Titling of property in forest reserve based on decennial possession prior to its creationTitulación de inmueble en reserva forestal por posesión decenal anterior a su creación

II.- The State's representative, Susana Fallas Cubero, is dissatisfied with the judgment approving the possessory information, considering that the property is within the two-kilometer strip adjacent to the Inter-American Highway, an encumbrance she considers prior to the Río Macho Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal Río Macho). 1) In her view, the testimony is insufficient to prove the exercise of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the enactment of the General Law on Vacant Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos), No. 13 of January 10, 1939, which established in its article six that vacant lands (baldíos) situated within a zone 2000 meters wide on each side of the route of the Pan-American Highway could not be alienated, and later, in 1945, included the remainder of the route containing oak trees. While it is true that the regulation was repealed on November 9, 1973, by Law No. 5385 of October 30, 1973, years before that repeal, the Río Macho Forest Reserve had been created (Decree No. 1-A of January 23, 1964, effective from February 4, 1964). She emphasizes that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in rulings 98-2015, considering VI, and 18836-2014, has indicated an encumbrance on the public domain beginning with Law No. 2528. Which, she also considers, has been the criterion of the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) in some rulings, among others, No. 533-F.-13, 623-F-11, and 649-F-12. Furthermore, she considers that repealed law survives for facts or situations that occurred under its validity (Constitutional Chamber No. 18840-2014, among others). The judgment recognizes a ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to said Reserve from the years 1948, 1949, and 1950-1953, a period during which the land with oak forest cover (cobertura de robledales) was already encumbered as a National Park between 1945 and 1973. In addition, she considers that the deponents do not coincide with what was stated in the testament of deed No. 3751, according to which [[Nombre1]] acquired from [[Nombre2]] and did not indicate the time of possession, coherence between them being required. She requests that the ruling be revoked and the titling be rejected.

III.- First of all, the appellant must be reminded that in agrarian matters, the principle of free assessment of evidence (libre apreciación probatoria) governs (Article 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction, Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), which allows judges to provide reasons of logic, experience, and common sense regarding the assessment of testimonial evidence. Regarding this evaluation system, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated: The Judge must have broad powers to appreciate and evaluate the evidence received. The free judicial assessment of evidence responds to the ex officio principle, which grants broad initiative to the judge in matters of proof. Both in the labor process and in the "agrarian" process, inspired by the former, our legislator provided for the system of free assessment of evidence (libre valoración probatoria). It is not a matter of arbitrary assessment, nor assessment "in conscience" (en conciencia). It is a system completely adhering to the rules of the legal system, which guarantee the possibility for the judge to base their judgments on principles of law and equity. The Agrarian Judge is not subject to or constrained by the pre-determined value that common procedural law (CPC) confers on a certain type of evidence. For example, a confession is full proof against the person making it; or the demonstration of verbal contracts up to a certain economic limit. Those criteria, typical of the civil process, would limit the powers of the agrarian judge and would notably prevent a correct administration of agrarian justice. The power of free assessment of evidence (libre apreciación probatoria) is expressly granted by the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), in its Article 54, when stating in its second paragraph: "When resolving on the merits of the case, the judge shall assess the evidence in conscience and without strict subjection to the rules of common law, but, in any case, when analyzing the result of the evidence gathered in the process, must express the principles of equity or of law on which their criterion is based." It is a power that the Agrarian Judge develops at the time of issuing the judgment (Agrarian Tribunal No. 31 of 9:40 a.m. on January 21, 1999, and No. 1018 of 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 2005). Given its importance, a recent judgment from the Constitutional Chamber on this principle, a pillar of Costa Rican agrarian procedural law, is transcribed: "I.- In relation to the assessment 'in conscience' (a conciencia) of the evidence. The plaintiff questions the constitutionality of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria), insofar as it allows the judge to assess the evidence in conscience and without strict subjection to the rules of common law, which he considers violates the principles of legality, equality, due process, and prompt justice (arts. 11, 33, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution) and art. 154 of the Political Constitution. ...In this way, far from affecting a constitutional right, it establishes a formal procedural prerequisite to precisely guarantee due process: that of grounding the assessment of the evidence that will allow the eventual aggrieved party their defense in relation to the object of their prejudice and the higher body to make a fair examination of the records that are brought to its knowledge. Likewise, it is worth noting that this principle is a manifestation of the application of the protective principle that governs labor jurisdiction, and which is concretized in the 'in dubio pro operario' principle, which is justified by virtue of the basic inequality that exists between the parties -employer/worker-, not only because of the subordination relationship in which the worker finds himself, but fundamentally because of the natural availability of means of proof that the employer has, which contrasts significantly with the employee's difficulty in this aspect. The warning must be made that what is contrary to the constitutional order is ruling in conscience and with total disregard for the other elements of conviction, as this Chamber indicated in constitutional judgment number 5546-95, at three hours six minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-four. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to interpret the rule in question in such a way that the power of labor judges to assess evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, provided that a reasoned judgment is issued, applying the rules of sound criticism and reasonableness. Therefore: The action is declared without merit." (Judgment No. 4448-96 of 9:00 a.m. on August 30, 1996). Consistent with the transcribed case law, the power granted to the agrarian judge to assess the evidence in conscience and evaluate it without strict subjection to the rules of common law as provided in the contested second paragraph of Article 54 is not unconstitutional, provided they issue a reasoned judgment, that is, analyze the result of the evidence gathered in the process and express the principles of equity or of law on which their criterion is based, thereby respecting the minimum contents of the right of defense. Hence, it is appropriate to reject the action on its merits regarding this point..."The principle of equality, contained in Article 33 of the Political Constitution, implies that in all cases, equal treatment must be given, disregarding any possible differentiating elements of legal relevance that may exist; or what is the same, not all inequality necessarily constitutes discrimination. Equality, as this Chamber has stated, is only violated when inequality lacks an objective and reasonable justification. But furthermore, the cause of justification for the act considered unequal must be evaluated in relation to its purpose and effects, such that there must necessarily exist a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose itself. That is, equality must be understood in terms of the circumstances that occur in each specific case in which it is invoked, such that universal application does not prohibit different solutions for different situations, with diverse treatment. All this means that equality before the law cannot imply material equality or real and effective economic equality." (Judgment number 1770-94, and in the same sense, number 1045-94.)" Consistent with the transcribed constitutional case law, and given the specific characteristics of agrarian procedural law, the implementation of the method of assessing evidence in conscience (en conciencia) is fully valid for the cases regulated by the contested second paragraph of Article 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria), so no violation of the principle of equality is evident. Each class of judicial process –civil, criminal, labor, agrarian, etc.– has, by reason of its specific nature, different characteristics that oblige the legislator to create rules and procedures that adjust to that special nature and that, at the same time, guarantee and protect the fundamental rights of the different procedural parties. Hence, aspects such as the assessment of evidence can vary from one process to another, without this being harmful to the principles of due process. For the foregoing reasons, the action must be dismissed in this sense, and this Chamber finds no reasons to change its criterion, nor reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the matter, therefore the action must be rejected on its merits." (Constitutional Chamber, Ruling No. 3657 of May 7, 2003) IV.- Moreover, in relation to the criteria for assessing testimonial evidence, the same system of free assessment of evidence (libre apreciación probatoria) of the agrarian jurisdiction implies that each specific case must be analyzed according to the circumstances. Therefore, a single rule or solution cannot be applied to all cases, as the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República intends. In this specific case, the full Tribunal considers that the testimonial evidence, regarding the time of possession of the title applicant and their previous transferor, has been well assessed, and this is reflected in the reasoning set forth by the lower court (a-quo) in the fourth considering (considerando), where it analyzes, one by one, the witnesses proposed to prove the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the creation of the [Dirección1] Macho reserve (Decree No. 1-A of January 23, 1964, effective from February 4, 1964), since the witnesses declared a possession prior to 1950. In the species, it is important to consider not only the declaration of the witnesses, but also to verify other circumstances to determine whether or not the property evinces a long-term possession.

