Partial annulment of CCSS FRE exemption from 8% withholding taxNulidad parcial de exención al FRE de la CCSS por retención del 8%

“III.- GROUNDS OF THE ACTION AND ASSESSMENT BY THIS TRIBUNAL: The matter submitted to this Chamber will be analyzed by addressing its subject matter in three sections. The first will address the prerequisites of a Lesivity Proceeding (Proceso de Lesividad), while the second will examine whether those prerequisites are present in the specific case, using the result of that intellectual exercise as input for resolving the statute-of-limitations exception (excepción de caducidad) filed by the CCSS. Finally, in the third section, it will be determined whether the challenged act conforms to the legal order or not. 1) Prerequisites of a Lesivity Proceeding: In general terms, a Lesivity Proceeding (Proceso de Lesividad) is a jurisdictional mechanism through which the ordinary legislature authorized Public Administrations to bring annulment claims against declaratory acts of subjective rights issued by them. In these types of judicial proceedings, the validity of a specific formal conduct is analyzed, which, as stated above, creates subjective rights in favor of an administered party—whether an individual or legal entity. Precisely for this reason, the mandatory participation of the addressee of the act whose nullity is sought is necessary, in order to guarantee not only an adversarial process but also the timely exercise of their right of defense. Article 34 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) is the provision that establishes the prior elements and procedural regulations of this figure. However, said normative provision must be read in conjunction with articles 173.6 and 183, both of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in order to have a complete overview of the subject matter being addressed. Precisely from that concordance, it is concluded that in this type of Proceeding, standing to sue is granted to the Administration that issued the attacked act, while the defendant with standing is the administered party who is the addressee of the effects of that formal conduct. This is so because, as stated above, lesivity constitutes an instrument for the legal suppression of specific administrative acts that create subjective rights, insofar as they are substantially inconsistent with the legal order—acts vitiated by absolute or relative nullity—(articles 128, 158, 165 and related articles of the General Law of Public Administration). Now, it is important to recall that in addition to the foregoing, it is essential that the supreme hierarchical superior of the respective Public Administration—the issuer of the formal conduct being challenged—declare the act’s lesivity, on the grounds that it harms public, economic, or other interests of any nature, for which purpose a technical-legal opinion supporting that decision is required. It is also important to recall that when the act emanates from the Central Administration—as occurs in the case at hand—the action may only be brought by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) (article 16 of the CPCA). Regarding the time allowed both to declare the act’s lesivity and to file the judicial proceeding under discussion, the current Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (CPCA) establishes a one-year period, counted from the day after the issuance of the act, to declare its lesivity in the administrative venue. The foregoing is subject to the exception of cases where the formal conduct in question has defects of absolute nullity, in which case, pursuant to the provisions of article 34.1 of the CPCA, that internal declaration may be made as long as the effects of the act persist. In such case, by mandate of said provision, the year is counted from the cessation of its effects, and the judgment ordering the eventual nullity shall do so solely for the annulment and future inapplicability of the challenged conduct. After the declaration of lesivity, the CPCA grants a one-year period to the respective Public Administration—counted from the day after that declaration becomes final—to bring the Administrative Contentious Lesivity Proceeding—article 39 of the CPCA. Such annual period applies even in lesivity proceedings against acts of the Tax Administrations—which is precisely what the case before us concerns—since the substantive right referred to in Article 41(b) of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) alludes precisely to the power of Public Administrations to judicially seek the suppression of their own conduct creating subjective rights, and this is regulated in articles 173, 175, 183 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), 34 and 39 of the cited Procedural Code and not in the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Hence, articles 51—statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of the power to determine the tax obligation—and 71—statute of limitations for the exercise of the sanctioning power—both of the aforementioned Code, are inapplicable to cases such as this one, insofar as they regulate situations of another nature. The same applies to article 43 of that normative body, provided for claims of overpaid sums. In summary, according to what has been stated here, for the initiation of a Lesivity Proceeding and a consequent ruling on the merits, the following are required: i) the existence of a specific, final administrative act declaratory of subjective rights; ii) that said formal conduct has defects of absolute or relative nullity; iii) that the said act has been declared harmful (lesivo) to public, economic, or other interests of any nature in the administrative venue, by the Supreme Hierarchical Superior of the Administration that issued it; iv) that such declaration of lesivity is made within the one-year period provided for in article 34 of the CPCA—except for matters relating to the protection of public domain assets, which is not subject to a time limit—article 34.2 of the CPCA; v) that the Contentious Lesivity Proceeding is brought by the Public Administration that issued the act, within the one-year period provided for by article 39.1.e of the CPCA—with the aforementioned exception regarding public domain assets. 2) Prerequisites of lesivity in the specific case. In this case, from the analysis of the record it is concluded that the internal declaration of lesivity meets the prerequisites set forth in the preceding section, which is explained below. As has been established, the act whose annulment is sought is official letter No. SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, issued by the Deputy Directorate of Collection, Control and Tax Services (Subdirección de Recaudación, Control y Servicios Tributarios) of the Directorate of Large Taxpayers (Dirección de Grandes Contribuyentes), solely insofar as it declares the Employee Retirement Fund (Fondo de Retiro de Empleados, FRE) of the CCSS exempt from the 8% withholding tax—established in Article 23(1)(c) of Law No. 7092—on income derived from the investment in securities, made with monies from said Fund. The action is filed by the entity authoring that formal conduct—the State—and is directed against the specific addressee of that action—the CCSS. For its part, the claim concerns an administrative act that is declaratory of subjective rights and is considered harmful (lesivo) to the fiscal and economic interests of the plaintiff State (prerequisite i). Regarding the procedural requirements, the internal declaration of lesivity was made by Resolution No. 0465-2011 at nine hours twenty-six minutes of July fifteen, two thousand eleven, issued by the Acting Minister of Finance (Ministro de Hacienda a.i.) in his capacity as supreme hierarchical superior of the aforementioned Ministry, pursuant to the provisions of articles 28.1 and 173.2, both of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) (prerequisite iii). And in that resolution, the specific conduct whose suppression is sought is clearly identified. Concerning the moments—time limits—in which both the declaration of lesivity and the filing of the present proceeding occurred, it must be recalled that in lesivity as a judicial process, two different time limits concur, which, as will be seen, are fully complied with in the matter under analysis (prerequisites iv and v), with the necessary reiteration, however, that neither of them applies to lesivity regarding the protection of public domain assets. With respect to the first time limit, it is provided for declaring the act’s lesivity internally within the Administration. It is a time limit that, in principle, is one year, counted from the day after the adoption of the formal conduct, except in cases of absolute nullity of an act with continuing effects, a hypothesis in which, it is reiterated, as long as the effects of the conduct persist, the aforementioned declaration is possible, even within the year after the cessation of those effects. For this, each case must be examined to determine whether the attacked act has an instantaneous or continuing effect, since in the first scenario, lesivity (even when absolute nullity is alleged) can only be declared by the same Administration within the aforementioned year. In contrast, if the act has continuing effects, lesivity may be declared during the course of those effects and up to within the period of one year, counted from their cessation, as stated. The foregoing requires that when the application of this provision is invoked, the judge must assess not only whether the act has continuing effects but also weigh the type of nullity, since the suppression of an act under those conditions is only viable if it has continuing effects and is absolutely null, given that regardless of the continuity of its effects, if the nullity is relative, the declaration of lesivity would be time-barred (extemporánea). This time limit for declaring (internally) the act declaratory of subjective rights as harmful (lesivo), if breached, leads to the inadmissibility of the proceeding, due to neglect of one of the core elements of the action. Regarding the second lapse, it must be indicated that it refers to the exercise of the right of action properly speaking. As mentioned, pursuant to article 39 of the CPCA, it is one year counted from the internal declaration of lesivity, with the stated exceptions. The breach of that time limit leads to the expiration (caducidad) of the action, pursuant to articles 39, 66.1.k, 67 and 92 subsections 6 and 7, all of the cited Code. Now, in the present matter, it has been established that the act whose suppression is sought by the plaintiff Administration was adopted on July 23, 2010—proven fact No. 2—and its lesivity was declared by Resolution No. 0465-2011 at nine hours twenty-six minutes of July fifteen, two thousand eleven, issued by the Acting Minister of Finance—proven fact No. 9. Thus, that internal declaration of lesivity occurred within the annual period stipulated by article 34 of the CPCA, which renders unnecessary—for this aspect in particular—the intellectual exercise of determining whether the attacked act that is claimed to be vitiated by absolute nullity has instantaneous or continuing effects. As for the time limit provided by the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code for the filing of the present Proceeding, it must be reiterated that the internal declaration of lesivity was issued by Resolution No. 0465-2011 at nine hours twenty-six minutes of July fifteen, two thousand eleven, issued by the Acting Minister of Finance—proven fact No. 9—and the present action was filed on May 30, 2012—f. 1 of the judicial record—that is, the proceeding was brought within the aforementioned annual period. What has been stated here allows the conclusion that both the declaration of lesivity and the filing of the present proceeding were carried out within the time limits provided by the CPCA for such purposes (prerequisites iv and v) and, consequently, that the statute-of-limitations exception (excepción de caducidad) raised by the CCSS must be rejected, without the need to reiterate in subsequent sections what has been stated here. Having reached this point, it is evident that one prerequisite remains to be analyzed, referring precisely to the conformity or not—due to defects of relative or absolute nullity—of the challenged administrative act with the legal order (prerequisite ii). For this purpose, the Tribunal has considered it pertinent to carry out such analysis in a separate section. 3) Analysis of the validity of the questioned conduct. According to the factual background presented, it has been established that through official letter SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, in response to the request made by the CCSS, the Deputy Directorate of Collection, Control and Tax Services of the Directorate of Large Taxpayers of the Ministry of Finance stated: ‘Regarding this matter, we inform you that, after conducting the corresponding study, your represented entity is exempt from the withholding tax established in Article 23(1)(c) of the Income Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta) when it invests in:

· Securities issued by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal.

· Securities issued by the National Financial System for Housing (Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda) (Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda), under Law No. 7052 of November 13, 1986.

· Securities issued by the Ministry of Finance.

· Securities issued by any financial entity supervised by the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF).

· Securities issued by the Banco Central de Costa Rica.

The exemption is granted, provided that it invests with special funds (Disability, Old-age and Death Regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, RIM), Social Benefits (Prestaciones Sociales, FPS), Health Insurance (Seguro de Salud, SS), Contingencies (Contingencias, FC) and Employee Retirement Fund (Fondo de Retiro de Empleados, FRE)…’ (Proven fact No. 2. The underlining is our own). From the issuance of that official letter and the opinion stated therein, a series of formal conduct was generated that culminated in the declaration of lesivity of the mentioned act. Precisely from such actions—all of them recounted in the proven facts of this judgment—as well as from the arguments put forth by both parties, it emerges with absolute clarity that the controversy in this matter is limited to the interpretation of articles 3(a) and 23 of the Income Tax Law as well as articles 30, 69 and 72 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador). This is so because, based on what each party understands that such provisions establish, one—the CCSS—alleges that when investing in securities with FRE funds, the gain obtained from such investment is exempt from the 8% withholding tax provided for in article 23 mentioned above, and the other—the State—argues that the income derived from investments in securities with monies from the cited Fund made by the CCSS is subject to the withholding tax under discussion. For the reason noted, this Tribunal considers it pertinent to make a brief reference to the figures of exemption (exención) and non-subjection (no sujeción)—especially since the parties in their briefs have mentioned both—in order to avoid confusion about how the matter is resolved herein. Having said that, suffice it to note that exemption, in accordance with the provisions of article 61 of the CNTP, should be understood as the legal dispensation from the tax obligation, which arises when the taxable event (hecho generador) occurs, as indicated by article 11 of that same normative body. That is, when we refer to an exemption, we must understand that in such cases the taxable event occurs and, consequently, the tax obligation arises. But, despite the birth of that obligation, it does not have to be paid by the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of the tax, by virtue of the express legal dispensation—total or partial—from said payment, issued by the legislature, which relieves, exempts, or excuses them. Put another way, “tax exemption occurs when a provision of legal rank contemplates that in those cases expressly provided for by it, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, its principal effect does not develop: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. So the structure of the tax exoneration is characterized by containing a single mandate manifested by two precepts, first the subjection (sujeción), and then the exemption; so that the tax obligation arises, but is not enforceable. Thus, it is clear that the essence of this concept is that the exemption does not affect the moment of the birth of the obligation, but rather that of its enforceability. Consequently, there is a clear separation between the taxable event of the tax obligation, which according to article 31 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures is the prerequisite established by law to typify the tax and whose realization causes the birth of the obligation, and the factual prerequisite of the exemption, whose realization determines the non-enforceability of the obligation derived from the taxable event.” (The bold emphasis corresponds to the original. Judgment No. 00232 at fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-three, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Tribunal). For its part, non-subjection refers to the non-realization of the taxable event of the respective tax, for which reason no tax obligation is born into legal existence. Thus, it is clear that exemption and non-subjection are different, each having its own foundations and effects, which for this brief overview do not merit mention in greater detail. In accordance with what has been indicated, it is relevant to transcribe—for purposes of its subsequent analysis—more specifically subsection c.1)—Article 23 of the Income Tax Law:

“ARTICLE 23.- Withholding at source.

Every public or private enterprise, subject or not to the payment of this tax, including the State, the banks of the National Banking System (Sistema Bancario Nacional), the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the other autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, the municipalities and the associations and institutions referred to in Article 3 of this Law, is obligated to act as a withholding or collection agent for the tax, when it pays or credits income subject to the tax established in this Law. For these purposes, the indicated subjects shall withhold and remit to the Treasury, on behalf of the beneficiaries of the income mentioned below, the amounts indicated in each case:

• a)Salaries and any other remuneration paid in connection with personal work performed in an employment relationship.

In these cases, the payer or employer must calculate the monthly tax corresponding to each of the beneficiaries of the indicated income.

If the beneficiary is a person not domiciled in Costa Rica, the corresponding tax amounts shall be withheld from the amount paid or credited, in accordance with the provisions of Article 59 of this Law. The provisions referred to in this subsection shall be included in the Regulations. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency of July 4, 2001).

• b)Per diems, whether or not arising from an employment relationship, bonuses, and other benefits for personal services, in connection with work in an employment relationship. In these cases, if the beneficiaries of such income are persons domiciled in the country, the payer must withhold fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts paid or credited to such persons; if the recipients of the income are persons not domiciled in Costa Rica, the corresponding amounts shall be withheld, as stipulated in Article 59 of this Law. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency of July 4, 2001).
• c)1.- Issuers, paying agents, corporations, and other public or private entities that, in the function of raising resources from the financial market, pay or credit interest or grant discounts on promissory notes and all kinds of securities, to persons domiciled in Costa Rica, must withhold fifteen percent (15%) of said income as tax.

If the securities are registered on an officially recognized stock exchange, or have been issued by financial entities duly registered with the Auditoría General de Bancos, pursuant to Law No. 5044 of September 7, 1972 and its amendments, by the State and its institutions, by banks integrated into the National Banking System, by cooperatives, or when dealing with bills of exchange and bankers’ acceptances, the percentage to be applied shall be eight percent (8%).

When the banks and financial entities mentioned in the preceding paragraph endorse bills of exchange or bankers’ acceptances, the withholding shall be applied to the discount value which, for these cases, shall be equated to the passive interest rate fixed by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, for the corresponding term, plus three percentage points.

Income derived from securities issued in national currency by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal and by the National Financial System for Housing, under Law No. 7052, of November 13, 1986, shall not be subject to income tax nor to the tax established in this subsection. Investments from the non-profit trust (fideicomiso sin fines de lucro) created by Article 6 of the Law for the creation of the Escuela de Agricultura de la Región Tropical Húmeda, No. 7044, of September 29, 1986, shall also not be subject to income tax nor to the tax established in this subsection. (Thus amended the preceding paragraph by Article 22 of the Law for the Protection of Victims, Witnesses and other participants in the Criminal Procedure, No. 8720 of March 4, 2009).

Likewise, the enumerated entities that are in the conditions indicated in subsection a) of Article 3 of this Law and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal are not subject to this withholding, solely when they invest in securities issued by the Ministry of Finance.

The amounts withheld shall be considered as a sole and final tax. The withholding referred to in this subsection shall not apply when the investor is the National Treasury (Tesorería Nacional). (Thus extended the fifth paragraph of subsection c.1) by subsection c) of Article 23 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency of July 4, 2001).

The Dirección General de la Tributación Directa is empowered so that, in those cases where the nature of the security makes withholding at source difficult, it may authorize, on a general basis, another payment modality.

2.- The tax withholdings referred to in the preceding subsections must be made on the date on which the payment or credit is made, whichever occurs first.

Likewise, they must be deposited in the Banco Central de Costa Rica or in its auxiliary treasuries, within the first fifteen calendar days of the month following that date. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency of July 4, 2001. Authentically Interpreted by Law No. 8320 of October 16, 2002, in the sense that securities issued by savings and credit cooperatives that are not intended for circulation, but rather can only be discounted by the issuing cooperatives, are not securities and, therefore, are not subject to the tax established in this subsection).

c bis) Likewise, in repurchase or securities repurchase transactions (recompras o reportos), in their different modalities, whether in one or several simultaneous operations and carried out through a stock exchange, a sole and final tax of eight percent (8%) shall be applied to the returns generated by the operation; said percentage shall be withheld by the stock exchange on which said operation was carried out. Where operations are not carried out through stock exchange mechanisms, the returns accrued from the operation shall be considered as ordinary taxable income. (Thus added the preceding subsection by subsection c) of Article 21 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency of July 4, 2001).

ch) Surpluses paid by cooperatives and solidarity associations (asociaciones solidaristas) and similar entities.

