Criminal Cassation: Notary Public Is Not a Public Official for Aggravated Ideological FalsehoodCasación penal: notario público no es funcionario público para agravante de falsedad ideológica

II.- Appeal of cassation filed by attorney Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In the first ground, based on articles 437, 439 and 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant alleges the existence of contradictory precedents between what was decided by the Appellate Court that issued the judgment now challenged, in relation to judgment number 2014-236 of that same court and the judgments of this Criminal Cassation Chamber numbers 475-F-93, 2004-1046 and 228-2012. He explains that in the cited case law it has been interpreted that for the purposes of the crime of ideological falsehood committed by a notary public in the exercise of their functions, they must be considered as public officials, and in that sense the aggravating circumstance provided for in article 366 in relation to article 367 of the Penal Code is applicable to them. However, on this occasion the appellate judges decided to change their criterion and stated so in the judgment, resolving that from that moment on they depart from that position and henceforth will not equate the notary public to a public official, applying the simple modality of the crime of ideological falsehood. He points out that given identical factual scenarios, both the Cassation Chamber and the Appellate Court itself have held that the status of the active subject does not constitute the simple criminal type of ideological falsehood but rather the aggravated one, by considering that the notary public is a public official liable in criminal proceedings for crimes committed in the abusive exercise of their functions. He concludes that this position caused harm to the prosecuting entity by illegitimately rejecting its punitive claim. He requests that the ground be declared with merit, that the challenged judgment be declared ineffective, solely with regard to the reclassification ordered, because it contradicts the jurisprudential precedents that the same Appellate Court and the Third Chamber have maintained regarding the classification that must be given in cases such as the present one, unifying the criterion establishing that for criminal purposes the Notary Public must be considered a public official, and that the judgment of the Trial Court be maintained insofar as it convicted the accused for the accused acts constituting the crimes of aggravated ideological falsehood. He indicates that, this is without prejudice to also leaving unscathed the remand ordered to the Trial Court in the challenged vote, considering in an unchallenged part the penalty of three years set for each crime to be unfounded. His second claim is based on articles 437, 439 and 468 subsection b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He alleges erroneous application and non-observance of substantive norms, specifically articles 366 and 367 of the Penal Code. He indicates that the Appellate Court made the error of classifying the crime in its simple modality and not aggravated as was proper, which influences the amount of the penalty. In support of his claim, the prosecutor cites the facts held as proven, and points out that they constitute the crime of aggravated ideological falsehood because the accused at the time of committing the unlawful act acted in her condition as a notary public, as was charged. He adds that, for criminal purposes, what matters for equating a notary with a public official is that the function the notary uses to commit the unlawful act is a public function. He submits that according to article 1 of the Notarial Code, the notarial profession “is the public function exercised privately.” In this sense, the appellant considers that: “A harmonious interpretation of article 367 of the Penal Code in relation to the last paragraph of article 366 of the same body of laws, in accordance with article 1 of the Notarial Code, allows concluding that, in the exercise of notarial functions, for the criminal sphere, the notary must be considered a public official and consequently the described aggravating circumstance must be applied to them.” (cf., folio 1715). He affirms that in order to consider the notary a public official, one must refer to the function they perform, not to other circumstances such as permanence in a public institution and salary dependence. He states that, however, the ad quem considered the independence of the notary at the time of exercising their functions privately and the fact that they have no direct link with the public administration. On the other hand, he points out that the appellate judges also argued that a differentiation had to be made between public function and public official, since for the aggravated criminal type, what matters is that the active agent be a public official, not that they exercise the public function. He argues that this argument is wrong because the criminal type (last paragraph of 366) aggravates the conduct when the subject commits the unlawful act abusing their functions, since no public official commits a crime as part of their duties. He concludes that the judgment causes him harm because the erroneous classification also affects the imposition of the penalty, which prejudices the punitive claim of the prosecuting entity. He requests that the ground be declared with merit, that the challenged judgment be declared ineffective, solely with regard to the reclassification ordered, because it is not consistent with the proven facts, and that the judgment of the trial court be maintained, regarding the legal classification of said facts as constituting the crime of aggravated ideological falsehood. He indicates that, this is without prejudice to also leaving unscathed the remand ordered to the Trial Court in the challenged vote, considering, in an unchallenged part, the penalty of three years set for each crime to be unfounded. Given the connectedness between the claims, they are hereby resolved jointly. The grounds are declared without merit. The discussion focuses on whether the aggravating circumstance contained in the second paragraph of article 366 of the Penal Code, in relation to article 367 of that same normative body, is applicable to the notary public who, in the exercise of their functions, incurs the crime of ideological falsehood. For this purpose, it is necessary to set forth the criterion assumed in the present matter by the Sentencing Appellate Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in resolution No. 2015-1075 (a thesis different from that adopted by that same Court –with a partially different integration– in judgment No. 2014-0236), as well as to make known the position adopted by this Criminal Cassation Chamber in various precedents. Subsequently, the position recently assumed by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment 2017-08043, of 11:50 hours, of May 26, 2017, will be presented. Finally, the arguments that lead this Chamber to declare without merit the first two grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office will be presented. A. Reasoning employed by the Appellate Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the specific case. Given the significance of the issue, this Chamber proceeds to transcribe what was indicated by the Appellate Court in judgment No. 2015-1075. In this regard, in said resolution it was stated: “…in this matter, the lower Court considered that the crime of aggravated ideological falsehood was configured, that is, that provided for in the second paragraph of article 366 (by remission of 367, both of the Penal Code)…” ( ) “…For those purposes, it is necessary to distinguish between public official and public function. Not all public officials display a public function in the strict sense nor do all those who display a public function are public officials…” ( ) “…On this topic, there have been several doctrinal pronouncements, and some jurisprudential ones, that make the differentiation. Thus, for example, INFANTE MELÉNDEZ, Gustavo Adolfo ("Legal nature of the Costa Rican notarial profession." In: Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas, No. 106, 2005, pp. 175-196. U.C.R. Available on the website: revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/juridicas/article/viewFile/13332/12603) and CHAVARRÍA ARIAS, María del Pilar ("Nature of the Public Notariat. Is it a public official or not?" In: Revista Rhombus, volume 3, No. 8, January-April 2007. Available at: www.ulacit.ac.cr/files/careers/29_chavarriaarias.pdf, both texts captured on July 27, 2015) based on HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén and SALAS MARRERO, Oscar. Notes on Notarial Law. Law degree thesis, University of Costa Rica, San José, 1971), provide a recount of the different theses that, regarding the notarial function, exist, to wit: the functionalist thesis (according to which the notarial function is a public function exercised by the notary as an independent public official, remunerated by private individuals. Within this current there are three tendencies regarding the placement of the notarial function: as part of the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch, or as an autonomous activity); the professionalist thesis (maintains that both the service provided and the subject who provides it have a professional character; the notary's function is not public, but technical-professional) and the eclectic thesis (which, although it accepts that the notary is a private professional and not a salaried public official, displays a public function). From them arise, in consideration of the notary, the notarialist doctrine (which qualifies the notary as a public official) and the administrativist doctrine that follows the functionalist thesis and maintains that it is possible for a private exercise of public functions to occur. This last thesis (following ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Thesis on Administrative Law, San José, volume I, editorial Stradtmann, 1st. edition, 1998, p. 387), considers that the legal nature of the notary public is that of a "Munera Pubblica" that is, in the words of the last cited author, a "...private individual who exercises public functions or provides public services is not a public official or a public organ, but precisely a private individual foreign to the public organization." The difference between a "munera pubblica" and a de facto official is that, while both provide a public service, the former does so in their own name and on their own account, while the latter, according to the terms established by article 111 of the General Law on Public Administration, does so in the name and on behalf of the Public Administration. For the aforementioned authors, if this article defines public servant, official or public employee (sic) as "...the person who provides services to the Administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence and of an imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent or public nature" it is clear that the notary lacks said character, because, regarding them, conditions such as representativeness (the notary does not represent the Public Administration, to the point that it is not jointly and severally liable with them in the exercise of their office, as happens with public servants), authority (unlike the official, the notary does not impose mandates but rather records the will requested by those who ask them), remuneration (they do not belong to the public employment regime but receive fees from the parties), designation (they are not appointed or elected, but authorized), etc., do not occur. Furthermore, INFANTE and CHAVARRÍA consider it a contradiction that they be deemed a public official if, at the same time, Directive No. 004-2000 of the National Directorate of Notaries of July 20, 2000, and its subsequent modification through the General Guidelines for the Provision and Control of the Notarial Exercise and Service, state that a notary public must have an open office and cannot be a public official. The position of these authors appears consistent with the Legal System since, even, more recently enacted laws, which expand the definition of public official (which is, then, a normative element of a legal type) contained in the General Law on Public Administration, such as, for example, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, No. 8422…” ( ) “…Additionally, that exclusion of the 'notary public' as a 'public official' seems to be endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber, through vote number 1749-2001 (regarding an unconstitutionality action against articles 22 and 25 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, articles that prohibit public officials from practicing liberal professions if they obtain money due to prohibition) which stated that "...the nature of the notarial function (...) the Chamber understands as the private exercise of a public function (...) It is a function exercised by delegation and with State supervision" and, in vote number 1483-2001 (amparo action by a group of notaries against the Directorate that regulates them) in which it referred to "...a conflict between being a public official and simultaneously exercising ANOTHER FUNCTION—which is also public—such as that of the notariat." On the other hand, the Contentious-Administrative Court, First Section, in vote number 293-2001 has stated that "The notariat is the private exercise of the public function, therefore notaries are not public officials, although they do have a special relationship of subjection for this reason." Thus, if a restrictive interpretation governs in Criminal Law (article 2 of the Penal Code) derived from the pro libertates principle and if, from the foregoing, it is possible to derive that, depending on the theoretical position assumed, it may be considered that the notary public is, or is not, a public official, one must adhere to the most limited thesis which, in any case, involves excluding them from said consideration, since, although they perform a public function, they do not have the benefits of being a public official to the point that they are even penalized for being one. The Legal System is based on Hermetic Fullness (article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch), that is, on its own coherence, so it is not conceivable that, for some purposes (labor, sanctioning, to eliminate the joint and several liability of the State, etc.) they are excluded from said condition, but they are taken into account to repress them criminally. For the foregoing, in the criterion of this Chamber, it is not possible to apply to notaries public the second paragraph of article 366 of the Penal Code for purposes of increasing their penalty for inserting false data into a public or authentic document or falsifying a document. Thus, the position that, without greater elucubration, may have been maintained in previous occasions is expressly modified, and the quick reference on the subject made by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in vote number 475-F-93 is not endorsed. For example, in vote number 2014-236 —K. Jiménez, R. Chinchilla and J. Arce— in which it was said:…( ) “…it must be distinguished that although there is no doubt that the exercise of the profession of lawyer and notary is carried out in a liberal and private manner, the law warns that whoever performs it acquires the condition of 'public official,' in this case of 'public attestor,' it being irrelevant whether that person is linked to the public service or whether there exists a hierarchical relationship with the Public Administration or the Civil Service that determines their quality as a 'public servant.' This, because, by its nature, the notary performs a task that is essentially public, regardless of whether they are part of the Public Administration…” ( ) “…Consequently, it is appropriate to revoke the judgment on this point and reclassify the facts, from this venue, as a simple ideological falsehood, without aggravating circumstance, that is, governed by the first paragraph of article 366 of the Penal Code (by remission of article 367 ibidem), which punishes the conduct with a penalty of one to six years imprisonment…” (cf., folios 1672 vto to 1675 fte, the bold and underlining are from the original). B. Precedents of the Criminal Cassation Chamber. In resolution No. 475-F-93, of 08:50 hours, of August 27, 1993, the Magistrates of the Third Chamber who integrated it on that occasion, considered that, because the accused was a notary, the crime of ideological falsehood was aggravated, however, since only the accused's appeal was heard, the principle of no reform in detriment was applicable. In this sense, they noted: “…it must be pointed out that contrary to what the sentenced person claims, in reality the conditions for considering that we are in the presence of the aggravation do indeed occur in this case. Upon having it proven that the accused is a lawyer and notary public, and that using his condition as a Notary Public, according to the title that accredited him as such, using the protocol granted to him for that reason by the Supreme Court of Justice, even assuming he was suspended at the time of his actions, he executed several deeds of false content, it is clear that the accused acted using his condition as a public official and the instruments that he had for this purpose by holding the status of notary public. In reality, it must be indicated that when the law states that falsification is aggravated when whoever performs it is a public official acting in the exercise of their functions, it is not actually trying to indicate that the crime is part of the exercise of their functions in the strict sense. No public official has among their duties the commission of criminal acts, and to that extent practically no crime could be understood as committed in the exercise of public functions, since all crimes are outside the exercise of public functions. In reality, what that phrase has sought to indicate is that the act be committed by the public official on the occasion of the exercise of their functions, or using their condition as a public official, but it could never be affirmed in the strict sense that it must be committed in the exercise of their functions. When the official commits the crime '...in the exercise of their functions...', they do so by abusing their office, exceeding their duties, using their condition, but not in the strict exercise of their functions. However, as was stated, the Court did not apply in this matter the ground for aggravation because the sentenced person acted on the occasion of their functions as a Notary Public, and the Chamber cannot aggravate their situation because it only hears appeals in favor of the accused (prohibition of reformatio in peius)…”. For its part, in vote No. 2004-01046, of 09:22 hours, of August 27, 2004, the Third Chamber annulled a definitive dismissal judgment issued by the Trial Court, considering that the criminal act charged was an aggravated ideological falsehood because it was committed by a notary public, given that the a quo calculated the statute of limitations based on the assumption that it involved a simple criminal modality. On this point, the Criminal Cassation Chamber noted: “…as can be seen from the accusatory instrument, the defendant [Name 004]. was identified as the possible responsible author of a crime of ideological falsehood and is presumed to have committed it, in his condition as a notary public, by drafting a deed in which he appears as the debtor of the Bank…precisely the victim and complainant here [Name 005]., an event that also occurred on July 15, 1996. That is, he is accused of being the alleged responsible author of an ideological falsehood committed in his character as a public official and whose penalty, in such a case, can be a maximum of up to eight years of imprisonment. Given this circumstance, contrary to what was resolved by the Court in upholding the definitive dismissal it issued, the criminal action in the present case did not prescribe at three years from when the first formal charge was made against the defendant, which occurred with the preliminary statement on February 14, 2000 (see folio 9), but rather when four years had elapsed since this act was executed. This term is also the one corresponding to half of the initial statute of limitations period provided for this type of crime (which is eight years), but which changed to four years after it was interrupted with the 'first formal charge ' of the crime. Now, why is it considered that in this case the penalty provided for this crime could be eight years? This is because in this class of events the notary public is considered a public official, in accordance with articles 1 of the Notarial Code and 111 of the General Law on Public Administration and 59 and 60 of the Penal Code. In this sense, article 1 of the Notarial Code is very clear in indicating that this involves a public official, since although it defines the notariat as a 'public function exercised privately ', it immediately warns that the person who performs this activity does so as a 'authorized official '. Likewise, article 111 of the General Law on Public Administration explains that a public official is determined by the specific function they perform or provide to the Administration and not so much by their link to it under a remunerative, imperative, permanent or representative regime. Regarding the scope of the concept of a public official, it is worth recalling what this Chamber has said on the matter, when indicated that the concept of a public official is much broader in Criminal Law than in other areas of the legal system, using a criterion that modern doctrine calls objective, according to which what matters is that one performs a function that in its essence is public. It is then the nature of the activity and not its link with the Administration that, among other aspects, characterizes the public official (see especially resolutions of this Chamber Nos. 103-F of 10:30 hrs. on June 2, 1989, and 104-F of 9:15 hrs. on April 27, 1990 where said concept was exhaustively analyzed).' (Third Chamber of the Court, vote No. 208-F of 9:30 hours on June 10, 1994). In other words, what is important in these cases is the 'public ' character of the task or 'function' that is performed and not whether the person who performs it is subject to a special regime -of a labor nature- with respect to the Administration. In the same way, it has been specifically stated that the notary public is considered a public official by virtue of the activity or 'function ' they perform…” (bold is from the original). In similar terms, through judgment No. 2010-00923, of 11:25 hours, of August 27, 2010, this Cassation Chamber stated: “…Having acted in his condition as a notary public, for all purposes the accused had the condition of a public official, as established by article 1 of the Notarial Code (law number 7764 of April 17, 1998). So the statute of limitations regime for such acts is not only that prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also that specifically established in the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (number 8422, of October 29, 2004)…”. In turn, in resolution No. 2011-00273, of 09:38 hours, of March 11, 2011, issued by this Chamber, it was said: “…we have that from the first block of charged facts, regarding J. there is only one ideological falsehood (as will be seen, in its simple modality), and with respect to [Name 006]., an ideological falsehood aggravated by her condition as a notary, a use of a false document and a crime of fraud to the detriment of I. (these last two crimes derive from fact three of the accusation). The reasons why the condition of a public official, which [Name 006] held in her capacity as a notary, for purposes of aggravating the crime of ideological falsehood, was not communicable to J., reside, in the poor technique with which the accusation was drafted. It was omitted to indicate that J., knew or took advantage of the public function exercised by the accused notaries, to commit the crime. As it is a subjective element that modifies the legal classification applicable to J., it should have been contained, even if only in a summary manner, in the accusatory instrument…” ( ) “…It happens then, regarding the second block of events, that J. is charged with only a crime of ideological falsehood, which is time-barred (for the same reasons as the other crime of the same type), while attributed to [Name 006]., is an ideological falsehood (aggravated because it was committed using her quality as a public attestor)…”. Likewise, in judgment No. 2012-00228, of 10:00 hours, of February 17, 2012, this Chamber referred to the scope of the concept of a public official, in its relationship with the notariat and with the aggravation contained in article 366 of the Penal Code (at that time, article 359 of that same legal text), the foregoing, based on what was provided in resolutions 103-F, of 10:30 hours, of June 2, 1989, 104-F, of 9:15 hours, of April 27, 1990, 208-F, of 9:30 hours, of June 10, 1994 and 2004-1046, of 9:22 hours, of August 27, 2004, concluding that, in that specific case, the statute of limitations for the criminal action had been erroneously declared, given that the term reduced by half for the crime of ideological falsehood was four years, as the aggravation existed that affected two defendants, who acted in their condition as notaries public. C. Recent position held by the Constitutional Chamber. Havings filed in the year 2016 an unconstitutionality action in criminal expedient No. 14-420-0612-PE, processed before the Constitutional Chamber under No. 16-005583-0007-CO, against the case law of the Third Chamber that has interpreted that the notary public holds the condition of a public official for purposes of the application of criminal law, specifically, the criminal type of ideological falsehood contemplated in article 367 of the Penal Code, and that, for this circumstance, if criminal liability is proven, they are liable for the aggravated penalty contained in article 366 of this same legal text for public officials, and not the ordinary penalty, the Constitutional Chamber by majority vote of five of the seven Magistrates, in resolution 2017-08043, of 11:50 hours, of May 26, 2017, declared partially unconstitutional the case law of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that considers that the notary public is a public official. Given the significance of this judgment, the most relevant ideas from the same are transcribed for the purposes of the case at hand. Regarding the legal nature of the notary public, the Highest Constitutional Body noted: “…Two norms of the Notarial Code, Law No. 7764 of April 17, 1998, are particularly significant for this effect. Article 1 establishes that 'The public notariat is the public function exercised privately. Through it, the authorized official advises persons on the correct legal formation of their will in legal acts or contracts and attests to the existence of the events that occur before them'. Certainly, this legal norm qualifies the notariat as a 'public function', in the sense that the notary public is, essentially, a public attestor who gives full faith, for legal purposes, to a series of legally relevant acts and facts. From which it is evident that the correct exercise of the notarial function has an unequivocal public interest or public relevance, given the implications of any error committed intentionally or not by a public attestor. However, from such legal qualification it cannot be concluded that the notary public is a public official, in the sense defined by the block of legality to which the criminal judge must necessarily refer to impose a sentence.

On the other hand, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Notarial Code is more precise in indicating that “The notary public is the legal professional, specialist in Notarial and Registry Law, legally authorized to exercise the notarial function (…)”. It is necessary to harmonize the two aforementioned norms with Articles 30 and 31 of the Notarial Code, to avoid falling into an isolated interpretation and application of Article 1, in the interest of a contextual and systematic hermeneutics. Thus, numeral 30 establishes that “The person authorized to practice the notariat, in the exercise of this function, legitimizes and authenticates the acts in which they intervene, subject to the regulations of this code and any other resulting from special laws, for which they enjoy public faith (…)” (emphasis not in original). For its part, ordinal 31 establishes that “The notary has public faith when they record a fact, event, situation, act, or legal contract, the purpose of which is to ensure or record rights and obligations (…) By virtue of public faith, the statements of the notary recorded in the instruments and other documents authorized by them are presumed true.” (emphasis not in original). Consequently, as a general rule, the notary public, then, is a liberal professional who exercises a notarial function of relevance or clear public interest, by attesting to a series of facts and acts, without this circumstance meaning they can be considered a public official…” (The bold is original). For its part, regarding the notion of public official in the legal framework, the Constitutional Chamber indicated: “…To determine the criminal liability of a person who is classified (sic) by a criminal type as a public official, it is necessarily required to refer to the notion of public official established by the legal system and, particularly, the law, in order to respect and act upon the already noted principles of legality and typicality in criminal matters. On this point, the General Law of Public Administration since 1978 established a clear and precise definition of public official by prescribing in its Article 111 the following: “1. A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, completely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. 2. For this purpose, the terms ‘public official’ (funcionario público), ‘public servant’ (servidor público), ‘public employee’ (empleado público), ‘person in charge of a public service’ (encargado de servicio público), and other similar ones are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. 3. Employees of state economic enterprises or services in charge of activities subject to common law are not considered public servants.” This conception of public official, obviously, is not absolute; a special or sectoral law may well determine a more flexible notion, even for the purposes of expanding the sphere of administrative and criminal liability. This occurred with the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office of 2004, whose Article 2 expanded the notion of public official by providing the following: “Public servant. For the purposes of this Law, a public servant shall be considered any person who provides their services in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, state and non-state, on behalf and account of it and as part of its organization, by virtue of an act of investiture and completely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. The terms official, servant, and public employee shall be equivalent for the purposes of this Law. The provisions of this Law shall be applicable to de facto officials and to persons who work for public enterprises in any of their forms and for public entities in charge of activities subject to common law; likewise, to the agents, administrators, managers, and legal representatives of legal entities that safeguard, administer, or exploit funds, assets, or services of the Public Administration, by any title or management modality.” This precept of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, as seen, in addition to reiterating the terms of the General Law of Public Administration of 1978, in paragraph 2 extends the notion of public official, even to persons who are not public officials from the perspective of Administrative Law, such as the agents, administrators, managers, or representatives of legal entities that administer, exploit funds, assets, or services of the public administration by any title or modality. The ordinary legislator may well, then, in the exercise of their freedom of configuration, extend the notion of public official to a notary public. What cannot be done by way of extensive judicial interpretation is to extrapolate the notion of public official to the notary public, since the principles of legality and legal reserve in matters of crimes, penalties, and their aggravation are clearly and manifestly broken. As the challenged jurisprudential standard has done by extensively applying the aggravated penalty of paragraph 2 of Article 366 of the Penal Code, provided for public officials in the exercise of their functions, to notaries public…”. Having clarified the Constitutional Chamber the circumstance that the notary public cannot be deemed a public official, it makes the exception of the notary public who has been contracted by a public entity (on staff), who, for those purposes, does act as a public official. On this point it noted: “…It does not go unnoticed by this Constitutional Court that there are notaries public who do share the condition of public official, having been contracted as such by a public entity. In such cases, being public officials, the principle of legality and legal reserve is then fulfilled, it being evident that, in such cases, the notary does have the condition of public official (e.g., notaries of the State or institutional notaries). This figure is not ordinary regarding the exercise of the notarial function…”. Based on the exposed considerations, the Constitutional Body ordered “…to partially declare unconstitutional the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that deems the notary public to be a public official. The jurisprudential standard must be maintained in force when applied to notaries public who are paid a salary in a public entity for performing that work as a public official. The declaration of unconstitutionality must have declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the challenged jurisprudence, without prejudice to legal relationships or situations consolidated by prescription, expiration, a judgment with the authority of material res judicata, the consummation of materially or technically irreversible facts, and rights acquired in good faith. Regarding persons who are serving a custodial sentence by final judgment, aggravated based on the challenged jurisprudential line that must be declared unconstitutional, their sentence must be reduced, and in the event they have already served it due to this reduction, they must be released, unless the execution of another final condemnatory judgment or a current pretrial detention measure prevents it…”. In conclusion, the thesis of the Constitutional Chamber in vote 2017-08043, at 11:50 hours, of May 26, 2017, was to consider that the notary public should not be deemed a public official unless they have been contracted as such by a public entity. D. Arguments that lead this Chamber to declare the first two grounds of the appeal for cassation filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office without merit. In accordance with Article 367 of the Penal Code, the prison sentence of one to six years contemplated in ordinal 366 of that normative body is applicable "…to whoever inserts or has another insert in a public or authentic document false statements, concerning a fact that the document must prove, in such a way that harm may result", given that, according to the second paragraph of the first of those numerals "…If the act was committed by a public official in the exercise of their functions, the sentence shall be from two to eight years". Based on Article 1 of the Notarial Code, when referring to the nature of the notariat, the Constitutional Chamber has said: “…the notariat is a public function that is performed in a private manner (see among others, judgment No. 2006-014008 at 9:46 hrs. of September 22, 2006). By its legal nature, this function must be exercised within the powers and limitations that the legal system provides, and it is the responsibility of the State, through the mechanisms it deems appropriate, to ensure the proper fulfillment of the duties and obligations of notaries…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgments No. 2015-09849, at 09.05 hours, of July 1, 2015 and 2015-06002, at 09.05 hours, of April 29, 2015). This Criminal Cassation Chamber has held in various resolutions, as set out in the background contained in section B of this Considerando, that the aggravating factor for a public official contained in ideological falsehood applies to the notary public. Now, it must be noted that, in the specific case, judgment 2015-01075, issued by the Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, even though it contradicts the precedents that this Criminal Cassation Chamber has issued, the truth is that it is in accordance with what the highest Constitutional body has recently ordered, in the sense that the jurisprudential line of this Cassation Chamber is unconstitutional insofar as it deems the notary public to be a public official. It must be remembered that, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Law No. 7135, of October 11, 1989, “The jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself”. Thus, by Constitutional imperative, the jurisprudential criterion is unified in the sense that the aggravating factor contained in the second paragraph of Article 366 of the Penal Code, in relation to ordinal 367 of that same normative body, is not applicable to the notary public who commits the crime of ideological falsehood, unless they have been contracted as such by a public entity, this last assumption not being applicable to the defendant Carmen María Amador Pereira. As a consequence of the foregoing, the first and second grounds of the appeal for cassation filed by Licentiate Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, are declared without merit, upholding what was ordered by the Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in judgment 2015-01075, at 09:15 hours, of July 30, 2015, insofar as it reclassified the acts committed to the detriment of [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009] as three crimes of simple ideological falsehood. Regarding the acts to the detriment of [Name 010], refer to Considerando IV. A ruling is omitted with respect to the case in which [Name 003] appears as the victim, given the remittal ordered by the ad quem, as well as taking into account that this Cassation Chamber declared the claim inadmissible regarding that point according to resolution 2016-00139, at 14:59 hours, of February 9, 2016. III. Appeal for cassation filed by Licentiate Engie Marín Pandolfi, private defender of the defendant Carmen María Amador Pereira. In the only admitted ground (first), she alleges the existence of contradictory precedents. According to the appellant, the Appeals Court reclassified the acts regarding the issue of concurrence of crimes between the crime of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, changing the criterion they had held until that moment, and against the position put forward by this Criminal Cassation Chamber in judgment number 2011-1204, from which she cites an excerpt. She concludes that as there exists a jurisprudential contradiction, the decision adopted by the ad quem caused harm to the accused that violated due process. She requests the challenged judgment be quashed. The claim is declared without merit, despite the existence of contradictory precedents, as no concrete harm is verified and the criterion of the Appeals Court is reasonable (it follows the thesis that this Chamber has adopted in the majority of the judgments where it has ruled on the issue) in the sense that ideological falsehoods absorb the uses of a false document. In the first place, it must be indicated that this Criminal Cassation Chamber, from long ago, categorically and uniformly, has adopted the criterion that between the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document there is an apparent concurrence of norms, in the event that it is the same person who performs both actions, however, taking into account that the composition of the chamber has not been the same over the years, two different criteria have been held regarding which of the crimes contains or absorbs the other. In this sense, as will be seen, the criterion adopted by the Sentence Appeals Court in the specific case (judgment 2015-01075), is contrary to the thesis held by this Cassation Chamber in votes 2011-00325, 2011-01204, 2012-01227, and 2014-00665, however, it is in accordance with what was noted by this Chamber in judgments 2004-00936, 2008-00584, 2010-01098, 2012-01181, 2013-01641, and 2014-00304. A. Position of the Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the case under review. In the present matter, in relation to the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, the Appeals Court indicated: “…In other words, it has been reiterated that if the protected legal interest is similar in both types (public faith because, although ideological falsehood has an additional legal interest, it also protects the purity of the document, as does the use of a false document); if this latter illicit act is only a consequence of the former, to the extent that the possibility of causing danger —a requirement of the first type— is only generated with use; if there is a common author's plan, they share the iter criminis and a spatial-temporal proximity between the acts of the two figures occurs, we are before an apparent concurrence of norms, when both crimes are committed by the same person. In such a case, the crime of greater disvalue absorbs the other. As provided in numeral 367, in relation to 366 second paragraph, both of the Penal Code, the penalties for the illicit act of ideological falsehood are from one to six years (in the first paragraph) and from two to eight years (in the case of public officials, a point on which a further precision must be made), while that of use of a false document, according to numeral 373 (sic) ibidem, is from one to six years of imprisonment. Since this is a penalty similar to the former, in the first paragraph, but not for the second, it is obvious that the legislator considered the first crime more serious, not only because they imposed aggravating factors but because they established, as an element of the type, the need for it to be able to cause harm, which only happens with effective use. Likewise, if it were considered that the use of the false document predominated over the falsification (or falsehood), the absurdity would be reached that the final act would have a lesser penalty than the first event, which breaks the rules of subsidiarity in matters of apparent concurrence, where the doctrine accepts the prior, concomitant, or subsequent unpunished act, provided that those events not punished have a disvalue less than the one that is punished. Therefore, the first crime predominates over the second and not the other way around, as proposed by the appellants, even decontextualizing the jurisprudence they use in support of their thesis, which points to the opposite of the conclusion they extract, a conclusion which, in any case, for the reasons noted above, is not always shared. For the foregoing, given that, as recorded in folios 1469 to 1471, the a quo court condemned the accused for four crimes (one of which has been annulled above but to which, by the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius, what is indicated here will be equally applicable, in the event that a condemnatory judgment is reached) of ideological falsehood in ideal concurrence with the use of a false document (without explaining why they did not exclude each other) and imposed, for the first illicit acts, three years of imprisonment and, for the second, one year of imprisonment (although later, it indicated that it did not increase the penalty for the most serious act: see folio 1471), it is appropriate to partially uphold the claim, revoking the judgment insofar as it considered the acts in ideal concurrence and instead, from this venue (since remittal is not necessary) decreeing that what is configured is an apparent concurrence, in which the ideological falsehood absorbs the use of the false document and, consequently, the sentence imposed for this last illicit act must be annulled. However, as mentioned, this lacks practical repercussions, because the penalty for the use of the document was not used to increase the one set for the most serious crime. Ergo, the penalties remain the same, without prejudice to what may be indicated in the following section, that is, three years of imprisonment for each of the three crimes of ideological falsehood and nine years of imprisonment in total…” (cfr, folios 1671 vto to 1672 fte). B. Thesis of the Third Chamber that considers that the use of a false document absorbs the ideological falsehood. This Chamber, in vote No. 2011-00325, considered that in those situations where the defendant uses documents containing false statements made by them, they are before the crime of use of a false document, which subsumes the disvalue of the preceding action. In this regard, it was said: “…the use of a false document (Article 365 of that legal body), consists of the employment of a document whose falsity may be in its content or its materiality, so the use of a false document encompasses the use of both documents that are falsified or adulterated, or that being original contain false statements. For the case before us, the use of a false document may refer both to those documents that were falsified, and to those that contain an ideological falsehood. But, precisely because the crimes are consummated when those false documents are put into circulation or used, if the author or authors of the falsifications or ideological falsehoods are the same ones who later use those documents, they will be before a single crime, consisting of the use of a false document, because it is only then that the possibility of harm is being created…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2011-00325, at 10:09 hours, of March 25, 2011). Under this same approach, in resolution No. 2011-01204, this Chamber affirmed: “…In the case under study, we find that by the nature of consummation of the crime of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, as both are consummated at the moment they are used publicly, that is, at the same moment, the presentation of the document before the Property Registry, which occurs, independently of the passage of time between the creation of the false document and its use. Because the purpose of the action and a violation of the same protected legal interest, that is, public faith, are verified at the same moment, since despite the falseness of the document or the false information contained in it, if that document is not used publicly, no illicit act is configured. In such a way, that both actions maintain a unity, containing the same purpose and permanence in time, producing the same result of injury to the same legal interest, verifying then, the apparent concurrence of norms, which the appellant rightly claims…” ( ) “…By virtue of the foregoing, the appellant's claim is upheld, and the judgment is quashed in this regard, the facts held as proven in the judgment brought in cassation are reclassified as constituting a single crime of use of a false document, in apparent concurrence with the crime of ideological falsehood…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2011-01204, at 09:10 hours, of September 29, 2011). This same line was followed by this Cassation Chamber in pronouncement No. 2012-01227, in which, for the purposes that interest us, it was said: “…In the matter under study, there is no doubt that the accused used a false document, in which, with his full knowledge, it was stated that he was another person. So that configured the use of a false document, thereby devaluing the falsification of said document that E.G. might have committed, given that the danger of those actions (ideological falsehood or falsification of a document) against the legal interest, only occurred with the use of the false document that was proven against him, without it being possible to say before that it had affected public faith. So he could not be punished for those actions, but only for the criminal act constituted by the use of a false document. Consequently, the appellant must be given reason, reclassifying the facts to a crime of use of a false document…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2012-01227, at 12:26 hours, of August 17, 2012). Finally, in vote 2014-00665, this Cassation Chamber indicated: “…There exists an apparent concurrence, in the terms defined by Article 23 of the Penal Code, when the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document are carried out by the same person, since it involves an affectation of the same legal interest by two situations in a relation of consumption…” ( ) “…In this case the a quo erroneously classified the facts as constituting the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document in material concurrence (at 18:41:40 hours of the Oral Judgment), despite having proven that it was the same defendant who drafted the deed with false information, and who presented said deed before the Public Registry. Thus, the appellant is correct in this ground, so the facts are reclassified as constituting only a crime of use of a false document. Because the facts were originally classified as two crimes in material concurrence, for the purposes of the penalty, a remittal trial is unnecessary, as there already exists an amount of penalty set for the crime of use of a false document, which the Court defined as one year of imprisonment and which has not been questioned…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2014-00665, at 10:54 hours, of April 4, 2014). C. Position of the Third Chamber that considers that ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document. In judgment No. 2004-00936, this Cassation Chamber, based on recognized foreign doctrine, held that in cases where the author of the false document uses it themselves, it is not a matter of two typically distinct and independent conducts from one another; rather, the use of the false document is absorbed by the ideological falsehood or, where appropriate, by the falsification of a document. Referring to this topic, it was said: “…According to the very nature of the crime of falsification and according to the form in which it is drafted (see Art. 360 of the Penal Code), the subsequent use of the document that the same person falsifies is part of the disvalue of action contained in this illicit act to the extent that it requires the possibility of harm at the time of its creation. On this point, the doctrine indicates the following: “The general principle recognized here is that the type of art. 296 does not contemplate the conduct of the one who falsified and later uses the falsified document; therefore, there is a situation of apparent concurrence: the different figures of document falsification and that of use of a false document, are mutually exclusive when they are constituted by conducts of the same subject; when it has been the use of the falsified document that creates the danger or causes the harm typical of the type of the falsification previously carried out, punishing that use by applying two different figures would be a gross violation of the ne bis in idem (...) in cases where the prior falsification is ideological or material of public documents (...) what happens then is that if the use is not a necessary factor of consummation, it is not excluded from it either: the use does nothing more than continue the consummation and, consequently, the solution cannot be different. It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the author of the falsification who at the same time uses the document, cannot be punished at the same time for that falsification and for this use; they can only be punished for the first crime.” (CREUS, Carlos: Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, Volume 2, 5th Edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1996, p. 476). Following this doctrinal position, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has expressed in similar terms that: “if the author of the use is also the author of the falsification, they will be responsible only for this last infraction, while if the author of that illicit act cannot be held responsible for the falsification, they will answer only for the use, if they have used the false document (cfr. FONTAN BALESTRA, Carlos: Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 10th Edition, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, p. 980; BREGLIA ARIAS, Omar and other: Código Penal Comentado, Anotado y Concordado, 2nd Edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 295; CREUS, Carlos: Falsificación de Documentos en General, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1986, p. 204 to 206, and; NÚÑEZ, Ricardo: Manual de Derecho penal Parte Especial, Ediciones Lerner, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 483 to 484).” (see vote No. 33 at 9:05 of January 24, 1997). Consequently, according to the relation of facts that the Court holds as proven, it is clear then that it is not a matter of two independent conducts, but only of a single crime of falsification (ideological falsehood)…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2004-00936, at 15:55 hours, of August 6, 2004, the highlighting is original). Under this same position, in resolution No. 2008-00584 this Chamber pointed out: “…Given the particular characteristics of the case in relation to [Name 012]., one could not think of the existence of an ideal concurrence, because we find ourselves before the same action in a legal sense, which injures two norms that exclude each other, constituting different degrees of affectation of the same legal interest (public faith). For this reason, the third claim as formulated by the private defender of R.A.C. must be upheld, and by virtue of this, the judgment is partially annulled, regarding the legal classification corresponding to the acts proven against him. The legal classification is corrected, and consequently, R.A.C. must be acquitted for the crime of use of a false document and in its place, only the conviction for falsification of a public document, reclassified as ideological falsehood in the terms already analyzed in the first considerando of this resolution, remains unchanged…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2008-00584, at 10:18 hours, of May 23, 2008, the bold is original). A similar criterion was held in 2010 when applying the criterion of consumption, establishing: “…we have that the defendant R, in his capacity as notary public, drafted the false deed, with the purpose of achieving through its presentation to the Public Registry the exclusion of a current annotation on the sale of a part of the property that had been owned by V, hence the registration of the deed whose content was not real by the notary and accused R was the way in which the harm materialized.