V.- Regarding the first grievance, related to the oak forests, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated the following: The grievance regarding the encumbrance of the [[Nombre3]] is also not admissible because the Procuradora seeks to apply a Law or regulation repealed since 1973. The appellant does not consider, as the lower court (a-quo) correctly points out, that the Forestry Law of 1996 (Ley Forestal) allows the titling of wild protected areas, provided that ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to their respective creating Law or Decree is demonstrated. In this case, consequently, the criterion of ten-year possession prior to the creation of the Río Macho Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal de Río Macho), created by Decree in 1964, must prevail, and if this possession has been proven since 1950, that is sufficient to authorize the titling. The first possessor was [[Nombre4]], who then passed it to his son [[Nombre1]], then from [[Nombre5]], who has reforested, (listen to testimonial declarations, document incorporated on 08/11/2016 at 08:12:25 a.m., in particular), [[Nombre6]] who attest to sustainable agri-environmental activity and stated he had known the property since 1948 and the successive possessors. The witness [[Nombre7]] says he has known the property for about 50 years, was born in 1941 and knew it around the year '54 (clarifies that he has known it since he was 9 years old and is now 73 years old), when it belonged to [[Nombre4]], then to [[Nombre1]], who was the son, then it was sold to Mr. [[Nombre5]], indicated that he works in trout farming, some little cows "for household use", and has conserved the forest. The witness [[Nombre8]], who stated he was 69 years old and had known the property his whole life, said it belonged to [[Nombre4]], then it was passed to [[Nombre1]], and the latter to [[Nombre5]]. As can be seen, all the testimonies are consistent with the successive chain of title regarding the property, from approximately the year 1950. Furthermore, they attest to the conservation of the forest, complying with the provisions of Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). This has been decided by the Tribunal on repeated occasions: "...In this case, both the testimonial and documentary evidence refer to a time prior to the year 1965. However, the representative of the State alleges that the encumbrance on the public domain predates that date, since it involves a property with oak trees and located in an area of [Dirección2] on both sides of the route of the [Dirección3], as provided by subsection a) of Article 7 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), repealed on November 9, 1973, by Law No. 5385 of October 30, 1973. However, she points out, two years later the Los Santos Forest Reserve was created, by Decree No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975. She even cites regulations prior to that which imposed limitations on that sector. In this regard, the Tribunal considers that when Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), which allows the titling of properties with forest located within protected areas, came into effect, a release from the public domain (desafectación al dominio público) occurred, requiring proof of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the enactment of the law or decree that created the protected area. That possession, evidently, must have been exercised under title of owner, i.e., a situation that, in the appellant's opinion, did not occur because, under Articles 6 and 62 of the General Law on Vacant Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos) No. 13 of January 10, 1939 –already repealed– possession of that area could only have been exercised through a lease contract. Those regulations provided: 'Vacant lands situated in a zone ... 2000 meters wide on each side of the route of the [Dirección4] may not be alienated.'; and: 'The Executive Branch may lease, by contract and for a term of four years, renewable at the will of the parties, the strips of land referred to in Article 6, in an extension not greater than two hundred fifty hectares, if dedicated to cattle breeding or fattening, and not greater than one hundred twenty-five hectares, if destined for agricultural crops...'. She adds that Law No. 197 of August 29, 1945, reformed the General Law on Vacant Lands, adding the element of oaks, declaring as a National Park the lands comprised within the two-thousand-meter zone on both sides of the [Dirección5] of the rest of the route to be built that contain oak trees. According to the list of cited norms, possession under the character of a lease could have occurred until the repeal of the General Law on Vacant Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos), which happened on August 29, 1945. That is, after that date, it was possible to enter into possession of those lands under the character of owner. Now, on that date, the lands comprised within the zone of [Dirección6] on both sides of the [Dirección7] of the rest of the route to be built that contain oak trees were declared a National Park. The National Park category was maintained until the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) came into effect, in which the lands located in that sector and having oak trees were declared public domain. This means that during the period in which that area, within which the property to be titled is comprised, constituted a national park, given its absolute protection, no agrarian possessory acts could be exercised until the enactment of the Land and Colonization Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961. After that date, the national park category changed, and those lands could be possessed ten-yearly until the Los Santos Forest Reserve was created, by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975, a situation that occurred in this case, according to the analysis made of the testimonial and documentary evidence provided to the process. Indeed, the Land and Colonization Law declared those areas public domain, excepting those that were under private domain, as happens in this case; in addition to this, it made such declaration through a subsection that has since been repealed. Consequently, the reasoning of the State's representative is not shared. (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 306-F-10 of 8:40 a.m. on April 13, 2010, among others. Also, 774-F-13, 533-F-13, 1015-F-12, 804-F-13). In a case similar to the one before us now, this Tribunal, in a recent resolution, pointed out regarding the objections of the Procuraduría, the following: "In this case, both the testimonial and documentary evidence refer to a time prior to the year 1965. However, the representative of the State alleges that the encumbrance on the public domain predates that date, since it involves a property with oak trees and located in an area of [Dirección6] on both sides of the route of the [Dirección3], as provided by subsection a) of Article 7 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), repealed on November 9, 1973, by Law No. 5385 of October 30, 1973. However, she points out, two years later the Los Santos Forest Reserve was created, by Decree No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975. She even cites regulations prior to that which imposed limitations on that sector. In this regard, the Tribunal considers that when Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), which allows the titling of properties with forest located within protected areas, came into effect, a release from the public domain (desafectación al dominio público) occurred, requiring proof of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the enactment of the law or decree that created the protected area. That possession, evidently, must have been exercised under title of owner, i.e., a situation that, in the appellant's opinion, did not occur because, under Articles 6 and 62 of the General Law on Vacant Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos) No. 13 of January 10, 1939 –already repealed– possession of that area could only have been exercised through a lease contract. Those regulations provided: 'Vacant lands situated in a zone ... 2000 meters wide on each side of the route of the [Dirección4] may not be alienated.'; and: 'The Executive Branch may lease, by contract and for a term of four years, renewable at the will of the parties, the strips of land referred to in Article 6, in an extension not greater than two hundred fifty hectares, if dedicated to cattle breeding or fattening, and not greater than one hundred twenty-five hectares, if destined for agricultural crops...'. She adds that Law No. 197 of August 29, 1945, reformed the General Law on Vacant Lands, adding the element of oaks, declaring as a National Park the lands comprised within the two-thousand-meter zone on both sides of the [Dirección5] of the rest of the route to be built that contain oak trees. According to the list of cited norms, possession under the character of a lease could have occurred until the repeal of the General Law on Vacant Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos), which happened on August 29, 1945. That is, after that date, it was possible to enter into possession of those lands under the character of owner. Now, on that date, the lands comprised within the two-thousand-meter zone on both sides of the [Dirección7] of the rest of the route to be built that contain oak trees were declared a National Park. The National Park category was maintained until the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) came into effect, in which the lands located in that sector and having oak trees were declared public domain. This means that during the period in which that area, within which the property to be titled is comprised, constituted a national park, given its absolute protection, no agrarian possessory acts could be exercised until the enactment of the Land and Colonization Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961. After that date, the national park category changed, and those lands could be possessed ten-yearly until the Los Santos Forest Reserve was created, by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975, a situation that occurred in this case, according to the analysis made of the testimonial and documentary evidence provided to the process. Indeed, the Land and Colonization Law declared those areas public domain, excepting those that were under private domain, as happens in this case; in addition to this, it made such declaration through a subsection that has since been repealed. Consequently, the reasoning of the State's representative is not shared." (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 306-F-10, of 8:40 a.m. on April 9, 2010). In another ruling (voto), the following was noted: "V.- In this process, likewise, the witnesses [[Nombre9]] (folio 189), [[Nombre10]] (folio 190), and [[Nombre1]] (folio 192), attest not only to the chain of transferors, but also to the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to 1964; the witnesses even refer to having known the property since the years 1950 and 1951, respectively. This fulfills the provisions of Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), by demonstrating ten-year possession prior to the creation of the Río Macho Forest Reserve, and having protected the forest resource. Consequently, the ruling must be confirmed." (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 1054-F-10 of 1:46 p.m. on November 3, 2010).

