cited in the appeal.

VII.The fundamental claim is the value of the cadastral map (plano catastrado) number [Placa1] which, according to the registry information, represents the property (finca) registered in the name of the defendant-counterclaimant [[Nombre1]]. At its core, the appeal seeks that the referenced map prevail over other topographic surveys, and also to grant the identity of the property that belongs to said party. However, such an allegation has no legal basis. In this case, the provisions of Article 301 of the Código Civil are applicable, which establishes that the survey (mesura) of a piece of land, whether or not protested, is not sufficient by itself to prove possession thereof. From the foregoing, it is insufficient to establish which map is older, but rather, in light of the criterion widely upheld by this Chamber, what occurs in the material reality must be observed. Returning to the arguments regarding the topographic drawing (levantamiento topográfico), the complainant maintains it is a public document, valid, protected by the principle of legal certainty, and also indicates that if there is a deficiency due to age, that does not detract from its being a valid public document. On this point, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has explained, in addition to the effects of the above-cited rule of the Código Civil, also what the scope of a topographic survey as a public document is. In judgment number 66 at 2:45 p.m. on August 17, 1994, it affirmed the following: "II.-[...] the questioning raised in the appeal revolves, above all, around the probative value of the cadastral map [...]. In this regard, it must be pointed out initially that, indeed, cadastral maps constitute documentary evidence of a public nature, insofar as they are documents issued by public officials, according to the required forms and within the limits of their attributions (doctrine of Articles 368 and 370 of the Código Procesal Civil). But such character as public documents, contrary to what the appellant points out, does not give them the quality of absolute and unchallengeable evidence, nor do they confer any right by themselves. Hence the provision of numeral 30 of the Código Civil, which points out that the survey of a piece of land is not sufficient by itself to prove possession of the same. The probative value of maps will depend on their conformity with other evidentiary elements that have been introduced in the proceedings. It is here where the analytical deployment of the judge gains special relevance, in accordance with the rules of Article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, in order to determine, for the specific case, the probative value of the cadastral map, because if the remaining evidence discredits what it indicates, necessarily, no matter how much of a public document it is, the reality demonstrated must prevail over what it expresses. Conversely, if there is no evidence that opposes what a map indicates, and it is given no value when it does have value, a pretermission of evidence (preterición de prueba) could indeed exist. Such a criterion has been sustained since long ago. Even in a resolution of the former Sala Primera Civil, No. 95 at 9:10 a.m. on April 6, 1979, it was already pointed out that: \"...a map unilaterally drawn up by the interested party, even if registered, by itself cannot affect third parties, does not constitute a translative title of ownership, does not prove ownership or possession, because pursuant to Article 301 of the Código Civil, the doctrine that informs it, and jurisprudence, the survey of a piece of land, whether or not protested, is not sufficient by itself to prove the possible ownership or possession of the land. To what has been said it must be added that the same special legislation, specifically Articles 30 of the Ley de Catastro Nacional, No. 6545 of March 26, 1981, and 42 of the Reglamento de la Ley, promulgated by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 13607-J of April 24, 1982, –which in what will be said are fully congruent with Article 301 of the Código Civil already mentioned–, establish the probative scope of cadastral maps, firstly, by prescribing both norms that only survey maps registered in the Catastro produce legal effects and, then, by providing the second norm stated: \"Cadastral registration does not validate documents that are null or voidable according to law, nor will it rectify their defects.\" It is clear, then, that not even special law recognizes cadastral maps the value that the appellant seeks to give them in the proceedings, because, in any contentious case, necessarily –as already pointed out–, the reality that prevails on the ground must be studied and demonstrated, and contrasted with that which the map indicates, in order to thus conclude on the true probative scope of the cited document. It must also be remembered that this is an agrarian reivindicatory proceeding, where, as the Chamber has already stated, among others, in judgment at 2:30 p.m. on October 4, 1991, to successfully claim the property sought, the documentary ownership title (titularidad documental) must be complemented with the quality of owner of the estate and, to acquire such status, it is necessary to have fully exercised the attributes of ownership, which is accredited not only through registry titles or cadastral maps, but also through testimonial evidence, confession, or expert evidence. \"This means that only and exclusively the one who has a preferential title over the property is actively legitimized, hence the character of owner must necessarily be required...\" (see referenced judgment)." As profusely explained by the High Chamber of Cassation, the map registered in the Catastro Nacional does not constitute full evidence; it consequently constitutes one more element to weigh along with the other evidence, as occurred in the appealed decision. Furthermore, it is emphasized, it was a unilateral act, which cannot affect the rights of third parties, and it is in this avenue that the plaintiff-counterdefendant company asserts the rights it considers have been violated.

VIII.Another of the claims against the arguments of the judgment lies in challenging the procedure carried out by the defendant in the Catastro Nacional because it was stolen from that office, given that that party owned the only copy and delivered it to that registry to replace the map that was stolen and it had a legend that is not part of it. Specifically, it refers to what happened in cadastral instances. That information emerges from resolution [Telf1], on folios 96 to 98 of volume I, which accounts for the addendum to the resolution for the restitution of cadastral map G-8675-1942 which occurred on August 8, 2003. In that administrative decision, lacking the original survey, it ordered that it be annotated as belonging to property number CED1. However, the drawing provided did not have the number of the plot to which it corresponded and that information was taken from handwritten data. However, that situation, as was taken as proven, relevantly caused the Catastro Nacional to issue, in the above-cited, that the map in question be eliminated as corresponding to that land; it also ordered preemptively including a marginal warning note until the definitive modification was made. From the foregoing, it is also inferred that the map [Placa1], contrary to what the appellant affirms, by administrative order does not represent his property. This aspect must be added to the thesis already set forth in the previous recital, it cannot affect the rights of third parties, because in its formal essence, in light of the registry requirements, it has defects of legal transcendence according to the documentary evidence in question that make it incapable of representing a plot of land.

