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Res. 00104-2016 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V · 2016
OutcomeResultado
The claim is dismissed as the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of actual damage and its causal link to ARESEP's conduct, rejecting the requested compensation.Se declara sin lugar la demanda al no haber probado el actor la existencia de un daño efectivo y su nexo causal con la conducta de la ARESEP, rechazándose la indemnización solicitada.
SummaryResumen
The ruling by the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, Section V (No. 00104-2016), rejects a fisherman's claim for damages against the Public Services Regulatory Authority (ARESEP). The plaintiff argued that ARESEP, when setting fuel prices for the national non-sport fishing fleet, had improperly equated the wholesale price to that of any final consumer, thereby partially breaching Article 45 of Law 7384. The court acknowledged that ARESEP had indeed incorporated cost components not originally provided for by law, based on a false premise of tacit repeal. However, the claim was denied because the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that this conduct had caused him actual, assessable, and individualized damage, or that the fuel price he paid had ceased to be competitive at an international level, as required by the strict liability regime for the Public Administration and the burden of proof resting on the claimant.La resolución del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V (N° 00104-2016) rechaza la demanda de un pescador que reclamaba indemnización por daños y perjuicios contra la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP). El actor alegaba que la ARESEP, al fijar el precio del combustible para la flota pesquera nacional no deportiva, había equiparado indebidamente el precio plantel al de cualquier consumidor final, incumpliendo parcialmente el artículo 45 de la Ley 7384. El tribunal reconoció que la ARESEP efectivamente incorporó en el precio componentes no previstos originalmente en la ley, basada en una premisa falsa de derogatoria tácita. Sin embargo, denegó la indemnización porque el demandante no aportó ninguna prueba que demostrara que dicha conducta le hubiera causado un daño efectivo, evaluable e individualizable, ni que el precio pagado por el combustible hubiera dejado de ser competitivo a nivel internacional, tal como lo exige el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración Pública y la carga de la prueba que recae sobre el actor.
Key excerptExtracto clave
However, it is not appropriate to uphold the claim, given that the plaintiff, on one hand, did not request the annulment of the respective administrative acts, and on the other, the plaintiff's representation did not prove that the changes in the items to be considered in the price of fuel for fishermen caused the price to cease being competitive with the international market, as expressly established by the norm, in addition to the lack of proof of the alleged damage, as will be indicated later. (...) the claim is completely devoid of any proof regarding its existence. (...) Consequently, the claims for damages must be rejected.No obstante, no resulta procedente acoger la demanda, en tanto que la parte actora, por una parte no pidió la nulidad de los respectivos actos administrativos y por otra, la representación del actor no probó que con los cambios en los rubros a considerar en el precio de los combustibles a los pescadores, el precio de aquellos haya dejado de ser competitivo con el mercado internacional, tal y como lo establece expresamente la norma, además de que la falta de prueba del daño invocado, tal y como se indicará posteriormente. (...) la demanda es ayuna de toda prueba con respecto a su existencia. (...) Por consiguiente, las pretensiones indemnizatorias deben ser rechazadas.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La demanda es totalmente ayuna de facturas, comprobantes de pago o al menos la realización de algún trámite ante el Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura en tal sentido, por lo que no es procedente, además de los argumentos expresados ut supra reconocer daño alguno."
"The claim is completely devoid of invoices, payment receipts, or at least some procedure before the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture in this regard, so it is not appropriate, in addition to the arguments expressed above, to recognize any damage."
Sección VIII.-Sobre los daños y perjucios reclamados
"La demanda es totalmente ayuna de facturas, comprobantes de pago o al menos la realización de algún trámite ante el Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura en tal sentido, por lo que no es procedente, además de los argumentos expresados ut supra reconocer daño alguno."
Sección VIII.-Sobre los daños y perjucios reclamados
"Correspondía a la parte actora demostrar este aspecto mediante la presentación de prueba técnica idónea, dado que este Tribunal no puede partir de meras presunciones respecto de las consecuencias de los actos mencionados respecto de la competitividad con los precios internacionales."
"It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove this aspect by presenting suitable technical evidence, given that this Court cannot proceed from mere presumptions regarding the consequences of the mentioned acts in relation to competitiveness with international prices."
Sección VII.-Sobre el caso concreto
"Correspondía a la parte actora demostrar este aspecto mediante la presentación de prueba técnica idónea, dado que este Tribunal no puede partir de meras presunciones respecto de las consecuencias de los actos mencionados respecto de la competitividad con los precios internacionales."
Sección VII.-Sobre el caso concreto
Full documentDocumento completo
V.-Object of the proceeding: From what the parties have expressed, both in their claims and arguments, we are faced with a civil hacienda proceeding, whose object is focused on determining the existence of a possible breach by ARESEP with respect to the provisions of article 45 of Law number 7384 and the existence of damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff by reason of said unlawful conduct.
VI.-On the liability of the Administration: As indicated in the previous section, when delimiting the object of this case, we are faced with a proceeding of a civil hacienda nature, in which the extracontractual liability of the Administration is discussed. For the corresponding compensation to proceed, it is necessary to apply the regulations governing the matter. From this legal framework, a series of elements emerge that make up the liability scheme. Since the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in 1978, the rules of the extracontractual civil liability regime, applicable to the Public Administration, were established. Rules that derived from before, from the apex of the legal system, in its articles 9, 11, 41, 148 and 193. From that moment on, the application of the Civil Code's own regulations, which regulated extracontractual civil liability (article 1045), gave way to this scheme. Thus, liability based on criteria for attributing responsibility, such as intent (dolo) or fault (culpa), evolved to those of "lawful, unlawful, normal or abnormal functioning" (funcionamiento lícito, ilícito, normal o anormal), typical of an objectivization of liability. Said system poses a series of elements and logical relationships, in such a way that all must converge and be identified with precision. In the contentious-administrative proceeding, whoever seeks to hold a public entity liable under this scheme, in a civil hacienda proceeding, must demonstrate, as part of the burden of proof (onus probandi), precisely and unequivocally, each of these elements. In such a way that the existence of the damage (daño) (196 LGAP) must be identified, which, moreover, must be effective, assessable and individualizable (efectivo, evaluable e individualizable), in turn the causal relationship (relación de causalidad) between said damage and the public entity or official. It is necessary to demonstrate that there are no exempting causes of liability (190 LGAP), in addition to specifying the existence of attribution criteria (criterios de imputación), meaning that the harmful conduct was produced lawfully or unlawfully, normally or abnormally. Regarding liability for lawful and normal conduct, due to the special nature of the damage (especialidad del daño), it requires the existence of a small proportion of affected persons and that the intensity of said injury is exceptional. Under this scheme, compensation covers the value of the damage (daño), but not the consequential damages (perjuicios). These concepts that make up the "special damage" (daño especial), are those known in law as indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados), which the Judges in each case must give content to and determine if the subjective right was denatured. On the other hand, to approach the analysis of the existence of liability for unlawful and abnormal conduct, it is essential to determine the existence of an action by the Administration contrary to the legal system or to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, respectively. Under this cause for attribution (causa de imputación), the recognition of damages (daños) is full, since unlike the previous one, consequential damages (perjuicios) are recognized. In this regard, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in judgment No. 000298-F-SI-2014, of March 6, 2014, has indicated: "It is important to note that the Public Administration is liable for all damages caused by its functioning, legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal (canon 190 LGAP). In such a way that all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of the servants committed in the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof must be repaired (precept 191 ibidem). From the foregoing, three basic presuppositions are derived: administrative conduct (active or omissive), effective damage (daño efectivo) and between both a cause-effect link (nexo de causalidad). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be clear that not all illegitimate or irregular functioning of the State generates its liability, given that the interested party must prove the effective damage (daño efectivo) and a cause-effect relationship between both phenomena. In other words, the declaration of ADMINISTRATION LIABILITY does not automatically generate the duty to compensate. Therefore, it will be necessary to demonstrate the existence of personal damage and its corresponding causal link with the conduct that is the object of the litigation, based on the fact that the burden of proof assists the party alleging that damage has been caused to them. The judge must corroborate the existence of effective damage (daño efectivo), which must be assessable, individualizable, and derived from conduct suitable for the emergence of liability. All damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of the servants, committed in the performance of the duties of the position or on occasion thereof, must be repaired (precept 191 ibidem). The legal system establishes that once liability is determined and the damage (daño) is held as certain in the terms indicated above, we will proceed to the recognition of material and moral damage in its different effects. See from this Chamber vote number 783 of 14 hours 35 minutes of June 19, 2013." By way of synthesis, it can be indicated that for a compensation to proceed under the scheme of article 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), it must be fully configured with each and every one of its elements.
VII.- On the specific case: At its core, the plaintiff in its lawsuit, for the purpose of determining the criterion for attributing liability (criterio de imputación) to the administrative conduct, to derive the damages (daños y perjuicios) it requests, as well as the required declarations, alleges that ARESEP, through administrative resolution No. 2774-2002, of 8:00 a.m., of September 26, 2002, established in Considerando 4, that Law No. 7593 tacitly repealed article 45 of the INCOPESCA law, so that the rates and prices of this public service (supply of fuel to fishermen) must be determined in accordance with the law of the regulatory authority, so that, in its rate structure, not only the cost for investments referred to but all those costs that are necessary for the provision of the public service will be incorporated. Consequently, the defendant, protected by that resolution, subsequently proceeded to issue resolution No. RRG-2821, of 9:30 a.m., of October 24, 2002, according to which the defendant entity materialized the elimination of the "preferential price" (precio preferencial), in favor of the national non-sport fishing fleet, in relation to the purchase of fuel. Consequently, as of November 4, 2002, invariably and sustainedly, ARESEP proceeded to set the same fuel price, both for consumers in general, and equally for the non-sport fishing fleet. It indicates that faced with this factual situation, the non-sport fishing sector was forced to promote an "Authentic Interpretation Law" (Ley de Interpretación Auténtica), on the real and effective scope of the benefit in the purchase of fuel, which materialized through Law No. 9134, of June 13, 2013, by which ARESEP was forced to change its price-setting criterion for the fisherman; such that Resolution No. RIE-084-2013 was issued, published in the Gazette of October 1, 2013, which reflects a lower price, regarding the fuel acquired by the non-sport fishing fleet. Consequently, in the entire period between November 4, 2002 - when the Cited Resolution No. RRG-2821 entered into force - and until October 1, 2013, when Resolution No. RIE-084-2013 was implemented, the non-sport fishing sector was not recognized a lower price, regarding the fuel price for the consumer in general. By reason of the foregoing, it considers that ARESEP has incurred in conduct contrary to Law, by showing itself omissive, consciously, repeatedly and sustainedly, in terms of granting a differentiated price to the non-sport fishing sector, during that entire period from November 4, 2002, to October 1, 2013. The defendant responds to said allegations indicating that it is not true that it ignored, neither before nor after the entry into force of the authentic interpretation, the provisions of the articles on which the plaintiff bases its lawsuit, given that due to the superficial wording of the indicated articles, the way to implement that benefit, regarding the establishment of the applicable calculation methodology, the costs to consider within the provision of the service, and other regulatory aspects, were left to the exclusive technical competence of Aresep, as specified in the final paragraphs of article 45 of Law 7384. The foregoing must be complemented with the existence of Law 7593, which imposes on it the power-duty to apply the principle of service at cost to the rates of all regulated public services, such that it is necessary for the financial balance of the service provider, to see incorporated in its rates, certain costs, including investment costs that guarantee the continuity, development and sustainability of the activity. It is not true that the Regulatory Authority omitted to establish a competitive price for the national fishing fleet, since since 2002 there has been a resolution of the General Regulator that establishes the form of calculation of fuel prices for that fishing fleet. According to that calculation method, such prices are set when the plant prices for Recope are established, because the price for the fishing fleet - considering investments - equals the RECOPE plant price, without single tax. Consequently, since then the investment item is incorporated within the calculation of the plant price, in accordance with what article 45 of Law 7384 indicates, which provides for the charging of a FOB plant price. Subsequently, on the occasion of the authentic interpretation, the methodology, previously approved, "to set the fuel price at Recope distribution plants and to the final consumer", is adapted to said regulations, issuing resolution RIE-084-2013 of September 24, 2013, by the Energy Superintendence (Intendencia de Energía). In accordance with the analysis of the evidence provided to the case file and the allegations of the parties, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff is not correct, for the reasons that will be indicated below. Article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fishing and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, established the following: "ARTICLE 45.- The fishing sector shall acquire from RECOPE fuel (gasoline and diesel), for non-sport fishing activity at a competitive price compared to the international price, based on the average import cost of the previous month and considering the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as pipeline distribution costs and distribution at plants, in such a way that the price is F.O.B. Plant. That price shall be set by the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad); to which RECOPE must previously request it, according to the provisions of Law No. 6588 of July 30, 1981, or the Institute. The Institute shall be in charge of the administration and control of the efficient use of fuel, destined for non-sport fishing activity". As can be seen from the norm, its purpose was to establish a competitive price for the fuel that would be destined for non-sport fishing activity, establishing the F.O.B. plant price as a parameter. In accordance with the previous norm, through resolution RRG-2708-2002, ARESEP established the extraordinary adjustment formula for determining prices for the fuels consumed by the fishing fleet. In accordance with the foregoing, the cost structure of gasoline and diesel in said cases would comprise: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost 3) Plant cost 4) Administrative cost. Subsequently, in accordance with resolutions RJD-013, 014 and 016-2002 of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of ARESEP, it was agreed that within the price structure of the indicated fuels, the investments of the service provider must be incorporated. Thus, in accordance with said administrative act, the respective structure contained: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost 3) Plant cost 4) Administrative cost 5) Investment cost. Through resolution 2774-2002 of eight o'clock on September twenty-sixth, two thousand two, ARESEP ordered the revocation of the extraordinary adjustment formula for determining the fuel prices consumed by the fishing fleet in accordance with resolution RRG-2708-2002 and to indicate to the parties that the price settings will be made in accordance with articles 3, 30 and 31 of Law 7593. By reason of the foregoing, the cost structure in accordance with this act contained: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost 3) Plant cost 4) Administrative cost 5) Investment cost 6) costs of service provision. It is thus how in practice, this resolution came to equate the plant price of fuel for fishermen to that of any final consumer. Subsequently, through resolution RRG-2821-2002 of 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2002, a fuel price was contemplated for fishermen, in accordance with resolution 2772-2002, at plant price, without taxes. It is necessary to indicate that what is provided in the indicated resolution 2772-2002 is based on the presumption that the provisions of the Law for the Creation of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos), Law number 7593, repealed the indicated article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fishing and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, just as the administrative conduct of reference expressly indicates. Notwithstanding the foregoing, through a criterion of the Specialized Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica Especializada) of ARESEP dated October 21, 2003, the General Regulator was informed that article 45 of Law 7384 is in force and must be applied over lower-ranking norms that contradict it. However, this did not result in modifying the price setting indicated above, failing to adapt it to the consideration that said norm was in force and clearly established that the FOB Plant price must exclusively take into consideration the average import cost of the previous month of the fuel and the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the pipeline distribution and plant distribution costs. The foregoing is reaffirmed later, with article 123 of Law 8436, Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, of April 25, 2005, which provided the following: "Article 123.—Exempt the national fishing fleet, except that dedicated to sport fishing, from all types of national taxes for the importation of vessels, spare parts, engines, navigation implements, fishing implements and their respective accessories. In compliance with the provisions of article 45 of Law No. 7384, of March 16, 1994, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel) to the national fishing fleet, except for sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price". From the text of this last norm, it is evident that the need for the price setting made to be competitive with the international fuel price is reiterated, although the parameter indicated ut supra is not established. It is necessary to indicate that through executive decree 31299-MAG-MINAE, the said article 45 was regulated in the following sense: "Article 1º-In compliance with the provisions of article 45 of Law No. 7384 of March 16, 1994, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel), to the National Fishing Fleet, except sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price. Article 2º—For the purposes of the application of this Regulation, the following definitions are established: a) PCFPi = It is the Plant Sale Price per Liter of Fuel (regular gasoline or diesel), consumed by the National Non-Sport Fishing Fleet (Flota Pesquera Nacional No Deportiva). b) CIFRi = It is the monthly CIF Refinery cost, per Liter of Fuel, which includes the F.O.B. costs (free on board), as well as the insurance and transportation of the fuel (regular gasoline and diesel), placed at the National Unloading Port. It must be interpreted that within this concept, its F.O.B. component is equal to that which RECOPE used as an average in its last extraordinary adjustment, for each of the aforementioned fuels. c) COif = Annual cost per liter transferred by Pipeline calculated based on the existing information in the accounting closing of the immediately preceding fiscal period, in accordance with the existing information in the last Available Financial Statement, considering as denominator, the proportional volume of fuels transferred by Pipeline, destined for consumption by the National Non-Sport Fishing Fleet. The amount obtained shall be updated with the estimated inflation for the following period. d) CPif = Annual cost per liter sold at Plants calculated based on the existing information in the accounting closing of the immediately preceding Fiscal Period, in accordance with the existing information in the last Available Financial Statement, considering as denominator, the proportional volume of fuel sold at Plants, during the corresponding period, destined for consumption by the National Non-Sport Fishing Fleet. The amount obtained shall be updated by the estimated inflation for the following period. e) International Fuel Price: It shall be determined based on the average of the price that RECOPE uses as a reference for the fuels (gasoline, diesel), it imports. f) Fuel for Fishing: Covers only the regular gasoline and diesel variety. Article 3º-The price setting of the fuels, consumed by the National Non-Sport Fishing Fleet, shall be established taking into account only the following cost structure: PCFPi = CIFRi + COif + CPif For: i = Regular Gasoline, Diesel f = Fixed until the conclusion of the next review. Article 4º-In determining the price of fuels destined for consumption by the National Non-Sport Fishing Fleet, amounts corresponding to administration expenses, asset depreciation, port charges, investment, commercialization margins or others of a similar nature shall not be considered, in such a way that the objective is met that the set price is competitive with the international prices of the markets that RECOPE uses as a reference in the acquisition of fuels. Article 5º-The price requests may be made by RECOPE or INCOPESCA or by the Regulating Entity ex officio, because the price variations for the National Non-Sport Fishing Fleet shall be made following the same Ordinary and Extraordinary variations requested by RECOPE." (highlighting is ours). Despite the foregoing, there is no proof that ARESEP modified the price setting made in resolution 2774-2002 of eight o'clock on September twenty-sixth, two thousand two regarding the incorporation of RECOPE administration expenses in the setting of the plant fuel price. Said decree was repealed by executive decree 32527-MAG of June 3, 2005, which provided: "Article 1º-In compliance with the provisions of article 45 of Law No. 7384 of March 16, 1994 and article 123 second paragraph of Law No. 8436 of March 1, 2005, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel) to the National Fishing Fleet, except sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price. Article 2º-The competitive price with the international price, for the sale of the fuel mentioned in the previous article, shall be comprised in the rate setting that is made, by the application of the exemption of the single fuel tax (impuesto único a los combustibles) and the non-incorporation within said price, of amounts corresponding to administration expenses, asset depreciation, port charges and investment. Article 3º-The difference resulting in the determination of the competitive price with the international price, between the corresponding amount by the application of the exemption of the single fuel tax and the items not incorporated in article second, shall be recognized by the State to the National Non-Sport Fishing Sector based on the "Agreement for addressing critical issues of the National Fishing Sector" (Acuerdo para la atención de temas críticos del Sector Pesquero Nacional) signed on January 29, 2008. For this, the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) shall incorporate in the national budget the amount corresponding to the subsidy (subsidio) established in Article Second and shall transfer it to the Costa Rican Institute of Fishing and Aquaculture (Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura) (INCOPESCA), through the respective transfer. The subsidy amount per liter of regular gasoline or diesel fuel shall be determined by INCOPESCA, which by reason of its competencies, shall be in charge of its allocation to each benefited fisherman, its distribution and control, having to render a biannual report to the cited ministry, in accordance with current regulations. Article 4º-The amount corresponding to the items exempted in Article Second shall be determined based on the accounting records of RECOPE of the immediately preceding closed fiscal period. For this and in relation to said period, RECOPE shall supply INCOPESCA with the required annual accounting information for the quantification of the subsidy per liter: the indicated financial statements, the total sales of RECOPE in volume, the administrative expenses, the depreciation of assets, the executed cash investments and the port charges". (highlighting is ours). As can be seen, the same established the need to set fuel prices for fishermen without taking into consideration administration expenses among others. However, it does not appear in the case file that ARESEP acted in accordance with said regulatory body, maintaining RECOPE's internal administrative cost. Even it is necessary to indicate that through resolution RRG-9233-2008 of ten hours twenty minutes on November eleventh, two thousand eight, again based on the validity of article 45 of Law 7384, a plant price without tax is set for fuel prices for non-sport fishing equal to that of the distributor for final consumer at service stations. As can be seen from the text of said administrative act, the defendant is correct when it indicates that the general formula would be the following:
P= PRI +/- D + K +IU+ M T +MC, understood these as: P= Final consumer price, PRI= International Reference Price, D = Difference or Tariff Lag, K = Internal margin of Recope, IU= Single fuel tax, MT= Transporter margin, MC = Marketer margin, Si= Subsidy. It is also correct when it indicates that the MT and MC factors are not included in the Recope plant price, given that they correspond to transportation to service stations and marketing at these. For the foregoing, it must be noted that the plant price excludes these factors, but it having to be taken into consideration that as indicated, the indicated plant price of fuels for fishermen does not differ from that indicated for other final consumers, except in what corresponds to the exemption from charging the respective fuel tax, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria). Thus, by way of example, the referred resolution RRG-9233-2008 of ten hours twenty minutes on November eleventh, two thousand eight, sets equal prices for fuel at the plant without tax for the national fishing fleet and for the fuel distributor for consumers. No modification of said situation appears until the provisions of the single article of Law No. 9134 of June 6, 2013, where the indicated article 45 was authentically interpreted, defining with greater precision the components that could be taken into consideration in setting fuel prices for fishermen, in the following manner: "... the expression \"competitive fuel price at the international level\", contained in both norms, that the national non-sport fishing fleet shall receive, is based on the Costa Rican fishing sector acquiring from the Costa Rican Oil Refinery (Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo) (Recope), or from the entity legally authorized for the importation of hydrocarbons into the country, the fuel, finished product (gasoline and diesel), at a price that shall comprise only the following items: a) Product cost value (refined product: amount of the purchase invoice. Non-refined product: cost of refining in Costa Rica). b) Freight to the port of destination in Costa Rica. c) The insurances corresponding to the fuel. d) The cost for transfer of the final product, within the national territory, to the distribution point. e) The cost of storage and pumping for the plant, where the sale is made. Those values shall be set based on the average import cost of the previous month, or the latest available similar information. No general price calculation model may cover the fuel destined for the national non-sport fishing sector, therefore the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) (Aresep) must exclude any other item or component considered in the setting of the common price of these fuels. Incopesca shall be in charge of the administration and control of the efficient use of fuel destined for non-sport fishing activity...". In accordance with the foregoing, this Tribunal has held it as proven that, based on the false premise of the repeal of article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fishing and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, ARESEP proceeded to equate the plant price for fishermen (excluding the respective tax) with that of any other final consumer, and incorporating into this concept a series of items not originally contemplated in the settings prior to the administrative acts of resolutions 2774-2002 of eight o'clock on September twenty-sixth, two thousand two and RRG-2821-2002 of 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2002. With the foregoing, it is evident that the provisions of the indicated article were partially breached, given that other costs different from those expressly established in Law 7384 were used in the setting of the plant price. Consequently, the two advantages that non-artisanal fishermen obtained were the following: a) acquisition of the product at plant price, without charging transportation costs outside the plant and marketing (with the exception that, as has been indicated, costs originally not contemplated were gradually charged to said plant price) and b) the exemption from payment of the single fuel tax (impuesto único sobre combustibles).