From this perspective, we are in the presence of an apparent concurrence of offenses (concurso aparente de delitos) between ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica) and the use of a false document, which would exclude the application of the ideal concurrence of norms (concurso ideal de normas) applied by the Tribunal, since the wrongfulness of the use of a false document in this case would form part of the unjust content of the ideological falsehood, hence the proper course is to order conviction for a single offense. Both offenses, pursuant to the provisions of numerals 360 and 365 of the Penal Code, carry the same penalty, from one to six years of imprisonment, but ideological falsehood is considered the more serious offense, since in a public or authentic document executed by someone by reason of their profession, in this case a notary public, statements were recorded that are presumed true, accepted as true before others unless proven otherwise. In accordance with the foregoing and in application of the principle of consumption (principio de consunción), which implies that when the commission of a more serious factual scenario –ideological falsehood– includes another of lesser significance –use of a false document–, the former is applied and not the latter, since it is considered practically included in the more severe regulation, the proper course is to grant this aspect of the challenge regarding the legal classification, which must be corrected according to the facts deemed proven…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2010-01098, of 12:03 p.m., of October 15, 2010, bold text is from the original). Through judgment No. 2012-01181, this Criminal Chamber noted: “…based on what was proven in the verdict, the facts constitute an offense of ideological falsehood (Article 360 of the Penal Code), there being an apparent concurrence of norms in relation to the use of a false document. Observe that, according to the list of proven facts, we are not faced with two independent legal actions, but only a single offense, that of ideological falsehood, consisting of the preparation of a cadastral plan into which false data regarding its location, boundaries, and measurements were inserted, a plan that was submitted to the Catastro Nacional for registration. When faced with an apparent concurrence of norms, the proper approach is to convict only for the offense of ideological falsehood. Consequently, the appealed judgment is partially annulled and, on our own motion (de oficio), the conduct is reclassified as a single offense of ideological falsehood, leaving the penalty at one year of imprisonment, as set by the sentencing Tribunal…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2012-01181, of 10:23 a.m., of August 17, 2012, bold text is from the original). Similarly, in judgment No. 2013-01641, when faced with an apparent concurrence between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, this Chamber reclassified the facts as constituting the latter criminal offense. In that regard, it was stated: “…in this case there is also an apparent concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, and therefore it is appropriate to reclassify the facts as constituting solely one offense of ideological falsehood in ideal concurrence with the offense of fraud (estafa). However, despite the foregoing, given that when setting the penalty for the ideal concurrence, the Tribunal set the penalty for the greater offense (fraud) at five years and decided not to increase it; the reclassification carried out does not affect the penalty imposed, which remains at five years without the need for remand. For all the foregoing, as there exists an apparent concurrence between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, the ground is partially granted only with respect to this aspect, and the facts are reclassified as constituting one offense of ideological falsehood and others of fraud…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2013-01641, of 10:57 a.m., of November 1, 2013). More recently, in opinion No. 2014-00304, this Cassation Chamber proceeded to deem only the offense of ideological falsehood as established, given the concurrence existing between this offense and the use of a false document. It pronounced in the following terms: “…regarding the subsequent analysis that the Judges make regarding the subject of concurrences, this Chamber does find an error that must be corrected. According to the Judges, the facts constitute three offenses of ideological falsehood and three offenses of use of a false document on the occasion of fraud (f. 1659). However, on this point there are reiterated pronouncements from the Third Chamber, in which it has been indicated that between the offense of ideological falsehood and that of the use of a false document there cannot be an ideal concurrence, when the agents of the falsehood are also the same ones who use the false document, as it is rather an apparent concurrence…” ( ) “…According to the foregoing, in this case there also exists an apparent concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and those of use of a false document, and therefore it is appropriate to reclassify the facts as constituting solely three offenses of ideological falsehood in ideal concurrence with three offenses of aggravated fraud (estafa mayor). Given that in this case it was considered proven that the defendants D.H.P. and E.M.J.C. acted jointly, it is appropriate to apply the extensive effect of the reclassification of the facts to both defendants. For all the foregoing, as there exists an apparent concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and the offenses of use of a false document, the ground is partially granted only with respect to this aspect, and the facts are reclassified as constituting solely three offenses of ideological falsehood and three offenses of aggravated fraud, with extensive effect to both defendants…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2014-00304, of 08:43 a.m., of March 7, 2014). D. Unifying Criterion of this Criminal Cassation Chamber. In the case under review, the Trial Tribunal convicted the defendant Carmen María Amador Pereira for four offenses of ideological falsehood in material concurrence (concurso material), these, in turn, in ideal concurrence with four offenses of use of a false document committed to the detriment of [Name 002], [Name 003], [Name 008], and [Name 009] and the public faith, imposing three years of imprisonment for each of the ideological falsehoods and one year of imprisonment for each use of a false document, resulting in a total of nine years of imprisonment in application of the concurrence rules (cfr, folios 1449-1478, Volume III). For its part, the Appellate Tribunal: i) annulled the appealed judgment solely insofar as it declared the defendant author responsible for the offenses of ideological falsehood and use of a false document to the detriment of [Name 003] (a remand on which this Chamber will not rule, having declared the claim inadmissible regarding that point pursuant to resolution 2016-00139, of 2:59 p.m., of February 9, 2016), ordering remand before a new panel of the lower court (a quo) so that, respecting the principle of prohibition of reform in detriment (reforma en perjuicio), the possibility of resolving the dispute through conciliation (conciliación) be assessed, should the parties propose and accept it again; ii) revoked the judgment insofar as it classified the facts as an ideal concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, and instead, decreed that what is established is an apparent concurrence of norms between both, in which the falsehood absorbs the use, and, consequently, annulled (without remand) the penalty imposed for the use of a false document (which, ultimately, the lower court did not use to increase the penalty for the greater offense) in relation to the victims [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009]; iii) revoked the judgment insofar as it considered that the figure was that of aggravated ideological falsehood (Articles 367 and 366, second paragraph, of the Penal Code) and, instead, declared that what is classified is simple ideological falsehood (first paragraph of numeral 366 of the Penal Code) and, as a consequence thereof, annulled the penalty imposed, ordering remand before a new panel of the lower court so that, respecting the principle of prohibition of reform in detriment and starting from the classification established here (simple offenses and in apparent concurrence), they set the penalty (cfr, folios 1655-1680, Volume IV). In relation to point iii), this Chamber issued a criterion in Considerando II, and it is appropriate to rule at this time on section ii, that is, on the concurrence that arises between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document. In the opinion of this Chamber, the appellate court (ad quem) is correct in concluding that the offense of ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document under the assumption that both actions are carried out by the same person. This thesis is supported by two solid arguments: a) the legislator considered the offense of ideological falsehood more serious, contemplating its commission under an aggravated modality; b) the need for it to be capable of causing harm was included as an element of that criminal type (tipo penal), which occurs with the effective use. This position has important doctrinal support. For several decades, the legal scholar Sebastián Soler indicated “…The use of a false document has great importance in doctrine and legislation from a double point of view: as an autonomous or relatively autonomous figure and as an integral part of certain falsehoods…” (Soler, Sebastián. Derecho Penal Argentino, Volume V, Tipográfica Editora Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 355), which is supplemented by what was indicated by Muñoz Conde in the sense that “…The falsification of a document naturally leads to its use. Therefore, if the use is carried out by the forger themselves, it is a subsequent unpunishable act…” (Muñoz Conde, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte Especial, 18th Edition, Editorial Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 2010, p. 755), which undoubtedly is applicable to the offense of ideological falsehood as a modality of falsehood. As the Appellate Tribunal points out, the decision of the lower court to consider that an ideal concurrence arose between the offenses of use of a false document and ideological falsehood was erroneous, given that since the same person is the author of those actions, in this case, the defendant Carmen Amador Pereira, the reproach for the first offense is contained in the second (consumption of the wrongfulness). Thus, the single admitted ground of the cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Engie Marín Pandolfi, private defender of the defendant, is dismissed, and the jurisprudential line is unified in the sense that between the offenses of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, an apparent concurrence of norms arises, under the assumption that the same person carries out both actions, it being understood that ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document. In relation to this point, what was ordered by the Appellate Tribunal in judgment No. 2015-01075, of 09:15 a.m., of July 30, 2015, is upheld, insofar as it annulled (without remand) the penalty imposed for the use of a false document (which, ultimately, the lower court did not use to increase the penalty for the greater offense), being faced with simple ideological falsehoods, for the acts committed to the detriment of [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009], and must proceed as ordered by the appellate court, which annulled the penalty imposed and ordered remand before a new panel of the lower court so that, respecting the principle of reform in detriment and starting from the established classification (simple offenses and in apparent concurrence), the penalty is imposed. What relates to the declaration of instrumental falsehood of the deeds (escrituras) and the certified copies derived from them, as well as the marriage declarations and any legal effect that these legal instruments may have produced, specifically in relation to the victims [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009], remains unaltered. IV. In the third ground raised by licensed attorney Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), he alleges erroneous application of procedural precepts, specifically, numerals 2, 7, 36, and 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The challenger bases his reproach on numerals 437, 439, and 468 subsection b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He asserts that the Appellate Tribunal committed an error of reasoning by endorsing the Trial Tribunal's position of allowing, once the trial was well advanced, a conciliation for the case of the victim [Name 010], contrary to the provisions of current regulations and the Constitutional Chamber. He states that the appellate court confirmed the decision of the lower court indicating that in opinion number 5836-99, the Constitutional Chamber established the possibility that conciliation could be permitted in the trial stage if the parties agree and there are reasons why the measure was not agreed upon in the intermediate stage. He affirms that the Public Ministry is aware of that resolution; however, what is established is that the measure cannot be denied solely on the grounds that it is untimely, and therefore the judge must assess the specific case and decide whether the application of the measure was appropriate or not, based on other circumstances. He considers that the first error of the appellate judges lies in giving the constitutional criterion a breadth that it does not contain. From his perspective, it must be considered that our procedural system is designed in stages, and therefore the possible application of conciliation after the order opening the trial (auto de apertura a juicio) is issued is prior to the commencement of the debate, as once it has begun the judges are hearing the merits of the case, having received testimonial and documentary evidence, as happened in this case. He deems that a second error lies in the fact that the Appellate Tribunal considered that the debate had not begun at the time the measure was proposed, a conclusion they reach based on the trial minutes which state that prior to the debate the defense proposed conciliation, but also, upon verifying what happened in the audiovisual record that the measure was proposed after the reading of the accusation –and receipt of evidence–, the judges determine that with the reading of the prosecutorial request the debate has not yet begun. This position contains the error of not considering that the trial had indeed begun and therefore the opportunity to conciliate had already lapsed. He also asserts that the resolution of the Appellate Tribunal contains the defect of considering that in the Trial Tribunal's action of admitting the conciliation in the trial phase there was a defective procedural act of an absolute nature to declare, given that some victims could not be located to appear at the preliminary hearing and therefore did not have the right to agree on alternative measures in the intermediate phase, and the lower court's decision to admit conciliation was the correct solution. He states that in the debate no defective procedural act occurred on the part of the defense, and that, in any case, there is no fundamental right of access to alternative solutions in criminal proceedings, as developed by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 2010-3941, of 2:39 p.m., of February 24, 2010, and therefore there was no defective procedural act of an absolute nature to declare. He concludes that the decision causes harm because the application of the measure was endorsed contrary to the principle of legality, frustrating the punitive interests of the prosecutorial body. The claim is granted for the reasons that will be stated. In order to respond to the challenger's questions, it is pertinent to know what the Appellate Tribunal resolved in the specific case regarding the conciliation involving the victim [Name 010]. On this point, the appellate court noted: “…Firstly, it must be indicated that, in accordance with what is recorded in the minutes at folio 1439, the proposal for an alternative measure (and, upon its rejection, for integral reparation) was made by the defendant before the reading of the accusation, that is, before the debate opened. Regardless of whether that document may or may not coincide with the audiovisual record (as the Prosecution alleges, stating that the proposal was later and referring to a sequence of the recording), the truth is that the preliminary acts of the debate were used, and therefore it is excessive formalism to understand that if the reading of the accusation begins, or concludes, the measure is no longer appropriate, which conflicts with the criterion of the Constitutional Chamber that will be indicated. Although it is true the Tribunal, for reasons of procedural efficiency, postponed the decision on the application until hearing the opinion of each victim, whom it asked during each deposition, that does not imply that, due to said procedure by the judges, the party who made the proposal during those preliminary trial acts, before the defendant was identified, should be penalized. Secondly, the Constitutional Chamber, through opinion number 5836-99, admitted that conciliation could be carried out in the debate phase, that is, after the preliminary hearing. That pronouncement was not limited, as the challenger erroneously states, to it being carried out before the reading of the accusation, since it was stated: '... interpreting restrictively the procedural timing of these actions (criteria of opportunity, suspension of the procedure to trial, conciliation, integral reparation of damage, abbreviated procedure), would mean illegitimately limiting the right of the parties to obtain the prompt resolution of their conflicts, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.1 and 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Therefore, the interpretation of procedural timing, in the case of the application of those legal institutes that allow the parties to conclude the criminal process and resolve the conflict arising between citizens (victim and defendant) as a consequence of the transgression of the criminal law, must be in accordance with the State's interest in restoring social harmony, as indicated in the General Part of the Criminal Procedure Code, in its Article 7. It is not possible, then, to limit the parties' access to conflict resolution, based on a restrictive interpretation of the procedural timing for the application of such legal institutes expressly contemplated in procedural law (...) a literal interpretation of the procedural timing regulated in Articles 17, 25, 36, and 373 of the Criminal Procedure Code limits the right granted to the procedural subjects to obtain a resolution to the conflict through alternative procedural solutions after the order opening the trial is issued. Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this literal interpretation must be replaced by an extensive interpretation of the phrase "at any time up until before the opening of the trial is agreed", which favors the exercise of the powers conferred by the legal system on those who intervene in the proceeding, for the prompt and effective resolution of the conflict. Therefore, the procedural timing referred to in this phrase cannot be interpreted as a peremptory deadline - given that it would limit the parties' right to resolve the conflict through alternative procedural outcomes - but rather as an orderatory deadline that may be extended with the consent of the parties. Consequently, if the victim and the defendant so request, the judge must assess, even after the order opening the trial (Article 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code), in which cases the application of conciliation would be appropriate...' Although, later, the same Constitutional Court indicated that the law has a limit for those mechanisms and that this does not infringe due process (see opinions numbers 4983-00 and 7378-09), that does not mean, then, that there is an absolute prohibition on accessing the referenced institute nor, either, can it be considered that procedural legality is violated if it is done, because norms must be interpreted in a systematic and not isolated manner. Thus, if here the Tribunal considered —although it did not use those exact words (which, demanding it, implies an excessive formalism that has been gradually banished from the criminal process)— that a defective procedural act had occurred, because the victims were not present at the preliminary hearing (see folios 1148-1150 of Volume II of the principal record) and, therefore, both they and the defendant were denied the possibility of concluding the conflict in a different manner, the appropriate course was to act as the lower court did, that is, by restoring the omitted procedure, as authorized by numeral 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Note that, as the Prosecution accepts at folio 1639, the victims were summoned but not located (see folios 1117, 1118, 1119, and 1138), a scenario in which, although it is true it was not possible to suspend the preliminary hearing, it was feasible to attempt the application of alternative measures, which satisfy the claims of both parties, in another procedural phase, to remedy the error. Thus, this Chamber does not observe any irregularity in what was acted upon and, therefore, the claim must be rejected, adding that, although the victim made some reservation to appeal what was resolved, she ultimately did not do so, which denotes that she was satisfied with it, and without it being discernible that she suffered any harm or grievance from what happened…” (cfr, folios 1656 reverse to 1657 reverse). Before resolving the specific case, it is pertinent to review what was ordered by the Constitutional Chamber in relation to the scope of the phrase “up until before the opening of the trial is agreed” as a requirement to apply conciliation, as well as other alternative measures and the abbreviated procedure. The highest Constitutional Body, in judgment 1999-05836, cited by the appellate court, adopted an open stance on the procedural stage in which alternative measures –including conciliation– and the abbreviated procedure are applicable, establishing for the purposes that interest us: “…interpreting restrictively the procedural timing of these actions (criteria of opportunity, suspension of the procedure to trial, conciliation, integral reparation of damage, abbreviated procedure), would mean illegitimately limiting the right of the parties to obtain the prompt resolution of their conflicts, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.1 and 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Therefore, the interpretation of procedural timing, in the case of the application of those legal institutes that allow the parties to conclude the criminal process and resolve the conflict arising between citizens (victim and defendant) as a consequence of the transgression of the criminal law, must be in accordance with the State's interest in restoring social harmony, as indicated in the General Part of the Criminal Procedure Code, in its Article 7. It is not possible, then, to limit the parties' access to conflict resolution, based on a restrictive interpretation of the procedural timing for the application of such legal institutes expressly contemplated in procedural law…”…Evidently, interpreting that once the order opening the trial is issued (Article 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code), the application of the cited legal institutes does not proceed, under any circumstance, constitutes a literal interpretation of the normative text. However, a literal interpretation of the procedural timing regulated in Articles 17, 25, 36, and 373 of the Criminal Procedure Code limits the right granted to the procedural subjects to obtain a resolution to the conflict through alternative procedural solutions after the order opening the trial is issued. Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this literal interpretation must be replaced by an extensive interpretation of the phrase "at any time up until before the opening of the trial is agreed", which favors the exercise of the powers conferred by the legal system on those who intervene in the proceeding, for the prompt and effective resolution of the conflict. Therefore, the procedural timing referred to in this phrase cannot be interpreted as a peremptory deadline - given that it would limit the parties' right to resolve the conflict through alternative procedural outcomes - but rather as an orderatory deadline that may be extended with the consent of the parties. Consequently, if the victim and the defendant so request, the judge must assess, even after the order opening the trial (Article 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code), in which cases the application of conciliation, suspension of the procedure to trial, or the abbreviated procedure –for example– would be appropriate, based on the principles and values that establish the criminal process…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 1999-05836, of 5:18 p.m., of July 27, 1999). A few days later, when resolving a habeas corpus appeal, said Chamber held: “…the parties must be summoned as a priority and immediately for the holding of the respective hearing, for the purpose of ensuring that at any stage of the process, including before the opening of the debate (Article 341 of the Criminal Procedure Code), the conciliation request is specially resolved…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 1999-05981, of 2:03 p.m., of August 3, 1999, the underlining is not from the original). However, this criterion was reconsidered and changed by said Chamber in judgments 2000-02989 and 2000-04983. In the first of those rulings, the Constitutional Chamber, when referring to the time limit imposed for requesting the application of the abbreviated procedure –which is the same as for conciliation– affirmed: “…although it is true that there is a clear interest of the State in restoring social harmony and that to a certain extent the abbreviated procedure –like other alternative measures to the full criminal process– seeks to fulfill that end by resolving the conflicts that at an intersubjective level underlie the criminal process, it is also true that, like any procedural institute, that of alternative measures cannot be left free of regulations for use by the parties at their discretion; this last idea is foreign to the very notion of an orderly procedural system and possibly originates when the pursuit of conflict resolution between the parties, as an aim of the process, is given greater relevance than what corresponds to it within the system. Quite the contrary, it must be taken into account that the design of the current criminal procedural system still preserves as its primary aim the regulation and iteration of the exercise of the punitive power of the State, even when various forms of conflict resolution are provided, with which it is intended to attenuate the rigorousness that the previous system exhibited in this regard, especially against certain special cases where an individual's interest in punishment and redress exceeded that of the State. From such a perspective, it is not unreasonable to establish final deadlines for the fulfillment of the different actions and stages provided that they do not prejudice what constitutes the main interest of the process or its essential formalities. Moreover, if we start from the reasoning expounded by the Chamber in judgments number 05836-99 and 05981-99 already transcribed, in which it maintains that the temporal limitation must be orderatory under penalty of violating fundamental rights, similarly no other limitation would hold either (not even the one that these same resolutions impose by authorizing the proposition of alternative measures up until before the opening of the hearing according to the text of numeral 341).

Taken to its ultimate consequences, the search for a resolution of the conflict between the parties should make permissible the possibility of a conciliation during the course of the trial, between the close of the trial and the issuance of the judgment, or even at the cassation stage, since res judicata does not yet exist; that is, the arguments used by the Chamber to disallow the limit contained in Article 373 are equally valid to disallow any other temporal limit or procedural stage that one might wish to oppose to the conciliatory will of the parties…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-02989, at 15:24 hours, on April 12, 2000).

As stated in that same ruling, it must be the judge of the intermediate stage “…who receives, analyzes, and intervenes in the processing and resolution of the proposed alternative measures, so that, if they are unsuccessful, the matter continues its normal course and the judge in charge of the trial receives the case without any predisposition regarding the facts that will be the subject of judgment. In exceptional cases to be qualified by the Court, it could be returned to the intermediate stage…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-02989, at 15:24 hours, on April 12, 2000).

In this same resolution, the highest Constitutional Body, upon reconsidering the position it had assumed in votes 1999-05836 and 1999-05981, emphasized: “…there indeed exists a contradiction between the judgments of this Chamber numbered 09129-98 and 05836-99, subsequently confirmed by 05981-99; this contradiction lies in the fact that while the first establishes that there is no violation of constitutional norms by the application of the limit established in Article 373 of the Código Procesal Penal, the other two, by making indirect reference to this article, indicate that it must be understood that said limit is not unconstitutional as long as it is understood that it cannot be opposed to the parties. Now, with new elements for judgment, the Chamber reconsiders the matter to nullify the jurisprudence contained in pronouncements 05836-99 and 05981-99, understanding that, firstly, the temporal limit imposed on the request for application of the abbreviated procedure (proceso abreviado) originates from the very text of Article 373 of the Código Procesal Penal, without requiring any interpretation other than the simple and literal one of the norm to apply it; secondly, that this rule requires submitting the request for application of the abbreviated procedure to the judge of the intermediate stage before said judge orders the opening of the trial in accordance with the power established in Article 341 of the Código Procesal Penal; thirdly, that the recently referenced limitation does not affect the core of the fundamental rights of the accused, as it refers to non-essential procedures within the criminal process; finally, that said rule, insofar as it temporally limits the exercise of a power legally granted to the accused, is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, because this restriction directly protects the principle of an impartial judge to which the accused is entitled…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-02989, at 15:24 hours, on April 12, 2000).

In resolution 2000-04983, the Sala Constitucional answered the consultation made, in the sense that the rejection of the petition for application of the abbreviated procedure is not contrary to due process when it is made after the opportunity established by the Código Procesal Penal has passed, reiterating what was indicated in vote 2000-02989 (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-04983, at 14:51 hours, on June 28, 2000).

Likewise, in resolution 2004-08726, the highest Constitutional Body clearly established the difference between the comprehensive reparation of damage (reparación integral del daño) and other alternative measures such as conciliation and the suspension of the process to trial (suspensión del proceso a prueba), an opportunity in which it referred: “…the Chamber does observe that it is necessary to clarify that according to the provisions of Article 30, subsection j) of the Código Procesal Penal, the comprehensive reparation of damage can be agreed upon “before the oral trial,” so it is not required to be before agreeing to the opening of the trial, as is required with other alternative resolutions, such as the suspension of the process to trial (Article 25 of the CPP) and conciliation (Article 36 of the CPP)…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2004-08726, at 15:20 hours, on August 11, 2004).

In vote 2009-07378, the Sala Constitucional took judgment 2000-02989 as its starting point, specifically stating regarding conciliation: “…Although the preceding considerations were expressed by the Chamber when it analyzed the constitutionality of the limit established in numeral 373 of the Código Procesal Penal for the application of the abbreviated procedure, on that occasion it was anticipated that what was said would be applicable to cases where a similar temporal restriction is involved regarding another type of alternative measures established in the Código Procesal Penal. Such is the case under study, since the norm now consulted, which regulates the institute of conciliation, in its first paragraph establishes the same temporal limit, by indicating that “conciliation between the victim and the accused will proceed, at any time until before agreeing to the opening of the trial.” The criteria expressed by the Chamber to reason the constitutionality of Article 373 of the Código Procesal Penal are fully adopted for this pronouncement, for which reason it must be concluded that numeral 36 of the Código Procesal Penal, insofar as it establishes a temporal limit for the parties to conciliate in the criminal process, is not unconstitutional…” ( ) “…Access to justice regulated in Article 41 of the Constitución Política is not violated by the consulted norm either, as the only thing it makes impossible is conciliating after the opening of the trial in the criminal process has been agreed upon…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2009-07378, at 14:47 hours, on May 6, 2009).

From the foregoing, a first conclusion emerges: since the year 2000, the Sala Constitucional has maintained the criterion that it is not possible to admit the abbreviated procedure, the suspension of the process to trial, and conciliation once the opening of the trial in the criminal process has been agreed upon, a situation that is different in relation to the institute of comprehensive reparation of damage, which, by legal provision, proceeds “before the oral trial.” For its part, it is established that this Cassation Chamber has been emphatic that it is improper to apply alternative measures—among them conciliation—or the abbreviated procedure at the trial stage. A general rule that has been excepted in judgment 2010-00200, at 11:00 hours, on March 18, 2010, as well as in the majority votes of resolutions 2009-00831, at 10:50 hours, on June 24, 2009, 2007-00687, at 10:20 hours, on June 29, 2007, and 2007-01191, at 14:25 hours, on October 24, 2007, contemplating as a premise, in these latter rulings, that the parties did not have access to that possibility when the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) was held (e.g., if the notice of the hearing was not notified to the accused who designated a specific place to receive notifications). In the specific case, this Cassation Chamber considers that there are two weighty reasons why the Trial Court was not authorized to homologate the conciliatory agreement between the accused Carmen Amador Pereira and the offended party [Name 010], a decision that was subsequently erroneously endorsed by the Court of Appeals.

First reason. In accordance with Article 36 of the Código Procesal Penal, “In misdemeanors or contraventions, in crimes of private action, of public action at the behest of a private party, those that admit the conditional suspension of the sentence, conciliation between the victim and the accused will proceed at any time until before agreeing to the opening of the trial…”. As stated by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, in the present matter, conciliation was proposed and agreed upon when the procedural moment authorized by procedural law had already lapsed. It is logical to think that if this Chamber has indicated that comprehensive reparation of damage is improper once the accused and the witnesses have testified, that is, after the opening of the debate (in this regard, see Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2008-01210, at 10:25 hours, on October 27, 2008, majority vote), with said procedural institute being appropriate “before the oral trial”—unlike conciliation, which can be agreed upon “until before agreeing to the opening of the trial”—, then, with greater reason, a conciliation after the debate has begun is unacceptable, as happened in the case under examination, in which the accusation had even already been read, and the statement of the accused and several witnesses had been received (see digital files c0001150320092615, sequence from 09:26:15 to 09:50:46, c0001150320100007, sequence from 10:00:07 to 11:00:00, and c0001150320150000, sequence from 15:00:00 to 15:56:23, all from March 20, 2015), a situation that the ad quem denies. This circumstance, by itself, already prevented the a quo from authorizing the conciliation; however, there is an additional reason.

Second reason. From the review of the recording of the preliminary hearing, it has been possible to appreciate that, when it was held, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office flatly opposed a conciliation being carried out in the present matter (see digital file c0000110921083916, sequence from 08:39:16 to 09:00:00), and that, at the trial stage, the Prosecutor presented the respective protest so that the Trial Court would not approve said alternative measure in relation to the facts where Mrs. [Name 010] appears as the offended party (see digital file c0001150320150000, sequence from 15:00:00 to 15:56:23, all from March 20, 2015). The agreement reached was not viable given the nature of the crimes, namely, ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica) and use of a false document, in which the protected legal interest is multi-offensive (public faith (fe pública) is the principal one). In this regard, on previous occasions this Chamber has stated: “…Therefore, if one of these instruments is falsified and then used, in an suitable manner, there exists the possibility that it may generate an erroneous judgment about what it is supposed to represent. This is where the requirement of the possibility of harm is located. This possibility must be distinguished from the impairment of the protected legal interest which, as stated, is included in every crime. It is a matter of something more, either when it is expressly required in the criminal description, or when it is considered an indispensable element -as occurs in the crime of use of a false document- even if it is not stated in the norm. Thus, it is affirmed that “The character of the document, the suitability of the falsification, and the possibility of harm, form a unity around the criminal legal concept of public faith, at least in the chapter on documentary falsehoods” (CREUS, Carlos. Falsificación de documentos en general, 2nd updated edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial Astrea, p.6.). That possibility of harm is linked to the injury to public faith that the falsehood represents and arises, so to speak, a biunivocal relationship: the injury to public faith implies the possibility of harm to other legal interests or interests deserving of protection, precisely because of the value it grants to those documents. To injure public faith efficiently, that is, to deem the conduct typical, one must be in a position where it can cause harm. The previously cited author points out in this regard: “normally the same falsehood ‑especially when it falls upon public documents- can already be pointed out as an impairment of public faith insofar as the document that carries it has been deformed; but that effect is not typically sufficient; the law requires that to this eventual “abstract” injury be added the concrete one of the possibility of harm to other legal interests (different from public faith), which can be of varied nature: patrimonial, moral, political, and must belong to a third party, that is, they must be owned by someone who is not the agent of the falsification. That effect must come directly from the falsification, from what it represents for the extinction or creation of rights, faculties, and burdens.” (ibid, p. 69)…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2009-00628, at 17:17 hours, on April 29, 2009).

Starting from the premise that the crimes charged are multi-offensive, the truth is that for the application of conciliation, the approval of the Public Prosecutor's Office was required, with the assent of the individualized victim not being sufficient, as these are crimes of public action in accordance with Article 16 of the Código Procesal Penal. In other words, given the refusal of the prosecutorial body, the homologation of the mentioned alternative measure was procedurally improper (in similar terms, in relation to the suspension of the process to trial regarding the crime of slanderous accusation (denuncia calumniosa), see Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2013-00744, at 11:35 hours, on June 14, 2013).