VI.- In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated by this Tribunal that the Procuraduría General de la República challenged, through an action of unconstitutionality (File No. EXPN1-), the jurisprudential line of this Tribunal that interprets that, with proof of the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the creation of the respective protected area, in accordance with Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), it is possible to authorize the titling of the property. Said action was declared WITHOUT MERIT, by majority ruling, number 001142/2017 at eleven hours twenty minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand seventeen (see in particular the additional reasons of Magistrate Fernando Castillo Víquez, to the majority ruling, where he indicates the technical and social criteria that prevailed in the legislator to release those areas from the public domain). Moreover, the State's representative, the Deputy Procuradora, had the possibility of opposing in this non-contentious jurisdiction process, under the terms set forth in Article 5 of the Law (within the month following the date of notification). However, by not opposing, the title applicant is given the possibility of proving the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) (prior to the creation of the protected area) through the non-contentious route. On the contrary, if she had opposed in time, it would be the interested party who must sue the State, through the corresponding route, in defense of their right. It is even seen that, in the brief dated April 10, 2013 (document associated on October 22, 2015), she noted the following: "In this proceeding, I request to corroborate the conservation of the forest cover (cobertura forestal) in the area adjacent to the spring (naciente), the [Dirección8] creek (Article 33, subsections a) and b) of the Forestry Law, and numerals 148, 149, and 151 of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas)), in order to certify the exercise of protective possession of the natural resources that must be carried out in wild protected areas (Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law)." Which was effectively corroborated, as deduced from the proven facts of the judgment being appealed (judicial inspection of September 10, 2013), in the judicial inspection of the property where the conservation of the forest was verified.

VII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appropriate course is to confirm, on the appealed points, the judgment under appeal. However, it is important to add that in the future, (for the purposes of the judgment's enforceability), it must be added that the title applicant must comply with all the recommendations of INTA, according to the soil study, in the sense that he must "Maintain the areas of primary forest, do not carry out any commercial forest exploitation activity, conserve the river's protection zone and the creek's, maintain the forest cover. For the reforested sector protecting the spring (naciente), maintain the trees (clearing, ring weeding, fertilizing) and in case of death, replant and conserve the area. For the sector in natural pasture, it is suitable for the activity, but maintain a low animal load, and for the sector used for tourism, keep the soil with vegetative cover to conserve it adequately." It requests that the ruling be revoked and the title issuance be denied.

III.- First, the appellant must be reminded that in agrarian matters, the principle of free assessment of evidence (principio de libre apreciación probatoria) governs (article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), which allows judges to provide reasons based on logic, experience, and common sense regarding the assessment of testimonial evidence. Regarding this system of evaluation, this Tribunal has repeatedly stated: The Judge must have broad powers to assess and evaluate the evidence received. The free judicial assessment of evidence responds to the ex officio principle, which grants the judge broad initiative in matters of evidence. Both in the labor process and in the "agrarian" process, inspired by the former, our legislator provided for the system of free assessment of evidence. This is not arbitrary evaluation, nor is it evaluation "in conscience." It is a system completely adhering to the rules of the legal system, which guarantee the judge the ability to base their rulings on principles of law and equity. The Agrarian Judge is not subject to or constrained by the predetermined value that common procedural law (CPC) confers on a specific type of evidence. For example, a confession is full proof against the one making it; or the demonstration of verbal contracts up to a certain economic limit. Those criteria, typical of the civil process, would come to limit the powers of the agrarian judge, and would notably impede a correct administration of agrarian justice. The power of free assessment of evidence is expressly granted by the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, in its article 54, when it indicates in its second paragraph: "When resolving on the merits of the case, the judge shall assess the evidence in conscience and without strict subjection to the rules of common law, but, in all cases, when analyzing the result of the evidence gathered in the process, must express the principles of equity or law upon which their criterion is based." It is a power that the Agrarian Judge develops at the time of issuing the judgment (Tribunal Agrario No. 31 of 9:40 a.m. on January 21, 1999 and No. 1018 of 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 2005). Due to its importance, a recent ruling by the Sala Constitucional on this principle, a pillar of Costa Rican agrarian procedural law, is transcribed: "I.- Regarding the evaluation 'in conscience' of the evidence. The claimant questions the constitutionality of the second paragraph of article 54 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, insofar as it allows the judge to evaluate the evidence in conscience and without strict subjection to rules of common law, which they consider violative of the principles of legality, equality, due process, and prompt justice (articles 11, 33, 39, and 41 of the Constitución Política) and article 154 of the Constitución Política. …In this way, far from affecting a constitutional right, it establishes a formal procedural prerequisite to precisely guarantee due process: that of substantiating the assessment of the evidence that will allow the eventual aggrieved party their defense in relation to what is the object of their harm and allow the higher body to make a fair examination of the proceedings that are brought to its attention. Likewise, it should be noted that this principle is a manifestation of the application of the protective principle that governs labor jurisdiction, and which materializes in the 'in dubio pro operario' principle, which is justified by virtue of the basic inequality that exists between the parties—employer/worker—not only due to the subordination relationship in which the worker finds themself, but fundamentally because of the natural availability of the means of proof that the employer has, which contrasts sharply with the employee's difficulty in this aspect. It must be noted that what is contrary to the constitutional order is ruling in conscience and with total disregard for the other elements of evidence, as this Chamber indicated in constitutional ruling number 5546-95, of three hours six minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-four. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to interpret the norm in question in such a way that the power of labor judges to assess evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, provided that a well-founded ruling is issued, applying the rules of sound criticism and reasonableness. Therefore: The action is declared without merit." (ruling No. 4448-96 of 9:00 a.m. on August 30, 1996). Consistent with the transcribed jurisprudence, the power granted to the agrarian judge to assess evidence in conscience and evaluate it without strict subjection to the rules of common law, as provided in the challenged second paragraph of article 54, is not unconstitutional, provided that they issue a well-founded ruling, that is, they analyze the result of the evidence gathered in the process and express the principles of equity or law upon which they base their criterion, thereby respecting the minimum content of the right to defense. Hence, it is appropriate to reject the action on the merits regarding this point… "The principle of equality, contained in Article 33 of the Constitución Política, implies that in all cases, equal treatment must be given regardless of possible differentiating elements of legal relevance that may exist; or what amounts to the same thing, not every inequality necessarily constitutes discrimination. Equality, as this Chamber has stated, is only violated when the inequality is devoid of an objective and reasonable justification. But in addition, the cause of justification for the act considered unequal must be evaluated in relation to its purpose and its effects, in such a way that a reasonable relationship of proportionality must necessarily exist between the means employed and the purpose itself. That is, equality must be understood in terms of the circumstances that occur in each specific case in which it is invoked, so that universal application does not prohibit contemplating different solutions for different situations, with diverse treatment. Everything expressed means that equality before the law cannot imply material equality or real and effective economic equality." (Ruling number 1770-94, and in the same sense, number 1045-94.)” Consistent with the transcribed constitutional jurisprudence and given the specific characteristics of agrarian procedural law, the implementation of the method of evaluating evidence in conscience for the cases regulated by the challenged article 54, second paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria is fully valid, so no violation of the principle of equality is evident. Each type of judicial process—civil, criminal, labor, agrarian, etc.—has, by reason of its specific nature, different characteristics that obligate the legislator to create norms and procedures that adjust to that special nature and that, at the same time, guarantee and protect the fundamental rights of the distinct procedural parties. Hence, aspects such as the assessment of evidence can vary from one process to another, without this being harmful to the principles of due process. For the foregoing reasons, the action must be dismissed in this regard, and this Chamber finds no reasons to change its criterion, nor reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the matter, so the action must be rejected on the merits.” (Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 3657 of May 7, 2003) IV.- Furthermore, regarding the criteria for assessing testimonial evidence, the same system of free assessment of evidence (libre apreciación probatoria) in agrarian jurisdiction implies that each specific case must be analyzed according to the circumstances. Therefore, a single rule or solution cannot be applied to all cases, as the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República intends. In this specific case, the full Tribunal considers that the testimonial evidence, regarding the time of possession by the title applicant and their prior transferor, has been properly assessed, and this is reflected in the reasoning set forth by the a-quo in the fourth considerando, where they analyze, one by one, the witnesses proposed to demonstrate the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the creation of the [Dirección1] Macho reserve (Decreto No. 1-A of January 23, 1964, in effect since February 4, 1964), as the witnesses testified to possession prior to 1950. In this instance, it is important to consider not only the witnesses' statements, but also to verify other circumstances to determine whether or not the property shows long-standing possession.

