V.The claims are granted: For the purpose of making this presentation as clear as possible, this chamber will divide the analysis into several sections, namely:
- 1)Jurisdiction of the trial court to verify compliance with the legal requirements contemplated for applying a prosecutorial discretion criterion (criterio de oportunidad).
- 2)Examination of the prosecutorial discretion criterion granted to [Name 064]. Defects present in its procedure and in the decision that authorized it.
- 3)Hypothetical inclusion of the conduct omitted by the requesting authority when seeking the prosecutorial discretion criterion, and new assessment of the reproach that should be made regarding the conduct charged against [Name 064], in comparison with that of other defendants. Weighing of the arguments put forth by the trial court regarding the particular issue.
- 4)Credibility to be afforded to the statement of the cooperating defendant.
- 1)Competence of the trial court to verify compliance with the legal requirements established for applying a criterion of opportunity. By majority and through a ruling issued at 1:30 p.m. on September 2, 2010 (cf. folios 13,676 to 13,736 verso of volume XXVIII), the trial court refused to hear the objections raised against the criterion of opportunity applied, regarding its "appropriateness or inappropriateness" and the possible "hits or misses" of the authorizing ruling issued by the criminal judge. This is a ruling—that of the trial court—which, being extremely lengthy, is not appropriate to transcribe; however, it can be synthesized as follows: i) The judge of the preliminary or intermediate procedure is the only one competent to exercise jurisdictional control over the application of the criterion of opportunity [in particular, the one established in subsection b) of numeral 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure] and its decriminalizing effects. The request for its application must be filed before the court of the preliminary or intermediate stage. Furthermore, given its complexity, once its application has been authorized, the decriminalizing consequence is subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, and it subsequently falls to the criminal judge to evaluate the effectiveness of the collaboration and the definitive solution of the matter. During the trial phase, the court must ensure the legality of the reception of the collaborator's account and its assessment according to the rules of sound judicial discretion. ii) The trial court does not have competence to issue a pronouncement on the implementation of the criterion of opportunity, since it only hears the matter once the opening to trial has been declared. The lower court assures that the Third Chamber has considered it so, because: "...not even in cases where the criterion of opportunity has not been processed in favor of a person who appears to testify at the debate, has said cassation body considered that the trial court should evaluate the prerequisites for its appropriateness, nor issue such a pronouncement in substitution of the criminal judge, abstracting, even from the competence of the trial judge, any assessment regarding the collaboration agreement (see rulings No. 392-1999 and No. 795-2009 of the Third Chamber). Conversely, in those cases, the indicated cassation body has determined that because control was not exercised by the criminal judge, it is not possible to receive the deponent in the debate (e.g., rulings No. 795-2009 and No. 1061-2008 of the Third Chamber), making it completely clear that the criminal judge is the only one competent to perform the referenced task." (F. 13,681 front). Therefore, it cannot be intended that the trial court define the fate of a criterion of opportunity that was already resolved and upon which the admission of [Name 064]'s statement in the debate was based. iii) If the trial court decided to examine the decision that accepted the criterion of opportunity to evaluate its decriminalizing effects, it would be arrogating knowledge of a matter pending before another jurisdictional body, which is prohibited by articles 11 and 155 of the Political Constitution and 4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, according to which judges must fulfill the duties imposed by law and not arrogate powers that have not been granted to them. Likewise, such a course of action would affect various principles and guarantees (legality, natural judge, judicial independence, impartiality, and due process). The court cannot hear objections aimed at invalidating the criterion of opportunity already granted without the legislator authorizing it to do so, to approve or reject prosecutorial requests to apply the criterion, to control the actions of the jurisdictional body in charge of that task, or to hear, through the appeal remedy, the parties' objections against that decision of the criminal judge. The legislator also did not provide for vertical control in the case of this type of ruling, a situation that the Constitutional Chamber justified in ruling No. 12090-2009. It is the statement given by the benefited person, and not the ruling approving the criterion, that must be analyzed by the trial court and challenged by the parties. iv) In contrast to what happens with other rulings (e.g., the order to open trial, the denial of a request for dismissal, or the rejection of an "incident of nullity") that are processed within the same procedure, regarding the criterion of opportunity, an autonomous and different procedure is structured in which it is discussed whether or not its application is appropriate (rulings No. 1119-2005 of the Constitutional Chamber and No. 114-2006 and 404-2006, both of the Third Chamber). While the first-mentioned decisions cannot be appealed because their discussion is feasible in later stages of the process (what is known as horizontal control), in the case of the criterion of opportunity, the dismissal that is eventually issued in favor of the collaborator can be appealed. For this reason, to maintain that the absence of an appeal remedy against the ruling that authorized the criterion of opportunity opens the door to a kind of horizontal control in the debate is incorrect, since the trial court is not competent to resolve that issue, given that vertical control is provided for in relation to the dismissal that may eventually be issued. v) Neither the trial court nor the cassation body can control the legality of the decriminalizing effects of the criterion of opportunity, since this concerns the criminal judge. A different matter is the presentation of evidence and its assessment, which does fall within the competence of the sentencing court and its controller. The court that authorized the criterion is only subject to the legal system, and its decision cannot be subject to a later assessment by the trial court when the legislator has not provided for it in that manner. vi) The impartiality of the trial court may be affected if it assesses the prerequisites for the appropriateness of the criterion of opportunity. It is the accusation that describes the charged acts and is the basis upon which the trial must be conducted. The trial is conducted in relation to specifically accused persons, not others with a different status (arts. 361, 363, and 365 of the C.P.P.). For this reason, the collaborator does not appear as an accused in the case, but rather as a source of evidence. Their statement must be assessed individually and in conjunction with the other evidence, but not to decide on their criminal liability, nor to contrast that liability with that attributed to the other accused. This is an additional reason why the legislator decided to remove from the competence of the trial court the assessment of the decriminalizing effects of the mechanism, insofar as it cannot hear a mechanism already ordered by another jurisdictional body, applied to someone who is not accused in the process under examination. vii) With convoluted wording, the court of merit argues that the criterion of opportunity is technically not a means of evidence. Its nature is not probative, but decriminalizing. When the commitment to collaborate consists of testifying during the debate, it is only then that the statement assumes the character of an evidentiary element. The route or channel through which said manifestations are received by the trial court is the means of evidence, which, for technical reasons, can never be the procedure followed for the approval of the criterion itself. In other words, the procedure carried out to obtain the statement does not constitute a means of evidence. This is how the lower court interprets ruling No. 6808-2002 of the Constitutional Chamber, when it affirms that the trial court is competent to exercise control of legality over the aforementioned instrument, that is, only to review the concurrence of the legal requirements for the application of the mechanism, but not to decide whether said criterion should have been granted or not, or other issues related to the decriminalizing effects derived from it. Although the constitutional court indicates that this control corresponds to the trial court, the truth is that, aside from numeral 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing the contrary, in that particular case, the issue addressed by the Constitutional Chamber was the provisional nature of the effects of the collaboration agreement and not the matter related to the competent body to decide on the waiver of the criminal action. It is, moreover, an isolated pronouncement, prior to two different and analogous ones (Nos. 12090-2009 and 1119-2005), which do not confer similar scopes to the control that the trial court must carry out, aside from the fact that the last two rulings, together with 2662-2001, are binding. viii) The procedure related to the application of the criterion of opportunity is independent of the process in which the collaborator must testify. Furthermore, it does not involve a definitive and irreproducible act, nor does it imply the production of advance evidence (as occurs, e.g., with searches, or the interception of communications), since the collaborator's statement must be presented during the debate. For this reason, it can be assessed by the trial court. Likewise, in the mentioned cases, the legality of the elements of conviction is not made dependent on the issuance of a prior judgment on the attributed conduct or the guilt of the persons involved—as does occur with the criterion—hence the treatment granted by the legislator is different. ix) It is not for the court to examine, in order to confirm or discard, the ruling of the criminal judge that authorized the application of the criterion (namely, the ruling issued at 9:51 a.m. on June 1, 2007, visible at folios 41 to 89 of the separate file where it was processed). x) The application of the criterion of opportunity is regulated. Regarding the scope of jurisdictional control, whether it is only regarding compliance with the formalities provided in the law, or also covers evaluative or substantial requirements—e.g., verifying the concept of lesser reproachability—the court of merit understands that said control is limited to the verification of formal or legal requirements, excluding evaluative ones, without the jurisdictional decision being able to substitute that of the prosecutorial office, nor invade its authority over the convenience or advisability of the measure, nor examine aspects specific to the accusatory function. In support of its position, it cites several rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, e.g., numbers 2662-2001, 12090-2009, 6808-2002, and 1119-2005, as well as respective judgments of the Third Chamber, specifically, No. 795-2009—in which it was affirmed that control encompasses substantial conditions—and No. 450-2004, in which the criterion expressed by the Constitutional Chamber, which the trial court shares, was adopted. The lower court adds that, in accordance with the adopted democratic model, essential functions cannot be concentrated in a single body, but must be distributed, and their exercise controlled. From that perspective, it could not be admitted that the criminal judge's criterion prevails over that of the Public Prosecutor's Office regarding the investigation and the exercise of the criminal action. As for the control that the trial court must carry out, it is insisted that it must be that corresponding to the evidence received in the debate. The collaborator's deposition, given live in the adversarial process, in the presence of the parties, is what has the status of evidence. The trial court's control over the procedure followed to authorize the criterion of opportunity is only insofar as it is the antecedent for the described appearance, since, not being a means of evidence, the court must confine itself to verifying the formal aspects specified by the Constitutional Chamber, that is, the existence of the prosecutorial request, hierarchical authorization, and approval by the judge. xi) Although the Third Chamber has proceeded to assess the conduct of the alleged beneficiary and the accused against whom they testify, in none of the cases has it attributed such a task to the sentencing court, something that, in any event, it could not do without compromising essential guarantees. In this regard, it cites rulings No. 1061-2008 and 795-2009. In the first, the trial court considered that there were irregularities in the jurisdictional advance testimony of a deponent, for which reason it stripped it of all evidentiary effectiveness. Given this, the Chamber deemed that although in the particular case the criterion had not been granted, the prerequisites for it were also not met, since the collaborator's participation was fundamental. In response to this, the majority opinion holds that the cassation body at no time argued that it was the task of the trial court to assess the appropriateness of said criterion, nor to contrast the conduct of the deponent and the accused. The Chamber performed that analysis based on the self-incriminating statement itself, an exercise that the trial court cannot carry out before sentencing and which is different from the case in which, according to the same cassation body, that examination should have been carried out, namely, when it is intended to receive a self-incriminating account without observing the respective guarantees. In the second ruling, the Third Chamber affirmed that the trial court should have limited itself to pointing out the non-existence of jurisdictional approval of the criterion of opportunity, without it being its task to inform itself of the collaboration criterion, qualify it, and much less invoke, for that purpose, the content of the evidence presented before hearing the deponent's account. This matter is fundamental, because a habeas corpus was filed in favor of the collaborator, resolved by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 6808-2002, in which it was considered proven that to declare the described agreement illegal, the court argued that the liability possibly attributable to the protected person would be similar to that of other accused persons and that the information they could provide would not be decisive for the outcome of the process. The lower court considers the minority position expressed in that judgment No. 6808-2002 to be crucial, since it explains that the trial court was prohibited from anticipating the outcome that the accusation would have; from establishing the authorship corresponding to the so-called "crown witness" when it has not yet ruled on the accusation in which other perpetrators and co-perpetrators of the act are cited and from which the collaborator is excluded; from making speculations about the outcome of the action that the Public Prosecutor's Office has not exercised; and from basing the rejection of the criterion on an assessment of the evidence and facts not contained in the accusation. According to Mr. Fernando Cruz Castro, a magistrate who subscribes to that minority position, it is only after receiving the evidence in the debate that the sentencing court can determine if the collaborator's action is less reproachable than the one they facilitated resolving and if their collaboration has been decisive. Based on this, the judges conclude that although the Third Chamber has assessed and compared the conduct of the collaborator and the implicated persons to determine whether the criterion of opportunity has been correctly granted (something that is in any case questionable, since in those cases the beneficiary would not be being judged, and the criminal action has not even been exercised against them by whoever has the power to do so), it is a task that is indeed viable to perform in cassation, firstly because it is done ex post (relying even on the assessments of the trial court) and then because it does not compromise the impartiality of the jurisdictional body, as would happen if the court of merit did so. They mention by way of example rulings No. 737-2001 and No. 136-2003 of the Third Chamber, in which it was never indicated that the trial court must perform that analysis before issuing a sentence, or that it is responsible for controlling the decriminalizing effects of the mechanism. Furthermore, in cases where that prior jurisdictional control was not exercised (No. 175-2003 and 114-2006, both of the Third Chamber), the only consequence derived from this has been the inadmissibility of the statement, but not the requirement for verification of said examination by the sentencing court. Finally, in pronouncement 795-2009 of the Third Chamber, faced with the lack of compliance with the established legal procedure and the non-existence of jurisdictional approval, it was said that it is the task of the Public Prosecutor's Office to remedy those deficiencies and therefore, to seek the suspension of the debate while the matter is resolved, from which it is inferred that it is not the trial court that must carry out jurisdictional control and that these errors, as the Chamber suggests, can even be corrected in the adversarial process. xii) After reiterating that jurisdictional control over the application of this mechanism is limited to compliance with legal requirements, the majority opinion points out that there is a third limitation for the trial court in said control, namely, the duty to guarantee its impartiality. They understand that it cannot pronounce on the issue of the lesser reproachability of [Name 064] without simultaneously reasoning on the substantive right under discussion, or without comparing the conduct of the accused with that of the former, which would mean anticipating the judgment on the facts. They refer again to the dissenting opinion in ruling No. 6808-2002 of the Constitutional Chamber, in which Magistrate Cruz Castro pointed out that the impartiality of the court would be weakened if it intervenes in prosecutorial powers, pronouncing on the eventual criminal liability of a person who, although benefited by a criterion of opportunity, has not been accused. Therefore, they emphasize that the control that the trial court must carry out, different from that which the criminal judge who authorized the application of the mechanism had to carry out, is solely to establish the legality of the appearance of the "collaborating declarant," by verifying compliance with the legal requirements determined at the time said authorization was granted and which are described in numeral 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely: that there is an express request from the prosecutorial office, that there is hierarchical authorization to carry out the proceeding, and that there is jurisdictional approval, all of which are fully met in this case. The assessment of the statement is a separate matter. xiii) Regarding the lack of reasoning in the ruling that authorized the criterion of opportunity, the trial court reiterates that it is not its responsibility to decide if the request for the criterion of opportunity should have been admitted or rejected, nor if the decriminalizing effects should arise from it. It insists that it has no standing to exercise control over the ruling of the criminal judge in question, issued in observance of the guarantee of the natural judge, in a process different from this one, and regarding someone who is not accused in this case. It was the criminal judge who was responsible for controlling the legality of the decriminalizing effects of the criterion of opportunity; therefore, both out of respect for her independence—since the court of merit lacks competence to assess her actions and judge whether she conformed to the legal prerequisites—and in application of the principles of impartiality and legality, which prevent arrogating a task not provided for, it is not feasible to hear the objections raised by the defense, and therefore, it is only appropriate to analyze the legality of the criterion as an antecedent to the deposition of [Name 064], determining that it was processed in a separate file, through a prosecutorial action that had the endorsement of the hierarchical superior, which was presented to the judge of the intermediate stage, who exercised the respective jurisdictional control and approved it. Having analyzed these reasonings, the undersigned consider them to be unacceptable. The judges who subscribe to the majority opinion make an effort to separate the statement made by [Name 064] in the debate from the procedure followed to apply a criterion of opportunity in his favor; however, it is notorious that if this accused collaborated, it was for the purpose of fulfilling the agreement he had made with the Public Prosecutor's Office. The expectation of obtaining impunity in relation to a series of criminal acts that, at least in principle, could be attributed to him, is what incentivized [Name 064] to collaborate, waiving his right not to testify against himself (article 36 of the Political Constitution) and the same state of innocence that protects him (art. 39 of the Political Constitution). Therefore, we are talking about intrinsically associated procedural acts, where the realization and, clearly, the legitimacy of one (the testimony, a term used in an atechnical sense since it is not offered under oath) is conditioned by the legality of the other (the agreement). It is not unknown that the statement of [Name 064], as evidence, was produced in the debate; however, this in no way modifies the conclusion previously stated, since if it took place, it was precisely because it was contemplated that way in the negotiation, from which it originates and derives. Having clarified the above, it is appropriate to make some general reflections on the principles that sustain our criminal procedure and that are indispensable for establishing the scope of jurisdictional control over the application of criteria of opportunity by the requesting body. We start with an obvious point, namely, that both the agreement made by the Public Prosecutor's Office and the ruling that authorized it are acts subject to the rule of law. According to article 11 of the Political Constitution, every public body, being a mere depositary of authority, is obliged to fulfill the duties that the legal system imposes on it, and furthermore, it can only act to the extent that the system permits it. Article 39 of the same Constitution indicates that no one shall be made to suffer a punishment except for a crime, quasi-crime, or misdemeanor, sanctioned by prior law and by virtue of a final judgment issued by a competent authority, after granting the indictee a prior opportunity to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt. From both norms, not only the principle of legality regarding crimes and penalties is deduced, but also regarding the procedure, as collected in the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter C.P.P.) in its article 1, when stating: "No one may be sentenced to a penalty or subjected to a security measure, except by virtue of a process conducted in accordance with this Code...". As can be appreciated, we are speaking of a provision that imposes the duty to respect procedural forms, not because they are valuable in themselves, but because they are destined to guarantee the rights of the parties, in particular those of the accused against whom the criminal action is exercised, and more specifically, against whom the so-called "crown witness" testifies. The majority opinion states that the requirements established in article 22, subsection b) of the C.P.P. are both substantial and formal, and that the criminal judge cannot control compliance with the former. This is a position that this court of appeals does not share, because it implies an indisputable violation of the principle of legality mentioned above. In general terms, two general models for the application of criteria of opportunity can be identified. In one, opportunity is the rule, a governing principle of criminal prosecution. As Maier points out, in this model applied, e.g., in the United States of America, the principle of legality is disregarded to such a point that the foundations of the criminal justice administration system would be threatened if this principle were adopted even partially: "...the force of that conclusion is so vigorous, that the power of selection resides in the public prosecutor's office (also in the police that interacts with it in criminal prosecution) and is inherent to it, just as the acts of government of the Executive Branch are discretionary, based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers; the practical reason is also incontestable: with that weapon, the public prosecutor's office governs the criminal process and its concrete form (through tools that, in accordance with the pursued, allow it to vary the nature of the procedure, to abbreviate it: plea bargaining, guilty plea), and harmonize its possibilities of pursuing criminally with efficiency (number of processes and complexity), with the human and material resources of the administration of justice in general, within the framework of a concrete and direct strategy for the better and most effective application of the law." (MAIER, Julio. Derecho Procesal Penal. Buenos Aires, Editores del Puerto s.r.l., 3rd reprint of the 2nd edition, 2004, p. 836). In the same sense, Fabricio Guariglia notes that, in this scheme, the discretionary powers of the requesting body are of such magnitude that in practice "...it is the prosecutor who completely dominates the procedure. These powers are not limited to the possibility of freely waiving the prosecution, but also cover a wide spectrum of 'intermediate' acts, so to speak, such as the prosecutor's power to propose a reduction in the charges on which the accusation is based or that appear in the police summary; even the public prosecutor's office can confer immunity, in compensation for having collaborated with the government in the investigation...". (GUARIGLIA, Fabricio. "Facultades discrecionales del ministerio público e investigación preparatorias: el principio de oportunidad." In: MAIER, Julio (Comp.). El Ministerio Público en el proceso penal. Buenos Aires, Ad Hoc S.R.L., 1993, pp. 89-90). In legal systems where the principle of discretion in the exercise of criminal action prevails, and not that of its mandatory nature, there is no problem whatsoever in accepting that an accused person provides collaboration in exchange for obtaining certain benefits or rewards, for example, not being investigated or prosecuted for certain acts. Faced with this model, where the requesting body's discretion is absolute, we find another characteristic of States that have adopted the continental European system, in which, in consideration of the principle of legality, the exercise of the criminal action is a duty. In this context, to waive the prosecution of a criminal act committed by an accused who collaborates with the investigation, or to suspend the exercise of the action already initiated, is not a decision free of controversy. So much so, that while some consider that the collaborator must be prosecuted criminally and can only have their sentence mitigated or be exempted from it, for others (and in this position the Code of Criminal Procedure of Costa Rica aligned itself) it is legitimate to exclude the exercise of the criminal action. Regarding the first position, Benítez Ortúzar points out to us: "The reward for 'procedural repentance', that is, the reward derived from the collaborative counter-conduct of the guilty party in the investigation of the criminal act, in the abstract, can have a merely procedural transcendence, in those legal systems where, as occurs in the Common Law States where the principle of opportunity in criminal action governs, translating into the possibility of not exercising the criminal action or even, once initiated, suspending it. However, in the States where the continental system of Law governs, in which the exercise of the criminal action is mandatory, the reward for the procedural collaboration of the guilty party must be substantiveized in the material Criminal Law, through specific mitigations of penalty or even exemptions from it, albeit after a criminal process in which the guilt of the repentant is determined." (BENÍTEZ ORTÚZAR, Ignacio Francisco. El "colaborador con la justicia": aspectos sustantivos, procesales y penitenciarios derivados de la conducta del "arrepentido". Spain, Dykinson, 2004, p. 29. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 10 November 2015 , p. 43). On the second position, and specifically, on the case of Costa Rica, Houed Vega indicates: "In accordance with what is established in the German procedural ordinance (arts. 153 et seq.), the Model Code of Criminal Procedure for Ibero-America (arts. 230 et seq.), the draft Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure of 1987 (art. 15), and the draft Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure (art. 10), it is admitted in certain, clearly predetermined cases, that the accusatory body, with the authorization and supervision of the jurisdictional body, may totally or partially waive criminal prosecution. The principle of legality in the exercise of the criminal action will continue to prevail; however, the introduction of the principle of opportunity in some clearly defined cases, under jurisdictional control, allows a significant rationalization of criminal prosecution, avoiding the intervention of state repression in cases where it is not really justified. As in the previous Code, in the current one, the governing principle of the public criminal action is that of mandatory prosecution. However, as a novelty, the said Code establishes the principle of opportunity, by virtue of which it is possible for the Prosecutor to request before the respective Court the suspension or the filing of the summary, if in the specific case any of the pre-established legal criteria are present." Thus, Article 22 provides that the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, with prior authorization from the hierarchical superior, may request that criminal prosecution be dispensed with, totally or partially, that it be limited to one or several infractions or to one of the persons who participated in the act..." (HOUED VEGA, Mario. *El proceso penal en Costa Rica*. San José, Corte Suprema de Justicia, 2000, s.n.p., available at: http://biblioteca.icap.ac.cr). Ultimately, although the Costa Rican legislator contemplated the principle of mandatory criminal prosecution (thus, art. 289 C.P.P.), it also provided an exhaustive list of scenarios in which it is plausible to order something different, hence it is a regulated opportunity (oportunidad reglada). In the case of subsection b) of Article 22 of the C.P.P., which contemplates the case of the so-called crown witness or cooperating witness (testigo de la corona o arrepentido), the application of the criterion of opportunity is conditioned upon the fulfillment of a series of requirements: i) that the prosecutor who requests to dispense totally or partially with criminal prosecution acts with prior authorization from the hierarchical superior; ii) that it involves a matter of organized crime (delincuencia organizada), violent criminality (criminalidad violenta), serious crimes (delitos graves), or complex proceedings (tramitación compleja); iii) that the accused collaborates effectively with the investigation, providing essential information to prevent the continuation of the crime or the perpetration of others, to help clarify the investigated act or other connected ones, or provides useful information to prove the participation of other accused persons; iv) that the conduct of the collaborator is less reproachable than the punishable acts whose prosecution they facilitate or whose continuation they prevent. In this matter, the trial court (tribunal de juicio), faced with a clear norm like Article 22 of the C.P.P., performs an unnecessary exercise of interpretation to give it a content it does not have. Despite the provision not distinguishing between "formal" and "substantive" requirements, the lower court (a quo) concludes that jurisdictional control can only concern the fulfillment of the former and, therefore, it is not appropriate to examine whether the collaborator's conduct is less reproachable than the punishable act whose prosecution they facilitate. In holding the above, it also recognizes, although without saying it expressly, that the requirement is not such, since the requesting body can act with absolute discretion, which is unacceptable in a criminal process like ours, governed by the principle of legality and in which it is emphasized, by express provision of the legislator, that the application of any criterion of opportunity is subject to the judge verifying compliance with all the formalities contemplated in numeral 22 C.P.P. At this point in the exposition, it is essential to differentiate between the principle of opportunity reflected in art. 22 cited supra and the legal requirements for its application, also described in that norm. One thing is the granting of a sphere of freedom to the requesting body so that, based on its prosecutorial policy, it chooses the matters in relation to which it deems opportune to dispense with or limit the exercise of criminal prosecution, and quite another are the requirements that art. 22 demands to materialize that request and within which, for what is relevant here, the lesser reproach to the cooperating accused is contemplated. Controlling strict compliance with these is the responsibility of the judge, which in no way constitutes an invasion of the functions granted to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), since the discretion granted to that public body is regarding the selection of cases, accused persons, and crimes with respect to which it requests the application of the criterion of opportunity, and regarding this petition, it must be the jurisdictional body that decides, after prior verification, as already said, of the observance of the legal requirements—hence why it is called a regulated opportunity (oportunidad reglada). In that context, the division made by the trial court (tribunal de mérito) of the requirements contemplated in Article 22 subsection b) C.P.P. is completely unfounded, since both those it calls substantive or evaluative (namely, the lesser reproach that must correspond to the collaborator's conduct) and those it calls formal (express request from the prosecutor's office with prior authorization from the hierarchical superior and jurisdictional approval), are legal and formal requirements (this to the extent that they are formalities described in the legislation), indispensable for the application of the legal device (instituto) to proceed and whose verification has been entrusted to the judge. In summary, we are talking about two different issues. On one hand, the opportunity—the sphere of discretion of the requesting body in the selection of matters where it requests the application of the criteria—and on the other, the requirements that the legal system provides for that application to take place. Just as the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is free to determine when it is opportune to dispense with or limit criminal prosecution in exchange for obtaining the collaboration of an accused, without anyone, public body or not, being able to force it to negotiate if it does not wish to do so, it is the judge who is responsible for corroborating that, in the cases selected by the requesting body, each and every one of the requirements contemplated by the legislator have been satisfied.
Having clarified the foregoing, we have that in this matter, the complaints against the criterion of opportunity applied to [Name 064] do not focus on the first aspect—in fact, no one disputes that the prosecutor's office was free to choose [Name 064] to the detriment of other accused persons—but on the second, that is, on the fulfillment of the requirements to materialize that request, an extreme that is subject to jurisdictional control. Regarding the body that must exercise that control, although in principle it must be the criminal judge (juez penal), since the request must follow the procedure established for the conclusion of the preparatory procedure (procedimiento preparatorio) (art. 22, last paragraph C.P.P.), nothing prevents the trial court (tribunal de juicio), or other bodies hearing the matter as a result of a challenge (impugnación), from assuming that task. And it is that, in addition to the examination that the criminal judge (juez penal) must carry out, aimed at determining the appropriateness and application of the criterion, we also have the control that the trial court (tribunal de juicio) must exercise a posteriori, aimed at determining whether it is appropriate to receive the statement of the cooperating witness (arrepentido), as well as that which the court of appeals (tribunal de apelación) and the cassation chamber (sala de casación) itself could come to exercise, with the purpose of establishing whether that statement can produce legal and evidentiary effects in relation to the subject against whom it is made.
Therefore, the control carried out by the criminal judge (juez penal) is not exclusive of that which other jurisdictional bodies may carry out, whether ex officio or at the request of a party. Regarding the latter, also note that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) indicates that absolute defects (defectos absolutos), such as relative defects that have not been validated (arts. 177 and 178 C.P.P.), must be remedied (saneados), a task that must be carried out without taking the process back to periods already precluded (art. 179 of the same legal body), the foregoing except in expressly provided cases, for example, a remand ordered in cassation. From this, it is extracted as a general rule that, in the case of absolute vices or non-validated relative vices, the legal operator has a duty to correct them—the norm has a mandatory nature—and this must be done, except for the exceptions also contemplated by the legislation, without taking the process back to stages already passed, which necessarily implies that the complaint against a defective act can be reiterated in multiple procedural phases.
Regarding this mechanism, Gilbert Armijo Sancho states: "In relation to the procedure in the NCPP we can say, roughly, that the defective procedural activity is capable of being claimed before the Court of the Intermediate Procedure (Tribunal del Procedimiento Intermedio). It is at this stage that all aspects related to matters not remedied in the preparatory stage must be resolved, provided they have not been validated by the inaction of the parties (arts. 15 and 317 subsection a. NCPP), and in case of not finding a positive response, it may claim said defects in trial through an incidental motion (art. 342 NCPP), and as a last alternative they may be invoked in cassation or review when dealing with aspects that imply a violation of constitutional guarantees... In cases referring to procedural defects, it is required as an admissibility requirement that the party has made a timely protest or has requested remedy (saneamiento), with the exception of absolute defects (defectos absolutos)..." (ARMIJO SANCHO, Gilbert.
"La actividad procesal defectuosa." In: *Derecho procesal penal costarricense*. San José, Asociación de Ciencias Penales de Costa Rica, Volume II, 2007, pp. 230 and 231). The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has also repeatedly ruled on the form of horizontal control alluded to before, as opposed to the vertical control that corresponds to appeals. For example, in resolution No. 1999-01550, at 3:15 p.m. on March 3, 1999, when resolving a claim of unconstitutionality against articles 437 and 315, in relation to 311, all of the C.P.P., in which it was claimed that such norms omitted the possibility of appealing an order that denies a dismissal (sobreseimiento), it indicated: "Non-existence of appeal regarding the resolution that rejects an incident of nullity... However, it is possible to affirm that the non-existence of the appeal against a resolution that denies an incident of nullity does not violate any element of due process.
The legislator is not obligated to establish a second instance for all resolutions and actions of the process. The mere existence of the appeal does not guarantee in itself the fulfillment of due process. Hence, the obligation to enable a second instance for the accused, from a human rights protection perspective, is so in relation to the sentence of conviction (sentencia condenatoria), as established by Article 8, second paragraph, subsection h) of the American Convention on Human Rights. For its part, Article 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) does is indicate which resolutions are appealable. If some irreparable harm is produced, said norm enables the appeal even if it is a resolution that has not been declared expressly appealable. If the resolution does not produce irreparable harm, one may proceed as provided in Articles 175 and following of the same Code, that is, the vice can be validated or can be remedied (sanearse).
Moreover, as indicated in the previous recital (considerando), the non-existence of an appeal in relation to a resolution that does not end the matter does not entail any injury to the fundamental guarantees of the parties, since the matter may be raised again in later stages and even in cassation in the case of a sentence of conviction (fallo condenatorio). So the contested norm does not cause any violation of due process and for that reason the action must be rejected on the merits also regarding that particular." In summary, horizontal control derives from the very structure of our criminal process. Except for the own limitations extracted from the provisions of Articles 175 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) (e.g., that it is a vice that is already validated for any of the reasons indicated in art. 177 C.P.P.), the parties can raise the questions again in later stages and the corresponding court, according to the procedural phase, will be obligated to resolve.
Added to the foregoing, we have that the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has peacefully assumed that jurisdictional bodies—the criminal judge (juez penal), the trial court (tribunal de juicio), the criminal sentence appeals courts (tribunales de apelación de sentencia penal), or even itself—are competent to examine whether one conduct is or is not less reproachable than others, for the purpose of determining whether a criterion of opportunity has been correctly granted. For example, in resolution No. 2001-00737, at 9:10 a.m. on July 27, 2001, it was indicated: "The core issue on which a judgment must be made with a view to determining whether the commented criterion can be used, is the reproachability of the specific conduct of the 'collaborator' in the act under investigation or in the one related to it and its lesser entity when compared to that of the remaining persons in whose prosecution cooperation is provided.
The defense errs, then, in affirming generically that the criterion of opportunity is inapplicable to co-perpetrators or participants in the same crime under investigation, as the law is clear in providing the opposite. In the present case, the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) maintained the thesis—admitted by the lower court (a quo) in the judgment on the merits—that witness A.J.A. participated in the act by hitting a third party whom he left unconscious (G.J.V.), but whom he did not kill; while the other persons attacked two other victims until causing their death. In this context, even if the defender's interpretation were admitted (in the sense that J. actively participated, with control over the act in the two homicides that other subjects materially carried out), the truth is that nothing prevented applying the criterion of opportunity in his favor, since the reproachability of his conduct (which, ultimately, only produced a slight incapacity in G.J.) is much less than that of the actions attributed to the other participants in the events, who would have directly sought the death of J.B.P. and N.V.C." Something similar occurs in judgment No. 00795-2009, at 2:35 p.m. on June 16, 2009.
In this, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) concluded, both that the acts committed by the collaborator may be different from the act whose prosecution they facilitate, and that the lesser reproachability corresponding to the former is one of the essential prerequisites that the judge must verify when approving the request for application of the criterion of opportunity: "The criterion of opportunity based on the cooperation that one of the participants in the crime provides to prosecute the others (or those of another more serious illicit act), constitutes a way of extinguishing criminal prosecution regarding the collaborator, it proceeds in cases of organized crime (delincuencia organizada), violent criminality (criminalidad violenta) (such as the homicide under investigation here), serious crimes (delitos graves) or complex proceedings (tramitación compleja) and demands two other essential conditions: that the conduct of the collaborator is less reproachable than the punishable acts whose prosecution they facilitate or whose continuation they prevent and that the information they provide satisfies the intended expectations.
Of course, the cooperator may be a participant in the same crime to be prosecuted (procedurally: a co-accused) or the perpetrator of another less serious punishable act. The procedure for applying the criterion of opportunity in this hypothesis includes the authorization of the hierarchical superior of the prosecutor (e.g.: the deputy prosecutor, regarding the assistant prosecutor), who must request the judge of the intermediate stage to approve the criterion of opportunity. If the judge admits it, after verifying the concurrence of the essential prerequisites (the type of criminality, the lesser reproachability of the collaborator's conduct, and the authorization of the competent prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office [Ministerio Público]), will decree the suspension of the exercise of public criminal prosecution, which will remain in that state until fifteen days after the finality of the judgment (sentencia firme) issued against the other accused persons (that is: those sought to be sanctioned with the help of the collaborator), at which time it must be definitively resolved whether the criminal prosecution is extinguished...
In this matter, the defender questions the court's agreement—which convicted three of the homicide participants—to refuse to receive the testimony of the accused 'collaborator' and, rather, order her arrest and deem the signed cooperation agreement illegal. On this point, it must be remembered that what happened was due to the actions and omissions of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), which limited itself to signing the agreement but failed to comply with the other applicable procedures (processing the authorization of the hierarchical superior and the judge's approval to declare the criminal prosecution suspended). From this perspective, no objection can be made to the act of the referred trial court (tribunal de juicio) of rejecting the proposed testimony, since the truth is that such a request sought nothing other than to receive as a witness (even without oath) a person who, according to the case file, was rather an accused who had undergone an investigative statement (indagatoria), but whose legal situation had not been defined through any jurisdictional pronouncement.
As stated, the suspension of the exercise of criminal prosecution against Y. was never decreed and, in fact, the agreement had not been submitted to a judge's examination, so the trial court (tribunal de juicio) was the first jurisdictional body that had contact with the issue. Despite the foregoing, all the court's actions cannot be endorsed either, insofar as they meant declaring the illegality of the agreement, since it would have been sufficient to reject the testimony pointing out the failure to comply with the planned legal procedure and, above all, the lack of jurisdictional approval, so it fell to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) to correct the failures incurred and seek the suspension of the oral trial while processing the hierarchical and judicial approval of the agreement, so that the testimony of the 'collaborator' would finally be received in the trial against the other participants in the crime, or, in the event that those approvals were denied, to continue with the criminal prosecution of the person subject to justice.
It is not the task of the trial court (tribunal de juicio) to declare the ineffectiveness of the collaboration agreement signed by a person who is presented as a witness without oath (or, to be more precise, an accused or co-accused whose prosecution is suspended) invoking for that purpose the content of the evidence received before hearing the account that the deponent would make. What it can do is refuse to receive the testimony if, as happened here, the established legal procedures to apply the criterion of opportunity were not fulfilled. On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasize that all the problems raised in this case and in relation to the accused are the exclusive responsibility of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público)..." Finally, in judgment No. 01712-2013, at 2:21 p.m. on November 22, 2013, the cassation body affirmed that said control must also be carried out by the court of appeals for criminal sentences (tribunal de apelación de sentencia penal): "I.
By resolution number 2013-1330, at eleven nine minutes in the morning on September twenty, two thousand thirteen, this Chamber admitted for a merits review the cassation appeal filed by attorney Jorge Pérez Ramírez, ... In the sole ground in favor of the accused I.A.C., W.M.G. and J.C.Q., he alleges the non-observance of procedural legal precepts, specifically, of the provisions in articles 142 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). In the defender's opinion, the Court of Appeals (Tribunal de Apelación) did not rule on all the aspects that were expressly questioned. In that sense, he points out that it was claimed the incorrect assessment of Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), considering that the participation of the person to whom a criterion of opportunity was granted was not less reproachable than the conduct attributed to the other accused; however, he considers that the analysis made by the Court of Appeals (Tribunal de Apelación) was limited to a review of the reasons why said witness was given credibility, and to agreeing with the thesis set forth in the ruling, without analyzing the substantive issue...
II. The claim is receivable. After conducting a careful study of judgment number 92-2013, issued by the Criminal Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de San José), at eleven o'clock on February twenty-fifth, two thousand thirteen; as well as resolution number 2013-1448, at eleven hours three minutes on July five, two thousand thirteen, of the Court of Appeals for Criminal Sentences of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), this Chamber considers that the private defense is correct in the filed claim. For the purpose of beginning the analysis on the merits of this matter, it is necessary to start from the factual framework that the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) held as proven: '1. On April 10, 2010, at approximately 6:00 p.m., the victim J.G.A.Z., alias "Cuadrado", was in San José, Alajuelita, Concepción Arriba, Residencial Los Almendros, outside Bar Betos, consuming liquor. 2.
At the same place, on the indicated date and time, the accused and administrator of said bar W.T.M.G. was present, in the company of co-accused D.A.S., c.c. "D.A.S.", who argued with the victim about a previous problem, to the point of threatening him with death. 3. Immediately thereafter, the accused M.G. and A.S., acting by mutual agreement and with the purpose of killing the aggrieved A.Z., contacted by telephone the also accused I.A.C., alias "Noringa", whom they offered the sum of two million colones to carry out said homicide. 4. By virtue of the foregoing, co-accused I.A.C., acting by mutual agreement and according to the plan previously established with the accused W.T.M.G. and D.A.S., contacted the also accused G.A.Ch.N., alias "Chava" (who is being prosecuted separately for these acts in case file 11-000052-1042-TP with whom a criterion of opportunity was negotiated) and J.J.C.Q., to execute the homicide of J.A.Z. 5.
As part of the previously established plan, the accused I.A.C., G.A.Ch.N. and J.J.C.Q., boarded in the vicinity of the former Delegation of the Public Force of Concepción de Alajuelita, the white vehicle, brand Hyundai, model Accent, license plate..., which was driven by co-accused J.C.Ch.M., alias "Pipo", who, without knowing about the previously agreed payment, but knowing that a homicide was going to be committed, was accompanied by the also accused M.J.A.S., alias "Coco" (who is being prosecuted separately for these acts in case file 12-000012-1042-TP), brother of D.A.S., who headed to the place where the victim was, with the purpose of killing him. 6. At approximately 11:30 p.m. that same day, the victim A.Z. was outside Bar Betos, at which time the accused W.T.M.G. and D.A.S., still acting by mutual agreement, according to the previously established plan and with a clear distribution of functions, communicated by telephone with co-accused I.A.C. and informed him of the exact location of the victim, in order to ensure his death. 7.