These entities must remit to the Treasury, as a sole and final tax, on behalf of their members, an amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the surpluses or profits distributed.

• d)Remittances or credits in favor of beneficiaries domiciled abroad. In these cases, the payer shall withhold, as a sole and final tax, the tax amounts that correspond in accordance with the provisions of Article 59 of this Law. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency of July 4, 2001).
• e)Transportation, communications, reinsurance, cinematographic films, international news, and the other services mentioned in subsections a), b), c) and ch) of Article 11 of this Law, provided by companies not domiciled in the country. In these cases, if the companies providing the services have a permanent representative in Costa Rica, the user companies must withhold, as an advance payment on account of the tax established in Article 15 of this Law, three percent (3%) of the amounts paid or credited.

When such companies do not have permanent representatives in the country, the user companies of the services must withhold, as a sole tax, the amounts mentioned below:

• i)Eight point five percent (8.5%) on the amount paid or credited, in the case of transportation and communication services.
• ii)Five point five percent (5.5%), in the case of reinsurance, re-bonding, and premiums ceded of any kind.
• iii)Twenty percent (20%) on the amount paid or credited in the case of the provision of the other services indicated in subsection e).
• f)Profits, dividends, and social participation shares. In these cases, the provisions referred to in Articles 18 and 19 of this Law must be applied.

Persons acting as tax withholding or collection agents must deposit the amount of the withholdings made in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, its agencies, or in the authorized auxiliary treasuries, within the first fifteen calendar days of the month following the date on which they were made. The Regulations shall establish, in each case, the requirements that the withholding or collection agents must meet, as well as matters relating to the reports they must provide to the Tax Administration, and the vouchers they must deliver to the persons from whom the withholding in question was made.

The requirements they must meet and the form of the withholdings established by this article shall be set forth in the Regulations of this Law.

• g)The State or its institutions, autonomous or semi-autonomous, the municipalities, public enterprises and other public entities, in cases of public or private tenders, contracting, business or other operations carried out by them, that pay or credit income to individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country, must withhold two percent (2%) of the gross product on the amounts mentioned, even when dealing with advance payments or down payments for those operations.

The taxpayer may request that the amounts of the withholdings made based on this provision be credited to the partial payments cited in Article 22 of this Law.

Those withholdings must be made on the dates on which the payments or credits that give rise to them are made. The sums withheld must be deposited in the banks of the National Banking System or in their authorized agencies or branches, authorized by the Central Bank, within the fifteen calendar days of the month following the date of the withholding. (As amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Law No. 8114, Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law of July 4, 2001).

The withholding and collection agents indicated in this Law must file a sworn declaration, through the means established for this purpose by the Tax Administration, for the withholdings or collections made during the month. The deadline for filing it will be the same as that for paying the withheld or collected amounts to the treasury." (Thus the last paragraph was added, by subsection g) of Article 19 of Law No. 8114, Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law of July 4, 2001, and amended by Article 16 of the Tax Justice Law No. 7535 of August 1, 1995, which, by adding subsection g), reproduces the content of the article in its entirety). The underlining is ours.

Note that the rule under discussion establishes, in addition to the tax, a withholding mechanism at the source of payment, just as is expressly "announced" in the title of the referenced numeral -"Withholding at the Source"-. In other words, the referenced Article 23 of the Income Tax Law practically provides for a true autonomous tax, which, as established by law, is unique and definitive, establishing the indicated withholding as the payment mechanism for the tax obligation. Now, the article being analyzed makes express reference to another numeral of that same regulatory body, when it provides that "not subject to this withholding are, solely, the enumerated entities that are in the conditions indicated in subsection a) of Article 3 of this Law and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, when they invest in securities issued by the Ministry of Finance." (The bold is ours). Hence, it is relevant to transcribe what the indicated rule establishes:

"ARTICLE 3.- Entities not subject to the tax a) The State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the State that by special law enjoy an exemption, and the state universities." (Tacitly amended by Law No. 7722 of December 9, 1997, which subjects the public institutions and companies it indicates to the payment of the income tax).

As can be observed, despite the fact that the title of the numeral uses the term "not subject to the tax," in its content, express reference is made to the word "exemption" (exención) as a liberalization or benefit that can only be granted by law -Article 5 CNPT-, which is congruent with numeral 23 of that same regulatory body, which, by establishing who is not subject to the withholding provided for in subsection 1.c), alludes, without a doubt, to who is not obligated to pay -via withholding- the tax established by that rule, even when the taxable event (hecho generador) provided for therein has occurred. That is, from the harmonious interpretation of said numerals, it is deduced with absolute clarity that the ordinary legislator created an exemption in favor of the entities indicated in numeral 3, subsection a) of the Income Tax Law -without expressly mentioning the FRE-, as it exempted them from the payment of the tax obligation under discussion. The absence of mention of the indicated Fund as favored or recipient of the cited tax benefit allows for the conclusion that it is in no way exempt from the withholding indicated above, not even when the investment in securities was made by the CCSS itself with FRE monies, because these do not form part of the entity's own assets, nor was the referenced Fund created with the purpose of strengthening the social security constitutionally and legally entrusted to said entity. In this regard, it must be remembered that in "our tax legal system, pursuant to the provisions of subsection b) of Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), the determination of exonerations is reserved to formal and material law, that is, through the procedures provided for by the Political Constitution itself and the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, in charge of the deputies of the indicated Branch of the Republic. Thus, the exemption (exención) is, then, the dispensation from the payment of a tax due, by express provision of the legislator, and consequently, the law must specify the conditions and requirements for its granting, the taxes that correspond, whether it is total or partial, and, where appropriate, its duration period." (Resolution No. 00232 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Tribunal. The bold is ours). Precisely on the subject of exemptions and the interpretation of tax rules, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated:

"IV.- Purpose of the rules that provide for exemptions. A tax exemption occurs when a rule contemplates that in certain expressly provided circumstances, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, the obligation of the taxpayer to pay the tax obligation does not arise. It forms part of the so-called "tax benefits," which usually respond to a non-tax purpose, or to the stimulation of certain activities. On many occasions, these benefits are based on the logic of the principle of economic capacity, or on other reasons that motivate the legislator's decision. In this sense, within tax law doctrine, they are constituted, and thus must be considered, as mechanisms and tools proper to the tax environment. They constitute paths that ultimately seek and allow, through strategic conditions (which may be temporary), the encouragement, development, or promotion of a specific economic sector, certain areas of activity, social contexts, or, the equalization of economic conditions to promote a state of equality in the distribution of tax burdens, in the short, medium, or long term. On occasions, they simply seek to prevent the tax system from becoming confiscatory. Hence, they are unfeasible when their purpose is an unjustified benefit, incompatible with their non-tax purpose, or they deviate from reasonable criteria and the value system inherent in the Political Constitution. Viewed this way, their creation is not incompatible with the principles of equality, generality, and the duty to contribute to public burdens that derives from numeral 18 of the Political Constitution, but rather they are elements that complement each other to achieve, in principle, a balance and stability in the fiscal situation of the country in its integral dimension. That is to say, they ultimately seek the fulfillment of those postulates, through actions oriented towards constituting a system vested with conditions of equity in terms of economic capacity and development. Therefore, in its new integration, this Chamber considers that contrary to the criterion held until now in this field, they do not constitute, stricto sensu, exceptions to the duty to contribute, but rather parts of a system that provide for the dispensation from the payment of the tax, or other benefits, which, integrally considered, seek to improve, in a global sense, the tax system in quantitative and qualitative terms. The foregoing by means of the total or partial dispensation from the payment of the tax or the reduction of its calculation base, ergo, they can fall on the tax obligation in its fullness, or, on the exclusion of some components from that base. Given these particularities, their management must be careful and cautious, because their arbitrary application may cause infringements of the principles of generality and equality, disrupting their own purpose." (Resolution of this Chamber number 399 of 10 hours 40 minutes of June 28, 2006). IV.- Interpretation of tax rules and exemptions. Purpose. On this specific aspect, in the aforementioned vote supra number 657, this Deciding Body made the following considerations: "The hermeneutical work of the mandates that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of juridical interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to determine the scope and particularities of a specific mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the goal that the legislator has prescribed for its issuance. In this sense, numeral 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures establishes: 'Tax rules must be interpreted in accordance with all methods admitted by Common Law./ Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created.' (The highlighting is not in the original). In this work, in accordance with the constitutional principle of equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, among them, the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that circumvents the very purpose of its content. The means used by the legal operator to carry out this process are mainly the philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and finalist methods. Article 10 of the Civil Code, to which canon 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures refers in relation to the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements: 'Rules shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.' The exegesis of tax rules, in principle, cannot be restrictive. The tax is particularized by its coercive nature, insofar as it emanates from the exercise of Public Power, which, through this means, imposes, under the protection of the Constitution, economic levies on taxpayers. But furthermore, it is identified by its contributory nature insofar as its purpose is to collaborate with public burdens, in order to provide the State with the adequate resources that allow it to deploy its functional and service-providing framework for the benefit of the community. This, of course, does not exclude that in certain cases, this type of levies are created with a different objective, as would be the case of the criterion of non-tax purposes (parafiscalidad). From this plane, tax rules cannot be considered exceptional or, restrictive of the rights of individuals, given that this character would lead to their application, and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. Within this approach then, rules containing regulations of the referred type must be weighed without subjection to any special or specific criterion. In this task, it must be remembered that the transcribed rule establishes in its final paragraph an objective limit to this exegetical work, such as, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions by analogy, a mechanism that, although useful for filling legal gaps, cannot supplant, in these terms, the role of the legislator by virtue of the principle of legal reservation. Seen this way, the field of creating tax levies and benefits is prohibited by this means, being therefore figures that must be created by a formal legislative manifestation, in the terms already explained previously. In sum, the legal operator must analyze in each case the content of the rule, to establish the proper channels for its application, in accordance with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose and, in the case of tax matters, satisfies the purpose immersed in the legislative manifestation, be it imposing tax burdens, establishing frameworks of benefits and other matters inherent to the legal-tax relationship arising from it." (The bold highlighting corresponds to the original and the underlining is ours. Judgment No. 091-2011 of eight hours fifty-five minutes of February third, two thousand eleven).

From what has been indicated up to here, there is no doubt that: i) in the exemption, the taxable event of the tax obligation is verified, meaning it is born into legal life, but the ordinary legislator, via Law, exempts certain subjects from its payment, specifying "the conditions and requirements for its granting, the taxes that correspond, whether it is total or partial, and, where appropriate, its duration period." (Resolution No. 00232 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Tribunal); ii) it is not possible to create exemptions via interpretation or analogical integration, as this is a matter that, pursuant to numeral 5 of the CNPT, is reserved to the Law and iii) by the ordinary legislator not expressly mentioning the FRE as a beneficiary of the exemption under analysis, it must be understood that it was not dispensed from the payment of the referenced tax obligation. Now, regarding the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), particularly the aforementioned Article 30 thereof, it is relevant to remember that the indicated ordinance prescribes:

"ARTICLE 30.- Exclusivity and legal nature. The pension funds, the respective plans, and the employment capitalization funds (fondos de capitalización laboral), shall be administered exclusively by operators (operadoras). These are legal entities of Private Law or of public capital constituted for this purpose as corporations (sociedades anónimas), which shall be subject to the requirements, rules, and controls provided for in this law and its regulations. The Superintendency must authorize the operation of the operators and shall establish the additional requirements that these entities must comply with, for the purpose of protecting the workers' savings and the efficiency of the system.

The following social organizations are authorized to administer the employment capitalization funds: cooperatives, in accordance with Law No. 7849, of November 20, 1998, and its amendments, and the labor capitalization fund operators established in Article 74 of this law and those created by unions. In both cases, these (sic) must be authorized and registered with the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones, SUPEN), in accordance with this law. Likewise, the solidarist associations (asociaciones solidaristas) defined in the Solidarist Associations Law, No. 6970, of November 7, 1984, are empowered by full right to administer employment capitalization funds, in accordance with this law.

For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the general assemblies of the social organizations may delegate the administration of these funds to operators, retaining the responsibility to oversee their correct investment and use. The respective contracts must be previously authorized by the Superintendent of Pensions.

When, in the opinion of the Superintendency, there are well-founded indications of the performance of activities regulated by this law without the proper authorization, the Superintendency shall have, with respect to the alleged violators, the same powers of inspection, imposition of precautionary measures and sanctions, that correspond to it in accordance with this law in relation to the entities supervised by it." (The underlining and bold are ours).

The rule just transcribed has a close relationship with ordinals 69 and 72 of that same regulatory body, which literally state:

"ARTICLE 69.- Requirements to obtain the tax incentives. The voluntary contributions to enjoy the tax incentives granted in this law must comply with all the provisions of this law and be contracted with an operator." (The underlining is ours).

"ARTICLE 72.- Tax benefits. The interest, dividends, capital gains and any other benefit produced by securities in national currency or foreign currency, in which the authorized entities invest the resources of the funds they administer, shall be exempt from the taxes referred to in Article 18 and in subsection c) of Article 23 of the Income Tax Law." (The underlining and bold are ours).

From the analysis of the reviewed ordinals, in addition to confirming that what is regulated in the referenced Article 23 of the Income Tax Law is an "exemption" -by dispensing from the payment of the tax obligation- and never a "non-subjection," it is concluded that in order to enjoy the same, it is required that the Funds -pension, respective plans, and employment capitalization funds- be administered and invested by Operators or, by the Social Organizations mentioned in Article 30 in its second paragraph, once authorized by the Superintendency of Pensions -SUPEN- and registered with said body. Now, this Tribunal does not omit to mention that the representative of the CCSS has argued that said entity is exempt from all types of taxes, and since within the referenced Institution there exists an entire organizational structure that jointly administers the FRE and FAP -FRAP- Funds, those tax benefits enjoyed by the entity -CCSS- should equally be extended to the Employee Retirement Fund or, as the representation of the defendant entity expressly states, the said Fund also "has the right to enjoy the tax exoneration established not only in Article 58 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja, as well as (sic) in subsection f), 72 of the Worker Protection Law," because the Directorate thereof "is attached to the Financial Management, therefore it belongs to the same organizational chart of our institution and uses the same legal entity ID..." (f. 51 of the judicial file). The foregoing is not acceptable. As has been stated, the "exemption" constitutes a liberality of the ordinary legislator, who, exercising their legislative discretion, evaluates the convenience of dispensing certain taxpayers from the payment of the tax obligation -for reasons of diverse nature-, without such tax benefit being able to be extended to other subjects who are not those expressly indicated by the legislator. From that perspective, the "exemption" to which the representative of the sued entity refers -provided for in numeral 58 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS- is, as they acknowledge, granted directly to said entity, and under no circumstance does the internal management of the Fund -joint administration-, nor the organizational structure to which they allude, constitute justifications, arguments, instruments, or mechanisms that allow understanding said exemptions granted to the CCSS, by virtue of its transcendence -for the vital functions it performs- for the Costa Rican Social and Democratic Rule of Law, to be extended to the FRE. This is so because the Employee Retirement Fund (Fondo de Retiro de Empleados) -a Fund of a complementary nature- technically does not constitute property of the entity, but of third parties -its employees-. Stated differently, the referenced Fund was created not for the fulfillment of the public-social purposes constitutionally and legally entrusted to the mentioned state entity, but for the own and direct benefit of the workers thereof -Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulations of the Employee Retirement Fund of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Likewise, it is also not possible, via Article 72 of the Worker Protection Law, to access the intended "exemption" of numeral 23, subsection 1c) of the Income Tax Law, because as indicated above, in order to enjoy the same, it is required that the Funds -pension, respective plans, and employment capitalization funds- be administered and invested by Operators or, by the Social Organizations mentioned in Article 30 of said Law in its second paragraph, once authorized by the Superintendency of Pensions -SUPEN- and registered with said body. Thus, it is the criterion of this Chamber that the exemption of the Employee Retirement Fund (FRE) from the 8% withholding on income derived from securities acquired with monies of said Fund, granted for one year through official letter No. SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, issued by the Subdirectorate of Collection, Control and Tax Services of the Large Taxpayers Directorate, is substantially incompatible with the legal system -Article 158.2 LGAP- by extending said tax benefit -granted among others to the CCSS- without a rule of legal or supra-legal rank that expressly authorized it, thereby generating an irremediable defect of nullity in the act under attack, due to the unlawfulness of its content -Articles 132 and 166 of the LGAP-. With such action, constitutional numeral 11, 5, 61 and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, Articles 3 and 23 of the Income Tax Law, ordinals 30, 69 and 72 of the Worker Protection Law, as well as Articles 11 and 132 of the General Law of Public Administration, were grossly violated. As a consequence of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the partial nullity of the attacked act, solely insofar as it ordered the exemption -for one year- of the Employee Retirement Fund (FRE) from the 8% withholding on income derived from securities acquired with monies of said Fund. A declaration that has declarative and retroactive effects to the effective date of the referenced act, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith -numerals 158.2, 166 and 171 of the LGAP and Article 131 of the CPCA-.

IV.- ON THE OBJECTIONS RAISED: As was indicated above, when answering the lawsuit, the representation of the CCSS raised the objection of lack of right and subsequently -in the Preliminary Hearing- alleged lack of joinder of a necessary party, as well as the expiration of the action. Regarding the lack of right, it has been indicated above that the contested act is substantially incompatible with the legal system, as it contains an irremediable defect of nullity in its grounds -due to its unlawfulness-. For this reason, the state's annulment claim finds full legal support, and as a consequence thereof, the rejection of the objection under analysis is required. As for the second of the raised objections, it is worth remembering that through resolution No. 672-2013 of nine hours fifty-six minutes of April fourth, 2013, it was rejected by the Processing Judge and said rejection confirmed by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Tribunal, through resolution No. 328-2013 of nine hours thirty-three minutes of June fifth, two thousand thirteen.

