ICE Not Exempt from Property Tax PaymentImprocedencia de exención del ICE al pago del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles

III.REGARDING THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATIVE RESERVE AND LEGALITY IN TAX MATTERS. In accordance with the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, it is the exclusive purview of the Legislative Assembly to establish national taxes and contributions, and to authorize municipal ones; this implies that a principle of legislative reserve exists in tax matters, also called the principle of tax legality. In this sense, Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties or impose levies, fees, fines, or other similar charges. For its part, Article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, in relation to Articles 5 and 62 of that same normative body, establishes which essential elements of the tax are reserved to the law, namely: a) To create, modify, or suppress taxes; to define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship; to establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and to indicate the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo); b) To classify infractions and establish the respective sanctions; c) To establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; d) To regulate the means of extinguishing tax credits. In accordance with subsection b) of Article 6 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, only the law may grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits, which consequently cannot be created by analogy, but rather by formal and material law (Article 6 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures), a legal norm that, in accordance with the principle of tax legality, must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes covered, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or if the transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions (Articles 5 and 62, paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures). The foregoing implies that, even if there is an express provision of tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation, as this would imply a future limitation on the State's tax power, to the detriment of the principle of equality before taxes and public burdens (Article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution). Now, this Court considers that in view of the indicated norms and in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, the principle of legislative reserve in tax matters is not absolute in nature, but relative, since while it is true that the essential elements must be established by law, it is also true that the legal norm must at least establish the limits or specific criteria based on which the infralegal norms –Article 2, subsection d) of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures– may or must complete the normative discipline of said essential elements, in order to execute and apply said legal norms (Articles 140, subsections 3 and 18 in fine of the Political Constitution and Article 99, second paragraph of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures). In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: “...Our jurisprudence, (...) has recognized, given certain circumstances, the possibility of a 'relative delegation' of said powers operating –within certain reasonable limits–, provided that the margins of the respective tax are set forth in the law, because otherwise, we would be in the presence of an 'absolute delegation' of such powers, a proceeding that lacks, as stated, constitutional validity (...) the Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not with respect to the constitutional elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called legislative reserve does apply...” (judgment number 1996-00687, and in a similar sense, judgment number 1995-000739 at fourteen hours fifty-one minutes on the eighth of February of nineteen ninety-six).

IV.-SOME GENERALITIES OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX. This tax is created by Law No. 7509, according to which a tax on real property (bienes inmuebles) is established in favor of the municipalities, whose object is the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions that exist there. Regarding its nature, it is necessary to point out that the Constitutional Chamber has established that it is a "tax of municipal order by reason of its destination –only–, but it is not so by virtue of its procedure of origin or enactment, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is to say, it is the product of ordinary legislative work itself. It should be reiterated that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, in terms of the use of tax power, to establish the taxes that are required, be they national or municipal." (SCV 5669-99). Thus, it is not a municipal tax originating from the derived and own tax power of the municipal corporations, which derives from section 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; but rather, it is what Spanish doctrine calls ceded taxes (tributos cedidos). Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created by the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121, subsection 13) of the Constitution, which is considered special both for the municipal initiative and for the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or rejecting the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the ceding of taxes is a financing mechanism developed primarily by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the tax power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds the competence over the yields, through points of connection of a territorial nature. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the tax power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the "collaboration" that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the ceding of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competences, without prejudice to the required coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Real Property Tax, by virtue of the inherent characteristics of this tax. Although they emanate from the exercise of the State's normative and tax power, the competence over collection is held by the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a point of connection. Likewise, the administrative power of tax management is also held by the municipalities, without this preventing the existence of coordination with the State Tax Administration, which is currently manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica) introduced by Article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729. It should be noted that our constitutional jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Voto 3930-95, it stated regarding the taxes that the State creates for the benefit of the municipalities: "...But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…" It should be indicated that it is an annual tax, whose period begins on January 1 and ends on December 31 of each calendar year. Its payment must be made annually or semi-annually or in four quarterly installments, as determined by each municipality. Likewise, considered as taxpayers (sujetos pasivos) of this tax are the owners of real property, concessionaires, permit holders or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, occupants or possessors with title, registrable or non-registrable in the Public Registry, with more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, esquilmos, gratuitous land borrowers and precarious occupants, the IDA parceleros in certain circumstances. The taxable base for calculating the tax will be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration, as of January 1 of the corresponding year, which implies that for tax purposes, every property must be valued, which is a task of each Municipality within the framework of the powers of administration, management, and tax collection imposed by Law No. 7509 itself. Throughout the country, the tax percentage will be a quarter percent (0.25%) and will be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As already indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the character of Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), which means that they are in charge of withholding and collecting the aforementioned tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures. This law also attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to fulfill the management of this tax, among them "(...) carry out valuations of real property, bill, collect, and process judicial collection and administer, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (...)." (Article 3). Finally, it should be kept in mind that the municipal corporations, in the exercise of the regulatory power that is their own, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Political Constitution, may well approve the internal organization norms they require in order to make effective the collection and gathering of the Real Property Tax (see in the same sense, judgment number 1565-2009 issued by the Sixth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on the eleventh of August of two thousand eight).

V.-ON THE SCOPE OF THE MODIFICATION TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS INCIDENCE ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE LAW 449. This Court, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Property Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree Law that creates the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) was added to by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, in order to establish: "Article 20.- The Costa Rican Electricity Institute is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege (franquicia postal y telegráfica)." Said norm created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect the ICE, but the Regulatory Law for All Current Exonerations, their Derogation and their Exceptions -Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this last condition, because in Article 2, subsection l) it provided to maintain only the exonerations in force at the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions, resulting in the ICE being affected insofar as it holds such a nature, which was reinforced with the reform of Articles 63 and 64 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures -contained in that same normative body-, which provided: "...ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation. (As reformed by Article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992). ARTICLE 64.-Validity. The exemption, even when granted depending on certain de facto conditions, can be derogated or modified by a later law, without liability for the State." Likewise, its effectiveness was made subject "...to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as the correct use and intended destination of the goods and services on which the exemption enjoyed by a certain subject has fallen…" (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, the effects of the exoneration were limited, in such a way that from the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code, it cannot claim to cover future taxes, even when so established. Such that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law. Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, it is derived that –in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below–, said institution would be obliged to pay any tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor (see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of January of the year two thousand four). By reason of the foregoing, this Court does not share the criterion expressed by the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Court, in judgment number 364-2002 at sixteen hours twenty-eight minutes on the eleventh of October of two thousand two, given that there it is maintained that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes is maintained in favor of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, considering that: "... Regarding the validity of Article 20 of the Constitutive Law of the ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992 'Regulatory Law for All Current Exonerations, their Derogation and their Exceptions'; which in its Article 1 derogates 'all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided in the different laws', and in 50, modifies numeral 63 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, to establish that those enacted affect only preceding laws, not future ones. However, in Article 2 of the legislation under commentary, it is expressly indicated that the tax exclusions established in the same Law and those others that: '...l) Have been granted ... to decentralized institutions...' are excepted from the derogation of the preceding article. This being so, the exemption from the payment of national and municipal taxes, established in Article 20 of Decree Law 449, is maintained..."; an affirmation that in any case, was nuanced by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of January of the year two thousand four, by indicating –pertinently– that "... Under this premise, decentralized institutions like the ICE, from that moment forward, and towards the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated and they conserve the exonerations granted by norms prior to that date (...) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibídem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date...". Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of the ICE in Article 20 of Decree Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 2, subsection l) of Law 7293 and 5, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures.

VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX THAT ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A) OF LAW 7509 PRESUMABLY ESTABLISHES IN FAVOR OF THE I.C.E. Now, in the case of the real property tax, although Article 34 of Law 7293 modified Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939 and its reforms), in the sense that "...The following real property are not subject to this tax, those owned by: (...) - Costa Rican Electricity Institute…"; it is also the case that, with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Real Property Tax Law (Law number 7509), not only was the Territorial Tax Law derogated (Article 38), but it also imposed as a condition for the real property of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Property Tax, that they enjoy an exemption by special law (Article 4, subsection a) of Law 7509). At this point, it is necessary to indicate that while it is true, the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions that exist there (Article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509); that it is a tax of a national character that was established in favor of the Municipalities (Article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509) and that in general terms, the taxable base for calculating the tax will be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration –now in charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the collection and supervision of taxes (Article 9 and following of Law 7509), previously by the Dirección General de Tributación (Article 5 of Law 27)–; it is also true that it is contrary to the principle of tax legality, provided in sections 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, to affirm that due to these similarities, the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law remains in force over time in favor of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, despite the fact that it was derogated by Article 38 of the Real Property Tax Law. Nor is the principle of fiscal immunity applicable to the specific case, because although the Real Property Tax constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) (ICE), and the beneficiary subject who is also competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a conditio sine qua non for the application of that principle, given that "... The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself. The greater entity assumes a double consideration as active subject and taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of the tax legal relationship whose consequence would be the extinction of the tax obligation by merger (confusión). Hence the reason (Article 49 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures) for establishing merger as a cause for the extinction of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being the active subject to the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of the tax, the tax obligation is non-existent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (...) For fiscal immunity –by merger– to operate, the subjective identity must be full..." (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours on the twenty-fifth of March of nineteen ninety-four. The highlighting is not from the original). So much so, that Article 5, subsection a), paragraph 2 of the Regulation to the Real Property Tax Law establishes that "...The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject...". In addition to the above, it is also not valid to affirm that subsection a) of Article 4 of the Real Property Tax Law establishes an exoneration from the payment of that tax in favor of the ICE, not only because it imposes as a condition for the real property of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Property Tax, that they enjoy an exemption by special law; but also, because in accordance with the principle of tax legality, specifically the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree Law number 449 cannot claim to cover future taxes, even when so established. Such that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not happen in the case of the Real Property Tax Law, reason for which, to refer to the provisions of Article 20 of Decree Law number 449 as the source of exoneration for that tax is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reserve. In this sense, it is worth citing what was resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 037-F-04 at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January 21 of two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Costa Rican Electricity Institute affirms, regarding the alleged maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in Article 20 of Decree Law 449, established the following: "...Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the derogation the exonerations granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its Article 63, the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there cannot be rules that grant exonerations, with a date prior to that date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exoneration cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992. Under this premise, decentralized institutions like the ICE, from that moment forward, and towards the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated and they conserve the exonerations granted by norms prior to that date. It should not be lost sight of that the Regulatory Law for Current Exonerations, Derogations and Exceptions, arises, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws, however, the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been holding cannot be applied with retroactive effect, for which the tax exonerations granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibídem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date. The contrary would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law. It is precisely for these reasons that the exoneration granted in favor of the ICE is not affected by Law No. 7283 on Municipal Tariffs and Taxes of the Canton of Tilarán, because it was enacted on a date prior to the Regulatory Law for all current exonerations, and it is not until this moment when, by express norm, granting exemptions under old norms is prohibited. The de facto situation provided in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant, if the norm is enacted after April 3, 1992. This being the case, because it is a tax prior to the law derogating exonerations, the exemption regime provided in the law of creation of the ICE continued to benefit it at the moment the Law No. 7283 entered into force. To maintain the contrary, it is reiterated, would entail a retroactive application of Article 63 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, which is prohibited by constitutional provision..." (the highlighting is not from the original). In this case, as was analyzed supra, to affirm that due to the existing similarities between the Territorial Tax and the Real Property Tax –mainly regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefited by the tax, and the national nature of the same–, the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (reformed in that sense by Article 34 of Law 7293), remains in force over time in favor of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, despite the fact that it was derogated by Article 38 of the Real Property Tax Law, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reserve in that matter. Even more so, when Article 4, subsection a) of Law 7509 itself –which entered into force on June 19, 1995–, conditioned the non-subjection to the tax regulated therein, to the fact that an exemption be established by special law –in the terms of Articles 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, that is, in an express, concrete, and clear manner– for the real property of autonomous institutions –which are the ones of interest for this case–, which does not happen in the species, since as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree Law number 449 cannot claim to cover future taxes, even when so established. For the reasons stated, this Court does not share the criteria expressed in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Contentious-Administrative Court, when resolving the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment issued in executive proceedings brought by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against the ICE, for alleged debts of the Real Property Tax; given that in these, it is assumed that subsection a) of Article 4 of Law 7509 indeed contains an exoneration in favor of the ICE or that it finds support in Article 20 of Decree Law 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned to the provisions of Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures.

In summary, once the Territorial Tax Law was repealed, as of June 19, 1995 (the effective date of Law 7509), there is no special law granting the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad an express, clear, and specific exemption in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code, establishing that the real estate of the appellant entity is not subject to the Real Estate Tax [...].” **III. REGARDING THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATIVE RESERVE AND LEGALITY IN TAX MATTERS.** Pursuant to the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly to establish national taxes and contributions and to authorize municipal ones; this implies that **a principle of legislative reserve exists in tax matters, also called the principle of tax legality.** In that sense, Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that regulations, circulars, instructions, and other general administrative provisions may not establish penalties nor impose levies, rates, fines, or other similar charges. For its part, Article 5 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code, in relation to Articles 5 and 62 of that same regulatory body, establishes which are the essential elements of the tax that are reserved to the law, namely: **a)** Creating, modifying, or eliminating taxes; defining the taxable event of the tax relationship; establishing the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicating the taxpayer; **b)** Classifying infractions and establishing the respective sanctions; **c)** Establishing privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; **d)** Regulating the means of extinguishment of tax credits. Pursuant to subsection b) of Article 6 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code, **only the law can grant exemptions**, **reductions, or benefits, which consequently cannot be created by analogy, but only by formal and material law** *(Article 6 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code)*, a legal norm that, in accordance with the **principle of tax legality**, must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it encompasses, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during the course of said period the goods can be released or the taxes must be liquidated, or whether transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions *(Articles 5 and 62, paragraph 1 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code).* The foregoing implies that, even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation, since that would imply a future limitation on the State's taxing power, to the detriment of the principle of equality before taxes and public charges *(Article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)*. Now, this Court considers that, in view of the indicated norms and in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, **the principle of legislative reserve in tax matters is not absolute in nature, but rather relative,** since while it is true that the essential elements must be established by law, it is also true that the legal norm must at least establish the specific limits or criteria based on which infra-legal norms –Article 2, subsection d) of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code– may or must complete the normative discipline of said essential elements, in order to execute and apply said legal norms *(Articles 140, subsections 3 and 18 in fine of the Political Constitution, and Article 99, second paragraph of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code)*. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“...Our jurisprudence, (...) has recognized, given certain circumstances, the possibility that a ‘relative delegation’ of said powers may operate –within certain reasonable limits–, provided that the margins of the respective tax are indicated in the law, otherwise, we would be in the presence of an ‘absolute delegation’ of such powers, a proceeding which, as stated, lacks constitutional validity (...) the Chamber has pronounced itself in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not so with regard to the constitutional elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), for which the so-called legislative reserve does apply...”* (ruling number 1996-00687, and in a similar sense, ruling number 1995-000739 at fourteen hours and fifty-one minutes of February eighth, nineteen ninety-six).