Nevertheless, the claim cannot be upheld, given that the plaintiff, on the one hand, did not seek the nullity of the respective administrative acts and, on the other, the plaintiff's representative did not prove that with the changes in the items to be considered in the price of fuel for fishermen, the price thereof had ceased to be competitive with the international market, as expressly established by the rule, in addition to the lack of proof of the alleged damage, as will be indicated subsequently. Although, as has been indicated, the different resolutions of ARESEP mentioned resulted in the equalization of the plant price for fishermen with that of any end consumer (less the respective tax), this does not mean per se that it had the consequence of having such an impact that the national plant price ceased to be competitive with the international market, also taking into consideration that in the case of fishermen's fuel, the single fuel tax did not have to be paid, which logically had an additional impact on the national price compared to the foreign price. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate this aspect through the presentation of suitable technical evidence, given that this Tribunal cannot rely on mere presumptions regarding the consequences of the acts mentioned with respect to competitiveness with international prices, as we are in the presence of plant prices (which do not include transportation costs to service stations and marketing therein) and which also do not include the payment of the respective tax. In accordance with the considerations made above, Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applied, as it provides: "The burden of proof falls: 1) On whoever makes a claim, with respect to the affirmations of the facts constituting his right. 2) On whoever opposes a claim, with respect to the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right." Regarding the burden of proof, it has been stated on another occasion that: "…, in order of the provisions of Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure: '(…) The burden of proof does not suppose, then, any right of the adversary, but rather an imperative of the own interest of each litigant; it is a circumstance of risk consisting in the fact that whoever does not prove the facts that he must prove, loses the suit. One can remove this burden by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts that the Law indicates. And this does not create, evidently, a right in the adversary, as if a personal legal situation pertaining to each party; the burden of not giving credence to the affirmations that were necessary to prove and were not proven... not proving is the same as not existing (…)'. (Vote number 262 at nine forty hours on June seventeenth, nineteen ninety-four, of the Second Civil Superior Tribunal, First Section). In accordance with the foregoing, the mere invocation of the party is not sufficient if there is no solid evidentiary foundation that serves as a demonstration of the facts or defenses alleged. Given that the party requests the analysis of legality, not for the purpose of removing the conduct from the legal world, but exclusively for indemnification purposes, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that beyond the existence or not of defects in the administrative conduct, this had an unlawful consequence that could cause harmful effects in its legal sphere. However, far from it, the case file does not show that the existence of negative changes in national competitiveness with respect to international fuel prices has been proven, nor the incidence of ARESEP's decisions in this regard, that may be identifiable, differentiable, and individualizable from other internal and external situations of the country that could have had an impact on an eventual loss of the ability to compete of our national fishermen. As the plaintiff rightly indicates, the purpose of the rule was to protect the competitiveness of national fishermen against the international market, and it so happens that he did not demonstrate that in the case under analysis a distortion of the country's plant prices has occurred such that it has affected that objective. Additionally, this Tribunal deems it necessary to refer to ARESEP's allegation that what was done was done in the exercise of its powers. In this sense, although it is clear that the Public Services Regulatory Authority has sufficient powers to impose on the concessionaires of the public service the rules to be followed for setting the tariff or tariff adjustment, and the choice of the price and tariff setting methodology is a technical problem and therefore methodologies compatible with the principle of service at cost established in Article 3 of the Law on the Creation of ARESEP may be used, it must be remembered that it may exercise its regulatory powers but within the framework of the legal order without disapplying the provisions of the Law, nor emptying the respective norm of content. In this vein, its technical discretion must be exercised within the framework of the legal system and if it establishes limits, it is not appropriate that by way of interpretation a specific provision is considered inapplicable or items are incorporated into prices not contemplated in a specific law, when the legislator has chosen to define the scope of the components of a specific price (as happened in the case of the administrative act of resolution 2774-2002 at eight hours on September twenty-six, two thousand two). Although ARESEP sets its tariffs in accordance with the principle of service at cost, the fact is that there was a valid, effective, and current norm, which established a specific method of setting, in order of the legal interests that the legislator at the time decided to protect, and it is not appropriate that by means of an administrative act this exceptional situation provided for by the legal system is circumvented. When the norm mentions the FOB plant price, it cannot be analyzed out of context from the rest of the norm that indicates that the price to be set will be "based on the average import cost of the previous month and considering the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the costs of distribution by pipeline and distribution at plants...", without mentioning other costs integrated into the price later by mere interpretation of ARESEP. In any case, as has been indicated, the corresponding administrative conduct has not been objected to and with respect to its consequences, as has been said and will be further elaborated below, there is not the slightest proof of a harmful result against the plaintiff.
VIII.- On the damages and losses claimed. It is not superfluous to indicate that in addition to the previous considerations, it is not appropriate to accept the indemnification for damages and losses requested, as the claim is devoid of any proof regarding their existence. In this vein, it must be remembered that the duty to indemnify all damages and losses arising from the conduct and omissions of the Public Administration finds its own specificity in our country, based on the Political Constitution of 1949. In said normative body, the existence of a contentious-administrative jurisdiction was established, as part of the fundamental rights enjoyed by all Costa Rican citizens. In this sense, its Article 49, with the reforms subsequently introduced, provides the following: "The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch, with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, of its institutions, and of any other public law entity. Deviation of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered." This norm must be complemented with what is stated in Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, as they provide: "The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers among themselves." (Our emphasis) and "Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done to them, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws." Regarding the constitutional basis of State responsibility, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber No. 5207-2004, at 14:55 on May 18, 2004, literally indicated: "Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the financial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of various constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that 'The Government of the Republic is (...) responsible (...)', whereby the responsibility of the larger public entity or State and its various organs –Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Power– is taken for granted. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the '(...) criminal responsibility (...)' of public officials and the second paragraph refers us to the '(...) personal responsibility for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (...)'. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects 'acquired property rights' and 'consolidated legal situations,' which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public role or performance. Article 41 ibidem stipulates that 'Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (...)', this precept imposes a duty on the author and person responsible for the damage to compensate for the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, with which it becomes the cornerstone at a constitutional level for the legislative development of a system of strict and direct liability in which the compensation does not depend on moral and subjective reproach to the conduct of the public official due to intent or fault but, solely and exclusively, for having inflicted or received, effectively, '(...) injuries or damages (...) in their person, property, or moral interests (...)', that is, an unlawful injury that they do not have the duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered who has suffered an unlawful injury from an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct– and the corresponding obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it integrally; the access to jurisdiction provided in this same constitutional precept becomes, thus, an instrumental right to forcibly ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the compensatory right of the injured party when the subject obliged to repair voluntarily breaches the referred obligation.... The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in the bearing of public burdens (Articles 18 and 33) that prevents imposing on the administered a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they do not have the duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the good functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of Articles, interpreted, a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4 and 191 of the fundamental Law as they respectively include the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the 'good functioning of services and administrative dependencies,' 'good governance of the Government' and 'efficiency of the administration.' This fundamental right to the good functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner and, of course, the corresponding obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it becomes evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate, and define the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury that its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct causes to the property and non-property sphere of the administered." (our emphasis)." From the foregoing, it is evident that a duty of full compensability of the damage is operative, which, based on the indicated provisions, derives from Article 190.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, as it provides that: "1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its lawful or unlawful, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party." As noted, a strict liability regime prevails in our country, through which the Administration's duty to indemnify is operative, regardless of subjective assessment criteria (intent or fault) in the actions of its employees. On the other hand, our legislation even provides for the possibility of claiming liability from the Administration due to lawful conduct, as Article 194 of the normative body mentioned provides in this regard: "1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered in a special manner, due to the small proportion of those affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury." By reason of the foregoing, as noted, the central axis of the State liability system in our country is the victim of the damage, since this arises whenever its normal or abnormal functioning causes damage that the victim does not have the duty to bear, whether financial or non-financial, regardless of their subjective legal situation. However, this compensatory duty is not complete either, in the sense of having an unrestricted character for any type of damage, but it must arise, in the case that it arises from an administrative conduct that is not lawful or normal, from the abnormality that represents deviating from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) i.e., due to poor functioning, or a tardy action or the nonexistence thereof, on the part of the Administration. This abnormality will determine the unlawfulness as a prerequisite for the compensability of the damage. In the case of the lawful functioning of the Administration, where there is no abnormality or unlawfulness, the unlawfulness that generates the possibility of indemnifying the damage lies in the non-obligation to suffer an effect that has the characteristic of being of exceptional intensity or affecting a small proportion of those affected. In this sense, it is worth clarifying that this liability is subject to other general provisions on State liability contained in the General Law of Public Administration. In this respect, consideration must be given to what is indicated in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, as it states the following: "In any case, the alleged damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group." Regarding the damages that may be subject to compensation in contentious-administrative jurisdiction, the vote of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 112 at 14 hours 15 minutes on July 15, 1992, among other things, indicated: "IV. The damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of tort liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful unlawful act has taken place that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the property or non-property legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, regarding which its conservation was objectively expected had the harmful event not occurred. Under this perspective, there is no civil liability without damage, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. On the other hand, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In summary, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the wrongful act with that subsequent to it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' and 'losses' are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. The damage constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnum emergens), while the loss is constituted by the frustrated profit or gain that was not received (lucrum cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected if the wrongful act had not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be a 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. The damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; certainty must not be confused with currency, as repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profit or loss, as the first refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, that is, its repercussions are not projected at the time of filing the process. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes an extreme of exclusive subjective concern of the injured party, however the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful event, and the second will be the victim's successors. C) It must be caused by a third party and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer) it becomes insubsistent. D) There must be a causal relationship between the unlawful act and the damage. VII.- Within the types of damages, material and bodily damage are found in the first place, the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's property, while the second impacts bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or financial damage, the specific terms of bodily damage and material damage, in a strict sense, are usually included. The second seems to be the most appropriate expression, as bodily damage usually affects the financial interests of the injured party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction was born in Roman Law, where a distinction was made between damage inflicted on things directly (damnum) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In financial damage, the impairment generated turns out to be economically assessable….” Complementary to the above, in order to determine the damage, it is necessary to indicate the need for a relationship between the claimed damage and the conduct deployed by the economic agent. In this vein, different criteria of objective imputation have been doctrinally indicated, among which adequate causation stands out for these purposes. With respect to this criterion, the following has been doctrinally indicated: "The conduct of the defendant is an adequate cause of the damage suffered by the victim if, ex ante, the causation of the damage was foreseeable –not very improbable– by the defendant. But authors have never agreed on what degree of probability –between 0 and 1– is adequate according to law; and they have always disagreed on whether the judgment on probability must consist of a purely subjective prognosis –similar to that carried out in the analysis of intent and fault–, that is, in a judgment on the avoidability of the result, or if, on the contrary, the prognosis must be objective in the sense that an agent endowed with special knowledge should have known the probability of the production of the result." (Causality and Liability. Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antonio Fernández Crende. Journal for the analysis of law. WWW.INDET.COM.) Regarding this criterion of causality, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its vote 251-f-06 at 10:30 on May 25, 2006, refers to it, but combined with the theory of efficient cause, as follows: "XIV.- The causal nexus as a prerequisite for liability. The diverse typology of causes. (…) it remains to be established whether the administrative inaction of the Ministry of Health in failing to verify, prior to issuing the health and operating permit, whether the roundabout complied with the standards provided by the General Health Law, was the direct or indirect cause of the damage, given that the estimation of the claim depends on the demonstration of the existence of a causal nexus, in its traditional notion of cause-effect. In this regard, it should be remembered that in the production of damage, multiple factors often concur, within which it is necessary to determine those that directly or indirectly are the efficient and adequate cause of the harm caused (…) In this confluence of factual or legal elements surrounding the harmful situation, the Judge must establish, based on the evidence of the process, whether the specific action consisting of administrative functioning, or the abstention from deploying the functional framework imposed by the Legal System, is an apt cause for the generation of the damage (…).. That is, to infer the efficiency of the cause that is deemed adequate, it is essential to deduce if it is the producer of the injury, so that if it is eliminated, it is rational to deduce that the damage would not have occurred. The foregoing supposes an evaluative exercise to displace from the framework of consideration those causes that have had no influence on the result (extraneous causes), from those that, had they not occurred, would have avoided the impairment. It is a kind of objective prognosis, through which it can be affirmed that with such action or omission it is logical or probable that the specific damage is produced. In this understanding, the causal nexus imposes itself as the inexorable relational link between the damage and the administrative conduct, so that without the latter, the former would probably not have occurred. It is clear that the determination of this factor depends to a high degree on the examination of the evidence brought to the process by the litigant parties. Based on it, the Judge can deduce whether within the particular factual framework, the actions of the State entail its liability, for having associated its functioning with the generation of the injuries." As noted, in the previous vote the First Chamber opted for a position regarding the causality of damage, where both the adequate cause criterion and the theory of the efficiency of the cause or sine qua non are combined, the latter being understood as that which has the greatest aptitude to generate the damage with greater efficacy and based on which that condition is selected from all conditions that supposes a maximum possibility in the contribution to the harmful result (greater intrinsic power of causing the damage). By combining both positions (questioned at the time by doctrine), it has been sought to individualize in the facts or omissions that have effective influence on the effect invoked by the injured party or that at least support a degree of objective probability in their influence on it (probability judgment of the result based on the facts deemed proven which is carried out according to the rules of experience). In any case, it is necessary to indicate that the respective demonstration of the existence of said causal link between the event considered as generating the damage and the latter will be the burden of the party invoking it. It is based on these considerations that the liability must be determined. The foregoing, as it is not sufficient to invoke damage, but its existence and the causal nexus linking it to the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be reliably demonstrated. In the case under analysis, the plaintiff rather imprecisely invokes the existence of damages as a product of the existence of an overprice in the purchase of fuel and requests that they be liquidated in the sentence execution stage. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the case file does not show that the plaintiff made any expenditure in the purchase of the referred fuel during the entirety of the charging period. The mere demonstration of ownership of authorized vessels does not mean that they were operating, nor that on the occasion of their operation the fuel referred to in the article of Law 7384 was used. The claim is completely lacking in invoices, payment receipts, or at least the completion of any procedure before the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture in this regard, so it is not appropriate, in addition to the arguments expressed ut supra, to recognize any damage. The plaintiff must remember that the sentence execution stage is intended to liquidate the damage proven in the trial and cannot seek to demonstrate in it effects that remained unproven throughout the entire process. Nor does it even provide evidence of the alleged moral damage or that the plaintiff was on the brink of bankruptcy on account of the administrative conduct in question. Nor does the plaintiff demonstrate that the fuel item represented 70% of his production costs as a fisherman or that the price he paid at any time during the period of his request was not within the framework of competitiveness with international prices.