Finally, with regard to the statute of limitations defense, in the immediately preceding Considerando, this Court addressed it and, for the reasons set forth therein —internal declaration of harmfulness (lesividad) and filing of the proceeding both carried out in a timely manner— its rejection was ordered.

**3) Analysis of the validity of the questioned conduct.** Pursuant to the factual framework set forth, it has been deemed accredited that via official communication SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, in response to the request formulated by the CCSS, the Deputy Directorate of Collection, Control and Tax Services of the Directorate of Large Taxpayers of the Ministry of Finance stated: "*Regarding this matter, we inform you that upon completing the corresponding study, your represented entity is exempt from the withholding established in numeral 1, subsection c) of Article 23 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta when investing in:*" </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:72.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 36.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:108.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1;tab-stops:list 72.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:61.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level3 lfo1;tab-stops:list 108.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol;color:#010101'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:black'>Securities issued by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal.</span></span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:61.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level3 lfo1;tab-stops:list 108.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol;color:#010101'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:black'>Securities issued by the Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda (Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda), under Ley No. 7052 of November 13, 1986.</span></span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:61.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level3 lfo1;tab-stops:list 108.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol;color:#010101'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:black'>Securities issued by the Ministry of Finance.</span></span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:61.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level3 lfo1;tab-stops:list 108.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol;color:#010101'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:black'>Securities issued by any financial entity supervised by the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF).</span></span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:61.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level3 lfo1;tab-stops:list 108.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Symbol;mso-fareast-font-family:Symbol;mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol;color:#010101'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>·<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:black'>Securities issued by the Banco Central de Costa Rica.</span></span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>The exemption is granted, provided it invests with special funds</span></u></i><span style='font-size:13.5pt;line-height:150%'> </span><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>(Disability, Old Age and Death Regime (RIM), Social Benefits (FPS), Health Insurance (SS), Contingencies (FC) <u>and Employee Retirement Fund (FRE</u></span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>)<i>..</i>" (Proven Fact No. 2. The underlining is ours). Following the issuance of said official communication and the opinion expressed therein, a series of formal actions were generated that culminated in the declaration of lesividad (prejudicial nature) of the aforementioned act. It is precisely from these actions—all of which are recounted in the proven facts of this judgment—as well as from the arguments put forth by both parties, that it follows with absolute clarity that the controversy of the present matter is confined to the interpretation of articles 3, subsection a) and 23 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta, as well as numerals 30, 69, and 72 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. This is so because, based on what each party understands these norms establish, one—the CCSS—alleges that when investing in securities with funds from the FRE, the profit obtained from such investment is exempt from the 8% withholding provided for in numeral 23 indicated above, and the other—the State—argues that the income derived from investments in securities with monies from the cited Fund made by the CCSS are subject to the withholding in question. For the pointed-out reason, this Tribunal considers it pertinent to make a brief reference to the figures of exemption and non-subjection—especially since the parties have mentioned both throughout their writings—in order to avoid confusion about the manner in which this matter is resolved here. That said, it suffices to note that exemption, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 61 of the CNTP, is to be understood as the legal dispensation from the tax obligation, which arises when the taxable event (hecho generador) occurs, as indicated in article 11 of that same regulatory body. That is, when we refer to an exemption, we must understand that in such cases, the taxable event occurs and, consequently, the tax obligation arises. But, despite the birth of said obligation, it does not have to be paid by the tax debtor (sujeto pasivo), by virtue of the express legal dispensation—total or partial—of said payment, issued by the legislator, which relieves, exempts, or exonerates them. Put differently, "<i>a tax exemption takes place when a norm of legal rank contemplates that, in those cases expressly provided for by it, despite the occurrence of the taxable event (hecho imponible), its main effect does not develop: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. In such a way that the structure of the tax exoneration is characterized by containing a single mandate manifested by two precepts, first the subjection, and then, the exemption; so that the tax obligation <span class=GramE>is born</span>, but it is not enforceable</i>. <i>Thus, it is clear that the essence of this concept is that the exemption does not affect the moment of the birth of the obligation, but rather that of its enforceability. Consequently, <b>there is a clear separation between the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation</b>, which, according to article 31 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, is the prerequisite established by law to classify the tax and whose realization gives rise to the obligation, and <b>the factual prerequisite of the <span class=GramE>exemption<span style='font-weight:normal;font-style:normal'> </span><span style='font-weight:normal'>,</span></span></b> whose realization determines the non-enforceability of the obligation derived from the taxable event.</i>" (Emphasis in bold corresponds to the original. Judgment No. 00232 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Tribunal). On the other hand, non-subjection refers to the non-realization of the taxable event of the respective tax, which is why no tax obligation is born into legal life. Thus, it is clear that exemption and non-subjection are different, each having its own foundations and effects, which, for this brief overview, do not warrant being pointed out in greater detail. In accordance with the foregoing, it is of relevance to transcribe—for purposes of its subsequent analysis—more specifically subsection c.1)—article 23 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta:</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>"ARTICLE 23.- Withholding at source. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>Every public or private enterprise, whether or not subject to the payment of this tax, including the State, the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and other autonomous or semiautonomous institutions, the municipalities, and the associations and institutions referred to in article 3 of this Law, is obligated to act as a withholding or collection agent for the tax, when paying or crediting income subject to the tax established in this Law. For these purposes, the indicated subjects must withhold and remit to the Treasury, on behalf of the beneficiaries of the income mentioned below, the amounts indicated in each case: </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>a) Salaries and any other remuneration paid for personal work performed in a dependent relationship. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>In these cases, the payer or employer must calculate the monthly tax corresponding to each of the beneficiaries of the indicated income. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>If the beneficiary is a person not domiciled in Costa Rica, the applicable tax amounts shall be withheld from the amount paid or credited, in accordance with the provisions of article 59 of this Law. The Regulations shall include the provisions referred to in this subsection. </span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>(Thus reformed by subsection g) of article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>b) Per diem payments, whether or not arising from a dependent labor relationship, bonuses, and other benefits for personal services, on the occasion of dependent work. In these cases, if the beneficiaries of such income are persons domiciled in the country, the payer must withhold fifteen percent (15%) on the amounts paid or credited to said persons; if the recipients of the income are persons not domiciled in Costa Rica, the corresponding amounts shall be withheld, as stipulated in article 59 of this Law. </span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>(Thus reformed by subsection g) of article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>c) </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>1.- Issuers, paying agents, corporations, and other public or private entities that, in order to raise funds from the financial market, pay or credit interest or grant discounts on promissory notes and all types of securities, to persons domiciled in Costa Rica, must withhold fifteen percent (15%) of said income as tax. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>If the securities are registered on an officially recognized stock exchange, or have been issued by financial entities duly registered with the Auditoría General de Bancos, pursuant to Ley No. 5044 of September 7, 1972, and its reforms, by the State and its institutions, by the banks integrated into the Sistema Bancario Nacional, by cooperatives, or when dealing with bills of exchange and bankers' acceptances, the percentage to be applied shall be eight percent (8%). </span></u></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>When the banks and financial entities mentioned in the preceding paragraph endorse bills of exchange or bankers' acceptances, the withholding shall be applied to the discount value, which, for these cases, shall be equated to the passive interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, for the corresponding term, plus three percentage points. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>Income derived from securities issued in national currency by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal and by the Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda, under Ley Nº 7052, of November 13, 1986, shall not be subject to income tax or to the tax established in this subsection. Neither shall income from investments from the non-profit trust, created by article 6 of the Ley de la creación de la Escuela de Agricultura de la Región Tropical Húmeda, Nº 7044, of September 29, 1986, be subject to income tax or to the tax established in this subsection.</span></u></i><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'> </span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt'>(Thus reformed the preceding paragraph by article 22 of the Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal N° 8720 of March 4, 2009.) </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>Likewise, only the enumerated entities that meet the conditions indicated in subsection a) of article 3 of this Law and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal are not subject to this withholding when they invest in securities issued by the Ministry of Finance. </span></u></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>The sums withheld shall be considered as a single and definitive tax.</span></u></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'> <i>It shall not be appropriate to make the withholding referred to in this subsection when the investor is the Tesorería Nacional. </i>(Thus expanded the fifth paragraph of subsection c.1) by subsection c) of article 23 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>The Dirección General de la Tributación Directa is empowered so that, in those cases where the nature of the security makes withholding at source difficult, it may authorize, in a general manner, another form of payment. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>2.- The tax withholdings referred to in the preceding subsections must be made on the date the payment or credit is made, according to whichever act occurs first. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>Likewise, they must be deposited with the Banco Central de Costa Rica or its auxiliary treasuries, within the first fifteen calendar days of the month following that date. </span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>(Thus reformed by subsection g) of article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001. Authentically interpreted by law N° 8320 of October 16, 2002, to the effect that securities issued by savings and credit cooperatives that are not intended for circulation, but rather can only be discounted by the issuing cooperatives, are not securities and, therefore, are not subject to the tax established in this subsection). </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><span class=GramE><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>c</span></i></span><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'> bis) Likewise, in repurchase or reporto operations of securities, in their different modalities, whether in one or several simultaneous operations and carried out through a stock exchange, a single and definitive tax of eight percent (8%) shall be applied on the income generated by the operation; said percentage shall be withheld by the stock exchange where said operation was carried out. In the event that the operations are not carried out through stock exchange mechanisms, the income earned from the operation shall be considered ordinary taxable income. </span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>(Thus added the preceding subsection by subsection c) of article 21 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><span class=SpellE><span class=GramE><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>ch</span></i></span></span><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>) Surplus paid by cooperatives and solidarista associations and similar entities. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>These entities must remit to the Treasury, as a single and definitive tax, on behalf of their associates, an amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the distributed surplus or profits. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>d) Remittances or credits in favor of beneficiaries domiciled abroad. In these cases, the payer shall withhold, as a single and definitive tax, the tax amounts corresponding in accordance with the provisions of article 59 of this Law. </span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>(Thus reformed by subsection g) of article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>e) Transportation, communications, reinsurance, cinematographic films, international news, and the other services mentioned in subsections a), b), c) and ch) of article 11 of this Law, provided by companies not domiciled in the country. In these cases, if the companies providing the services have a permanent representative in Costa Rica, the user companies must withhold, as an advance payment on account of the tax established in article 15 of this Law, three percent (3%) on the amounts paid or credited. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>When said companies do not have permanent representatives in the country, the user companies of the services must withhold, as a single tax, the following sums: </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:17.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>i) Eight point five percent (8.5%) on the amount paid or credited, in the case of transportation and communications services. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:17.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:36.85pt'><span class=SpellE><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>ii</span></i></span><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>) Five point five percent (5.5%), in the case of reinsurance, counter-guarantees, and ceded premiums of any kind. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:17.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:36.85pt'><span class=SpellE><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>iii</span></i></span><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>) Twenty percent (20%) on the amount paid or credited in the case of provision of the other services indicated in subsection e). </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>f) Profits, dividends, and social participations. In these cases, the provisions referred to in articles 18 and 19 of this Law must be applied. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>Persons acting as tax withholding or collection agents must deposit the amount of the withholdings made with the Banco Central de Costa Rica, its agencies, or the authorized auxiliary treasuries, within the first fifteen calendar days of the month following the date on which they were made. The Regulations shall establish, in each case, the requirements that the withholding or collection agents must meet, as well as matters relating to the reports they must provide to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), and the receipts they must deliver to the persons from whom the respective withholding was made. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>The requirements to be met and the form of the withholdings established in this article shall be set forth in the Regulations to this Law. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p style='margin-left:36.85pt'><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;color:#010101'>g) The State or its institutions, autonomous or semiautonomous, the municipalities, public enterprises, and other public entities, in cases of public or private bidding processes, contracts, business dealings, or other operations carried out by them, that pay or credit income to individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country, must withhold two percent (2%) of the gross product on the mentioned amounts, even when dealing with advance payments or prepayments for those operations. </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> The taxpayer may request that the amounts of withholdings made based on this provision be credited against the partial payments cited in Article 22 of this Law.

Those withholdings must be made on the dates when the payments or credits giving rise to them are made. The amounts withheld must be deposited in banks of the National Banking System or in their agencies or branches authorized by the Central Bank, within fifteen calendar days of the month following the date of withholding. (Thus amended by subparagraph g) of Article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001).

The withholding and collection agents designated in this Law must file a sworn declaration, through the means provided for that purpose by the Tax Administration, for the withholdings or collections made during the month. The deadline for filing it shall be the same as that for remitting the withheld or collected amounts to the tax authority." (Thus added as the last paragraph, by subparagraph g) of Article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001, and amended by Article 16 of the Ley de Justicia Tributaria No. 7535 of August 1, 1995, which, by adding subparagraph g), reproduces the content of the article in its entirety). Underlining added.

Note that the provision under discussion establishes, in addition to the tax, a mechanism for withholding at source, just as is expressly "announced" in the title of the cited article—"Withholding at Source (Retención en la Fuente)". In other words, the referenced Article 23 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta practically provides for a true autonomous tax, which, as established by law, is single and final, with the aforementioned withholding being established as the mechanism for payment of the tax obligation. Now, the article under analysis makes an express reference to another section of that regulatory body, when it states that "**only the listed entities that meet the conditions set forth in subparagraph a) of Article 3 of this Law and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, when investing in securities issued by the Ministry of Finance, are not subject to this withholding.**" (Bold added). Hence, it is relevant to transcribe what the cited provision establishes:

"*ARTICLE 3.- Entities not subject to the tax* *a) The State, the municipalities, **the autonomous institutions** and semi-autonomous institutions of the State **that by special law enjoy an exemption** and the state universities.*" *(Tacitly amended by Law No.7722 of December 9, 1997, which subjects the public institutions and companies indicated therein to the payment of the income tax).* As can be observed, although the title of the article uses the term "not subject to the tax," its content makes express reference to the word "exemption" as a liberal benefit or privilege that can only be granted by law—Article 5 of the CNPT—, which is consistent with Article 23 of that same regulatory body, which, when establishing who is not subject to the withholding provided for in subparagraph 1.c), undoubtedly alludes to who is not obligated to pay—via withholding—the tax established by that provision, even if the taxable event provided for therein has occurred. That is, from a harmonious interpretation of these articles, it is deduced with absolute clarity that the ordinary legislator created an exemption in favor of the entities indicated in Article 3, subparagraph a) of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta—without expressly mentioning the FRE—, since it exempted them from paying the tax obligation under discussion. The absence of any mention of the said Fund as a beneficiary or recipient of the cited tax benefit allows the conclusion that it is in no way exempt from the aforementioned withholding, not even when the investment in securities was made by the CCSS itself with funds from the FRE, since these funds do not form part of the entity's assets, nor was the said Fund created with the purpose of strengthening the social security constitutionally and legally entrusted to that entity. In this regard, it should be remembered that in "*our tax legal system, according to the provisions of subparagraph b) of Article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, the determination of exemptions is reserved to formal and material law, that is, through the procedures provided for by the Political Constitution itself and the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, in charge of the deputies of the said Power of the Republic. Thus, **exemption is, therefore, the dispensation from payment of a tax owed by express provision of the legislator, and consequently, the law must specify the conditions and requirements for its granting, the taxes involved, whether it is total or partial, and, if applicable, its duration.**" (Resolution No. 00232 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Court. Bold added). Precisely on the subject of exemptions and the interpretation of tax provisions, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated:

"**IV.- Purpose of provisions granting exemptions.** A tax exemption occurs when a provision states that in certain expressly foreseen situations, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, the obligation of the passive subject to pay the tax obligation does not arise. It forms part of the so-called "tax benefits," which usually respond to a non-tax (extrafiscal) purpose, or as a stimulus to certain activities. On many occasions, these benefits are based on the logic of the principle of economic capacity, or on other reasons that motivate the legislator's decision. In this sense, within tax doctrine, they constitute, and must be considered as, mechanisms and tools specific to the tax environment. They constitute avenues that fundamentally seek and allow, through strategic conditions (which may be temporary), the promotion, development, or advancement of a specific economic sector, of certain areas of activity, social contexts, or the equalization of economic conditions to enhance a state of equality in the distribution of tax burdens, in the short, medium, or long term. Occasionally, they simply seek to prevent the tax system from becoming confiscatory. Hence, they become unfeasible when their purpose is an unjustified benefit, incompatible with their parafiscal purpose, or deviate from reasonable criteria and the value system inherent in the Political Constitution. Viewed as such, their creation is not incompatible with the principles of equality, generality, and the duty to contribute to public burdens derived from Article 18 of the Political Constitution, but they are elements that complement each other to achieve, in principle, a balance and stability in the country's fiscal situation in its integral dimension. That is, they fundamentally seek the fulfillment of those postulates, through actions aimed at constituting a system endowed with conditions of equity in terms of economic capacity and development. Therefore, in its new interpretation, this Chamber considers that, contrary to the criterion previously held in this field, they do not constitute, stricto sensu, exceptions to the duty to contribute, but rather parts of a system that provide for the dispensation from payment of the tax, or other benefits, which, considered integrally, seek to improve, in a global sense, the tax system in quantitative and qualitative terms. The foregoing through the total or partial dispensation from payment of the tax or the reduction of its calculation base, ergo, they may fall upon the tax obligation in its entirety, or upon the exclusion of some components from that base. Given these particularities, their management must be careful and cautious, since their arbitrary application can lead to violations of the principles of generality and equality, distorting their very purpose."* (Resolution of this Chamber number 399 of 10 hours 40 minutes of June 28, 2006). **IV.- Interpretation of tax provisions and exemptions. Purpose.** On this specific aspect, in the aforementioned vote number 657, this Deciding Body made the following considerations: *"The hermeneutic task of mandates regulating tax relationships must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily practice, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has provided for its issuance. In this sense, Article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios establishes: 'Tax provisions must be interpreted in accordance with all the methods admitted by Common Law./ Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue of it, neither taxes nor exemptions may be created.' (The highlighting is not from the original). In this task, in accordance with the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, among them, the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that undermines the very purpose of its content. The means that the legal operator uses to carry out this process are mainly the philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and teleological. Article 10 of the Civil Code, to which Canon 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios refers regarding the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements: 'Provisions shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to the spirit and purpose thereof.' The exegesis of tax provisions, in principle, cannot be restrictive. The tax is characterized by its coerciveness, as it emanates from the exercise of Public Power, which by this means imposes, under the protection of the Constitution, economic levies on passive subjects. But furthermore, it is identified by its contributory nature, as its purpose is to collaborate with public burdens, in order to provide the State with the appropriate resources that allow it to deploy its functional and service-providing framework for the benefit of the community. This, of course, does not exclude that in certain cases, such types of levies arise with a different objective, as would be the case with the criterion of parafiscality. From this perspective, tax provisions cannot be considered exceptional or restrictive of individuals' rights, since that nature would lead to their application, and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. Within this approach then, provisions containing regulations of the referred type must be weighed without being subject to any special or specific criterion. In this task, it must be remembered that the transcribed provision establishes in its final paragraph an objective limit to this exegetical labor,* *which is the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions via analogy, a mechanism that, although useful for filling legal gaps, cannot replace, in these terms, the role of the legislator by virtue of the principle of legal reserve.* Thus seen, the field of creating tax levies and benefits is forbidden through this means, these therefore being figures that must be created by a formal legislative expression, in the terms already explained previously. In summary, the legal operator must analyze in each case the content of the provision, to establish the proper channels for its application, in accordance with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose and, in the case of tax matters, the purpose inherent in the legislative expression is satisfied, whether to impose tax burdens, establish frameworks of benefits, and other matters inherent to the legal-tax relationship derived therefrom." (Highlighting in bold corresponds to the original, and underlining is added. Judgment No. 091-2011 of eight hours fifty-five minutes of February third, two thousand eleven).

