Same-sex common-law marriage and regulatory gapUnión de hecho entre personas del mismo sexo y vacío normativo

“I.- Mr. [Nombre 001] appeared before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, seeking recognition of the couple relationship he claims to have maintained with Mr. [Nombre 003] for more than three years, in a public, notorious, stable, and exclusive manner. He expressly requested the extensive application of the rules contained in the Family Code intended to regulate the personal and property effects of a common-law union (unión de hecho) (folios 1-2). In the appealed decision, issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, the first-instance judge rejected the complaint outright because she deemed it unactionable, given that Costa Rican legislation, by not permitting marriage between persons of the same sex, prevents recognizing as such a bond like the one held between the parties, which lacks an essential element: its heterosexual character (folio 4).- II.- Although Costa Rican law currently does not recognize cohabitation between persons of the same sex as a source of rights and obligations, it is indisputable that it also does not prohibit it and that, when it occurs under conditions of stability, notoriety, and exclusivity, it cannot be substantially distinguished from that formed by heterosexual human beings, since both are instituted by virtue of consent and reflect the purpose of building a shared life project, based on bonds of love and solidarity. Without a doubt, the object of both bonds can be stated as "(…) shared life, cooperation, and mutual assistance." (Article 11 of the Family Code). As María MARTÍN SÁNCHEZ points out, "In today's society, there are same-sex couples who cohabit stably, share expenses, assets, have a shared life project, and even have children, all in a public and notorious manner. Their way of life is the same as that of any marriage, except that they have not been able to access this right. If society is already prepared to deal normally with this type of cohabitation, the Law is obliged to regulate their de facto situation." [The constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Spain. Law 13/200, of July 1, amending the Civil Code concerning the right to contract marriage. Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal Constitucional, 13, January-June, 2010, p. 255]. For this reason, the members of a homosexual couple, and especially the one in the weaker economic position, have analogous requirements for legal protection as those of heterosexual persons who decide to live together. Hence, not only reasons of legal certainty and justice require that their personal and property effects be regulated by the legislation in force. The human dignity of their members and their fundamental rights to the free development of their personality, to equality, to the protection of their family, and to the autonomy of will are compromised by the existing protection deficit. In the recent judgment of February 24 of this year, issued in the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reaffirmed "(…) that the American Convention does not determine a closed concept of family, much less only protects a 'traditional' model of it. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the concept of family life is not limited solely to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties have a shared life outside of marriage1." Therefore, denying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group "(…) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention, as there is no specific family model (the 'traditional family')." In support of that argument, that international jurisdictional body cited the ruling of August 16, 2010, issued by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Mexican Nation, which, when resolving the action of unconstitutionality A.I. 2/2010, stated that "(…) this Supreme Court considers that the sexual diversity of the contracting parties is neither constitutionally nor legally a defining element of the marital institution, but rather the result of the social conception that existed at a given historical moment, but not the essential core of marriage (…)." [Para. 256] and that "It is, therefore, the sexual orientation of a person, as part of their personal identity, a relevant element in their life project that, like any person, includes the desire to have a shared life with another person of the same or different sex, or not, and that in no way should it be limited in the pursuit and achievement of their happiness. At this point, (…) within fundamental rights lies the right to personal and sexual identity, the former being understood as the right of every individual to be oneself, in their own conscience and in the opinion of others, according to their physical and internal characteristics and their actions, which individualize them before society and allow them to be identified, which also implies sexual identity, projecting them before themselves and socially from their sexual perspective, as well as their sexual preference or orientation, and which, therefore, falls within the self-determination of persons and affects their free development, as it is an element that undeniably will determine their affective and/or sexual relationships with persons of a different or the same sex and, hence, their choice of whom to form a shared life and have children with, if they so desire." [Para. 264]. It further specified that "(…) in the case of homosexual persons, just as occurs with persons with a sexual orientation towards persons of a different sex (heterosexuals), the free and voluntary establishment of affective relationships with persons of the same sex is part of their full development; relationships, both types of which, as various sociological data report, share the characteristic that they constitute a community of life based on affective, sexual, and reciprocal solidarity ties, with a vocation for stability and permanence over time." [Para. 266]; that "(…) if one of the aspects that guides the way an individual will project their life and their relationships is their sexual orientation, it is a fact that, in full respect for human dignity, it is necessary to demand recognition by the State not only of an individual's sexual orientation towards persons of the same sex, but also of their unions, under the modalities that, at a given moment, it is decided to adopt (domestic partnerships, solidarity pacts, concubinage, and marriage)." [Para. 269]; that from the existence of homoparental families derive a series of rights and obligations for those who form them, as it is a reality that they exist and, as such, must be protected by legislation: both types are equally respectable, and their recognition does not disregard principles such as the best interests of the child [para. 333].- III.- In his dissenting separate opinion forming part of the judgment of September 27, 1990 (Case of Cossey vs. United Kingdom), Mr. S. K. Martens, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, rightly pointed out that "Marriage is much more than a sexual union and, therefore, the capacity to have relations of this nature is not 'essential.' Persons who cannot procreate or have sexual relations can also seek to marry. This is because marriage involves more than a union that legitimizes such relations and aims at procreation: it is a legal institution that creates a fixed legal relationship between the spouses and between them and third parties (including the authorities). As one author has stated, the spouses, through the bonds of marriage, 'announce to the world around them that their relationship is based on intense human feelings and on a mutual, exclusive, and permanent commitment.' It is also a kind of community in which intellectual, spiritual, and emotional ties are at least as essential as physical ones. / Article 12 of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] protects the right of any man or woman (of marriageable age) to enter into this union, and, therefore, the definition of what the words 'man and woman' mean in this context must take into account all these characteristics of marriage." In similar terms, Ms. E. Palm and Messrs. I. Foighel and R. Pekkanen, judges of that same body, stated in their joint dissenting separate opinion forming part of the same ruling: "The fact that a transsexual cannot procreate is not decisive. There are many men and many women who also cannot have children and, yet, have the undisputed right to marry. The capacity to procreate is not and cannot be a prerequisite for marriage." Under this same approach, the professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid, Pilar DOMÍNGUEZ LOZANO, poses that, "Indeed, if marriage [and, by extension, the heterosexual common-law union] is defined as an affective and material community of life, and no longer by its social function; if its essential purpose is no longer reproductive, but defined around personal fulfillment and the free development of personality; if its constitutional content links it, primarily, to fundamental individual rights and freedoms; if the ius connubium is predicated, in principle, of any person, based on requirements of equality and freedom; and if the legal regulation of marriage and of relations between spouses has experienced a turn towards the Law of Obligations; it becomes difficult to accept as unquestionable the prohibition on same-sex couples entering into marriage." [Las uniones de personas del mismo sexo: las opciones de regulación y sus implicaciones jurídicas. Derecho Privado y Constitución, Madrid: 20, January-December, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- IV.- In the judgment issued on November 18, 2003, in the case Hillary Goodridge and others vs. Department of Public Health, for which Judge Marshall was the reporting judge, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the prohibition on marriage access for persons of the same sex contrary to the Constitution. It argued that we are in the presence of "(…) a vital social institution (…)" and that "(…) the decision of whether to marry and whom to marry is among the most significant moments of self-determination in life." Therefore, and because "the benefits accessible only to those with a marriage license are enormous, affecting virtually every aspect of life and death," it has long been considered a fundamental right (civil right). As it is a central element of individuals' lives and the community's well-being, barring same-sex persons from the right to marry deprives them "(…) of one of the most significant aspects of human experience (…)" and "(…) denies them full access to the protection of the laws (…)"; hence, such an exclusion could only be admitted if it serves "(…) an indispensable public objective (…)" and is "(…) a reasonable means to achieve that end." These conditions are not met regarding the prohibition of same-sex marriage, which creates an exception to that rule because of a singular trait: sexual orientation, which harms the freedom recognized in the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as equality, which prevents the existence of second-class citizens. The three main justifications for this prohibition are not constitutionally reasonable: neither that heterosexual marriage provides a favorable framework for procreation (meaning unassisted heterosexual procreation); nor that it ensures an optimal environment for child care; nor that same-sex marriage will trivialize or destroy that institution as historically configured. The essence of the freedom to marry is to unite with the person of one's own choice. By preventing same-sex marriage, "(…) the State confers an official seal of approval on the destructive stereotypes that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to heterosexual relationships and are therefore not worthy of respect."- V.- It is true that in ruling no. 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, in which it deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6) of Article 14 of the Family Code, the Constitutional Chamber assigned to the Legislative Assembly the responsibility of "(…) considering the need to regulate, in whatever manner it deems appropriate, the bonds or rights derived from this type of union, which evidently requires a full normative development establishing the rights and obligations of this type of couple (…)." It is also true that, four years later, in ruling no. 2010-641, of 2:56 a.m. on January 13, 2010, it rejected on the merits the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. [Nombre 001] against article 242 ibidem; a pronouncement that, according to the scarce information available as its drafting is still pending, cites no. 2006-7262, referenced above. Hence, based on the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is not venturesome to conclude that these precedents appear to prevent us from resorting to the regulation of common-law union, contained in articles 242, 243, 244, and 245 ibidem, even by analogy, in order to resolve this complaint on its merits, leaving no alternative but to confirm the outright rejection ordered by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the ruling issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, which, as noted, deemed it unactionable.- VI.- However, it is impossible to disregard our duty to weigh the de facto situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Assembly at a given historical moment, in order to properly integrate the legal system and offer a response to the substantive claim of Mr. [Nombre 001]. Indeed, we are convinced that, in a system like Costa Rica's, the absence of specific regulations does not authorize outright rejection of a complaint. The fundamental right to effective judicial protection, recognized, among other precepts, in Article 8(1) and Article 25(1), in relation to Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principle of the hermetic completeness of the legal system, addressed by Article 6 of the Civil Code and Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, prevent such a pronouncement. The magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber highlighted this: "In our condition as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider in decision-making regarding the matters submitted to our knowledge (…)." (Ruling no. 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006).- VII.- Pursuant to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970, "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition." (Article 1(1)). "Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms." (Article 2). "Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, (…) for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature." (Article 8(1)). "Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties." (Article 25(1)). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina) it noted that "This Court has affirmed on other occasions that '[u]nder the law of nations, a customary norm prescribes that a State that has concluded an international agreement must introduce into its domestic law the necessary modifications to ensure the execution of the obligations assumed.' In the American Convention this principle is embodied in its Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of the same, to guarantee the rights recognized therein2." It also reiterated that "(…) the adaptation of domestic regulations to the parameters established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two aspects, namely: a) the suppression of rules and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees provided in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or hinder their exercise, and b) the issuance of rules and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of said guarantees. The first aspect is satisfied through the reform, repeal, or annulment of the rules or practices having those scopes, as appropriate. The second obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, therefore, must adopt all necessary legal, administrative, and other measures to avoid similar events from occurring again in the future3." Without a doubt, in the case of the union between persons of the same sex, its legislative recognition is paramount in order to eradicate social discrimination against those who form part of it. Considering the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights enshrined in the Convention, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of Heliodoro Portugal Vs. Panama), given the imperative need to offer some response to the legitimate claim formulated in the sub-lite, "(…) there is a duty to use those recourses (…) that are related to the protection of fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as, for example, the right to liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention." In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (Case of Durand and Ugarte), the Inter-American Court affirmed that "101. (…) the right of every person to simple and prompt recourse or to any other effective recourse before the competent courts or tribunals for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but also of the Rule of Law itself in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention […]. Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties4. / 102. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that the non-existence of an effective recourse against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression thereof by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In this regard, it should be stressed that, for such a recourse to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for by the Constitution or the law or that it is formally admissible, but rather it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a human rights violation has been incurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it5. / (…) / 121. This Court has established that '[A]rticle 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively enshrine an effective recourse, but also to ensure the due application of said recourse by its judicial authorities6'." In the judgment of June 21, 2002 (Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin and others vs. Trinidad and Tobago), it stated that "The Inter-American Court has also established that, as part of the general obligations of States, they have a positive duty of guarantee with respect to individuals subject to their jurisdiction. This entails taking all necessary measures to remove the obstacles that may exist for individuals to be able to enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the tolerance by the State of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic recourses to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]7." In the judgment of September 7, 2004 (Case of Tibi vs. Ecuador) it reiterated that "Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation on the States to offer all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective judicial recourse against acts that violate their fundamental rights. / (…). From this perspective, it has been pointed out that for the State to comply with the provisions of said Article 25.1 of the Convention, it does not suffice for the recourses to exist formally, but rather it is essential that they be effective, that is, the person must be provided with the real possibility of filing a simple and prompt recourse that allows, as applicable, achieving the required judicial protection." [See, in a similar sense, the judgments of November 27, 2003 (Case of Maritza Urrutia); June 7, 2003 (Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez); November 28, 2002 (Case of Cantos); August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community); January 31, 2001 (Case of the Constitutional Tribunal); November 25, 2000 (Case of Bámaca Velásquez); August 18, 2000 (Case of Cantoral Benavides); November 19, 1999 (Case of the "Street Children" (Case of Villagrán Morales and others)); September 29, 1999 (Case of Cesti Hurtado); May 30, 1999 (Case of Castillo Petruzzi and others); March 8, 1998 (Case of the "White Panel" (Paniagua Morales and others)); January 24, 1998 (Case of Blake); November 12, 1997 (Case of Suárez Rosero) and November 3, 1997 (Case of Castillo Páez)]. In the judgment of August 6, 2008 (Case of Castañeda Gutman vs. United Mexican States) it specified that "An effective judicial recourse is one capable of producing the result for which it was conceived8, that is, it must be a recourse capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal to establish whether or not a human rights violation has occurred and, if so, to provide reparation9." Finally, in the cited judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina) it concretized "107. (…) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of the States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial recourse against acts that violate their fundamental rights. Said effectiveness implies that, in addition to the formal existence of recourses, they must yield results or responses to the violations of rights contemplated either in the Convention, the Constitution, or the laws. In that sense, those recourses cannot be considered effective that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, turn out to be illusory. This can occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated by practice, because the means to execute their decisions are lacking, or due to any other situation that configures a scenario of denial of justice. Thus, the process must tend towards the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial ruling through the suitable application of said ruling10. / 108. On the other hand, as the Court has previously pointed out, when evaluating the effectiveness of recourses, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial processes have effectively contributed to ending a situation violative of rights, to ensuring the non-repetition of the harmful acts, and to guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention11."- VIII.- According to Article 41 of the Political Constitution, "Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be provided prompt, complete justice, in strict conformity with the laws." At the time (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Plenary Court, acting as the body responsible for constitutional control, pointed out that from this supreme norm derive a series of basic principles to which all competent persons and bodies in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust their actions. By virtue of these, the Legislative Assembly is obliged to promulgate the necessary legal precepts to regulate the rights of persons and to establish the adequate avenues and procedures to procure their effective judicial protection when they have been violated. For their part, the different Tribunals are responsible for interpreting and applying these provisions in such a way that they do not hinder the due verification of the grievance and guarantee, if it is proven, the full and timely reestablishment of those rights. Hence, we judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we make impossible or difficult access to the stipulated procedures or when we reject or deny a request that we should have granted in a judgment, without any reason or by invoking an insufficient or spurious one.

In Vote No. 1739-92, at 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, that Chamber held that "At the base of every procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of administration of justice, that is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State—to declare the disputed right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in specific cases—which in turn comprises a set of independent judicial bodies specialized in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that social life originates, in a civilized and effective manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, in conditions of equality and without discrimination. / a) In this first sense, then, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that, which require the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable for guaranteeing precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, on the other hand, no more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right to petition, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other implications that are even more immediately demandable, which may, in turn, concern the system of administration of justice itself, in itself, or the right of access to justice for all persons: / (…) / 2. And belonging to the second—the right of all equally to access justice—, in addition to the generic right to petition of Article 27 and the specific right to justice of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, are a series of complementary—but also fundamental—attributes, among them: / (i) the general right and principle of equality—and its counterpart of non-discrimination—, which is contained in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, besides being a criterion for interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that this is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which poses, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here because they are not directly involved in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informality, etc." As it concluded in Vote No. 1562-93, at 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing "(…) means, in the first place, that due process requires the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable for guaranteeing the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right to petition enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution (…). In the second place, it concerns the system of administration of justice itself and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be 'reasonableness of the effects' on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on these (…) limitations other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those indispensable for them to function adequately in the life of society." IX.— In ordinary legislation, that fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the Civil Code and in Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. By virtue of the first, "The Tribunals have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters brought before them, for which they shall adhere to the established system of sources." Pursuant to the second paragraph of the latter, "The tribunals may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from deciding on matters within their competence due to a lack of applicable norm and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of their sources." Indeed, that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply for the absence of legal norms: "The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm that they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it comes to supplying for the absence and not the insufficiency of the provisions regulating a matter, said sources shall have the rank of law." (The boldface is added). Consequently, we jurisdictional bodies are forbidden from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from deciding on the merits of a process such as this. The dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system obliges us to resort, in integrative application, to the written and unwritten sources for the sake of identifying and putting into practice the best solution to the dispute raised. On this point, in Vote No. 36-F-94, at 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber noted that "(…) jurisprudence as an informing source of the legal system is called upon to supply, by way of extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms charged with resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or has not been conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code)." In Nos. 112-F-92, at 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, at 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001; and 360-F-02, at 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that "(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admit referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system), furthermore Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admits the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and no norm prohibiting it." For its part, the Second Chamber, in No. 415, at 9 a.m. on December 22, 1994, framed it in the following terms: "(…) in every case, one must resort, for the sake of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity and even, as Prof. Antequera points out in his cited work, to common sense, that is, that which people normally possess to judge things reasonably (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, Article 15 of the Labor Code, and Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch)." In No. 2004-200, at 10 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code "(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now then, to fulfill such a task, one must take into consideration Article 12 of that Code, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific situation but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits that application. In a case such as the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not unfamiliar in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) joined or having been joined only by affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, to order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what is due to her. But also, to resolve the issue, attending to what has been stated, a response to the situation raised can be provided, resorting 'mutatis mutandi' to the regulations given by law to similar institutions." Lastly, in No. 769-93, at 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, that Constitutional Chamber recognized that "Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a certain matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code; and even analogical application, which subsequent Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing that, in accordance with the first cited norm, a tribunal cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of applicable law to the case raised. Judges [both male and female], therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power that the jurisprudence of Family Law in our country has held has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in decisions of the tribunals, including some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but no less lacking in justice or equity for that. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been most quickly noticed." X.— Article 12 of the Civil Code stipulates that "The analogical application of norms shall proceed when they do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, unless a norm prohibits that application." Regarding the analogical procedure of integration of positive law, in Vote No. 1-F-94, at 3 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in Second Chamber Vote No. 2010-1094, at 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the First Chamber specified that "III.— (…). By analogy is understood, from a logical point of view, a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, by means of which it seeks to extend the validity of a proposition from a given situation to another generically similar. In antiquity it was known under the name of 'procedure by similarity.' Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but merely probable. In other words, in analogy one situation or fact is compared with another situation or fact, and thus an attempt is made to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those aspects or connotations that are similar between the situations analyzed, such that the more the essential and not merely accidental aspects of them resemble each other, the more convincing the extensive conclusion drawn will be. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which from several cases, analyzing their particular connotations, a general conclusion is obtained. In generalization, it is not a matter of comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but of analyzing several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses them all. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence regarding legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in the general doctrine of law, it has come to be admitted, in a majority view, that the legal system may have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a determined matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts, in order to resolve the conflicts of interest present in these cases. Therefore, faced with gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to decide, alleging not finding any norm to apply to the specific case; that would be equivalent to a denial of justice. However, neither does the judge have the faculty to arbitrarily create the norm applicable to the specific case. In our normative system, the judge [male or female] is one of law, not of conscience, and any decision made must find support in the current legal system. To fill these voids, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, both in its earlier text and in the current one, establishes that tribunals may not excuse themselves from deciding for lack of a norm, and by establishing that in such a case resort shall be made to the general principles of law in the absence of a legal norm, it does not exclude that before resorting to this interpretative criterion, analogy, regulated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, may be used to apply a written norm established for a similar legal situation to the case raised. Through this procedure, the aim is to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents the same legal essence. These are situations in which there is no identity of fact, but rather a substantial similarity so relevant that it justifies the application of the norm established for the case contemplated by the legislator to that which lacks regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar norms. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine whether between the two situations there exist legal similarities of such an entity as to permit the analogical extension of the known norm. This problem cannot be resolved mechanically or with merely logical criteria; it is rather a legal assessment made by the judge [male or female], in which it is determined whether the factual elements contemplated in the known norm, which motivated the establishment of a determined provision by the legislator (in accordance with the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation taken into consideration. The fact considered may have certain essential elements that characterize it and other accidental or contingent elements that accompany it. What is important is that there be correspondence between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogy legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is used; and analogy iuris, which takes as a starting point not a single norm, but a series of provisions, from which it induces a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding consideration: legis corresponds to induction by analogy and iuris to induction by generalization. The doctrine considers the recourse to the general principles of law, which can only be obtained through generalization, as a case of analogy iuris. To proceed to the analogical interpretation of norms, the following is necessary: 1- that a precise legal provision is lacking for the disputed case, so analogical application would not be possible where there are express legal precepts or from which a solution to the case raised can be deduced through extensive interpretation; 2- that an essential legal similarity exists between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge [male or female], after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it does not concern those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to be applied, analogy is inappropriate. Regarding this last requirement, legal praxis has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this respect, it is appropriate to cite the following: 1- It is not possible to apply by analogy laws that are prohibitive and sanctioning, because they are restrictive in nature; 2- nor is it possible to do so in the case of norms that limit the capacity of the person or subjective rights, because this is odious matter; 3- in the case of 'ius singulare' or exceptional law, by its very nature, as it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application does not proceed; and, 4- in the case of temporary norms, analogy also does not proceed, because they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the assumptions that prevent the application of analogy, it is appropriate to refer (…), to the impossibility of extensively applying those norms of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by norms characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, its directives, assumptions, and foundations do not deviate from the general guidelines of Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional, is inspired by rules different from those that characterize the normative system in general. On occasion, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal commerce, or to resolve some special cases with particular criteria of equity, or because of emerging needs from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice the general principles, establishing provisions that exclude certain persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special sanctions or liabilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general norms that govern the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. For this reason, in such cases, the application by analogy of exceptional norms or those of ius singulare to those cases not expressly contemplated by the norms is not possible. / VI.— In our Civil Code, the analogical application of norms is regulated by Articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to Article 12, the analogical interpretation of norms is possible '... when they do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, unless some norm prohibits that application.' In this way, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where there exists an identical 'ratio legis.' For its part, Article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of criminal, exceptional, and temporary laws. In this manner, our Civil Code allows this method of integrating Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding considerations." (See, additionally, First Chamber Vote No. 167-F-S1-2010, at 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).