V.- Regarding the first grievance, related to the oak groves (robledales), this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated the following: The grievance relating to the impact on the [[Nombre3]] is also not admissible because the Attorney General intends to apply a Law or norm repealed since 1973. The appellant does not consider, as the a-quo rightly points out, that the Ley Forestal of 1996 permits the title issuance of protected wild areas, provided that ten-year possession (posesión decenal) is demonstrated prior to the respective Law or Decree of creation. In this case, consequently, the criterion of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the creation of the Reserva Forestal de Río Macho created by Decree in 1964 must prevail, and if that possession since 1950 is demonstrated, that is sufficient to authorize the title issuance. The first possessor was [[Nombre4]], then it passed to his son [[Nombre1]], then from [[Nombre5]], who has reforested, (listen to testimonial statements, document incorporated on 08/11/2016 at 08:12:25 a.m., in particular), [[Nombre6]] who attest to sustainable agro-environmental activity and stated they knew the farm since 1948 and the successive possessors. The witness [[Nombre7]] says they have known the farm for about 50 years, was born in 1941 and knew it around the year 54 (clarifies that they have known it since they were 9 years old and are currently 73), when it belonged to [[Nombre4]], then to [[Nombre1]], who was the son, then it was sold to Mr. [[Nombre5]], indicated that they work in trout, some cows "for household expenses," and have conserved the forest. The witness [[Nombre8]], who stated they are 69 years old and have known the farm all their life, it belonged to [[Nombre4]], then it passed to [[Nombre1]] and the latter to [[Nombre5]]. As can be seen, all the testimonies are consistent with the successive tract regarding the property, from approximately the year 1950. Furthermore, they attest to the conservation of the forest, complying with the provisions of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. This Tribunal has resolved on repeated occasions: "...In this case, both the testimonial and documentary evidence allude to a time prior to the year 1965. However, the State representative alleges that the encumbrance on the public domain is prior to that date, since it involves a property that has oak trees and is located in a [[Dirección2]] zone on both sides of the layout of the [[Dirección3]], as provided in subsection a) of article 7 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, repealed on November 9, 1973 by Law No. 5385 of October 30, 1973; however, they point out that two years later the Reserva Forestal Los Santos was created, by Decreto No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975. They even cite earlier regulations that imposed limitations on that sector. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that, upon the entry into force of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which permits the title issuance of properties with forest located within protected areas, a release from the public domain (desafectación al dominio público) occurred, requiring proof of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the effectiveness of the law or decree that created the protected area. That possession, evidently, must have been exercised as an owner, that is, a situation which, in the appellant's view, did not occur because, according to articles 6 and 62 of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 10, 1939—already repealed—possession of that area could only have been exercised through a lease contract. Those norms stated: 'Baldíos located in a zone ... of 2000 meters wide on each side of the tread of the [[Dirección4]] may not be alienated.'; and: 'The Executive Branch may lease, by contract and for a term of four years, renewable at the will of the parties, the strips of land referred to in article 6 in an area not exceeding two hundred and fifty hectares, if dedicated to cattle raising or fattening, and not exceeding one hundred and twenty-five hectares, if used for agricultural crops...'. They add that Law No. 197 of August 29, 1945, reformed the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos adding the element of the oak trees, declaring as Parque Nacional the lands within the zone of two thousand meters on both sides of the [[Dirección5]] of the rest of the layout to be built that have oak trees. According to the list of cited norms, possession as a lease could have occurred until the repeal of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, which happened on August 29, 1945. That is, after that date, it was indeed possible to have entered into possession of those lands as an owner. Now, on that date, the lands within the zone of [[Dirección6]] on both sides of the [[Dirección7]] of the rest of the layout to be built that have oak trees were declared Parque Nacional. The category of Parque Nacional was maintained until the Ley de Tierras y Colonización came into effect, in which lands located in that sector and having oak trees were declared part of the public domain. The foregoing means that during the period in which that area, within which the property to be titled is included, constituted a national park, given its absolute protection, no agrarian possession acts could be exercised until the effectiveness of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización No. 2825 of October 14, 1961. After that date, the park category changed, and those lands could be possessed in a ten-year form until the Reserva Forestal Los Santos was created, by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975, a situation that occurred in this case, according to the analysis made of the testimonial and documentary evidence provided in the process. Certainly, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización declared those areas part of the public domain, making the exception of those that were under private domain, as occurs in this case; added to this, such a declaration was made by means of a subsection that has already been repealed. Consequently, the State representative's reasoning is not shared. (Tribunal Agrario, No. 306-F-10 of 8:40 a.m. on April 13, 2010, among others. Furthermore, 774-F-13, 533-F-13, 1015-F-12, 804-F-13). In a case similar to the one now before us, this Tribunal, in a recent ruling, stated regarding the objections of the Procuraduría, the following: "In this case, both the testimonial and documentary evidence allude to a time prior to the year 1965. However, the State representative alleges that the encumbrance on the public domain is prior to that date, since it involves a property that has oak trees and is located in a [[Dirección6]] zone on both sides of the layout of the [[Dirección3]], as provided in subsection a) of article 7 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, repealed on November 9, 1973 by Law No. 5385 of October 30, 1973; however, they point out that two years later the Reserva Forestal Los Santos was created, by Decreto No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975. They even cite earlier regulations that imposed limitations on that sector. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that, upon the entry into force of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which permits the title issuance of properties with forest located within protected areas, a release from the public domain (desafectación al dominio público) occurred, requiring proof of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the effectiveness of the law or decree that created the protected area. That possession, evidently, must have been exercised as an owner, that is, a situation which, in the appellant's view, did not occur because, according to articles 6 and 62 of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 10, 1939—already repealed—possession of that area could only have been exercised through a lease contract. Those norms stated: 'Baldíos located in a zone ... of 2000 meters wide on each side of the tread of the [[Dirección4]] may not be alienated.'; and: 'The Executive Branch may lease, by contract and for a term of four years, renewable at the will of the parties, the strips of land referred to in article 6 in an area not exceeding two hundred and fifty hectares, if dedicated to cattle raising or fattening, and not exceeding one hundred and twenty-five hectares, if used for agricultural crops...'. They add that Law No. 197 of August 29, 1945, reformed the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos adding the element of the oak trees, declaring as Parque Nacional the lands within the zone of two thousand meters on both sides of the [[Dirección5]] of the rest of the layout to be built that have oak trees. According to the list of cited norms, possession as a lease could have occurred until the repeal of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, which happened on August 29, 1945. That is, after that date, it was indeed possible to have entered into possession of those lands as an owner. Now, on that date, the lands within the zone of two thousand meters on both sides of the [[Dirección7]] of the rest of the layout to be built that have oak trees were declared Parque Nacional. The category of Parque Nacional was maintained until the Ley de Tierras y Colonización came into effect, in which lands located in that sector and having oak trees were declared part of the public domain. The foregoing means that during the period in which that area, within which the property to be titled is included, constituted a national park, given its absolute protection, no agrarian possession acts could be exercised until the effectiveness of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización No. 2825 of October 14, 1961. After that date, the park category changed, and those lands could be possessed in a ten-year form until the Reserva Forestal Los Santos was created, by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5389-A of October 28, 1975, a situation that occurred in this case, according to the analysis made of the testimonial and documentary evidence provided in the process. Certainly, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización declared those areas part of the public domain, making the exception of those that were under private domain, as occurs in this case; added to this, such a declaration was made by means of a subsection that has already been repealed. Consequently, the State representative's reasoning is not shared." (Tribunal Agrario, No. 306-F-10, of 8:40 a.m. on April 9, 2010). In another ruling, it was stated: "V.- In this process, likewise, the witnesses [[Nombre9]] (folio 189), [[Nombre10]] (folio 190), and [[Nombre1]] (folio 192), attest, not only to the chain of transferors, but also to the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to 1964; the witnesses even mention that they have known the farm since the years 1950 and 1951, respectively. With this, the provisions of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias are fulfilled, by demonstrating a ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the creation of the Reserva Forestal Río Macho, and having protected the forest resource. Consequently, the ruling must be upheld." (Tribunal Agrario, No. 1054-F-10 of 1:46 p.m. on November 3, 2010).

