Validity of municipal regulation on cellular telecommunications infrastructureValidez de reglamento municipal sobre infraestructura de telecomunicaciones celulares

XXIV.- With all of the foregoing, the appellant (casacionista) is correct in alleging a violation of Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, because the Court disregarded the powers assigned by the constituent power to the municipal councils, applicable in this specific case to the defendant, regarding the administration of local interests and services in its canton, through a corporate autonomy that is likewise assigned by the Magna Carta. In this sense, the decision of how to regulate the provision of cellular telephone service, by means of poles located on public sites, is its responsibility, which it materialized in the challenged regulatory provisions. Furthermore, from a reading of the Regulation, in its “Considering”, the pursued purpose is notorious, by objectivizing the regulation of cellular telecommunications infrastructure, to increase the availability of the service, improve its quality and ensure affordable prices, in respect and harmony with environmental and urban sustainability, considering its visual and environmental impact on the urban and natural surroundings, for the benefit of the collective interest of the canton of Curridabat. This was motivated by the fact that technological advances have led to the emergence of new communications services and the multiplication of telecommunications facilities, which entails the aforementioned visual and environmental impact on that environment. Hence, the content of the administrative conduct has resided in the creation of the Regulation, establishing the parameters to govern the standardization of the system of supporting structures for radio base stations (radiobases) for cellular telecommunications, regarding land use (uso de suelo), addressing conformity with the location, form and constructive condition and commercial exploitation. These elements are set forth in the cited regulations and serve to justify their validity, as they are also based on the necessity the Municipal Administration considered, within its competence and under the premise of its autonomy in territorial planning and administration matters, to establish the parameters that regulate the standardization of supporting infrastructure for cellular telecommunications, as was also expressed in the Regulation. In this way, the administrative conduct conformed to the precepts alluding to the elements and validity of the administrative act, provided for in the General Public Administration Act; of interest to this matter, in Articles 128 to 136. As the appellant alleged, this latter legal provision was violated by the Court. In light of the foregoing, the Court is not correct in holding that the Regulation lacked a statement of reasons. Consider further the legal basis that supported the municipal council in issuing the aforementioned regulation: “…in the Magna Carta, Articles 169 and 170, as well as Articles 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63 and 64 et seq. of the Urban Planning Act (Ley de Planificación Urbana), as well as Articles 13, 59 and from 190 to 198 of the General Public Administration Act”. From all this, the cited constitutional precepts highlight municipal autonomy, under which the municipality may adopt its own decisions and administer itself according to its own legal personality and own assets, for which the issuance of local rules is feasible. Thus, within the competences of the Municipal Council is, precisely, the issuance of Regulations. The Municipal Code so contemplates in Articles 2, 4 and 13, which find constitutional shelter in the aforementioned precepts 169 and 170 of the Political Charter. This is, fundamentally, a local regulatory power, rooted in the essential core of its autonomy, which compels the municipal council to govern itself according to the cantonal interests it is called to protect, including urban and environmental control, the surroundings and an ecologically balanced environment, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of the Political Constitution and as harmonized with the Urban Planning Act, for example, in its Articles 4 and 15. The former establishes the competence of the Municipal Council to issue regulatory provisions. The latter prescribes that, pursuant to canon 169 of the Political Constitution, competence and authority is recognized to municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory and, consequently, each of them shall order whatever is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan and the related urban development regulations (reglamentos de desarrollo urbano), in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors where qualified reasons prevail to establish a specific control regime. Likewise, Article 19 Ibid., authorizes the enactment of procedural rules for compliance with regulation plans and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort and well-being of the community. That is, its competence extends to the issuance of regulatory provisions. In the specific case, the plaintiff acknowledges in its complaint that the defendant complied with the requirement of a non-binding public consultation of the Regulation, which is confirmed by reference to Gazette No. 121 of June 23, 2011. This demonstrates how, coupled with the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) inherent to that municipal council, its exercise considered the collective opinion by subjecting it to their knowledge. It decided to regulate in the manner described, without this violating the constitutional and legal backing that protects it in this regard. In the sub lite, the Court did not take that normative spectrum into account. Furthermore, as reported by the challenger, it overlooked that the defendant entity could well choose the use of supporting structural networks that, according to technical standards, were suitable for the full performance of the cellular communication service. Among them, as provided in Article 6, subsection 18), of the General Telecommunications Act, which the appellant alleges was violated, poles, within the definition of “Scarce Resources (Recursos escasos)” and as part of the infrastructure required to operate telecommunications networks. The appellant also noted, it is not necessary to establish whether tower structures are or are not suitable for that purpose, nor whether private installation sites should be included, because the basis of this case must be examined from whether poles in public areas fulfill their purpose. This is precisely