IX.In this matter, as indicated in preceding recitals, what is fundamentally challenged in the judgment is the legitimacy that the defendant has based on the cadastral map with the number G-8675-1942. Within the set of grievances against the judgment, what was indicated regarding the accidents on the boundary (colindancia) is criticized, such as the Vigía stream, the nonexistence of a public road not documented in maps [Placa1] and [Placa2], which it classifies as a private road, erroneously called a public road, or regarding the existence of tie points. With those explanations, it seeks to demonstrate the portion of land that corresponds to it. It also alleges that, by comparing the mentioned surveys from 1942, the boundary (colindancia) can be determined. It also says the topographic drawings were prepared by the same surveyor. However, these grounds also do not allow modifying what was indicated in the judgment. La Hacienda actora, hereinafter referred to as Hacienda Oscar Miguel Rojas Sociedad Anónima, among other real actions, seeks the reivindication (reivindicación) of a strip of approximately [[Dirección1]] square meters (petition 4 on folio 212 of volume I). Through expert evidence, the plaintiff Hacienda proved its claim. To counter this proven event, the appellant, in accordance with ordinal 317 subsection 2) of the Código Procesal Civil, of supplementary application to the matter, must provide pertinent evidentiary elements to support his opposition. However, the assessments indicated above do not have that possibility. First, the topographic survey that he claims represents the property bordering that of the plaintiff Hacienda, administratively, by the Registro Nacional, it has been indicated that it does not represent the plot of land of the district of Guanacaste number CED2. It must be reiterated, on August 12, 2003, the Registro Nacional, in response to the action of the defendant-counterclaimant, ordered the restitution of that map. Subsequently, an administrative warning was made, which modified the previous resolution, to indicate that the referenced survey does not represent the real estate (inmueble) registered in the name of the defendant (pages 96 to 98 of volume I). This situation is also reflected in the map repeatedly cited, whose certified copy is attached on page 18 of volume I, and in the annotations recorded on the back of that same page, first the restitution and subsequently the administrative warning. To further develop the reasoning on this point, on pages 28 to 139 of volume I, the file of the administrative procedure number 01-07-23-2007 processed in the Catastro Nacional was attached, where it is evident the appellant party participated. This is observed in the document on page 102, where the appellant appeared in the proceedings and affirmed, knowing that the legends indicated in the resolution were not on the original map, therefore expressing: “…I am in full agreement that the same be eliminated”. Thus, the cadastral scenario was not surprising and he had the opportunity to exercise the right of defense in that registry venue. Second, as will be explained, the expert opinion (experticia) carried out in the case file is clear, precise, and congruent, to reach the conclusion that the appellant is not correct in his allegations. Although in agrarian matters the assessment system is not one of weighted evidence, it does require the joint analysis of the evidence, for which reason the allegation of observing the map by its figure that it can be concluded it represents his real estate, because it has already been indicated in the administrative venue that it is not that way and there are other evidentiary elements, not refuted, that prove what was stated in the judgment. Finally, it must be observed from the defendant's map G-8575-1942 on folio 18 volume I, that it does not have coordinates or any reference that allows for reliably knowing the location of such a plot of land, it only indicates that it is in Montano de Bagaces in the province of Guanacaste, an aspect that prevents accepting the appellant's arguments, added to the other two indicated in preceding lines.

X.Concerning the value of the plaintiff Hacienda's map, a lack of respect for the principle of chain of title (principio del tracto sucesivo) contained in numerals 15 and 55 of the Reglamento de la Ley del Catastro Nacional is claimed, a situation carried out, it alleges, to appropriate the segment of land in conflict. The core point of this grievance is based on the fact that the plaintiff had a map from 1942, however in the year 2001 it registered with the number CED1 visible on folio 26 of volume I. Canon 55 of the cited regulation contemplates the cadastral principle of chain of title (tracto sucesivo). According to that legal precept, the Catastro shall seek the necessary means to achieve a perfect concatenation between the inscriptions of the cadastral maps. The norm adds that there must be a perfect sequence and correlation between the inscriptions and their modifications, cancellations, or extinctions. This principle is aimed at ordering the registry information, so as to generate legal certainty. However, in this case, as the appellant also alleges, when a study is made of the real estate involved, these did not reflect correlation to any topographic survey. The plaintiff Hacienda's property number 9598-000 arises from a consolidation (reunión) of two contiguous properties, according to the copy of the volume on page 261 of volume II and at that time, January 12, 1948, it does not report a map related to such real estate. The same fate for the appellant's property, according to the copy of the volume on folio 162 of volume I, when it comes into legal existence it does so through a segregation; it also does not account for a cadastral map. Although the plaintiff Hacienda drew up a new cadastral drawing in 2001, this situation does not imply any injury to the above-stated principle. It must be highlighted that when the Código Notarial came into force as of May 1999, according to the transitory provisions, a cadastral map is required in every registry transaction referring to a real estate (inmueble), save for mortgage cancellations, attachment to family patrimony, and embargo, as established by numeral 30 of the Ley del Catastro Nacional. With Law number 8710, in force as of 2009, ordinal 2 of the Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, number 5695, was amended, in order to establish the Registro Inmobiliario to give uniformity to all information aimed at organizing the national territory. Added to the above, there are shortcomings in the old topographic surveys, whether due to the implementation of various technological tools, as well as the information that must be provided to the corresponding Registry. The principle in question must manifest itself formally and materially. This aspect was addressed by the expert appointed in the case file when he affirms the problem of the 1942 maps that lack geographic location as currently required and that only represent "an idea of a property that existed delimited by the graphic that a land surveyor made..." (folio 884 of volume IV). The other expert opinion rendered in the case file, on folios 451 to 453 of volume II, mentions the particularities of cadastral surveys from that era. It is evident from the foregoing, the expert explains the deficiencies of the 1942 map of the plaintiff Hacienda, in addition to clearly and precisely mentioning the reasons why it cannot be associated, from the cadastral point of view, with the property of the plaintiff company. To further reinforce this thesis, there is, as complementary evidence to the above, the certification issued by the Registro Nacional, which states the following: “…El plano numero (sic) G-8677-1942 NO ha generado titulo (sic) o derecho…” (the highlighting is from the original text on folio 813 volume IV). It follows from the previous documentary that the principle of chain of title (tracto sucesivo) was not violated, because the plaintiff Hacienda's map G-8677-1942 was never related to the property of the district of Guanacaste number 9598-000. This situation is diametrically opposite to what was executed by the appellant defendant, who did manage for his 1942 map to be related to his real estate, a situation that was subsequently modified by the cadastral registry as explained in preceding lines. In this case, with support in numeral 15 of the Reglamento del Catastro, the aim is for what happened in material reality to be reflected in the formal record. Hence, the appellant is not correct regarding the infringement of the principle by the drawing up of the 2001 map, because it is in this Court where the validity of his map vis-à-vis the one related to the plot of land of the plaintiff Hacienda is elucidated.