Therefore, the third claim of the challenge filed by the prosecutorial representation is granted. Judgment No. 2015-01075 of the Court of Appeals is annulled, only insofar as it declared the appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office without merit and endorsed the conciliation where [Name 010] appears as the offended party. Likewise, the definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) for conciliation issued by the Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, through judgment No. 331-2015, at 16:15 hours, on April 13, 2015, is annulled, and the matter is remanded so that the Trial Court, with a different panel, holds the oral and public trial for the facts charged to the detriment of the Fe Pública and the offended party [Name 010].” Thesis on Administrative Law, San José, volume I, editorial Stradtmann, 1st edition, 1998, p. 387), considers that the legal nature of the notary public is that of a **"Munera Pubblica"** that is, in the words of the last cited author, a "...private individual who exercises public functions or provides public services is not a public official nor a public organ, but precisely a private individual outside the public organization." The difference between a "munera pubblica" and a de facto official is that, while both provide a public service, the former does so in their own name and on their own behalf, while the latter, under the provisions of Article 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration, does so in the name and on behalf of the Public Administration. For the authors cited supra, if this numeral defines public servant, official, or public employee (sic) as "...the person who provides services to the Administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with entire independence and of an imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character," it is clear that the notary lacks such character, because conditions such as representativeness (the notary does not represent the Public Administration, to the point that it is not jointly liable with him, in the exercise of his office, as happens with public servants), imperium (unlike the official, the notary does not impose mandates but rather records the will requested by those who ask him), remuneration (he does not belong to the public employment regime but earns fees from the parties), appointment (he is not appointed or elected, but rather enabled), etc., do not apply to him. Furthermore, INFANTE and CHAVARRÍA, consider it a contradiction to deem him a public official if, at the same time, Directive N° 004-2000 of the National Directorate of Notaries of July 20, 2000, and its subsequent modification through the General Guidelines for the Provision and Control of the Notarial Exercise and Service, state that a notary public must have an open office and cannot be a public official. The position of these authors appears in accordance with the Legal System because, even, more recent laws, which broaden the definition of public official (which, then, is a normative element of a legal type) contained in the General Law of the Public Administration, such as the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, N° 8422..." ( ) "...Additionally, this exclusion of the 'notary public' as a 'public official' seems to be endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber, by means of vote number 1749-2001 (facing an action of unconstitutionality against articles 22 and 25 of the Law of Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, those numerals, which prohibit public officials from practicing liberal professions if they obtain money by prohibition) which stated that "...the nature of the notarial function (...) the Chamber understands as the private exercise of a public function (...) It is a function exercised by delegation and with State supervision" and, in vote number 1483-2001 (protection action of a group of notaries against the Directorate that regulates them) in which it alluded to "...a conflict between being a public official and simultaneously exercising ANOTHER FUNCTION —which is also public— such as that of the notary." On the other hand, the Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Section One, in vote number 293-2001, has stated that "The notary is the private exercise of the public function, therefore notaries are not public officials, although they do have a special relationship of subjection for this reason." Thus, if in Criminal Law a restrictive interpretation governs (Article 2 of the Penal Code) derived from the pro libertates principle, and if, from the foregoing, it is possible to derive that, depending on the theoretical position assumed, the notary public may or may not be considered a public official, the most limited thesis must be adhered to, which, in any case, proceeds to exclude him from such consideration, since, although he performs a public function, he does not have the benefits of being a public official to the point that he is even penalized for being one. The Legal System starts from the Hermetic Plenitude (Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power), that is, from its own coherence, so it is unthinkable that, for some purposes (labor, sanctioning, to eliminate the State's subsidiary liability, etc.) he is excluded from said condition, but is taken into account to repress him criminally. For the foregoing reasons, **in the opinion of this Chamber, it is not possible to apply the second paragraph of 366 of the Penal Code to notaries public for the purpose of increasing their penalty for inserting false data into a public or authentic document, or for falsifying a document.** Thus, **the position that, without greater elaboration, may have been held on previous occasions is expressly modified** and the quick reference that the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice made on the subject in vote number 475-F-93 is not endorsed. For example, in vote number 2014-236 —K. Jiménez, R. Chinchilla and J. Arce — in which it was stated*:…( ) *“…it must be distinguished that although there is no doubt that the practice of the profession of lawyer and notary is carried out in a liberal and private form, the law warns that whoever performs it acquires the condition of “public official,” in this case of “public attestor,” it being irrelevant whether that person is linked to the public service or exists a hierarchical relationship with the Public Administration or the Civil Service that determines their quality of "public servant." This, because, by its nature, the notary performs essentially public work, regardless of whether they are part of the Public Administration…” ( ) “…Consequently, the judgment must be reversed on this issue and the facts reclassified, from this venue, as a simple ideological falsehood, without aggravating circumstances, that is, governed by the first paragraph of Article 366 of the Penal Code (by referral of 367 ibidem), which punishes the conduct with a penalty of **one to six years of imprisonment**…”* (cfr, folios 1672 vto to 1675 fte, the bold and underline are from the original).* **B. Precedents of the Chamber of Criminal Cassation.** In resolution No. 475-F-93, of 08:50 hours, of August 27, 1993, the Magistrates of the Third Chamber who sat on that opportunity, considered that, because the accused was a notary, the crime of ideological falsehood was aggravated; however, since only the appeal of the accused was known, the principle of reformation in peius was applicable. In this regard, they noted: *“…it must be pointed out that contrary to what the sentenced party claims, conditions do indeed concur in the case to consider that we are in the presence of the aggravation. Having proven that the accused is a lawyer and notary public, and that taking advantage of his condition as a notary public, according to the title that accredited him as such, using the protocol granted to him for that reason by the Supreme Court of Justice, even assuming he was suspended at the time of his actions, he executed several documents of false content, it is clear that the accused acted taking advantage of his condition as a public official and of the instruments he had for holding the quality of notary public. In reality, it should be noted that when the law states that falsification is aggravated when committed by a public official acting in the exercise of their functions, it is not actually intending to indicate that the crime is part of the exercise of their functions in the strict sense. No public official has among their attributions the performance of criminal acts, and to that extent practically no crime could be understood as committed in the exercise of public functions, since all crimes are outside the exercise of public functions. In reality, with that phrase what has been intended to indicate is that the act is committed by the public official on the occasion of the exercise of their functions, or taking advantage of their condition as a public official, but it could never be affirmed in a strict sense that it must be committed in the exercise of their functions. When the official commits the crime "...in the exercise of their functions...", they do so by abusing their office, exceeding their attributions, taking advantage of their condition, but not in the strict exercise of their functions. However, as stated, the Court did not apply in this matter the cause for aggravation because the sentenced party acted on the occasion of their functions as a notary public, and the Chamber cannot aggravate their situation because it only hears appeals in favor of the accused (prohibition of reformatio in peius)…”*. For its part, in vote No. 2004-01046, of 09:22 hours, of August 27, 2004, the Third Chamber annulled a judgment of definitive dismissal issued by the Trial Court, considering that the criminal act charged was an ideological falsehood aggravated by having been committed by a notary public, since the *a quo* computed the prescription starting from the assumption that it was a simple criminal modality. On this point, the Chamber of Criminal Cassation noted: *“…as is evident from the accusatory document, the defendant [Name 004]. was identified as the possible responsible author of a crime of ideological falsehood and it is supposed that he committed it, in his condition as notary public, when drawing up a deed in which he appears as debtor of the Bank…precisely the offended party and plaintiff here [Name 005]., a fact that also occurred on July 15, 1996. That is, he is blamed for being the alleged responsible author of an ideological falsehood committed in his character as a public official and whose penalty, in such a case, can be up to a maximum of eight years of imprisonment. Given this circumstance, differently from what was decided by the Court in sustaining the definitive dismissal it issued, the criminal action in the present case did not prescribe three years after the first formal imputation was made to the defendant, which occurred with the preliminary statement on February 14 of the year 2000 (thus folio 9), but when four years had elapsed since this act was executed. This term is also the one that corresponds to half of the initial prescription period that is provided for this class of crime (which is eight years), but which changed to four years after it was interrupted with the “**first formal imputation**” *” of the crime. Now then, why is it estimated that in this case the penalty provided for this crime could be eight years? This is because in this class of acts, the notary public is considered a public official, in accordance with Articles 1 of the Notarial Code and 111 of the General Law of Public Administration and 59 and 60 of the Penal Code. In this sense, Article 1 of the Notarial Code is very clear in indicating that it refers to a public official, because although it defines the **notariate*** as a “**public function exercised privately**”, it immediately warns that the person who performs this activity does so as an “**enabled official** *”. Likewise, numeral 111 of the General Law of Public Administration explains that the public official is determined by the specific function that a person performs or provides to the Administration and not so much the link to it under a remunerative, imperative, permanent, or representative regime. On the scope of the concept of **public official**, it is worth remembering what this Chamber had said on the matter, explaining that: “Indeed, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has repeatedly pointed out that the concept of public official is much broader in Criminal Law than in other areas of the legal system, using a criterion that modern doctrine points out as objective, according to which what matters is that a function that is in its essence public is performed. It is then the nature of the activity and not its link to the Administration what, among other aspects, characterizes the public official (see especially the resolutions of this Chamber Nos. 103-F of 10:30 hrs. on June 2, 1989, and 104-F of 9:15 hrs. on April 27, 1990, where said concept was exhaustively analyzed).” (**Third Chamber of the Court**, vote **No. 208-F** of 9:30 hours on June 10, 1994). In other words, what is important in these cases is the “**public** ” character of the task or “**function**” performed and not whether the person who performs it is subject to a special regime -of a labor nature- with respect to the Administration. Likewise, it has been specifically said that **the notary public is considered a public official*** by virtue of the activity or “ **function** ” they perform…”* (the bold is from the original).* In similar terms, through judgment No. 2010-00923, of 11:25 hours, of August 27, 2010, this Chamber of Cassation stated: *“…Having acted in his condition as notary public, for all purposes the accused had the condition of public official, as established by Article 1 of the Notarial Code (law number 7764 of April 17, 1998). So the prescription regime for such acts is not only the one prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code, but the one particularly established by the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (number 8422, of October 29, 2004)…”*. In turn, in resolution No. 2011-00273, of 09:38 hours, of March 11, 2011, issued by this Chamber, it was stated*: “…we have that from the first block of charged acts, regarding J. there is only an ideological falsehood (as will be seen, in its simple modality), and regarding [Name 006]., an ideological falsehood aggravated by her condition as notary, a use of a false document, and a crime of fraud to the detriment of I. (these last two crimes derive from fact three of the accusation). The reasons why the condition of public official, which [Name 006]. held in her capacity as notary, for the purpose of aggravating the crime of ideological falsehood, was not communicable to J., lie in the poor technique with which the accusation was drafted. It was remiss in pointing out that J. knew or took advantage of the public function exercised by the accused notaries, to commit the crime. Being a subjective element that modifies the legal classification applicable to J., it had to be contained, even if in a summary way, in the accusatory document…” ( ) “…It happens then, regarding the second block of events, that J. is charged with only one crime of ideological falsehood, which is prescribed (for the same reasons as the other crime of the same species), while [Name 006]. is attributed an ideological falsehood (aggravated because it was committed using her quality of public attestor)…”*. Likewise, in judgment No. 2012-00228, of 10:00 hours, of February 17, 2012, this Chamber referred to the scope of the concept of public official, in its relationship with the notariate and with the aggravating circumstance contained in Article 366 of the Penal Code (at that time, numeral 359 of that same legal text), the above, based on what it provided in resolutions 103-F, of 10:30 hours, of June 2, 1989, 104-F, of 9:15 hours, of April 27, 1990, 208-F, of 9:30 hours, of June 10, 1994, and 2004-1046, of 9:22 hours, of August 27, 2004, concluding that, in that specific case, the prescription of the criminal action had been erroneously declared, given that the reduced period by half for the crime of ideological falsehood was four years, as the aggravating circumstance existed that affected two defendants, who acted in their condition as notaries public. **C. Recent position held by the Constitutional Chamber.** An action of unconstitutionality having been filed in 2016 in criminal expediente No. 14-420-0612-PE, processed before the Constitutional Chamber under No. 16-005583-0007-CO, against the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber that has interpreted that the notary public holds the condition of public official for the purpose of applying criminal law, specifically, the criminal type of ideological falsehood contemplated in Article 367 of the Penal Code, and that, for this circumstance of proving guilt, they are entitled to the aggravated penalty contained in ordinal 366 of this same legal text for public officials, and not the ordinary penalty, the Constitutional Chamber, by a majority vote of five of the seven Magistrates, in resolution 2017-08043, of 11:50 hours, of May 26, 2017, partially declared unconstitutional the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that considers the notary public to be a public official. Given the importance of this ruling, we proceed to transcribe the most relevant ideas of the same for the purposes of the case at hand. Regarding the legal nature of the notary public, the Highest Constitutional Body noted: *“…Two norms of the Notarial Code, Law No. 7764 of April 17, 1998, are particularly significant for this purpose. Numeral 1 establishes that “The notariate public is the public function exercised privately. Through it, the enabled official advises persons on the correct legal formation of their will in legal acts or contracts and attests to the existence of facts that occur before him.” Certainly, this legal norm qualifies the notariate as a “public function,” in the sense that the notary public is, essentially, a public attestor who gives full faith, for legal purposes, of a series of facts and acts of legal relevance. With which it is evident that the correct exercise of the notarial function has an unequivocal public interest or public relevance, given the implications that any error committed intentionally or not by a public attestor has. However, from such legal qualification, it is not possible to conclude that the notary public is a public official, in the sense defined by the block of legality to which the criminal judge must necessarily refer to impose a sentence. On the other hand, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Notarial Code is more precise in indicating that “The notary public is the professional in Law, specialist in Notarial and Registral Law, legally enabled to exercise the notarial function (…).” It is necessary to harmonize the two already cited norms with Articles 30 and 31 of the Notarial Code, to avoid falling into an isolated interpretation and application of Article 1, for the sake of a contextual and systematic hermeneutics. Thus, numeral 30 establishes that “The person authorized to practice the notariate, in the exercise of this function, legitimizes and authenticates the acts in which they intervene, subject to the regulations of this code and any other resulting from special laws, for which purpose **they enjoy public faith*** *(…)” (the highlighting is not from the original). For its part, ordinal 31 establishes that “**The notary has public faith** when they record a fact, event, situation, act, or legal contract, whose purpose is to ensure or record rights and obligations (…) **By virtue of public faith, the manifestations of the notary** that appear in the instruments and other documents authorized by them are presumed true.” (the highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, as a general rule, the notary public, then, is a liberal professional who exercises a notarial function of relevance or clear public interest, by attesting to a series of facts and acts, without for this circumstance being able to be considered as a public official…”* (The bold is from the original). For its part, regarding the notion of public official in the block of legality, the Constitutional Chamber indicated: *“…To determine the criminal responsibility of a person who is classified (sic) by a criminal type as a public official, it is necessarily required to refer to the notion of public official established by the legal system and, particularly, the law, in order to respect and act upon the already mentioned principles of legality and specificity in criminal matters. On this particular, the General Law of the Public Administration since 1978, established a clear and precise definition of public official by prescribing in its Article 111 the following: “1. A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with entire independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity. 2. For this purpose, the terms "public official," "public servant," "public employee," "person in charge of public service," and similar ones are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. 3. Employees of economic companies or services of the State in charge of operations subject to common law are not considered public servants.” This conception of public official, obviously, is not absolute; a special or sectoral law may determine a more flexible notion, including for purposes of expanding the sphere of administrative and criminal responsibility. This is what happened with the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function of 2004, whose Article 2 broadened the notion of public official by providing the following: “**Public servant.** For the purposes of this Law, a public servant shall be considered any person who provides their services in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, state and non-state, in the name and on behalf of it and as part of its organization, by virtue of an act of investiture and with entire independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity. The terms official, servant, and public employee shall be equivalent for the purposes of this Law.

The provisions of this Law shall be applicable to de facto officials and to persons who work for public enterprises in any of their forms and for public entities responsible for activities subject to common law; likewise, to the agents, administrators, managers, and legal representatives of legal entities that custody, administer, or exploit funds, goods, or services of the Public Administration, by any title or management modality.” This precept of the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, as can be seen, in addition to reiterating the terms of the General Law of Public Administration of 1978, in paragraph 2 extends the notion of public official even to persons who are not public officials from the perspective of Administrative Law, such as the agents, administrators, managers, or representatives of legal entities that administer or exploit funds, goods, or services of the public administration by any title or modality. Thus, the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, may well extend the notion of public official to a notary public. What cannot be done by way of extensive judicial interpretation is to extrapolate the notion of public official to the notary public, since this would clearly and manifestly violate the principles of legality and legal reserve in matters of crimes, penalties, and their aggravation. Just as the challenged jurisprudential guideline has done by extensively applying the aggravated penalty of paragraph 2 of Article 366 of the Criminal Code, provided for public officials in the exercise of their functions, to notaries public…”. The Constitutional Chamber having clarified the circumstance that the notary public cannot be deemed a public official, it makes an exception for the notary public who has been hired by a public entity (on staff), who, for these purposes, does act as a public official. On this point it noted: “…It does not go unnoticed by this Constitutional Court that there exist notaries public who do share the status of public official, having been hired as such by a public entity. In such cases, since they are public officials, the principle of legality and legal reserve is fulfilled, it being evident that, in such cases, the notary does have the status of public official (e.g., State or institutional notaries). This figure is not the ordinary one regarding the exercise of the notarial function…”. Based on the considerations set forth, the Constitutional Body ordered “…to partially declare unconstitutional the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that considers the notary public to be a public official. The jurisprudential guideline must remain in force when applied to notaries public who are paid a salary in a public entity for performing that work as a public official. The declaration of unconstitutionality shall have declarative and retroactive effects to the date of entry into force of the challenged jurisprudence, without prejudice to legal relationships or situations consolidated by prescription, expiration, judgment with the authority of material res judicata, the consummation of materially or technically irreversible facts, and rights acquired in good faith. With respect to persons who are serving a custodial sentence by final judgment, aggravated based on the challenged jurisprudential line that must be declared unconstitutional, their sentence must be reduced, and in the event they have already completed it due to this reduction, they must be released, unless the execution of another final conviction or a current pretrial detention measure prevents it…”. In conclusion, the thesis of the Constitutional Chamber in vote 2017-08043, at 11:50 a.m., of May 26, 2017, was to consider that the notary public must not be deemed a public official unless they have been hired as such by a public entity.

D. Arguments that lead this Chamber to dismiss the first two grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. Pursuant to Article 367 of the Criminal Code, the penalty of one to six years' imprisonment provided for in Article 366 of that normative body is applicable “…to anyone who inserts or causes to be inserted in a public or authentic document false statements concerning a fact that the document is intended to prove, such that harm may result”, given that, according to the second paragraph of the first of those articles “…If the act is committed by a public official in the exercise of their functions, the penalty shall be from two to eight years”. Based on Article 1 of the Notarial Code, when referring to the nature of the notarial profession, the Constitutional Chamber has stated: “…the notarial profession is a public function carried out privately (see, among others, judgment No. 2006-014008 at 9:46 a.m. of September 22, 2006). By its legal nature, this function must be exercised within the powers and limitations that the legal system provides, and it is the State’s responsibility, through the mechanisms it deems appropriate, to ensure the proper fulfillment of the duties and obligations of notaries…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgments No. 2015-09849, at 09:05 a.m., of July 1, 2015 and 2015-06002, at 09:05 a.m., of April 29, 2015). This Criminal Cassation Chamber has held in various rulings, as set forth in the background contained in section B of this Considering, that the aggravating factor of public official contained in ideological falsehood applies to the notary public. Now, it is the case that, in the specific matter, judgment 2015-01075, issued by the Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, even though it contradicts the precedents dictated by this Criminal Cassation Chamber, the truth is that it is consistent with what the highest Constitutional body has recently ordered, in the sense that the jurisprudential line of this Criminal Cassation Chamber is unconstitutional in deeming that the notary public is a public official. It must be remembered that, pursuant to Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Law No. 7135, of October 11, 1989, “The jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself”. Thus, by Constitutional imperative, the jurisprudential criterion is unified in the sense that the aggravating factor contained in the second paragraph of Article 366 of the Criminal Code, in relation to Article 367 of that same normative body, is not applicable to the notary public who commits the crime of ideological falsehood, unless they have been hired as such by a public entity, a circumstance that is not applicable to the accused Carmen María Amador Pereira. As a consequence of the foregoing, the first and second grounds of the cassation appeal filed by Mr. Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, are dismissed, upholding what was ordered by the Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in judgment 2015-01075, at 09:15 a.m., of July 30, 2015, insofar as it reclassified the acts committed against [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009] as three simple ideological falsehood crimes. Regarding the acts against [Name 010], refer to Considering IV. A ruling is omitted with respect to the case in which [Name 003] appears as the injured party, given the remand ordered by the ad quem, as well as taking into account that this Criminal Cassation Chamber declared the claim inadmissible regarding that point according to resolution 2016-00139, at 2:59 p.m., of February 9, 2016.

III.Cassation appeal filed by Ms. Engie Marín Pandolfi, private defense attorney for the accused Carmen María Amador Pereira. In the sole ground admitted (first), she alleges the existence of contradictory precedents. According to the appellant, the Sentence Appeals Court reclassified the facts regarding the joinder issue between the crime of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, changing the criterion they had maintained up to that point, and against the position argued by this Criminal Cassation Chamber in judgment number 2011-1204, from which she cites an excerpt. She concludes that, as there is a jurisprudential contradiction, the decision adopted by the ad quem caused harm to the accused that violated due process. She requests that the challenged judgment be quashed. The claim is dismissed, despite the existence of contradictory precedents, as no specific harm has been verified and the criterion of the Sentence Appeals Court is acceptable (following the thesis this Chamber has adopted in the majority of judgments issued on the subject) in the sense that ideological falsehoods absorb the uses of false documents. In the first place, it must be stated that this Criminal Cassation Chamber, for a long time, categorically and uniformly, has adopted the criterion that between the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document there exists an apparent joinder (concurso aparente) of norms, in the event that the same person performs both actions; however, taking into account that the composition of this Chamber has not been the same over the years, two different criteria have been maintained as to which of the crimes contains or absorbs the other. In this sense, as will be seen, the criterion adopted by the Sentence Appeals Court in the specific case (judgment 2015-01075) is contrary to the thesis held by this Cassation Chamber in votes 2011-00325, 2011-01204, 2012-01227, and 2014-00665; however, it is consistent with what was stated by this Chamber in judgments 2004-00936, 2008-00584, 2010-01098, 2012-01181, 2013-01641, and 2014-00304.

A. Position of the Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the case under review. In the present matter, regarding the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, the Sentence Appeals Court stated: “…In other words, it has been reiterated that if the legal interest (bien jurídico) is similar in both types (public trust, since although ideological falsehood has an additional legal interest, it also protects the purity of the document, as does the use of a false document); if this latter offense is merely a consequence of the former, insofar as the possibility of causing danger—a requirement of the first type—only arises with the use; if there is a common author’s plan, they share the iter criminis, and there is spatial-temporal proximity between the facts of the two figures, we are before an apparent joinder (concurso aparente) of norms, when both crimes are committed by the same person. In such a case, the crime with greater disvalue absorbs the other. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 367, in relation to Article 366, second paragraph, both of the Criminal Code, the penalties for the offense of ideological falsehood are from one to six years (in the first paragraph) and from two to eight years (in the case of public officials, an aspect on which a subsequent precision must be made), while that for the use of a false document, according to the tenor of Article 373 (sic) ibidem, is from one to six years' imprisonment. Since this is a sanction similar to the former, in the first paragraph, but not for the second, it is obvious that the legislator considered the first crime more serious, not only because it imposed aggravating factors but also because it established, as an element of the type, the need that it may cause harm, which only happens with its effective use. Likewise, if it were considered that the use of the false document predominates over the falsification (or falsehood), it would lead to the absurdity that the final act has a lesser penalty than the first event, which breaks the rules of subsidiarity in matters of apparent joinder (concurso aparente), in which doctrine accepts the prior, concomitant, or subsequent unpunished act, provided that those events that are not punished have a lesser disvalue than the one that is sanctioned. Therefore, the first crime predominates over the second and not the reverse, as proposed by the appellants, even decontextualizing the jurisprudence they use in support of their thesis, which states the opposite of the conclusion they draw, a conclusion which, in any case, for the reasons stated above, is not always shared. Therefore, given that, as recorded on pages 1469 to 1471, the a quo court convicted the defendant of four crimes (one of which has been annulled above but to which, by the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius, what is indicated herein will be equally applicable, should a conviction be reached) of ideological falsehood in ideal joinder (concurso ideal) with the use of a false document (without explaining why they did not exclude each other) and imposed, for the first offenses, three years' imprisonment and, for the second, one year's imprisonment (although it later indicated that it did not increase the penalty for the most serious act: see page 1471), it is proper to partially grant the claim, revoke the judgment insofar as it considered the facts in ideal joinder (concurso ideal) and instead, from this venue (since remanding is not necessary), decree that what is constituted is an apparent joinder (concurso aparente), in which the ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document, and, consequently, the penalty imposed for this latter offense must be annulled. However, as mentioned, this has no practical repercussions, because the penalty for the use of the document was not used to increase the one set for the most serious crime. Ergo, the penalties remain the same, without prejudice to what may be indicated in the following section, that is, three years' imprisonment for each of the three ideological falsehood crimes and nine years' imprisonment in total…” (cfr, pages 1671 verso to 1672 recto).

B. Thesis of the Third Chamber that considers that the use of a false document absorbs ideological falsehood. This Chamber, in vote No. 2011-00325, considered that in those situations where the accused uses documents containing false statements made by them, it is a case of the crime of use of a false document, which subsumes the disvalue of the preceding action. In this regard, it was stated: “…the use of a false document (Article 365 of that legal body) consists of the employment of a document whose falsehood can be in its content or its materiality, so the use of a false document encompasses the use both of documents that are falsified or adulterated, and those that, while original, contain false statements. For the case at hand, the use of a false document can refer both to those documents that were falsified and to those that contain an ideological falsehood. But, precisely because the crimes are consummated when those false documents are put into circulation or used, if the author or authors of the falsifications or ideological falsehoods are the same ones who later use those documents, it will be a single crime, consisting of the use of a false document, because it is only then that the possibility of harm is created…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2011-00325, at 10:09 a.m., of March 25, 2011). Under this same approach, in resolution No. 2011-01204, this Chamber affirmed: “…In the case under study, we find that, due to the consummation nature of the crime of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, they are consummated at the moment they are used publicly, that is, at the same moment, the presentation of the document before the Property Registry, which happens regardless of the time elapsed between the making of the false document and its use. For the purpose of the action and a violation of the same protected legal interest, that is, public trust, are verified at the same moment, since despite the falsehood of the document or the false information contained therein, if that document is not publicly used, no offense is constituted. Thus, both actions maintain a unity, containing the same purpose and permanence over time, producing the same injurious result to the same legal interest, thereby verifying the apparent joinder (concurso aparente) of norms, which the appellant rightly claims…” ( ) “…By virtue of the foregoing, the appellant's claim is granted, and the judgment is quashed in this respect, the facts held as proven in the judgment under cassation are reclassified as constituting a single crime of use of a false document, in apparent joinder (concurso aparente) with the crime of ideological falsehood…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2011-01204, at 09:10 a.m., of September 29, 2011). This same line was followed by this Cassation Chamber in ruling No. 2012-01227, in which, for the purposes of interest here, it was stated: “…In the matter under study, there is no doubt that the accused made use of a false document, in which, to his knowledge, it was stated that he was another person. So this constituted the use of a false document, which thus devalued the falsification of said document that E.G. might have committed, given that the danger of those actions (ideological falsehood or document falsification) against the legal interest only arose with the use of the false document that was proven against him, without it being possible to say before that he had affected public trust. Therefore, he could not be sanctioned for those actions, but only for the criminality constituted by the use of a false document. Consequently, the appellant must be granted the reason, reclassifying the facts to a crime of use of a false document…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2012-01227, at 12:26 p.m., of August 17, 2012). Finally, in vote 2014-00665, this Cassation Chamber indicated: “…There exists an apparent joinder (concurso aparente), in the terms defined by Article 23 of the Criminal Code, when the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document are carried out by the same person, since it involves an affectation of the same legal interest by two situations in a relationship of consumption (consunción)…” ( ) “…In this case, the a quo court erroneously classified the facts as constituting the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document in material joinder (concurso material) (at 18:41:40 hours of the Oral Judgment), despite having proven that it was the same accused who drafted the deed with false information, and who presented said deed to the Public Registry. Thus, the appellant is correct on this ground, so the facts are reclassified as constituting only a crime of use of a false document. Because the facts were originally classified as two crimes in material joinder (concurso material), for purposes of the penalty, a remand hearing is unnecessary, as there already exists an amount of penalty set for the crime of use of a false document, which the Court set at one year's imprisonment and which has not been challenged…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2014-00665, at 10:54 a.m., of April 4, 2014).

C. Position of the Third Chamber that considers that ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document. In judgment No. 2004-00936, this Cassation Chamber, based on recognized foreign doctrine, held that in cases where the author of the false document themselves uses it, there are not two typically distinct and independent conducts, but rather the use of a false document is absorbed by the ideological falsehood or, as the case may be, by the falsification of a document. When addressing this issue, it was stated: “…According to the very nature of the crime of falsification and the way in which it is drafted (see Art. 360 of the Criminal Code), the subsequent use of the document that the same person falsifies is part of the disvalue of action contained in this offense to the extent that it requires the possibility of harm at the time of making it. On this point, the doctrine states the following: ‘The general principle recognized here is that the type of Art. 296 does not contemplate the conduct of one who falsified and later uses the falsified document; therefore, a situation of apparent joinder (concurso aparente) arises: the different figures of document falsification and that of use of a false document exclude each other when they are constituted by conduct of the same subject; when the use of the falsified document is what creates the danger or causes the harm characteristic of the type of falsification previously committed, it would be a gross violation of the ne bis in idem principle to punish that use by applying two different figures (...) in cases where the prior falsification is ideological or material of public documents (...) what then occurs is that if the use is not a necessary factor for consummation, it is not excluded from it either: the use does nothing more than continue the consummation and, consequently, the solution cannot be different. Therefore, it is beyond discussion that the author of the falsification who at the same time uses the document cannot be punished simultaneously for that falsification and for this use; they can only be punished for the first crime.’ (CREUS, Carlos: Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, Volume 2, 5th Edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1996, p. 476). Following this doctrinal position, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has expressed in similar terms that: ‘if the author of the use is also the author of the falsification, they will be responsible only for this latter offense, whereas if the author of that offense cannot be held responsible for the falsification, they will answer only for the use, if they have used the false document (cfr. FONTAN BALESTRA, Carlos: Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 10th Edition, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, p. 980; BREGLIA ARIAS, Omar and other: Código Penal Comentado, Anotado y Concordado, 2nd Edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 295; CREUS, Carlos: Falsificación de Documentos en General, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1986, p. 204 to 206, and; NÚÑEZ, Ricardo: Manual de Derecho penal Parte Especial, Ediciones Lerner, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 483 to 484).’ (see vote No. 33 at 9:05 a.m. of January 24, 1997). Consequently, according to the account of facts that the Court holds as proven, it is clearly not a case of two independent conducts, but only a single crime of falsification (ideological falsehood)…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2004-00936, at 3:55 p.m., of August 6, 2004, the highlight is from the original). Under this same position, in resolution No. 2008-00584, this Chamber stated: “…Given the particular characteristics of the case in relation to [Name 012], one could not think of the existence of an ideal joinder (concurso ideal), because we find ourselves before a single action in a legal sense, which injures two norms that exclude each other, as they constitute different degrees of affectation of the same legal interest (public trust). For this reason, the third claim as formulated by the private defense attorney of R.A.C. must be granted, and by virtue thereof, the judgment is partially annulled, regarding the legal classification corresponding to the facts proven against him. The legal classification is corrected, and consequently, R.A.C. must be acquitted of the crime of use of a false document, and instead, only the conviction for falsification of a public document remains unaltered, reclassified as ideological falsehood in the terms already analyzed in the first considering of this resolution…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2008-00584, at 10:18 a.m., of May 23, 2008, the bold is from the original). A similar criterion was held in 2010, applying the criterion of consumption (consunción), establishing: “…we have that the accused R, in his condition as notary public, drafted the false deed, with the purpose of achieving, through its presentation to the Public Registry, the exclusion of a valid annotation regarding the sale of a part of the property that had been the property of V, hence the registration of the deed whose content was not real by the notary and accused R was the manner in which the harm materialized.