**IV.- SOME GENERALITIES OF THE REAL ESTATE TAX.** This tax is created by Law No. 7509, according to which a tax on real estate is established in favor of the municipalities, whose object is the land, installations, or fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon. Regarding its nature, it is necessary to point out that the Constitutional Chamber has established that it is a *“municipal-level tax by reason of its destination –solely–, but it is not so by virtue of its origin or promulgation procedure, given that it was not born from the initiative of local governments, but rather from the exercise of the taxing power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; that is, it is a product of the ordinary legislative work itself. It is worth reiterating that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of the taxing power, to establish the taxes that are required, be they national or municipal.” (SCV 5669-99).* Thus, it is not a municipal tax deriving from the derived and own taxing power of municipal corporations that stems from numeral 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; but rather what Spanish doctrine terms as ceded taxes. While both are local revenue sources, the first are those which, as indicated, are created through the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121, subsection 13) constitutional, which is considered special both for the municipal initiative and for the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or disapproving the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the ceding of taxes is a financing mechanism developed primarily by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the taxing power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds competence over the yields, through connection points of a territorial nature. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the taxing power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the “collaboration” that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. As indicated, the ceding of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competencies, without prejudice to the mandatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Real Estate Tax, by virtue of the own characteristics of this tax. Although it emanates from the exercise of the State's normative and taxing power, the competence over collection is held by the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a connection point. Likewise, the administrative power for tax management is also held by the municipalities, without this preventing there from being a coordination with the State Tax Administration, which to date is manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body introduced by Article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729. It should be pointed out that **our constitutional jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Voto 3930-95,** it stated regarding the taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities *“...But that does not mean that the legislator cannot provide the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…”* It should be indicated that this is an annual tax, whose period begins on January 1 and ends on December 31 of each calendar year. Its payment must be made annually or semi-annually or in four quarterly installments, as determined by each municipality. Likewise, considered as taxpayers of this tax are the owners of real estate, concessionaires, permit holders or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, occupants or possessors with title, registrable or not registrable in the Public Registry, with more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, tithe-holders, gratuitous land borrowers, and precarious occupants, the IDA parcel holders under certain circumstances. The taxable base for the tax calculation shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration, as of January 1 of the corresponding year, which entails that for tax purposes, every property must be valued, which is a task of each Municipality within the framework of the administration, management, and collection powers of the tax imposed by Law No. 7509 itself. Throughout the country, the tax percentage shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As already indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the character of Tax Administration, which means they are responsible for withholding and receiving said tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code. This law also bestows upon them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to be able to fulfill the management of this tax, among them *“(…) carrying out valuations of real estate, invoicing, collecting, and processing judicial collection and administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…).” (Article 3).* Bear in mind, finally, that the municipal corporations, in exercise of their own regulatory power, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Political Constitution, may well approve the internal organization norms they require in order to make effective the collection and gathering of the Real Estate Tax *(see in the same sense, ruling number 1565-2009 issued by the Sixth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Tax Court, at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes of August eleventh, two thousand eight)*.

**V.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS INCIDENCE ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449.** This Court, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Estate Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree-Law creating the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was supplemented by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, to establish: *“Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege”.* Said norm **created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that might affect the ICE**, but the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, their Derogation and their Exceptions -Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this latter condition, since in Article 2, subsection l) it **provided for maintaining only the exemptions in force at the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions, with the ICE being affected insofar as it holds such nature**, which was reinforced with the reform of Articles 63 and 64 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code -contained in that same regulatory body-, which provided: *“...ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.* (Thus amended by Article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992). *ARTICLE 64.-Validity. The exemption, even when granted in accordance with certain conditions of fact, may be derogated or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.”* Likewise, its effectiveness was subjected *“…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes governing the granting, as well as the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services upon which the exemption enjoyed by a certain subject has fallen…”* (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, **the effects of the exemption were limited, such that as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code**, **it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established**. In such a way that **the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law**. **Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that –in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below–, said institution would be obligated to pay every tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor** *(see in this regard, ruling number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten hours and thirty-five minutes of January twenty-first, two thousand four)*. For this reason, this Court does not share the opinion rendered by the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Court, in ruling number 364-2002 at sixteen hours and twenty-eight minutes of October eleventh, two thousand two, since therein it is held that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes is maintained in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, by considering that: *“... Regarding the validity of Article 20 of the Constitutive Law of the ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992 ‘Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, their Derogation and their Exceptions’; which in its Article 1 derogates ‘all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided in the different laws’, and in 50, modifies numeral 63 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code, to establish that those enacted affect only preceding laws, not future ones. However, in Article 2 of the regulation under discussion, it is expressly indicated that the tax exclusions established in the same Law and those others that: ‘…l) Have been granted … to decentralized institutions…’ are excepted from the derogation of the preceding article. **This being so, the exemption from the payment of national and municipal taxes, established in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, is maintained...**”;* an affirmation that in any case was nuanced by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours and thirty-five minutes of January twenty-first, two thousand four, by indicating –in what is relevant– that *“… **Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as the ICE, as of that moment, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under the protection of norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated and they retain the exemptions granted by norms prior to that date** (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply regarding taxes created after that date…”.* Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of the ICE in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449 remains in force, although limited in its future scope and effectiveness to the provisions of Articles 121, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 2, subsection l) of Law 7293 and 5, 63, and 64 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code.

**VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE REAL ESTATE TAX THAT ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A) OF LAW 7509 PRESUMPTIVELY ESTABLISHES IN FAVOR OF THE I.C.E.** Now, in the case of the real estate tax, although Article 34 of Law 7293 amended Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its reforms), in the sense that *“…Not subject to this tax are the properties owned by: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad…”;* it is also true that with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Real Estate Tax Law *(Law number 7509)*, not only was the Territorial Tax Law derogated *(Article 38)*, but it also imposed as a condition for the real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Estate Tax, that they enjoy an exemption by special law *(Article 4, subsection a of Law 7509).* On this point, it is necessary to indicate that while it is true that the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: the land, installations, or fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon *(Article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509);* that it is a national-level tax that was established in favor of the Municipalities *(Article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509)* and that in general terms, the taxable base for the tax calculation shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration –now under the charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the perception and oversight of the taxes *(Article 9 and following of Law 7509)*, previously by the Dirección General de Tributación *(Article 5 of Law 27)*-; it is also true that **to affirm that due to these similarities, the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite having been derogated by Article 38 of the Real Estate Tax Law, is contrary to the principle of tax legality** provided in numerals 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5 and 62 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code. **Nor is the principle of fiscal immunity applicable to the specific case,** because although the Real Estate Tax constitutes a national-level tax, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the taxpayer (ICE), and the beneficiary subject and also the entity competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a condition sine qua non for the application of that principle, since *“… The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State creating taxes to charge itself. The higher entity assumes a dual consideration as active and passive subject of the tax legal relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinguishment of the tax obligation by confusion. Hence the reason (Article 49 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code) for establishing confusion as a cause for extinguishment of the tax obligation. When the State transitions from being the active subject to the taxpayer of the tax, the tax obligation is non-existent since the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity –by confusion– to operate, the subjective identity must be complete…” (ruling number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours of March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. The highlighting is not from the original).* So much so that in Article 5, subsection a), paragraph 2 of the Regulation to the Real Estate Tax Law, it is established that *“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”.* Added to the foregoing, it is also not valid to assert that subsection a) of Article 4 of the Real Estate Tax Law establishes in favor of the ICE an exemption from payment of that tax, not only because it imposes as a condition for the real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Estate Tax, **that they enjoy an exemption by special law;** but also because, in accordance with the principle of tax legality, specifically the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the Tax Standards and Procedures Code, as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, **cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established**. In such a way that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Real Estate Tax Law, a reason for which, referring to the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 as the source of an exemption from that tax, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reserve. In that sense, it is worth citing what was resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling number 037-F-04 at ten hours and thirty-five minutes of January 21, two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad affirms, regarding the supposed maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, established the following: *“…Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the derogation the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions.* Additionally, in its Article 63, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (amended by Article 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there cannot be rules granting exemptions dated prior to the date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot predate the tax. This rule has effects from its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992<b>. <u>Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment forward, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under rules predating those regulating the tax, and they retain the exemptions granted by rules prior to that date</u>.</b> It should not be lost sight of that the Regulatory Law on Existing Exemptions, Derogations, and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones) emerged, among other reasons, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws; however, the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been enjoying cannot be applied retroactively, therefore the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. <b>Consequently, the restriction of Article 63 <span class=SpellE>ibidem</span> can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date.</b> The contrary would imply a reprehensible retroactive application of the law. <u>It is precisely for these reasons that the exemption granted in favor of ICE is not affected by Law <span class=SpellE>No.</span> 7283 on Municipal Tariffs and Taxes of the Canton of <span class=SpellE>Tilarán</span>, because it was enacted on a date prior to the Regulatory Law on all existing exemptions</u>, and it is not until this moment that, through an express rule, granting exemptions under rules of old date is prohibited. <u>The factual scenario provided in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant if the rule had been enacted after April 3, 1992</u>. Thus, as it is a tax predating the law that derogated exemptions, the exemption regime provided in the law creating ICE continued to benefit it at the time Law <span class=SpellE>No.</span> 7283 entered into force. To hold the contrary, it is reiterated, would imply a retroactive application of Article 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which is precluded by constitutional provision..." (<span class=GramE>the</span> highlighting is not from the original). </i>In this case, as analyzed <span class=SpellE>supra</span>, to affirm that, due to the similarities between the Territorial Tax (Impuesto Territorial) and the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) –mainly regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefiting from the tax, and its national nature–, the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (reformed in that sense by Article 34 of Law 7293) remains in force over time in favor of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad), despite having been derogated by Article 38 of the Real Property Tax Law, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria) and legislative reservation (reserva de ley) in this matter. Even more so when Article 4, subsection a) of Law 7509 –which entered into force on June 19, 1995–, itself conditioned non-affection by the tax regulated therein, to a special law establishing an exemption <b>–in the terms of Articles 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, that is, expressly, concretely, and clearly– </b>for the real property of autonomous institutions –which are those of interest for this case–, which does not happen in this instance, since from the entry into force of Law <span class=SpellE>No.</span> 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law Number 449, <b>cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established</b>. For the reasons set forth, this Tribunal does not share the criteria expressed in rulings 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 handed down by the Administrative Litigation Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo) upon resolving the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment handed down in enforcement proceedings (procesos ejecutivos) initiated by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, <span class=SpellE>Tilarán</span>, and San Carlos against ICE, for alleged debts of the Real Property Tax; given that in those rulings, it is assumed that subsection a) of Article 4 of Law 7509 does contain an exemption in favor of ICE, or that the exemption finds its basis in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned by the provisions of Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. <u>In summary, once the Territorial Tax Law was derogated, from June 19, 1995 (the date of entry into force of Law 7509), there is no special law that grants the Costa Rican Electricity Institute an express, clear, and concrete exemption in accordance with Article 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, establishing that the real property of the appealing entity is not subject to the Real Property Tax</u> [...]."</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> Throughout the country, the percentage of the tax shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As already indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the status of Tax Administration, which means they are responsible for withholding and collecting said tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures. This law also attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to fulfill the management of this tax, among them <i>“(…) to perform valuations of real estate, to bill, collect, and process judicial collection, and to administer, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…).” (Article 3).</i> Finally, it should be borne in mind that municipal corporations, in exercise of the regulatory power that is their own, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Political Constitution, may well approve the internal organization rules they require in order to make effective the collection and gathering of the Property Tax <i>(see, in the same sense, judgment number 1565-2009 issued by the Sixth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, at sixteen fifteen hours on August eleventh, two thousand eight)</i>. </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-top:5.05pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.05pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='color:#010101'>V.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS INCIDENCE ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449. </span></b><span style='color:#010101'>This Tribunal, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Property Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree-Law creating the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity was added to by Law N° 764 of October 25, 1949, to establish: <i>“Article 20.- The Costa Rican Institute of Electricity is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege”.