Even, it could be resolved against the proven facts and be based solely on the private knowledge of the judge. It will suffice for the judge to affirm having the moral certainty that the facts occurred in a certain way, without being required to provide the logical development of their reasoning. The Costa Rican Civil Procedure Code is framed within a hybrid between the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and fixed evidentiary value (prueba tasada). Such a conclusion is drawn from precept 330, as well as from various regulations, remnants of the previous system, regarding the value of evidentiary means such as confession, public instruments (instrumentos públicos), documents that prevail over witness statements, and the impossibility of proving some facts solely with the latter. On the other hand, the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria), in its article 54, second paragraph, provides the following: “When resolving the merits of the case, the judge shall assess the evidence conscientiously and without strict subjection to the rules of common law, but, in any case, when analyzing the result of the evidence gathered in the process, they must state the principles of equity or law on which their criterion is based.” Although, due to similarity of terminology, it could initially be interpreted as conforming to the system of free conviction (libre convicción), in reality it is not so, because the rule itself orders the judge to give arguments of law or equity to justify their assessment. Likewise, there was a pronouncement on the subject, when the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its judgment No. 11932 of 15 hours 37 minutes of November 21, 2001, explained that evidence cannot be assessed at the mere discretion of the judicial authority. Rather, said numeral 54 obliges it to “...analyze the result of the evidence gathered in the process and state the principles of equity or law on which its criterion is based; thus respecting the minimum contents of the right of defense.” Said Chamber, in the cited vote, refers to its judgment No. 4448 of 9 hours of August 30, 1996, where it stated: “In this way, the assessment of evidence conscientiously does not imply resolving in an arbitrary manner, since every judge – as a public official – is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adaptation of public action, not only to the specific rules on a given object, but to the entire body of legality; therefore, they cannot rule with disregard for constitutional principles and rights, as they are limited by the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and principles of reasonableness, which, duly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional assessment with the Political Constitution” Then, it must be concluded, in reality, ordinal 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law does not allow the judge to embrace a system of free conviction (libre convicción). Furthermore, based on the duties to provide reasons that are imposed and, in light of what is interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence, it is subjecting the judge to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), insofar as they must seek logical reasoning consistent with intersubjective human experience to justify what they order. For lack of subjection to common law, as the precept itself regulates, it must be understood that, unlike civil proceedings, there will be no fixed evidentiary value (prueba tasada) whatsoever. In that regard, when an improper evidentiary assessment is alleged against agrarian judges, what is actually being alleged is the non-observance of the rules of logic and experience, which inform correct human understanding, at the time of substantiating their conviction.” (See judgment no. 712, of 15 hours 15 minutes of September 26, 2005, the underlining does not correspond to the original). Based on these normative premises and in accordance with the legal system, we will proceed to analyze the matters referring to the charges raised, in relation to the judgment rendered under appeal. As noted, the judgment expresses the principles of equity or law on which it bases its criterion to arrive at the given conclusion.

From the reading of the appellate brief, it is denoted that the claim is directed at the value of the documentary evidence, which in that party's opinion contains elements capable of turning the matter favorably to their interests. In the following recitals (considerandos), we will proceed to the analysis of the evidentiary items cited in the appeal.

**VII.** The fundamental claim is the value of the cadastral map (plano catastrado) number [Placa1] which according to the registry information represents the property (finca) registered in the name of the defendant-counterclaimant [[Nombre1]]. At its core, the appeal intends for said map to prevail over other topographic surveys (levantamientos topográficos), in addition to granting the identity of the property that belongs to the cited party. However, such an argument has no legal foundation. In the specific case, the provisions of article 301 of the Civil Code apply, which establishes that the measurement (mesura) of a piece of land, whether or not protested, is not sufficient by itself to prove possession of it. From the foregoing, it is insufficient to establish which map is older; rather, in light of the criterion widely held by this Chamber, what happens in material reality must be observed. Returning to the arguments about the topographic drawing, the complainant maintains it is a public document, valid, protected by the principle of legal certainty, and also indicates that if there is a deficiency due to its age, that does not detract from it being a valid public document. On this point, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has explained, in addition to the effects of the above-cited rule of the Civil Code, also what the scope of a topographic survey is as a public document. In judgment number 66 of 14 hours 45 minutes of August 17, 1994, it affirmed the following: "*II.-[...] the questioning raised in the appeal revolves, above all, around the evidentiary value of the cadastral map [...]. In this regard, it must be initially pointed out that, indeed, cadastral maps constitute documentary evidence of a public nature, insofar as they are documents issued by public officials, according to the required forms and within the limits of their attributions (doctrine of articles 368 and 370 of the Civil Procedure Code). But such character as public documents, contrary to what the appellant indicates, does not give them the quality of absolute and incontestable proof, nor do they confer any right by themselves. Hence the provision of numeral 30 of the Civil Code, which indicates that the measurement of a piece of land is not sufficient by itself to prove possession thereof. The evidentiary value of the maps will depend on their conformity with other evidentiary elements that have been presented in the process. It is here where the analytical deployment of the judge takes on special relevance, in accordance with the rules of article 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, in order to determine, for the specific case, the evidentiary value of the cadastral map, because if the remaining evidence discredits what it indicates, necessarily, no matter how much of a public document it may be, the demonstrated reality must prevail against what is expressed by it. Conversely, if there is no proof opposing what is indicated by a map, and it is given no value, when it should have one, there could indeed be a pretermission of evidence. Such a criterion has been held since old times. Even in resolution of the former First Civil Chamber, No. 95 of 9:10 hours of April 6, 1979, it was already indicated that: '...a map unilaterally drawn up by the interested party, even if registered, by itself cannot affect third parties, does not constitute a translative title of ownership, does not prove ownership or possession, because according to article 301 of the Civil Code, the doctrine that informs it, and the jurisprudence, the measurement of a piece of land, whether or not protested, is not sufficient by itself to prove the possible ownership or possession of the land. To what has been said it must be added that the same special legislation, specifically articles 30 of the National Cadastre Law (Ley de Catastro Nacional), No. 6545 of March 26, 1981, and 42 of the Regulation of the Law, promulgated via Executive Decree No. 13607-J of April 24, 1982, -which in what will be said are fully congruent with the aforementioned 301 of the Civil Code-, establish the evidentiary scope of cadastral maps, firstly, by both rules prescribing that only surveying plans registered in the Cadastre have legal effects and, later, by the second indicated rule providing: "Cadastral registration does not validate documents that are null or voidable according to the law, nor will it remedy their defects.". It is clear, then, that not even special law recognizes the cadastral map with the value that the appellant intends to give it in the process, because, in any conflictive case, necessarily, -as already indicated-, the reality prevailing on the land must be studied and demonstrated, and contrasted with what the map indicates, in order to conclude on the true evidentiary scope of the cited document. It must be remembered, also, that this is an agrarian reivindicatory process, where, as the Chamber has already said, among others, in judgment of 14:30 hours of October 4, 1991, to successfully claim the property pursued, the documentary title must be complemented with the quality of owner of the inheritance (heredad) and, to acquire such status, it is necessary to have fully exercised the attributes of ownership, which is accredited not only through registry titles or cadastral maps, but also through testimonial, confessional, or expert evidence. "This means that uniquely and exclusively the one who has a preferential title over the property is actively legitimized, hence the character of owner must necessarily be required..." (see referenced judgment).'* As the High Cassation Chamber extensively explains, the map registered in the National Cadastre does not constitute full proof; consequently, it constitutes one more element to be weighed along with the other evidentiary items, as occurred in the appealed decision. Furthermore, it is underlined, it was a unilateral act, which cannot affect the rights of third parties, and it is in this avenue that the plaintiff-counterdefendant company asserts the rights it has estimated are being harmed.