XI.— Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber affirmed in the cited Vote No. 2006-7262, at 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, "(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged regulation [subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…)."; if it does not violate the Political Constitution because there is no "(…) impediment of any nature to the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is an empirical confirmation indicating that they have increased." and if "(…) it is not appropriate to apply the regulations developed for marriage in the terms currently conceived in our constitutional system."; what, then, would be the regulations from which we would have to draw to decide this process on its merits. Bear in mind that, despite having been pointed out on that occasion that the problem raised "(…) does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of appropriate normative regulation to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, above all if they meet conditions of stability and uniqueness, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary. We are, then, in the presence of a scenario of lege ferenda, but not even remotely of an illegitimate omission by the State. This is indicated, moreover, because in the documentation included in the record, and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing held during the substantiation of this process, some countries have been enacting laws (in the formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, with the purpose that they have specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to which (…) the legal framework that the derived constituent organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied." (The boldface is added); on a more recent date that same body made evident that "(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Tribunal in the above-cited Judgment, is […maintained…], with which it is […being…] disregarded, in an indirect manner, the reasons given (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in matters of constitutionality control, to consider that Article 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code conforms to the Law of the Constitution." (Vote No. 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not superfluous to mention that in this last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the subject in the terms set forth below: "As of this judgment [referring to No. 2006-7262, previously cited], several important aspects for resolving the sub lite are clear, which are the following: / 1) Relations between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or sidestepped. / 2) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relations between persons of the same sex. / 3) There exists a normative vacuum on the part of the ordinary legislator that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relations between persons of the same sex. / 4) The ordinary legislator must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relations between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely for this reason, the ordinary legislator assumed the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relations between persons of the same sex." (The boldface and underlining do not appear in the original document). Nor is it feasible to fail to highlight that, as a result of the political events known to all, no change in that state of affairs appears to be on the horizon in the short or medium term, especially after last June 6, the Special Permanent Commission on Human Rights of the Legislative Assembly, chaired by Deputy Justo Orozco, issued a majority negative recommendation on the bill on cohabitation partnerships (Ley de sociedades de convivencia) (No. 17.668), presented since April 13, 2010, by former legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría and then-legislators José Merino del Río, Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez, Sergio Alfaro Salas, and Alberto Salom Echeverría, and published in La Gaceta No. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And it does not alter what has been pointed out that, one day after the pronouncement of that Commission, the initiative was presented again at the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate by Deputies Carmen Muñoz and Carmen Granados and Deputies Carlos Góngora and José María Villalta (No. 18.481). Furthermore, consider that the topic has been in the legislative stream since September 27, 2006, a date on which Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, José Merino del Río, and Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez presented the bill on civil union between persons of the same sex (Ley de unión civil entre personas del mismo sexo) (No. 16.390), published in La Gaceta No. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up being archived on September 22, 2010.

XII.— Undoubtedly, in this specific matter submitted to our decision, at stake are both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it, and that of the substantive regulations to which resort must be had to integrate the current legal system. As, in our view, the condition of family group of the homosexual couple is undeniable, it corresponds to the family jurisdiction to hear and rule definitively on its personal and patrimonial consequences. Indeed, we are convinced that, as the non-heterosexual persons who make it up are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection, they have a full right to that recognition in this venue. Consider, additionally, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever may be made, above all if what is taken into account is sexual orientation, at the time of guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the bodies specialized in family matters may study their claim and, by means of a reasoned and well-founded ruling, uphold or reject it and thus resolve their conflict. It is not superfluous to highlight, furthermore, that however much it may be deemed impossible to apply the regulations of marriage in these cases, no violation of the reinforced protection contained in Article 52 of the Political Constitution is committed by recognizing such effects to the couple relationship between subjects of the same sex. For that reason and in order not to cause defenselessness and lack of protection to the parties, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and unique cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the recognition sought. Denying it for lack of a specific norm is not only incongruent with the family legal system, but also constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see, in similar terms, Second Chamber Vote No. 2003-143, at 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).

XIII.— In support of our thesis, we consider it essential to bring up the arguments set forth by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued in the framework of the cases "Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie" (Case C.C.T. 60/04) and "Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs" (Case C.C.T. 10/04), by means of which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the matrimonial regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual or gender identity or their sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a period of twelve months to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the national Law on marriage. In line with the line subsequently set forth by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with the writing by Justice Albie Sachs, specified then "(…) that the harm to same-sex couples exceeds the deprivations of material assets (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 72, among many others)." The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love is inferior, but that these persons may never be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but represents a radical way of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The statements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, first, through an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage entails and, second, through the construction of a different status as members of the community, a devalued status based on their chosen sexual orientation." [FERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Mariano (2007). Matrimonio y diversidad sexual: La lección sudafricana. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence, "(...) the State cannot withdraw certain couples from the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization it causes, largely limit and condition the choice and materialization of life plans. In this line, the Constitutional Court affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most prominent passages, the judgment emphasizes that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond respect for a private sphere free from state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be 'left alone' by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78)." [Ibid, p. 98].- XIV.- In summary, if, as the Sección Segunda of the Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil pointed out in its time, regarding the heterosexual de facto union (unión de hecho heterosexual) when it was considered by some social sectors as "(...) an illicit act contrary to good customs and marriage (...)", the truth is "(...) times are changing and jurisprudence must now fill the gap that the Legal System has by not protecting relationships of such a nature.", because, "It is not possible, in accordance with the principles of equity and justice, to set aside the joint effort made by two persons who unite in that way (...)." (Voto n.º 358, of 8:35 hours on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that the same reason exists ["Principle: 'ubi eadem ratio, idem jus' (For the same reason, the same right), contemplated in article 12 of the Civil Code (...)." (Voto of the Sala Segunda n.º 2003-502, of 15:30 hours on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and patrimonial consequences for the decision of two homosexual subjects to establish a bond with characteristics similar to conjugal ones, especially when full validity is given to the criterion according to which "(...) legislative power is subject to the limits established 'by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law'. It is thus that the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law – Declarations and Conventions on the matter – constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator (sic), both ordinary and, eminently, popular through referendum. This Tribunal Constitucional has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and pursuant to the provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to persons. Furthermore, this Tribunal Constitucional in Voto No. 2771-2003 of 11:40 hrs. on April 4, 2003, considered that even the derived reforming or constituent power – as a constituted power – is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, such that, by way of partial constitutional reform, the essential content of those rights cannot be reduced or curtailed. It should be added that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator (sic) is the Constitutional Law itself or the constitutional block (bloque de constitucionalidad) composed of constitutional principles, values, precepts, and jurisprudence. It is necessary to add that minority rights, due to their inalienable nature, constitute an eminently technical-legal matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator (sic) and not of majorities prone to their denial." (Voto n.º 2010-13313, of 16:31 hours on August 10, 2010).- XV.- Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal system and, in particular, the pronouncements of the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, in voto n.º 2313-95, of 16:18 hours on May 9, 1995, that body accurately noted that "(...) if the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos is the natural organ to interpret the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will have – in principle – the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis we now uphold, moreover, is accepted in our law, when the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides that unwritten norms – such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law – shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (article 7.l.)."- XVI.- The Yogyakarta Principles on the application of International Human Rights Law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Legislation and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards for the Organización de las Naciones Unidas and its Member States to advance in guaranteeing the necessary protections for non-heterosexual persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and transgender). In its preamble, it is recognized that "Sexual orientation and gender identity are essential to the dignity and humanity of every person and must not be grounds for discrimination or abuse." According to its first principle, "Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender identities are entitled to the full enjoyment of all human rights." The second stipulates that "All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination." According to the third, "The sexual orientation or gender identity that each person defines for themselves is essential to their personality and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of self-determination, dignity, and freedom. No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for the legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressures to hide, suppress, or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity." And, finally, the 24th recognizes the right of every person "(...) to form a family, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Various configurations of families exist. No family may be subjected to discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members." To that end, States "E. Shall take all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that in those States that recognize marriages or registered cohabitation partnerships (sociedades de convivencia registradas) between persons of the same sex, any right, privilege, obligation, or benefit granted to persons of different sexes who are married or in a registered union is available on equal terms to persons of the same sex married or in a registered cohabitation partnership; / F. Shall take all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that any obligation, right, privilege, or benefit granted to unmarried couples of different sexes is available on equal terms to unmarried couples of the same sex; (...)." In 2008, the Asamblea General of the Organización de los Estados Americanos unanimously adopted resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, through which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern about acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented to the Asamblea General of the United Nations the text of the Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, which reaffirms the principle of universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination, demanding that they apply equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, it expresses deep concern about violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and about the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice directed against persons in all countries of the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuse; it condemns human rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity wherever they occur; it calls upon all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and urges the former to take all necessary measures, particularly legislative or administrative, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity may not, under any circumstances, be the basis for criminal penalties. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the Joint Declaration to stop acts of violence and related human rights violations directed against persons for their sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, emphasized that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. "As a result, some governments treat these persons as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must fulfill the ideals of the Universal Declaration."- XVII.- Recently, in the cited judgment of February 24 of this year, issued in the Caso Atala Riffo y niñas vs. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of States Parties to the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos to respect and guarantee "without any discrimination" the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term "other social condition" ("otra condición social"), included in its article 1, paragraph 1). On this point, it specified the following: "78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of a general nature whose content extends to all the provisions of the treaty, and establishes the obligation of the States Parties to respect and guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein 'without any discrimination.' That is, whatever its origin or the form it assumes, any treatment that may be considered discriminatory regarding the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with it12. / 79. (...) the Court has indicated13 that the notion of equality derives directly from the oneness of the human family and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, against which any situation is incompatible that, by considering a certain group superior, leads to treating it with privilege; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it in the enjoyment of rights that are recognized for those not considered to be in such a situation. The Court's jurisprudence has also indicated that in the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The entire legal framework of national and international public order rests upon it and it permeates the entire legal system14." It also pointed out that, as a consequence of this, no domestic legal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation of all authorities and public officials to guarantee that they may enjoy each and every one of the rights established in the Convention. "80. Furthermore, the Tribunal has established that States must refrain from carrying out actions that are in any way directed, directly or indirectly, at creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination15. States are obligated to adopt positive measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations existing in their societies, to the detriment of a certain group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise with respect to actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations16." "82. (...) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits discrimination in law or in fact, not only regarding the rights enshrined in that treaty, but with respect to all laws approved by the State and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect or guarantee of a conventional right, it would breach the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to an unequal protection of domestic law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention17." "83. The Court has established, like the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must accompany the evolution of the times and current living conditions18. Such evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19." "84. In this sense, when interpreting the expression 'any other social condition' of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the most favorable alternative for the protection of the rights protected by that treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the norm most favorable to the human being20." "85. The specific criteria under which it is prohibited to discriminate, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not a taxative or limiting list but merely illustrative. On the contrary, the wording of that article leaves the criteria open with the inclusion of the term 'other social condition' so as to incorporate other categories that had not been explicitly indicated. The expression 'any other social condition' of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, from the perspective of the option most favorable to the person and of the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law21." "86. In this regard, in the Inter-American System, the Asamblea General of the Organización de Estados Americanos (hereinafter 'OEA') has approved, since 2008, in its annual sessions, four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of concrete measures for effective protection against discriminatory acts has been demanded22." "87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that sexual orientation is 'another condition' mentioned in Article 1423 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 'European Convention'), which prohibits discriminatory treatment24. In particular, in the Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta Vs. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Furthermore, it reiterated that the list of categories contained in that article is illustrative and not exhaustive25. Likewise, in the Case of Clift Vs. United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that may be included under 'other condition,' is another specific example of those found in that list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person26." "88. Within the framework of the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have classified sexual orientation as one of the prohibited discrimination categories considered in Article 2.127 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.228 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case of Toonen Vs. Australia that the reference to the category 'sex' would include the sexual orientation of persons29. Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding various discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been repeatedly expressed in its concluding observations on reports submitted by States30." "89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation may be framed under 'other social condition'31. Likewise, the Committee on the Rights of the Child32, the Committee against Torture33 have made references within the framework of their general observations and recommendations regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination." "90. On December 22, 2008, the Asamblea General of the United Nations adopted the 'Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,' reaffirming the 'principle of non-discrimination, which demands that human rights apply equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity'34. Likewise, on March 22, 2011, the 'Joint Declaration to stop acts of violence and human rights violations directed against persons for their sexual orientation and gender identity'35 was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on 'human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity' in which it expressed its 'grave concern regarding acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, [committed] against persons for their sexual orientation and gender identity'36. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports by United Nations special rapporteurs37." "91. Taking into account the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the criteria of interpretation set forth in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the Asamblea General of the OEA, the standards established by the European Court and United Nations bodies (supra paras. 83 to 90), the Inter-American Court hereby establishes that the sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on the sexual orientation of the person is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no domestic legal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation." "92. With regard to the State's argument that at the date of the issuance of the Supreme Court judgment there would have been no consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court emphasizes that the alleged lack of consensus within some countries on full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered38. The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Tribunal to abstain from deciding, since in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations undertaken by sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention." "93. A right that is recognized to persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstance based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1. of the American Convention. The Inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including therein categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention."- XVIII.- This Sala Constitucional has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in combating it. In voto n.º 2007-18660, of 11:17 hours on December 21, 2007, it specified this in the following terms: "Through its jurisprudential line, this Sala has recognized respect for the dignity of every human being as a fundamental legal principle contained in the Constitución Política de Costa Rica and, consequently, the absolute prohibition of carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or a group thereof; in this case, of homosexuals. Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity duly enshrined in the Constitución Política and in the International Treaties on Human Rights signed by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its Article 26 discrimination based on 'race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'; from which it also derives that acts that violate the right to equality and human dignity of persons because of their sexual orientation are not permitted, since they have the right to access any commercial establishment and to receive equal treatment, without discrimination based on their sexual preference." In n.º 2010-13313, of 16:31 hours on August 10, 2010, it added that "The human, fundamental, and statutorily-configured rights of minority or disadvantaged groups, for having traditionally suffered discrimination, exclusion, and all kinds of social prejudices – as occurs with that of homosexuals – arise from movements for their vindication (sic), ordinarily, against majority groups, given the insistence and natural inclination of majorities to maintain and perpetuate any discrimination and asymmetric treatment. The public powers, for their part, are obligated, by the Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law, to guarantee and promote the effective respect for the principle and the right to equality – real and not merely formal – of such groups (Article 33 of the Constitution and Article 24 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos or Pacto de San José). Situations of discrimination can be factual or legal; they will be of the first type when, in the presence of a minority group that is disadvantaged and discriminated against, measures are not adopted to overcome such a state of affairs." "In the face of groups that are the object of discrimination and social prejudices, the application of the principle of real equality and the prohibition of all discrimination, which normally operate ex post to the perpetration of the discriminatory act, does not suffice. Therefore, it is necessary that the public powers implement the principle of support for such groups through public policies and effective normative measures. The principle of support for discriminated groups prevents and anticipates discrimination, so that it has an ex ante effect with respect to them. The principle of support is fulfilled when legislation and regulations are enacted that recognize the rights of discriminated groups, even if these are of sub-constitutional configuration."- XIX.- As Fernando REY MARTÍNEZ points out, "Equality/prohibition of discrimination has a broader normative scope because it protects homosexuality in private spaces (preventing it from being treated by Law in an unreasonably different way from heterosexuality) but also in public ones, in that same sense. Public powers will have to provide an especially convincing or persuasive reason to treat homosexuals legally in a different and worse way than heterosexuals." "It goes without saying that, from the perspective of the prohibition of discrimination, protection becomes more effective and incisive, among other things because moral or historical arguments will no longer be sufficient by themselves to prevent homosexual persons from accessing certain rights that were traditionally forbidden to them, such as, for example, the right to maintain a legally recognized stable union with a person of their same sexual orientation." [Homosexualidad y Constitución. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid: 73, enero/abril, 2005, p.132]. Hence, it is imperative to eradicate, at least from the legal world, the profound homophobic social prejudice, which, moreover, perhaps bears a significant relationship to discrimination against women, inasmuch as the stigmatization of non-heterosexual persons appears closely linked to the supposed deviation from the role traditionally deemed appropriate for them (the core of the social reproach seems to lie in the fact that the "gay" man adopts a "woman's" position and that the lesbian assumes a "man's" one). "The fundamental right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation would, therefore, have the typical effect of equal treatment with its two corollaries, the prohibition of direct discrimination, that is, of different and worse legal treatments based on homosexuality, and of indirect or impact discrimination, that is, of legal differentiations that could be formally established not on the basis of sexual orientation, but which, in fact, negatively impact the homosexual minority." [ ibid, p. 139]. From the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation also derives a mandate for affirmative action. Public authorities are obliged to ensure that the social discrimination suffered by homosexual persons "does not prevail" in any way, for which they are obliged to adopt equal opportunity measures. "The protection of homosexuality, despite not being explicitly mentioned by our Constitution, has become a central constitutional matter, and not only because it affects, as one might suppose, a number of persons not easily determinable but undoubtedly significant, but, above all, because of the concurrence of two qualitative arguments, one relating to the value of liberty and the other to that of equality. In the question about the constitutional framework of homosexuality, liberty is, of course, at stake, because the heart of the matter is the sexual orientation of persons, that is, one of the keys to human existence and, therefore, to their dignity, central to family life, collective well-being, and the development of individual personality. But equality is also implicated, because our Constitution, as Justice Harlan of the U.S. Constitution said in his dissent to the Plessy v. Ferguson judgment (1896), 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens'." [ Ibid, p. 117]. As Justice J. Greaney indicated in his concurring opinion in the famous judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussets, Hillary Goodridge and others v. Departament of Public Health, of November 18, 2003: "As a matter of constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction can justify the perpetuation of the hierarchy according to which same-sex couples and their families are judged less deserving of social and legal recognition than opposite-sex ones".- XX.- Based on all of the foregoing, and although we have not the slightest doubt that, to decide whether the claim formulated in this matter can be granted or rejected, it is appropriate to apply analogically what is provided for de facto unions in the Family Code, with the exception, of course, of the requirement that it be a heterosexual relationship, we feel compelled to formulate this judicial consultation of constitutionality in order for that Chamber to define whether what it previously resolved regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevents us from doing so." “Every person has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, before the competent judges or tribunals, for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution, the law, or this Convention, even when such violation is committed by persons acting in the performance of their official duties.” (Article 25(1)). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter v. Argentina), it emphasized that “This Court has affirmed on other occasions that ‘in the law of nations, a customary norm prescribes that a State that has concluded an international agreement must introduce into its domestic law the modifications necessary to ensure the execution of the obligations assumed.’ In the American Convention, this principle is set forth in its Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions thereof, to guarantee the rights recognized therein².” It also reiterated that “(…) the adaptation of domestic legislation to the parameters established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two aspects, namely: a) the suppression of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees provided in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or obstruct their exercise, and b) the issuance of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of said guarantees. The first aspect is satisfied through the reform, repeal, or annulment of the norms or practices that have those scopes, as appropriate. The second obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, therefore, it must adopt all legal, administrative, and other measures that are necessary to avoid similar events from happening again in the future³.” Without a doubt, in the case of the union between persons of the same sex, its legislative recognition is essential in order to eradicate social discrimination against those who form it. In light of the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights enshrined in the Convention, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine expressed in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama), given the pressing need to offer some answer to the legitimate claim formulated in the sub-lite, “(…) there exists the duty to use those resources (…) that are related to the protection of fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as the right to liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention.” In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (Case of Durand and Ugarte), the Inter-American Court affirmed that “101. (…) the right of every person to a simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, before the competent judges or tribunals for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only (sic) of the American Convention, but also of the very Rule of Law in a democratic society in the sense of the Convention […]. Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties⁴. / 102. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that the inexistence of an effective recourse against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the same (sic) by the State Party in which such a situation takes place. In that sense, it must be underscored that, for such a recourse to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for by the Constitution or the law or that it is formally admissible, but rather it is required that it be truly suitable for establishing whether a violation of human rights has been incurred and for providing what is necessary to remedy it⁵. / (…) / 121. This Court has established that Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively enshrine an effective recourse, but also to ensure the due application of said recourse by its judicial authorities⁶.” In the judgment of June 21, 2002 (Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamín et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago), it expressed that “The Inter-American Court has also established that as part of the general obligations of the States, they have a positive duty of guarantee with respect to individuals subject to their jurisdiction. This entails taking all necessary measures to remove obstacles that may exist so that individuals may enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic resources to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]⁷.” In the judgment of September 7, 2004 (Case of Tibi v. Ecuador), it reiterated that “Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation on the part of the States to offer all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective judicial recourse against acts violative of their fundamental rights. / (…). From this perspective, it has been indicated that for the State to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 25.1 of the Convention, it is not enough that recourses exist formally, but (sic) it is essential that they be effective, that is, the person must be afforded the real possibility of filing a simple and prompt recourse that allows them to obtain, as applicable, the required judicial protection.” [See, in a similar vein, the judgments of November 27, 2003 (Case of Maritza Urrutia); June 7, 2003 (Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez); November 28, 2002 (Case of Cantos); August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community); January 31, 2001 (Case of the Constitutional Tribunal); November 25, 2000 (Case of Bámaca Velásquez); August 18, 2000 (Case of Cantoral Benavides); November 19, 1999 (Case of the “Street Children” (Case of Villagrán Morales et al.)); September 29, 1999 (Case of Cesti Hurtado); May 30, 1999 (Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al.); March 8, 1998 (Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.)); January 24, 1998 (Case of Blake); November 12, 1997 (Case of Suárez Rosero); and November 3, 1997 (Case of Castillo Páez)]. In the judgment of August 6, 2008 (Case of Castañeda Gutman v. United Mexican States), it specified that “An effective judicial recourse is that which is capable of producing the result for which it was conceived⁸, that is, it must be a recourse capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal for the purposes of establishing whether or not there has been a violation of human rights and, as applicable, providing a reparation⁹.” Finally, in the aforementioned judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter v. Argentina), it specified “107. (…) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of the States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial recourse against acts violative of their fundamental rights. Said effectiveness supposes that, in addition to the formal existence of the recourses, these yield results or responses to the violations of rights contemplated either in the Convention, the Constitution, or the laws. In that sense, those recourses that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, prove illusory cannot be considered effective. This may occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated by practice, because the means to execute their decisions are lacking, or for any other situation that configures a situation of denial of justice. Thus, the process must tend toward the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial pronouncement through the suitable application of said pronouncement¹⁰. / 108. On the other hand, as the Court has previously indicated, when evaluating the effectiveness of recourses, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial processes have effectively contributed to putting an end to a situation violative of rights, to ensuring the non-repetition of harmful acts, and to guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention¹¹.”- VIII.- According to Article 41 of the Constitución Política, “By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice in strict conformity with the laws.” In its time (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Corte Plena, acting as the body responsible for constitutional review, highlighted that from that supreme norm a series of basic principles are derived to which all persons and competent bodies must adjust their actions in the jurisdictional sphere. By virtue of these, the Asamblea Legislativa is obliged to promulgate the necessary legal precepts to regulate the rights of persons and to establish the adequate means and procedures to procure their effective jurisdictional protection when they have been violated. For their part, the different Tribunals are responsible for interpreting and applying those provisions in such a way that they do not hinder the due verification of the grievance and guarantee, if it is proven, the full and timely reestablishment thereof. Hence, we judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we make access to the stipulated procedures impossible or difficult, or when we reject or deny a petition that we should have granted in a judgment, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one. In Voto 1739-92, of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, this Chamber held that “At the base of all procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a justice administration system, that is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State -declaring the disputed right or restoring the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in specific cases- which comprises, in turn, a set of independent specialized judicial bodies in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that social life originates, in a civilized and effective manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under conditions of equality and without discrimination. / a) In this first sense, then, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for this (sic), which require the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is not, on the other hand, more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right of petition, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27 -in general- and 41 -in particular- of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other implications that are even more immediately exigible, which may, in turn, concern the justice administration system itself, per se, or the right of access to justice for all persons: / (…) / 2. And belonging to the second -the right of all to access justice equally-, in addition to the generic right of petition of Article 27 and the specific right to justice of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, a series of complementary -but also fundamental- attributes, among which: / (i) the general right and principle of equality -and its counterpart of non-discrimination-, contained in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as all international Human Rights instruments, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these (sic) demonstrates that equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that this (sic) is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here because they are not directly implicated in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informalism, etc.” As was concluded in Voto 1562-93, of 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing “(…) means, in the first place, that due process requires the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right of petition enshrined in Articles 27 -in general- and 41 -in particular- of the Constitution (…). In the second place, it concerns the justice administration system itself per se and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be ‘reasonableness of the effects’ on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing upon these (sic) (…) other limitations than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those indispensable for them to function adequately in social life.”- IX.- In ordinary legislation, that fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the Código Civil and in Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. By virtue of the first, “The Tribunals have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which they shall adhere to the system of sources established.” According to the second paragraph of the latter, “The tribunals may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their competence due to a lack of a norm to apply and they must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of their sources.” Indeed, that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply the absence of legal norms: “The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it comes to supplying the absence and not the insufficiency of the provisions that regulate a matter, said sources shall have the rank of law.” (The bold text is added). Consequently, we jurisdictional bodies are prohibited from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to a specific case in order to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a proceeding such as this. The dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system obliges us to resort, in an integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the controversy raised. On this matter, in Voto 36-F-94, of 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the Sala Primera pointed out that “(…) jurisprudence as a source informing the legal system is called upon to supply, through extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms tasked with resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or when it was not conceived for new legal demands (Article 9 of the Código Civil).” In decisions No. 112-F-92, of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; No. 151-F-01, of 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001; and No. 360-F-02, of 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it expressed that “(…) Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Código Civil admit referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system), on the other hand Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Código Civil admits the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and there is no norm prohibiting it.” For its part, the Sala Segunda, in decision No. 415, of 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, framed it in the following terms: “(…) in every case, one must resort, for the sake of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity, and even, as Prof. Antequera points out in his cited work, to common sense, that is, what people normally have to reasonably judge things (Articles 10 to 12 of the Código Civil, 15 of the Código de Trabajo, and 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).” In decision No. 2004-200, of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Código Civil “(…) develops a fundamental right, contained in Article 41 of the Constitución Política, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, to fulfill such an objective, Article 12 of that Code must be taken into consideration, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when these (sic) do not contemplate a specific scenario but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits that application. In a case such as the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not strange in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) that the only thing that unites them or united them were affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, to order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the lengthy relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But also, to resolve the matter, in light of what has been stated, an answer can be provided to the situation raised, resorting ‘mutatis mutandis’ to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.” Finally, in decision No. 769-93, of 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, this Constitutional Chamber recognized that “Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could resort to another regulation (…), or to other parameters likewise authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a certain matter. These criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and Article 1 of the Código Civil; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Código Civil, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing that, pursuant to the first norm cited, a tribunal cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of applicable law to the case raised. Judges [both male and female] therefore have, at their disposal, broad possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power that case-law on Family Law in our country has had has been such, that it has also been affirmed categorically, that many of the norms of the Código de Familia have their origin in court decisions, some even markedly dissident or minority in tone, but not thereby devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that this is where such behavior has been noticed most rapidly.”- X.- Article 12 of the Código Civil stipulates that “The analogical application of norms shall proceed when these (sic) do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when any norm prohibits that application.” In relation to the analogical procedure for integrating positive law, in Voto 1-F-94, of 3:00 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in decision No. 2010-1094 of the Sala Segunda, of 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the Sala Primera specified that “III.- (…). By analogy is understood, from a logical point of view, a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, by means of which one seeks to extend the validity of a proposition from one specific situation to another generically similar one. In antiquity, it was known by the name of ‘procedure by similarity.’ Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction, the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but only probable. In other words, in analogy, one situation or fact is compared with another situation or fact, and thus one tries to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those similar aspects or connotations between the situations analyzed, such that the more the essential aspects, and not merely accidental ones, resemble each other, the more convincing the extensive conclusion drawn will be. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which, based on several cases, analyzing their particular connotations, a general conclusion is obtained. In generalization, it is not a matter of comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but rather the analysis of several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses all of them. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence regarding legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in the general doctrine of law, it has come to be admitted, by a majority, that the legal system can have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a certain matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts, in order to thus resolve the conflicts of interests present in these cases. Therefore, in the face of gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to rule by alleging that they find no norm whatsoever to apply to the specific case; this would amount to a denial of justice.