VI.- In addition to the above, this Tribunal must indicate that the Procuraduría General de la República challenged, through an unconstitutionality action (Expediente No. EXPN1-), the jurisprudential line of this Tribunal interpreting that with proof of ten-year possession (posesión decenal) prior to the creation of the respective protected area, according to article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, it is possible to authorize the title issuance of the property. Said action was declared SIN LUGAR, by majority vote, number 001142/2017 of eleven hours and twenty minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand seventeen (see in particular the additional reasons of Magistrate Fernando Castillo Víquez to the majority vote, where they indicate the technical and social criteria that prevailed in the legislator to release those areas from the public domain). On the other hand, the State representative, Deputy Attorney General, had the possibility of opposing in this non-contentious jurisdiction process, in the terms provided in article 5 of the Law (within the month following the date of notification); however, by not opposing, the title applicant is given the possibility of being able to demonstrate the ten-year possession (posesión decenal) (prior to the creation of the protected area) in the non-contentious manner. On the contrary, if they had opposed in time, it would be the interested party who must sue the State, in the appropriate manner, in defense of their right. Observe even, that in the brief of April 10, 2013 (document associated on October 22, 2015), they stated the following: "In this proceeding I request to corroborate the conservation of the forest cover (cobertura forestal) in the area adjacent to the spring (naciente), the [[Dirección8]] stream (article 33, subsections a) and b) of the Ley Forestal, and numerals 148, 149, and 151 of the Ley de Aguas), to accredit the exercise of protective possession of natural resources that must be carried out in protected wild areas (article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Which was effectively corroborated, as is evident from the proven facts of the judgment sold on appeal (judicial inspection of September 10, 2013), in the Judicial inspection of the property where the conservation of the forest is verified.

VII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the proper course is to uphold, in the appealed portion, the contested judgment; however, it is important to add that in the future, (for purposes of the judgment's enforceability), it must be added that the title applicant must comply with all INTA recommendations, according to the soil study, in the sense that they must "Maintain the primary forest zones, not carry out any commercial forest exploitation activity, conserve the river and stream protection zone, and maintain the forest cover (cobertura forestal)." In the reforested protection sector of the spring, maintain the trees (clearing, ring weeding, fertilizing) and in case of death, replant and conserve the area. In the case of the sector in natural pasture, it is suitable for the activity, but maintain a low animal load and in the case of the sector used for tourism, maintain the soil with plant cover (cobertura vegetal) to adequately conserve it\".</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html> However, the State representative alleges that the public domain encumbrance predates that date, since it involves a property that has oak trees and is located in a zone of [[Dirección6]] on both sides of the [[Dirección3]] route, as provided in subsection a) of Article 7 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, repealed on November 9, 1973, by Law No. 5385 of October 30, 1973; however, she indicates, two years later the Reserva Forestal Los Santos was created by Decreto Nº 5389-A of October 28, 1975. She even cites legislation prior to that which imposed limitations on that sector. In this regard, the Tribunal considers that upon the entry into force of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which allows the titling of properties with forest located within protected areas, a declassification (desafectación) from the public domain occurred, requiring proof of ten-year possession prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the protected area. That possession, evidently, must have been exercised as an owner, that is, a situation that in the appellant's opinion did not occur because, pursuant to Articles 6 and 62 of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 10, 1939—already repealed—possession of that area could have been exercised only through a lease contract. Those provisions stipulated: “Baldíos located in a zone ... 2000 meters wide on each side of the [[Dirección4]] route may not be alienated.”; and: “The Executive Branch may lease, by contract and for a term of four years, renewable at the will of the parties, the strips of land referred to in Article 6 in an area not exceeding two hundred fifty hectares, if used for livestock breeding or fattening, and not exceeding one hundred twenty-five hectares, if used for agricultural crops...”. She adds, Law No. 197 of August 29, 1945, reformed the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, adding the element of oak trees and declaring as Parque Nacional the lands within the two-thousand-meter zone on both sides of the [[Dirección5]] of the remainder of the route yet to be built that have oak trees. According to the cited provisions, possession under a leasehold character could have occurred until the repeal of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, which took place on August 29, 1945. That is, after that date, it was possible to enter into possession of those lands as an owner. However, on that date, the lands within the two-thousand-meter zone on both sides of the [[Dirección7]] of the remainder of the route yet to be built that have oak trees were declared Parque Nacional. The Parque Nacional category was maintained until the Ley de Tierras y Colonización entered into force, in which the lands located in that sector that had oak trees were declared public domain. The foregoing means that during the period in which that area, within which the property to be titled is located, constituted a parque nacional, given its absolute protection, no agrarian possessory acts could have been exercised until the effective date of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización No. 2825 of October 14, 1961. After that date, the parque nacional category changed, allowing those lands to be possessed for a ten-year period until the Reserva Forestal Los Santos was created by Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 5389-A of October 28, 1975, a situation that occurred in this case, according to the analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence provided to the proceeding. Certainly, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización declared those areas public domain, excepting those that were under private domain, as occurs in this case; in addition, it made such declaration through a subsection that has since been repealed. Consequently, the reasoning of the State representative is not shared.” (Tribunal Agrario, No. 306-F-10, of 8:40 a.m. on April 9, 2010). In another ruling, the following was stated: “V.- In this proceeding, likewise, the witnesses [[Nombre9]] (folio 189), [[Nombre10]] (folio 190), and [[Nombre1]] (folio 192), attest not only to the chain of transferors but also to the ten-year possession prior to 1964; the witnesses even state that they have known the farm since 1950 and 1951, respectively. This satisfies the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, by demonstrating ten-year possession prior to the creation of the Reserva Forestal Río Macho, and that the forest resource has been protected. Consequently, the judgment must be confirmed.” (Tribunal Agrario, No. 1054-F-10 of 1:46 p.m. on November 3, 2010).

VI.- In addition to the foregoing, this Tribunal must indicate that the Procuraduría General de la República challenged, through an unconstitutionality action (Expediente No. EXPN1- ), the jurisprudential line of this Tribunal interpreting that, with proof of ten-year possession prior to the creation of the respective protected area, pursuant to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, it is possible to authorize the titling of the property. Said action was declared WITHOUT MERIT, by majority ruling number 001142/2017 at eleven hours twenty minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand seventeen (see in particular the additional reasons of Justice Fernando Castillo Víquez, concurring with the majority ruling, where he indicates the technical and social criteria that prevailed in the legislature to declassify those areas). On the other hand, the State representative, the Deputy Procuradora, had the possibility of opposing within this non-contentious jurisdiction proceeding, under the terms provided in Article 5 of the Law (within one month following the date of notification); however, by not opposing, she opened the possibility for the title applicant to demonstrate the ten-year possession (prior to the creation of the protected area) in the non-contentious venue. Conversely, had she opposed in a timely manner, it would be the interested party who must sue the State, in the corresponding venue, in defense of their right. Note even that in the brief of April 10, 2013 (document filed on October 22, 2015), she stated the following: “In that proceeding, I request to corroborate the conservation of the forest cover (cobertura forestal) in the area adjacent to the spring (naciente), the [[Dirección8]] stream (quebrada) (Article 33, subsections a) and b) of the Ley Forestal, and sections 148, 149, and 151 of the Ley de Aguas), to accredit the exercise of protective possession of the natural resources that must be carried out in protected wild areas (Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Which was effectively corroborated, as is evident from the proven facts of the judgment being appealed (judicial inspection of September 10, 2013), during the judicial inspection of the property where the conservation of the forest was verified.