Immediately thereafter, once these accused arrived near Bar Betos, the defendants G.A.Ch.N. and J.C.Q. got out of said vehicle, at which time co-accused J.C.Ch.M., according to the plan previously established to ensure the subsequent escape from the place, parked approximately 50 meters north of the point where the victim was, a place where he waited for them while they carried out the homicide, in the company of co-accused M.A.S. and I.A.C., who had previously given them the respective operational instructions to execute said crime. 8. Immediately thereafter, the accused G.A.Ch.N. and J.C.Q., acting by mutual agreement with the also accused W.M.G., D.A.S., M.J.A.S., I.A.C. and J.C.Ch.M., approached the victim and without any cause of justification and with total disregard for his life, shot him on multiple occasions with firearms, also injuring co-accused J.J.C.Q. ...10. As a consequence of the illicit actions of all the accused, the victim suffered seven wounds caused by firearm projectiles, located in the thorax, abdomen, right buttock, right upper and left lower extremities, which caused his death that same day at Hospital San Juan de Dios, the cause of death being: Firearm projectile wound to the thorax with cardiac laceration with left hemothorax and hemopericardium and the manner of death: Homicide from a medico-legal point of view.' In this way, for the Sentencing Court (Tribunal de sentencia) it was duly proven that the defendants G.A.Ch.N. and J.C.Q. were the material perpetrators of the homicide, because in the distribution of functions previously agreed among all the co-accused, they were the two who agreed to execute the charged crime, shooting on various occasions with the firearms they carried, with the purpose of ending the victim's life.
Now then, the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) decided to negotiate a criterion of opportunity with co-accused G.A.Ch.N., who collaborated with his statement, as a crown witness (testigo de la corona). This deal was objected to by the defense of the other defendants, pointing out that the legal prerequisites for the applicability of the criterion of opportunity were not met, since the accused had the quality of co-perpetrator in the charged acts, was the material executor of the homicide, and his conduct was as reproachable as that of the other co-perpetrators. The protest for defective procedural activity (actividad procesal defectuosa) was resolved in the first recital (considerando) of the judgment (sentencia) issued by the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) (visible from folio 1223 of volume II of the investigation file). In summary, said protest was declared without merit, for the following reasons:
- 1)Article 22, subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) grants the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) the discretion to dispense totally or partially with criminal prosecution, when the accused testifies against other participants in the act, with the purpose of obtaining a benefit, in relation to the reproach of their responsibility in the charged crime.
- 2)The negotiation escapes the control of the other accused, it is not a right that belongs to them and it is a private business between the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the defender, and the collaborator, therefore, the agreement has no obligation of publicity.
- 3)Regarding the degree of reproach of the conduct attributed to the crown witness (testigo de la corona), it stated: 'The factual framework that has been demonstrated and that finds support in the accusatory document, establishes that due to criminal problems that existed between a brother of the victim and a brother of the accused, friction had arisen that culminated in the decision of the accused D.A.S., to pay a sum of two million colones with the sole purpose of ending the life of J., which found justification in the taunts that the latter made at the business of A. S., in relation to the supposed rights of his brother, because of the debts of A. S. and a brother of his, to him. Thus, on April 10, 2011, and after one of these problems, A. S. and co-accused W. M. G., taking advantage of the economic advantage of the former, devised the death of the victim, deciding to pay third parties a sum of two million colones for that execution. In this way, it is feasible to conclude that those who had control, the decision over that act, were A. S. and M. G., who assumed the primary function in the act, for they were the ones who decided to contract co-accused I.A., so that he in turn would contract J.J.C.Q. and the accused and crown witness (testigo de la corona), Ch.N., to materialize the death of the victim, in addition, the defendant J.C.Ch. participated in the act, who was in charge of facilitating and driving the vehicle that was used to transport those who would be in charge of committing the criminal act. It is denoted then, that the planned homicide was even structured hierarchically based on those who in that small organizational structure were the ones who decided and paid for the commission of the homicide. In a second plane, as we have said, we find A. who was the contractor-intermediary, and even lower, it is possible to find those who materialized the act, who in the Court's opinion can be seen as replaceable pieces of that plan. The Court considers then that the participation attributed to Ch.N. can be framed within a lesser reproach, this from the perspective of the organizational structure, where he followed orders from others, which reflects his lesser relevance in the events. It is important to indicate that in relation to the decision of which of the accused should be granted the criterion of opportunity, it must be concluded that this is a power that the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) holds by law and that it will depend on the lesser reproach and that the information provided is sufficient, according to the prosecutorial criterion, without the Court being able to observe any vice in that the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) chooses one accused over others, to benefit him with the non-prosecution of his criminal responsibility for the events.' For its part, the Court of Appeals for Criminal Sentences of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), in resolution number 2013-1448, at eleven hours three minutes on July five, two thousand thirteen, when hearing that same argument as one of the grounds of the appeal of the sentence of conviction (sentencia condenatoria), indicated: 'i.- In the first place, the defense has complained about the agreement of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) to grant a criterion of opportunity to one of those involved in the case, arguing that the content of Article 22 subsection b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) was exceeded, insofar as it was applied to the one who committed the most serious action of shooting the victim. This issue was extensively addressed in the ruling (fs.
1223-1226), demonstrating that the Code of Criminal Procedure has granted a broad margin of discretion to the Public Prosecutor's Office to negotiate within the criminal process, evaluating the pertinence in each case, in accordance with the orientation of criminal policy. It further indicated that the agreements are not public nor do third parties not interested in the transaction participate, to the point that it is handled in a separate and independent file. Furthermore, the ruling highlights that, according to what was demonstrated, the decision-making power to order the death of the victim was in the hands of D.A.S. and W.M.G., meaning that they are the ones to whom greater blameworthiness corresponds for the act, and to a lesser degree G.Ch.N., notwithstanding that the latter was an executor of the orders given. This Court has examined the point and concurs with the thesis set forth in the ruling, in that those who give the orders and pay the reward for the death of the offended party and make others obey, have greater blameworthiness than the executors themselves, meaning that we are faced with one of the presuppositions that authorizes the negotiation of opportunity criteria in organized crime." (see folio 1501 front and back).
Regarding the foregoing reasoning shared by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, it is appropriate to make the following reflections: The principle of opportunity, contemplated in the adjective law as an exception to the principle of legality, presupposes a series of sine qua non conditions for the purposes of admissibility, as provided by the legislator. Thus, in all cases, the prior authorization of the hierarchical superior of the prosecutor promoting the agreement is required, according to the different factual assumptions authorized by the legislator. The first of these, contemplated in subsection a) of Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides: "It involves an insignificant act, minimal culpability of the perpetrator or participant, or a meager contribution thereof, except when there is violence against persons or force against things, the public interest is affected, or the act was committed by a public official in the exercise of their duties or on occasion thereof." According to the legal grounds set forth by the trial judges in the conviction judgment…, this is the applicable factual assumption in the present matter.
However, none of the requirements set forth therein are met in the case sub examine. This Chamber considers that the crime of homicide is not, from any point of view, an insignificant act. The figure of the material perpetrator of homicide contravenes the concept of "minimal culpability" or "meager contribution." Killing a person is the ultimate representation of violence against a human being and, therefore, directly affects the public interest. Consequently, the proven facts of the ruling fail to meet all the legal requirements enshrined in this factual hypothesis. If we continue on to the next substratum, contained in subsection b) of the article in question, it establishes: "It involves matters of organized crime, violent criminality, serious crimes, or cases of complex processing, and the accused cooperates efficiently with the investigation, provides essential information to prevent the continuation of the crime or the perpetration of others, helps to clarify the investigated act or other connected acts, or provides useful information to prove the participation of other accused persons, provided that the conduct of the collaborator is less blameworthy than the punishable acts whose prosecution it facilitates or whose continuation it prevents…
Based on the foregoing, the acts accused here could be adapted to the guidelines stipulated on violent criminality, serious crimes, efficient collaboration, helping to clarify the investigated act, and providing useful information to prove the participation of other accused persons, because there is a statement from the crown witness that, for the purposes of the sentencing court, was sufficiently clear, convincing, and truthful, regarding the participation of the other defendants, as well as regarding the motive and the dynamics developed, from the planning to the execution of the crime, capable of accrediting, jointly with the other evidence for the prosecution, the acts charged. However, the law provides that in addition to those requirements, "the conduct of the collaborator is less blameworthy than the punishable acts whose prosecution it facilitates or whose continuation it prevents." It is regarding this last requirement that the defense directs its claim, and it is precisely on this that a careful analysis must exist, in order to determine the legality and admissibility of the opportunity criterion that was granted to G.A.Ch.N., in the capacity of what in legal doctrine is called a "repentant accused" or "crown witness" of the prosecuting entity.
Without losing sight of the fact that this is a criminal structure, in which there are clearly delimited functions among the participating subjects, a logical and analytical examination must be carried out, aimed at determining the essentiality and relevance of the conduct of the agent who seeks to benefit from the application of this legal instrument. Based on the effective concretization of the action imputed to them and the essentiality and significance in the harmful result, the lawful and proportional parameters that would delineate the agreement between the parties are established; namely, the Public Prosecutor's Office, defense attorney, and repentant or collaborating accused. Although the law grants the prosecuting entity a broad margin of negotiation and even the power to totally or partially waive the criminal prosecution, it is also true that it sets a limit for the exercise of that discretion, while it warns that the beneficiary must have a conduct less blameworthy than that imputed to the other co-participants in the act that is sought to be ceased or proven.
Likewise, it gives the Public Prosecutor's Office the possibility of graduating the granting of that benefit, in order to assess the blameworthiness of the conduct compared to that of the other co-participants and the effectiveness of the collaboration provided in the investigation, as well as in obtaining the conviction. The graduation of the benefit offered to the crown witness is directly related to whether the criminal prosecution is partially or totally waived, and, therefore, with the elimination or reduction of the penalty to be imposed. Thus, an action carried out by a subject accused of actual or personal favoritism in the criminal organization will not have the same level of reproach as the one who performs the action as an accomplice to the more serious crime, just as it does not resemble the one executed by the perpetrator or co-perpetrators. Therefore, there must be a correlation between the benefit offered and the degree of blameworthiness of the conduct, in such a way that a rational proportion is established to determine whether the criminal prosecution is completely waived or whether, on the contrary, the illicit act is sanctioned in a less rigid way, making the proposal attractive for the repentant accused, but which, at the same time, is appropriate for the ends of justice, thus avoiding that the same measure (of completely waiving the criminal prosecution) is applied indiscriminately to every type of participant in a crime, obviating the legally established requirements for the application of this legal instrument.
It is for this reason that we consider the agreement made between the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the collaborating accused, and his legal representative to be illegitimate, because there is no proportionality between the benefit received and the degree of participation in the accused acts. Contrary to what the judges state in the conviction judgment and in the appeals decision, the conduct attributed to the defendant Ch.N. is highly blameworthy; since, acting in association with the accused C.Q., they killed the offended party here, that is, they materialized the act, without any justification whatsoever, other than the interest of receiving an undue pecuniary benefit. To opt for a different criterion is to accept that the figure of contract killing is clothed with an insignificant and even null censure, as in the case that concerns us, in which the conduct deployed by one of the co-perpetrators is made inconsequential.
The Public Prosecutor's Office, for its part, has the legal power to negotiate with the crown witness the imposition of a lesser penalty than that provided for the other co-participants, thus avoiding the impunity of a conduct that holds a high degree of reproach. It is also contradictory that, while the Prosecutor's Office completely waives the criminal prosecution against Ch.N., for that same conduct and, therefore, with the same degree of reproach, C.Q. is sanctioned to the extent of twenty-five years of prison, as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of aggravated homicide, just like the penalty imposed on the accused who were accused of being the intellectual authors… and the mediator who hired the hitmen and carried out the respective collection for doing the job… In this sense, it is incompatible to state that the conduct of one of the material perpetrators of the act is less blameworthy, to justify the application of the opportunity criterion and, on the other hand, to sanction all the other accused with the same penalty, evading all the prior reasoning on the blameworthiness of the conducts, according to the hierarchical structure of the criminal organization and the functions entrusted to each member." This contradiction in the judges' reasoning violates the logicality and legality of the ruling, because it is not possible to admit that one conduct is less harmful than another and have the sanction applied equally to all.
Nor is it acceptable that one argument is used to legalize an agreement, and with another totally opposite one, such a high prison sentence is imposed, when the act judged in both cases is identical. Finally, since the entirety of the judgment on the merits was based on the version given by the crown witness, on the occasion of an opportunity criterion that fails to meet the legally established requirements for its admissibility, judgment number 92-2013, of eleven hours on the twenty-fifth of February of two thousand thirteen, issued by the Criminal Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of San José and the trial that preceded it are annulled; as well as decision number 2013-1448, of eleven hours three minutes on the fifth of July of two thousand thirteen, issued by the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judgment of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, in which the judgment on the merits was confirmed.
It is ordered that this matter be remitted at the earliest possible time to the Court of origin, so that with a new composition, the retrial may be conducted...". The foregoing citation is extensive, but indispensable to gauge the scope of the jurisdictional control which, according to the cassation body, must be carried out on the issue of reproach and which supports the thesis of this chamber. We are speaking of judgments where no objection whatsoever was had to examining the point, where it is recognized, expressly and implicitly, that this analysis can be reiterated in different phases of the process and, above all, where the thesis of the a quo is discarded, to the effect that this particular requirement contemplated by subsection b) of Article 22 C.P.P., at any stage of the procedure, is exempt from jurisdictional control. It is also important to refer to what was said by the Constitutional Chamber regarding this extreme.
According to the judges of first instance, the constitutional court, through binding jurisprudence, prohibited the judge from controlling whether the conduct of the collaborator is less blameworthy than the criminal acts attributed to other accused persons. Such an assertion is not accurate. In decision No. 12090, of 14:40 hours on July 31, 2009, the Constitutional Chamber ruled on an action of unconstitutionality filed by [Name 033] against Articles 22 and 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The action was rejected on the merits, and regarding what is relevant here, it was stated: "On the other hand, Article 22 in fine is clear in pointing out that the request for the application of an opportunity criterion must be raised before the court, which is the one that definitively decides, exercising due legality control. It is not true, then, what was indicated by the claimant, in that there is no control by the guarantee judge.
This control cannot be understood, in any way, in the sense that the judge can replace the decisions of the prosecutors related to the criminal-political opportunity and convenience of initiating or continuing with the criminal prosecution. As will be analyzed, judicial control must be limited to the legal requirements, but it cannot assess aspects that are characteristic of the exercise of the accusatory function. To achieve the objectives pursued by the principle of opportunity, it must be administered by the body in charge of state criminal prosecution. It must be added that the fact that the right to appeal the decision approving the application of an opportunity criterion by those who appear as accused in the same cause is not provided for does not injure due process or the right to defense, given that the testimony given by the person to whom an opportunity criterion has been applied will be assessed by the court, which must substantiate the credibility it grants or not, in relation to the rest of the evidence and, furthermore, may be broadly questioned by the parties in the debate.
Likewise, the accused has the right to challenge the judgment if they consider that defects have occurred in the reasoning of the ruling or in the incorporation or assessment of the evidence...". Further on, in that same decision, it was also stated: "VII. Regarding the principle of judicial independence. The claimant indicates that the questioned norms infringe upon the principle of judicial independence, because the Public Prosecutor's Office subordinates the judge, who truly disappears from the criminal scene and is reduced to fulfilling a merely formal task, which injures their independence, weakening the protection of the rights of the other accused, especially the right to defense, to a fair trial, and to due process with all guarantees.- In relation to this aspect, it must be recognized that the Public Prosecutor's Office must be the axis of any markedly adversarial system. In the application of opportunity criteria, it is the accusatory body that must decide the convenience and necessity of its application, as it has been attributed the competence to design criminal prosecution policies, exercise the criminal action, and carry out the preparatory investigation.
As provided by the legislator, the judge must exercise a legality control over the application of said measures, but not over their opportunity and convenience. Such a division of functions, far from violating the principle of judicial independence, rather strengthens it, given that the jurisdictional function must be restricted to controlling respect for the rights and guarantees of the parties and not to deciding on the accusation. On this topic, the Chamber ruled in judgment 2662-01 of 15:30 hrs. on 4-4-01, where a judicial consultation filed regarding the constitutionality of the deputy prosecutor's decision that obligated the judge to admit the application of an opportunity criterion due to the insignificance of the act and order the definitive dismissal was resolved. In what is relevant, it was stated: 'Consequently, it corresponds to the Prosecutor to decide regarding the convenience of applying or not an opportunity criterion.
The parties may request its application, within the five-day period provided for in Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the court of the intermediate procedure cannot accept that request without the approval of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which, as was said, must have the approval of the hierarchical superior. It is a duty and power of the Prosecutor General to establish the general policy of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the criteria for the exercise of the criminal action (Article 25 subsection a) of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecutor's Office). Consequently, in accordance with that structure, the analysis that the court must carry out to authorize the application of an opportunity criterion must be limited to verifying compliance with the formal requirements established by the legislator. The judge's authorization excludes carrying out an analysis of the convenience or opportunity of the measure, given that they cannot substitute the decision of the Prosecutor, who is in charge of the exercise of the criminal action; it is to them that the responsibility is attributed, because this leads to distorting –within the system that has been chosen (the adversarial system)- the judging function that corresponds to them, having to wait to be duly excited by the requesting body in order to act.
In the assumption of Article 22 subsection a), corresponding to the criterion of insignificance of the act, whose application originates this consultation, the judge must verify that the act was not committed by a public official in the exercise of their duties or on occasion thereof. The determination of whether it involves an act that affects the public interest or not corresponds to the Prosecutor because it is a value judgment criterion that has to do with the exercise of the State's criminal policy, to be weighed in each specific case by the representation of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The foregoing, because it is a clear fact that in all crimes subject to public prosecution, the affectation of a public interest is involved, hence society at the time considered it necessary to classify them as such. It is the Public Prosecutor's Office –it bears repeating- that must make the judgment regarding the convenience, utility, and necessity of the criminal prosecution in each specific case.' …It is clear, then, that it is the Public Prosecutor's Office, and not the judge, that is responsible for deciding on the convenience or opportunity of applying the criteria provided for in Article twenty-two of the code of criminal procedure.
This decision is an expression of the accusatory power and responds to a prosecution policy attributed exclusively to the accusatory body. However, the legislator established a legality control that the judge must exercise regarding compliance with the requirements contained in the objected regulation itself. It is not a decision that lacks judicial assessment, although in some eminently adversarial systems, such control is not required, without it having been considered that such liberality violates fundamental rights." (The underlining is not from the original). For those subscribing to this decision, the foregoing precedent cannot be interpreted in the manner set forth in the majority vote. In the first place, the Constitutional Chamber did not indicate that jurisdictional control should be circumscribed to part of the requirements provided for in Article 22 subsection b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Quite the contrary. It stated that in our country, unlike what happens in other latitudes (where a model has been adopted according to which the principle of opportunity is the rule and the decisions adopted by the Public Prosecutor's Office are not subject to judicial assessment), the judge is the one called to determine if the requirements contemplated in the legal system are met. This, the Constitutional Chamber indicates, does not empower the judge to assume tasks that do not correspond to them, for example, to assess the convenience or opportunity of waiving the criminal prosecution in a specific case. And it is that indeed, the decision to prosecute or not a specific conduct is the purview of the Public Prosecutor's Office; however, this does not mean that in that area it has maximum discretion. Its decisions are subject to the law - since it can only waive criminal prosecution and promise advantages in the terms indicated by the latter, cf.
Art. 22 and 96 C.P.P.-, it being the task of the jurisdictional body, also by express provision of the legislator, to guarantee respect for the legal system. It is important to add that although the Constitutional Chamber pointed out that there are assessments that only the Public Prosecutor's Office can carry out (e.g., establishing that in a particular case the affectation to the public interest was insignificant in the terms indicated by Art. 22 subsection a) of the C.P.P., cf. judgment No. 2662-01 mentioned in No. 12090-2009 previously reproduced), this does not allow interpreting that, in the case of subsection b) of numeral 22 -that is, of another assumption- the Public Prosecutor's Office can determine, without any jurisdictional control, that the conduct of the collaborator is less blameworthy than other punishable acts, or affirm, as the court on the merits does, that this position is the one assumed by the highest constitutional court of our country, disregarding that the latter has only expressly indicated that the convenience of applying or not the mentioned legal instrument is the purview of the requesting body, a position that is shared without reservation, because indeed, only the Public Prosecutor's Office can decide if it is convenient to waive the criminal prosecution of an accused in a particular case, in exchange for their collaboration.
The foregoing, it must be insisted, does not mean that it can negotiate with any accused in any case, or negotiate any benefit, this insofar as its request, to be accepted, depends on verifying compliance with the requirements defined by the C.P.P. Obviously, neither the criminal judge, nor the trial court, nor the bodies hearing the matter on appeal, will assess the timeliness of the decision of the Public Prosecutor's Office (supported by its prosecutorial policy), but they must corroborate, because the legal system so orders, the strict compliance with its (legal and constitutional) requirements, which is something different. In the same way, it will be the Public Prosecutor's Office that must assume the consequences of deciding in that area incorrectly, because if it negotiates with an accused whose statement, besides being essential, is implausible, it is probable that the outcome of the process is not the desired one, just as if it negotiates with an accused who bears greater reproach, it is also plausible that at any procedural stage and in the face of the protests of the parties, the negotiation will be considered illegal.
In summary, based on the same precedents cited by the a quo and in which the importance of legality as a guiding principle of the actions of any public body is underlined, this chamber concludes that the court, regardless of the stage in which the procedure finds itself, is obligated to verify that all the requirements contemplated in Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are met, therefore including what is related to the lesser reproach that must correspond to the conduct of the collaborating accused whose criminal prosecution is waived. For the judge to be able to appreciate this extreme, the criminal prosecution policies designed by the Public Prosecutor's Office are inconsequential, the same ones that do acquire relevance for the purpose of establishing, for example, the cases and accused in relation to whom that body requests the application of a specific criterion, a matter in which it certainly has a considerable margin of freedom.
In this same order of ideas, it is also not unnecessary to insist that decision No. 2662-2001, mentioned in turn in No. 12090-2009 of the Constitutional Chamber, ruled on subsection a) of Article 22 C.P.P. and not on subsection b), which is the one that concerns us here. Added to this, there are other decisions of the referred Chamber, e.g., No. 2002-06808, of 14:46 hours on July 10, 2002, where in a majority vote, and indeed referring to what was said in subsection b) of numeral 22, the control carried out by the trial court over the legality of an opportunity criterion was endorsed: "The non-conformity of the appellant lies in the fact that the protected party… signed an agreement with the Public Prosecutor's Office, for the application of the regulated principle of opportunity, in the assumption established in Article 22 subsection b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and after offering a statement of great utility to arrive at the truth of the investigated facts, the appealed court revoked the agreement, leaving the accused in total defenselessness.
In this regard, the first thing this Chamber must clarify is that the Code of Criminal Procedure itself clearly distributed the competences in matters of application of the regulated principle of opportunity, leaving in the hands of the Public Prosecutor's Office the analysis of the convenience and opportunity to abstain from exercising the punitive claim in the cases provided for in Article 22; likewise, it leaves to the criminal courts the control of legality in the use of said instrument, given the gravity that its application contrary to Law would entail. In the specific case of subsections b) and f) of the already cited Article 22, the effects of the agreement entered into by the Public Prosecutor's Office with the accused person are merely provisional, and become final only when the Trial Court definitively determines if it is appropriate –in accordance with the parameters provided for in the Law- to waive the criminal action against that person.
That is to say, it is clear that the mere signing of an agreement between the Public Prosecutor's Office and the accused in a criminal case, the latter committing to provide useful information in the investigation, does not by itself confer the right to obtain a dismissal decision in that process, but rather the final decision in this matter always remains in the hands of the judge… In the present case, it is obvious that the protected party could not demand that the Trial Court apply, without a prior legality judgment, the agreement it signed with the Public Prosecutor's Office. This being the case, the action of the appealed court, reviewing whether the agreement in question met the requirements of Article 22 subsection b), is not illegitimate, but in accordance with its competences, as was explained in the previous paragraph…", a vote that supports what was said by this court of sentence appeal and which the court on the merits disregards, by relying only on the dissenting vote signed by Judge Fernando Cruz Castro, the same one which, for further abundance, also does not call into question our conclusions.
Note that Judge Cruz Castro does not deny that the trial court could or should verify compliance with the requirements contemplated in Article 22 subsection b) of the C.P.P. What he questions is that the court took measures against the liberty of a person (the collaborator), against whom an accusation had not been formulated that would delineate their criminal responsibility. Said dissenting vote states: “… The intervention of the trial court against a decision adopted by the Prosecutor's Office, rejecting an agreement between the defendant and the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, decreeing, at the same time, the detention of a person against whom an accusation had not been formulated, constitutes an improper intervention that denaturalizes the jurisdictional function, because a requirement that ensures the impartiality of the judge is their disconnection from the requesting power.
This separation ensures the effective validity of the judge's impartiality, which is one of the most important organic guarantees that define the jurisdictional function. Without the accusatory body having defined the issue, the judges of the court outlined a possible responsibility of the claimant, anticipating a judgment, without the criminal action having been exercised. The Court rejects the agreement and the application of the principle of opportunity, but by decreeing detention and ruling on the possible responsibility of a witness against whom the criminal action had not been exercised, it improperly assumes the functions that correspond to the accusatory body. The liberty of a citizen is not satisfactorily protected if the judge assumes repressive and judgmental powers, without the requesting body having formulated the accusation. The possible criminal responsibility of the respondent in a process in which the prosecuting entity had not exercised the accusation constitutes an excess that violates the balance of powers and the clear differentiation of actors and powers that governs the criminal process.
The possible criminal responsibility that may correspond to a witness who testifies in such condition and against whom the criminal action has not been exercised is an irrelevant issue that does not justify an anticipated judgment such as the one exercised by the trial court, because no person who testifies under oath or without it can provide legitimate evidence that self-incriminates them. By virtue of safeguarding such a probability, legally inadmissible and whose consequences must be resolved in another process, following the exercise of the requesting action, the court cannot meddle in the judgment of an act that has not been submitted to its knowledge. Nor was the possible departure from the country of the witness-accused relevant, because such an extreme is a responsibility of the Public Prosecutor's Office, especially vis-à-vis a citizen over whom the competent body had not exercised its requesting power. Nor was it a flagrant crime, and for this reason, they could not decree the immediate detention of the claimant, as was done in the trial hearing.
To assert that the witness was not detained because she was placed at the disposal of the competent authorities is a fallacious argument intended to conceal an action in which the jurisdictional power exceeds its limits, blurring the difference between accusation and judgment, thereby violating the impartiality of the jurisdiction. As established by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court may reject the agreement but cannot base such a determination on speculation about the possible responsibility of the crown witness; rather, it must do so in a judgment, in accordance with the requirements set forth in Article 23 of the C.P.P. The Judge cannot anticipate the outcome of the accusation, even less so when it concerns the trial court itself, as it is not possible for it to rule on the possible authorship attributable to the crown witness when it has not yet pronounced on the accusation that excludes the collaborator and mentions other actors and possible co-perpetrators of the act.
The problem in this case is not that the agreement ensures the dismissal of the claimant—which would not be a legally admissible claim—but that the court imposed a limitation on the freedom of… without having the legitimacy required for such a decision, since the competent authority had not exercised its requesting power. Although the Prosecutor’s Office had not previously requested the legality review corresponding to the court of the intermediate stage (see the last paragraph of Article 22 of the C.P.P.), such omission does not authorize the trial court to reject the criterion of opportunity based on a series of assessments and speculations about the outcome of an action that the Public Prosecutor’s Office has not pursued. The rejection of the criterion of opportunity provided for in subsection b) of Article 22 of the C.P.P. must be based on the description and evidence of the main accusation, but it is not acceptable—as occurred in the present case—that the rejection be based on an anticipatory evaluation of the evidence, as well as on an interpretation of the facts not contained in the accusation.
The rejection of the agreement cannot be based on a factual and legal determination that does not arise from the accusation and the agreement; it is for this reason that Article 23 of the C. P. P. suspends the extinction of the criminal action, authorizing it only after the trial has been held, which is the opportunity when the court, in the full exercise of its powers, once the evidence has been received in accordance with the constitutional principles that legitimize its reception and evaluation, determines whether the collaboration is legally acceptable, defining two points: a) whether the person in question is someone whose action in the criminal activity is less reprehensible than that of the person they helped to resolve, and secondly; b) whether the collaboration provided by the collaborating witness has been decisive. The evaluation of these parameters cannot be undertaken before the trial hearing, as the trial court did, constructing an accusatorial hypothesis over which it had no involvement, as the Code of Criminal Procedure correctly defines by recognizing, as appropriate, that the eventual responsibility of the crown witness must be resolved only after the trial has been held (see the second paragraph of Article 23 of the C.P.P.).
Given the failure to comply with the provisions set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure (the last paragraph of Article 22 and Article 24 of the C.P.P.), the court could well have rejected the agreement that the Public Prosecutor’s Office presented unexpectedly, but without ruling on the content of the agreement and the possible participation of the claimant. Nor could the court, as explained, order the detention of a person who was not an offender caught in flagrante delicto and against whom the Public Prosecutor’s Office had not brought a criminal action. The admissibility or legality of the criterion of opportunity applied by the Public Prosecutor’s Office does not authorize the Court to exercise the powers corresponding to the accusation. By virtue of the arguments that have been set forth, the undersigned of this vote considers that, although the unexpected presentation of the agreement with the claimant by the Public Prosecutor’s Office violates the principles of loyalty and due process, such error does not authorize the trial court to exercise powers corresponding to the accusing body, by ruling on the possible criminal responsibility of a person without an accusation having been filed against them and by ordering, based on such determination, the unlawful detention of the claimant …”.
As can be observed, this dissenting vote does not deny the possibility that the trial court may control compliance with all the requirements set forth in Article 22, subsection b) of the C.P.P. On the contrary, it admits such an option, on the understanding that this must be done once the evidence has been received at trial. For all the foregoing reasons, this Chamber concludes that jurisdictional control over the appropriateness of the criterion of opportunity must exist, verifying compliance with the legal requirements—without distinctions, since the law makes no distinction in this regard—that the procedural code requires for its application. It is not a matter of supplanting the prosecutor in the selection of cases in which, for reasons of criminal policy, criminal prosecution should be waived (as certainly, no one disputes that determining the appropriateness of the measure in a specific case is the purview of the requesting authority), but rather of ensuring that said authority’s action—meaning, the application to a specific case—conforms to the legal system.
Finally, the fact that the criterion of opportunity must be processed in a separate file is not, as the trial court indicates, an argument that exempts it from its duty to control compliance with the requirements that gave rise to its application, since, although it is true that the declaration of the collaborating defendant takes place at trial—meaning the evidence is produced at that time and not before—it cannot be ignored that said declaration has its raison d'être in the aforementioned criterion. If this had not been negotiated, the collaborator would not give testimony, and to that extent we cannot exclude that procedure from judicial control. As is correctly indicated in the vote signed by Judge Camacho Morales, the promise of impunity, the promise to waive criminal prosecution, whether total or partial, is what motivates the will of the collaborator, and therefore it is necessary to corroborate whether that promise conforms to the regulations or not.
This, logically, must take place in the main proceeding, since it is in this proceeding where the criminal prosecution of the collaborator is waived and the punishable conduct is charged, which, in light of Article 22, subsection b), must be more reprehensible than that which ceases to be of interest to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The fact that the criterion of opportunity was accepted by a criminal judge is no obstacle to the matter being heard by the trial court, since in our criminal procedure the parties may repeatedly object to defects that cause them harm, whether these are absolute or relative when they have not been validated. That said, we also note that in the appealed judgment, some additional reasons are set forth to support the refusal to rule on the criterion, which it is appropriate to examine carefully. The first is that the proceeding in which the criterion of opportunity was processed is independent of this one.
As already noted, this implies setting aside that the declaration of [Name 064] was to be rendered in this case; that the criterion of opportunity takes place because, at least in principle, the conduct of [Name 064] is less reprehensible than that attributed to other defendants, and finally, that it will be based on what is decided in this matter that it will be determined whether the expectations for which the exercise of the criminal action was suspended have been satisfied. That is to say, even if it is admitted that the criterion of opportunity is processed in a certified copy of documents independent of the main file, and that the account of [Name 064] contained therein need not be brought to the attention of those named as defendants in this matter (thus, Resolutions No. 4142 of 2:51 p.m. on June 2, 1999 and No. 1119 of 11:09 a.m. on February 4, 2005, both from the Constitutional Chamber), the legality of the procedure (compliance with requirements set forth in the C.P.P.) is part of the issues that the trial court can and must control (whether because the parties so request, or because it understands it must do so ex officio), just as occurs with other procedural acts that take place in prior stages and through which the door is opened for a specific piece of evidence to be produced or incorporated at trial (e.g., the resolution ordering a jurisdictional advance of evidence).
Moreover, the trial court incurs in contradictions, since if, based on the argument that the criterion of opportunity was processed in an independent proceeding, it refused to review the requirements that it—erroneously—classified as substantial (namely, the lesser reprehension of the collaborator), it would also lack jurisdiction to verify compliance with those it termed formal (namely, an express request from the Prosecutor’s Office that has the endorsement of the hierarchical superior and jurisdictional approval), given that it did the latter. To the above, an additional inconsistency must be added, namely, that despite the trial judges agreeing to examine the procedural issues, they omitted to resolve the claims raised by the defense counsel for [Name 033] and [Name 041] regarding the lack of reasoning in the resolution issued by the criminal judge (cf. folios 13,676 front and back, 13,677 back, volume XXVIII), and this despite the fact that the defect referred to is clearly one of form.
As a second argument, the professionals signing the majority vote maintain that, regarding the criterion of opportunity, the decision can only be challenged through the appeal against the final dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) that may eventually be issued in the proceeding where the application of that legal institution is processed. Such a position evidently renders nugatory the right of defense of the accused in the main proceedings who are harmed by the collaborator’s declaration, especially considering that they are not parties to that proceeding (in fact, the a quo acknowledges this). Furthermore, the final dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) would supervene, according to Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, once the judgment—meaning, the one issued by the trial court in this matter—has become final, whereby the situation of those on trial, convicted by then, would be consolidated.
That is to say, we find ourselves confronting the absurdity that the procedure to apply a criterion of opportunity to a collaborating defendant, even in cases where it is openly illegal, would be exempt from all control, since according to the thesis of the a quo, the so-called substantial requirements can never be assessed by the judge and because, quite simply, those harmed by the decision to apply the criterion cannot challenge it in any proceeding—neither in this one being pursued against them, nor in the one where the criterion is processed, as they are not parties—which would imply a flagrant violation of Article 42 of the Political Constitution. As a third argument, the majority vote maintains that analyzing the issue would entail advancing a criterion. This is also unacceptable, since it is one thing to compare reprehensibility based on the information provided by the requesting authority when requesting the criterion of opportunity, and quite another to issue a pronouncement on whether that conduct actually occurred or not—the latter being what would compromise the impartiality of the trial court.
In any event, the option always remained to defer the resolution of the issue to the judgment, as expressly indicated by Article 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as stated by Judge Cruz Castro in the dissenting vote invoked by the judges. For all the foregoing reasons, this Chamber concludes that the application of the criterion of opportunity set forth in Article 22, subsection b) of the C.P.P. is subject to jurisdictional control, and that therefore the court—whether the criminal judge, the trial court, and even the appellate and cassation courts, when appropriate—must verify compliance with all the requirements that the legislature mandates for such purposes. It is not a matter of supplanting the prosecutor in the selection of cases in which, for reasons of criminal policy, they consider that criminal prosecution should be waived, but rather of ensuring that in those cases chosen by the requesting authority, the formalities required by the legal system for such purposes are met.
- 2)Examination of the criterion of opportunity granted to [Name 064]. Defects present in its proceeding and in the resolution that authorized it. As already explained, this court does not share the opinion of the lower court (a quo) in the sense that it lacked competence to assess the appropriateness of the criterion of opportunity and, in particular, to verify whether the conduct from which criminal prosecution was dispensed was less reprehensible than the conduct whose prosecution was facilitated. For this reason, and since some parties have also claimed this defect during this procedural phase, we proceed to conduct the aforementioned examination at this time, concluding that the application of the cited legal institution for the benefit of [Name 064] is illegal.
The resolution accepting the application of the criterion of opportunity was issued by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), at 9:51 a.m. on June 1, 2007 (cf. folios 41 to 89 front, of the file called “File of request for the criterion of opportunity” — Legajo de solicitud del criterio de oportunidad). Regarding this, the first thing that must be noted is that it is a resolution lacking proper reasoning (fundamentación). The criminal judge who resolved the matter, in addition to transcribing the 116 points cited by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) in its request, granted it by noting a series of points that can be summarized as follows: i) Alongside ex officio criminal prosecution, derived from the principle of legality, the law also authorizes the Public Prosecutor's Office to dispense with it in certain cases regulated by the same law and for “the convenience of the criminal policy of the current system” (f. 83 front of the cited file); ii) defining criminal policy and dispensing with criminal prosecution are discretionary powers that cannot be controlled by the judge: “In this investigation, the Prosecutors make use of that power and request for the benefit of the accused [Name 064], the application of the criterion of opportunity under the premise of subsection b) of the cited article 22 of the CPP, a request that is heard, and emphasis is placed on the discretionary powers that cannot be controlled by the judge, such that for reasons of procedural economy, and as ultimately it is the Public Prosecutor's Office that determines whether to exercise criminal prosecution or dispense with its exercise in the specific case” (sic, f. 83 mentioned); iii) the request has the approval (visto bueno) of the hierarchical superior; iv) after citing articles 22 subsection b) and 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), the criminal judge affirms that the application of the criterion is appropriate.
At this point, she transcribes what was indicated in the request made by the Public Prosecutor's Office (f. 85 to 87 front) and, having closed the textual quote, affirms: “According to what the lady prosecutors (sic) state, the weighty reason motivating this petition by the Public Prosecutor's Office is based on the premise that it is a matter of complex procedure, in which the accused [Name 064] made a written statement for the purposes of the criterion of opportunity, committing himself to render testimony, at the trial stage (etapa de juicio) or in any oral hearing, where he would provide or ratify all the truthful, useful, and pertinent information for the clarification of the facts investigated against the accused [Name 041], [Name 078], [Name 046], and [Name 033]. Likewise, it notes that the conduct attributed to the (sic) accused [Name 064] is less reprehensible than that of the accused [Name 033].
On the other hand, note that the Prosecutor files the request before formulating the accusation, in writing, before the Judge of the Intermediate Stage (Juez de la Etapa Intermedia) and as indicated supra with the authorization of the hierarchical superior, which are the formal aspects whose compliance the judge must verify, and which ultimately limits the legality control that must be carried out. Consequently, this being the case, the request is granted…” (F. 87 front, the highlighting is not from the original). As can be observed, there is no pronouncement whatsoever on whether the conduct attributed to [Name 064] was or was not less reprehensible than that imputed to [Name 041], [Name 078], [Name 046], and [Name 033], accused persons whose intervention in the events, according to what is affirmed in the request for application of the criterion of opportunity, was what was sought to be proven through the testimony that [Name 064] would render at the oral trial (debate) (cf. folio 28 front of the file in question, as well as folio 1, point 1.- of the file called “Agreement between the prosecutor's office and [Name 064] for the application of the criterion of opportunity” — Acuerdo entre la fiscalía y [Name 064] para la aplicación del criterio de oportunidad, evidence No. 776).
We are dealing with a resolution lacking reasoning and, therefore, ineffective, either because the criminal judge simply did not set forth her reasoning regarding the issue of the degree of blame (reproche) applicable to the collaborator, or because she decided not to do so under the belief that such an issue is outside jurisdictional control. In fact, that seems to emerge from the resolution (cf. the last lines reproduced), a position that for what was said supra, is erroneous. Added to this, the conclusion previously set forth—namely, that the resolution presents a defect of lack of reasoning—does not change even if we hypothetically assume that the jurisdictional body, by transcribing some excerpts of what was stated by the Public Prosecutor's Office, made them its own (and the hypothetical nature of the situation is underlined). This is because the request made by the requesting body also presents the same defect.
As is clear from its reading, despite the fact that the Public Prosecutor's Office sought the application of a criterion of opportunity for the benefit of [Name 064] to facilitate the prosecution of [Name 041], [Name 078], [Name 046], and [Name 033], in its request it did not dedicate a single line to explaining why the conduct of [Name 064], from whose criminal prosecution they intended to dispense, was less reprehensible than that of the accused [Name 041], [Name 078], and [Name 046]. Consequently, neither did the resolution that authorized its application and which, as already stated, was limited to transcribing what was said by the requesting body.