However, neither does [the judge] have the power to arbitrarily create the applicable rule for the specific case. In our normative system, the judge is a judge of law, not of conscience, and any decision made must find support in the current legal system. To fill these gaps, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, both in its previous and current text, establishes that courts may not excuse themselves from ruling due to a lack of a rule, and by establishing that in such a case, the general principles of law shall be resorted to in the absence of a legal rule, it does not exclude that, before resorting to this interpretive criterion, analogy may be used, as regulated by articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, in order to apply a written rule established for a similar legal situation to the case at hand. Through this procedure, the aim is to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents the same legal essence. These are situations in which there is no factual identity, but rather a substantial similarity so relevant that it justifies the application of the rule established for the case contemplated by the legislator to the one lacking regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar rules. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine whether between both situations there exist legal similarities of such an entity as to allow the analogical extension of the known rule. This problem cannot be resolved mechanically or with purely logical criteria; it is rather a legal assessment made by the judge, in which it is determined whether the factual elements contemplated in the known rule, which motivated the establishment of a specific provision by the legislator (according to the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation under consideration. It may be that the fact considered has certain essential elements that characterize it and other accidental or contingent ones that accompany it. What is important is that there is a correspondence between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogy legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is used; and analogy iuris, which does not take a single rule as its starting point, but rather a series of provisions, from which it induces a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding whereas clause: analogy legis corresponds to induction by analogy and analogy iuris to induction by generalization. The doctrine considers the recourse to general principles of law as a case of analogy iuris, which can only be obtained through generalization. To proceed with the analogical interpretation of rules, the following is necessary: 1- that a precise legal provision is lacking for the disputed case, so that analogical application would not be possible where there are express legal precepts or from which, through extensive interpretation, a solution to the case at hand can be deduced; 2- that there exists an essential juridical similarity between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge, after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it is not one of those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to be applied, analogy is inappropriate. Regarding this last requirement, legal praxis has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the following: 1- It is not possible to apply prohibitive and punitive laws by analogy, as they are restrictive in nature; 2- nor is it possible to do so in the case of rules that limit a person's capacity or subjective rights, as this is an odious matter; 3- in the case of "ius singulare" or exceptional law, by its very nature, as it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application is not appropriate; and, 4- in the case of temporary rules, analogy is also not appropriate, as they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the assumptions that prevent the application of analogy, it is appropriate to refer (…), to the impossibility of extensively applying those rules of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by rules characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, its guidelines, assumptions, and foundations do not deviate from the general lines of the Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional law, is inspired by rules different from those that characterize the normative system in general. At times, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal transactions, or to resolve some special cases with particular equity criteria, or due to needs emerging from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice general principles, establishing provisions that exclude some persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special penalties or liabilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general rules that govern the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. Therefore, in such cases, the application by analogy of exceptional rules or those of ius singulare to those cases not expressly contemplated by the rules is not possible. / VI.- In our Civil Code, the analogical application of rules is regulated by articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to article 12, the analogical interpretation of rules is possible "... when these do not contemplate a specific assumption, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, unless some rule prohibits that application". Thus, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where there is an identical "ratio legis". For its part, article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of criminal, exceptional, and temporary laws. In this way, our Civil Code allows this method of integrating the Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding whereas clauses." (See, also, the ruling of the First Chamber No. 167-F-S1-2010, of 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).- XI.- Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber affirmed in the cited ruling No. 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, "(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged regulations [subsection 6 of article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…)."; if it does not violate the Political Constitution because there is no "(…) impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is an empirical verification to indicate that they have increased." and if "(…) it is not appropriate to apply the regulations developed for marriage in the terms currently conceived in our constitutional order."; what, then, would be the regulation we would have to resort to in order to decide this process on its merits? It should be borne in mind that, despite having been pointed out on that occasion that the problem raised "(…) does not lie in the rule challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary. We are, then, in the presence of a scenario of lege ferenda, but not by any stretch of an illegitimate omission by the State. This is also indicated because in the documentation attached to the file, and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing held during the substantiation of this process, some countries have been enacting laws (in a formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, with the purpose that they have specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to which (…) the legal framework that the derived constituent organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied." (The boldface is added); on a more recent date, that same body evidenced that "(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Court in the Sentence supra cited, is […maintained…], with which […it is being…] indirectly disregarding the reasons given (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in matters of constitutionality control, to consider that numeral 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution." (Ruling No. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not superfluous to mention that in that last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the subject in the terms set forth below: "From this ruling [referring to No. 2006-7262, previously cited] several important aspects for resolving the sub-lite are clear, which are the following: / 1st) Relationships between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or bypassed. / 2nd) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex. / 3rd) There exists a normative void of the ordinary legislator that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4th) The ordinary legislator must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Ruling, by what is provided in article 13 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator assumed the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex." (The boldface and underlining do not appear in the original document). Nor is it feasible to fail to highlight that, as a result of the political events known to all, it does not seem foreseeable that, in the short or medium term, this state of affairs may vary, especially after last June 6, the Special Permanent Commission on Human Rights of the Legislative Assembly, chaired by deputy Justo Orozco, issued a negative majority opinion on the project of Law on Cohabitation Partnerships (No. 17,668), presented since April 13, 2010 by former legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría and then legislators José Merino del Río, Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez, Sergio Alfaro Salas, and Alberto Salom Echeverría and published in La Gaceta No. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And what has been pointed out is not altered by the fact that, one day after the pronouncement of that Commission, the initiative was presented again at the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate by deputies Carmen Muñoz and Carmen Granados and deputies Carlos Góngora and José María Villalta (No. 18,481). Note, also, that the issue has been in the legislative stream since September 27, 2006, the date on which Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, José Merino del Río, and Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez presented the project of Law on Civil Union between Persons of the Same Sex (No. 16,390), published in La Gaceta No. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up being archived on September 22, 2010.- XII.- Without a doubt, in this specific matter submitted to our decision, both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it and that of the substantive regulations to which recourse must be made to integrate the current legal system are at stake. Since, in our opinion, the condition of a family group of the homosexual couple is undeniable, it falls to the family jurisdiction to hear and definitively rule on its personal and patrimonial consequences. Indeed, we are convinced that, since the non-heterosexual persons who form it are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection, they have every right to that recognition in this venue. Note, also, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever should be made, especially if what is taken into account is sexual orientation, at the time of guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the bodies specialized in family matters study their claim and, through a reasoned and founded judgment, grant or reject it and thus resolve their conflict. It is not superfluous to evidence, furthermore, that, however much it is considered impossible to apply the regulations of marriage in these cases, no infraction of the reinforced protection contained in article 52 of the Political Constitution is committed by recognizing such effects to the couple relationship between subjects of the same sex. For this reason and in order not to cause defenselessness and lack of protection to the parties, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and singular cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the intended recognition. Denying it due to the lack of a specific rule is not only incongruent with the family legal order, but also constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see, in similar terms, the ruling of the Second Chamber No. 2003-143, of 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).- XIII.- In support of our thesis, we consider it essential to bring up the arguments set forth by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued within the framework of the cases "Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie" (Case C.C.T. 60/04) and "Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs" (Case C.C.T. 10/04), through which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the matrimonial regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual or gender identity or their sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a period of twelve months to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the national Law on marriage. In line with the position later expounded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with the writing of Judge Albie Sachs, pointed out then "(…) that the harm to same-sex couples exceeds the deprivations of material goods (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 72, among many others). The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love is inferior, but that these persons will never be able to be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but represents a radical way of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The statements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, in the first place, from an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage brings with it and, in the second place, from the construction of a different status as members of the community, a devalued status by reason of the chosen sexual orientation." [FERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Mariano (2007). Marriage and sexual diversity: The South African lesson. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved on June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence, "(…) the State cannot exempt certain couples from the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization it causes, greatly limit and condition the choice and materialization of life plans. In that line, the Constitutional Court affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most prominent passages, the judgment emphasizes that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond respect for a private sphere foreign to state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be "left alone" by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78)." [Ibid, p. 98].- XIV.- In summary, if, as pointed out in its time by the Second Section of the Second Superior Civil Court, regarding the heterosexual common-law marriage when it was considered by some social sectors as "(…) an illicit act contrary to good customs and marriage (…)", the truth is "(…) times are changing and jurisprudence must now fill the gap that the Legal System has by not protecting relationships of such a nature.", because, "It is not possible, according to the principles of equity and justice, to set aside the common effort made by two persons who unite in that way (…)." (Ruling No. 358, of 8:35 a.m. on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that the same reason exists ["Principle: "ubi eadem ratio, idem jus" (Where there is the same reason, there is the same right), contemplated in article 12 of the Civil Code (…)." (Ruling of the Second Chamber No. 2003-502, of 3:30 p.m. on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and patrimonial consequences to the decision of two homosexual subjects to establish a bond with characteristics similar to conjugal ones, especially when full force is given to the criterion according to which "(…) the legislative power is subject to the limits imposed "by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law". Thus, the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law –Declarations and Conventions on the matter–, constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator, both ordinary and, eminently, popular through a referendum. This Constitutional Court has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and according to what is established in article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to persons. On the other hand, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 2771-2003 of 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, considered that even the amending or derived constituent power –as a constituted power– is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, so that, by way of partial reform of the constitution, the essential content of those cannot be reduced or curtailed. It should be added that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator is constituted by the Law of the Constitution itself or the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional principles, values, precepts, and jurisprudence. It is necessary to add that the rights of minorities, due to their inalienable character, constitute an eminently technical-juridical matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator and not of majorities prone to their denial." (Ruling No. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010).- XV.- Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal system and, in particular, of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in ruling No. 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, that body accurately pointed out that "(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normativity, whether in a contentious case or in a mere advisory opinion, will have -in principle- the same value as the interpreted rule. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood it. This thesis that we now uphold, moreover, is accepted in our law, when the General Law of the Public Administration provides that unwritten rules -such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law- will serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and will have the rank of the rule they interpret, integrate or delimit (article 7.l.)."- XVI.- The Yogyakarta Principles on the application of International Human Rights Law to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Legislation and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards for the United Nations Organization and the States that comprise it to advance in guaranteeing the necessary protections for non-heterosexual persons (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals, and transgender persons). In its preamble, it is recognized that "Sexual orientation and gender identity are essential for the dignity and humanity of each person and should not be a reason for discrimination or abuse." According to its first principle, "Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender identities have the right to the full enjoyment of all human rights." The second stipulates that "All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit all discrimination and guarantee all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination." According to the third, "The sexual orientation or gender identity that each person defines for themself is essential for their personality and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom.

No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for the legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressures to conceal, suppress, or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity.” And, finally, section 24 recognizes the right of every person “(…) to form a family, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Diverse configurations of families exist. No family may be subjected to discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members.” To that end, States “E. Shall adopt all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that in those States that recognize same-sex marriages or registered cohabitation partnerships, any right, privilege, obligation, or benefit granted to opposite-sex persons who are married or in a registered union is available under equal conditions to same-sex persons who are married or in a registered cohabitation partnership; / F. Shall adopt all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that any obligation, right, privilege, or benefit granted to unmarried opposite-sex couples is available under equal conditions to unmarried same-sex couples; (…).” In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States unanimously adopted resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, through which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern regarding acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented to the United Nations General Assembly the text of the Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, which reaffirms the principle of the universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination, which requires that they be applied equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, deep concern is expressed therein regarding violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice directed against persons from all countries of the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuses; human rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity are condemned wherever they occur; a call is made to all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to promoting and protecting the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and the former are urged to take all necessary measures, particularly legislative or administrative ones, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity may not, under any circumstances, be the basis for criminal penalties. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the Joint declaration to stop acts of violence and related human rights violations directed against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia before the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, highlighted that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. “As a result, some governments treat these persons as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must fulfill the ideals of the Universal Declaration.”- XVII.- In a recent ruling, the aforementioned judgment of February 24 of this year, issued in the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights to respect and guarantee “without any discrimination” the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term “other social condition,” contained in its Article 1, paragraph 1. On this matter, it specified the following: “78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of general character whose content extends to all the provisions of the treaty, and sets forth the obligation of the States Parties to respect and guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein ‘without any discrimination.’ That is, whatever the origin or form it assumes, any treatment that may be considered discriminatory regarding the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with it12. / 79. (…) the Court has indicated13 that the notion of equality derives directly from the unity of the nature of the human race and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, before which any situation that, by considering a certain group superior, leads to treating it with privilege is incompatible; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it in the enjoyment of rights that are recognized for those not considered to be in such a situation. The jurisprudence of the Court has also indicated that at the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The legal framework of both national and international public order rests on it and it permeates the entire legal system14.” It further specified, moreover, that as a consequence thereof, no internal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person because of their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation of all authorities and officials to guarantee that they can enjoy each and every one of the rights established in the Convention. “80. In addition, the Court has established that States must refrain from carrying out actions that are in any way directed, directly or indirectly, at creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination15. States are obligated to adopt positive measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations existing in their societies, to the detriment of a specific group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise with respect to actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations16.” “82. (…) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits discrimination in law or in fact, not only with respect to the rights enshrined in said treaty, but also with respect to all laws approved by the State and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect or guarantee of a conventional right, it would breach the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to unequal protection of domestic law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention17.” “83. The Court has established, like the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must accompany the evolution of the times and current living conditions18. Such evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19.” “84. In this sense, when interpreting the expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the alternative most favorable for the protection of the rights protected by said treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the norm most favorable to the human being20.” “85. The specific criteria under which discrimination is prohibited, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not a closed or limitative list but merely illustrative. On the contrary, the wording of said article leaves the criteria open by including the term ‘other social condition’ to thereby incorporate other categories that may not have been explicitly indicated. The expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, from the perspective of the option most favorable to the person and the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law21.” “86. In this regard, in the Inter-American System, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter ‘OAS’) has approved, since 2008, in its annual sessions, four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of concrete measures for effective protection against discriminatory acts22 has been demanded.” “87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that sexual orientation is an ‘other condition’ mentioned in Article 1423 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ‘European Convention’), which prohibits discriminatory treatment24. In particular, in the Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta Vs. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Moreover, it reiterated that the list of categories made in said article is illustrative and not exhaustive25. Likewise, in the Case of Clift Vs. the United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that can be included under ‘other condition,’ is another specific example of those found in said list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person26.” “88. Within the framework of the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have qualified sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination considered in Article 2.127 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.228 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case of Toonen Vs. Australia that the reference to the category ‘sex’ would include the sexual orientation of persons29. Equally, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding various discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been repeatedly expressed in its concluding observations on the reports submitted by States30.” “89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation can be framed under ‘other social condition’31. Likewise, the Committee on the Rights of the Child32, the Committee against Torture33 have made references within the framework of their general observations and recommendations, regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination.” “90. On December 22, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the ‘Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ reaffirming the ‘principle of non-discrimination, which requires that human rights apply equally to every human being, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity’34. Likewise, on March 22, 2011, the ‘Joint Declaration to Stop Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Directed Against Persons Because of Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’35 was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on ‘human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’ in which ‘grave concern’ was expressed over ‘acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, [committed] against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity’36. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports by the United Nations special rapporteurs37.” “91. Considering the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the interpretation criteria set forth in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the OAS, the standards established by the European Court and the organs of the United Nations (supra paras. 83 to 90), the Inter-American Court establishes that sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on the sexual orientation of the person is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no internal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation.” “92. Regarding the State’s argument that, at the date of issuance of the Supreme Court’s judgment, there would not have been a consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court emphasizes that the alleged lack of consensus within some countries on the full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered38. The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Court to abstain from deciding, because in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations assumed by sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention.” “93. A right that is recognized to persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstance based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1. of the American Convention. The inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including therein categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention.”- XVIII.- This Constitutional Chamber has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in combating it. In Ruling No. 2007-18660, of 11:17 a.m. on December 21, 2007, it specified this in the following terms: “Through its jurisprudential line, this Chamber has recognized as a fundamental legal principle contained in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica the respect for the dignity of every human being and, consequently, the absolute prohibition of carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or group thereof; in this case, of homosexuals. Based on the foregoing, it can validly be affirmed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity duly enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Human Rights Treaties signed by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its Article 26 discrimination on grounds of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’; from which it also derives that acts violating the right to equality and human dignity of persons based on their sexual orientation are not permitted, since they have the right to access any commercial establishment and to receive equal treatment, without discrimination due to their sexual preference.” In No. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010, it added that “The human rights, fundamental rights, and legal configuration rights of minority or disadvantaged groups, for having traditionally suffered discrimination, exclusion, and all kinds of social prejudices – as occurs with that of homosexuals – arise from movements of vindication by the latter (sic), ordinarily against majorities, given the insistence and natural inclination of majorities to maintain and perpetuate any discrimination and asymmetric treatment. The public authorities, for their part, are obligated, by the Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law, to guarantee and promote the effective respect for the principle and the right to equality – real and not formal – of such groups (Article 33 of the Constitution and Article 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José). Situations of discrimination can be factual or legal; they will be of the first type when, given the existence of a minority group at a disadvantage and discriminated against, measures are not adopted to overcome such a state of affairs.” “In the face of groups that are subject to discrimination and social prejudices, the application of the principle of real equality and prohibition of all discrimination, which normally operate ex post to the perpetration of the discriminatory act, is insufficient. Therefore, it is necessary for the public authorities to implement the principle of support for such groups through public policies and effective normative measures. The principle of support for discriminated groups prevents and anticipates discriminations, so that it has an ex ante effect with respect to them. The principle of support is fulfilled when legislation and regulations are enacted that recognize rights of discriminated groups, even if these are of infra-constitutional configuration.”- XIX.- As Fernando REY MARTÍNEZ points out, “The equality/prohibition of discrimination has a broader normative scope because it protects homosexuality in private spaces (preventing it from being treated by Law in an unreasonably different manner from heterosexuality) but also in public ones, in that same sense. Public authorities will have to provide an especially convincing or persuasive reason to treat homosexuals legally in a different and worse manner than heterosexuals. Needless to say, from the perspective of the prohibition of discrimination, protection becomes more effective and incisive, among other things because moral or historical arguments will no longer be sufficient by themselves to prevent homosexual persons from accessing certain rights that they traditionally had been barred from, such as, for example, the right to maintain a legally recognized stable union with a person of their same sexual orientation.” [Homosexualidad y Constitución. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid: 73, January/April, 2005, p.132]. Hence, it becomes imperative to eradicate, at least from the legal world, the deep homophobic social prejudice, which, on the other hand, perhaps bears a significant relationship to discrimination against women, since the stigmatization of non-heterosexual persons appears closely linked to the supposed deviation from the role traditionally judged as appropriate for them (the center of social reproach seems to lie in the fact that the “gay” person adopts a “female” position and that the lesbian assumes a “male” one). “The fundamental right not to be discriminated against by reason of sexual orientation would thus have the typical effect of equal treatment with its two corollaries, the prohibition of direct discriminations, that is, of different and worse legal treatments based on homosexuality, and of indirect or impact discriminations, that is, of legal differentiations that could formally be established not by reason of sexual orientation, but that, in fact, would negatively impact the homosexual minority.” [ibid, p. 139]. From the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation also derives a mandate for affirmative action. Public authorities are obligated to ensure that the social discrimination suffered by homosexual persons ‘does not prevail’ in any way, for which purpose they are obligated to adopt equal opportunity measures. “The protection of homosexuality, despite not being explicitly alluded to by our Constitution, has become a central constitutional matter, and not only because it affects, as one can assume, a number of persons not easily determinable, but undoubtedly significant, but, above all, because of the concurrence of two qualitative arguments, one relating to the value of freedom and the other to that of equality. What is at stake in the question regarding the constitutional framework of homosexuality is, of course, freedom, because the heart of the matter is the sexual orientation of persons, that is, one of the keys to human existence and, therefore, to their dignity, central to family life, collective well-being, and the development of individual personality. But equality is also implicated, because our Constitution, as Justice Harlan of the American Constitution said in his dissent to the Plessy v. Ferguson Judgment (1896), ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” [Ibid, p. 117]. As Justice J. indicated.