VII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appropriate course is to confirm, in the appealed aspects, the appealed judgment; however, it is important to add that in the future (for purposes of the enforcement of the judgment), it must be added that the title applicant must comply with all recommendations of INTA, according to the soil study, in the sense that they must “Maintain the primary forest zones, not carry out any commercial forest exploitation activity, conserve the river protection zone and maintain the forest cover (cobertura forestal) at the stream (quebrada). In the reforested protection sector of the spring (naciente), maintain the trees (clearing, ring weeding, fertilizing) and in case of death, replant and conserve the zone. In the case of the sector in natural pasture, it is suitable for the activity, but maintain a low animal load, and in the case of the sector used for tourism, maintain the soil with vegetative cover (cobertura vegetal) to adequately conserve it.”

“II.- La representante del Estado, Susana Fallas Cubero, se muestra inconforme con la sentencia de aprobación de la información posesoria., al considerar que el inmueble está en la franja de dos kilómetros contigua a la carretera interamericana, cuya afectación considera previa a la Reserva Forestal Río Macho. 1) A su juicio, la testimonial resulta insuficiente para demostrar el ejercicio de la posesión decenal con anterioridad a la vigencia de Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, No. 13 del 10 de enero de 1939, que estableció en su artículo seis que no pueden enajenarse baldíos situados en una zona de 2000 metros de ancho a cada lado del trazado de la carretera panamericana, y luego en 1945, incluyó el resto del trazado que contuvieran robles. Si bien es cierto, la norma fue derogada el 9 de noviembre de 1973, mediante Ley No. 5385 del 30 de octubre de 1973, años antes de esa derogatoria había sido creada la Reserva Forestal Río Macho (Decreto No. 1-A-del 23 de enero de 1964, vigente desde el 4 de febrero de 1964). Subraya que la Sala Constitucional en votos 98-2015, considerando VI y 18836-2014, ha indicado una afectación al dominio público a partir de la Ley No. 2528. Lo cual, además considera ha sido el criterio el Tribunal Agrario en algunos votos, entre otros el No. 533-F.-13, 623-F-11 y 649-F-12. Además considera que el Derecho derogado supervive para hechos o situaciones acontecidos bajo su vigencia (Sala Constitucional No. 18840-2014, entre otras). La sentencia reconoce una posesión decenal previa a dicha Reserva desde los años 1948, 1949 y 1950-1953, período para el cual el terreno con cobertura de robledales, ya estaba afecto como Parque Nacional entre 1945 y 1973. Además, considera que los deponentes no coinciden con lo indicado en el testimonio de escritura No. 3751, según el cual [[Nombre1]] adquirió de [[Nombre2]] y no indicaron el tiempo de posesión, debiendo existir coherencia entre los mismos. Solicita se revoque el fallo y se rechace la titulación.

III.- En primer lugar, debe recordarse a la recurrente que en materia agraria rige el principio de libre apreciación probatoria (artículo 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), lo que permite a los juzgadores dar las razones de lógica, experiencia y sentido común, en lo referente a la apreciación de la prueba testimonial. Sobre dicho sistema de valoración, este Tribunal ha indicado reiteradamente: El Juez debe tener amplios poderes para apreciar y valorar la prueba recibida. La libre apreciación judicial de la prueba responde al principio oficioso, que le otorga amplia iniciativa al juzgador en materia de pruebas. Tanto en el proceso laboral, como en el “agrario”, inspirado en aquél, nuestro legislador previó el sistema de libre valoración probatoria. No se trata de valoración arbitraria, y tampoco valoración “en conciencia”. Es un sistema completamente apegado a las reglas del ordenamiento jurídico, que garantizan la posibilidad al juzgador de fundamentar sus sentencias en principios de derecho y de equidad. El Juez agrario no está sujeto o constreñido al valor pre-determinado que le confiere la ley procesal común (CPC) a determinado tipo de prueba. Por ejemplo la confesión es plena prueba contra quien la dice; o la demostración de contratos verbales hasta cierto límite económico. Esos criterios, propios del proceso civil, vendrían a limitar las facultades del juez agrario, e impedirían, notablemente, una correcta administración de justicia agraria. La facultad de libre apreciación probatoria, está expresamente concedida por la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, en su artículo 54, al indicar en su segundo párrafo: “Al resolver sobre el fondo del negocio, el juez apreciará la prueba a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas del derecho común, pero, en todo caso, al analizar el resultado de la prueba recogida en el proceso, deberá expresar los principios de equidad o de derecho en que basa su criterio.” Es una facultad que desarrolla el Juez Agrario al momento de dictar la sentencia (Tribunal Agrario No. 31 de las 9:40 horas del 21 de enero de 1999 y No. 1018 de las 13 horas del 7 de diciembre del 2005). Por su importancia, se transcribe una sentencia reciente de la Sala Constitucional sobre este principio, pilar del derecho procesal agrario costarricense: “ I.- En relación con la valoración “a conciencia” de la prueba. El accionante cuestiona la constitucionalidad del párrafo segundo del artículo 54 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, en el tanto permite al juez valorar la prueba en conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a normas del derecho común, lo que considera violatorio de los principios de legalidad, igualdad, debido proceso, justicia pronta (arts. 11, 33, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política ) y el art. 154 de la Constitución Política. …De esta manera, lejos de afectar un derecho constitucional, establece un presupuesto procesal formal para garantizar precisamente el debido proceso: el de fundamentar la apreciación de la prueba que permitirá al eventual agraviado su defensa en relación con lo que es objeto de su perjuicio y al órgano superior hacer un examen justo de los autos que sean elevados a su conocimiento. Asimismo, cabe señalar que este principio es una manifestación de la aplicación del principio protector que rige la jurisdicción laboral, y que se concreta en el principio “in dubio pro operario”, que se justifica en virtud de la desigualdad básica que se da entre las partes -patrono/trabajador-, no sólo por la relación de subordinación en que se halla el trabajador, sino, fundamentalmente por las natural disponibilidad de los medios de prueba que tiene el empleador, la cual contrasta sensiblemente con la dificultad del empleado en este aspecto. Debe hacerse la advertencia que lo que sí resulta contrario al orden constitucional es el fallar en conciencia y con total prescindencia de los demás elementos de convicción, tal y como lo señaló esta Sala en sentencia de constitucionalidad número 5546-95, de las quince horas seis minutos del once de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. Con fundamento en lo anterior, es que procede interpretar la norma en cuestión de tal manera que no resulta inconstitucional la facultad de los jueces laborales de apreciar la prueba en conciencia, siempre y cuando se dicte un fallo fundamentado, en aplicación de las regias de la sana crítica y razonabilidad. Por tanto: Se declara sin lugar la acción".:. (sentencia No. 4448-96 de las 9:00 horas del 30 de agosto de 1996). Consecuente con la jurisprudencia transcrita, no resulta inconstitucional el poder otorgado al juez agrario para apreciar en conciencia la prueba y valorarla sin sujeción estricta a las normas del derecho común según lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 54 impugnado, siempre y cuando dicte un fallo fundamentado, es decir analice el resultado de la prueba recogida en el proceso y exprese los principios de equidad o de derecho en que basa su criterio, respetando de tal modo los contenidos mínimos del derecho de defensa . De ahí que procede rechazar por el fondo la acción en cuanto a este extremo…."El principio de igualdad, contenido en el Artículo 33 de la Constitución Política, implica que en todos los casos, se deba dar un trato igual prescindiendo de los posibles elementos diferenciadores de relevancia jurídica, que pueda existir; o lo que es lo mismo, no toda desigualdad constituye necesariamente una discriminación. La igualdad, como lo ha dicho esta Sala, sólo es violada cuando la igualdad está desprovista de una justificación objetiva y razonable. Pero además, la causa de justificación del acto considerado desigual, debe ser evaluada en relación con la finalidad y sus efectos, de tal forma que deba existir, necesariamente, una relación razonable de proporcionalidad entre los medios empleados y la finalidad propiamente dicha. Es decir, que la igualdad debe entenderse en función de las circunstancias que ocurren en cada supuesto concreto en el que se invoca, de tal forma que la aplicación universal, no prohíbe que se contemplen soluciones distintas ante situaciones distintas, con tratamiento diverso. Todo lo expresado quiere decir, que la igualdad ante la ley no puede implicar una igualdad material o igualdad económica real y efectiva." (Sentencia número 1770-94, y en igual sentido, la número 1045-94.)” Consecuente con la jurisprudencia constitucional transcrita y dadas las características propias del derecho procesal agrario, resulta plenamente válido la implementación del método de valoración de la prueba en conciencia para los casos que regula el artículo 54 párrafo segundo de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria cuestionado, por lo que no se evidencia violación alguna al principio de igualdad. Cada clase de proceso judicial –civil, penal, laboral, agrario, etc.- tiene, en razón de su naturaleza específica, características diferentes que obligan al legislador a crear normas y procedimientos que se ajusten a esa especial naturaleza y que al mismo tiempo, garanticen y protejan los derechos fundamentales de las distintas partes procesales. De ahí que aspectos como la valoración de la prueba, pueden variar de uno a otro proceso, sin que ello resulte lesivo a los principios del debido proceso. En razón de lo anterior debe desestimarse la acción en este sentido, y esta Sala no encuentra motivos para variar de criterio, ni razones de interés público que justifiquen reconsiderar la cuestión, por lo que la acción debe ser rechazada por el fondo.”(Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 3657 del 7 de mayo del 2003) IV.- Por otra parte, en relación a los criterios de valoración de la prueba testimonial, el mismo sistema de libre apreciación probatoria de la jurisdicción agraria, implica que debe analizarse cada caso concreto de acuerdo a las circunstancias. Por ende, no puede aplicarse una misma regla o solución a todos los casos, como lo pretende la representante de la Procuraduría General de la República. En este caso concreto, el Tribunal en pleno considera que la prueba testimonial, en cuanto al tiempo de la posesión del titulante y su anterior transmitente, ha sido bien apreciada, y así se plasma en el razonamiento vertido por el a-quo en el considerando cuarto, donde analiza, uno a uno los testigos propuestos para demostrar la posesión decenal anterior a la creación de la reserva de [Dirección1] Macho (Decreto No. 1-A-del 23 de enero de 1964, vigente desde el 4 de febrero de 1964), pues los testigos declararon una posesión anterior a 1950. En la especie, es importante considerar no solamente la declaración de los testigos, sino también verificar otras circunstancias para determinar si el inmueble acusa o no una larga posesión.