**VIII.** Another of the claims against the judgment's arguments lies in contesting the procedure carried out by the defendant in the National Cadastre because the defendant's only copy was stolen from that office, and they handed it over to that registry to replace the map that was stolen and it had a legend that is not part of it. It specifically refers to what happened in cadastral instances. This information emerges from resolution [Telf1], in folios 96 to 98 of volume I, where it gives an account of the addition to the resolution for restitution of cadastral map G-8675-1942 which occurred on August 8, 2003. In such administrative decision, lacking the original survey, it ordered that it be noted as belonging to property number CED1. However, the drawing provided did not have the number of the rural property to which it corresponded, and that information was taken from handwritten data. However, that situation, as it was held to be proven, relevantly caused the National Cadastre to issue, in the aforementioned resolution, that the map in question be eliminated as corresponding to that land; it also ordered the precautionary inclusion of a marginal warning note until the definitive modification is made. From the foregoing, it is also deduced that map [Placa1], contrary to what is asserted by the appellant, by administrative order does not represent their property. An aspect which must be added to the thesis already set forth in the preceding recital (considerando); it cannot affect the rights of third parties, because in its formal essence, in light of the registry requirements, it has defects of legal significance according to the documentary evidence in question that make it incapable of representing a rural property.

**IX.** In this matter, as indicated in preceding recitals (considerandos), what is fundamentally contested from the judgment is the legal standing (legitimación) that the defendant has based on the cadastral map with number G-8675-1942. In the set of grievances against the judgment, what is indicated regarding the accidents on the boundary line is criticized, such as the Vigía creek (quebrada Vigía), the non-existence of the public street not documented in maps [Placa1] and [Placa2] which the appellant qualifies as a private road, erroneously called a public street, or regarding the existence of tie points. With these explanations, the appellant intends to demonstrate which portion of the land corresponds to them. They also allege that by comparing the aforementioned 1942 surveys, the boundary line can be determined. They also say, the topographic drawings were prepared by the same surveyor. However, these grounds also do not allow modifying what was indicated in the judgment. The plaintiff Hacienda, henceforth referred to as Hacienda Oscar Miguel Rojas Sociedad Anónima, among other real actions, seeks the reivindication of a strip of approximately [[Dirección1]] square meters (claim 4 in folio 212 of volume I). Through expert evidence, the plaintiff Hacienda proved its claim. To contest this demonstrated event, the appellant, in accordance with ordinal 317 subsection 2) of the Civil Procedure Code, of supplementary application to the matter, must contribute pertinent evidentiary elements to support their opposition. However, the appraisals indicated above do not have that possibility. **First**, the topographic survey that the appellant alleges represents the property adjacent to that of the plaintiff Hacienda, administratively, by the National Registry, has been indicated not to represent the rural property of the Guanacaste district number CED2. It must be reiterated, on August 12, 2003, the National Registry, upon the request of the defendant-counterclaimant, ordered the restitution of that map. Subsequently, an administrative warning was made, which was modified to the previous resolution, to indicate that the referenced survey does not represent the real property registered in the defendant's name (pages 96 to 98 of volume I). This situation is also reflected in the repeatedly cited map, whose certified copy is attached at folio 18 of volume I, and in the annotations appearing on the back of that same folio, first the restitution and subsequently the administrative warning. For greater abundance of reasons on this point, on pages 28 to 139 of volume I, the file for administrative proceeding number 01-07-23-2007 processed in the National Cadastre was attached, where it is evident the appellant participated. This is observed in the document at folio 102, where the appellant appeared at the proceedings and affirmed knowing that the legends indicated in the resolution were not on the original map, for which reason they expressed: “…*I am in full agreement that the same be eliminated*”. This being the case, the cadastral scenario was not surprising and they had the possibility of exercising the right of defense in that registry venue. In **second** order, as will be explained, the expert analysis (experticia) carried out in the case record is clear, precise, and congruent, to arrive at the conclusion that the appellant is not correct in their allegations. Even though in agrarian matters the assessment system is not one of fixed evidentiary value (prueba tasada), it does require the joint analysis of the evidentiary items, which is why the allegation of the map's observation by its figure can lead one to conclude it represents their real property, because in the administrative venue it has already been indicated it is not so and there are other evidentiary elements, not refuted, that prove what was indicated in the judgment. **Lastly**, it must be observed from the defendant's map G-8575-1942 in folio 18 volume I, it does not possess any coordinates or reference that allows one to know with certainty the location of said rural property; it only indicates that it is in Montano de Bagaces in the province of Guanacaste, an aspect that prevents accepting the appellant's arguments, added to the other two indicated in the preceding lines.

**X.** Concerning the value of the plaintiff Hacienda's map, the claim is made of disrespect for the principle of successive tract (tracto sucesivo) contained in numerals 15 and 55 of the regulation of the National Cadastre Law, a situation carried out, it alleges, to appropriate the segment of land in conflict. The core point of this grievance is based on the plaintiff having a map from 1942, however, in 2001 it registered map number CED1 visible in folio 26 of volume I. Canon 55 of the cited regulation contemplates the cadastral principle of successive tract. According to such legal precept, the Cadastre will seek the necessary means for there to be a perfect concatenation between the inscriptions of the cadastral maps. The rule adds, there must be a perfect sequence and correlation between the inscriptions and their modifications, cancellations, or extinctions. This principle is oriented towards ordering the registry information, so that legal certainty is generated. However, in the specific case, as the appellant also alleges, when a study is made of the involved real properties, these did not reflect correlation to any topographic survey. The plaintiff Hacienda's rural property number 9598-000 arises from a merger of two contiguous properties, according to the copy of the volume on page 261 of volume II, and at that time, January 12, 1948, it does not report a map related to such real property. The same fate applies to the appellant's property; according to the copy of the volume at folio 162 of volume I, when it comes into legal existence it does so through a segregation; it also does not report a cadastral map. Even though the plaintiff Hacienda drew up a new cadastral drawing in 2001, this situation does not imply any injury to the above-cited principle. It must be highlighted that when the Notarial Code came into effect starting in May 1999, according to the transitional provisions, a cadastral map is required for any registry movement referring to a real property, except for mortgage cancellations, the affectation to family patrimony, and seizure, as established by numeral 30 of the National Cadastre Law. With law number 8710, effective as of 2009, ordinal 2 of the Law of Creation of the National Registry, number 5695, was reformed in order to establish the Real Property Registry to give uniformity to all information aimed at organizing the national territory. Added to the above, there are shortcomings in the old topographic surveys, whether due to the implementation of various technological tools, as well as the information that must be supplied to the corresponding Registry. The principle in question must manifest itself formally and materially. This aspect was addressed by the expert appointed in the case record when they affirm the problem of the 1942 maps that lack geographic location as is currently required and that only represent "*an idea of a property that existed delimited by the graphic made by a surveyor...*" (folio 884 of volume IV). The other expert opinion rendered in the case record, in folios 451 to 453 of volume II, makes mention of the particularities of cadastral surveys from that era. It is denoted from the above that the expert explains the deficiencies of the 1942 map of the plaintiff Hacienda, in addition to clearly and precisely mentioning the reasons why it cannot be associated, from the cadastral point of view, with the plaintiff company's property. For greater reinforcement of this thesis, there is, as complementary evidence to the above, the certification issued by the National Registry, where the following is recorded: “…*Map number (sic) **G-8677-1942** HAS **NOT** generated title (sic) or right*…” (the highlighting is from the original text in folio 813 volume IV).