In the case of [Name 033], the situation is no less serious, since on the point in question—the degree of blame—it only states that the conduct of [Name 064] is less reprehensible than that of [Name 033] because the latter was [...] of the country and the former a member of a board of directors (junta directiva) of an autonomous institution; because [Name 033] was the one who appointed the majority of members of the cited board and had influence over the actions of those institutions; and because [Name 064] was also an advisor to the presidential house, by which he owed obedience to [Name 033]. From the above, the Public Prosecutor's Office indicated, “… the enormous power that [Name 033] wielded over ‘the institutional direction and actions,’ as well as on a personal level, over [Name 064], is evident” (f. 30 front of the file). That is, if we abide by the request, which it is worth reiterating, was not weighed by the criminal judge but only reproduced in her resolution (f. 86 to 87 front), the only argument offered to sustain that the conduct imputed to [Name 033] was more reprehensible than that carried out by [Name 064] is related to the position held by the former, leaving aside any consideration of the conduct effectively imputed to [Name 064] and to [Name 033].
As if all the above were not enough to understand that the resolution authorizing the criterion of opportunity is ineffective, there exists a defect of greater magnitude that makes the decision illegal. And it is that, just as was denounced during the trial stage (etapa de debate) and now, in the sentence appeal phase, it can be extracted from the case record that the criminal judge who applied the criterion of opportunity did not have all the necessary information to decide. In reality, the conduct that can be imputed to [Name 064] and from whose criminal prosecution was dispensed with was greater than that cited by the Public Prosecutor's Office when requesting the criterion of opportunity. From the very statements that [Name 064] had made up to that moment before the Public Prosecutor's Office, in which he narrated conduct unrelated to the matters investigated here and that can also be considered criminal, as well as from the expert report 297-DEF (evidence No. 598) and case file (expediente) No. 08-000032-0615-PE, followed against Francisco Dall'anese Ruiz for the alleged crime of breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes) (and which was admitted as evidence in this procedural stage), it is clear that in addition to matters related to the contracting of the 400,000 lines, at the time the criterion was negotiated there were sufficient elements to suspect that [Name 064] had received other such “prizes or royalties (premios o regalías).” Specifically, $110,207.00 and $29,833.95 originating from [Name 083] and [Name 085] (thus, expert report No. 297-DEF-540-04/05, folio 38 of the report); an economic retribution calculated at $56,000.00 by reason of what was resolved on the La Joya electric generation project (cf. investigative statement (declaración indagatoria) of [Name 064] rendered at 4:15 p.m. on September 30, 2004, f. 132 front of volume I; complaint (denuncia) filed by [Name 033], f. 19 front of case file No. 08-000032-06154-PE and a note published in the national news section, at La Nación.com, on Saturday, October 2, 2004, titled “[Name 064] admits another ‘prize’ as an ICE board member,” visible at folios 256 to 258 front of the already mentioned case file No. 08-000032-06154-PE). [Name 064] also described some advantages of economic content received on his trips to Prague and Switzerland (cf. investigative statement of September 30, 2004 and complaint of [Name 033], f. 20 front of case file No. 08-000032-06154-PE).
Finally, in the complaint filed by [Name 033], it was mentioned that [Name 064] received significant sums of money originating from [Name 091] related to contracts other than those for cellular telephony, as well as a trip to Brazil paid for by that company [cf., folio 19 of the cited case file No. 08-000032-06154-PE and f. 1771 of volume V (this regarding the trip to Brazil)].
Now, in that same proceeding—the one followed against Francisco Dall'anese Ruiz—, prosecutor Maribel Bustillo Piedra clearly admitted that, with the exception of the royalties enjoyed in Prague and Switzerland, the facts that according to [Name 033] had not been investigated (that is, matters related to the monies that [Name 046] transferred to [Name 064]; to the funds originating from [Name 060] associated with contracts No. 424 H 39552, 424 J 44031, and 424 H 39562; to the trip to Brazil and to the economic retributions related to La Joya and [Name 083]-[Name 270]) had not been the object of criminal prosecution because they were covered by the criterion of opportunity. Specifically, attorney Bustillo Piedra requested the dismissal of the complaint filed by the accused [Name 033] against the then Attorney General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) with the following arguments:
“DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT IS REQUESTED. The undersigned, MARIBEL BUSTILLO PIEDRA, Prosecutor of the Unit of Various Crimes… request the Dismissal of these proceedings (Desestimación de las presentes diligencias), based on the following: RELATION OF FACTS. A. Mr. [Name 033], in his capacity as complainant, states that on the occasion of investigation No. 04-006835-647-PE where [Name 064] appears as an accused (who has the exercise of criminal prosecution suspended by application of the institution of the Criterion of Opportunity), this individual acknowledged not only having participated in the acts of corruption for the benefit of the company [Name 091] related to the award and contracting of four hundred thousand mobile telephone lines, but also acknowledged having committed another series of criminal conduct, supported even by documentation that is in the main file, for example, the reports of the Section of Economic and Financial Crimes of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), conduct that, in his opinion, was not investigated by the Public Prosecutor's Office.
The criminal facts to which the complainant refers and that he indicates have not been the object of investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office against [Name 064], refer to:
· Monies improperly received from the company [Name 091] on the occasion of: the purchase of fixed-line switches for the “ICE-Switching program 2000-2001,” the purchase for expansion of telephone switching centers made by ICE on May 23, 2002, and an ICE expansion program ($325,253.32).
· Monies improperly received from [Name 280] for the approval of the concession of the “La Joya” hydroelectric project ($56,000.00).
· Monies improperly received from [Name 046] for payments made to him by the company [Name 091] for “diverse reasons” ($62,562.50).
· Monies improperly received from the company [Name 270]-[Name 083] for a granted contract ($110,207.00).
· Cost of tickets for the San José-Río de Janeiro, Río de Janeiro-Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo-San José trip in first class by the company [Name 091] ($5,617.00).
B. On the other hand, the complainant [Name 033] points out that [Name 064] also acknowledged in his investigative statement having received royalties as an ICE Board Member, on a trip taken to Prague and Switzerland, facts that he indicates have not been investigated by the Public Prosecutor's Office in a premeditated manner to protect him illegally.
II.On the merits of the matter.
After a detailed study of these proceedings, the undersigned considers… that in this case the appropriate action is the dismissal of these proceedings, because the facts denounced by Mr. [Name 033] do not constitute a crime.
A. The complainant himself in his writing… offers the answer as to why the mentioned facts have not, for the moment, been the object of criminal prosecution, by stating…:
‘… such facts have not only been proven by his confession (that of [Name 064]) but also by expert evidence, and notwithstanding, due to the evident negotiation agreement existing between [Name 064] and Prosecutor Dall'Anese Ruiz…, they have not to date been the object of any type of investigation or criminal imputation against the confessed criminal [Name 064] …’ Indeed. The Public Prosecutor's Office has agreed with the accused [Name 064], the application of the institution called Criterion of Opportunity and regarding this there exists a signed formal agreement and therefore, at least for the moment, he is not the object of criminal prosecution. Let this moment serve to make some clarifying considerations… The mentioned Criterion of Opportunity was not carried out between [Name 064] and the accused Dall'Anese Ruiz, but rather between [Name 064], his private defense counsel Edwald Acuña Blanco and the prosecutors of the Public Prosecutor's Office Carlos Morales Chinchilla, Criss Gonzáles Ugalde on January 31, 2006, being authorized by the person who was at that time the Deputy Prosecutor of the Economic, Corruption, and Tax Crimes Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía de Delitos Económicos, Corrupción y Tributarios), Attorney Warner Molina Ruiz.
On the other hand, the mentioned facts have (sic) been the object of investigation, to the point that as the complainant indicates, they are contained in several documents that form part of the main file, among them, the police reports of the Section of Economic Crimes of the Judicial Investigation Agency, but as indicated previously, they form part of the agreement for the application of the institution of article 22… Certainly the investigation carried out by the Deputy Prosecutor's Office for Economic, Corruption, and Tax Crimes of the Public Prosecutor's Office involves an extremely complex procedure regarding serious corruption crimes committed in high spheres by those who wielded political power in our country in the early years of this decade… The conduct of [Name 064] is less reprehensible than that of [Name 033], for in the realm of public service, when dealing with corruption crimes, the mere condition of being the [...] implies a greater degree of blame than that which any other public official could merit regardless of the position held…
The Deputy Prosecutor's Office for Economic, Corruption, and Tax Crimes of the Public Prosecutor's Office analyzes that in the case all the procedural requirements set forth are present and therefore, it decides to apply the institution with the accused [Name 064], not solely for the monies improperly received from the company [Name 091] corresponding to the contracting by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad) of the four hundred thousand wireless telephone lines using GMS (sic) technology, but also for the other mentioned criminal acts. This is clearly evident from the “Agreement for the application of the criterion of opportunity” carried out in the Deputy Prosecutor's Office for Economic, Corruption, and Tax Crimes on January 31, 2006, which the undersigned representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office had before her and which may be requested from that office by the Criminal Judge for his analysis.
The agreement, in what is relevant, establishes:… “Present in the Economic, Corruption, and Tax Crimes Prosecutor's Office, the accused [Name 064], of legal age… his defense counsel… the Prosecutors… for the purpose of setting the limits regarding the application of a criterion of opportunity for the benefit of the accused [Name 064]… it is agreed: 1. The Public Prosecutor's Office… commits to requesting for the benefit of the accused [Name 064], that the criminal prosecution in the cause indicated above be totally dispensed with, provided always that the testimony he commits to render in this case is not discredited by other probative elements that make it appear false, whether totally or partially…” In the agreement in mention, it can be observed that the Public Prosecutor's Office, in the exercise of its legally conferred powers, commits to requesting for the benefit of [Name 064], that criminal prosecution be dispensed with, not only for the fact related to the money improperly received from the company [Name 091] on the occasion of the contracting by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute of the four hundred thousand mobile lines…, but for the entirety of the criminal prosecution in cause No. 04-006835-647-PE which encompasses this and the other facts that the complainant mentions, for all form part of the investigation with the single number indicated, so much so, that the accused was subjected to an investigative statement (indagado) for all those facts and well before the application of this agreement, on September 30, 2004…
B. On the other hand, the complainant [Name 033] states in his writing that in addition to all the illegal acts mentioned, [Name 064] also confessed, in his first investigative statement of September 30, 2004 in cause 04-006835-647-PE, having received royalties as an ICE Board Member on a trip taken to Prague and Switzerland, which is being processed in independent cause No. 04-004671-647-PE… this cause was initiated in the Public Prosecutor's Office before cause 04-006835-647-PE was initiated, it is for this reason that these facts are outside the agreement for the application of the criterion of opportunity carried out on January 31, 2006…” (cf., folios 27 to 36 front of case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE, followed against Francisco Dall'anese Ruiz, for breach of duties; the highlighting is not from the original).
As can be observed, in the very request for dismissal made by attorney Bustillo Piedra for the benefit of the then Attorney General of the Republic, Mr. Francisco Dall'anese Ruiz, the cited professional categorically stated that the criterion of opportunity encompassed not only the facts related to the contracting of the 400 thousand lines, but also the other facts known in cause No. 04-006835-647-PE and that, in principle, she enumerated in the request for dismissal, clarifying that they were part of the same investigation and that [Name 064] was subjected to an investigative statement in relation to them. Of the facts covered by the negotiation with the collaborating accused, attorney Bustillo Piedra only excluded those related to the trips to Prague and Switzerland, which according to what she said, were being investigated in an independent cause.
Now, this court has also undertaken the task of examining both the request for application of the criterion of opportunity and the resolution that authorized it, determining the following: a.- the economic retributions delivered by [Name 046] to [Name 064] as acknowledgment for the payment management actions that the collaborating accused carried out before [Name 091], are indeed contemplated in the negotiation (f. 17 to 18, 65 to 67 front, points identified with numbers 80 to 85, file of request for criterion of opportunity); b.- the funds transferred to [Name 064] and that are related to contracts No. 424 H 39552, 424 J 44031 and 424 H 39562 (contracts cited by the complainant [Name 033] from folios 6 to 8 front of case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE), are indeed linked with the matter of the 400,000 GSM mobile telephone lines, for according to what is set forth in the appealed sentence, those contracts were only screens (mamparas) used to receive the funds that were subsequently delivered to several public officials on the occasion of the aforementioned matter.
To that extent, these are sums that are included within the scope of the criterion of opportunity (cf. point 97.- and following, both in the request and in the resolution that authorized the application of the criterion and in which reference is made to the delivery to [Name 064] of $2,560,253.32 on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines, folios 20 to 28 and 70 to 82 front of the file). c.- Regarding the economic retributions associated with the La Joya project and the companies [Name 083]-[Name 270], as well as the trip to Brazil, there is no reference in the agreement for the application of the criterion of opportunity. d.- The acceptance by [Name 064] of an economic retribution originating from [Name 085] is mentioned neither in the complaint filed by [Name 033] (case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE), nor in the request for application of the criterion, or in the resolution that authorized it.
From all the above, several conclusions can be drawn:
- 1)At the moment when the criterion of opportunity was negotiated, in the present cause there were indications to attribute to [Name 064] criminal facts distinct from those related to the contract for the 400,000 GSM mobile lines and which had to do with his receipt of various economic retributions originating from distinct persons—both natural and legal—, namely:
- a)sums delivered, apparently, by [Name 280], for the award of the La Joya hydroelectric project;
- b)sums delivered by the companies [Name 083]-[Name 270];
- c)funds transferred by [Name 085];
- d)a trip to Brazil paid for by the company [Name 091]; and, finally, e) monies delivered by [Name 046], apparently as a reward for having interceded before [Name 091] so that they would pay [Name 046] what they owed him.
- 2)While the retributions mentioned in point e) cited were indeed contemplated in the request for the criterion and the resolution that authorized it, the economic retributions related to the La Joya hydroelectric project, those originating from the companies [Name 083]-[Name 270], and the trip to Brazil, for an unknown reason were not included, this despite the fact that they were part of the agreement, as attorney Bustillo Piedra acknowledged, in case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE.
- 3)Although the gift (dádiva) delivered by the company [Name 085] was not contemplated in the request for application of the criterion of opportunity and was also not mentioned by attorney Bustillo Piedra when requesting the dismissal of the cause followed against Mr. Dall'anese Ruiz (which is understandable, because [Name 033] did not include it in his complaint either), at the moment of negotiating the criterion of opportunity there were elements that gave notice of its existence.
- 4)Regarding all those gifts—including the one originating from [Name 085]—the Public Prosecutor's Office did not carry out any investigation.
- 5)There is an irreconcilable inconsistency between what was stated by licensed attorney Maribel Bustillo Piedra in the aforementioned case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE and what was indicated both in the request for the prosecutorial discretion criterion and in the ruling that approved it. An inconsistency that can only be explained in two ways: i) Licensed attorney Bustillo Piedra would have been untruthful in case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE when requesting the dismissal of the complaint filed against the then Attorney General of the Republic; or ii) licensed attorney Bustillo Piedra told the truth and, therefore, it must be concluded that although some of the facts initially attributable to [Name 064] (the gifts from Bolaños Alpízar, from the companies [Name 083]-[Name 270], and the trip to Brazil), despite having been considered when negotiating the prosecutorial discretion criterion, for unknown reasons were not contemplated or included in the application request for it. That is, in relation to those facts, a "de facto" prosecutorial discretion criterion was negotiated, devoid of jurisdictional control. For the undersigned judges, of both alternatives, the second is the one deemed reasonable, not only because in the dismissal request formulated by licensed attorney Bustillo Piedra, she recommended that the jurisdictional authority examine the documents related to the criterion (which demonstrates that she acted with transparency), but also because none of the aforementioned gifts have been the subject of criminal investigation and prosecution. Resorting to this same argument (the absence of investigation and prosecution), it is feasible to conclude that [Name 064]'s acceptance of the gift given to him by the company [Name 085] was also one of the conducts negotiated without complying with the stipulated legal formalities. Although this was not described in the dismissal request made by licensed attorney Bustillo Piedra, nor in the application request for the prosecutorial discretion criterion or the ruling that approved it, this is a fact that has been given the same treatment as the economic compensations described above and which, according to the oft-mentioned prosecutor, are included in the prosecutorial discretion criterion. At this point, and regardless of the consequences that may arise from the foregoing, for this Chamber it is necessary to emphasize the errors that have been committed, not only by the requesting body (which—perhaps through oversight—failed to inform the jurisdictional body about some of the facts whose criminal prosecution it dispensed with when negotiating a prosecutorial discretion criterion with [Name 064]), but also by the criminal judge who resolved the dismissal request formulated in the cited case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE, since, at a minimum, to grant it, the judge should have verified what was stated by licensed attorney Bustillo Piedra, just as this very professional requested when formulating the dismissal request. A simple reading of the application request for the prosecutorial discretion criterion and the ruling that authorized it would have sufficed to conclude that some of the economic compensations received by [Name 064], unrelated to the matter of the 400,000 lines, were not contemplated (at least not formally and expressly) in the negotiation carried out in this matter. It is important to note that the defect of interest, understood as the one that occurred in this proceeding, was also not corrected by the requesting body despite having had that opportunity, whether when the accused [Name 033] filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Francisco Dall'anese Ruiz for breach of duties, on July 1, 2008 (p. 1, case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE), or during the trial, when the issue was questioned by the defense (cf. folios 13,676 to 13,705 verso, volume XXVIII). The majority vote states that the facts submitted to the prosecutorial discretion criterion are only those related to the award of the 400,000 mobile telephone lines, since only these are included in the factual basis of its application request and in the ruling that approved it; hence, the defense attorneys are not correct in asserting that the criminal judge was deceived to favor [Name 064], guaranteeing him impunity for crimes not included in the management (p. 16,079 front, volume XXXIII). This criterion is not shared. As already explained, the discrepancy between what was raised in the dismissal request formulated in case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE and what was contemplated in the application request for the prosecutorial discretion criterion in this case is evident, and to establish the scope of the agreement, it is not plausible to rely solely on what is indicated in the latter, because the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), besides being a single entity, was the one that, through one of its representatives, categorically admitted and assured that a series of facts initially attributable to the cooperating accused had not been investigated because they were included in the negotiation. Even during the trial, [Name 064], who refused to testify regarding all the previously mentioned matters, namely, the economic advantages from [Name 083], [Name 270], [Name 085], and the one linked to the project called La Joya (cf. folios 14,975 and 14,976 front, volume XXXI), also refused to indicate whether some of those facts were covered by the prosecutorial discretion criterion (p. 14,995, first line). For the undersigned judges, the thesis of the majority vote, in the sense that what is important is what is stated in the agreement and not what may have happened outside of it, would imply admitting that the Public Prosecutor's Office can handle a double discourse in negotiation matters: one that is recorded within the proceeding and on the basis of which compliance with the legal requirements for applying the legal figure is examined, and another outside jurisdictional control, where it can simply dispense with prosecuting certain facts in exchange for collaboration. This is a position that is inadmissible in constitutional terms, because—as already explained—by reason of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) governing our system, the Public Prosecutor's Office is obliged to exercise criminal prosecution, a duty that can only be excepted in cases exhaustively indicated by the legislator and under jurisdictional control. And this control can only be carried out when the requesting body, when requesting the application of a prosecutorial discretion criterion, objectively and transparently contemplates all the facts included in the agreement, without omitting core information. Only in this way can the jurisdictional authority determine whether the conduct of the cooperating accused, whose criminal prosecution is dispensed with, is less reprehensible than that of the accused who are affected by the criterion. This is an issue that acquires greater importance in legal systems like ours, where the criminal conduct of the collaborator whose prosecution is dispensed with is not necessarily part of the fact whose continuation is prevented or whose criminal prosecution is facilitated (thus, ZÚÑIGA MORALES, Ulises. "El testigo de la corona". In: Derecho Procesal Penal Costarricense. San José, Asociación de Ciencias Penales de Costa Rica, 2007, pp. 592 and 599. In the same sense, Sala Tercera, ruling No. 2001-0737). And it is that if, on the occasion of the prosecutorial discretion criterion, impunity can be guaranteed to the collaborator for facts different from those investigated and resolved with his help (in this case, those related to the 400,000 lines and the gifts that [Name 046] gave him as thanks for his collection efforts before [Name 091]), the importance is notorious that the Public Prosecutor's Office, when requesting the application of the legal institute, does not omit any detail about all the conducts that will cease to be investigated and prosecuted, not limiting itself to the description of those whose criminal prosecution is facilitated by the so-called crown witness (testigo de la corona), since the assessment or comparison of reproaches must be made on the set of facts. In summary, if the agreement includes, as happened in this case, conducts of the collaborator that are not part of the investigated fact, the application request for a prosecutorial discretion criterion must include them, since otherwise, the jurisdictional body lacks the necessary information to control whether applying the mentioned legal institute—which has clear utilitarian connotations—is justified, to the detriment of the principle of legality and mandatory prosecution in the exercise of criminal prosecution. For all the foregoing, this Chamber understands that, when requesting the application of the prosecutorial discretion criterion, the requesting body had the duty to set forth all the facts involved in the pact, whether these were related to the investigated fact or were distinct and independent. If they were included by the agreement and it was intended to dispense with their criminal prosecution, they should have been described, because jurisdictional control is exercised over the agreement and not, as some might interpret, over a part of it, that is, the part related to a particular investigation—a position which, it is reiterated, would open the door for the requesting body to arbitrarily dispose of the exercise of criminal prosecution, conducting, on the one hand, within the proceeding, negotiations that are favorable to its interests and in which the requirements of lesser reprehensibility or culpability of the collaborator are satisfied and, on the other hand, outside the legal system, other agreements, exempt from any jurisdictional control. According to licensed attorneys Criss González Ugalde and Maribel Bustillo Piedra (p. 171,400 and 171,401 front, volume XXXVIII), it cannot be asserted that the requesting body concealed information from the criminal judge because, although the processing of the criterion was carried out in a separate file, the application mentioned the case in which it was required (namely, case No. 04-6835-647-PE). That is, according to these professionals, it was enough for the judge who had to resolve the application request for the criterion to become aware of the content of the investigation to discover that [Name 064] had received other economic compensations. Such reasoning by licensed attorneys González and Bustillo is erroneous, since according to Art. 22 of the C.P.P., it is the Public Prosecutor's Office that must decide whether to dispense totally or partially with criminal prosecution, or whether to limit it to one or several offenses. That is, the examination that the criminal judge must make must always start from the limits established by that body. So much so that, even hypothetically assuming that the court detected that the case involved facts additional to those contemplated in the application, this was of no importance, since in accordance with the rules governing the matter, it could well be understood that in relation to those, criminal prosecution remained in force—something that is now known did not happen in this case, not only because of the statements made by licensed attorney Bustillo Piedra in case file No. 08-000032-0615-PE, but also because, despite the passage of time, the acceptance by [Name 064] of a series of advantages of patrimonial content that were presented to him outside the facts submitted for judgment in this matter has not been investigated and prosecuted. This confirms what has been argued, in the sense that the requesting body is obliged to act with extreme transparency, objectivity, loyalty, and rigor, reflecting in the agreement ALL the facts submitted to negotiation and not only those it deems opportune. Finally, the situation of [Name 064] himself cannot be ignored, since if he provided collaboration, it was because the requesting body committed to dispensing with the criminal prosecution of a series of conducts, and it is inadmissible to endorse practices that cast doubt on the scope of the agreement, preventing the cooperating accused himself, if necessary, from demanding compliance with what was agreed.
- 3)Hypothetical inclusion of the conduct omitted by the requesting body when seeking the application of the prosecutorial discretion criterion (criterio de oportunidad) and new assessment regarding the reproach that can be formulated with respect to the conduct attributed to [Name 064], in comparison with that of other defendants. Weighing of the arguments put forward by the trial court regarding this particular issue. The decision that authorized the application of the prosecutorial discretion criterion in favor of [Name 064] not only lacks proper reasoning but was also adopted without all the information necessary for such purposes, given that the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) omitted to include in the request some of the facts whose criminal prosecution it had agreed (apparently "de facto") to forgo. This defect becomes relevant insofar as, with the inclusion of those facts, the jurisdictional body could have concluded that the collaborator's conduct was not less reprehensible than that of those defendants against whom the cited legal mechanism was negotiated. Thus, in order to determine the essential nature of the error, it is necessary to carry out this exercise of hypothetical inclusion, not without first pointing out certain points:
- 1)As already indicated above, in the case of [Name 041], [Name 078], and [Name 046], neither the requesting body when seeking the application of the prosecutorial discretion criterion, nor the criminal judge who ruled on that request, pronounced on the reproach that could be attributed to them in comparison with that which should be attributed to [Name 064]. It is an issue that was simply overlooked, contrary to what happened with [Name 033], since when requesting the application of the prosecutorial discretion criterion, the requesting body referred to him, explaining the reasons why it considered he warranted a greater reproach than [Name 064], reasons that, as explained supra, the jurisdictional body merely transcribed, without carrying out any weighing or verification.
- 2)The examination of the reproach that could be attributed to the defendants was done for the first time in the appealed judgment, considering in this regard only the facts that were described in the documentation prepared on the occasion of the agreement made, leaving aside those conduct of [Name 064] in relation to which it was negotiated and agreed ("de facto" and not de jure) to forgo criminal prosecution.
- 3)The analysis that this Chamber must now undertake must be retraced to the moment when the prosecutorial discretion criterion was authorized, considering, from an ex ante perspective, as indicated by Article 22(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (código de rito), the conduct whose criminal prosecution was sought to be facilitated by the collaborator's contribution, it being impermissible to include conduct other than this (even if, from an ex post analysis, the lower court (a quo) held them to be proven based on that contribution and they were useful for arguing that the reproach attributable to some defendants is greater than that corresponding to [Name 064]. Thus, for example, the trial court (tribunal de mérito) affirmed that [Name 041]'s conduct is more reprehensible than that of the collaborator because the former extended promises of gifts (promesas de dádivas) to various public officials and not only to [Name 064], a point regarding which [Name 064] could not make any contribution, since he denied knowing whether, besides himself and [Name 033], there were other public officials involved.
- 4)The comparison, which must be retraced to the moment when the agreement took place, must be made between the conduct or conduct of [Name 064] whose criminal prosecution is forgone, and that of the defendants whose criminal prosecution is facilitated by the application of the legal mechanism, it being illegitimate to consider, for establishing the extent of the reproach, the conduct of other defendants that the sentencing court held to be proven based on [Name 064]'s testimony but regarding whom the prosecutorial discretion criterion was not negotiated (this is the case, for example, of [Name 001], [Name 022], or [Name 028]). That is, the study must be circumscribed to the reproach that can be formulated for the acts of [Name 064] in comparison with that attributable to [Name 078], [Name 033], [Name 046], and [Name 041], since it was only in relation to these defendants that the requesting body sought the application of the prosecutorial discretion criterion. On this point, it is important to stress that this Chamber is not calling into question that [Name 064]'s statement, once incorporated into the trial, was weighed as one more piece of evidence, even to the detriment of some defendants against whom the prosecutorial discretion criterion was not negotiated (in this same sense, see the judgment of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) No. 1030-2014, at 10:00 hours on June 27, 2014), however, this does not mean, by any stretch, that in order to examine the degree of reprehensibility, as concerns the cited Article 22(b), that circumstance must be weighed, since at the time the negotiation took place, which is precisely the moment to which we must retrace our analysis, the causing of such effects was not contemplated, and the fact is that the negotiation occurred, it is reiterated, only to the detriment of specific defendants ([Name 033], [Name 046], [Name 041], and [Name 078]). Having clarified the foregoing, we proceed to the substance of the matter, indicating that, for the reasons that will be set forth below, for this sentence appeals court (tribunal de apelación de sentencia), the conduct attributed to [Name 064] is not, nor was it at the time of the negotiation, less reprehensible than that whose criminal prosecution he facilitated with his statement, and—to that extent—the prosecutorial discretion criterion is also illegal for this reason. Upon signing the agreement, there were elements to suspect that [Name 064] was a public official prone to receiving irregular economic advantages. As stated in proven facts numbers 113 and 114 (folio 15,450 front), of the two million five hundred sixty thousand two hundred fifty-three dollars and thirty-two cents ($2,560,253.32) he received on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines, he transferred to [Name 033] the sum of five hundred eighty-nine thousand five hundred sixty-three dollars ($589,563.00), plus the sum of two hundred thirty-one thousand dollars ($231,000) delivered in cash. That is, [Name 064] appropriated $1,739,690.32, thus becoming the public official who obtained the greatest economic advantages from the criminal scheme associated with the issue of the 400,000 lines, a conclusion that is not modified by the fact that, subsequently, when negotiating an abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado) and then a prosecutorial discretion criterion with the Public Prosecutor's Office, he was willing to deliver important sums of money and certain assets in favor of the State (thus, cf. folios 3 and 4 of evidence No. 308 and folio 3, evidence No. 776). In addition to the foregoing, [Name 064], before the facts investigated herein, had received $63,083.59 delivered to him by [Name 046]; $110,207.00 paid by the companies [Name 083].- [Name 270]., $29,833.95 from the company [Name 085]., and finally, an approximate $56,000 related to the La Joya project, the foregoing without mentioning the trip to Brazil that, according to the complaint by [Name 033], [Name 091] paid for. In summary, by the time the prosecutorial discretion criterion was negotiated and requested, there were elements to reasonably think that [Name 064] had committed several criminal acts, some related to the issue of the 400,000 lines and many others unrelated to it, all—apparently—of a similar nature: receipt of gifts (recepción de dádivas) in his capacity as a public official. Despite this, it was decided to guarantee his impunity so that, in exchange, he would testify against [Name 033], [Name 041], [Name 046], and [Name 078] (the latter was not subjected to this criminal process). In the case of [Name 041], the collaborator was willing to testify that the latter extended him a promise of a gift related to the contract for the 400,000 lines and that, later, he transferred the promised funds to him through [Name 058]. While [Name 064]'s collaboration, at the time of agreeing on the prosecutorial discretion criterion and regarding [Name 041], made it possible to prove a single fact, namely, that he extended him an offer of economic retribution prior to the contract for the 400,000 lines, the impunity guaranteed to the former covered conduct that is extremely censurable due to its quantity (we speak of repeated acceptances of gifts, which, at a minimum, demonstrates that for [Name 064] this was a habit); due to the sums involved ([Name 064] was the public official who received the most money on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines, even after subtracting the portion he gave to [Name 033], and he also received substantial earnings from other individuals and legal entities); and finally, due to his condition as a director member of ICE, a position he used to receive all the described economic retributions. We know that the legislator punishes the corrupter, at least in certain cases, with the same penalty as that corresponding to the corrupt public official, however, in terms of reproach, or in other words, of the culpability of those involved (and which in the case of [Name 064] is established hypothetically, since no accusation has been filed nor trial held against him), it is impossible to ignore how he, despite having the obligation to perform his duties with probity, abused his position of power as a member of the board of directors of ICE, to obtain economic benefits at the expense of various suppliers of said autonomous institution. Against this, we have [Name 041], a private individual who, if we stick to what [Name 064] presented, offered him a gift in exchange for helping [Name 091] in three specific areas (migration to GSM, use of bids (licitaciones), and a favorable vote in the award of the 400,000 lines), which in turn would allow him ([Name 041]) to obtain a profit. Although both paying and receiving are censurable conduct, [Name 064] does not warrant a lesser reproach than [Name 041] and, to that extent, it is not legitimate to grant procedural advantages to the former for the sake of securing the conviction of the latter, since as indicated, [Name 064] was a public official who was not only involved in the facts related to the 400,000 lines, but in many others, which demonstrates that the receipt of gifts was a custom for him, [Name 041] being just one of the subjects who, apparently, offered him one of those economic retributions. This Chamber is not unaware that [Name 064]'s statement was essential to prove that [Name 041] made offers of gifts to other public officials, which undoubtedly increases the reproach, however, it must be reiterated, this is an unexpected and unforeseen result when the prosecutorial discretion criterion was negotiated, to the point that [Name 064] himself stated that he did not know if other officials were in the same situation as him (cf. e.g., statement of [Name 064], folio 14,957 front, last lines, volume XXXI). That is, at the time the agreement was made, it was not intended that [Name 064] would make any contribution to prove the guilt of other public officials beyond [Name 033], and proof of this is that the legal mechanism was requested only to the detriment of [Name 078], [Name 046], [Name 041], and [Name 033]. Therefore, this court would be wrong if it used that consequence, to a certain extent unforeseen, to try to support—retroactively, moreover—a decision that completely lacks foundation, not only because the jurisdictional body effectively did not carry out any analysis, but also because, had it done so considering all the information we know was omitted, it would have concluded that [Name 064] did not warrant a lesser reproach. The situation is similar in the case of the defendant [Name 033]. Regarding the prosecutorial discretion criterion, he was charged with having instigated [Name 064] to accept the promise of a gift that was extended to him by [Name 041] and [Name 078] and, later, having received the money that the collaborating defendant transferred to him, for the purpose of fulfilling what was promised. As was held to be proven (cf. facts 113 and 114, folio 15,450 front), of the two million five hundred sixty thousand two hundred fifty-three dollars and thirty-two cents ($2,560,253.32) that [Name 064] received, he gave [Name 033] the sum of five hundred eighty-nine thousand five hundred sixty-three dollars ($589,563.00), plus the sum of two hundred thirty-one thousand dollars ($231,000) delivered in cash. Against this isolated conduct of [Name 033], we have the repeated conduct of [Name 064] that was pointed out above, namely, the acceptance of various economic retributions paid by companies and private individuals with whom he had contact due to his position at ICE (namely, $1,739,690.32 from [Name 091] on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines; $63,083.59 delivered to him by [Name 046]; $110,207.00 paid by the companies [Name 083].-[Name 270]., $29,833.95 from [Name 085]., and finally, an approximate $56,000 related to the La Joya hydroelectric project, as well as the trip to Brazil also mentioned before). Thus, the difference between the position that [Name 033] held compared to that held by [Name 064] is the only argument invoked in the lower court's judgment (fallo de mérito) to affirm that the conduct attributed to the former is more reprehensible than all that executed by the latter, which is untenable, for although it is true that the personal conditions of the active subject that are determinant for the commission of the crime must be considered, this does not mean ignoring the gravity of the conduct actually carried out and, in the particular case of the 400,000 lines, [Name 033]'s action was not so decisive, to the point that [Name 064] himself had no problem disregarding the distribution of the irregular profits established by the former (where—as he stated—[Name 033] would get 60% and he 40%). On the other hand, the fact that [Name 033] was his hierarchical superior in Casa Presidencial, and that—furthermore—it was the Government Council of the [Name 033] administration that appointed him as a member of the Board of Directors of ICE, for purposes of determining the degree of reprehensibility of both conduct do not have major importance, since, despite that hierarchical relationship, as explained, [Name 064] would have had no problem refusing to give [Name 033] the percentage of the profits they had agreed upon, considering it unfair. In fact, at trial, despite affirming that the difference in the profit distribution percentages was justified "... from the point of view of the participants because Mr. [Name 033] was the [...]", upon being questioned, he acknowledged having stated in previous declarations that those percentages were unfair and disproportionate, since he was the one who assumed the total risk, as "... the money arrived in the accounts I provided and I dealt with [Name 091] to protect the [...], I only dealt with high-level people from [Name 091] . From the money received I had the responsibility of giving Mr. [Name 033] the money that corresponded to him..." (Folio 14,991 front of the judgment, volume XXXI). That is, starting (according to an ex ante analysis) from the facts that supported the prosecutorial request for approval (homologación) of the prosecutorial discretion criterion, as well as from the very account that [Name 064] provided, he was not a person who, sporadically and by chance of fate, received a promise of a gift and, faced with that, sought the support of the then [...] to accept it. On the contrary, he was a public official seasoned in these matters, who knew how to act, and who sought out [Name 033] because he understood that the future act expected of him might require someone more influential. The matter is so clear, that despite [Name 033] being the [...] and hierarchical superior of [Name 064], the latter had no problem abandoning the commitment made with him and delivering a smaller sum of money, considering the agreed-upon distribution percentages to be unfair. That is, with the purpose of keeping the greater part of the illicit profit, [Name 064] (as he declared) set aside [Name 033]'s position, which allows the conclusion that the hierarchical relationship, contrary to what was sketched out by the requesting body when requesting the criterion, is not an element that, at least in light of the specific case, can be considered determinant for the purposes of deeming that [Name 033]'s conduct was more reprehensible. This appeals court is not unaware that (as derived from [Name 064]'s account) the then [...] of the country was required to censure his subordinate and report what happened. However, the fact that instead of this he backed him in a way that only he could, does not allow affirming that the acts of [Name 064] were less reprehensible, to the point of justifying the cost of the impunity guaranteed to the collaborator with the sole purpose of obtaining the conviction of a person who at that time held a higher rank. This seems to have been the only purpose that moved the requesting body since, as has been pointed out, despite having negotiated the prosecutorial discretion criterion to obtain information against [Name 046], [Name 041], and [Name 078], in the request that the Public Prosecutor's Office formulated, it did not even attempt to explain why it is understood that these individuals warrant a greater reproach than [Name 064], which it did attempt to justify in the case of [Name 033], although with little success, since the only argument put forward is the one already mentioned, namely, the consideration that [Name 033] was [...] and the hierarchical superior of [Name 064], without considering various issues that have already been mentioned, specifically, that [Name 064] was also a public official, that he had made a habit of receiving gifts; that compared to the multiple criminal conduct that could be attributed to him, [Name 033] was only accused of having participated in a crime in which [Name 064] figured as the perpetrator and, finally, that the economic retribution the collaborator obtained on the occasion of the 400,000 lines was the most important of all, and those received for other acts were also substantial. For all these reasons, it cannot be considered that the conduct of instigation attributed to [Name 033], whose criminal prosecution was facilitated by [Name 064]'s statement, was more reprehensible than that attributed to the latter. Similarly, the assertion contained in the contested judgment, to the effect that [Name 064] warrants a lesser reproach because he has been willing to collaborate with the administration of justice, is extremely questionable, since, firstly, if we start from the thesis adopted by the trial court, to the effect that the version he gave after negotiating with the Public Prosecutor's Office is the true one, we would have to conclude that for months, by denying the promise of a gift, he sought to confuse the respective authorities, with the sole purpose of evading his responsibility. In the same way, just as one cannot derive from that collaboration the conclusion that [Name 064] is repentant, as it is very clear that his help has not been gratuitous, from the exercise of the right to defense, which is what has characterized the other defendants, including [Name 033], one cannot extract a lack of repentance for the facts that, according to the court, he has committed. Finally, regarding [Name 046], the situation is also quite clear. Although both he and [Name 064] himself were individuals with a long career in the public sector, at the time of the facts that interest us here, it was the latter who was serving in public office. Thus, several crimes that, at least in principle, were attributable to [Name 064] (including that related to the contract for the 400,000 GSM lines, which meant an enormous gain for the collaborator) were left uninvestigated and unprosecuted, in exchange for facilitating the criminal prosecution of a person who, before the facts investigated herein, would have promised him (according to [Name 064]'s account) an economic retribution in exchange for helping him collect a sum of money owed to him from [Name 091], a proposal that the public official accepted and translated into collection actions, to later receive, also without any obstacle, the sums that [Name 046] transferred to him as a token of gratitude for that help. That is, the requesting body was willing to guarantee impunity to a public official who repeatedly received gifts, some of surprising amount, in exchange for facilitating the conviction of a private individual who appeared as a corrupter in just one of those acts, one prior to and unrelated to the contracting of the 400,000 lines. In summary, the conduct of the defendant [Name 064], because of its repetition, the amount of the economic retributions obtained and, clearly, for the use of his office to obtain those illicit gains, is not less reprehensible than the conduct of [Name 046] that was sought to be proven with the statement of the former and that is circumscribed to a single event, where both [Name 046] and [Name 064] himself would have participated and would have obtained an illicit patrimonial benefit. Having stated the foregoing, it is important to point out that the court, in the judgment, despite insisting that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on the "substantial" requirements established in Art. 22(b) of the C.P.P., dedicated a subsection to setting out some reasons why it understands that the requirement of lesser reprehensibility was indeed met, which can be schematized as follows: i) what is significant is that the reproach made to the collaborator is less than that of those who were subjected to process, an issue that has nothing to do with the concepts of authorship and participation; ii) reprehensibility is measured from the standpoint of culpability. Culpability in the criminal wrong must be taken into account, in accordance with Article 71 of the Penal Code (Código Penal). The judgment of reproach entails the determination of the typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct executed by the collaborator and that carried out by the accused, the capacity of both for understanding and acting in accordance with the law, the reproach to the collaborator and to the accused. Personal conditions [Art. 71(d) of the Penal Code] must be considered to the extent that they influenced the commission of the crime. Therefore, the criminal judge committed no error by considering these conditions to establish that [Name 064] warranted a lesser reproach. It cannot be said that such an assessment is characteristic of a criminal law based on the author (as the minority vote of the trial court considers), since the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has endorsed the consideration of these personal circumstances when setting the penalty, and, moreover, what is judged is a specific conduct and not what a person is, and, in the case of crimes related to public office, the scope of the office held ceases to be an irrelevant condition and becomes related to the typical prohibition; iii) the comparison is with respect to the "reproaches," not the conduct or crimes, nor the penalties, nor the effects of the benefit agreed to for the collaborator. It is not appropriate to examine the crime or crimes, when there were several, committed by the collaborator or by the accused. The rule speaks of "conduct" and "punishable act," whereby the analysis, more than on crimes and penalties, must be qualitative. It is not enough to know the sanctioning parameters and establish the lowest and the highest, but rather the examination must focus on the presuppositions of Article 71 of the Penal Code regarding, on one hand, the indicated conduct and, on the other, the punishable act. For this reason, it is also not enough to compare, in the abstract, other illicit conduct and economic benefits that [Name 064] supposedly received; iv) the trial court must control the concurrence of formal requirements and not those of substance, meaning, it cannot control whether the collaborator's conduct is less reprehensible. Here it is reiterated what was said before, namely, that it is the Public Prosecutor's Office that must carry out this assessment ex ante and that the control of said mechanism corresponds to the judge of the preparatory or intermediate stage (etapa preparatoria o intermedia), and the trial court cannot analyze this issue before delivering judgment, as this would be to advance an opinion. Now, in the specific case, it argues, the court resolved that the criterion conformed to the formal requirements, whereby it cannot be affirmed that there was no pronouncement. Moreover, the body competent to control the appropriateness of the mechanism did so, therefore it cannot be argued that there was a denial of justice when each jurisdictional body fulfilled its tasks, without exceeding its own or arrogating those that do not correspond to it, even if it is not to the liking of some of the parties to the process; v) the conduct of [Name 064] is less reprehensible than that of [Name 041], [Name 033], and [Name 046], whose prosecution it facilitates. From here and following the statements of the aforementioned Article 71, the trial court sets out the reasons for which it qualifies [Name 064]'s conduct as "less reprehensible," using a comparative exercise with each of the defendants against whom the prosecutorial discretion criterion was requested. Regarding [Name 041], the court points out, regarding the objective and subjective aspects of the punishable act, that this whole situation would not have occurred without the existence of a remunerative proposition made by [Name 041]. There can be a corrupting person without there being a corrupt person, but not the reverse, hence from the objective perspective, the action of [Name 041] is more reprehensible than that of [Name 064]. Regarding the importance of the harm or danger, while it is recognized that the conduct of both affects the legal interest and social order, the trigger of the facts is the plan devised by [Name 041], aimed at signing consulting contracts as a front (mampara) for financing the operation, whereby in the production of social harm and the injury to the legal interest, the greatest contribution was from [Name 041], who acted following a previously established scheme. He knew how to set the plan in motion, could define the adequate amount to make the promise and provoke its acceptance, actions that reveal that he acted in a calculated manner, not so [Name 064], who was unaware of all the illicit machination previously mentioned, to the point of ignoring that there were other people involved, or the magnitude of [Name 041]'s corrupting proposals, whereby also the greater reproach falls on the latter. Regarding the circumstances of mode, time, and place, [Name 041] communicated with the other corruptors to generate a financing strategy and for this purpose set out to deceive the corporation [Name 060]. He coordinated approaches with public officials, held meetings with those officials—among them [Name 064]—and provided information to the other corrupting persons so they would make the payments. That is, [Name 041] was working on the structuring and assembly of a plan that allowed him, through the payment of gifts to public officials, for ICE to acquire the products offered by [Name 091]. In contrast, [Name 064]'s action not only depends on the described plan, but occurred as a result of the meetings in which both participated, and the payments he received are singular links within a chain of events that envelops the criminal behavior of the former. Regarding the quality of the determining motives, the harm to the legal interest of probity occurred both with the acts of [Name 064] and with those of [Name 041], however, while the former sought to procure an individual patrimonial benefit, in the case of [Name 041] the sum was greater, since it was he who, together with the other corruptors, disposed of the money for his illicit purposes. Regarding the other personal conditions of the active subject or the victim to the extent that they influenced the commission of the crime, [Name 041] was the general manager of the company [Name 091], hence he knew how the corporation was organized, and he had also worked at ICE and knew its dynamics. He earned the trust of the corporation to the point that he was responsible for proposing the consultants to be hired and participated in the process of paying disbursements to them. He also knew ICE and its relationship with [Name 091], which provided him with the mechanisms to identify the key characters, how to contact them, how to influence their decisions so they would be favorable to the company, and how to obtain the money to overcome their barriers. For his part, [Name 064] was only one of the pieces in this criminal strategy, one of the officials he needed to convince with his proposal.