why the appellant’s disagreement regarding fact 6, held as unproven in the appealed judgment, is admissible, by virtue of which, for the adjudicating body, it was not proven that telecommunications towers are technically inappropriate, generate visual pollution or increase the cost of telecommunications service in Curridabat. Those aspects are for municipal consideration by virtue of constituting matters related to its work as local government. For all these reasons, the Court is also incorrect in considering that the defendant exceeded its discretion and regulatory power. Rather, its decision to deem pole infrastructure in public areas adequate for those purposes is respectable, as was regulated in the challenged regulation that the Court annulled, forcing it to adopt proposals and provisions from entities that are not binding upon it, thereby violating, as the defendant alleges, the aforementioned legal rules and its regulatory power in this matter. Furthermore, the plaintiff has in no way demonstrated compelling reasons to detract from the technical or functional suitability of using pole infrastructure (postería) on public sites with respect to the provision of the corresponding service. It should be considered that, since the environment is involved (urban surroundings, land use, landscape), the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 109 of the Biodiversity Act applies. Under this premise, the plaintiff should have demonstrated that the established regulations contravene the law in this particular, which it did not do, nor did it demonstrate that the technical and functional suitability contained in those regulations does not allow the full performance of the respective telecommunications service. As for the deprivation of its rights it claims to have suffered, in the cassation appeal it filed, it acknowledged how another company providing services similar to those it offers, adjusted to the regulatory provisions and succeeded in materializing its commercial activity. That is to say, natural and legal persons with commercial interests and economic expectations, to be developed in the corresponding canton, must adjust to the established rules as a derivation of the exercise of the municipal council’s regulatory power; if they do not, it is not appropriate to claim a violation of rights, as long as they did not adjust to those regulations.

XXV.- By virtue of what has been indicated, the defendant’s appeal should be granted. The appealed judgment must be reversed. Ruling on the merits, the portions of the complaint upheld by the Court shall be rejected, in order to dismiss it in its entirety. The plaintiff shall be liable for the payment of personal and procedural costs. On this matter, precept 193 of the CPCA establishes the power to exempt when the judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party, verisimilarly, may not have known, and for that reason, the party's opposition was adjusted. Also, when due to the nature of the matter debated there existed, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate. The rule established in following canon 194 does not contain a power to exempt but rather an imposition. It applies when the winning party incurred in excessive claim (plus petitio). As a power that it is, the Court incurs in no normative violation when it decides to depart from it. Moreover, the factual assumption to consider the existence of excessive claim as a ground for exemption is not met. Hence the cost order imposed at this instance.

Hence the conviction imposed in this venue.”</span><o:p></o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> Rather, its decision to deem the pole (postería) infrastructure in public areas adequate for those purposes is respectable, as it was regulated in the questioned provision that the Court annulled, obligating it to adopt proposals and provisions of entities that are not binding upon it, thereby infringing, as the defendant denounces, the aforementioned legal rules and its regulatory authority (potestad reglamentaria) in this matter. Moreover, the plaintiff has in no way demonstrated compelling reasons to detract from the technical or functional suitability of the use of poles (postería) in public sites regarding the provision of the corresponding service. Consider, since the environment is involved (urban surroundings, land use, landscape), the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 109 of the Biodiversity Law applies. Under this predicate, the plaintiff should have demonstrated that the established regulations contravene the law in this particular, which it did not do, nor did it show that the technical and functional suitability contained in those regulations does not permit the full performance of the respective telecommunications service. As for the deprivation of its rights it claims to have suffered, in the cassation appeal it filed, it acknowledged how another company providing services similar to those it offers complied with the regulatory provisions and managed to carry out its commercial activity. That is, natural and legal persons with commercial interests and economic expectations to be developed in the corresponding canton must conform to the rules established as a derivation of the exercise of the local government's regulatory authority (potestad reglamentaria); failing to do so, it is improper to allege infringement of rights, as long as they did not conform to that body of rules.

**XXV.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the defendant's appeal must be granted. The contested judgment must be annulled. Ruling on the merits, the claims of the lawsuit upheld by the Court shall be rejected, and the lawsuit shall be declared without merit in its entirety. The plaintiff shall bear the personal and procedural costs. On this particular, precept 193 of the CPCA establishes the power to exonerate when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence, plausibly, the opposing party was unaware of and, for that reason, that party's opposition was adjusted. Furthermore, when due to the nature of the matter debated, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient cause to litigate. The rule established in canon 194 below does not contain a power to exonerate but rather an imposition. It applies when the winning party incurred in excessive claim (plus petitio). As a power, the Court does not incur in any regulatory breach when it decides to depart from it. Moreover, the factual supposition for considering the existence of excessive claim (plus petitio) as a ground for exoneration is not met. Hence the condemnation imposed in this venue.”