</i> Said norm <u>created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect the ICE</u>, but the Law Regulating All Existing Exonerations, its Derogations and its Exceptions -Law N° 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this last condition, since in article 2, subsection l) <u>it provided to maintain only the exemptions in force as of the date of its promulgation in favor of all autonomous institutions, affecting the ICE insofar as it holds such a nature, which was reinforced by the reform of articles 63 and 64 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures</u> -contained in that same regulatory body-, which provided: <i>“…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.</i> (Thus amended by Article 50 of Law Nº 7293 of March 26, 1992). <i>ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even when granted based on certain conditions of fact, may be derogated or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.”</i> Likewise, its effectiveness was subject to <i>“…full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services upon which the exemption enjoyed by a given subject has fallen…” </i>(Article 37 of Law 7293). In consequence, <u>the effects of the exoneration were limited, such that as of the entry into force of Law N° 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code</u>, <b>it cannot claim to cover future taxes, even when so established</b>. Thus, <u>the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law</u>. <b>Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, it follows that –in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below-, said institution would be obligated to pay any tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption in its favor has been expressly granted </b><i>(see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four)</i>. By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal does not share the criterion expressed by the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Tribunal, in judgment number 364-2002 at sixteen twenty-eight hours on October eleventh, two thousand two, since it holds therein that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes remains in favor of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, on the grounds that: <i>“… Regarding the validity of Article 20 of the Constitutive Law of the ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992, ‘Regulating All Existing Exonerations, their Derogation and their Exceptions’; which in its article 1° derogates ‘all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided in the different laws’, and in article 50, modifies numeral 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, to establish that those issued affect only preceding laws, not future ones. However, in article 2° of the regulation under discussion, it is expressly indicated that exempted from the derogation of the preceding article are the tax exclusions established in the same Law and those others that: ‘…l) Have been granted … to the decentralized institutions…’. <b>That being the case, the exemption from payment of national and municipal taxes, established in article 20 of Decree-Law 449, is maintained…</b>”</i>; an assertion that in any case was qualified by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, by stating –in what is relevant– that <i>“… <u>Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as the ICE, from that moment onward, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under the umbrella of norms predating those in which the tax is regulated and retain the exonerations granted by norms prior to that date</u> (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 Ibid. can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date…”. </i>Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of the ICE in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 2 subsection l) of Law 7293; and 5, 63, and 64 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures. </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-top:5.05pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.05pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='color:#010101'>VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE PROPERTY TAX THAT ARTICLE 4 SUBSECTION A) OF LAW 7509 PRESUMABLY ESTABLISHES IN FAVOR OF THE I.C.E.</span></b><span style='color:#010101'> Now then, in the case of the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), although Article 34 of Law 7293 modified Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial, Law Nº 27 of March 2, 1939, and its reforms), in the sense that <i>“…The following real estate is not subject to this tax: (…) - Costa Rican Institute of Electricity…”;</i> it is also true that with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Property Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) <i>(Law number 7509),</i> not only was the Territorial Tax Law derogated <i>(Article 38)</i>, but also, it imposed as a condition for the real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Property Tax, that they enjoy an exemption by special law <i>(Article 4 subsection a of Law 7509). </i>At this point, it is necessary to indicate that although it is true, the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: the lands, the fixed and permanent installations or constructions existing there <i>(Article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509); </i>that it is a tax of a national character that was established in favor of the Municipalities <i>(Article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509)</i> and that, in general terms, the taxable base for the calculation of the tax shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration –now under the charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the collection and supervision of the taxes <i>(Article 9 and following of Law 7509)</i>, previously by the General Directorate of Taxation <i>(Article 5 of Law 27)</i>-; it is also true that <b>it is contrary to the principle of tax legality,</b> provided in numerals 121 subsection 13 of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5 and 62 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, <u>to affirm that because of those similarities, the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law remains valid over time in favor of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, despite having been derogated by Article 38 of the Property Tax Law</u>. <b>Neither is the principle of fiscal immunity applicable to the specific case,</b> because although the Property Tax constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE), and the beneficiary subject and, furthermore, the body competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, since <i>“… <u>The principle of fiscal immunity releases the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</u>. <b>The larger entity assumes a dual consideration of active and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by confusion</b>. Hence the reason (Article 49 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures) to establish confusion as a cause for the extinction of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is non-existent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of State fiscal immunity is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity -by confusion- to operate, the subjective identity must be full…” (</i>judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours on March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. The highlighting is not from the original<i>). </i>So much so, that in Article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Regulation to the Property Tax Law, it is established that <i>“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”. </i>In addition to the foregoing, it is also not valid to affirm that subsection a) of Article 4 of the Property Tax Law establishes in favor of the ICE an exoneration from the payment of that tax, not only because it imposes as a condition for the real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Property Tax, <b>that they enjoy an exemption by special law; </b>but also, because in accordance with the principle of tax legality, specifically the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, as of the entry into force of Law N° 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, <b>cannot claim to cover future taxes, even when so established</b>. <u>Thus, the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Property Tax Law, which is why, referring as a source of exoneration for that tax to the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legal reserve</u>. In that sense, it is worth citing what was resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 037-F-04 at ten thirty-five hours on January 21, two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity affirms, regarding the supposed maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, established the following: <i>“…Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the derogation the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its article 63 the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law Nº 7293) indicates that there cannot be rules granting exonerations predating that date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exoneration cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its promulgation, that is, April 3, 1992<b>. <u>Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as the ICE, from that moment onward, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under the umbrella of norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated and retain the exonerations granted by norms prior to that date</u>.</b> It should not be lost sight of that the Law Regulating Existing Exonerations, Derogations and Exceptions, arises, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of exemptions existing through a high number of laws, however the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been holding cannot be applied with retroactive effect, for which reason the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. <b>Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 Ibid. can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date. </b>The opposite would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law. <u>It is precisely for these reasons that the exoneration granted in favor of the ICE is not affected by Law N° 7283 of Municipal Tariffs and Taxes of the Canton of Tilarán, because it was promulgated on a date prior to the Law Regulating all existing exonerations</u>, and it is not until this moment when, by express rule, granting exemptions under the umbrella of old rules is prohibited. <u>The factual basis provided in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant if the rule is promulgated after April 3, 1992</u>. Thus, as it involves a tax prior to the law derogating exonerations, the exemption regime provided in the law creating the ICE continued to benefit it at the time of the entry into force of Law N° 7283. To sustain the contrary, it is reiterated, would entail a retroactive application of Article 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, which is prohibited by constitutional provision…” (</i>the highlighting is not from the original). In this case, as analyzed supra, to affirm that because of the existing similarities between the Territorial Tax and the Property Tax –principally regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefited with the tax, and the national nature thereof–, the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (reformed in that sense by Article 34 of Law 7293) remains valid over time in favor of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, despite having been derogated by Article 38 of the Property Tax Law, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legal reserve in that matter. Even more so, when Article 4 subsection a) of Law 7509 itself -which entered into force on June 19, 1995- conditioned the non-affectation to the tax regulated therein, to the establishment by special law of an exemption <b>–in the terms of Articles 5 and 62 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, that is, in an express, concrete, and clear manner- </b>for the real estate of the autonomous institutions –which are those of interest for this case-, which does not occur in the species, since as of the entry into force of Law N° 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, <b>cannot claim to cover future taxes, even when so established</b>. For the reasons set forth, this Tribunal does not share the criteria expressed in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Contentious-Administrative Court, in resolving the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment issued in executive proceedings initiated by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against the ICE, for alleged debts of the Property Tax; since in these, it is presumed that subsection a) of Article 4 of Law 7509 does contain an exoneration in favor of the ICE or that it finds support in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned by the provisions of Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures. <u>In summary, once the Territorial Tax Law was derogated, there exists, as of June 19, 1995 (date of entry into force of Law 7509), no special law that grants the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity an express, clear, and concrete exemption, in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, establishing that the real estate of the appellant entity is not subject to the Property Tax</u> […].”