Finally, with regard to the conduct of the agent after the offense, while [Name 041] has done nothing to repair the damage, [Name 064] has acknowledged his wrongful conduct and has returned a large part of the money received, making the latter’s conduct less reproachable. In the case of [Name 046], the judgment states that the reproach that [Name 064] deserves is lesser because: Regarding the subjective and objective aspects of the punishable act, [Name 046] had a broad public trajectory, greater than that of [Name 064]. Regarding the importance of the harm or danger, although [Name 064] was a public official and [Name 046] was not, the more significant harm to the legal interest of probity is caused by the latter, since he is the promoter of the criminal action. Regarding the circumstances of manner, time, and place, [Name 046] approached [Name 064] and asked him to undertake collection actions against [Name 091] so that the monies owed to the former would be paid. [Name 064] accepted and acted accordingly, which is why [Name 046] subsequently paid him various sums of money.
The majority opinion states that it was [Name 046] who went to [Name 064], who sought him out at ICE knowing his status and knowing that [Name 091] was an ICE supplier. Based on his command of that background, he put forward the remunerative promise to [Name 064], which contributes to his greater reprehensibility. As for the determining motives, both were moved by a monetary interest; however, it is [Name 046] who is the architect of the mechanism (the promise and delivery of a gift) that motivated [Name 064]. Regarding the other personal conditions of the active subject or the victim insofar as they influenced the commission of the crime, it is observed that [Name 046] used the knowledge obtained during his tenure in the public sector (he held a position at ICE) and his contact with figures from the national political sphere, among them [Name 033], to manage to communicate with [Name 064].
Finally, regarding the conduct of the agent after the offense, [Name 046] has not taken any action to repair the damage, whereas [Name 064] has, by handing over money and movable property. In the case of [Name 033], the court indicates, regarding the objective and subjective aspects of the punishable act, that this defendant held one of the most relevant positions in public service, a position that is significant for the commission of the attributed crime, since not just anyone can be the active subject of the crime of bribery. Furthermore, being a [...] is not merely a personal condition related to the typicality of the conduct, but also relates to the legal interest—probity—since it does not cause the same social harm for a low-ranking public official to be convicted of this crime as it does for the person who holds the apex of public administration. Although [Name 064] was also a public official, [Name 033] had a higher rank and hierarchy and, by virtue of being the [...], probity in conduct was required of him; it was from him that honest behavior oriented exclusively toward fulfilling the public interest was expected, which is why the reproach he merits is greater.
On the importance of the harm or danger, although both [Name 033] and [Name 064] contributed to causing the harm, the more significant contribution, states the majority opinion, was made by [Name 033], since by criminalizing conduct such as bribery, the legislator sought to protect probity, rectitude, honesty, and impartiality in the fulfillment of public office, so that those who hold such office on a remunerated basis do so focused on satisfying the public interest and not their own interests, least of all to enrich themselves improperly by that means. The [...], by having high popular representativeness, enjoys broad authority and is situated on a central plane, both for public control and for the integration of the nation and the definition of its direction. He is not only the one who appoints the cabinet and removes it, but the one who heads it and directs relevant tasks both nationally and internationally.
And if the head falters, the body tends to collapse. It is concluded that the weaknesses in [Name 033] are those that most contribute to the harm. As for the circumstances of manner, time, and place, the trial court considers that although one might think that [Name 064] was the one who contacted [Name 033] to convey [Name 041]’s proposal to him, and thus the development of the crime was the former’s initiative, one must consider that [Name 064] went to [Name 033] because of the trust that exists between them, because there was political support from one for the other, as well as an employment nexus and a friendship relationship ([Name 064] was a member of the board of directors of ICE and his appointment corresponded to the government council presided over by [Name 033], also being a presidential advisor). Moreover, before [Name 064] conveyed the described proposal to [Name 033], the latter had already urged the former to participate in a prior criminal act, namely, when he asked him to intercede with [Name 091] so that the payment of monies to [Name 046] would be honored.
He even asked him to attend to this matter while taking advantage of a trip that [Name 064] would make outside the country. Thus, instead of [Name 033] calling [Name 064] to account and demanding probity from him, what he did was urge him to accept the proposal, to ask for a larger percentage, and he even proposed the formula for distributing the money. That is, although [Name 064] is the one who had to comply with the proposal, he went to [Name 033] to make a decision, as he knew he could not decide alone. This reveals the decisive role of [Name 033], as he was the one who determined [Name 064]. Regarding the quality of the determining motives, the legal interest of probity was harmed by both defendants, and to that extent, the reproach was similar. What is revealing is the economic interest that [Name 033] demonstrates, when upon listening to [Name 064], the first thing he does is ask how much the amount to be received will be, and then he decides the distribution formula, inflated in his favor, and this is what later, also reflecting [Name 064]’s ambition, leads the latter to tell him that he does not agree with such distribution.
Regarding the personal conditions of the active subject or the victim insofar as they influenced the commission of the crime, the trial court indicates that when [Name 033] learned of the corrupt proposal, he was the highest authority of the country and one of the few officials whom the majority of the population had elected with their vote, thus greater zeal was expected from him, as well as inexhaustible effort to be correct in the exercise of his function. Despite this, he opted for the opposite, promoted the acceptance of the corrupt proposal, and benefited from the gifts delivered. The one who declined his duty of probity, the lower court points out, was not just any public official, but the one of highest rank, even determining [Name 064] to accept the proposal. Likewise, [Name 064] did not go to just any person to inform them of the proposal, but to the [...] of all Costa Ricans and head of the administration, a figure influential over [Name 064] not only because of their friendship but also because of their functional link.
In that regard, we have on one side [Name 064], a director of an autonomous institution and presidential advisor, and on the other [Name 033], the highest-ranking official with decision-making power over the appointments that the former held, and from whom a greater degree of lawful conduct was required, just as the reproach for not doing so is greater. In terms of the agent’s conduct after the offense, [Name 033] has taken no action to reduce the impact of the damage caused by his actions, while [Name 064] accepted his responsibility, was willing to negotiate an abbreviated process and to serve a custodial sentence for which house arrest did not apply as credit. This option did not succeed because those who appeared as complainants in this process opposed it, and the prosecutorial authority opted for the prosecutorial discretion criterion (criterio de oportunidad). [Name 064], moreover, appeared at the hearing and accepted his behavior, additionally handing over part of the money received and two vehicles.
Although the defense has questioned that he has not returned the total amount of money and that the vehicles are old, the truth is that, if one starts from that parameter, one would have to conclude that [Name 033] has returned nothing. The trial court ends its presentation indicating that the foregoing reasoning explains why, at the time, it considered that it could not resolve the issue of greater or lesser reprehensibility, namely, because it is a matter for another court and because impartiality could be compromised by conducting that analysis, however “abstract” it might be (folios 15,395 to 15,415 front of volume XXXI). This far constitutes the court’s argumentation. For those who subscribe to this decision, the foregoing reasoning is erroneous not only for what was stated supra, when examining the issue of the reproach that each defendant deserves in relation to [Name 064], but for what will be set out below.
In the first place, it emerges that to determine the intensity of the reproach in the case of [Name 041], the lower court not only considered his culpability in relation to the specific fact that was sought to be proven through [Name 064]’s statement (namely, that the former made a promise of a gift to the latter at the restaurant [Name 094] and later transferred a large sum of money to him through [Name 058]), but also his culpability for all the other facts that it had deemed proven against him and which were unknown to [Name 064] at the time the prosecutorial discretion criterion was negotiated, e.g., that he was a co-perpetrator of a criminal plan that included other public officials, that there were approaches with these and deliveries of economic compensation under similar modal and temporal circumstances; or that [Name 041] had larger sums of money at his disposal than [Name 064], the foregoing to the extent that it was he who identified the public officials to be paid and the amounts.
As can be seen, we are talking about matters that are extraneous to the facts that, at the time of the negotiation, were intended to be proven through [Name 064]’s testimony, meaning they could not be considered when weighing the issue of reproach (at least not for the purpose of legitimizing the prosecutorial discretion criterion), nor can they be taken into account now, since that examination (ex ante) must necessarily extend back to the date the agreement was entered into, bearing in mind the facts that were intended to be clarified through the collaborator’s statement, and not those that, after the hearing, have been deemed proven with his help. The undersigned do not ignore that [Name 064]’s statement was an indication that allowed the trial court on the merits to confirm that, in addition to the collaborating defendant, there were other public officials involved and that [Name 041], in common agreement with [Name 028], used the corporation [Name 058] to legitimize and later distribute the funds originating from [Name 060].
Nor is it possible to ignore, conducting an a posteriori examination, that [Name 064]’s statement and, in particular, his assertion that he was given a promise of a gift prior to the contract for the 400,000 lines, was the most important indication relied upon by the trial court on the merits to deem it proven that a similar promise was made to the remaining accused public officials. However, these consequences derived from [Name 064]’s statement, which were not contemplated when negotiating the prosecutorial discretion criterion, cannot be considered for purposes of establishing the greater or lesser reproach that [Name 041] deserves vis-à-vis the collaborating defendant, since the latter’s statement was negotiated solely to be used against [Name 041], [Name 033], and [Name 046], and not to facilitate the criminal prosecution of other defendants, e.g., [Name 028], or of the public officials who also received economic compensation and whose link to the facts was unknown even to [Name 064] himself.
That is, in the case of [Name 041], at the time of negotiating the prosecutorial discretion criterion, what could be proven with the collaborator’s statement was that the former had given him a promise of a gift and that, after the awarding of the contract, he delivered a sum exceeding two and a half million dollars to him through [Name 058], which he shared with [Name 033]. Thus, to facilitate the criminal prosecution of a particular conduct, the prosecuting body chose to guarantee impunity for the person who, besides accepting that promise and receiving the mentioned sum, received other non-negligible economic compensation, doing so in his capacity as a public official, thus breaching the duties that had been entrusted to him. It is important to emphasize that when examining the reproach, it is not permissible to consider the significance that [Name 064]’s statement had in proving other facts, since this was not foreseeable at the time the criterion was negotiated, and so true is this that the application of the legal mechanism was requested only to the detriment of [Name 033], [Name 041], [Name 078], and [Name 046].
Finally, it is important to note that the trial court’s thesis, to the effect that the conduct of the one who pays or corrupts is more reprehensible than that of the public official who receives the gift or allows himself to be corrupted, lacks any foundation, for several reasons. The first, because, according to the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, the sanction applicable to the latter is the same as provided for by legislation for the public official. The second, because unlike what happens with the corrupter, it is the corrupted official who disregards his duties and compromises the citizenry’s trust in their institutions, by using his office to enrich himself. Thus, to argue, without more, that [Name 041]’s conduct is more reprehensible than [Name 064]’s because the former extended the promise and the latter merely accepted it, is—in the best of cases—an assertion that finds no support.
Turning to [Name 033], the same situation arises. From the arguments cited by the court, it is extracted with crystal clarity that the greater reproach against him rests on the hierarchy of the public functions he performed. All analysis of the seriousness of the conduct actually carried out by the then [...] was set aside, thus avoiding comparing it with the conduct that was not pursued. It was not considered that [Name 064], at the time of the negotiation, appears as an individual involved in multiple criminal acts of a similar nature, which demonstrates that he was prone to receiving gifts; that it was he, and not [Name 033], who, according to the majority opinion itself, assumed the perpetration of the criminal act and who also, of the two, obtained the greater economic benefit, for despite the fact that [Name 033] requested 60% of the criminal proceeds, [Name 064] had no qualms about altering that distribution deeming it “unfair.” There are no reasons to doubt that [Name 033] had a hierarchical relationship with [Name 064] at the time of the facts.
It is not unknown that he had appointed him minister, then presidential advisor, and then, through the Government Council that he presided over, nominated him as a member-director of ICE. This, which certainly from an ethical perspective makes [Name 033]’s conduct more reprehensible (for if events occurred as [Name 064] recounted, he should have reported it immediately instead of supporting his intentions), from a legal standpoint does not permit establishing that the reproach the latter merits is of a lesser degree if everything else is considered. Even so, it is important to note that in the case of [Name 064], the condition of being a public official also played a central role, not only with respect to the contract for the 400,000 lines, but for all the other receipts of gifts in which he figured as a suspect. Finally, see how the lower court, while it considered the conduct of [Name 041] and [Name 046] more reprehensible on the argument that they were the promoters of the crime’s execution, the ones who had the initiative to seek out [Name 064], in the case of [Name 033] it disregards this reasoning, concluding that even though it was [Name 064] who decided to convey the proposal to [Name 033], this does not make his conduct more reprehensible, since he acted thus because of the trust and support given to him by the then president.
This being the case, while it is true that [Name 033] was, at the time of the facts, the highest-ranking public official, this circumstance alone does not justify the decision to guarantee impunity for [Name 064], since the facts in relation to which criminal prosecution is waived (which include that with respect to which it is affirmed that [Name 033] is the instigator and [Name 064] the instigated perpetrator), contrary to what the lower court points out, merit greater reproach than the conduct sought to be prosecuted. Not to accept this also leads to the understanding that the reproach, instead of depending on the seriousness of the act and the personality of the participant, responds exclusively to the personal characteristics of the active subject and, in the case of public officials, to the position held, in such a way that, regardless of the conduct actually carried out, the greater the hierarchy, the greater the reproach will always be.
In summary, for all the foregoing, it is concluded that the prosecutorial discretion criterion granted to [Name 064] is illegal. As a consequence of the above, the statement that he gave at the hearing as a collaborating defendant is illicit evidence and is so declared. For greater abundance, we proceed to resolve certain questions raised by [Name 033] in relation to the credibility that can be granted to the word of [Name 064] and on the occasion of which, this court of appeal concludes that it is implausible.
- 4)Regarding the assessment of the testimony given by [Nombre 064] at trial. A matter beyond all discussion is the obligation of the trial court to analyze the statement given by the collaborator [Nombre 064] in accordance with the rules of sound criticism. The court weighed it, concluding—erroneously, in this chamber's view—that it was credible. For such purposes, it took into account several circumstances, some general and others particular, described in relation to each accused. From folio 16,073 front onwards of volume XXXIII, the appealed judgment explains:
- i)The statement of [Nombre 064], contrary to what was said by the defense attorneys for the accused, was plausible and disinterested, since it was conceived, not under the protection of a prosecutorial discretion criterion (criterio de oportunidad), but months before this was agreed upon, under more burdensome conditions for the collaborator, namely, on the occasion of an abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado). In this, he accepted his responsibility and was willing to have a penalty of 4 years of imprisonment imposed on him, a procedure that did not proceed due to the opposition of those who requested to intervene as private prosecutors (querellantes), among them persons close to Mr. [Nombre 033];
- ii)facing the expectation of submitting to an abbreviated procedure, [Nombre 064] delivered the sum of $1,401,000 dollars and two vehicles, by way of economic compensation;
- iii)to think, as Mr. Gairaud does, that [Nombre 064] accepted such a custodial sentence because he knew that, by reason of the home arrest (arresto domiciliario) suffered, he would be granted the benefit of Article 55 of the Penal Code, is to ignore that from May 9, 2005, the process having begun at the end of 2004, [Nombre 064] was willing to accept the facts and be sanctioned; that by May 2005, two years had not elapsed and, therefore, half the sentence could not be considered served, given that the granting of that benefit is a matter for the National Institute of Criminology and not the Public Prosecutor's Office;
- iv)from the very beginning, [Nombre 064] was willing to have his bank accounts, cards, and telephone calls investigated and offered what was within his reach for the investigation; likewise his wife and his mother. His first statement took place on September 30, 2004, and by October 5, he was already authorizing the opening of his accounts and the obtaining of banking information;
- v)on October 12, 2004, he showed an interest in compensating the damage caused when he proceeded to deliver to the criminal court a certificate for the sum of $1,401,241.36;
- vi)as already indicated, on May 9, 2005, 8 months after the case began, he agreed to the application of an abbreviated procedure in the terms indicated, namely, serving a sentence of four years of imprisonment without any benefit, obligating himself to testify at trial and paying the mentioned sums to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and to ICE, as well as delivering two cars. The court points out that at that time, [Nombre 064] could not become eligible for the benefit contemplated in Article 55 of the Penal Code; that such an option was not negotiated with the Public Prosecutor's Office nor was it within the powers of this body. It adds that if the process in question did not materialize, it was due to the refusal of the private prosecutors Fernando Apuy Sirias and Freddy Coto Varela, where, at least the former, had a connection to [Nombre 033]. This is what, ultimately, led the prosecutor's office to agree on a prosecutorial discretion criterion. It is not true, therefore, that right off the bat, [Nombre 064] was benefited with the prosecutorial discretion criterion so that, in exchange for his impunity, he would "sink" the other accused; rather, it was the actions carried out by those close to [Nombre 033] that prevented the application of the abbreviated procedure, given that already, from this procedure, [Nombre 064] had committed to testify at trial;
- vii)abbreviated procedures were negotiated with other accused in this case, with penalties of three years of imprisonment and the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence (v.g., [Nombre 068], [Nombre 105]). Thus, it cannot be said that there was preferential treatment for [Nombre 064] when a penalty of four years of imprisonment was agreed with him;
- viii)according to the dissenting vote, [Nombre 064] was allowed to keep around one million dollars in bribes in exchange for testifying, but there is no evidence whatsoever of this. What is on record is that with or without an abbreviated procedure, with or without a prosecutorial discretion criterion, [Nombre 064] delivered a sum of $1,401,241.36 dollars since October 2004. For the majority vote, if [Nombre 064] had wanted to keep some money in exchange for his impunity, he would not have delivered that sum, much less would he have negotiated such a possibility. Furthermore, according to the dynamic insinuated by the defense, if the Public Prosecutor's Office wanted to compensate [Nombre 064] for his statement, one would have to think that it also wanted to compensate him when, for that same sum, it agreed to apply the abbreviated procedure and impose 4 years of imprisonment on him, or that it wanted to compensate [Nombre 105] when he only returned $100,000 having received more than $1,000,000, but that it did not want to do so with [Nombre 068] when it negotiated an abbreviated procedure and the return of more than $1,000,000 with him. This reflects that the negotiation with the accused was not conditioned on the issue of the exact repayment of the amount from which they benefited;
- ix)although [Nombre 064] did not answer some questions from the defense attorneys of [Nombre 033], [Nombre 041], and [Nombre 018], this was because he was questioned regarding facts in which his account would self-incriminate him, hence he was entitled to the right of abstention, or because they were facts unrelated to the accused. In any case, it was the court that cautioned him (the collaborator) in that sense, whereby this situation in no way undermines his credibility.
Starting from folio 16,085 front of the same volume, the lower court (a quo) undertook the task of setting forth the reasons why it considers that the account of [Nombre 064] can be verified with other evidentiary elements of a direct or indirect nature. It clarifies, however, that this verification is in relation to the general aspects of his version and not with respect to each of the facts related by him, since this would render the prosecutorial discretion criterion meaningless:
- a)[Nombre 033] was [...] from May 8, 1998, to May 8, 2002.
- b)[Nombre 064] had a long career in public service. He was Minister Counselor in charge of business at the Embassy of Chile from 1978 to 1983; deputy (diputado) in the periods from 1986 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1994; minister in the administration of [Nombre 033] from May 1998 to July 1999. Subsequently, in this same administration, from August 1, 1999, to May 9, 2002, he was appointed presidential advisor and general director of the presidential house. He was also appointed by the Government Council as director of ICE, starting August 3, 1999, both positions (as minister counselor or general director of the presidency of the Republic and as a member of the board of directors of ICE) held simultaneously (of the above, there is abundant evidence, e.g., numbers 15, 303, 304, 305, 638.1 and 638.2, all cited at folio 16,091 front and following). From all this, it is inferred that [Nombre 064] was a person close to [Nombre 033], who depended hierarchically on him. It was also ruled out that [Nombre 064] harbored a feeling of animosity against [Nombre 033];
- c)despite ICE being an autonomous institution, it maintained a link with the central government. This is not solely the result of institutional practice, but of the legal system that provides for it, by leaving in the hands of the Government Council the appointment of the directors of autonomous institutions and attributing to the [...] the power of direction and coordination of tasks;
- d)there is abundant evidence that allows demonstrating that, even before the facts investigated here, the policy of giving attentions to public officials of ICE was frequent. [Nombre 041] spontaneously accepted having paid bribes to public officials. [Nombre 105] and [Nombre 078] submitted to a conformity procedure, with the consequent acceptance of charges. There are also three ICE officials who have admitted their responsibility ([Nombre 068] in an abbreviated procedure, [Nombre 001] spontaneously admitted before a media outlet having received money from [Nombre 091] and [Nombre 064] admitted it before the court), whereby the collaborator's statement is corroborated, to the effect that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] made him a promise of a bribe and that he accepted it after bringing it to the attention of [Nombre 033];
- e)lunches and other activities between the employees of [Nombre 091] and public officials were frequent. There were meetings between the corruptors and [Nombre 064], [Nombre 001], [Nombre 018], [Nombre 063], and [Nombre 022]. There was also another series of attentions for public officials, e.g., the payment of a travel ticket to Paris for "[Nombre 064]" and his wife (evidence No. 55, folio 91), or hotel reservations for [Nombre 022].
- f)Some public officials frequented the facilities of [Nombre 091], for example, [Nombre 022] and [Nombre 001]. Likewise, [Nombre 041] sent some public officials ([Nombre 022], [Nombre 001] and [Nombre 018]) envelopes containing the legend "confidential and personal" to their homes and offices. He also sent them to the corruptor [Nombre 028].
- g)[Nombre 046] had a relationship with [Nombre 033]. According to [Nombre 064], he made collection efforts from mid-2000 before [Nombre 041] at the request of [Nombre 046] and through the intercession of [Nombre 033]. [Nombre 046] wrote an opinion article (evidence No. 592.7), where he states that he, at the request of [Nombre 078], carried out a transaction for [Nombre 110] (a company linked to [Nombre 033]) and that he never charged any commission for favors done for two [...], one who appointed him ambassador and another as a bank director (the latter being [Nombre 033]). With this, says the court, the relationship between [Nombre 046] and [Nombre 033] is corroborated, and although the former exonerates the latter from responsibility in that article, the true explanation behind those payments is already known.
- h)Two of the directors appointed in the [Nombre 033] administration are linked to these acts of corruption ([Nombre 064] and [Nombre 068]). A third, [Nombre 022], although appointed in the Figures Olsen administration, had ties to [Nombre 033].
- i)Before making the proposal to [Nombre 064], [Nombre 041] had already initiated a similar approach with respect to [Nombre 001], meeting with him on Friday, December 1, 2000, also with the attendance of [Nombre 078], [Nombre 111], and [Nombre 112]. Evidence No. 81 demonstrates that this lunch existed, “... which allows appreciating how the corruptors were resorting to a similar strategy for the remunerative proposals not only regarding [Nombre 064] …” (f. 16,129 front);
- j)At the time the meeting took place at the [Nombre 094] restaurant between [Nombre 064], [Nombre 041], and [Nombre 078] and then, the next day, between [Nombre 064] and [Nombre 033] at the latter's house, all those involved were in the country. The call from [Nombre 078] to [Nombre 064] was made, says the court, on December 1, 2000, the date on which he also met with [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 001]. The meeting at [Nombre 094] was on Saturday, December 2, 2000, and the meeting between [Nombre 033] and [Nombre 064] took place on Sunday, December 3, 2000. According to the court, if [Nombre 064] were lying, no coincidence would have been achieved between the data obtained from the immigration movements of those involved ([Nombre 064], [Nombre 078], [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 033]), the expense reports of [Nombre 041] (which show that on December 1, 2000, there was a meeting between [Nombre 078], [Nombre 041], [Nombre 111], [Nombre 112], and [Nombre 001]) and the flight itineraries.
- k)The existence of these meetings is also demonstrated by considering that [Nombre 064] voted in favor of the awarding of the 400,000 lines and that months after that vote, he received the bribe that he shared with [Nombre 033]. The distribution of the money reflects a strategy aimed at hiding its origin. Furthermore, [Nombre 064] received an amount similar to other accused but doubled, which reveals that the corruptors had been informed that they were paying two officials and not one. Furthermore, there is coincidence in the modal and temporal circumstances for the delivery and receipt of the bribes paid to the three directors of ICE, namely [Nombre 022], [Nombre 068], and [Nombre 064], the same as to [Nombre 001] and [Nombre 018];
- l)there is evidence that although up to December 5, 2000, the quantity of 400,000 cell lines was formally mentioned, this information was already known beforehand by the corruptors, as affirmed by [Nombre 064]. There is a note from November 10, 2000, where [Nombre 098] points out to [Nombre 041] that although the announcement made by [Nombre 095] about the future tender for the 600,000 GSM cell lines was favorable, they had to maintain pressure to not allow them to continue favoring Lucent and Ericsson, since it seemed that ICE planned a purchase of 200,000 to expand the current ones (TDMA). This exposes that the corruptors were informed of what was happening and how, despite the announcement of the migration, they thought that [Nombre 091] should not sit idly by, as it should accelerate that process (as also suggested by the note of November 22, also sent by [Nombre 098] to [Nombre 041] in relation to the appointment of [Nombre 001], evidence No. 396), aside from noticing that if a direct purchase of 200,000 TDMA lines was made, 400,000 lines in GSM technology would remain. According to the judges, that is the data that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] were handling by November 22, 2000, and, therefore, it is ruled out that [Nombre 064] erroneously assembled his statement, anticipating information that would not be known until December 5, 2000.
- m)[Nombre 091] sought to be treated with equity and felt the need to defend its rights. In the session of December 5, 2000, in which the comprehensive telecommunications plan project was approved, a proposal was presented to acquire 600,000 lines, specifically, 200,000 from the companies Lucent and Ericsson in TDMA technology and 400,000 that would be awarded to [Nombre 091], Siemens, Nortel, Ericsson, and Lucent with GSM technology. In a second stage, 200,000 mobile lines would be approved for the third-generation (3G) tender. It is observed how, although the opening to GSM is proposed through the awarding of 400,000 lines and the inclusion of [Nombre 091] as a bidder, a "right of way" is also respected for the companies Lucent and Ericsson, which denotes ambivalent behavior on the part of ICE, by continuing to encourage the purchase of TDMA lines. The evidence also demonstrates that [Nombre 091] had been denied participation in the contracting for cell lines, which changed as of February 27, 2001, after the remunerative promises were made, when it was considered by the board of directors of ICE as a possible bidder in the acquisition of the 160,000 cell lines by direct contracting, given that at that time the contracting for the 400,000 lines was already underway. Likewise, the evidence allows accrediting that on August 28, 2001, the contract for the 400,000 cell lines was awarded to [Nombre 091], a session in which [Nombre 064], [Nombre 068], [Nombre 022], as well as other public officials of ICE were present.
- n)It was ruled out that [Nombre 064] was paid only for the awarding of the 160,000 lines, since this accused was not present at session No. 5271, in which the matter was decided.
- o)It was demonstrated through abundant evidentiary elements—expert, documentary, and testimonial—that [Nombre 064] received money from [Nombre 060] and transferred part of it to [Nombre 033]. So much for the reasons of the trial court for granting credibility, according to its judgment, to the statement provided by [Nombre 064] at trial.
Having analyzed the foregoing indicators, the undersigned appellate judges consider that the conclusion of the lower court, to the effect that the statement of [Nombre 064] is credible regarding the promise of a bribe that was made to him in relation to the contract for the 400,000 GSM lines, is contrary to the rules of sound criticism. It is undeniable that [Nombre 064] testified from the beginning of this process; however, it was many months and several investigative statements later that he affirmed having received from [Nombre 078] and [Nombre 041] a promise of a bribe related to the contract for the 400,000 GSM telephone lines. Now, it is not that [Nombre 064] initially had remained silent about the cause of the economic retributions received, only to later decide to speak out on the matter, but rather that he had expressly and repeatedly indicated to the Public Prosecutor's Office that the money received was offered and delivered to him after the awarding, by way of a "reward." That is, [Nombre 064] ruled out that a promise of a bribe had been made to him prior to the awarding of the mentioned contract.
As is inferred from the review of the audio and video recordings of the trial, specifically from what is related to the testimony given by [Nombre 064] before the trial court, as well as from the appealed judgment itself, we find that on several occasions and based on Article 343 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the statements that the collaborator accused made before the requesting body were incorporated in what was contradictory to what he was stating at trial, establishing with clear clarity that from September 30, 2004, and repeatedly (cf. e.g., the expanded statement he gave on October 15, 2004, second paragraph of folio 9,003, incorporated by reading into the trial as recorded at f. 14,996 front of the judgment, volume XXXI), [Nombre 064] stated that it was after the awarding and even when the execution of the contract was taking place, that he was contacted to inform him that there was "a reward" from [Nombre 091].
As is concluded without effort, the collaborator accused was categorical in ruling out that a prior promise had been made to him, it being some time later, on May 9, 2005, when he first indicated something completely different, specifically, that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078], at the end of the year 2000 or the beginning of 2001, at the [Nombre 094] restaurant, made him a promise of a bribe in exchange for him helping [Nombre 091] with the migration to GSM technology, with the implementation of tenders instead of direct contracts, and with his favorable vote for the company in the contract for the 400,000 lines (cf. f. 2,992 to 3,010 front, volume VIII). At the request of a party, the court incorporated the second paragraph of folio 2,999, which, in what is of interest, indicates: "So then Mr. [Nombre 078] arrived in the company of Mr. [Nombre 041], there was an exchange of introductory phrases and Mr. [Nombre 078] tells me that they are worried, that they have increasing certainty that the tender will be bypassed to harm [Nombre 091].
He also told me that Mr. [Nombre 046] had indicated to them that he had the power to bring down said tender, even with the help of Zapote, for those reasons they ask for my help so that the process is not aborted and that if everything goes well the company would give me a gratuity. I asked him what I had to do, then they indicated to me that they simply needed the tender to take place, I asked them if I didn't have to speak to someone and they said no, that the only thing they needed was for the tender not to be aborted. Later I asked them what the reward consisted of and they indicated to me that between one point five percent (1.5%) and two percent (2%) of the tender, outside of expenses..." (Transcription made at f. 15,001 of the judgment, volume XXXI). That is, it was approximately eight months after having given his first statement that [Nombre 064] stated that there was a promise of a bribe prior to the contracting of the 400,000 lines, the same one he shared with [Nombre 033].
The statement in which [Nombre 064] changed his version of the facts began to be given on the same day that he signed an agreement with the Public Prosecutor's Office for the application of an abbreviated procedure, in which the requesting body conditioned its consent on the expansion of [Nombre 064]'s investigative statement complying with certain terms, namely, "... to set forth in a clear manner the existence of negotiations and of a promise of delivery of money prior to the approval of the contract for the 400 K between the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity and the company [Nombre 091]. Likewise, the accused [Nombre 064] will disclose the name of a reference witness, who has knowledge because the accused [Nombre 064] made it known to him, of the promise of delivery of money prior to the approval of the ICE-[Nombre 091] contract. On the other hand, he will make an even broader statement about the delivery of money to the co-defendant [Nombre 033], clarifying each of the transactions carried out regarding the money corresponding to the bribes or payments from [Nombre 091].
He will also relate the knowledge that the co-defendant [Nombre 033] had of the promise of bribes or payments made by [Nombre 091], as well as the latter’s approval for [Nombre 064] to receive said money… The agreed penalty shall be four years of imprisonment without any type of reduction.” (F. 2, evidence No. 308, prior agreement document for the application of an abbreviated procedure). It is true, as the trial court points out, that the abbreviated procedure was not applied for reasons beyond [Nombre 064]'s control and that the agreed penalty did not allow the application of benefits such as the conditional execution of the sentence. This circumstance, however, does not allow concluding that the first version of [Nombre 064] was false and that the second was true, especially considering that the latter was given precisely under the shelter of a negotiation with the Public Prosecutor's Office, which from then on, conditioned the abbreviated procedure on [Nombre 064] including in his account certain information (specifically, about the promise of a bribe made to him before the awarding, the identification of a reference witness, and more details about the conduct of [Nombre 033], the knowledge he had of the promise, and the approval he gave for [Nombre 064] to receive the money).
That is, upon negotiating with the requesting body, [Nombre 064]'s account changed drastically on a core aspect, specifically, on the existence of a promise of a bribe prior to the awarding. It is an inconsistency that acquires paramount importance when assessing the credibility of the statement, not only because the configuration of the crime—aggravated corruption by improper bribery—depends on the demonstration of the prior promise made by [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078], but because, contrary to what the lower court indicated, its existence rests solely on the word of the collaborator accused himself. According to the appealed judgment, what was stated by [Nombre 064] is true because all those involved were in the country on Saturday, December 2, 2000. This, clearly, is unsustainable, since from that single indicator (the presence of [Nombre 041], [Nombre 078], and [Nombre 064] in national territory) it could not be inferred as a reasonable and natural conclusion that the meeting existed, much less that the promise was made.
It is important to note that although there is evidence that [Nombre 078] and [Nombre 041] met on December 1, 2000, with [Nombre 001] and other persons (cf. voucher from folio 6 bis and invoice from folio 7, expense report from folio 1, evidence No. 81 that this chamber has viewed) and that [Nombre 041] also met with [Nombre 001] on November 29, 2000 (cf. also evidence No. 81), this is absolutely irrelevant for what is of interest here, since, as the same court recognized, these meetings were frequent, without it being possible to assert that they were aimed at making illicit proposals to those public servants (f. 16,112 front, volume XXXIII). Therefore, it is a simple supposition of the judges who subscribe to the majority vote to conclude that the meeting that took place the day before the one described by [Nombre 064] allows demonstrating that "... the corruptors were resorting to a similar strategy for the remunerative proposals not only regarding [Nombre 064], but also regarding another co-defendant and ICE official..." (F. 16,129 front, volume XXXIII).
The same can be held in relation to the meeting between [Nombre 064] and [Nombre 033]. That both were in the national territory, an indicator verified through the documents that account for their immigration movements, does not even allow establishing with a degree of probability that the cited meeting existed. It is important to remember that [Nombre 064] is not a witness in this process, but a collaborator accused who, as such, is not obligated to tell the truth or to testify under oath. His contribution is also not gratuitous. It is articulated knowing that, if he satisfies the expectations for which the exercise of criminal prosecution against him was suspended (Art. 23 C.P.P.), he will obtain, by way of a benefit or reward, the extinction of that prosecution. Although that sole circumstance would not allow denying credibility to his statement, the truth is that it must be weighed with extreme caution, to the point that it is indispensable to have additional evidentiary elements that ratify his words.
In the same sense, Zúñiga Morales points out: “For some, when an accused informs on others, affirming that they committed the act together with him or that they intend to incur more crimes, the authorities are obligated to act with the utmost prudence and caution, without despising that information, but granting it only the value that corresponds to a notitia criminis. If an accused decides to reveal data that another would jealously guard, how many reasons can motivate that conduct? For this reason, it has been said, with all reason, that the system should establish all necessary guarantees to ensure the truthfulness of the data, confirming the information by other means. However, in many cases, the revelations of the collaborator are easily accepted as authentic indicators of criminal responsibility, without the personality of the informant, nor the little credibility he deserves, nor the preceding contradictory statements he has given, mattering.
Although, on occasions, the collaborator accused does not say everything he knows or does not assume all the responsibility that corresponds to him, it can happen that, due to an accommodating attitude, his revelations deserve much more credit than any exculpatory version offered by those who are informed upon. In certain cases, this can lead to a lack of depth in the police investigations and, in close relation to this, to a stagnation of investigation techniques.” (ZÚÑIGA MORALES, op. cit., p. 595). This is a concern that is not exclusive to our environment. In other countries where the figure of the “repentant” has been incorporated in the context of the fight against organized crime, questions are also formulated regarding the procedural assessment that can be made of their statements and about the need, in order to deem the account plausible, for its verification by other means of proof: “The simple informing on other individuals carried out by the self-declared guilty accused, who provides his testimony incriminating other participants in the criminal organization seeking better punitive treatment, poses serious evidentiary problems.
