Partial Judicial Approval of Extra-Procedural Satisfaction in a Job Reassignment CaseHomologación parcial de satisfacción extraprocesal en reasignación de puesto

**Fifth:** **Regarding extra-procedural satisfaction.** It is first necessary to refer to the brief filed on May 11, 2015, through which the plaintiff informs the Tribunal, in accordance with article 115, subsection 1, CPCA, that in the present case “*a partial extra-procedural satisfaction has occurred in the administrative venue of claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, which is proven by Certification DGIRH-2978-2014* [sic] *of fourteen hours four minutes on the day of May 8, 2015* [sic]*, issued by Lic. Cristian Méndez Blanco, Director of Institutional Management of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), which certifies the following* …”. Said document states the following: “*… in accordance with articles 109, 110 and 111 of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute, prepared and approved Technical Report DGIRH-0002-2015 dated April 14, 2015, related to the Reassignment Study of Position 047969 of Civil Service Manager 3, held on a tenured basis by the employee Rafael Chan Jaén, identification number 5-134-539. That in accordance with official letter DGIRH-2975-2015 dated May 7, 2015, Technical Report DGIRH-0002-2015 was sent to the Coordinator, Civil Service Office-Ministry of Public Works and Transport for its countersignature procedure*.” (folio 463). The plaintiff adds that MOPT, by completing and approving the reassignment study of position #047969 “*not only demonstrates the partial extra-procedural satisfaction of claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the lawsuit and in particular claim 3, but thereby demonstrates the non-conformity of the conduct with the legal system and absolute nullity of the conduct of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, for lack of competence in the matter of reassignment of positions under the Civil Service Regime and for express violation of the law* ...” (folio 458).

**1.-** Title VI of the CPCA, regarding the <termination of the proceeding>, in its chapter I, under the heading <other modes of termination>, regulates extra-procedural satisfaction, in the following terms:

“1) If, having initiated the proceeding, the defendant Public Administration recognizes, totally or partially, *in the administrative venue the claims of the plaintiff*, any of the parties may bring this to the attention of the processing judge or the tribunal. 2) The processing judge or the Tribunal, after granting a hearing to the plaintiff for a maximum period of five business days, and *after verifying what has been alleged*, shall declare the proceeding terminated in the pertinent part. 3) If what was resolved by the Public Administration infringes the legal system, the processing judge or Tribunal shall deny the extra-procedural satisfaction and continue with the proceeding until the judgment is issued…” (article 115).

**2.-** Regarding the requirements for this legal-procedural figure to operate, this Tribunal has stated in its precedents:

“**II.- On extra-procedural satisfaction.** The procedural reform embodied through the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure (hereinafter CPCA) advocates for a more agile and efficient justice, with shorter timeframes in the processing and resolution of matters, based on four ideological pillars, all of them of constitutional basis, namely: … In accordance with the norm, extra-procedural satisfaction occurs when, while a proceeding is underway, the Administration in its own venue recognizes, whether totally or partially, what was sought by the petitioner, which directly affects the former. That is, in accommodation to the block of legality and the exercise of its self-tutelage powers, the public entity chooses to recognize in its own venue what the plaintiff accuses and claims in the judicial venue. It is an event (the administrative conduct that recognizes what was requested) that, although it occurs outside the proceeding, has a direct impact on it insofar as it recognizes and satisfies in the administrative venue a part or the entirety of the claim. To that extent, it is evident that for the termination to occur there must be correspondence between the claims outlined by the plaintiff and what was acted upon by the Administration. From this perspective, it is clear that this fact (the total or partial recognition of what was requested) causes a decline of the current interest and upon the disappearance of that procedural prerequisite, the proceeding must conclude. Now, from an interpretation of the provisions in ordinals 115 and 197 of the CPCA, it can be established that for this modality of termination of the proceeding to occur with its respective consequences, compliance with the following conditions is required: 1) That the Administration in its venue totally or partially recognizes the claims outlined by the plaintiff. At this point, it should be highlighted that our legislator chose to allow not only the total satisfaction of the petitions (which was already established by the repealed Regulatory Law of the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction) but also partial satisfaction, with the understanding that in this latter case the proceeding must continue regarding what was not granted by the Administration. 2) That any of the parties brings the procedural satisfaction that has occurred to the attention of the Tribunal. 3) That it occurs before the issuance of the judgment. This means it can occur and be processed during the various phases of the proceeding provided it is prior to the issuance of the ruling on the merits. 4) That a hearing be granted to the plaintiff so they may allege what they deem necessary in relation to the conduct voluntarily adopted by the administrative authority. 5) That the extra-procedural satisfaction conforms to the legal system, an aspect in which the function of the Judge as guarantor of the legality of the administrative conduct takes on relevance. Finally, it must be noted that in accordance with subsection 1) of numeral 197 of the CPCA, a consequence inherent to the declaration of procedural satisfaction is that a judgment for costs will not be imposed (unless otherwise agreed by the parties) provided that it is processed before or during the preliminary hearing.” (Resolution # 300-2012-VI of 4:15 p.m. on December 20, 2012, file # 12-004553-1027-CA).

