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Res. 00071-2017 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · 2017
OutcomeResultado
The Court denied the claim of the CIFH Deputy Director, finding that in substituting for the Director she had not performed foreign or superior duties that would constitute remunerable functional overload.El Tribunal declaró sin lugar la demanda de la Subdirectora del CIFH, concluyendo que al suplir al Director no había realizado funciones extrañas o superiores que configuraran un recargo de funciones remunerable.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Contentious Court, Section VI, ruled on a claim brought by the Deputy Director of the Center for Tax Research and Training (CIFH) of the Ministry of Finance, who sought payment of a salary bonus known as "functional overload" for having assumed the Director's functions over extended periods. The plaintiff requested annulment of administrative acts denying this payment and recognition of salary differentials. The Court defined functional overload as a temporary assignment of additional, foreign, and higher-hierarchy duties, requiring the employee to meet the qualifications of the superior post. Analyzing the CIFH's organic regulations, it found that the Deputy Director serves as a substitute by regulatory provision, whose duties are neither different nor superior to the Director's, as both belong to the same hierarchical level and share competencies. Thus, lacking foreign or higher-level functions, no functional overload occurred. The claim was dismissed, with the Court clarifying that its ruling was limited to the specific plea and that the plaintiff could pursue salary differentials through other legal grounds.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, resolvió la demanda de la Subdirectora del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria (CIFH) del Ministerio de Hacienda, quien reclamaba el pago del plus salarial denominado "recargo de funciones" por haber asumido, durante largos períodos, las funciones del Director. La actora solicitaba la nulidad de los actos administrativos que le denegaron dicho pago y el reconocimiento de las diferencias salariales. El Tribunal definió el recargo de funciones como una figura que exige que el funcionario asuma temporalmente labores adicionales, extrañas y de jerarquía superior a las de su puesto, y que cumpla los requisitos del cargo superior. Analizando la normativa orgánica del CIFH, concluyó que el cargo de Subdirector es un suplente por disposición normativa, cuyas funciones no son distintas ni superiores a las del Director, ya que ambos pertenecen al mismo nivel jerárquico y comparten competencias. Por tanto, al no existir funciones ajenas o de mayor categoría, no se configuró el recargo de funciones. Se declaró sin lugar la demanda, aclarando que la decisión se limitaba a la pretensión específica y que la actora podría reclamar por otras vías diferencias salariales basadas en figuras distintas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Thus, this Court reaches a different conclusion from the plaintiff's legal theory, as she has not experienced a proper "functional overload," since the functions she may have performed as Acting Director (a.i.) of the Center for Tax Research and Training Directorate are neither foreign to her duties, nor additional to those of Deputy Director, nor hierarchically superior—these being the essential requirements for the existence of that legal concept. This Chamber wishes to make it very clear to the parties and stresses again that this ruling is limited to what was requested, as clarified and delimited by her legal representative at the hearing granted, in which she confined her claim to the supposed right to payment of functional overload as a salary bonus. Therefore, the dismissal ruling herein is restricted to that pleaded framework and cannot extend to other possible compensation scenarios or administrative conduct not challenged...Así las cosas, este Tribunal arriba a una conclusión distinta a la teoría del caso de la representación de la señora Madrigal Chaves, toda vez que ella no ha experimentado un “recargo de funciones” propiamente dicho, ya que las funciones que en algún momento hubiese desempeñado como Directora ad interim (a.i.) de la Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria, no son ni de carácter extraño o ajeno a sus labores, ni adicionales a las propias como Subdirectora, ni tampoco jerárquicamente superiores, siendo estos los requisitos fundamentales para estar en presencia de aquel instituto jurídico. Sí desea esta Cámara dejar muy en claro a las partes e insistir en lo ya señalado antes, de que este pronunciamiento se restringe a lo peticionado por la parte, en los términos que incluso fue aclarado y delimitado por su representación legal en la audiencia concedida en su momento, oportunidad en la que confinó su reclamo al supuesto derecho al pago del recargo como plus salarial. Por esta razón, el fallo desestimatorio que aquí corresponde llevar a cabo se restringe a ese marco petitorio y por tanto, no puede hacerse extensivo a otras posibles hipótesis remunerativas u otras conductas administrativas que no hayan sido impugnadas...
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La nota básica y distinta del “recargo de funciones”, es el hecho de que a un funcionario inferior jerárquicamente, se le asignan temporalmente, total o parcial, labores adicionales a las propias y que le resultan extrañas, por corresponder a las propias de un funcionario de rango superior."
"The core distinguishing feature of "functional overload" is the temporary assignment, in whole or in part, of additional duties foreign to a hierarchically inferior official's own duties, which correspond to those of a higher-ranking official."
Considerando VII
"La nota básica y distinta del “recargo de funciones”, es el hecho de que a un funcionario inferior jerárquicamente, se le asignan temporalmente, total o parcial, labores adicionales a las propias y que le resultan extrañas, por corresponder a las propias de un funcionario de rango superior."
Considerando VII
"La suplencia no supone per se que se asuman concurrentemente competencias distintas, como pareciera entenderlo la parte actora."
"Substitution per se does not imply the concurrent assumption of different competencies, as the plaintiff seems to understand it."
Considerando VIII
"La suplencia no supone per se que se asuman concurrentemente competencias distintas, como pareciera entenderlo la parte actora."
Considerando VIII
"El cargo de Subdirector del CIFH ilustra a la perfección un caso más de suplencia por disposición normativa, ya que constituye un puesto cuya funcionalidad se restringe -porque no se ha demostrado otra cosa-, a suplir ipso iure las vacancias y ausencias del Director del CIFH."
"The position of CIFH Deputy Director perfectly illustrates a case of substitution by regulatory provision, as it is a post whose functionality is limited—since no other evidence was produced—to ipso iure filling the vacancies and absences of the CIFH Director."
Considerando VIII
"El cargo de Subdirector del CIFH ilustra a la perfección un caso más de suplencia por disposición normativa, ya que constituye un puesto cuya funcionalidad se restringe -porque no se ha demostrado otra cosa-, a suplir ipso iure las vacancias y ausencias del Director del CIFH."
Considerando VIII
Full documentDocumento completo
**V. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS.** – As stated in the first finding of fact above, this lawsuit has six claims. In claims numbered 1 to 4, the plaintiff brings an annulment action, by which she seeks to have three administrative acts removed from the legal system: official letter No. DGPH-A0-520-2013, by which the Human Potential Management Department of the Ministry of Finance denied Mrs. Madrigal Chaves the request she had made for recognition of the overload (recargo) bonus; official letter No. DGPH-AO-549-2013 from that same Department; and the ruling of the Office of the Minister of Finance No. 0051-2015 dated January 29, 2015, the latter two insofar as they resolve the reconsideration and appeal remedies, respectively, filed against the first of these acts. However, regarding the fifth claim put forward by the plaintiff, it was not clear to this Court what its meaning was, specifically what was being sought therein, whether the request was strictly limited to the salary differences for the concept of “overload (recargo),” or whether it referred in general to the salary differences for the functions as Acting Director, even though her position is that of Deputy Director of the Center for Tax Research and Training (Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria, CIFH) of the Ministry of Finance. Given this situation, the plaintiff’s representative was duly admonished at the time, who in turn stated the following: “…The undersigned knows and has always been clear that her position is that of Deputy Director and not Acting Director, so the spirit of point 5) of the claims refers to the restitution of salary differences as a result of the overload (recargo) assumed and not recognized in salary terms. Therefore, it is stated that '...I request that the salary differences I have failed to receive for this overload (recargo) be restored to me, counted from when I assumed the position of Deputy Director of the CIFH to date.' The lawsuit sets forth and proves through documents, that the administration has practically overloaded me, from the outset, with the duties of Acting Director, and precisely for this reason I state that I be recognized the salary differences I have failed to receive for the overload (recargo) assumed […] In summary, I refer to the salary differences I have failed to receive as an 'overload (recargo)' of functions, accounted for over many years as I have taken pains to demonstrate. Concomitantly, should this payment for the overload (recargo), which is of a salary nature, proceed in accordance with Law, we wish for it to be taken into account in the salary components described…” (Highlighting is not from the original). This being the case, this Chamber understands that what is requested in claim number five is strictly limited to the salary differences for the concept of “overload (recargo)” and, should that payment proceed, the effect of that recognition is also to be acknowledged with respect to the remaining components that make up Mrs. Madrigal Chaves’ salary. Finally, the last claim refers to the issue of costs.- **VI. ON THE MERITS.** The plaintiff challenges the legality of the denial of payment of the bonus called “overload (recargo),” because she believes she meets the requirements to be eligible for it and that the Administration incorrectly interprets the legal system, understanding that in her condition as Deputy Director, she is under a duty to indefinitely substitute for the head of the office, without payment of compensation. For this Court, the first thing is to clarify what we refer to with and what the scope is of this component called “overload (recargo).” Article 22 bis of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, RESC), Executive Decree No. 21 of December 14, 1954, regulates the figure in question, and it was the result of an addition made to said regulations, through Article 2 of Executive Decree No. 21418-P of June 23, 1992. The article in question of the RESC states in what is relevant: “…Article 22 bis.- Transfers, reassignments, and overloads of functions (recargos de funciones) shall be governed in accordance with what is indicated below: […] b) Overloads of functions (recargos de funciones) of higher-category positions, which exceed one month, may be remunerated, but shall be subject to the prior approval of the General Directorate, which shall verify that the public servant upon whom the overload (recargo) is placed meets the established requirements…” (Highlighting is not from the original). This rule has a substantive element and a procedural one, since on the one hand it attempts to define the legal institution and on the other, the manner in which it is to be recognized for remuneration purposes. Understand, then, that the overload (recargo) may or may not operate as a salary bonus, since not every overload of functions (recargo de funciones) is remunerated. First, it is established that the overload (recargo), as a form of work distribution in the public sector, occurs when additional, foreign functions of a higher hierarchy than those common to a public servant are assigned, where said servant must necessarily meet the same requirements demanded to suitably occupy the position of the superior. In Article 1.45) of Executive Decree No. 35823-H of March 4, 2010, referring to the Procedures for the application and follow-up of the General Guidelines on Salary, Employment, and Position Classification Policy for Public Entities, Ministries, and other Bodies as applicable, covered by the Scope of the Budgetary Authority, this legal institution is defined as follows: “…45) Overload of functions (Recargo de funciones): Temporarily assuming functions of a position of a higher salary level, additional to the permanent position activities of the official, in cases of vacations, paid leave, and incapacities, among others. Those exceeding one uninterrupted calendar month shall be subject to remuneration...”. (Highlighting is not from the original). This regulatory provision gives us other important substantive notions, since we can affirm that the overload (recargo) operates, then, on a temporary basis, so that the functions assumed do not permanently become part of the position and job held by the official, nor of the remuneration structure associated with them, so that the public servant must simultaneously exercise the ordinary functions associated with their position, along with the extraordinary ones of the superior. In such a way that the remunerative treatment of overload (recargo) functions is the same as that of an interim promotion: “…Article 9.- The overload of functions (recargo de funciones) shall have the same effects as an interim promotion, in what refers to salary recognition…” (Decree No. 35823-H. Highlighting is not from the original). For the purpose of clarifying the aforesaid, we must take into account that according to the cited decree, the concept of “position (puesto)” is defined as the “…Set of activities, duties, and responsibilities assigned by a competent authority to be performed by an official during all or part of the working day, for which there exists the budgetary content for its payment…”, while the term “Job (Cargo)” corresponds to the “…Internal nomenclature by which each of the positions of the organization is known…” (Subsections 7 and 39 of Art. 1 Decree No. 35823-H, as well as articles 101 and 3.i RESC, respectively). For an overload of functions (recargo de funciones) to be able to entail remuneration (salary bonus), the cited regulations establish two requirements: one of a temporal nature and another of control and oversight. In relation to the first, it is essential that the official upon whom the functions of the superior have been assigned, has exercised them uninterruptedly for more than one calendar month, and the second, that the General Directorate of Civil Service has approved the overload of functions (recargo de funciones) prior to the salary recognition. Said approval aims to verify that the subordinate upon whom the extraordinary functions have been overloaded meets the position’s profile. Art. 8 of Decree 35823-H states: “…For reassignments, promotions, substitutions, overload of functions (recargo de funciones), and any other personnel movement, the Active Administration shall ensure compliance with the academic and legal requirements demanded by the corresponding institutional class and job manuals in force…” (Highlighting is not from the original). In accordance with the principle of budgetary legality (Art. 180 of the Political Constitution), in the determination of the remunerated overload of functions (recargo de funciones), the Administration must take into account the respective budgetary content that allows it to meet the expenditure implied by this personnel movement and, by virtue of the principles of efficiency and effectiveness, its advisability or not compared to other alternatives in managing institutional human resources, in pursuit of satisfying the public interest and service needs (Arts. 5, 69, 107, 110.f, 110.g of the Law on Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets and 2, 93, and 94 of its Regulations). In order to finalize this conceptualization of the overload of functions (recargo de funciones), it is necessary to take into account that despite the requirements necessary for its remunerability, Articles 120 and 148 RESC establish an insurmountable temporal limit for the Administration, in the case of NON-remunerated overloads (recargos): “…Article 120.- When the public service so requires, tasks corresponding to another position different from the servant’s own may be assigned to a public servant, without this signifying a salary increase or decrease, for a period that must not exceed sixty consecutive or non-consecutive days during a year. […] Article 148.