It follows from the foregoing documentary evidence that the principle of successive tract was not violated, because the survey plan of the plaintiff Hacienda G-8677-1942 was never linked to the property of the Guanacaste district number 9598-000. This is a situation diametrically opposed to what was carried out by the defendant-appellant, who did take steps to have his 1942 survey plan linked to his property, a situation that was subsequently modified by the Cadastral Registry as explained in preceding lines. In this case, based on Article 15 of the Cadastre Regulations, the intent is for what happened in material reality to be reflected in the formal record. Hence, the appellant is incorrect regarding the violation of the principle by the preparation of the 2001 survey plan, as it is this Court that is determining the validity of his survey plan compared to the one linked to the plaintiff Hacienda's property." **Lastly,** it must be noted from the defendant's map G-8575-1942 on folio 18 volume I, that it has no coordinates or any reference that would allow the location of that property to be known with certainty; it only indicates that it is in Montano de Bagaces in the province of Guanacaste, an aspect that prevents accepting the appellant's arguments, in addition to the other two indicated in the preceding lines.

**X.** Concerning the value of the plaintiff Hacienda's map, the appellant claims a violation of the principle of successive tract (principio del tracto sucesivo) contained in articles 15 and 55 of the regulation of the National Cadastre Law (Ley del Catastro Nacional), a situation carried out, according to the claim, in order to appropriate the segment of land in conflict. The core point of this grievance is based on the fact that the plaintiff had a map from 1942, however in the year 2001 it was registered with the number CED1 visible on folio 26 of volume I. Article 55 of the cited regulation provides for the cadastral principle of successive tract. According to this legal precept, the Cadastre will provide the necessary means to ensure a perfect linkage between the registrations of cadastral maps (planos catastrados). The rule adds that there shall be a perfect sequence and correlation between registrations and their modifications, cancellations, or extinctions. This principle is aimed at ordering registry information in a manner that generates legal certainty. However, in this specific case, as the appellant also claims, when a study of the involved properties was conducted, they did not reflect any correlation to any topographical survey. The plaintiff Hacienda's property number 9598-000 arises from a merger of two adjacent farms, according to the copy of the volume on page 261 of volume II, and at that moment, January 12, 1948, no map related to that property is reported. The same fate applies to the appellant's property, according to the copy of the volume on folio 162 of volume I; when it came into legal existence, it did so by a segregation; it also does not account for a cadastral map. Although the plaintiff Hacienda created a new cadastral drawing in 2001, this situation does not imply any injury to the aforementioned principle. It should be highlighted that when the Notarial Code (Código Notarial) came into effect as of May 1999, according to the transitional provisions, a cadastral map is required for any registry transaction referring to a property, except in the case of mortgage cancellations, the encumbrance as family patrimony, and seizure, as established by article 30 of the National Cadastre Law. With Law number 8710, effective as of 2009, article 2 of the Law Creating the National Registry (Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional), number 5695, was amended in order to establish the Real Estate Registry to give uniformity to all information aimed at ordering the national territory. Added to the above, there are deficiencies in the old topographical surveys, whether due to the implementation of different technological tools, as well as the information that must be provided to the corresponding Registry. The principle mentioned must manifest itself formally and materially. This aspect was addressed by the expert appointed in the proceedings when he states the problem of the 1942 maps that lack geographical location as required today and that only represent "*an idea of a property that existed delimited by the graphic made by a surveyor...*" (folio 884 of volume IV). The other expert report provided in the proceedings, on folios 451 to 453 of volume II, mentions the particularities of cadastral surveys from that era. From the foregoing, it is denoted that the expert explains the deficiencies of the plaintiff Hacienda's 1942 map, besides mentioning clearly and precisely the reasons why it cannot be associated, from a cadastral point of view, with the plaintiff company's property. Further reinforcing this thesis, there is, as complementary evidence to the foregoing, the certification issued by the National Registry, which certifies the following: “…*Map number (sic)* ***G-8677-1942*** ***HAS NOT*** *generated title (sic) or right*…” (the highlighting is from the original text on folio 813 volume IV). It is deduced from the aforementioned documentary evidence that the principle of successive tract was not violated, because the plaintiff Hacienda's map G-8677-1942 was never related to the property of the Guanacaste district number 9598-000. A diametrically opposite situation to what was executed by the defendant appellant, who did manage to have his 1942 map related to his property, a situation that was subsequently modified by the Cadastre Registry as explained in preceding lines. In this case, based on article 15 of the Cadastre Regulation (Reglamento del Catastro), the intent is that what happened materially be reflected formally. Hence, the appellant is incorrect regarding the infringement of the principle by the creation of the 2001 map, since it is this Court that elucidates the validity of his map against the one related to the plaintiff Hacienda's property."