V.- En cuanto al primer agravio, relacionado con los robledales, este Tribunal ha indicado en forma reiterada lo siguiente: El agravio relativo a la afectación de los [[Nombre3]] , tampoco es de recibo porque pretende la Procuradora aplicar una Ley o norma derogada desde 1973. La apelante no considera, como bien lo hacer ver la a-quo, que la Ley Forestal de 1996, permite la titulación de las áreas silvestres protegidas, siempre y cuando se demuestre una posesión decenal anterior a su respectiva Ley o Decreto de creación. En este caso, en consecuencia, debe prevalecer el criterio de la posesión decenal anterior a la creación de la Reserva Forestal de Río Macho creada por Decreto en 1964 y si está demostrada esa posesión desde 1950, ello es suficiente para autorizar la titulación, el primer poseedor fue [[Nombre4]] , luego la pasó a su hijo [[Nombre1]] , luego de [[Nombre5]] , quien ha reforestado, (escuchar declaraciones testimoniales documento incorporado el 11/08/2016 a las 08:12:25 a.m., en particular), [[Nombre6]] quienes dan fe de una actividad agroambiental sostenible y manifestó conocer la finca desde 1948 y los sucesivos poseedores. El testigo [[Nombre7]] , dice conocer la finca hacía 50 años, nació en 1941 y la conoció como en el año 54 (aclara que desde que tenía 9 años la conoce y actualmente tiene 73 años), cuando era de [[Nombre4]] , luego de [[Nombre1]] , quien era el hijo, luego se la vendió a don [[Nombre5]] , indicó que trabaja en trucha, algunas vaquitas "para el gasto", y ha conservado el bosque. El testigo [[Nombre8]] , quien manifestó tener 69 años de edad y conocer la finca toda la vida, le pertenecía a [[Nombre4]] , luego se la pasó a [[Nombre1]] y éste a [[Nombre5]] . Como puede verse, todos los testimonios son coincidentes con el tracto sucesivo respecto al inmueble, desde aproximadamente el año 1950. Además, dan fe de la conservación del bosque, cumpliendo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Así lo ha resuelto el Tribunal en reiteradas ocasiones: "...En este caso, tanto la testimonial como la documental hacen alusión a un época anterior al año 1965. No obstante, la representante del Estado alega la afectación al dominio público es anterior a esa fecha, puesto que se trata de un inmueble que tiene robles y que se localiza en una zona de [[Dirección2]] a ambos lados del trazado de la [[Dirección3]] , tal y como lo disponía el inciso a) del artículo 7º de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, derogado el 9 de noviembre de 1973 mediante Ley Nº 5385 de 30 de octubre de 1973, sin embargo, señala, dos años después se creó la Reserva Forestal Los Santos, mediante Decreto Nº 5389-A del 28 de octubre de 1975. Inclusive, cita normativa anterior a esa que imponía limitaciones a ese sector. Al respecto, estima el Tribunal que al entrar en vigencia el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias que permite la titulación de inmuebles con bosque ubicados dentro de áreas protegidas, se dió una desafectación al dominio público, debiéndose acreditar una posesión decenal anterior a la vigencia de la ley o decreto que creó el área protegida. Esa posesión, evidentemente, debió ser ejercida a título de dueño, es decir, situación que en criterio de la recurrente no se dio debido a que conforme a los artículos 6 y 62 de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos Nº 13 de 10 de enero de 1939 -ya derogada- la posesión de esa área pudo haberse ejercido sólo por medio de un contrato de arrendamiento. Esas normas disponían: "No podrán enajenarse baldíos situados en una zona ... de 2000 metros de ancho a cada lado del cazado de la [[Dirección4]] ."; y: "El Poder Ejecutivo podrá dar en arrendamiento mediante contrato y por un plazo de cuatro años, prorrogable a voluntad de las partes, las fajas de terreno de que se habla en el artículo 6º en una extensión no mayor de doscientos cincuenta hectáreas, si se dedican a la cría o engorde de ganado, y no mayor de ciento veinticinco hectáreas, sí se destinan a cultivos agrícolas... ". Agrega, la Ley Nº 197 de 29 de agosto de 1945 reformó la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos adicionando el elemento de los robles, declarando Parque Nacional los terrenos comprendidos en la zona de dos mil metros a ambos lados de la [[Dirección5]] del resto del trazado por construir que tengan robles. De acuerdo a la relación de normas citada, la posesión en carácter de arrendamiento pudo haberse dado hasta la derogatoria de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, lo cual aconteció el 29 de agosto de 1945. Es decir, después de esa fecha, sí se pudo haber entrado a poseer esos terrenos en el carácter de dueño. Ahora bien, en esa fecha se declaró Parque Nacional a los terrenos comprendidos en la zona de [[Dirección6]] a ambos lados de la [[Dirección7]] del resto del trazado por construir que tengan robles. La categoría de Parque Nacional se mantuvo hasta que entró en vigencia la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, en la que se declaró a los terrenos ubicados en ese sector y que tuvieran robles, como de dominio público. Lo anterior significa que durante el período durante el cual esa área, dentro de la que está comprendido el inmueble a titular, constituyó parque nacional, dada su protección absoluta, no pudieron ejercerse actos posesorios agrarios hasta la vigencia de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización Nº 2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961. Después de esa fecha, la categoría de parque nacional varió, pudiendo poseerse esos terrenos en forma decenal hasta que se creó la Reserva Forestal Los Santos, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 5389-A del 28 de octubre de 1975, situación que se dio en este caso, según el análisis que se hiciera de la prueba testimonial y documental aportada al proceso. Ciertamente, la Ley de Tierras y Colonización declaró de dominio público esas áreas, haciendo la salvedad de aquellas que estuvieran bajo dominio privado, como sucede en este caso; aunado a ello, tal declaratoria la hizo mediante un inciso que ya fue derogado. En consecuencia, no se comparten los razonamientos de la representante del Estado.­ (Tribunal Agrario, No. 306-F-10 de las 8:40 del 13 de abril del 2010, entre otros. Además, 774-F-13, 533-F-13, 1015-F-12, 804-F-13). En un caso similar al que ahora nos ocupa, este Tribunal, en una resolución reciente, señaló respecto de los reparos de la Procuraduría, lo siguiente: "En este caso, tanto la testimonial como la documental hacen alusión a un época anterior al año 1965. No obstante, la representante del Estado alega la afectación al dominio público es anterior a esa fecha, puesto que se trata de un inmueble que tiene robles y que se localiza en una zona de [[Dirección6]] a ambos lados del trazado de la [[Dirección3]] , tal y como lo disponía el inciso a) del artículo 7º de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, derogado el 9 de noviembre de 1973 mediante Ley Nº 5385 de 30 de octubre de 1973, sin embargo, señala, dos años después se creó la Reserva Forestal Los Santos, mediante Decreto Nº 5389-A del 28 de octubre de 1975. Inclusive, cita normativa anterior a esa que imponía limitaciones a ese sector. Al respecto, estima el Tribunal que al entrar en vigencia el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias que permite la titulación de inmuebles con bosque ubicados dentro de áreas protegidas, se dio una desafectación al dominio público, debiéndose acreditar una posesión decenal anterior a la vigencia de la ley o decreto que creó el área protegida. Esa posesión, evidentemente, debió ser ejercida a título de dueño, es decir, situación que en criterio de la recurrente no se dio debido a que conforme a los artículos 6 y 62 de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos Nº 13 de 10 de enero de 1939 -ya derogada- la posesión de esa área pudo haberse ejercido sólo por medio de un contrato de arrendamiento. Esas normas disponían: "No podrán enajenarse baldíos situados en una zona ... de 2000 metros de ancho a cada lado del cazado de la [[Dirección4]] ."; y: "El Poder Ejecutivo podrá dar en arrendamiento mediante contrato y por un plazo de cuatro años, prorrogable a voluntad de las partes, las fajas de terreno de que se habla en el artículo 6º en una extensión no mayor de doscientos cincuenta hectáreas, si se dedican a la cría o engorde de ganado, y no mayor de ciento veinticinco hectáreas, sí se destinan a cultivos agrícolas... ". Agrega, la Ley Nº 197 de 29 de agosto de 1945 reformó la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos adicionando el elemento de los robles, declarando Parque Nacional los terrenos comprendidos en la zona de dos mil metros a ambos lados de la [[Dirección5]] del resto del trazado por construir que tengan robles. De acuerdo a la relación de normas citada, la posesión en carácter de arrendamiento pudo haberse dado hasta la derogatoria de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, lo cual aconteció el 29 de agosto de 1945. Es decir, después de esa fecha, sí se pudo haber entrado a poseer esos terrenos en el carácter de dueño. Ahora bien, en esa fecha se declaró Parque Nacional a los terrenos comprendidos en la zona de dos mil metros a ambos lados de la [[Dirección7]] del resto del trazado por construir que tengan robles. La categoría de Parque Nacional se mantuvo hasta que entró en vigencia la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, en la que se declaró a los terrenos ubicados en ese sector y que tuvieran robles, como de dominio público. Lo anterior significa que durante el período durante el cual esa área, dentro de la que está comprendido el inmueble a titular, constituyó parque nacional, dada su protección absoluta, no pudieron ejercerse actos posesorios agrarios hasta la vigencia de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización Nº 2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961. Después de esa fecha, la categoría de parque nacional varió, pudiendo poseerse esos terrenos en forma decenal hasta que se creó la Reserva Forestal Los Santos, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 5389-A del 28 de octubre de 1975, situación que se dio en este caso, según el análisis que se hiciera de la prueba testimonial y documental aportada al proceso. Ciertamente, la Ley de Tierras y Colonización declaró de dominio público esas áreas, haciendo la salvedad de aquellas que estuvieran bajo dominio privado, como sucede en este caso; aunado a ello, tal declaratoria la hizo mediante un inciso que ya fue derogado. En consecuencia, no se comparten los razonamientos de la representante del Estado.­" (Tribunal Agrario, No. 306-F-10, de las 8:40 horas del 9 de abril del 2010). En otro voto, se señaló lo siguiente: "V.- En este proceso, de igual manera, los testigos [[Nombre9]] (folio 189), [[Nombre10]] (folio 190) e [[Nombre1]] (folio 192), dan fe, no solamente de la cadena de transmitentes, sino también de la posesión decenal anterior a 1964, incluso los testigos se refieren a que conocen la finca desde los años 1950 y 1951, respectivamente. Con ello se cumple lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, al demostrarse una posesión decenal anterior a la creación de la Reserva Forestal Río Macho, y haberse protegido el recurso forestal. En consecuencia, deberá confirmarse el fallo". (Tribunal Agrario, No. 1054-F-10 de las 13:46 del 3 de noviembre del 2010).