- When the public service so requires, tasks corresponding to another position, different from the servant’s own, may be assigned to a servant, without this signifying a promotion, demotion, or salary increase, for a period that must not exceed sixty days -consecutive or non-consecutive- during a year….” (Highlighting is not from the original). Finally, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also pronounced on this figure in the following terms: “…One of the manifestations of the ius variandi occurs when the employer orders a change of functions; this change must be of temporary, not indefinite, duration, since if the variation is for a long or indeterminate period, the worker's position must be consolidated, placing them in the position they are actually performing. In cases where the worker is assigned functions of a higher level than those they normally exercise, the work must be remunerated in accordance with the salary corresponding to the new assigned tasks. When referring to this hypothesis, Alonso García indicates: 'On the other hand, the question could be posed, whether as performing work of a higher category than usual, in which case a higher salary, corresponding to the work, would have to be granted to the worker, and the new category recognized as consolidated after a certain time has passed….' (Alonso García Manuel, Course on Labor Law, 9th Edition, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona Spain, 1985, page 545)…” (Highlighting is not from the original. See rulings of the Second Chamber No. 2009-0863 of 9:38 a.m. on September 4, 2009, and 2016-001354 of 09:50 a.m. on December 7, 2016).- **VII. ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGATIONS.** Having clarified the concept of overload of functions (recargo de funciones) and its remunerability, we can move on to the analysis of the plaintiff’s theory of the case. In summary, we can identify 3 lines of argument on the basis of which she grounds the nullity of the challenged acts and the alleged right to the remuneration for the overload of functions (recargo de funciones) she claims to hold. First, in her opinion, she herself satisfies the requirements set forth in section 22 bis RESC, so that by the Administration denying her request, the latter falls into a sort of omission by not initiating the respective studies indicated in turn in official letter of the DGSC No. IT-NT-248-2009 (proven fact No. 1). Secondly, she believes she has a right to payment of the overload (recargo), because it is not possible that she is under an obligation to substitute the Director of the CIFH indefinitely, without the right to any compensation whatsoever. And lastly, thirdly, because according to rulings of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR), Article 13 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, LSAP), 22 bis RESC, and 95 and 96 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), the substitution she has performed for the Director of the CIFH can only be remunerated through the overload (recargo) figure, given that according to Decree 35305-H, practically all the functions of the CIFH correspond to the Directorate position, not to the Sub-Directorate, which she has had to carry out despite being foreign to her position. Now then, in relation to the first of the defects pointed out by the plaintiff, this Court observes that the Administration has not unjustifiably refused to carry out the studies required for the payment of the overload of functions (recargo de funciones), for on the contrary, throughout the various challenged conducts and in a constant and consistent manner, the ministerial authorities have denied her the request considering that this is not a case of overload (recargo), since it involves tasks “inherent to the job (cargo)” of Deputy Director, so that since they are not about different functions, it is not possible to apply the figure in question. Basically, for this Chamber, this argument is understood as a kind of lack of motivation in the manner in which the bodies of the Ministry of Finance pronounce on the request she has established; however, as we have affirmed, no defect in that sense is detailed, given that the Administration has expressly proceeded to hear her request and has dismissed it as inadmissible. In any case, what is alleged corresponds to the core of the other two following claims. Regarding the second and third arguments, they share the point of whether the plaintiff has or does not have the right to payment itself of the overload of functions (recargo de funciones); what varies in them is the foundation given by the legal representative of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves. This being so, this Court considers that the claimant is not correct in her arguments, whereas on the contrary, the criterion of the Administration is shared, in the sense that due to the assigned functions and the nature of the “overload of functions (recargo de funciones)” as a form of work distribution in the public sector, the plaintiff effectively is not in a position to claim payment of remuneration for that particular concept. Let us see, as we explained in the preceding recital, the basic and distinctive note of the “overload of functions (recargo de funciones)” is the fact that a hierarchically lower official is temporarily assigned, totally or partially, additional tasks to their own and that are foreign to them, because they correspond to those proper to a higher-ranking official, which does not occur in the case of Mrs. Madrigal. We would like to point out from this moment that it is not a matter of the plaintiff not having, in general, a right to remuneration for her work, but rather that what is sought – payment for overload of functions (recargo de funciones) – indeed lacks legal basis, this being the cause to which the claimant limited her claim, because she so stated, even in the hearing granted by this Court. As the defendant Administration has made her see in the various challenged acts, as well as in the reply given here by the State's representation, a person who holds a job (cargo) like that occupied by the plaintiff, save for very exceptional situations – as we will see below –, will not have the circumstances required to merit payment of remuneration for overload (recargo). Contrary to what the claimant argues, not every substitution implies an overload of functions (recargo de funciones). We will delve into this immediately.- **VIII. SUBSTITUTION (SUPLENCIA) AND OVERLOAD OF FUNCTIONS (RECARGO DE FUNCIONES).** In Articles 95 and 96 of our General Law of Public Administration, the phenomenon of substitution (suplencia) is provided for as a mode of change or transfer of competences, this is because it is a means to transmit competence to a person who can effectively perform the tasks required by the service, functions that would otherwise correspond to the public servant regularly designated to hold the headship of a public body, given that the latter cannot or is temporarily or definitively impeded from exercising their functions. Legal doctrine coincides with this definition; for example, Santamaría Pastor tells us that substitution (suplencia) consists “…in the personal and temporal substitution in the headship of a body; that is, in the temporary assumption by the head of one body of the functions of another by reason of the latter's sudden impossibility of exercising them…” (Principles of General Administrative Law, Vol. I., p. 367), or Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, who indicated that “…Substitution (suplencia) is the phenomenon (of organization) by virtue of which a person is placed in the stead of the head of a body, due to vacancy (death, resignation, definitive incapacity, removal) or absence of the latter (vacations, leaves, temporary incapacity, suspension), in an extraordinary and temporary manner, while the new head of office is not placed in possession of the job (cargo)…” (Theses of Administrative Law, Vol. II, pp. 96-97). Substitution (suplencia) is a practical response of the legal system to a common abnormality in administrative activity: the absence of the head official, for all types of reasons. Consequently, the function of the substitute is to substitute “… the head of office for all legal effects, without any subordination, and shall exercise the competences of the body with the fullness of the powers and duties that the same contain…” (Art. 96.1 LGAP), in such a way as to ensure the continuity of the body’s activity. The LGAP provides for two ways through which substitution (suplencia) can be carried out: That it be assumed by the hierarchical superior (Art. 95.1, 96.2, and 102.e LGAP) or otherwise, through the appointment of a substitute: “…If the hierarchical superior does not wish to perform the substitution (suplencia) or after two months have elapsed since its exercise began by him, the substitute must be appointed in accordance with the law…” (Art. 95.2 LGAP. Highlighting is not from the original). The appointment of the substitute official can in turn occur according to the administrative legal system through various ways, among others the following: i.- By interim appointment (whether or not by promotion), ii.- by regulatory provision, iii.- by overload of functions (recargo de funciones), iv.- by inopia, etc. Regarding overload of functions (recargo de funciones), we have already sufficiently explained, and in relation to interim appointments, it suffices to cite the provisions in Article 10 RESC, in what is relevant: “…Interim substitute servants shall be considered those who are appointed to temporarily replace a regular servant, for any cause of suspension of the service relationship. […] In the event that a promotion is agreed upon for the temporary substitution of the regular servant, it shall have the character of interim, as well as the other movements agreed upon to replace the servant giving rise to the appointments, during the time the respective head considers it necessary, or for up to the period of suspension of the head of office’s service relationship…”. On the other hand, we refer to the case of substitution (suplencia) by regulatory provision, when the legal system itself, in an effort to guarantee continuity in the provision of services under the Administration’s charge, provides for positions whose function may be limited totally or partially to automatically substituting for the temporary or definitive absences of the head official; for example and without greater effort, see articles 22.1, 26.b, 47, and 51 LGAP, in which jobs (cargos) are provided for whose associated functions are the ipso iure substitution (suplencia) – to a greater or lesser degree – of the heads of certain bodies: Vice-Presidents, vice-ministers, among others. It is fundamental to clarify that substitution (suplencia) does not per se imply that different competences are concurrently assumed, as the plaintiff seems to understand it. For example, this does not occur at all in the case of interim public servants, although it does happen in the case of officials with overload of functions (recargo de funciones). In the case of substitutes by operation of Law or by regulatory provision, this is variable, since if the legal system were to attribute exclusive functions to them and given that, finally, between the head official and this type of substitute some degree of subordination could subsist, we would be facing the exceptional situation in which different and hierarchically superior functions are indeed transferred to the former, which they must perform concurrently with their own, with which a scenario of overload (recargo) could come to occur in the terms set forth in recital VII. In any case, given its special nature, it would be the procedural burden of whoever alleges it to prove those very particular conditions. This does not occur in the specific case, where the functions assigned to Mrs. Madrigal Chaves in her condition as Deputy Director of the CIFH are not different from those assigned to the Director, with it being the case that since she is a substitute by regulatory provision, her tasks are limited to automatically substituting for the absences of the head official. Let us see, according to Executive Decrees No. 24397-H published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 129 of July 7, 1995, and No. 35713-H published in La Gaceta No. 30 of February 12, 2010, which amends the first, as well as Executive Decree No. 35305-H published in La Gaceta No. 121 of June 24, 2009, which corresponds to the “Regulations for the Creation, Organization, and Operation of the Directorate of the Center for Tax Research and Training of the Ministry of Finance (Reglamento de Creación, Organización y Funcionamiento de la Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria del Ministerio de Hacienda)” (RCIFH, hereinafter), the Directorate of the CIFH constitutes a dependency of the Ministry of Finance, under the charge of a Director and a Deputy Director (Art. 1.o Decree 24397-H and Art. 3 Decree 35305-H), whose function “…consists of supporting the actions of the Ministry of Finance, through the development of research, training, and capacitation in matters of public finances (public income and expenditure), and the execution of programs aimed at institutional improvement and growth…” (Art. 1 Decree 35305-H). In accordance with the provisions of Articles 3.c and 4.g of the Civil Service Statute, which considers personnel who occupy the positions of Directors of the Ministries as confidential personnel and thus excluded from the statutory regime, Art. 3 RCIFH distinguishes in that same sense between the positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIFH, determining that the latter will be precisely subject to the Civil Service Regime, whereas the Director is not. Also, this section establishes the essential function assigned to the position of Deputy Director: “…shall substitute the Director in his absences with all the duties and responsibilities inherent to the job (cargo). The Director shall determine the functions and responsibilities that the Deputy Director will be in charge of, in accordance with the Center’s plans, projects and programs...” (Highlighting is not from the original). This provision is further reinforced based on the general rule established in Article 8 of Decree 24397-H, regarding the organization of the dependencies of the Ministry of Finance: “…In the event of absence of the head of the dependency or of impossibility to hear the matter due to challenge, inhibition, excuse, or impediment, the person who substitutes them shall assume the functions established herein…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, we can affirm with certainty that, indeed, the position of Deputy Director of the CIFH perfectly illustrates another case of substitution (suplencia) by regulatory provision, since it constitutes a position whose functionality is restricted – because nothing else has been demonstrated – to ipso iure substituting for the vacancies and absences of the Director of the CIFH. Now, both Article 3 cited previously and Article 4 of that same regulatory body literally establish that the public body “Directorate of the Center for Tax Research and Training” is made up of both the Director and the Deputy Director: “…The Center shall have a Directorate, composed of the Director and the Deputy Director at the management level and with the support personnel required for its function…”. Consequently, both jobs (cargos) are at the same hierarchical level, with functions of the same category. Even in the enumeration of the competences (“functions”) of the Directorate of the CIFH, determined in Article 5 of the RCIFH, only in 1 out of 14 competences is a distinct and exclusive task entrusted to the Sub-Directorate. Subsection k) states: “…At the Sub-Directorate level of the Center, to ensure the execution and control of plans and programs…”, from which it is not possible to assert that between both jobs (cargos) there exist diverse functions, much less subordinate ones. In that sense, nor from the rest of the CIFH’s organic regulations is there any rule that separates and diversifies both positions, assigning functions of a different type between both jobs (cargos). It suffices to say equally, that neither has the plaintiff demonstrated this. This being so, this Court arrives at a conclusion different from the theory of the case of the representation of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves, given that she has not experienced an “overload of functions (recargo de funciones)” properly speaking, since the functions that she may have at some point performed as Acting Director (a.i.) of the Directorate of the Center for Tax Research and Training are neither of a foreign or extraneous character to her duties, nor additional to her own as Deputy Director, nor hierarchically superior, with these being the fundamental requirements to be in the presence of that legal institution. In relation to the allusion made by the plaintiff’s representative to the rulings of the PGR and Articles 13 LSAP, 22 bis RESC, and 95 and 96 LGAP, we must say the following: First, to indicate that the rulings of the PGR, by virtue of its consultative powers, do not in any way bind this jurisdiction, in addition to the fact that as will be seen below, since they are based on regulations that are no longer in force, they are not applicable to the specific case. Second, to warn the plaintiff that Article 13 LSAP, which was not only the foundation of those rulings, but was also alleged and even transcribed in the lawsuit (see image 72 of the scanned judicial file, former folio 66 of the physical file), was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber more than 15 years before the action was filed, through ruling number 1999-04845 of 4:21 p.m. on June 22, 1999, such that it does not constitute an argument addressable by this Court; and finally, regarding Articles 22 bis RESC and 95 and 96 LGAP, we have already made sufficient analysis of them throughout this judgment, without it having been possible to derive from them sufficient Right to sustain the annulment and condemnation claim attempted here by the claimant. This Chamber does wish to make very clear to the parties and to insist on what has been pointed out before, that this pronouncement is restricted to what was petitioned by the party, in the terms that were even clarified and delimited by her legal representative at the hearing granted at the time, an opportunity in which she confined her claim to the alleged right to payment of the overload (recargo) as a salary bonus.