From the foregoing, there is no doubt whatsoever that: **i)** in an exemption, the taxable event of the tax obligation occurs, that is, it comes into legal existence, but the ordinary legislator, via Law, exempts certain subjects from its payment, specifying "*the conditions and requirements for its granting, the taxes involved, whether it is total or partial, and, if applicable, its duration*". (Resolution No. 00232 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Court); **ii)** it is not possible to create exemptions through interpretation or analogical integration, as this is a matter that, pursuant to Article 5 of the CNPT, is reserved to Law, and **iii)** by not expressly mentioning the FRE as a beneficiary of the exemption under analysis, it must be understood that it was not dispensed from paying the said tax obligation. Now, regarding the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, particularly the aforementioned Article 30 thereof, it is relevant to recall that the cited provision prescribes:

"*ARTICLE 30.- Exclusivity and legal nature. Pension funds, the respective plans, and labor capitalization funds shall be administered exclusively by operators. These are legal persons under Private Law or public capital constituted for this purpose as corporations, which shall be subject to the requirements, rules, and controls provided for in this law and its regulations.* *The Superintendency must authorize the operation of the operators and shall stipulate the additional requirements that these entities must meet, for the purpose of protecting workers' savings and the efficiency of the system.* *The following social organizations are authorized to administer the labor capitalization funds: cooperatives, in accordance with Ley No. 7849, of November 20, 1998, and its amendments, and the labor capitalization fund operators established in Article 74 of this law and those created by unions. In both cases, these (sic) must be authorized by and registered before the Superintendency of Pensions, in accordance with this law. Likewise, the solidarist associations defined in the Ley de Asociaciones Solidaristas, No. 6970, of November 7, 1984, are fully authorized by law to administer labor capitalization funds, in accordance with this law.* *For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the general assemblies of the social organizations may delegate the administration of these funds to operators, retaining responsibility for monitoring their correct investment and destination. The respective contracts must be previously authorized by the Superintendent of Pensions.* *When, in the judgment of the Superintendency, there are well-founded indications that activities regulated by this law are being carried out without proper authorization, the Superintendency shall have, with respect to the presumed violators, the same powers of inspection, imposition of precautionary measures, and sanctions that correspond to it according to this law in relation to the entities supervised by it.*" (Underlining and bold added).

The provision just transcribed has a close relationship with Articles 69 and 72 of that same regulatory body, which read as follows:

"*ARTICLE 69.-* *Requirements to obtain the tax incentives. The voluntary contributions to enjoy the tax incentives granted in this law must comply with all provisions of this law and be contracted with an operator.*" (Underlining added).

"*ARTICLE 72.-* *Tax benefits. The interest, dividends, capital gains, and any other benefit produced by securities in national currency or in foreign currency, in which the authorized entities invest the resources of the funds they administer, shall be exempt from the taxes referred to in Article 18 and in subparagraph c) of Article 23 of the Ley del impuesto sobre la renta.*" (Underlining and bold added).

From the analysis of the cited articles, in addition to confirming that what is regulated in the referenced Article 23 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta is an "exemption"—since it dispenses payment of the tax obligation—and never a "non-subjection," it is concluded that to enjoy the same, it is required that the Funds—pension, the respective plans, and labor capitalization funds—be administered and invested by Operators or by the Social Organizations mentioned in Article 30 in its second paragraph, once authorized by the Superintendency of Pensions—SUPEN—and registered before said body. Now, this Court does not fail to mention that the representative of the CCSS has argued that said entity is exempt from all types of taxes, and since within the said Institution there is an entire organizational structure that jointly administers the Funds of the FRE and the FAP—FRAP—those tax benefits that the entity—CCSS—enjoys must equally extend to the Employees' Retirement Fund, or as expressly stated by the representative of the defendant entity, the said Fund also "*has the right to enjoy the tax exemption established not only in Article 58 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, as well as (sic) in subparagraph f), 72 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador*", given that the Directorate of the same "*is attached to the Financial Management, therefore it belongs to the same organizational chart of our institution and uses the same legal entity...*" (f. 51 of the judicial file). **The foregoing is not acceptable.** As has been stated, the "exemption" constitutes a liberal benefit granted by the ordinary legislator, who, exercising legislative discretion, assesses the advisability of dispensing with the payment of the tax obligation for certain passive subjects—for reasons of various kinds—without such tax benefit being extendable to other subjects who are not those expressly indicated by the legislator. From that perspective, the "exemption" to which the representative of the defendant entity refers—provided for in Article 58 of the Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS—is, as he himself acknowledges, granted directly to that entity, and under no circumstances does the internal management of the Fund—joint administration—, nor the organizational structure to which he alludes, constitute justifications, arguments, instruments, or mechanisms that allow the exemptions granted to the CCSS—by virtue of its transcendence (for the vital functions it performs) for the Costa Rican Social and Democratic Rule of Law—to be understood as extended to the FRE. This is so because the Employees' Retirement Fund—a Fund of a complementary nature—does not technically constitute assets of the entity, but rather of third parties—its employees. In other words, the said Fund was created not for the fulfillment of the public-social purposes constitutionally and legally entrusted to the mentioned state entity, but for the own and direct benefit of its workers—Articles 1 and 2 of the Reglamento del Fondo de Retiro de los Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Likewise, it is also not possible, via Article 72 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), to access the intended “exemption” of subsection 23(1)(c) of the Income Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta), because as indicated above, in order to enjoy it, it is required that the Funds—pension funds, the respective plans, and labor capitalization funds—be administered and invested by Operators or, as the case may be, by the Social Organizations mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 30 of said Law, once authorized by the Superintendency of Pensions (SUPEN) and registered before that body. As matters stand, it is the criterion of this Chamber that the exemption of the Employee Retirement Fund (Fondo de Retiro de Empleados, FRE) from the 8% withholding on income derived from securities acquired with monies from said Fund, granted for one year through official letter No. SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, issued by the Subdirectorate of Collection, Control and Tax Services of the Large Taxpayers Directorate, is substantially contrary to the legal system—Article 158.2 LGAP—by extending said tax benefit—granted, among others, to the CCSS—without a legal or supralegal norm that expressly authorized it, thereby generating an incurable defect of nullity of the act being challenged, due to the unlawfulness of its content—Articles 132 and 166 of the LGAP. With such action, Constitutional Article 11, Articles 5, 61, and 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, Articles 3 and 23 of the Income Tax Law, Articles 30, 69, and 72 of the Worker Protection Law, as well as Articles 11 and 132 of the General Law of Public Administration, were grossly violated. As a consequence of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the partial nullity of the challenged act, solely insofar as it provided for the exemption—for one year—of the Employee Retirement Fund (FRE) from the 8% withholding on income derived from securities acquired with monies from said Fund. A declaration that has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the referred act, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith—Articles 158.2, 166, and 171 of the LGAP and Article 131 of the CPCA.

**IV.- ON THE OBJECTIONS RAISED:** As indicated above, when answering the complaint, the representation of the CCSS raised the objection of lack of right and subsequently—at the Preliminary Hearing—alleged the failure to join a necessary party (falta de integración de la litis consorcio necesaria), as well as the expiration of the action. Regarding the lack of right, it has been indicated above that the challenged act is substantially contrary to the legal system, as it contains an incurable defect of nullity in its grounds—due to the unlawfulness thereof. For this reason, the State’s annulment claim finds full legal support, and as a consequence thereof, the rejection of the objection under examination is warranted. As for the second of the objections raised, it bears remembering that by resolution No. 672-2013 of nine hours fifty-six minutes of April 4, 2013, it was rejected by the Procedural Judge (Juzgadora de Trámite), and said rejection was confirmed by the Appeals Tribunal of Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation, through resolution No. 328-2013 of nine hours thirty-three minutes of June 5, 2013. Finally, regarding the expiration defense, in the immediately preceding Considerando, this Tribunal addressed it, and for the reasons set forth therein—internal declaration of detrimental effect (lesividad) and filing of the process carried out on time—its rejection was ordered.” In such a case, by mandate of said rule, the year is computed from the cessation of its effects, and the judgment ordering the eventual nullity will do so solely for the annulment and future inapplicability of the challenged conduct. After the declaration of lesividad, the CPCA grants a one-year period to the respective Public Administration—computed from the day after such declaration becomes final—to initiate the Administrative Litigation Process of Lesividad—article 39 of the CPCA. This annual period applies even in lesividad proceedings against acts of the Tax Administrations—which is precisely the matter of the case before us—since the substantive right referred to in numeral 41, subsection b) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo alludes precisely to the power of the Public Administrations to judicially request the suppression of their own conduct that creates subjective rights, and this is regulated in precepts 173, 175, 183 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, 34, and 39 of the cited Código Procesal, and not in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Hence, the ordinal numbers 51—statute of limitations for the exercise of the power to determine the tax obligation—and 71—statute of limitations for the exercise of the sanctioning power—both of the referred Code, are inapplicable to cases such as the present one, insofar as they regulate situations of a different nature. The same applies to ordinal number 43 of that regulatory body, provided for the claim of sums paid in excess. In summary, according to what has been stated thus far, for the filing of a Lesividad Process and the consequent ruling on the merits, the following is required: i) the existence of a specific, final administrative act that declares subjective rights; ii) that said formal conduct has defects of absolute or relative nullity; iii) that the referred act has been declared lesivo to public, economic, or any other nature of interests in the administrative venue, by the Supreme Hierarchical Superior of the Administration that issued it; iv) that such declaration of lesividad is made within the one-year period provided for in numeral 34 of the CPCA—except regarding the protection of public domain assets, which is not subject to a period—article 34.2 of the CPCA; v) that the Litigation Process of Lesividad is initiated by the Public Administration that issued the act, within the one-year period provided for by article 39.1.e of the CPCA—with the aforementioned exception regarding public domain assets. 2) Prerequisites of lesividad in the specific case. In the present matter, from the analysis of the case records, it is concluded that the internal declaration of lesividad meets the prerequisites indicated in the previous section, which is explained below. As has been established, the act whose annulment is sought is official letter No. SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, issued by the Subdirección of Recaudación, Control and Servicios Tributarios of the Dirección of Grandes Contribuyentes, solely insofar as it declares the Fondo de Retiro de Empleados (FRE) of the CCSS exempt from the 8% withholding—established in numeral 1, subsection c) of article 23 of Ley No. 7092—on the income derived from the investment in securities (títulos valores), made with monies from said Fund. The action is brought by the entity authoring that formal conduct—the State—and is directed against the specific recipient of that action—the CCSS. For its part, the lawsuit concerns an administrative act declaring subjective rights, which is deemed lesivo to the fiscal and economic interests of the plaintiff State (prerequisite i). Regarding the procedural requirements, the internal declaration of lesividad was made through resolution No. 0465-2011 at nine hours and twenty-six minutes on July fifteenth, two thousand eleven, issued by the a.i. Minister of Hacienda in his capacity as supreme hierarchical superior of the aforementioned Ministry, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 28.1 and 173.2, both of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (prerequisite iii). And in said resolution, the specific conduct whose suppression is sought is clearly identified. As for the moments—time periods—in which both the declaration of lesividad and the filing of the present process occurred, it should be remembered that in the lesividad as a judicial process, two different time periods concur, which, as will be seen, are fully met in the matter under analysis (prerequisite iv and v), while reiterating, as necessary, that neither of them is applicable to lesividad concerning the protection of public domain assets. With respect to the first of the periods, it is established for declaring the act lesivo internally within the Administration. This is a period that, in principle, is one year, counted from the day after the adoption of the formal conduct, except in cases of absolute nullity of an act with continued effects, a hypothesis in which, it is reiterated, as long as the effects of the conduct persist, the aforementioned declaration is possible, even within the year following the cessation of those effects. To this end, in each case, it must be determined whether the challenged act is of instantaneous or continued effect, since in the first scenario, the lesividad (even if absolute nullity is alleged) can only be declared by the same Administration within the aforementioned year. In contrast, if the act has continued effects, the lesividad can be declared during the course of those effects and up to within the one-year period counted from their cessation, as has been stated. The foregoing requires that, when the application of this rule is invoked, the adjudicator must assess not only whether the act has continued effects but also ponder the type of nullity, since the suppression of an act under those conditions is only viable if it has continued effects and is absolutely null, because regardless of the continuity of its effects, if the nullity is relative, the declaration of lesividad would be untimely. This period for declaring (internally) lesivo an act declaring subjective rights, if breached, leads to the inadmissibility of the process, due to neglect of one of the core elements of the action. Regarding the second lapse, it must be indicated that it refers to the exercise of the right of action itself. As has been noted, in accordance with article 39 of the CPCA, it is one year computed from the internal declaration of lesividad, with the stated exceptions. The violation of that period leads to the expiration (caducidad) of the action, in accordance with articles 39, 66.1.k, 67, and 92 subsections 6 and 7, all of the cited Code. Now, in the present matter, it has been taken as established that the act whose suppression is sought by the plaintiff Administration was adopted on July 23, 2010—proven fact No. 2—and its lesividad was declared through resolution No. 0465-2011 at nine hours and twenty-six minutes on July fifteenth, two thousand eleven, issued by the a.i. Minister of Hacienda—proven fact No. 9. Thus, said internal declaration of lesividad was issued within the annual period stipulated by article 34 of the CPCA, which makes unnecessary—for this particular aspect—the intellectual exercise of determining whether the challenged act, alleged to be absolutely null, has instantaneous or continued effects. Regarding the period provided for by the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo for the filing of the present Process, it must be reiterated that the internal declaration of lesividad was issued through resolution No. 0465-2011 at nine hours and twenty-six minutes on July fifteenth, two thousand eleven, emitted by the a.i. Minister of Hacienda—proven fact No. 9—and the present action was filed on May 30, 2012—folio 1 of the judicial file—that is, the process was filed within the alluded annual period. What has been stated here allows concluding that both the declaration of lesividad and the presentation of the present process were carried out within the periods provided for by the CPCA for such purposes (prerequisites iv and v) and consequently, that the expiration (caducidad) defense asserted by the CCSS must be rejected, without the need to reiterate in later sections what has been stated here. Having reached this point, it is evident that one prerequisite remains to be analyzed, referring precisely to the conformity or non-conformity—due to defects of relative or absolute nullity—of the challenged administrative act with the legal system (prerequisite ii). To this end, the Tribunal has deemed it pertinent to carry out such analysis in a separate section. 3) Analysis of validity of the questioned conduct. According to the factual framework set forth, it has been taken as established that through official letter SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, in response to the request formulated by the CCSS, the Subdirección of Recaudación, Control and Servicios Tributarios of the Dirección of Grandes Contribuyentes of the Ministry of Hacienda stated: "Regarding this matter, we inform you that, having carried out the corresponding study, your represented entity is exempt from the withholding established in numeral 1, subsection c) of Article 23 of the Income Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta) when investing in:

· · · Títulos valores issued by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. · · · Títulos valores issued by the Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda (Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda), under Ley No. 7052 of November 13, 1986. · · · Títulos valores issued by the Ministry of Hacienda. · · · Títulos valores issued by any financial entity supervised by the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF). · · · Títulos valores issued by the Banco Central de Costa Rica.