From this perspective, we are in the presence of an apparent concurrence of offenses (concurso aparente de delitos) between ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica) and the use of a false document (uso de documento falso), which would exclude the application of the ideal concurrence of norms (concurso ideal de normas) carried out by the Tribunal, since the wrongfulness (disvalor) of the use of a false document in this case would form part of the unjust content of the ideological falsehood, hence the appropriate course is to order a conviction for a single illicit act. Both offenses, pursuant to the provisions of numerals 360 and 365 of the Penal Code, carry the same penalty, from one to six years of imprisonment, but ideological falsehood is considered the more serious offense, since in a public or authentic document made by someone by reason of their profession, in this case a notary public, declarations were recorded that are presumed true, accepted as true before others unless proven otherwise. In accordance with the foregoing and in application of the principle of **consumption (consunción),** which implies that when the commission of a more serious factual scenario –ideological falsehood– includes that of another of lesser entity –use of a false document, the former is applied and not the latter, as it is considered practically included in the more severe regulation, the appropriate action is to grant this part of the challenge regarding the legal characterization, which must be corrected in accordance with the facts deemed proven…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2010-01098, of 12:03 p.m., of October 15, 2010, bold in the original). Through judgment No. 2012-01181, this Criminal Chamber pointed out: *“…based on what was proven in the ruling, the facts constitute an offense of ideological falsehood (article 360 of the Penal Code), there being an apparent concurrence of norms in relation to the use of a false document. See that, according to the list of proven facts, we are not faced with two independent legal actions, but only with a single illicit act, that of ideological falsehood, consisting of the preparation of a cadastral plan into which false data were inserted regarding its location, boundaries, and measurement, a plan that was presented before the National Cadastre for its registration. Finding ourselves before an apparent concurrence of norms, the proper course is to convict solely for the offense of ideological falsehood. Consequently, the appealed judgment is* ***partially*** *annulled and, ex officio, the conduct is recharacterized as a single illicit act of ideological falsehood, leaving the penalty at one year of imprisonment, as was set by the sentencing Tribunal…”* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2012-01181, of 10:23 a.m., of August 17, 2012, bold in the original). Similarly, in ruling No. 2013-01641, being faced with an apparent concurrence between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, this Chamber recharacterized the facts as constituting this latter criminal illicit act. In this regard, it was stated: *“…in this case there is also an apparent concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, therefore it is appropriate to recharacterize the facts as constituting solely an offense of ideological falsehood in ideal concurrence with the offense of fraud (estafa). Now then, despite the foregoing, in view of the fact that when setting the penalty for the ideal concurrence the Tribunal set the penalty for the greater offense (fraud) at five years and decided not to increase it; the recharacterization made does not affect the penalty imposed, which remains at five years without the need for remand. For all the foregoing reasons, since there is an apparent concurrence between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, the ground is partially granted only with regard to this aspect, and the facts are recharacterized as constituting an offense of ideological falsehood and others of fraud…”* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2013-01641, of 10:57 a.m., of November 1, 2013). More recently, in vote No. 2014-00304, this Chamber of Cassation proceeded to find that only the offense of ideological falsehood was configured given the concurrence between this illicit act and the use of a false document. It pronounced in the following terms: *“…regarding the subsequent analysis made by the Judges on the topic of concurrences, this Chamber does find an error that must be corrected. According to the Judges, the facts constitute three offenses of ideological falsehood and three offenses of use of a false document on the occasion of fraud (f. 1659). However, on this point there are repeated pronouncements by the Third Chamber, in which it has been indicated that between the offense of ideological falsehood and that of the use of a false document there cannot be an ideal concurrence, when the agents of the falsehood are also the same ones who make the use of the false document, as it is rather an apparent concurrence…” ( ) “…According to the foregoing, in this case there is also an apparent concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and those of the use of a false document, so it is appropriate to recharacterize the facts as constituting solely three offenses of ideological falsehood in ideal concurrence with three offenses of major fraud (estafa mayor). In view of the fact that in this case it was deemed proven that the defendants D.H.P. and E.M.J.C., acted jointly, it is appropriate to apply the extensive effect of the recharacterization of the facts to both accused. For all the foregoing, since there is an apparent concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and the offenses of the use of a false document, the ground is partially granted only with regard to this aspect, and the facts are recharacterized as constituting solely three offenses of ideological falsehood and three offenses of major fraud, with extensive effect to both accused…”* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment No. 2014-00304, of 08:43 a.m., of March 7, 2014). **D. Unifying Criterion of this Criminal Cassation Chamber.** In the case under examination, the Trial Tribunal convicted the defendant Carmen María Amador Pereira for four offenses of ideological falsehood in material concurrence (concurso material), the same, in turn, in ideal concurrence with four offenses of the use of a false document committed to the detriment of [Name 002], [Name 003], [Name 008] and [Name 009] and the public faith (fe pública), imposing on her three years of imprisonment for each of the ideological falsehoods and one year of imprisonment for each use of a false document, resulting in nine years of imprisonment in application of the rules on concurrence of offenses (reglas concursales) (cfr, folios 1449-1478, Volume III). For its part, the Court of Appeals: *i)* annulled the appealed judgment only insofar as it declared the accused responsible as the perpetrator of the offenses of ideological falsehood and use of a false document to the detriment of [Name 003] (remand on which this Chamber will not pronounce itself, having declared the claim inadmissible with respect to said point according to resolution 2016-00139, of 2:59 p.m., of February 9, 2016), ordering remand before a new integration of the *a quo* so that, with respect for the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius (reforma en perjuicio), the possibility of resolving the dispute through a conciliation (conciliación) is assessed, if the parties propose and accept it again; *ii)* revoked the judgment insofar as it typified the facts as an ideal concurrence between the offenses of ideological falsehood and use of a false document to, instead, decree that what is configured is an apparent concurrence of norms between both, in which the falsehood absorbs the use and, consequently, annulled (without remand) the penalty imposed for the use of a false document (which, ultimately, the *a quo* did not use to increase that of the greater offense) in relation to the aggrieved parties [Name 002], [Name 008] and [Name 009]; *iii)* revoked the judgment insofar as it considered that it was dealing with the figure of aggravated ideological falsehood (articles 367 and 366 second paragraph of the Penal Code) and, instead, declared that what is typified is simple ideological falsehood (first paragraph of numeral 366 of the Penal Code) and, as a consequence thereof, annulled the penalty imposed, ordering remand before a new integration of the court of first instance so that, with respect for the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius and starting from the characterization set forth here (simple offenses and in apparent concurrence), they set the penalty (cfr, folios 1655-1680, Volume IV). In relation to point *iii)*, this Chamber issued its criterion in Considerando II, and it is appropriate to pronounce at this moment on section *ii)*, that is, on the concurrence that appears between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document. In the criterion of this Chamber, the *ad quem* is correct in concluding that the offense of ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document under the assumption that both actions are carried out by the same person. This thesis is based on two solid arguments: a) the legislator considered the offense of ideological falsehood more serious, contemplating its commission under an aggravated modality; b) it was included as an element of said criminal type, the necessity that it may cause harm, which occurs with the effective use. This position has important doctrinal support. For several decades, the jurist Sebastián Soler indicated *“…The use of a false document has great importance in doctrine and legislation from a double point of view: as an autonomous or relatively autonomous figure and as an integral part of some falsehoods…”* (Soler, Sebastián. **Derecho Penal Argentino,** Volume V, Tipográfica Editora Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 355), which is complemented by what was indicated by Muñoz Conde in the sense that *“…The falsification of a document naturally leads to its use. Therefore, if the use is carried out by the falsifier himself, it is a subsequent unpunishable act…”* (Muñoz Conde, Francisco. **Derecho Penal. Parte Especial**, 18th Edition, Editorial Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 2010, p. 755), which without a doubt is applicable to the offense of ideological falsehood as a modality of falsehood. As indicated by the Court of Appeals, the *a quo*'s decision to consider that an ideal concurrence appeared between the offenses of use of a false document and ideological falsehood was erroneous, given that since the same person is the perpetrator of those actions, in this case, the defendant Carmen Amador Pereira, the reproach of the first illicit act is contained in the second (consumption of the wrongfulness). This being the case, the sole admitted ground of the cassation appeal filed by attorney Engie Marín Pandolfi, private defense counsel for the accused, is denied; the line of jurisprudence is unified in the sense that an apparent concurrence of norms appears between the offenses of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, under the assumption that it is the same person who carries out both actions, it being necessary to understand that the ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document. In relation to this point, the provisions of the Court of Appeals in judgment No. 2015-01075, of 09:15 a.m., of July 30, 2015, are maintained, insofar as it annulled (without remand) the penalty imposed for the use of a false document (which, ultimately, the *a quo* did not use to increase that of the greater offense), it being a case of simple ideological falsehoods, for the acts committed to the detriment of [Name 002], [Name 008] and [Name 009], it being necessary to proceed as ordered by the *ad quem*, which annulled the penalty imposed and ordered remand before a new integration of the court of first instance so that, with respect for the principle of reformatio in peius and starting from the characterization set forth (simple offenses and in apparent concurrence), the penalty is imposed. The part relating to the declaration of instrumental falsehood (falsedad instrumental) of the deeds and the testimonials derived from them is kept unaltered, as well as the marriage declarations and any legal effect that said legal instruments may have produced, specifically in relation to the aggrieved parties [Name 002], [Name 008] and [Name 009]. **IV. In the** **third ground raised by attorney Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público),** he alleges erroneous application of procedural precepts, concretely, numerals 2, 7, 36 and 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The challenger supports his reproach on numerals 437, 439 and 468 paragraph b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a reasoning error (error de fundamentación) by endorsing the Trial Tribunal’s position of permitting, once the trial was already advanced, a conciliation for the case of the aggrieved party [Name 010], against what is provided by the applicable regulations and the Constitutional Chamber. He states that the *ad quem* confirmed the *a quo*'s decision indicating that in vote number 5836-99, the Constitutional Chamber established the possibility of allowing conciliation during the trial phase if the parties agree and there are reasons why the measure was not agreed upon during the intermediate phase. He affirms that the Public Prosecutor's Office is aware of that resolution, however, what it establishes is that the measure cannot be denied alleging only that it is untimely, so the judge must assess the specific case and decide whether the application of the measure was appropriate or not, based on other circumstances. He considers that the first error of the appellate judges lies in giving the constitutional criterion a breadth that it does not contain. From his perspective, it must be valued that our procedural system is designed by stages, so the possible application of conciliation after the order to open the trial (auto de apertura a juicio) is issued is prior to the start of the debate, since once it has begun the judges are hearing the merits of the case, as they have received testimonial and documentary evidence, as happened in this case. He deems that a second error is found in the fact that the Court of Appeals considered that the debate had not begun at the time the measure was proposed, a conclusion they reach based on the trial record that indicates that prior to the debate the defense proposed conciliation, but furthermore, upon verifying what happened in the audiovisual backup that the measure was proposed after the reading of the accusation –and reception of evidence–, the judges resolve that with the reading of the prosecutor's charging document the debate has not yet begun. This posture contains the error of not considering that the trial had indeed begun and therefore the opportunity to conciliate had already expired. He also claims that the Court of Appeals’ resolution contains the defect of considering that in the Trial Tribunal's action of admitting the conciliation in the trial phase there was a defective procedural activity of an absolute nature to be declared, in view of the fact that some aggrieved parties could not be located to appear at the preliminary hearing and that therefore they did not have the right to agree upon alternative measures in the intermediate phase and the decision of the *a quo* to admit the conciliation was the correct solution. He refers that no defective procedural activity was presented by the defense in the debate, it being that, in any case, there is no fundamental right of access to alternative solutions in the criminal process, as developed by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 2010-3941, of 2:39 p.m., of February 24, 2010, so there was no defective procedural activity of an absolute nature to be declared. He concludes that the decision causes harm because the application of the measure against the principle of legality was not endorsed, the punitive interests of the prosecuting body being frustrated. **The claim is granted for the reasons that will be stated.** In order to respond to the challenger's questions, it is appropriate to know what was resolved by the Court of Appeals in the specific case regarding the conciliation where [Name 010] appears as the aggrieved party. On this point, the *ad quem* noted: *“…First of all, it should be indicated that, in accordance with what is recorded in the record of folio 1439, the proposal for an alternative measure (and, upon its rejection, for full reparation) was made by the accused before the reading of the accusation, that is, before the debate was opened. Aside from whether that document may, or may not, coincide with the audiovisual record (as the Prosecutor's Office alleges, stating that the proposal was later and referring to a sequence of the recording), the truth is that the acts preliminary to the debate were used, so it is an excessive formalism to understand that if the reading of the accusation begins, or concludes, the measure is no longer appropriate, which conflicts with the criterion of the Constitutional Chamber that will be indicated. Although it is true that the Tribunal, for reasons of procedural efficiency, postponed the decision on the matter until having the opinion of each aggrieved person, whom it asked during each deposition, that does not imply that, because of said proceeding by the judges, the party must be punished, who made the proposal in those acts preliminary to the trial, before the defendant was identified. Secondly, the Constitutional Chamber, through vote number 5836-99 admitted that conciliation could be carried out in the debate phase, that is, after the preliminary hearing was completed. That pronouncement was not circumscribed, as the challenger erroneously points out, to being carried out before the reading of the accusation, as it was stated: "...to interpret restrictively the procedural time for these actions (criteria of opportunity (criterios de oportunidad), probationary suspension of the procedure (suspensión del procedimiento a prueba), conciliation, comprehensive reparation for the harm (reparación integral del daño), abbreviated process (proceso abreviado)), would mean illegitimately limiting the right of the parties to obtain the prompt resolution of their conflicts, in accordance with the provisions of articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.1 and 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Consequently, the interpretation of procedural time, when dealing with the application of those legal institutes that allow the parties to conclude the criminal process and resolve the conflict arising among citizens (victim and defendant) as a consequence of the transgression of the criminal law, must be in accordance with the State's interest in restoring social harmony, as indicated by the General Part (Parte General) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its article 7. It is not possible, then, to limit the access of the parties to the resolution of the conflict, based on a restrictive interpretation of the procedural time for the application of such legal institutes expressly contemplated in procedural law (...) a literal interpretation of the procedural time regulated in articles 17, 25, 36 and 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, limits the right conferred upon the procedural subjects to obtain a solution to the conflict through alternative procedural solutions after the order to open the trial has been issued. Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this literal interpretation must be substituted by an extensive interpretation of the phrase "at any time up until before the opening to trial is agreed upon", that favors the exercise of the powers conferred by the legal system on those who intervene in the procedure, for the prompt and effective solution of the conflict. So that the procedural time referred to by this phrase, may not be interpreted as a peremptory time limit -given that it would limit the right of the parties to resolve the conflict through alternative procedural exits-, but as an order-oriented time limit that may be extended with the consent of the parties. Consequently, if the victim and the defendant so request, the judge must assess, even after the order to open the trial (article 322 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), in which cases the application of conciliation would be appropriate..." Although, later, the same Constitutional Tribunal indicated that the law has a limit for those mechanisms and that it does not infringe due process (see votes numbers 4983-00 and 7378-09), that does not mean, then, that there exists an absolute prohibition on accessing the institute in reference nor, either, can it be considered that procedural legality is violated if it is done, because the rules must be interpreted systematically and not in isolation. Thus, if here the Tribunal considered —even if it did not use those exact words (the request for which implies an excessive formalism that has been banished from the criminal process)— that a defective procedural activity had occurred, because the aggrieved parties were not present at the preliminary hearing (see folios 1148-1150 of volume II of the principal record) and, therefore, both they and the accused were denied the possibility of concluding the conflict in a different way, the appropriate course was to act as the a quo did, that is, reinstating the omitted procedure, as it was authorized by numeral 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Note that, as accepted by the Prosecutor's Office on folio 1639, the aggrieved parties were cited but not located (see folios 1117, 1118, 1119 and 1138), an assumption in which, although it is true it was not possible to suspend the preliminary hearing, it was feasible to attempt the application of alternative measures, that satisfy the claims of both parties, in another procedural phase, to correct the error. Things being so, this Chamber does not observe that any irregularity occurred in the proceedings and, therefore, the claim must be rejected, adding that, even if the aggrieved party made a reservation to appeal what was resolved, ultimately she did not do so, which denotes that she conformed with it and without it being perceived that she suffered any harm or grievance with what happened…”* (cfr, folios 1656 back to 1657 back). Prior to resolving the specific case, it is pertinent to recount what was provided by the Constitutional Chamber in relation to the scope of the phrase “up until before the opening to trial is agreed upon” as a requirement to apply conciliation, as well as other alternative measures and the abbreviated process. The highest Constitutional Body, in judgment 1999-05836, cited by the *ad quem*, adopted an open posture on the procedural stage in which alternative measures –among them conciliation– and the abbreviated process are applicable, establishing for the effects that interest us: *“…to interpret restrictively the procedural time for these actions (criteria of opportunity, probationary suspension of the procedure, conciliation, comprehensive reparation for the harm, abbreviated process), would mean illegitimately limiting the right that the parties have to obtain the prompt resolution of their conflicts, in accordance with the provisions of articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.1 and 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Consequently, the interpretation of procedural time, when dealing with the application of those legal institutes that allow the parties to conclude the criminal process and resolve the conflict arising among citizens (victim and defendant) as a consequence of the transgression of the criminal law, must be in accordance with the State's interest in restoring social harmony, as indicated by the General Part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its article 7. It is not possible, then, to limit the access of the parties to the resolution of the conflict, based on a restrictive interpretation of the procedural time for the application of such legal institutes expressly contemplated in procedural law…”…Evidently, to interpret that once the order to open the trial (article 322 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) has been issued, the application of the cited legal institutes is not appropriate, under any circumstance, constitutes a literal interpretation of the normative text. However, a literal interpretation of the procedural time regulated in articles 17, 25, 36 and 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, limits the right conferred upon the procedural subjects to obtain a solution to the conflict through alternative procedural solutions after the order to open the trial has been issued. Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this literal interpretation must be substituted by an extensive interpretation of the phrase "at any time up until before the opening to trial is agreed upon", that favor the exercise of the powers conferred by the legal system on those who intervene in the procedure, for the prompt and effective solution of the conflict. So that the procedural time referred to by this phrase, may not be interpreted as a peremptory time limit -given that it would limit the right of the parties to resolve the conflict through alternative procedural exits-, but as an order-oriented time limit that may be extended with the consent of the parties.* Consequently, if the victim and the accused so request, the judge must assess, even after the order to open trial (auto de apertura a juicio) (article 322 of the Código Procesal Penal), in which cases the application of conciliation, the suspension of the process to test (suspensión del proceso a prueba), or the abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado) would be appropriate—for example—based on the principles and values that establish the criminal process…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 1999-05836, of 17:18 hours, of July 27, 1999). A few days later, when resolving a habeas corpus appeal, said Chamber held: “…the parties must be summoned as a priority and immediately for the respective hearing to be held, so that at any stage of the process, even before the opening of the debate (article 341 of the Código Procesal Penal), the conciliation request may be resolved in a special manner…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 1999-05981, of 14:03 hours, of August 3, 1999, the underlining is not from the original). However, this criterion was reconsidered and changed by said Chamber in judgments 2000-02989 and 2000-04983. In the first of those rulings, the Sala Constitucional, when referring to the time limit imposed for the request to apply the abbreviated procedure—which is the same for conciliation—stated: “…although it is true that there is an evident interest of the State in restoring social harmony and that to a certain extent the abbreviated procedure—like other alternative measures to the full criminal process (proceso penal plenario)—seeks to fulfill that end through the resolution of the conflicts that at the intersubjective level underlie the criminal process, it is also true that, like any procedural institute, that of alternative measures cannot be left free of regulations to be used by the parties at their discretion; this last idea is foreign to the very notion of an orderly procedural system and possibly has its origin when the search for the resolution of the conflict between the parties, as an end of the process, is given greater relevance than it deserves within the system. Quite the contrary, it must be taken into account that the design of the current criminal procedural system still retains as its primary end the regulation and iteration of the exercise of the punitive power of the State, even when various forms of conflict resolution are provided, with which it is intended to attenuate the rigor that the previous system exhibited in that sense, especially in certain special cases where the interest of an individual for the sanction and compensation exceeded that of the State. From such a perspective, it is not unreasonable to establish final deadlines for the fulfillment of the different actions and stages so that they do not harm what constitutes the main interest of the process nor its essential ritualities. Moreover, if we start from the reasoning set forth by the Sala in judgments number 05836-99 and 05981-99 already transcribed, in which it holds that the temporal limitation must be directory (ordenatoria) lest fundamental rights be injured, similarly no other limitation would be sustained either, (not even the one these very resolutions impose by authorizing the proposal of alternative measures until before the opening of the hearing according to the text of numeral 341). Carried to its ultimate consequences, the search for a solution to the conflict between the parties should make permissible the possibility of a conciliation during the course of the debate, between the closing of the debate and the issuance of the judgment, or even in the cassation stage, since res judicata (cosa juzgada) does not yet exist; that is, the arguments used by the Sala to disapprove the limit contained in article 373 are equally valid to disapprove any other temporal limit or procedural stage that one might wish to oppose to the conciliatory will of the parties…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-02989, of 15:24 hours, of April 12, 2000). As stated in that same ruling, it must be the judge of the intermediate stage (etapa intermedia) “…who receives, analyzes, and intervenes in the processing and resolution of the proposed alternative measures, so that, if they are unsuccessful, the matter continues with its normal course and the judge in charge of the debate receives the case without any predisposition regarding the facts that will be the subject of judgment. In exceptional cases to be qualified by the Court, it could be returned to the intermediate stage…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-02989, of 15:24 hours, of April 12, 2000). In this same resolution, the highest Constitutional Organ (Órgano Constitucional), upon reconsidering the position it had assumed in votes 1999-05836 and 1999-05981, emphasized: “…indeed there is a contradiction between the judgments of this Chamber number 09129-98 and 05836-99, subsequently confirmed by 05981-99; said contradiction goes in the sense that while the first establishes that there is no violation of constitutional norms by the application of the limit established in article 373 of the Código Procesal Penal, the other two, by making indirect reference to this article, indicate that it must be understood that said limit is not unconstitutional as long as it is understood that it cannot be opposed to the parties. Now, with new elements of judgment, the Sala reconsiders the matter to render ineffective the jurisprudence contained in pronouncements 05836-99 and 05981-99, understanding that, in the first place, the temporal limit imposed on the request for application of the abbreviated procedure originates in the very text of article 373 of the Código Procesal Penal, without requiring any other interpretation beyond the simple and literal one of the norm to apply it; in the second place, that this rule obliges the request for application of the abbreviated procedure to be presented before the judge of the intermediate stage and prior to said judge ordering the opening of the trial in accordance with the power established in article 341 of the Código Procesal Penal; in the third place, that the recently referred limitation does not affect the core fundamental rights of the accused because it refers to non-essential procedures within the criminal process; finally, that said rule, insofar as it temporally limits the exercise of a power legally granted to the accused, turns out to be neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, because said restriction is in direct protection of the principle of an impartial judge to which the accused is entitled…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-02989, of 15:24 hours, of April 12, 2000). In resolution 2000-04983, the Sala Constitucional evacuated the consultation made in the sense that the rejection of the petition for application of the abbreviated procedure, when made after the opportunity established by the Código Procesal Penal has passed, is not contrary to due process, reiterating what was indicated in vote 2000-02989 (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2000-04983, of 14:51 hours, of June 28, 2000). Likewise, in resolution 2004-08726, the highest Constitutional Organ clearly established the difference between comprehensive reparation of the damage (reparación integral del daño) and other alternative measures such as conciliation and the suspension of the process to test, an opportunity in which it stated: “…the Sala does observe that it is necessary to clarify that according to the provisions of article 30 subsection j) of the Código Procesal Penal, comprehensive reparation of the damage may be agreed upon “before the oral trial (juicio oral)”, so it is not required that it be before ordering the opening of trial, as is indeed required with other alternative outcomes, such as suspension of the process to test (article 25 of the CPP) and conciliation (article 36 of the CPP)…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2004-08726, of 15:20 hours, of August 11, 2004). In vote 2009-07378, the Sala Constitucional took judgment 2000-02989 as its starting point, stating concretely with respect to conciliation: “…Although the preceding considerations were expressed by the Sala when it analyzed the constitutionality of the limit established in numeral 373 of the Código Procesal Penal for the application of the abbreviated procedure, on that occasion it was anticipated that what was said would be applicable to cases where a similar temporal restriction is involved for another type of alternative measures from those established in the Código Procesal Penal. Such is the case under study, because the norm now being consulted, which regulates the institute of conciliation, in its first paragraph establishes the same temporal limit, by indicating that “conciliation between the victim and the accused will proceed, at any time until before the opening of trial is ordered.” The criteria expressed by the Sala to reason the constitutionality of article 373 of the Código Procesal Penal are adopted in their entirety for this pronouncement, so it must be concluded that numeral 36 of the Código Procesal Penal, insofar as it establishes a temporal limit for the parties to conciliate in the criminal process, is not unconstitutional…” ( ) “…Access to justice regulated in article 41 of la Constitución Política is also not violated by the norm consulted, because the only thing it makes impossible is conciliating after the opening of trial has been ordered in the criminal process…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2009-07378, of 14:47 hours, of May 6, 2009). From the transcribed text, a first conclusion emerges: since the year 2000, the Sala Constitucional has maintained the criterion that it is not possible to admit the abbreviated procedure, the suspension of the process to test, or conciliation once the opening of trial has been ordered in the criminal process, a different situation in relation to the institute of comprehensive reparation of the damage, which, by legal provision, proceeds “before the oral trial.” For its part, this Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación) has been emphatic that it is improper to apply alternative measures—among them conciliation—or the abbreviated procedure in the debate stage. A general rule that has been excepted in judgment 2010-00200, of 11:00 hours, of March 18, 2010, as well as in the majority votes of resolutions 2009-00831, of 10:50 hours, of June 24, 2009, 2007-00687, of 10:20 hours, of June 29, 2007, and 2007-01191, of 14:25 hours, of October 24, 2007, the assumption being contemplated, in these latter rulings, that the parties had not had access to that possibility when the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) was held (e.g.: if the notice of the hearing was not served to the accused who designated a specific place to receive notifications). In the specific case, this Cassation Chamber considers that there are two compelling reasons why the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) was not authorized to homologate the conciliatory agreement between the accused Carmen Amador Pereira and the aggrieved party [Name 010], a decision that, subsequently, was erroneously endorsed by the Appellate Court (Tribunal de Apelación). First reason. In accordance with article 36 of the Código Procesal Penal, “In misdemeanors or infractions, in crimes of private action (delitos de acción privada), of public action at the instance of a private party (acción pública a instancia privada), those that admit the conditional suspension of the sentence (suspensión condicional de la pena), conciliation between the victim and the accused will proceed, at any time until before the opening of trial is ordered…”. As stated by the representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público), in the present matter, conciliation was proposed and agreed upon when the procedural moment authorized by procedural law had already lapsed (precluido). It is logical to think that if this Chamber has indicated that a comprehensive reparation of the damage is improper once the accused person and the witnesses have testified, that is, after the opening of the debate (in this regard, see Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2008-01210, of 10:25 hours, of October 27, 2008, majority vote), said procedural institute being appropriate “before the oral trial”—unlike conciliation which may be agreed upon “until before the opening of trial is ordered”—, with greater reason a conciliation after the debate has begun is unacceptable, as happened in the case under examination, in which the accusation had already been read, as well as the statement of the accused and several witnesses received (see digital files c0001150320092615, sequence from 09:26:15 to 09:50:46, c0001150320100007, sequence from 10:00:07 to 11:00:00, and c0001150320150000, sequence from 15:00:00 to 15:56:23, all of March 20, 2015), a situation that negates the ad quem limit. This circumstance, by itself, already prevented the a quo from authorizing the conciliation; however, there is an additional reason. Second reason. From the review of the recording of the preliminary hearing, it has been observed that, when it was held, the representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office flatly opposed the holding of a conciliation in the present matter (see digital file c0000110921083916, sequence from 08:39:16 to 09:00:00), and that, during the debate stage, the Prosecutor submitted the respective protest so that the Trial Court would not approve said alternative measure in relation to the facts where Mrs. [Name 010] appears as the aggrieved party (see digital file c0001150320150000, sequence from 15:00:00 to 15:56:23, all of March 20, 2015). The agreement reached was not viable considering the nature of the crimes, namely, ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica) and use of false document (uso de documento falso), in which the protected legal interest is multi-offensive (pluriofensivo) (public faith (fe pública) is the principal one). In this regard, on previous occasions this Chamber has said: “…Therefore, if one of these instruments is falsified and later used, in an suitable manner, there is the possibility that it may generate an erroneous judgment about what it supposedly represents. Here is where the requirement of the possibility of harm is located. This possibility must be distinguished from the impairment of the protected legal interest which, as stated, is included in every crime. It is something more, either when it is expressly required in the statutory definition, or when it is considered to be an indispensable element—as occurs in the crime of use of false document—even if it is not stated in the norm. Thus, it is affirmed that “The character of the document, the suitability of the falsification, and the possibility of harm, form a unity around the criminal legal concept of public faith, at least in the chapter on documentary falsehoods” (CREUS, Carlos. Falsificación de documentos en general, 2nd updated edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial Astrea, p.6.). That possibility of harm is linked to the injury to public faith that the falsehood represents and arises, so to speak, a biunivocal relationship: the injury to public faith implies the possibility of harm to other legal interests or interests deserving of protection, precisely because of the value it grants to those documents. To injure public faith in an efficient manner, that is, for the conduct to be considered typical, one must be in a position that it may cause harm. The previously cited author in this regard points out: “normally the same falsehood—especially when it involves public documents—can already be pointed out as an impairment of public faith insofar as the document that carries it has been deformed; but that effect is not typically sufficient; the law requires that to that “abstract” eventual injury be added the concrete one of the possibility of harm to other legal interests (distinct from public faith), which may be of varied nature: patrimonial, moral, political, and must belong to a third party, that is, they must be owned by someone other than the agent of the falsification. That effect must come directly from the falsification, from what it represents for the extinction or creation of rights, faculties, and burdens.” (ibid, p. 69)…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2009-00628, of 17:17 hours, of April 29, 2009). Starting from the fact that the accused crimes are multi-offensive, the truth is that for the application of conciliation, the approval of the Public Prosecutor’s Office was required, the assent of the individualized victim not being sufficient, as these are crimes of public action (delitos de acción pública) according to article 16 of the Código Procesal Penal. In other words, given the refusal of the prosecutorial organ, the homologation of the mentioned alternative measure was procedurally improper (in similar terms, in relation to the suspension of the process to test regarding the crime of slanderous accusation (denuncia calumniosa), see Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 2013-00744, of 11:35 hours, of June 14, 2013). This being the case, the third claim of the challenge filed by the fiscal representation is granted. Judgment N° 2015-01075 of the Appellate Court is annulled, solely insofar as it declared the appeal of the Public Prosecutor’s Office without merit and endorsed the conciliation where [Name 010] appears as the aggrieved party. Likewise, the definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) by conciliation issued by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José), through judgment N° 331-2015, of 16:15 hours, of April 13, 2015, is annulled, and a remand (reenvío) is ordered so that the Trial Court, with a different integration, holds the oral and public trial for the facts accused to the detriment of la Fe Pública and the aggrieved party [Name 010].” **"II.-** **Appeal (Recurso de casación) filed by Mr. Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público). In the first ground**, based on articles 437, 439, and 468 subsection a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), the appellant argues the existence of contradictory precedents between what was decided by the Court of Appeals that issued the ruling now being challenged, in relation to judgment number 2014-236 from that same court and the rulings of this Criminal Division (Sala de Casación Penal) numbers 475-F-93, 2004-1046, and 228-2012. He explains that in the cited case law it has been interpreted that for the purposes of the crime of ideological falsehood committed by a notary public in the exercise of their functions, they must be considered as public officials, and in that sense, the aggravating circumstance provided for in article 366 in relation to article 367 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) applies to them. However, in this instance, the appellate judges decided to change their criterion and so indicated in the ruling, deciding that from that moment forward they depart from that position and henceforth will not equate a notary public with a public official, applying the simple form of the crime of ideological falsehood. He notes that in identical factual scenarios, both the Criminal Division and the Court of Appeals itself have held that the status of the active subject constitutes not the simple criminal type of ideological falsehood but the aggravated one, considering that a notary public is a public official for the purpose of answering in criminal proceedings for crimes committed in the abusive exercise of their functions. He concludes that this position caused a grievance (agravio) to the prosecuting body by illegitimately rejecting its punitive claim. He requests that the ground be declared with merit (con lugar), that the challenged ruling be declared ineffective, only with regard to the ordered reclassification, for contradicting the jurisprudential precedents that the same Court of Appeals and the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) have maintained regarding the legal classification that must be given in cases such as the present one, unifying the criterion that establishes that for criminal purposes the Notary Public must be considered a public official, and that the sentence of the Trial Court be upheld insofar as it convicted the defendant for the proven acts constituting the crimes of aggravated ideological falsehood. He indicates that this is without prejudice to the fact that the referral (reenvío) ordered to the Trial Court in the challenged decision (voto) is similarly left untouched, given that in a non-appealed section the three-year penalty set for each crime was deemed unfounded. His second claim is based on articles 437, 439, and 468 subsection b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). He alleges erroneous application and disregard of substantive norms, specifically articles 366 and 367 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal). He indicates that the Court of Appeals committed the error of classifying the crime in its simple form and not the aggravated form as required, which influences the amount of the penalty. In support of his claim, the prosecutor cites the facts considered proven and indicates that they constitute the crime of aggravated ideological falsehood because the defendant, at the time of committing the offense, acted in her capacity as a notary public, as was charged. He adds that for criminal purposes, what matters in equating a notary with a public official is that the function the notary uses to commit the offense is a public function. He argues that according to article 1 of the Notarial Code (Código de Notarial), the notarial function *“is the public function exercised privately.”*. In this regard, the appellant considers that: *“A harmonious interpretation of article 367 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) in relation to the last paragraph of article 366 of the same body of laws, in conjunction with article 1 of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial), allows us to conclude that in the exercise of notarial functions, for the criminal sphere, the notary must be considered a public official and consequently the described aggravating circumstance must be applied to them.”* (cfr, folio 1715). He affirms that to consider a notary a public official, one must refer to the function they perform, not to other circumstances like permanence in a public institution and salary dependency. He states that, however, the *ad quem* considered the independence of the notary when exercising their functions privately and the fact that they do not have a direct link with the public administration. Furthermore, he notes that the appellate judges also argued that a differentiation must be made between public function and public official, given that for the aggravated criminal type what matters is that the active agent is a public official, not that they exercise a public function. He argues that this argument is erroneous because the criminal type (article 366, last paragraph) aggravates the conduct when the subject commits the offense abusing their functions, since no public official commits a crime as part of their duties. He concludes that the ruling causes him a grievance (agravio) because the erroneous classification also affects the imposition of the penalty, which harms the prosecuting body's punitive claim. He requests that the ground be declared with merit (con lugar), that the challenged ruling be declared ineffective, only with regard to the ordered reclassification, for not being consistent with the proven facts, and that the Trial Court's ruling be maintained regarding the legal classification of said facts as constituting the crime of aggravated ideological falsehood. He indicates that this is without prejudice to the fact that the referral (reenvío) ordered to the Trial Court in the challenged decision (voto) is similarly left untouched, given that in a non-appealed section the three-year penalty set for each crime was deemed unfounded. Given the connection (conexidad) between the claims, they are resolved jointly. The grounds are declared without merit (sin lugar). The discussion focuses on whether the aggravating circumstance contained in the second paragraph of article 366 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal), in relation to article 367 of that same regulatory body, is applicable to a notary public who, in the exercise of their functions, commits the crime of ideological falsehood. To do this, it is necessary to present the criterion assumed in this matter by the Sentencing Court of Appeals of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José) in resolution No. 2015-1075 (a thesis different from that adopted by that same Court –with a partially different composition– in sentence No. 2014-0236), as well as to communicate the position that this Criminal Division (Sala de Casación Penal) has adopted in various precedents. Subsequently, the position recently assumed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) in judgment 2017-08043, of 11:50 a.m., on May 26, 2017, will be presented. Finally, the arguments that lead this Chamber to declare without merit the first two grounds of the appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) will be presented. A. Reasonings used by the Court of Appeals of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José) in the specific case. Given the importance of the issue, this Chamber proceeds to transcribe what was stated by the Court of Appeals in judgment No. 2015-1075. In this regard, in said resolution it was stated: *“…in this matter, the lower Court considered that the crime of aggravated ideological falsehood was configured, that is, the one provided for in the second paragraph of article 366 (by reference from article 367, both of the Criminal Code (Código Penal)…”* ( ) *“…For these purposes, it is necessary to distinguish between public official and public function. Not all public officials carry out a public function in the strict sense, nor do all those who carry out a public function are public officials…”* ( ) *“…On this topic, there have been several doctrinal pronouncements, and some jurisprudential ones, that make the differentiation. Thus, for example, INFANTE MELÉNDEZ, Gustavo Adolfo ("Legal nature of the Costa Rican notariat." In: Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas, No. 106, 2005, pp. 175-196. U.C.R. Available at the internet page: revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/juridicas/article/viewFile/13332/12603) and CHAVARRÍA ARIAS, María del Pilar ("Nature of the Public Notariat: Is it a public official or not?" In: Revista Rhombus, volume 3, No. 8, January-April 2007. Available at: www.ulacit.ac.cr/files/careers/29_chavarriaarias.pdf, both texts captured on July 27, 2015) based on HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén and SALAS MARRERO, Oscar. Notes on Notarial Law. Law degree thesis, Universidad of Costa Rica, San José, 1971), recount the different theses that exist regarding the notarial function, namely: the functionalist thesis (according to which the notarial function is a public function exercised by the notary as an independent public official, remunerated by private parties. Within this current there are three tendencies regarding the placement of the notarial function: as part of the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch, or as an autonomous activity); the professionalist thesis (holds that both the service provided and the subject who provides it are professional in nature; the notary's function is not public, but technical-professional) and the eclectic thesis (which, although it accepts that the notary is a private professional and not a salaried public official, carries out a public function). From these arise, in consideration of the notary, the notarialist doctrine (which qualifies the notary as a public official) and the administrativist doctrine that follows the functionalist thesis and holds that a private exercise of public functions is possible. This last thesis (following ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Thesis on Administrative Law, San José, volume I, Editorial Stradtmann, 1st edition, 1998, p. 387), considers that the legal nature of the public notary is that of a "Munera Pubblica" that is to say, in the words of the last cited author, a "...private individual who exercises public functions or provides public services is not a public official nor a public body, but precisely a private individual outside the public organization." The difference between a "munera pubblica" and a de facto official is that, while both provide a public service, the former does so in their own name and on their own account, whereas the latter, according to what is established by article 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), does so in the name and on account of the Public Administration. For the authors cited above, if this article defines public servant, official, or employee as "...the person who provides services to the Administration or in its name and on its account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence and of an imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature" it is clear that the notary lacks this character, because conditions such as representativeness (the notary does not represent the Public Administration, to the point that the latter is not jointly and severally liable with them in the exercise of their office, as is the case with public servants), authority (imperio) (unlike the official, the notary does not impose mandates but rather records the will requested by those who ask), remuneration (they do not belong to the public employment regime but receive fees from the parties), appointment (they are not appointed or elected, but rather qualified), etc., do not apply to them. Furthermore, INFANTE and CHAVARRÍA consider it a contradiction to deem them a public official if, at the same time, Directive No. 004-2000 of the National Directorate of Notaries (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) of July 20, 2000, and its subsequent modification through the General Guidelines for the Provision and Control of Notarial Exercise and Service, indicate that a public notary must have an open office and cannot be a public official. The position of these authors seems in accordance with the Legal System because, even more recent laws that broaden the definition of public official (which, then, is a normative element of a legal type) contained in the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), such as the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), No. 8422…”* ( ) *“…Additionally, this exclusion of the 'notary public' as a 'public official' seems to be endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through decision number 1749-2001 (in response to an action of unconstitutionality against articles 22 and 25 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, articles that prohibit public officials from practicing liberal professions if they obtain money by prohibition) which stated that "...the nature of the notarial function (...) the Chamber understands as the private exercise of a public function (...) It is a function that is exercised by delegation and with State supervision" and, in decision number 1483-2001 (amparo filed by a group of notaries against the Directorate that regulates them) in which it referred to "...a conflict between being a public official and simultaneously exercising ANOTHER FUNCTION —which is also public— such as the notariat." On the other hand, the Administrative Litigation Court, First Section, in decision number 293-2001 has stated that "The notariat is the private exercise of a public function, for which reason notaries are not public officials, although they do have a special relationship of subjection for this reason." Thus, if in Criminal Law a restrictive interpretation governs (article 2 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal)) derived from the pro libertatis principle and if, from what has been stated, it is possible to derive that, depending on the theoretical position assumed, it can be considered that the notary public is, or is not, a public official, one must adhere to the more limited thesis which, in any case, entails excluding them from such consideration, since, although they perform a public function, they do not have the benefits of being a public official, to the point that they are even penalized for being one.** The Legal System is based on the principle of Hermetic Completeness (article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch), that is, on its own coherence, so it is unthinkable that, for some purposes (labor, sanctioning, to eliminate the State's joint and several liability, etc.), it be excluded from that condition, but yet be taken into account to repress it criminally. For the reasons stated, **in the opinion of this Chamber, it is not possible to apply the second paragraph of article 366 of the Criminal Code to notaries public for the purpose of increasing their penalty for inserting false data into a public or authentic document or falsifying a document.** Thus, *it is expressly modified the position that, without further elaboration, may have been held on previous occasions* and the brief reference made on the subject by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in vote number 475-F-93 is not endorsed. For example, in vote number 2014-236 —K. Jiménez, R. Chinchilla and J. Arce— in which it was stated:…( ) *“…it must be distinguished that although there is no doubt that the practice of the profession of lawyer and notary is carried out in a liberal and private manner, the law warns that whoever performs it acquires the condition of “public official,” in this case “public attestor (fedatario público),” making it irrelevant whether that person is linked to public service or whether there exists a hierarchical relationship with the Public Administration or the Civil Service that determines their status as a "public servant." This is because, by its nature, the notary performs an essentially public task, regardless of whether they are part of the Public Administration…”* ( ) *“…Consequently, it is appropriate to revoke the judgment on this point and reclassify the facts, from this venue, as a simple ideological falsehood, without aggravation, that is, governed by the first paragraph of article 366 of the Criminal Code (by remission of article 367 ibidem), which represses the conduct with a penalty of one to six years of imprisonment…”* (cfr, folios 1672 vto to 1675 fte, the bold and underline are from the original). **B. Background of the Criminal Cassation Chamber.** In resolution No. 475-F-93, of 08:50 hours, on August 27, 1993, the Magistrates of the Third Chamber who composed it on that occasion, considered that, because the accused was a notary, the crime of ideological falsehood was aggravated, however, because only the accused's appeal was being heard, the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius was applicable. In this regard they noted: *“…it should be noted that contrary to what the convicted person affirms, the conditions to consider that we are in the presence of the aggravation do, in reality, concur in the case. Having been proven that the accused is a lawyer and notary public, and that taking advantage of his condition as a notary public, according to the title that accredited him as such, using the protocol granted to him for that reason by the Supreme Court of Justice, even assuming he was suspended at the time of his actions, he executed several deeds of false content, it is clear that the accused acted taking advantage of his condition as a public official and of the instruments he had for that purpose by holding the status of notary public. In reality, it must be indicated that when the law states that falsification is aggravated when the person who performs it is a public official acting in the exercise of their functions, it is not actually intending to indicate that the crime is part of the exercise of their functions in the strict sense. No public official has among their attributions the carrying out of criminal acts, and to that extent practically no crime could be understood as committed in the exercise of public functions, since all crimes are outside the exercise of public functions. In reality, with that phrase what has been intended to indicate is that the act is committed by the public official on the occasion of the exercise of their functions, or taking advantage of their condition as a public official, but it could never be affirmed in the strict sense that it must be committed in the exercise of their functions. When the official commits the crime "...in the exercise of their functions...", they do so by abusing their position, exceeding their attributions, taking advantage of their condition, but not in the strict exercise of their functions. However, as stated, the Court did not apply the cause for aggravation in this matter because the convicted person acted on the occasion of their functions as a notary public, and the Chamber cannot aggravate their situation because it only hears appeals in favor of the accused (prohibition of reformatio in peius)…”*. On its part, in vote No. 2004-01046, of 09:22 hours, on August 27, 2004, the Third Chamber annulled a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) judgment issued by the Trial Court, considering that the criminal act charged was an ideological falsehood aggravated by having been committed by a notary public, given that the a quo court calculated the statute of limitations based on the assumption that it was facing a simple criminal modality. On this point, the Criminal Cassation Chamber noted: *“…as it emerges from the accusatory document, the defendant [Name 004] was indicated as the possible responsible author of a crime of ideological falsehood and it is supposed he committed it, in his condition as notary public, when drawing up a deed in which the debtor of the Bank…precisely the victim and complainant here [Name 005]., appears, an event that also occurred on July 15, 1996. That is to say, he is accused of being the alleged responsible author of an ideological falsehood committed in his capacity as a public official and whose penalty, in such a case, can be a maximum of up to eight years of imprisonment. Given this circumstance, unlike what was resolved by the Court when sustaining the definitive dismissal it issued, the criminal action in the present case did not prescribe three years after the first formal accusation was made against the defendant, which occurred with the preliminary statement (indagatoria) on February 14, 2000 (thus folio 9), but rather when four years had elapsed since this act was executed. This term, moreover, is the one corresponding to half of the initial statute of limitations period that is provided for this class of crime (which is eight years), but which changed to four years after it was interrupted by the “first formal accusation” of the crime. Now then, why is it estimated that in this case the penalty provided for this crime could be eight years? This is because in this class of acts the notary public is considered a public official, in accordance with articles 1 of the Notarial Code and 111 of the General Law of Public Administration and 59 and 60 of the Criminal Code. In this sense, article 1 of the Notarial Code is very clear in indicating that it is a public official, because although it defines the notarial function as a “public function exercised privately”, it immediately warns that the person who performs this activity does so as an “authorized official”. Likewise, numeral 111 of the General Law of Public Administration explains that the public official is determined by the specific function that a person performs or renders to the Administration and not so much by the link to it under a remunerative, imperative, permanent or representative regime. Regarding the scope of the concept of public official, it is worth recalling what this Chamber had said on the matter, when explaining that: “Indeed, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the concept of public official is much broader in Criminal Law than in other areas of the legal system, using a criterion that modern doctrine designates as objective, according to which what matters is that a function that is public in its essence is performed. It is then the nature of the activity and not its link with the Administration what, among other aspects, characterizes the public official (see especially resolutions of this Chamber Nos. 103-F of 10:30 hrs. on June 2, 1989, and 104-F of 9:15 hrs. on April 27, 1990 where said concept was exhaustively analyzed).” (Third Chamber of the Court, vote No. 208-F of 9:30 hours on June 10, 1994). In other words, what is important in these cases is the “public” character of the task or “function” that is performed and not whether the person performing it is subject to a special regime -of a labor nature- with respect to the Administration. Likewise, specifically, it has been said that the notary public is considered a public official by virtue of the activity or “function” they perform…”* (the bold is from the original). In similar terms, by judgment No. 2010-00923, of 11:25 hours, on August 27, 2010, this Cassation Chamber indicated: *“…Having acted in his condition as notary public, for all purposes the accused had the condition of public official, as established by article 1 of the Notarial Code (law number 7764 of April 17, 1998). So the statute of limitations regime for such acts is not only that prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code, but that which is particularly established by the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (number 8422, of October 29, 2004)…”*. In turn, in resolution No. 2011-00273, of 09:38 hours, on March 11, 2011, issued by this Chamber, it was stated: *“…we have that from the first block of charged acts, regarding J. there is only an ideological falsehood (as will be seen, in its simple modality), and regarding [Name 006]., an ideological falsehood aggravated by her condition as a notary, a use of a false document and a crime of fraud to the detriment of I. (these last two crimes derive from fact three of the accusation). The reasons why the condition of public official, which [Name 006] held in her capacity as notary, for purposes of aggravating the crime of ideological falsehood, was not communicable to J., reside in the poor technique with which the accusation was drafted. It was remiss in indicating that J. knew of or took advantage of the public function exercised by the accused notaries to commit the crime. Being a subjective element that modifies the legal classification applicable to J., it had to be contained, even if superficially, in the accusatory document…” ( ) “…It happens then, regarding the second block of events, that J. is accused of a crime of ideological falsehood only, which is time-barred (for the same reasons as the other crime of the same kind), while [Name 006]. is attributed an ideological falsehood (aggravated for being committed by availing herself of her quality as public attestor (fedataria pública))…”*. Likewise, in judgment No. 2012-00228, of 10:00 hours, on February 17, 2012, this Chamber referred to the scope of the concept of public official, in its relationship with the notarial function and with the aggravating circumstance contained in article 366 of the Criminal Code (at that time, numeral 359 of that same legal text), the foregoing, starting from what was decided in resolutions 103-F, of 10:30 hours, on June 2, 1989, 104-F, of 9:15 hours, on April 27, 1990, 208-F, of 9:30 hours, on June 10, 1994 and 2004-1046, of 9:22 hours, on August 27, 2004, concluding that, in that specific case, the statute of limitations for the criminal action had been erroneously declared, given that the term reduced by half for the crime of ideological falsehood was four years, the aggravating circumstance affecting two defendants who acted in their condition as notaries public existing. **C. Recent position held by the Constitutional Chamber.** Having been presented in 2016 an action of unconstitutionality in criminal case file No. 14-420-0612-PE, processed before the Constitutional Chamber under No. 16-005583-0007-CO, against the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber that has interpreted that the notary public holds the condition of public official for purposes of the application of criminal law, specifically, the criminal type of ideological falsehood contemplated in article 367 of the Criminal Code, and that, due to this circumstance, if guilt is proven, they are entitled to the aggravated penalty contained in ordinal 366 of this same legal text for public officials, and not the ordinary penalty, the Constitutional Chamber, by a majority vote of five of the seven Magistrates, in resolution 2017-08043, of 11:50 hours, on May 26, 2017, partially declared unconstitutional the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that considers the notary public to be a public official. Given the significance of this ruling, we proceed to transcribe the most relevant ideas from it for the purposes of the case at hand. Regarding the legal nature of the notary public, the Highest Constitutional Body noted: *“…Two norms of the Notarial Code, Law No. 7764 of April 17, 1998, are particularly significant for this purpose. Numeral 1 establishes that “The public notarial function is the public function exercised privately. Through it, the authorized official advises persons on the correct legal formation of their will in legal acts or contracts and attests to the existence of the facts that occur before them”. Certainly, this legal norm qualifies the notarial function as a “public function”, in the sense that the notary public is, essentially, a public attestor who gives full faith, for legal purposes, of a series of facts and acts of legal relevance. Thus, it is evident that the correct exercise of the notarial function has an unequivocal public interest or public relevance, given the implications of any error committed intentionally or not by a public attestor. However, from such legal qualification it is not appropriate to conclude that the notary public is a public official, in the sense defined by the block of legality to which the criminal judge must necessarily refer to impose a conviction. On the other hand, article 2, paragraph 1, of the Notarial Code is more precise by indicating that “The notary public is the professional in Law, specialist in Notarial and Registry Law, legally authorized to exercise the notarial function (…)”. It is necessary to harmonize the two aforementioned norms with articles 30 and 31 of the Notarial Code, to avoid falling into an isolated interpretation and application of article 1, for the sake of a contextual and systematic hermeneutics. Thus, numeral 30 establishes that “The person authorized to practice the notarial function, in the exercise of this legitimate function authenticates the acts in which they intervene, subject to the regulations of this code and any other resulting from special laws, for which purpose they enjoy public faith (…)” (the highlighting is not from the original). For its part, ordinal 31 establishes that “The notary has public faith when they record a fact, event, situation, legal act or contract, whose purpose is to secure or record rights and obligations (…) By virtue of public faith, the manifestations of the notary that appear in the instruments and other documents authorized by them are presumed certain.” (the highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, as a general rule, the notary public, then, is a liberal professional who exercises a notarial function of relevance or of clear public interest, by attesting to a series of facts and acts, without, due to this circumstance, being able to be considered a public official…”* (The bold is from the original). On its part, regarding the notion of public official in the block of legality, the Constitutional Chamber indicated: *“…To determine the criminal responsibility of a person who is qualified (sic) by a criminal type as a public official, it is necessarily essential to refer to the notion of public official established by the legal system and, particularly, by law, in order to respect and act upon the already indicated principles of legality and specificity (tipicidad) in criminal matters. On this particular point, the General Law of Public Administration since 1978, established a clear and precise definition of public official by prescribing in its article 111 the following: “1. A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with full independence from the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent or public nature of the respective activity. 2. To this effect, the terms "public official", "public servant", "public employee", "person in charge of public service" and similar others are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates the contrary. 3. Employees of State economic enterprises or services in charge of activities subject to common law are not considered public servants.” This conception of public official, obviously, is not absolute; a special or sectorial law may well determine a more flexible notion, including for the purpose of expanding the sphere of administrative and criminal responsibility. Thus happened with the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in the public function of 2004, whose article 2 expanded the notion of public official by providing the following: “Public servant. For the purposes of this Law, a public servant shall be considered any person who provides their services in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, state and non-state, on behalf and on account of it and as part of its organization, by virtue of an act of investiture and with full independence from the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent or public nature of the respective activity. The terms official, servant and public employee shall be equivalent for the purposes of this Law. The provisions of this Law shall be applicable to de facto officials and to persons who work for public enterprises in any of their forms and for public entities in charge of activities subject to common law; likewise, to the agents (apoderados), administrators, managers and legal representatives of legal persons that have custody, administer or exploit funds, goods or services of the Public Administration, by any title or management modality.” This precept of the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in the public function, as can be seen, in addition to reiterating the terms of the General Law of Public Administration of 1978, in paragraph 2 extends the notion of public official, even, to persons who are not public officials from the perspective of Administrative Law, such as the agents, administrators, managers or representatives of legal persons that administer, exploit funds, goods or services of the public administration by any title or modality. The ordinary legislator, then, in the exercise of their freedom of configuration, may well extend the notion of public official to a notary public. What cannot be done by way of extensive judicial interpretation is to extrapolate the notion of public official to the notary public, since this evidently and manifestly breaks the principles of legality and legal reserve in matters of crimes, penalties and their aggravation. Just as the challenged jurisprudential standard has done by extensively applying the aggravated penalty of paragraph 2 of article 366 of the Criminal Code, provided for public officials in the exercise of their functions, to notaries public…”.* Having clarified the Constitutional Chamber the circumstance that the notary public cannot be considered a public official, it makes the exception of the notary public who has been hired by a public entity (on staff (de planta)), who, for those purposes, does act as a public official. On this point it noted: *“…It does not go unnoticed by this Constitutional Court that there are notaries public who do share the condition of a public official, having been hired as such by a public entity. In such cases, as they are public officials, the principle of legality and legal reserve is then fulfilled, it being evident that, in such cases, the notary does have the condition of a public official (v. gr. State or institutional notaries). That figure is not the ordinary one regarding the exercise of the notarial function…”.* Based on the considerations set forth, the Constitutional Body ordered *“…to partially declare unconstitutional the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that considers the notary public to be a public official. The jurisprudential standard must remain valid when applied to notaries public who are paid a salary in a public entity for performing that work in the capacity of a public official. The declaration of unconstitutionality must have declaratory and retroactive effects to the date of validity of the challenged jurisprudence, without prejudice to legal relationships or situations consolidated by statute of limitations, expiration (caducidad), judgment with the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), the consummation of materially or technically irreversible facts and rights acquired in good faith. Regarding persons who are serving a custodial sentence (pena privativa de libertad) by final judgment, aggravated based on the challenged jurisprudential line that must be declared unconstitutional, their penalty must be reduced and in the event of having already served it due to this reduction, they must be released, unless the execution of another final condemnatory judgment or a valid pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) precautionary measure prevents it…”.* In conclusion, the thesis of the Constitutional Chamber in vote 2017-08043, of 11:50 hours, on May 26, 2017, was to consider that the notary public should not be considered a public official unless they have been hired as such by a public entity. **D. Arguments that lead this Chamber to declare without merit the first two grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the representative of the Public Ministry.** In accordance with article 367 of the Criminal Code, the penalty of one to six years of imprisonment contemplated in ordinal 366 of that normative body is applicable *“…to whoever inserts or causes to be inserted in a public or authentic document false statements, concerning a fact that the document must prove, so that harm may result”*, given that, according to the second paragraph of the first of those numerals *“…If the act were committed by a public official in the exercise of their functions, the penalty shall be from two to eight years”*. Based on article 1 of the Notarial Code, when referring to the nature of the notarial function, the Constitutional Chamber has said: *“…the notarial function is a public function that is performed privately (see among others, judgment No. 2006-014008 of 9:46 hrs. on September 22, 2006). By its legal nature, this function must be exercised within the powers and limitations that the legal system provides and it corresponds to the State, through the mechanisms it deems appropriate, to ensure the proper fulfillment of the duties and obligations of notaries…”* (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgments No. 2015-09849, of 09:05 hours, on July 1, 2015 and 2015-06002, of 09:05 hours, on April 29, 2015). This Criminal Cassation Chamber has held in various resolutions, as set forth in the background contained in section B of this Considering (Considerando), that the aggravating circumstance of a public official contained in ideological falsehood applies to the notary public.