“XXIV.- Con todo y lo expuesto, lleva razón el casacionista cuando acusa quebranto de los numerales 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, por cuanto el Tribunal desconoció las atribuciones asignadas por el constituyente a los ayuntamientos, aplicable en el caso concreto a la demandada, respecto a la administración de los intereses y servicios locales en su cantón, a través de una autonomía corporativa que igualmente asigna la Carta Magna. En este sentido, la decisión de cómo regular la prestación del servicio de telefonía celular, mediante postes ubicados en sitios públicos, es de su encargo, lo cual materializó en las normas reglamentarias cuestionadas. Por lo demás, de la lectura del Reglamento, en su “Considerando”, es notoria la finalidad perseguida, al objetivar la regulación de la infraestructura de telecomunicaciones celulares, para aumentar la disponibilidad del servicio, mejorar su calidad y asegurar precios asequibles, en respecto y armonía a la sostenibilidad ambiental y urbanística, tomando en cuenta su impacto visual y medioambiental en el entorno urbano y natural, en beneficio del interés colectivo del cantón de Curridabat. Ello, motivada en que los avances tecnológicos han propiciado la aparición de nuevos servicios de comunicaciones y la multiplicación de instalaciones de telecomunicaciones, lo cual supone el referido impacto visual y medioambiental de aquel entorno. De allí, el contenido de la conducta administrativa ha radicado en la creación del Reglamento, al establecer los parámetros para regir la normalización del sistema de estructuras soportantes de radiobases para las telecomunicaciones celulares, en lo atinente al uso de suelo, atendiendo la conformidad con la ubicación, forma y condición constructiva y la normativa y vienen a justificar su validez, en tanto se fundamenta, asimismo, en la necesidad que consideró la Administración Municipal, dentro de su competencia y bajo el presupuesto de su autonomía en materia de planificación y administración territorial, de establecer los parámetros que regulen la normalización de la infraestructura soportante para las telecomunicaciones celulares, según también se expresó en el Reglamento. De este modo, la conducta administrativa se ajustó a los preceptos alusivos a los elementos y a la validez del acto administrativo, previstos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública; de interés para este asunto, en los numerales 128 a 136. Como lo denunció el recurrente, esta última disposición legal fue conculcada por el Tribunal. Por lo expuesto, éste no lleva razón al estimar que el Reglamento no se motivó. Considérese además la base jurídica que acuerpó al ayuntamiento para apoyar el dictado de la aludida reglamentación: “…en la Carta Magna, Artículos 169 y 170, así como los artículos 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 32,33 34, 36, 38, 39, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63 y 64 y siguientes de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, así como los Artículos 13, 59 y del 190, al 198, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública”. De todo ello, los citados preceptos constitucionales resaltan la autonomía municipal, en cuya virtud, el municipio puede adoptar decisiones propias y administrase en orden a su personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, a lo que le resulta viable el dictado de normas locales. De este modo, dentro de las competencias del Concejo Municipal está, precisamente, la emisión de Reglamentos. Así lo contempla el Código Municipal en los artículos 2, 4 y 13, que encuentran égida constitucional en los susodichos preceptos 169 y 170 de la Carta Política. Se trata, en lo fundamental, de una potestad regulatoria local, radicada sobre el núcleo esencial de su autonomía, que motiva al ayuntamiento a gobernarse según los intereses cantonales que está llamado a tutelar, incluyendo el control urbano, ambiental, el entorno y el ambiente ecológicamente equilibrado, de consuno con los numerales 41 y 50 de la Constitución Política y según se armoniza con la Ley de Planificación Urbana, por ejemplo, en sus artículos 4 y 15. El primero estatuye la competencia del Concejo Municipal para dictar disposiciones normativas. El segundo preceptúa que, conforme al canon 169 de la Constitución Política, se reconoce competencia y autoridad a los gobiernos municipales, para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio jurisdiccional y, en consecuencia, cada uno de ellos dispondrá lo que proceda para implantar un plan regulador y los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano conexos, en las áreas donde deba regir, sin perjuicio de extender todos o algunos de sus efectos a otros sectores en que primen razones calificadas para establecer un determinado régimen contralor. De igual manera, el artículo 19 Ibid., autoriza la promulgación de reglas procesales para el acatamiento de planes de regulación y para la protección de los intereses de la salud, seguridad, comodidad y bienestar de la