**3.-** In view of the allegations raised by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to delve into what relates to: i) the prior verification of the alleged objective administrative recognition, and ii) the judicial homologation. In this sense, it is timely to recall that this jurisdiction operates as a negative Administration, whose intervention depends on the actual existence of a legal infraction being appreciated. The control of legality over the Administration's actions consists of determining whether the decision [resolution] was adopted within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system (articles 16.1 and 216.1 of the General Law of Public Administration [LGAP]), and that its acts are not the simple fruit of the naked will of whoever adopted them. Within the object and reason for being of this administrative-contentious jurisdiction is to guarantee the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law (article 1° CPCA). If, in the exercise of this competence, legal violations are verified, the jurisdiction has the duty to sanction them, as a way to restore both the objective validity of the law, and to restore the enjoyment of the violated right, pursuant to the provisions of article 49 of the Political Constitution [CP], in relation to the guarantee of justice under article 41 ibid., giving fullness to the system. These guarantees respond to what some Italian commentators call a secondary guarantee, consisting of the legal protection regarding the so-called primary guarantees whose fundamental function is to ensure the justiciability of rights violations; these are remedial guarantees aimed at eliminating or reducing the damage produced or at restraining or punishing those responsible. This new vision has the advantage of clearly establishing what the fundamental function of the administrative-contentious jurisdiction in Costa Rica is, not only as an instrument for controlling administrative legality but also as a guarantee for the enforcement of Law. It implies abandoning the concept of justice as a service or a branch of public administration, which in reality has been a tendency towards the devaluation of the jurisdiction and the exaltation of other alternative forms of conflict resolution. It equally denotes the application of the violated substantive norms, as a reaffirmation of the principle of strict legality or juridicity where the jurisdiction develops its own function of substantial application and, therefore, of affirmation of the law (On these ideas, see: Constitutional Chamber, rulings #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, recital X; #7006-94 of 9:24 a.m. on December 2, 1994, and #2000-878 of 4:12 p.m. on January 26, recital II; from Ferrajoli, Luigi, PRINCIPIA IURIS, Theory of Law and Democracy, Theory of Law, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, pages 637 to 644; and THE FOUNDATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, pages 28, and 45 to 52; Michele Taruffo, PAGES ON CIVIL JUSTICE, translation by Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pages 21 to 29; also, articles 152 to 155 CP).

**4.-** In accordance with that article 115.3 CPCA, homologation proceeds only if what was resolved by the Administration does not infringe the legal system; if it does, that is, if the recognition agreed upon infringes the block of juridicity, the extra-procedural satisfaction must be denied and the normal course of the procedure must continue. This requirement imposes on the jurisdiction the exercise of a kind of negative judgment of weighing, which is neither more nor less than the obligation to control and determine that what was resolved administratively does not infringe the legal order, as a requirement for its own validity (article 49 CP), which requires a substantive legal analysis, considering that the Administration ordinarily must act subject to the law and to Law, as mandated by the principle of legality [or, better yet, of juridicity], in its positive and negative aspects (Cfr. articles 11 CP, 8, 11 and 216.1 LGAP). It is precisely this exercise that must be addressed in each specific case, since any administrative action carried out outside the walls of Law (Heraclitus imagined laws as <walls of the city>. Cfr. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, A Tormented Apologia of the Law, in the work FAITH IN THE LAW by Piero Calamandrei, edition by Silvia Calamandrei, translation and prologue by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, page 37), as a general rule is null, invalid, and incompatible with said principle.