</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html>

“III. RESPECTO A LOS LÍMITES Y ALCANCES DE LOS PRINCIPIOS DE RESERVA DE LEY Y DE LEGALIDAD EN MATERIA TRIBUTARIA. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa, establecer los impuestos y contribuciones nacionales, y autorizar los municipales, ello implica que existe un principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria, también denominado principio de legalidad tributaria. En ese sentido, el artículo 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que los reglamentos, circulares, instrucciones y demás disposiciones administrativas de carácter general no podrán establecer penas ni imponer, exacciones, tasas, multas ni otras cargas similares. Por su parte, el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios en relación con los artículos 5 y 62 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, establece cuáles son los elementos esenciales del tributo que están reservados a la ley, a saber: a) Crear, modificar o suprimir tributos; definir el hecho generador de la relación tributaria; establecer las tarifas de los tributos y sus bases de cálculo; e indicar el sujeto pasivo; b) Tipificar las infracciones y establecer las respectivas sanciones; c) Establecer privilegios, preferencias y garantías para los créditos tributarios; d) Regular los modos de extinción de los créditos tributarios. De conformidad con el inciso b) del artículo 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, sólo la ley puede otorgar exenciones, reducciones o beneficios, las que en consecuencia no pueden crearse por analogía, sino por ley formal y material (artículo 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), norma legal que de conformidad con el principio de legalidad tributaria, debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones (artículos 5 y 62 párrafo 1º del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Lo anterior implica, que aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación, pues ello implicaría una limitación a futuro de la potestad tributaria del Estado, en detrimento del principio de igualdad ante el impuesto y las cargas públicas (artículo 18 in fine de la Constitución Política). Ahora bien, este Tribunal considera que con vista en las normas indicadas y de conformidad con la jurisprudencia emitida por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria no es de carácter absoluto, sino relativo, ya que si bien es cierto, los elementos esenciales deben ser establecidos por la ley, también lo es, que la norma legal deberá al menos establecer los límites o criterios concretos con base en los cuales, las normas infralegales –artículo 2 inciso d) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios- puedan o deban completar la disciplina normativa de dichos elementos esenciales, a efecto de ejecutar y aplicar dichas normas legales (artículos 140 incisos 3 y 18 in fine de la Constitución Política y artículo 99 párrafo segundo del artículo 99 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha considerado: “...Nuestra jurisprudencia, (...) ha reconocido, habida cuenta de determinadas circunstancias, la posibilidad de que opere -dentro de ciertos límites razonables- una “delegación relativa” de dichas facultades, siempre y cuando, se señalen en la ley los márgenes del tributo respectivo, pues de lo contrario, estaríamos en presencia de una “delegación absoluta” de tales facultades, proceder que carece, como se expuso, de validez constitucional (...) la Sala se pronunciado a favor de la delegación relativa en materia tributaria, pero no así en lo que se refiere a los elementos constitucionales de la obligación tributaria (sujetos activo y pasivo, objeto de la obligación, causa, tarifa del impuesto), en los que sí se da la llamada reserva de ley...” (sentencia número 1996-00687, y en sentido similar, la sentencia número 1995-000739 de las catorce horas cincuenta y un minutos del ocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y seis).

IV.-ALGUNAS GENERALIDADES DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES. Este impuesto es creado mediante Ley No. 7509, según la cual se establece en favor de las municipalidades, un impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles, cuyo objeto son los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan. En torno a su naturaleza, es menester señalar que la Sala Constitucional ha establecido que se trata de un “tributo de orden municipal en razón de su destino –únicamente–, pero no lo es en virtud de su procedimiento de origen o promulgación, dado que no nació de la iniciativa de los gobiernos locales, sino del ejercicio de la potestad tributaria otorgada a la Asamblea Legislativa, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, es decir, que es producto de la propia labor legislativa ordinaria. Cabe reiterar que la Asamblea Legislativa es soberana, en cuanto al uso del poder tributario, para establecer los impuestos que se requieran, sean estos nacionales o municipales.” (SCV 5669-99). Así, se trata, no de un tributo municipal que provenga de la potestad tributaria derivada y propia de las corporaciones municipales que deriva del numeral 121 inciso 13) del la Constitución Política; sino más bien de lo que la doctrina española denomina como tributos cedidos. Si bien ambos son fuentes tributarias locales, los primeros son aquellos que, como se indicó, se crean por el procedimiento legislativo especial previsto en el artículo 121 inciso 13) constitucional, el cual se considera especial tanto por la iniciativa municipal como por la prohibición de enmienda que tiene la Asamblea Legislativa, que debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar el acuerdo municipal respectivo. Por su parte, la cesión de tributos es un mecanismo de financiamiento desarrollado principalmente por las Comunidades Autónomas Españolas. Se dice que en éstos, el Estado se reserva el poder tributario; mientras que la Comunidad Autónoma individualmente detenta la competencia sobre los rendimientos, a través de puntos de conexión de carácter territorial. Así, en la gestión del tributo cedido, la potestad tributaria la retiene el Estado, quien delega el ejercicio de la competencia en la Comunidad Autónoma, todo ello sin perjuicio de la “colaboración” que se puede establecer entre las Administraciones de ambos entes territoriales, Estado y Comunidad Autónoma. Según lo indicado, la cesión de tributos implica la delegación de competencias administrativas, sin perjuicio de la obligada coordinación y colaboración entre las Administraciones Tributarias. En el caso de Costa Rica, esta figura puede asociarse, a juicio de este órgano, con la situación del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, en virtud de las características propias de este tributo. Si bien emanan del ejercicio de la potestad normativa y tributaria del Estado, la competencia sobre la recaudación la tienen las Municipalidades, tomando en cuenta la ubicación del inmueble dentro del territorio municipal como punto de conexión. Asimismo, la potestad administrativa de gestión del impuesto también la tienen los municipios, sin que ello obste para que exista una coordinación con la Administración Tributaria Estatal misma que a la fecha se manifiesta en la existencia del Órgano de Normalización Técnica introducido por el artículo 2, inciso c) de la Ley 7729. Debe señalarse que nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional ha admitido la figura de los tributos cedidos, cuando en el Voto 3930-95, señaló respecto de los tributos que crea el Estado en beneficio de las municipalidades “...Pero ello no quiere decir que el legislador no pueda dotar a las Municipalidades de recursos extraordinarios mediante un impuesto general a distribuir, como en el caso del impuesto territorial…” Debe indicarse que se trata de un impuesto anual, cuyo período inicia el 1 de enero y termina el 31 de diciembre de cada año calendario. Su pago debe realizarse anual o semestralmente o en cuatro cuotas trimestrales, según lo determine cada municipalidad. Asimismo, se consideran como sujetos pasivos de este impuesto, a los propietarios de los bienes inmuebles, los concesionarios, los permisionarios o los ocupantes de la franja fronteriza o de la zona marítimo terrestre, los ocupantes o los poseedores con título, inscribible o no inscribible en el Registro Público, con más de un año y que se encuentren en las siguientes condiciones: poseedores, empresarios agrícolas, usufructuarios, aparceros rurales, esquilmos, prestatarios gratuitos de tierras y ocupantes en precario, los parceleros del IDA en determinadas circunstancias. La base imponible para el cálculo del impuesto será el valor del inmueble registrado en la Administración Tributaria, al 1 de enero del año correspondiente, lo que conlleva que para efectos tributarios, todo inmueble debe ser valorado, lo cual es una labor de cada Municipalidad en el marco de las potestades de administración, gestión y recaudación del tributo impuestas por la propia Ley No. 7509. En todo el país, el porcentaje del impuesto será de un cuarto por ciento (0,25%) y se aplicará sobre el valor del inmueble registrado por la Administración Tributaria. Como ya fuera indicado, para la gestión de este impuesto, la ley le otorga a las municipalidades el carácter de Administración Tributaria, lo cual significa que son las encargadas de retener y percibir el citado impuesto, de conformidad con la doctrina del artículo 99 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Les atribuye también esta ley una serie de prerrogativas y deberes a fin de poder cumplir con la gestión de este tributo, entre ellas “(…) realizar valoraciones de bienes inmuebles, facturar, recaudar y tramitar el cobro judicial y de administrar, en sus respectivos territorios, los tributos que genera la presente Ley. (…).” (Artículo 3). Téngase en cuenta, finalmente, que las corporaciones municipales, en ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria que les es propia, en razón de la autonomía que les garantiza la Constitución Política, bien pueden aprobar las normas de organización interna que requieran a fin de hacer efectivo el cobro y la recaudación del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (ver en igual sentido, la sentencia número 1565-2009 dictada por la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, a las dieciséis horas quince minutos del once de agosto del dos mil ocho).