Now, in the specific case, Judgment 2015-01075, issued by the Sentencing Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, even though it contradicts the precedents set by this Criminal Cassation Chamber, is consistent with what the highest Constitutional body has recently ordered, in the sense that the jurisprudential line of this Cassation Chamber is unconstitutional for considering a notary public to be a public official. It must be remembered that, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, Law N° 7135 of October 11, 1989, “*The jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself*”. Thus, by Constitutional imperative, the jurisprudential criterion is unified in the sense that the aggravating circumstance contained in the second paragraph of Article 366 of the Criminal Code, in relation to ordinance 367 of that same normative body, is not applicable to a notary public who commits the crime of ideological falsehood, unless they have been contracted as such by a public entity, the latter assumption not being applicable to the accused Carmen María Amador Pereira. As a consequence of the foregoing, the first and second grounds of the cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Ministry, are dismissed, upholding what was ordered by the Sentencing Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in Judgment 2015-01075, at 09:15 hours, on July 30, 2015, regarding its reclassification of the acts committed to the detriment of [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009] as three crimes of simple ideological falsehood. As for the acts to the detriment of [Name 010], refer to Considerando IV. No ruling is made regarding the case in which [Name 003] appears as the victim, given the remand ordered by the ad quem, and also taking into account that this Cassation Chamber declared the claim inadmissible regarding that point under Resolution 2016-00139, at 14:59 hours, on February 9, 2016.

**III. Cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Engie Marín Pandolfi, private defense counsel for the accused Carmen María Amador Pereira.** In the **sole admitted ground** (first), she alleges the existence of contradictory precedents. According to the appellant, the Appeals Court reclassified the facts regarding the concurrence of crimes issue between the crime of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, changing the criterion they had held up to that point, and contrary to the position argued by this Criminal Cassation Chamber in Judgment number 2011-1204, from which she cites an excerpt. She concludes that due to the existence of a jurisprudential contradiction, the decision adopted by the ad quem caused an injury to the accused that violated due process. She requests that the contested judgment be quashed. **The claim is dismissed, despite the existence of contradictory precedents, as no specific injury is verified and the criterion of the Appeals Court is tenable (it follows the thesis that this Chamber has adopted in the majority of its judgments on the subject) in the sense that ideological falsehoods absorb the uses of a false document.** First of all, it must be noted that this Criminal Cassation Chamber, for a long time now, has categorically and uniformly adopted the criterion that between the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, an apparent concurrence of norms arises, under the assumption that the same person performs both actions; however, *taking into account that the composition of the panel has not been the same over the years, two different criteria have been held regarding which of the crimes contains or absorbs the other*. In this sense, as will be seen, the criterion adopted by the Sentencing Appeals Court in the specific case (Judgment 2015-01075) is contrary to the thesis held by this Cassation Chamber in rulings 2011-00325, 2011-01204, 2012-01227, and 2014-00665; however, it is consistent with what this Chamber stated in Judgments 2004-00936, 2008-00584, 2010-01098, 2012-01181, 2013-01641, and 2014-00304.

**A. Position of the Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the case under review.** In the present matter, regarding the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, the Appeals Court stated: *"...In other words, it has been reiterated that if the legal interest is similar in both types (public faith, because, although ideological falsehood has an additional legal interest, it also protects the purity of the document, as does the use of a false document); if the latter offense is only a consequence of the former, to the extent that the possibility of causing danger—a requirement of the first type—is only generated with the use; if there is a common plan by the author, they share the iter criminis, and a spatial-temporal proximity is produced between the acts of the two figures, we are dealing with an apparent concurrence of norms, when both crimes are committed by the same person. In such a case, the crime with the greater disvalue absorbs the other. As provided in ordinance 367, in relation to article 366 second paragraph, both of the Criminal Code, the penalties for the offense of ideological falsehood are from one to six years (in the first paragraph) and from two to eight years (in the case of public officials, an aspect on which a further precision must be made), while that for the use of a false document, under the terms of ordinance 373* (sic) *ibidem, is one to six years of imprisonment. Since this is a sanction similar to the former, in the first paragraph, but not for the second, it is obvious that the legislator considered the first crime more serious, not only because they imposed aggravating factors but because they established, as an element of the type, the necessity that it could cause harm, which only occurs with the effective use. Likewise, if it were considered that the use of the false document predominates over the falsification (or falsehood), it would lead to the absurdity that the final act has a lesser penalty than the first event, which breaks the rules of subsidiarity in matters of apparent concurrence, where doctrine accepts the prior, concomitant, or subsequent unpunished act, provided that those events not punished have a lesser disvalue than the one that is sanctioned. Therefore, the first crime predominates over the second and not the other way around, as proposed by the appellants, even decontextualizing the jurisprudence they use in support of their thesis, which points to the contrary of the conclusion they extract and which, in any case, for the reasons pointed out above, is not always shared. For the above reasons, given that, as recorded on folios 1469 to 1471, the lower court convicted the defendant for four crimes (one of which has been annulled above but to which, by the principle of prohibition of reform in disfavor, what is indicated here will be equally applicable, in the event that a conviction is reached) of ideological falsehood in an ideal concurrence of crimes with the use of a false document (without explaining why they did not exclude each other) and imposed, for the first offenses, three years of imprisonment and, for the second offenses, one year of imprisonment (although later, it indicated that it did not increase the penalty for the most serious offense: see folio 1471), it is appropriate to partially grant the claim, revoke the judgment insofar as it considered the facts in an ideal concurrence to, instead, from this venue (since remand is not necessary) decree that what is configured is an apparent concurrence, in which ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document and, consequently, the penalty imposed for the latter offense must be annulled. However, as mentioned, this lacks practical repercussions, because the penalty for the use of the document was not used to increase the one set for the more serious crime. Ergo, the penalties remain the same, *without prejudice to what may be indicated in the following section*, that is, at three years of imprisonment for each of the three crimes of ideological falsehood and nine years of imprisonment in total..."* (cf., folios 1671 verso to 1672 recto).

**B. Thesis of the Third Chamber considering that the use of a false document absorbs ideological falsehood.** This Chamber, in Ruling Nº 2011-00325, considered that in those situations where the accused uses documents containing false statements made by them, one is dealing with the crime of use of a false document, which subsumes the disvalue of the preceding action. Regarding this, it was stated: *"...the use of a false document (Article 365 of that legal body), consists of the employment of a document whose falsehood may be in its content or its materiality, so the use of a false document encompasses the use of both documents that are falsified or adulterated, or those that, being original, contain false statements. For the case at hand, the use of a false document can refer both to those documents that were falsified and to those that contain an ideological falsehood. But, precisely because the crimes are consummated when those false documents are put into circulation or used, if the author or authors of the falsifications or ideological falsehoods are the same ones who later use those documents, one will be dealing with a single crime, consisting of the use of a false document, because it is until then that the possibility of harm is being created..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2011-00325, at 10:09 hours, on March 25, 2011). Under this same view, in Resolution Nº 2011-01204, this Chamber affirmed: *"...In the case under study, we find that due to the nature of the consummation of the crime of ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, being consummated at the moment they are publicly used, that is, at the same moment, the presentation of the document before the Property Registry occurs, which happens, regardless of the time elapsed between the making of the false document and its use. For the purpose of the action and a violation of the same protected legal interest, that is, public faith, are verified at the same moment, since despite the falsehood of the document or the false information contained within it, if that document is not publicly used, no offense is configured. Thus, both actions maintain a unity, containing the same purpose and permanence over time, producing the same result of injury to the same legal interest, thus verifying the apparent concurrence of norms, which the appellant rightly claims..."* ( ) *"...By virtue of the foregoing, the appellant's claim is granted, and the judgment is quashed in this aspect, the facts considered proven in the decision under cassation are reclassified as constituting a single crime of use of a false document, in an apparent concurrence with the crime of ideological falsehood..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2011-01204, at 09:10 hours, on September 29, 2011). This same line was followed by this Cassation Chamber in pronouncement Nº 2012-01227, in which, for the purposes of interest, it stated: *"...In the matter under study, there is no doubt that the accused made use of a false document, in which, knowingly, it was stated that he was another person. So that configured the use of a false document, thus devaluing the falsification of said document that E.G. might have committed, given that the danger of those actions (ideological falsehood or falsification of a document) against the legal interest only occurred with the use of a false document that was proven against him, without it being possible to say before then that public faith had been affected. Therefore, he could not be sanctioned for those actions, but only for the criminal activity constituted by the use of a false document. Consequently, the challenger must be given reason, reclassifying the facts to a crime of use of a false document..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2012-01227, at 12:26 hours, on August 17, 2012). Finally, in Ruling 2014-00665, this Cassation Chamber indicated: *"...There is an apparent concurrence, in the terms defined by Article 23 of the Criminal Code, when the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document are committed by the same person, since it is an affectation of the same legal interest by two situations in a relationship of consumption..."* ( ) *"...In this case the lower court erroneously qualified the facts as constituting the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document in a material concurrence of crimes (at 18:41:40 of the Oral Judgment), despite having proven that it was the same accused who drafted the deed with false information, and who presented said deed before the Public Registry. Thus, the appellant is correct in this ground, so the facts are reclassified as constituting only one crime of use of a false document. Because the facts were originally qualified as two crimes in a material concurrence, for penalty purposes, a remand proceeding is unnecessary, as there is already a penalty amount set for the crime of use of a false document, which the Court defined as one year of imprisonment and which has not been challenged..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2014-00665, at 10:54 hours, on April 4, 2014).

**C. Position of the Third Chamber considering that ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document.** In Judgment Nº 2004-00936, this Cassation Chamber, based on recognized foreign doctrine, held that in cases where the author of the false document themselves uses it, one is not dealing with two typically distinct and independent conducts, but rather the use of the false document is absorbed by the ideological falsehood or, as the case may be, by the falsification of a document. Referring to this topic, it was stated: *"...According to the very nature of the crime of falsification and according to the way it is drafted (see Art. 360 of the Criminal Code), the subsequent use of the document that the same person falsifies is part of the action disvalue contained in this offense to the extent that the offense itself requires the possibility of harm at the time of its creation. On this point, doctrine indicates the following: 'The general principle recognized here is that the definition of art. 296 does not contemplate the conduct of one who falsified and then uses the falsified document; therefore, a situation of apparent concurrence exists: the different figures of documentary falsification and the use of a false document exclude each other when they are constituted by conduct of the same subject; when it has been the use of the falsified document that creates the danger or causes the harm inherent to the type of falsification previously carried out, it would be a gross violation of the ne bis in idem to punish that use by applying two different figures (...) in cases where the prior falsification is ideological or material of public documents (...) what then occurs is that if the use is not a necessary factor of consummation, it is not excluded from it either: the use does nothing more than continue the consummation and, consequently, the solution cannot be different. It is, then, beyond discussion that the author of a falsification who at the same time uses the document cannot be punished simultaneously for that falsification and for this use; they can only be punished for the first crime.' (CREUS, Carlos: *Derecho Penal, Parte Especial*, Volume 2, 5th Edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1996, p. 476). Following this doctrinal position, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has expressed in similar terms that: 'if the author of the use is also the author of the falsification, they will be responsible only for the latter infraction, while if the author of that offense cannot be held responsible for the falsification, they will answer only for the use, if they have used the false document (cf. FONTAN BALESTRA, Carlos: *Derecho Penal Parte Especial*, 10th Edition, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, p. 980; BREGLIA ARIAS, Omar and another: *Código Penal Comentado, Anotado y Concordado*, 2nd Edition, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 295; CREUS, Carlos: *Falsificación de Documentos en General*, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1986, p. 204 to 206, and; NÚÑEZ, Ricardo: *Manual de Derecho penal Parte Especial*, Ediciones Lerner, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 483 to 484)."* (see Ruling Nº 33 at 9:05 on January 24, 1997). Consequently, in accordance with the relationship of facts the Court holds as proven, it is clear then that we are not dealing with two independent conducts, but only with a single crime of falsification (ideological falsehood)..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2004-00936, at 15:55 hours, on August 6, 2004, emphasis is original). Under this same posture, in Resolution Nº 2008-00584, this Chamber pointed out: *"...Given the particular characteristics of the case in relation to [Name 012]., one could not think of the existence of an ideal concurrence of crimes, because we are facing the same action in a legal sense, which injures two norms that exclude each other, by constituting different degrees of affectation to the same legal interest (public faith). For this reason, the third claim as formulated by the private defender of R.A.C. must be granted and by virtue of this, the judgment is partially annulled, as it pertains to the legal classification corresponding to the facts proven against them. The legal classification is corrected, and consequently, R.A.C. must be acquitted of the crime of use of a false document and in its place, only the conviction for falsification of a public document remains intact, reclassified as ideological falsehood in the terms already analyzed in the first considerando of this resolution..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2008-00584, at 10:18 hours, on May 23, 2008, bold type is original). A similar criterion was held in 2010 when applying the criterion of consumption, establishing: *"...we have that the accused R, in his condition as notary public, drafted the false deed, with the purpose of achieving, by its presentation to the Public Registry, the exclusion of a current annotation on the sale of a part of the property that had been owned by V, hence the registration of the deed whose content was not true by the notary and accused R was the way in which the harm materialized. From this perspective, we are in the presence of an apparent concurrence of crimes between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, which would exclude the application of the ideal concurrence of norms carried out by the Court, since the disvalue of the use of a false document in this case would form part of the unjust content of the ideological falsehood, hence the appropriate action is to order the conviction for a single offense. Both crimes, according to the provisions of ordinances 360 and 365 of the Criminal Code, carry the same sanction, from one to six years of imprisonment, but ideological falsehood is considered the more serious crime, since in a public or authentic document made by someone by reason of their profession, in this case a notary public, statements were recorded that are presumed true, accepted as true before others unless proven otherwise. In accordance with the foregoing and in application of the principle of consumption, which implies that when the execution of a more serious factual scenario —ideological falsehood— includes that of another of lesser entity —use of a false document—, the former is applied and not the latter, as it is considered practically included in the more severe regulation, the appropriate action is to declare this aspect of the challenge granted as it refers to the legal classification, which must be corrected according to the facts held as proven..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2010-01098, at 12:03 hours, on October 15, 2010, bold type is original). Through Judgment Nº 2012-01181, this Criminal Chamber noted: "...based on what is proven in the decision, the facts constitute a crime of ideological falsehood (Article 360 of the Criminal Code), there being an apparent concurrence of norms regarding the use of a false document. Observe that, according to the set of proven facts, we are not dealing with two independent legal actions, but only with a single offense, that of ideological falsehood, consisting of the preparation of a cadastral map into which false data was inserted concerning its location, boundaries, and measurements, which map was presented before the National Cadastre for registration. As we are dealing with an apparent concurrence of norms, the proper action is to convict solely for the crime of ideological falsehood. Consequently, the appealed judgment is partially annulled and ex officio the conduct is reclassified to a single offense of ideological falsehood, leaving the penalty at one year of imprisonment, as it was set by the sentencing Court..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2012-01181, at 10:23 hours, on August 17, 2012, bold type is original). Similarly, in Decision Nº 2013-01641, when there was an apparent concurrence between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, this Chamber reclassified the facts as constituting the latter criminal offense. Regarding this, it was stated: *"...in this case there also exists an apparent concurrence between the crimes of ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, so it is appropriate to reclassify the facts as constituting only one crime of ideological falsehood in an ideal concurrence of crimes with the crime of fraud. Now, despite the foregoing, in view of the fact that when fixing the penalty for the ideal concurrence, the Court set the penalty for the greater crime (fraud) at five years and decided not to increase it; the reclassification made does not affect the penalty imposed, which remains at five years without the need for remand. For all of the above, as there exists an apparent concurrence between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document, the ground is declared partially granted only regarding this aspect, and the facts are reclassified as constituting a crime of ideological falsehood and others of fraud..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2013-01641, at 10:57 hours, on November 1, 2013). More recently, in Ruling Nº 2014-00304, this Cassation Chamber proceeded to consider only the crime of ideological falsehood as configured, given the existing concurrence between this offense and the use of a false document. It pronounced itself in the following terms: *"...regarding the subsequent analysis made by the Judges concerning the topic of concurrence of crimes, this Chamber does find an error that must be corrected. According to the Judges, the facts constitute three crimes of ideological falsehood and three crimes of use of a false document on the occasion of fraud (f. 1659). However, on this point, there are reiterated pronouncements by the Third Chamber, in which it has been indicated that between the crime of ideological falsehood and the use of a false document there cannot be an ideal concurrence, when the agents of the falsehood are also the same ones who make use of the false document, as it is rather an apparent concurrence..."* ( ) *"...According to the foregoing, in this case there also exists an apparent concurrence between the crimes of ideological falsehood and the crimes of use of a false document, so it is appropriate to reclassify the facts as constituting only three crimes of ideological falsehood in an ideal concurrence with three crimes of major fraud. Given that in this case it was held as proven that the accused D.H.P. and E.M.J.C. acted jointly, it is appropriate to apply the extensive effect of the reclassification of the facts to both defendants. For all of the above, as there exists an apparent concurrence between the crimes of ideological falsehood and the crimes of use of a false document, the ground is declared partially granted only regarding this aspect, and the facts are reclassified as constituting only three crimes of ideological falsehood and three crimes of major fraud, with extensive effect to both defendants..."* (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment Nº 2014-00304, at 08:43 hours, on March 7, 2014).

**D. Unifying Criterion of this Criminal Cassation Chamber.** In the case under review, the Trial Court convicted the accused Carmen María Amador Pereira of four counts of ideological falsehood in material concurrence, which, in turn, are in ideal concurrence with four counts of use of a false document committed against [Name 002], [Name 003], [Name 008], and [Name 009] and the public faith, imposing three years of imprisonment for each of the ideological falsehoods and one year of imprisonment for each use of a false document, resulting in a total of nine years of imprisonment applying the concurrence rules (cf., folios 1449-1478, Volume III). For its part, the Court of Appeal: *i)* annulled the contested judgment only insofar as it declared the accused criminally responsible for the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document against [Name 003] (*a remand on which this Chamber will not rule, having declared the claim inadmissible regarding that point by resolution 2016-00139, at 14:59 hours, on February 9, 2016*), ordering a remand before a new panel of the *a quo* court so that, respecting the principle of prohibition of *reformatio in peius*, the possibility of resolving the dispute through conciliation is evaluated, should the parties propose and accept it again; *ii)* revoked the judgment insofar as it classified the acts as an ideal concurrence between the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, instead decreeing that what is configured is an apparent concurrence of norms between the two, in which the falsehood absorbs the use and, consequently, annulled (without remand) the penalty imposed for the use of a false document (which, ultimately, the *a quo* court did not use to increase the penalty for the more serious crime) in relation to the victims [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009]; *iii)* revoked the judgment insofar as it considered the figure to be aggravated ideological falsehood (articles 367 and 366, second paragraph, of the Penal Code) and, instead, declared that what is classified is simple ideological falsehood (first paragraph of article 366 of the Penal Code) and, as a consequence thereof, annulled the penalty imposed, ordering a remand before a new panel of the trial court so that, respecting the principle of prohibition of *reformatio in peius* and starting from the legal classification fixed here (simple crimes and in apparent concurrence), they set the sanction (cf., folios 1655-1680, Volume IV). Regarding point *iii)*, this Chamber issued its opinion in Considering II; it is now appropriate to rule on section *ii)*, that is, on the concurrence that arises between ideological falsehood and the use of a false document. In the opinion of this Chamber, the *ad quem* court is correct in concluding that the crime of ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document under the assumption that both actions are carried out by the same person. This thesis is supported by two solid arguments: a) the legislator considered the crime of ideological falsehood more serious, providing for its commission under an aggravated modality; b) the necessity that it can cause harm was included as an element of said criminal type, which occurs with its effective use. This position has significant doctrinal support. For several decades, the scholar Sebastián Soler indicated *“…The use of a false document holds great importance in doctrine and legislation from a dual perspective: as an autonomous or relatively autonomous figure and as an integral part of some falsehoods…”* (Soler, Sebastián. **Derecho Penal Argentino**, Volume V, Tipográfica Editora Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 355), which is complemented by what Muñoz Conde stated, to the effect that *“…The falsification of a document naturally leads to its use. Therefore, if the use is carried out by the forger themselves, it is a subsequent unpunishable act…”* (Muñoz Conde, Francisco. **Derecho Penal. Parte Especial**, 18th Edition, Editorial Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 2010, p. 755), which undoubtedly applies to the crime of ideological falsehood as a modality of falsehood. As the Court of Appeal indicates, the decision of the *a quo* court to consider that an ideal concurrence existed between the crimes of use of a false document and ideological falsehood was erroneous, given that since the author of those actions is the same person, in this case, the accused Carmen Amador Pereira, the reproach of the first illicit act is contained in the second (consumption of the disvalue). Consequently, the sole admitted ground of the cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Engie Marín Pandolfi, private defender of the accused, is dismissed; the jurisprudential line is unified in the sense that an apparent concurrence of norms exists between the crimes of ideological falsehood and use of a false document, under the assumption that the same person carries out both actions, it being understood that the ideological falsehood absorbs the use of a false document. Regarding this point, the ruling of the Court of Appeal in judgment No. 2015-01075, at 09:15 hours, on July 30, 2015, is upheld insofar as it annulled (without remand) the penalty imposed for the use of a false document (which, ultimately, the *a quo* court did not use to increase the penalty for the more serious crime), there being simple ideological falsehoods for the acts committed against [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009], and proceedings must continue as ordered by the *ad quem* court, which annulled the penalty imposed and ordered a remand before a new panel of the trial court so that, respecting the principle of *reformatio in peius* and starting from the fixed legal classification (simple crimes and in apparent concurrence), the sanction is imposed. The matter regarding the declaration of material falsehood of the deeds and the certifications derived from them is maintained unchanged, as well as the marriage declarations and any legal effect that said legal instruments may have produced, specifically in relation to the victims [Name 002], [Name 008], and [Name 009].