The absence of proof of effective, certain, evaluable, and compensable harm is evident and fully attributable to the representation of the plaintiff, and not even the expert evidence that was at one point indicated for the execution of judgment could have had any probative effect, if, as indicated at the trial stage, no element of conviction regarding the alleged damages was provided. Consequently, the claims for compensation must be dismissed.” **V.- Object of the proceeding:** From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, we are faced with a **civil treasury proceeding (proceso civil de hacienda)**, the object of which is centered on determining the existence of a possible breach by ARESEP with respect to the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384, and the existence of damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff by reason of said unlawful conduct.
**VI.- On the liability of the Administration:** As indicated in the previous section, when delimiting the object of this case, we are faced with a proceeding of a **civil treasury (civil de hacienda)** nature, in which the extra-contractual liability of the Administration is discussed. For the corresponding compensation to proceed, it is necessary to apply the regulations governing the matter. From this legal framework, a series of elements emerge that make up the liability scheme. Since the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, in 1978, the rules of the extra-contractual civil liability regime applicable to the Public Administration were established. Rules that previously derived from the apex of the legal system, in its Articles 9, 11, 41, 148, and 193. From that moment on, the application of the Civil Code's own regulations, which regulated extra-contractual civil liability (Article 1045), gave way to this scheme. Thus, liability based on criteria for attributing liability, such as willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa), evolved into those of "lawful, unlawful, normal, or abnormal functioning (funcionamiento lícito, ilícito, normal o anormal)," characteristic of an objectivization of liability. Said system poses a series of elements and logical relationships, in such a way that they must all converge and be precisely identified. In the administrative litigation proceeding, whoever intends to hold a public entity liable under this scheme, in a **civil treasury proceeding (proceso civil de hacienda)**, must demonstrate, as part of the *onus probandi*, precisely and unequivocally, each of these elements. In such a way that the existence of the **damage (daño)** must be identified (196 LGAP), which, in addition, must be **effective (efectivo)**, **evaluable (evaluable)** , and **individualizable (individualizable)** , and in turn the **causal relationship (relación de causalidad)** between said damage and the public entity or official. It is necessary to demonstrate that no **exempting causes (causas eximentes)** of liability exist (190 LGAP), in addition to concretizing the existence of **criteria for attribution (criterios de imputación)** , meaning that the harmful conduct occurred in a **lawful (lícita)** or **unlawful (ilícita)** manner, **normal (normal)** or **abnormal (anormal)** . Regarding liability for **lawful (lícita)** and **normal (normal)** conduct, given the special nature of the damage, it requires the existence of a small **proportion of affected individuals (proporción de afectados)** and that the intensity of said injury be **exceptional (excepcional)** . Under this scheme, compensation covers the value of the damage, **but not the consequential damages (perjuicios)** . These concepts that comprise the "special damage (daño especial)" are what are known in law as indeterminate legal concepts, which it will be up to the Judges in each case to give content to and determine if the subjective right was denatured. On the other hand, to address the analysis of the existence of liability for **unlawful (ilícita)** and **abnormal (anormal)** conduct, it is essential to determine the existence of an action by the Administration **contrary to the legal system (contraria al ordenamiento jurídico)** or to the **unequivocal rules of science or technique (reglas unívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica)** , respectively. Under this cause for attribution, the recognition of damages is full, since unlike the previous one, consequential damages (perjuicios) are recognized. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 000298-F-SI-2014, of March 6, 2014, has indicated: "*It is important to note that the Public Administration is liable for all damages caused by its functioning, whether legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal (canon 190 LGAP). Thus, all damage caused to the subjective rights of others due to faults of servants committed in the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof (precept 191 ibid.) must be repaired. From the foregoing, three basic assumptions derive: administrative conduct (active or omissive), effective damage (daño efectivo), and a cause-effect link (causal nexus, nexo de causalidad) between them. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be clear that not every illegitimate or irregular functioning of the State generates its liability, given that the interested party must prove the effective damage (daño efectivo) and a cause-effect relationship between both phenomena. In other words, the declaration of LIABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION does not automatically generate the duty to compensate. Therefore, it will be necessary to demonstrate the existence of a personal damage and its corresponding causal nexus (nexo causal) with the conduct under litigation, based on the fact that the burden of proof rests with the party alleging that damage has been caused to it. The judge must corroborate the existence of an effective damage (daño efectivo), which must be evaluable, individualizable, and derived from conduct capable of giving rise to liability. All damage caused to the subjective rights of others due to faults of servants, committed in the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof (precept 191 ibid.), must be repaired. The legal system establishes that once liability is determined and the damage is taken as certain in the terms previously indicated, the recognition of material and moral damage in its different effects shall proceed. See from this Chamber vote number 783 of 14 hours 35 minutes of June 19, 2013."* As a synthesis, it can be indicated that for compensation to proceed under the scheme of Article 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, it must be fully configured with each and every one of its elements.
**VII.- On the specific case:** At its core, the plaintiff in its lawsuit, with the purpose of determining the criterion for attributing administrative conduct, in order to derive the damages (daños y perjuicios) it requests, as well as the requested declarations, alleges that ARESEP, through administrative resolution No. 2774-2002, of 8:00 a.m. on September 26, 2002, established in recital (considerando) 4, that Law No. 7593 tacitly repealed Article 45 of the INCOPESCA law, and therefore the rates and prices of this public service (fuel supply to fishermen) must be determined in accordance with the law of the regulatory authority, so that, in its rate structure, not only the referenced investment cost will be incorporated, but also all those costs that are necessary for the provision of the public service. Consequently, the defendant, protected by that resolution, subsequently proceeded to issue resolution No. RRG-2821, of 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2002, according to which the defendant entity materialized the elimination of the "preferential price (precio preferencial)" in favor of the national non-sport fishing fleet, regarding the acquisition of fuel. Consequently, as of November 4, 2002, ARESEP invariably and steadily proceeded to set the same fuel price, both for consumers in general and for the non-sport fishing fleet. It indicates that faced with this factual situation, the non-sport fishing sector was forced to promote an "Authentic Interpretation Law (Ley de Interpretación Auténtica)" on the real and effective scope of the benefit in fuel purchase, which materialized through Law No. 9134, of June 13, 2013, by which ARESEP was forced to change its price-setting criterion for the fisherman; thus, Resolution No. RIE-084-2013 was issued, published in the Gazette of October 1, 2013, which reflects a lower price for fuel acquired by the non-sport fishing fleet. Therefore, throughout the entire period between November 4, 2002 – when the Cited Resolution No. RRG-2821 entered into force – and until October 1, 2013, when Resolution No. RIE-084-2013 was implemented, the non-sport fishing sector was not recognized a lower price, relative to the price of fuel for the consumer in general. By reason of the foregoing, it considers that ARESEP has incurred in conduct contrary to Law, by being omissive, consciously, repeatedly, and steadily, in granting a differentiated price to the non-sport fishing sector, during that entire period from November 4, 2002, until October 1, 2013. The defendant responds to these allegations by indicating that it is not true that it ignored, neither before nor after the entry into force of the authentic interpretation, the provisions of the articles on which the plaintiff bases its lawsuit, given that due to the superficial wording of the indicated articles, the manner of implementing that benefit, regarding the establishment of the applicable calculation methodology, the costs to be considered within the service provision, and other regulatory aspects, were left to the exclusive technical competence of ARESEP, as specified in the final paragraphs of Article 45 of Law 7384. The foregoing must be complemented by the existence of Law 7593, which imposes on it the power-duty to apply the principle of service at cost to the rates of all regulated public services, thus making it necessary for the financial balance of the service provider to have certain costs incorporated into its rates, among them investment costs that guarantee the continuity, development, and sustainability of the activity. It is not true that the Regulatory Authority omitted to establish a competitive price for the national fishing fleet, since since 2002 there has been a resolution of the General Regulator establishing the method for calculating fuel prices for that fishing fleet. According to that calculation method, such prices are set when the plantel prices for RECOPE are established, given that the price for the fishing fleet – considering investments – is equivalent to the plantel price of RECOPE, without the single tax. Consequently, since then the investment item has been incorporated within the calculation of the plantel price, in accordance with what is stated in Article 45 of Law 7384, which provides for the charging of a FOB plantel price. Subsequently, on the occasion of the authentic interpretation, the previously approved methodology for setting the price of fuel at RECOPE distribution plants and to the final consumer, is adapted to said regulation, issuing resolution RIE-084-2013 of September 24, 2013, by the Energy Superintendency. In accordance with the analysis of the evidence provided to the case file and the arguments of the parties, this Court considers that the plaintiff is not correct, for the reasons that will be indicated below. Article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, established the following: "*ARTICLE 45.- The fishing sector shall acquire from RECOPE the fuel (gasoline and diesel), for the non-sport fishing activity at a price competitive with the international price, based on the average import cost of the previous month and considering the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the costs of pipeline distribution and distribution at plants, in such a way that the price is F.O.B. Plantel. That price shall be set by the National Electricity Service; to which RECOPE must previously request it, according to the provisions of Law No. 6588 of July 30, 1981, or the Institute. The Institute shall be in charge of the administration and control of the efficient use of fuel, destined for the non-sport fishing activity*". As can be seen from the rule, its purpose was to establish a competitive price for the fuel to be used for non-sport fishing activity, establishing the F.O.B. plantel price as a parameter. In accordance with the previous rule, through **resolution RRG-2708-2002**, ARESEP established the extraordinary adjustment formula for determining prices for the fuels consumed by the fishing fleet. In accordance with the foregoing, the cost structure for gasoline and diesel in said cases would include: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost, 3) Plant cost, 4) Administrative cost. Subsequently, in accordance with **resolutions RJD-013, 014, and 016-2002** of the Board of Directors of ARESEP, it was agreed that within the price structure of the indicated fuels, the service provider's investments must be incorporated. Thus, according to said administrative act, the respective structure contained: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost, 3) Plant cost, 4) Administrative cost, 5) Investment cost. By means of **resolution 2774-2002 of eight o'clock on September twenty-six, two thousand two**, ARESEP ordered the revocation of the extraordinary adjustment formula for determining the prices of fuel consumed by the fishing fleet in accordance with resolution RRG-2708-2002, and to indicate to the parties that price fixings shall be carried out in accordance with Articles 3, 30, and 31 of Law 7593. By reason of the foregoing, the cost structure in accordance with this act contained: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost, 3) Plant cost, 4) Administrative cost, 5) Investment cost, 6) Costs of service provision. Thus, in practice, this resolution equated the plantel price of fuel for fishermen to that of any final consumer. Subsequently, by means of resolution **RRG-2821-2002 of 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2002**, a fuel price for fishermen was contemplated, in accordance with resolution 2772-2002, at plantel price, without taxes. It is necessary to indicate that what was ordered in the indicated resolution 2772-2002 is based on the presumption that the provisions of the Law for the Creation of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, Law No. 7593, repealed the indicated Article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, as the administrative conduct in reference expressly indicates. Notwithstanding the foregoing, through an opinion of the Specialized Legal Directorate of ARESEP dated October 21, 2003, the General Regulator was informed that Article 45 of Law 7384 is in force and must be applied over lower-ranking norms that contradict it. However, this did not result in modifying the price fixing previously indicated, failing to adapt it to the consideration that said norm was in force and clearly established that the FOB Plantel price must exclusively take into consideration the average import cost of the fuel from the previous month and the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the pipeline distribution and plant distribution costs. The foregoing is reaffirmed later, with Article 123 of Law 8436, Fisheries and Aquaculture Law, of April 25, 2005, which ordered the following: "*Article 123.—The national fishing fleet is exempted, except for that dedicated to sport fishing, from all types of national taxes for the importation of vessels, spare parts, engines, navigation and fishing implements, and their respective accessories. In compliance with the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384, of March 16, 1994, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel) to the national fishing fleet, except for sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price*". From the text of this latter rule, it is evident that it reiterates the need for the price fixing carried out to be competitive with the international fuel price, although the parameter indicated supra is not established. It is necessary to indicate that through executive decree 31299-MAG-MINAE, said Article 45 was regulated in the following sense: "*Article 1.-In compliance with the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384 of March 16, 1994, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel), to the National Fishing Fleet, except sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price. Article 2.—For the purposes of applying this Regulation, the following definitions are established: a) PCFPi = It is the Plantel Sale Price per Liter of Fuel (regular gasoline or diesel), consumed by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet. b) CIFRi = It is the monthly CIF Refinery cost, per Liter of Fuel, which includes the F.O.B. (free on board) costs, as well as the insurance and transport of the fuel (regular gasoline and diesel), placed at the National Port of Unloading. It shall be interpreted that within this concept, its F.O.B. component is equal to that used by RECOPE as an average in its last extraordinary adjustment, for each of the fuels cited above. c) COif = Annual cost per liter transferred by Pipeline calculated based on the information existing in the accounting closing of the immediately preceding fiscal period, in accordance with the information existing in the last Available Financial Statement, considering as denominator, the proportional volume of fuels transferred by Pipeline, destined for the consumption of the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet. The amount obtained shall be updated with the estimated inflation for the following period. d) CPif = Annual cost per liter sold at Plants calculated based on the information existing in the accounting closing of the immediately preceding Fiscal Period, in accordance with the information existing in the last Available Financial Statement, considering as denominator, the proportional volume of fuel sold at Plants, during the corresponding period, destined for the consumption of the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet. The amount obtained shall be updated by the estimated inflation for the following period. e) International Fuel Price: It shall be determined based on the average of the price that RECOPE uses as a reference for the fuels (gasoline, diesel), that it imports. f) Fuel for Fishing: It covers only the regular gasoline and diesel variety. Article 3.-The setting of the price of fuels consumed by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet shall be established taking into account only the following cost structure: PCFPi = CIFRi + COif + CPif For: i = Regular Gasoline, Diesel f = Fixed until the conclusion of the next review. Article 4.-**In determining the price of fuels destined for consumption by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet, the amounts corresponding to administrative expenses, asset depreciation, port charges, investment, marketing margins, or others of a similar nature shall not be considered, in such a way that the objective of the set price being competitive with the international prices of the markets that RECOPE uses as a reference in the acquisition of fuels is met**. Article 5.-Price requests may be made by RECOPE or INCOPESCA or by the Regulatory Entity ex officio, as the price variations of the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet shall be made following the same Ordinary and Extraordinary variations requested by RECOPE." (the highlighting is ours).* Despite the foregoing, there is no proof that ARESEP modified the price fixing made in resolution 2774-2002 of eight o'clock on September twenty-six, two thousand two, regarding the incorporation of RECOPE's administrative expenses in setting the plantel fuel price.