V.-SOBRE LOS ALCANCES DE LA MODIFICACIÓN AL ARTÍCULO 63 DEL C.N.P.T. POR LA LEY 7293 Y SU INCIDENCIA EN LA EXENCIÓN GENÉRICA, SUBJETIVA Y A FUTURO PREVISTA EN EL NUMERAL 20 DEL DECRETO LEY 449. Este Tribunal, por mayoría, considera que la entidad recurrente no está exenta de pagar el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, por las razones que de seguido se fue adicionado por Ley N° 764 de 25 de octubre de 1949, para efectos de establecer: “Artículo 20.- El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad está exento del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales y goza de franquicia postal y telegráfica”. Dicha norma, creó una exención genérica subjetiva que resultaba aplicable para todos los impuestos presentes y futuros que pudieran afectar al ICE, más la Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones -Ley N° 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992- eliminó esta última condición, pues en el artículo 2 inciso l) dispuso mantener únicamente las exenciones vigentes a la fecha de su promulgación a favor de todas las instituciones autónomas, resultando afectado el ICE en el tanto ostenta tal naturaleza, lo cual se reforzó con la reforma de los artículos 63 y 64 el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios -contenida en ese mismo cuerpo normativo-, que dispuso: “…ARTICULO 63: Límite de aplicación. Aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación. (Así reformado por el artículo 50 de la ley Nº 7293 de 26 de marzo de 1992). ARTICULO 64.-Vigencia. La exención, aun cuando fuera concedida en función de determinadas condiciones de hecho, puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado.” Asimismo, se sujetó su eficacia "…al pleno acatamiento de los preceptos, requisitos y fines que regulan el otorgamiento, así como al correcto uso y destino previsto, de los bienes y servicios sobre los que haya recaído la exención que disfruta determinado sujeto…” (Artículo 37 de la Ley 7293) . En consecuencia, se limitaron los efectos de la exoneración, de manera tal que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. De manera tal que la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser situación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, se deriva que –en principio y sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660, que se analizará de seguido-, dicha institución se encontraría obligada al pago de todo tributo establecido con posterioridad a la Ley 7293, salvo en aquellos supuestos en que expresamente se haya otorgado una exención en su favor (ver al respecto, la sentencia número 000037-F-04 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del año dos mil cuatro). En razón de lo anterior, este Tribunal no comparte el criterio vertido por la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil, en sentencia número 364-2002 de las dieciséis horas veintiocho minutos del once de octubre del dos mil dos, toda vez que allí se sostiene que la exención genérica y subjetiva para impuestos futuros, se mantiene a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, al considerar que: “… En cuanto a la vigencia del artículo 20 de la Ley Constitutiva del ICE, debemos remitirnos a la Ley 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992 “Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones”; que en su artículo 1 ° deroga "todas las exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes", y en el 50, modifica el numeral 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, para establecer que las que se dictan afectan solamente a las leyes precedentes, no a las futuras. Sin embargo, en el artículo 2 ° de la normativa en comentario, expresamente se indica, que se exceptúan de la derogatoria del artículo precedente, las exclusiones tributarias establecidas en la misma Ley y aquellas otras que: "…l) Se han otorgado … a las instituciones descentralizadas…". Siendo así, se mantiene la exención del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales, establecida en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449…”; afirmación que en todo caso, fue matizada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 000037-F-04 dictada a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del año dos mil cuatro, al indicar –en lo que interesa- que “… Bajo este predicado, instituciones descentralizadas como el ICE, a partir de ese momento, y hacia futuro, no pueden beneficiarse de exoneraciones tributarias creadas al amparo de normas anteriores a aquéllas en las que se regula el tributo y conservan las exoneraciones concedidas por normas anteriores a esa fecha (…)En consecuencia la restricción del canon 63 ibídem sólo puede aplicar respecto de impuestos creados luego de esa data…”. En consecuencia, a partir del 3 de abril de 1992, la exención genérica y subjetiva prevista a favor del ICE en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, se mantiene, aunque limitada en sus alcances y vigencia futuras a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 inciso l) de la Ley 7293 y 5, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

VI.- RESPECTO DE LA ALEGADA EXENCIÓN AL PAGO DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES QUE PRESUNTAMENTE ESTABLECE EL ARTÍCULO 4 INCISO A) DE LA LEY 7509 A FAVOR DEL I.C.E. Ahora bien, en el caso del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, aunque el artículo 34 de la Ley 7293 modificó el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (Ley Nº 27 del 2 de marzo de 1939 y sus reformas), en el sentido de que “…No están afectos a este impuesto, los inmuebles propiedad de: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad…”; también lo es, que con la entrada en vigencia el 19 de junio de 1995 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (Ley número 7509), no sólo se derogó la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (artículo 38), sino que además, impuso como condición para que los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semi-autónomas no estén afectos al Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, a que por ley especial gocen de exención (artículo 4 inciso a de la Ley 7509). En este punto, es menester indicar que si bien es cierto, el objeto de ambos impuestos es prácticamente el mismo, a saber: los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan (artículo 2 de las Leyes 27 y 7509); que es un impuesto de carácter nacional que fue establecido a favor de las Municipalidades (artículo 1 de las Leyes 27 y 7509) y que en términos generales, la base imponible para el cálculo del impuesto será el valor del inmueble registrado en la Administración Tributaria –ahora a cargo del órgano administrativo municipal al que le corresponde la percepción y fiscalización de los tributos (artículo 9 y siguientes de la Ley 7509), antes por la Dirección General de Tributación (artículo 5 de la Ley 27)-; también lo es, que resulta contrario al principio de legalidad tributaria, previsto en los numerales 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5 y 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, afirmar que por esas similitudes, la exención prevista en el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, se mantiene vigente en el tiempo a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, a pesar de que fue derogada por el artículo 38 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles. Tampoco resulta aplicable al caso concreto, el principio de inmunidad fiscal, pues aunque el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles constituye un impuesto de carácter nacional, también lo es, que no hay una identidad entre el sujeto activo, el sujeto pasivo (ICE) y el sujeto beneficiario y además, competente para la recaudación y gestión del impuesto (Municipalidades), condición sine qua non para la aplicación de ese principio, toda vez que “… El principio de inmunidad fiscal libera al Estado de la obligación de pagar