The informing statement of a co-defendant can hardly be identified with that of a procedural witness, insofar as, the interrogation of the accused is itself built as a means of defense that allows him not to answer the questions raised and, even, to lie about the facts, while the procedural witness is obligated to tell the truth about the facts under the threat of being charged with a crime of false testimony. The introduction into legal systems of the 'hybrid figure of the accused-witness' opens the doors to the danger of the 'degeneration of the evidentiary system.'” (BENÍTEZ ORTÚZAR, op. cit., p. 29.). In the particular case, what is being assessed is whether the testimony given by an accused is credible regarding the existence of a fact (the promise of economic retribution prior to the awarding), when he himself throughout the process had expressly denied the point, stating emphatically that the sums received were offered to him after the awarding of the contract for the 400,000 cell phone lines.
This chamber has no doubts about the discomfort experienced by the heads of [Nombre 091] during 1999 and 2000, since due to the use of captive technologies—TDMA—in Costa Rica, [Nombre 091] was practically left out of the mobile phone market.
Nor does it have doubts about the strategy that, at least formally, the aforementioned company designed to resolve that problem (course of action of [Name 124]) and which contemplated approaches to key figures in different spheres of national activity; about the links between [Name 064] and [Name 033], as well as between the former and other public officials with the company [Name 091] and its representatives. It was also demonstrated that [Name 041], through two corporations ([Name 058]. and [Name 114].), transferred funds to a series of officials linked to the telecommunications field after [Name 091] obtained the award of the 400,000 lines, officials among whom [Name 064] figured, who, it was also demonstrated, transferred part of those funds to [Name 033] or to individuals or legal entities close to him. However, what cannot be established with a degree of certainty is that [Name 041] and [Name 078] made a promise of financial compensation to [Name 064] at the [Name 094] restaurant, located in Alajuela, before the contract for the 400,000 lines materialized and, even less so, that this promise was made in exchange for that public official acting in three areas, specifically, favoring the migration to GSM, promoting the use of public tenders to replace direct contracting, and voting favorably for [Name 091] in the aforementioned contract.
Likewise, except for what was stated by [Name 064], it cannot be deemed proven with certainty that he conveyed the aforementioned promise to [Name 033] the following day, under the terms explained by the requesting body. One cannot lose sight of the fact that regarding the cited fact (the promise of a bribe made in December 2000), the only thing the lower court had was the statement of the cooperating defendant, a statement that is clearly not reliable because it has varied over time; because the changes occurred precisely when negotiating with the Public Prosecutor's Office, to the point that the abbreviated procedure was conditioned on what [Name 064] would declare regarding the promise of a bribe; because the changes do not concern tangential issues, but quite the contrary, a core fact that had not gone unnoticed by the cooperating defendant himself, since for months he had dismissed any offer prior to the mentioned contract, and finally, because [Name 064] was a public official prone to receiving irregular financial compensation ("rewards" as he called them), originating from individuals and legal entities with whom he had ties due to his position, which means it also cannot be ruled out that things happened in other ways not contemplated in the accusation, e.g., under the terms he narrated for months (in that case constituting the crime of accepting a bribe for an act already performed), or in other ways also proscribed by our legal system (e.g., that it was he who demanded the payment of the financial compensation, an alternative that is also not discardable if one considers that [Name 064] himself acknowledged at trial that before the events investigated here, and at the insistence of [Name 046] and [Name 033], he "suggested" to [Name 041] and to [Name 078] himself "the advisability of paying" [Name 046] what they had promised him in the past; cf. f. 14,940 and 14,941 front, volume XXXI).
It is important to emphasize that [Name 064] had criminal liability in the investigated events and, to that extent, his contributions as a cooperator are conditioned by his interest in satisfying the expectations of the requesting body. His testimony (a term used improperly, as he did not testify under oath) cannot be considered sufficient proof to deem the existence of a prior promise of a bribe to be proven (an element that is decisive for speaking of a crime of aggravated corruption by improper bribery), and furthermore, contrary to what the appealed judgment states, there are no other indications confirming that point. It is important to note that for this chamber, by reason of the principle of freedom of evidence contemplated in Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no impediment to deeming a fact of interest for the resolution of the case proven based solely on the information provided by the cooperating defendant when it stands on its own; however, this is not the case here, since, as has been explained, there are weighty questions about the account provided and its veracity, which, despite the efforts made by the requesting body, have not been eliminated.
There are a series of indications (set forth above) that can certainly be deemed proven without relying on the statement of [Name 064], namely, that between 1999 and 2000, the representatives of [Name 091] in the country considered that the company was subject to irregular treatment by ICE; that a strategy was developed to resolve that problem, which contemplated approaching important people in different spheres; that although the need for ICE to migrate to GSM technology was foreseen and the institution had taken some steps in that direction, by the year 2000 it was not a consolidated decision; that several public officials related to the telecommunications field and with ties to [Name 091] received, under similar circumstances and through the same channels ([Name 058]. and [Name 114].), sums originating from [Name 060] and, of course, that [Name 091] secured the contract for the 400,000 lines.
Now, from all these indications, it can reasonably be inferred that the public officials received money from the aforementioned company, and it could even be suspected that those funds had some relation to the award of the cited contract; however, what is not plausible is to assert with certainty that those funds, all transferred to the public officials after the award, were to fulfill a promise that was made to them previously and separately, in exchange for supporting the cited company, especially considering that, as was demonstrated, [Name 091] was favored with the contract not by chance or by irregular acts of the defendants, but by meeting all the tender specifications, which was not the case with the competition (proven fact No. 41). That is, regarding the existence of a prior promise made to [Name 064] (and which the lower court uses to establish that a similar proposal was also made to the other defendants who were public officials), the only evidence available is the word of that cooperating defendant, a person who for months expressly denied that point.
It is important to note that at trial, [Name 064] was asked about this and other inconsistencies detected in his version. He, despite acknowledging having said that the offer was after the award, denied having lied on September 30, 2004, arguing that he had only tried to "cover or protect himself" back then, and that he later "refined" his statement (f. 14,962 and 14,986 front, volume XXXI). He even stated that "… it was obvious that that statement was not going to stand on its own; that is why the Prosecutor's Office told me that could not be, to justify it, and that is when I clarified things, I said that the offer was not after the award but before." (F. 14,962 front of the same volume). And despite [Name 064] persistently denying having falsified the facts, it is indubitable, evident, that one of the two versions he offered does not correspond to reality. Either he lied when stating that there was no prior offer, or he lied when stating that there was one, making it impossible to establish, based on such a questionable and biased testimony, whether a promise of financial compensation was indeed made to him before the contract for the 400,000 lines materialized, or whether such an assertion only responds to his interest in satisfying the Public Prosecutor's Office to obtain the procedural benefit promised to him.
For the trial court, the corroboration of [Name 064]'s statement must be regarding the general aspects and not with respect to each of the facts related, since seeking this would render the opportunity criterion unproductive. Such a conclusion, in this particular case, is unacceptable, since the cooperating defendant's statement has been inconsistent on a fact that, while specific, is of the greatest importance in his entire version, namely, the existence of a promise of a bribe prior to abbreviated competitive procedure No. 1-2001. That being the case, it is not possible to ignore the foregoing and deem the account credible solely because, regarding some general facts, it coincides with other evidentiary elements (e.g., regarding the situation [Name 091] faced in a market that worked with captive technologies). It must be insisted that, although Article 182 C.P.P. contemplates the possibility of proving any circumstance of interest to the case by any permitted means of proof, which would include the statement of the cooperating defendant, according to the rules of sound criticism, it is not the same to base a judgment of certainty on an account that has been coherent and consistent as on one that is openly contradictory regarding the core alleged fact (the promise of a bribe), a contradiction that, moreover, arose upon reaching an agreement with the requesting body, first to apply an abbreviated procedure and then an opportunity criterion.
In addition to this, there are other inconsistencies in [Name 064]'s statement that are impossible to ignore. For example, on September 30, 2004, [Name 064] declared that, after the first remittance of money from [Name 091], he gave [Name 033], in the latter's office and in cash, the amount of $370,000. However, it turned out that the amount [Name 091] had given him on that occasion was only $225,000. When questioned about this, [Name 064] indicated that the confusion was involuntary "...due to the turmoil of the events" (f. 14,987 front) and that of those $225,000, what he transferred to [Name 033] in his office was the sum of $130,000 as follows: "...a certificate for $100,000 and 6 for $5,000..." (f. 14,987 front). The tribunal, in its majority vote, accepted [Name 064]'s excuses, considering that the documentary evidence confirms that the cooperating defendant gave [Name 033] the certificates described above.
However, it is one thing to have proven that this transfer of certificates took place, and quite another to have proven the concept for which this transfer occurred, a point that can only be credited through the word of [Name 064], and to that extent, it is central that his account be credible. It is reiterated that, regarding the prior promise of a bribe and the intervention of [Name 033] in the acceptance of that promise, the only existing evidence is the word of [Name 064] (who is not a witness, but a defendant whose legal situation depends on what is resolved in this process), hence any inconsistency observed in it must be assessed with extreme care. In this context, it is striking that this deponent incurred in "confusions" of no small magnitude, such as the one already noted, for one does not hand over $370,000 dollars in cash from a criminal act, to the [...] every day. Continuing along this line of thought, it is striking how [Name 064], when questioned by the defense attorneys of the accused on this and other important topics, stated he did not remember.
It is impossible to ignore that he says he does not remember, for example, whether in his statements before the requesting body he had insisted that the "reward" was after the award, or whether he had told [Name 115] about his agreement with [Name 033] or with [Name 091] (f. 14,990 front), issues that are elementary and central to his testimony. In addition to this, note that—according to [Name 064]—the promise of a bribe was not only related to the migration to GSM technology, or the use of tenders instead of direct contracting, but to the award of the contract for the 400,000 lines (f. 14,963 front); however, the abbreviated bidding procedure for the lease with purchase option of 400,000 GSM cellular lines arose because the Comptroller General of the Republic so ordered some time after, according to [Name 064], the promise of financial compensation had been made. Although, as the tribunal indicates, by early December 2000, some proposal had already been developed, which is precisely the one discussed on the 5th (session No. 5249), the majority vote chooses to ignore that it spoke of 600,000 lines, 200,000 to expand the current ones—with TDMA technology—and 400,000 in GSM technology to be obtained not by public tender but by direct purchase from 5 suppliers ([Name 091], Siemens, Nortel, Ericsson, and Lucent), with the Comptroller being the one who, after that date (and, therefore, after, according to [Name 064], the promise of a bribe was made to him), refused to authorize more direct purchases, opening the door to an abbreviated competitive process.
To that extent, it is difficult to believe that the promise of compensation that [Name 064] placed at the beginning of December 2000 contemplated, as he said, a favorable vote in relation to a bidding procedure that did not then exist nor was foreseen (again, what had been designed regarding the 400,000 GSM lines was direct purchase from several suppliers). In summary, although there are evidentiary elements that allow confirming some points of the account given by [Name 064] (e.g., that after the award, [Name 091] gave him a significant sum of money), in its core aspects (that is, having received on December 2, 2000, a promise of financial compensation that he conveyed to [Name 033] on the 3rd of that same month and year; cf. proven facts identified with numbers 85 to 92), his account not only finds no support in other evidence, but has also been contradictory, to the point of making it impossible to rule out that things also happened in another way, namely, that it was he—[Name 064]—and other public officials who demanded the delivery of financial compensation from the heads of [Name 091]; that these occurred after the contract for the 400,000 lines was awarded without a prior promise (a thesis that, it is reiterated, he maintained for several months), or that the promise, if it existed, had a different content than what [Name 064] mentions.
For the undersigned, the word of [Name 064] is simply incredible, and therefore, it is not sufficient to deem proven the reason why public officials received payments originating from [Name 060]. It is important to emphasize that granting [Name 064] an opportunity criterion in no way relates to the credibility that may be given to his testimony. That being the case, it is not understood why the Public Prosecutor's Office, knowing that this defendant, who was prone to receiving financial compensation, supplied them with two different versions on a topic as central as the promise of financial compensation, chose to apply an opportunity criterion in his case, setting aside the referred circumstances that, in the end, as now happens, make it impossible to deem his words credible. Furthermore, this chamber has also taken on the task of listening to the audio and video recording of this cooperating defendant's statement at trial, determining that the answers he gave to a significant number of questions posed by the defense attorneys of the other defendants were not spontaneous.
Notice that in many cases, before responding, [Name 064] would speak with his defense attorney, Lic. Edwald Acuña Blanco, a professional who was sitting next to him. This situation was even the subject of questioning, not only because it was repeated, but because it occurred in connection with questions whose answers could not generate liability for [Name 064] regarding criminal acts unrelated to those negotiated under the opportunity criterion. However, the tribunal refused to correct the situation, arguing that it could not be assured that Lic. Acuña Blanco was recommending to [Name 064] what to answer (cf., e.g., the recording corresponding to September 16, 2010, file c0002100916102255.vgz, from 10:42:10 hours onwards). This is a conclusion this tribunal does not share. [Name 064], as a cooperating defendant, had the right to speak privately with his attorney before testifying, so the latter could advise him.
He also had the right to testify in his presence (Art. 82 subsection e), 93, and 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and, of course, for Lic. Acuña Blanco, if deemed necessary, to recommend he remain silent to questions whose answers could potentially imply some liability for him regarding acts different from those negotiated with the requesting body. What constitutes an abuse of those rights is for any defendant (and even more so [Name 064], who would obtain a significant procedural advantage in exchange for his statement) to limit himself to communicating his advisor's answers, it being naive to believe, as the majority vote does, that the conversations between the defendant and his attorney after each question and before answering were not intended to guide his responses, dialogues that, moreover, had no reason to exist when dealing with questions related to the facts contemplated, at least formally, in the opportunity criterion, since it was regarding these that [Name 064] undertook to cooperate.
But even hypothetically assuming that a defendant who has decided to testify can do so under such conditions, what cannot be denied is that this behavior adds to the doubts that arise regarding the veracity of his version, since he was not even able to respond spontaneously to many of the questions asked of him. Finally, note that besides the word of [Name 064], the only evidence that is somehow related to the issue of the prior promise is judgment No. 586-07, handed down on October 16, 2007, against [Name 068], in which he is convicted for having accepted a promise of a bribe from [Name 105] (evidence No. 747); however, this is a judgment issued years after [Name 064] corrected his statement (and after, based on this, the requesting body adopted a specific theory of the case) within the framework of an abbreviated procedure, where the acceptance of charges by [Name 068] was of a formal nature, and therefore it does not have sufficient weight to make an account as questionable as the one already presented credible.
And if the intention of the requesting body was to support the testimony of [Name 064] with that of [Name 068], or with that of any other defendant who had made a deal with the requesting body (e.g., [Name 105]), it should have offered their statements to be received at the time of trial and not attempt to assign to a judgment—which, even on the point in question—the acceptance of the promise of a bribe—is quite concise, an evidentiary significance it does not have, since it is not a document containing a statement given with all the formalities required by the legal system to be incorporated by reading into the trial and examined in this process, as if it were an advance of evidence. In addition to this, one cannot lose sight of the fact that while [Name 064] speaks of a promise of a bribe made to him since December 2000 with three specific objectives (migration to GSM, public tender instead of direct contracting, and award of the 400,000 lines), regarding [Name 068], the judgment only alludes to a promise that was articulated when the bidding process was already underway, meaning these are not identical situations, where the demonstration of one can lead to deriving the existence of the other.
In the case of the statements of [Name 041], acknowledging having made payments to public officials, and that of [Name 001], accepting having received them, it is important to note that neither one nor the other indicated the concept for which the payments were made or received. That is, the doubt remains as to whether the amounts were to fulfill a promise of a bribe made before the award (which leads us to doubt whether that promise of a bribe that [Name 064] and the requesting body described in relation to the involved public officials actually existed), or if the payments responded to other equally plausible dynamics, which, besides not being contemplated in the accusation, would fit different criminal offenses (e.g., bribery, acceptance of bribes for an act already performed, or extortion by a public official). It is important to add that the Public Prosecutor's Office, on the occasion of the oral hearing held before this chamber, provided a document called "Written Record of the Public Prosecutor's Office's Oral Presentation/ICE-[Name 091] Case", in which it asserts that the tribunal, in its majority vote, analyzed a large amount of both documentary and testimonial evidence that allows verifying the truthfulness of [Name 064]'s statement on a series of points, which the requesting body set out in 24 points, namely:
- 1)[Name 091] used numerous public opinion formation instruments to explain its interest in migrating to new trends. This was the start of a public discussion that combined with unsatisfied demand. Additionally, [Name 091] always maintained that it was subjected to discriminatory treatment by ICE and questioned purchases made from other companies;
- 2)by May 2000, the decision to migrate to GSM technology had not been made;
- 3)there is evidence that [Name 041] knew what was going to happen regarding the direct contracting of 160,000 lines to [Name 091], which confirms what [Name 064] said, in the sense that the former called him and asked him to attend the board of directors session where an agreement on the topic, adopted at the previous session that [Name 064] did not attend, was called into question;
- 4)there was a close relationship between [Name 064] and [Name 033];
- 5)[Name 064] and [Name 041] had contact;
- 6)[Name 041] acknowledged to [Name 116] that [Name 058] was a kind of trust. The payer was [Name 058]., not [Name 091] directly, which confirms what [Name 064] stated regarding the inquiry he made to [Name 041] about that corporation;
- 7)regarding the content of the remunerative promise, [Name 064] mentioned it was in exchange for migrating technology, promoting the tender, and voting affirmatively for [Name 091]'s offer. For his part, [Name 128] described how the company contacted [Name 018] to discuss the elimination of direct contracting, also noting that [Name 018] asked him to speak with his superiors. It is also on record that [Name 018] received, through the same channel and at the same time as [Name 064], a sum of money, and there is documentary evidence showing the discomfort of one of the managers of the corrupt plan, associated with the three aforementioned objectives;
- 8)regarding the promise described by [Name 064], there is evidence that money was transferred to this defendant through [Name 058].;
- 9)by the time [Name 064] says the proposal was made to him to favor migration, it had not yet occurred;
- 10)regarding the process of seduction described by [Name 064], there is abundant evidence showing the meetings, invitations, and attentions from [Name 091] toward several public officials;
- 11)[Name 064] placed the offer at the end of 2000, and that year was decisive for [Name 091], as can be inferred from the complaints it filed and other documentary evidence (e.g., paid advertisements);
- 12)regarding the meeting between [Name 064] and [Name 033], there is documentary evidence showing how they divided [Name 091]'s money;
- 13)according to [Name 064], he was paid the money because of the promise made. This is confirmed by the fact that both he and other public officials were paid through similar means—via [Name 058].—;
- 14)[Name 064] said part of the money was for [Name 033]. On this point, the evidence shows that [Name 064] received a sum similar to the other public officials but doubled, which reveals that through him, two officials were being paid, not one. The transfer of money from [Name 064] to [Name 033] was demonstrated, and it was ruled out that it was a loan, as the latter claimed;
- 15)and
- 16)there is evidence confirming [Name 046]'s relationship with [Name 091], the transfer of funds from that company to [Name 046], and the transfer of funds from the latter to [Name 064]. This confirms the cooperator's statement to the effect that [Name 046] compensated him for having collected from [Name 091] what they owed him;
- 17)regarding the deliveries of money from [Name 064] to [Name 033] described by the former, there is documentary evidence;
- 18)[Name 064] initially said he transferred funds to the account of [Name 110], but later clarified that this was not the case. This is credible because [Name 064] provided a document showing the number of the cited account, and furthermore, the link of that company with [Name 033] was not known even by people close to [Name 033];
- 19)it was demonstrated that [Name 064] made a first payment to [Name 033] with some BICSA certificates belonging to his mother, since his account was being questioned, just as he stated;
- 20)it was established that part of the second payment made by [Name 064] to [Name 033] was used for the benefit of the latter; 21), 22), and 23) regarding other payments made by [Name 064] to the then [...], there is documentary and testimonial evidence showing the path followed by the money and how it ended up in the hands of people linked to [Name 033], and furthermore, part of those payments were accepted by [Name 033]; 24) [Name 064] said that regarding the last payments [Name 091] made to him, he did not transfer money to [Name 033] because it was difficult since the latter was in Washington and because he believed the distribution was unfair, which—the prosecutors say—the tribunal used to explain why the transfer of funds was truncated (f. 176,960 to 176,965 back, volume XLIV). For this chamber, the indications mentioned above in no way allow confirming that the promise of a bribe took place under the terms described by [Name 064] at trial, much less do they allow categorically discarding other equally plausible alternatives that were not charged. And it is that no one has questioned that the representatives of [Name 091] were dissatisfied with the treatment they received from ICE (it must be remembered that captive technologies were used in the country and, therefore, [Name 091] could not compete); that they denounced the situation and designed a strategy to correct it, one that involved approaching certain public figures—contact that indeed took place and, as was demonstrated, was not strange either. Likewise, it was credited that some public officials, unfortunately, had the habit of receiving and even soliciting favors from companies doing business with ICE, and that this happened before the events investigated here. Nor has it been questioned that [Name 064] transferred funds to [Name 033], or to individuals or legal entities close to him (in fact, there is abundant documentary evidence demonstrating the foregoing); however, it cannot be derived from this, with certainty, that those funds were to fulfill a prior promise, accepted before the award, as the Public Prosecutor's Office asserted. This also cannot be inferred from the fact that several defendants received, some time after the award, similar sums under similar modal conditions, inasmuch as, with the same situation, other scenarios are equally plausible, for example, that the monies were accepted by those public officials for acts already performed and not for having assumed the commitment to perform future acts (which would constitute the crime of accepting bribes for an act performed and would rule out bribery); that it was those officials who, abusing their status or functions, compelled or induced the promise or payment of the patrimonial benefit (extortion by a public official), which, it is added, would not be surprising, since, as we will see later, there were public officials who solicited economic advantages from supplier companies, among them [Name 064] himself, who acknowledged having made "collection efforts" before [Name 091] for it to pay [Name 046]. Nor can it be ruled out that, with a prior promise existing before abbreviated competitive procedure 1-2001, its content was different.
The same can be said regarding the actions of [Name 064] and other executives in relation to the matter, since it is true that no irregularity was demonstrated in the processing of the contract for the 400,000 lines (which, it is reiterated, began some time after the moment when [Name 064] placed the promise of a gratuity, and furthermore, it originated because the Contraloría General de la Republica ordered it, not the ICE). It is insisted, the only deponent who reported the promise of a gratuity was [Name 064], and his testimony, for the reasons previously noted, besides being illicit, is unreliable. In summary, given that the statement of the cooperating accused is illicit evidence and also implausible, it is appropriate to establish the consequences of its hypothetical exclusion, bearing in mind—of course—that, due to the extensive effect contemplated in Article 443 of the Código Procesal Penal, this exercise must be carried out for all the accused in relation to whom such evidence has been considered, and not only for those who claimed its use by the trial court.
For all the foregoing, the second ground of appeal against the judgment filed by attorneys Federico Morales Herrera and Erick Ramos Fallas, defense counsel for [Name 041], is granted, as well as the second section point D), and the third section point A), of the appeal against the judgment filed by the accused [Name 033], in a personal capacity.
VI.Consequences of the foregoing ruling. Although the defects described above (the illegality of the opportunity criterion granted to [Name 064] and, therefore, of the statement he gave at trial, as well as the violation of the rules of sound criticism in the assessment of that account) are formal or procedural in nature, this court considers it unnecessary to order a remand. This is because, having conducted an exhaustive investigation, no possibility is foreseen that in a potential new trial other evidentiary elements additional to those already existing could be legitimately incorporated, and, to that extent, there is also no impediment for the undersigned to proceed to directly resolve what is appropriate in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), determining, through the analysis of the remaining evidence after hypothetically suppressing the aforementioned statement, which facts that the trial court has deemed proven remain unscathed.
This is a solution that, although it may be atypical in the case of procedural errors, can be adopted in consideration of the principle of swift and complete justice, since it makes no sense to prolong the process when there are sufficient reasons to believe that the state of affairs will not change (in that regard, consult rulings of the Third Chamber numbers 827-F-96, of 12:35 p.m. on December 23, 1996, and 1173-1997 of 9:30 a.m. on October 31, 1997). This being the case, the following will proceed to conduct that study for each of the accused.
- 1)[Nombre 001]: The court found it proven, in fact No. 131, that [Nombre 001] received from the corruptors a promise of a gift in exchange for carrying out the necessary actions within the scope of his duties as advisor to the executive presidency of I.C.E. and person in charge of the execution of the 400,000-line project, to make that contracting effective by favoring [Nombre 091]. Based on this, it considered him the responsible perpetrator of an aggravated corruption crime by improper bribery. Regarding the crime of improper bribery, it is important to make some remarks. The criminal statute contemplates two actions, namely: i) receiving a gift or any other undue advantage to perform, in the future, an act proper to one's duties and ii) accepting the promise of a retribution of that nature for the same purpose. As Carlos Creus notes, referring to Argentine legislation which on this matter presents some similarities with ours, "he who enters into material possession of the object delivered to him" receives, and "he who admits to receiving in the future what is promised to him" accepts, with the same purpose being pursued in both cases, specifically, that the public official perform a future act concerning his duties; hence it can be argued that a gift given to retribute a functional conduct already adopted by the official does not fall within the limits of bribery (see CREUS, Carlos. Derecho Penal. Parte Especial. Buenos Aires, Editorial Astrea, Volume II, 1st reprint of the 6th edition, 1998, pp. 272 and 273). In the case of [Nombre 001], between both typical conducts, the second has been found to be configured, since as indicated above, he accepted a promise of economic retribution in exchange for executing—a future act—the necessary actions so that [Nombre 091] would be favored in the 400,000 GSM lines project. Clarifying the foregoing is fundamental, since as has been found proven, [Nombre 001] received the funds coming from [Nombre 060] after the award of the contract. If the award had already occurred, it is not plausible to maintain that [Nombre 001] received a gift in exchange for favoring [Nombre 091]—a future action—in that award and, therefore, the other scenario contemplated in the criminal statute (namely, receiving the retribution in exchange for undertaking to perform a future act, proper to his duties) is completely excluded. Having thus discarded the hypothesis of receiving the gift, we focus on the one that was accused and found proven, namely, that this defendant accepted a promise of a gift prior to that award to favor [Nombre 091] therein. In this case, the conviction requires the verification of a series of core elements of the criminal statute, namely, the promise of a gift, its content—the act proper to one's duties in exchange for which the promise is made—and its acceptance. As explained in the judgment, from folios 15,894 to 15,980 front of volume XXXIII, as well as in the general sections thereof, referring to the general framework surrounding the contracting of the 400,000 GSM cellular lines (f. 15,512 front and following), what was set forth in relation to the alleged corruptors, their identification, the criminal planning, the signing of the consultancy contracts by [Nombre 058] and [Nombre 114] and the channeling of the monies for the payment of gifts and their distribution (f. 15,572 front and following), to find the promise made to [Nombre 001] (and accepted by him) proven, the following was considered: i) [Nombre 001] began working at ICE at the end of the year 2000—which even the defense accepted in conclusions, f. 15,895, volume XXXIII—with the employment relationship being formalized in January 2001. [Nombre 001] was in charge of the abbreviated process 1-2001, corresponding to the 400,000 cellular lines. He was the project coordinator and the one who had a relationship with the supplying company; ii) [Nombre 001] admitted before the media having received monies from [Nombre 091]; iii) In the evidence, there are three notes prepared on paper with the letterhead of [Nombre 058]. In the first, dated November 22, 2000, sent by [Nombre 098] to [Nombre 041]—which the court of first instance understands are [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 098]—it is stated that steps are being taken so that [Nombre 001], recently appointed by [Nombre 095], will be [Nombre 091]'s interlocutor in the negotiations regarding the new expansions, since he is a person with whom progress can be made because he is more political and, due to his recent appointment, is not contaminated by the influences affecting the traditional administration. In the second, dated November 23, 2000, and which is a continuation of the previous one, it is stated that they succeeded in having [Nombre 001] take the lead in the negotiation from now on and that, consequently, a more flexible position can be expected from the ICE negotiating group. Finally, in the note of November 29, 2000, reference is made to the possible refusal of the Contraloría to accept [Nombre 095]'s proposal to contract with all suppliers, which, according to the note, was [Nombre 095]'s idea to avoid objections, but which in any case also allowed keeping at bay the intention to expand the then-current system, accelerate the publication of the new tender for GSM, and therefore keep [Nombre 091]'s fighting capacity alive (all these notes, as verified by this appellate court, are visible in evidence No. 686, called “Expediente principal de la causa Número 04-7810-0647-PE”, folios 295, 298, and 299 front); iv) [Nombre 041] invited [Nombre 001] to lunch on November 29, 2000; v) in internal note PE-0102-P of February 22, 2002, sent by the executive presidency of ICE to the different strategic business units, they are informed that for the abbreviated contracting process of the 400,000 lines, a commission coordinated by [Nombre 001] was appointed, which would be in charge of the study and award of the project (study of offers, answering clarifications, evaluation in all aspects, recommendation of award, consultation and resolution of possible appeals, etcetera, work that would conclude when the contract was endorsed), a commission that would report to a high-level body composed of [Nombre 095], [Nombre 122], and [Nombre 068]. These are communications that, despite being for internal use at ICE, were sent to [Nombre 041], who kept abreast of what was happening at ICE with the 400,000-line project, especially the functions assigned to [Nombre 001], with which he was highly pleased. According to the court, the appointment of [Nombre 001] was also part of the plan devised by [Nombre 041] (f. 15,902 front); vi) even though, indeed, [Nombre 001] did not have the final say on the project, as was the case with the members of the board of directors (e.g., [Nombre 022], [Nombre 064], and [Nombre 068]; the second accepted having received gifts from [Nombre 091] and the last was convicted for facts of a similar nature), for this company it was essential to count on the project coordinator, thus guaranteeing that he would act in its favor. We are speaking of the person who had access to all information and whose opinion also carried great weight with officials such as [Nombre 095], [Nombre 122], and [Nombre 068], who ultimately made the decision and brought it to the board of directors. It is important to remember, the ruling indicates, that [Nombre 068], like [Nombre 105], were convicted for the commission of crimes related to the offering and receipt of gifts coming from [Nombre 091]; vii) for the court, even before his appointment as assistant in the executive presidency of ICE and later as coordinator of the 400,000-line project, [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] knew [Nombre 001] as a more political person, with whom progress could be made, hence he was the right person for the proposed plan. Therefore, once he assumed the position of coordinator, in accordance with his duties, [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] promised him the payment of a gift in exchange for carrying out the necessary actions within the scope of his duties to make the contracting effective, favoring the interests of [Nombre 091]; viii) the court considered that the appointment of [Nombre 001] took place in November 2000, when the concern about migrating to GSM technology was already within the board of directors, which, coupled with the conflicts that arose between [Nombre 091] and ICE that were extensively explained in the judgment, made it necessary to have supporters for [Nombre 091]'s cause, a purpose achieved by promising gifts to [Nombre 022], [Nombre 064], [Nombre 068], and [Nombre 001] himself. The lower court also revisited the topic of the so-called “action proposal” by [Nombre 124], in the sense that an approach between the company and people from different fields and factions—business, religious, and political—was advisable, a suggestion that [Nombre 041] took as the representative of [Nombre 091] in Costa Rica to carry out a plan that included an approach to [Nombre 001] and to other defendants in this process; ix) finally, the existence of abundant evidence allowing it to be demonstrated with certainty that [Nombre 001] received and disposed of the gifts coming from [Nombre 060] was considered. In addition to the foregoing, when examining the situation of [Nombre 022], the trial court cited other indications that, in its understanding, also compromise [Nombre 001], namely: x) a communication from [Nombre 126], dated February 17, 2005, where it is recorded that [Nombre 091] began relations with this company in January 2000 and that, according to its records, [Nombre 105], [Nombre 064], [Nombre 001], and [Nombre 022] used its services, which allows the conclusion that three of the people favored with the trips were ICE officials, trips that occurred after the endorsement of the 400,000-line contract and therefore are not unrelated to this matter (f. 15,845 and 15,846 front, volume XXXII); xi) the promise of a gift is also proven through the statement of [Nombre 064]. This, the trial court says, is plausible, because despite some differences with his previous accounts, he has remained the same on the relevant points. According to [Nombre 064], [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] offered him a reward if he helped in three areas, namely, migration to GSM, use of a tender or public contest, and a favorable vote for [Nombre 091]. The court says that if this was a constant practice, it is not strange that they approached other officials such as [Nombre 022] or [Nombre 001] (f. 15,862 to 15,864 front, volume XXXII). Hypothetical mental suppression exercise of [Nombre 064]'s statement and examination of the remaining indications in accordance with the rules of sound criticism: As attorney Greysa Barrientos Núñez pointed out in the oral hearing held on this matter, there is no doubt that [Nombre 091]'s representatives believed that the company was being excluded from the mobile telephony market and that they designed a plan to achieve a position in that field. As is correctly explained in the judgment, ICE took its first steps with TDMA technology, which is a captive technology, since network expansions could only be made with equipment produced by the same companies that offered that technology and which, in the case of our country, were Lucent Tecnologías de Costa Rica S.A. and Ericsson, companies that were contracted by ICE under the modality of direct purchases, which prevented other companies from having access to that market, e.g., [Nombre 091], a company that supplied ICE with equipment for fixed telephony, with [Nombre 091] also offering GSM technology equipment (cf. folios 15,540 and 15,541 front, volume XXXII). Based on the testimony of several deponents (e.g., [Nombre 095], [Nombre 128], [Nombre 132], among others), the appealed ruling concluded that by the years 1999 and 2000, GSM technology was establishing itself in the world; that in 1999 there was a “tense” relationship between [Nombre 091] and ICE, and that during the year 2000, [Nombre 091] fought to be one more competitor in the mobile telephony market. This company, in addition to explaining to the ICE board of directors the benefits of migrating to GSM technology (apparently with little success, because although those benefits were admitted, direct contracting continued, some of which [Nombre 091] also questioned, e.g., the direct contracting of 100,000 lines in the year 2000, f. 15,563, volume XXXII), designed an entire strategy that implied making the matter a topic of public domain and national interest, which is why it contacted people from different fields, e.g., legislators, opinion makers, politicians, media, and public oversight bodies (e.g., the Contraloría General de la República), among others, in order to denounce what they considered practices lacking in transparency, and as a result of these actions, the majority vote indicates, [Nombre 095], on October 6, 2000, publicly announced the migration to GSM technology, which in any case occurred a few months later (cf. 15,540 to 15,572 front, volume XXXII). Likewise, there is no doubt that several public officials received sums of money from the aforementioned company, under similar circumstances of manner and time. This, however, is not sufficient to find it proven, as the appealed majority vote did, with a degree of certainty and not of probability, that the payments made some time after the award were the product of a promise of retribution made previously and accepted by [Nombre 001], in exchange for him executing acts proper to his position to favor [Nombre 091] with the 400,000-line contract. According to the appealed judgment, the appointment of [Nombre 001] was part of the corruptor plan. However, upon examining the matter, it is easily determined that this conclusion does not derive from the evidence and that, therefore, it violates the rules of sound criticism. The designation of [Nombre 001] was made by [Nombre 095], a person who was never involved in the criminal scheme. Moreover, as [Nombre 095] explained, what he intended with that designation was to have a person more willing to engage in dialogue, who would allow the recovery of peace after the events that occurred with the so-called "combo eléctrico". Thus, [Nombre 095] indicated: “I directly appointed [Nombre 001] myself. He arrived at the institution as a specialist in conflict resolution and helped greatly in the process of recovering labor peace following the events that occurred with the 'combo eléctrico'. [Nombre 001] arrived very close to my arrival at ICE, part of the problem the institution had at that time was satisfying electrical service and telecommunications. I met [Nombre 001] at the National University, in the School of Planning; he introduced himself, described his characteristics and skills, and I believed he could help us recover social peace in the institution. I did not ask for references for him; the interview was enough for me. It seemed to me that he had a great capacity for conflict resolution, listening to positions, and providing solutions to conflicts, and that is what he demonstrated. I was looking to rescue labor peace in the institution and that is why [Nombre 001] seemed good to me. I did not know if he had knowledge of telecommunications; he was an advisor to the Executive Presidency, he coordinated meetings with the different union groups, and perceived the concerns of those groups.” (F. 14,712 front, volume XXX). The same court recognized that it was [Nombre 095] who brought [Nombre 001] to work at the institution in the last months of the year 2000, with his designation as Executive Assistant in the Executive Presidency being formalized in January 2001 (f. 15,894 to 15,896, volume XXXIII). For all the foregoing reasons, the majority vote errs in stating that even before his appointment and later as coordinator of the 400,000-line project, [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] knew [Nombre 001] as a more political person and, therefore, suitable for the proposed plan, to the point of asserting that the designation of this public official was part of the strategy followed by the corruptors. On the other hand, although—indeed—[Nombre 001] was the person in charge of abbreviated process 1-2001 corresponding to the 400,000 cellular lines, it is important to note that this originated in the year 2001, not out of interest from ICE or its leaders, but because the Contraloría General de la República so proposed, with the additional fact that this circumstance does not demonstrate that a promise of economic retribution was made to him at the end of 2000 or the beginning of 2001, as the trial court asserted. This is also not derived from the lunch [Nombre 041] had with [Nombre 001] on November 29, 2000, or from the contacts that existed between the aforementioned public official and the employees of [Nombre 091], since as the same court accepted and was demonstrated with abundant evidence, which even documents the abuses by public officials who requested privileges from supplying companies for a long time (e.g., the case of [Nombre 022]), that type of meeting was frequent (f. 16,112 front, volume XXXIII). Continuing along this line of thought, it is also clear that [Nombre 001] accepted before a national television channel having received money from [Nombre 091]; however, he never explained for what concept. Thus, the only thing that can be derived from the cited evidence is the acceptance of the money, which, it is not omitted to indicate, was also proven through abundant documentary evidence; however, it is not an indication from which it can be derived, as a certain fact, that a promise of retribution prior to the award was made to [Nombre 001]. The same can be pointed out regarding the notes examined in the judgment and mentioned above. From the first one, dated November 22, 2000, what is inferred is that the appointment of [Nombre 001] was the responsibility of [Nombre 095], with which, it is reiterated, it could not be affirmed that the cited designation was also part of the criminal plan. Moreover, what that note indicates is that the designation sought to accelerate things in ICE's expansion plans, both in fixed and cellular telephony, and that negotiations were underway for [Nombre 001] to be [Nombre 091]'s interlocutor in the negotiations on new expansions, since being a “more political” person and due to his recent appointment, he would not be contaminated by “the influences affecting the traditional administration,” hence it would be possible to make more progress. As can be observed, it is a note that merely alludes to the characteristics of [Nombre 001] as a negotiator, even favorable to the defendant's interests to the extent that he is considered free from influences, and from which, moreover, it is not inferred, even remotely, that there existed a promise of economic retribution, or that it is at least a public official who was willing to lend cooperation to the company regarding the contract so often mentioned, especially considering that the analyzed evidence mentions both fixed and cellular telephony. As if the foregoing were not enough, it must be taken into account that by November 22, 2000, the 400,000-line contract had not yet come into legal existence and that, therefore, [Nombre 001] had not been designated as the person in charge of the execution of the project. The same applies in relation to the note dated November 23, 2000, which simply states that [Nombre 001] will be the one to lead the negotiation with [Nombre 091] and speaks of direct contracting with that company, aspects that do not contribute to the proof of the prior promise in relation to the 400,000-line contract, or to the proof of the content of that promise. Finally, regarding the note of November 29, 2000, we speak of a missive in which “[Nombre 098]” (we understand, [Nombre 098]), communicates to “[Nombre 041]” ([Nombre 041]) the following: 1.- that the idea of including all suppliers has been successfully introduced and that “[Nombre 095]” (this chamber understands, [Nombre 095]) believes he can convince the Contraloría to approve a scheme that allows contracting with everyone, thus avoiding objections; 2.- that although he ([Nombre 098]) thinks this will not be possible, he recognizes that this manages to keep at bay the intention to expand the current system, accelerate the publication of the new tender in GSM technology, and maintain [Nombre 091]'s fighting capacity; 3.- that [Nombre 001] told him that the Swedes (understood, Ericsson) are very hurt at having lost control of things and are not willing to cede supremacy in the metropolitan area to [Nombre 091]; 4.- that [Nombre 091] must not cede anything it has achieved, that Siemens and Nortel are entering the scheme thanks to [Nombre 091]'s effort, and that ICE knows it cannot move forward without this company's consent. This is a note that also does not allow one to glimpse the making of a promise to [Nombre 001] in exchange for carrying out the necessary actions within the scope of his duties to make the contracting of the 400,000 lines effective by favoring [Nombre 091]. At most, it confirms that [Nombre 001] had spoken with [Nombre 098] by November 2000, a date on which—it is reiterated—neither had the 400,000-line contract come into legal existence, nor had the defendant been designated as the person in charge of its execution. The lower court says in its majority vote that another indication against [Nombre 001] is that the same promise was made to other public officials and that they accepted monies from [Nombre 091]. In this regard, note that although—indeed—there is evidence that allows categorically establishing that [Nombre 001], like other defendants, received monies originating from that company, there is no evidence to find it proven, at least not with a degree of certainty, that a promise of a gift existed prior to the award, to the point that it is not plausible to discard other hypotheses, for example, that without a prior promise existing, [Nombre 001] accepted the economic retribution for a completed act, or that it was he who induced [Nombre 091]'s representatives to give or promise him an economic retribution. For the undersigned, only by considering the statement of [Nombre 064], who was explicit regarding the matter, could it be held that other public officials received promises of a gift and, to that extent, make the lower court's conclusion reasonable, in the sense that [Nombre 001] also received one. Suppressing this statement, what remains regarding this point is a judgment handed down against [Nombre 068]; however, from this, a judgment of certainty that [Nombre 001] received the cited promise cannot be derived either, since the resolution referred to was handed down in the context of an abbreviated procedure, where the defendant—[Nombre 068]—limited himself to accepting the attributed facts and the agreed sanction (cf. evidence No. 747, file called Copia certificada de la sentencia Nº 586-07 Expediente 06-000045-621-PE Delito corrupción agravada, contra [Nombre 068]). Although indeed, in that judgment it is found proven that [Nombre 105], with the collaboration of [Nombre 046], offered [Nombre 068] a promise of a gift in exchange for voting in favor of the company [Nombre 091] in the tender for the 400,000 lines, a promise that [Nombre 068] accepted, this does not allow it to be found proven that the same promise was made to [Nombre 001], since the acceptance that [Nombre 068] made of those facts is personal in nature and, moreover, formal, being a requirement for the abbreviated procedure to be applicable, with which its evidentiary significance, at least for what concerns this process, is quite limited, arguments that are precisely the same ones that can be set forth in relation to the conviction judgment No. 260-09, handed down against [Nombre 105] for the crime of corruption of the corruptor, judgments that the appealed ruling itself acknowledges have only been considered “…in relation to those who submitted to such procedures and solely with the type of crime for which they were convicted, the sanction, parties, and eventual reparations or other merely referential data, without the proven facts and other content being valued in any case.” (F. 15,767 and 15,768 front, volume XXXII). Furthermore, as stated in the aforementioned resolution, [Nombre 068] received an offer from [Nombre 105] and from [Nombre 046] himself, while in the case of the other defendants, among whom [Nombre 001] is included, the making of the promises is attributed to other characters, specifically, to [Nombre 078] or to [Nombre 041], with which it could not be affirmed either that they are identical situations, for the purpose of assigning a value to that judgment that it does not have. Regarding the so-called route of action prepared by [Nombre 124], the first thing that must be indicated is that this document does not contemplate the realization of criminal acts, but only the need for [Nombre 091] to garner support in different fields of national life (business sector, Catholic Church, political parties, etc.). Moreover, it is also not reasonably derived from it that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] made a promise of a gift to [Nombre 001]. As has been noted, there is no doubt that [Nombre 001] illegitimately increased his wealth and that he made a series of transactions aimed at distancing the received funds both from their origin and from his person (which is one more element to confirm that he knew the irregular nature of those funds); however, to declare him the responsible perpetrator of the crime of improper bribery in its modality of aggravated corruption, it is not enough to find the foregoing proven; it is not even enough to find it proven that the money he received from [Nombre 091] had some relationship to the matter of the 400,000 lines. Rather, it was indispensable to prove that [Nombre 001], prior to the award, accepted a promise of economic retribution in exchange for carrying out the necessary actions within the scope of his duties to make the 400,000-line contract effective by favoring [Nombre 091], which logically also implies conclusively discarding other equally admissible hypotheses, for example, that without the aforementioned promise, he accepted the sums that were transferred to him for acts performed in his capacity as a public official, or that it was he who induced [Nombre 041] to give or promise him the cited economic retribution, which, in addition to not having been discarded, was also not part of the accusation. Following this analysis, the court indicates that evidence No. 75, folios 324 and 325, note PE-0102-P of February 22, 2002, is important because despite being for internal use at ICE, it was sent to [Nombre 041] and to the company [Nombre 091] in France, which allows corroborating that he was aware of what was happening regarding the 400,000-line GSM technology project and of the functions that had been assigned to [Nombre 001] as project coordinator. It is even asserted, based on that evidence, that the appointment of [Nombre 001] to that position was part of the plan devised by [Nombre 041]. The errors in this reasoning are obvious. As already indicated, the appointment of [Nombre 001] was not the prerogative of [Nombre 078], of [Nombre 041], or of [Nombre 028]. Moreover, it is unknown who sent that internal note to [Nombre 041] and to [Nombre 137]. Finally, but no less important, it must be highlighted that the evidence in question also adds nothing to the issue of the prior promise, since it only mentions the members of the commission that would be in charge of the 400,000-line project and those of the high-level commission on which that working group would directly depend, composed—the high-level one—of [Nombre 095], [Nombre 122], and [Nombre 068]. That is, as is established without any effort and the same lower court acknowledges in the appealed judgment, [Nombre 001] did not have the final say on the project, since there was another working group overseeing the matter—the so-called high-level commission—and, of course, the board of directors of the institution itself, making it a speculation by the trial court to conclude that, despite this, the corruptors practically "designated" [Nombre 001] as part of the criminal plan and that he was essential since, in addition to access to information, he carried "weight" with officials such as [Nombre 095], [Nombre 122], and [Nombre 068].