<p>Greaney, in his concurring vote in the famous Judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hillary Goodridge and others v. Department of Public Health, of November 18, 2003: “As a matter of constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition nor individual conviction can justify the perpetuation of the hierarchy under which same-sex couples and their families are deemed less worthy of social and legal recognition than opposite-sex ones.”.-</p> <p>XX.- Based on all of the foregoing, and although we have no doubt whatsoever that in order to decide whether the claim brought in this matter can be upheld or dismissed, it is appropriate to apply by analogy what is provided for de facto unions in the Family Code (Código de Familia), with the exception, of course, of the requirement that it be a heterosexual relationship, we find ourselves compelled to formulate this judicial consultation of constitutionality for the purpose of having that Chamber define whether its prior rulings regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevent us from doing so.”</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> Martens, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, rightly pointed out that <i>“Marriage is much more than a sexual union and, therefore, the capacity to have relations of this nature is not ‘essential.’ Persons who cannot procreate or have sexual relations may also seek to marry. This is because marriage entails more than a union that legitimizes such relations and is intended for procreation: it is a legal institution that creates a fixed legal relationship between the spouses and between them and third parties (including the authorities). As one author has stated, spouses, through the bonds of marriage, ‘announce to the world around them that their relationship is founded on intense human feelings and on a mutual, exclusive and permanent commitment.’ It is also a kind of community in which intellectual, spiritual and sentimental ties are at least as essential as physical ones. / Article 12 of the Convention [for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms] protects the right of any man or woman (of marriageable age) to enter into this union and, therefore, the definition of what the words ‘man and woman’ mean in this context must take into account all these characteristics of marriage.”</i> In similar terms, Ms. E. Palm and Messrs. I. Foighel and R. Pekkanen, judges of that same body, stated in their joint dissenting individual opinion that forms part of the same judgment: <i>“The fact that a transsexual cannot procreate is not decisive. There are many men and many women who are also unable to have children and yet have the unquestionable right to marry. The capacity to procreate is not and cannot be a prerequisite for marriage.”</i> Under the same approach, Professor Pilar DOMÍNGUEZ LOZANO of the Autonomous University of Madrid argues that, <i>“Indeed, if marriage [and, by extension, the heterosexual de facto union] is defined as an affective and material community of life, and not by its social function; if its essential purpose is no longer reproductive, but defined around personal fulfillment and the free development of personality; if its constitutional content is linked, primarily, to fundamental individual rights and freedoms; if the ius connubium is predicated, in principle, of any person, based on requirements of equality and freedom; and if the legal regulation of marriage and of relations between spouses has undergone a turn towards the Law of Obligations; it is difficult to admit as unquestionable the prohibition on same-sex couples entering into marriage.”</i> [Same-sex unions: regulatory options and their legal implications. <i>Derecho Privado y Constitución</i>, Madrid: 20, January-December, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- **IV.-** In the judgment issued on November 18, 2003 in the case Hillary Goodridge and others vs. Department of Public Health, delivered by Judge Marshall, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the prohibition on access to marriage for same-sex persons contrary to the Constitution. It argued that it is faced with <i>“(…) a vital social institution (…)”</i> and that <i>“(…) the decision of whether to marry and whom to marry is one of the utmost moments of self-determination in life.”</i> Therefore, and because <i>“the benefits accessible only to those holding a marriage license are enormous, affecting practically every aspect of life and death”</i>, it has long been considered a fundamental right (<i>civil right</i>). As it is a central element of individuals’ lives and the community’s well-being, barring same-sex persons from the right to marry deprives them <i>“(…) of one of the most important aspects of human experience (…)”</i> and <i>“(…) denies them full access to the protection of the laws (…)”</i>; hence, such exclusion could only be admitted if it fulfills <i>“(…) an indispensable public objective (…)”</i> and is <i>“(…) a reasonable means to achieve that end.”</i> Those conditions are not met regarding the prohibition on marriage between same-sex persons, which excepts such rule because of a singular trait: sexual orientation, which injures the freedom, recognized in the Constitution of Massachusetts, as well as equality, which prevents the existence of second-class citizens. The three main justifications for this prohibition are not constitutionally reasonable: neither that heterosexual marriage provides a favorable framework for procreation (understood as unassisted heterosexual procreation); nor that it ensures an optimal space for child care; nor that homosexual marriage will trivialize or destroy that institution as it has been historically configured. The essence of the freedom to marry is to unite with the person of one’s own choice. By preventing marriage between same-sex persons, <i>“(…) the State confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotypes that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to heterosexual relationships and are therefore not worthy of respect.”</i>- **V.-** It is true that in Vote n.º 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, in which it deemed the legal impossibility of marriage between same-sex persons, established in subsection 6 of article 14 of the <i>Family Code</i>, to be legitimate, the Constitutional Chamber assigned to the Legislative Assembly the responsibility of <i>“(…) considering the need to regulate, in whatever manner it deems appropriate, the bonds or rights derived from this type of union, which evidently requires a complete regulatory development establishing the rights and obligations of this type of couple (…).”</i> It is also true that, four years later, in number 2010-641, at 2:56 a.m. on January 13, 2010, it dismissed on the merits the unconstitutionality action brought by Mr. [Name 001] against article 242 <i>ibidem</i>; a ruling which, according to the limited information available as its drafting is still pending, cites the aforementioned number 2006-7262. From this, based on the provisions of article 13 of the <i>Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction</i>, it is not far-fetched to conclude that those precedents would seem to prevent us from resorting to the regulation of the de facto union, contained in articles 242, 243, 244 and 245 <i>ibidem</i>, even by analogy, in order to resolve this claim on the merits, leaving no other option but to confirm the outright rejection ordered by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the order issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, which, as noted, considered it unfilable.- **VI.-** Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the de facto situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Assembly at a given historical moment, in order to properly integrate the legal system and offer a response to the underlying claim of Mr. [Name 001]. Indeed, we are convinced that, in a system such as Costa Rica’s, the absence of specific legislation does not authorize the outright rejection of a claim. The fundamental right to effective judicial protection, recognized, among other provisions, in Article 8(1) and Article 25(1), in relation to Articles 1 and 2 of the <i>American Convention on Human Rights</i> and Article 41 of the <i>Political Constitution</i>, and the principle of the hermetic completeness of the legal system, dealt with in Article 6 of the <i>Civil Code</i> and Article 5 of the <i>Organic Law of the Judicial Branch</i>, prevent such a ruling. As the judges of the Constitutional Chamber highlighted: <i>“In our capacity as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to be considered in decision-making regarding matters brought before us (…).”</i> (Vote n.º 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006).- **VII.-** Pursuant to the <i>American Convention on Human Rights</i>, approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law n.º 4534, of February 23, 1970, <i>“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”</i> (Article 1, paragraph 1). <i>“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”</i> (Article 2). <i>“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, (…) for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”</i> (Article 8, paragraph 1). <i>“Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.”</i> (Article 25, paragraph 1). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina), it emphasized that <i>“This Court has affirmed on other occasions that ‘[i]n the law of nations, a customary norm prescribes that a State which has concluded an international agreement must introduce into its domestic law the necessary modifications to ensure the execution of the obligations assumed.’ This principle is embodied in Article 2 of the American Convention, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of this Convention in order to guarantee the rights recognized therein².”</i> It also reiterated that <i>“(…) the adaptation of domestic legislation to the parameters established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two respects, namely: a) the suppression of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees set forth in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or hinder their exercise, and b) the issuance of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of those guarantees.</i> <i>The first aspect is satisfied by reforming, derogating, or annulling the norms or practices that have those scopes, as appropriate. The second obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, for this reason, must adopt all necessary legal, administrative, and other measures to prevent similar events from occurring in the future³.”</i> Without a doubt, in the case of same-sex unions, their legislative recognition is essential in order to eradicate social discrimination against those who form them. Given the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights enshrined in the <i>Convention</i>, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of Heliodoro Portugal Vs. Panama), given the overriding need to offer some response to the legitimate claim made in the <i>sub-lite</i> ,<i>“(…) there is a duty to use those remedies (…) that are related to the protection of the fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as the right to freedom, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention.”</i> In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (Case Durand and Ugarte), the Inter-American Court affirmed that <i>“101. (…) the right of every person to a simple and prompt remedy or any other effective remedy before competent courts or tribunals that protects them against acts that violate their fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but of the Rule of Law itself in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention […]. Article 25 is intimately linked to the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties⁴. / 102. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that the inexistence of an effective remedy against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the same by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In this sense, it must be underlined that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for in the Constitution or the law or that it is formally admissible, but it is required that it is truly suitable to establish whether a violation of human rights has occurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it⁵. / (…) / 121. This Court has established that [A]rticle 25 is intimately linked to the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively establish an effective remedy, but also to ensure the due application of said remedy by its judicial authorities⁶.”</i> In the judgment of June 21, 2002 (Case Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. vs. Trinidad and Tobago), it expressed that <i>“The Inter-American Court has also established that as part of the general obligations of the States, they have a positive duty of guarantee with respect to individuals subject to their jurisdiction. This implies taking all necessary measures to remove obstacles that may exist so that individuals can enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State’s tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]⁷.”</i> In the judgment of September 7, 2004 (Case Tibi vs. Ecuador), it reiterated that <i>“Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation on the part of the States to offer all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. / (…). Under this perspective, it has been pointed out that for the State to comply with the provisions of the cited Article 25.1 of the Convention, it is not enough that remedies exist formally, but it is necessary that they be effective, that is, the individual must be given the real possibility of filing a simple and prompt remedy that allows achieving, if applicable, the required judicial protection.”</i> [See, in a similar vein, judgments of November 27, 2003 (Case Maritza Urrutia); June 7, 2003 (Case Juan Humberto Sánchez); November 28, 2002 (Case Cantos); August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community); January 31, 2001 (Case of the Constitutional Court); November 25, 2000 (Case Bámaca Velásquez); August 18, 2000 (Case Cantoral Benavides); November 19, 1999 (Case of the “Street Children” (Case Villagrán Morales et al.)); September 29, 1999 (Case Cesti Hurtado); May 30, 1999 (Case Castillo Petruzzi et al.); March 8, 1998 (Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.)); January 24, 1998 (Case Blake); November 12, 1997 (Case Suárez Rosero) and November 3, 1997 (Case Castillo Páez)]. In the judgment of August 6, 2008 (Case Castañeda Gutman vs. United Mexican States), it specified that <i>“An effective judicial remedy is one capable of producing the result for which it was conceived⁸, that is, it must be a remedy capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal in order to determine whether or not a human rights violation has occurred and, if applicable, to provide a reparation⁹.”</i> Finally, in the cited judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina), it concretized <i>“107. (…) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of the States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. Such effectiveness implies that, in addition to the formal existence of the remedies, these must yield results or responses to the violations of rights contemplated either in the Convention, the Constitution, or the laws. In this sense, those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, become illusory cannot be considered effective. This may occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated in practice, because the means to execute their decisions are lacking, or because of any other situation that constitutes a denial of justice. Thus, the process must tend towards the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial pronouncement through the suitable application of said pronouncement¹⁰. / 108. Moreover, as the Court has previously pointed out, when evaluating the effectiveness of remedies, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial processes have effectively contributed to ending a rights-violating situation, to ensuring the non-repetition of the harmful acts, and to guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention¹¹.”</i>- **VIII.-** According to Article 41 of the <i>Political Constitution</i>, <i>“Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have suffered in their person, property, or moral interests. They must receive prompt, complete justice in strict conformity with the laws.”</i> In its time (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Full Court, acting as the body responsible for constitutionality control, highlighted that a series of basic principles derive from that supreme norm to which all persons and competent bodies in the judicial sphere must adjust their conduct. By virtue of these, the Legislative Assembly is obliged to enact the necessary legal precepts to regulate the rights of persons and to establish the adequate avenues and procedures to procure their effective judicial protection when they have been breached. For their part, the various Courts are responsible for interpreting and applying those provisions in such a way that they do not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantee, in case it is proven, the full and timely reestablishment of those rights. Hence, we judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we make access to the stipulated procedures impossible or difficult, or when we reject or deny a petition that we should have granted in judgment, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one. In Vote n.º 1739-92, of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, this Chamber held that <i>“At the base of the entire procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of administration of justice, that is, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the <u>jurisdictional function of the State</u> - to declare the disputed right or reestablish the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in concrete cases - which in turn comprises, a set of <u>specialized independent judicial bodies</u> in that exercise, <u>the availability of that apparatus</u> to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs originating in social life, in a civilized and effective manner, and the guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, <u>under conditions of equality and without discrimination</u> <i>. / a) In this first sense, then, the due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for this reason, which demand the existence, sufficiency and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, no more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the <u>right of petition</u>, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27 -in general- and 41 -in particular- of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other even more immediately demanding implications, which can, in turn, pertain to the system of administration of justice itself, in itself, or to the right of <u>access to justice</u> <i>for all persons: / (…) / 2.</i></i></i></i> And they belong to the second (sic) —the equal right of everyone to access justice—, in addition to the generic <u>right of petition</u> of Article 27 and the specific <u>right to justice</u> of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, a series of complementary —but also fundamental— attributes, among which: / (i) the general right and principle of equality —and its counterpart of non-discrimination—, set forth in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as in all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these (sic) demonstrates that equality, in addition to being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, such that this (sic) is also violated when discrimination occurs with respect to non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here because they are not directly involved in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informality, etc.”</i> As it concluded in vote no. 1562-93, of 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing <i>“(…) means, in the first place, that due process requires the existence, sufficiency and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable for guaranteeing the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right of petition enshrined in Articles 27 —in general— and 41 —in particular— of the Constitution (…). In the second place, it concerns the system of administration of justice itself and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be “reasonableness of the effects” on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on these (sic) (…) other limitations than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those indispensable for them to function adequately in the life of society.”</i> IX.- In ordinary legislation, this fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the Civil Code and in Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. By virtue of the former, <i>“The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which purpose they shall adhere to the established system of sources.”</i> According to the second paragraph of the latter, <i>“The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their jurisdiction for lack of a rule to apply and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources.”</i> Even that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supplement the absence of legal norms: <i>“The General Principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate or delimit. <b>When it comes to supplementing the absence</b> and not the insufficiency <b>of the provisions that regulate a matter</b>, said sources shall have the rank of law.”</i> (Emphasis added). Consequently, we jurisdictional bodies are forbidden from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case in order to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a proceeding such as this. The dogma of the hermetic completeness of the legal system obliges us to resort, in integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the controversy raised. On this matter, in vote no. 36-F-94, of 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber pointed out that <i>“(…) jurisprudence as an informing source of the legal system is called upon to supplement, by way of extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms responsible for resolving legal conflicts when there is no norm for the specific case or when it has not been conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code).”</i> In votes nos. 112-F-92, of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, of 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001 and 360-F-02, of 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it expressed that <i>“(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admit referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic completeness of the legal system); on the other hand, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admits the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and there is no norm that prohibits it.”</i> For its part, the Second Chamber, in vote no. 415, of 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, set it forth in the following terms: <i>“(…) in any case, one must turn, for the sake of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity and even, as Prof. Antequera points out in his cited work, to common sense, that is, that which people normally have to judge things reasonably (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch).”</i> In vote no. 2004-200, of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code <i>“(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now then, to fulfill such a task, Article 12 of that Code must be taken into consideration, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when these (sic) do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits that application. In a case such as the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) whom the only thing that unites or united them were affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds for, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, ordering the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But, also, to resolve the question, in light of the foregoing, a response can be provided to the situation raised, resorting “mutatis mutandi”, to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.”</i> Finally, in vote no. 769-93, of 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, this Constitutional Chamber recognized that <i>“Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could turn to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which Article 12 below authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing, that according to the first cited norm, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging lack of law applicable to the case raised. The judges [male and female], therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with express norms, with extensive application (analogical interpretation) and even through the re-creation of norms based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power of Family Law jurisprudence in our country has been such, that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, including some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that reason devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been noted with the most celerity.”</i> X.- Article 12 of the Civil Code stipulates that <i>“The analogical application of norms shall proceed when these (sic) do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits that application.”</i> In relation to the analogical procedure for integrating positive law, in vote no. 1-F-94, of 3:00 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in that of the Second Chamber no. 2010-1094, of 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the First Chamber specified that <i>“III.- (…). By analogy is understood, from a logical point of view, a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, by means of which one seeks to extend the validity of a proposition from a determined situation to another generically similar one. In antiquity it was known by the name of ‘procedure by similarity’. Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but only probable. In other words, in analogy one compares a situation or fact with another situation or fact, and thus tries to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those similar aspects or characteristics between the situations analyzed, such that the more the essential and not merely accidental aspects of them resemble each other, the more convincing the extensive conclusion made will be. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which from several cases, analyzing their particular characteristics, a general conclusion is obtained. In generalization, it is not a matter of comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but of analyzing several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses all of them. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence regarding legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in the general doctrine of law, it has been admitted, in a majority manner, that the legal system can have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a determined matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts, in order to thus resolve the conflicts of interests present in these cases. Therefore, faced with gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to rule alleging not finding any norm to apply to the specific case; that would be equivalent to a denial of justice. However, he or she also does not have the power to arbitrarily create the norm applicable to the specific case.</i> <i>In our normative system the judge [male or female] is of law, not of conscience, and any decision made must find support in the current legal system. To fill these voids, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, both in its previous text and in the current one, establishes that courts may not excuse themselves from resolving for lack of a norm, and by establishing that in such a case one shall turn to the general principles of law in the absence of a legal norm, it does not exclude that before resorting to this interpretative criterion one may use analogy, regulated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, in order to apply a written norm established for a similar legal situation, to the case raised. By means of this procedure, one seeks to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis, to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents the same legal essence. It involves situations in which there is no identity of fact, but a substantial similarity so relevant that it justifies the application of the norm established for the case contemplated by the legislator to that lacking regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar norms. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine if between both situations there exist legal similarities of such entity, as to permit the analogical extension of the known norm. This problem cannot be resolved mechanically or with merely logical criteria; it is rather a legal assessment made by the adjudicator [male or female], in which it is determined whether the factual elements contemplated in the known norm, which motivated the establishment of a certain provision by the legislator (according to the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation taken into consideration. It may be that the considered fact has certain essential elements that characterize it and others that are accidental or contingent that accompany it. What is important is that there is correspondence between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogia legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is used; and analogia iuris, which does not take as a starting point a single norm, but a series of provisions, from which it induces a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding recital: the legis corresponds to induction by analogy and the iuris to induction by generalization. The doctrine considers the recourse to the general principles of law as a case of analogia iuris, which can only be obtained through generalization. To proceed to the analogical interpretation of norms, the following is necessary: 1- that there is a lack of a precise legal provision for the controverted case, for which reason analogical application would not be possible where there exist express legal precepts or from which a solution can be deduced, through extensive interpretation, to the case raised; 2- that there exists an essential legal similarity between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge [male or female], after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it does not involve those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to be applied, analogy is improper. Regarding this last requirement, legal praxis has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this respect, it is appropriate to cite the following: 1- It is not possible to apply by analogy prohibitive and punitive laws, because they are of a restrictive nature; 2- nor is it possible to do so in the case of norms that limit the capacity of the person or subjective rights, as it is odious matter; 3- in the case of ‘ius singulare’ or exceptional law, by its very nature, since it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application does not proceed; and, 4- in the case of temporary norms, analogy also does not proceed, because they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the situations that prevent the application of analogy, it is appropriate to refer (…), to the impossibility of applying in an extensive manner those norms of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by norms characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, its guidelines, presuppositions and foundations do not separate from the general guidelines of the Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional, is inspired by rules different from those that characterize the normative system in general. On occasions, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal transactions, or to resolve some special cases with particular criteria of equity, or due to emerging needs from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice general principles, establishing provisions that exclude certain persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special sanctions or responsibilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general norms that govern the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. Therefore, in such cases, the application by analogy of exceptional norms or of ius singulare is not possible to those cases not expressly contemplated by the norms. / VI.- In our Civil Code, the analogical application of norms is regulated by Articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to Article 12, the analogical interpretation of norms is possible ‘... when these do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits that application’. Thus, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where there exists identical ‘ratio legis’. For its part, Article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of criminal, exceptional and temporary laws. In this way, our Civil Code permits this method of integrating the Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding recitals.”</i> (See, also, the vote of the First Chamber no. 167-F-S1-2010, of 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).