For this reason, the dismissive ruling that must be issued here is restricted to that petitionary framework and therefore, cannot be extended to other possible remunerative hypotheses or other administrative conducts that have not been challenged, it being sufficient to remind the defendant Administration of what has been repeatedly stated by the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) in various judgments, such as number 2011-00695 of 15:35 hours on August 25, 2011, 2012-1154 of 10:55 hours on December 14, 2012, and 2013-001144 of 10:00 hours on October 4, 2013, when it has indicated that “…In accordance with the principle of legality that binds administrative activity, the Administration cannot grant salary rights or benefits if they are not previously authorized or provided for by the legal system. However, this principle must also be understood as a limitation for the Administration itself not to act outside the permitted limits, which is legally contemplated under the figure of abuse of power (article 146 of the General Law of Public Administration). In the field of public employment, in which each position has a specific description regarding personal requirements, tasks, remuneration, etc., it is not possible to admit that, to the detriment of workers' rights, this same legality is ignored and the rights of servants are curtailed. That is, administrative legality also implies for the Administration the impossibility of overextending the performance of its officials, outside the established parameters, for the specific position in question; because the opposite would mean admitting an unjust enrichment for the Administration, by seeing itself benefited with services alien and different from those remunerated to the official…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, none of the foregoing implies that if the plaintiff considers herself a creditor of salary differences originating from a figure different from the additional duties (recargo de funciones), she cannot file the corresponding claim in administrative and/or judicial venue.
V.SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING.- As stated in the first resultando above, this lawsuit has six claims. In those numbered 1 to 4, the plaintiff raises an annulment action, by which she intends to eliminate from the legal system three administrative acts: official letter No. DGPH-A0-520-2013, by which the Department of Human Potential Management of the Ministry of Finance denied Mrs. Madrigal Chaves the request she had formulated for the recognition of the additional duties pay (plus de recargo), as well as official letter No. DGPH-AO-549-2013 from that same Department and the resolution of the Office of the Minister of Finance No. 0051-2015 dated January 29, 2015, the latter insofar as they resolve the motions for reconsideration and appeal, respectively, filed against the first of these acts. However, in relation to the fifth claim brought by the plaintiff, for this Court it was not clear what its meaning was, specifically what was being requested there, whether the request was strictly limited to salary differences for the concept of “additional duties,” or whether it referred in general to salary differences for the functions as Acting Director, despite her position being Deputy Director of the Center for Tax Research and Training (CIFH) of the Ministry of Finance. Given this situation, the plaintiff’s representative was warned at the time, who in turn stated the following: “…The undersigned knows and has always been clear that her position is that of Deputy Director and not Acting Director, so the spirit of point 5) of the claims refers to the restitution of salary differences, as a product of the additional duties assumed and not recognized salary-wise. Therefore, it is said that ‘...I request that the salary differences I stopped receiving for these additional duties be restored to me, counted from when I assumed the position of Deputy Director of the CIFH to date.’ The lawsuit exposes and proves with documents, that the administration has practically burdened me from the beginning with the labors of Acting Director, and precisely for this reason, I state that the salary differences I have failed to receive for the additional duties assumed be recognized to me […] In summary, I refer to the salary differences stopped receiving as ‘additional duties’ of functions, accounted for over many years as I have served to demonstrate. Concomitantly, if the payment of these additional duties, which has a salary nature, proceeds in Law, we wish for it to be taken into account in the described salary components….” (Highlighting is not from the original). This being the case, this Chamber understands that what is requested in claim number five is strictly limited to salary differences for the concept of “additional duties” and, should that payment proceed, the effect of that recognition is also to be recognized regarding the remaining components that make up Mrs. Madrigal Chaves’s salary. Finally, the last claim refers to the issue of costs.-
VI.ON THE MERITS.- The plaintiff questions the legality of the denial of payment of the plus called “additional duties,” because she considers that she possesses the requirements to qualify for it and that the Administration incorrectly interprets the legal system, understanding that in her condition as Deputy Director, she is under the duty to indefinitely substitute for the titular head, without payment of consideration. For this Court, the first thing is to clarify what we refer to and what the scope is of this component called “additional duties.” Article 22 bis of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil), executive decree No. 21 of December 14, 1954, regulates the figure in question and it was the result of an addition made to said regulation, through article 2 of executive decree number 21418-P of June 23, 1992. The article in question of the Civil Service Statute Regulation indicates in what is relevant: “…Article 22 bis.- Transfers, reassignments, and additional duties (recargos de funciones) shall be governed according to what is indicated below: […] b) Additional duties from positions of a higher category, which exceed one month, may be remunerated, but shall be subject to the prior approval of the General Directorate, which must verify that the servant to whom the additional duties are assigned meets the established requirements…” (Highlighting is not from the original). This rule has a substantive element and a procedural one, because on one hand it attempts to define the institution and on the other, the manner in which it must be recognized for remuneration purposes. It must be understood thus that additional duties may or may not operate as a salary plus (plus salarial), since not all additional duties are remunerated. First, it is established that additional duties, as a form of work distribution in the public sector, occurs when additional, foreign functions of a higher hierarchy than the common ones of a servant are assigned, where the servant necessarily must meet the same requirements demanded to suitably occupy the position of the supraordinate. In article 1.45) of executive decree No. 35823-H of March 4, 2010, referring to the Procedures for the application and monitoring of the General Guidelines of Salary, Employment, and Position Classification Policy for Public Entities, Ministries, and other Organs as applicable, covered by the Budgetary Authority Scope, this institution is defined as follows: “…45) Additional duties (Recargo de funciones): Temporarily assuming functions of a position of a higher salary level, additional to the permanent position’s own activities of the official, in cases of vacations, paid leave, and sick leave, among others. Those that uninterruptedly exceed one calendar month shall be subject to remuneration...”. (Highlighting is not from the original). This regulatory rule gives us other important substantive notions, since we can affirm that additional duties operate temporarily, so that the functions assumed do not permanently enter the position and office held by the official, nor the remunerative structure associated with them, so the servant must simultaneously exercise the ordinary functions associated with their position, along with the extraordinary ones of the superior. In such a way that the remunerative treatment of functions under additional duties is the same as an interim promotion: “…Article 9-The additional duties shall have the same effects as an interim promotion, regarding salary recognition…” (Decree No. 35823-H. Highlighting is not from the original). For the purpose of clarifying the foregoing, we must bear in mind that according to the cited decree, the concept of “position” is defined as the “…Set of activities, duties, and responsibilities assigned by a competent authority to be performed by an official during all or part of the workday, for which budgetary content exists for its payment…”, while the term “Office” corresponds to the “…Internal nomenclature by which each of the organization's positions is known…” (Subsections 7 and 39 of Art. 1 Decree No. 35823-H, as well as articles 101 and 3.i of the Civil Service Statute Regulation, respectively). For additional duties to entail a remuneration (salary plus), the cited rules establish two requirements: one of a temporary nature and another of control and oversight. Regarding the first, it is essential that the official to whom the superior’s functions have been assigned has exercised them uninterruptedly for more than one calendar month, and the second, that the General Directorate of Civil Service has approved the additional duties prior to the salary recognition. Said approval aims to verify that the subordinate to whom the extraordinary functions have been assigned meets the position’s profile. Art. 8 of decree 35823-H states: “…For reassignments, promotions, substitutions, additional duties, and any other personnel movement, the Active Administration shall ensure compliance with the academic and legal requirements demanded by the corresponding institutional class and office manuals in force…” (Highlighting is not from the original). In attention to the principle of budget legality (Art. 180 of the Political Constitution), in the determination of remunerated additional duties, the Administration must take into account the respective budgetary content that allows it to face the expenditure implied by this personnel movement, and by virtue of the principles of effectiveness and efficiency, its suitability or not compared to other alternatives in managing institutional human resources, in pursuit of satisfying the public interest and service needs (Arts. 5, 69, 107, 110.f, 110.g of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets and 2, 93 and 94 of its Regulation). To begin concluding this conceptualization of additional duties, it is necessary to bear in mind that despite the necessary requirements for their remuneration eligibility (remunerabilidad), articles 120 and 148 of the Civil Service Statute Regulation establish an impassable time limit for the Administration, in the case of NON-remunerated additional duties: “…Article 120.- When the public service demands it, tasks corresponding to another position different from the servant’s own may be assigned to a servant, without this implying an increase or decrease in salary, for a period that must not exceed sixty consecutive days or not during a year. […] Article 148.- When the public service demands it, labors corresponding to another position, different from the servant’s own, may be assigned to a servant, without this implying promotion, demotion, or salary increase, for a period that must not exceed sixty days -consecutive or not- during a year….” (Highlighting is not from the original). Finally, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has also pronounced on this figure in the following terms: “…One of the manifestations of the ius variandi occurs when the employer orders a change of functions; this change must be of temporary, not indefinite, duration, because if the variation is for a long or indeterminate period, the worker’s position must be consolidated by placing them in the position they are actually performing. In cases where the worker is assigned functions of a higher level than those they normally exercise, the work must be remunerated according to the salary corresponding to the newly assigned labors. Referring to this hypothesis, Alonso García indicates: ‘On the other hand, the question could arise, either as performing work of a higher category than usual, in which hypothesis a higher salary corresponding to the work would have to be granted to the worker, with the new category being recognized as consolidated after a certain time….’” (Alonso García Manuel, Curso de Derecho del Trabajo, 9th Edition, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona Spain, 1985, page 545)…” (Highlighting is not from the original. See judgments of the Second Chamber No. 2009-0863 of 9:38 hours on September 4, 2009, and 2016-001354 of 09:50 hours on December 7, 2016).-
VII.ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGATIONS.- Having clarified the concept of additional duties and their remuneration eligibility (remunerabilidad), we can proceed to the analysis of the theory of the case of the plaintiff. In summary, we can identify 3 argumentative lines based on which she grounds the nullity of the challenged acts and the supposed right to the remuneration of the additional duties she claims to hold. First, insofar as in her opinion, she does satisfy the requirements set forth in numeral 22 bis of the Civil Service Statute Regulation, so that when the Administration denies her request, it falls into a sort of omissive conduct by not initiating the respective studies indicated in turn in official letter of the General Directorate of Civil Service No. IT-NT-248-2009 (proven fact No. 1). Secondly, she considers she has a right to the payment of additional duties, because it is not possible to be under the obligation to substitute for the Director of the CIFH indefinitely, without the right to any retribution. And lastly, thirdly, because according to opinions of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR), article 13 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, LSAP), 22 bis of the Civil Service Statute Regulation, and 95 and 96 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), the substitution she has performed for the Director of the CIFH can only be remunerated through the figure of additional duties, given that according to decree 35305-H, practically all the functions of the CIFH correspond to the Direction position, not to the Sub-direction, which she has had to carry out despite being foreign to her position. Now, in relation to the first of the defects pointed out by the plaintiff, this Court observes that the Administration has not unjustifiably refused to conduct the studies required for the payment of additional duties, because on the contrary, throughout the various challenged conducts and in a constant and consistent manner, the ministerial authorities have denied her petition by considering that this is not a case of additional duties because they are tasks “inherent to the office” of Deputy Director, such that, since they do not deal with different functions, it is not possible to apply the figure in question. Basically, for this Chamber, this claim is understood as a type of lack of motivation in the way the organs of the Ministry of Finance pronounce on the request she has made; however, as we have affirmed, no defect is detailed in that sense, given that the Administration expressly has indeed addressed her petition and dismissed it as improper. In any case, what is alleged corresponds to the core of the next two claims. Regarding the second and third claims, they share the point of whether the plaintiff has or not the right to the payment of additional duties per se; what varies in them is the foundation given by the legal representation of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves. This being so, this Court considers that the plaintiff does not carry reason in her arguments, and on the contrary, the Administration’s criterion is shared, in the sense that due to the functions assigned and the nature of “additional duties” as a form of work distribution in the public sector, effectively, the plaintiff is not in a position to claim payment of remuneration for that particular concept. Let us see, as we explained in the previous recital, the basic and distinct note of “additional duties” is the fact that a hierarchically inferior official is assigned, temporarily, totally or partially, additional labors that are their own and that are foreign to them, because they correspond to those of a higher-ranking official, which does not occur in the case of Mrs. Madrigal. We would like to point out from the outset that it is not a matter of the plaintiff not having a right generally to remuneration for her work, but that what was sought –payment for additional duties– does lack legal basis, this being the cause to which the plaintiff limited her claim, because she so stated, even in the hearing granted by this Court. As the defendant Administration has made her see in the various challenged acts, as well as in the response given here by the State’s representation, a person who holds an office like the one the plaintiff occupies, save very exceptional situations –as we will see immediately–, will not have the required circumstances that warrant the payment of remuneration for additional duties. Unlike what is sustained by the plaintiff, not every substitution implies additional duties. On this, we will delve immediately.-