The exemption is granted, as long as it invests with special funds (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (RIM), Prestaciones Sociales (FPS), Seguro de salud (SS), Contingencias (FC) and Fondo de Retiro de Empleados (FRE))." (Proven fact No. 2. Underlining added). From the issuance of said official letter and the opinion expressed therein, a series of formal conduct was generated that culminated in the declaration of lesividad of the aforementioned act. Precisely from such actions—all of them detailed in the proven facts of this judgment—as well as from the arguments put forth by both parties, it emerges with absolute clarity that the controversy in the present matter is confined to the interpretation of articles 3, subsection a) and 23 of the Income Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta) as well as numerals 30, 69, and 72 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador. This is so because, based on what each party understands these norms establish, one—the CCSS—alleges that when investing in títulos valores with funds from the FRE, the gain obtained from such investment is exempt from the 8% withholding provided for in numeral 23 aforementioned, and the other—the State—argues that the income derived from investments in títulos valores with monies coming from the cited Fund, made by the CCSS, is subject to the withholding in question. For the reason stated, this Tribunal considers it pertinent to make a brief reference to the concepts of exemption (exención) and non-subjection (no sujeción)—especially since the parties throughout their writings have mentioned one and the other—in order to avoid confusion about the manner in which this matter is resolved. Having said the above, suffice it to note that exemption (exención), in accordance with the provisions of numeral 61 of the CNTP, is to be understood as the legal dispensation (dispensa legal) from the tax obligation, which arises when the taxable event (hecho generador) occurs, as indicated by article 11 of that same regulatory body. That is, when we refer to an exemption (exención), we must understand that in such cases, the taxable event (hecho generador) occurs and, consequently, the tax obligation arises. But, despite the birth of that obligation, it need not be paid by the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of the tax, by virtue of the express legal dispensation (dispensa legal)—total or partial—from said payment, issued by the legislator, which relieves, absolves, or exonerates them. In other words, "exemption (exención tributaria) takes place when a norm of legal rank contemplates that in those cases expressly provided for by it, despite the occurrence of the taxable event (hecho imponible), its main effect does not develop: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. Thus, the structure of the tax exoneration (exoneración tributaria) is characterized by containing a single mandate manifested in two precepts, first, subjection (sujeción), and second, exemption (exención); so that the tax obligation is born, but is not enforceable. Thus, it is clear that the essence of this conception is that the exemption (exención) does not affect the moment of the birth of the obligation, but rather that of its enforceability. Consequently, there is a clear separation between the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation, which according to article 31 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, is the prerequisite established by law to define the tax and whose realization gives rise to the birth of the obligation, and the factual prerequisite of the exemption (exención), whose realization determines the non-enforceability of the obligation derived from the taxable event (hecho generador)." (Bold emphasis corresponds to the original. Judgment No. 00232 of fifteen hours and fifteen minutes on June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Tribunal). For its part, non-subjection (no sujeción) refers to the non-occurrence of the taxable event (hecho generador) of the respective tax, for which reason no tax obligation is born into legal existence. Thus, it is clear that exemption (exención) and non-subjection (no sujeción) are different, each having its own foundations and effects, which for this brief overview need not be detailed further. In accordance with what has been indicated, it is relevant to transcribe—for purposes of its later analysis—more specifically of subsection c.1)—article 23 of the Income Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta):

"ARTICLE 23.- Withholding at source (Retención en la fuente). All public or private entities, whether or not subject to the payment of this tax, including the State, the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, and other autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, municipalidades, and the associations and institutions referred to in article 3 of this Law, are obligated to act as withholding or collection agents (agente de retención o de percepción) of the tax, when they pay or credit income (rentas) subject to the tax established in this Law. For these purposes, the indicated subjects shall withhold and pay over to the Treasury (Fisco), on behalf of the beneficiaries of the incomes (rentas) mentioned below, the amounts specified in each case: a) Salaries and any other remuneration paid for personal work performed in a dependent relationship. In these cases, the payer or employer must calculate the monthly tax applicable to each of the beneficiaries of the indicated incomes (rentas). If the beneficiary is a person not domiciled in Costa Rica, the applicable tax sums shall be withheld from the amount paid or credited, in accordance with the provisions of article 59 of this Law. The Regulations shall include the provisions referred to in this subsection. (Thus amended by subsection g) of article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). b) Per diem allowances, whether or not they arise from a dependent employment relationship, bonuses, and other benefits for personal services, provided for work in a dependent relationship. In these cases, if the beneficiaries of such income (rentas) are persons domiciled in the country, the payer must withhold fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts paid or credited to such persons; if the income recipients are persons not domiciled in Costa Rica, the applicable sums shall be withheld, as stipulated in article 59 of this Law. (Thus amended by subsection g) of article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001). c) 1.- Issuers, paying agents, public limited companies, and other public or private entities that, in the function of raising resources from the financial market, pay or credit interest or grant discounts on promissory notes and all types of títulos valores, to persons domiciled in Costa Rica, must withhold fifteen percent (15%) of said income (renta) as tax. If the títulos valores are registered on an officially recognized stock exchange, or have been issued by financial entities duly registered with the Auditoría General de Bancos, pursuant to Ley No. 5044 of September 7, 1972, and its amendments, by the State and its institutions, by the banks integrated into the Sistema Bancario Nacional, by cooperatives, or when dealing with bills of exchange and bankers' acceptances, the applicable percentage shall be eight percent (8%).

When banks and financial entities mentioned in the preceding paragraph guarantee promissory notes or bankers' acceptances, the withholding shall be applied on the discount value, which, for these cases, shall be equated to the fixed passive interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the corresponding term, plus three percentage points.

Income derived from securities issued in national currency by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal and by the Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda, pursuant to Ley Nº 7052 of November 13, 1986, shall not be subject to the income tax or the tax established in this subsection. Neither shall investments originating from the non-profit trust, created pursuant to Article 6 of the Law for the creation of the Escuela de Agricultura de la Región Tropical Húmeda, Nº 7044, of September 29, 1986, be subject to the income tax or the tax established in this subsection. (Thus amended the preceding paragraph by Article 22 of the Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal N° 8720 of March 4, 2009.)

Likewise, only the listed entities that meet the conditions set forth in subsection a) of Article 3 of this Law, and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, when investing in securities issued by the Ministerio de Hacienda, are not subject to this withholding.

The amounts withheld shall be considered as a single and final tax. This withholding shall not apply when the investor is the Tesorería Nacional. (Thus expanded the fifth paragraph of subsection c.1) by subsection c) of Article 23 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001).

The Dirección General de la Tributación Directa is empowered to authorize, on a general basis, another payment modality in those cases where the nature of the security makes withholding at source difficult.

2.- The tax withholdings referred to in the preceding subsections must be made on the date payment or credit is effected, whichever occurs first.

Likewise, they must be deposited with the Banco Central de Costa Rica or its auxiliary treasuries within the first fifteen calendar days of the month following that date. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001. Authentically Interpreted by Law N° 8320 of October 16, 2002, in the sense that instruments issued by savings and credit cooperatives that are not intended for circulation, but rather can only be discounted by the issuing cooperatives, are not securities and, therefore, are not subject to the tax established in this subsection).

c bis) Likewise, in repurchase or report transactions of securities, in their different modalities, whether in one or several simultaneous operations and conducted through a stock exchange, a single and final tax of eight percent (8%) shall apply on the yields generated by the operation; this percentage shall be withheld by the stock exchange where such operation was conducted. If the operations are not conducted through exchange mechanisms, the yields earned from the operation shall be considered as ordinary taxable income. (Thus added the preceding subsection by subsection c) of Article 21 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001).

ch) Surplus paid by cooperatives and solidarista associations and similar entities.

These entities must remit to the Treasury, as a single and final tax, on behalf of their members, an amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the surpluses or profits distributed.

• d)Remittances or credits in favor of beneficiaries domiciled abroad. In these cases, the payer shall withhold, as a single and final tax, the tax amounts corresponding in accordance with the provisions of Article 59 of this Law. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001).
• e)Transport, communications, reinsurance, cinematographic films, international news, and the other services mentioned in subsections a), b), c), and ch) of Article 11 of this Law, provided by companies not domiciled in the country. In these cases, if the companies supplying the services have a permanent representative in Costa Rica, the user companies must withhold, as an advance payment against the tax established in Article 15 of this Law, three percent (3%) on the amounts paid or credited.

When such companies do not have permanent representatives in the country, the user companies of the services must withhold, as a single tax, the amounts indicated below:

• i)Eight point five percent (8.5%) on the amount paid or credited, for transport and communications services.
• ii)Five point five percent (5.5%), for reinsurance, reafianzamientos, and ceded premiums of any kind.
• iii)Twenty percent (20%) on the amount paid or credited in the case of providing the other services indicated in subsection e).
• f)Profits, dividends, and social participations. In these cases, the provisions referred to in Articles 18 and 19 of this Law shall apply.

Persons acting as withholding or collection agents of the tax must deposit the amount of the withholdings made with the Banco Central de Costa Rica, its agencies, or authorized auxiliary treasuries, within the first fifteen calendar days of the month following the date they were made. The Regulations shall establish, in each case, the requirements to be met by withholding or collection agents, as well as matters relating to the reports they must provide to the Administración Tributaria, and the receipts they must deliver to the persons from whom the withholding was made.

The requirements to be met and the form of the withholdings established by this article shall be set forth in the Regulations of this Law.

• g)The State or its institutions, autonomous or semiautonomous, municipalities, public companies, and other public entities, in cases of public or private tenders, contracting, business, or other operations carried out by them, that pay or credit income to natural or legal persons domiciled in the country, must withhold two percent (2%) of the gross proceeds on the mentioned amounts, even when dealing with advance payments or advances on such operations.

The taxpayer may request that the amounts of withholdings made based on this provision be credited to the partial payments cited in Article 22 of this Law.

These withholdings must be made on the dates when the payments or credits that give rise to them are made. The amounts withheld must be deposited in banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional or in their agencies or branches authorized by the Banco Central, within fifteen calendar days of the month following the date of withholding. (Thus amended by subsection g) of Article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001).

Withholding and collection agents indicated in this Law must file a sworn statement, using the means provided for such purpose by the Administración Tributaria, for the withholdings or collections made during the month. The deadline for filing it shall be the same as that for paying the withheld or collected amounts to the treasury." (Thus added the last paragraph, by subsection g) of Article 19 of Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria of July 4, 2001 and amended by Article 16 of the Ley de Justicia Tributaria No. 7535 of August 1, 1995, which, upon adding subsection g), fully reproduces the content of the article). Underlining is ours.

Note that the provision under commentary establishes, in addition to the tax, a withholding mechanism at the paying source, just as is expressly "announced" in the title of the referred numeral -"Withholding at Source"-. In other words, the referred Article 23 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta practically provides for a true autonomous tax, which, as established by law, is single and final, with the noted withholding established as the payment mechanism for the tax obligation. Now, the article under analysis makes express reference to another numeral of that same legal body, when it provides that "only the listed entities that meet the conditions set forth in subsection a) of Article 3 of this Law are not subject to this withholding, and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, when investing in securities issued by the Ministerio de Hacienda." (Boldface is ours). Hence, it is relevant to transcribe what the indicated provision establishes:

"ARTICLE 3.- Entities not subject to the tax a) The State, municipalities, autonomous institutions and semiautonomous institutions of the State that by special law enjoy an exemption, and state universities." (Tacitly amended by Law No. 7722 of December 9, 1997, which subjects the public institutions and companies it indicates to the payment of income tax).

As can be observed, despite the title of the numeral using the term "not subject to the tax," its content makes express reference to the word "exemption" as a liberality or benefit that can only be granted by law -Article 5 CNPT-, which is consistent with numeral 23 of that same legal body, which, when establishing who is not subject to the withholding provided for in subsection 1.c), undeniably alludes to who is not obligated to pay -via withholding- the tax established by that provision, even though the taxable event provided for therein has occurred. That is, from the harmonious interpretation of these numerals, it is deduced with absolute clarity that the ordinary legislator created an exemption in favor of the entities indicated in Article 3, subsection a) of the Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta -without expressly mentioning the FRE-, since it exempted them from paying the tax obligation under discussion. The absence of mention of the indicated Fund as favored or recipient of the cited tax benefit allows the conclusion that it is in no way exempt from the aforementioned withholding, even when the investment in securities was made by the CCSS itself with FRE funds, since they are not part of the institution's assets, nor was the referred Fund created for the purpose of strengthening the social security constitutionally and legally entrusted to that entity. In this regard, it should be remembered that in "our tax legal system, pursuant to the provisions of subsection b) of Article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, the determination of exemptions is reserved to formal and material law, that is, through the procedures provided for by the Constitución Política itself and the Regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, in charge of the deputies of the indicated Poder de la República. Thus, the exemption is, then, the dispensation from the payment of a tax due by express provision of the legislator, and consequently, the law must specify the conditions and requirements for its granting, the corresponding taxes, whether it is total or partial, and, if applicable, the duration period." (Resolution No. 00232 of three fifteen p.m. on June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by the Sección III of this Tribunal. Boldface is ours). Precisely on the subject of exemptions and the interpretation of tax provisions, the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has stated:

"IV.- Purpose of provisions providing exemptions. A tax exemption occurs when a provision contemplates that in certain expressly provided cases, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, the obligation of the taxpayer to pay the tax liability does not arise. It forms part of the so-called 'tax benefits,' which usually respond to an extra-fiscal purpose, or to stimulate certain activities. On many occasions, these benefits are based on the logic of the principle of economic capacity, or on other reasons that motivate the legislator's decision. In this sense, within tax doctrine, they are constituted and should be considered as mechanisms and tools characteristic of the tax environment. They constitute avenues that, in essence, seek and allow, through strategic conditions (which may be temporary), the promotion, development, or advancement of a specific economic sector, certain areas of activity, social contexts, or the equalization of economic conditions to enhance a state of equality in the distribution of the tax burden, in the short, medium, or long term. On occasions, they simply seek to prevent the tax system from becoming confiscatory. Hence, they are unviable when their purpose is an unjustified benefit, incompatible with their parafiscal purpose, or when they deviate from reasonable criteria and the value system proper to the Constitución Política. Thus seen, their creation is not incompatible with the principles of equality, generality, and the duty to contribute to public burdens derived from numeral 18 of the Constitución Política, but rather they are complementary elements to achieve, in principle, an equilibrium and stability in the country's fiscal situation in its integral dimension. That is, in essence, they seek the fulfillment of those postulates, through actions aimed at constituting a system endowed with conditions of equity in terms of economic capacity and development. Therefore, in its new integration, this Chamber considers that, contrary to the criterion held until now in this field, they do not constitute, strict sensu, exceptions to the duty to contribute, but rather parts of a system that provide for the dispensation from tax payment, or other benefits, which, integrally considered, seek to improve, in a global sense, the tax system in quantitative and qualitative terms. This through the total or partial dispensation from tax payment or the reduction of its calculation base, ergo, they may fall upon the tax obligation in its entirety, or upon the exclusion of some components from that base. Given these particularities, their handling must be careful and cautious, since their arbitrary application can lead to violations of the principles of generality and equality, distorting their very purpose." (Resolution of this Chamber number 399 of ten hours forty minutes on June 28, 2006). IV.- Interpretation of tax provisions and exemptions. Purpose. On this specific aspect, in the aforementioned vote number 657, this Deciding Body made the following considerations: "The hermeneutic task of mandates that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of juridical interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to clarify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily practice, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the goal the legislator has set for its issuance. In this sense, numeral 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios establishes: 'Tax provisions must be interpreted in accordance with all methods admitted by Common Law./ Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created.' (Highlighting is not from the original). In this task, in accordance with the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the diverse variables that converge in each situation, including the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that circumvents the very purpose of its content. The means available to the legal operator to carry out this process are mainly the philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and finalist methods. Article 10 of the Código Civil, to which canon 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios refers regarding the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements: 'Provisions shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.' The exegesis of tax provisions, in principle, cannot be restrictive. Tax is characterized by its coerciveness, as it emanates from the exercise of Public Power, which, through this means, imposes, under the protection of the Constitution, economic levies on taxpayers. But it is also identified by its contributory nature, as its purpose is to collaborate with public burdens, in order to provide the State with the adequate resources that allow it to deploy its functional and service-providing framework for the benefit of the community. This, of course, does not exclude that in certain cases, this type of burden arises with a different objective, as would be the case of the criterion of parafiscality. From this perspective, tax provisions cannot be considered exceptional or as limiting the rights of individuals, given that such a character would lead to their application, and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. Within this approach then, provisions containing regulations of the referenced type must be weighed without subjection to any special or specific criterion. In this task, it must be remembered that the transcribed provision establishes, in its final paragraph, an objective limit to this exegetical task, which is the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions via analogy, a mechanism that, while useful for filling legal gaps, cannot replace, in these terms, the role of the legislator by virtue of the principle of legal reserve. Thus seen, the field of creating tax levies and benefits is prohibited by this means, being therefore figures that must be created by a formal legislative manifestation, in the terms already explained previously. In sum, the legal operator must analyze in each case the content of the provision, to establish the due channels for its application, in accordance with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose, and in the case of tax matters, the purpose inherent in the legislative manifestation is satisfied, be it to impose tax burdens, establish frameworks of benefits, and other matters inherent to the juridical-tax relationship arising therefrom." (Highlighting in boldface corresponds to the original, and underlining is ours. Judgment No. 091-2011 of eight hours fifty-five minutes on February three, two thousand eleven).