XI.- Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber affirmed in the cited vote no. 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, <i>“(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged regulation [subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…).”</i>; if it does not violate the Political Constitution because there is no <i>“(…) impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is an empirical verification to indicate that they have (sic) increased.”</i> and if it is <i>“(…) not appropriate to apply the regulation developed for marriage in the terms currently conceived in our constitutional legal system.”</i>; what would be, then, the regulation we would have to draw upon to decide this proceeding on its merits. It should be borne in mind that, despite it having been noted on that occasion that the problem raised <i>“(…) <b>does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of unions, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not</b> (sic) <b>of justice, makes it necessary</b>. We are, then, in the presence of a scenario of lege ferenda, but not by any stretch of an illegitimate omission of the State. This is indicated, moreover, because in the documentation added to the record (sic), and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing conducted during the substantiation of this proceeding, some countries have been enacting laws (in the formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, with the purpose that they have specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to which (…) the legal framework that the derivative constituent power organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied.” </i>(Emphasis added); on a more recent date that same body evidenced that <i>“(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Court in the aforementioned Decision, is […maintained…], with which it is […failing to observe…], in an indirect manner, the reasons given (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in matters of constitutionality control, to consider that Article 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code is in conformity with the Law of the Constitution.”</i> (Vote no. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not superfluous to mention that in that last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the subject in the terms set forth below: <i>“From this judgment [it refers to vote no. 2006-7262, cited above] several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite are clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relationships between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or overlooked. / 2°) <b><u>It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex</u></b>. / 3°) <b><u>There exists a normative vacuum</u></b></i> <i>of the ordinary legislator (sic) <b><u>that must be filled</u></b>, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator (sic) must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Decision, by virtue of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers; precisely for that reason, the ordinary legislator (sic) assumed the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex.” </i>(The boldface and underlining do not appear in the original document). Nor is it feasible to fail to highlight that, as a result of the political events known to all, it does not seem to be foreseeable that, in the short or medium term, this state of affairs may change, especially after the past 6th of June the Special Permanent Commission on Human Rights of the Legislative Assembly, chaired by Deputy Justo Orozco, rendered a negative majority opinion on the bill for the Law of Cohabitation Partnerships (no. 17,668), presented since April 13, 2010 by the former legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría and the then legislators José Merino del Río, Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez, Sergio Alfaro Salas and Alberto Salom Echeverría and published in La Gaceta no. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And the fact that, one day after the pronouncement of that Commission, the initiative was again presented in the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate by Deputies Carmen Muñoz and Carmen Granados and Deputies Carlos Góngora and José María Villalta (no. 18,481) does not alter the point made. Note, moreover, that the topic has been in the legislative stream since September 27, 2006, the date on which Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, José Merino del Río and Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez presented the bill for the Law of Civil Union between Persons of the Same Sex (no. 16,390), published in La Gaceta no. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up archived on September 22, 2010.

XII.- Without a doubt, in this specific matter submitted to our decision, both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it, and that of the substantive regulation to which one must resort to integrate the current legal system are at stake. As, in our judgment, the condition of a family group of the homosexual couple is undeniable, it falls to the family jurisdiction to hear and definitively pronounce on its personal and patrimonial consequences.

Indeed, we are convinced that, just as the non-heterosexual persons who comprise it are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection, they have the full right to that recognition in this venue. Consider, moreover, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever may be made, especially when sexual orientation is taken into account, at the moment of guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the specialized bodies in family matters may study their claim and, through a reasoned and substantiated ruling, accept or reject it and thereby resolve their dispute. It is not superfluous to point out, furthermore, that however much it may be deemed impossible to apply marriage regulations in these cases, no infringement of the reinforced protection contained in Article 52 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) is committed by recognizing such effects to the relationship of a same-sex couple. For that reason, and for the sake of not causing defenselessness (indefensión) and lack of protection to the parties, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and singular cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the recognition sought. Denying it because no specific rule exists is not only inconsistent with the family legal order but also constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see, in similar terms, the vote of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) No. 2003-143, of 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).- XIII.- In support of our thesis, we consider it essential to bring up the arguments set forth by the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional) of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued in the context of the cases "Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie" (Case C.C.T. 60/04) and "Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs" (Case C.C.T.10/04), by which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the marriage regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual identity or gender or their sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a twelve-month period to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the national Marriage Law. In accordance with the line subsequently set forth by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with the writing of Judge Albie Sachs, pointed out then that “(…) the harm to same-sex couples exceeds the deprivations of material goods (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 72, among many others). The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love is inferior, but that these persons can never be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but represents a radical way of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The statements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, first, from an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage entails and, second, from the construction of a different status as members of the community, a status devalued due to the chosen sexual orientation.” [FERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Mariano (2007). Matrimonio y diversidad sexual: La lección sudafricana. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved on June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence, “(…) the State cannot remove certain couples from the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization that it provokes, greatly limit and condition the choice and materialization of life plans. In this line, the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional) affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most notable passages, the judgment emphasizes that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond respect for a private sphere alien to state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be ‘left alone’ by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78).” [Ibid, p. 98].- XIV.- In summary, if, as the Second Section of the Second Superior Civil Court (Sección Segunda del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil) pointed out in its time, regarding the de facto heterosexual union (unión de hecho heterosexual) when it was considered by some social sectors as “(…) an illicit act contrary to good customs and to marriage (…)”, the truth is “(…) times are changing and the case law must now fill the gap that the Legal Order has in not protecting relationships of such a nature.”, because “It is not possible, in accordance with the principles of equity and justice, to disregard the joint effort made by two persons who unite in that way (…).” (Vote No. 358, of 8:35 a.m. on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that the same reason exists [“Principle: ‘ubi eadem ratio, idem jus’ (Where there is the same reason, there is the same right), contemplated in Article 12 of the Civil Code (…).” (Vote of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) No. 2003-502, of 3:30 p.m. on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and property consequences to the decision of two homosexual individuals to establish a bond with characteristics similar to conjugal ones, especially when full force is given to the criterion according to which “(…) the legislative power is subject to the limits established ‘by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law’. Thus, the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law – Declarations and Conventions on the matter – constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator (sic), both ordinary and, eminently, popular through referendum. This Constitutional Court has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to persons. Moreover, this Constitutional Court in Vote No. 2771-2003 of 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, considered that, even the derived reforming or constituent power – as a constituted power – is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, so that, by means of partial reform of the constitution, the essential content of those cannot be reduced or curtailed. It should be added that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator (sic) is the Law of the Constitution itself or the block of constitutionality (bloque de constitucionalidad) formed by constitutional principles, values, precepts, and case law. It is necessary to add that the rights of minorities, due to their inalienable nature, constitute an eminently technical-legal matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator (sic) and not of the majorities prone to denying them.” (Vote No. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010).- XV.- Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal order and, in particular, of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in vote No. 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, that body accurately pointed out that “(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative, whether in a contentious case or in a mere advisory opinion, will – in principle – have the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now hold, moreover, is enshrined in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provides that unwritten norms – such as custom, case law, and general principles of law – shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.1.).”- XVI.- The Yogyakarta Principles on the application of International Human Rights Law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Legislation and on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards for the United Nations Organization and its Member States to advance in guaranteeing the necessary protections to non-heterosexual persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and transgender). In its preamble, it is recognized that “Sexual orientation and gender identity are essential to the dignity and humanity of each person and must not be grounds for discrimination or abuse.” In accordance with its first principle, “Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender identities have the right to the full enjoyment of all human rights.” The second stipulates that “All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit all discrimination and guarantee all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination.” According to the third, “The sexual orientation or gender identity that each person defines for themself is essential to their personality and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom. No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for the legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressures to conceal, suppress, or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity.” And, finally, the 24th recognizes the right of every person “(…) to found a family, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Various family configurations exist. No family may be subjected to discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members.” To that end, States “E. Shall take all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that in those States that recognize marriages or registered partnerships between persons of the same sex, any right, privilege, obligation, or benefit granted to persons of different sex who are married or in a registered union is available on an equal basis to persons of the same sex married or in a registered partnership; / F. Shall take all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that any obligation, right, privilege, or benefit granted to different-sex unmarried couples is available on an equal basis to same-sex unmarried couples; (…).” In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States unanimously adopted resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, by which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern about acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10) and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations the text of the Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, in which the principle of universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination are reaffirmed, requiring that they be applied equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, deep concern is expressed there for the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and for the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice directed against persons in all countries of the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuses; violations of human rights based on sexual orientation or gender identity are condemned wherever they occur; a call is made to all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and the former are urged to take all necessary measures, in particular legislative or administrative ones, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity cannot, under any circumstances, be the basis for criminal penalties. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the Joint Declaration to bring an end to acts of violence, and related human rights violations, directed against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stressed that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. “As a result, some governments treat these persons as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must fulfill the ideals of the Universal Declaration.” XVII.- Recently, in the aforementioned judgment of February 24 of the current year, issued in the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of the States Party to the American Convention on Human Rights to respect and guarantee “without any discrimination” the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term “other social condition”, contained in its Article 1, paragraph 1). On this matter, it stated the following: “78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of a general nature whose content extends to all provisions of the treaty, and provides for the obligation of the States Parties to respect and guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein “without any discrimination.” That is, whatever the origin or form it assumes, any treatment that can be considered discriminatory with respect to the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with it12. / 79. (…) the Court has indicated13 that the notion of equality derives directly from the unity of the nature of the human race and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, against which any situation that, by considering a certain group superior, leads to treating it with privilege is incompatible; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it in the enjoyment of rights that are indeed recognized to those who are not considered to be in such a situation. The Court's case law has also indicated that at this stage in the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The juridical framework of national and international public order rests upon it and it permeates the entire legal system14.” It further noted that, as a consequence of this, no internal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person because of their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation of all authorities and officials to guarantee them the full enjoyment of each and every one of the rights established in the Convention. “80. Furthermore, the Court has established that States must refrain from carrying out actions that are, in any way, directed, directly or indirectly, to creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination15. States are obliged to adopt positive measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations existing in their societies, to the detriment of a determined group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise with respect to actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations16.” “82. (…) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits discrimination in law or in fact, not only regarding the rights enshrined in said treaty, but with respect to all laws approved by the State and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect for or guarantee of a conventional right, it would breach the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to unequal protection of the internal law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention17.” “83. The Court has established, as has the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, the interpretation of which must accompany the evolution of the times and current living conditions18. Such an evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19.” “84. In this sense, when interpreting the expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the most favorable alternative for the protection of the rights protected by said treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the norm most favorable to the human being20.” “85. The specific criteria by virtue of which it is prohibited to discriminate, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not an exhaustive or restrictive list but merely illustrative. On the contrary, the drafting of said article leaves the criteria open with the inclusion of the term ‘other social condition’ to thus incorporate other categories that had not been explicitly indicated. The expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, in the perspective of the most favorable option to the person and of the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law21.” “86. In this regard, within the Inter-American System, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter “OAS”) has approved since 2008 in its annual sessions four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of concrete measures for effective protection against discriminatory acts has been demanded22.” “87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a category of prohibited discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that sexual orientation is ‘another condition’ mentioned in Article 1423 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ‘European Convention’), which prohibits discriminatory treatments24. In particular, in the Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta Vs. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Furthermore, it reiterated that the list of categories made in said article is illustrative and not exhaustive25. Likewise, in the Case of Clift Vs. the United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that can be included under ‘other condition’, is another specific example of those found in said list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person26.” “88. Within the Universal System of Human Rights Protection, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have qualified sexual orientation as one of the categories of prohibited discrimination considered in Article 2.127 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.228 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case of Toonen Vs. Australia that the reference to the ‘sex’ category would include the persons' sexual orientation29.

Likewise, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding various discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been repeatedly stated in its concluding observations to the reports presented by the States³⁰." "89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation can be framed under "other social condition"³¹. Likewise, the Committee on the Rights of the Child³², the Committee against Torture³³ have made references within the framework of their general observations and recommendations, regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination." "90. On December 22, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the "Declaration on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity", reaffirming the "principle of non-discrimination, which requires that human rights apply equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity"³⁴. Likewise, on March 22, 2011, the "Joint Declaration to put an end to acts of violence, and human rights violations directed against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity" was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council³⁵. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on "human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity" in which it expressed "grave concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, [committed] against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity"³⁶. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports of the United Nations special rapporteurs³⁷." "91. Bearing in mind the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the interpretation criteria set forth in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the OAS, the standards established by the European Court and the United Nations bodies (supra paras. 83 a 90), the Inter-American Court establishes that the sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on a person's sexual orientation is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, can diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation." "92. Regarding the State's argument that at the date of issuance of the Supreme Court's judgment there would not have been a consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court highlights that the alleged lack of consensus within some countries on full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered³⁸. The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Court to abstain from deciding, as in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations contracted by sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention." "93. A right that is recognized to persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstance based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1 of the American Convention. The inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including therein categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention." **XVIII.-** This Constitutional Chamber has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in combating it. In vote No. 2007-18660, of 11:17 hours on December 21, 2007, it specified in the following terms: *“Through its jurisprudential line, this Chamber has recognized as a fundamental juridical principle contained in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica the respect for the dignity of every human being and, consequently, the absolute prohibition of carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or group thereof; in this case, of homosexuals. Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity duly enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights signed by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its Article 26 discrimination based on "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status"; from which it also derives that acts that violate the right to equality and human dignity of persons based on their sexual orientation are not permitted, as they have the right to access any commercial establishment and to receive equal treatment, without discrimination based on their sexual preference.”* In No. 2010-13313, of 16:31 hours on August 10, 2010, it added that *“The human, fundamental, and legally configured rights of minority or disadvantaged groups, for having traditionally suffered discrimination, exclusion, and all kinds of social prejudices -as occurs with that of homosexuals-, arise from movements for their vindication, ordinarily, against majorities, given the insistence and natural inclination of majorities to maintain and perpetuate any discrimination and asymmetric treatment. The public authorities, for their part, are obligated, by the Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law, to guarantee and promote the effective respect for the principle and the right to equality—real and not formal—of such groups (Articles 33 of the Constitution and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José). Situations of discrimination can be factual or juridical; they will be of the first type when, given the existence of a disadvantaged and discriminated minority group, measures are not adopted to overcome such a state of affairs.” “Faced with groups that are the object of discrimination and social prejudices, the mere application of the principle of real equality and prohibition of all discrimination, which normally operate ex post to the perpetration of the discriminatory act, is not enough. Due to the foregoing, it is necessary for public authorities to implement the principle of support for such groups with public policies and effective normative measures. The principle of support for discriminated groups prevents and anticipates discriminations, such that it has an ex ante effect regarding them. The principle of support is fulfilled when legislation and regulations are issued that recognize rights of discriminated groups, even if these are of infra-constitutional configuration.”* **XIX.-** As Fernando REY MARTÍNEZ points out, *“The equality/prohibition of discrimination has a broader normative scope because it protects homosexuality in private spaces (preventing it from being treated by Law in an unreasonably different manner than heterosexuality) but also in public ones, in the same sense. Public authorities will have to provide an especially convincing or persuasive reason to treat homosexuals juridically in a different and worse way than heterosexuals. Needless to say, from the perspective of the prohibition of discrimination, protection becomes more effective and incisive, among other things because moral or historical arguments will no longer be sufficient by themselves to prevent homosexual persons from accessing certain rights that they traditionally had been barred from, such as, for example, the right to maintain a legally recognized stable union with a person of the same sexual orientation.”* [Homosexualidad y Constitución. *Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional*, Madrid: 73, January/April, 2005, p.132]. Hence, it is imperative to eradicate, at least from the juridical world, the deep homophobic social prejudice, which, on the other hand, perhaps bears a significant relationship with discrimination against women insofar as the stigmatization of non-heterosexual persons appears closely linked to the alleged deviation from the role traditionally judged as appropriate for them (the center of social reproach seems to reside in the fact that the ‘gay’ man adopts a ‘woman's’ position and that the lesbian assumes that of a ‘man’). *“The fundamental right not to be discriminated against based on sexual orientation would have, then, the typical effect of equal treatment with its two corollaries, the prohibition of direct discriminations, that is, of different and worse juridical treatments in consideration of homosexuality, and of indirect discriminations or of impact, that is, of juridical differentiations that could be established formally not based on sexual orientation, but that, in fact, would negatively impact the homosexual minority.”* [ibid, p. 139]. From the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation also derives a mandate for affirmative actions. Public authorities are obligated to ensure that the social discrimination suffered by homosexual persons ‘does not prevail’ in any way, for which purpose they are obligated to adopt measures for equality of opportunities. *“The protection of homosexuality, despite not being explicitly alluded to by our Constitution, has become a central constitutional matter, and not only because it affects, as one might suppose, a number of persons not easily determinable, but undoubtedly significant, but, above all, because of the concurrence of two qualitative arguments, one relative to the value of freedom and the other to that of equality. In the question regarding the constitutional framework of homosexuality, freedom is at stake, of course, because the heart of the matter is the sexual orientation of persons, that is, one of the keys to human existence and, therefore, to their dignity, central to family life, collective well-being, and the development of individual personality. But equality is also involved, because our Constitution, as Justice Harlan of the American Constitution said in his dissent to the Plessy v. Ferguson Judgment (1896), ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens’.”* [Ibid, p. 117]. As Justice J. Greaney indicated in his concurring vote in the famous Judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, *Hillary Goodridge and others v. Department of Public Health*, of November 18, 2003: “As a matter of constitutional Law, neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction can justify the perpetuation of the hierarchy according to which same-sex couples and their families are judged less deserving of social and juridical recognition than opposite-sex ones.”- **XX.-** Based on all the foregoing and although we have no doubt that to decide if the claim formulated in this matter can be accepted or rejected, it is appropriate to apply analogically what is provided for common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in the *Family Code (Código de Familia)*, except, of course, for the requirement that it be a heterosexual bond, we are compelled to formulate this judicial consultation of constitutionality with the purpose that this Chamber defines whether what it previously resolved regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevents us from doing so."