That decree was repealed by Executive Decree 32527-MAG of June 3, 2005, which provided: <i>"Article 1—In compliance with the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384 of March 16, 1994, and Article 123, second paragraph, of Law No. 8436 of March 1, 2005, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel) to the National Fishing Fleet (Flota Pesquera Nacional), except for sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price. Article 2—The price competitive with the international price, for the sale of the fuel mentioned in the preceding article, shall be included in the tariff setting carried out, through the application of the exemption from the single fuel tax and the non-inclusion within said price of the amounts corresponding to administrative expenses, asset depreciation, port charges, and investment. Article 3—The difference resulting in the determination of the price competitive with the international price, between the amount corresponding to the application of the exemption from the single fuel tax and the items not included in Article Two, shall be recognized by the State to the Non-Sport National Fishing Sector under the "Agreement for the attention of critical issues of the National Fishing Sector" signed on January 29, 2008. For this purpose, the Ministry of Finance shall incorporate into the national budget the amount corresponding to the subsidy established in Article Two and shall transfer it to the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA), through the respective transfer. The amount of the subsidy per liter of regular gasoline or diesel fuel shall be determined by INCOPESCA, which, by reason of its powers, shall be responsible for its allocation to each benefited fisherman, its distribution, and control, and must render a semi-annual report to the aforementioned ministry, in accordance with current regulations. Article 4—The amount corresponding to the items exempted in Article Two shall be determined based on the accounting records of RECOPE for the immediately preceding closed fiscal period. For this purpose and in relation to said period, RECOPE shall provide INCOPESCA with the annual accounting information required for the quantification of the subsidy per liter: the indicated financial statements, the total sales of RECOPE in volume, the administrative expenses, the depreciation of assets, the cash investments executed, and the port charges</i>." (emphasis added). As noted, it established the need for price setting for fuel for fishermen without taking into consideration administrative expenses, among others. However, the case file does not show that ARESEP acted in accordance with that regulatory body, maintaining the internal administrative cost of RECOPE. It is even necessary to indicate that through resolution RRG-9233-2008 at ten hours twenty minutes of November eleven, two thousand eight, the validity of Article 45 of Law 7384 is again taken as a starting point, establishing an ex-plant price (precio plantel) without tax for non-sport fishing fuel prices equal to that of the distributor for the final consumer at service stations. As is evident from the text of said administrative act, the defendant party is correct when it indicates that the general formula would be as follows:
P= PRI +/- D + K + IU + M T + MC, understood as: P= Final price to the consumer, PRI= International Reference Price, D = Tariff Difference or Lag, K = Internal margin of Recope, IU= Single fuel tax, MT= Transporter's margin, MC = Marketer's margin, Si= Subsidy. It is also correct when it indicates that the MT and MC factors are not included in the ex-plant price of Recope, given that they correspond to transportation to service stations and marketing at these. Therefore, it must be noted that the ex-plant price excludes these factors, but it must be taken into consideration that, as indicated, the stated ex-plant price of fuels for fishermen does not differ from that set for other final consumers, except with regard to the exemption from the collection of the respective fuel tax, in accordance with the provisions of the Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law. Thus, by way of example, the aforementioned resolution RRG-9233-2008 at ten hours twenty minutes of November eleven, two thousand eight, sets equal prices for fuel at the plant without tax for the national fishing fleet and for the fuel distributor to the consumer. No modification of this situation is recorded until the provision in the sole article of Law No. 9134 of June 6, 2013, where the indicated Article 45 was authentically interpreted, defining with greater precision the components that could be taken into consideration in setting fuel prices for fishermen, as follows: "<i>... the expression 'internationally competitive fuel price,' contained in both norms, which the non-sport national fishing fleet shall receive, is based on the Costa Rican fishing sector acquiring from the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery (RECOPE), or from the entity legally authorized for the importation of hydrocarbons into the country, the fuel, finished product (gasoline and diesel), at a price that shall comprise only the following items: a) Value of the product cost (refined product: amount of the purchase invoice. Unrefined product: cost of refining in Costa Rica). b) Freight to the port of destination in Costa Rica. c) Insurance corresponding to the fuel. d) Cost of transfer of the final product, within the national territory, to the point of distribution. e) Cost of storage and pumping for the plant, where the sale is made. Those values shall be set based on the average import cost of the previous month, or the latest similar information available. No general price calculation model may cover fuel destined for the non-sport national fishing sector; therefore, the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (ARESEP) must exclude any other item or component considered in setting the common price of these fuels. INCOPESCA shall be responsible for the administration and control of the efficient use of fuel destined for non-sport fishing activity...". </i>In accordance with the foregoing, this Tribunal has deemed it proven that, based on the false premise of the repeal of Article 45 of Law 7384, Law Creating the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, ARESEP proceeded to equate the ex-plant price for fishermen (excluding the respective tax) with that of any other final consumer, and incorporating into this concept a series of items not originally contemplated in the settings prior to the administrative acts of resolutions 2774-2002 at eight hours of September twenty-six, two thousand two, and RRG-2821-2002 at 9:30 hours of October 24, 2002. With the foregoing, it is evident that the provisions of the indicated article were partially breached, given that other costs different from those expressly established in Law 7384 were used in setting the ex-plant price. Consequently, the two advantages obtained by non-artisanal fishermen were the following: a) acquisition of the product at the ex-plant price, without bearing transportation costs outside the plant and marketing costs (with the caveat that, as has been indicated, costs originally not contemplated were progressively loaded onto said ex-plant price) and b) exemption from payment of the single fuel tax. However, it is not appropriate to uphold the claim, insofar as the plaintiff, on the one hand, did not request the annulment of the respective administrative acts, and on the other, the plaintiff's representative did not prove that, with the changes in the items to be considered in the price of fuels for fishermen, the price thereof ceased to be competitive with the international market, just as the norm expressly establishes, in addition to the lack of proof of the invoked damage, as will be indicated subsequently. Although, as has been indicated, the different resolutions of ARESEP mentioned had the consequence of equating the ex-plant price for fishermen with that of any final consumer (less the respective tax), this does not mean per se, that it had as a consequence an impact such that it implied that the domestic ex-plant price had ceased to be competitive with the international market, also taking into consideration that in the case of fuels for fishermen, the single fuel tax did not have to be paid, which logically had an additional impact on the domestic price compared to the foreign one. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate this aspect through the presentation of suitable technical evidence, given that this Tribunal cannot proceed from mere presumptions regarding the consequences of the mentioned acts with respect to competitiveness with international prices, insofar as we are dealing with ex-plant prices (which do not incorporate the costs of transportation to service stations and marketing at these) and that also do not include the payment of the respective tax. In accordance with the considerations made above, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code is applied, as it provides: "<i>The burden of proof lies on: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the constitutive facts of his right. 2) Whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right</i>." Regarding the burden of proof, it has been said on some other occasion that: "<i> ..., pursuant to the provisions of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code: "(…) The burden of proof does not, therefore, suppose any right of the adversary, but rather an imperative of each litigant's own interest; it is a circumstance of risk consisting in that whoever does not prove the facts that he must prove, loses the case. One can remove this burden by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts that the Law indicates. And this does not, evidently, create a right in the adversary, as if a personal juridical situation pertaining to each party; the burden of not giving credence to the affirmations that were necessary to prove and were not proven... not proving is the same as not existing (…)."</i> (Vote number 262 at nine hours forty minutes of June seventeen, nineteen ninety-four, of the Second Civil Superior Tribunal, First Section). In accordance with the foregoing, the mere invocation by the party is not sufficient, if there is no solid evidentiary basis that serves as a demonstration of the facts or defenses alleged. Given that the party requests the analysis of legality, not for the purpose of extracting the conducts from the juridical world, but exclusively for indemnification purposes, it was the plaintiff's responsibility to demonstrate that, beyond the existence or not of defects in the administrative conduct, it had an unlawful consequence that could be capable of causing harmful effects in his juridical sphere. However, far from it, the case file does not show that the existence of negative changes in national competitiveness with respect to international fuel prices, nor the incidence of ARESEP's decisions in that sense, has been demonstrated, in a way that can be identifiable, differentiable, and individualizable from other internal and external situations of the country that could have had an impact on an eventual loss of the ability to compete of our national fishermen. As the plaintiff rightly indicates, the purpose of the norm was to protect the competitiveness of national fishermen against the international market, and thus he did not demonstrate that in the case under analysis, a distortion of the country's ex-plant prices occurred such that it had an impact on that objective. Additionally, this Tribunal deems it necessary to refer to ARESEP's allegation that what was performed was done in the exercise of its powers. In this sense, while it is clear that the Regulatory Authority of Public Services possesses sufficient powers to impose on public service concessionaires the rules to be followed for tariff setting or tariff adjustment, and thus the choice of the price and tariff setting methodology is a problem of a technical nature and, consequently, methodologies compatible with the principle of service at cost established in Article 3 of the Law Creating ARESEP can be used, it must be remembered that it can exercise its regulatory powers but within the framework of the legal system, without disapplying the provisions of the Law, nor emptying the respective norm of content. In this order of ideas, its technical discretion must be exercised within the framework of the juridical system, and if it establishes limits, it is not appropriate that, by way of interpretation, a specific provision be deemed inapplicable or items be incorporated into prices not contemplated in a specific law, when the legislator has chosen to define the scope of the components of a specified price (as happened in the case of the administrative act of resolution 2774-2002 at eight hours of September twenty-six, two thousand two, Although ARESEP sets its tariffs in accordance with the principle of service at cost, the truth is that there was a valid, effective, and current norm, which established a specific method of setting, in order to protect the juridical interests that the legislator at the time decided to safeguard, and it is not appropriate that through an administrative act, that exceptional situation provided for by the juridical system be obviated. When the norm mentions the FOB ex-plant price, it cannot be analyzed out of context from the rest of the norm, which indicates that the price to be set shall be "<i>based on the average import cost of the previous month and considering the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the costs of pipeline distribution and distribution at plants...", </i>without other costs integrated into the price being mentioned subsequently by mere interpretation of ARESEP. In any case, as has been indicated, the corresponding administrative conducts have not been challenged, and regarding their consequences, as has been said and will be further elaborated below, there is not the slightest proof of a harmful result against the plaintiff.
**VIII.-Regarding the damages and losses claimed.** It is not superfluous to indicate that, in addition to the foregoing considerations, it is not appropriate to grant the requested compensation for damages and losses, insofar as the claim is devoid of any proof regarding their existence. In this order of ideas, it must be remembered that the duty to indemnify all damages and losses caused by the conducts and omissions of the Public Administration, finds its own specificity in our country, starting from the Political Constitution of 1949. In that regulatory body, the existence of an administrative contentious jurisdiction was established, as part of the fundamental rights enjoyed by all Costa Rican citizens. In this sense, its Article 49, with the reforms introduced subsequently, provides the following: <i>"The administrative contentious jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Power, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity. Diversion of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties". </i>Said norm must be complemented with what is indicated in Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, as they provide: "<i>The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers.</i>" (Emphasis added) and "<i>By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt, complete justice must be done, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws</i>". With respect to the constitutional basis of State responsibility, judgment of the Constitutional Chamber. No. 5207-2004, at 14 hours and 55 minutes of May 18, 2004, literally indicated: <i>"Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the patrimonial responsibility of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered parties. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, being that it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several precepts, principles, and constitutional values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that 'The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)' thus taking for granted the responsibility of the greater public entity or State and its various organs –Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers-. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the '(…) criminal responsibility (…)' of public officials, and the second paragraph refers us to the '(…) personal responsibility for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (…).' Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects 'acquired patrimonial rights' and 'consolidated juridical situations,' which can only be, effectively and actually, protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative responsibility without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public scope or performance. Numeral 41 ibid, mandates that 'By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…),' this precept imposes on the author and responsible for the damage the duty to compensate the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered parties as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conducts by action or negative conducts by omission of the public entities, thus becoming the cornerstone at the constitutional level for the legislative development of a system of objective and direct responsibility in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for intent or negligence, but, solely and exclusively, for having inflicted or received, effectively, '(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…),' that is, an unlawful injury that they do not have the duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered party who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct– and the correlative obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it integrally; access to the jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to forcibly ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the compensatory right of the injured party when the subject obliged to repair voluntarily fails to comply with the referred obligation.... The principle of administrative responsibility of public entities and their officials is complemented with the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on the administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they do not have the duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several administered parties and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution encompasses an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted, a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law insofar as they encompass, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the 'proper functioning of services and administrative dependencies,' 'good march of the Government,' and 'efficiency of the administration.' This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner, and, certainly, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly encompassed the principle of the responsibility of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate, and delimit the entire juridical system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative responsibility is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from responsibility for some unlawful injury that its normal or abnormal functioning, or its lawful or unlawful conduct, causes to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties." (emphasis is ours)." </i>From the foregoing, it is evident that a duty of full compensability of the damage operates, which, based on the indicated provisions, derives from Article 190.1 of the General Law of the Public Administration, as it provides that: <i>"1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party"</i>. As noted, in our country a regime of objective liability prevails, through which the duty of indemnification of the Administration operates, independent of criteria of subjective assessment (intent or negligence), in the performance of its servants. On the other hand, our legislation even foresees the possibility of claiming liability from the Administration, due to lawful conduct, insofar as Article 194 of the aforementioned normative body provides, in this regard, the following: "<i>1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of those affected or due to the exceptional intensity of the injury</i>." By reason of the foregoing, as noted, the central axis of the State liability system in our country is the victim of the damage, since that arises, provided that its normal or abnormal functioning causes damage that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or extra-patrimonial, independent of their subjective juridical situation. However, this compensatory duty is not absolute either, in the sense of having an unrestricted character for any type of damage, but rather it must originate, in the case that it originates from a non-lawful or normal administrative conduct, from the abnormality that means departing from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or that is, due to poor functioning, or a tardy act or non-existence thereof, on the part of the Administration. This abnormality shall determine the unlawfulness as a prerequisite for the compensability of the damage. In the case of the legitimate functioning of the Administration, where there is no abnormality or illegality, the unlawfulness generating the possibility of indemnifying the damage occurs in the non-obligatoriness of suffering an effect that has the characteristic of being of exceptional intensity or involving a small proportion of those affected. In this sense, it is worth clarifying that this liability is subject to other general provisions on State responsibility contained in the General Law of the Public Administration. In this regard, consideration must be taken of what is indicated in Article 196 of the General Law of the Public Administration, as it expresses the following: <i>"In any case, the alleged damage must be effective, evaluable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group." </i>With respect to the damages that may be the object of compensation in the administrative contentious jurisdiction, vote of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 112 at 14 hours 15 minutes of July 15, 1992, among other things, indicated: <i>"IV. The damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of extra-contractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a harmful illicit act that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the juridical system. Damage, in the juridical sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial juridical sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a juridical good, regarding which the conservation was objectively expected had the harmful event not occurred.</i> Under this approach, there is no civil liability if no damage (daño) occurs, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. Moreover, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In short, damage constitutes the harmful breach for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with the situation subsequent to it. V.- The expressions "damage" (daños) and "loss of profits" (perjuicios) are often used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss suffered by the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss of profits is constituted by the frustrated or lost earnings or utility (lucro cessans), which was reasonably and probably expectable had the unlawful act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be a "compensable damage" (daño resarcible): A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with currentness, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profits (lucro cesante) or loss of profits (perjuicio), since the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating fact of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project forward at the time the process is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of sole subjective concern for the injured party, yet the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful act, and the second will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes insubsistent. D) There must be a causal relationship (relación de causalidad) between the unlawful act and the damage. VII.- Within the classes of damages, there is, in the first place, material damage (daño material) and bodily harm (daño corporal), the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's estate (patrimonio), while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or property damage (daño material o patrimonial), the specific ones of bodily harm and material damage, in a strict sense, are usually included. The second appears to be the most apt expression, since bodily harm usually affects the property interests of the injured party (payment for medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from carrying out their usual occupations (loss of profits (perjuicios)), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, where a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical person of the individual (injuria). In property damage (daño patrimonial), the impairment generated is economically assessable…." Complementary to the foregoing, in order to determine the damage, it is necessary to indicate the need for the existence of a relationship between the damage claimed and the conduct carried out by the economic agent. In this vein, doctrine has indicated different criteria of objective imputation, among which, for these purposes, adequate causation (causalidad adecuada) stands out. With respect to this criterion, the following has been indicated doctrinally: "The conduct of the defendant is an adequate cause of the damage suffered by the victim if, ex ante, the causation of the damage was foreseeable – not very improbable – by the defendant. But authors have never agreed on what degree of probability – between 0 and 1 – is adequate according to the law; and they have always disagreed about whether the judgment on probability must consist of a purely subjective prognosis – similar to that carried out in the analysis of fraud (dolo) and fault (culpa) –, that is, a judgment on the avoidability of the result, or if, on the contrary, the prognosis must be objective in the sense that an agent endowed with special knowledge should have known the probability of the production of the result". (Causalidad y Responsabilidad. Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antonio Fernández Crende. Revista para el análisis del derecho. WWW.INDET.COM.) With respect to this criterion of causality, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in its vote 251-f-06 at 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006, refers to it, but combining it with the theory of the efficient cause, in the following manner: "XIV.- The causal link (nexo causal) as a prerequisite for liability. The diverse typology of causes. (…) it remains to be established whether the administrative inaction of the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) in not verifying, prior to issuing the health and operating permit, whether the roundabout complied with the standards set forth in the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), was the direct or indirect cause of the damage, given that the estimation of the claim depends on the demonstration of the existence of a causal link, in its traditional notion of cause-effect. In this regard, it should be remembered that multiple factors often concur in the production of damage, among which it is necessary to determine those that directly or indirectly are the efficient and adequate cause of the harm caused (…) In that confluence of factual or legal elements surrounding the harmful situation, the Judge must establish, based on the evidence of the process, whether the concrete action consisting of an administrative functioning, or the abstention from deploying the functional framework imposed by the Legal System, is an apt cause for the generation of the damage (…).. That is, to infer the efficiency of the cause deemed adequate, it is indispensable to deduce if it is the producer of the injury, such that, if eliminated, it is rational to deduce that the damage would not have occurred. The foregoing supposes an evaluative exercise to displace from the framework of consideration, the causes that have had no influence on the result (extraneous causes), from those that, had they not taken place, would have avoided the impairment. This is a kind of objective prognosis, through which it can be affirmed that with such action or omission, it is logical or probable that the specific damage will occur. In this understanding, the causal link imposes itself as the inexorable relational bond between the damage and the administrative conduct, so that without the latter, the former probably would not have occurred. It is clear that the determination of this factor depends to a high degree on the examination of the evidence brought to the process by the litigant parties. Based on them, the Judge can deduce whether, within the particular factual scenario, the actions of the State entail its liability, because its functioning has been associated with the generation of the injuries". As noted, in the previous vote, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) opted for a position regarding the causation of the damage, where both the criterion of adequate cause and the theory of the efficiency of the cause or sine qua non are combined, the latter understood as that which has the greatest aptitude to generate the damage with greater efficacy and based on which, from all the conditions, that which supposes a maximum possibility in the contribution to the harmful result (greater intrinsic power of causation of the damage) is selected. Through the combination of both positions, (questioned at the time by doctrine), the aim has been to individualize those acts or omissions that have an effective influence on the harm invoked by the injured party or that at least sustain a degree of objective probability in their influence on it (judgment of probability of the result based on the facts held as proven, carried out according to the rules of experience). In any case, it is necessary to indicate that it will be the burden of the party invoking it to provide the respective demonstration of the existence of said causal link between the act deemed to generate the damage and the damage itself. It is based on these considerations that it is appropriate to determine liability. The foregoing, insofar as it is not enough to invoke damage, but its existence and the causal link (nexo de causalidad) that unites it with the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be convincingly demonstrated. In the case under analysis, the plaintiff invokes in a rather imprecise manner the existence of damages as a product of the existence of an overprice in the purchase of fuel and requests that they be settled in the judgment enforcement stage. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is not recorded in the case file that the plaintiff made any disbursement in the purchase of the referenced fuel, during the entirety of the charging period. The mere demonstration of ownership of authorized vessels does not mean that they were operating, nor that, due to their functioning, the fuel referred to in the article of Law 7384 was used. The claim is completely devoid of invoices, payment vouchers, or at least the undertaking of any procedure before the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura) in that regard, so it is not appropriate, in addition to the arguments expressed above, to recognize any damage. The plaintiff must remember that the judgment enforcement stage aims to liquidate the damage proven in trial and cannot seek to demonstrate, at that stage, harm that remained unproven throughout the entire process. Nor does it provide at least indications of the invoked moral damage (daño moral), nor that the plaintiff was on the verge of bankruptcy due to the administrative conducts mentioned. Nor does the plaintiff demonstrate that the fuel item constituted 70% of his production costs as a fisherman, or that the price he paid at some point during the period of his request was not within the framework of competitiveness with international prices. The absence of proof of effective, certain, assessable, and compensable damage is evident and fully attributable to the plaintiff's representation, and even the expert evidence (prueba pericial) that was indicated at the time for sentence enforcement could not have had a probative effect if, as indicated during the trial phase, no element of conviction was provided regarding the invoked damages. Consequently, the indemnity claims must be rejected." On the other hand, to address the analysis of the existence of liability for <u>unlawful conduct</u> and <u>abnormal conduct</u>, it is essential to determine the existence of an act by the Administration <u>contrary to the legal system</u> or to the <u>unequivocal rules of science or technique</u>, respectively. Under this ground for imputation, the recognition of damages is full, since, unlike the previous one, losses are recognized. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 000298-F-SI-2014, of March 6, 2014, has indicated: "<i>It is important to note that the Public Administration is liable for all damages caused by its operation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal (canon 190 LGAP). Thus, any damage caused to the subjective rights of others due to faults of the servants committed in the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof must be repaired (precept 191 ibid.). From the above, three basic prerequisites are derived: administrative conduct (active or omissive), effective damage, and a cause-effect link between them (causal nexus). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be clear that not every illegitimate or irregular operation of the State generates its liability, given that the interested party must prove the effective damage and a cause-effect relationship between both phenomena. In other words, the declaration of ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY does not automatically generate the duty to indemnify. Therefore, it will be necessary to demonstrate the existence of personal damage and its corresponding causal link with the conduct subject to the litigation, based on the fact that the burden of proof rests with the party claiming to have suffered damage. The judge must corroborate the existence of effective damage, which must be evaluable, individualizable, and derived from conduct suitable for the emergence of liability. Any damage caused to the subjective rights of others due to faults of the servants, committed in the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, must be repaired (precept 191 ibid.). The legal system establishes that once liability has been determined and the damage has been taken as true in the terms previously indicated, the recognition of material and moral damage in its different effects shall proceed. See from this Chamber vote number 783 of 14:35 hours on June 19, 2013."</i> By way of summary, it can be indicated that for an indemnity to be admissible under the scheme of Article 190 and following of the General Law of the Public Administration, it must be fully configured with each and every one of its elements.