From what has been stated so far, there is no doubt whatsoever that: i) in the exemption, the taxable event of the tax obligation is verified, that is, it comes into legal existence, but the ordinary legislator, via Law, exempts certain subjects from its payment, specifying "the conditions and requirements for its granting, the corresponding taxes, whether it is total or partial, and, if applicable, the duration period." (Resolution No.

00232 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand eleven, issued by Section III of this Tribunal); ii) it is not possible to create exemptions via interpretation or analogical integration, as this is a matter that, pursuant to numeral 5 of the CNPT, is reserved to the Law, and iii) as the ordinary legislator did not expressly mention the FRE as a beneficiary of the exemption under analysis, it must be understood that it was not dispensed from paying the referenced tax obligation. Now then, with respect to the Worker Protection Law, particularly the aforementioned Article 30 thereof, it is relevant to recall that the indicated article prescribes:

"ARTICLE 30.- Exclusivity and legal nature. Pension funds, the respective plans, and labor capitalization funds shall be administered exclusively by operators. These are legal entities of Private Law or of public capital constituted for this purpose as corporations (sociedades anónimas), which shall be subject to the requirements, rules, and controls provided for in this law and its regulations. The Superintendency must authorize the operation of the operators and shall provide any additional requirements that these entities must meet, for the purpose of protecting workers' savings and the efficiency of the system.

The following social organizations are authorized to administer labor capitalization funds: cooperatives, in accordance with Law No. 7849, of November 20, 1998, and its reforms, and the labor capitalization fund operators established in Article 74 of this law and those created by unions. In both cases, these (sic) must be authorized and registered before the Superintendency of Pensions, in accordance with this law. Likewise, the solidarista associations (asociaciones solidaristas) defined in the Law of Solidarista Associations, No. 6970, of November 7, 1984, are fully empowered by law to administer labor capitalization funds, in accordance with this law.

For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, the general assemblies of the social organizations may delegate the administration of these funds to operators, retaining the responsibility to monitor their correct investment and destination. The respective contracts must be previously authorized by the Superintendent of Pensions.

When, in the judgment of the Superintendency, there are grounded indications of the carrying out of activities regulated by this law without the due authorization, the Superintendency shall have, with respect to the alleged offenders, the same powers of inspection, imposition of precautionary measures, and sanctions that correspond to it in accordance with this law in relation to the entities supervised by it." (The underlining and boldface are our own).

The recently transcribed provision is closely related to articles 69 and 72 of that same body of law, which literally state:

"ARTICLE 69.- Requirements for obtaining tax incentives. Voluntary contributions to enjoy the tax incentives granted in this law must comply with all the provisions of this law and be contracted with an operator." (The underlining is our own).

"ARTICLE 72.- Tax benefits. The interest, dividends, capital gains, and any other benefit produced by securities in national currency or in foreign currency, in which the authorized entities invest the resources of the funds they administer, shall be exempt from the taxes referred to in Article 18 and in subsection c) of Article 23 of the Income Tax Law." (The underlining and boldface are our own).

From the analysis of the reviewed articles, in addition to confirming that what is regulated in the referenced Article 23 of the Income Tax Law is an "exemption"—by dispensing the payment of the tax obligation—and never a "non-subjection," it is concluded that in order to enjoy the same, it is required that the Funds—pension, the respective plans, and labor capitalization funds—be administered and invested by Operators or by the Social Organizations mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 30, once authorized by the Superintendency of Pensions—SUPEN—and registered before said body. Now then, this Tribunal does not omit to mention that the representative of the CCSS has argued that said entity is exempt from all types of taxes, and given that within the referenced Institution there exists an entire organizational structure that jointly administers the FRE and FAP Funds—FRAP—those tax benefits enjoyed by the entity—CCSS—must equally extend to the Employee Retirement Fund, or as the representation of the defendant entity expressly states, said Fund also "has the right to enjoy the tax exemption established not only in Article 58 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja, as well as (sic) in subsection f), 72 of the Worker Protection Law," because the Directorate of the same "is attached to the Financial Management, therefore it belongs to the same organizational chart of our institution and uses the same legal identification number..." (f. 51 of the judicial file). The foregoing is not admissible. As has been stated, the "exemption" constitutes a liberality of the ordinary legislator, who, exercising legislative discretion, assesses the advisability of dispensing the payment of the tax obligation to certain passive subjects—for diverse reasons—without such tax benefit being extendable to other subjects not expressly indicated by the legislator. From that perspective, the "exemption" referred to by the representative of the sued entity—provided for in numeral 58 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS—is, as he himself acknowledges, granted directly to said entity, and under no circumstance do the internal handling of the Fund—joint administration—nor the organizational structure to which he alludes, constitute justifications, arguments, instruments, or mechanisms that allow understanding that such exemptions granted to the CCSS by virtue of its transcendence—for the vital functions it performs—for the Costa Rican Social and Democratic State of Law are extended to the FRE. This is so, because the Employee Retirement Fund—a Fund of a complementary nature—does not technically constitute the entity's patrimony, but that of third parties—its employees. In other words, the referenced Fund was created not for the fulfillment of the public-social purposes constitutionally and legally entrusted to the mentioned state entity, but for the own and direct benefit of its workers—Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulation of the Employee Retirement Fund of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Equally, it is also not possible, via Article 72 of the Worker Protection Law, to access the intended "exemption" of numeral 23 subsection 1c) of the Income Tax Law, since as indicated above, in order to enjoy it, the Funds—pension, the respective plans, and labor capitalization funds—must be administered and invested by Operators or by the Social Organizations mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 30 of said Law, once authorized by the Superintendency of Pensions—SUPEN—and registered before said body. Thus, it is the Chamber's view that the exemption of the Employee Retirement Fund (FRE) from the 8% withholding on income derived from securities acquired with monies of said Fund, granted for one year through official letter No. SRCST-TV-009-10 of July 23, 2010, issued by the Subdirectorate of Collection, Control, and Tax Services of the Large Taxpayers Directorate, is substantially inconsistent with the legal system—Article 158.2 LGAP—by extending said tax benefit—granted, among others, to the CCSS—without a legal or supra-legal provision that expressly authorized it, thereby generating an insurmountable defect of nullity of the act being challenged, due to the illegality of its content—Articles 132 and 166 of the LGAP. With such action, constitutional article 11, articles 5, 61, and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, Articles 3 and 23 of the Income Tax Law, articles 30, 69, and 72 of the Worker Protection Law, as well as Articles 11 and 132 of the General Law of Public Administration, were grossly violated. As a consequence of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the partial annulment (nulidad parcial) of the challenged act, only insofar as it provided for the exemption—for one year—of the Employee Retirement Fund (FRE) from the 8% withholding on income derived from securities acquired with monies of said Fund. This declaration has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the referenced act, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith—articles 158.2, 166, and 171 of the LGAP and Article 131 of the CPCA.

IV.- ON THE OPPOSED EXCEPTIONS: As was indicated above, when answering the lawsuit, the representation of the CCSS opposed the exception of lack of right and later—at the Preliminary Hearing—alleged the failure to join a necessary party (falta de integración de la litis consorcio necesaria), as well as the expiration (caducidad) of the action. Regarding the lack of right, it has been indicated above that the challenged act is substantially inconsistent with the legal system, containing an insurmountable defect of nullity in its grounds—due to its illegality. For this reason, the state's annulment claim finds full legal backing, and as a consequence, the rejection of the exception under analysis is warranted. As for the second of the opposed exceptions, it is worth recalling that through Resolution No. 672-2013 of nine hours fifty-six minutes of April fourth, two thousand thirteen, it was rejected by the Processing Judge, and said rejection was confirmed by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Tribunal through Resolution No. 328-2013 of nine hours thirty-three minutes of June fifth, two thousand thirteen. Finally, regarding the defense of expiration, in the immediately preceding Considerando, this Tribunal addressed the same, and for the reasons stated therein—internal declaration of lesividad (declaración interna de lesividad) and filing of the proceeding carried out in a timely manner—its rejection was ordered.”

“III.- DEL FUNDAMENTO DE LA DEMANDA Y SU VALORACIÓN POR PARTE DE ESTE TRIBUNAL: Se procederá al análisis del asunto sometido a conocimiento de esta Cámara, abordando la temática objeto del mismo en tres acápites. En el primero de ellos, se tratará el tema de los presupuestos propios de un Proceso de Lesividad, mientras que en el segundo, se examinará si los mismos se encuentran presentes en el caso concreto, tomando como insumo el resultado de tal ejercicio intelectual para la resolución de la excepción de caducidad formulada por la CCSS. Por último, en el tercero de los apartados, se procederá a determinar si el acto impugnado es conforme o no con el ordenamiento jurídico. 1) Presupuestos del Proceso de Lesividad: En términos generales, el Proceso de Lesividad es un mecanismo jurisdiccional, por medio del cual el legislador ordinario autorizó a las Administraciones Públicas, a deducir pretensiones anulatorias respecto de actos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos dictados por ellas. En estos tipos de procesos judiciales, se analiza la validez de una conducta formal concreta, que tal y como se indicó líneas atrás, genera derechos subjetivos a favor de un administrado -persona física o jurídica-. Precisamente por ello, se hace necesaria la obligada participación del destinatario del acto cuya nulidad se pretende, a efectos de garantizar no solamente el contradictorio, sino el ejercicio oportuno de su derecho de defensa. El artículo 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, es la norma que fija los elementos previos y regulaciones procesales de esta figura. Sin embargo, dicho precepto normativo debe concordarse con los numerales 173.6 y 183, ambos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública a efecto de tener un panorama completo sobre la temática que se aborda. Precisamente de la referida concordancia, se concluye que en este tipo de Procesos la legitimación activa se concede a la Administración emisora del acto atacado, en tanto que el legitimado pasivo es el administrado destinatario de los efectos de esa conducta formal. Ello es así, por cuanto como se indicó líneas atrás, la lesividad se constituye en un instrumento de supresión jurídica de actos administrativos concretos creadores de derechos subjetivos, en el tanto los mismos sean sustancialmente disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico -actos viciados de nulidad absoluta o relativa- (artículos 128, 158, 165 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Ahora bien, es importante recordar que además de lo ya señalado, resulta esencial que el superior jerárquico supremo de la Administración Pública respectiva -emisora de la conducta formal que se ataca- declare la lesividad del acto, por lesionar el mismo intereses públicos, económicos o de cualquier otra naturaleza, para lo cual, requiere contar con un criterio técnico-jurídico que sustente esa decisión. Igualmente es importante recordar, que cuando el acto emane de la Administración Central -como ocurre en el caso de marras-, la demanda solo podrá ser incoada por la Procuraduría General de la República (artículo 16 del CPCA). En lo que respecta al tiempo con que se cuenta, tanto para declarar lesivo el acto como para interponer el proceso judicial de comentario, el actual Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -CPCA-, establece el plazo de un año computado a partir de del día siguiente al de la emisión del acto, para declararlo lesivo en sede administrativa. Lo anterior, salvo los supuestos en que la referida conducta formal tenga vicios de nulidad absoluta, en cuyo caso, al tenor de lo regulado por el ordinal 34.1 del CPCA, esa declaratoria interna puede hacerse mientras perduren los efectos del acto. En tal caso, por mandato de dicha norma, el año se computa desde el cese de sus efectos y la sentencia que disponga la eventual nulidad, lo hará únicamente para la anulación e inaplicabilidad futura de la conducta impugnada. Luego de la declaratoria de lesividad, el CPCA otorga el plazo de un año a la Administración Pública respectiva -computado a partir del día siguiente a la firmeza de tal declaratoria- para incoar el Proceso Contencioso Administrativo de Lesividad -artículo 39 del CPCA-. Tal plazo anual, opera incluso en los procesos de lesividad contra actos de las Administraciones Tributarias -que es precisamente de lo que trata el caso que nos ocupa-, pues el derecho de fondo a que hace referencia el numeral 41 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, alude precisamente a la potestad de las Administraciones Públicas de requerir judicialmente la supresión de sus propias conductas creadoras de derechos subjetivos y ello se regula en los preceptos 173, 175, 183 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 34 y 39 del citado Código Procesal y no en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. De ahí que, los ordinales 51 -prescripción para el ejercicio de la potestad de determinación de la obligación tributaria- y 71 -prescripción para el ejercicio de la potestad sancionatoria- ambos del referido Código, resultan inaplicables a casos como el presente, en el tanto, regulan situaciones de otra naturaleza. Lo mismo ocurre con el ordinal 43 de dicho cuerpo normativo, previsto para el reclamo de sumas pagadas en exceso. En síntesis, conforme lo hasta aquí señalado, para la instauración de un Proceso de Lesividad y consecuente pronunciamiento sobre el fondo del asunto, se requiere: i) la existencia de un acto administrativo concreto, firme y declaratorio de derechos subjetivos; ii) que dicha conducta formal, tenga vicios de nulidad absoluta o relativa; iii) que el referido acto haya sido declarado lesivo a los intereses públicos, económicos o de cualquier otra naturaleza en sede administrativa, por el Superior Jerárquico Supremo de la Administración emisora del mismo; iv) que tal declaratoria de lesividad se realice dentro del plazo del año previsto en el numeral 34 del CPCA -salvo en lo relativo a la tutela de bienes de dominio público que no está sujeto a plazo -artículo 34.2 del CPCA; v) que el Proceso Contencioso de Lesividad se incoe por la Administración Pública emisora del acto, en el plazo del año previsto por el artículo 39.1.e del CPCA -con la salvedad dicha en cuanto a los bienes de dominio público-. 2) Presupuestos de lesividad en el caso concreto. En la especie, del análisis de los autos se concluye, que la declaratoria de lesividad interna cumple con los presupuestos señalados en el apartado anterior, lo cual se explica seguidamente. Según se ha establecido, el acto cuya anulación se pretende es el oficio No. SRCST-TV-009-10 del 23 de julio de 2010, emitido por la Subdirección de Recaudación, Control y Servicios Tributarios de la Dirección de Grandes Contribuyentes, únicamente en cuanto declara exento al Fondo de Retiro de Empleados (FRE) de la CCSS, de la retención del 8% -establecida en el numeral 1 inciso c) del artículo 23 de la Ley No. 7092- sobre los réditos derivados de la inversión en títulos valores, realizada con dineros de dicho Fondo. La acción se formula por la entidad autora de esa conducta formal -el Estado-, y se direcciona contra el destinatario concreto de esa actuación -la CCSS-. Por su parte, la demanda recae sobre un acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos subjetivos, que se estima lesivo a los intereses fiscales y económicos del Estado accionante (presupuesto i). En lo atinente a las exigencias procedimentales, la declaratoria interna de lesividad fue realizada mediante la resolución No. 0465-2011 de las nueve horas veintiséis minutos del quince de julio de dos mil once, emitida por el Ministro de Hacienda a.i. en su condición de superior jerárquico supremo del mencionado Ministerio, conforme a los dispuesto por los numerales 28.1 y 173.2 ambos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (presupuesto iii). Y en la misma, se identifica claramente la conducta específica cuya supresión se pretende. En lo que atañe a los momentos -plazos- en los cuales se produjeron tanto la declaratoria de lesividad como la interposición del presente proceso, cabe recordar que en la lesividad como proceso judicial, concurren dos plazos diversos, los cuales como se verá, se cumplen cabalmente en el asunto bajo análisis (presupuesto iv y v), haciéndose eso sí la necesaria reiteración, en cuanto a que ninguno de ellos resulta aplicable a la lesividad referente a la tutela de bienes de dominio público. En lo que respecta al primero de los plazos, el mismo está previsto para declarar lesivo el acto a lo interno de la Administración. Se trata de un plazo que en tesis de principio es de un año, contado a partir del día posterior al de la adopción de la conducta formal, salvo en casos de nulidad absoluta de un acto de efectos continuados, hipótesis en la que se reitera, en tanto perduren los efectos de la conducta, la declaratoria aludida es posible, incluso, dentro del año posterior al cese de esos efectos. Para ello, en cada caso ha de discriminarse si el acto atacado es de efecto instantáneo o continuado, pues en el primer escenario, la lesividad (aún cuando se acuse nulidad absoluta), solamente puede declararse por la misma Administración dentro del año mencionado. En cambio, si el acto es de efecto continuado, la lesividad puede declararse en el curso de esos efectos y hasta dentro del plazo de un año, contado a partir del cese de los mismos según se ha dicho. Lo anterior exige, que cuando se invoque la aplicación de esta norma, el juzgador deba valorar no solo si el acto es de efecto continuado, sino además, ponderar el tipo de nulidad, pues la supresión de un acto en esas condiciones, solo es viable si es de efecto continuado y absolutamente nulo, ya que al margen de la continuidad de sus efectos, si la nulidad es relativa, la declaratoria de lesividad sería extemporánea. Este plazo para declarar (a lo interno) lesivo el acto declaratorio de derechos subjetivos, caso de incumplirse, lleva a la inadmisibilidad del proceso, por desatención de uno de los elementos medulares de la acción. En cuanto al segundo lapso, ha de indicarse que el mismo se refiere al ejercicio del derecho de acción propiamente dicho. Como se ha señalado, conforme al artículo 39 del CPCA, es de un año computado desde la declaratoria interna de lesividad, con las salvedades dichas. La infracción de ese plazo lleva a la caducidad de la acción, de conformidad los artículo 39, 66.1.k, 67 y 92 incisos 6 y 7, todos del citado Código. Ahora bien, en el presente asunto se ha tenido por acreditado, que el acto cuya supresión se pretende por la Administración demandante, fue adoptado el 23 de julio de 2010 -hecho probado No. 2- y su lesividad, fue declarada mediante resolución No. 0465-2011 de las nueve horas veintiséis minutos del quince de julio de dos mil once, emitida por el Ministro de Hacienda a.i.-hecho probado No. 9- Así entonces, dicha declaración interna de lesividad se produjo dentro del plazo anual que estipula el artículo 34 del CPCA, lo que torna en innecesario -para este aspecto en particular- el ejercicio intelectual para la determinación de si el acto atacado y que se dice viciado de nulidad absoluta, es de efectos instantáneos o continuados. En lo que atañe al plazo previsto por el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para la interposición del presente Proceso, ha de reiterarse que la declaratoria interna de lesividad fue externada mediante resolución No. 0465-2011 de las nueve horas veintiséis minutos del quince de julio de dos mil once, emitida por el Ministro de Hacienda a.i. -hecho probado No. 9- y la presente acción fue formulada el 30 de mayo del 2012 -f. 1 del expediente judicial-, es decir, el proceso se interpuso dentro del plazo anual aludido. Lo aquí señalado permite concluir, que tanto la declaratoria de lesividad como la presentación del presente proceso, se llevaron a cabo dentro de los plazos previstos por el CPCA para tales efectos (presupuestos iv y v) y en consecuencia, que la excepción de caducidad opuesta por la CCSS deba rechazarse, sin necesidad de reiterar en acápites posteriores lo aquí señalado. Llegado a este punto, se evidencia que resta un presupuesto por analizar, referido precisamente a la conformidad o no -por vicios de nulidad relativa o absoluta- del acto administrativo impugnado con el ordenamiento jurídico (presupuesto ii). Para ello, el Tribunal ha considerado pertinente, realizar tal análisis en un apartado exclusivo. 3) Análisis de validez de las conductas cuestionadas. Conforme al cuadro fáctico expuesto, se ha tenido por acreditado que mediante oficio SRCST-TV-009-10 del 23 de julio de 2010, en respuesta a la gestión que formulara la CCSS, la Subdirección de Recaudación, Control y Servicios Tributarios de la Dirección de Grandes Contribuyentes del Ministerio de Hacienda señaló: "Sobre el particular le indicamos que realizado el estudio correspondiente su representada se encuentra exenta de la retención establecida en el numeral 1 inciso c) del Artículo 23 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la renta cuando invierta, en:

· · · Títulos valores emitidos por el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal.