Similarly, the finding of the lower court in proven fact No. 132 is entirely unfounded, namely, that [Nombre 001] fulfilled the agreed actions and that once he “managed,” together with other ICE officials, to open the bidding process for the purchase of cellular telephony and the award of the contract for the 400,000 GSM lines to [Nombre 091], he received the promised gift; the foregoing because [Nombre 001] was a middle manager who lacked the decision-making power regarding the aforementioned matter; because the contract for the 400,000 lines (abbreviated bidding process 1-2001) arose within the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and not within ICE, which until then had opted for direct contracting; and, finally, because [Nombre 091] was legitimately awarded the contract, after meeting all the requirements and having been recommended in the respective studies, and not because of the particular actions of [Nombre 001] (who, it is reiterated, did not have the power to open the bidding process or award the contract), or of any other defendant.
In fact, the judgment itself states: “In the minutes of the ICE Board of Directors session No. 5326 of August 28, 2001, on folios 4191 to 4215 (exhibit No. 2), it is recorded that the date for receiving offers in relation to Abbreviated Process 01-2001 for the acquisition of 400,000 wireless telephone solutions in the 1800 Mhz band with GSM technology was set for July 20, 2001, and that only two bidders appeared: Consorcio Ericsson II and the joint offer between [Nombre 060] and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE). It is also evident from the cited minutes that the offer submitted by Consorcio Ericsson II had technical defects for which it was disqualified, while the offer jointly submitted by [Nombre 060] and BCIE met all the requirements of the bid specifications, so it was unanimously agreed to award Abbreviated Bidding Procedure 01-2001 for the lease with option to purchase of the necessary equipment for ICE to provide 400,000 integrated wireless telephone solutions with GSM technology in the 1800 Mhz band, plus the associated services and components, to the joint offer submitted by [Nombre 060] and BCIE.
Regarding the award matter, witnesses [Nombre 095], Executive President of ICE, [Nombre 287], and [Nombre 195], President and Directors of ICE at that same time, coincidentally declared that the winner of the 400,000-line bidding process was the company [Nombre 091], which was decided unanimously, based on the result of a study analysis by various interdisciplinary sectors of the institution, all of whom recommended awarding the bid to said company. When witness [Nombre 095] was shown the minutes of ICE Board of Directors Session No. 5326, folios 3533 to 3557 of Volume IX (exhibit No. 3), he stated that he recognized that document and that the Board’s decision was unanimous to grant that tender to [Nombre 091]. He finally declared that with the award of those 400,000 lines, the demand for mobile lines was largely resolved, that he does not know if it generated a surplus for ICE, but that the negotiation was positive and justified the need to migrate to GSM technology based on the need to provide new and better services to the user with new technologies, a point on which the former executives [Nombre 287] and [Nombre 195] also agreed.
The company Ericsson, dissatisfied with the award of the 400,000-line tender and the disqualification it had received, proceeded to file an appeal against the decision of the ICE Board of Directors, which it filed with the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic on September 14, 2001, according to the received stamp on the appeal, which is recorded in field 5C of exhibit No. 640, folios 2357 to 2297. The cited appeal was declared without merit by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic on December 17, 1991, according to resolution R.C.N. 796-2001, visible on folios 3303 to 3219 of field 7C of documentary exhibit No. 640. Exhibit No. 640 contains a certified copy of the complete administrative file of Abbreviated Bidding Procedure No. 01-2001…” (The transcription is literal, f. 15,570 and 15,571 recto, volume XXXII, the underlining is not from the original). In short, the licit evidence analyzed comprehensively is insufficient to consider the crime of aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery as configured.
Without the statement of [Nombre 064] as a guiding thread, the only thing left is a series of ambiguous (anfibológicos) indications regarding the promise of economic remuneration that, according to the accusation, [Nombre 041] extended to [Nombre 001] in relation to the 400,000-line project. This conclusion does not change if one considers, as already explained, the convictions rendered against [Nombre 068] and [Nombre 105], since in these, only a personal and formal acceptance of charges is observed, which in no way is sufficient to establish the cited judgment of certainty. Even if, from the position that [Nombre 001] held at ICE, we can infer with a high degree of probability that the economic remuneration he received had some relation to the matter of the 400,000 lines, without the testimony of the cooperating defendant, it cannot be asserted with certainty that there was a prior promise and, even less so, that the delivery of the gift was conditioned on the effective award of the offer that [Nombre 091] would present to ICE, as the lower court asserts in proven fact number 131 (f. 15,455 recto).
Without that statement, it must be insisted, other factual hypotheses that were not the subject of the accusation cannot be ruled out, e.g., that the economic remuneration admitted by [Nombre 001] was granted to him without a prior promise, for an act performed in his capacity as a public official (just as [Nombre 064] had originally stated), or even that it was [Nombre 001] who forced or induced the representatives of [Nombre 091] to give or promise him a specific patrimonial benefit, or that, if a prior promise existed, it had a different content. Continuing along this line of thought, it is important to note that, although [Nombre 041] admitted to [Nombre 116] having paid public officials, among them [Nombre 001], he never admitted having made a prior promise in exchange for [Nombre 091] obtaining the 400,000-line contract. Quite the contrary, what [Nombre 116] describes is that, according to a draft statement sent by [Nombre 041], he indicated that it was [Nombre 064] and other public officials who asked him for bonuses for having helped in opening public tenders instead of direct contracting (f. 15,157 recto, volume XXXI).
While it is true that, according to the same witness, at the meeting held, [Nombre 041] did not mention this circumstance (cf. same folio), what was indicated in the aforementioned draft (which is introduced into the debate through the testimony of [Nombre 116]) contributes to the doubts that the undersigned have as to whether the promise of a gift prior to the award actually took place. Regarding the communication from [Nombre 126], in which it is indicated that this agency invoiced against [Nombre 091], on April 24, 2002, and in the name of [Nombre 001], the amount corresponding to “Visa to Cuba and cancellation of reservation” (cf. f. 1771, volume V, which we have had in view), note that, contrary to what the court indicates, it does not follow from this that the promise of a gift existed. Just as with the money that [Nombre 001] received, the economic advantage provided through Sertur was admitted after the award of the 400,000 lines and, although it can be presumed that it is related to that matter, it cannot be ruled out that it was received as remuneration for an act performed without a prior promise, or that it was requested by the same public official.
Finally, it is important to add that although when examining the particular case of [Nombre 001], the trial court did not make a lengthy mention of the statement of [Nombre 064], from a comprehensive reading of the judgment and what was said regarding [Nombre 022], it is clear that this statement played a fundamental role in both cases, to the extreme that despite [Nombre 064] stating that he was unaware if other public officials had received similar promises, the lower court used that evidence to conclude that this is what happened, a conclusion that this chamber cannot endorse at this procedural stage, since, as has been indicated, the account of the cooperating defendant, in addition to being illegal, is implausible. This being the case, and having ruled out, because it is impossible to prove, that a promise of a gift was made to [Nombre 001], what must be analyzed is whether it is possible to consider another crime as configured, specifically, that of illicit enrichment.
In the first instance, it must be pointed out that this is a residual crime compared to other more complex ones, so there is no impediment to applying the basic figure if these cannot be proven (e.g., improper or proper bribery, the acceptance of gifts for an act performed, graft (concusión), etc.), provided that its elements have been included in the accusation formulated by the requesting body and have been taken as proven in the judgment. The answer to this question is negative. The criminal type of illicit enrichment provided for in numeral 346, subsection
- 3)of the Penal Code in force at the date of the facts, stated: “A public official who, without incurring a more severely punished crime, is: (…)
- 3)Admitting gifts that were presented or offered to him in consideration of his office, while he remains in the exercise of his position; (…)”. As can be seen from the above, the action described in subsection
- 3)contains two alternative conducts, namely, the acceptance of an offered gift and the acceptance of a presented gift. In the first scenario, the admission, which alludes to the material reception of the economic advantage, occurs, as does the presentation, while the active subject remains in the exercise of his position. In the second, the admission or acceptance refers to the offering, where those actions—the offering of the gift and its acceptance—are what must occur during the exercise of the position. Since the crime is consummated with the admission of the offering, the material reception of the gift, if it occurs, will constitute a subsequent unpunishable act, making it irrelevant whether it takes place while the public official exercises the position that motivated the economic remuneration, or whether by then, he had left it. Having clarified the above, note that from the relation of proven facts that remains after hypothetically eliminating the offering of an economic remuneration prior to the award of the 400,000-line contract, the only thing left is that [Nombre 001] admitted the gifts that were delivered to him in consideration of his office. We speak of a behavior that, at most, conforms to the first scenario of the illicit enrichment described above, that is, the admission of the presented gift. However, neither in the accusation formulated by the requesting body, nor in the judgment, was it clarified if that admission took place while the defendant occupied the position, an element that also forms part of the typical description and which in the particular case is of utmost importance, since he would have admitted some economic remunerations after he had left public service (namely, the one received on May 7, 2004, for twenty-four thousand dollars—proven fact No. 167—and the one received on July 29, 2004, for twenty-five thousand dollars—proven fact No. 170—). It is important to add that although, upon examining the situation of this defendant, the trial court indicated that he left the position on March 10, 2004 (f. 15,895 recto, volume XXXIII), as this is not a matter contained in the accusation formulated by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), it could not be incorporated into the proven facts without violating the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment. But even if it is hypothetically assumed that the cited information was indeed available, specifying which amounts he received while he was Executive Assistant to the Executive Presidency of ICE and which ones he did not (and the hypothetical nature of the situation is underscored), the criminal action, in the case of the crime of illicit enrichment, would be time-barred (prescrita). The crime in question is punishable by a prison sentence of 6 months to 2 years, meaning its statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción), according to Article 31, subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), is 3 years and was reduced to 18 months with the first formal accusation (Article 33, subsection a) of the same normative body), a procedural act that occurred on October 8, 2004 (f. 316 to 324 recto, volume I). That is, the 18-month period expired on April 8, 2006, no procedural act having occurred by then that, by legal provision, had the virtue of interrupting or suspending its count. Furthermore, the resolution that declared this case to be of complex processing became final on June 26, 2006, a date by which the criminal action was already time-barred. It is important to add that although the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), in resolution No. 1847-2014, indicated that in accordance with Article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the finality of the resolution declaring the matter of complex processing modifies the reductive condition of the prescriptive periods, to the extreme of eliminating the reduction by half of the statute of limitations period that is underway, it also added that “… the only exception to that reasoning would have occurred in the scenario in which the fatal prescriptive period would have expired before that issuance, since in that scenario, the extinction of the criminal action due to the statute of limitations would have occurred, this circumstance becoming a consolidated legal situation, to which the effects of the aforementioned Article 376 could not have been applied …” (Cf. considering IV.-, resolution No. 1847-2014, the underlining is not from the original). This is exactly what happens here, since we would find that by the date on which the resolution declaring the complex processing became final (namely, June 23, 2006), the action to criminally prosecute the crime of illicit enrichment would have already prescribed and, to that extent, there was a consolidated legal situation not modifiable by the application of the mentioned numeral 376. Finally, this conclusion does not vary in the slightest if one considers Article 62 of Law No. 8422, Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service (Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública), published in La Gaceta No. 212 of October 29, 2004. The cited article provides: “ Prescription of criminal liability. The criminal action regarding crimes against the duties of public service and those provided for in this Law, shall prescribe in the manner established by the applicable legislation; however, the following rules shall apply: a) Once the statute of limitations is interrupted, the periods set forth in Article 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall run again for a new period, without any reduction. b) In addition to the grounds provided for in Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the criminal action may be interrupted by the declaration of illegality of the administrative function, active or omissive, or by the annulment of the administrative acts and contracts related to the corresponding crime, whether the pronouncement is issued in judicial or administrative proceedings.” (The highlighting is not from the original). From this norm, especially from subsection a), it is evident that in the case of crimes against the duties of public service and those provided for in Law No. 8422, upon the occurrence of any of the acts indicated by the Code of Criminal Procedure as interrupters of the computation of the statute of limitations period, the count begins to run anew in its entirety (that is, without a reducing effect), which constitutes an exception to Article 33 of the just mentioned Code. This is an article that is applicable to procedural acts carried out after its entry into force, thus ruling out its retroactive application to prior acts. Precisely, that norm would be given retroactive application if, for example, it were held that Article 62, subsection a) [which—it is reiterated—entered into force on October 29, 2004] eliminated the reduction of the statute of limitations period by half that operated with the interrupting act carried out days before, namely, on October 8, 2004, when [Nombre 001] appeared to give his investigative statement (declaración indagatoria). It is important to clarify that the cited position is endorsed by the same Third Chamber in resolution No. 1847-2014 cited above, insofar as it concluded that, because giving retroactive effects to procedural norms is not in accordance with the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), only with respect to the defendants who were investigated after the entry into force of Law No. 8422, was Article 62 of this law applicable to them, according to which the statute of limitations period, after an interrupting act, had to be counted in full and not reduced by half (f. 176,429 to 176,431, volume XLIII). This situation only arises in the cases of [Nombre 018] and [Nombre 006], so that only with respect to them was one more reason added to those already given by that court, to maintain that the criminal action was not time-barred. In the same sense as already expounded, the Criminal Cassation Court of San José (Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José) has ruled, for example, in judgment No. 132-2006, at 10:30 a.m. on February 23, 2006, which, in what is relevant, indicates: “The jurisprudence of this Court (thus votes No. 391-1999, No. 372-2001, and No. 1058-2001), as well as that of the Constitutional Chamber (see votes No. 5821-1998 or No. 4397-1999) and the Third Chamber of the Court (cf. votes No. 891-1999, No. 368-2000, No. 383-2002, No. 1017-2002, No. 1019-2002, and No. 35-2003), has indicated that the rules of prescription, as they are instrumental norms, have validity only towards the future and never towards the past. It is therefore not possible to apply procedural law retroactively, given that such a possibility is contemplated only for substantive norms and provided they are more beneficial to the defendant. Under such consideration, the rules regarding prescription will be effective from their entry into force for the facts or procedural acts they foresee, but never for those already produced, as their effects cannot be retroacted to these. Thus, although Article 62 of the ‘Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service’ (Law No. 8422) provides that henceforth the reduction provided for in Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not be applied once the statute of limitations period is interrupted when any of the grounds allowing it occur, initiating again the entirety of the period of Article 31 of that same legal body, such a norm cannot be applied to the scenarios or cases in which, prior to its entry into force, which occurred on October 29, 2004, the statute of limitations period had already been reduced by half precisely as a consequence of some of the provided interrupting grounds, as established for that moment by the procedural regulations. Such a norm is effective only from its entry into force for cases in which one of the interrupting acts provided for in the procedural regulations occurs and provided that the period had not already been reduced beforehand as was provided, since the actions are governed by the procedural law in force at the time they occur and not by those that had already occurred. In other words, the entirety of the statute of limitations period could not be restored by virtue of a norm that was not yet in force at the time when, according to the legislation that did govern, a ground with a reductive effect occurred. This means that when the ‘illicit enrichment law’ was enacted (October 29, 2004), in this process, the statute of limitations period had already been interrupted and reduced by half, in accordance with the regulations governing it, that is, according to what is provided in numeral 33 of the Procedural Code. This better safeguards the rights of the parties and the essential principle of legal certainty, as it rules out that a later procedural law could resolve differently what occurred in a prior process or proceeding. This latter point occurs even regardless of the moment in which the extinction of the criminal action is declared (whether during the period of validity of the reform or before it), because the resolution that so establishes has only a declarative and not a constitutive character of the prescription already consummated. Thus, if in the case under analysis, and according to the provisions of the law that was in force when it arose, the statute of limitations period was reduced by half once the corresponding interrupting acts occurred, the period that must be computed is that of one year and six months and not that of three years, as is affirmed in the appeal…” (The underlining is not from the original). Now, in addition to the lack of description of the typical elements of illicit enrichment, both in the accusation and in the proven facts, as well as the expiration of the statute of limitations period for criminal action having occurred, regarding the gifts that [Nombre 001] materially received after March 10, 2004, one more reason can be added that would prevent considering the mentioned crime as configured, namely, its atypicality (atipicidad). As was noted supra, [Nombre 001] was listed as a public official at ICE from January 1, 2001, to March 10, 2004 (f. 15,895, volume XXXIII), a period during which he received the majority of the irregular funds. After leaving that position, on May 7, 2004, he received $24,000, and on July 29, 2004, he received $25,000 (proven facts numbers 167 and 170, folios 15,466 and 15,467 recto, volume XXXII). As explained above, the criminal type of illicit enrichment, in the scenario relevant here—admission of presented gifts—contemplates only the admission of the gifts that were presented to the public official in consideration of his office while he remains in the exercise of his position, which is not the case with the aforementioned amounts. This being so, the conduct of [Nombre 001], at least in the two already indicated scenarios, would also be atypical. For all the above, the appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it declared [Nombre 001] the responsible perpetrator of a crime of aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery. In its place, for procedural economy and in application of the principle in dubio pro reo, he is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the mentioned crime. As unnecessary, a ruling on the appeals filed by his public defender, licenciada Yamura Valenciano Jiménez, is omitted. Regarding the appeal that [Nombre 001] personally filed, jointly with other defendants, this chamber will refer to it later.
- 2)[Name 022]. As can be seen from folios 15,837 to 15,893 front of volume XXXII and folios 15,972 to 15,980 front of volume XXXIII (where a joint assessment is made of the situation of [Name 001] and [Name 022]), as well as from the general sections of the judgment, also mentioned by this chamber when examining the case of [Name 001], namely, those related to the general framework regarding the contracting of the 400,000 GSM cellular lines (f. 15,512 front et seq.) and the corruptors and the criminal plot (f. 15,572 front et seq.), in order to determine the liability of [Name 022], the lower court considered a series of circumstances. Those set forth from folios 15,837 to 15,893 front of volume XXXII can be summarized as follows: i) There is abundant documentary evidence that establishes that [Name 022] was a member of the ICE Board of Directors from June 1, 1994, to May 31, 2002; ii) as a member of said board, the accused had a voice and vote in the decisions that were adopted and, for what is relevant here, concerning the matter of the 400,000 cellular lines (the court here cites the minutes of some of the board of directors meetings); iii) between [Name 041], [Name 078], and [Name 022] there was a relationship of trust and friendship, a relationship that continued after 2002 when his appointment to the board of directors ceased. There is abundant documentary evidence, all examined in depth in the ruling, that accounts for the courtesies that [Name 041] and [Name 078] extended to [Name 022]. For example, they made hotel reservations in Madrid and Paris for [Name 022] (1996); they paid for trips, including one to Spain (1999), and arranged for [Name 139] to provide him with courtesies on a trip he made to that country (1996). The court analyzed one of the documents that [Name 022] sent to [Name 078], requesting that he make reservations in Madrid and Paris. In that missive, in addition to telling him that he would write later, [Name 022] bids farewell with the words "hug [Name 290]". This missive was answered by [Name 078] with a copy to [Name 041], confirming the reservations. The lower court also highlights that [Name 105] intervened in some of these events, who accepted an abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado); for example, in 1997, on the occasion of a trip by [Name 022] to Spain, it is [Name 105] who asked [Name 078], with a copy to [Name 041], for help with [Name 022]'s hotel expenses, help that was indeed provided; iv) the court weighed documentary evidence from which it follows that [Name 091] began relations with the travel agency SERTUR in January 2000 and that, according to the accounting records of that company, [Name 105], [Name 064], [Name 001], and [Name 022] used its services, the latter accused in May 2002. According to the court, this is no coincidence. Three of those favored with the trips were ICE officials and another was related to the company [Name 114], in turn linked to [Name 060]. Although these are trips that took place after the contract for the 400,000 lines was countersigned (refrendar), the appealed ruling states that they are not unrelated to those events, nor are the money transfers that [Name 022] received starting in March 2002 (date of the countersignature); v) the offers and deliveries of gifts (dádivas) to the accused are coincident, both in timing and in the amounts received, as well as in the company that issued the investment certificates, the company that ordered the money transfers, and the person who managed the bank account; vi) it makes no sense to think that the gifts (dádivas) were given to [Name 022] and to [Name 001] because [Name 041] "liked them very much." They were given because they had been promised in exchange for these individuals promoting the migration to GSM technology; vii) report 011-SDI-206, evidence 630, file named Refrend 114363, is an email message sent on September 5, 2001, by [Name 022] to [Name 078]. It concerns a study that said accused requested from an ICE official for his personal use and, when he had it in his possession, he sent it to [Name 078] with the purpose of informing him about the "negative environment of the Comptroller's Office (Contraloría)" regarding, among other things, direct contracts (contrataciones directas) 108212 and 108213 approved on December 5, 2000, by the ICE Board of Directors, aimed at expanding the [Name 091] and Siemens branded exchanges that existed in the country and which, as of the date of that report, had not been countersigned. This is information that, although it was sent to [Name 078] on September 5, 2001, that is, after the abbreviated process for the 400,000 lines had been awarded to [Name 091] (on August 28, 2001), continued to be of interest to him, since this award had not been countersigned by the Comptroller General of the Republic, making it urgent for him to know what the Comptroller's criteria and requirements were regarding direct contracting (contratación directa) and the possibility opened for [Name 091] to expand the contract for the 400,000 lines by 50%; viii) the relationship between [Name 041] and [Name 022] extended beyond May 31, 2002, when the latter ceased to be a director of ICE. This is demonstrated by documentary evidence that was examined in the ruling (f. 15,850 front); ix) from the testimonial evidence, this close relationship is also evident, as there are several witnesses who attest to the presence of [Name 022] in the offices of [Name 091], to a link between [Name 041] and [Name 022], and to the sending of sealed envelopes—whose content could not be determined—by [Name 041] to [Name 022], specifically to his home address and not to the ICE offices, as indeed happened with what was sent to [Name 095] (e.g., the testimonies of [Name 142], [Name 144], [Name 148], and [Name 150], examined from folios 15,851 to 15,855 front); x) although there is no direct evidence of the promise of a gift (promesa de dádiva) (which is understandable as it concerns an illegal act), its existence can be demonstrated through several elements:
- 1)The money received does not stem from legal and transparent negotiations, and [Name 022] is so aware of this situation that he used mechanisms to try to distance the received assets from his person, despite which, through exhaustive studies, it was possible to determine that the funds came from [Name 060].
- 2)[Name 041], as representative of [Name 060], and [Name 078], deemed it necessary to have the help of ICE officials and other dependencies to open a public tender (concurso público) in which the company could participate and be the awardee of the 400,000 mobile lines. To reach this conclusion, the court considered the unfavorable antecedents that said company had in contracting with ICE. Based on the testimony of [Name 128] and on abundant documentary evidence specified in the judgment (f. 15,857 to 15,861 front), the non-conformity of [Name 091] with ICE policies is explained, particularly those adopted to contract 83,000 lines in 1999 and 100,000 lines in 2000, policies which placed the company at a clear disadvantage compared to other competitors, e.g., Ericsson, a situation that was denounced by [Name 091] in various forums, namely, ICE itself, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Legislative Assembly, and the press itself (f. 15,857 to 15,861 front). This situation is what first reveals the need and urgency that [Name 041] and [Name 078] had, on the eve of a contract like that of the 400,000 cellular lines, to have people within ICE who were aligned with them, a project of which they were aware, since, as the defense acknowledges, the issue of technology migration had been discussed for some time. Indeed, since 1998 [Name 091] offered to donate GSM-PCS equipment for 2000 terminals.
- 3)An additional evidentiary element is the testimony of [Name 064], to the effect that [Name 041] and [Name 078] offered him a reward in exchange for helping to materialize the migration to open or GSM technologies; to move towards a public tender (licitación) and to vote in their favor. [Name 064] was clear that both corruptors spoke to him about the courtesies or rewards for those who helped them. He also described the environment prior to the contracting of the 400,000 lines, the deficit in fixed technology and especially in mobile technology, noting that at that time, in fixed technology the largest supplier was [Name 091] while in mobile technology, due to the use of captive technologies—TDMA—other companies could not compete. Even then, it was clear that the future was cellular technology and an interest in migrating to GSM was detected, since there was no captivity regarding the technology. He indicated that [Name 091] used public opinion instruments to explain the importance of migrating to other technologies and noted that said company always maintained that it was being subjected to discriminatory treatment. This assessment by [Name 064] confirms that, before the contract for the 400,000 lines, [Name 091], through [Name 041], was dissatisfied with the policies followed in relation to direct contracts (contrataciones directas) in which it could not participate.
- 4)Another element that allows the promise of a gift to be considered proven is the so-called "action route proposal" (propuesta de ruta de acción), designed by [Name 124] (f. 15,863 et seq.). According to the ruling, although [Name 124] abstained at trial, the document in question describes actions to address the problems of [Name 091] with ICE. In it, [Name 124] (who—according to [Name 132]—was a political strategist who knew the environment quite well), speaks of the need to gather support in the business sector, the Catholic Church, minority parties, and the political sector. Specifically, he mentions the need to obtain the support of three deputies, a pre-candidate for [...], members of the board of the Liberación Nacional party, and the private advice of a former president. Once again, an element that reveals the urgency and need that [Name 091], in the person of [Name 041], had to exhaust all channels so that its offer regarding GSM technology would be accepted by ICE.
- 5)Another indication that accounts for the promise is the abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado) to which [Name 068] submitted, for events of the same nature as those already known (evidence No. 747).
- 6)Although in the minutes of the board of directors meetings where [Name 022] participated, he never openly expressed himself in favor of [Name 091], this is not surprising, since by then the discussion was favorable to that company (f. 15,866 front). On the other hand, the circumstances pointed out by the lower court from folios 15,972 to 15,980 front of volume XXXIII (and which largely reiterate those already mentioned), are the following: xi) The relationship between [Name 091] and ICE before the contract for the 400,000 lines was tense. By way of example, in the direct contracting (contratación directa) of 83,000 lines in 1999, the participation of [Name 091] was not allowed, which is why this company denounced ICE before the Comptroller General of the Republic and launched a public campaign to explain that denunciation. The same can be argued with the year 2000 project, to expand by direct contracting by 100,000 lines. Here, problems again arise between both parties and, once more, [Name 091] campaigned against what it considers a transparency problem at ICE. All these campaigns sought to position [Name 091] with ICE and break the chain of direct contracts to specific suppliers; xii) the action route prepared by [Name 124]; xiii) the statement of [Name 064] in the terms set forth above; xiv) the statement of [Name 116], who, as relevant, spoke of the statements made by [Name 041] before her and other members of the commission that [Name 060] sent to the country to investigate the events that were being published in the press. According to the deponent, [Name 041] acknowledged having paid [Name 022], [Name 001], [Name 064], and [Name 018], and added that these payments were his initiative; xv) [Name 001] accepted having received money from [Name 091]; xvi) there are notes—also mentioned earlier—where they speak of how [Name 001] was a better interlocutor for [Name 091]; xvii) [Name 041] invited [Name 001] to lunch; xviii) between [Name 022], [Name 041], and [Name 078] there was a relationship of friendship, trust, and collaboration, which continued after the former ceased to be a member of the ICE board of directors. This is evidenced by a series of documents, namely: 1.- missive dated May 22, 1996, where [Name 041] requests [Name 139] that, on the occasion of a trip by [Name 022] to that nation, any courtesy be provided as he is an ICE member and this institution is the main client of [Name 091] in the country; 2.- a fax, which can be placed between March 28 and 29, 1996, where [Name 022] thanks [Name 078] for an invitation and asks him to make hotel reservations in Madrid and Paris, with a copy of that fax being sent to [Name 041]. 3.- There is also a fax sent on July 18, 1997, by [Name 105] to [Name 078] with a copy to [Name 041], stating that [Name 022] is going to Spain and requests help with hotel expenses in Madrid; 4.- the documents that attest that on October 8, 1999, a trip to Spain was paid for him; 5.- evidence No. 630, namely, an email dated September 5, 2001, where [Name 022] informs [Name 078] about the negative environment at the Comptroller General of the Republic in relation to direct contracts intended to expand the [Name 091] and Siemens branded exchanges that existed in the country and that, as of the date of the report, had not been countersigned. In the same vein, he informs him of the contract for the 160,000 lines granted to [Name 091] and about which, unofficially, it was heard that the Comptroller would in no way countersign because there were interests involved and that if one wanted to purchase additional cellular lines, it was feasible to do so through a 50% expansion process of the 400,000 lines (folios 15,973 to 15,978 front). Analysis of the aforementioned indicators after the hypothetical exclusion of [Name 064]'s statement: The fundamental evidence to establish that [Name 022] received a promise of a gift (promesa de dádiva) from the corruptors, as happened with [Name 001], was [Name 064]'s account. While there is a series of indicators that allow this fact to be considered proven with a degree of probability, without the cooperating accused's statement it is impossible to do so with absolute certainty. As explained in the previous case, there is no doubt that the top executives of the company [Name 091] were upset with ICE's mobile telephony policies, because due to the use of captive technologies, [Name 091] could not compete in that market. Likewise, it was demonstrated that they did not hesitate to denounce the situation in different forums, understanding that despite the need to migrate to open technologies, the institution insisted on contracts that perpetuated TDMA technology. It was also demonstrated that [Name 091] resorted to a professional—[Name 124]—to design a strategy to address this problem; that [Name 022] had a close relationship with [Name 078] and [Name 041] that originated years before the events investigated here; that also for years, [Name 022] received various advantages of economic content from this company, some of which were requested by him, and finally, that after the award of the contract for the 400,000 lines, he received, like other public officials, funds originating from [Name 060]. However, from all this it cannot be inferred that a promise of a gift was made to [Name 022] at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001 so that, in exchange, he would take the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as a director of I.C.E. to promote the migration from TDMA technology to GSM technology, to promote purchases through tenders (licitaciones) and prevent them from being aborted, as well as to vote in favor of [Name 091] in the contracting process for the 400,000 lines (cf. proven fact No. 117). Next, this chamber will conduct a meticulous examination of the indicators mentioned above. Regarding the relationship of trust between [Name 041], [Name 078], and the co-defendant [Name 022], there is abundant evidence attesting to it. For example, evidence 59, called folder CRG 005 ICE, record 370760. In it, there is an un-foliated document, located before folio 345. It is a fax dated May 22, 1996, sent by [Name 105] to [Name 041] in which he talks about a trip by [Name 022] to Chile, asking that he be given special treatment. In that same evidence No. 59, at folio 354, there appears a fax sent by [Name 022] to [Name 078] between March 28 and 29, 1996, where he thanks him for an invitation and simultaneously requests that he make reservations in Madrid and Paris for April 1, 2, 5, and 7. In this document, he bids farewell with the phrase "a hug [Name 290]". Also available at folio 352 of the mentioned evidence is the reply given by [Name 078] to this message, confirming the reservations. These are documents from 1996, which, although they reveal familiarity (an extremely reprehensible one, since we are talking about an ICE director who repeatedly receives favors from a company that supplies the institution), do not provide elements to assert that there was a promise of a gift (promesa de dádiva) years later. The same applies to evidence No. 65, from folder CRG.002-01/02 A ICE, which consists of a document dated July 18, 1997, addressed to [Name 078] by [Name 105] in which he informs him of a trip that [Name 022] would make to Spain, with the request that they "help him" with the hotel expenses in Madrid, where he would arrive on Thursday the 24th in the morning and from which he would return to San José on Monday the 28th, a request that was indeed attended to according to the document at folio 144. The court also weighed evidence No. 80, folio 238, which attests—as stated at folio 15,845 of volume XXXII—that on October 8, 1999, a trip to Spain was paid for [Name 022]. As observed, we are talking about documents that prove that [Name 022] had, years before the events investigated here, a close relationship (very reprehensible, by the way) with the representatives of [Name 091] that was clearly improper, but which in no way allows proving that years later and on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines, a remunerative promise was made to [Name 022] with a specific content and purpose. Likewise, there is evidence from which it can be deduced that this close relationship continued after [Name 022] ceased to be an ICE director (cf. evidence No. 633, annex 3, folios 9 to 11), but from which a judgment of certainty cannot be derived regarding the point so often mentioned. Added to this, it suffices to review evidence No. 80, specifically documents numbers 238 and 259, to conclude that it cannot be derived from it that [Name 091] paid for a trip to Madrid for [Name 022], as the trial court assured without any reason. What is established with this evidence is that he was invited to eat at a restaurant in that city called Botillería del Café de Oriente. The same can be noted regarding official communication from [Name 126], visible in volume V of the main file, folio 1,771 front. According to the court, the trips referred to there, like the money received after the award, are part of the economic advantages promised before this occurred. This assertion, the undersigned understand, lacks foundation. In that document, Sertur indicates that its accounting records show two invoices from May 2002 that account for two trips made by [Name 022] to Guatemala and Tegucigalpa, paid for by [Name 091]. Although this is additional evidence that accounts for the dynamic (extremely reprehensible, it is insisted) that existed between some ICE public officials and the companies supplying the institution, where the latter showered the former with advantages of economic content, from it, it cannot be deduced that on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines, a promise of economic retribution was made that Mr. [Name 022] accepted. As happened with the money received after the award, the receipt of advantages of patrimonial content does not allow proving that fact, much less asserting, as the lower court does, that they are part of what was promised, especially considering that [Name 022] was prone to soliciting and receiving gifts (dádivas) from that company years before the events under examination here occurred. On the other hand, regarding evidence No. 630 already mentioned, consisting of report 011-SDI-206, file Refrend 114363, which is an email sent by [Name 022] to [Name 078] on September 5, 2001, note that in it, the former warns the latter about the negative environment at the Comptroller General of the Republic in relation to the direct contracts aimed at expanding the [Name 091] and Siemens branded exchanges that existed in the country and which, as of the date of the report, had not been countersigned. He also tells him about the direct contract for the 160,000 lines granted to [Name 091] and that, unofficially, it was heard that the Comptroller would in no way countersign, because there were interests involved and that if one wanted to purchase additional cellular lines, it was feasible to purchase through a 50% expansion process of the 400,000 lines. As can be seen, this is a communication that is subsequent to the award and from which, due to its content (which relates to direct contracts and not to the abbreviated competitive process for the 400,000 lines), it cannot be deduced that months before, prior to the award of said contract, the promise of the gift (promesa de la dádiva) took place in the terms in which it was charged by the requesting body. The court itself understands that the intention of [Name 022] with the cited communication was for [Name 078] to be aware of the Comptroller's criteria regarding direct contracting (contratación directa) and the possibility that opened for [Name 091] to expand the contract for the 400,000 lines by 50%. While this allows suspecting with some degree of probability that the economic retributions were associated with that contract, it does not allow asserting with a degree of certainty that before its award [Name 022] had received a promise of economic retribution. So much so that, based on all the indicators described above, it is also possible to consider other possibilities, namely, that before the mentioned contract and without the need for a specific promise of economic retribution to be made to him, [Name 022] was already committed to the cause of [Name 091] and acted in its favor (as seen, there is evidence proving that since 1996 this public official received advantages of economic content from said company) and that therefore, the money received after the award was merely a retribution for a completed act. Likewise, and considering that [Name 022] had no qualms about soliciting economic retributions, it is also plausible that he was the one who induced the payment, or that if there was a previous promise, its content was different. Regarding the proposal from [Name 124], it is worth reiterating what has already been stated. The approach suggested by this professional in no way implies the commission of criminal conduct and even less the formulation of promises of gifts to public officials. The same can be noted regarding the sealed envelopes delivered to [Name 022] at his home. The court assessed the testimony of [Name 144], who, as relevant, reported that he, as a messenger for [Name 091], delivered them by order of [Name 041]. For the lower court, the fact that these documents were not delivered at ICE with a copy of receipt, as indeed used to happen with other documentation, proves that their content was not debatable in board of directors meetings and that it served the illicit aims proposed regarding the abbreviated procedure 1-2001 (f. 15,854 front, volume XXXII). This is a conclusion completely lacking in any foundation, since, regarding the content of such envelopes, there is no information whatsoever that allows even suspecting that it was documentation related to said tender, money, or negotiable instruments (e.g., investment certificates), it being that, in addition, even assuming this hypothetically, as has been explained, from [Name 022]'s receipt of the gifts (dádivas) it cannot be concluded that the promise prior to the contract for the 400,000 lines took place. Furthermore, note that the trial court, despite recognizing that witness [Name 148], the person in charge of preparing the envelopes, stated that their content was not related to the payment of gifts, concluded that such statements "… do not rule out that the envelopes delivered to [Name 144] by [Name 041] were different from those mentioned by witness [Name 148] because the characteristics of one and the other envelopes were different: some were yellow and others were not" (f. 16,115 front, volume XXXIII), an assessment that is also unfounded, since, at least from what was recorded by the lower court in the descriptive foundation of the ruling, [Name 144] did not raise categorical distinctions regarding the colors of the envelopes he had to deliver, pointing out only that they were "normal" manila envelopes (f. 14,774 and 14,775 front, volume XXX). Moreover, witness [Name 148] stated that the envelopes could be sent with or without a confidential seal, and that some of these went to ICE (f. 14,785, 14,786, and 14,787, volume XXX), from which it is reasonably inferred that she also prepared envelopes for other destinations and it was in relation to all or most of those that she prepared and sent that the deponent denied that their content was related to the payment of gifts. For all the above reasons, this chamber understands that it is speculation by the lower court to assert that the envelopes delivered to [Name 022] at his home contained documents linked to the criminal act. Continuing along this line of thought, the court also weighed the testimonies that attest to the presence of [Name 022] at [Name 091] (e.g., those of [Name 148] and [Name 150]). This is evidence that, although it demonstrates the close relationship that existed between this accused and the top executives of [Name 091], and which originated years before the contracting of the 400,000 lines, does not allow reaching the conclusion that the offer of a gift (ofrecimiento de dádiva) (in the terms and circumstances described by the Public Prosecutor's Office) took place. It is reiterated, this chamber does not doubt that [Name 022] received funds from [Name 060], nor that he was a public official prone to requesting and receiving advantages of economic content from that company; however, this does not allow sustaining with the degree of certainty required by our Political Constitution that, on the occasion of the contract for the 400,000 lines, a promise of a gift was made to him in exchange for favoring the migration to GSM, the use of public tenders (licitaciones) or competitive processes, and for voting favorably towards [Name 091]. Having said the above, we will proceed to examine the three core aspects on which the trial court based its conclusion that the promise of economic retribution indeed occurred, namely: i) the completely unfavorable antecedents for [Name 091] before the contract for the 400,000 lines. In the trial ruling, a series of direct contracts in mobile telephony that took place since 1999 and in which [Name 091] could not participate were analyzed, as well as the company's response to that situation, which ranged from exhausting all channels within ICE, to denouncing the matter before the Comptroller General of the Republic and the public. In particular, a direct contracting (contratación directa) for 83,000 lines in 1999 and another for 100,000 lines in 2000 were examined, both opposed by [Name 091] (f. 15857 to 15,861 volume XXXII), all to demonstrate that said company was dissatisfied with ICE policies on the contracting procedure that had been used, since only the suppliers of that time, among them Ericsson, had the option to participate. For the lower court, this constitutes a first element to understand the need that [Name 041] and [Name 078] had, on the eve of a contract like that of the 400,000 cellular lines, to have people within ICE who were aligned with their interests, a project they were aware of because the move to GSM technology had been discussed for some time.