VIII.SUBSTITUTION AND ADDITIONAL DUTIES.- In articles 95 and 96 of our General Law of Public Administration, the phenomenon of substitution (suplencia) is provided for as a mode of change or transfer of competencies, this is because it is a means to transmit competence to a person who can effectively perform the labors required by the service, functions that would otherwise correspond to the servant regularly designated to occupy the titular headship of a public organ, given that the latter cannot or is temporarily or permanently impeded from exercising their functions. The doctrine agrees with this definition; for example, Santamaría Pastor tells us that substitution consists “…in the personal and temporary substitution in the headship of an organ; that is, in the temporary assumption by the head of one organ of the functions of another due to the latter’s supervening impossibility to exercise them…” (Principios de Derecho Administrativo General, T. I., p. 367), or Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, who indicated that “… Substitution is the (organizational) phenomenon by virtue of which a person is placed in the place of the head of an organ, due to vacancy (death, resignation, permanent incapacity, removal) or absence of the latter (vacations, leaves, temporary incapacity, suspension), in an extraordinary and temporary form, while the new head is not placed in possession of the office…” (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, T. II, pp. 96-97). Substitution is a practical response of the legal system to a common abnormality in administrative activity: the absence of the head official, for all kinds of reasons. Consequently, the function of the substitute is to substitute “… the head for all legal effect, without any subordination, and shall exercise the competencies of the organ with the fullness of the powers and duties that the same contain…” (Art. 96.1 of the General Law of Public Administration), in such a way that the continuity of the organ’s activity is assured. The General Law of Public Administration provides two forms through which substitution can be carried out: That it be assumed by the hierarchical superior (Art. 95.1, 96.2 and 102.e of the General Law of Public Administration) or, alternatively, through the appointment of a substitute: “…If the hierarchical superior does not wish to perform the substitution or after two months have elapsed since he began exercising it, the substitute must be appointed in accordance with the law…” (Art. 95.2 of the General Law of Public Administration. Highlighting is not from the original). The appointment of the substitute official can in turn occur according to the administrative legal system through various means, among others the following: i.- By interim appointment (whether or not by promotion), ii.- by normative provision, iii.- by additional duties, iv.- by default (inopia), etc. Regarding additional duties, we have already explained sufficiently, and in relation to interim appointments, it suffices to cite the provisions of article 10 of the Civil Service Statute Regulation, in what is relevant: “…Those officials appointed to temporarily replace a regular servant, for any cause of suspension of the service relationship, shall be considered substitute interim servants. […] In the event that a promotion is agreed upon for the temporary substitution of the regular servant, this shall have the character of interim, as well as the other movements agreed upon to replace the servant originating the appointments, during the time the respective chief considers it necessary, or for the period of suspension of the titular head's service relationship…”. On the other hand, we refer to the case of substitution by normative provision, when the legal system itself, in pursuit of guaranteeing continuity in the provision of services under the Administration’s charge, provides for positions whose function may be limited totally or partially to automatically substituting the temporary or permanent absences of the head official; for example, and without further effort, see articles 22.1, 26.b, 47 and 51 of the General Law of Public Administration, in which offices are provided for whose associated functions are the substitution ipso iure –to a greater or lesser degree– of the heads of certain organs: Vice Presidents, Vice Ministers, among others. It is fundamental to clarify that substitution does not per se suppose that distinct competencies are concurrently assumed, as the plaintiff seems to understand it. For example, this does not entirely occur in the case of interim servants, although it does happen in the case of officials with additional duties. In the case of substitutes by full right or by normative provision, this is variable, because if the legal system were to attribute exclusive functions to these and given that, finally, between the head and this type of substitute some degree of subordination could subsist, we would be facing the exceptional situation in which different and hierarchically superior functions are effectively transferred to the former, which they must perform concurrently with their own, with which a situation of additional duties could occur under the terms set forth in recital VII. In any case, given their special nature, it would be the procedural burden of whoever claims it to prove those very particular conditions.
This is not the case in the specific matter at hand, where the functions assigned to Mrs. Madrigal Chaves in her capacity as Deputy Director (Sub Directora) of the CIFH are no different from those assigned to the Director, given that, as a substitute by normative provision, her duties are limited to automatically filling in for the absences of the titular official. Let us see: according to Executive Decrees No. 24397-H published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 129 of July 7, 1995, and No. 35713-H published in La Gaceta No. 30 of February 12, 2010, which amends the former, as well as Executive Decree No. 35305-H published in La Gaceta No. 121 of June 24, 2009, which corresponds to the "Reglamento de Creación, Organización y Funcionamiento de la Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria del Ministerio de Hacienda" (RCIFH, hereinafter), the Directorate (Dirección) of the CIFH constitutes a dependency of the Ministry of Finance, led by a Director and a Deputy Director (Art. 1 of Decree 24397-H and Art. 3 of Decree 35305-H), whose function “…consists of backing the actions of the Ministry of Finance, through the development of research, education, and training in matters of public finance (public income and expenditure), and the execution of programs aimed at institutional improvement and growth…” (Art. 1 of Decree 35305-H). In accordance with the provisions of articles 3.c and 4.g of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), which considers individuals holding the positions of Directors of Ministries as confidential personnel and therefore excluded from the statutory regime, Art. 3 of the RCIFH distinguishes in that same sense between the positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIFH, determining that the latter shall be precisely subject to the Civil Service Regime, but not the Director. Likewise, this numeral provides the essential function assigned to the Deputy Director position: “…shall substitute for the Director in his/her absences with all the duties and responsibilities inherent to the position. The Director shall determine the functions and responsibilities that the Deputy Director will have under his/her charge, in accordance with the plans, projects, and programs of the Center...” (Highlighting is not from the original). This provision is, in turn, reinforced by the general rule established in Article 8 of Decree 24397-H, regarding the organization of the dependencies of the Ministry of Finance: “…In the event of the absence of the head of the dependency or the impossibility of hearing the matter due to challenge (recusación), inhibition, excuse, or impediment, the person who substitutes for him/her shall assume the functions established herein…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, we can safely affirm that, indeed, the position of Deputy Director of the CIFH perfectly illustrates yet another case of substitution by normative provision (suplencia por disposición normativa), given that it constitutes a position whose functionality is restricted—because nothing else has been demonstrated—to ipso iure filling the vacancies and absences of the Director of the CIFH. Now, both Article 3 cited above, and Article 4 of that same normative body, literally establish that the public body "Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria" is composed of both the Director and the Deputy Director: “…The Center shall have a Directorate, composed of the Director and the Deputy Director at the directive level and with the support staff required for its function…”. Consequently, both positions are at the same hierarchical level, with functions of the same category. Even in the enumeration of the powers ("functions") of the Directorate of the CIFH, determined in Article 5 of the RCIFH, only in 1 of 14 powers is a distinct and exclusive task entrusted to the Deputy Director’s Office (Subdirección). Subsection k) states: “…At the level of the Deputy Director’s Office of the Center, ensure the execution and control of plans and programs…”, from which it is not possible to assert that diverse, much less subordinate, functions exist between the two positions. In that sense, neither does the rest of the organic regulation of the CIFH contain any rule that separates and diversifies both posts, assigning functions of different types between the two positions. Suffice it to say, equally, that the plaintiff has not demonstrated this either. Thus, this Court reaches a conclusion different from the theory of the case presented by the representation of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves, since she has not experienced an “overload of functions (recargo de funciones)” properly speaking, given that the functions she may have performed at some time as Director ad interim (a.i.) of the Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria are neither of an unusual or alien nature to her duties, nor additional to her own as Deputy Director, nor hierarchically superior, these being the fundamental requirements for the existence of that legal concept. Regarding the allusion made by the plaintiff’s representative to the opinions of the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) and articles 13 of the LSAP, 22 bis of the RESC, and 95 and 96 of the LGAP, we must state the following: First, to indicate that the opinions of the PGR, by virtue of its consultative powers, do not bind this jurisdiction in any way, besides which, as will be seen next, being based on regulations that are no longer in force, they are not applicable to the specific case. Second, to warn the plaintiff that Article 13 of the LSAP, which was not only the basis for those opinions but was also alleged and even transcribed in the lawsuit (see image 72 of the scanned judicial file, former folio 66 of the physical file), was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) more than 15 years before the action was filed, by means of judgment number 1999-04845 at 16:21 hours on June 22, 1999, such that it does not constitute an argument that this Court can consider; and finally, regarding Articles 22 bis of the RESC and 95 and 96 of the LGAP, we have already conducted sufficient analysis of them throughout this judgment, without it having been possible to derive sufficient Law from them to sustain the annulment and condemnation claim attempted here by the plaintiff. This Chamber does wish to make it very clear to the parties, and to insist on what has already been stated before, that this pronouncement is restricted to what was petitioned by the party, in the terms that were even clarified and delimited by her legal representation at the hearing granted at the time, an opportunity in which she confined her claim to the alleged right to payment of the overload (recargo) as a salary bonus. For this reason, the dismissal ruling (fallo desestimatorio) that is appropriate to issue here is restricted to that petitionary framework and, therefore, cannot be extended to other possible compensatory hypotheses or other administrative conduct that have not been challenged, it being sufficient to remind the defendant Administration of what has been repeatedly stated by the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice in various judgments, such as number 2011-00695 at 15:35 hours on August 25, 2011, 2012-1154 at 10:55 hours on December 14, 2012, and 2013-001144 at 10:00 hours on October 4, 2013, when it has indicated that “…In accordance with the principle of legality that binds administrative activity, the Administration cannot grant salary rights or benefits if they are not previously authorized or provided for by the legal system. However, this principle must also be understood as a limitation for the Administration itself not to act outside the permitted limits, which is legally contemplated under the figure of abuse of power (Article 146 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). In the sphere of public employment, in which each position has a specific description regarding personal requirements, tasks, remuneration, etc., it is not possible to admit that, to the detriment of the workers' rights, that same legality is disregarded and the rights of the servants are curtailed. That is to say, administrative legality also implies for the Administration the impossibility of exceeding the performance of its officials, outside the established parameters, for the specific position in question; because the opposite would mean admitting an unjust enrichment for the Administration, by benefiting from services alien to and different from those remunerated to the official…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, none of the foregoing implies that if the plaintiff considers herself entitled to salary differences originating from a concept different from the overload of functions, she cannot file the corresponding claim in the administrative and/or judicial venue.