**VII.- Regarding the specific case:** At its core, the plaintiff in its complaint, with the aim of determining the criterion for imputation to the administrative conduct, in order to derive the damages and losses it requests, as well as the required declarations, alleges that ARESEP, through administrative resolution No. 2774-2002, of 8:00 hours, on September 26, 2002, established in considerando 4, that Law No. 7593 tacitly repealed Article 45 of the INCOPESCA law, so that the rates and prices of this public service (supply of fuel to fishermen) must be determined in accordance with the law of the regulatory authority, so that, in its rate structure, not only the referenced investment cost will be incorporated, but all those costs that are necessary for the provision of the public service. Consequently, the defendant, protected by that resolution, subsequently proceeded to issue resolution No. RRG-2821, of 9:30 hours, on October 24, 2002, according to which the defendant entity materialized the elimination of the "preferential price", in favor of the national non-sport fishing fleet, in relation to the acquisition of fuel. Consequently, as of November 4, 2002, ARESEP invariably and consistently proceeded to set the same fuel price, both for consumers in general, as well as for the non-sport fishing fleet. It indicates that faced with this factual situation, the non-sport fishing sector found it necessary to promote an "Authentic Interpretation Law", on the real and effective scope of the benefit in the purchase of fuel, which materialized through Law No. 9134, of June 13, 2013, by which ARESEP was forced to change its pricing criterion for fishermen; thus, Resolution No. RIE-084-2013 was issued, published in La Gaceta on October 1, 2013, reflecting a lower price for the fuel acquired by the non-sport fishing fleet. Consequently, throughout the entire period from November 4, 2002—when cited Resolution No. RRG-2821 entered into force—until October 1, 2013, when Resolution No. RIE-084-2013 was implemented, a lower price was not recognized for the non-sport fishing sector, relative to the fuel price for the general consumer. For this reason, it considers that ARESEP has incurred conduct contrary to the Law, by being consciously, repeatedly, and persistently omissive in granting a differentiated price to the non-sport fishing sector throughout that entire period from November 4, 2002, to October 1, 2013. The defendant responds to these allegations indicating that it is not true that it ignored, either before or after the entry into force of the authentic interpretation, the provisions of the articles on which the plaintiff bases its complaint, given that due to the superficial wording of the indicated articles, the way to implement that benefit, regarding the establishment of the applicable calculation methodology, the costs to be considered within the provision of the service, and other regulatory aspects, were left to the exclusive technical competence of Aresep, as specified in the final paragraphs of Article 45 of Law 7384. The foregoing must be complemented by the existence of Law 7593, which imposes on it the power-duty to apply the principle of service at cost to the rates of all regulated public services, thus making it necessary for the financial equilibrium of the service provider to see certain costs, including investment costs that guarantee the continuity, development, and sustainability of the activity, incorporated into its rates. It is not true that the Regulatory Authority has omitted to establish a competitive price for the national fishing fleet, since since 2002 there has been a resolution from the Regulador General that establishes the method for calculating fuel prices for that fishing fleet. According to that calculation method, such prices are set when the plant prices for Recope are established, because the price for the fishing fleet—considering investments—is equivalent to RECOPE's plant price, without the single tax. Consequently, since then, the investment item has been incorporated into the calculation of the plant price, in accordance with what is stated in Article 45 of Law 7384, which provides for the charging of a FOB plant price. Subsequently, on the occasion of the authentic interpretation, the previously approved methodology for setting the fuel price at Recope's distribution plants and to the final consumer was adapted to said regulation, issuing resolution RIE-084-2013 of September 24, 2013, by the Energy Superintendency. According to the analysis of the evidence provided to the case file and the arguments of the parties, this Court considers that the plaintiff is not correct, for the reasons that will be indicated below. Article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, established the following: "<i>ARTICLE 45.- The fishing sector shall acquire from RECOPE the fuel (gasoline and diesel), for non-sport fishing activity at a price competitive with the international price, based on the average import cost of the previous month and considering the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the costs of distribution by pipeline and distribution at plants, so that the price is F.O.B. Plant. That price shall be set by the National Electricity Service; to which RECOPE must previously request it, in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 6588 of July 30, 1981, or the Institute. The Institute shall be responsible for the administration and control of the efficient use of fuel destined for non-sport fishing activity</i>". As noted from the rule, its purpose was to establish a competitive price for the fuel that would be used for non-sport fishing activity, establishing the F.O.B. plant price as a parameter. In accordance with the aforementioned rule, through <u>resolution RRG-2708-2002</u>, ARESEP established the extraordinary adjustment formula for determining prices for the fuels consumed by the fishing fleet. In accordance with the foregoing, the cost structure of gasoline and diesel in such cases would comprise: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost 3) Plant cost 4) Administrative cost. Subsequently, in accordance with <u>resolutions RJD-013, 014 and 016-2002</u> of the Board of Directors of ARESEP, it was agreed that the investments of the service provider must be incorporated into the price structure of the indicated fuels. Thus, according to said administrative act, the respective structure contained: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost 3) Plant cost 4) Administrative cost 5) Investment cost. Through <u>resolution 2774-2002 of eight hours on September twenty-six, two thousand two</u>, ARESEP decided to revoke the extraordinary adjustment formula for determining the fuel prices consumed by the fishing fleet in accordance with <u>resolution RRG-2708-2002</u> and to indicate to the parties that price setting would be carried out in accordance with Articles 3, 30, and 31 of Law 7593. For this reason, the cost structure according to this act, contained: 1) CIF refinery cost, 2) Pipeline cost 3) Plant cost 4) Administrative cost 5) Investment cost 6) Service provision costs. Thus, in practice, this resolution equated the fuel plant price for fishermen to that of any final consumer. Subsequently, through <u>resolution RRG-2821-2002 of 9:30 hours on October 24, 2002</u>, a fuel price for fishermen was contemplated, in accordance with resolution 2772-2002, at the plant price, without taxes. It is necessary to indicate that the provisions of the indicated resolution 2772-2002 are based on the presumption that the provisions of the Law for the Creation of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, Law number 7593, repealed the indicated Article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, as expressly indicated by the referenced administrative conduct. Notwithstanding the foregoing, through an opinion of the Specialized Legal Directorate of ARESEP dated October 21, 2003, the Reguladora General was informed that Article 45 of Law 7384 is in force and must be applied over lower-ranking rules that contradict it. However, this did not result in modifying the price setting indicated above, failing to adjust it to the consideration that said rule was in force and clearly established that the FOB Plant price must exclusively consider the average import cost of the previous month for the fuel and the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the costs of distribution by pipeline and distribution at plants. The foregoing is subsequently reaffirmed by Article 123 of Law 8436, Law of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of April 25, 2005, which provided the following: <i>"Article 123.—Exonerate the national fishing fleet, except that dedicated to sport fishing, from all types of national taxes for the importation of vessels, spare parts, engines, navigation equipment, fishing equipment, and their respective accessories. In compliance with the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384, of March 16, 1994, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel) to the national fishing fleet, except for sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price</i>". From the text of this last rule, it is evident that it reiterates the need for the price setting carried out to be competitive with the international fuel price, although the parameter indicated above is not established. It is necessary to indicate that through Executive Decree 31299-MAG-MINAE, said Article 45 was regulated in the following sense: <i>"Article 1- In compliance with the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384 of March 16, 1994, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel), to the National Fishing Fleet, except for sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price. Article 2—For the purposes of applying this Regulation, the following definitions are established: a) PCFPi = Is the Plant Sale Price per Liter of Fuel (regular gasoline or diesel), consumed by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet. b) CIFRi = Is the monthly CIF Refinery cost, per Liter of Fuel, which includes the F.O.B. (free on board) costs, as well as the insurance and transport of the fuel (regular gasoline and diesel), placed at the National Port of Disembarkation. It shall be interpreted that within this concept, its F.O.B. component is equal to that used by RECOPE as an average in its last extraordinary adjustment, for each of the aforementioned fuels. c) COif = Annual cost per liter transferred by Pipeline calculated based on the information existing in the accounting close of the immediately preceding fiscal period, in accordance with the information existing in the last Available Financial Statement, considering as the denominator, the proportional volume of fuels transferred by Pipeline, destined for consumption by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet. The amount obtained shall be updated with the estimated inflation for the following period. d) CPif = Annual cost per liter sold at Plants calculated based on the information existing in the accounting close of the immediately preceding Fiscal Period, in accordance with the information existing in the last Available Financial Statement, considering as the denominator, the proportional volume of fuel sold at Plants, during the corresponding period, destined for consumption by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet. The amount obtained shall be updated by the estimated inflation for the following period. e) International Fuel Price: Shall be determined based on the average of the price that RECOPE uses as a reference for the fuels (gasoline, diesel), that it imports. f) Fuel for Fishing: Encompasses only the regular gasoline and diesel varieties. Article 3- The setting of the price of fuels consumed by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet shall be established by taking into account solely the following cost structure: PCFPi = CIFRi + COif + CPif For: i = Regular Gasoline, Diesel f = Fixed until the conclusion of the next review. Article 4- <u>In determining the price of fuels destined for consumption by the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet, the amounts corresponding to administration expenses, asset depreciation, port charges, investment, marketing margins, or others of a similar nature shall not be considered, so that the objective that the set price is competitive with the international prices of the markets that RECOPE uses as a reference in the acquisition of fuels is fulfilled</u>. Article 5- Price requests may be made by RECOPE or INCOPESCA or by the Regulatory Entity ex officio, since the price variations of the Non-Sport National Fishing Fleet shall be made following the same Ordinary and Extraordinary variations requested by RECOPE." (<i>emphasis is ours).</i> Despite the foregoing, there is no evidence that ARESEP modified the price setting made in resolution 2774-2002 of eight hours on September twenty-six, two thousand two, regarding the incorporation of RECOPE administration expenses in setting the plant fuel price. Said decree was repealed by Executive Decree 32527-MAG of June 3, 2005, which provided: <i>"Article 1- In compliance with the provisions of Article 45 of Law No. 7384 of March 16, 1994, and Article 123 second paragraph of Law No. 8436 of March 1, 2005, RECOPE shall sell fuel (regular gasoline and diesel) to the National Fishing Fleet, except for sport fishing activity, at a price competitive with the international price. Article 2- The price competitive with the international price, for the sale of the fuel mentioned in the preceding article, shall be comprised within the rate setting carried out, by the application of the single fuel tax exemption and <u>the non-incorporation within said price of the amounts corresponding to administration expenses, asset depreciation, port charges, and investment</u>. Article 3- The resulting difference in the determination of the competitive price with the international price, between the amount corresponding to the application of the single fuel tax exemption and the items not incorporated in article two, shall be recognized by the State to the Non-Sport National Fishing Sector starting from the "Agreement for the attention of critical issues of the National Fishing Sector" signed on January 29, 2008. For this, the Ministry of Finance shall incorporate into the national budget the amount corresponding to the subsidy established in Article Two and shall transfer it to the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA), through the respective transfer. The amount of the subsidy per liter of regular gasoline or diesel fuel shall be determined by INCOPESCA, which, by reason of its powers, shall be responsible for its allocation to each benefited fisherman, its distribution and control, and must render a semi-annual report to the cited ministry, in accordance with current regulations. Article 4- The amount corresponding to the exempted items in Article Two shall be determined based on RECOPE's accounting records for the immediately preceding closed fiscal period. For this and in relation to said period, RECOPE shall provide INCOPESCA with the annual accounting information required for the quantification of the subsidy per liter: the indicated financial statements, total sales of RECOPE by volume, administrative expenses, asset depreciation, executed cash investments, and port charges</i>". (emphasis is ours). As noted, it established the need for setting fuel prices for fishermen without considering administration expenses, among others. However, it is not recorded in the case file that ARESEP acted in accordance with said regulatory body, maintaining RECOPE's internal administrative cost. It is even necessary to indicate that through <u>resolution RRG-9233-2008 of ten hours and twenty minutes on November eleven, two thousand eight</u>, again based on the validity of Article 45 of Law 7384, a plant price without tax is set for the fuel prices for non-sport fishing equal to that of the distributor for the final consumer at service stations. As noted from the text of said administrative act, the defendant is correct when it indicates that the general formula would be as follows:
P= PRI +/- D + K +IU+ M T +MC, these being understood as: P= Final consumer price, PRI= International Reference Price, D = Difference or Tariff Lag, K = Recope's internal margin, IU= Single fuel tax, MT= Transporter's margin, MC = Marketer's margin, Si= Subsidy. It is also correct when it indicates that factors MT and MC are not included in Recope's plant price, given that they correspond to transportation to service stations and marketing at these. Therefore, it must be noted that the plant price excludes these factors, but taking into consideration that, as indicated, the indicated plant price of fuels for fishermen *is not different from that indicated for other final consumers*, except regarding the exemption from charging the respective fuel tax, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency. Thus, for example, the referred resolution RRG-9233-2008 of ten hours and twenty minutes on November eleven, two thousand eight, sets equal plant fuel prices without tax for the national fishing fleet and for the fuel distributor to the consumer. No modification of said situation is recorded until the provisions of the single article of Law No. 9134 of June 6, 2013, where the indicated Article 45 was authentically interpreted, defining with greater precision the components that could be considered in setting fuel prices for fishermen, as follows: "<i>... the expression 'competitive fuel price at the international level', contained in both rules, which the national non-sport fishing fleet shall receive, is based on the fact that the Costa Rican fishing sector shall acquire from the Costa Rican Oil Refinery (Recope), or from the entity legally authorized for the importation of hydrocarbons into the country, the fuel, finished product (gasoline and diesel), at a price that shall comprise solely the following items: a) Value of the product cost (refined product: amount of the purchase invoice. Unrefined product: cost of refining in Costa Rica). b) Freight to the port of destination in Costa Rica. c) The insurance corresponding to the fuel. d) The cost of transferring the final product, within the national territory, to the distribution point. e) The cost of storage and pumping for the plant, where the sale is made. These values shall be set based on the average import cost of the previous month, or the latest similar information available. No general price calculation model may cover the fuel destined for the national non-sport fishing sector, therefore the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Aresep) must exclude any other item or component considered in setting the common price of these fuels. Incopesca shall be responsible for the administration and control of the efficient use of fuel destined for non-sport fishing activity..."</i>. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court has found it proven that, based on the false premise of the repeal of Article 45 of Law 7384, Law for the Creation of the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture, of March 29, 1994, ARESEP proceeded to equate the plant price for fishermen (excluding the respective tax) with that of any other final consumer, and incorporating into this concept a series of items not originally contemplated in the price settings prior to the administrative acts of resolutions 2774-2002 of eight hours on September twenty-six, two thousand two and RRG-2821-2002 of 9:30 hours on October 24, 2002. With the foregoing, it is evident that the provisions of the indicated article were partially breached, given that other costs different from those expressly established in Law 7384 were used in setting the plant price. Consequently, the two advantages that non-artisanal fishermen obtained were the following: a) acquisition of the product at the plant price, without charging transportation costs outside the plant and marketing (with the exception that, as indicated, the referred plant price was gradually loaded with costs not originally contemplated) and b) the exemption from paying the single fuel tax. However, it is not appropriate to grant the claim, since the plaintiff, on the one hand, did not request the nullity of the respective administrative acts and, on the other, the plaintiff's representative did not prove that with the changes in the items to be considered in the fuel price for fishermen, the price thereof ceased to be competitive with the international market, as expressly established by the rule, in addition to the lack of proof of the damage invoked, as will be indicated later.
While, as has been indicated, the various resolutions of ARESEP mentioned resulted in the equalization of the plant price for fishers with that of any final consumer (less the respective tax), this does not mean *per se* that it resulted in such an impact that the national plant price ceased to be competitive with the international market, taking into consideration, moreover, that in the case of fishers' fuels, the single fuel tax did not have to be paid, which logically had an additional impact on the national price compared to the foreign price. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate this aspect through the submission of suitable technical evidence, given that this Court cannot rely on mere presumptions regarding the consequences of the mentioned acts with respect to competitiveness with international prices, insofar as we are dealing with plant prices (which do not incorporate transportation costs to service stations and the marketing thereof) and which also do not include the payment of the respective tax. In accordance with the considerations made above, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code is applied, as it provides: "The burden of proof falls upon: 1) Whomever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting his right. 2) Whomever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right." On the burden of proof, it has been stated on another occasion that: "…, in accordance with the provisions of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code: “(…) The burden of proof does not, therefore, imply any right of the adversary, but rather an imperative of the self-interest of each litigant; it is a circumstance of risk consisting in that whoever does not prove the facts they must prove loses the case. This burden can be lifted by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts indicated by the Law. And this does not, evidently, create a right in the adversary, as if it were a personal legal situation pertaining to each party; the burden of not lending credence to the affirmations that were necessary to prove and were not proven... not proving is the same as not existing (…)”. (Vote number 262 of nine hours forty minutes of the seventeenth of June of nineteen ninety-four, of the Second Civil Superior Court, First Section). In accordance with the foregoing, the mere invocation by the party is not sufficient if there is no solid evidentiary foundation that serves as a demonstration of the facts or defenses alleged. Given that the party requests the legality review, not for the purpose of extracting the conducts from the legal world, but exclusively for compensatory purposes, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that, beyond the existence or not of defects in the administrative conduct, it had an unlawful consequence that could be provoking damaging effects in his legal sphere. However, far from that, it is not evident in the case file that the existence of negative changes in national competitiveness with respect to international fuel prices was demonstrated, nor the impact of ARESEP's decisions in that sense, that may be identifiable, differentiable, and individualizable from other internal and external situations to the country that could have influenced a potential loss of the ability of our national fishers to compete. As the plaintiff rightly indicates, the purpose of the rule was to protect the competitiveness of national fishers against the international market, and it was thus that he did not demonstrate that in the case under analysis there was a distortion of the country's plant prices such that it had an impact on that objective. Additionally, this Court deems it necessary to refer to ARESEP's allegation that its actions were carried out in the exercise of its powers. In this sense, while it is clear that the Public Services Regulatory Authority possesses sufficient powers to impose upon the public service concessionaires the rules that must be followed for setting the tariff or tariff adjustment, and thus the choice of the price and tariff setting methodology is a technical issue and consequently the methodologies compatible with the service-at-cost principle established in Article 3 of the ARESEP Creation Law may be used, it must be remembered that it may exercise its regulatory powers but within the framework of the legal order without disapplying the provisions of the Law, nor emptying the respective rule of content. In this regard, its technical discretion must be exercised within the framework of the legal order, and if the same establishes limits, it is not appropriate that, via interpretation, a specific provision is considered inapplicable or items not contemplated in a specific law are incorporated into prices, when the legislator has chosen to define the scope of the components of a specific price (as happened in the case of the administrative act of resolution 2774-2002 of eight hours of the twenty-sixth of September of two thousand two). While ARESEP sets its tariffs in accordance with the service-at-cost principle, the truth is there was a valid, effective, and current rule that established a specific setting method, in accordance with the legal interests that the legislator at the time decided to protect, and it is not appropriate for an administrative act to bypass said exceptional situation provided for by the legal order. When the rule mentions the FOB plant price, it cannot be analyzed out of context from the rest of the rule that indicates the price to be set will be "based on the average import cost of the previous month and considering the C.I.F. refinery cost, as well as the costs of pipeline distribution and distribution at plants...", without mentioning other costs integrated into the price later by mere interpretation by ARESEP. In any case, as has been indicated, the corresponding administrative conducts have not been challenged, and regarding their consequences, as has been said and will be further elaborated upon below, there is not the slightest proof of a harmful result against the plaintiff.