“VI. El primer reclamo se vincula con el sistema de valoración de la prueba. Invoca el recurso la infracción al canon 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, cuando procede a calificar la sentencia como amplia en explicaciones teóricas, pero exigua en el análisis de los puntos debatidos. De la lectura de la pieza apelada se denota, la persona juzgadora en cada uno de los puntos de desarrollo expuso según la norma arriba citada los motivos tenidos en consideración para dar el peso concedido a cada una de las pruebas vertidas en autos. Debe de tenerse presente, lo explicado por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en voto 60-2011 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 27 de enero de 2011 indicó: "Conforme al numeral 54 de la LJA, en materia agraria, la prueba debe ser valorada “a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas del derecho común, pero, en todo caso, al analizar el resultado de la prueba recogida en el proceso, deberá expresar los principios de equidad o de derecho en que basa su criterio.” Por su parte el mandato 61 ibídem determina “La Sala de Casación, a la hora de apreciar la prueba y de resolver el negocio, se regirá por lo dispuesto en el artículo 54 y, en general, por los principios que informan esta ley.” En lo atinente a este tema, esta Sala indicó: “IV. En el sub júdice la discusión gira en torno a un punto concreto: la apreciación del material probatorio, en cuanto a cuál de las partes incumplió el contrato. La forma cómo deben los jueces apreciar la prueba, ha variado a lo largo de la historia del Derecho Procesal. En una primera etapa, anterior a las codificaciones decimonónicas, se partía de un sistema tasado para discernir sobre la fuerza demostrativa de cada elemento. Así, la ley de antemano imponía valor a cada probanza, sin que el juzgador estuviera en la posibilidad de decidir, por sí mismo, cuáles elementos informaban mejor su convicción para resolver el caso concreto. De esa manera, se requerían medios específicos para demostrar cada derecho, variando su cantidad en torno a cada uno, así como estableciendo, a priori, discriminaciones sobre los declarantes en razón de su género, edad, oficio o clase social. Ese sistema fue superado en la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil española, de 1855, que sirvió de base a los códigos procesales de América Latina, incluyendo a Costa Rica. En dicha legislación hispana se acogió el modelo de apreciar el material demostrativo a la luz de las reglas de la sana crítica. Se trata de la figura intermedia entre la prueba legal y la libre convicción. Con fundamento en la sana crítica, el juez puede llegar a un convencimiento por sí mismo sobre la certeza de los hechos sobre los cuales basa su decisión, a través de su propia valoración, pero, esta no es del todo libre, sino que está sujeta a las normas del pensamiento lógico formal y, de manera simultánea, a la experiencia humana. Sobre el punto ha expresado la doctrina, en especial, Couture, que el juez no es una máquina de razonar, sino, esencialmente, un ser humano que toma conocimiento del mundo que le rodea y le conoce a través de sus procesos sensibles e intelectuales. La sana crítica es, además de lógica, la correcta apreciación de ciertas proposiciones de experiencia de que toda persona se sirve en la vida. Por lo tanto, la autoridad judicial estará encargada de apreciar las probanzas con una debida concatenación lógica y, además, bajo las circunstancias de su entorno, observadas mediante la experiencia. La finalidad de lo anterior es que el juzgador no podrá acogerse tan solo a su discrecionalidad, sino que deberá fundamentar, con base en la lógica y la experiencia, los motivos de su convicción. Esto, además, permitirá al superior, si se impugna el fallo, revisar si los criterios del a quo, se sujetaron a tales reglas del correcto entendimiento humano. Un tercer sistema es el denominado como de libre convicción. En este, lo que decida el juzgador no deberá estar sujeto, necesariamente, a la prueba aportada por las partes al proceso. Incluso, podría resolverse contra los hechos probados y tener asidero tan solo en el saber privado del juez. Bastará con que este afirme tener la certidumbre moral de que los hechos sucedieron de tal manera, sin que se le pueda exigir el desarrollo lógico de su razonamiento. El Código Procesal Civil costarricense se enmarca en un híbrido entre las reglas de la sana crítica y la prueba tasada. Tal conclusión se extrae del precepto 330, así como de diversas regulaciones, resabios del sistema anterior, en torno al valor de los medios demostrativos como la confesión, los instrumentos públicos, los documentos que prevalecen sobre las declaraciones testimoniales y la imposibilidad de probar algunos hechos tan sólo con estas últimas. Por otra parte, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, en su artículo 54, párrafo segundo, dispone lo siguiente: “Al resolver sobre el fondo del negocio, el juez apreciará la prueba a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas del derecho común, pero, en todo caso, al analizar el resultado de la prueba recogida en el proceso, deberá expresar los principios de equidad o de derecho en que basa su criterio.”. Aunque, por similitud de terminología, en principio, podría interpretarse que se ajusta al sistema de libre convicción, en realidad no es así, pues la propia norma ordena al juzgador dar argumentos de derecho o de equidad para justificar su apreciación. Asimismo, hubo pronunciamiento sobre el tema, cuando la Sala Constitucional, en su sentencia n.º 11932 de las 15 horas 37 minutos del 21 de noviembre del 2001, explicó que la prueba no puede valorarse al mero arbitrio de la autoridad judicial. Más bien, dicho numeral 54 la obliga a que “...analice el resultado de la prueba recogida en el proceso y exprese los principios de equidad o de derecho en que basa su criterio; respetando de tal modo los contenidos mínimos del derecho de defensa.” Dicha Sala, en el voto de cita, refiere a su sentencia n.º 4448 de las 9 horas del 30 de agosto de 1996, donde expresó: “De esta manera, la apreciación de la prueba en conciencia no implica resolver en forma arbitraria, por cuanto todo juez –como funcionario que es- se encuentra sujeto al principio de legalidad, el cual constituye un imperativo de adecuación de la acción pública, no sólo de las normas específicas sobre un objeto determinado, sino a todo el bloque de legalidad; por lo que no puede fallar con desprecio de los principios y derecho constitucionales, ya que está limitado por las reglas de la sana crítica y principios de razonabilidad, que debidamente aplicados conducen a la armonía de la apreciación jurisdiccional con la Constitución Política” Entonces, debe concluirse, en realidad, el ordinal 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria no permite al juzgador acogerse a un sistema de libre convicción. Aún más, a partir de los deberes de fundamentar que se imponen y, a la luz de lo interpretado en la jurisprudencia constitucional, lo está sujetando a las reglas de la sana crítica, en el tanto, debe procurar un razonamiento lógico y acorde a la experiencia humana intersubjetiva para justificar lo que dispone. Por falta de sujeción al derecho común, según regula el propio precepto, habrá de entenderse que, a diferencia de los procesos civiles, no habrá prueba tasada alguna. En ese tanto, cuando se acuse una indebida valoración probatoria, por parte de los jueces agrarios, en realidad se estará acusando la inobservancia a las reglas de la lógica y de la experiencia, que informan el correcto entendimiento humano, al momento de fundamentar su convicción.” (Véase sentencia no. 712, de las 15 horas 15 minutos del 26 de setiembre de 2005, lo subrayado no corresponde al original). Con base en estas premisas normativas y acorde al ordenamiento jurídico, se procederá a analizar lo referente a los cargos esgrimidos, en relación a la sentencia dictada recurrida". Tal como se apuntó la sentencia expresa los principios de equidad o de derecho en que basa su criterio para arribar a la conclusión dada. De la lectura del libelo recursivo, se denota el reclam o se dirige al valor de la prueba documental, que a criterio de esa parte hay elementos capaces de tornar en favorable el asunto a sus intereses. En los considerandos siguientes se procederá al análisis de las probanzas citadas en la apelación.