The complaint sets forth and proves documentarily that the administration has practically overloaded me from the outset with the duties of Acting Director, and precisely for that reason, I request that the salary differences I have ceased to receive be recognized, for the overload assumed […] In summary, I refer to the salary differences left uncollected as "overload" of functions, tallied over many years as I have demonstrated. Concomitantly, should that payment of the overload, which has a salary nature, proceed in Law, we wish for it to be taken into account in the salary components described….” (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, this Chamber understands that what is sought in claim number five is limited strictly to the salary differences for the concept of “overload” and, in the event such payment were to proceed, that the effect of that recognition also be recognized with respect to the remaining components that make up the salary of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves. Finally, the last claim refers to the issue of costs.-
VI.ON THE MERITS.- The plaintiff challenges the legality of the denial of payment of the additional pay called “overload,” because she believes she possesses the requirements to qualify for it and that the Administration incorrectly interprets the legal system, understanding that in her condition as Deputy Director, she is under the duty to indefinitely substitute for the titleholder, without payment of consideration. For this Tribunal, the first thing to do is to clarify what we refer to and what are the scope of this component called “overload.” Article 22 bis of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (RESC), Executive Decree No. 21 of December 14, 1954, regulates the figure in question, and it was the result of an addition made to said regulation, by means of Article 2 of Executive Decree number 21418-P of June 23, 1992. The article in question of the RESC indicates, in what is relevant: “…Article 22 bis.- Transfers, relocations, and overloads of functions shall be governed in accordance with the following: […] b) Overloads of functions of higher-category posts, exceeding one month, may be remunerated, but shall be subject to the prior approval of the General Directorate, which must verify that the public servant to whom the overload is assigned meets the established requirements…” (Highlighting is not from the original). This rule has a substantive element and a procedural one, as on one hand it attempts to define the institute, and on the other, the manner in which it must be recognized for purposes of its remuneration. It is thus understood that the overload may or may not operate as a salary extra, since not every overload of functions is remunerated. First, it is established that the overload, as a form of work distribution in the public sector, occurs when additional, foreign functions of a higher hierarchy than the common ones are assigned to a public servant, where the latter necessarily must meet the same requirements demanded to suitably hold the post of the supraordinate. In Article 1.45) of Executive Decree No. 35823-H of March 4, 2010, referring to the Procedures for the application and monitoring of the General Guidelines on Salary Policy, Employment, and Post Classification for Public Entities, Ministries, and other Bodies, as applicable, covered by the Scope of the Budgetary Authority, said institute is defined as follows: “…45) Overload of functions: Temporarily assuming functions of a post of a higher salary level, additional to the inherent activities of the official’s permanent post, in cases of vacations, leaves with pay, and incapacities, among others. Those exceeding one uninterrupted calendar month shall be subject to remuneration...”. (Highlighting is not from the original). This regulatory norm grants us other substantive notions of importance, since we can affirm that the overload then operates temporarily, such that the functions assumed are not permanently incorporated into the post and position held by the official, nor into the remuneration structure associated with these, so the public servant must simultaneously exercise the ordinary functions associated with his or her post, together with the extraordinary ones of the superior. In such a way that the remuneration treatment of the functions in overload is the same as an interim promotion: “…Article 9.-The overload of functions shall have the same effects as an interim promotion, as regards salary recognition…” (Decree No. 35823-H. Highlighting is not from the original). For purposes of clarifying the foregoing, we must take into account that according to the cited decree, the concept of “post” is defined as the “…Set of activities, duties, and responsibilities assigned by a competent authority to be performed by an official during all or part of the working day, for which the budgetary content for its payment exists…,” while the term “Position” corresponds to the “…Internal nomenclature by which each of the posts of the organization is known…” (Subsections 7 and 39 of Art. 1 Decree No. 35823-H, as well as Articles 101 and 3.i RESC, respectively). For an overload of functions to entail remuneration (salary extra), the cited norms establish two requirements: one of a temporal nature and another of control and oversight. In relation to the first, it is indispensable that the official to whom the superior’s functions have been assigned exercised them uninterruptedly for more than one calendar month, and the second, that the General Directorate of Civil Service approved the overload of functions prior to the salary recognition. That approval has the purpose of verifying that the subordinate on whom the extraordinary functions have been overloaded meets the profile of the post. Article 8 of Decree 35823-H states: “…For reassignments, promotions, substitutions, overload of functions, and any other personnel movement, the Active Administration shall ensure compliance with the academic and legal requirements demanded by the corresponding institutional manuals of classes and positions in force…” (Highlighting is not from the original). In accordance with the principle of budgetary legality (Art. 180 CPOL), in determining the remunerated overload of functions, the Administration must take into account the respective budgetary content that allows it to meet the expenditure implied by this personnel movement, and by virtue of the principles of effectiveness and efficiency, its benefit or not compared to other alternatives in the management of institutional human resources, in pursuit of satisfying the public interest and service needs (Arts. 5, 69, 107, 110.f, 110.g of the Law on Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, and 2, 93, and 94 of its Regulation). For the purpose of concluding this conceptualization of the overload of functions, it is necessary to take into account that despite the necessary requirements for its remunerability, Articles 120 and 148 RESC establish an insurmountable temporal limit for the Administration, in the case of NON-remunerated overloads: “…Article 120.- When the public service so requires, tasks corresponding to another post different from the servant’s own may be assigned to a servant, without this implying an increase or decrease in salary, for a period that must not exceed sixty days, consecutive or not, during one year. […] Article 148.- When the public service so requires, tasks corresponding to another post, different from the servant’s own, may be assigned to a servant, without this implying promotion, demotion, or a salary increase, for a period that must not exceed sixty days - consecutive or not - during one year….” (Highlighting is not from the original). Finally, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also pronounced on this figure in the following terms: “…One of the manifestations of the ius variandi occurs when the employer orders a change of functions; this change must be of a temporary, not indefinite, duration, because if the variation is for a long or undetermined period, the worker’s position must be consolidated by placing him or her in the post they are actually performing. In cases where the worker is assigned functions of a higher level than those normally exercised, the work must be remunerated according to the salary corresponding to the new assigned tasks. Referring to this hypothesis, Alonso García indicates: “On the other hand, the question could arise, either as the performance of work of a higher category than usual, in which case the worker must be granted a salary also superior corresponding to the work, and the new category being recognized as consolidated after a certain time….” (Alonso García Manuel, Curso de Derecho del Trabajo, 9th Edition, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, Spain, 1985, page 545)…” (Highlighting is not from the original. See judgments of the Second Chamber No. 2009-0863 of 9:38 a.m. on September 4, 2009, and 2016-001354 of 09:50 a.m. on December 7, 2016).-
VII.ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGATIONS.- Having clarified the concept of overload of functions and its remunerability, we can proceed to the analysis of the theory of the case of the plaintiff. In summary, we can identify 3 argumentative lines on which she bases the nullity of the challenged acts and the alleged right to the remuneration of the overload of functions which she claims to possess. First, in her opinion, she does satisfy the requirements set forth in subsection 22 bis RESC, so that, in denying her request, the Administration engages in a sort of omissive conduct by not initiating the respective studies indicated, in turn, in official letter DGSC No. IT-NT-248-2009 (proven fact No. 1). Secondly, she believes she has the right to the payment of the overload, because it is not possible that she should be under the obligation to substitute the Director of the CIFH indefinitely, without the right to any remuneration. And finally, thirdly, because according to opinions of the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), Article 13 of the Public Administration Salary Law (LSAP), 22 bis RESC, and 95 and 96 LGAP, the substitution of the Director of the CIFH that she has performed can only be remunerated through the figure of the overload, given that, according to Decree 35305-H, practically all the functions of the CIFH correspond to the post of Director, not to the Deputy Directorate, which she has had to carry out despite being alien to her post. Now, with regard to the first of the defects pointed out by the plaintiff, this Tribunal observes that the Administration has not unjustifiably refused to conduct the studies required for the payment of the overload of functions, since, on the contrary, throughout the various challenged conducts and in a constant and consistent manner, the ministerial authorities have denied the request on the grounds that this is not a case of overload, as it involves tasks “inherent to the position” of Deputy Director, so that, as it does not concern distinct functions, it is not possible to apply the figure in question. Basically, for this Chamber, this argument is understood as a type of lack of reasoning in the manner in which the bodies of the Ministry of Finance pronounce on the request she has made; however, as we have stated, no defect in that sense is detailed, given that the Administration has expressly indeed examined her petition and dismissed it as unfounded. In any case, what was alleged corresponds to the core of the other two subsequent claims. Regarding the second and third arguments, they share the point of whether or not the plaintiff has the right to the payment itself of the overload of functions; what varies in them is the foundation given by the legal representation of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves. Thus, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff is not correct in her arguments, and, on the contrary, shares the criterion of the Administration, in the sense that, due to the functions assigned and the nature of the “overload of functions” as a form of work distribution in the public sector, indeed, the plaintiff is not in a position to claim the payment of remuneration under that particular concept. Let us see: as we explained in the preceding recital, the basic and distinctive note of the “overload of functions” is the fact that a hierarchically inferior official is temporarily assigned, totally or partially, tasks additional to his or her own and that are foreign, because they correspond to those of a higher-ranking official, which does not happen in the case of Mrs. Madrigal. We would like to point out from the outset that it is not that the plaintiff generally lacks the right to remuneration for her work, but rather that what is claimed –payment for overload of functions– indeed lacks legal basis, this being the cause to which the plaintiff limited her claim, as she herself stated, including at the hearing granted by this Tribunal. As the respondent Administration has pointed out to her in the various challenged acts, as well as in the answer given here by the representation of the State, a person holding a position such as the one occupied by the plaintiff, except in very exceptional situations –as we shall see below–, will not meet the circumstances required to warrant the payment of remuneration for overload. Unlike what is argued by the plaintiff, not every substitution implies an overload of functions. We will elaborate on this immediately.-