**VIII.- On the damages and losses claimed.** It is not superfluous to indicate that in addition to the previous considerations, it is not appropriate to grant the claimed compensation for damages and losses, insofar as the lawsuit is devoid of all proof regarding its existence. In this regard, it must be remembered that the duty to compensate all damages and losses caused by the conducts and omissions of the Public Administration finds its own specificity in our country, starting from the Political Constitution of 1949. In said normative body, it was established, on the one hand, the existence of a contentious-administrative jurisdiction, as part of the fundamental rights enjoyed by all Costa Rican citizens. In this sense, its Article 49, with the reforms introduced later, provides the following: "The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch, with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity. Abuse of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties." Said rule must be complemented by what is stated in Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, as they provide: "The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers." (Our emphasis) and "By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws." With respect to the constitutional foundation of the State's liability, ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 5207-2004, of 14 hours 55 minutes of May 18, 2004, literally indicated: “Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered parties. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that ‘The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)’, by which the liability of the major public entity or State and its various organs –Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches– is taken for granted. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the ‘(…) criminal liability (…)’ of public officials and the second paragraph refers to the ‘(…) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (…)’. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects ‘acquired patrimonial rights’ and ‘consolidated legal situations’, which can only be effectively and really protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their activities or public performance. Article 41 ibidem establishes that ‘By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)’, this precept imposes the duty on the author and party responsible for the damage to compensate the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered parties as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conducts by action or negative by omission of public entities, thus becoming the cornerstone at the constitutional level for the legislative development of a system of objective and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for fraud or fault, but solely and exclusively for having been inflicted or having effectively received ‘(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)’, that is, an unlawful injury they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered party who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its licit or illicit conduct– and the correlative obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it integrally; the access to jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to ensure, forcibly, the enjoyment and exercise of the compensatory right of the injured party when the party obliged to repair voluntarily breaches said obligation.... The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33) which prevents imposing on the administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several administered parties and unjustly endured by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of articles, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Fundamental Law insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the ‘proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies’, ‘proper course of Government’, and ‘efficiency of the administration’. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal order. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury that its normal or abnormal functioning or its licit or illicit conduct causes to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties.” (the emphasis is ours).” From the foregoing, it is evident that a duty of full compensability of the damage operates, which based on the indicated provisions, is derived from Article 190.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, as it provides that: "1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party." As noted, in our country a system of objective liability prevails, through which the duty of compensation of the Administration operates, regardless of subjective assessment criteria (fraud or fault) in the actions of its servants. Moreover, our legislation even provides for the possibility of claiming liability from the Administration for a legitimate conduct, as Article 194 of the mentioned normative body provides the following in this regard: "1. The Administration shall be liable for its licit acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, by the small proportion of affected parties or by the exceptional intensity of the injury." By reason of the foregoing, as noted, the central axis of the state liability system in our country is the victim of damage, since it arises whenever its normal or abnormal functioning causes damage that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or extra-patrimonial, regardless of their subjective legal situation. However, this compensatory duty is not absolute either, in the sense of having an unrestricted character for any type of damage, but rather it must originate, in the case it arises from non-licit or non-normal administrative conduct, from the abnormality that means deviating from good administration (as per the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency), that is, due to poor functioning, or delayed or non-existent action by the Administration. This abnormality will determine the unlawfulness as a prerequisite for the compensability of the damage. In the case of the legitimate functioning of the Administration, where there is no abnormality or illegality, the unlawfulness generating the possibility of compensating the damage lies in the non-obligation to suffer an impact that has the characteristic of being of exceptional intensity or affecting a small proportion of people. In this sense, it is worth clarifying that this liability is subject to other general provisions on State liability contained in the General Law of Public Administration. In this regard, consideration must be taken of what is indicated in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, as it expresses the following: "In any case, the alleged damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group." With respect to the damages that may be subject to compensation in the contentious-administrative venue, the ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 112 of 14 hours 15 minutes of July 15, 1992, among other things, indicated: “IV. The damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of extracontractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a damaging wrongful act that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal order. Damage, in the legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, regarding which its preservation was objectively expected had the damaging event not occurred. Under this understanding, there is no civil liability if there is no damage, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. Moreover, only the damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved for the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, the damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the wrongful act with the one subsequent to it. V.- On many occasions the expressions ‘damages’ and ‘losses’ are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or uncollected gain or profit (lucrum cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the wrongful act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically concur to be a ‘compensable damage’: A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on assumed or conjectural realizations. The damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; certainty should also not be confused with actuality, since the reparation of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with loss of profit or losses, since the first refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, that is, its repercussions are not projected at the time the process is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes an extreme of the subjective concern solely of the injured party, however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there may be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the damaging event, and the second will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes unsubsisting. D) There must be a causal relationship between the wrongful act and the damage. VII.- Within the classes of damages, in the first place, there is material damage and bodily damage, the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's patrimony, while the second impacts bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The second seems to be the most appropriate expression, since bodily damage usually affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction was born in Roman Law, as a distinction was made between damage inflicted on things directly (damnum) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injury). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated is assessable economically….” Complementary to the above, in order to determine the damage, it is necessary to indicate the need for the existence of a relationship between the damage claimed and the conduct deployed by the economic agent. In this regard, doctrinally, different criteria of objective imputation have been indicated, among which adequate causality is highlighted for these purposes. With respect to this criterion, the following has been indicated doctrinally: "The conduct of the defendant is an adequate cause of the damage suffered by the victim if, ex ante, the causation of the damage was foreseeable –not very improbable– for the defendant. But the authors have never agreed on what degree of probability –between 0 and 1– is adequate according to the law; and they have always disagreed about whether the judgment on probability should consist of a purely subjective prognosis –similar to that carried out in the analysis of fraud and fault–, that is, in a judgment on the avoidability of the result, or if, on the contrary, the prognosis must be objective in the sense that an agent endowed with special knowledge would have had to know the probability of the result occurring." (Causalidad y Responsabilidad. Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antonio Fernández Crende. Journal for the analysis of law. WWW.INDET.COM.) With respect to this causality criterion, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its vote 251-f-06 of 10 hours 30 minutes of May 25, 2006, refers to it, but combining it with the theory of efficient cause, in the following manner: "XIV.- The causal link as a prerequisite for liability. The diverse typology of causes. (…) it remains to establish whether the administrative inaction of the Ministry of Health by not verifying, prior to issuing the health and operating permit, if the roundabout complied with the standards provided by the General Law of Health, was the direct or indirect cause of the damage, given that the estimation of the claim depends on the demonstration of the existence of a causal link, in its traditional notion of cause-effect. In this regard, it is worth remembering that in the production of damage, multiple factors usually concur, within which it is necessary to determine those that directly or indirectly are the efficient and adequate cause of the harm caused (…) In that confluence of factual or legal elements surrounding the damaging situation, the Judge must establish, based on the evidence of the process, if the concrete action consisting of administrative functioning, or the abstention from deploying the functional framework imposed on it by the Legal Order, is an apt cause for the generation of the damage (…). That is, to infer the efficiency of the cause that is deemed adequate, it is indispensable to deduce whether it is the producer of the injury, so that if it were eliminated, it is rational to deduce that the damage would not have occurred. The foregoing requires an evaluative exercise to displace from the framework of consideration the causes that had no influence on the result (strange causes), from those which, had they not occurred, would have avoided the impairment. It is a kind of objective prognosis, through which it can be affirmed that with such action or omission it is logical or probable that the specific damage will occur. In this understanding, the causal link is imposed as the inexorable relational bond between the damage and the administrative conduct, so that without the latter, the former probably would not have occurred. Of course, the determination of this factor depends to a high degree on the examination of the evidence brought to the process by the litigant parties. From them, the Judge can deduce whether, within the particular factual picture, the actions of the State entail its liability, for having associated its functioning with the generation of the injuries.” As noted, in the preceding vote, the First Chamber opted for a position regarding the causality of the damage, combining both the criterion of adequate cause with the theory of the efficiency of the cause or sine qua non, the latter understood as that which has the greatest aptitude to generate the damage with greater efficacy and based on which, from all the conditions, the one that presupposes a maximum possibility in contributing to the harmful result is selected (greater intrinsic power of causation of the damage). Through the combination of both positions (questioned at the time by doctrine), the aim has been to individualize the facts or omissions that have an effective influence on the impact invoked by the injured party or that at least sustain a degree of objective probability in their influence on it (judgment of probability of the result based on the facts deemed proven, carried out according to the rules of experience).
En todo caso, es menester indicar que será carga de la parte que la invoca, la respectiva demostración de la existencia de dicho vínculo causal entre el hecho que se estima generador del daño y éste. Es con base en estas consideraciones que procede determinar la responsabilidad. Lo anterior, en tanto que no es suficiente invocar un daño, sino que se debe demostrar fehacientemente su existencia y el nexo de causalidad que le une con la conducta u omisión del ente responsable. En el caso de análisis, la parte actora invoca de una manera bastante imprecisa la existencia de daños como producto de la existencia de un sobreprecio en la compra de combustible y pide que los mismos sean liquidados en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. No obstante lo anterior, no consta en autos que el actor haya realizado erogación alguna en la compra del combustible a que se hace referencia, durante la totalidad del período de cobro. La mera demostración de titularidad de embarcaciones autorizadas, no significa que las mismas hayan estado operando, ni que con motivo de su funcionamiento se haya hecho uso del combustible a que se refiere el artículo de la Ley 7384. La demanda es totalmente ayuna de facturas, comprobantes de pago o al menos la realización de algún trámite ante el Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura en tal sentido, por lo que no es procedente, además de los argumentos expresados ut supra reconocer daño alguno. Debe recordar la parte actora que la etapa de ejecución de sentencia tiene por objeto liquidar el daño demostrado en juicio y no puede pretender demostrar en ésta afectaciones que resultaron indemostradas durante todo el proceso. Tampoco aporta al menos indicios del daño moral invocado ni que el actor haya quedado al borde de la quiebra con motivo de las conductas administrativas en mención. Tampoco demuestra el actor que el rubro de combustible haya significado el 70% de los costos de producción de él como pescador ni que el precio que pagó en algún momento en el período de su solicitud no estuviera en el marco de la competitividad con los precios internacionales. La ausencia de prueba de un daño efectivo, cierto, evaluable e indemnizable es evidente y plenamente imputable a la representación de la parte actora y ni siquiera la prueba pericial que en su momento indicó para ejecución de sentencia, habría podido tener un efecto probatorio, si como se indicó en la etapa de juicio, no se aportó ningún elemento de convicción sobre los daños invocados. Por consiguiente, las pretensiones indemnizatorias deben ser rechazadas.”
“V.-Objeto del proceso: De lo expresado por las partes, tanto en sus pretensiones como argumentos, nos encontramos frente a un proceso civil de hacienda, cuyo objeto se centra en determinar la existencia de un eventual incumplimiento de la ARESEP con respecto a las disposiciones del artículo 45 de la Ley número 7384 y la existencia de daños y perjuicios generados al actor con motivo de dicha conducta antijurídica.
VI.-Sobre la responsabilidad de la Administración: Tal y como se indicó en el acápite anterior, al delimitar el objeto de la presente causa, nos encontramos frente a un proceso de naturaleza civil de hacienda, en el que se discute la responsabilidad extracontractual de la Administración. Para que proceda la indemnización correspondiente, se hace necesario aplicar la normativa que regula la materia. De este marco jurídico, se desprenden una serie de elementos que conforman el esquema de responsabilidad. Desde la entrada en vigencia la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en el año 1978, quedaron sentadas las reglas del régimen de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, aplicable a la Administración Pública. Reglas que derivaban desde antes, de la cúspide del ordenamiento jurídico, en sus artículos 9,11, 41, 148 y 193. Desde ese momento la aplicación de la normativa propia del Código Civil, que regulaba la responsabilidad civil extracontractual (artículo 1045), cedió su paso a este esquema. De ese modo, la responsabilidad basada en criterios de imputación de responsabilidad, como lo son el dolo o la culpa, evolucionaron a los de "funcionamiento lícito, ilícito, normal o anormal", propios de una objetivación de la responsabilidad. Dicho sistema, plantea una serie de elementos y relaciones lógicas, de manera tal que todos deben confluir y estar identificados con precisión. En el proceso contencioso administrativo, quien pretenda responsabilizar a un ente público bajo este esquema, en un proceso civil de hacienda, ha de demostrar, como parte del onus probandi, de forma precisa e inequívoca, cada uno de estos elementos. De manera tal que debe identificarse la existencia del daño (196 LGAP), que, además, debe ser efectivo, evaluable e individualizable , a su vez la relación de causalidad entre dicho daño y el ente público o funcionario. Es necesario demostrar que no existan causas eximentes de responsabilidad (190 LGAP), además de concretar la existencia de criterios de imputación, esto quiere decir que la conducta dañosa se produjo de forma lícita o ilícita, normal o anormal. En lo que respecta a la responsabilidad por conducta lícita y normal, por la especialidad del daño, requiere la existencia de una pequeña proporción de afectados y que la intensidad de dicha lesión sea excepcional. Bajo este esquema, la indemnización cubre el valor del daño, mas no los perjuicios. Estos conceptos que componen el "daño especial", son los que se conocen en derecho como los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, que serán los Juzgadores en cada caso que deberá darles contenido y determinar si el derecho subjetivo se desnaturalizó. Por otro lado, para abordar el análisis de la existencia de responsabilidad por conducta ilícita y anormal, resulta medular determinar la existencia de una actuación de la Administración contraria al ordenamiento jurídico o a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica, respectivamente. Bajo esta causa de imputación el reconocimiento de los daños es pleno, ya que a diferencia de la anterior se reconocen los perjuicios. A ese respecto la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en la sentencia n.° 000298-F-SI-2014, del 6 de marzo del 2014, ha indicado: "Es importante acotar que la Administración Pública responde por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento, legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal (canon 190 LGAP). De tal manera que debe repararse todo daño que se cause a los derechos subjetivos ajenos por faltas de los servidores cometidas en el desempeño de los deberes del cargo o en ocasión de este (precepto 191 ibídem). De lo anterior, se derivan tres presupuestos básicos: conducta administrativa (activa u omisiva), daño efectivo y entre ambos un vínculo de causa-efecto (nexo de causalidad). No obstante lo anterior, ha de tenerse claro que no todo funcionamiento ilegítimo o irregular del Estado genera su responsabilidad, dado que el interesado ha de acreditar el daño efectivo y una relación de causa-efecto entre ambos fenómenos. Dicho de otro modo, la declaratoria de RESPONSABILIDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN no genera automáticamente el deber de indemnizar. Por ende, resultará necesario demostrar la existencia de un daño personal y de su correspondiente nexo causal con la conducta objeto del litigio, partiendo del hecho que la carga probatoria le asiste a la parte que alegue se le ha ocasionado un daño. El juzgador ha de corroborar la existencia de un daño efectivo, el cual debe ser evaluable, individualizable, y derivado de una conducta apta para el surgimiento de la responsabilidad. Se debe reparar todo daño que se cause a los derechos subjetivos ajenos por faltas de los servidores, cometidas en el desempeño de los deberes del cargo o con ocasión de este (precepto 191 ibídem). El ordenamiento jurídico establece que una vez determinada la responsabilidad y tenido por cierto el daño en los términos antes señalados, se procederá al reconocimiento del daño material y moral en sus diferentes afectaciones. Puede verse de esta Sala el voto número 783 de las 14 horas 35 minutos del 19 de junio de 2013." A modo de síntesis, se puede indicar que para la procedencia de una indemnización bajo el esquema del artículo 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, debe configurarse de forma completa con todos y cada uno de sus elementos.