By way of example, the court recalls that in 1998, [Name 091] maintained ties with ICE and made an offer to donate GSM-PCS equipment for 2000 terminals, an offer that was accepted (folio 15,861). It is for this reason that the representatives of [Name 060] chose to promise and later deliver a gift (dádiva) to [Name 022]. ii) A second piece of evidence considered by the trial court regarding the promise was the statement of [Name 064]. According to the a quo, this “witness” not only spoke of the promise of a gift (dádiva) made to him by [Name 041] and [Name 078] in exchange for helping to materialize the migration to GSM technology, for ensuring that the purchase of material or equipment was done through public tender or bidding (concurso público o licitación), and for voting in favor of [Name 091]. He also said that the corruptors mentioned to him that they extended courtesies to the people who helped them.
This statement also confirmed the situation that [Name 091] faced before the 400,000-line contract, which was described supra. iii) The route of action prepared by [Name 124] is a third element for considering the promise of economic retribution to have been demonstrated. It speaks of a plan aimed at addressing the problems of [Name 091] with ICE, which involved approaches to the business sector, the Catholic church, and the political sector. In that document, the need is mentioned to gather the support of at least three deputies, a presidential candidate, two members of the board of Liberación Nacional, and a former president (Exhibit No. 686). According to the appealed judgment, “This document, without a doubt, evidences the urgency and need that [Name 091] had, in the person of the co-defendant [Name 041], to exhaust all social and, above all, political avenues so that its offer regarding GSM technology would be the one accepted by ICE.
Let us recall the disagreement of said company with ICE’s administrative policies on contracting matters.” (F. 15,864, volume XXXII). As can be extracted from the foregoing, after hypothetically suppressing the statement of the cooperating defendant, we are left with only two indications (indicios) (namely, the route of action proposed by [Name 124] and the unease experienced by the officials of the company [Name 091] due to its exclusion from the mobile telephone market), which are clearly insufficient to confirm the judgment insofar as it considered the promise of economic retribution to [Name 022] to have been demonstrated. This conclusion does not change if these two indications (indicios) are analyzed together with those mentioned previously (e.g., the longstanding relationship of trust between this defendant and the representatives of [Name 091]; the sending of envelopes whose content is unknown; and, of course, the receipt of funds after the award), since although from this whole picture it is plausible to extract with a high degree of probability that there was a promise of economic retribution, or at the very least, that the funds received had some link to the 400,000-line contract, this cannot be affirmed with absolute certainty, to the point that other possibilities can be admitted which have been repeatedly mentioned and which, moreover, were not charged by the requesting body, at least in a subsidiary manner.
As occurred with [Name 001], this chamber has no doubt that [Name 022] irregularly increased his assets thanks to the gifts (dádivas) from the cited company, and that there was no legitimate reason to support proceeding in this manner; however, this does not permit the promise of economic retribution charged by the Public Prosecutor’s Office to be considered demonstrated, insofar as the indications (indicios) remaining after the exclusion of [Name 064]'s testimony, although plural and independent, do not lead to the conclusion that the promise took place. Indeed, in the case of circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria), the consequence fact or presumed fact (in this case, the promise and its acceptance by the defendant) must be extracted from the indications (indicios) in an immediate, reasonable, natural manner, if you will, which does not occur here, since these elements do not converge into a single conclusion that simultaneously excludes other options that were not contemplated, for example, that the content of the promise was something else; that it was an acceptance of gifts (dádivas) for a completed act, without a prior promise, or even that it was the public officials who induced the payment of the gifts (dádivas), which in the case of [Name 022] would also not be unusual, since as was demonstrated, he was prone to requesting all kinds of advantages of economic content from the officials of [Name 091].
Finally, it is important to add that from the judgment rendered against [Name 068] (Exhibit No. 747), a judgment of certainty cannot be derived either that [Name 022] was extended a promise of economic retribution related to the 400,000-line contract, since the aforementioned resolution was rendered in the context of an abbreviated procedure, where [Name 068]'s acceptance of the facts had a personal and formal character, and to that extent, little evidentiary significance can be given to it with respect to this case. This is an argument that can also be applied to the conviction rendered against [Name 105], with identical results. Added to this, as indicated when examining the situation of [Name 001], the offer that [Name 068] received was extended by [Name 105] and [Name 046] himself, whereas in the case of [Name 022], it was attributed to other persons, namely, [Name 078] and [Name 041], whereby we also cannot assert that the factual platforms are identical, to the point of logically deriving from one what is affirmed in relation to the other.
Finally, as the appealed judgment well recognizes, from the analyzed board of directors minutes, no particularly striking action by [Name 022] in favor of [Name 091] is evident either; hence, it is not evidence whose consideration modifies what this sentence appeals court has affirmed. In sum, for the undersigned, without the testimony of [Name 064], what can be established is that [Name 022] received gifts (dádivas) from [Name 091] before the facts investigated here—which was not charged—and that he also accepted them after the award of the 400,000 lines, notwithstanding which it cannot be assured, at least not with certainty, that those funds were destined to fulfill a promise made to him months earlier and that he accepted, aimed at his acting for the benefit of [Name 091] on very specific points: technology migration, promotion of public tenders or bidding processes (licitaciones o concursos públicos), and a favorable vote regarding the 400,000-line contract.
Finally, it must be reiterated that although [Name 041] admitted before [Name 116] to having paid public officials, he never referred to having made a promise in that sense to [Name 022]. At the risk of incurring unnecessary reiterations, it should be noted that—according to [Name 116]—in a draft statement sent by [Name 041], he indicated that it was [Name 064] and other public officials who requested the rewards from him for having helped in opening public bidding processes (licitaciones públicas) instead of direct contracting (f. 15,157 front, volume XXXI). Although the witness also stated that in the meeting they held with [Name 041], he did not say the foregoing (cf. same folio), what was set forth in the cited draft allows increasing the existing doubts about whether, before the award, a promise of a gift (dádiva) with specific content and purpose had been made, and whether it had been accepted by [Name 022].
In summary, after excluding the illicit evidence and examining the remainder, this court concludes that from this, it is not reasonably extracted that there was a prior promise of a gift (dádiva), whereby the circumstances that would allow the crime of aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery (cohecho impropio) to be considered configured cannot be held as demonstrated. Thus, what is appropriate is to assess whether the facts that remain unscathed can be considered constitutive of another crime, which is ruled out in advance. As has been pointed out, the accusation formulated by the requesting body did not consider other possibilities, namely, that the gifts (dádivas) were received without a prior promise, for a completed act; that they were required or solicited by the public officials; or that, having been promised previously, they had other content. After discarding the prior promise in relation to the 400,000-line contract, the only thing that can be considered demonstrated is that [Name 022] admitted—understand received—the economic advantages that were given to him, conduct that cannot even be subsumed under the criminal offense of illicit enrichment.
As explained before, in the case of the admission of gifts (dádivas) given in consideration of the public official’s position, it is indispensable that the conduct takes place while the active subject remains in the exercise of the office. Now, as extracted from the proven facts (specifically numbers 115 and 118 to 126), [Name 022] was a director of ICE until May 31, 2002, whereas the gifts (dádivas) were given to him from October 2002 to May 2004. Therefore, [Name 022]'s conduct, with regard to the crime of illicit enrichment, would be atypical. It is important to emphasize that in this case, the scenario of admission of an offered gift (dádiva) that the criminal offense of illicit enrichment also contemplates cannot be applied, since it could not be demonstrated that while [Name 022] remained in his position and on the occasion of it, a gift (dádiva) was offered to him that he accepted, which would have sufficed to consider the crime configured and, consequently, would have made irrelevant the moment at which the economic advantage was materially received.
Furthermore, it is held that the criminal action to prosecute the crime of illicit enrichment would be time-barred. This crime is punishable by a prison sentence of 6 months to 2 years. Therefore, its statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) is 3 years and was reduced to 18 months with the first formal accusation (Articles 31 a) and 33 subsection a) C.P.P.), a procedural act that occurred on October 1, 2004 (f. 146 to 161 front, volume I). That is, the 18-month period expired on April 1, 2006, and by then, no procedural act had occurred that, by legal provision, had the virtue of interrupting or suspending its count. Moreover, as explained when examining the situation of [Name 001], a section to which the parties must refer to avoid unnecessary reiterations, this conclusion is not modified if what is set forth in Article 376 C.P.P. is considered, especially the interpretation that the Third Chamber made of this norm, since on the date on which the resolution declaring this case to be of complex processing became final (namely, June 26, 2006), the criminal action was already time-barred.
Likewise, Article 62 of Law No. 8422, Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, is not applicable in the particular case of [Name 022] either, since this provision entered into force on October 29, 2004, that is, after the defendant rendered his investigative statement (declaración indagatoria) and the interrupting and reducing effects on the computation of the statute of limitations period operated simultaneously. For the foregoing reasons, the appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it declared [Name 022] to be the responsible perpetrator of a crime of aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery (cohecho impropio). Likewise, for procedural economy and in application of the principle in dubio pro reo, he is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for this crime. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the cassation appeals (recursos de casación) filed by his public defender, Licenciada Yamura Valenciano Jiménez, is omitted.
- 3)[Name 006]: With respect to this defendant, the trial court found it proven that he accepted a gift while remaining in the exercise of his duties, specifically, that of deputy head of the switching department directorate of ICE; a gift that was also delivered in three installments. By virtue of those facts, [Name 006] was convicted of the offense of illicit enrichment. As the basis for this decision, on pages 16,256 to 16,282 recto of the judgment, volume XXXIV, the lower court considered the following: i) [Name 006] had a relationship with the company [Name 091], since the specialized switching area was the one that had to carry out the equipment installations and administer the contracts. Furthermore, [Name 006] had active participation in several contracts awarded to that company and which were recommended by him, namely, (i) No. 103830 for the acquisition of 38 remote subscriber units, awarded in session No. 5109 of September 7, 1999; (ii) contract No. 104333 for the acquisition of 509 primary rate interfaces for digital TED ISDN in exchanges, awarded on April 13, 2000, and in which [Name 006] was co-administrator of the contract; (iii) contract No. 105543 for intelligent network expansion, awarded in session No. 5210 of August 22, 2000. In this one, [Name 006] was in charge of the acceptance tests; (iv) contract No. 108213 for the expansion of [Name 091] 1000 - E10 exchanges, awarded in session No. 5294 of May 9, 2001. [Name 006] was co-administrator of the contract; (v) contract No. 112346, execution of the purchase option for the intelligent network, awarded in session No. 5375 of February 12, 2002; (vi) contract No. 112765, expansion of the [Name 091] exchanges, awarded in session No. 5404 of May 14, 2002. [Name 006] was the administrator of this contract. The evidence of the foregoing is documentary in nature and is mentioned on pages 16,257 and 16,258 recto of the judgment. ii) By reason of the administration of the contracts, [Name 006] had a close relationship with the representatives of [Name 091], a matter also attested to by witnesses such as [Name 153] and [Name 156]. iii) Based on that same testimony and documentary evidence No. 344, it was established that [Name 006], as head of the switching department of ICE, had, among other functions, to determine the needs regarding expansions or improvements in the different areas of the country. As coordinator, he had under his command a team of technicians who determined the equipment needs; based on those needs, a document was prepared and, in the words of witness [Name 156], “became a requirement,” with the defendant [Name 006] being responsible for signing the certification of the supplier’s need. Subsequently, he brought the award recommendation to the board of directors of ICE so that this body could decide whether to convene the bidding process. In addition to the competencies already indicated, he was also responsible for installing the equipment, executing the contracts, and evaluating performance, for which reason he was a key official within the award procedure, not only internally at ICE but also for those companies intending to participate (p. 16,276 recto); iv) [Name 006] had nothing to do with abbreviated procedure 1-2001 referring to the contract for the 400,000 lines, but he did with fixed-line telephony contracts; v) there is documentary and expert evidence also examined in the judgment, which allows it to be demonstrated that [Name 006] received funds originating from [Name 060] and that they were transferred to him using the same mechanisms employed to convey economic advantages to other public officials (namely, through the account held by [Name 058].); vi) this defendant received the sum of $110,336.20 dollars, an increase in assets that lacks any justification, especially considering that his monthly salary was approximately 400,000 colones, according to the testimonial evidence presented. Consequences of the hypothetical exclusion of the testimony of [Name 064]. As this chamber understands it, the statement of [Name 064] was not decisive in establishing the responsibility of [Name 006], to the point that if it were hypothetically suppressed, the decision reached would not suffer any modification. Therefore, the claims formulated by his defense counsel against the trial court judgment will be addressed further on.
- 4)[Name 018]: The lower court convicted him of the offense of illicit enrichment, having understood that, so as not to violate the principle of correlation between the accusatory pleading and the judgment, it was not possible to deem the promise of a gift proven and convict for the offense of aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery (cohecho impropio), in the terms requested by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público). To determine the responsibility of [Name 018] regarding the mentioned illicit enrichment, the trial court weighed a series of circumstances that can be schematized as will be stated below: i) [Name 018] was a deputy of the Legislative Assembly from May 1, 1998, to April 30, 2002. Later, from May 8, 2002, to April 21, 2004, he was the executive president of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) (the documentary evidence cited on page 15,998 recto and the testimony of [Name 158], also cited on that same page, attest to the foregoing); ii) as a deputy, he was part of the special mixed commission that was formed after the protests over the so-called ICE combo (combo del ICE). The aim was that no bill related to ICE would be processed without the opinion of that commission (thus, evidence No. 59, page 93). This is of interest, says the trial court, because at the management of [Name 091], a document was seized titled “New Telecommunications Law (Combo ICE), impact on [Name 091] and actions to follow,” which reveals the importance for the company of any action that could modify or affect the commercial expectations or contracts with the referenced institution (p. 15,999 recto); iii) [Name 063] worked at ICE from August 1, 1974, to September 27, 2004, and was the liaison between [Name 091] and [Name 018]. The representatives of [Name 091] approached the latter thanks to the mediation of [Name 063], to convey their concerns about the direct contracts carried out by ICE which, according to [Name 091], shut it out of the market. Report No. 428-DEF-443-05/05, evidence No. 630, PC06, file “White Book,” and the statement of [Name 128] attest to this; iv) based on the testimonial evidence presented, it was ruled out that [Name 018] had been a consultant for the company [Name 091], as well as that he had had any commercial or employment relationship with [Name 058] that would justify the receipt of the funds that were delivered to him. In fact, [Name 158] declared that this defendant told him that he had earned money with [Name 091] easily, since he had done nothing, and according to witness [Name 116], [Name 041] spontaneously told her that he had paid bribes to public officials, including [Name 018]. Similarly, there is the testimony of [Name 142], who pointed out that [Name 041] acknowledged having paid gifts to public officials in the media. Finally, the company [Name 091] had a policy prohibiting the hiring of public officials as consultants. v) Based on the statement of [Name 128], it was established that [Name 018] was informed about the mobile telephony issue and about [Name 091]’s interest in eliminating direct contracting without bidding. [Name 091] had conducted two public and denunciation campaigns, one to oppose the awarding of fixed lines to Ericsson in 1999, and another in 2000 regarding GSM technology, and there had been contact with [Name 018] since 1999. There were several meetings with the then deputy, and on one occasion, [Name 018] asked [Name 128] to speak with his superiors, a meeting that, according to the witness, did take place. vi) For the trial court, it can be inferred from what [Name 128] said that [Name 018] was contacted to discuss the elimination of direct contracts and the opening of the bidding process, which leads to the matter of the 400,000 cellular lines. This confirms the version of [Name 064], to the effect that the offer of the gift had to do with the matter of mobile exchanges and GSM technology and, to that extent, there are indicia that allow one to glimpse that a remuneratory promise was also made to [Name 018] under modal and temporal circumstances similar to that made to [Name 064], only that while [Name 078] called the latter, it was [Name 018] who asked to speak with [Name 128]’s superiors. Moreover, the payments were also made to him through the same channels as to other defendants. vii) There is documentation that indicates that on August 17, 2000, at the [...] café, [Name 041] met with [Name 018] and [Name 063]; viii) [Name 144], a messenger for the company [Name 091], said he had taken envelopes, sent by [Name 041], to defendants [Name 022], [Name 001], [Name 018], and [Name 028], at their homes and offices. The secretary of [Name 041] said that envelopes were sent to ICE and to the defendants, and that she knew their contents; however, “…this does not exclude that [Name 144] carried envelopes that were not the ones she knew; envelopes that also had different characteristics from those described as known by her person.” (P. 16,011 recto). ix) Just as the public campaign by [Name 091] in favor of public bidding and the migration to GSM technology began in 2000, between July 2000 and December of that year, representatives of [Name 091] also met with deputies and other figures from the political sphere. It was then that the meetings with [Name 018], [Name 001], and [Name 064] took place, all of whom ultimately received funds originating from [Name 060]. x) Finally, the lower court assessed abundant documentary evidence, described from page 16,014 recto to 16,054 recto, to demonstrate that the funds received by [Name 018] originated from [Name 060]. xi) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court understands that the prosecution’s request to convict [Name 018] for the offense of improper bribery (cohecho impropio) is not acceptable, on the basis that this defendant attended to the representatives of [Name 091] in fulfillment of the obligation that every deputy has to receive the public. The foregoing is because fact number 220 of the accusatory pleading alludes to the offer of the gift and fact number 221 to the acceptance thereof, without the elements of improper bribery (cohecho impropio) having been described. Therefore, the trial court indicates, regardless of whether what the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) affirmed in its closing arguments was proven or not (namely, that a remuneratory promise was made to [Name 018] for attending to the public), since the accusatory pleading does not contain such information, the only offense that can be deemed to have been established is that of illicit enrichment, insofar as he admitted the gift that was presented or offered to him by virtue of the position he held (p. 16,054 to 16,056 recto). With respect to defendant [Name 018], the hypothetical exclusion of the statement of [Name 064] has a particular significance, because although without that evidence, as will be explained further on, it is impossible to uphold the appealed judgment insofar as it deemed it proven that this accused admitted a gift that was offered to him in the terms set forth in the criminal definition of illicit enrichment, the application of the other scenario contemplated in Art. 346 subsection 3) of the Criminal Code is not ruled out, namely, that of the admission of a gift presented. This being the case, and it being evident that resolving the legal situation of this defendant (including the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción)) requires a more detailed examination of the facts and the evidence, this chamber will proceed to hear the appeals formulated by [Name 018] in a personal capacity and by his defense counsel, Attorney José Miguel Villalobos Umaña.
- 5)[Name 033]: The core evidence considered by the lower court (a quo) was the statement of [Name 064]. Without it, there is no possibility that the finding of certainty reached could remain intact, since although after its hypothetical suppression, it can be reasonably demonstrated that some funds from [Name 060] ended up in his hands, or in those of individuals or legal entities close to him, these are funds that were first received by [Name 064] and then, only in part, transferred by him to [Name 033]. Furthermore, the only evidence regarding the reason or justification for those transfers is the word of the cooperating accused (imputado colaborador) himself, to the effect that at the end of 2000 he spoke with [Name 033] about the promise of financial compensation (retribución económica) that had been made to him by the heads of [Name 091] regarding the matter of the 400,000 lines, and that the then [...] urged him to accept it. Therefore, it must be concluded that without the account of [Name 064], the conviction imposed on [Name 033] is left devoid of any evidentiary foundation. To better explain the foregoing conclusion, this Chamber will begin by synthetically outlining the arguments used by the trial court to convict [Name 033], not without first clarifying that it will not delve into the reasons invoked by the lower court (a quo) to deem the statement of [Name 064] credible, this not only because they have already been analyzed in this ruling, but because they are of no interest whatsoever considering that the opportunity criterion (criterio de oportunidad) and the evidence derived from it were declared illegal. Regarding [Name 033], the following was weighed: i) [Name 064] had an extensive career in public service. He was, for example, a congressman (diputado), Minister of Housing and Urban Settlements in the [Name 033] administration (from May 1998 to July 1999), presidential advisor from August 1, 1999, to May 9, 2002, and general director of the presidential house. Also, with the endorsement of [Name 033], he was appointed by the government council as director of ICE from August 3, 1999, onwards, positions he held simultaneously. [Name 064] was director of ICE until May 31, 2010, and, for this, he had the endorsement of the following administration. [Name 064] was a person very close to [Name 033] and, despite the hierarchical relationship between them, there was also a friendship (folios 16,088 to 16,111, volume XXXIII); ii) [Name 064], as a director of ICE, had a relationship with [Name 041] and [Name 078] (f. 16,111 to 16,116 front); iii) as it was determined, since 1997 there was a practice by [Name 091] of offering various attentions and courtesies to the public officials of ICE. The lower court (a quo) says that although the ultimate goal of this practice was not to make illicit proposals, [Name 041] and [Name 078] used this to approach public officials, gain their trust, and determine if they could admit an eventual remunerative promise. All of this confirms what [Name 064] said, in the sense that there was a process of seduction that culminated in the promise of a gift (dádiva) (f. 16,112 front to 16,116 front); iv) there were meetings between some public officials -[Name 022], [Name 001] and [Name 018]- with [Name 041], and he also sent them envelopes (f. 16,114 and 16,115 front); v) [Name 041] made a spontaneous statement where he accepted the payment of gifts to public officials, a statement alluded to by several witnesses ([Name 116], [Name 164] and [Name 142]). [Name 068] admitted the facts, [Name 001] accepted before the press having received money, and [Name 064] also admitted having received from [Name 041] and [Name 078] a promise prior to the award, which he made known to [Name 033] (f. 16,111 and 16,112 front); vi) regarding the existence of the remunerative promise made to [Name 064], the core evidence is his own "testimony," which the lower court (a quo) deemed credible. Regarding the meeting between [Name 064] and [Name 033] at the latter's house, that statement is also the evidence (cfr. folios 16,126 to 16,134 front, volume XXXIII). [Name 064] said that, at the end of 2000, he met with [Name 078] and [Name 041] at the request of the former, at the [Name 094] restaurant, near the airport, at which time both made him a promise of a gift (dádiva) in exchange for promoting the technology migration, ensuring the bidding process instead of direct purchases, and voting in favor of [Name 091]. That he, in principle, accepted, but upon further thought decided to ask [Name 033], since he was in a better position to direct the criteria of the board members if necessary. This is why he met with [Name 033] the next day, to present the offer, which the then [...] endorsed, indicating that the distribution of the profit would be 60% for [Name 033] and 40% for [Name 064]. vii) To confirm the existence of the meeting at [Name 094], it was taken into account that, according to their migratory movements, all participants ([Name 064], [Name 041] and [Name 078]) were in the country by December 2, 2000. Likewise, it was weighed that by December 3, the date on which according to [Name 064] he met with [Name 033] at the latter's house, both were in the country (f. 16,130 and 16,131 front); viii) two of the directors linked to these acts of corruption were appointed in the [Name 033] administration, namely, [Name 064] and [Name 068], who has already been sentenced through an abbreviated procedure. As for the third, [Name 022], although he was appointed in another administration, he had a prior link with [Name 033] (f. 16,120 and 16,121 front); ix) regarding the delivery and receipt of the gift (dádiva), it was [Name 064] who transferred the funds to [Name 033]. That is, [Name 058] did not transfer money to the accounts of [Name 033] or to the accounts of individuals or legal entities in his immediate circle, but rather transferred them to [Name 064] who, in turn, delivered them to [Name 033] under the terms described from folios 16,145 to 16,151 front of the judgment. For this Chamber, hypothetically excluding the statement of [Name 064], the conviction imposed on [Name 033] is left without any evidentiary foundation. The statement of the cooperating accused (imputado colaborador) is the only evidence to demonstrate that he shared with [Name 033] the promise that, according to him, [Name 041] and [Name 078] made to him. Without that account, it is impossible to confirm the appealed judgment insofar as it holds as proven that the then [...] gave him the support he needed to accept the promise of financial compensation (retribución económica), or that it was [Name 033] who determined the manner of distributing the irregular earnings delivered by [Name 058]. It is important to note that abundant evidence was incorporated and thoroughly examined at trial allowing the determination that funds originating from [Name 060] reached the hands of [Name 033] or those of his close associates; however, from this it cannot be extracted that [Name 033] participated in the acceptance of the promise of a gift (dádiva) under the terms that [Name 064] referred to, or that the funds were associated with that promise. Note that [Name 058] never delivered money directly to [Name 033] or to individuals or legal entities in his circle, but rather delivered it to [Name 064], who in turn transferred part of it to [Name 033]. This being the case, without his "testimony" (and again clarifying that the word testimony is used in a non-technical sense, as the cooperating accused is not a witness in the strict sense since he does not offer his statement under oath), it cannot be assured, as if it were a proven fact, that there was a link between the then [...] and the mentioned company. And indeed, apart from the meeting between [Name 064] and [Name 033] that according to the former took place, [Name 033] did not carry out any action that would allow one to suggest, even as probable, his participation in the investigated facts. Neither the accusation, nor the judgment, attributes to him having contacted any member of the ICE Board of Directors or any other public official with the purpose of determining their decisions regarding the matter of the 400,000 lines. Nor was he even accused of maintaining contacts with the heads of [Name 091] who were branded as corruptors. Therefore, the demonstration of the link between [Name 033] and the alleged promise of financial compensation (retribución económica) prior to the award of the mentioned contract depends exclusively on evidence that this appellate court has declared illicit. At this point, it is necessary to clarify that the receipt by [Name 033] of some funds originating from [Name 060] (the only fact that can be demonstrated without the statement of [Name 064]), is not sufficient to confirm the judgment insofar as it considered him an instigator of the crime of aggravated corruption by improper bribery (cohecho impropio). Not only because without that evidence, it is impossible to assure, beyond a degree of probability, that the promise of financial compensation (retribución económica) existed, but also because, in the same way, other hypotheses that were not charged cannot be ruled out with certainty, namely, that the money was a gratuity for a completed act without a prior promise, or that it was the public officials who induced its payment. Furthermore, for other reasons that will be set forth below, upon examining each of the money deliveries that the trial court (tribunal de mérito) held as accredited. Regarding the first delivery (as there were several more), proven fact number 96 states: " 96) Without specifying a date, but after January 6, 2002, and before February 18 of that same year, in accordance with the illicit distribution percentages established by the accused [Name 033], the defendant [Name 064] delivered to [Name 033] at the Presidential Office the sum of one hundred thirty thousand dollars ($130,000), through 7 bearer certificates of deposit from Banco Internacional de Costa Rica S.A., namely No. 19692 for an amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), No. 19693 for an amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), No. 19694 for an amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), No. 19695 for an amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), No. 19696 for an amount of ($5,000), No. 19698 for an amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), and No. 19699 for an amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000). The foregoing certificates were generated from the account of [Name 166] -mother of [Name 064]- and issued on December 14, 2001, maturing on February 14, 2002...". As observed, the certificates that [Name 064] delivered were generated from the account of his mother, [Name 166], and not from the account of his wife, [Name 080], which was the one supplied with the funds from [Name 060]. Although [Name 064] explained the foregoing at trial, pointing out that the funds coming from [Name 060] were blocked or frozen and that is why he turned to his mother's account to pay [Name 033] (f. 16,165 front), by suppressing his statement it is impossible to determine with certainty both the reason for that first delivery, as well as the link of the funds to [Name 060]. It is important to note that although there is documentary evidence that allows demonstrating that the two hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($225,000) that [Name 058] transferred on December 10, 2001, to the dollar account that the wife of [Name 064] had at Saint Georges Bank were frozen (cfr. evidence No. 208, folio 28, which we have examined), this does not delegitimize the foregoing, since that documentation does not even allow one to suspect that the $130,000 that [Name 064] delivered to [Name 033] between January and February 2002, have any relationship with the already mentioned $225,000, or at the very least, with [Name 060]. For this, it is insisted, the word of the cooperating accused (imputado colaborador) is indispensable. Regarding the second delivery of funds, the demonstrated facts stated: "98) On May 20, 2002, with the resources from account No. [Value 012] of [Name 058] at Banco Cuscatlán, supplied with the money previously deposited by [Name 060], the defendant [Name 028], in accordance with the role assigned to him within the distribution of functions of the corruptors, partially cancelled the demand investment No. 21200289108 for the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) and constituted four investment certificates for twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) each, all bearer and issued on May 20, 2002, numbers 2240020043928, 2240020043936, 2240020043901, 2240020043944 and the respective interest coupons for $64.58 each. These certificates the accused [Name 028] delivered to the co-defendant [Name 041] so that he, in turn, would deliver them to [Name 064] also as part of the promised illicit payment. 99) To achieve this end, without specifying a date, but after May 20, 2002, [Name 064] went to the front of the offices of the company [Name 091] in Sabana Sur, and received from [Name 041] a yellow manila envelope which contained the described certificates, and with them he carried out the following financial movements: a. With the proceeds from certificates No. 2240020043901 and No. 2240020043944, including the accrued interest from certificates No. 2240020043928 and No. 2240020043936, the manager's check from Banco Cuscatlán No. 12847-3 dated June 26, 2002, for fifty thousand two hundred fifty-three dollars and thirty-two cents ($50,253.32) was acquired, which was deposited into the account of [Name 080] at Banco BCT S.A. on the 27th of that month and year. b. The proceeds from certificates No. 2240020043928 and No. 2240020043936 were reinvested by order of [Name 080], according to the plans of [Name 064], in the investment certificate of Banco Cuscatlán No. 2241420000191 issued on June 26, 2002, to bearer, for the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). 100) On an undetermined date, but after June 26, 2002, in accordance with the distribution of the money agreed upon between them, [Name 064] delivered certificate No. 2241420000191 for fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to the accused [Name 033], who received it at his place of residence. Before July 30 of that year, [Name 033], in turn, delivered the referenced certificate to Mr. [Name 167] (who since 1994 worked as the administrator of the companies linked to the defendant [Name 033]), and ordered him to make some payments. a) He cancelled certificate No. 2241420000191 and requested from Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica S.A., the issuance of three manager's checks that were drawn up dated July 30, 2002, No. 14589-1 for fourteen thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($14,750), No. 14590-1 for five thousand two hundred dollars ($5,200) and No. 14591-6 for seven thousand dollars ($7,000), in the name of [Name 291]; and withdrew in cash the sum of twenty-three thousand thirty-five dollars ($23,035). b) On July 31, 2002, with manager's check No. 14589-1 he paid the debt pending at that time on the credit card in the name of the accused [Name 033] No. 4732981669923003 from Banco Interfin, for an amount of five thousand one hundred forty dollars and eight cents ($5,140.08). c) On July 31, 2002, with manager's check No. 14590-1, [Name 167] paid the balance in colones of three hundred twenty-five thousand eight hundred four colones and fifteen cents (¢325,804.15) and in dollars of four thousand three hundred dollars and fifty-six cents ($4,300.56), both of the credit card of the accused [Name 033] No. [Value 014] from Banco Internacional de Costa Rica. d) With manager's check No. 14591-6 for seven thousand dollars ($7,000) in the name of [Name 291], who has been the driver of the accused [Name 033] since March 1992, in compliance with the instructions of [Name 033], payroll, electricity, water, telephone, taxes, among other obligations of the [Name 033] family were paid ...". As the lower court (a quo) explained from folios 16,170 to 16,186 front, there is documentary evidence that allows demonstrating that [Name 080], wife of [Name 064], endorsed four investment certificates for $25,000 each, all bearer, constituted with funds from the account of [Name 058], previously supplied with money originating from [Name 060]. Likewise, that the proceeds of two of those certificates were reinvested in investment certificate No. 2241420000191 of Banco Cuscatlán, also bearer, for the sum of $50,000, which was endorsed by [Name 167], a person close to [Name 033] and who used part of the money to pay two credit cards in the name of [Name 033] and expenses of his home. Now, although we can reasonably maintain that [Name 033], through intermediary persons - [Name 058], [Name 080] and then [Name 167] - incorporated into his assets funds coming from [Name 060], without the statement of [Name 064] it is impossible to assure that those sums correspond to the payment or fulfillment of a promise of a gift (dádiva) that [Name 064] received with a specific content and purposes and that [Name 033] determined he accept. This same situation occurs with the third delivery of funds, examined from folios 16,186 front onwards and described in proven facts numbers 101 to 104: "101) Without specifying a date, but in the month of August 2002, the accused [Name 041] announced to [Name 064] a third payment of the promised gift (dádiva). With the purpose of not raising suspicions in the national financial system, [Name 064] asked him to make the deposit into two accounts, No. [Value 015] at Terrabank and No. [Value 016] at BCT International Bank (offshore of Banco BCT), in the name of [Name 080]. 102) On August 14, 2002, with the resources from account No. [Value 012] of [Name 058] at Banco Cuscatlán, supplied with the money previously deposited by [Name 091], the defendant [Name 028], in accordance with the role assigned to him within the distribution of functions of the corruptors, requested the Personal Banking Department of Banco Cuscatlán to transfer the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) to account No. [Value 015] of Terrabank, and the sum of five hundred ninety thousand dollars ($590,000) to account [Value 055] of BCT Bank International to later transfer it to account No. [Value 016] of [Name 080]. These funds were formally credited on August 16, 2002, after applying the respective bank commissions. 103) On August 19, 2002, [Name 064] with the five hundred ninety thousand dollars ($590,000) mentioned in the previous fact, arranged for the issuance of investment certificate No. 25694 for a 92-day term at BCT Bank International for the sum of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000), which was liquidated early on October 28 of that year and both the principal and the interest were credited again to account No. [Value 016]. On that same date, [Name 064] requested the issuance of three investment certificates, all bearer, two for one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) and one for seventy thousand dollars ($70,000), numbers 4523, 4522 and 4521 respectively and with a maturity date of January 28, 2003. 104) Without specifying a date, but after October 28 and before November 27, 2002, in accordance with the plan and distribution of the gift (dádiva), established by the accused [Name 033], he personally received from the defendant [Name 064] the investment certificates No. 4521, No. 4522 and No. 4523 of Banco BCT S.A., and one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in cash. The defendant [Name 033] disposed of this money as set forth below: a) He delivered certificate 4521 for its sale to ACOBO S.A. along with the respective interest coupon on November 4, 2002. The following day, ACOBO registered the sale of said security for a total of seventy thousand forty-five dollars and thirty-five cents ($70,045.35), an amount it credited to account No. [Value 017] of the wife of the accused [Name 033], [Name 169]. That same day, 20 participations of the “[Name 171]” were acquired for the amount of one hundred one thousand seventy-eight dollars and seventy-eight cents ($101,078.78) which were partially covered with the indicated funds. Subsequently, on November 12, 2002, the sale management of the 20 cited participations was carried out to the company [Name 172]., in whose account the gentlemen [Name 173] and [Name 167], collaborators of the accused [Name 033], appear as authorized. Despite the fact that the judicial and extrajudicial representative of said company is Mr. [Name 175], son of [Name 033], the truth is that the latter maintains a real and direct link with its management. b) Between mid and late November 2002, the accused [Name 033] delivered certificates No. 4522 and No. 4523 to [Name 173], a man of his trust, whom he instructed to deposit them in ACOBO together with the respective interest coupons, with the purpose that the brokerage house negotiate them to make them effective. Subsequently, the amount from the sale was credited to account No. [Value 019] of [Name 176] which, although formally represented by [Name 173] and [Name 167], the accused [Name 033] at that time maintained a real and direct link despite not legally appearing as its president or proxy. c) Finally, as a result of the liquidation of the certificates mentioned in the previous point, on December 2, 2002, check No. 5118-1 was drawn against the current account [Value 020] of ACOBO with Banco Interfin, for one hundred ninety-nine thousand seven hundred ninety dollars ($199,790), in favor of [Name 173], who on that same date deposited it into his current account No. [Value 021] at Banco San José, which at that time showed a balance of $248.75. d) In November 2002, [Name 173] proposed to [Name 033] the possibility of participating as a capitalist partner of Mr. [Name 177] in a housing project for upper-middle class consisting of eighteen houses and six apartments, since the latter did not have sufficient money. [Name 033] agreed to invest in the project, entrusting [Name 173] to make the investment effective with the proceeds from check No. 5118-1 of Banco Interfin mentioned above. In this way, [Name 173] drew funds from December 2002 and until July 2003 in favor of [Name 177] or in favor of the company [Name 180], a company that [Name 177] represented. To hide the participation of [Name 033], the investment was made through a company owned by [Name 173] called [Name 182]., represented by [Name 187], who was the secretary of [Name 167] and a person of trust of [Name 173]; in turn, the latter made a personal contribution to the project of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000). To formalize the business, the following contracts were entered into: i) Purchase option between [Name 183] representing the company [Name 184]., owner of the real estate registered in the Party of Heredia, real folio registration number [Value 022] and [Name 177], the total value of the sale being the sum of one hundred fifty-two thousand eight hundred twenty-five dollars and sixty-eight cents ($152,825.68). ii) Contract dated December 4, 2002, between the company [Name 180]. represented by [Name 177] and [Name 182]. represented by [Name 187], by which it was stated that [Name 182]. was interested in participating in the housing project of the company [Name 180]., contributes the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) and due to the initial risk of the investment by [Name 182]., the acquired lots would be registered in its name. Likewise, it was stipulated that [Name 182]. would receive seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) in profits and the remainder the company [Name 180]. Subsequently, approximately three months later it was increased by fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), leaving the total contribution of [Name 182]. at two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000). iii) Subsequently, another contract was made between [Name 177] and [Name 187] in her capacity as legal representative of [Name 182]., by means of which the former assigned to the latter the initial purchase option with the company Servicios Casablanca, which operated automatically. iv) Likewise, on December 4, 2002, by public deed before notary public Alex Thompson Chacón, Mrs. [Name 183] as president with powers of generalísima proxy of [Name 184] transferred to the company [Name 182]., represented at that act by Mrs. [Name 187], the following properties all registered in the party of Heredia: real folio No. [Value 023] with an area of 160.4 square meters; real folio No. [Value 024] with an area of 160.4 square meters; real folio No. [Value 025] with an area of 160.4 square meters; real folio No. [Value 026] with an area of 277.13 square meters; real folio No. 146.397-000, with an area of 166.50 square meters; real folio No. [Value 027] with an area of 180.77 square meters; real folio No. [Value 028] with an area of 160 square meters; real folio No. [Value 029] with an area of 160 square meters; real folio No. [Value 030] area of 160 square meters. The total price of the properties was set at the sum of eighty-six thousand seven hundred sixty-two dollars and forty-two cents ($86,762.42), also constituting a first-degree mortgage for the cited value and over the referenced properties. v) The recovery from the sale of the properties began in March 2003 and entered accounts No. [Value 031] in the name of [Name 182]., No. [Value 032], No. [Value 033] and No. [Value 021] all in the name of [Name 173] at Bac San José. After several financial movements, of the money that entered the account of [Name 182], finally part of this money was received by the accused [Name 033], with credits in his favor being registered between September 8, 2003, and June 4, 2004, for a total of fifty-two thousand two hundred twenty dollars ($52,220). Likewise, in current account No. [Value 031] of [Name 182]., Mr. [Name 173] was credited a total sum of eighty-one thousand two hundred fifty ($81,250), and Mr. [Name 167] was credited the sum of seventy-nine thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($79,350) ...". In the case of this delivery, we have that after a series of transactions that are not of interest to recapitulate, based on the resources from the account of [Name 080] at BCT Bank International, investment certificates No. 4523, 4522 and 4521 were issued, all bearer, the first two for $100,000 and the last for $70,000, which after several transformations, ended up in the hands of legal entities linked in one way or another to [Name 033]. For the undersigned, although there is no doubt whatsoever about the foregoing, since the trail followed by the money was meticulously reconstructed (cfr. folios 16,186 to 16,221 front, volume XXXIII), this says nothing regarding the reasons by virtue of which [Name 033] received those funds, as this point can only be established through the account of [Name 064]. Furthermore, in this delivery there is also mention of $100,000 that according to the cooperating accused (imputado colaborador) he delivered in cash and in relation to which there is no evidence whatsoever beyond his own words, as the trial court itself acknowledges at folio 16,220 front. In the case of the fourth delivery that has been held as proven, and which is examined from f. 16,221 to 16,231 front, it speaks of a check for $81,480 drawn to [Name 189]., a company with which [Name 033] had a direct link. The lower court (a quo) says in the demonstrated facts: "105) On December 10, 2002, with the resources from account No. [Value 012] of [Name 058] at Banco Cuscatlán, supplied with the money previously deposited by [Name 091], the defendant [Name 028], in accordance with the role assigned to him within the distribution of functions of the corruptors, delivered to [Name 064] the sum of one hundred eighty thousand dollars ($180,000), by means of a transfer to account No. [Value 016] of [Name 080] at BCT Bank International, less the deduction of the bank commission of $9.50. 106) With the resources just indicated, [Name 064] made a 31-day term investment maturing on January 10, 2003, for the sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000). At the end of the term, the money re-entered his account and [Name 064], in accordance with the prior orders given by the co-defendant [Name 033], issued the directive to issue manager's check No. 012342 from BCT Bank International for the sum of eighty-one thousand four hundred eighty dollars ($81,480) in favor of the company [Name 189]., with which he maintained a real and direct link. 107) Without specifying a date, but after January 23, 2003, [Name 064] delivered the check to the accused [Name 033] at the house of the latter's in-laws. Then on February 3, 2003, [Name 033] deposited that manager's check No. 012342 in Riggs Bank N.A of Washington D. C., which was applied to account No. [Value 034] of the Company [Name 189]. directly linked to the accused [Name 033]. The defendant [Name 033] later admitted having received the amount of this check and two others -which will be described later- allegedly as a loan granted by [Name 064], to whom he made a payment arrangement but it was rejected by [Name 064] due to the nonexistence of such credit as the amounts came from [Name 091] funds...". Without the statement of [Name 064], besides it being impossible to determine with certainty the cause of this transfer of funds, it is also impossible to rule out the defense's thesis, to the effect that these were part of a loan that [Name 064] made to the then [...].