VIII.SUBSTITUTION AND OVERLOAD OF FUNCTIONS.- In Articles 95 and 96 of our General Law of Public Administration, the phenomenon of substitution is provided for as a mode of change or transfer of competences, because it is a means of transmitting competence to a person who can effectively perform the tasks required by the service, functions that would otherwise correspond to the public servant regularly appointed to hold the title of a public body, since the latter is unable to or is temporarily or definitively impeded from exercising his or her functions. The doctrine coincides with this definition; for example, Santamaría Pastor tells us that substitution consists “…in the personal and temporary substitution in the title of a body; that is, in the temporary assumption by the titleholder of one body of the functions of another by reason of the supervening impossibility of the latter to exercise them…” (Principios de Derecho Administrativo General, Vol. I., p. 367), or Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, who pointed out that “…Substitution is the phenomenon (of organization) by virtue of which a person is placed in lieu of the titleholder of a body, due to vacancy (death, resignation, definitive incapacity, removal) or absence of the latter (vacations, leaves, temporary incapacity, suspension), in an extraordinary and temporary manner, while the new titleholder is not put in possession of the position…” (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Vol. II, pp. 96-97). Substitution is a practical response of the legal system to a common abnormality in administrative activity: the absence of the titleholder official, for all sorts of reasons. Consequently, the function of the substitute is to substitute “…the titleholder for all legal effects, without any subordination, and shall exercise the competences of the body with the fullness of the powers and duties that the same contain…” (Art. 96.1 LGAP), in such a way as to ensure the continuity of the body’s activity. The LGAP provides two forms through which substitution can be carried out: That it be assumed by the hierarchical superior (Art. 95.1, 96.2, and 102.e LGAP), or otherwise, through the appointment of a substitute: “…If the hierarchical superior does not wish to perform the substitution or after two months have passed from the beginning of its exercise by him, a substitute must be appointed in accordance with the law…” (Art. 95.2 LGAP. Highlighting is not from the original). The appointment of the substitute official may in turn occur, according to the administrative legal system, through various means, among others the following: i.- By interim appointment (whether or not by promotion), ii.- by regulatory provision, iii.- by overload of functions, iv.- by lack of personnel, etc. Regarding the overload of functions, we have already explained sufficiently, and in relation to interim appointments, it suffices to cite the provisions of Article 10 RESC, in what is relevant: “…Substitute interim servants shall be considered those appointed to temporarily replace a regular servant, for any cause of suspension of the service relationship. […] In the event that for the temporary substitution of the regular servant a promotion is agreed, this shall have the character of interim, as shall the other movements agreed to replace the servant giving rise to the appointments, for as long as the respective chief deems it necessary, or up to the period of suspension of the service relationship of the titleholder…”. On the other hand, we refer to the case of substitution by regulatory provision, when the legal system itself, in an effort to guarantee continuity in the provision of services under the Administration’s charge, provides for posts whose function may be limited, totally or partially, to automatically substituting the temporary or definitive absences of the titleholder official; for example, and without further elaboration, see Articles 22.1, 26.b, 47, and 51 LGAP, in which posts are provided for whose associated functions are the ipso iure substitution –to a greater or lesser degree– of the titleholders of certain bodies: Vice Presidents, vice ministers, among others. It is fundamental to clarify that substitution does not suppose per se that different competences are concurrently assumed, as the plaintiff seems to understand it. For example, this does not occur at all in the case of interim servants, although it does happen in the case of officials with an overload of functions. In the case of de jure substitutes or those by regulatory provision, this is variable, because if the legal system were to assign exclusive functions to them, and since, in the end, between the titleholder and this type of substitute, some degree of subordination could subsist, we would be facing the exceptional situation in which functions that are indeed different and hierarchically superior are transferred to the former, which must be performed concurrently with their own, whereby a situation of overload could come to pass under the terms set forth in Recital VII. In any case, given its special nature, it would be the procedural burden of whoever alleged it to prove those very particular conditions. This does not occur in the specific case, where the functions assigned to Mrs. Madrigal Chaves in her condition as Deputy Director of the CIFH are not different from those assigned to the Director, given that, as a substitute by regulatory provision, her tasks are limited to automatically substituting the absences of the titleholder official. Let us see: according to Executive Decrees No. 24397-H, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 129 of July 7, 1995, and No. 35713-H, published in La Gaceta No. 30 of February 12, 2010, which amends the former, as well as Executive Decree No. 35305-H, published in La Gaceta No. 121 of June 24, 2009, which corresponds to the “Reglamento de Creación, Organización y Funcionamiento de la Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria del Ministerio de Hacienda” (RCIFH, hereinafter), the Directorate of the CIFH constitutes a dependency of the Ministry of Finance, headed by a Director and a Deputy Director (Art. 1.o Decree 24397-H and Art. 3 Decree 35305-H), whose function “…consists in supporting the actions of the Ministry of Finance, through the development of research, training, and capacity building in the field of public finances (public revenue and expenditure), and the execution of programs aimed at institutional improvement and growth…” (Art. 1 Decree 35305-H). In accordance with the provisions of Articles 3.c and 4.g of the Civil Service Statute, which considers as trust personnel and therefore excluded from the statutory regime those persons occupying the positions of Directors of Ministries, Art. 3 RCIFH distinguishes in that same sense between the positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIFH, stating that the latter shall be precisely subject to the Civil Service Regime, but not the Director. Likewise, this subsection provides the essential function assigned to the post of Deputy Director: “…shall substitute the Director in his absences with all the duties and responsibilities inherent to the position. The Director shall determine the functions and responsibilities that the Deputy Director shall be in charge of, in accordance with the plans, projects, and programs of the Center...” (Highlighting is not from the original). This provision is reinforced, in turn, based on the general rule established in Article 8 of Decree 24397-H, in relation to the organization of the dependencies of the Ministry of Finance: “…In the event of the absence of the titleholder of the dependency or an inability to hear the matter due to recusal, inhibition, excuse, or impediment, the functions established herein shall be assumed by the person who substitutes him…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, we can safely affirm that, indeed, the position of Deputy Director of the CIFH perfectly illustrates a further case of substitution by regulatory provision, as it constitutes a post whose functionality is restricted –because nothing else has been demonstrated– to substituting ipso iure the vacancies and absences of the Director of the CIFH. Now, both Article 3 cited above and Article 4 of that same regulatory body literally state that the public body “Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria” is made up of both the Director and the Deputy Director: “…The Center shall have a Directorate, made up of the Director and the Deputy Director at a directive level and of the support personnel required for its function…”. Consequently, both positions are at the same hierarchical level, with functions of the same category. Even in the enumeration of the competences (“functions”) of the Dirección del CIFH, determined in Article 5 of the RCIFH, only in 1 of 14 competences is the Subdirectorate entrusted with a different and exclusive task. Subsection k) reads: “…At the Subdirectorate level of the Center, ensure the execution and control of the plans and programs…”, from which it is not possible to assert that between both positions there exist diverse, much less subordinate, functions. In that sense, neither does the rest of the organic regulation of the CIFH contain any rule that separates and diversifies both posts, assigning functions of a different type between both positions. Suffice it also to say that the plaintiff has not demonstrated this either. Thus, this Tribunal arrives at a conclusion different from the theory of the case of the representation of Mrs. Madrigal Chaves, since she has not experienced a “overload of functions” properly speaking, because the functions that at any time she might have performed as Acting Director ad interim (a.i.) of the Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria, are neither of a foreign or alien nature to her tasks, nor additional to her own as Deputy Director, nor hierarchically superior, these being the fundamental requirements for being in the presence of that legal institute. In relation to the reference made by the plaintiff’s representation to the opinions of the PGR and Articles 13 LSAP, 22 bis RESC, and 95 and 96 LGAP, we must state the following: First, to point out that the opinions of the PGR, according to its consultative powers, do not bind this jurisdiction in any way, and furthermore, as will be seen below, being based on regulations no longer in force, they are not applicable to the specific case. Second, to warn the plaintiff that Article 13 LSAP, which was not only the basis for those opinions, but was also alleged and even transcribed in the complaint (see image 72 of the scanned judicial file, former folio 66 of the physical file), was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber more than 15 years before the action was filed, by means of judgment number 1999-04845 of 4:21 p.m. on June 22, 1999, in such a way that it is not a tenable argument for this Tribunal; and finally, with respect to Articles 22 bis RESC and 95 and 96 LGAP, we have already sufficiently analyzed them throughout this judgment, without any sufficient right having been derived from them to support the annulment and condemnation claim brought here by the plaintiff. This Chamber does wish to make it very clear to the parties, and to insist on what was already stated earlier, that this ruling is restricted to what was requested by the party, in the terms that were even clarified and delimited by their legal representation at the hearing granted at the time, an opportunity in which they confined their claim to the alleged right to the payment of the overload as a salary extra.
For this reason, the dismissive ruling that must be issued here is limited to that petitionary framework and therefore cannot be extended to other possible compensation hypotheses or other administrative actions that have not been challenged, it being sufficient to remind the defendant Administration of what the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly stated in various rulings, such as ruling number 2011-00695 of 3:35 p.m. on August 25, 2011, 2012-1154 of 10:55 a.m. on December 14, 2012, and 2013-001144 of 10:00 a.m. on October 4, 2013, when it has indicated that “…In accordance with the principle of legality that binds administrative activity, the Administration may not grant salary rights or benefits if they are not previously authorized or provided for by the legal system. However, this principle must also be understood as a limitation for the Administration itself not to act outside the permitted limits, which is legally contemplated under the figure of abuse of power (article 146 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). In the sphere of public employment, in which each position has a specific description in terms of personal requirements, tasks, remuneration, etc., it is not possible to admit that, to the detriment of workers' rights, that same legality is disregarded and the rights of servants are curtailed. That is to say, administrative legality also implies for the Administration the impossibility of exceeding the performance of its officials, outside the established parameters, for the specific position in question; since the contrary would mean admitting an unjust enrichment for the Administration, by being benefited with services foreign to and different from those remunerated to the official…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, nothing indicated above implies that if the plaintiff considers herself a creditor of salary differences originating from a figure other than the additional duties surcharge, she may not file the corresponding claim in administrative and/or judicial proceedings.