VII.El reclamo fundamental es el valor del plano catastrado número [Placa1] que según la información registral representa la finca inscrita a nombre del demandado- reconventor [[Nombre1]] . En lo medular la apelación pretende que el referido plano prevalezca sobre otros levantamientos topográficos, además de conceder la identidad del bien que es propiedad de la citada parte. No obstante, tal alegato no tiene fundamento jurídico. En la especie resulta de aplicación lo preceptuado en el artículo 301 del Código Civil, el cual establece, la mesura de un terreno, sea o no protestada, no basta por sí sola para probar la posesión de tal. De lo anterior, es insuficiente establecer cuál plano es más antiguo sino a la luz del criterio ampliamente sostenido por esta Cámara, deberá de observarse lo que acontece en la materialidad. Retomando los argumentos sobre el dibujo topográfico , sostiene el quejoso se trata de un documento público, valido, amparado al principio de seguridad jurídica, además de indicar si hay falencia por la antigüedad eso no demerita que sea un documento público válido. En este punto , la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha explicado, además de los efecto s de la norma arriba citada del Código Civil, también cuál es el alcance de un levantamiento topográfico como documento público. En la sentencia número 66 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 17 de agosto de 1994 afirmó lo siguiente: "II.-[...] el cuestionamiento planteado en el recurso gira en torno, sobre todo, al valor probatorio del plano catastrado [...]. Al respecto, debe señalarse inicialmente que, en efecto, los planos catastrados constituyen prueba documental de carácter público, en el tanto se trata de documentos expedidos por funcionarios públicos, según las formas requeridas y dentro de los límites de sus atribuciones (doctrina de los artículos 368 y 370 del Código Procesal Civil). Pero tal carácter de documentos públicos, contrario a lo que señala el recurrente, no les dan la calidad de prueba absoluta e incombatible, ni confieren ningún derecho por sí mismos. De ahí la disposición del numeral 30 del Código Civil, que señala que la mesura de un terreno, no basta por sí sola para probar la posesión del mismo. El valor probatorio de los planos dependerá de su conformidad con otros elementos probatorios que hayan sido evacuados en el proceso. Es aquí, en donde cobra especial relevancia el despliegue analítico del juez, conforme a las reglas del artículo 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, a efecto de determinar, para el caso concreto, el valor probatorio del plano catastrado, pues si la restante prueba desacredita lo que señala, necesariamente, por más documento público de que se trate, debe privar la realidad demostrada, contra lo expresado por él. En sentido contrario, si no existe prueba que se oponga a lo indicado por un plano, y no se le da a éste ningún valor, teniéndolo, sí podría existir preterición de prueba. Tal criterio ha sido sostenido desde vieja data. Incluso en resolución de la antigua Sala Primera Civil, Nº 95 de las 9:10 horas del 6 de abril de 1979, ya se señalaba que: "...un plano levantado unilateralmente por el interesado, aunque esté inscrito, por sí mismo no puede afectar a terceros, no constituye título traslativo de dominio, no comprueba la propiedad ni la posesión, pues conforme el artículo 301 del Código Civil, a la doctrina que lo informa y a la jurisprudencia, la mesura de un terreno sea o no protestada, no basta por sí sola para probar la posible propiedad o posesión del terreno. A lo dicho debe agregarse, que la misma legislación especial, concretamente los artículos 30 de la Ley de Catastro Nacional, Nº 6545 de 26 de marzo de 1981, y 42 del Reglamento de la Ley, promulgado mediante Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 13607-J de 24 de abril de 1982, -que en lo que se dirá, resultan plenamente congruentes con el 301 del Código Civil ya mencionado-, establecen el alcance probatorio de los planos catastrados, primeramente, al prescribir ambas normas que, únicamente los planos de agrimensura inscritos en el Catastro, surten efectos legales y, luego, al disponer la segunda norma señalada: "La registración catastral no convalida los documentos que sean nulos o anulables conforme con la ley, ni subsanará sus defectos.". Está claro, entonces, que ni ley especial reconoce al plano catastrado el valor que el recurrente pretende darle en el proceso, pues, en todo caso conflictivo, necesariamente, -como ya se señaló-, debe estudiarse y demostrarse la realidad que impera sobre el terreno, y contraponerla con la que señala el plano, para de esta forma concluir sobre el verdadero alcance probatorio del citado documento. Debe recordarse, además, que se está ante un proceso reivindicatorio agrario, en donde, como ya lo ha dicho la Sala, entre otras, en sentencia de las 14:30 horas del 4 de octubre de 1991, para reclamar con éxito el bien que se persigue, la titularidad documental debe complementarse con la calidad de dueño de la heredad y, para adquirir tal status, es necesario haber ejercido plenamente los atributos del dominio, lo que se acredita no sólo mediante títulos registrales o planos catastrados, sino, también mediante prueba testimonial, confesional o pericial. "Esto quiere decir que única y exclusivamente se encuentra legitimado en forma activa aquel que tenga una titularidad preferente sobre el bien, de ahí que debe exigirse necesariamente el carácter de dueño..." (véase sentencia referida)." Como lo explica de manera profusa la Alta Sala de Casación, el plano inscrito en el Catastro Nacional, no hace plena prueba, constituye en consecuencia un elemento más a ponderar junto con las demás probanzas, como ocurrió en la pieza apelada. Además, se subraya, fue un acto unilaterial, el cual no puede afectar derechos de terceras personas, y es en esta vía que la empresa actora- contrademandada hace los derechos que ha estimado le son lesionados.

VIII.Otro de los reclamos contra los argumentos de la sentencia radica en combatir el trámite realizado por el demandado en el Catastro Nacional porque fue sustraído de esa oficina, siendo que esa parte la única copia que poseía y se la entregó a ese registro para reponer el plano que fue sustraído y tenía una leyenda que no es parte de tal. Específicamente se refiere a lo acontecido en instancias catastrales. Esa información se desprende de la resolución [Telf1], en folios 96 a 98 del tomo I , donde da cuenta, de la adición a la resolución de restitución de plano catastrado G-8675-1942 la cual aconteció el 08 de agosto de 2003. En tal decisión administrativa , al carecer el levantamiento original , ordenó se anotara como de la finca número CED1. Sin embargo, el dibujo aportado no tenía el número del fundo a la cual correspondía y esa información se tomó de datos escritos a mano. Sin embargo, esa situación, tal como se tuvo por demostrado, generó de manera relevante, el Catastro Nacional emitiera, en la supracitada se eliminara el plano en mención corresponda a esa terreno; además ordenó incluir precautoriamente una nota marginal de advertencia hasta que se hiciera la modificación definitiva. De lo anterior, además se colige, el plano [Placa1], contrario a lo afirmado por el recurrente , por orden administrativa no representa a su finca. Aspecto que se debe abonar, a la tesis ya expuesta en el considerando anterior, no puede afectar derechos de terceras personas, pues en su esencia formal, a la luz de los requerimientos registrales, tiene defectos de trascendencia jurídica de acuerdo a la documental en mención que le hacen incapaz de representar un fundo.