**5.-** The verification of whether what was resolved in the administrative venue satisfies, totally or partially, the plaintiff's claims, is a matter that consists of confronting, collating, or contrasting the administrative act or resolution against the claims formulated in the lawsuit. Strictly speaking, satisfaction is a requirement that has a strong subjective component; the scope of the recognition agreed upon, vis-à-vis the plaintiff, will depend greatly on the position they assume before the formal administrative conduct, without the underlying presence of the principle of the autonomy of the will or the party disposition principle being able to be ignored or circumvented. The party's conduct within the proceeding is an element worthy of consideration.

**6.-** It is appropriate to examine whether in this specific case the aforementioned requirements for homologating or not the extra-procedural satisfaction alleged by the plaintiff himself are present. It is, first of all, opportune to clarify that this form of procedural termination took place in April 2015, that is, long before the judgment; the ideal would have been for the intervention of the jurisdiction to have occurred contemporaneously with that moment. As it did not happen that way, in this specific case, the Tribunal has leaned towards and opted to resolve the issue raised in the final judgment, considering the state in which the proceeding is found; this is supported by obvious reasons of celerity and concentration, in accordance with the constitutional maxim that when a person comes to the jurisdiction seeking redress for the injuries or damages received, “they must be given prompt, completed justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws” (article 41 CP).

**7.-** In the plaintiff's opinion, the administrative conduct of preparing and approving technical report DGIRH-0002-2015 of April 14, 2015, related to the reassignment study of the position he holds, # 047969 of Civil Service Manager 3, satisfies the claims of his lawsuit, identified as # 1, # 2, # 3, and # 4. In the first of these claims, it is requested to declare the absolute nullity of the acts contained in official letters 2013-4135, 2013-4876, 2013-3305, and 2013-4694; the second claim involves in part a request of the same genre (point 2.3); the rest is merely declaratory, in the sense that it be declared that upon the enactment of Laws #8696 and #9078, Laws # 6324 (articles 3 and), #7331 (articles 3 and 5) and #7969 (articles 8, letter b]), were modified, regarding the [non-]existence of the Transportation Division; the third is a natural consequence of the previous ones, in that it is pointed out that upon declaring the alleged [or operated] modification and elimination of the fundamental core of the tasks and responsibilities, competencies and functions of position # 047969 of Civil Service Manager 3, what is appropriate is, based on articles 109, 110 and 111 RESC, to carry out the study of the aforementioned position. And the fourth claim is of a negative, restrictive, or impeding nature, directed at making possible or paving the way for the effectiveness of the third, by imposing obligations of non-action, upon the Minister of MOPT and any other official.

**8.-** In accordance with the foregoing, the Tribunal appreciates that the carrying out or preparation and approval of the technical study itself, is a faithful reflection of the exercise of a legally conferred competence, on the occasion of variations experienced in certain laws, regardless of the assessments or legal conclusions that the plaintiff derives from there. That study regarding the reassignment of the position held by the plaintiff herein, conforms to what is sought in that sense, insofar as it is the driving force of his entire legal battle, as is evident from the prolegomena of the lawsuit brief (folios 7 and 8), and was confirmed *ab initio* of the oral closing arguments discourse; it is the core aspect of this proceeding, just as Licenciado Apuy Sirias expressed when substantiating the appeal for reversal that he filed in the preliminary hearing against the rejection of the declaration of Mr. Cristian Méndez Blanco, offered as a witness, and the Attorney General's Office endorsed it in exercising its right of defense, immediately thereafter; said study responds to the plaintiff's designs, to the extent that it comes to define and clarify what the current and future situation of the position he holds is, after the mutations that have occurred, according to the legal changes or reforms produced. Moreover, it comes to remove and overcome the initial refusal of the head of MOPT to endorse its execution, and empowers the initiative that the holder of the position has in this sense. Of course, position reassignment studies, unlike the assignment study, arise when their tasks and responsibilities vary substantially and permanently, with an impact on the classification, and can be carried out at the initiative of the head or authorized superior or, in the event of the latter's refusal, at the request of the holder of the position (Cfr. articles 105, letters a] and b] and 110 RESC). Claims #1, #2, and #3 (the latter in the relevant part), in essence boil down to describing the reason, the background that would justify the carrying out of the study. It is necessary to deem the case terminated to the suggested extent[…].