· Títulos valores emitidos por el Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda (Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda), al amparo de la Ley No. 7052 de 13 de noviembre de 1986.

· Títulos valores emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda.

· Títulos valores emitidos por cualquier entidad financiera supervisada por la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF).

· Títulos valores emitidos por el Banco Central de Costa Rica.

La exención se concede, siempre y cuando invierta con fondos especiales (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (RIM), Prestaciones Sociales (FPS), Seguro de salud (SS), Contingencias (FC) y Fondo de Retiro de Empleados (FRE)..." (Hecho probado No. 2. El subrayado es propio). A partir de la emisión de dicho oficio y del criterio en el mismo externado, se generaron una serie de conductas formales que culminaron con la declaratoria de lesividad del mencionado acto. Precisamente de tales actuaciones -todas ellas reseñadas en los hechos probados de esta sentencia-, así como de las argumentaciones esgrimidas por ambas partes, se desprende con absoluta claridad que la controversia del presente asunto, se circunscribe a la interpretación de los artículos 3 inciso a) y 23 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta así como de los numerales 30, 69 y 72 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. Ello es así, pues a partir de lo que cada parte entiende que establecen tales normas, una -la CCSS- alega que cuando se invierte en títulos valores con fondos del FRE, la ganancia obtenida con tal inversión se encuentra exenta de la retención del 8% previsto en el numeral 23 antes señalado y la otra -el Estado-, aduce que las rentas derivadas de las inversiones en títulos valores con dineros provenientes del citado Fondo que realice la CCSS, están afectos a la retención de comentario. Por la razón apuntada, considera pertinente este Tribunal hacer una breve referencia a las figuras de la exención y no sujeción -máxime que las partes a lo largo de sus escritos han hecho mención a una y otra-, a efecto de evitar confusiones acerca de la forma en que aquí se resuelve. Dicho lo anterior, baste señalar que la exención de conformidad con lo preceptuado en el numeral 61 del CNTP, ha de entenderse como la dispensa legal de la obligación tributaria, misma que nace cuando se produce el hecho generador, según lo señala el artículo 11 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. Es decir, cuando nos referimos a una exención, debemos entender que en tales casos ocurre el hecho generador y que en consecuencia, nace la obligación tributaria. Pero, no obstante el nacimiento de dicha obligación, la misma no debe pagarse por parte del sujeto pasivo del tributo, en virtud de la dispensa legal expresa -total o parcial- de dicho pago, emitida por el legislador, que lo releva, exime o exonera. Dicho de otra forma, "la exención tributaria tiene lugar cuando una norma de rango legal contempla que en aquellos supuestos se desarrolla su efecto principal: el deber pagar el tributo u obligación tributaria. De tal forma que la estructura de la exoneración tributaria se caracteriza por contener un único mandato manifestado por dos preceptos, primero la sujeción, y de seguido, la exención; de manera que la obligación tributaria nace, pero no es exigible. Así, queda claro que la esencia de esta concepción es que la exención no afecta el momento de nacimiento de la obligación, sino el de su exigibilidad. En consecuencia, existe una separación neta entre el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria, que de acuerdo con el artículo 31 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, es el presupuesto establecido por la ley para tipificar el tributo y cuya realización origina el nacimiento de la obligación y el presupuesto de hecho de la exención , cuya realización determina la no exigibilidad de la obligación derivada del hecho generador." (Destacado en negrita corresponde al original. Sentencia No. 00232 de las quince horas quince minutos del veintitrés de junio de dos mil once, emitida por la Sección III de este Tribunal). Por su parte, la no sujeción, se refiere a la no realización del hecho generador del tributo respectivo, razón por la cual, no nace a la vida jurídica obligación tributaria alguna. Así entonces, resulta claro que exención y no sujeción, son diferentes, teniendo cada una sus propios fundamentos y efectos, que para este breve acercamiento no ameritan señalarse con mayor detalle. Conforme a lo indicado, resulta de relevancia transcribir -para efectos de su posterior análisis -más concretamente del inciso c.1)-, el artículo 23 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta:

"ARTICULO 23.- Retención en la fuente.

Toda empresa pública o privada, sujeta o no al pago de este impuesto, incluidos el Estado, los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros y las demás instituciones autónomas o semiautónomas, las municipalidades y las asociaciones e instituciones a que se refiere el artículo 3 de esta Ley, está obligado a actuar como agente de retención o de percepción del impuesto, cuando pague o acredite rentas afectas al impuesto establecido en esta Ley. Para estos fines, los indicados sujetos deberán retener y enterar al Fisco, por cuenta de los beneficiarios de las rentas que a continuación se mencionan, los importes que en cada caso se señalan:

• a)Salarios y cualquier otra remuneración que se pague en ocasión de trabajos personales ejecutados en relación de dependencia.

En estos casos el pagador o patrono deberá calcularle el impuesto mensual que corresponda a cada uno de los beneficiarios de las rentas indicadas.

Si el beneficiario fuere una persona no domiciliada en Costa Rica, sobre el monto pagado o acreditado se retendrán las sumas del impuesto que procedan, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 59 de esta Ley. En el Reglamento se incluirán las disposiciones a que se refiere este inciso. (Así reformado por el inciso g) del artículo 19 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001).

• b)Dietas, provengan o no de una relación laboral dependiente, gratificaciones y otras prestaciones por servicios personales, en ocasión del trabajo en relación de dependencia. En estos casos, si los beneficiarios de tales rentas fueren personas domicialiadas en el país, el pagador deberá retener el quince por ciento (15%) sobre los importes que pague o acredite a dichas personas; si los receptores de la renta fueren personas no domiciliadas en Costa Rica, se retendrán las sumas que correspondan, según lo estipulado en el artículo 59 de esta Ley. (Así reformado por inciso g) del artículo 19 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001).
• c)1.- Los emisores, agentes pagadores, sociedades anónimas y otras entidades públicas o privadas que, en función de captar recursos del mercado financiero, paguen o acrediten intereses o concedan descuentos sobre pagarés y toda clase de títulos valores, a personas domiciliadas en Costa Rica, deberán retener el quince por ciento (15%) de dicha renta por concepto de impuesto.

Si los títulos valores se inscribieren en una bolsa de comercio reconocida oficialmente, o hubieren sido emitidos por entidades financieras debidamente registradas en la Auditoría General de Bancos, al tenor de la Ley No. 5044 del 7 de setiembre de 1972 y sus reformas, por el Estado y sus instituciones, por los bancos integrados al Sistema Bancario Nacional, por las cooperativas, o cuando se trate de letras de cambio y aceptaciones bancarias, el porcentaje por aplicar será el ocho por ciento (8%).

Cuando los bancos y las entidades financieras mencionadas en el párrafo anterior avalen letras de cambio o aceptaciones bancarias, la retención se aplicará sobre el valor de descuento que, para estos casos, se equiparará a la tasa de interés pasiva fija por el Banco Central de Costa Rica, para el plazo correspondiente, más tres puntos porcentuales.

No estarán sujetas al impuesto sobre la renta ni al establecido en este inciso, las rentas derivadas de los títulos emitidos en moneda nacional por el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal y por el Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda , al amparo de la Ley N º 7052, de 13 de noviembre de 1986. Tampoco estarán sujetas al impuesto sobre la renta ni al establecido en este inciso, las inversiones provenientes del fideicomiso sin fines de lucro, creado mediante el artículo 6 de la Ley de la creación de la Escuela de Agricultura de la Región Tropical Húmeda, Nº 7044, de 29 de setiembre de 1986 . (Así reformado el párrafo anterior por el artículo 22 de la Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal N° 8720 de 4 de marzo de 2009.)

Asimismo, no están sujetas a esta retención, únicamente, las entidades enumeradas que se encuentren en las condiciones señaladas en el inciso a) del artículo 3 de la presente Ley y el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, cuando inviertan en títulos valores emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda.

Las sumas retenidas se considerarán como impuesto único y definitivo. No corresponderá practicar la retención aludida en este inciso cuando el inversionista sea la Tesorería Nacional. (Así ampliado el quinto párrafo del inciso c.1) por el inciso c) del artículo 23 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001).

Se faculta a la Dirección General de la Tributación Directa para que, en aquellos casos en que por la naturaleza del título se dificulte la retención en la fuente, pueda autorizar, con carácter general, otra modalidad de pago.

2.- Las retenciones de los impuestos a que se refieren los incisos anteriores deberán practicarse en la fecha en la que se efectúe el pago o crédito, según el acto que se realice primero.

Asimismo, deberán depositarse en el Banco Central de Costa Rica o en sus tesorerías auxiliares, dentro de los primeros quince días naturales del mes siguiente a aquella fecha. (Así reformado por inciso g) del artículo 19 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001. Intrepretado Auténticamente por ley N° 8320 de 16 de octubre del 2002, en el sentido de que los títulos emitidos por las cooperativas de ahorro y crédito que no estén destinados a la circulación, sino que solamente puedan ser descontados por las cooperativas emisoras, no son títulos valores y, por tanto, no están afectos al impuesto establecido en este inciso).

c bis) Asimismo, en las operaciones de recompras o reportos de valores, en sus diferentes modalidades, sea en una o varias operaciones simultáneas y que se realicen por medio de una bolsa de valores, se aplicará un impuesto único y definitivo del ocho por ciento (8%), sobre los rendimientos generados por la operación; dicho porcentaje será retenido por la bolsa de valores en que se realizó dicha operación. En caso de que las operaciones no se realicen mediante los mecanismos de bolsa, los rendimientos devengados de la operación serán considerados como renta ordinaria gravable. (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el inciso c) del artículo 21 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio de 2001).

ch) Excedentes pagados por las cooperativas y las asociaciones solidaristas y similares.

Estas entidades deberán enterar al Fisco, como impuesto único y definitivo, por cuenta de sus asociados, un monto equivalente al cinco por ciento (5%) de los excedentes o utilidades distribuidas.

• d)Remesas o créditos a favor de beneficiarios domiciliados en el exterior. En estos casos, el pagador retendrá, como impuesto único y definitivo, las sumas del impuesto que correspondan de acuerdo con lo señalado en el artículo 59 de esta Ley. (Así reformado por inciso g) del artículo 19 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001).
• e)Transporte, comunicaciones, reaseguros, películas cinematográficas, noticias internacionales y los otros servicios mencionados en los incisos a), b), c) y ch) del artículo 11 de esta Ley, prestados por empresas no domiciliadas en el país. En estos casos, si las empresas que suministran los servicios tienen representante permanente en Costa Rica, las empresas usuarias deberán retener, como pago a cuenta del impuesto establecido en el artículo 15 de esta Ley, el tres por ciento (3%) sobre los importes pagados o acreditados.

Cuando dichas empresas no tengan representantes permanentes en el país, las empresas usuarias de los servicios deberán retener, como impuesto único, las sumas que a continuación se mencionan:

• i)El ocho punto cinco por ciento (8.5%) sobre el monto pagado o acreditado, tratándose de servicios de transporte y comunicaciones.
• ii)El cinco punto cinco por ciento (5.5%), tratándose de reasegurados, reafianzamientos y primas cedidas de cualquier clase.
• iii)El veinte por ciento (20%) sobre el importe pagado o acreditado en el caso de prestación de los otros servicios indicados en el inciso e).
• f)Utilidades, dividendos y participaciones sociales. En estos casos se deberán aplicar las disposiciones a que se refieren los artículos 18 y 19 de esta Ley.

Las personas que actúen como agentes de retención o percepción del impuesto, deberán depositar el importe de las retenciones practicadas en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, sus agencias, o en las tesorerías auxiliares autorizadas, dentro de los primeros quince días naturales del mes siguiente a la fecha en que se efectuaron. En el Reglamento se establecerán, en cada caso, los requisitos que deberán cumplir los agentes de retención o percepción, así como lo relativo a los informes que deberán propocionar a la Administración Tributaria, y a los comprobantes que deberán entregar a las personas a quienes se les hizo la retención de que se trate.

Los requisitos que deberán cumplir y la forma de las retenciones que establece este artículo serán fijados en el Reglamento de esta Ley.

• g)El Estado o sus instituciones, autónomas o semiautónomas, las municipalidades, las empresas públicas y otros entes públicos, en los casos de licitaciones públicas o privadas, contrataciones, negocios u otras operaciones realizadas por ellas, que paguen o acrediten rentas a personas físicas o jurídicas con domicilio en el país, deben retener el dos por ciento (2%) del producto bruto sobre las cantidades mencionadas, aun cuando se trate de pagos a cuenta o adelanto de esas operaciones.

El contribuyente podrá solicitar que los montos de las retenciones efectuadas con base en la presente disposición, se acrediten a los pagos parciales citados en el artículo 22 de esta Ley.

Esas retenciones deben practicarse en las fechas en que se efectúen los pagos o los créditos que las originen. Las sumas retenidas deberán depositarse en los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional o en sus agencias o sucursales, que cuenten con la autorización del Banco Central, dentro de los quince días naturales del mes siguiente a la fecha de la retención. (Así reformado por inciso g) del artículo 19 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001).

Los agentes de retención y percepción señalados en esta Ley, deberán presentar una declaración jurada, en los medios que para tal efecto disponga la Administración Tributaria, por las retenciones o percepciones realizadas durante el mes. El plazo para presentarla será el mismo que tienen para enterar al fisco los valores retenidos o percibidos." (Así adicionado el último párrafo, por inciso g) del artículo 19 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria de 4 de julio del 2001 y reformado por el artículo 16 de la Ley de Justicia Tributaria No. 7535 de 1º de agosto de 1995, el cual, al adicionar el inciso g), reproduce íntegramente el contenido del artículo). El subrayado es propio.

Nótese que la norma de comentario, establece además del impuesto, un mecanismo de retención en la fuente pagadora, tal y como en forma expresa, se "anuncia" en el título que tiene el referido numeral -"Retención en la Fuente"-. Dicho de otra forma, el referido Artículo 23 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta, prácticamente prevé un verdadero impuesto autónomo, que tal y como lo establece la ley, es único y definitivo, estableciéndose como mecanismo de pago de la obligación tributaria la retención apuntada. Ahora bien, el artículo que se analiza hace expresa remisión a otro numeral de dicho cuerpo normativo, cuando dispone que "no están sujetas a esta retención, únicamente, las entidades enumeradas que se encuentren en las condiciones señaladas en el inciso a) del artículo 3 de la presente Ley y el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, cuando inviertan en títulos valores emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda." (La negrita es propia). De ahí que, sea relevante transcribir lo que la norma señalada establece:

"ARTICULO 3º.- Entidades no sujetas al impuesto a) El Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas del Estado que por ley especial gocen de exención y las universidades estatales." (Reformado tácitamente por la ley No.7722 de 9 de diciembre de 1997, que sujeta a las instituciones y empresas públicas que señala, al pago del impuesto sobre la renta).