IX.En este asunto, como se indicó en considerandos precedentes se combate fundamentalmente de la sentencia la legitimación que tiene el demandado en función del plano catastrado con el número G-8675-1942. En el conjunto de agravios contra la sentencia, se recrimina lo indicado en cuanto a los accidentes en la colindancia, tales como la quebrada Vigía, la inexistencia de la calle pública no documentada en los planos [Placa1] y [Placa2] el cual califica como un camino privado, erróneamente llamado calle pública, o bien sobre la existencia de puntos de amarre. Con esas explicaciones pretende demostrar cual es la porción de terreno que le corresponde. Además alega, con el cotejo de los levantamiento mencionados de 1942 se puede determinar la colindancia. También dice, los dibujos topográficos fueron confeccionado por el mismo topógrafo. Sin embargo, estos fundamentos tampoco permiten modificar lo indicado en la sentencia. La Hacienda actora, así denominada en lo sucesivo a Hacienda Oscar Miguel Rojas Sociedad Anónima, entre otras acciones reales pretende la reivindicación de una franja de aproximadamente [[Dirección1]] metros cuadrados (petitoria 4 en folio 212 del tomo I). Mediante la prueba pericial, la Hacienda actora probó su dicho. Para combatir este evento demostrado, el apelante de conformidad con el ordinal 317 inciso 2) del Código Procesal Civil de aplicación supletoria a la materia, debe aportar elementos probatorios pertinentes para fundamentar su oposición. No obstante, las apreciaciones arriba indicadas no tienen esa posibilidad. Primero, el levantamiento topográfico que alega representar a la finca colindante a la de la Hacienda actora, administrativamente, por el Registro Nacional, se ha indicado que no representa a el fundo del partido de Guanacaste número CED2. Debe reiterarse, el 12 de agosto de 2003 el Registro Nacional, ante la gestión del demandado-reconventor pidió la restitución de ese plano. Posteriormente, se hizo una advertencia administrativa, la cual fue modifica d a la resolución anterior, para indicar que el referido levantamiento no representa el inmueble inscrito a nombre del demandado (páginas 96 a 98 del tomo I). Esta situación también está reflejada en el plano de reiterada cita, cuya copia certificad a está agregada en foja 18 del tomo I, y en las anotaciones consta en ese mismo folio vuelto, en primer orden la restitución y posteriormente la advertencia administrativa. A mayor abundamiento de razones en este punto, en las páginas 28 a 139 del tomo I, se agregó el expediente de la gestión administrativa número 01-07-23-2007 diligenciado en el Catastro Nacional, donde es evidente la parte recurrente tuvo participación. Esto se observa en documento de foja 102, donde el apelante se apersonó a las diligencias y afirmó, conocer que las leyendas indicadas en la resolución, no estaban en el plano original, por lo que expresó: “…estoy en pleno acuerdo de que las mismas sean eliminadas”. Así las cosas, el escenario catastral no era sorpresivo y tuvo la posibilidad de ejercer el derecho de defensa en esa sede registral. En segundo orden, como se explicará, la experticia practicada en autos, resulta clara, precisa y congruente, para arribar a la conclusión, el apelante no lleva razón en sus alegatos. Si bien en materia agraria el sistema de valoración no es de prueba tasada, si exige el análisis en conjunto de las probanzas, motivo por el cual, la alegación de la observación del plano por su figura se puede arribar que representa su inmueble, porque ya en sede administrativa se ha indicado no es de esa manera y hay otros elementos probatorios, no desvirtuados, que prueban lo señalado en sentencia. Por último, debe de observarse del plano del demandado G-8575-1942 en folio 18 tomo I, tal no posee coordinadas o referencia alguna que permita de manera certera conocer la ubicación de tal fundo, solo se indica que esta en Montano de Bagaces de la provincia de Guanacaste, aspecto que impide acoger los argumentos del recurrente, sumados a los otros dos indicados en líneas anteriores.

X.Concerniente al valor del plano de la Hacienda actora, se reclama el irrespeto el principio del tracto sucesivo contenido en los numerales 15 y 55 de reglamento de la Ley del Catastro Nacional, situación realizada, según alega, para apropiarse del segmento de terreno en conflicto. El punto medular de este agravio , se sustenta en que la actora tenía un plano de 1942, sin embargo en el año 2001 inscrito con el número CED1 visible en folio 26 del tomo I. El canon 55 del citado reglamento contempla, el principio catastral del tracto sucesivo. De acuerdo a tal precepto legal, el Catastro procurará los medios necesarios para que se de una perfecta concatenación entre las inscripciones de los planos catastrados. Agrega la norma, deberá existir una perfecta secuencia y correlación entre las inscripciones y sus modificaciones, cancelaciones o extinciones. Este principio se orienta a ordenar la información registral, de manera que se genere seguridad jurídica. Sin embargo, en la especie, como también lo alega el apelante, cuando se hace un estudio de los inmuebles involucrados estos no reflejaban correlación a levantamiento topográfico alguno . El fundo de la Hacienda actora número 9598-000 surge de una reunión de dos fincas contiguas, de acuerdo a la copia del tomo de página 261 del tomo II y en ese momento, 12 de enero de 1948, no reporta plano relacionado con tal inmueble. Igual suerte con el del recurrente, según la copia del tomo de foja 162 del tomo I, cuando nace a la vida jurídica lo hace por una segregación ; tampoco de cuenta de un plano catastrado. Si bien, la Hacienda actora levantó un nuevo dibujo catastral en 2001, esta situación no implica lesión alguna al supracitado principio. Debe destacarse, cuando entra en vigencia el Código Notarial a partir de mayo de 1999, de acuerdo a los transitorios, se exige plano catastrado en todo movimiento registral referido a un inmueble, salvo que se trate de cancelaciones hipotecarias, la afectación a patrimonio familiar y el embargo, según lo establece el numeral 30 de la Ley del Catastro Nacional. Con la ley número 8710, vigente a partir del 2009, se reformó el ordinal 2 de la Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, número 5695, en aras de establecer el Registro Inmobiliario para dar uniformidad a toda la información tendiente a ordenar el territorio nacional. Sumado a lo anterior, hay falencias en los antiguos levantamientos topográficos, sea por la implementación de diversas herramientas tecnológicas, así como de la información que se debe suministrar al Registro correspondiente. El principio en mención tiene que manifestarse de manera formal y material. Este aspecto fue abordado por el experto nombrado en autos cuando afirma el problema de los planos de 1942 que carecen de ubicación geográfica como se exige en la actualidad y que solo representan "una idea de una propiedad que existió delimitada por el gráfico que hizo un agrimensor..." (folio 884 del tomo IV). El otro peritaje vertido en autos, en folio 451 a 453 del tomo II, se hace mención a las particularidades de levantamiento catastrales de esa época. Se denota de lo anterior, el experto, explica las deficiencias del plano de 1942 de la Hacienda actora, además de mencionar de manera clara y precisa los motivos por los cuales no se puede asociar, desde el punto de vista catastral a la finca de la empresa actora. A mayor refuerzo de esta tesis, se encuentra, como prueba complementaria a lo anterior, la certificación expedida por el Registro Nacional, donde se hace constar lo siguiente: “…El plano numero (sic) G-8677-1942 NO ha generado titulo (sic) o derecho…” (lo destacado es del texto original en foja 813 tomo IV). Se deriva de la documental anterior, el principio al tracto sucesivo no fue agredido, porque nunca se relacionó el plano de la Hacienda actora G-8677-1942 a la finca del partido de Guanacaste número 9598-000. Situación diametralmente opuesta a lo ejecutado por el d emandado recurrente, quien sí gestionó para que su plano de 1942 se relacionara con su inmueble, situación que posteriormente fue modificada por el Registro catastral según se explicó en líneas anteriores. En este caso con sustento en el numeral 15 del Reglamento del Catastro se pretende que lo acontecido en la materialidad se refleje en lo formal. De ahí, no lleva razón el apelante en cuanto a la infracción del principio por la confección del plano de 2001, pues es esta Sede donde se dilucida la validez de su plano frente al relacionado con el fundo de la Hacienda actora.”