comunidad. Es decir, su competencia se extiende a la emisión de normativa reglamentaria. En el caso concreto, la actora reconoce en su demanda, la accionada cumplió con la exigencia de consulta pública no vinculante del Reglamento, lo cual se ratifica con vista en la Gaceta número 121 del 23 de junio de 2011. Ello evidencia cómo, aunada a la potestad reglamentaria propia de ese ayuntamiento, su ejercicio consideró la opinión colectiva al someterlo a su conocimiento. Se decantó por regular en el sentido dicho, sin que ello vulnere el respaldo constitucional y legal que al efecto le ampara. En el sub lite, el Tribunal no tomó en cuenta ese espectro normativo. Además, según lo informa el impugnante, desconoció que la entidad accionada bien podía escoger el empleo de las redes estructurales soportantes que, según la técnica, conviniera para el cabal cumplimiento del servicio de comunicación celular. Entre ellas, como lo dispone el mandato 6, inciso 18), de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, que el casacionista aduce quebrantado, los postes, dentro de la definición de “Recursos escasos” y como parte de la infraestructura requerida para operar las redes de telecomunicaciones. También lo acotó el recurrente, no precisa establecer si las estructuras de torres son o no aptas para ese fin, ni si deben incluirse sitios privados de instalación, porque la base de este caso se debe examinar a partir de si los postes en zonas públicas cumplen su cometido. Es por esto mismo que resulta atendible la inconformidad del impugnante respecto al hecho 6 tenido por no probado en el fallo recurrido, en virtud el cual, para el órgano sentenciador, no se probó que las torres de telecomunicaciones sean técnicamente inapropiadas, generen contaminación visual o aumenten el costo del servicio de telecomunicaciones en Curridabat. Esos aspectos son de consideración municipal en virtud de consistir materia relacionada con su quehacer como gobierno local. Por todo ello, tampoco lleva razón el Tribunal al considerar que la accionada extralimitó su discrecionalidad y potestad reglamentaria. Antes bien, es respetable su decisión de estimar adecuada a esos propósitos la infraestructura de postes en zonas públicas, según se reguló en la normativa cuestionada que el Tribunal anuló, obligándola a adoptar propuestas y disposiciones de entes que no le resultan vinculantes, infringiendo, según lo denuncia la demandada, las susodichas normas jurídicas y su potestad reglamentaria en esta materia. Además, la actora en modo alguno ha patentizado razones contundentes, como para desmeritar la adecuación técnica o funcional de la utilización de postería en sitios públicos respecto a la prestación del correspondiente servicio. Considérese, al estar involucrado el ambiente (entorno urbano, uso de suelo, paisaje), aplica la inversión de la carga probatoria contenida en el artículo 109 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. En este predicado, debió la actora demostrar que las regulaciones establecidas contrarían el derecho en este particular, lo cual no hizo, como tampoco que la adecuación técnica y funcional, contenida en esas regulaciones, no permite el cabal cumplimiento del respectivo servicio de telecomunicaciones. En cuanto a la privación que dice haber sufrido de sus derechos, en el recurso de casación que presentó, reconoció cómo otra compañía prestataria de servicios similares a los que ofrece, se ajustó a las disposiciones reglamentarias y logró concretar su actividad mercantil. Esto es, las personas físicas y jurídicas con intereses comerciales y expectativas económicas, a desarrollar en el correspondiente cantón, deberán ajustarse a las reglas establecidas como derivación del ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria del ayuntamiento; de no hacerlo, no procede alegar quebranto de derechos, en tanto no se ajustaron a esa normativa.

XXV.- En mérito de lo indicado procede acoger el recurso de la demandada. Se deberá anular la sentencia impugnada. Fallando por el fondo, se rechazarán los extremos de la demanda acogidos por el Tribunal, para declararla sin lugar en su totalidad. Corresponderá a la actora el pago de las costas personales y procesales. Sobre este particular, el precepto 193 del CPCA, establece la facultad de exonerar cuando la sentencia se dicta en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia, verosímilmente, no haya conocido la contraria y, por esa causa, se haya ajustado la oposición de la parte. Además, cuando por la naturaleza de lo debatido haya existido, a juicio del Tribunal, suficiente motivo para litigar. La regla establecida en el canon 194 siguiente, no contiene una facultad para exonerar sino una imposición. Aplica cuando la parte vencedora incurrió en plus petitio. Como facultad que es, el Tribunal no incurre en quebranto normativo alguno cuando dispone apartarse de ella. Por lo demás, no se cumple el supuesto de hecho para considerar la existencia de plus petitio como motivo de exoneración. De allí la condenatoria impuesta en esta sede.”