“I.- En señor [Nombre 001] acudió al Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, con la pretensión de obtener el reconocimiento de la relación de pareja que afirma haber mantenido con el señor [Nombre 003] durante más de tres años, en forma pública, notoria, estable y singular. De modo expreso reclamó la aplicación extensiva de las normas contenidas en el Código de Familia destinadas a regular los efectos personales y patrimoniales de la unión de hecho (folios 1-2). En la resolución apelada, emitida a las 8:47 horas del 19 de junio de 2009, la señora jueza de primera instancia rechazó ad portas la demanda porque la estimó improponible debido a que la legislación costarricense, al no permitir el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, impide reconocer como tal un vínculo como el sostenido entre las partes, que no reúne un elemento esencial: su carácter heterosexual (folio 4).- II.- Aunque en la actualidad el derecho costarricense no recoge como fuente de derechos y obligaciones la convivencia entre personas del mismo sexo, es indiscutible que tampoco la prohíbe y que, cuando se verifica en condiciones de estabilidad, notoriedad y singularidad, no cabe distinguirla sustancialmente de la conformada por seres humanos heterosexuales, pues tanto una como otra se instituyen en virtud del consentimiento y traducen el propósito de construir un proyecto de vida en común, basado en vínculos de amor y solidaridad. Sin duda, de ambos vínculos cabe predicar que su objeto es “(…) la vida en común, la cooperación y el mutuo auxilio.” (Artículo 11 del Código de Familia). Como apunta María MARTÍN SÁNCHEZ, “En la sociedad actual existen parejas del mismo sexo que conviven de forma estable, comparten gastos, bienes, tienen un proyecto de vida común, e incluso tienen hijos, y todo ello de forma pública y notoria. Su modo de vida es igual al de cualquier matrimonio, salvo que ellos no han podido acceder a este derecho. Si la sociedad ya está preparada para afrontar con normalidad este tipo de convivencia, el Derecho se ve en la obligación de regular su situación de hecho.” [El derecho constitucional al matrimonio homosexual en España. Ley 13/200, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio. Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal Constitucional, 13, enero-junio, 2010, p. 255]. Por esa razón, las o los miembros de una pareja homosexual y, en especial, el o la que ocupa la posición económica más débil, tienen análogos requerimientos de protección legal a los de las personas heterosexuales que deciden vivir juntas. De ahí que no solo razones de seguridad jurídica y de justicia exijan que sus efectos personales y patrimoniales sean regulados por la normativa vigente. La dignidad humana de sus integrantes y sus derechos fundamentales al libre desarrollo de su personalidad, a la igualdad, a la protección de su familia y a la autonomía de la voluntad se ven comprometidos con el déficit de protección existente. En la reciente sentencia del 24 de febrero del año en curso, emitida en el Caso Atala Riffo y niñas vs. Chile, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos reafirmó “(…) que en la Convención Americana no se encuentra determinado un concepto cerrado de familia, ni mucho menos se protege sólo (sic) un modelo “tradicional” de la misma (sic). Al respecto, el Tribunal reitera que el concepto de vida familiar no está reducido únicamente al matrimonio y debe abarcar otros lazos familiares de hecho donde las partes tienen vida en común por fuera del matrimonio1 .” Por eso, negarle a una pareja no heterosexual la condición de grupo familiar “(…) refleja una percepción limitada y estereotipada del concepto de familia que no tiene base en la Convención al no existir un modelo específico de familia (la “familia tradicional”).” En apoyo de ese argumento, aquel órgano jurisdiccional internacional citó el acuerdo del 16 de agosto de 2010, emitido por la Suprema Corte Mexicana de Justicia de la Nación que, al resolver la acción de inconstitucionalidad A.I. 2/2010, señaló que “(…) esta Suprema Corte estima que la diversidad sexual de los contrayentes no es ni constitucional, ni legalmente, un elemento definitorio de la institución matrimonial, sino más bien el resultado de la concepción social que, en un momento histórico dado, existía, mas no el núcleo esencial del matrimonio (…).” [Párr. 256] y que “Es, `por tanto, la orientación sexual de una persona, como parte de su identidad personal, un elemento relevante en el proyecto de vida que tenga y que, como cualquier persona, incluye el deseo de tener una vida en común con otra persona de igual o distinto sexo o no y que, en modo alguno, deberá limitarlo en la búsqueda y logro de su felicidad. En este punto, (…) dentro de los derechos fundamentales, se encuentra el derecho a la identidad personal y sexual, entendiéndose por el primero, el derecho de todo individuo a ser uno mismo, en la propia conciencia y en la opinión de los demás, de acuerdo con sus caracteres físicos e internos y sus acciones, que lo individualizan ante la sociedad y permiten identificarlo, lo que implica, además, la identidad sexual, que lo proyecta frente a sí y socialmente desde su perspectiva sexual, así como su preferencia u orientación sexual y que, por tanto, se inscribe dentro de la autodeterminación de las personas e incide en el libre desarrollo de las mismas (sic), al ser un elemento que innegablemente determinará sus relaciones afectivas y/o sexuales con personas de diferente o de su mismo sexo y, de ahí, su elección de con quién formar una vida común y tener hijos, si es que desea hacerlo.” [Párr. 264]. Puntualizó, además, que “(…) tratándose de personas homosexuales, de la misma forma que ocurre en las personas con orientación sexual hacia otras de diferente sexo (heterosexuales), es parte de su pleno desarrollo el establecimiento libre y voluntario de relaciones afectivas con personas del mismo sexo; relaciones, unas y otras, que, como informan los diferentes datos sociológicos, comparten como característica que constituyen una comunidad de vida a partir de lazos afectivos, sexuales y de solidaridad recíproca, con una vocación de estabilidad y de permanencia en el tiempo.”[Párr. 266]; que “(…) si uno de los aspectos que conduce la forma en que un individuo proyectará su vida y sus relaciones, es su orientación sexual, es un hecho que, en pleno respeto a la dignidad humana, es exigible el reconocimiento por parte del Estado no sólo de la orientación sexual de un individuo hacia personas de su mismo sexo, sino también de sus uniones, bajo las modalidades que, en un momento dado, se decida adoptar (sociedades de convivencia, pactos de solidaridad, concubinatos y el matrimonio).” [Párr. 269]; que de la existencia de familias homoparentales derivan una serie de derechos y obligaciones de quienes las conforman, pues es una realidad que existen y, como tales, deben ser tuteladas por la legislación: son tan respetables unas como otras y que su reconocimiento no desatiende principios tales como el interés superior del niño o de la niña [párr. 333].- III.- En su voto particular disidente que forma parte de la sentencia del 27 de septiembre de 1990 (Caso Cossey vs. Reino Unido), el señor S. K. Martens, juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, puntualizó con acierto que “El matrimonio es mucho más que una unión sexual y, por tanto, la capacidad para tener relaciones de esta naturaleza no es “esencial”. Las personas que no pueden procrear o tener relaciones sexuales pueden también pretender casarse. Se debe esto a que el matrimonio supone más que una unión que legitime dichas relaciones y que se proponga la procreación: es una institución legal que crea una relación jurídica fija entre los cónyuges y entre estos y los terceros (con inclusión de las autoridades). Como ha dicho un autor, los cónyuges, a través de los lazos del matrimonio, “anuncian al mundo que los rodea que su relación se funda en sentimientos humanos intensos y en un compromiso mutuo, exclusivo y permanente”. Es además una especie de comunidad en la que los lazos intelectuales, espirituales y sentimentales son por lo menos tan esenciales como los físicos. / El artículo 12 del Convenio [para la protección de los derechos humanos y de las libertades fundamentales] protege el derecho de cualquier hombre o mujer (de edad núbil) de entrar en esta unión y, por tanto, la definición de lo que significan las palabras “el hombre y la mujer” en este contexto debe tener en cuenta todas estas características del matrimonio.” En similares términos se pronunciaron la señora E. Palm y los señores I. Foighel y R. Pekkanen, jueces de ese mismo órgano, en su voto particular disidente y conjunto que forma parte del mismo fallo: “El hecho de que un transexual no pueda procrear no es decisivo. Hay muchos hombres y muchas mujeres que tampoco pueden tener hijos y, sin embargo, tienen el derecho indiscutible de casarse. La capacidad de procrear no es ni puede ser un requisito previo para el matrimonio.” Bajo esa misma tesitura, la profesora de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Pilar DOMÍNGUEZ LOZANO, plantea que, “En efecto, si el matrimonio [y, por extensión, la unión de hecho heterosexual] se define como comunidad afectiva y material de vida, y no ya por su función social; si su finalidad esencial ya no es reproductora, sino definida en torno a la realización personal y al libre desarrollo de la personalidad; si su contenido constitucional lo vincula, prioritariamente, a los derechos y libertades individuales fundamentales; si el ius connubium se predica, en principio, de cualquier persona, sobre exigencias de igualdad y libertad; y si la regulación jurídica del matrimonio y de las relaciones entre cónyuges ha vivido un giro hacia el Derecho de Obligaciones; resulta difícil admitir como incuestionable la prohibición de contraer matrimonio a parejas del mismo sexo.” [Las uniones de personas del mismo sexo: las opciones de regulación y sus implicaciones jurídicas. Derecho Privado y Constitución, Madrid: 20, enero-diciembre, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- IV.- En la sentencia emitida el 18 de noviembre de 2003 en el caso Hillary Goodridge and others vs. Departament of Public Health, cuyo ponente fue el juez Marshall, la Supreme Judicial Court de Massachussets declaró contraria a la Constitución la prohibición de acceso al matrimonio a las personas del mismo sexo. Argumentó que se está en presencia de “(…) una institución social vital (…)” y que “(…) la decisión de si contraer matrimonio y con quién es uno de los momentos máximos de autodeterminación de la vida.” Por eso y porque “los beneficios accesibles sólo a los que tienen una licencia matrimonial son enormes, afectando prácticamente a todos los aspectos de la vida y la muerte”, desde hace tiempo se le ha considerado como un derecho fundamental (civil right). Como es un elemento central de la vida de los individuos y del bienestar de la comunidad, vedarles a las personas del mismo sexo el derecho a contraer matrimonio las priva “(…) de uno de los aspectos más importantes de la experiencia humana (…)” y les “(…) deniega el pleno acceso a la protección de las leyes (…)”; de ahí que solo podría admitirse tal exclusión si cumple “(…) un objetivo público imprescindible (…)” y es “(…) un medio razonable para conseguir tal fin.” Esas condiciones no se dan respecto de la prohibición del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, que excepciona tal regla a causa de un rasgo singular: la orientación sexual, lo cual lesiona la libertad, reconocida en la Constitución de Massachussets, así como la igualdad, que impide que haya ciudadanos de segunda clase. Las tres principales justificaciones de esta prohibición no resultan constitucionalmente razonables: ni que el matrimonio heterosexual proporcione un marco favorable para la procreación (se entiende heterosexual no asistida); ni que asegure un espacio óptimo para el cuidado de los hijos; ni que el matrimonio homosexual trivializará o destruirá esa institución tal y como ha sido históricamente configurada. La esencia de la libertad de contraerlo es unirse con la persona de la propia elección. Al impedir el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, “(…) el Estado confiere un sello oficial de aprobación a los estereotipos destructivos de que las relaciones del mismo sexo son inherentemente inestables e inferiores a las relaciones heterosexuales y no son por ello merecedoras de respeto.”- V.- Es cierto que en el voto n.º 2006-7262, de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006, en el cual estimó legítima la imposibilidad legal del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, establecida en el inciso 6º del artículo 14 del Código de Familia, la Sala Constitucional le endilgó a la Asamblea Legislativa la responsabilidad de “(…) plantearse la necesidad de regular, de la manera que estime conveniente, los vínculos o derechos que se deriven de este tipo de uniones, lo cual evidentemente requiere de todo un desarrollo normativo en el que se establezcan los derechos y obligaciones de este tipo de parejas (…).”También lo es que, cuatro años después, en el n.º 2010-641, de las 2:56 horas del 13 de enero de 2010, rechazó por el fondo la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por don [Nombre 001] contra el ordinal 242 ibídem; pronunciamiento que, de acuerdo con la poca información disponible pues su redacción aun está pendiente, cita el n.º 2006-7262, antes referido. De ahí que, con base en lo estipulado en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, no es aventurado concluir que esos antecedentes parecieran impedirnos recurrir a la regulación de la unión de hecho, contenida en los numerales 242, 243, 244 y 245 ibídem, aun cuando sea por analogía, a efecto de resolver por el fondo esta demanda, con lo cual no quedaría más salida que confirmar el rechazo de plano ordenado por el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en el auto emitido a las 8:47 horas del 19 de junio de 2009, que, como se anotó, la consideró improponible.- VI.- No obstante, es imposible hacer caso omiso de nuestro deber de ponderar las situaciones de hecho que escapan a las soluciones preconcebidas por la Asamblea Legislativa en un momento histórico determinado, a efecto de integrar adecuadamente el ordenamiento jurídico y ofrecerle una respuesta a la pretensión de fondo del señor [Nombre 001]. En efecto, estamos convencidos de que, en un sistema como el costarricense, la ausencia de normativa específica no autoriza para rechazar de plano una demanda. El derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, reconocido, entre otros preceptos, en el 8, inciso 1) y en el 25, inciso 1), en relación con el 1º y el 2º de la Convención americana sobre derechos humanos y en el 41 de la Constitución Política y el principio de plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico, del que se ocupan el 6 del Código Civil y el 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, impiden un pronunciamiento semejante. Así lo destacaron las magistradas y los magistrados de la Sala Constitucional: “En nuestra condición de jueces [y juezas], (…) no podemos obviar la realidad social como un elemento a considerar en la toma de decisiones respecto de los asuntos sometidos a nuestro conocimiento (…).” (Voto n.º 2006-7262, de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006).- VII.- Al tenor de lo dispuesto por la Convención americana sobre derechos humanos, aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa por Ley n.º 4534, de 23 de febrero de 1970, “Los Estados Partes en esta Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta a su jurisdicción, sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social.” (Artículo 1º, inciso 1). “Si el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades mencionados en el Artículo 1 no estuviere ya garantizado por disposiciones legislativas o de otro carácter, los Estados Partes se comprometen a adoptar, con arreglo a sus procedimientos constitucionales y a las disposiciones de esta Convención, las medidas legislativas o de otro carácter que fueren necesarias para hacer efectivos tales derechos y libertades.” (Artículo 2º). “Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez (sic) o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, (…) para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter.” (Artículo 8, inciso 1). “Toda persona tiene derecho a un recurso sencillo y rápido o a cualquier otro recurso efectivo ante los jueces o tribunales competentes, que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la Constitución, la ley o la presente Convención, aún cuando tal violación sea cometida por personas que actúen en ejercicio de sus funciones oficiales.” (Artículo 25, inciso 1). La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha desarrollado el contenido de esos preceptos en diversas oportunidades. En su reciente sentencia del 27 de abril de 2012 (Caso Forneron e hija vs. Argentina) destacó que “Este Tribunal ha afirmado en otras oportunidades que “[e]n el derecho de gentes, una norma consuetudinaria prescribe que un Estado que ha celebrado un convenio internacional, debe introducir en su derecho interno las modificaciones necesarias para asegurar la ejecución de las obligaciones asumidas”. En la Convención Americana este principio es recogido en su artículo 2, que establece la obligación general de cada Estado Parte de adecuar su derecho interno a las disposiciones de la misma, para garantizar los derechos en ella reconocidos2.”También reiteró que “(…) la adecuación de la normativa interna a los parámetros establecidos en la Convención implica la adopción de medidas en dos vertientes, a saber: a) la supresión de las normas y prácticas de cualquier naturaleza que entrañen violación a las garantías previstas en la Convención o que desconozcan los derechos allí reconocidos u obstaculicen su ejercicio, y b) la expedición de normas y el desarrollo de prácticas conducentes a la efectiva observancia de dichas garantías. La primera vertiente se satisface con la reforma, la derogación o la anulación de las normas o prácticas que tengan esos alcances, según corresponda. La segunda, obliga al Estado a prevenir la recurrencia de violaciones a los derechos humanos y, por eso, debe adoptar todas las medidas legales, administrativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias para evitar que hechos similares vuelvan a ocurrir en el futuro3.” Sin duda, en el caso de la unión entre personas del mismo sexo, su reconocimiento legislativo es primordial a efecto de erradicar la discriminación social contra quienes la integran. En atención al carácter particularmente grave de esta práctica y por violentar varios derechos recogidos en la Convención, tal protección ha de ser suficiente. Y, siguiendo la doctrina plasmada en la sentencia del 12 de agosto de 2008 (Caso Heliodoro Portugal Vs. Panamá), ante la imperiora necesidad de ofrecerle alguna respuesta a la legítima pretensión formulada en el sub-lite ,“(…) existe el deber de utilizar aquellos recursos (…) que guarden relación con la protección de los derechos fundamentales que se pueden ver afectados en tales casos, como por ejemplo el derecho a la libertad, a la integridad personal y el derecho a la vida, en su caso, que están reconocidos en la Convención Americana.” En la sentencia del 16 de agosto de 2000 (caso Durand y Ugarte), la Corte Interamericana afirmó que “101. (…) el derecho de toda persona a un recurso sencillo y rápido o a cualquier otro recurso efectivo ante los jueces o tribunales competentes que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos fundamentales constituye uno de los pilares básicos, no sólo (sic) de la Convención Americana, sino del propio Estado de Derecho en una sociedad democrática en el sentido de la Convención […]. El artículo 25 se encuentra íntimamente ligado con la obligación general del artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, al atribuir funciones de protección al derecho interno de los Estados Partes4. / 102. Además, la Corte ha señalado que la inexistencia de un recurso efectivo contra las violaciones a los derechos reconocidos por la Convención constituye una transgresión de la misma (sic) por el Estado Parte en el cual semejante situación tenga lugar. En ese sentido debe subrayarse que, para que tal recurso exista, no basta con que esté previsto por la Constitución o la ley o con que sea formalmente admisible, sino que se requiere que sea realmente idóneo para establecer si se ha incurrido en una violación a los derechos humanos y proveer lo necesario para remediarla5. / (…) / 121. Esta Corte ha establecido que [e]l artículo 25 se encuentra íntimamente ligado con la obligación general del artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, al atribuir funciones de protección al derecho interno de los Estados Partes, de lo cual se desprende que el Estado tiene la responsabilidad de diseñar y consagrar normativamente un recurso eficaz, pero también la de asegurar la debida aplicación de dicho recurso por parte de sus autoridades judiciales6 .” En la del 21 de junio de 2002 (caso Hilaire, Constantine y Benjamín y otros vs. Trinidad y Tobago), Corte Interamericana ha establecido también que como parte de las obligaciones generales de los Estados, estos tienen un deber positivo de garantía con respecto a los individuos sometidos a su jurisdicción. Ello supone tomar todas las medidas necesarias para remover los obstáculos que puedan existir para que los individuos puedan disfrutar de los derechos que la Convención reconoce. Por consiguiente, la tolerancia del Estado a circunstancias o condiciones que impidan a los individuos acceder a los recursos internos adecuados para proteger sus derechos, constituye una violación del artículo 1.1 de la Convención […]7.” En la del 7 de septiembre de 2004 (caso Tibi vs. Ecuador) reiteró que “El artículo 25.1 de la Convención establece, en términos amplios, la obligación a cargo de los Estados de ofrecer a todas las personas sometidas a su jurisdicción un recurso judicial efectivo contra actos violatorios de sus derechos fundamentales. / (…). Bajo esta perspectiva, se ha señalado que para que el Estado cumpla con lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 25.1 de la Convención no basta con que los recursos existan formalmente, sino (sic) es preciso que sean efectivos, es decir, se debe brindar a la persona la posibilidad real de interponer un recurso sencillo y rápido que permita alcanzar, en su caso, la protección judicial requerida.” [Ver, en similar sentido, las sentencias del 27 de noviembre de 2003 (caso Maritza Urrutia); 7 de junio de 2003 (caso Juan Humberto Sánchez); 28 de noviembre de 2002 (caso Cantos); 31 de agosto de 2001 (caso de la Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni); 31 de enero de 2001 (caso del Tribunal Constitucional); 25 de noviembre de 2000 (caso Bámaca Velásquez); 18 de agosto de 2000 (caso Cantoral Benavides); 19 de noviembre de 1999 (caso de los “Niños de la Calle” (Caso Villagrán Morales y otros)); 29 de septiembre de 1999 (caso Cesti Hurtado); 30 de mayo de 1999 (caso Castillo Petruzzi y otros); 8 de marzo de 1998 (caso de la “Panel Blanca” (Paniagua Morales y otros)); 24 de enero de 1998 (caso Blake); 12 de noviembre de 1997 (caso Suárez Rosero) y 3 de noviembre de 1997 (caso Castillo Páez)]. En la del 6 de agosto de 2008 (Caso Castañeda Gutman vs. Estados Unidos Mexicanos) puntualizó que “Un recurso judicial efectivo es aquel capaz de producir el resultado para el que ha sido concebido8, es decir, debe ser un recurso capaz de conducir a un análisis por parte de un tribunal competente a efectos de establecer si ha habido o no una violación a los derechos humanos y, en su caso, proporcionar una reparación9 .” Por último, en la citada sentencia del 27 de abril de 2012 (Caso Forneron e hija vs. Argentina) concretó “107. (…) que el artículo 25.1 de la Convención contempla la obligación de los Estados Parte de garantizar, a todas las personas bajo su jurisdicción, un recurso judicial efectivo contra actos violatorios de sus derechos fundamentales. Dicha efectividad supone que, además de la existencia formal de los recursos, éstos den resultados o respuestas a las violaciones de derechos contemplados ya sea en la Convención, en la Constitución o en las leyes. En ese sentido, no pueden considerarse efectivos aquellos recursos que, por las condiciones generales del país o incluso por las circunstancias particulares de un caso dado, resulten ilusorios. Ello puede ocurrir, por ejemplo, cuando su inutilidad haya quedado demostrada por la práctica, porque falten los medios para ejecutar sus decisiones o por cualquier otra situación que configure un cuadro de denegación de justicia. Así, el proceso debe tender a la materialización de la protección del derecho reconocido en el pronunciamiento judicial mediante la aplicación idónea de dicho pronunciamiento10 . / 108. Por otra parte, como lo ha señalado anteriormente el Tribunal, al evaluar la efectividad de los recursos, la Corte debe observar si las decisiones en los procesos judiciales han contribuido efectivamente a poner fin a una situación violatoria de derechos, a asegurar la no repetición de los actos lesivos y a garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos protegidos por la Convención11 .”- VIII.- De acuerdo con el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política, “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida y en estricta conformidad con las leyes.” En su momento (sesión extraordinaria de 11 de octubre de 1982), la Corte Plena, actuando como órgano encargado del control de constitucionalidad, destacó que de esa norma suprema se derivan una serie de principios básicos a los cuales deben ajustar su actuación todas las personas y órganos competentes en el ámbito jurisdiccional. En virtud de ellos la Asamblea Legislativa está obligada a promulgar los preceptos legales necesarios para regular los derechos de las personas y para establecer las vías y procedimientos adecuados para procurar su efectiva tutela jurisdiccional cuando hayan sido quebrantados. Por su parte, a los distintos Tribunales les corresponde interpretar y aplicar esas disposiciones de manera tal que no entorpezcan la debida comprobación del agravio y garanticen, en caso de ser acreditado, el pleno y oportuno restablecimiento de aquellos. De ahí que los jueces y las juezas vulneramos la disposición constitucional citada cuando imposibilitamos o dificultamos el acceso a los trámites estipulados o cuando rechazamos o denegamos una petición que debimos conceder en sentencia, sin motivo alguna o invocando uno insuficiente o espurio. En el voto n.º 1739-92, de las 11:45 horas del 1º de julio de 1992, esa Sala sostuvo que “En la base de todo orden procesal está el principio y, con él, el derecho fundamental a la justicia, entendida como la existencia y disponibilidad de un sistema de administración de la justicia, valga decir, de un conjunto de mecanismos idóneos para el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional del Estado -declarar el derecho controvertido o restablecer el violado, interpretándolo y aplicando imparcialmente en los casos concretos- lo cual comprende a su vez, un conjunto de órganos judiciales independientes especializados en ese ejercicio, la disponibilidad de ese aparato para resolver los conflictos y corregir los entuertos que origina la vida social, en forma civilizada y eficaz, y el acceso garantizado a esa justicia para todas las personas, en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación . / a) En este primer sentido, pues, el debido proceso tiene, ante todo, dimensiones programáticas, no por esta (sic) menos vinculantes jurídicamente, que exigen la existencia, suficiencia y eficacia de un sistema judicial y procesal idóneo para garantizar precisamente ese derecho fundamental a la justicia, que no es, por otra parte, más que una consecuencia del monopolio de la fuerza, asumido por el Estado, y la más importante manifestación del derecho de petición , que en Costa Rica se consagra, en los artículos 27 -en general- y 41 -en especial- de la Constitución (…). / b) Pero tiene también otras implicaciones aun más inmediatamente exigibles, las cuales pueden, a su vez, atañer al sistema mismo de administración de la justicia, en sí, o al derecho de acceso a la justicia para todas las personas: / (…) / 2. Y pertenecen a los segundo (sic) -derecho de todos por igual a acceder a la justicia-, además del genérico derecho de petición del artículo 27 y del específico derecho a la justicia del artículo 41 de la Constitución ya citados, una serie de atributos complementarios -pero también fundamentales-, entre los cuales: / (i) el derecho y principio generales de igualdad -y su contrapartida de no discriminación-, que recoge el artículo 33 de la Constitución, así como todos los instrumentos internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos, por ejemplo los artículos 1.1 y 24 de la Convención Americana, con la particularidad de que la dualidad de éstos (sic) demuestra que la igualdad, además de criterio de interpretación y aplicación de los derechos fundamentales, es ella misma un derecho fundamental, de modo que también se viola éste (sic) cuando se discrimina respecto de derechos no fundamentales (…); / (ii) en general, el acceso universal a la justicia para toda persona, indiferentemente de su sexo, edad, color, nacionalidad, origen o antecedentes, o cualquier otra condición social, todo lo cual plantea, a su vez, consecuencias que no es necesario examinar aquí por no estar implicadas directamente en el caso en consulta, como la gratuidad de la justicia, el informalismo, etc.”Conforme lo concluyó en el voto n.