“V. OBJETO DEL PROCESO.- Según se hizo constar en el resultando primero anterior, esta demanda posee seis pretensiones. En las numeradas 1 a 4, la parte actora plantea una acción anulatoria, por la cual pretende que se elimine del ordenamiento jurídico tres actos administrativos: el oficio n° DGPH-A0-520-2013, por el cual el Departamento de Gestión del Potencial Humano del Ministerio de Hacienda le deniega a la señora Madrigal Chaves la solicitud que ella había formulado para el reconocimiento del plus de recargo, así el oficio n° DGPH-AO- 549-2013 de ese mismo Departamento y la resolución del Despacho del Ministro de Hacienda n° 0051-2015 de fecha 29 de enero del 2015, éstos últimos en tanto resuelven los recursos de revocatoria y apelación, respectivamente, incoados en contra del primero de estos actos. Sin embargo, en relación con la quinta pretensión esgrimida por la parte actora, para este Tribunal no resultaba claro cuál era el sentido de la misma, específicamente en qué consistía lo allí pretendido, si lo solicitado se limitaba estrictamente a las diferencias salariales por concepto de “recargo”, o si se refería en general, a las diferencias salariales por las funciones como Directora a.i., pese a que su puesto es de Subdirectora del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria (CIFH) del Ministerio de Hacienda. Ante esta situación, se apercibió en su momento a la representación de la actora, quien a su vez manifestó lo siguiente: “…La suscrita conoce y siempre ha tenido claro que su plaza es de Subdirectora y no de Directora a.i., por lo que el espíritu del punto 5) de las pretensiones, se refiere a la restitución de diferencias salariales, como producto del recargo asumido y no reconocido salarialmente. Por ello, se dice que "...Solicito que se me restituyan las diferencias salariales dejados de percibir por este recargo, contados desde que asumí el cargo de Subdirectora del CIFH hasta la fecha". La demanda expone y prueba documentalmente, que la administración prácticamente me ha recargado desde un inicio, las labores de Directora a.i., y precisamente, por ello manifiesto que se me reconozcan las diferencias salariales que he dejado de recibir, por el recargo asumido […] En síntesis, me refiero a las diferencias salariales dejadas de percibir como "recargo" de funciones, contabilizadas a lo largo de muchos años según me he servido demostrar. Concomitantemente, de proceder a Derecho ese pago del recargo, que tiene naturaleza salarial, deseamos que sea tomado en cuenta en los componentes salariales descritos….” (Resaltado no es del original). Así las cosas, comprende esta Cámara que lo solicitado en la pretensión número cinco se limita estrictamente a las diferencias salariales por concepto de “recargo” y en caso de que procediera ese pago, se reconozca también el efecto de ese reconocimiento respecto de los restantes componentes que integran el salario de la señora Madrigal Chaves. Finalmente, la última pretensión está referida al tema de las costas.-
VI.SOBRE EL FONDO.- La actora cuestiona la legalidad de la denegatoria del pago del plus denominado “recargo”, porque estima que posee los requisitos para optar por el mismo y que la Administración interpreta incorrectamente el ordenamiento jurídico, entendiendo que en su condición de Subdirectora, ella está en el deber de suplir indefinidamente al titular, sin pago de contraprestación. Para este Tribunal, lo primero es poner en claro a qué nos referimos con y cuáles son los alcances de este componente denominado “recargo”. El artículo 22 bis del Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil (RESC), decreto ejecutivo N° 21 de 14 de diciembre de 1954, regula la figura en cuestión y el mismo fue resultado de una adición realizada a dicho reglamento, por medio del artículo 2 del decreto ejecutivo numero 21418-P del 23 de junio de 1992. El artículo en cuestión del RESC indica en lo que interesa: “…Artículo 22 bis.- Los traslados, reubicaciones y recargos de funciones se regirán de acuerdo con lo que se indica a continuación: […] b) Los recargos de funciones de puestos de mayor categoría, que excedan de un mes, podrán ser remunerados, pero estarán sujetos a la aprobación previa de la Dirección General, la que deberá constatar que el servidor a quien se hiciere el recargo, reúne los requisitos establecidos…” (Resaltado no es del original). Esta norma tiene un elemento sustantivo y uno procedimental, pues por una parte intenta definir el instituto y el otro, la manera en que se ha de reconocer para efectos de su remuneración. Entiéndase así que el recargo, puede o no operar como un plus salarial, ya que no todo recargo de funciones es remunerado. Primero, se establece que el recargo, como forma de distribución de trabajo en el sector público, ocurre cuando se asignan funciones adicionales, extrañas y de jerarquía superior a las comunes de un servidor, en donde éste necesariamente debe cumplir los mismos requisitos exigidos para ocupar idóneamente el puesto del supraordinado. En el artículo 1.45) del decreto ejecutivo n° 35823-H del 04 de marzo de 2010 referido a los Procedimientos para la aplicación y seguimiento de las Directrices Generales de Política Salarial, Empleo y Clasificación de Puestos para las Entidades Públicas, Ministerios y demás Órganos según corresponda, cubiertos por Ámbito Autoridad Presupuestaria, se define a este instituto de la siguiente manera: “…45) Recargo de funciones: Asumir temporalmente funciones de un puesto de mayor nivel salarial, adicionales a las actividades propias del puesto permanente del funcionario, en casos de vacaciones, licencias con goce de salario e incapacidades, entre otros. Serán sujeto de remuneración aquellas que excedan un mes calendario ininterrumpidamente...”. (Resaltado no es del original). Esta norma reglamentaria, nos otorga otras nociones sustantivas de importancia, ya que podemos afirmar que el recargo opera entonces de manera temporal, de modo que las funciones asumidas no ingresan de forma permanente al puesto y cargo desempeñados por la persona funcionaria, ni a la estructura remunerativa asociada a estos, de modo que el servidor ha de ejercer de manera simultánea las funciones ordinarias asociadas a su puesto, junto con las extraordinarias del superior. De tal modo que el tratamiento remunerativo de las funciones en recargo, es el mismo de un ascenso interino: “…Artículo 9º-El recargo de funciones tendrá los mismos efectos de un ascenso interino, en lo que se refiere al reconocimiento salarial…” (Decreto N° 35823-H. Resaltado no es del original). Para efectos de precisar lo antes dicho, tenemos que tener en cuenta que según el decreto de cita, el concepto de “puesto” se define como el “…Conjunto de actividades, deberes y responsabilidades asignadas por una autoridad competente para que sean realizadas por un funcionario durante la totalidad o una parte de la jornada de trabajo, para el cual existe el contenido presupuestario para su pago…”, mientras que el término “Cargo” corresponde a la “…Nomenclatura interna con la que se conoce a cada uno de los puestos de la organización…” (Incisos 7 y 39 del Art. 1 Decreto N° 35823-H, así como los artículos 101 y 3.i RESC, respectivamente). Para que un recargo de funciones pueda conllevar una remuneración (plus salarial), las normas de cita establecen dos requisitos: uno de naturaleza temporal y otro de control y fiscalización. En relación con lo primero, es indispensable que el funcionario a quien se le hayan asignado las funciones del superior, las hubiese ejercido de manera ininterrumpida por más de un mes calendario y lo segundo, que la Dirección General de Servicio Civil hubiese aprobado el recargo de funciones de previo al reconocimiento salarial. Dicha aprobación tiene por finalidad comprobar que el inferior a quien se le han recargado las funciones extraordinarios cumpla con el perfil del puesto. Dice el art. 8 del decreto 35823-H: “…Para las reasignaciones, ascensos, sustituciones, recargo de funciones y cualquier otro movimiento de personal, la Administración Activa velará por el cumplimiento de los requisitos académicos y legales que exigen los correspondientes manuales institucionales de clases y cargos vigentes…” (Resaltado no es del original). En atención al principio de legalidad presupuestaria (Art. 180 CPOL), en la determinación del recargo de funciones remunerado, la Administración debe tomar en cuenta el respectivo contenido presupuestario que le permita hacer frente a la erogación que implica este movimiento de personal y en virtud de los principios de eficacia y eficiencia, su bondad o no frente a otras alternativas en el manejo de recurso humano institucional, en procura de la satisfacción del interés público y las necesidades del servicio (Arts. 5, 69, 107, 110.f, 110.g de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos y 2, 93 y 94 de su Reglamento). A efectos de ir finalizando con esta conceptualización del recargo de funciones, es necesario tener en cuenta que pese a los requisitos necesarios para su remunerabilidad, los artículos 120 y 148 RESC establecen un límite temporal infranqueable para la Administración, en tratándose de recargos NO remunerados: “…Artículo 120.- Cuando el servicio público lo exija, podrán asignarse a un servidor tareas correspondientes a otro puesto distinto al suyo, sin que ello signifique aumento o disminución de salario, por un plazo que no debe exceder de sesenta días consecutivos o no durante un año. […] Artículo 148.- Cuando el servicio público lo exija, podrán asignarse a un servidor labores correspondientes a otro puesto, distinto al suyo, sin que ello signifique ascenso, descenso ni aumento de sueldo, por un plazo que no deberá exceder de sesenta días -consecutivos o no- durante un año….” (Resaltado no es del original). Por último, la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha venido también ha venido a pronunciarse sobre esta figura en los siguientes términos: “…Una de las manifestaciones del ius variandi se da cuando el patrono ordena un cambio de funciones, este cambio debe ser de duración temporal no indefinida, pues si la variación es por un período largo o indeterminado, se debe consolidar la posición del trabajador ubicándolo en el puesto que realmente está desempeñando. En los casos en que al trabajador se le asignen funciones de nivel superior a las que normalmente ejerce, el trabajo debe ser remunerado de acuerdo con el salario correspondiente a las nuevas labores asignadas. Al referirse a esta hipótesis Alonso García indica: “Por otro lado, la cuestión podría plantearse, bien como realización de trabajos de categoría superior al habitual en cuya hipótesis habría de otorgarse al trabajador un salario también superior correspondiente con el trabajo y reconociéndose consolidada la nueva categoría pasado cierto tiempo….” (Alonso García Manuel, Curso de Derecho del Trabajo, 9 Edición, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona España, 1985, página 545)…” (Resaltado no es del original. Ver sentencias de la Sala Segundo n° 2009-0863 de las 9:38 horas del 4 de septiembre de 2009 y 2016-001354 de las 09:50 horas del 07 de diciembre de 2016).-
VII.ANÁLISIS DE LO ALEGADO.- Aclarado el concepto de recargo de funciones y su remunerabilidad, podemos pasar al análisis de la teoría del caso de la parte actora. En síntesis, podemos identificar 3 líneas argumentativas con base en las cuales fundamenta la nulidad de los actos impugnados y el supuesto derecho a la remuneración del recargo de funciones que dice ostentar. Primero, en tanto en su opinión, ella sí satisface los requisitos dispuestos en el numeral 22 bis RESC, de modo que al negar la Administración su solicitud, ésta recae en una suerte de conducta omisiva al no iniciar con los estudios respectivos indicados a su vez en el oficio de la DGSC n° IT-NT-248-2009 (hecho probado n° 1). En segundo lugar, estima que tiene derecho al pago del recargo, porque no es posible que se encuentre en la obligación de sustituir al Director del CIFH de manera indefinida, sin derecho a retribución alguna. Y por último, en tercer lugar, porque según dictámenes de la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), artículo 13 de Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública (LSAP), 22 bis RESC y 95 y 96 LGAP, la suplencia que ha desempeñado del Director del CIFH solamente puede ser remunerada mediante la figura del recargo, toda vez que de acuerdo con el decreto 35305-H, según prácticamente todas las funciones del CIFH le corresponden al puesto de Dirección, no a la S ubdirección, las cuales ha tenido que llevar a cabo pese a resultar ajenas a su puesto. Ahora bien, en relación con el primero de los vicios apuntados por la parte actora, observa este Tribunal que la Administración no ha negado injustificadamente realizar los estudios requeridos para el pago del recargo de funciones, pues por el contrario, a largo de las distintas conductas impugnadas y de manera constante y consistente, las autoridades ministeriales le han denegado la petición por considerar que no se está ante el supuesto del recargo, pues se trata tareas “inherentes al cargo” de Subdirector, de modo que al no versar sobre funciones distintas no es posible aplicar la figura en cuestión. Básicamente, para esta Cámara, este alegato se entiende como una clase de falta de motivación en la manera en que se pronuncian los órganos del Ministerio de Hacienda respecto de la solicitud que ella ha establecido, sin embargo, como hemos afirmado no se detalla vicio alguno en ese sentido, siendo que la Administración expresamente sí ha entrado a conocer su petición y la ha desestimado por improcedente. En todo caso, lo alegado corresponde al núcleo de lo otros dos reclamos siguientes. Respecto del segundo y tercer alegato, los mismos comparten el punto de si la actora tiene o no derecho al pago en sí del recargo de funciones, lo que varía en ellos es el fundamento dado por la representación legal de la señora Madrigal Chaves. Así las cosas, considera este Tribunal que la accionante no lleva razón en sus argumentos, siendo que por el contrario se comparte el criterio de la Administración, en el sentido de que por las funciones asignadas y la naturaleza del “recargo de funciones” como forma de distribución de trabajo en el sector público, efectivamente, la señora actora no se encuentra en posición de reclamar el pago de remuneración por ese concepto en particular. Veamos, como explicamos en el considerando anterior, la nota básica y distinta del “recargo de funciones”, es el hecho de que a un funcionario inferior jerárquicamente, se le asignan temporalmente, total o parcial, labores adicionales a las propias y que le resultan extrañas, por corresponder a las propias de un funcionario de rango superior, lo cual no sucede en el caso de la señora Madrigal. Quisiéramos desde ya apuntar que no se trata de que la actora no tenga en general derecho a una remuneración por su trabajo, sino que lo pretendido –pago por recargo de funciones- sí carece de asidero jurídico, siendo ésta la causa a la que la accionante limitó su reclamo, porque así lo manifestó, incluso en la audiencia concedida por este Tribunal. Como se lo ha hecho ver la Administración demandada en los distintos actos impugnados, así como en la contestación dada aquí por la representación del Estado, una persona que ostenta un cargo como el que ocupa la actora, salvo situaciones muy excepcionales –como lo veremos seguidamente–, no va a contar con las circunstancias requeridas que ameriten el pago de la remuneración por recargo. A diferencia de lo sostenido por la accionante, no toda suplencia implica un recargo de funciones. Sobre esto, ahondaremos de inmediato.-