VI.- Aunado a lo anterior, debe indicarse por parte de este Tribunal, que la Procuraduría General de la República, impugnó mediante acción de inconstitucionalidad (Expediente No. EXPN1- ), la linea jurisprudencial de este Tribunal que interpreta que con la prueba de la posesión decenal anterior a la creación de la respectiva área protegida, de acuerdo al artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), es posible autorizar la titulación del bien. Dicha acción fue declarada SIN LUGAR, por voto de mayoría, número 001142/2017 de las once horas veinte minutos del veinticinco de enero del dos mil diecisiete (véase en particular las razones adicionales del Magistrado Fernando Castillo Víquez, al voto de mayoría, en donde indica los criterios técnicos y sociales que privaron en el legislador, para desafectar esas áreas). Por otra parte, la representante del Estado, Procuradora Adjunta, tenía la posibilidad de oponerse en este proceso de jurisdicción no contenciosa, en los términos previstos en el artículo 5 de la Ley (dentro del mes siguiente a la fecha de notificación), sin embargo, al no oponerse le abre la posibilidad al titulante el hecho de poder demostrar la posesión decenal (anterior a la creación del área protegida), en la vía no contenciosa. Por el contrario, si se hubiera opuesto en tiempo, sería la parte interesada la que deba demandar al Estado, en la vía correspondiente, en defensa de su derecho. Véase incluso, que en el memorial del 10 de abril del 2013 (documento asociado el 22 de octubre del 2015), señaló lo siguiente: "En esa diligencia solicito corroborar la conservación de la cobertura forestal en el área contigua a la naciente, el [[Dirección8]] quebrada (artículo 33, incisos a) y b) de la Ley Forestal, y numerales 148, 149 y 151 de la Ley de Aguas), para acreditar el ejercicio de la posesión protectora de los recursos naturales que debe realizarse en las áreas silvestres protegidas (artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Lo cual fue efectivamente corroborado, según se desprende de los hechos probados de la sentencia vendida en alzada (reconocimiento judicial del 10 de setiembre del 2013), en la Inspección judicial del inmueble donde se constata la conservación del bosque.

VII.- En virtud de lo expuesto, lo procedente es confirmar, en lo apelado, la sentencia recurrida, sin embargo, es importante adicionar que en el futuro, (para efectos de la ejecutoria de la sentencia), debe adicionarse que el titulante debe acatar todas las recomendaciones del INTA, según el estudio de suelos, en el sentido de que debe "Mantener las zonas de bosque primario no realizar ninguna actividad de explotación forestal comercial, conservar la zona de protección del río y a la quebrada mantener la cobertura forestal. El sector reforestado de protección de la naciente dar mantenimiento a los árboles (chapea, rodajea, abono) y en caso de muerte replantar y conservar la zona. En caso del sector en pasto natural es adecuado para la actividad, pero mantener una baja carga animal y en caso del sector utilizado para turismo mantener el suelo con cobertura vegetal para conservarlo adecuadamente".”