VII.- Sobre el caso concreto: En lo medular, la parte actora en su demanda, con la finalidad de determinar el criterio de imputación a la conducta administrativa, para derivar los daños y perjuicios que solicita, así como las declaratorias requeridas, alega que la ARESEP mediante la resolución administrativa No. 2774-2002, de las 8:00 horas, del 26 de setiembre del 2002, estableció en el considerando 4, que la Ley n.°7593 derogó tácitamente al articulo 45 de la ley de INCOPESCA, por lo que las tarifas y precios de este servicio público (suministro de combustible a pescadores) se deberán determinar de acuerdo con la ley de la autoridad reguladora, de forma que, en su estructura tarifaria, se incorporarán no solo el costo por inversiones referido, sino todos aquellos costos que sean necesarios para la prestación del servicio público. Por consiguiente, la parte demandada amparada en esa resolución posteriormente se procedió a emitir la resolución No.RRG-2821,de las 9:30 horas, del 24 de octubre del 2002, conforme a la cual la entidad demandada materializó la eliminación del "precio preferencial", a favor de la flota pesquera nacional no deportiva, en lo relacionado con la adquisición del combustible. Consecuentemente, a partir del 4 de noviembre del 2002, de manera invariable y sostenida la ARESEP procedió a fijar el mismo precio del combustible, tanto para los consumidores en general, como igualmente para la flora pesquera no deportiva. Indica que ante esa situación fáctica, el sector pesquero no deportivo se vio en la necesidad de gestionar una "Ley de Interpretación Auténtica", sobre el alcance real y efectivo del beneficio en la compra del combustible, lo cual se materializó mediante la Ley No.9134, DEL 13 de junio del 2013 , por la cual la ARESEP se vio forzada a variar su criterio de fijación de precios para el pescador; siendo así que se dictó la Resolución No.RIE-084- 2013, publicada en la Gaceta del 1 de octubre del 2013, en la que se refleja un precio inferior, respecto al combustible que adquiera la flota pesquera no deportiva. Por consiguiente, en todo el período comprendido entre el 4 de noviembre de 2002 -que entró en vigencia la Citada Resolución No.RRG-2821-y hasta el1de octubre de 2013, que se implementó la Resolución No.RlE-084-2013, al sector pesquero no deportivo no se le reconoció un precio menor, respecto al precio del combustible para el consumidor en general. En razón de lo anterior, estima que la ARESEP ha incurrido en una conducta contraria a Derecho, al mostrarse omisa, de forma consciente, reiterada y sostenida, en cuanto a conceder un precio diferenciado al sector pesquero no deportivo, durante todo ese período que va del 4 de noviembre del 2002, hasta el 1 de octubre del 2013. La parte demandada responde dichos alegatos indicando que no es cierto que haya ignorado ni antes ni después de la entrada en vigencia de la interpretación auténtica, lo dispuesto en los artículos que la parte actora funda su demanda, dado que por la redacción superficial de los indicados artículos, la forma de implementar ese beneficio, en cuanto al establecimiento de la metodología de cálculo aplicable, los costos a considerar dentro de la prestación del servicio, y otros aspectos de carácter regulatorio,fueron dejados a la competencia técnica exclusiva de la Aresep, como se puntualiza en los párrafos finales del artículo 45 de la Ley 7384. Lo anterior debe complementarse con la existencia de la Ley 7593, que le impone, el poder-deber de aplicar el principio de servicio al costo a las tarifas de todos los servicios públicos regulados, siendo así que resulta necesario para el equilibrio financiero del prestador del servicio, ver incorporado en sus tarifas, determinados costos, entre ellos los de inversión que garanticen la continuidad,desarrollo y sostenibilidad de la actividad. No es cierto que la Autoridad Reguladora haya omitido establecer un precio competitivo para la flota pesquera nacional, pues desde el 2002 existe una resolución del Regulador General que establece la forma de cálculo de los precios de los combustibles para esa flota pesquera. Según ese método de cálculo, tales precios se fijan cuando se establezcan los precios plantel para Recope, en razón de que, el precio para la flota pesquera -considerando inversiones- equivale al precio plantel de RECOPE, sin impuesto único. Consecuentemente, desde entonces se incorpora el rubro de inversiones dentro del cálculo del precio plantel, de acuerdo con lo que señala el artículo 45 de la Ley 7384, que dispone el cobro de un precio FOB plantel. Con posterioridad, con ocasión a la interpretación auténtica, la metodología, de previo aprobada, para fijar el precio del combustible en planteles de distribución de Recope y al consumidor final", se adecua a dicha normativa, emitiéndose la resolución RIE-084-2013 del 24 de septiembre de 2013, por parte de la Intendencia de Energía. De conformidad con el análisis de la prueba aportada a los autos y los alegatos de las partes, estima este Tribunal que no lleva razón la parte actora, por los motivos que a continuación se indicarán. El artículo 45 de la Ley 7384, Ley de Creación del Instituto de Pesca y Acuicultura, de 29 de marzo de 1994. estableció lo siguiente: "ARTICULO 45.- El sector pesquero adquirirá de RECOPE el combustible (gasolina y diésel), para la actividad de pesca no deportiva a un precio competitivo con el precio internacional, basado en el costo promedio de importación del mes anterior y considerando el costo C.I.F. refinería, así como los costos de distribución por oleoducto y distribución en planteles, de tal forma que el precio sea F.O.B. Plantel. Ese precio será fijado por el Servicio Nacional de Electricidad; al cual deberá solicitarlo previamente RECOPE, según lo dispuesto en la Ley No. 6588 del 30 de julio de 1981, o el Instituto. El Instituto se encargará de la administración y el control del uso eficiente del combustible, destinado a la actividad pesquera no deportiva". Como se advierte de la norma, su propósito era establecer un precio competitivo para el combustible que se destinaría a la actividad pesquera no deportiva, estableciéndose como parámetro el precio F.O.B. plantel. De acuerdo con la anterior norma, mediante resolución RRG-2708-2002, la ARESEP estableció la fórmula de ajuste extraordinario para la determinación de precios para los combustibles que consumía la flota pesquera. De conformidad con lo anterior, la estructura de costos de la gasolina y diésel en dichos casos, comprendería: 1) Costo CIF refinería, 2) Costo por oleoducto 3) Costo por planteles 4) Costo administrativo. Con posterioridad acorde con resoluciones RJD-013, 014 y 016-2002 de la Junta Directiva de la ARESEP se acordó que dentro de la estructura de precio de los indicados combustibles, se debía incorporar las inversiones del prestador del servicio. Así, de acuerdo con dicho acto administrativo, la estructura respectiva contenía: 1) Costo CIF refinería, 2) Costo por oleoducto 3) Costo por planteles 4) Costo administrativo 5) Costo de inversiones. Mediante resolución 2774-2002 de las ocho horas del veintiséis de septiembre de dos mil dos, la ARESEP dispuso revocar la fórmula de ajuste extraordinario para determinación de los precios de combustible que consume la flota pesquera acorde con la resolución RRG-2708-2002 e indicar a las partes que las fijaciones de precios se realizarán conforme a los artículos 3,30 y 31 de la ley 7593. En razón de lo anterior, la estructura de costos de conformidad con este acto, contenía: 1) Costo CIF refinería, 2) Costo por oleoducto 3) Costo por planteles 4) Costo administrativo 5) Costo de inversiones 6) costos de prestación del servicio. Es así como en la práctica, esta resolución vino a equipara el precio plantel del combustible para pescadores al de cualquier consumidor final. Con posterioridad, mediante resolución RRG-2821-2002 de 9:30 horas de 24 de octubre de 2002 se contempló un precio de combustibles para los pescadores, de acuerdo con la resolución 2772-2002, a precio plantel, sin impuestos. Es menester indicar que lo dispuesto en la indicada resolución 2772-2002 parte de la presunción de que las disposiciones de la Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos, Ley número 7593, derogaron el indicado artículo 45 de la Ley 7384, Ley de Creación del Instituto de Pesca y Acuicultura, de 29 de marzo de 1994, tal y como lo indica expresamente la conducta administrativa de referencia. No obstante lo anterior, mediante criterio de la Dirección Jurídica Especializada de la ARESEP de fecha 21 de octubre de 2003 se le indicó a la Reguladora General que el artículo 45 de la Ley 7384 está vigente y debe aplicarse sobre las normas de rango inferior que lo contradigan. Sin embargo, ello no devino en modificar la fijación de precios indicada anteriormente, obviándose adecuarlo a la consideración de que dicha norma se encontraba vigente y establecía claramente que el precio FOB Plantel, debía tomar en consideración exclusivamente el costo promedio de importación del mes anterior del combustible y el costo C.I.F. refinería, así como los costos de distribución por oleoducto y distribución en planteles. Lo anterior, se ve reafirmado con posterioridad, con el artículo 123 de la Ley 8436, Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura, de 25 de abril de 2005, dispuso lo siguiente: "Artículo 123.—Exonérase a la flota pesquera nacional, excepto a la dedicada a la pesca deportiva, de todo tipo de impuestos nacionales para la importación de embarcaciones, repuestos, motores, implementos de navegación, de pesca y sus respectivos accesorios. En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 45 de la Ley Nº 7384, de 16 de marzo de 1994, RECOPE venderá el combustible (gasolina, regular y diésel) a la flota pesquera nacional, excepto para la actividad de pesca deportiva, a un precio competitivo con el precio internacional". Del texto de esta última norma se evidencia que se viene a reiterar la necesidad de que la fijación del precio que se realice sea competitiva con el precio internacional del combustible, si bien no se establece el parámetro indicado ut supra. Es menester indicar que mediante decreto ejecutivo 31299-MAG-MINAE, se reglamentó el artículo 45 dicho en el siguiente sentido: "Artículo 1º-En cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en el artículo 45 de la Ley Nº 7384 de 16 de marzo de 1994, RECOPE venderá el combustible (gasolina regular y diésel), a la Flota Pesquera Nacional, excepto la actividad de pesca deportiva, a un precio competitivo con el precio internacional. Artículo 2º—Para los efectos de la aplicación del presente Reglamento, se establecen las siguientes definiciones: a) PCFPi = Es el Precio de Venta en Plantel por Litro de Combustible (gasolina regular o diésel), que consume la Flota Pesquera Nacional No Deportiva. b) CIFRi = Es el costo mensual CIF Refinería, por Litro de Combustible, el cual incluye los costos F.O.B. (libre a bordo), así como el seguro y el transporte del combustible (gasolina regular y diésel), colocado en el Puerto de Desembarque Nacional. Se deberá interpretar que dentro de este concepto, su componente F.O.B., sea igual al que utilizó RECOPE como promedio en su último ajuste extraordinario, para cada uno de los combustibles antes citados. c) COif = Costo anual por litro trasegado por Oleoducto calculado con base en la información existente en el cierre contable del período fiscal inmediato anterior, de conformidad con la información existente en el último Estado Financiero Disponible, considerando como denominador, el volumen proporcional de combustibles trasegados por Oleoducto, destinado al consumo de la Flota Pesquera Nacional no Deportiva. El monto obtenido se actualizará con la inflación estimada para el período siguiente. d) CPif = Costo anual por litro vendido en Planteles calculado con base en la información existente en el cierre contable del Período Fiscal inmediato anterior, de conformidad con la información existente en el último Estado Financiero Disponible, considerando como denominador, el volumen proporcional de combustible vendido en Planteles, durante el período que corresponda, destinado al consumo de la Flota Pesquera Nacional No Deportiva. El monto obtenido se actualizará por la inflación estimada para el período siguiente. e) Precio Internacional de Combustible: Se determinará con base en el promedio del precio que RECOPE utiliza como referencia para los combustibles (gasolina, diésel), que importa. f) Combustible para Pesca: Abarca únicamente la variedad gasolina regular y el diésel. Artículo 3º-La fijación del precio de los combustibles, que consume la Flota Pesquera Nacional No Deportiva, se establecerá tomando en cuenta únicamente la siguiente estructura de costos: PCFPi = CIFRi + COif + CPif Para: i = Gasolina Regular, Diésel f = Fijos hasta la conclusión de la próxima revisión. Artículo 4º-En la determinación del precio de los combustibles destinados al consumo de la Flota Pesquera Nacional No Deportiva, no se considerarán los montos correspondientes a gastos de administración, depreciación de activos, cargos portuarios, inversión, márgenes de comercialización u otros de naturaleza similar, de modo tal, que se cumpla con el objetivo de que el precio fijado, sea competitivo con los precios internacionales de los mercados que utiliza RECOPE como referencia en la adquisición de los combustibles. Artículo 5º-Las solicitudes de precio podrán ser hechas por RECOPE o INCOPESCA o por el ente Regulador de Oficio, por cuanto las variaciones de precio de la Flota Pesquera Nacional No Deportiva, se harán siguiendo las mismas variaciones Ordinarias y Extraordinarias solicitadas por RECOPE." (el destacado es nuestro). A pesar de lo anterior, no hay prueba de que ARESEP haya modificado la fijación de precios hecha en la resolución 2774-2002 de las ocho horas del veintiséis de septiembre de dos mil dos en cuanto a la incorporación de gastos de administración de RECOPE en la fijación del precio plantel del combustible. Dicho decreto fue derogado por el decreto ejecutivo 32527-MAG de 3 de junio de 2005, el cual dispuso: "Artículo 1º-En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 45 de la Ley Nº 7384 del 16 de marzo de 1994 y el artículo 123 párrafo segundo de la Ley Nº 8436 del 1° de marzo del 2005, RECOPE venderá el combustible (gasolina regular y diésel) a la Flota Pesquera Nacional, excepto la actividad de pesca deportiva, a un precio competitivo con el precio internacional. Artículo 2º-El precio competitivo con el precio internacional, para la venta del combustible mencionado en el artículo anterior, estará comprendido en la fijación tarifaria que se realice, por la aplicación de la excepción del impuesto único a los combustibles y la no incorporación dentro de dicho precio, de los montos correspondientes a gastos de administración, depreciación de activos, cargos portuarios e inversión. Artículo 3º-La diferencia resultante en la determinación del precio competitivo con el precio internacional, entre el monto correspondiente por la aplicación de la excepción del impuesto único a los combustibles y los rubros no incorporados en el artículo segundo, serán reconocidos por el Estado al Sector Pesquero Nacional no Deportivo a partir del "Acuerdo para la atención de temas críticos del Sector Pesquero Nacional" suscrito el 29 de enero del 2008. Para ello el Ministerio de Hacienda incorporará en el presupuesto nacional el monto correspondiente al subsidio establecido en el Artículo Segundo y lo girará al Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura (INCOPESCA), a través de la respectiva transferencia. El monto del subsidio por litro de combustible de gasolina regular o diésel será determinado por el INCOPESCA, el que en razón de sus competencias, será el encargado de su asignación a cada pescador beneficiado, su distribución y control, debiendo rendir un informe semestral al citado ministerio, de acuerdo a la normativa vigente. artículo 4º-El monto correspondiente a los rubros excepcionados en el artículo Segundo serán determinados con base en los registros contables de RECOPE del período fiscal inmediato anterior cerrado. Para ello y en relación con dicho periodo, RECOPE suministrará al INCOPESCA la información anual contable requerida para la cuantificación del subsidio por litro: los estados financieros indicados, las ventas totales de RECOPE en volumen, los gastos administrativos, la depreciación de activos, las inversiones de caja ejecutadas y los cargos portuarios". (el destacado es nuestro). Como se advierte, el mismo estableció la necesidad de fijación de precios para el combustible para pescadores sin tomar en consideración gastos de administración entre otros. No obstante, no consta en autos que ARESEP haya actuado de conformidad con dicho cuerpo normativo, manteniendo el costo interno administrativo de RECOPE. Inclusive es menester indicar que mediante resolución RRG-9233-2008 de diez horas con veinte minutos del once de noviembre de dos mil ocho, nuevamente se parte de la vigencia del artículo 45 de la Ley 7384, se fija un precio plantel sin impuesto para los precios de combustible para pesca no deportiva igual al del distribuidor para consumidor final en estaciones de servicio. Como se advierte del texto de dicho acto administrativo, lleva razón la parte demandada cuando indica que la fórmula general, sería la siguiente:
P= PRI +/- D + K +IU+ M T +MC, entendidas esta como: P= Precio final al consumidor, PRI= Precio Internacional de Referencia, D = Diferencia o Rezago tarifario, K = Margen interno de Recope, IU= Impuesto único a los combustibles, MT= Margen del transportista, MC = Margen del comercializador, Si= Subsidio. También lleva razón cuando indica que los factores MT y MC no se incluyen en el precio plantel de Recope, dado que corresponden al transporte a las estaciones de servicio y la comercialización en éstas. Por lo anterior, debe atenderse a que el precio plantel excluye estos factores, mas debiendo tomarse en consideración que como se indicó el indicado precio plantel de los combustibles para pescadores no se diferencia del señalado para otros consumidores finales, excepto en lo que corresponde a la exoneración de cobro del respectivo tributo sobre combustibles, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria. Así a manera de ejemplo, la referida resolución RRG-9233-2008 de diez horas con veinte minutos del once de noviembre de dos mil ocho,fija iguales precios para el combustible en plantel sin impuesto para la flota pesquera nacional y para el distribuidor de combustibles a consumidor. No consta modificación de dicha situación hasta lo dispuesto en el artículo único de la ley N° 9134 del 6 de junio del 2013, en donde se interpretó auténticamente el indicado artículo 45, que se define con mayor precisión los componentes que se podrían tomar en consideración en la fijación de precios del combustible para pescadores, de la siguiente manera: "... la expresión "precio competitivo del combustible a nivel internacional", contenido en ambas normas, que recibirá la flota pesquera nacional no deportiva, es basado en que el sector pesquero costarricense adquirirá de la Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo (Recope), o de la entidad legalmente autorizada para la importación de hidrocarburos al país, el combustible, producto terminado (gasolina y diésel), a un precio que comprenderá únicamente los siguientes rubros: a) Valor del costo del producto (producto refinado: monto de la factura de compra. Producto no refinado: costo de refinamiento en Costa Rica). b) El flete hasta el puerto de destino en Costa Rica. c) Los seguros correspondientes al combustible. d) El costo por traslado del producto final, dentro del territorio nacional, hasta el punto de distribución. e) El costo de almacenamiento y bombeo para el plantel, donde se efectúe la venta. Esos valores se fijarán con base en el costo promedio de importación del mes anterior, o la última información similar disponible. Ningún modelo general de cálculo de precios podrá abarcar el combustible destinado al sector pesquero nacional no deportivo, por lo tanto la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep) deberá excluir cualquier otro rubro o componente considerado en la fijación del precio común de estos combustibles. El Incopesca se encargará de la administración y el control del uso eficiente del combustible destinado a la actividad pesquera no deportiva...". De conformidad con lo anterior, este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que, fundada en la premisa falsa de la derogatoria del artículo 45 de la Ley 7384, Ley de Creación del Instituto de Pesca y Acuicultura, de 29 de marzo de 1994, la ARESEP procedió a equiparar el precio plantel de los pescadores (excluyendo el respectivo impuesto) con el de cualquier otro consumidor final, e incorporando en este concepto una serie de rubros no contemplados originalmente en las fijaciones anteriores a los actos administrativos de resoluciones 2774-2002 de las ocho horas del veintiséis de septiembre de dos mil dos y RRG-2821-2002 de 9:30 horas de 24 de octubre de 2002. Con lo anterior, es evidente que se incumplió parcialmente con lo dispuesto en el indicado artículo, dado que se empleó en la fijación del precio plantel otros costos diferentes a los establecidos expresamente en la Ley 7384. Por consiguiente, las dos ventajas que obtenían los pescadores no artesanales eran las siguientes: a) adquisición del producto precio plantel, sin cargar costos de transporte fuera de plantel y comercialización (con la salvedad de que como se ha indicado al referido precio plantel se le fueron cargando costos originalmente no contemplados) y b) la exoneración del pago del impuesto único sobre combustibles. No obstante, no resulta procedente acoger la demanda, en tanto que la parte actora, por una parte no pidió la nulidad de los respectivos actos administrativos y por otra, la representación del actor no probó que con los cambios en los rubros a considerar en el precio de los combustibles a los pescadores, el precio de aquellos haya dejado de ser competitivo con el mercado internacional, tal y como lo establece expresamente la norma, además de que la falta de prueba del daño invocado, tal y como se indicará posteriormente. Si bien, tal y como se ha indicado, las diferentes resoluciones de la ARESEP mencionadas tuvieron como consecuencia la equiparación del precio plantel de los pescadores con el de cualquier consumidor final (menos el tributo respectivo), ello no significa per se, que tuviera como consecuencia, una incidencia tal que implicara que el precio nacional plantel haya dejado de poseer competitividad con el mercado internacional, tomando en consideración además que en el caso de los combustibles de los pescadores no se debía pagar el impuesto único de combustibles, lo cual resulta lógico, tuvo incidencia adicional en el precio nacional frente al exterior. Correspondía a la parte actora demostrar este aspecto mediante la presentación de prueba técnica idónea, dado que este Tribunal no puede partir de meras presunciones respecto de las consecuencias de los actos mencionados respecto de la competitividad con los precios internacionales, en tanto que estamos en presencia de precios plantel (que no tienen incorporados los costos al transporte a las estaciones de servicio y la comercialización en éstas) y que además no incluyen el pago del impuesto respectivo. De conformidad con las consideraciones realizadas anteriormente, se aplica el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, en tanto dispone: "La carga de la prueba incumbe: 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho. 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor". Sobre la carga de la prueba se ha dicho en alguna otra oportunidad, que: “…, en orden a lo dispuesto en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil: “(…) La carga de la prueba no supone, pues, ningún derecho del adversario, sino un imperativo del propio interés de cada litigante; es una circunstancia de riesgo que consiste en que quien no prueba los hechos que ha de probar, pierde el pleito. Puede quitarse esta carga de encima, probando, es decir, acreditando la verdad de los hechos que la Ley señala. Y esto no crea, evidentemente, un derecho en el adversario, como si una situación jurídica personal atinente a cada parte; el gravamen de no restar creencia a las afirmaciones que era menester probar y no se probaron... es lo mismo no probar que no existir (…)”. (Voto número 262 de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del diecisiete de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Primera). De conformidad con lo anterior, la mera invocación de la parte no es suficiente, si no existe un sólido fundamento probatorio que sirva de demostración de los hechos o defensas que se alegan. En razón de que la parte solicita el análisis de legalidad, no para efectos de extraer las conductas del mundo jurídico, sino exclusivamente con fines indemnizatorios, le correspondía al actor demostrar que más allá de la existencia o no de vicios en la conducta administrativa, ésta tuvo una consecuencia antijiurídica que podría ser provocadora de efectos dañosos en su esfera jurídica. No obstante, lejos de ello, en autos no consta que se haya demostrado la existencia de cambios negativos en la competitividad nacional con respecto a los precios internacionales del combustible, ni la incidencia de las decisiones de la ARESEP en tal sentido, que puedan ser identificables, diferenciables e individualizables de otras situaciones internas y externas al país que pudieren haber incidido en una eventual pérdida de la posibilidad de competir de nuestros pescadores naciones. Como bien lo indica la parte actora, el propósito de la norma era proteger la competitividad de los pescadores nacionales frente al mercado internacional, siendo así que él no demostró que en el caso de análisis se haya presentado una distorsión de los precios plantel del país tal que haya incidido en tal objetivo. De manera adicional estima este Tribunal necesario referirse a la alegación de la ARESEP con respecto a que lo actuado fue hecho en ejercicio de sus competencias. En este sentido si bien es claro que la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos posee competencias suficientes para imponer a los concesionarios del servicio público las reglas que deben seguirse para la fijación de la tarifa o del ajuste tarifario, siendo así que la escogencia de la metodología de fijación de precios y tarifas es un problema de índole técnica y por consiguiente se puede utilizar las metodologías que sean compatibles con el principio del servicio al costo establecido en el artículo 3 de la Ley de Creación de la ARESEP, debe recordarse que ésta puede ejercer sus competencias regulatorias pero dentro del marco del ordenamiento sin desaplicar lo dispuesto en la Ley, ni vaciar de contenido la respectiva norma. En este orden de ideas, su discrecionalidad técnica debe ejercerse dentro del marco del ordenamiento jurídico y si el mismo establece límites, no resulta procedente que vía interpretación se considere no aplicable una disposición determinada o se incorporen rubros a los precios no contemplados en una ley concreta, cuando el legislador ha optado por definir los alcances de los componentes de un determinado precio (tal y como sucedió en el caso del acto administrativo de resolución 2774-2002 de las ocho horas del veintiséis de septiembre de dos mil dos, Si bien la ARESEP fija sus tarifas de conformidad con el principio de servicio al costo, lo cierto es que había una norma válida, eficaz y vigente, que establecía un método de fijación determinado, en orden a los intereses jurídicos que el legislador en su momento decidió tutelar y no es procedente que mediante acto administrativo se obvie dicha situación excepcional prevista por el ordenamiento jurídico. Cuando la norma menciona el precio FOB plantel no puede analizarse descontextualizada del resto de la norma que indica que el precio a fijar será "basado en el costo promedio de importación del mes anterior y considerando el costo C.I.F. refinería, así como los costos de distribución por oleoducto y distribución en planteles...", sin que se mencione otros costos integrados al precio posteriormente por mera interpretación de la ARESEP. En todo caso, como se ha indicado, las conductas administrativas correspondientes no se han objetado y con respecto a sus consecuencias, como se ha dicho y se terminará de ahondar a continuación, no hay la más mínima prueba de un resultado dañoso en contra del actor.