The fifth and final delivery, described in proven fact number 111) and examined on folios 16,232 to 16,241 recto, is for approximately $188,000, delivered as follows: two checks (one for $30,000 and another for $28,083) and $131,000 in cash. The lower court states: “111) Approximately in the month of September 2003, in fulfillment of the plan and the agreed distribution, [Name 064] delivered one hundred thirty-one thousand dollars ($131,000) in cash to the accused [Name 033] at his mother-in-law's house. Likewise, following the instructions given by [Name 033], he made out two checks in favor of [Name 169], which were drawn at the same time but entered with different dates, different sequences, and for two different amounts, with the purpose of avoiding suspicion within the financial system. In this way, [Name 064] drew check number 419 dated September 9, 2003, for an amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) and number 425 for an amount of twenty-eight thousand eighty-three dollars ($28,083.00) dated September 25, 2003, both against checking account number [Value 056] of [Name 080] at Saint George Bank, in favor of [Name 169].
The accused [Name 033], after endorsement by [Name 169], deposited the checks into the ACOBO account. Subsequently, the proceeds from these checks were recorded by that brokerage firm as a credit to investment account No. [Value 017] in the name of [Name 169] and used in the purchase of 11 participations in a real estate fund for a total of fifty-five thousand nine hundred sixteen dollars and eighty-nine cents ($55,916.89), and for the remainder, a check was issued for two thousand one hundred fifty-two dollars and eighty-three cents ($2,152.83) in favor of Banco Interfin S.A. Subsequently, the indicted [Name 033] admitted having received the amount of these two checks and another one—already indicated—allegedly as a loan granted by [Name 064], to whom he made a demand for payment which was rejected by [Name 064] given the non-existence of such credit, as those amounts came from funds of [Name 091] ...”.
As has been indicated, a transfer of cash sums has been deemed proven, the sole evidentiary support for which is the illicit and implausible statement by the cooperating accused, as well as a transfer of funds (the aforementioned checks) with respect to which, although there is documentary evidence, the reason for their existence is unknown, as it is impossible to establish with certainty, a matter that is essential if [Name 033] is to be convicted of having instigated [Name 064] to accept a promise of economic retribution with specific content and purposes. In summary, the statement of [Name 064] has an essential character in [Name 033]'s case. Without it, it is not possible to deem it proven that [Name 064] received a promise of economic retribution about which he informed [Name 033], and that the latter gave him the necessary impetus to accept it, also defining the distribution percentages of the criminal gain that might be obtained (and which, for further abundance, it should be added, do not correspond to what was actually received by one and the other).
For all the foregoing, it is appropriate to annul the judgment insofar as it declared [Name 033] the instigator of a crime of aggravated corruption by improper bribery (cohecho impropio) committed by [Name 064]. That said, the question that must be asked is whether the proven facts that remain intact after removing the promise of a gift prior to the award of the 400,000 lines—and which is sustained, in turn, on illegal evidence—can be subsumed under any criminal offense. The answer to this question is no. Although, in effect and except for the transfers of cash funds, it is established that [Name 064] transferred funds to [Name 033] on various occasions, whether directly or through individuals or legal entities close to him, the characteristic elements of crimes other than that of aggravated corruption by improper bribery were neither charged nor deemed proven, a topic that gains enormous importance in the case of [Name 033], since the only conduct attributed to him is having determined [Name 064] so that the latter, as principal, would admit a promise of economic retribution in relation to the matter of the 400,000 lines, in exchange for carrying out specific actions in three areas (migration to GSM technology, public tenders or competitions, and a favorable vote for [Name 091]).
Therefore, only by violating the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment and including circumstances not foreseen by the prosecuting body at the time, could [Name 033] be considered the principal of another crime, including one of a residual nature such as illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito). Moreover, as was explained when examining the legal situation of the accused [Name 001], the criminal offense of illicit enrichment encompasses both the admission of gifts presented and the admission of gifts offered. In the first case, the presentation and the material receipt of the retribution must occur during the performance of the office. In the second, both the offer and the admission must occur within the aforementioned period, it being irrelevant, as it is a subsequent unpunished act, that the public official takes possession of the economic advantage once he leaves the position that motivated the offer.
In this matter, the typical conduct to consider is the first, namely, the admission of gifts presented, this being because it was not possible to deem proven either the promise of economic retribution made to [Name 064] before the award (and which constituted the basis for the crime of aggravated corruption by improper bribery), or any other offer of undue advantage to [Name 033] (which, in any case, was not charged). Having clarified this point, it is held that the conduct of [Name 033] described in the proven facts, which remains intact after the exercise of hypothetical suppression (and which consists of receiving the economic advantages that were delivered to him by [Name 064]), cannot be subsumed under section 346(3) of the Criminal Code applicable in this matter, since, with the exception of the seven certificates described in proven fact number 96, these receipts occurred after the accused ceased to be president of the country (cfr. proven fact number 61 in relation to those already transcribed), wherefore these are atypical actions.
Now, in the case of the seven bearer deposit certificates from Banco Internacional de Costa Rica S.A., although these were admitted during the exercise of the office, as the criminal offense requires, after the hypothetical exclusion of the testimony of [Name 064] it is impossible to be certain that these were presented to him in consideration of his office. The person who handed over the certificates was [Name 064], a person who at that time, besides being a high-ranking public official, was someone very close to [Name 033]. Furthermore, the certificates were generated from the account of the cooperating witness's mother, Mrs. [Name 166], an account that had no link whatsoever with [Name 060]. This being said, and at least as far as these certificates are concerned, there are no elements to establish that [Name 064] delivered them to [Name 033] for being the [...]. As Carlos Creus rightly points out when analyzing the offense of admission of gifts in Argentine legislation, which is also partly similar to ours, it is essential to demonstrate that the gift delivered was given in consideration of the recipient's office, which requires ruling out that it is not linked to a different circumstance, such as friendship or another relationship outside that office (CREUS, op. cit., pp. 280-281), something which is impossible in this matter, for the reasons already set forth.
Finally, as if what has already been said were not enough, it is held that the criminal action to prosecute the crime of illicit enrichment would be time-barred (prescrita). In this sense, note that [Name 033] was questioned on October 15, 2004 (f. 552 to 558 recto, volume II). The statute of limitations period for the crime of illicit enrichment was 18 months (this because at that time the procedure was ordinary), thus we have that this period expired on April 15, 2006, a date on which neither had another cause for interrupting the computation of the period occurred, nor had the resolution declaring the case to be of complex processing (tramitación compleja) become final (the latter occurred on June 23, 2006). That is, before the process changed its nature, a legal situation was consolidated in favor of [Name 033] that, as the Third Chamber itself admitted when ordering the remand, prevents applying the effects of the last paragraph of Article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In this sense, and assuming the risk of being repetitive (since the issue was addressed when examining the cases of the co-defendants [Name 001] and [Name 022]), the court of cassation stated: “This being the case, it is clear that the validity of the reducing effect on the prescriptive period as a result of the ordinary processing of the case file was always subject to the case remaining processed as ordinary; on the other hand, when complex processing was ordered and became final, in the early stages of the process, the reducing condition of the prescriptive periods varied, in accordance with the aforementioned section 376, given that the only exception to that reasoning would have been presented in the event that the fatal prescriptive period had expired before that order, since in that event the extinction of the criminal action due to the statute of limitations would have occurred, as that circumstance is considered a consolidated legal situation, to which the effects of the aforementioned Article 376 could not have been applied ...” (Resolution No. 1847-2014, Considering IV, f. 176,427 verso, volume XLIII, the underlining does not come from the original).
In summary, it is held that, even following the interpretation made by the Third Chamber regarding Article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the sense that the finality of the resolution declaring the procedure complexly processed eliminated the reducing effect on the prescriptive periods that took place before that finality, the fact is that by the date of that declaration there was already a consolidated legal situation in favor of [Name 033] that cannot be ignored, because the statute of limitations period had taken effect. Likewise, the entry into force of Article 62 of Law No. 8422, called the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, does not modify this conclusion, since [Name 033] appeared to give his investigative statement on October 15, 2004, that is, before the said regulation was published (on October 29, 2004). As was explained supra, the same court of cassation, in Resolution No. 2014-1847, specifically in Considering IV.-, folios 176,429 to 176,431 recto, recognized that it is not possible to give retroactive effects to a later procedural law, not only because in the case of procedural laws the one to be applied is the one in force at the time of carrying out the act, but also because the Political Constitution in its Article 34 contemplates a general prohibition against applying laws retroactively to the detriment of any person.
The Public Prosecutor's Office affirms that if the statute of limitations had not taken effect by the time the cited law entered into force, it is plausible to apply its effects to procedural acts carried out previously, since “…it did not retroactively nullify the interrupting acts that occurred previously, as the accused [Name 033] erroneously interprets - but rather it nullified the reduction of the pending balances, which were extended from that moment on and for the full term, according to the abstract penalty of each crime ...” (F. 176,933 recto, volume XLIV). The undersigned respect but do not share these arguments. It can be said in different ways and denied that Article 34 of the Political Constitution is being violated; however, what is ultimately intended is that the effects of Article 62, in force as of October 29, 2004, affect an interrupting and reducing procedural act of the statute of limitations period that took place before that date, namely, on October 15, 2004, stripping all value from the regulation under which that act was produced (namely, Article 33, first paragraph, of the C.P.P.).
For further abundance, note that nothing in Law No. 8422 indicates that the legislator had contemplated applying the prescriptive rules contained in section 62 in a manner different from that which corresponds in the case of any procedural rule (that is, from its entry into force and prospectively). Finally, it is important to note that in Resolution No. 1847-2004, which the Public Prosecutor's Office cites as a basis for its position (f. 176,934 recto, second paragraph), the Third Chamber adopted the thesis contrary to that which this procedural party expounds, namely, that Law No. 8422 is applicable to procedural acts carried out as of October 29, 2004, this being the reason why only in relation to the accused who were questioned after that date ([Name 018] and [Name 006]) did it argue that, once the interruption had taken effect, the statute of limitations period ran in full under the terms set forth in Article 62(a) of the aforementioned law.
In summary, and given that after the process of hypothetical exclusion that has been carried out, the remaining evidence does not allow for it to be deemed proven that [Name 033] acted as an instigator in the crime of aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery committed by [Name 064], and having ruled out the application of other residual criminal offenses to the proven facts that remain intact after the cited exclusion, the judgment is annulled insofar as it declared [Name 033] an instigator of a crime of aggravated corruption by improper bribery committed by [Name 064] and, in application of the principle of in dubio pro reo and for procedural economy, he is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for that criminal activity. As unnecessary, we omit ruling on the other claims made by him personally, as well as on the appeals filed by his defense counsel, Licensed Attorney Rafael Gairaud Salazar.
- 6)[Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028]: The trial court found it proven that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] committed three offenses of penalty of the corrupter in relation to the offenses of aggravated corruption by improper bribery attributed to [Nombre 022], [Nombre 001], and [Nombre 064]. Additionally, [Nombre 041] was charged with one offense of penalty of the corrupter in relation to the offense of aggravated corruption by improper bribery committed by [Nombre 068]. For organizational purposes, the offenses understood to have been committed by both defendants will be analyzed first, followed by the one attributed solely to [Nombre 041]. 6.a) Offenses of penalty of the corrupter in relation to [Nombre 001], [Nombre 022], and [Nombre 064]: It was found proven that in December 2000, [Nombre 078] and [Nombre 041] promised [Nombre 064] a gift in exchange for him taking the necessary actions as director of the I.C.E. to promote the migration from TDMA to GSM technology, prevent the bidding process for the 400,000 lines from being aborted, and finally, vote in favor of awarding said bid to the company [Nombre 091] (proven fact number 87.-, folio 15,438 recto, volume XXXII). Regarding [Nombre 022], it was found accredited that between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, the defendants [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] requested he take the necessary actions within the scope of his duties as a Director of the I.C.E. in support of [Nombre 091]'s interests, primarily, to promote the migration from TDMA technology to GSM technology, promote purchases through tenders and prevent them from being aborted, and that once the contracting process for the 400,000 lines was authorized, they requested he vote in favor of awarding that tender to the company [Nombre 091]; in exchange for all the above, they promised him the delivery of a gift, a promise that was accepted by [Nombre 022] (fact number 117, f. 15,451 recto). As for [Nombre 001], the lower court found it proven that in the period between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, the accused [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] requested he take the necessary actions within the scope of his duties as advisor to the Executive Presidency of the I.C.E. and person in charge of executing the 400,000-line project, to make said contracting effective by favoring [Nombre 091], and that in exchange for the above, they promised him the delivery of a gift, a promise that was accepted by the public official. Likewise, it was agreed that the delivery of the money would be conditional upon the effective award of the offer that [Nombre 091] would present to the I.C.E. (fact No. 131, f. 15,455 recto). Regarding [Nombre 028], in the judgment on the merits he was considered a co-perpetrator of the aforementioned acts, understanding that in the division of tasks agreed upon with [Nombre 041] for committing the crimes, he had the task of receiving funds from [Nombre 060] and transferring them to the corrupt public officials (proven fact number 56, f. 15,431 recto). This chamber will not reiterate the arguments set forth by the lower court to find it proven that [Nombre 041], in collusion with other persons, made a promise of economic compensation to [Nombre 001], [Nombre 022], and [Nombre 064] prior to the award of the contract for the 400,000 lines, nor the reasoning that leads these appellate judges to conclude that the accreditation of that fact is unsustainable, since an extensive exposition on this has been made previously and to which the parties must refer. It is sufficient to emphasize as a starting point that, hypothetically excluding the statement of [Nombre 064], it is impossible to affirm that point with certainty. While it can be assured that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028], through [Nombre 058]., delivered significant sums of money to the cited individuals, one can only maintain with a degree of probability (insufficient to support a conviction) that these sums were intended to fulfill a prior promise, to the point that other equally plausible hypotheses cannot be ruled out, for example, that they were compensation for a completed act (without a prior promise, logically), or that it was the public officials who solicited their payment. Now, discarding the promise of economic compensation not only prevents the application of the criminal type of aggravated corruption by improper bribery in the case of the three mentioned public officials, but also prevents the application of the penalty of the corrupter contemplated in Article 345 of the Penal Code in force at the time the investigated acts occurred. This article stated: “The penalties established in the five preceding articles are applicable to whoever gives or permits a gift or undue advantage to the public official.” As gleaned from its mere reading, this is a blanket criminal norm, which refers to other articles of the same Penal Code to establish a subjective element additional to intent, which must characterize the execution of the prohibited conduct, as well as the penalty to be imposed. The article prohibits giving or permitting a gift or undue advantage to a public official with any of the purposes indicated in the five articles that precede it. That is, regardless of the decision adopted by the public official in response to the corrupter's approach, to penalize the latter it is essential that their conduct be directed toward the pursuit of certain purposes that have been contemplated by the legislator in the provisions prior to the mentioned numeral 345. The complementary criminal type, as well as the sanction to be imposed, depend, therefore, on the purpose for which the gift is given or permitted. For example, if the corrupter gave it so that the public official would perform an act contrary to their duties, or to not perform or to delay an act proper to their functions, the corresponding penalty will be that of active bribery (cohecho propio), which ranges between two and six years of imprisonment and disqualification from holding public offices and employment for ten to fifteen years. If the corrupter gave it for an act fulfilled or omitted by the public official in that capacity, without a prior promise having been made, the penalty to be imposed shall be the one previously stated reduced by one third, as stipulated by the norm that contemplates the offense of accepting gifts for a completed act. Similarly, if giving or permitting the economic compensation or undue advantage under the terms described in the offenses of active or passive bribery (cohecho propio or impropio) has the purpose of granting public positions, retirements, pensions, or the execution of contracts in which the administration to which the official belongs is interested, the penalty of the corrupter will range between 1 and 5 years if the acts are those described in passive bribery (cohecho impropio) and from 3 to 10 years in the case of active bribery (cohecho propio). In summary, to sanction the corrupter it is essential to have demonstrated that they gave or permitted the gift with one of the purposes contemplated in the five articles prior to Article 345 of the Penal Code, which in this case is not plausible for the reasons stated in previous sections and that can be reduced, at the risk of incurring an excessive simplification of matters, to the fact that without the statement of [Nombre 064], from the analysis of the remaining evidence it is impossible to derive a judgment of certainty and not of probability, regarding the existence of the promise of a gift, its content, and the purposes it pursued. Once the illicit evidence is hypothetically suppressed, it is not possible to assure that [Nombre 041], in collusion with [Nombre 028], promised (conduct that, with an extremely questionable interpretation but endorsed by the Third Chamber, the lower court considered encompassed by the verb to give) an economic advantage to several public officials, so that they would perform acts proper to their functions with the purpose of [Nombre 091] being favored with the contract for the 400,000 lines, a purpose that is precisely the one contemplated in the offense of aggravated corruption, which is one of the five articles preceding that of the penalty of the corrupter and which, in turn, expressly refers to the offense of passive bribery (cohecho impropio), for what concerns us here. Excluding the promise of compensation, what remains unscathed is that [Nombre 041], in common accord with [Nombre 028], transferred monies from [Nombre 060] to [Nombre 001], [Nombre 022], and [Nombre 064]; however, this alone does not constitute any crime. Firstly, it is not a penalty of the corrupter because, as already explained, it is impossible to establish with certainty what the reason for the payments was. Even hypothetically admitting that the delivered monies had some relation to the field of mobile telephony, or even to the contract for the 400,000 lines, from the evidence examined only a judgment of probability is extracted that they were intended to fulfill a promise made before the awarding of that contract, in exchange for the public officials performing certain actions proper to their position that favored [Nombre 091], it being equally plausible to consider other hypotheses often mentioned, for example, that the funds were delivered as compensation for a completed act without a prior promise, or that it was the officials who solicited or demanded their payment, hypotheses which, in any case, were not charged by the Public Prosecutor's Office. In sum, from the evidence that has been obtained and lawfully incorporated into the debate, it is impossible to find proven the promise of a gift that was charged (that is, a promise in exchange for public officials performing future actions, proper to their position, to favor [Nombre 091] in obtaining the contract for the 400,000 lines) and, to that extent, the conviction imposed on [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] for the offense of penalty of the corrupter by aggravated corruption by improper bribery is unsustainable. It is worth adding that this result would not change even if the issue of the promise were set aside and emphasis were placed on the material delivery of the gifts, basically for two reasons, namely: i) because promising economic compensation to certain public officials (and not delivering the gift to them after the award) is the only conduct that, in the context of the acts charged and proven, can be subsumed under the offense of penalty of the corrupter by aggravated corruption by improper bribery, and ii) because the penalty of the corrupter is atypical in the case of illicit enrichment. We will now delve into both arguments. Regarding the first, according to the legal text in force at the time the investigated acts occurred, in the offense of penalty of the corrupter the typical action consisted of giving or permitting gifts or undue advantages to a public official with the purposes described in the "five preceding offenses," namely: i) corruption of judges; ii) offering or granting of a gift or compensation (repealed in 2008); iii) acceptance of gifts for a completed act; iv) aggravated corruption (criminal type that was applied by the trial court and whose typical description is integrated, by express provision of the legislator, with the criminal types of active and passive bribery, as applicable); and finally, v) active bribery (cohecho propio). As can be observed, whether one speaks of the promise of a gift (as the trial court did by considering that the verb to promise is encompassed by the verb to give), or of the material delivery of the compensation (now, in full harmony with the verb to give contemplated in Art. 345 of the Penal Code), the penalty of the corrupter demands that the prohibited conduct be directed by any of the purposes described in the aforementioned criminal types, and, in this case, it was neither charged nor proven that the funds were delivered before the award to the public officials in exchange for them performing (future) acts proper to their functions that were favorable to [Nombre 091] in the matter of the 400,000 lines (this is the purpose). What was indicated was that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] gave the gift after the award, to fulfill a prior promise that pursued the purposes already mentioned. In other words, it is the promise of a gift and not the material delivery thereof that complements the offense of penalty of the corrupter with the criminal type of aggravated corruption and passive bribery (cohecho impropio) and, therefore, only in relation to this can the application of the cited numeral 345 be considered. In line with the above, if that promise of a gift contemplated in the accusation cannot be found proven, the offense cannot be understood as configured, this despite it having been accredited that a transfer of funds was made to some officials. Regarding the second argument, it suffices to point out that the acts that remain unscathed after hypothetically suppressing the reference to the prior promise are atypical, even if one were to start from the premise that [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] presented the economic advantages to [Nombre 064], [Nombre 001], and [Nombre 022] in consideration of their office and during the exercise of their position, since the penalty of the corrupter is only provided for in relation to the five articles preceding that offense and illicit enrichment was not, at the date of the acts, nor is it now, part of that group. The issue is so clear that the legislator placed illicit enrichment after the offense of penalty of the corrupter, whereby the latter, by alluding to the "preceding articles," does not include it. In sum, having discarded, because it is impossible to prove without the illicit evidence, that [Nombre 041] in common accord with [Nombre 028] issued promises of gifts to [Nombre 064], to [Nombre 022], and to [Nombre 001] so that they would perform acts proper to their functions, directed at [Nombre 091] obtaining the contract for the 400,000 lines, and given that, furthermore, after that exercise of hypothetical suppression that has been carried out, the acts that remain unscathed regarding [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 028] (which essentially are reduced to the material delivery of certain sums to the public officials) do not satisfy the requirements of any criminal type, the judgment is annulled insofar as it declared both defendants criminally liable as co-perpetrators of three offenses of penalty of the corrupter by aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery in material concurrence, in relation to [Nombre 022], [Nombre 001], and [Nombre 064], and, instead, for procedural economy and in application of the in dubio pro reo principle, they are acquitted of all penalty and liability for the aforementioned offenses. 6.b) Offense of penalty of the corrupter attributed to [Nombre 041] in relation to [Nombre 068]: The trial court also convicted [Nombre 041] as the responsible perpetrator of an offense of penalty of the corrupter by aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery, this committed by [Nombre 068]. We will now proceed to explain why, following the declaration of illegality of the opportunity criterion granted to [Nombre 064], it is impossible to find this offense proven. The first thing that must be mentioned is that, according to what the court stated in its majority vote, the promise of a gift to [Nombre 068] was made by [Nombre 105], in collusion with [Nombre 046]. For the lower court, [Nombre 041]'s connection to this fact results from his condition as head of [Nombre 091] in the country and from having acted with [Nombre 105] (representative of [Nombre 114].) in the same manner as he did with [Nombre 028] (representative of [Nombre 058].), using those corporations to sign consulting contracts that did not correspond to reality, with the purpose of inputting the economic resources from [Nombre 060] that were later distributed among the public officials. From folios 15,767 and following of volume XXXII, the lower court concluded that a promise of a gift was issued to [Nombre 068] (for which liability must be attributed to [Nombre 041]), by virtue of the following: i) With evidence No. 747, it is determined that [Nombre 068] was prosecuted for the offense of aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery, availing himself of an abbreviated procedure through which he was convicted (judgment No. 586-07 of 14:50 hours on October 16, 2007). The gift, according to that resolution, was promised through [Nombre 114]., whose representative, [Nombre 105], also underwent an abbreviated procedure (judgment No. 260-09 of 14:15 hours on July 21, 2001). According to the court, these judgments have been considered “…in relation to those who underwent such procedures and solely with the type of offense for which they were convicted, the sanction, parties, and eventual reparations or other merely referential data, without in any case evaluating the proven facts and other content...” (F. 15,768 recto). ii) The conception of the criminal plan responded to several antecedents, one of special importance, namely, that [Nombre 091] was not considered by ICE in the area of mobile telephony, which led [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] to deem it necessary to channel monies coming from [Nombre 060] to give gifts to public officials; iii) from the documentary evidence (namely, official letter No. 813 of January 23, 2001, from the Comptroller General of the Republic and the minutes of sessions No. 5271 and 5277 of the ICE Board of Directors), it is extracted that on January 23, 2001, the Comptroller General of the Republic authorized the abbreviated bidding procedure for the contracting of the 400,000 GSM technology cell lines. Despite this, the Board of Directors unanimously authorized direct contracting No. 108792 to expand the GSM mobile network to [Nombre 091], which satisfied its commercial interests and incidentally facilitated its incursion into GSM technology. However, in the following session, [Nombre 068] requested the revocation of that decision, which did not prosper. This led [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] to envision the need to recruit this board member, as they did with [Nombre 064], [Nombre 191], and [Nombre 001] (f. 15,768 and 15,769 recto); iv) to promise the gift to [Nombre 068], [Nombre 105] was used. The corporation [Nombre 114]. belongs to him, which originally represented [Nombre 060] in the country. Once [Nombre 091] was established, [Nombre 114]. remained within its facilities and offered them assistance in the technical area (f. 15,769 recto); v) due to the good relationship with [Nombre 105] (which several witnesses attest to), and given that [Nombre 114]. appeared at that time as a consultant for [Nombre 292], a company that in turn represented [Nombre 060], simulated consulting contracts were signed, to generate the funds from [Nombre 060] that were later delivered to public officials (f. 15,770 to 15,772 recto); vi) there is no direct proof of [Nombre 105]'s request to [Nombre 046] to facilitate the meeting with [Nombre 068]; however, [Nombre 046] had a prior bond with [Nombre 105] and had a relationship of trust with [Nombre 068]. Likewise, [Nombre 046] engaged in lobbying efforts to approach public officials and, prior to the investigated acts, had performed such work for [Nombre 091]. He also acted as an intermediary in the payment of the gift made to [Nombre 068], given that [Nombre 046] also received a large sum from [Nombre 114]. for bringing [Nombre 105] and [Nombre 068] together and later transferred that gift to [Nombre 068], which “…reflects his knowledge that it was the gift paid to [Nombre 068] for his positive vote for [Nombre 091] in the 400,000 cell lines and because [Nombre 068] and [Nombre 105] were sentenced for convergent offenses.” (F. 15,773 recto). From this point on, the judgment undertakes a more exhaustive examination of the outlined clues to demonstrate the promise of a gift, specifically, of the link between [Nombre 046], [Nombre 105], [Nombre 114]., [Nombre 060], and [Nombre 091] Costa Rica (f. 15,773 to 15,775 recto); the lobbying and advocacy work that [Nombre 046] had previously done before public officials to benefit [Nombre 091] (f. 15,775 to 15,777 recto); the link between [Nombre 068] and [Nombre 046] (f. 15,777 to 15,781 recto), a bond that also arose before the acts of interest here and that is evidenced by the handling given to the illicit gains and the meetings between [Nombre 105] and [Nombre 068] (f. 15,781 to 15,783 recto), encounters that, according to [Nombre 193], took place on at least two occasions, in Coronado, the place where the company [Nombre 085]. is located, of which [Nombre 068] is president and judicial and extrajudicial representative. Moreover, the resolution points out, although there is no proof that [Nombre 046] was present at those meetings, it is clear that he was the one who put [Nombre 105] in contact with [Nombre 068] (f. 15,781 to 15,783 recto). The judgment also explains how [Nombre 068], as a member of the ICE board of directors, intervened in the vote of August 28, 2001, where the award was decided (f. 15,783 to 15,784 recto). For the court, a promise of a gift was issued to [Nombre 068] so that he would vote in favor of this award, and regarding the subject, it refers to what was stated in relation to the plan devised by [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078], to propose consulting contracts in favor of two companies that had engaged in commercial activities with [Nombre 060], one of them [Nombre 114]., whose manager is [Nombre 105]. Those contracts were simulated, the company became a creditor of [Nombre 060], and later, with the resources received, the gift promised to [Nombre 068] was paid. The trial court adds that while the funds were transferred to [Nombre 022] and [Nombre 064] through [Nombre 058]. ([Nombre 028]), they were delivered to [Nombre 068] through [Nombre 114]. ([Nombre 105]), there being a common purpose and a common trunk ([Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078]). Furthermore, the sums paid are similar. For the judges who signed the majority vote, the fact that [Nombre 068] was a director of ICE and that [Nombre 046] facilitated the meeting between the former and [Nombre 105] before the vote in which the 400,000 lines were awarded, allows the conclusion that the gift was offered at that moment in exchange for his affirmative vote. And it is that [Nombre 046] moves within those circles and knows the directors, and this is also shown by his approach to [Nombre 064], to ask him for help with the amounts [Nombre 091] owed him. In the same vein, the transfer of money via [Nombre 060] - [Nombre 114] - [Nombre 046] - [Nombre 068], demonstrates that the act the latter executed was to receive payment for an act proper to his functions and that, prior to this act, the promise of compensation was made to him. Finally, it was stated that [Nombre 046] had knowledge that the money offered and delivered through him to [Nombre 068] was for having cast his favorable vote for the awarding of the 400,000 lines. As support for this conclusion, the court alludes to how atypical the contract for the 400,000 lines was, not only due to its magnitude, but also due to the enormous demand that existed at the time. From the testimonial evidence (statements of [Nombre 128], [Nombre 195], and [Nombre 095]), it is extracted that it was a transcendental project in the history of ICE. This matter was known by [Nombre 046], not only because he moves in the telecommunications field, but also due to his relationship with [Nombre 105]. Furthermore, the matter was widely publicized. At this point, the court also emphasizes the statement of [Nombre 064]. He indicated that in the meeting at [Nombre 094], [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] spoke to him about the importance for [Nombre 091] of the ICE migrating to open telephony schemes, using the tender as a method for acquiring technology, and him voting in favor of the company, this also because, according to what [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] told him, on a recent date, [Nombre 046] had told them that he could influence that decision in a way detrimental to [Nombre 091]'s interests, and had even announced that he would have the backing of the Executive Branch, a statement that for the court demonstrates [Nombre 046]'s knowledge of what [Nombre 091]'s priorities were (migration and tender), as well as of the procedure defined at the beginning of 2001 by the Comptroller General of the Republic. It was also considered that due to the closeness between the two, [Nombre 046] knew of [Nombre 068]'s position within ICE. That closeness was also evidenced by the way of receiving and disposing of the gift (specifically, [Nombre 068] requested a bank account from [Nombre 046] to receive part of the payments). Finally, the reference to the convictions handed down against [Nombre 068] and [Nombre 105] and the admissions of guilt made by both regarding the facts was reiterated (f. 15,785 to 15,789 recto). vii) Likewise, the lower court examined the consulting contracts signed by [Nombre 114]. with [Nombre 091], the monies delivered to [Nombre 068] through this means, as well as the profits obtained by [Nombre 046] and [Nombre 105] (f. 15,789 to 15,828 recto). Based on all the foregoing, it convicted [Nombre 046] for the offense of penalty of the corrupter by aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery in relation to the acts attributed to [Nombre 068] (f. 15,833 recto and following). Now, regarding [Nombre 041], what the appealed judgment stated is that this defendant acted in common accord with [Nombre 105] and [Nombre 046] to manage to approach [Nombre 068] and make the compensatory offer. In addition, that [Nombre 041] was the common trunk between the distribution of gifts via [Nombre 058]. and via [Nombre 114]., such that he knew that the consulting contracts signed by [Nombre 105] were as simulated as those of [Nombre 058]. and that this was the mechanism implemented to provide resources to the illicit arm that would allow paying monies to [Nombre 068], counting on the contribution of [Nombre 046] regarding the indication of the accounts and other data that needed to be coordinated for each delivery (f. 15,726 recto, volume XXXII). Having analyzed the foregoing reasonings, this chamber considers that, after hypothetically excluding the "testimony" of [Nombre 064], it is not possible to prove with certainty that [Nombre 041] was a co-perpetrator of a compensatory promise issued to [Nombre 068] by [Nombre 105]. As has been pointed out, this court does not cast doubt on the situation of [Nombre 091] in the field of mobile telephony, the delivery to public officials of significant sums (in similar amounts, moreover) that took place after the contract for the 400,000 GSM lines was awarded, the relationship of trust between [Nombre 046] and the heads of [Nombre 091], and even the mechanism through which the funds that would later be distributed among the public officials entered (meaning, consulting contracts signed with [Nombre 058]. and [Nombre 114].). However, it is not possible to assert with certainty that the sums [Nombre 068] received were to fulfill a promise - prior to the award - issued to him by [Nombre 105] in common accord with [Nombre 041]. Although it can be taken as true that this last defendant distributed funds from [Nombre 060] among several public officials, regarding the promise and the purposes pursued thereby, the fundamental evidence is the statement of [Nombre 064], to the point that when this is hypothetically excluded, it is not plausible to rule out other hypotheses, for example, that it involved economic compensation accepted for a completed act and without there having been a prior promise, that the public officials themselves induced that payment, or that, even if a promise existed, it had a different content. See also that it was [Nombre 064] who, during the debate, spoke of the concern of [Nombre 041] and [Nombre 078] about what [Nombre 046] had told them, in the sense that regarding the granting of the contract for the 400,000 lines he could exert influence and harm [Nombre 091], an assertion used by the lower court to understand the interest of the corrupters in approaching the ICE directors before that contract was awarded. Even the role that the majority vote assigned to [Nombre 046] in this scheme was largely established thanks to what was said by [Nombre 064], since – according to him – [Nombre 046] approached him to help him collect monies that [Nombre 091] owed him for his services. So clear is the weight held by [Nombre 064]'s testimony, that in this section of the judgment, an appeal was made to the parallelism between his situation and that of [Nombre 068], affirming that they are two of the directors who received money from [Nombre 091] and who received promises of gifts, a conclusion reached because the former said so and because [Nombre 068] was sentenced for it. However, with the statement of the cooperating defendant hypothetically suppressed, and bearing in mind that the convictions of [Nombre 068] and [Nombre 105] were handed down within the framework of an abbreviated procedure, where the admission of guilt has a formal character, the possibility of establishing the promise of a gift with certainty and, especially, of involving [Nombre 041] in that promise, vanishes. Again, this chamber has no doubt that [Nombre 041] paid a series of public officials using two corporations ([Nombre 114]. and [Nombre 058].).
One might even suspect that those payments were related to [Name 091]'s incursion into the mobile telephone market; however, it is not possible to assert that those payments were made to fulfill promises of gifts made before the award of the contract for the 400,000 lines, in exchange for it being granted to [Name 091], especially when other alternatives may also be considered, e.g., that they were economic compensation given for completed acts, without prior promise (as [Name 064] had stated), or that it was the public officials who demanded the payment, as [Name 041] himself indicated at one point (cf. in this regard, the statement of [Name 116], analyzed in previous sections). In this regard and in application of the in dubio pro reo principle, the judgment is annulled insofar as it convicted [Name 041] for a crime of corruptor's penalty for aggravated corruption in its modality of improper bribery, in relation to the acts attributed to [Name 068], and instead, he is acquitted of all penalty and liability for the aforementioned crime.
By reason of what is set forth in this considerando and because it is unnecessary, a ruling is omitted concerning the other claims contained in the appeals filed by attorneys Federico Morales Herrera and Erick Ramos Fallas, as well as those raised by attorney Mario Navarro Quirós, private defender of [Name 028], with the exception of the third ground he termed "Erroneous and inadequate reasoning. Violation of due process and the right to defense due to erroneous application of Article 110 of the Penal Code," since this, being related to the confiscation of certain assets belonging to legal entities linked to [Name 028], demands a more in-depth analysis. Regarding that ground, this Court will rule later.