º 1562-93, de las 15:06 horas del 30 de marzo de 1993, lo expuesto “(…) significa, en primer lugar, que el debido proceso exige la existencia, suficiencia y eficacia de un sistema judicial y procesal idóneo para garantizar el derecho fundamental a la justicia, que es la más importante manifestación del derecho de petición consagrado en los artículos 27 -en general- y 41 -en especial- de la Constitución (…). En segundo lugar, atañe al sistema mismo de administración de la justicia en sí y al derecho de acceso a la justicia para todas las personas, lo que implica que debe haber en todo sistema procesal "razonabilidad de los efectos" sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a éstos (sic) (…) otras limitaciones más que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, y las indispensables para que funcionen adecuadamente en la vida de sociedad.”- IX.- En la legislación ordinaria, ese derecho fundamental es desarrollado, entre otros preceptos, en el 6 del Código Civil y en el 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. En virtud del primero, “Los Tribunales tienen el deber inexcusable de resolver, en todo caso, los asunto (sic) que conozcan, para lo que se atenderán al sistema de fuentes establecido.” Al tenor del párrafo segundo del último, “Los tribunales no podrán excusarse de ejercer su autoridad o de fallar en los asuntos de su competencia por falta de norma que aplicar y deberán hacerlo de conformidad con las normas escritas y no escritas del ordenamiento, según la escala jerárquica de sus fuentes.” Incluso, esa misma disposición reconoce, como parte de la potestad jurisdiccional, el deber de suplir la ausencia de normas legales: “Los principios generales del Derecho y la Jurisprudencia servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpreten, integren o delimiten. Cuando se trate de suplir la ausencia y no la insuficiencia de las disposiciones que regulen una materia, dichas fuentes tendrán rango de ley.” (La negrita es agregada). Por consiguiente, a los órganos jurisdiccionales nos está vedado alegar la falta de norma (s) aplicable (s) al caso concreto para excusarnos de fallar por el fondo un proceso como este. El dogma de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico nos obliga a recurrir, en aplicación integradora, a las fuentes escritas y a las no escritas en aras de identificar y poner en práctica la mejor solución a la controversia planteada. Sobre el particular, en el voto n.º 36-F-94, de las 9:40 horas del 27 de mayo de 1994, la Sala Primera apuntó que “(…) la jurisprudencia como fuente informadora del ordenamiento jurídico es la llamada a suplir, por la vía de interpretación extensiva, los alcances de las normas encargadas de resolver los conflictos jurídicos cuando no exista norma para el caso concreto o no haya sido concebida para las nuevas exigencias jurídicas (Artículo 9 del Código Civil).” En los n.os 112-F-92, de las 14:15 horas del 15 de julio de 1992; 151-F-01, de las 15:20 horas del 14 de febrero de 2001 y 360-F-02, de las 11:10 horas del 3 de mayo de 2002, expresó que “(…) el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y 6 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil admiten la remisión a otras fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico y a los Principios Generales del Derecho cuando no hay norma aplicable (principio de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico), por otra parte el artículo 12 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil, admite la aplicación analógica de las normas siempre que medie identidad de razón y no haya norma que la prohíba.” Por su parte, la Sala Segunda, en el n.º 415, de las 9 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1994, lo planteó en los siguientes términos: “(…) en todo caso, debe acudirse, en aras de la mejor solución, a las situaciones análogas expresamente tratadas, a los principios generales del derecho, como (…) la buena fe y la equidad e incluso, como lo señala el Prof. Antequera en su citado trabajo, al sentido común, o sea, el que las personas normalmente tienen de juzgar razonablemente las cosas (artículos 10 a 12 del Código Civil, 15 del Código de Trabajo y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).” En el n.º 2004-200, de las 10 horas del 24 de marzo de 2004, ese mismo órgano sostuvo que el ordinal 6 del Código Civil “(…) desarrolla un derecho de carácter fundamental, contenido en el numeral 41 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza a todas las personas el acceso a la justicia. Ahora bien, para cumplir tal cometido, se debe tomar en consideración el artículo 12 de aquel Código, según el cual es procedente la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando éstas (sic) no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando una norma prohíba esa aplicación. En un caso como el presente, el negarle todo efecto a la relación que interesa, además, de injusto, significa desconocer una realidad, no extraña en nuestro entorno, cual es la convivencia de dos personas, (…) que lo único que los une o los unió fueron lazos afectivos, sin protección por parte del ordenamiento jurídico. Lo anterior, constituye fundamento suficiente para, en atención del valor justicia que inspira el ordenamiento jurídico, disponer la liquidación de los bienes adquiridos y producidos durante la larga relación, dándole a la actora lo que le corresponde. Mas, también, para resolver la cuestión, atendiendo a lo expuesto, se puede brindar una respuesta a la situación planteada, recurriendo “mutatis mutandi”, a las regulaciones dadas por la ley a instituciones similares.” Por último, en el n.º 769-93, de las 15:48 horas del 16 de febrero de 1993, esa Sala Constitucional reconoció que “Aquí, como lo anticipa el propio Tribunal consultante, podría acudirse a otra normativa (…), o a otros parámetros igualmente autorizados por el ordenamiento, cuando haya insuficiencia en la regulación de una determinada materia. Esos criterios podrían ser los principios generales de derecho, que están autorizados por el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el artículo 1 del Código Civil; la equidad, que podría utilizarse a tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 11 del Código Civil, y hasta la aplicación analógica, que el artículo 12 siguiente autoriza. Debe agregarse a lo anterior, que conforme a la primera norma citada, un tribunal no puede excusar el conocimiento de un asunto, ni resolverlo negativamente, alegando falta de ley aplicable al caso planteado. Tienen los jueces [y las juezas], pues, a su haber, amplias posibilidades para resolver con norma expresa, con aplicación extensiva (interpretativa analógica) y hasta mediante la re-creación normativa a base de otra insuficiente. / (…) / El poder que la jurisprudencia del Derecho de Familia en nuestro país ha sido tal, que también se ha afirmado con carácter categórico, que muchas de las normas del Código de Familia tienen su origen en decisiones de los tribunales, incluso algunas de tono marcadamente disidente o minoritario, pero no por ello ayunas de justicia o equidad. Por el contrario, el desarrollo histórico del Derecho de Familia nos indica cómo el paso del tiempo ha sido determinante para una evolución de sus conceptos y sus soluciones. Nuestro país no es excepción en este campo e incluso podría decirse que es donde con más celeridad ese comportamiento se ha notado.”- X.- El artículo 12 del Código Civil estipula que “Procederá la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando éstas (sic) no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en el que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando alguna norma prohíba esa aplicación.” En relación con el procedimiento analógico de integración del derecho positivo, en el voto n.º 1-F-94, de las 15 horas del 5 de enero de 1994, reiterado en el de la Sala Segunda n.º 2010-1094, de las 10:26 horas del 6 de agosto de 2010, la Sala Primera puntualizó que “III.- (…). Por analogía se entiende, desde un punto de vista lógico, un procedimiento de inducción singular de un caso a otro, por medio del cual se busca extender la validez de una proposición de una determinada situación a otra genéricamente similar. En la antigüedad era conocido como el nombre de "procedimiento por semejanza". A diferencia de los procedimientos deductivos, en la inducción analógica la validez de la conclusión no es necesaria, sino únicamente probable. En otras palabras, en la analogía se compara una situación o hecho con otra situación o hecho, y así se trata de obtener una conclusión particular. El argumento analógico se basa en aquellos aspectos o connotados similares entre las situaciones analizadas, de modo tal que entre más se parezcan los aspectos esenciales y no meramente accidentales de ellos, más convincente será la conclusión extensiva que se haga. Otro procedimiento lógico similar es la inducción por generalización, en la cual a partir de varios casos, analizando sus connotados particulares, se obtiene una conclusión general. En la generalización no se trata de la comparación de dos situaciones particulares, para extender lo concerniente a una a la otra, sino del análisis de varios casos particulares para obtener una conclusión general que los abarque a todos. Ambos tipos de procedimientos lógicos tienen una influencia innegable en lo tocante a la analogía jurídica (…). / IV. Luego de prolongadas discusiones en la doctrina general del derecho, se ha llegado a admitir, en forma mayoritaria, que el ordenamiento jurídico puede tener lagunas. Estas lagunas son deficiencias de la ley, la cual no presenta una disposición específica para una determinada materia o caso. Al mismo tiempo, se ha aceptado que los ordenamientos jurídicos tienen la capacidad latente de elaborar los preceptos jurídicos pertinentes, para así resolver los conflictos de intereses presentes en estos casos. Por ello, frente a las lagunas de la ley, el juez [o la jueza] no puede negarse a fallar alegando no encontrar norma alguna para aplicar al caso concreto; ello equivaldría a una denegación de justicia. Empero, tampoco tiene la facultad de crear arbitrariamente la norma aplicable al caso concreto. En nuestro sistema normativo el juez [o la jueza] es de derecho, no de conciencia, y cualquier decisión que tome debe encontrar sustento en el sistema jurídico vigente. Para colmar estos vacíos, nuestra Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, tanto en su texto anterior cuando en el actual, establece que los tribunales no podrán excusarse de resolver por falta de norma, y al establecer que en tal caso se acudirá a los principios generales del derecho en ausencia de norma legal, no excluye que antes de recurrir a este criterio interpretativo no pueda utilizarse la analogía, regulada por los artículos 12 y 13 del Código Civil, para poder aplicar una norma escrita establecida para una situación jurídica semejante, al caso planteado. Por medio de este procedimiento, se busca aplicar un principio jurídico que la ley establece para cierta hipótesis, a otro hecho no regulado Se trata de situaciones en las cuales no existe una identidad de hecho, sino una similitud sustancial tan relevante que justifique la aplicación de la norma establecida para el caso contemplado por el legislador a aquel carente de regulación. La aplicación de la analogía se justifica por la necesidad de regular hechos semejantes, según el principio de la igualdad jurídica, con normas semejantes. El problema principal será, en estos casos, determinar si entre ambas situaciones existen similitudes jurídicas de tal entidad, como para permitir la extensión analógica de la norma conocida. Este problema no puede ser resuelto en forma mecánica o con criterios meramente lógicos, se trata más bien de una valoración jurídica hecha por el juzgador [o la juzgadora], en la cual se determina si los elementos fácticos contemplados en la norma conocida, los cuales motivaron el establecimiento de una determinada disposición por parte del legislador (de acuerdo con la ratio legis), se encuentran también presentes en la situación similar tomada en consideración. Puede ser que el hecho considerado tenga ciertos elementos esenciales que lo caracterizan y otros accidentales o contingentes que lo acompañan. Lo importante es que exista correspondencia entre los elementos esenciales del hecho previsto y aquellos de la situación no regulada. La analogía jurídica suele ser clasificada en dos tipos: la analogía legis, en la cual, para resolver el caso no previsto, se utiliza una disposición normativa singular; y la analogía iuris, la cual no toma como punto de partida una sola norma, sino una serie de disposiciones, de las cuales induce un principio general. Ambos procedimientos obedecen a los esquemas de razonamiento analizados en el considerando anterior: la legis corresponde a la inducción por analogía y la iuris a la inducción por generalización. La doctrina estima como un caso de analogía iuris el recurso a los principios generales del derecho, los cuales solo pueden ser obtenidos a través de la generalización. Para proceder a la interpretación analógica de las normas, es necesario lo siguiente: 1- que falte una precisa disposición legal para el caso controvertido, por lo que no sería posible la aplicación analógica donde existan preceptos legales expresos o de los cuales se pueda deducir, a través de la interpretación extensiva, una solución al caso planteado; 2- que exista una similitud jurídica esencial entre el caso regulado y aquel a regular, lo cual debe ser determinado por el juez [o la jueza], previa una valoración de ambas situaciones; 3- que no se trate de aquellas situaciones en las cuales, dada la naturaleza de la disposición a aplicar, sea improcedente la analogía. En lo tocante a este último requisito, la praxis jurídica ha elaborado algunos principios relevantes, los cuales muchas veces han sido adoptados expresamente por la legislación. Al respecto, conviene citar los siguientes: 1- No es posible aplicar por analogía las leyes prohibitivas y sancionatorias, por ser de naturaleza restrictiva; 2- tampoco es posible hacerlo tratándose de normas que limiten la capacidad de la persona o los derechos subjetivos, por ser materia odiosa; 3- tratándose de "ius singulare" o de derecho excepcional, por su misma naturaleza, al obedecer a una razón particular de regulación, no procede este tipo de aplicación normativa; y, 4- tratándose de normas temporales, tampoco procede la analogía, por estar determinadas para una circunstancia momentánea. / V. De los supuestos que impiden la aplicación de la analogía, conviene referirse (…), a la imposibilidad de aplicar en forma extensiva aquellas normas del ius singulare. En doctrina se contrapone esta categoría al ius regulare. Este último, está formado por normas caracterizadas por la correspondencia de sus fundamentos a los principios generales del ordenamiento jurídico; en otras palabras, sus directrices, presupuestos y fundamentos no se separan de los lineamientos generales del Derecho. Por el contrario, el ius singulare, también llamado excepcional, se inspira en reglas diversas de aquellas que caracterizan el sistema normativo en general. En ocasiones, dada la necesidad de brindar una protección especial para ciertas personas, o para resguardar un interés particular del tráfico jurídico, o para solucionar algunos casos especiales con particulares criterios de equidad, o por necesidades emergentes de circunstancias extraordinarias, resulta necesario sacrificar los principios generales, estableciendo disposiciones que excluyan a algunas personas o relaciones jurídicas de la aplicación de las consecuencias normales para ciertos actos, o estableciendo sanciones o responsabilidades especiales no previstas para los casos normales. Así, el derecho singular representa una desviación de las normas generales que rigen al sistema, lo cual es necesario por razones peculiares de conveniencia que exigen tal tratamiento. Por ello, en tales casos, no es posible la aplicación por analogía de las normas excepcionales o de ius singulare a aquellos casos no contemplados expresamente por las normas. / VI.- En nuestro Código Civil, la aplicación analógica de las normas está regulada por los artículos 12 y 13, ubicados en su Título Preliminar. Según el artículo 12, es posible la interpretación analógica de las normas "... cuando éstas no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en el que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando alguna norma prohíba esa aplicación". De tal forma, se sienta el principio general de la aplicación analógica en aquellos casos donde exista idéntica "ratio legis". Por su parte, el artículo 13 excluye la aplicación analógica tratándose de leyes penales, excepcionales y temporales. De esa forma, nuestro Código Civil permite este método de integración del Derecho según los lineamientos doctrinales esbozados en los considerandos anteriores.” (Ver, además, el voto de la Sala Primera n.º 167-F-S1-2010, de las 8:40 horas del 29 de enero de 2010).- XI.- Ahora bien, si, como la Sala Constitucional lo afirmó en el citado voto n.º 2006-7262, de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006, “(…) la prohibición contenida en la normativa impugnada [inciso 6º del artículo 14 del Código de Familia] se refiere específicamente a la institución denominada matrimonio (…).”; si ella no vulnera la Constitución Política porque no existe “(…) impedimento de alguna naturaleza para la existencia de uniones homosexuales. Más bien, hay una constatación empírica para indicar que han (sic) incrementado.” y si no “(…) procede aplicar la normativa desarrollada para el matrimonio en los términos actualmente concebidos en nuestro ordenamiento constitucional.”; cuál sería, entonces, la normativa de la que habríamos de echar mano para decidir por el fondo este proceso. Téngase presente que, a pesar de haberse apuntado en esa oportunidad que el problema planteado “(…) no radica en la norma aquí impugnada sino, más bien, en la ausencia de una regulación normativa apropiada, para regular los efectos personales y patrimoniales de ese tipo de uniones, sobre todo si reúnen condiciones de estabilidad y singularidad, porque un imperativo de seguridad jurídica, si no (sic) de justicia, lo hace necesario. Estamos, entonces, en presencia de un escenario de lege ferenda, pero ni por asomo de una omisión ilegítima del Estado. Esto se indica, además, porque en la documentación que corre agregada en autos (sic), y según lo expresado en la audiencia oral llevada a cabo durante la sustanciación de este proceso, algunos países han ido promulgando leyes (en sentido formal) que han dotado de un marco jurídico y ciertas formalidades a estas uniones, con el propósito de que tengan efectos jurídicos específicos en relación a las personas que las llevan a cabo […y…], a las cuales (…) no se les puede aplicar el marco jurídico que el constituyente derivado organizó para el tratamiento de las parejas heterosexuales.” (La negrita es agregada); en fecha más reciente ese mismo órgano evidenció que “(…) la laguna normativa apuntada por […ese…] Tribunal Constitucional en la Sentencia supra citada, se […mantiene…], con lo cual se […está…] inobservando, de manera indirecta, las razones vertidas (ratio decidendi) por […la…] Sala especializada de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en materia de control de constitucionalidad, para estimar que el numeral 14, inciso 6º, del Código de Familia es conforme con el Derecho de la Constitución.” (Voto n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010). Y no sobra mencionar que en ese último pronunciamiento, sintetizó sus criterios sobre el tema en los términos consignados a continuación: “A partir de esta sentencia [se refiere a la n.º 2006-7262, antes citada] quedan claros varios aspectos de importancia para resolver el sub-lite, que son los siguientes: / 1°) Las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo son una realidad social que no puede ignorarse o soslayarse. / 2°) Es preciso regular, legislativamente, los efectos patrimoniales y personales de tales relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. / 3°) Existe un vacío normativo del legislador (sic) ordinario que debe ser colmado, habida cuenta que la institución del matrimonio no puede aplicarse a las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. / 4°) El legislador (sic) ordinario debe dictar una marco normativo que regule las consecuencias jurídicas de tales relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. Esta Sentencia, por lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tiene efectos erga omnes, para todos los poderes constituidos, precisamente, por tal razón, el legislador (sic) ordinario asumió la tarea de discutir la oportunidad y conveniencia de regular las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo.” (Las negritas y el subrayado no aparecen en el documento original). Tampoco es factible dejar de destacar que, a raíz de los acontecimientos políticos por todos conocidos, no parece vislumbrarse que, a corto o mediano plazo, ese estado de cosas pueda variar, sobre todo después de que el pasado 6 de junio la Comisión Permanente Especial de Derechos Humanos de la Asamblea Legislativa, presidida por el diputado Justo Orozco, rindiera dictamen de mayoría negativo sobre el proyecto de Ley de sociedades de convivencia (n.º 17.668), presentado desde el 13 de abril de 2010 por la otrora legisladora Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría y los entonces legisladores José Merino del Río, Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez, Sergio Alfaro Salas y Alberto Salom Echeverría y publicado en La Gaceta n.º 120 de 22 de junio de ese mismo año. Y no altera lo apuntado que, un día después del pronunciamiento de esa Comisión, la iniciativa fuese presentada de nuevo en la Secretaría del Directorio Legislativo por las diputadas Carmen Muñoz y Carmen Granados y los diputados Carlos Góngora y José María Villalta (n.º 18.481). Repárese, además, en que el tema ha estado en la corriente legislativa desde el 27 de septiembre de 2006, data en que Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, José Merino del Río y Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez presentaron el proyecto de Ley de unión civil entre personas del mismo sexo (n.º 16.390), publicado en La Gaceta n.º 214 de 8 de noviembre de 2006, que terminó archivado el 22 de setiembre de 2010.- XII.- Sin duda, en este asunto concreto sometido a nuestra decisión están en juego tanto la determinación del orden jurisdiccional competente para tramitarlo, como la de la normativa de fondo a la cual debe recurrirse para integrar el ordenamiento vigente. Como, a nuestro juicio, es innegable la condición de grupo familiar de la pareja homosexual, le corresponde a la jurisdicción de familia conocer y pronunciarse en definitiva sobre sus consecuencias personales y patrimoniales. En efecto, estamos convenciones de que, como las personas no heterosexuales que la conforman también son titulares de los derechos fundamentales a la igualdad de trato, a la protección de su familia y a la tutela judicial efectiva, tienen pleno derecho a ese reconocimiento en esta sede. Repárese, además, en que, en virtud de esos mismos derechos fundamentales, no cabe hacer distinción alguna, sobre todo si lo que se toma en cuenta es la orientación sexual, en el momento de garantizarles el efectivo acceso al sistema judicial para que los órganos especializados en materia de familia estudien su pretensión y, mediante un fallo motivado y fundado, la acojan o la rechacen y resuelvan así su conflicto. No sobra evidenciar, además, que, por más que se estime imposible aplicar en estos casos las regulaciones del matrimonio, ninguna infracción a la protección reforzada contenida en el artículo 52 de la Constitución Política se comete al reconocerle tales efectos a la relación de pareja entre sujetos del mismo sexo. Por eso y en aras de no causar indefensión y desprotección a las partes, la acreditación de su convivencia pública, estable, prolongada y singular sería así suficiente para justificar el reconocimiento pretendido. Negarlo por no existir una norma específica no solo resulta incongruente con el ordenamiento familiar, sino que también constituye un quebranto del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva (ver, en similares términos, el voto de la Sala Segunda n.º 2003-143, de las 9:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2003).- XIII.- En apoyo de nuestra tesis consideramos de rigor traer a colación los argumentos Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica, en la sentencia del 1º de diciembre de 2005, emitida en el marco de los casos “Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie” (Case C.C.T. 60/04) y “Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs” (Case C.C.T.10/04), mediante la cual anuló la cláusula heterosexual del régimen matrimonial, lo extendió a cualquier pareja, con independencia de su identidad sexual o de género o de su orientación sexual y le otorgó al Parlamento un plazo de doce meses para adaptar su legislación de modo que las parejas del mismo sexo pudiesen acceder a la Ley nacional sobre matrimonio. Acorde con la línea expuesta con posterioridad por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, aquel órgano extranjero, con redacción del juez Albie Sachs, puntualizó entonces “(…) que el daño a las parejas de personas del mismo sexo excede las privaciones de bienes materiales (sentencia, párrafos Nº 71 y 72, entre muchos otros). La definición de matrimonio que las excluye sugiere no sólo que su compromiso, relación y amor es inferior, sino que estas personas nunca podrán ser parte de la comunidad que la Constitución promete crear con igualdad para todos (sentencia, párrafo Nº 71). Estas parejas no son valoradas con el mismo respeto que es otorgado a las parejas heterosexuales (sentencia, párrafos Nº 71 y 81, entre muchos otros). La exclusión de los beneficios y responsabilidades del matrimonio no es un inconveniente pequeño y tangencial sino que representa una forma radical de decir indirectamente que las parejas homosexuales son outsiders (Ídem). Los dichos del tribunal constitucional reflejan que la discriminación opera, en primer lugar, a partir de una indebida exclusión de diferentes parejas de todos los beneficios materiales y protecciones que el matrimonio trae consigo y, en segundo lugar, a partir de la construcción de un diferente estatus como miembros de la comunidad, un estatus devaluado en razón de la orientación sexual elegida.” [FERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Mariano (2007). Matrimonio y diversidad sexual: La lección sudafricana. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Recuperado el 28 de junio de 2008, de http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. De ahí que “(…) el Estado no puede sustraer a determinadas parejas de la protección que las leyes otorgan a otras unidas en matrimonio, ya que la privación de estos derechos y la correlativa estigmatización que provoca, limitan y condicionan en gran medida la elección y materialización de planes de vida. En esa línea, la Corte Constitucional afirmó que dada la importancia y centralidad que atribuyen nuestras sociedades al matrimonio y sus consecuencias en nuestra cultura, el negar este derecho a las parejas de personas del mismo sexo representa negar su derecho a la autodefinición en una forma profunda (sentencia, párrafo Nº 72). Asimismo, en uno de sus pasajes más destacados, la sentencia remarca que la Constitución de Sudáfrica otorga derechos que van más allá del respeto a un ámbito privado ajeno a la interferencia estatal, y que las litigantes no están reclamando un derecho a ser “dejadas a solas” por el Estado, sino más bien un derecho a ser reconocidas como iguales y tratadas dignamente por la ley (sentencia, párrafo Nº 78).” [ Ibid, p. 98].- XIV.- En síntesis, si, como lo apuntó en su momento la Sección Segunda del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, respecto de la unión de hecho heterosexual cuando era considerada por algunos sectores sociales como “(…) un acto ilícito contrario a las buenas costumbres y al matrimonio (…)”, lo cierto es “(…) las épocas son cambiantes y la jurisprudencia debe llenar ahora la laguna que el Ordenamiento tiene al no proteger relaciones de tal índole.”, por cuanto, “No es posible conforme a los principios de equidad y de justicia dejar de lado el esfuerzo en común que realizan dos personas que se unen de esa manera (…).” (Voto n.º 358, de las 8:35 horas del 16 de junio de 1987), es incuestionable que existe la misma razón [“Principio: “ubi eadem ratio, idem jus” (A igual razón, igual derecho), contemplado en el artículo 12 del Código Civil (…).” (Voto de la Sala Segunda n.