**IV. In the third ground raised by licensed attorney Andrés Garro Mora, in his capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office,** he alleges erroneous application of procedural precepts, specifically, articles 2, 7, 36, and 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant bases his reproach on articles 437, 439, and 468, subsection b), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He asserts that the Court of Appeal committed an error in its reasoning by endorsing the Trial Court's position of allowing, once the trial was well advanced, a conciliation for the case of the victim [Name 010], contrary to the provisions of current regulations and the Constitutional Chamber. He states that the *ad quem* court confirmed the *a quo* court's decision, indicating that in vote number 5836-99, the Constitutional Chamber established the possibility that conciliation could be permitted during the trial stage if the parties agreed and there were reasons why the measure was not agreed upon during the intermediate stage. He affirms that the Public Prosecutor's Office is aware of that resolution; however, what is established is that the measure cannot be denied solely on the grounds that it is untimely, so the judge must assess the specific case and decide whether the application of the measure was appropriate or not, due to other circumstances. He considers that the first error of the appellate judges lies in giving the constitutional criterion a breadth it does not contain. From his perspective, it must be considered that our procedural system is designed in stages, so the possible application of conciliation after the issuance of the order to proceed to trial is prior to the start of the debate, since once it has begun, the judges are hearing the merits of the case, as they have received testimonial and documentary evidence, as happened in this case. He deems that a second error lies in the fact that the Court of Appeal considered that the debate had not begun at the time the measure was proposed, a conclusion they reached based on the trial record stating that prior to the debate the defense proposed conciliation, but also, upon verifying what happened in the audiovisual record that the measure was proposed after the reading of the accusation –and the receipt of evidence–, the judges resolved that with the reading of the prosecutorial request, the debate has not yet begun. This stance contains the error of not considering that the trial had indeed begun and, therefore, the opportunity for conciliation had already expired. He also claims that the Court of Appeal's resolution contains the defect of considering that in the Trial Court's handling of admitting the conciliation during the trial phase, there was a defective procedural activity of absolute nature that needed to be declared, in view of the fact that some victims could not be located to appear at the preliminary hearing and that consequently, they did not have the right to agree on alternative measures in the intermediate stage, and the *a quo* court's decision to admit the conciliation was the correct solution. He notes that during the debate, no defective procedural activity by the defense occurred, and that, in any case, there is no fundamental right of access to alternative solutions in criminal proceedings, as developed by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 2010-3941, at 14:39 hours, on February 24, 2010, so there was no defective procedural activity of an absolute nature to declare. He concludes that the decision causes harm because the application of the measure was not endorsed, contrary to the principle of legality, frustrating the punitive interests of the prosecutorial body. **The claim is granted for the reasons that will be stated.** To respond to the appellant's questions, it is appropriate to know what the Court of Appeal resolved in the specific case regarding the conciliation where [Name 010] appears as a victim. On this point, the *ad quem* court noted: *“…Firstly, it must be indicated that, according to what is recorded in the record on folio 1439, the proposal for an alternative measure (and, upon its rejection, for integral reparation of the damage) was made by the accused before the reading of the accusation, that is, before the debate was opened. Regardless of whether that document may, or may not, coincide with the audiovisual record (as the Public Prosecutor's Office alleges, stating that the proposal was subsequent and referring to a sequence of the recording), the truth is that the preliminary acts of the debate were used, so it constitutes excessive formalism to understand that if the reading of the accusation begins, or concludes, the measure is no longer appropriate, which clashes with the criterion of the Constitutional Chamber that will be indicated. While it is true the Tribunal, for reasons of procedural agility, postponed the decision on the request until hearing the opinion of each victim, whom it asked upon giving each deposition, this does not imply that, due to said conduct by the judges, the party should be punished, who made the proposal during those preliminary acts of the trial, before the accused was identified. Secondly, the Constitutional Chamber, through vote number 5836-99, admitted that conciliation could be carried out in the debate phase, that is, after the preliminary hearing is completed. That pronouncement was not limited, as the appellant erroneously indicates, to occurring before the reading of the accusation, since it was stated: "...interpreting the procedural time for these actions (opportunity criteria, suspension of the procedure on probation, conciliation, integral reparation of the damage, abbreviated procedure) restrictively would mean illegitimately limiting the right of the parties to obtain the prompt resolution of their conflicts, in accordance with the provisions of articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.1 and 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. So that the interpretation of procedural time, in the case of the application of those legal institutes that allow the parties to conclude the criminal process and resolve the conflict arising between citizens (victim and accused) as a consequence of the transgression of criminal law, should be consistent with the State's interest in restoring social harmony, as indicated by the General Part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its article 7. It is not possible, then, to limit the parties' access to the resolution of the conflict, based on a restrictive interpretation of the procedural time for the application of such legal institutes expressly contemplated in the procedural law (...) a literal interpretation of the procedural time regulated in articles 17, 25, 36 and 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, limits the right conferred on the procedural subjects to obtain a solution to the conflict through alternative procedural solutions after the order to proceed to trial has been issued. Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this literal interpretation shall be replaced by an extensive interpretation of the phrase 'at any time until before the opening of the trial is agreed upon,' which favor the exercise of the powers conferred by the legal system on those who participate in the procedure, for the prompt and effective resolution of the conflict. So that the procedural time referred to in this phrase cannot be interpreted as a peremptory term - given that it would limit the right of the parties to resolve the conflict through alternative procedural avenues -, but as an order-giving term that may be extended with the consent of the parties. Consequently, if the victim and the accused so request, the judge must assess, even after the order to proceed to trial (article 322 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), in which cases the application of conciliation would be appropriate...' Although, later, the same Constitutional Tribunal indicated that the law has a limit for those mechanisms and that this does not infringe upon due process (see votes numbers 4983-00 and 7378-09), this does not mean, then, that there is an absolute prohibition on accessing the institute in question, nor can it be considered that procedural legality is violated if it is done, because the norms must be interpreted systematically and not in isolation. In this way, if here the Tribunal considered — although it did not use those exact words (requesting which implies an excessive formalism that has been progressively banished from the criminal process) — that a defective procedural activity had occurred, because the victims were not present at the preliminary hearing (see folios 1148-1150 of volume II of the principal) and, consequently, both they and the accused were denied the possibility of concluding the conflict in a different manner, the proper course was to act as the a quo court did, that is, remedying the omitted procedure, as authorized by article 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Note that, as the Public Prosecutor's Office accepts on folio 1639, the victims were summoned but not located (see folios 1117, 1118, 1119 and 1138), a scenario in which, while it is true that suspending the preliminary hearing was not possible, it was feasible to attempt the application of alternative measures, which satisfy the claims of both parties, in another procedural phase, to correct the error. Thus, this Chamber does not observe that any irregularity was produced in the proceedings and, therefore, the claim must be rejected, adding that, although the victim made some reservation about appealing what was resolved, ultimately she did not do so, which denotes that she conformed to it, and without it being envisioned that she suffered any harm or grievance from what happened…”* (cf., folios 1656 verso to 1657 verso). Before resolving the specific case, it is pertinent to review the provisions of the Constitutional Chamber regarding the scope of the phrase “until before the opening of the trial is agreed upon” as a requirement for applying conciliation, as well as other alternative measures and the abbreviated procedure. The highest Constitutional Body, in judgment 1999-05836, cited by the *ad quem* court, adopted an open stance on the procedural stage in which alternative measures – among them, conciliation – and the abbreviated procedure are applicable, establishing for the purposes that interest us: *“…interpreting the procedural time for these actions (opportunity criteria, suspension of the procedure on probation, conciliation, integral reparation of the damage, abbreviated procedure) restrictively would mean illegitimately limiting the right of the parties to obtain the prompt resolution of their conflicts, in accordance with the provisions of articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.1 and 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. So that the interpretation of procedural time, in the case of the application of those legal institutes that allow the parties to conclude the criminal process and resolve the conflict arising between citizens (victim and accused) as a consequence of the transgression of criminal law, should be consistent with the State's interest in restoring social harmony, as indicated by the General Part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its article 7. It is not possible, then, to limit the parties' access to the resolution of the conflict, based on a restrictive interpretation of the procedural time for the application of such legal institutes expressly contemplated in the procedural law…”… Evidently, interpreting that once the order to proceed to trial (article 322 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) has been issued, the application of the cited legal institutes is not appropriate under any circumstance constitutes a literal interpretation of the normative text. However, a literal interpretation of the procedural time regulated in articles 17, 25, 36 and 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure limits the right conferred on the procedural subjects to obtain a solution to the conflict through alternative procedural solutions after the order to proceed to trial has been ordered. Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this literal interpretation shall be replaced by an extensive interpretation of the phrase 'at any time until before the opening of the trial is agreed upon,' which favor the exercise of the powers conferred by the legal system on those who participate in the procedure, for the prompt and effective resolution of the conflict. So that the procedural time referred to in this phrase cannot be interpreted as a peremptory term - given that it would limit the right of the parties to resolve the conflict through alternative procedural avenues -, but as an order-giving term that may be extended with the consent of the parties. Consequently, if the victim and the accused so request, the judge must assess, even after the order to proceed to trial (article 322 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), in which cases the application of conciliation, suspension of the process on probation, or the abbreviated procedure – for example – would be appropriate, based on the principles and values that establish the criminal process…”* (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 1999-05836, at 17:18 hours, on July 27, 1999). A few days later, when resolving a habeas corpus appeal, said Chamber held: “…*the parties must be summoned with priority and immediately for the holding of the respective hearing, so that at any stage of the process, even before the opening of the debate (article 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the conciliation request is specifically resolved…*” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 1999-05981, at 14:03 hours, on August 3, 1999, the underlining is not in the original). However, this criterion was reconsidered and changed by said Chamber in judgments 2000-02989 and 2000-04983. In the first of those rulings, the Constitutional Chamber, referring to the time limit imposed for requesting the application of the abbreviated procedure – which is the same for conciliation – affirmed: *“…while it is true that there is an evident interest of the State in restoring social harmony and that to a certain extent the abbreviated procedure - like other alternative measures to the plenary criminal process - seeks to fulfill that end through the resolution of the conflicts that at an intersubjective level underlie the criminal process, it is also true that, like any procedural institute, that of alternative measures cannot be left free of regulations to be used by the parties at their discretion; this latter idea is foreign to the very notion of an orderly procedural system and possibly originates when the search for conflict resolution between the parties, as an end of the process, is granted a relevance greater than that which corresponds to it within the system. Quite to the contrary, it must be taken into account that the design of the current criminal procedural system still retains as its primary aim the regulation and iteration of the exercise of the State's punitive power, even when various forms of conflict resolution are provided, with which the intention is to mitigate the rigor that the previous system exhibited in this sense, especially in the face of certain special cases where a particular individual's interest in the sanction and compensation exceeded that of the State. From this perspective, it is not unreasonable to establish final deadlines for the fulfillment of the different actions and stages so long as they do not harm what constitutes the main interest of the process nor its essential rituals. Moreover, if we start from the reasoning form exposed by the Chamber in judgments number 05836-99 and 05981-99 already transcribed, in which it maintains that the time limitation must be order-giving under penalty of harming fundamental rights, similarly, no other limitation would be sustainable, (not even the one these very resolutions impose by authorizing the proposal of alternative measures only until before the opening of the hearing according to the text of article 341). Taken to its ultimate consequences, the search for a solution to the conflict between the parties should make permissible the possibility of conciliation during the course of the debate, between the close of the debate and the issuance of the judgment, or in the cassation stage, since res judicata does not yet exist; that is, the arguments used by the Chamber to disallow the limit contained in article 373 are equally valid to disallow any other time limit or procedural stage that one might wish to oppose to the conciliatory will of the parties…”* (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2000-02989, at 15:24 hours, on April 12, 2000). As stated in that same ruling, it must be the judge of the intermediate stage “…*who receives, analyzes, and intervenes in the processing and resolution of the proposed alternative measures, so that, if they are unsuccessful, the matter continues its normal course and the judge in charge of the debate receives the case without any type of predisposition regarding the facts that will be the subject of judgment. In exceptional cases to be determined by the Tribunal, it could be returned to the intermediate stage…*” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2000-02989, at 15:24 hours, on April 12, 2000). In this same resolution, the highest Constitutional Body, upon reconsidering the position it had assumed in votes 1999-05836 and 1999-05981, highlighted: *“…there indeed exists a contradiction between the judgments of this Chamber number 09129-98 and 05836-99, subsequently confirmed by 05981-99; said contradiction goes in the sense that while in the first it is established that there is no violation of constitutional norms due to the application of the limit established in article 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the other two, in making indirect reference to this article, indicate that it should be understood that said limit is not unconstitutional as long as it is understood that it cannot be opposed to the parties.

Now, with new grounds for consideration, the Chamber reconsiders the matter to set aside the jurisprudence contained in rulings 05836-99 and 05981-99, understanding that, firstly, the temporal limit imposed on the request for application of the abbreviated proceeding (proceso abreviado) originates in the very text of article 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), without requiring any interpretation beyond the simple and literal reading of the rule to apply it; secondly, that this rule requires presenting the request for application of the abbreviated proceeding before the judge of the intermediate stage and prior to that judge ordering the opening of trial in accordance with the power established in article 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; thirdly, that the recently referenced limitation does not affect the core of the accused's fundamental rights because it pertains to non-essential procedures within the criminal process; finally, that said rule, insofar as it temporally limits the exercise of a power legally granted to the accused, is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, because such restriction directly protects the principle of an impartial judge to which the accused has the right…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2000-02989, at 15:24 hours, of April 12, 2000). In resolution 2000-04983, the Constitutional Chamber resolved the consultation posed in the sense that rejecting a petition for application of the abbreviated proceeding, when made after the opportunity established by the Code of Criminal Procedure has passed, is not contrary to due process, reiterating what was indicated in vote 2000-02989 (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2000-04983, at 14:51 hours, of June 28, 2000). Likewise, in resolution 2004-08726, the highest Constitutional Body clearly established the difference between integral reparation of harm (reparación integral del daño) and other alternative measures such as conciliation (conciliación) and suspension of the process on probation (suspensión del proceso a prueba), an opportunity in which it stated: “…the Chamber does observe that it is necessary to clarify that according to the provisions of article 30 subsection j) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, integral reparation of harm may be agreed 'before the oral trial (juicio oral)', thus it is not required to be before the opening of trial is agreed upon, as is required with other alternative exits, such as suspension of the process on probation (article 25 of the CPP) and conciliation (article 36 of the CPP)…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2004-08726, at 15:20 hours, of August 11, 2004). In vote 2009-07378, the Constitutional Chamber took judgment 2000-02989 as its starting point, stating specifically with respect to conciliation: “…Although the previous considerations were expressed by the Chamber when it analyzed the constitutionality of the limit established in numeral 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the application of the abbreviated proceeding, on that occasion it was advanced that what was said would be applicable to cases where a similar temporal restriction is involved regarding other types of alternative measures established in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such is the case under study, given that the rule now consulted, which regulates the institution of conciliation, in its first paragraph establishes the same temporal limit, by indicating that 'conciliation between the victim and the accused shall be admissible, at any time up until before the opening of trial is agreed upon.' The criteria expressed by the Chamber to reason the constitutionality of article 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are adopted in their entirety for this present ruling, thus it must be concluded that numeral 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as it establishes a temporal limit for the parties to conciliate in the criminal process, is not unconstitutional…” ( ) “…Access to justice regulated in article 41 of the Political Constitution is also not violated by the consulted rule, since the only thing it makes impossible is to conciliate after the opening of trial in the criminal process has been agreed upon…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2009-07378, at 14:47 hours, of May 6, 2009). From what has been transcribed, a first conclusion emerges: since the year 2000, the Constitutional Chamber has maintained the criterion that it is not possible to admit the abbreviated proceeding, suspension of the process on probation, and conciliation once the opening of trial in the criminal process has been agreed upon, a situation distinct from that relating to the institution of integral reparation of harm, which, by legal provision, is admissible “before the oral trial.” Meanwhile, it is established that this Cassation Chamber has been emphatic that it is improper to apply alternative measures –among them conciliation– or the abbreviated proceeding at the debate stage. A general rule that has been excepted in judgment 2010-00200, at 11:00 hours, of March 18, 2010, as well as in the majority votes of resolutions 2009-00831, at 10:50 hours, of June 24, 2009, 2007-00687, at 10:20 hours, of June 29, 2007, and 2007-01191, at 14:25 hours, of October 24, 2007, the latter rulings contemplating as a scenario that the parties had not had access to that possibility when the preliminary hearing was held (e.g.: if the notice of the hearing was not notified to the accused who designated a specific place to receive notices). In the specific case, this Cassation Chamber considers that there are two substantive reasons why the Trial Court was not authorized to homologate the conciliation agreement between the accused Carmen Amador Pereira and the victim [Name 010], a decision that was subsequently erroneously endorsed by the Court of Appeal. First reason. Pursuant to article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “In misdemeanors or contraventions, in crimes of private action, of public action upon private instance, those that admit conditional suspension of the sentence, conciliation between the victim and the accused shall be admissible, at any time up until before the opening of trial is agreed upon…”. As the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) explains, in the present matter, conciliation was proposed and agreed upon after the procedural moment authorized by procedural law had precluded. It is logical to think that if this Chamber has indicated that integral reparation of harm is improper once the accused person and witnesses have declared, that is, after the opening of the debate (in this regard see Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2008-01210, at 10:25 hours, of October 27, 2008, majority vote), that procedural institution being admissible “before the oral trial” –unlike conciliation which may be agreed “up until before the opening of trial is agreed upon”–, with greater reason a conciliation after the debate has begun is unacceptable, as occurred in the case under examination, in which the accusation had even been read, as well as the statement of the accused and several witnesses received (see digital files c0001150320092615, sequence from 09:26:15 to 09:50:46, c0001150320100007, sequence from 10:00:07 to 11:00:00 and c0001150320150000, sequence from 15:00:00 to 15:56:23, all of March 20, 2015), a situation that denies the ad quem. This circumstance, by itself, already prevented the a quo from authorizing the conciliation; however, there is an additional reason. Second reason. From the review of the recording of the preliminary hearing, it has been possible to observe that, when it was held, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office categorically opposed a conciliation being carried out in the present matter (see digital file c0000110921083916, sequence from 08:39:16 to 09:00:00), given that, at the debate stage, the Prosecutor lodged the respective protest so that the Trial Court would not approve said alternative measure in relation to the events where Ms. [Name 010] appears as the victim (see digital file c0001150320150000, sequence from 15:00:00 to 15:56:23, all of March 20, 2015). The agreement reached was not viable given the nature of the crimes, namely, ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica) and use of a false document (uso de documento falso), in which the protected legal interest is multi-offensive (the public trust (fe pública) is the principal one). In this regard, on previous occasions this Chamber has stated: “…Therefore, if one of these instruments is falsified and then used, in an suitable manner, there exists the possibility of generating an erroneous judgment about what it supposedly represents. Here is where the requirement of the possibility of harm is located. This possibility must be distinguished from the detriment to the legal interest protected which, as was said, is included in every crime. It is something more, either when expressly required in the legal type, or when considered an indispensable element -as occurs with the crime of use of a false document- even if not stated in the rule. Thus, it is affirmed that 'The character of the document, the suitability of the falsification, and the possibility of harm, form a unit around the criminal legal concept of public trust, at least in the chapter of documentary falsehoods' (CREUS, Carlos. Falsification of documents in general, 2nd updated edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial Astrea, p.6.). That possibility of harm is linked to the injury to public trust that the falsehood represents and there arises, so to speak, a bi-univocal relationship: the injury to public trust implies the possibility of harm to other legal interests or interests worthy of protection, precisely because of the value it grants to those documents. To injure public trust efficiently, that is, to consider the conduct typical, one must be in a position where it may cause harm. The previously cited author in this regard points out: 'normally the falsehood itself -particularly when it relates to public documents- can already be pointed out as a detriment to public trust insofar as the document that carries it has been deformed; but that effect is not typically sufficient; the law requires that to that eventual 'abstract' injury is added the concrete one of the possibility of harm to other legal interests (distinct from public trust), which may be of varied nature: patrimonial, moral, political, and must belong to a third party, that is, they must be held by someone other than the agent of the falsification. That effect must come directly from the falsification, from what it represents for the extinction or creation of rights, faculties, and burdens.' (ibid., p. 69)…” (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2009-00628, at 17:17 hours, of April 29, 2009). Given that the accused crimes are multi-offensive, the truth is that for the application of conciliation, the approval of the Public Prosecutor's Office was required, as the assent of the individualized victim was not sufficient, this being a crime of public action pursuant to article 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, given the refusal of the prosecutorial body, the homologation of the mentioned alternative measure was procedurally improper (in similar terms, in relation to the suspension of the process on probation regarding the crime of slanderous complaint, see Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 2013-00744, at 11:35 hours, of June 14, 2013). Given the circumstances, the third claim of the challenge filed by the prosecutorial representation is granted. The judgment No. 2015-01075 of the Court of Appeal is annulled, solely insofar as it dismissed the appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office and endorsed the conciliation where [Name 010] appears as the victim. Likewise, the definitive dismissal due to conciliation ordered by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, through judgment No. 331-2015, at 16:15 hours, of April 13, 2015, is annulled and a remand is ordered so that the Trial Court, with a different composition, holds the oral and public trial for the events accused to the detriment of the Public Trust (Fe Pública) and the victim [Name 010].