VIII.-Sobre los daños y perjucios reclamados. No está de más indicar que adicional a las anteriores consideraciones, no resulta procedente acoger la indemnización de daños y perjuicios solicitados, en tanto que la demanda es ayuna de toda prueba con respecto a su existencia. En este orden de ideas, debe recordarse que el deber de indemnizar todos los daños y perjuicios originados con motivo de las conductas y omisiones de la Administración Pública, encuentra su especificidad propia en nuestro país, a partir de la Constitución Política del año 1949. En dicho cuerpo normativo se estableció por una parte, la existencia de una jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, como parte de los derechos fundamentales de que gozan todos los ciudadanos costarricenses. En este sentido su artículo 49, con las reformas introducidas posteriormente, dispone lo siguiente: "Establécese la jurisdicción contencioso - administrativa como atribución del Poder Judicial, con el objeto de garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público. La desviación de poder será motivo de impugnación de los actos administrativos. La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados". Dicha norma, debe complementarse con lo señalado en los artículos 9 y 41 de nuestra Carta Magna, en tanto disponen: "El Gobierno de la República es popular, representativo, participativo, alternativo y responsable. Lo ejercen el pueblo y tres Poderes distintos e independientes entre sí". (El destacado es nuestro) y "Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes". Con respecto al fundamento constitucional de la responsabilidad del Estado, la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional. N° 5207-2004, de las 14 horas y 55 minutos del 18 de mayo del 2004, literalmente indicó: “Nuestra Constitución Política no consagra explícitamente el principio de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones públicas por las lesiones antijurídicas que, en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, le causen a los administrados. Empero, este principio se encuentra implícitamente contenido en el Derecho de la Constitución, siendo que puede ser inferido a partir de una interpretación sistemática y contextual de varios preceptos, principios y valores constitucionales. En efecto, el artículo 9°, párrafo 1°, de la Carta Política dispone que “El Gobierno de la República es (…) responsable (…)”, con lo cual se da por sentada la responsabilidad del ente público mayor o Estado y sus diversos órganos –Poder Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial-. El ordinal 11°, de su parte, establece en su párrafo primero la “(…) responsabilidad penal (…)” de los funcionarios públicos y el segundo párrafo nos refiere la “(…) responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes (…)”. El artículo 34 de la Constitución Política ampara los “derechos patrimoniales adquiridos” y las “situaciones jurídicas consolidadas”, los cuales solo pueden ser, efectiva y realmente, amparados con un sistema de responsabilidad administrativa de amplio espectro sin zonas inmunes o exentas cuando sean vulnerados por las administraciones públicas en el despliegue de su giro o desempeño público. El numeral 41 ibídem, estatuye que “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, este precepto impone el deber al autor y responsable del daño de resarcir las lesiones antijurídicas efectivamente sufridas por los administrados como consecuencia del ejercicio de la función administrativa a través de conductas positivas por acción o negativas por omisión de los entes públicos, con lo cual se convierte en la piedra angular a nivel constitucional para el desarrollo legislativo de un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva y directa en el cual el resarcimiento no depende del reproche moral y subjetivo a la conducta del funcionario público por dolo o culpa, sino, única y exclusivamente, por habérsele inflingido o recibido, efectivamente, “(…) injurias o daños (…) en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, esto es, una lesión antijurídica que no tiene el deber de soportar y, por consiguiente, debe serle resarcida. El numeral 41 de la Constitución Política establece un derecho fundamental resarcitorio a favor del administrado que haya sufrido una lesión antijurídica por un ente –a través de su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita- y la obligación correlativa , de éste de resarcirla o repararla de forma integral, el acceso a la jurisdicción previsto en este mismo precepto constitucional, se convierte, así en un derecho instrumental para asegurar, forzosamente, el goce y ejercicio del derecho resarcitorio del damnificado cuando el sujeto obligado a la reparación incumpla voluntariamente con la obligación referida.... El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos. Finalmente, es menester tomar en consideración que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, el que se infiere claramente de la relación de los numerales, interpretados, a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el “buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, “buena marcha del Gobierno” y “eficiencia de la administración”. Este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. De esta forma, queda en evidencia que el constituyente originario recogió de forma implícita el principio de la responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas, el que, como tal, debe servir a todos los poderes públicos y operadores del Derecho como parámetro para interpretar, aplicar, integrar y delimitar el entero ordenamiento jurídico. Bajo esta inteligencia, un corolario fundamental del principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa lo constituye la imposibilidad para el legislador ordinario de eximir o exonerar de responsabilidad a algún ente público por alguna lesión antijurídica que le cause su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita a la esfera patrimonial y extramatrimonial de los administrados.” (el destacado es nuestro).” De lo anterior, es evidente que opera un deber de resarcibilidad plena del daño, que con base en las indicadas disposiciones, se desprende del artículo 190.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto dispone que: "1. La Administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero". Como se advierte, en nuestro país impera un régimen de responsabilidad objetiva, mediante la cual opera el deber de indemnización de la Administración, con independencia de criterios de valoración subjetiva (dolo o culpa), en la actuación de sus servidores. Por otra parte, nuestra legislación prevee inclusive la posibilidad de reclamar responsabilidad de la Administración, con motivo de una conducta legítima, en tanto que el artículo 194 del cuerpo normativo mencionado, dispone al respecto, lo siguiente: "1. La Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión". En razón de lo anterior, como se advierte, el eje central del sistema de responsabilidad estatal en nuestro país, es la víctima de daño, ya que aquella surge, siempre que su funcionamiento normal o anormal, cause un daño que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, ya sea patrimonial o extra patrimonial, con independencia de su situación jurídica subjetiva. No obstante, este deber resarcitorio, no es tampoco pleno, en el sentido tenga un carácter irrestricto para cualquier tipo de daño, sino que el mismo debe originarse, en el caso de que se origine de una conducta administrativa no lícita o normal, de la anormalidad que significa el apartarse de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o sea con motivo de un mal funcionamiento, o un actuar tardío o inexistencia del mismo, por parte de la Administración. Esta anormalidad determinará la antijuricidad como presupuesto para la resarcibilidad del daño. En el caso del funcionamiento legítimo de la Administración, donde no hay anormalidad o ilicitud, la antijuricidad generadora de la posibilidad de indemnizar el daño, se da en la no obligatoriedad de sufrir una afectación que reviste la característica de ser de intensidad excepcional o pequeña proporción de afectados. En este sentido, vale aclarar que esta responsabilidad está sujeta a otras disposiciones generales sobre la responsabilidad del Estado contenidas en la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Al respecto, debe tomarse consideración lo indicado en el artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto expresa lo siguiente: " En todo caso el daño alegado habrá ser efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo". Con respecto a los daños que pueden ser objeto de resarcimiento en sede contencioso administrativa, el voto de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia N°112 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 15 de julio de 1992 entre otras cosas, indicó: “IV. El daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por cuanto el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho ilícito dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico. El daño, en sentido jurídico, constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extra patrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso. Bajo esta tesitura, no hay responsabilidad civil si no media daño, así como no existe daño si no hay damnificado. Por otra parte, sólo es daño indemnizable el que se llega a probar (realidad o existencia), siendo ello una cuestión de hecho reservada al prudente arbitrio del juzgador. En suma, el daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo. V.- En muchas ocasiones se utilizan indiscriminadamente las expresiones "daños" y "perjuicios". Es menester precisar y distinguir ambos conceptos. El daño constituye la pérdida irrogada al damnificado (damnum emergens), en tanto el perjuicio está conformado por la ganancia o utilidad frustrada o dejada de percibir (lucro cesans), la cual era razonable y probablemente esperable si no se hubiese producido el hecho ilícito. VI.- No cualquier daño da pie a la obligación de resarcir. Para tal efecto, han de confluir, básicamente las siguientes características para ser un "daño resarcible": A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjetúrales. El daño no pierde esta característica si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; asimismo, no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio, pues el primero está referido a aquél que surge como una consecuencia necesaria derivada del hecho causal o generador del daño, es decir, sus repercusiones no se proyectan al incoarse el proceso. En lo relativo a la magnitud o monto (seriedad) del daño, ello constituye un extremo de incumbencia subjetiva única del damnificado, empero el derecho no puede ocuparse de pretensiones fundadas en daños insignificantes, derivadas de una excesiva susceptibilidad. B) Debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo. Así puede haber un damnificado directo y otro indirecto: el primero es la víctima del hecho dañoso, y el segundo serán los sucesores de la víctima. C) Deberá ser causado por un tercero, y subsistente, esto es, sí ha sido reparado por el responsable o un tercero (asegurador) resulta insubsistente. D) Debe mediar una relación de causalidad entre el hecho ilícito y el daño. VII.- Dentro de las clases de daños, se encuentra en primer término el daño material y el corporal, siendo el primero el que incide sobre las cosas o bienes materiales que conforman el patrimonio de la persona, en tanto el segundo repercute sobre la integridad corporal y física. En doctrina, bajo la denominación genérica de daño material o patrimonial, suelen comprenderse las específicas de daño corporal y de daño material, en sentido estricto. La segunda parece ser la patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc.. Esta distinción nació en el Derecho Romano, pues se distinguía entre el daño inferido a las cosas directamente (damnun) y el que lesionaba la personalidad física del individuo (injuria). En el daño patrimonial el menoscabo generado resulta ser valorable económicamente….”. Complementario con lo anterior, a fin de determinar el daño, es menester indicar la necesidad de existencia de relación entre el daño reclamado y la conducta desplegada por el agente económico. En este orden de ideas, doctrinariamente se han indicado diferentes criterios de imputación objetiva, en los que se destaca para los efectos, la causalidad adecuada. Con respecto a este criterio, se ha indicado doctrinariamente lo siguiente: "La conducta del demandado es una causa adecuada del daño padecido por la víctima si, ex ante, la causación del daño era previsible –no muy improbable- por parte del demandado. Pero los autores nunca se han puesto de acuerdo en qué grado de probabilidad –entre 0 y 1- es el adecuado según el derecho; y siempre han discrepado acerca de si el juicio sobre la probabilidad debe consistir en una prognosis puramente subjetiva –similar a la que se lleva a cabo en el análisis del dolo y la culpa-, es decir, en un juicio sobre la evitabilidad del resultado, o si, por el contrario la prognosis ha de ser objetiva en el sentido de que un agente dotado de conocimientos especiales habría de haber conocido la probabilidad de la producción del resultado". ( Causalidad y Responsabilidad . Pablo Salvador Coderch y Antonio Fernández Crende. Revista para el análisis del derecho. WWW.INDET.COM.) Con respecto a este criterio de causalidad, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en su voto 251-f-06 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2006, hace referencia al mismo, mas combinándolo con la teoría de la causa eficiente, de la siguiente manera: "XIV.- El nexo causal como presupuesto de responsabilidad. La diversa tipología de las causas. (…) resta por establecer si la inacción administrativa del Ministerio de Salud por no verificar, de previo a emitir el permiso de salud y de funcionamiento, si el redondel cumplía con los estándares que dispone la Ley General de Salud, fue la causante directa o indirecta del daño, dado que la estimación de la demanda depende de la demostración de la existencia de un nexo causal, en su tradicional noción de causa-efecto. Al respecto cabe recordar que en la producción del daño suelen concurrir con frecuencia múltiples factores, dentro de los cuales es preciso determinar aquellos que directa o indirectamente son causa eficiente y adecuada del mal causado (…) En esa confluencia de elementos fácticos o jurídicos que rodean la situación dañosa, el Juzgador debe establecer, con base en las pruebas del proceso, si la acción concreta que consiste en un funcionamiento administrativo, o bien la abstención de desplegar el marco funcional que le impone el Ordenamiento Jurídico, es causa apta para la generación del daño (…).. Es decir, para inferir la eficiencia de la causa que se tiene por adecuada, es indispensable deducir si es la productora de la lesión, de manera que de eliminarse, es racional deducir que el daño no se hubiera producido. Lo anterior supone un ejercicio valorativo para desplazar del marco de consideración, las causas que no han tenido ninguna influencia en el resultado (causas extrañas), de las que, de no haber tenido lugar, hubiesen evitado el menoscabo. Se trata de una especie de prognosis objetiva, a través de la cual se pueda afirmar que con tal acción u omisión es lógico o probable que se produzca el daño específico. En esta inteligencia, el nexo causal se impone como el inexorable vínculo relacional entre el daño y la conducta administrativa, de modo que sin esta, aquel probablemente no se hubiese producido. Claro está que la determinación de este factor depende en alto grado del examen de las pruebas traídas al proceso por las partes litigantes. A partir de ellas, el Juzgador puede deducir si dentro del cuadro fáctico particular, las acciones del Estado conllevan a su responsabilidad, por haberse asociado su funcionamiento a la generación de las lesiones”. Como se advierte, en el anterior voto la Sala Primera se decantó por una posición respecto de la causalidad del daño, en donde se combina tanto el criterio de causa adecuada con la teoría de la eficiencia de la causa o sine qua non, entendida ésta como aquella que tiene mayor aptitud para generar con mayor eficacia el daño y con base en la cual se selecciona de todas las condiciones aquella que supone una posibilidad máxima en la contribución al resultado dañoso (mayor poder intrínseco de causación del daño). Mediante la combinación de ambas posiciones, (cuestionado en su momento por la doctrina) se ha buscado individualizar en los hechos u omisiones que tengan efectiva influencia en la afectación que invoca la parte lesionada o que al menos sustente un grado de probabilidad objetiva en su influencia en el mismo (juicio de probabilidad del resultado basado en los hechos tenidos por demostrados que se realiza conforme las reglas de la experiencia). En todo caso, es menester indicar que será carga de la parte que la invoca, la respectiva demostración de la existencia de dicho vínculo causal entre el hecho que se estima generador del daño y éste. Es con base en estas consideraciones que procede determinar la responsabilidad. Lo anterior, en tanto que no es suficiente invocar un daño, sino que se debe demostrar fehacientemente su existencia y el nexo de causalidad que le une con la conducta u omisión del ente responsable. En el caso de análisis, la parte actora invoca de una manera bastante imprecisa la existencia de daños como producto de la existencia de un sobreprecio en la compra de combustible y pide que los mismos sean liquidados en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. No obstante lo anterior, no consta en autos que el actor haya realizado erogación alguna en la compra del combustible a que se hace referencia, durante la totalidad del período de cobro. La mera demostración de titularidad de embarcaciones autorizadas, no significa que las mismas hayan estado operando, ni que con motivo de su funcionamiento se haya hecho uso del combustible a que se refiere el artículo de la Ley 7384. La demanda es totalmente ayuna de facturas, comprobantes de pago o al menos la realización de algún trámite ante el Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura en tal sentido, por lo que no es procedente, además de los argumentos expresados ut supra reconocer daño alguno. Debe recordar la parte actora que la etapa de ejecución de sentencia tiene por objeto liquidar el daño demostrado en juicio y no puede pretender demostrar en ésta afectaciones que resultaron indemostradas durante todo el proceso. Tampoco aporta al menos indicios del daño moral invocado ni que el actor haya quedado al borde de la quiebra con motivo de las conductas administrativas en mención. Tampoco demuestra el actor que el rubro de combustible haya significado el 70% de los costos de producción de él como pescador ni que el precio que pagó en algún momento en el período de su solicitud no estuviera en el marco de la competitividad con los precios internacionales. La ausencia de prueba de un daño efectivo, cierto, evaluable e indemnizable es evidente y plenamente imputable a la representación de la parte actora y ni siquiera la prueba pericial que en su momento indicó para ejecución de sentencia, habría podido tener un efecto probatorio, si como se indicó en la etapa de juicio, no se aportó ningún elemento de convicción sobre los daños invocados. Por consiguiente, las pretensiones indemnizatorias deben ser rechazadas.”
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