º 2003-502, de las 15:30 horas del 17 de setiembre de 2003)] para reconocerle consecuencias civiles y patrimoniales a la decisión de dos sujetos homosexuales de establecer un vínculo con características similares a las conyugales, máxime cuando se le otorga plena vigencia al criterio según el cual “(…) la potestad legislativa está sujeta a los límites dispuestos “por los tratados, conforme a los principios del Derecho Internacional”. Es así como los derechos humanos establecidos en los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público –Declaraciones y Convenciones sobre la materia-, resultan un valladar sustancial a la libertad de configuración del legislador (sic), tanto ordinario como, eminentemente, popular a través del referéndum. Este Tribunal Constitucional ha indicado que los derechos humanos consagrados en los instrumentos internacionales tienen, incluso, y a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 48 constitucional, un rango supra constitucional cuando ofrecen una mayor protección a las personas. De otra parte, este Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto No. 2771-2003 de las 11:40 hrs. de 4 de abril de 2003, estimó que, incluso, el poder reformador o constituyente derivado –en cuanto poder constituido- está limitado por el contenido esencial de los derechos fundamentales y humanos, de modo que, por vía de reforma parcial a la constitución, no puede reducirse o cercenarse el contenido esencial de aquellos. Cabe añadir, que un límite implícito a la libertad de configuración del legislador (sic) ordinario o soberano, lo constituye el propio Derecho de la Constitución o bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los principios, valores, preceptos y jurisprudencia constitucionales. Es menester agregar que los derechos de las minorías, por su carácter irrenunciable, constituyen un asunto eminentemente técnico-jurídico, que debe estar en manos del legislador (sic) ordinario y no de las mayorías proclives a su negación.” (Voto n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010).- XV.- Respecto del valor de los instrumentos internacionales en el sistema de fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense y, en particular, de los pronunciamientos de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en el voto n.º 2313-95, de las 16:18 horas del 9 de mayo de 1995, ese órgano certeramente apuntó que “(…) si la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos es el órgano natural para interpretar la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica), la fuerza de su decisión al interpretar la convención y enjuiciar leyes nacionales a la luz de esta normativa, ya sea en caso contencioso o en una mera consulta, tendrá -de principio- el mismo valor de la norma interpretada. No solamente valor ético o científico, como algunos han entendido. Esta tesis que ahora sostenemos, por lo demás, está receptada en nuestro derecho, cuando la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que las normas no escritas -como la costumbre, la jurisprudencia y los principios generales del derecho- servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpretan, integran o delimitan (artículo 7.l.).”- XVI.- Los Principios de Yogyakarta sobre la aplicación del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos a las cuestiones de orientación sexual e identidad de género, adoptados por el Panel Internacional de Especialistas en Legislación Internacional de Derechos Humanos y en Orientación Sexual e Identidad de Género, en la reunión realizada del 6 al 9 de noviembre de 2006, establecen los estándares básicos para que la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y los Estados que la conforman avancen para garantizar las protecciones necesarias a las personas no heterosexuales (lesbianas, gay, bisexuales, transexuales y transgénero). En su preámbulo se reconoce que “La orientación sexual y la identidad de género son esenciales para la dignidad y humanidad de cada persona y no deben ser motivo de discriminación o abuso.” De acuerdo con su primer principio “Los seres humanos de todas las orientaciones sexuales e identidades de género tienen derecho al pleno disfrute de todos los derechos humanos.” El segundo estipula que “Todas las personas tienen derecho al disfrute de todos los derechos humanos, sin discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual o identidad de género. La ley prohibirá toda discriminación y garantizará a todas las personas protección igual y efectiva contra cualquier discriminación.” Al tenor del tercero, “La orientación sexual o identidad de género que cada persona defina para sí, es esencial para su personalidad y constituye uno de los aspectos fundamentales de la autodeterminación, la dignidad y la libertad. Ninguna persona será obligada a someterse a procedimientos médicos como requisito para el reconocimiento legal de su identidad de género. Ninguna persona será sometida a presiones para ocultar, suprimir o negar su orientación sexual o identidad de género.” Y, por último, el 24 reconoce el derecho de toda persona “(…) a formar una familia, con independencia de su orientación sexual o identidad de género. Existen diversas configuraciones de familias. Ninguna familia puede ser sometida a discriminación basada en la orientación sexual o identidad de género de cualquiera de sus integrantes.” Con ese propósito, los Estados “E. Adoptarán todas las medidas legislativas, administrativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias a fin de asegurar que en aquellos Estados que reconocen los matrimonios o las sociedades de convivencia registradas entre personas de un mismo sexo, cualquier derecho, privilegio, obligación o beneficio que se otorga a personas de sexo diferente que están casadas o en unión registrada esté disponible en igualdad de condiciones para personas del mismo sexo casadas o en sociedad de convivencia registrada; / F. Adoptarán todas las medidas legislativas, administrativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias a fin de garantizar que cualquier obligación, derecho, privilegio o beneficio que se otorga a parejas de sexo diferente no casadas esté disponible en igualdad de condiciones para parejas del mismo sexo no casadas; (…).” En 2008, la Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos adoptó en forma unánime la resolución AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) sobre Derechos Humanos, Orientación Sexual e Identidad de Género, mediante la cual se extendió la protección de los derechos humanos a la identidad de género y la orientación sexual. En esa declaración los 34 países miembros reafirmaron la universalidad, indivisibilidad e interdependencia de los derechos humanos y manifestaron su preocupación por los actos de violencia y las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, cometidos contra individuos a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género. En los años siguientes esa organización internacional emitió resoluciones similares: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10) y AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Por último, el 18 de diciembre de 2008, los Representantes Permanentes de Argentina, Brasil, Croacia, Francia, Gabón, Japón, Noruega y los Países Bajos presentaron a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el texto de la Declaración sobre Orientación Sexual e Identidad de Género, en la cual se reafirma el principio de universalidad de los derechos humanos y el de no discriminación, que exige que se apliquen por igual a todos los seres humanos, independientemente de su orientación sexual o identidad de género. Además, se expresa ahí la profunda preocupación por las violaciones de derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales basadas en la orientación sexual o identidad de género y por la violencia, acoso, discriminación, exclusión, estigmatización y prejuicio que se dirigen contra personas de todos los países del mundo por causa de su orientación sexual o identidad de género, y porque estas prácticas socavan la integridad y dignidad de aquéllos sometidos a tales abusos; se condenan las violaciones de derechos humanos basadas en la orientación sexual o la identidad de género dondequiera que tengan lugar; se hace un llamado a todos los Estados y mecanismos internacionales relevantes de derechos humanos a que se comprometan con la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos de todas las personas, independientemente de su orientación sexual e identidad de género y se insta a los primeros para que tomen todas las medidas necesarias, en particular las legislativas o administrativas, para asegurar que la orientación sexual o identidad de género no puedan ser, bajo ninguna circunstancia, la base de sanciones penales. Costa Rica es uno de los 85 países signatarios de la Declaración conjunta para poner alto a los actos de violencia, y a las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, dirigidos contra las personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género, presentada por Colombia ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas en 2011. En enero de este año, el Secretario General de las Unidas, Ban Ki-moon, destacó que la discriminación debida a la orientación sexual o a la identidad de género es una de las injusticias que muchos Estados han ignorado o incluso aprobado. “Como resultado, algunos gobiernos tratan a estas personas como ciudadanos de segunda clase o incluso criminales. Plantar cara a esta discriminación es un desafío. Pero debemos cumplir los ideales de la Declaración Universal.”- XVII.- En fecha reciente, en la citada sentencia del 24 de febrero del año en curso, emitida en el Caso Atala Riffo y niñas vs. Chile, en la cual reiteró la obligación de los Estados parte en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos de respetar y garantizar “sin discriminación alguna” el pleno y libre ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos estableció que la orientación sexual y la identidad de género son categorías protegidas por ese instrumento internacional bajo el término “otra condición social”, recogido en su artículo 1º, inciso 1). Sobre el particular puntualizó lo siguiente: “78. La Corte ha establecido que el artículo 1.1 de la Convención es una norma de carácter general cuyo contenido se extiende a todas las disposiciones del tratado, y dispone la obligación de los Estados Parte de respetar y garantizar el pleno y libre ejercicio de los derechos y libertades allí reconocidos “sin discriminación alguna”. Es decir, cualquiera sea el origen o la forma que asuma, todo tratamiento que pueda ser considerado discriminatorio respecto del ejercicio de cualquiera de los derechos garantizados en la Convención es per se incompatible con la misma12 . / 79. (…) la Corte ha señalado13 que la noción de igualdad se desprende directamente de la unidad de naturaleza del género humano y es inseparable de la dignidad esencial de la persona, frente a la cual es incompatible toda situación que, por considerar superior a un determinado grupo, conduzca a tratarlo con privilegio; o que, a la inversa, por considerarlo inferior, lo trate con hostilidad o de cualquier forma lo discrimine del goce de derechos que sí se reconocen a quienes no se consideran incursos en tal situación. La jurisprudencia de la Corte también ha indicado que en la actual etapa de la evolución del derecho internacional, el principio fundamental de igualdad y no discriminación ha ingresado en el dominio del jus cogens. Sobre él descansa el andamiaje jurídico del orden público nacional e internacional y permean todo el ordenamiento jurídico14.” Puntualizó, además, que como consecuencia de ello, ninguna norma, decisión o práctica de derecho interno, sea por parte de las autoridades estatales o por los particulares, puede disminuir o restringir, de modo alguno, los derechos de una persona por causa de su orientación sexual. Por el contrario, la proscripción de la discriminación por orientación sexual conlleva la obligación de todas las autoridades y funcionarios de garantizarles que puedan gozar de todos y cada uno de los derechos establecidos en la Convención. “80. Además, el Tribunal ha establecido que los Estados deben abstenerse de realizar acciones que de cualquier manera vayan dirigidas, directa o indirectamente, a crear situaciones de discriminación de jure o de facto15 . Los Estados están obligados a adoptar medidas positivas para revertir o cambiar situaciones discriminatorias existentes en sus sociedades, en perjuicio de determinado grupo de personas. Esto implica el deber especial de protección que el Estado debe ejercer con respecto a actuaciones y prácticas de terceros que, bajo su tolerancia o aquiescencia, creen, mantengan o favorezcan las situaciones discriminatorias16.”“82. (…) el artículo 24 de la Convención Americana prohíbe la discriminación de derecho o de hecho, no sólo en cuanto a los derechos consagrados en dicho tratado, sino en lo que respecta a todas las leyes que apruebe el Estado y a su aplicación. En otras palabras, si un Estado discrimina en el respeto o garantía de un derecho convencional, incumpliría la obligación establecida en el artículo 1.1 y el derecho sustantivo en cuestión. Si, por el contrario, la discriminación se refiere a una protección desigual de la ley interna o su aplicación, el hecho debe analizarse a la luz del artículo 24 de la Convención Americana17 .” “83. La Corte ha establecido, al igual que el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que los tratados de derechos humanos son instrumentos vivos, cuya interpretación tiene que acompañar la evolución de los tiempos y las condiciones de vida actuales18. Tal interpretación evolutiva es consecuente con las reglas generales de interpretación consagradas en el artículo 29 de la Convención Americana, así como las establecidas por la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados19.” “84. En este sentido, al interpretar la expresión "cualquier otra condición social" del artículo 1.1. de la Convención, debe siempre elegirse la alternativa más favorable para la tutela de los derechos protegidos por dicho tratado, según el principio de la norma más favorable al ser humano20.” “85. Los criterios específicos en virtud de los cuales está prohibido discriminar, según el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, no son un listado taxativo o limitativo sino meramente enunciativo. Por el contrario, la redacción de dicho artículo deja abiertos los criterios con la inclusión del término “otra condición social” para incorporar así a otras categorías que no hubiesen sido explícitamente indicadas. La expresión “cualquier otra condición social” del artículo 1.1. de la Convención debe ser interpretada por la Corte, en consecuencia, en la perspectiva de la opción más favorable a la persona y de la evolución de los derechos fundamentales en el derecho internacional contemporáneo21 .” “86. Al respecto, en el Sistema Interamericano, la Asamblea General de la Organización de Estados Americanos (en adelante “OEA”) ha aprobado desde 2008 en sus sesiones anuales cuatro resoluciones sucesivas respecto a la protección de las personas contra tratos discriminatorios basados en su orientación sexual e identidad de género, mediante las cuales se ha exigido la adopción de medidas concretas para una protección eficaz contra actos discriminatorios22 .” “87. Respecto a la inclusión de la orientación sexual como categoría de discriminación prohibida, el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ha señalado que la orientación sexual es “otra condición” mencionada en el artículo 14 23 del Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales (en adelante “Convenio Europeo”), el cual prohíbe tratos discriminatorios24. En particular, en el Caso Salgueiro da Silva Mouta Vs. Portugal, el Tribunal Europeo concluyó que la orientación sexual es un concepto que se encuentra cubierto por el artículo 14 del Convenio Europeo. Además, reiteró que el listado de categorías que se realiza en dicho artículo es ilustrativo y no exhaustivo25. Asimismo, en el Caso Clift Vs. Reino Unido, el Tribunal Europeo reiteró que la orientación sexual, como una de las categorías que puede ser incluida bajo “otra condición”, es otro ejemplo específico de los que se encuentran en dicho listado, que son consideradas como características personales en el sentido que son innatas o inherentes a la persona26.” “88. En el marco del Sistema Universal de Protección de Derechos Humanos, el Comité de Derechos Humanos y el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales han calificado la orientación sexual como una de las categorías de discriminación prohibida consideradas en el artículo 2.127 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y el artículo 2.228 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Al respecto, el Comité de Derechos Humanos indicó en el caso Toonen Vs. Australia que la referencia a la categoría “sexo” incluiría la orientación sexual de las personas 29. Igualmente, el Comité de Derechos Humanos ha expresado su preocupación frente a diversas situaciones discriminatorias relacionadas con la orientación sexual de las personas, lo cual ha sido expresado reiteradamente en sus observaciones finales a los informes presentados por los Estados30 .” “89. Por su parte, el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales determinó que la orientación sexual puede ser enmarcada bajo “otra condición social”31. Asimismo, el Comité de los Derechos del Niño 32 , el Comité contra la Tortura33 han realizado referencias en el marco de sus observaciones generales y recomendaciones, respecto a la inclusión de la orientación sexual como una de las categorías prohibidas de discriminación.” “90. El 22 de diciembre de 2008 la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas adoptó la “Declaración sobre derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género”, reafirmando el “principio de no discriminación, que exige que los derechos humanos se apliquen por igual a todos los seres humanos, independientemente de su orientación sexual o identidad de género”34. Asimismo, el 22 de marzo de 2011 fue presentada, ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas, la “Declaración conjunta para poner alto a los actos de violencia, y a las violaciones de derechos humanos dirigidas contra las personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género” 35. El 15 de junio de 2011 este mismo Consejo aprobó una resolución sobre “derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género” en la que se expresó la “grave preocupación por los actos de violencia y discriminación, en todas las regiones del mundo, [cometidos] contra personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género”36 . La prohibición de discriminación por orientación sexual ha sido resaltada también en numerosos informes de los relatores especiales de Naciones Unidas37 .” “91. Teniendo en cuenta las obligaciones generales de respeto y garantía establecidas en el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, los criterios de interpretación fijados en el artículo 29 de dicha Convención, lo estipulado en la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, las Resoluciones de la Asamblea General de la OEA, los estándares establecidos por el Tribunal Europeo y los organismos de Naciones Unidas (supra párrs. 83 a 90), la Corte Interamericana deja establecido que la orientación sexual y la identidad de género de las personas son categorías protegidas por la Convención. Por ello está proscrita por la Convención cualquier norma, acto o práctica discriminatoria basada en la orientación sexual de la persona. En consecuencia, ninguna norma, decisión o práctica de derecho interno, sea por parte de autoridades estatales o por particulares, pueden disminuir o restringir, de modo alguno, los derechos de una persona a partir de su orientación sexual.” “92. En lo que respecta al argumento del Estado de que para la fecha de emisión de la sentencia de la Corte Suprema no habría existido un consenso respecto a la orientación sexual como categoría prohibida de discriminación, la Corte resalta que la presunta falta de un consenso al interior de algunos países sobre el respeto pleno por los derechos de las minorías sexuales no puede ser considerado como un argumento válido para negarles o restringirles sus derechos humanos o para perpetuar y reproducir la discriminación histórica y estructural que estas minorías han sufrido38 . El hecho de que ésta pudiera ser materia controversial en algunos sectores y países, y que no sea necesariamente materia de consenso no puede conducir al Tribunal a abstenerse de decidir, pues al hacerlo debe remitirse única y exclusivamente a las estipulaciones de las obligaciones internacionales contraídas por decisión soberana de los Estados a través de la Convención Americana.” “93. Un derecho que le está reconocido a las personas no puede ser negado o restringido a nadie y bajo ninguna circunstancia con base en su orientación sexual. Ello violaría el artículo 1.1. de la Convención Americana. El instrumento interamericano proscribe la discriminación, en general, incluyendo en ello categorías como las de la orientación sexual la que no puede servir de sustento para negar o restringir ninguno de los derechos establecidos en la Convención.”- XVIII.- Esa Sala Constitucional también ha reconocido que la orientación sexual es un vector de discriminación social y personal y ha destacado el papel de las autoridades públicas en la lucha contra esta. En el voto n.º 2007-18660, de las 11:17 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2007, lo puntualizó en los siguientes términos: “A través de su línea jurisprudencial esta Sala ha reconocido como principio jurídico fundamental contenido en la Constitución Política de Costa Rica el respeto a la dignidad de todo ser humano y, en consecuencia, la prohibición absoluta de realizar cualquier tipo de discriminación contraria a esa dignidad. Discriminar, en términos generales, es diferenciar en perjuicio de los derechos y la dignidad de un ser humano o grupo de ellos; en este caso de los homosexuales. A partir de lo anterior, puede válidamente afirmarse que la discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual es contrario al concepto de dignidad debidamente consagrado en la Constitución Política y en los Tratados Internacionales en materia de Derechos Humanos suscritos por nuestro país. A manera de ejemplo, el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos prohíbe en su artículo 26 la discriminación por motivos de "raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social"; de lo que también deriva que no son permitidos los actos que atenten contra el derecho a la igualdad y dignidad humana de las personas por su orientación sexual, pues tienen derecho a acceder a cualquier establecimiento comercial y a recibir un trato igual, sin discriminación en razón de su preferencia sexual.” En el n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010, agregó que “Los derechos humanos, fundamentales y de configuración legal de los grupos minoritarios o en desventaja, por haber sufrido, tradicionalmente, discriminación, exclusión y toda clase de prejuicios sociales -como ocurre con el de los homosexuales-, surgen a partir movimientos de reivindicación de éstos (sic), ordinariamente, contra mayoritarios, dada la insistencia e inclinación natural de las mayorías por mantener y perpetuar cualquier discriminación y trato asimétrico. Los poderes públicos, de su parte, están obligados, por la Constitución y los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, a garantizar y propiciar el respeto efectivo del principio y el derecho a la igualdad –real y no formal- de tales grupos (artículos 33 constitucional y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José). Las situaciones de discriminación pueden ser fácticas o jurídicas, serán del primer tipo cuando, ante la existencia de un grupo minoritario en desventaja y discriminado, no se adoptan medidas para superar tal estado de cosas.” “Frente a los grupos que son objeto de discriminación y prejuicios sociales no basta la aplicación del principio de la igualdad real y prohibición de toda discriminación que, normalmente, operan ex post a la perpetración del acto discriminatorio. Por lo anterior, es preciso que los poderes públicos actúen el principio de apoyo a tales grupos con políticas públicas y medidas normativas efectivas. El principio de apoyo a los grupos discriminados previene y se anticipa a las discriminaciones, de modo que tiene un efecto ex ante, respecto de éstas. El principio de apoyo se logra cumplir cuando se dicta legislación y reglamentación que reconoce derechos de los grupos discriminados, aunque estos sean de configuración infra constitucional.”- XIX.- Como apunta Fernando REY MARTÍNEZ, “La igualdad/prohibición de discriminación tiene un ámbito normativo más amplio porque protege la homosexualidad en los espacios privados (impidiendo que sea tratada por el Derecho de un modo irrazonablemente distinto al de la heterosexualidad) pero también en los públicos, en ese mismo sentido. Los poderes públicos tendrán que aportar una razón especialmente convincente o persuasiva para tratar jurídicamente de modo distinto y peor a los homosexuales que a los heterosexuales. Huelga decir que desde el enfoque de la prohibición de discriminación la protección se hace más eficaz e incisiva, entre otras cosas porque los argumentos morales o históricos ya no serán suficientes por sí solos para impedir que las personas homosexuales accedan a ciertos derechos que tradicionalmente tenían vetados, como, por ejemplo, el derecho a mantener una unión estable reconocida jurídicamente con una persona de su misma orientación sexual.” [Homosexualidad y Constitución. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid: 73, enero/abril, 2005, p.132]. De ahí que resulte imperativo erradicar, cuando menos del mundo jurídico, el profundo prejuicio social homofóbico, que, por otra parte, quizás guarde una significativa relación con la discriminación contra las mujeres por cuanto la estigmatización de las personas no heterosexuales aparece estrechamente vinculada a la supuesta desviación del rol juzgado tradicionalmente como apropiado para ellas (el centro del reproche social parece residir en que el «gay» adopta una posición de «mujer» y en que la lesbiana asume una de «hombre»). “El derecho fundamental a no ser discriminado por razón de orientación sexual tendría, pues, el típico efecto de la igualdad de trato con sus dos corolarios, la prohibición de discriminaciones directas, es decir, de tratamientos jurídicos diferentes y peores en atención a la homosexualidad, y de discriminaciones indirectas o de impacto, esto es, de diferenciaciones jurídicas que se pudieran establecer formalmente no en razón de la orientación sexual, pero que, de hecho, impactaran negativamente sobre la minoría homosexual.” [ ibid, p. 139]. De la prohibición de discriminación por la orientación sexual se deriva también un mandato de acciones positivas. Los poderes públicos están obligados a que la discriminación social que sufren las personas homosexuales «no prevalezca» de ningún modo, para lo cual están obligadas a adoptar medidas de igualdad de oportunidades. “La tutela de la homosexualidad, a pesar de no ser aludida explícitamente por nuestra Constitución, se ha convertido en un asunto constitucional central, y no sólo porque afecta, como cabe suponer, a un número de personas no fácilmente determinable, pero sin duda significativo, sino, sobre todo, por la concurrencia de dos argumentos cualitativos, uno relativo al valor de la libertad y otro al de la igualdad. En la pregunta sobre el marco constitucional de la homosexualidad está en juego, desde luego, la libertad, porque el corazón del asunto es la orientación sexual de las personas, es decir, una de las claves de la existencia humana y, por tanto, de su dignidad, central para la vida familiar, el bienestar colectivo y el desarrollo de la personalidad individual. Pero también la igualdad está implicada, porque nuestra Constitución, como dijera el Juez Harlan de la Constitución norteamericana en su dissent a la Sentencia Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), «ni conoce ni tolera clases entre los ciudadanos».” [ Ibid, p. 117]. Como lo indicó el magistrado J. Greaney en su voto concurrente en la famosa Sentencia de la Supreme Judicial Court de Massachussets, Hillary Goodridge and others v. Departament of Public Health, de 18 de noviembre de 2003: «Como asunto de Derecho constitucional, ni el mantra de la tradición, ni la convicción individual pueden justificar la perpetuación de la jerarquía según la cual las parejas del mismo sexo y sus familias son juzgadas menos merecedoras de reconocimiento social y jurídica que las de sexo opuesto».- XX.- Con base en todo lo expuesto y aunque no nos cabe la menor duda de que para decidir si la pretensión formulada en este asunto puede ser acogida o rechazada, procede aplicar analógicamente lo previsto para la unión de hecho en el Código de Familia, con excepción, claro está, del requerimiento de que se trate de un vínculo heterosexual, nos vemos compelidos a formular esta consulta judicial de constitucionalidad con el propósito de que esa Sala defina si lo resuelto por ella con anterioridad en relación con la validez constitucional de esa exigencia nos impide hacerlo.”