“II.- Recurso de casación interpuesto por el licenciado Andrés Garro Mora, en su condición de representante del Ministerio Público. En el primer motivo, con base en los ordinales 437, 439 y 468 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal, el recurrente aduce la existencia de precedentes contradictorios entre lo resuelto por el Tribunal de Apelación que dictó el fallo que ahora se impugna, en relación con la sentencia número 2014-236 de ese mismo tribunal y los fallos de esta Sala de Casación Penal números 475-F-93, 2004-1046 y 228-2012. Explica que en la jurisprudencia citada se ha interpretado que para los efectos del delito de falsedad ideológica cometido por un notario público en el ejercicio de sus funciones, éstos deben ser considerados como funcionarios públicos, y en ese sentido le es de aplicación la agravante contemplada en el artículo 366 en relación con el 367 del Código Penal. Sin embargo, en esta oportunidad los jueces de apelación deciden cambiar de criterio y así lo indican en el fallo, resolviendo que a partir de ese momento se apartan de esa posición y en adelante no equiparan al notario público como funcionario público, aplicando la modalidad simple del delito de falsedad ideológica. Señala que ante supuestos fácticos idénticos tanto la Sala de Casación como el propio Tribunal de Apelación han sostenido que la calidad del sujeto activo constituye no el tipo penal simple de falsedad ideológica sino el agravado, al considerar que el notario público es funcionario público para responder en la vía penal por los delitos cometidos en el ejercicio abusivo de sus funciones. Concluye que esta posición ocasionó un agravio al ente acusador al rechazar en forma ilegítima su pretensión punitiva. Solicita se declare con lugar el motivo, se declare la ineficacia del fallo impugnado, únicamente en cuanto a la recalificación ordenada, por contradecir los precedentes jurisprudenciales que el mismo Tribunal de Apelación y la Sala Tercera han sostenido en cuanto a la calificación que debe darse en casos como el presente, unificándose el criterio que establece que para los efectos penales el Notario Público debe ser considerado como funcionario público, y se mantenga la sentencia del Tribunal de Juicio en cuanto condenó a la encartada por los hechos acusados configurativos de los delitos de falsedad ideológica agravada. Señala que, ello sin perjuicio de que de igual forma se deje incólume el reenvío ordenado al Tribunal de Juicio en el voto impugnado, al considerarse en un aparte no recurrido infundada la pena de tres años fijada para cada delito. Su segundo reclamo, lo fundamenta en los artículos 437, 439 y 468 inciso b) del Código Procesal Penal. Alega errónea aplicación e inobservancia de normas sustantivas, concretamente los ordinales 366 y 367 del Código Penal. Indica que el Tribunal de Apelación cometió el error de calificar el delito en su modalidad simple y no agravada como correspondía, lo que influye en el monto de la pena. En sustento de su reclamo, el fiscal cita los hechos tenidos por demostrados, y señala que constituyen el delito de falsedad ideológica agravada porque la encartada al momento de cometer el ilícito actuó en su condición de notaria pública, como fue acusado. Agrega que, para efectos penales lo que interesa para equiparar a un notario con un funcionario público es que la función de la que se prevalece el notario para cometer el ilícito es una función pública. Aduce que de acuerdo al numeral 1 del Código de Notarial, el notariado “es la función pública ejercida privadamente.”. En este sentido, el recurrente estima que: “Una interpretación armónica del artículo 367 del Código Penal en relación al último párrafo del 366 del mismo cuerpo de leyes, en concordancia del artículo 1 del Código Notarial, permite concluir que el ejercicio de las funciones notariales, para el ámbito penal, el notario debe ser considerado funcionario público y por consiguiente debe aplicársele la agravante descrita.” (cfr, folio 1715). Afirma que para considerar al notario funcionario público debe referirse a la función que cumple no a otras circunstancias como permanencia en una institución pública y dependencia salarial. Manifiesta que, sin embargo, el ad quem consideró la independencia del notario al momento de ejercer sus funciones en forma privada y el que no cuente con un ligamen directo con la administración pública. Por otra parte, señala que los jueces de apelación también adujeron que había que hacer una diferenciación entre función pública y funcionario público, siendo que para el tipo penal agravado lo que interesa es que el agente activo se trate de un funcionario público, no que ejerza la función pública. Arguye que ese argumento está errado por cuanto el tipo penal (366 último párrafo) agrava la conducta cuando el sujeto comete el ilícito abusando de sus funciones, pues ningún funcionario público comete delito como parte de sus atribuciones. Concluye que el fallo le ocasiona un agravio pues la errónea calificación incide también en la imposición de la pena, lo cual perjudica la pretensión punitiva del ente acusador. Solicita se declare con lugar el motivo, se declare la ineficacia del fallo impugnado, únicamente en cuanto a la recalificación ordenada, por no ser acorde con los hechos demostrados, y que se mantenga el fallo del tribunal de juicio, en cuanto a la calificación legal de dichos hechos como configurativos del delito de falsedad ideológica agravada. Señala que, ello sin perjuicio de que de igual forma se deje incólume el reenvío ordenado al Tribunal de Juicio en el voto impugnado, al considerarse, en un aparte no recurrido, infundada la pena de tres años fijada para cada delito. Dada la conexidad entre los reclamos, se proceden a resolver de manera conjunta. Se declaran sin lugar los motivos. La discusión se centra en si la agravante contenida en el párrafo segundo del artículo 366 del Código Penal, en relación con el ordinal 367 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, resulta aplicable al notario público que, en el ejercicio de sus funciones, incurre en el delito de falsedad ideológica. Para ello, se hace necesario exponer el criterio que asumió en el presente asunto el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en la resolución Nº 2015-1075 (tesis distinta a la adoptada por ese mismo Tribunal –con una integración parcialmente distinta– en la sentencia Nº 2014-0236), así como dar a conocer la posición que ha adoptado esta Sala de Casación Penal en diversos antecedentes. Posteriormente se presentará la posición asumida recientemente por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en la sentencia 2017-08043, de las 11:50 horas, del 26 de mayo de 2017. Finalmente, se presentarán los argumentos que llevan a esta Cámara a declarar sin lugar los dos primeros motivos del recurso de casación presentado por el representante del Ministerio Público. A. Razonamientos empleados por el Tribunal de Apelación del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en el caso concreto. Dada la trascendencia del tema, esta Sala procede a transcribir lo señalado por el Tribunal de Apelación en la sentencia Nº 2015-1075. Al respecto en dicha resolución se dijo: “…en este asunto, el Tribunal de instancia consideró que se configuraba el delito de falsedad ideológica agravado, es decir, el previsto en el párrafo segundo del 366 (por remisión del 367 ambos del Código Penal)…” ( ) “…Para esos fines, es necesario distinguir entre funcionario público y función pública. No todos los funcionarios públicos despliegan una función pública en estricto sentido ni todos los que despliegan función pública son funcionarios públicos…” ( ) “…Sobre este tema, han sido varios los pronunciamientos doctrinales, y algunos jurisprudenciales, que hacen la diferenciación. Así, por ejemplo, INFANTE MELÉNDEZ, Gustavo Adolfo ("Naturaleza jurídica del notariado costarricense." En: Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas, N° 106, 2005, págs. 175-196. U.C.R. Disponible en la página de internet: revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/juridicas/article/viewFile/13332/12603) y CHAVARRÍA ARIAS, María del Pilar ("Naturaleza del Notariado Público ¿Es un funcionario público o no?" En: Revista Rhombus , volumen 3, N° 8, enero-abril 2007. Disponible en: www.ulacit.ac.cr/files/careers/29_chavarriaarias.pdf, ambos textos capturados el 27 de julio de 2015) basándose en HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén y SALAS MARRERO, Oscar. Apuntes del Derecho Notarial. Tesis de licenciatura en Derecho, Universidad de Costa Rica, San José, 1971), hacen un recuento de las distintas tesis que, sobre la función notarial , existen, a saber: la tesis funcionarista (según la cual la función notarial es una función pública ejercida por el notario como funcionario público independiente, remunerado por los particulares. Dentro de esta corriente hay tres tendencias respecto a la ubicación de la función notarial: como parte del Poder Ejecutivo, del Poder Judicial o como una actividad autónoma); la tesis profesionalista (sostiene que tanto el servicio prestado como el sujeto que lo brinda, tienen carácter profesional; la función del notario no es pública, sino técnico-profesional) y la tesis ecléctica (que, aunque acepta que el notario es un profesional privado y no un funcionario público asalariado, despliega una función pública). De ellas surgen, en consideración al notario, la doctrina notarialista (que califica al notario como funcionario público) y la doctrina administrativista que sigue la tesis funcionarista y sostiene que es posible que se dé un ejercicio privado de funciones públicas. Esta última tesis (siguiendo a ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, San José, tomo I, editorial Stradtmann, 1a. edición, 1998, pág. 387), considera que la naturaleza jurídica del notario público es la de un "Munera Pubblica" es decir, en palabras del último autor citado, un "...particular que ejerce funciones públicas o presta servicios públicos no es un funcionario público ni un órgano público, sino precisamente un particular extraño a la organización pública". La diferencia entre un "munera pubblica" y un funcionario de hecho es que, mientras ambos prestan un servicio público, el primero lo hace a nombre y por cuenta propia, en tanto que el segundo, al tenor de lo establecido por el artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, lo hace en nombre y por cuenta de la Administración Pública. Para los autores supra citados, si este numeral define servidor, funcionario o empleado público público (sic) como "...la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia y de carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público" es claro que el notario carece de dicho carácter, porque no se dan, respecto a él, condiciones como la representatividad (el notario no representa a la Administración Pública, al punto que esta no es solidaria, con él, en el ejercicio de su cargo, como sí sucede con los servidores públicos), el imperio (a diferencia del funcionario, el notario no impone mandatos sino que recoge la voluntad rogada por quienes se lo piden), la remuneración (no pertenece al régimen de empleo público sino que percibe honorarios de las partes), la designación (no es nombrado ni electo, sino habilitado), etc. Además INFANTE y CHAVARRÍA, estiman un contrasentido que se le repute funcionario público si, a la vez, la directriz N° 004-2000 de la Dirección Nacional de Notariado del 20 de julio de 2000 y su posterior modificación a través de los Lineamientos Generales para la Prestación y Control del Ejercicio y Servicio Notarial, señalan que un notario público debe tener oficina abierta y no puede ser funcionario público. La posición de esos autores luce acorde al Ordenamiento Jurídico pues, inclusive, leyes de más reciente data, que amplían la definición de funcionario público (que, entonces, es un elemento normativo de tipo jurídico) que contiene la Ley General de la Administración Pública, como por ejemplo la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, N° 8422…” ( ) “…Adicionalmente, esa exclusión del 'notario público' como 'funcionario público' parece ser avalada por la Sala Constitucional, por medio del voto número 1749-2001 (ante una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 22 y 25 de la Ley de Enriquecimiento Ilícito de los Servidores Públicos, numerales esos, que les prohíben a los funcionarios públicos ejercer profesiones liberales si obtienen dinero por prohibición) que señaló que "...la naturaleza de la función notarial (...) la Sala entiende como el ejercicio privado de una función pública (...) Es una función que se ejerce por delegación y con supervisión del Estado" y, en el voto número 1483-2001 (amparo de un grupo de notarios contra la Dirección que los regula) en que aludió a "...un conflicto entre ser funcionario público y simultáneamente ejercer OTRA FUNCIÓN —que también es pública— como es la del notariado." Por otro lado, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, en el voto número 293-2001 ha señalado que "El notariado es ejercicio privado de la función pública, por lo que los notarios no son funcionarios públicos, aunque sí tengan una especial relación de sujeción por este motivo." Así las cosas, si en Derecho Penal rige una interpretación restrictiva (artículo 2 del Código Penal) derivada del principio pro libertates y si, por lo expuesto, es posible derivar que, según sea la posición teórica que se asuma, así puede considerarse que el notario público es, o no, funcionario público, debe estarse a la tesis más limitada que, en todo caso, pasa por excluirlo de la consideración de tal, desde que, aunque realice una función pública, no tiene los beneficios de ser funcionario público al punto que hasta se le penaliza por serlo. El Ordenamiento Jurídico parte de la Plenitud Hermética (artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), es decir, de su propia coherencia, por lo que no es pensable que, para unos efectos (laborales, sancionatorios, para eliminar la responsabilidad solidaria del Estado, etc.) se le excluya de dicha condición, pero sí se le tome en cuenta para reprimirlo penalmente. Por lo expuesto, en criterio de esta Cámara, no es posible aplicarles a los notarios públicos el párrafo segundo del 366 del Código Penal para efectos de incrementarles la pena por insertar, en un documento público o auténtico, datos falsos o falsificar un documento. Así las cosas, expresamente se modifica la posición que, sin mayor elucubración, se puede haber sostenido en oportunidades anteriores y no se avala la referencia, rápida, que sobre el tema hiciera la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en el voto número 475-F-93. Por ejemplo, en el voto número 2014-236 —K. Jiménez, R. Chinchilla y J. Arce — en que se dijo:…( ) “…debe distinguirse que si bien no cabe duda de que el ejercicio de la profesión de abogado y notario se realiza en forma liberal y privada, la ley advierte que quien la realiza adquiere la condición de “funcionario público,” en este caso de “fedatario público,” resultando irrelevante si esa persona está ligada al servicio público o exista una relación de jerarquía tal con la Administración Pública o el Servicio Civil que determine su calidad de "servidor público." Esto, porque, por su naturaleza, el notario ejecuta una labor en esencia pública, con independencia de que sea parte de la Administración Pública…” ( ) “…En consecuencia, procede revocar la sentencia en este tema y recalificar los hechos, desde esta sede, como una falsedad ideológica simple, sin agravante, es decir, regida por el párrafo primero del artículo 366 del Código Penal (por remisión del 367 ibídem ), que reprime la conducta con una pena de uno a seis años de prisión…” (cfr, folios 1672 vto a 1675 fte, la negrita y el subrayado son del original). B. Antecedentes de la Sala de Casación Penal. En la resolución Nº 475-F-93, de las 08:50 horas, del 27 de agosto de 1993, los Magistrados de la Sala Tercera que integraron en aquella oportunidad, estimaron que, en razón de que el imputado era notario, el delito de falsedad ideológica era agravado, sin embargo, por conocerse sólo el recurso del imputado, resultaba aplicable el principio de reforma en perjuicio. En este sentido anotaron: “…debe señalarse que contrariamente a cuanto afirma el sentenciado, en realidad sí concurren en la especie condiciones para estimar que estamos en presencia de la agravación. Al tenerse por demostrado que el imputado es abogado y notario público, y que prevaliéndose de su condición de notario Público, según el título que lo acreditó como tal, utilizando el protocolo que le otorgó por esa razón la Corte Suprema de Justicia, aún suponiendo que estaba suspendido al momento de sus actuaciones, realizó varias escrituras de contenido falso, es claro que el imputado actuó prevaliéndose de su condición de funcionario público y de los instrumentos que al efecto tenía por ostentar la calidad de notario público. En realidad debe indicarse que cuando la ley señala que la falsificación se agrava cuando quien la realiza es un funcionario público actuando en el ejercicio de sus funciones, en realidad no está queriendo indicar que el delito sea parte del ejercicio de sus funciones en sentido estricto. Ningún funcionario público tiene entre sus atribuciones el realizar hechos delictivos, y en esa medida prácticamente ningún delito podría entenderse cometido en el ejercicio de funciones públicas, pues todos los delitos están fuera del ejercicio de funciones públicas. En realidad con esa frase lo que se ha pretendido indicar es que el hecho sea cometido por el funcionario público con ocasión del ejercicio de sus funciones, o prevaliéndose de su condición de funcionario público, pero nunca podría afirmarse en sentido estricto que deba ser cometido en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Cuando el funcionario comete el delito "...en el ejercicio de sus funciones...", lo hace abusando de su cargo, excediéndose en sus atribuciones, prevaliéndose de su condición, pero no en el ejercicio estricto de sus funciones. Sin embargo, conforme se dijo el Tribunal no aplicó en este asunto la causal de agravación por haber actuado el sentenciado con ocasión de sus funciones como notario Público, y la Sala no puede agravar su situación porque conoce sólo de recursos en favor del imputado (prohibición de la reformatio in peius)…”. Por su parte, en el voto Nº 2004-01046, de las 09:22 horas, del 27 de agosto de 2004, la Sala Tercera anuló una sentencia de sobreseimiento definitivo dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio, al considerar que el hecho delictivo acusado era una falsedad ideológica agravada por haberla cometido un notario público, siendo que el a quo realizó el cómputo de la prescripción partiendo de que se estaba ante una modalidad delictiva simple. Sobre este extremo la Sala de Casación Penal apuntó: “…conforme se desprende de la pieza acusatoria, al justiciable [Nombre 004]. se le señaló como posible autor responsable de un delito de falsedad ideológica y que se supone lo cometió, en su condición de notario público, al confeccionar una escritura en la que aparece como deudor del Banco…precisamente el aquí ofendido y querellante [Nombre 005]., hecho sucedido además el 15 de julio de 1996. Es decir, se le endilga ser el presunto autor responsable de una falsedad ideológica cometida en su carácter de funcionario público y cuya pena, en tal supuesto, puede ser de un máximo de hasta ocho años de prisión. Ante esta circunstancia, distinto a lo resuelto por el Tribunal el sustentar el sobreseimiento definitivo que dictó, la acción penal en el presente caso no prescribía a los tres años de haberse realizado la primera imputación formal al justiciable, lo que ocurrió con la indagatoria el 14 de febrero del año 2000 (así folio 9), sino cuando hubiesen transcurrido cuatro años desde que este acto se ejecutó. Este término además es el que corresponde a la mitad del plazo inicial de la prescripción que está previsto para esta clase de delincuencia (y que es ocho años), pero que varió a cuatro años luego de que se interrumpió con la “primera imputación ” formal del delito. Ahora bien, ¿por qué se estima que en este supuesto la pena prevista para esta delincuencia podría ser ocho años? Esto se debe a que en esta clase de hechos al notario público se le considera un funcionario público, de acuerdo con los artículos 1º del Código Notarial y 111 de la Ley General de Administración Pública y 59 y 60 del Código Penal. En este sentido, el artículo 1º del Código Notarial es muy claro al indicar que se trata de un funcionario público, pues si bien define el notariado como una “función pública ejercida privadamente ”, de inmediato advierte que la persona que realiza esta actividad lo hace como “funcionario habilitado ”. Asimismo, el numeral 111 de la Ley General de Administración Pública explica que el funcionario público lo determina la función específica que desempeña o presta una persona a la Administración y no tanto el ligamen a esta bajo un régimen remunerativo, imperativo, permanente o representativo. Sobre los alcances del concepto de funcionario público, vale recordar lo que esta Sala había dicho al respecto, al señalado que el concepto de funcionario público es mucho más amplio en Derecho Penal que en otras áreas del ordenamiento jurídico, utilizando un criterio que la doctrina moderna señala como objetivo, según el cual lo que interesa es que se desempeñe una función que en su esencia es pública. Es entonces la naturaleza de la actividad y no su ligamen con la Administración lo que, entre otros aspectos, caracteriza al funcionario público (ver en especial las resoluciones de esta Sala Ns. 103-F de las 10:30 hrs. del 2 de junio de 1989, y 104-F de las 9:15 hrs. del 27 de abril de 1990 donde se analizó exhaustivamente dicho concepto).” (Sala Tercera de la Corte, voto No. 208-F de 9:30 horas del 10 de junio de 1994). En otras palabras, lo importante en estos casos es el carácter “público ” de la tarea o “función” que se desempeña y no si la persona que la realiza está sometida a un régimen especial -de orden laboral- con respecto a la Administración. De igual forma, de manera concreta se ha dicho que se considera funcionario público al notario público en virtud de la actividad o “función ” que realiza…” (la negrita es del original). En similares términos, mediante sentencia Nº 2010-00923, de las 11:25 horas, del 27 de agosto de 2010, esta Sala de Casación indicó: “…Habiendo actuado en su condición de notario público, para todos los efectos el imputado tenía la condición de funcionario público, según lo establece el artículo 1 del Código Notarial (ley número 7764 del 17 de abril de 1998). De manera que el régimen de prescripción para tales hechos no es sólo el preceptuado en el Código Procesal Penal, sino el que en particular establece la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (número 8422, del 29 de octubre del 2004)…”. A su vez, en la resolución Nº 2011-00273, de las 09:38 horas, del 11 de marzo de 2011, dictada por esta Sala se dijo: “…tenemos que del primer bloque de hechos acusados, se tiene respecto a J. una falsedad ideológica (como se verá, en su modalidad simple) únicamente, y con respecto a [Nombre 006]., una falsedad ideológica agravada por su condición de notaria, un uso de documento falso y un delito de estafa en daño de I. (estos dos últimos delitos, derivan del hecho tres de la acusación). Las razones por las cuales la condición de funcionaria pública, que en su calidad de notaria ostentaba [Nombre 006]., a efectos de agravar el delito de falsedad ideológica, no era comunicable a J., reside, en la mala técnica con la que se redactó la acusación. Esta fue omisa en señalar que J., conociera o aprovechara la función pública ejercida por los notarios acusados, para cometer el delito. Tratándose de un elemento subjetivo que modifica la calificación jurídica aplicable a J., el mismo debía ser contenido, aún cuando fuese de forma somera, en la pieza acusatoria…” ( ) “…Ocurre entonces, respecto al segundo bloque de acontecimientos, que se imputa a J. un delito de falsedad ideológica únicamente, el cual se encuentra prescrito (por las mismas razones que el otro delito de la misma especie), en tanto que se atribuye a [Nombre 006]., una falsedad ideológica (agravada por ser cometida valiéndose de su calidad de fedataria pública)…”. Asimismo, en la sentencia Nº 2012-00228, de las 10:00 horas, del 17 de febrero de 2012, esta Sala se refirió a los alcances del concepto de funcionario público, en su relación con el notariado y con la agravante contenida en el artículo 366 del Código Penal (para ese entonces, el numeral 359 de ese mismo texto legal), lo anterior, partiendo de lo que dispuso en las resoluciones 103-F, de las 10:30 horas, del 2 de junio de 1989, 104-F, de las 9:15 horas, del 27 de abril de 1990, 208-F, de las 9:30 horas, del 10 de junio de 1994 y 2004-1046, de las 9:22 horas, del 27 de agosto de 2004, concluyendo que, en ese caso concreto, se había dictado erróneamente la prescripción de la acción penal, dado que el plazo reducido a la mitad por el delito de falsedad ideológica era de cuatro años, al existir la agravante que afectaba a dos imputados, quienes actuaron en su condición de notarios públicos. C. Posición reciente sostenida por la Sala Constitucional. Habiéndose presentado en el año 2016 una acción de inconstitucionalidad en bajo el Nº 16-005583-0007-CO, contra la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera que ha interpretado que el notario público ostenta la condición de funcionario público para efectos de la aplicación de la ley penal, específicamente, el tipo penal de falsedad ideológica contemplado en el artículo 367 del Código Penal, y que, por esta circunstancia de demostrarse la culpabilidad es acreedor de la pena agravada contenida en el ordinal 366 de este mismo texto legal para los funcionarios públicos, y no la pena ordinaria, la Sala Constitucional mediante voto de mayoría de cinco de los siete Magistrados y Magistradas, en la resolución 2017-08043, de las 11:50 horas, del 26 de mayo de 2017, declaró parcialmente inconstitucional la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que estima que el notario público es un funcionario público. Dada la trascendencia de este fallo, se proceden a trascribir las ideas más relevantes del mismo para los efectos del caso que nos ocupa. En cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica del notario público, el Máximo Órgano Constitucional anotó: “…Dos normas del Código Notarial, Ley No. 7764 de 17 de abril de 1998, son particularmente significativas para tal efecto. El numeral 1° establece que “El notariado público es la función pública ejercida privadamente. Por medio de ella, el funcionario habilitado asesora a las personas sobre la correcta formación legal de su voluntad en los actos o contratos jurídicos y da fe de la existencia de los hechos que ocurran ante él”. Ciertamente, esta norma legal califica el notariado como “función pública”, en el sentido que el notario público es, esencialmente, un fedatario público que da plena fe, para efectos jurídicos, de una serie de hechos y actos de relevancia jurídica. Con lo que es evidente que el correcto ejercicio de la función notarial tiene un inequívoco interés público o relevancia pública, dadas las implicaciones que tiene algún yerro cometido de manera intencional o no por un fedatario público. Empero, a partir de tal calificación legal no cabe concluir que el notario público sea un funcionario público, en el sentido que lo define el bloque de legalidad al que debe, necesariamente, remitirse el juez penal para imponer una condena. De otra parte, el artículo 2°, párrafo 1°, del Código Notarial es más preciso al indicar que “El notario público es el profesional en Derecho, especialista en Derecho Notarial y Registral, habilitado legalmente para ejercer la función notarial (…)”. Es menester concordar las dos normas ya citada con los artículos 30 y 31 del Código Notarial, para evitar caer en una interpretación y aplicación aislada del artículo 1°, en aras de una hermenéutica contextual y sistemática. Así el numeral 30 establece que “La persona autorizada para practicar el notariado, en el ejercicio de esta función legítima y auténtica los actos en los que interviene, con sujeción a las regulaciones del presente código y cualquier otra resultante de leyes especiales, para lo cual goza de fe pública (…)” (el destacado no es del original). Por su parte, el ordinal 31 establece que “El notario tiene fe pública cuando deja constancia de un hecho, suceso, situación, acto o contrato jurídico, cuya finalidad sea asegurar o hacer constatar derechos y obligaciones (…) En virtud de la fe pública, se presumen ciertas las manifestaciones del notario que consten en los instrumentos y demás documentos autorizados por él.” (el destacado no es del original). Consecuentemente, por regla general, el notario público, entonces, es un profesional liberal que ejerce una función notarial de relevancia o de claro interés público, al dar fe de una serie de hechos y actos, sin que por tal circunstancia se le pueda tener como un funcionario público…” (La negrita es del original). Por su parte, en lo referente a la noción de funcionario público en el bloque de legalidad, la Cámara Constitucional indicó: “…Para determinar la responsabilidad penal de una persona que es calificado (sic) por un tipo penal como funcionario público, necesariamente, es menester remitirse a la noción de funcionario público que establezca el ordenamiento jurídico y, particularmente, la ley, en aras de respetar y actuar los ya señalados principios de legalidad y tipicidad en materia penal. Sobre este particular, la Ley General de la Administración Pública desde 1978, estableció una definición clara y precisa de funcionario público al preceptuar en su artículo 111 lo siguiente: “1. Es servidor público la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. 2. A este efecto considéranse equivalentes los términos "funcionario público", "servidor público", "empleado público", "encargado de servicio público" y demás similares, y el régimen de sus relaciones será el mismo para todos, salvo que la naturaleza de la situación indique lo contrario. 3. No se consideran servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común.” Esta concepción de funcionario público, obviamente, no es absoluta, bien puede una ley especial o sectorial determinar una noción más flexible, incluso para fines de ampliar la esfera de responsabilidad administrativa y penal. Así sucedió con la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública de 2004, cuyo artículo 2° amplió la noción de funcionario público al disponer lo siguiente: “Servidor público . Para los efectos de esta Ley, se considerará servidor público toda persona que presta sus servicios en los órganos y en los entes de la Administración Pública, estatal y no estatal, a nombre y por cuenta de esta y como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto de investidura y con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. Los términos funcionario, servidor y empleado público serán equivalentes para los efectos de esta Ley. Las disposiciones de la presente Ley serán aplicables a los funcionarios de hecho y a las personas que laboran para las empresas públicas en cualquiera de sus formas y para los entes públicos encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común; asimismo, a los apoderados, administradores, gerentes y representantes legales de las personas jurídicas que custodien, administren o exploten fondos, bienes o servicios de la Administración Pública, por cualquier título o modalidad de gestión.” Este precepto de la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, como se ve, además, de reiterar los términos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública de 1978, en el párrafo 2° extiende la noción de funcionario público, incluso, a personas que no son funcionarios públicos desde la perspectiva del Derecho Administrativo, tales como los apoderados, administradores, gerentes o representantes de personas jurídicas que administren, exploten fondos, bienes o servicios de la administración pública por cualquier título o modalidad. Bien puede, entonces, el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de configuración, extender la noción de funcionario público a un notario público. Lo que no puede hacerse por vía de interpretación judicial extensiva es extrapolarse la noción de funcionario público al notario público, puesto que, se quebrantan evidente y manifiestamente los principios de legalidad y reserva de ley en materia de delitos, penas y su agravamiento. Tal y como lo ha hecho la pauta jurisprudencial impugnada al aplicar extensivamente la pena agravada del párrafo 2° del artículo 366 del Código Penal, prevista para los funcionarios públicos en el ejercicio de sus funciones, a los notarios públicos…”. Habiendo aclarado la Sala Constitucional la circunstancia de que el notario público no puede reputarse como funcionario público, hace la salvedad del notario público que ha sido contratado por una entidad pública (de planta), el cual, para esos efectos, sí actúa como funcionario público. Sobre este extremo apuntó: “…No pasa inadvertido para este Tribunal Constitucional que existen notarios públicos que sí comparten la condición de funcionario público, por haber sido contratados como tales por una entidad pública. En tales supuestos, al ser funcionarios públicos se cumple, entonces, con el principio de legalidad y reserva de ley, siendo evidente que, en tales casos, el notario sí tiene la condición de funcionario público (v. gr. notarios del Estado o institucionales). Esa figura no es lo ordinario en cuanto al ejercicio de la función notarial…”. A partir de las consideraciones expuestas, el Órgano Constitucional dispuso “…declarar parcialmente inconstitucional la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que estima que el notario público es funcionario público. Debe mantenerse vigente la pauta jurisprudencial cuando se aplique a notarios públicos a quienes se les paga un salario en una entidad pública por desempeñar esa labor en calidad de funcionario público. La declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad debe tener efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la jurisprudencia impugnada, sin perjuicio de de las relaciones o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas por prescripción, caducidad, sentencia con autoridad de cosa juzgada material, la consumación de hechos material o técnicamente irreversibles y derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Respecto de las personas que estén descontando una pena privativa de libertad por sentencia firme, agravada con fundamento en la línea jurisprudencial impugnada y que debe declararse inconstitucional, se les debe reducir su pena y en el supuesto de haberla cumplido por esta reducción, se les debe poner en libertad, salvo que la ejecución de otra sentencia condenatoria firme o medida cautelar de prisión preventiva vigente lo impida…”. En conclusión, la tesis de la Sala Constitucional en el voto 2017-08043, de las 11:50 horas, del 26 de mayo de 2017, fue considerar que el notario público no debe reputarse como funcionario público a no ser que haya sido contratado como tal por una entidad pública. D. Argumentos que llevan a esta Cámara a declarar sin lugar los dos primeros motivos del recurso de casación presentado por el representante del Ministerio Público. De conformidad con el artículo 367 del Código Penal, la pena de uno a seis años de prisión contemplada en el ordinal 366 de ese cuerpo normativo resulta aplicable "…al que insertare o hiciere insertar en un documento público o auténtico declaraciones falsas, concernientes a un hecho que el documento deba probar, de modo que pueda resultar perjuicio", siendo que, de acuerdo con el párrafo segundo del primero de esos numerales "…Si el hecho fuere cometido por un funcionario público en el ejercicio de sus funciones, la pena será de dos a ocho años". Basándose en el artículo 1 del Código Notarial, al referirse a la naturaleza del notariado, la Sala Constitucional ha dicho: “…el notariado es una función pública que se realiza de manera privada (véase entre otras, la sentencia Nº 2006-014008 de las 9:46 hrs. de 22 de septiembre de 2006). Por su naturaleza jurídica, esta función debe ejercerse dentro de las potestades y limitaciones que el ordenamiento jurídico dispone y le corresponde al Estado, a través de los mecanismos que considere adecuados, velar por el adecuado cumplimiento de los deberes y obligaciones de los notarios…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencias N° 2015-09849, de las 09.05 horas, del 1 de julio de 2015 y 2015-06002, de las 09.05 horas, del 29 de abril de 2015). Esta Cámara de Casación Penal ha sostenido en diversas resoluciones, según se expuso en los antecedentes contenidos en el apartado B del presente Considerando, que al notario público le aplica la agravante de funcionario público contenida en la falsedad ideológica. Ahora bien, se tiene que, en el caso concreto, la sentencia 2015-01075, emitida por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, aún y cuando contradice los precedentes que ha dictado esta Sala de Casación Penal, lo cierto es que resulta acorde con lo que recientemente ha dispuesto el Máximo órgano Constitucional, en el sentido de que la línea jurisprudencial de esta Cámara de Casación es inconstitucional al estimar que el notario público es funcionario público. Debe recordarse que, de conformidad con el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, Ley N° 7135, del 11 de octubre de 1989, “La jurisprudencia y los precedentes de la jurisdicción constitucional son vinculantes erga omnes, salvo para sí misma”. Así las cosas, por imperativo Constitucional, se unifica el criterio jurisprudencial en el sentido de que la agravante contenida en el párrafo segundo del artículo 366 del Código Penal, en relación con el ordinal 367 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, no resulta aplicable al notario público que incurre en el delito de falsedad ideológica, a no ser que haya sido contratado como tal por una entidad pública, supuesto este último que no resulta aplicable a la imputada Carmen María Amador Pereira. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, se declaran sin lugar los motivos primero y segundo del recurso de casación interpuesto por el licenciado Andrés Garro Mora, en su condición de representante del Ministerio Público, manteniéndose lo dispuesto por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en la sentencia 2015-01075, de las 09:15 horas, del 30 de julio del 2015, en cuanto recalificó los hechos cometidos en perjuicio de [Nombre 002], [Nombre 008] y [Nombre 009] a tres delitos de falsedad ideológica simple. En cuanto a los hechos en perjuicio de [Nombre 010], remítase al Considerando IV. Se omite pronunciamiento con respecto a la causa en la que figura como ofendida [Nombre 003], dado el reenvío ordenado por el ad quem, así como tomando en cuenta que esta Cámara de Casación declaró inadmisible el reclamo en cuanto a dicho extremo según resolución 2016-00139, de las 14:59 horas, del 9 de febrero de 2016. III. Recurso de casación presentado por la licenciada Engie Marín Pandolfi, defensora particular de la imputada Carmen María Amador Pereira. En el único motivo admitido (primero), alega la existencia de precedentes contradictorios. De acuerdo con la recurrente, el Tribunal de Apelación recalificó los hechos con respecto al tema concursal entre el delito de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso, cambiando el criterio que habían sostenido hasta ese momento, y en contra de la posición esgrimida por esta Sala de Casación Penal en la sentencia número 2011-1204, de la cual cita un extracto. Concluye que al existir una contradicción jurisprudencial, la decisión adoptada por el ad quem ocasionó un agravio a la acusada que vulneró el debido proceso. Solicita se case la sentencia impugnada. Se declara sin lugar el reclamo, pese a la existencia de precedentes contradictorios, al no constatarse un agravio concreto y al ser atendible el criterio del Tribunal de Apelación (sigue la tesis que ha asumido esta Sala en la mayoría de las sentencias que se ha pronunciado sobre el tema) en el sentido de que las falsedades ideológicas absorben los usos de documento falso. En primer lugar, debe indicarse, que esta Sala de Casación Penal, desde vieja data, de manera categórica y uniforme, ha asumido el criterio de que entre los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso se presenta un concurso aparente de normas, en el supuesto que sea la misma persona quien realice ambas acciones, no obstante, tomando en cuenta que la integración no ha sido la misma a lo largo de los años, se han sostenido dos criterios distintos en cuanto a cuál de los delitos contiene o absorbe al otro. En este sentido, como se verá, el criterio asumido por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia en el caso concreto (sentencia 2015-01075), es contrario a la tesis sostenida por esta Sala de Casación en los votos 2011-00325, 2011-01204, 2012-01227 y 2014-00665, sin embargo, es acorde con lo señalado por esta Cámara en las sentencias 2004-00936, 2008-00584, 2010-01098, 2012-01181, 2013-01641 y 2014-00304. A. Posición del Tribunal de Apelación del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en el caso que se examina. En el presente asunto, en relación con los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso, el Tribunal de Apelación indicó: “…En otras palabras, se ha reiterado que si el bien jurídico es similar en ambos tipos (la fe pública pues, aunque la falsedad ideológica tiene un bien jurídico adicional, también tutela la puridad del documento, como lo hace el uso del documento falso); si este último ilícito es solo consecuencia de aquel, en la medida en que la posibilidad de causación de peligro —requisito del primer tipo— solo se genera con el uso; si hay un plan de autor común, comparten el iter criminis y se produce una cercanía espacio-temporal entre los hechos de las dos figuras, estamos ante un concurso aparente de normas, cuando ambos delitos los comete una misma persona. En tal caso, el delito de mayor disvalor absorbe al otro. Conforme lo dispone el numeral 367, en relación con el 366 párrafo segundo, ambos del Código Penal, las penas para el ilícito de falsedad ideológica son de uno a seis años (en el párrafo primero) y de dos a ocho años (entratándose de funcionarios públicos aspecto en que el que deberá hacerse una precisión ulterior), en tanto que la del uso de documento falso, al tenor del numeral 373 (sic) ibídem, es de uno a seis años de prisión. Al ser esta una sanción similar a aquella, en el primer párrafo, no así para el segundo, es obvio que el legislador consideró más grave el primer delito, no solo porque le impuso agravantes sino porque estableció, como elemento del tipo, la necesidad de que pueda causar perjuicio, lo que solo sucede con el efectivo uso. Así mismo, si se estimara que predomina el uso del documento falso sobre la falsificación (o la falsedad) se llegaría al absurdo que el hecho final tenga una menor pena que el primer evento, lo que rompe las reglas de la subsidiariedad en materia de concurso aparente, en que la doctrina acepta el hecho previo, concomitante o posterior impune, siempre que esos eventos que no se castigan tengan un disvalor menor que el que sí se sanciona. Por ello, predomina el primer delito por sobre el segundo y no a la inversa, como lo proponen las recurrentes descontextualizando, inclusive, la jurisprudencia que usan en apoyo de su tesis, que señala lo contrario a la conclusión que ellas extraen que, en todo caso, por las razones arriba apuntadas, no siempre se comparte. Por lo quo condenó a la encartada por cuatro delitos (uno de los cuales ha sido anulado atrás pero al que, por el principio de prohibición de reforma en perjuicio, le resultará igualmente aplicable lo aquí indicado, en caso de que se llegara a sentencia condenatoria) de falsedad ideológica en concurso ideal con el uso de documento falso (sin explicar por qué no se excluían entre sí) y le impuso, por los primeros ilícitos, tres años de prisión y, por los segundos, un año de cárcel (aunque luego, indicó que no aumentaba la pena por el hecho más grave: ver folio 1471), procede acoger parcialmente el reclamo, revocar la sentencia en cuanto consideró los hechos en concurso ideal para, en su lugar, desde esta sede (pues no es necesario el reenvío) decretar que lo que se configura es un concurso aparente, en que la falsedad ideológica absorbe al uso de documento falso y, por consiguiente, se debe anular la pena impuesta por este último ilícito. Sin embargo, como se mencionó, esto carece de repercusiones prácticas, porque la pena por el uso del documento no fue usada para incrementar la fijada al delito más grave. Ergo, las penas quedan igual, sin perjuicio de lo que se llegue a indicar en el siguiente apartado, es decir, en tres años de prisión por cada uno de los tres delitos de falsedad ideológica y nueve años de prisión en total…” (cfr, folios 1671 vto a 1672 fte). B. Tesis de la Sala Tercera que considera que el uso de documento falso absorbe a la falsedad ideológica. Esta Cámara, en el voto Nº 2011-00325 estimó que en aquellas situaciones en que el imputado utiliza documentos que contienen declaraciones falsas hechas por él, se está ante el delito de uso de documento falso, el cual subsume el desvalor de la acción precedente. Al respecto se dijo: “…el uso de documento falso (artículo 365 de ese cuerpo legal), consiste en el empleo de un documento cuya falsedad puede ser en su contenido o su materialidad, por lo que el uso de documento falso abarca el uso tanto de los documentos que falsificados o adulterados, o bien que siendo originales contienen declaraciones falsas. Para el caso que nos ocupa, el uso de documento falso puede referirse tanto a aquellos documentos que fueron falsificados, como a aquellos que contienen una falsedad ideológica. Pero, justamente porque los delitos se consuman cuando se ponen en circulación o se utilizan esos documentos falsos, si el autor o autores de las falsificaciones o las falsedades ideológicas son los mismos que utilizan luego esos documentos, se estará ante un único delito, consistente en el uso de documento falso, porque hasta entonces se está creando la posibilidad de perjuicio…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2011-00325, de las 10:09 horas, del 25 de marzo de 2011). Bajo esta misma tesitura, en la resolución Nº 2011-01204, esta Sala afirmó: “…En el caso de estudio, encontramos que por la naturaleza de consumación del delito de falsedad ideológica y de uso de documento falso, al consumarse en el momento que utilizan públicamente, sea en un mismo momento, la presentación del documento ante el Registro de la Propiedad., lo cual sucede, con independencia del transcurso del tiempo entre la realización del documento falso y su uso. Pues la finalidad de la acción y una vulneración al mismo bien jurídico tutelado, sea la fe pública, se verifican en un mismo momento, ya que pese a la falsedad del documento o de la información falsa contenida en éste, si ese documento no es utilizado públicamente, no se configura el ilícito alguno. De tal forma, que ambos acciones mantienen una unidad, al contener la misma finalidad y permanencia en el tiempo, produciendo el mismo resultado de lesión al mismo bien jurídico, verificándose entonces, el concurso aparente de normas, que reclama atinadamente el recurrente…” ( ) “…En virtud de lo anterior, se acoge el reclamo del recurrente, y se casa la sentencia en este aspecto, se recalifican los hechos tenidos por acreditados en el fallo venido en casación, como constitutivos de un único delito de uso de documento falso, en concurso aparente con el delito de falsedad ideológica…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2011-01204, de las 09:10 horas, del 29 de setiembre de 2011). Esta misma línea fue seguida por esta Sala de Casación en el pronunciamiento Nº 2012-01227, en el que, para los efectos que nos interesa se dijo: “…En el asunto en estudio, no cabe duda de que el acusado hizo uso de un documento falso, en el que, a sabiendas de aquel, se decía que era otra persona. De manera que eso configuraba el uso de documento falso, por lo que desvaloraba la falsificación de dicho documento que pudiera haber cometido E.G., dado que el peligro de esas acciones (falsedad ideológica o falsificación de documento) contra el bien jurídico, sólo se daba con el uso de documento falso que se le demostró, sin que antes pudiera decirse que había afectado la fe pública. De manera que no podía sancionársele por aquellas acciones, sino solo por la delincuencia constituida por el uso de documento falso. En consecuencia, debe darse la razón a la impugnante, recalificando los hechos a un delito de uso de documento falso…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2012-01227, de las 12:26 horas, del 17 de agosto de 2012). Finalmente, en el voto 