tributos creados por él. El sujeto activo de la obligación tributaria debe ser el mismo Estado. Sería ilógico un Estado creando tributos para cobrarse a sí mismo. El ente mayor asume una doble consideración de sujeto activo y pasivo de la relación jurídico tributaria cuya consecuencia sería la extinción de la obligación tributaria por confusión. De ahí la razón (artículo 49 del Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) de establecer como causal de extinción de la obligación tributaria la confusión. Cuando el Estado pasa de ser sujeto activo a sujeto pasivo del tributo la obligación tributaria es inexistente pues no existe la relación intersubjetiva. Respecto del régimen municipal el principio de inmunidad fiscal del Estado es inoperante (…) Para que opere la inmunidad fiscal -por confusión- la identidad subjetiva debe ser plena…” (sentencia número 12-1994 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte, a las once horas del veinticinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. El resaltado no es del original). Tan es así, que en el artículo 5 inciso a) párrafo 2º del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, se establece que “…El Estado y las municipalidades no requieren la presentación de requisito alguno, puesto que por definición se encuentran no afectos…”. Aunado a lo anterior, tampoco resulta válido afirmar que el inciso a) del artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establece a favor del ICE una exoneración al pago de ese impuesto, no sólo porque impone como condición para que los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semi-autónomas no estén afectos al Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, a que por ley especial, gocen de exención; sino también, porque de conformidad con el principio de legalidad tributaria, específicamente lo dispuesto en los artículos 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. De manera tal que la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley, lo que no sucede en el supuesto de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, razón por la cual, remitir como fuente de exoneración de ese impuesto a lo dispuesto en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, resulta sustancialmente contrario al principio de legalidad tributaria y reserva de ley. En ese sentido, valga citar lo resuelto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 037-F-04 de las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del 21 de enero del dos mil cuatro, que contrario a lo que afirma el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, respecto al supuesto mantenimiento de los alcances futuros de la exención genérica y subjetiva contenida en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, estableció lo siguiente: “…El inciso l) del segundo artículo de la Ley 7293, excluye de la derogatoria a las exenciones otorgadas a las instituciones descentralizadas. Adicionalmente, en su artículo 63 el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (reformado por el ordinal 50 de la Ley Nº 7293) señala que no pueden haber reglas que concedan exoneraciones, de fecha anterior a aquella data en la que se crea el tributo, ergo, la exoneración no puede ser anterior al impuesto. Esta regla tiene efectos a partir de su promulgación, esto es, el 3 de abril de 1992. Bajo este predicado, instituciones descentralizadas como el ICE, a partir de ese momento, y hacia futuro, no pueden beneficiarse de exoneraciones tributarias creadas al amparo de normas anteriores a aquéllas en las que se regula el tributo y conservan las exoneraciones concedidas por normas anteriores a esa fecha. No debe perderse de vista que la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, surge, entre otras cosas, con la finalidad de organizar la maraña de exenciones existentes a través de una elevada cantidad de leyes, sin embargo las restricciones a los beneficios que vinieron ostentando diversas actividades e instituciones, no pueden aplicarse con efecto retroactivo, por lo cual se mantienen las exoneraciones de impuesto concedidas antes de la entrada en vigencia de esa ley. En consecuencia la restricción del canon 63 ibídem sólo puede aplicar respecto de impuestos creados luego de esa data. Lo contrario entrañaría una repudiable aplicación retroactiva de la ley. Es justamente por estas razones, que la exoneración concedida a favor del ICE, no se ve afectada por la Ley N° 7283 de Tarifas e Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Tilarán, porque se promulgó en fecha anterior a la Ley Reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, y no es sino hasta este momento cuando mediante norma expresa, se prohíbe otorgar exenciones bajo el amparo de normas de vieja data. El supuesto de hecho previsto en la Ley 7283 sólo podría habérsele aplicado a la demandada, si la norma se promulga luego del 3 de abril de 1992. Así las cosas, por tratarse de un tributo anterior a la ley derogatoria de exoneraciones, el régimen de exención dispuesto en la ley de creación del ICE continuaba beneficiándolo en el momento de entrada en vigencia de la Ley N° 7283. Sostener lo contrario, se reitera, entrañaría una aplicación retroactiva del artículo 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, lo cual está vedado por disposición constitucional…” (el resaltado no es del original). En este caso, tal y como se analizó supra, afirmar que por las similitudes existentes entre el Impuesto Territorial y el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles –principalmente en cuanto al objeto, la determinación de la base imponible, el sujeto beneficiado con el impuesto, y la naturaleza nacional del mismo-, la exención prevista en el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (reformado en ese sentido por el artículo 34 de la Ley 7293), se mantiene vigente en el tiempo a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, a pesar de que fue derogada por el artículo 38 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, resulta sustancialmente contraria al principio de legalidad tributaria y reserva de ley en esa materia. Más aún, cuando el propio artículo 4 inciso a) de la Ley 7509 -que entró en vigencia el 19 de junio de 1995-, condicionó la no afectación al impuesto allí regulado, a que por ley especial se estableciera una exención –en los términos de los artículos 5 y 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, o sea, de manera expresa, concreta y clara- a los bienes inmuebles de las instituciones autónomas –que son los que nos interesan para este caso-, lo que no sucede en la especie, ya que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. Por las razones expuestas, este Tribunal no comparte los criterios vertidos en las sentencias 759-2010, 1037-2010 y 983-2010 dictadas por el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, al resolver los recursos de apelación interpuestos contra la sentencia de primera instancia dictada en procesos ejecutivos incoados por las Municipalidades de Montes de Oro, Tilarán y San Carlos, contra el ICE, por supuestos adeudos del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles; toda vez que en éstas, se parte de que el inciso a) del artículo 4 de la Ley 7509 si contiene una exoneración a favor del ICE o de que ésta encuentra sustento en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, sin analizar que los alcances de ésta última está condicionada a lo dispuesto en los artículos 5, 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios. En síntesis, una vez derogada la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, no existe a partir del 19 de junio de 1995 (fecha de entrada en vigencia de la Ley 7509), una ley especial que otorgue al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, una exención de Normas Procedimientos Tributarios, que establezca que los inmuebles de la entidad recurrente no están afectos al Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles […].”