VIII.SUPLENCIA Y RECARGO DE FUNCIONES.- En los artículos 95 y 96 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública, el fenómeno de la suplencia está prevista como un modo de cambio o transferencia de competencias, esto porque es un medio para transmitir la competencia a una persona que pueda efectivamente desempeñar las labores requeridas por el servicio, funciones que lo de lo contrario le corresponderían al servidor regularmente designado para ocupar la titularidad de un órgano público, toda vez que éste no puede o está impedido temporal o definitivamente para el ejercicio de sus funciones. La doctrina coincide con esta definición, por ejemplo Santamaría Pastor, nos dice que la suplencia consiste “…en la sustitución personal y temporal en la titularidad de un órgano; esto es, en la asunción temporal por el titular de un órgano de las funciones de otro por razón de la imposibilidad sobrevenida de éste para ejercerlas…” (Principios de Derecho Administrativo General, T. I., p. 367), o don Eduardo Ortiz, quien indicaba que “… La suplencia es el fenómeno (de organización) en virtud del cual se coloca a una persona en lugar del titular de un órgano, por vacancia (muerte, dimisión, incapacidad definitiva, remoción) o ausencia de éste (vacaciones, licencias, incapacidad temporal, suspensión), en forma extraordinaria y temporal, mientras no es puesto en posesión del cargo el nuevo titular…” (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, T. II, pp. 96-97). La suplencia es una respuesta práctica del ordenamiento jurídico a una anormalidad común en la actividad administrativa: la ausencia del funcionario titular, por todo tipo de motivos. Por consiguiente, la función del suplente es sustituir “… al titular para todo efecto legal, sin subordinación ninguna, y ejercerá las competencias del órgano con la plenitud de los poderes y deberes que las mismas contienen…” (Art. 96.1 LGAP), de tal manera que se asegure la continuidad de la actividad del órgano. La LGAP prevé dos formas a través de las cuales se puede llevar a cabo la suplencia: Que la asuma el superior jerárquico (Art. 95.1, 96.2 y 102.e LGAP) o de lo contrario, mediante el nombramiento de un suplente: “…Si el superior jerárquico no quisiere hacer la suplencia o transcurridos dos meses de iniciado su ejercicio por él, deberá nombrarse al suplente de conformidad con la ley…” (Art. 95.2 LGAP. Resaltado no es del original). El nombramiento del funcionario suplente puede a su vez darse según el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo a través de diversas maneras, entre otras las siguientes: i.- Por nombramiento interino (sea o no por ascenso), ii.- por disposición normativa, iii.- por recargo de funciones, iv.- por inopia, etc. Sobre el recargo de funciones ya hemos explicado lo suficiente y en relación con los nombramientos interinos, basta con citar lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 RESC, en lo que interesa: “…Se considerarán servidores interinos sustitutos los que fueren nombrados para reemplazar temporalmente a un servidor regular, por cualquier causa de suspensión de la relación de servicio. […] En el caso de que para la sustitución temporal del servidor regular se acordare un ascenso, este tendrá el carácter de interino, lo mismo que los demás movimientos acordados para reemplazar al servidor que origine los nombramientos, durante el tiempo que el jefe respectivo lo considere necesario, o hasta por el período de suspensión de la relación de servicio del titular…”. Por otra parte, nos referimos al caso de la suplencia por disposición normativa, cuando el mismo ordenamiento jurídico en procura de garantizar la continuidad en la prestación de los servicios a cargo de la Administración, prevé puestos cuya función puede estar limitada total o parcialmente, a suplir automáticamente las ausencias temporales o definitivas del funcionario titular; por ejemplo y sin mayor afán, véanse los artículos 22.1, 26.b, 47 y 51 LGAP, en los cuales se prevén cargos cuyas funciones asociadas son la suplencia ipso iure –en mayor o menor grado– de los titulares de determinados órganos: Vicepresidentes, viceministros, entre otros. Es fundamental aclarar que la suplencia no supone per se que se asuman concurrentemente competencias distintas, como pareciera entenderlo la parte actora. Por ejemplo, esto no ocurre del todo tratándose de servidores interinos, aunque sí pasa en el caso de funcionarios con recargo de funciones. En el caso de los suplentes de pleno Derecho o por disposición normativa, esto es variable, pues si el ordenamiento jurídico llegara a atribuir funciones exclusivas para éstos y siendo que, finalmente, entre el titular y este tipo de suplentes podría subsistir algún grado de subordinación, estaríamos de frente a la situación excepcional en la que efectivamente se le transfieran a aquel funciones distintas y jerárquicamente superiores, que deba desempeñar en concurrencia con las propias, con lo cual podría llegarse a dar un supuesto de recargo en los términos expuestos en el considerando VII. En todo caso dada su naturaleza especial, sería carga procesal de quien lo aduzca acreditar esas condiciones tan particulares. Esto no ocurre en el caso concreto, donde las funciones asignadas a la señora Madrigal Chaves en su condición de Sub Directora del CIFH no son distintas de aquellas asignadas al Director, siendo que por tratarse de un suplente por disposición normativa, sus labores se limitan a suplir de manera automática las ausencias del funcionario titular. Veamos, según los decretos ejecutivos n° 24397-H publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta n°129 del 07 de julio de 1995 y n° 35713-H publicado en La Gaceta n° 30 del 12 de febrero de 2010, que reforma al primero, así como el decreto ejecutivo n° 35305-H publicado en La Gaceta N° 121 del 24 de junio de 2009, que corresponde al “Reglamento de Creación, Organización y Funcionamiento de la Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria del Ministerio de Hacienda” (RCIFH, en adelante), la Dirección del CIFH constituye una dependencia del Ministerio de Hacienda, a cargo de un Director y un Subdirector (Art. 1.o Decreto 24397-H y Art. 3 Decreto 35305-H), cuya función “…consiste en respaldar la actuación del Ministerio de Hacienda, mediante el desarrollo de la investigación, la formación y la capacitación en materia de finanzas públicas (ingreso y gasto públicos), y la ejecución de programas destinados al mejoramiento y crecimiento institucional…” (Art. 1 Decreto 35305-H). En atención a lo dispuesto en los artículos 3.c y 4.g del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, que considera como personal de confianza y por tanto excluido del régimen estatutario a las personas que ocupen los cargos de Directores de los Ministerios, el art. 3 RCIFH distingue en ese mismo sentido entre los cargos de Director y Subdirector del CIFH, determinando que el segundo estará precisamente sometido al Régimen de Servicio Civil, no así el Director. Asimismo, este numeral dispone la función esencial asignada al puesto de Subdirector: “…sustituirá al Director en sus ausencias con todos los deberes y responsabilidades inherentes al cargo. El Director determinará las funciones y responsabilidades que tendrá a cargo el Subdirector, de acuerdo con los planes, proyectos y programas del Centro...” (Resaltado no es del original). Esta disposición, se refuerza a su vez con base en la norma general establecida en el artículo 8 del decreto 24397-H, en relación con la organización de las dependencias del Ministerio de Hacienda: “…En caso de ausencia del titular de la dependencia o de imposibilidad para conocer el asunto por recusación, inhibición, excusa o impedimento, asumirá las funciones aquí establecidas quien lo sustituya…” (Resaltado no es del original). Así, podemos afirmar con seguridad que, efectivamente, el cargo de Subdirector del CIFH ilustra a la perfección un caso más de suplencia por disposición normativa, ya que constituye un puesto cuya funcionalidad se restringe -porque no se ha demostrado otra cosa-, a suplir ipso iure las vacancias y ausencias del Director del CIFH. Ahora, tanto el artículo 3 de anterior cita, como el 4 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, literalmente establecen que el órgano público “Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria” se encuentra conformado tanto por el Director, como el Subdirector: “…El Centro contará con una Dirección, conformada por el Director y el Subdirector a nivel directivo y con el personal de apoyo requerido para su función…”. Por consiguiente, ambos cargos en encuentran en el mismo nivel jerárquico, con funciones de la misma categoría. Inclusive en la enumeración de las competencias (“funciones”) de la Dirección del CIFH, determinadas en el artículo 5 del RCIFH, únicamente en 1 de 14 competencias, se encomienda a la Subdirección una labor distinta y exclusiva. Dice el inciso k): “…A nivel de la Subdirección del Centro, velar por la ejecución y el control de los planes y programas…”, de lo cual no es posible aseverar que entre ambos cargos existan funciones diversas, mucho menos subordinadas. En ese sentido, tampoco del resto del reglamento orgánico del CIFH hay norma alguna que separe y diversifique ambos puestos, asignando funciones de distinto tipo entre ambos cargos. Baste decir igualmente, que tampoco lo ha demostrado la actora. Así las cosas, este Tribunal arriba a una conclusión distinta a la teoría del caso de la representación de la señora Madrigal Chaves, toda vez que ella no ha experimentado un “recargo de funciones” propiamente dicho, ya que las funciones que en algún momento hubiese desempeñado como Directora ad interim (a.i.) de la Dirección del Centro de Investigación y Formación Hacendaria, no son ni de carácter extraño o ajeno a sus labores, ni adicionales a las propias como Subdirectora, ni tampoco jerárquicamente superiores, siendo estos los requisitos fundamentales para estar en presencia de aquel instituto jurídico. En relación con la alusión que hace la representación de la actora a los dictámenes de la PGR y los artículos 13 LSAP, 22 bis RESC y 95 y 96 LGAP, debemos decir lo siguiente: Primero, indicar que los dictámenes de la PGR a tenor de sus potestades consultivas, no vinculan en modo alguno a esta jurisdicción, además de que como se verá seguidamente, al fundamentarse en normativa que ya no está vigente, no resultan de aplicación al caso concreto. Segundo, advertir a la parte actora que el artículo 13 LSAP, que no sólo fue fundamento de aquellos dictámenes, sino que además fue alegado e incluso transcrito en la demanda (ver imagen 72 del expediente judicial escaneado, anterior folio 66 del expediente físico), fue declarado inconstitucional por parte de la Sala Constitucional más de 15 años antes de incoada la acción, por medio de la sentencia número 1999-04845 de las 16:21 horas del 22 de junio de 1999, de manera tal que no resulta un argumento atendible por parte de este Tribunal; y finalmente, respecto de los artículo 22 bis RESC y 95 y 96 LGAP, ya hemos hecho suficiente análisis de los mismos a lo largo de esta sentencia, sin que de ellos se haya podido derivar Derecho suficiente para sostener la pretensión anulatoria y condenatoria, aquí intentada por la accionante. Sí desea esta Cámara dejar muy en claro a las partes e insistir en lo ya señalado antes, de que este pronunciamiento se restringe a lo peticionado por la parte, en los términos que incluso fue aclarado y delimitado por su representación legal en la audiencia concedida en su momento, oportunidad en la que confinó su reclamo al supuesto derecho al pago del recargo como plus salarial. Por esta razón, el fallo desestimatorio que aquí corresponde llevar a cabo se restringe a ese marco petitorio y por tanto, no puede hacerse extensivo a otras posibles hipótesis remunerativas u otras conductas administrativas que no hayan sido impugnadas, bastando recordar a la Administración demandada lo dicho de manera reiterada por la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en diversas sentencias, tales como la número 2011-00695 de las 15:35 horas del 25 de agosto de 2011, 2012-1154 de las 10:55 horas del 14 de diciembre de 2012 y 2013-001144 de las 10:00 horas del 04 de octubre de 2013, cuando ha señalado que “…Conforme al principio de legalidad que vincula la actividad administrativa, la Administración no puede otorgar derechos o beneficios salariales, si no están previamente autorizados o previstos por el ordenamiento jurídico. No obstante, ese principio, debe también entenderse, como una limitación para la propia Administración de no actuar fuera de los límites permitidos, lo que legalmente se contempla bajo la figura del abuso de poder (artículo 146 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). En el plano del empleo público, en el que cada puesto tiene una descripción específica en cuanto a requisitos personales, tareas, remuneración, etc., no es posible admitir que, en demérito de los derechos de los trabajadores, se desconozca esa misma legalidad y se coarten los derechos a los servidores. Es decir, la legalidad administrativa implica también para la Administración la imposibilidad de extralimitar el desempeño de sus funcionarios, fuera de los parámetros establecidos, para el puesto específico de que se trate; pues lo contrario significaría admitir, un enriquecimiento injusto para la Administración, al verse beneficiada con servicios ajenos y distintos a los remunerados al funcionario…” (Resaltado no es del original). En consecuencia, nada de lo anteriormente indicado implica que si la actora se estima acreedora de diferencias salariales originadas en una figura diferente al recargo de funciones, no pueda interponer el correspondiente reclamo en sede administrativa y/o judicial.”
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