Como puede observarse, pese a que el título del numeral utiliza el término "no sujetas al impuesto", en su contenido se hace que sólo por ley puede concederse -artículo 5 CNPT-, lo cual es congruente con el numeral 23 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, que al establecer quiénes no están sujetos a la retención prevista en el inciso 1.c), a lo que sin lugar a dudas alude, es a quiénes no están obligados a pagar -vía retención- el impuesto por esa norma establecido, aún y cuando se haya verificado el hecho generador allí previsto. Es decir, de la interpretación armónica de dichos numerales, se deduce con absoluta claridad, que el legislador ordinario creó una exención a favor de las entidades señaladas en el numeral 3 inciso a) de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta -sin mencionar expresamente al FRE-, pues las eximió del pago de la obligación tributaria que se comenta. La ausencia de mención del señalado Fondo como favorecido o destinatario del beneficio fiscal citado, permite concluir que el mismo no se encuentra en modo alguno exento de la retención supra indicada, ni aún cuando la inversión en títulos valores, la haya realizado la propia CCSS con dineros del FRE, pues los mismos no forman parte del patrimonio de la entidad, ni el referido Fondo fue creado con una finalidad de fortalecer la seguridad social encomendada constitucional y legalmente a dicha entidad. Al respecto debe recordarse, que en "nuestro ordenamiento jurídico tributario, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el inciso b) del artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, la determinación de las exoneraciones está reservada a la ley formal y material, esto es, mediante los procedimientos previstos por la propia Constitución Política y el Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, a cargo de los diputados del indicado Poder de la República. Así, la exención es, pues, la dispensa del pago de un tributo debido por disposición condiciones y requisitos para su otorgamiento, los tributos que corresponden, si es total o parcial y, en su caso, el plazo de duración." (Resolución No. 00232 de las quince horas quince minutos del veintitrés de junio de dos mil once, emitida por la Sección III de este Tribunal. La negrita es propia). Precisamente sobre el tema de las exenciones y la interpretación de las normas tributarias, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha señalado:

“IV.- Finalidad de las normas que disponen exenciones. La exención tributaria tiene lugar cuando una norma contempla que en determinados supuestos expresamente previstos, no obstante producirse el hecho generador, no surge la obligación del sujeto pasivo de cancelar la obligación tributaria. Forma parte de los denominados “beneficios fiscales”, los que suelen responder a una finalidad extrafiscal, o bien de estímulo a ciertas actividades. En muchas ocasiones, estos beneficios se sustentan en la lógica del principio de capacidad económica, o en otras razones que motivan la decisión del legislador. En este sentido, dentro de la doctrina tributarista se constituyen y así deben considerarse, como mecanismos y herramientas propias del entorno tributario. Constituyen vías que en el fondo pretenden y permiten, mediante condiciones estratégicas (que pueden ser temporales), el fomento, desarrollo o promoción de un determinado sector económico, de ciertas áreas de actividad, contextos sociales, o bien, la equiparación de las condiciones económicas para potenciar un estado de igualdad en la distribución de las cargas contributivas, a corto, mediano o largo plazo. En ocasiones, simplemente buscan evitar que el sistema tributario se torne confiscatorio. De ahí que resulten inviables cuando tengan por fin un beneficio injustificado, incompatible con su finalidad parafiscal o se aparten de criterios razonables y del sistema de valores propio de la Constitución Política. Así visto, su creación no es incompatible con los principios de igualdad, generalidad y el deber de contribuir con las cargas públicas que se desprende del numeral 18 de la Constitución Política, sino que son elementos que se complementan para lograr, en tesis de principio, un equilibrio y estabilidad en la situación fiscal del país en su dimensión integral. Es decir, en el fondo buscan el cumplimiento de esos postulados, mediante acciones que se orientan a constituir un sistema revestido por condiciones de equidad en términos de capacidad económica y desarrollo. Por ende, en su nueva integración, esta Sala considera que contrario al criterio hasta el momento sostenido en este campo, no constituyen estricto sensu, excepciones al deber de contribuir, sino partes de un sistema que disponen la dispensa del pago del impuesto, o bien otros beneficios, que integralmente considerados, buscan mejorar, en sentido global, el sistema impositivo en términos cuantitativos y cualitativos. Lo anterior mediante la dispensa total o parcial del pago del impuesto o la disminución de su base de cálculo, ergo, pueden recaer sobre la obligación tributaria en su plenitud, o bien, sobre la exclusión de aquella base de algunos componentes. Ante estas particularidades, su manejo debe ser cuidadoso y cauteloso, pues su aplicación arbitraria puede hacer incurrir en afectaciones a los principios de generalidad y de igualdad, trastornando su propia finalidad.”. (Resolución de esta Sala número 399 de las 10 horas 40 minutos del 28 de junio de 2006). IV.- Interpretación de las normas tributarias y exenciones. Finalidad. Sobre este aspecto en concreto, en el voto mencionado supra número 657, este Órgano decisor hizo las siguientes consideraciones: “La labor hermenéutica de los mandatos que regulen relaciones tributarias, debe realizarse dentro de los cauces de las reglas de interpretación jurídica, comunes a todas las ramas del derecho acudiendo a sus diversos métodos, a fin de precisar los alcances y particularidades de un determinado mandato, de modo que la formulación hipotética, aplicada a la praxis diaria, cumpla su cometido intrínseco y el fin que ha dispuesto el legislador para su emisión. En este sentido, el numeral 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios establece: “Las normas tributarias se deben interpretar con arreglo a todos los métodos admitidos por el Derecho Común./ La analogía es procedimiento admisible para llenar los vacíos legales pero en virtud de ella no pueden crearse tributos ni exenciones .” (El resaltado no es del original). En esta labor, a tono con el principio de igualdad constitucional, es claro que el intérprete debe ponderar las diversas variables que convergen en cada situación, dentro de ellas, la naturaleza de la disposición, procurando que su uso, en la forma y alcances que establezca, sea igual para todos los casos similares y evitar una aplicación material que burle la finalidad misma de su contenido. Los medios de que el operador jurídico, se sirve para llevar a cabo este proceso, son principalmente el filológico o gramatical, lógico, histórico, sociológico y finalista. El artículo 10 del Código Civil, al cual remite el canon 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, en relación a la interpretación de las reglas tributarias, contempla estos elementos: “ Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas ”. La exégesis de las normas tributarias, en tesis de principio, no puede ser restrictiva. El tributo se particulariza por su coactividad, en tanto dimana del ejercicio del Poder Público, que mediante esta vía, impone, al amparo de la Constitución, gravámenes económicos a los sujetos pasivos. Pero además, se identifica por su carácter contributivo en tanto su finalidad es colaborar con las cargas públicas, a fin de dotar al Estado de los recursos adecuados que le permitan desplegar su marco funcional y prestacional a favor de la colectividad. Esto desde luego no excluye que en ciertos casos, este tipo de cargas nazcan con un objetivo diferente, como sería el caso del criterio de la parafiscalidad. Desde este plano, las normas tributarias no pueden ser consideradas excepcionales o bien, limitativas de los derechos de los particulares, dado que ese carácter llevaría a que su aplicación y por tanto su interpretación, fuese igualmente restrictivo. Dentro de este enfoque entonces, las normas que contengan regulaciones del tipo referido, deben ser ponderadas sin sujeción a ningún criterio especial o específico. En esta tarea, debe recordarse que la norma transcrita establece en su párrafo final un límite objetivo a esta labor exegética, tal cual es, la imposibilidad de crear tributos o exenciones vía analógica, mecanismo que si bien es útil para llenar los vacíos legales, no puede suplir en estos términos, el papel del legislador en virtud del principio de reserva legal. Así visto, el campo de la creación de gravámenes y beneficios tributarios está vedado por este medio, siendo por ende figuras que deben crearse por una manifestación legislativa formal, en los términos ya cada caso, el contenido de la norma, para establecer los cauces debidos de su aplicación, a tono con los parámetros ya señalados, a fin de que el mandato cumpla su cometido y en el caso de la materia tributaria, se satisfaga la finalidad inmersa en la manifestación legislativa, sea imponer cargas tributarias, establecer marcos de beneficios y demás asuntos inherentes a la relación jurídico tributaria que de aquella se desprenda.” (Destacado en negrita, corresponde al original y el subrayado es propio. Sentencia No. 091-2011 de las ocho horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del tres de febrero de dos mil once).

De lo señalado hasta aquí, no cabe duda alguna que: i) en la exención se verifica el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria, sea nace a la vida jurídica la misma, pero el legislador ordinario vía Ley, exime de su pago a determinados sujetos, especificando "las condiciones y requisitos para su otorgamiento, los tributos que corresponden, si es total o parcial y, en su caso, el plazo de duración". (Resolución No. 00232 de las quince horas quince minutos del veintitrés de junio de dos mil once, emitida por la Sección III de este Tribunal); ii) no es posible crear exenciones vía interpretación ni integración analógica, pues ello es materia que conforme al numeral 5 del CNPT está reservada a la Ley y iii) al no mencionar en forma expresa el legislador ordinario al FRE, como beneficiario de la exención que se analiza, ha de entenderse que el mismo no fue dispensado del pago de la referida obligación tributaria. Ahora bien, en lo que atañe a la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, particularmente al mencionado artículo 30 de la misma, resulta relevante recordar que el señalado ordinal prescribe:

"ARTÍCULO 30.- Exclusividad y naturaleza jurídica. Los fondos de pensiones, los planes respectivos y los fondos de capitalización laboral, serán administrados exclusivamente por operadoras. Estas son personas jurídicas de Derecho Privado o de capital público constituidas para el efecto como sociedades anónimas, que estarán sujetas a los requisitos, las normas y los controles previstos en la presente ley y sus reglamentos. La Superintendencia deberá autorizar el funcionamiento de las operadoras y dispondrá los requisitos adicionales que deberán cumplir estas entidades, con el propósito de proteger los ahorros de los trabajadores y la eficiencia del sistema.

Autorízase a las siguientes organizaciones sociales para que administren los fondos de capitalización laboral: las cooperativas, de conformidad con la Ley No. 7849, de 20 de noviembre de 1998 y sus reformas y las operadoras de fondos de capitalización laboral establecidas en el artículo 74 de la presente ley y las creadas por los sindicatos. En ambos casos, estas (sic) deberán ser autorizadas y registradas ante la Superintendencia de Pensiones, conforme a esta ley. Asimismo, las asociaciones solidaristas definidas en la Ley de Asociaciones Solidaristas, No. 6970, de 7 de noviembre de 1984, quedan facultadas de pleno derecho, para administrar los fondos de capitalización laboral, conforme a la presente ley.

Para el efecto del párrafo anterior, las asambleas generales de las organizaciones sociales podrán delegar la administración de estos fondos en operadoras, conservando la responsabilidad de vigilar su correcta inversión y destino. Los contratos respectivos deberán ser autorizados previamente por el Superintendente de Pensiones.

Cuando, a juicio de la Superintendencia, existan indicios fundados de la realización de las actividades reguladas por esta ley sin la debida autorización, la Superintendencia tendrá, respecto de los presuntos infractores, las mismas facultades de inspección, imposición de medidas precautorias y sanciones, que le corresponden de acuerdo con esta ley en relación con las entidades fiscalizadas por ella." (El subrayado y la negrita es propio).

La norma recién transcrita, tiene una estrecha relación con los ordinales 69 y 72 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, que a la letra señalan:

"ARTÍCULO 69.- Requisitos para obtener los incentivos fiscales. Los aportes voluntarios para gozar de los incentivos fiscales otorgados en esta ley, deberán cumplir todas las disposiciones de esta ley y ser contratados con una operadora." (El subrayado es propio).

"ARTÍCULO 72.- Beneficios fiscales. Estarán exentos de los impuestos referidos en el artículo 18 y en el inciso c) del artículo 23 de la Ley del impuesto sobre la renta, los intereses, los dividendos, las ganancias de capital y cualquier otro beneficio que produzcan los valores en moneda nacional o en moneda extranjera, en los cuales las entidades autorizadas inviertan los recursos de los fondos que administren." (El subrayado y la negrita son propios).

Del análisis de los ordinales reseñados, además de confirmarse que lo regulado en el referido artículo 23 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta, es una "exención" -al dispensar del pago de la obligación tributaria- y nunca una "no sujeción", se concluye, que para poder gozar de la misma, se requiere que los Fondos -de pensiones, los planes respectivos y los de capitalización laboral- sean administrados e invertidos por Operadoras o bien, por las Organizaciones Sociales que menciona el artículo 30 en su párrafo segundo, una vez autorizadas por la Superintendencia de Pensiones -SUPEN- y registradas ante dicho órgano. Ahora bien, no omite este Tribunal hacer mención a que el representante de la CCSS ha argumentado, que dicha entidad se encuentra exenta de todo tipo de tributos y siendo que a lo interno de la referida Institución existe toda una estructura organizativa que administra en conjunto los Fondos del FRE y del FAP -FRAP-, esos beneficios fiscales de los cuales goza el ente -CCSS- igual deben extenderse al Fondo de Retiro de Empleados o como expresamente lo manifiesta la representación de la entidad demandada, también el Fondo dicho "tiene derecho a gozar de la exoneración tributaria establecida no sólo en el artículo 58 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja, así como (sic) en el inciso f), 72 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador", por cuanto la Dirección del mismo"está adscrita a la Gerencia Financiera, por lo que pertenece al mismo organigrama de nuestra institución y utiliza la misma cédula jurídica..." (f. 51 del expediente judicial). Lo anterior no resulta de recibo. Según ha sido expuesto, la "exención" constituye una liberalidad del legislador ordinario, quien ejerciendo su discrecionalidad legislativa, valora la conveniencia de dispensar del pago de la obligación tributaria a determinados sujetos pasivos -por motivos de diversa índole-, sin que tal beneficio fiscal, pueda extenderse a otros sujetos que no sean los expresamente señalados por el legislador. Desde esa perspectiva, la "exención" a la que hace referencia el representante de la entidad accionada -prevista en el numeral 58 de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS- es como el mismo reconoce, concedida en forma directa a dicha entidad y bajo ninguna circunstancia, el manejo interno del Fondo -administración conjunta-, ni la estructura organizacional a la que alude, constituyen justificaciones, argumentos, instrumentos o mecanismos que permitan entender extendida al FRE, tales exenciones concedidas a la CCSS en virtud de su trascendencia -por las funciones vitales que realiza- para el Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho costarricense. Ello es así, por cuanto el Fondo de Retiro de Empleados -Fondo de naturaleza complementaria- no constituye técnicamente patrimonio de la entidad, sino de terceros -sus servidores-. Dicho de otra forma, el referido Fondo fue creado no para el cumplimiento de los fines público-sociales encargados constitucional y legalmente a la mencionada entidad estatal, sino para el beneficio propio y directo de los trabajadores de la misma -artículos 1 y 2 del Reglamento del Fondo de Retiro de los Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Igualmente, tampoco es posible vía artículo 72 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, acceder a la pretendida "exención" del numeral 23 inciso 1c) de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta, pues como se indicó líneas atrás, para poder gozar de la misma, se requiere que los Fondos -de pensiones, los planes respectivos y los de capitalización laboral- sean administrados e invertidos por Operadoras o bien, por las Organizaciones Sociales que menciona el artículo 30 de dicha Ley en su párrafo segundo, una vez autorizadas por la Superintendencia de Pensiones -SUPEN- y registradas ante dicho órgano. Así las cosas, es criterio de esta Cámara que la exención del Fondo de Retiro de Empleados (FRE), de la retención del 8% sobre la renta derivada de títulos valores adquiridos con dineros de dicho Fondo, concedida por un año mediante el oficio No. SRCST-TV-009-10 del 23 de julio de 2010 emitido por la Subdirección de Recaudación, Control y Servicios Tributarios de la Dirección de Grandes Contribuyentes, es sustancialmente disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico -artículo 158.2 LGAP- al extender dicho beneficio fiscal -concedido entre otros a la CCSS- sin norma de rango legal o supralegal que expresamente lo autorizara, generándose con ello un vicio insalvable de nulidad del acto que se ataca, por la ilicitud de su contenido -artículos 132 y 166 de la LGAP-. Con dicho actuar, se transgredieron groseramente los numerales 11 constitucional, 5, 61 y 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, los artículos 3 y 23 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta, los ordinales 30, 69 y 72 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, así como los artículos 11 y 132 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Consecuencia de lo anterior, procede declarar la nulidad parcial del acto atacado, únicamente en cuanto dispuso la exención -por un año- del Fondo de Retiro de Empleados (FRE) de la retención del 8% sobre la renta derivada de títulos valores adquiridos con dineros de dicho Fondo. Declaratoria, que tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia del referido acto, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe -numerales 158.2, 166 y 171 de la LGAP y artículo 131 del CPCA-.

IV.- SOBRE LAS EXCEPCIONES OPUESTAS: Tal y como fuera señalado líneas atrás, al contestar la demanda, la representación de la CCSS opuso las excepción de falta de derecho y posteriormente -en la Audiencia Preliminar- alegó la falta de integración de la litis consorcio necesaria, así como la caducidad de la acción. En lo que atañe a la falta de derecho, ha sido señalado líneas atrás, que el acto impugnado es sustancialmente disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, por contener un vicio insalvable de nulidad en su motivo -por ilicitud del mismo-. Por tal razón, la pretensión anulatoria estatal, encuentra pleno respaldo jurídico y como consecuencia de ello, se impone el rechazo de la excepción que se analiza. En cuanto a la segunda de las excepciones opuestas, valga recordar que mediante resolución No. 672-2013 de las nueve horas cincuenta y seis minutos del cuatro de abril de 2013, fue rechazada por la Juzgadora de Trámite y confirmado dicho rechazo por el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil Hacienda, mediante resolución No.328-2013 de las nueve horas treinta y tres minutos del cinco de junio de dos mil trece. Por último, con relación a la defensa de caducidad, en el Considerando inmediato anterior, este Tribunal abordó la misma y por la razones que allí se expusieron -declaración interna de lesividad y presentación del proceso efectuadas en tiempo- se dispuso su rechazo.”