2014-00665, esta Cámara de Casación indicó: “…Existe un concurso aparente, en los términos definidos por el artículo 23 del Código Penal, cuando los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso son realizados por la misma persona, ya que se trata de una afectación al mismo bien jurídico por dos situaciones en relación de consunción…” ( ) “…En este caso el a quo calificó erróneamente los hechos como constitutivos de los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso en concurso material (a las 18:41:40 horas de la Sentencia Oral), a pesar de tener por demostrado que fue el mismo imputado quien confeccionó la escritura con información falsa, y quien presentó dicha escritura ante el Registro Público. Así las cosas, lleva razón el recurrente en este motivo, por lo que se recalifican los hechos como constitutivos únicamente de un delito de uso de documento falso. Por haberse calificado originalmente los hechos como dos delitos en concurso material, para efectos de la penalidad resulta innecesario el juicio de reenvío, al existir ya un monto de pena fijado para el delito de uso de documento falso, que el Tribunal definió en un año de prisión y que no ha sido cuestionado…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2014-00665, de las 10:54 horas, del 4 de abril de 2014). C. Postura de la Sala Tercera que considera que la falsedad ideológica absorbe al uso de documento falso. En la sentencia Nº 2004-00936, esta Sala de Casación, con fundamento en reconocida doctrina extranjera, sostuvo que en los casos donde el propio autor del documento falso lo utiliza no se está ante dos conductas típicamente distintas e independientes una de la otra, sino que el uso de documento falso es absorbido por la falsedad ideológica o, en su caso, por la falsificación de documento. Al referirse a este tema se dijo: “…De acuerdo con la misma naturaleza del delito de falsificación y según la forma en la que se encuentra redactado (ver Art. 360 del Código Penal), el uso posterior del documento que una misma persona falsifica es parte del disvalor de acción contenido en este ilícito en la medida que el mismo exige la posibilidad de un perjuicio al confeccionarlo. En este punto la doctrina indica lo siguiente: “El principio general que aquí se ha dado por reconocido es que el tipo del art. 296 no contempla la conducta del que falsificó y después usa el documento falsificado; por lo tanto, se da una situación de concurso aparente: las distintas figuras de falsificación documental y la de uso de documento falso, se excluyen entre sí cuanto están constituidas por conductas del mismo sujeto; cuando ha sido el uso de documento falsificado el que crea el peligro o irroga el perjuicio propio de tipo de la falsificación antes realizada, vendría a ser una grosera vulneración del ne bis in idem castigar aquel uso aplicándose dos figuras distintas(...) en los casos en que la previa falsificación es ideológica o material de documentos públicos(...) lo que entonces ocurre es que si el uso no es un factor necesario de consumación, no queda excluida tampoco de ella: el uso no hace más que continuar la consumación y, por consiguiente, la solución no puede ser distinta. Queda, pues, fuera de discusión, que el autor de falsificación que a la vez usa el documento, no puede ser castigado al mismo tiempo por aquella falsificación y por este uso; únicamente puede serlo por el primer delito.” (CREUS , Carlos: Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, Tomo 2, 5ª Edición, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1996, p. 476). Siguiendo esta posición doctrinal, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha expresado en términos semejantes que: “si el autor del uso lo es también de la falsificación será responsable sólo por esta última infracción, en tanto que si al autor de ese ilícito no se le puede responsabilizar por la falsificación, responderá sólo por el uso, si ha usado el documento falso (cfr. FONTAN BALESTRA, Carlos: Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 10ª Edición, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, p. 980; BREGLIA ARIAS, Omar y otro: Código Penal Comentado, Anotado y Concordado, 2ª Edición, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 295; CREUS, Carlos: Falsificación de Documentos en General, Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1986, p. 204 a 206, y; NÚÑEZ , Ricardo: Manual de Derecho penal Parte Especial, Ediciones Lerner, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 483 a 484).” (ver voto Nº 33 de las 9:05 del 24 de enero de 1997). Consecuentemente, conforme a la relación de hechos que el Tribunal tiene por probada, resulta claro entonces que no se está ante dos conductas independientes, sino solo ante un solo delito de falsificación (falsedad ideológica)…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2004-00936, de las 15:55 horas, del 6 de agosto de 2004, el destacado es del original). Bajo esta misma postura, en la resolución Nº 2008-00584 esta Sala señaló: “…Dadas las características particulares del caso en relación con [Nombre 012]., no podría pensarse en la existencia de un concurso ideal, porque nos hallamos ante una misma acción en sentido jurídico, que lesiona dos normas las cuales se excluyen entre sí, al constituir diversos grados de afectación a un mismo bien jurídico (la fe pública). Por esta razón, debe acogerse el tercer reclamo por la forma que formulara el defensor particular de R.A.C. y en virtud de ello, se anula parcialmente el fallo, en lo que toca a la calificación jurídica correspondiente a los hechos acreditados en su contra. La calificación jurídica se corrige, y en consecuencia, debe absolverse a R.A.C. por el delito de uso de documento falso y en su lugar, se mantiene incólume únicamente la condenatoria por falsificación de documento público, recalificado como falsedad ideológica en los términos ya analizados en el considerando primero de esta resolución…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2008-00584, de las 10:18 horas, del 23 de mayo de 2008, la negrita es del original). Similar criterio se sostuvo en el año 2010 al aplicarse el criterio de consunción, estableciéndose: “…tenemos que el encartado R en su condición de notario público confeccionó la escritura falsa, con la finalidad de lograr mediante su presentación al Registro Público excluir una anotación vigente sobre la venta de una parte de la finca que había sido propiedad de V, de ahí que la inscripción de la escritura cuyo contenido no era real por parte del notario y acusado R fue la forma en que se materializó el perjuicio. Desde esta perspectiva, se está en presencia de un concurso aparente de delitos entre la falsedad ideológica y el uso de documento falso, que excluiría la aplicación del concurso ideal de normas efectuado por el Tribunal, pues el disvalor del uso de documento falso en este caso formaría parte del contenido injusto de la falsedad ideológica, de ahí que lo procedente es disponer la condena por un solo ilícito. Ambos delitos conforme lo dispuesto en los numerales 360 y 365 del Código Penal, tienen la misma sanción, de uno a seis años de prisión, pero la falsedad ideológica se considera como el delito más grave, ya que en un documento público o auténtico realizado por quien en razón de su profesión, en este caso un notario público, se consignaron declaraciones que se presumen ciertas, aceptadas como verdaderas ante los demás salvo prueba en contrario. Acorde con lo expuesto y en aplicación del principio de consunción, que implica que cuando la realización de un supuesto de hecho más grave –la falsedad ideológica- incluye la de otro de menos entidad –uso de documento falso, se aplica el primero y no el último, pues se considera prácticamente incluido en la regulación más severa, lo procedente es declarar con lugar este extremo de la impugnación en cuanto se refiere a la calificación jurídica, la que se debe corregir conforme a los hechos tenidos por demostrados…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2010-01098, de las 12:03 horas, del 15 de octubre de 2010, la negrita es del original). Mediante sentencia Nº 2012-01181, esta Sala Penal apuntó: “…con base en lo acreditado en el fallo, los hechos resultan constitutivos de un delito de falsedad ideológica (artículo 360 del Código Penal), existiendo un concurso aparente de normas con relación al uso de documento falso. Véase que, de acuerdo con el elenco de hechos acreditados, no se está ante dos acciones jurídicas independientes, sino solo ante un único ilícito, el de falsedad ideológica, consistente en la elaboración de un plano de catastro al que se le insertaron datos falsos relativos a su ubicación, linderos y medida, plano que fue presentado ante el Catastro Nacional para su inscripción. Al encontrarnos ante un concurso aparente de normas, lo propio es que se condenara únicamente por el delito de falsedad ideológica. En consecuencia, se anula parcialmente la sentencia recurrida y de oficio se recalifica la conducta a un único ilícito de falsedad ideológica, quedando la pena en el tanto de un año de prisión, tal como fue fijada por el Tribunal sentenciador…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2012-01181, de las 10:23 horas, del 17 de agosto de 2012, la negrita es del original). De igual forma, en el fallo Nº 2013-01641, al estarse ante un concurso aparente entre la falsedad ideológica y el uso de documento falso, esta Sala recalificó los hechos como constitutivos de este último ilícito penal. Al respecto se dijo: “…en este caso también existe un concurso aparente entre los delitos de falsedad ideológica y el uso de documento falso, por lo que corresponde recalificar los hechos como constitutivos únicamente de un delito de falsedad ideológica en concurso ideal con el delito de estafa. Ahora bien, a pesar de lo anterior, en vista de que al fijar la pena por el concurso ideal el Tribunal fijó la pena del delito mayor (la estafa) en cinco años y decidió no aumentarla; la recalificación efectuada no afecta la penalidad impuesta, la cual permanece en cinco años sin necesidad de reenvío. Por todo lo anterior, al existir un concurso aparente entre la falsedad ideológica y el uso de documento falso, se declara parcialmente con lugar el motivo únicamente en cuanto a este aspecto, y se recalifican los hechos como constitutivos de un delito de falsedad ideológica y otros de estafa…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2013-01641, de las 10:57 horas, del 1 de noviembre de 2013). Más recientemente, en el voto Nº 2014-00304, esta Sala de Casación procedió a tener por configurado únicamente el delito de falsedad ideológica ante el concurso existente entre este ilícito y el uso de documento falso. Se pronunció en los siguientes términos: “…en cuanto al análisis posterior que hacen los Juzgadores respecto al tema de los concursos, sí encuentra esta Sala un error que debe ser corregido. De acuerdo con los Juzgadores, los hechos son constitutivos de tres delitos de falsedad ideológica y tres delitos de uso de documento falso con ocasión de estafa (f. 1659). No obstante, sobre este punto existen reiterados pronunciamientos de la Sala Tercera, en los que se ha indicado que entre el delito de falsedad ideológica y el de uso de documento falso no puede haber un concurso ideal, cuando los agentes de la falsedad son también los mismos que hacen el uso del documento falso, pues se trata más bien de un concurso aparente…” ( ) “…De acuerdo con lo anterior, en este caso también existe un concurso aparente entre los delitos de falsedad ideológica y los de uso de documento falso, por lo que corresponde recalificar los hechos como constitutivos únicamente de tres delitos de falsedad ideológica en concurso ideal con tres delitos de estafa mayor. En vista de que en este caso se tuvo por demostrado que los imputados D.H.P. y E.M.J.C., actuaron de manera conjunta, corresponde aplicar el efecto extensivo de la recalificación de los hechos a ambos encartados. Por todo lo anterior, al existir un concurso aparente entre los delitos de falsedad ideológica y los delitos de uso de documento falso, se declara parcialmente con lugar el motivo únicamente en cuanto a este aspecto, y se recalifican los hechos como constitutivos únicamente de tres delitos de falsedad ideológica y tres delitos de estafa mayor, con efecto extensivo a ambos encartados…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia Nº 2014-00304, de las 08:43 horas, del 07 de marzo de 2014). D. Criterio Unificador de esta Sala de Casación Penal. En el caso que se examina, el Tribunal de Juicio condenó a la imputada Carmen María Amador Pereira por cuatro delitos de falsedad ideológica en concurso material, mismos, a su vez, en concurso ideal con cuatro delitos de uso de documento falso cometidos en perjuicio de [Nombre 002], [Nombre 003], [Nombre 008] y [Nombre 009] y la fe pública, imponiéndole tres años de prisión por cada una de las falsedades ideológicas y un año de prisión por cada uso de documento falso, quedando en el tanto de nueve años de prisión en aplicación de las reglas concursales (cfr, folios 1449-1478, Tomo III). Por su parte, el Tribunal de Apelación: i) anuló la sentencia impugnada únicamente en cuanto declaró a la encartada autora responsable de los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso en perjuicio de [Nombre 003] (reenvío sobre el que esta Sala no se pronunciará al haber declarado inadmisible el reclamo en cuanto a dicho extremo según resolución 2016-00139, de las 14:59 horas, del 9 de febrero de 2016), ordenando el reenvío ante una nueva integración del a quo para que, con respeto al principio de prohibición de reforma en perjuicio, se valore, en caso de que las partes la vuelvan a proponer y aceptar, la posibilidad de solucionar el diferendo mediante una conciliación; ii) revocó la sentencia en cuanto tipificó los hechos como un concurso ideal entre los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso para, en su lugar, decretar que lo que se configura es un concurso aparente de normas entre ambos, en que la falsedad absorbe al uso y, por consiguiente, anuló (sin reenvío) la pena impuesta por el uso de documento falso (que, finalmente, el a quo no usó para incrementar la del delito mayor) en relación con las ofendidas [Nombre 002], [Nombre 008] y [Nombre 009]; iii) revocó la sentencia en cuanto consideró que se estaba ante la figura de falsedad ideológica agravada (artículos 367 y 366 párrafo segundo del Código Penal) y, en su lugar, declaró que lo que se tipifica es la falsedad ideológica simple (párrafo primero del numeral 366 del Código Penal) y, como consecuencia de ello, anuló la pena impuesta, ordenándose el reenvío ante una nueva integración del órgano de instancia para que, con respeto al principio de prohibición de reforma en perjuicio y partiendo de la calificación aquí fijada (delitos simples y en concurso aparente), fijen la sanción (cfr, folios 1655-1680, Tomo IV). En relación con el punto iii), esta Sala emitió criterio en el Considerando II, siendo procedente pronunciarnos en este momento sobre el apartado ii, es decir, sobre el concurso que se presenta entre la falsedad ideológica y el uso de documento falso. A criterio de esta Sala, lleva razón el ad quem al concluir que el delito de falsedad ideológica absorbe al uso de documento falso bajo el supuesto de que ambas acciones las realice la misma persona. Esta tesis se sustenta en dos sólidos argumentos: a) el legislador consideró más grave el delito de falsedad ideológica, contemplando su comisión bajo una modalidad agravada; b) se incluyó como elemento de dicho tipo penal, la necesidad de que pueda causar perjuicio, lo cual se da con el efectivo uso. Esta posición tiene un importante sustento doctrinario. Desde hace varias décadas el tratadista Sebastián Soler indicó “…El uso de documento falso tiene en la doctrina y en la legislación una importancia grande desde un doble punto de vista: como figura autónoma o relativamente autónoma y como parte integrante de algunas falsedades…” (Soler, Sebastián. Derecho Penal Argentino , Tomo V, Tipográfica Editora Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1978, p. 355), lo cual se complementa con lo indicado por Muñoz Conde en el sentido de que “…La falsificación de un documento desemboca naturalmente en su uso. Por eso, si el uso es llevado a cabo por el propio falsificador, es un acto posterior impune…” (Muñoz Conde, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte Especial, 18ª Edición, Editorial Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 2010, p. 755), lo que sin duda alguna resulta aplicable al delito de falsedad ideológica como una modalidad de falsedad. Conforme lo señala el Tribunal de Apelación, la decisión del a quo de considerar que entre los delitos de uso de documento falso y falsedad ideológica se presentó un concurso ideal fue errónea, dado que al ser la misma persona la autora de esas acciones, en este caso, la imputada Carmen Amador Pereira, el reproche del primer ilícito está contenido en el segundo (consunción del disvalor). Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar el único motivo admitido del recurso de casación presentado por la licenciada Engie Marín Pandolfi, defensora particular de la encartada, se unifica la línea jurisprudencial en el sentido de que entre los delitos de falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso se presenta un concurso aparente de normas, en el supuesto que sea la misma persona quien realice ambas acciones, debiendo entenderse que la falsedad ideológica absorbe al uso de documento falso. En relación con este extremo, se mantiene lo dispuesto por el Tribunal de Apelación en la sentencia N° 2015-01075, de las 09:15 horas, del 30 de julio del 2015, en cuanto anuló (sin reenvío) la pena impuesta por el uso de documento falso (que, finalmente, el a quo, no usó para incrementar la del delito mayor), estándose ante falsedades ideológicas simples, por los hechos cometidos en perjuicio de [Nombre 002], [Nombre 008] y [Nombre 009], debiendo procederse conforme lo dispuso el ad quem, el cual anuló la pena impuesta y ordenó el reenvío ante una nueva integración del órgano de instancia para que, con respeto al principio de reforma en perjuicio y partiendo de la calificación fijada (delitos simples y en concurso aparente) se imponga la sanción. Se mantiene incólume lo relativo a la declaratoria de falsedad instrumental de las escrituras y los testimonios derivados de éstas, así como de las declaraciones de matrimonios y cualquier efecto jurídico que hubiesen producido dichos instrumentos jurídicos, específicamente en relación con las ofendidas [Nombre 002], [Nombre 008] y [Nombre 009]. IV. En el tercer motivo planteado por el licenciado Andrés Garro Mora, en su condición de representante del Ministerio Público, alega errónea aplicación de preceptos procesales, concretamente, los numerales 2, 7, 36 y 142 del Código Procesal Penal. El impugnante sustenta su reproche en los numerales 437, 439 y 468 inciso b) del Código Procesal Penal. Asegura que el Tribunal de Apelación cometió un error de fundamentación al avalar la posición del Tribunal de Juicio de permitir, ya avanzado el juicio, una conciliación para el caso de la ofendida [Nombre 010], en contra de lo dispuesto por la normativa vigente y la Sala Constitucional. Manifiesta que el ad quem confirmó la decisión del a quo indicando que en el voto número 5836-99, la Sala Constitucional estableció la posibilidad de que en la etapa de juicio se permitiera la conciliación si las partes están de acuerdo y existen razones por las cuales no se pactó la medida en la etapa intermedia. Afirma que el Ministerio Público conoce de esa resolución, sin embargo, lo que se establece es que no se puede negar la medida aduciendo únicamente que es extemporáneo, por lo que el juez debe valorar el caso concreto y decidir si era procedente la aplicación de la medida o no, por otras circunstancias. Considera que el primer yerro de los jueces de apelación radica en darle al criterio constitucional una amplitud que no contiene. Desde su perspectiva, debe valorarse que nuestro sistema procesal está diseñado por etapas, por lo que la posible aplicación de la conciliación después de dictado el auto de apertura a juicio es previa al inicio del debate, pues ya iniciado los jueces están conociendo el fondo del asunto, pues han recibido prueba testimonial y documental, como sucedió en este caso. Estima que un segundo error se encuentra en el hecho de que el Tribunal de Apelación consideró que el debate no había iniciado al momento en que se planteó la medida, conclusión a la que llegan con base en el acta de juicio que señala que previo al debate la defensa planteó la conciliación, pero además, al constatar lo sucedido en el respaldo audiovisual de que la medida se propuso después de la lectura de la acusación –y recepción de prueba-, los juzgadores resuelven que con la lectura de la requisitoria fiscal aún no se ha iniciado el debate. Esta postura contiene el error de no considerar que el juicio sí había iniciado y por lo tanto la oportunidad de conciliar ya había fenecido. También acusa que la resolución del Tribunal de Alzada contiene el defecto de considerar que en la gestión del Tribunal de Juicio de admitir la conciliación en la fase de juicio había una actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto que declarar en vista de que algunas ofendidas no fueron habidas para que comparecieran en la audiencia preliminar y que por ende no tuvieron el derecho a pactar medidas alternas en la fase intermedia y la decisión del a quo de admitir la conciliación fue la solución correcta. Refiere que en el debate no se presentó ninguna actividad procesal defectuosa por parte de la defensa, siendo que, en todo caso, no existe un derecho fundamental de acceso a las soluciones alternativas en el proceso penal, como lo desarrolló la Sala Constitucional en la resolución 2010-3941, de las 14:39 horas, del 24 de febrero de 2010, por lo que no había actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto que declarar. Concluye que la decisión ocasiona un perjuicio pues no se avaló la aplicación de la medida en contra del principio de legalidad, viéndose frustrados los intereses punitivos del órgano fiscal. Se declara con lugar el reclamo por las razones que se dirán. A fin de dar respuesta a los cuestionamientos del recurrente, resulta oportuno conocer lo resuelto por el Tribunal de Alzada en el caso concreto con respecto a la conciliación donde figura como ofendida [Nombre 010]. Sobre este extremo el ad quem anotó: “…En primer lugar debe indicarse que, de conformidad con lo que consta en el acta de folio 1439, la propuesta de medida alterna (y, ante su rechazo, de reparación integral) la hizo la encartada antes de la lectura de la acusación, es decir, antes de que se abriera el debate. Al margen de que ese documento pueda, o no, coincidir con el registro audiovisual (como lo alega la Fiscalía, al decir que la propuesta fue posterior y remitir a una secuencia de la grabación), lo cierto es que se usaron los actos preliminares del debate, por lo que resulta un formalismo excesivo, entender que si inicia, o concluye, la lectura de la acusación, ya no sea procedente la medida, lo cual riñe con el criterio de la Sala Constitucional que se indicará. Si bien es cierto el Tribunal, por razones de agilidad procesal, postergó la decisión de la gestión hasta contar con el parecer de cada persona ofendida, a quien le preguntó al darse cada deposición, eso no implica que, por dicho proceder de los jueces, deba castigarse a la parte, que hizo la propuesta en esos actos preliminares del juicio, antes de que se identificara a la imputada. En segundo término, la Sala Constitucional, a través del voto número 5836-99 admitió que la conciliación pudiera realizarse en la fase de debate, es decir, superada la audiencia preliminar. Ese pronunciamiento no se circunscribió, como erróneamente lo señala el impugnante, a que se efectuara antes de la lectura de la acusación, pues se dijo: "...interpretar restrictivamente el tiempo procesal de estas acciones (criterios de oportunidad, suspensión del procedimiento a prueba, conciliación, reparación integral del daño, proceso abreviado), significaría limitar en forma ilegítima el derecho que tienen las partes a obtener la pronta resolución de sus conflictos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 39, 41 de la Constitución Política, 8.1 y 7.5 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, y la Declaración sobre los Principios Fundamentales de Justicia para las Víctimas de Delitos y del Abuso de Poder. De manera que la interpretación del tiempo procesal, tratándose de la aplicación de aquellos institutos jurídicos que permiten a las partes concluir el proceso penal y solucionar el conflicto suscitado entre los ciudadanos (víctima e imputado) como consecuencia de la transgresión de la ley penal, deberá ser acorde al interés del Estado de restaurar la armonía social, tal y como lo indica la Parte General del Código Procesal Penal, en su artículo 7. No es posible, entonces, que se limite el acceso de las partes a la solución del conflicto, con fundamento en una interpretación restrictiva del tiempo procesal para la aplicación de tales institutos jurídicos expresamente contemplados en la ley procesal (...) una interpretación literal del tiempo procesal regulado en los artículos 17, 25, 36 y 373 del Código Procesal Penal, limita el derecho conferido a los sujetos procesales, de obtener solución al conflicto mediante soluciones procesales alternativas después de ordenado el auto de apertura a juicio. En consecuencia, y de conformidad con los dispuesto en los artículos 2 y 7 del Código Procesal Penal, esta interpretación literal deberá ser sustituida por una interpretación extensiva de la frase "en cualquier momento hasta antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio", que favorezcan el ejercicio de las facultades conferidas por el ordenamiento jurídico a quienes intervienen en el procedimiento, para la solución pronta y efectiva del conflicto. De manera que el tiempo procesal a que se refiere esta frase, no podrá interpretarse como un plazo perentorio -dado que limitaría el derecho de las partes a solucionar el conflicto mediante salidas procesales alternativas-, sino como un plazo ordenatorio que podrá ampliarse con el consentimiento de las partes. En consecuencia, si la víctima y el imputado así lo solicitan, el juez deberá valorar, aún después del auto de apertura a juicio (artículo 322 del Código Procesal Penal), en qué casos procedería la aplicación de la conciliación..." Aunque, luego, el mismo Tribunal Constitucional indicó que la ley tiene un límite para esos mecanismos y que este no infringe el debido proceso (ver votos números 4983-00 y 7378-09), eso no significa, entonces, que exista una prohibición absoluta de acceder al instituto de referencia ni, tampoco, puede considerarse que se viole la legalidad procesal si se hace, porque las normas deben interpretarse en forma sistemática y no aislada. De este modo, si aquí el Tribunal consideró —aunque no usara esas palabras exactas (que, pedirlo, implica un formalismo excesivo que se ha ido desterrando del proceso penal)— que se había producido una actividad procesal defectuosa, porque las ofendidas no estuvieron presentes en la audiencia preliminar (ver folios 1148-1150 del tomo II del principal) y, por ende, tanto a ellas como a la encartada se les vedó la posibilidad de concluir el conflicto de un modo diferente, lo procedente era que se actuara como lo hizo el a quo, es decir, reponiendo el trámite omitido, pues a ello lo autorizaba el numeral 179 del Código Procesal Penal. Nótese que, como lo acepta la Fiscalía en folio 1639, las ofendidas fueron citadas pero no localizadas (ver folios 1117, 1118, 1119 y 1138), supuesto ante el cual, si bien es cierto no era posible suspender la audiencia preliminar, sí era dable intentar la aplicación de medidas alternas, que satisfagan las pretensiones de ambas partes, en otra fase procesal, para subsanar el yerro. Así las cosas, no observa esta Cámara que se haya producido irregularidad alguna en lo actuado y, por ello, debe rechazarse el reclamo, agregando que, aunque la ofendida efectuara alguna reserva de recurrir lo resuelto, en última instancia no lo hizo, lo que denota que se conformó con ello y sin que se vislumbre que sufriera algún perjuicio o agravio con lo sucedido…” (cfr, folios 1656 vto a 1657 vto). De previo a resolver el caso concreto, resulta pertinente hacer un recuento de lo dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional en relación con los alcances de la frase “hasta antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio” como requisito para aplicar la conciliación, así como otras medidas alternas y el procedimiento abreviado. El máximo Órgano Constitucional, en la sentencia 1999-05836, citada por el ad quem, adoptó una postura abierta sobre la etapa procesal en la que resultan aplicables las medidas alternas –entre ellas la conciliación– y el procedimiento abreviado, estableciendo para los efectos que nos interesa: “…interpretar restrictivamente el tiempo procesal de estas acciones (criterios de oportunidad, suspensión del procedimiento a prueba, conciliación, reparación integral del daño, proceso abreviado), significaría limitar en forma ilegítima el derecho que tienen las partes a obtener la pronta resolución de sus conflictos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 39, 41 de la Constitución Política, 8.1 y 7.5 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, y la Declaración sobre los Principios Fundamentales de Justicia para las Víctimas de Delitos y del Abuso de Poder. De manera que la interpretación del tiempo procesal, tratándose de la aplicación de aquellos institutos jurídicos que permiten a las partes concluir el proceso penal y solucionar el conflicto suscitado entre los ciudadanos (víctima e imputado) como consecuencia de la transgresión de la ley penal, deberá ser acorde al interés del Estado de restaurar la armonía social, tal y como lo indica la Parte General del Código Procesal Penal, en su artículo 7. No es posible, entonces, que se limite el acceso de las partes a la solución del conflicto, con fundamento en una interpretación restrictiva del tiempo procesal para la aplicación de tales institutos jurídicos expresamente contemplados en la ley procesal…”…Evidentemente, interpretar que una vez dictado el auto de apertura a juicio (artículo 322 del Código Procesal Penal) no procede, bajo ninguna circunstancia, la aplicación de los institutos jurídicos citados, constituye una interpretación literal del texto normativo. Sin embargo, una interpretación literal del tiempo procesal regulado en los artículos 17, 25, 36 y 373 del Código Procesal Penal, limita el derecho conferido a los sujetos procesales, de obtener solución al conflicto mediante soluciones procesales alternativas después de ordenado el auto de apertura a juicio. En consecuencia, y de conformidad con los dispuesto en los artículos 2 y 7 del Código Procesal Penal, esta interpretación literal deberá ser sustituida por una interpretación extensiva de la frase "en cualquier momento hasta antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio", que favorezcan el ejercicio de las facultades conferidas por el ordenamiento jurídico a quienes intervienen en el procedimiento, para la solución pronta y efectiva del conflicto. De manera que el tiempo procesal a que se refiere esta frase, no podrá interpretarse como un plazo perentorio -dado que limitaría el derecho de las partes a solucionar el conflicto mediante salidas procesales alternativas-, sino como un plazo ordenatorio que podrá ampliarse con el consentimiento de las partes. En consecuencia, si la víctima y el imputado así lo solicitan, el juez deberá valorar, aún después del auto de apertura a juicio (artículo 322 del Código Procesal Penal), en qué casos procedería la aplicación de la conciliación, la suspensión del proceso a prueba o el procedimiento abreviado -verbigracia-, con fundamento en los principios y valores que instauran el proceso penal…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 1999-05836, de las 17:18 horas, del 27 de julio de 1999). Pocos días después, al resolver un recurso de hábeas corpus, dicha Sala sostuvo: “…se deberá prioritaria e inmediatamente citar a la partes para la realización de la audiencia respectiva, a los efectos de que en cualquier etapa del proceso, incluso antes de la apertura del debate (artículo 341 del Código Procesal Penal), de manera especial sea resuelta la solicitud de conciliación…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 1999-05981, de las 14:03 horas, del 3 de agosto de 1999, el subrayado no es del original). Sin embargo, este criterio fue reconsiderado y cambiado por dicha Cámara en las sentencias 2000-02989 y 2000-04983. En el primero de esos fallos, la Sala Constitucional, al referirse al límite temporal impuesto para la solicitud de aplicación del proceso abreviado –que es el mismo para la conciliación– afirmó: “…si bien es verdad que existe un evidente interés del Estado en restaurar la armonía social y que en cierta medida el proceso abreviado -como otras medidas alternas al proceso penal plenario- busca llenar ese fin mediante la resolución de los conflictos que a nivel intersubjetivo subyacen al proceso penal, también es cierto que, como todo instituto procesal, el de las medidas alternas no puede quedar librado de regulaciones para ser utilizado por las partes a discreción; esta última idea resulta extraña a la propia noción de un sistema procesal ordenado y posiblemente tiene su origen cuando se otorga a la búsqueda de la resolución del conflicto entre las partes, en cuanto fin del proceso, una relevancia mayor a la que le corresponde dentro del sistema. Justamente al contrario, debe tomarse en cuenta que el diseño del sistema procesal penal actual, conserva aún como fin primordial la regulación e iteración del ejercicio del poder punitivo del Estado, inclusive cuando se proveen diversas formas de solución de conflictos, con las que se pretende atenuar la rigurosidad que en tal sentido exhibía el sistema anterior, en especial frente a ciertos casos especiales donde el interés de un particular por la sanción y el resarcimiento sobrepasaba al estatal. Desde tal perspectiva no resulta irrazonable establecer plazos finales para el cumplimiento de las diferentes actuaciones y etapas con tal de que ellas no perjudiquen lo que constituye el interés principal del proceso ni sus ritualidades esenciales. Más aún, si partimos de la forma de razonar expuesta por la Sala en las sentencias número 05836-99 y 05981-99 ya transcritas, en las que sostiene que la limitación temporal debe ser ordenatoria so pena de lesionar derechos fundamentales, similarmente tampoco se sostendría ninguna otra limitación, (ni siquiera la que estas mismas resoluciones imponen al autorizar la proposición de las medidas alternas hasta antes de la apertura de la audiencia según el texto del numeral 341). Llevada a sus últimas consecuencias, la búsqueda de la solución del conflicto entre las partes, debería hacer permisible la posibilidad de una conciliación en el transcurso del debate, entre el cierre del debate y la emisión de la sentencia o bien en la etapa de casación, puesto que aún no existe cosa juzgada; es decir, los argumentos empleados por la Sala para desautorizar el límite contenido en el artículo 373 son igualmente válidos para desautorizar cualquier otro límite temporal o etapa procesal que se quiera oponer a la voluntad conciliadora de las partes…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2000-02989, de las 15:24 horas, del 12 de abril del 2000). Según se dijo en ese mismo fallo, debe ser el juez de la etapa intermedia “…quien reciba, analice e intervenga en el trámite y resolución de las medidas alternativas propuestas, de manera que, si resultan fallidas, el asunto continúe con su trámite normal y el juez encargado del debate reciba la causa sin ningún tipo de predisposición sobre los hechos que serán objeto de juzgamiento. En casos excepcionales a calificar por el Tribunal podría devolverse a la etapa intermedia…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2000-02989, de las 15:24 horas, del 12 de abril del 2000). En esta misma resolución, el máximo Órgano Constitucional, al reconsiderar la posición que había asumido en los votos 1999-05836 y 1999-05981 destacó: “…efectivamente existe una contradicción entre las sentencias de esta Sala número 09129-98 y la 05836-99 confirmada posteriormente por la 05981-99; dicha contradicción va en el sentido de que mientras en la primera se establece que no existe violación de normas constitucionales por la aplicación del límite establecido en el artículo 373 del Código Procesal Penal, las otras dos, al hacer referencia indirecta a este artículo, señalan que debe entenderse que dicho límite no es inconstitucional siempre y cuando se entienda que no puede ser opuesto a las partes. Ahora, con nuevos elementos de juicio la Sala reconsidera el asunto para dejar sin efecto la jurisprudencia contenida en los pronunciamientos 05836-99 y 05981-99 por entender que, en primer término, el límite temporal impuesto a la solicitud de aplicación del proceso abreviado se origina en el propio texto del artículo 373 del Código Procesal Penal, sin que se requiera ninguna otra interpretación fuera de la simple y literal de la norma para aplicarlo; en segundo término que esa regla obliga a presentar la solicitud de aplicación del proceso abreviado, ante el juez de la etapa intermedia y previo a que éste ordene la apertura a juicio de conformidad con la facultad establecida en el artículo 341 del Código Procesal Penal; en tercer lugar, que la recién referida limitación no incide en el núcleo de derechos fundamentales del imputado por referirse a trámites no esenciales dentro del proceso penal; finalmente, que dicha regla, en cuanto limita temporalmente el ejercicio de potestad legalmente concedida al imputado, no resulta ser ni irrazonable ni desproporcionada, porque dicha restricción va en directa protección del principio de juez imparcial a que tiene derecho el imputado…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2000-02989, de las 15:24 horas, del 12 de abril del 2000). En la resolución 2000-04983, la Sala Constitucional evacuó la consulta formulada en el sentido de que no es contrario al debido proceso el rechazo de la petición de aplicación del proceso abreviado, cuando ésta se hace después pasada la oportunidad establecida por el Código Procesal Penal, reiterando lo indicado en el voto 2000-02989 (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2000-04983, de las 14:51 horas, del 28 de junio del 2000). Asimismo, en la resolución 2004-08726, el máximo Órgano Constitucional estableció claramente la diferencia entre la reparación integral del daño con otras medidas alternas como la conciliación y la suspensión del proceso a prueba, oportunidad en la que refirió: “…sí observa la Sala que se requiere aclarar que según lo dispuesto en el artículo 30 inciso j) del Código Procesal Penal, la reparación integral del daño puede acordarse “antes del juicio oral”, por lo que no se requiere que sea antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio, como sí se exige con otras salidas alternativas, tales como la suspensión del proceso a prueba (artículo 25 del CPP) y la conciliación (artículo 36 del CPP)…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2004-08726, de las 15:20 horas, del 11 de agosto del 2004). En el voto 2009-07378, la Sala Constitucional tomó como punto de partida la sentencia 2000-02989, exponiendo concretamente con respecto a la conciliación: “…Si bien las consideraciones anteriores fueron externadas por la Sala cuando analizó la constitucionalidad del límite establecido en el numeral 373 del Código Procesal Penal para la aplicación del proceso abreviado, en esa oportunidad se adelantó que lo dicho resultaría aplicable para casos donde se encuentre de por medio una restricción temporal similar frente a otro tipo medidas alternas de las establecidas en el Código Procesal Penal. Tal es el caso de estudio, pues la norma que ahora se consulta, que regula el instituto de la conciliación, en su párrafo primero establece el mismo límite temporal, al indicar que “procederá la conciliación entre la víctima y el imputado, en cualquier momento hasta antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio.” Los criterios externados por la Sala para razonar la constitucionalidad del artículo 373 del Código Procesal Penal se acogen en su totalidad para el presente pronunciamiento, por lo que debe concluirse que el numeral 36 del Código Procesal Penal en tanto establece un límite temporal para que las partes concilien en el proceso penal, no es inconstitucional…” ( ) “…El acceso a la justicia regulado en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política tampoco es vulnerado por la norma consultada, pues lo único que imposibilita es conciliar después de que se haya acordado la apertura a juicio en el proceso penal…” (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2009-07378, de las 14:47 horas, del 6 de mayo del 2009). De lo transcrito se desprende una primera conclusión: desde el año 2000, la Sala Constitucional ha mantenido el criterio de que no es posible admitir el procedimiento abreviado, la suspensión del proceso a prueba y la conciliación una vez acordada la apertura a juicio en el proceso penal, situación distinta en relación con el instituto de la reparación integral del daño, el cual, por disposición legal, procede “antes del juicio oral”. Por su parte, se tiene que esta Sala de Casación, ha sido enfática en que resulta improcedente aplicar medidas alternas –entre ellas la conciliación– o el procedimiento abreviado en la etapa de debate. Regla general que se ha exceptuado en la sentencia 2010-00200, de las 11:00 horas, del 18 de marzo del 2010, así como en los votos de mayoría de las resoluciones 2009-00831, de las 10:50 horas, del 24 de junio del 2009, 2007-00687, de las 10:20 horas, del 29 de junio del 2007 y 2007-01191, de las 14:25 horas, del 24 de octubre del 2007, contemplándose como supuesto, en estos últimos fallos, el que las partes no hubiesen tenido acceso a esa posibilidad al realizarse la audiencia preliminar (v. gr.: si no se notificó el señalamiento de la audiencia al imputado que designó un lugar propio para atender notificaciones). En el caso concreto, esta Cámara de Casación considera que existen dos razones de peso por las que el Tribunal de Juicio no estaba autorizado para homologar el acuerdo conciliatorio entre la imputada Carmen Amador Pereira y la ofendida [Nombre 010], decisión que, posteriormente, fue avalada erróneamente por el Tribunal de Apelación. Primera razón. De conformidad con el artículo 36 del Código Procesal Penal, “En las faltas o contravenciones, en los delitos de acción privada, de acción pública a instancia privada, los que admitan la suspensión condicional de la pena, procederá la conciliación entre la víctima y el imputado, en cualquier momento hasta antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio…”. Tal y como lo conciliación se propuso y se acordó habiendo precluido el momento procesal autorizado por la ley procesal. Resulta lógico pensar que si esta Sala ha indicado que resulta improcedente una reparación integral del daño habiendo declarado la persona imputada y los testigos, es decir, con posterioridad a la apertura del debate (al respecto véase Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2008-01210, de las 10:25 horas, del 27 de octubre de 2008, voto de mayoría), siendo procedente dicho instituto procesal “antes del juicio oral” –a diferencia de la conciliación que puede acordarse “hasta antes de acordarse la apertura a juicio”–, con mayor razón resulta inaceptable una conciliación después de iniciado el debate, tal como sucedió en el caso que se examina, en el que incluso ya se había leído la acusación, así como recibido la declaración de la imputada y varios testigos (ver archivos digitales c0001150320092615, secuencia de las 09:26:15 a las 09:50:46, c0001150320100007, secuencia de las 10:00:07 a las 11:00:00 y c0001150320150000, secuencia de las 15:00:00 a las 15:56:23, todos del 20 de marzo de 2015), situación que niega el ad quem. Esta circunstancia, por sí misma, ya impedía que el a quo autorizara la conciliación, sin embargo, hay un motivo adicional. Segunda razón. De la revisión de la grabación de la audiencia preliminar se ha podido apreciar que, al celebrarse esta, la representante del Ministerio Público se opuso rotundamente a que en el presente asunto se llevara a cabo una conciliación (ver archivo digital c0000110921083916, secuencia de las 08:39:16 a las 09:00:00), siendo que, en la etapa del debate, el Fiscal presentó la protesta respectiva a efectos de que el Tribunal de Juicio no aprobara dicha medida alterna en relación con los hechos donde figura como ofendida la señora [Nombre 010] (ver archivo digital c0001150320150000, secuencia de las 15:00:00 a las 15:56:23, todos del 20 de marzo de 2015). El acuerdo al que se llegó no era viable atendiendo a la naturaleza de los delitos, a saber, falsedad ideológica y uso de documento falso, en los que el bien jurídico protegido es pluriofensivo (la fe pública es el principal). Al respecto, en anteriores oportunidades esta Sala ha dicho: “…Por ello, si se falsifica uno de estos instrumentos y luego se utiliza, en forma idónea, existe la posibilidad de que genere un juicio errado sobre lo que se supone representa. Aquí es donde se ubica la exigencia de la posibilidad de perjuicio. Esta posibilidad debe distinguirse del menoscabo al bien jurídico tutelado que, según se dijo, está incluido en todo delito. Se trata de algo más, bien cuando está expresamente exigido en el tipo, bien cuando se considere que es elemento indispensable -como sucede en el delito de uso de documento falso- aunque no se enuncie en la norma. Así, se afirma que “El carácter del documento, la idoneidad de la falsificación y la posibilidad de perjuicio, forman unidad en torno al concepto jurídico penal de la fe pública, al menos en el capítulo de las falsedades documentales” (CREUS , Carlos. Falsificación de documentos en general , 2a. edición actualizada, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial Astrea, p.6.). Esa posibilidad de perjuicio va unida a la lesión a la fe pública que la falsedad representa y surge, por así decirlo, una relación biunívoca: la lesión a la fe pública implica la posibilidad de perjuicio para otros bienes jurídicos o intereses merecedores de tutela, precisamente por el valor que ella otorga a esos documentos. Para lesionar la fe pública en forma eficiente es decir, para estimar típica la conducta, debe estarse en posibilidad de que ésta cause perjuicio. El autor antes citado al respecto señala: “normalmente la misma falsedad ‑sobre todo cuando recae sobre documentos públicos- puede señalarse ya como un menoscabo de la fe pública en cuanto se ha deformado el documento que la lleva; pero ese efecto no es típicamente suficiente; la ley exige que a esa eventual lesión “abstracta” se sume la concreta de la posibilidad de perjuicio de otros bienes jurídicos (distintos de la fe pública), que pueden ser de variada naturaleza: patrimonial, moral, política, y deben pertenecer a un tercero, es decir, tienen que ser de titularidad de alguien que no sea el agente de la falsificación. Ese efecto tiene que provenir directamente de la falsificación, de lo que ella represente para la extinción o creación de derechos, facultades y cargas.” (i bid, p. 69)…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2009-00628, de las 17:17 horas, del 29 de abril de 2009). Partiendo de que los delitos acusados son pluriofensivos, lo cierto, es que para la aplicación de la conciliación se debía contar con la aprobación del Ministerio Público, no bastando el asentimiento de la víctima individualizada, al tratarse de delitos de acción pública conforme al artículo 16 del Código Procesal Penal. En otras palabras, ante la negativa del órgano fiscal, era procesalmente improcedente la homologación de la medida alterna mencionada (en similares términos, en relación con la suspensión del proceso a prueba respecto al delito de denuncia calumniosa, véase Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2013-00744, de las 11:35 horas, del 14 de junio de 2013). Así las cosas, se declara con lugar el tercer reclamo de la impugnación interpuesta por la representación fiscal. Se anula la sentencia N° 2015-01075 del Tribunal de Apelación, únicamente en cuanto declaró sin lugar el recurso del Ministerio Público y avaló la conciliación donde figura como ofendida [Nombre 010]. Asimismo, se anula el sobreseimiento definitivo por conciliación dictado por el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, mediante sentencia N° 331-2015, de las 16:15 horas, del 13 de abril de 2015 y se dispone el reenvío para que el Tribunal de Juicio, con diferente integración, celebre el juicio oral y público por los hechos acusados en perjuicio de la Fe Pública y la ofendida [Nombre 010].”