**Fifth**: **On the extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal).** First, it is necessary to refer to the brief filed on May 11, 2015, through which the plaintiff informs the Tribunal, in accordance with article 115, subsection 1, CPCA, that in the present case “*a partial extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal) in the administrative venue has occurred regarding claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, which is verified by Certification DGIRH-2978-2014* [sic]* at fourteen hours and four minutes on May 8, 2015* [sic]*, issued by Mr. Cristian Méndez Blanco, Director of Institutional Management of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), certifying the following…*”. Said document states the following: “… *in accordance with articles 109, 110 and 111 of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute, prepared and approved Technical Report DGIRH-0002-2015 dated April 14, 2015, related to the Study of Reassignment of Position 047969 of Civil Service Manager 3, held in property by the employee Rafael Chan Jaén, identification number 5-134-539. That according to official letter DGIRH-2975-2015 dated May 7, 2015, Technical Report DGIRH-0002-2015 was sent to the Coordinator, Civil Service Office-Ministry of Public Works and Transport for its endorsement process*” (folio 463). The plaintiff adds that MOPT, by finishing and approving the study of reassignment of position #047969, “*not only demonstrates the partial extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal) of claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the lawsuit and particularly claim 3, but also demonstrates the non-conformity of the conduct with the legal system and the absolute nullity of the conduct of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, due to lack of competence in matters of reassignment of positions of the Civil Service Regime and for express violation of the law*” (folio 458).

**1.-** Title VI of the CPCA, concerning “termination of the process”, in its Chapter I, under the heading “other modes of termination”, regulates the extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal), as follows:

“1) If, having initiated the process, the sued Public Administration fully or partially acknowledges, *in the administrative venue, the plaintiff's claims*, any of the parties may bring this to the attention of the processing judge or the tribunal. 2) The processing judge or the Tribunal, after granting an audience to the plaintiff for a maximum period of five business days, and *after prior verification of what is alleged*, will declare the process terminated in the pertinent part. 3) If what was resolved by the Public Administration infringes the legal system, the processing judge or Tribunal will deny the extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal) and continue with the process until the issuance of the judgment…” (article 115).

**2.-** Regarding the requirements for this legal-procedural figure to operate, this Tribunal has stated in its precedents:

“*II.- On extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal). The procedural reform embodied through the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code (hereinafter CPCA) advocates for more agile and efficient justice, with shorter deadlines in the processing and resolution of matters, based on four ideological pillars, all of constitutional basis, namely: … According to the norm, extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal) occurs when, during an ongoing process, the Administration acknowledges in its own venue, either totally or partially, what was sought by the petitioner, which directly impacts the former. That is, in accommodation to the block of legality and exercise of its powers of self-review, the public entity chooses to acknowledge in its own venue what the plaintiff accuses and claims in the judicial venue. It is an event (the administrative conduct that acknowledges what was requested) that, although it happens outside the process, has a direct impact on it as it acknowledges and satisfies a part or the totality of the claim in the administrative venue. Therefore, it is evident that for termination to occur, there must be correspondence between the claims outlined by the plaintiff and what was done by the Administration. …*” **3.-** In attention to the allegations raised by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to delve into matters related to: i) the prior verification of the alleged objective administrative acknowledgment, and ii) the judicial approval (homologación judicial). In this sense, it is timely to recall that this jurisdiction operates as a negative Administration, whose intervention depends on the actual appreciation of the existence of a legal infringement. The legality control over the conduct of the Administration consists of determining whether the decision [resolution] was adopted within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system (articles 16.1 and 216.1 of the General Law of Public Administration [LGAP]), and that its acts are not the simple fruit of the bare will of whoever adopted it. Within the object and reason for being of this contentious-administrative jurisdiction is *guaranteeing the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to administrative law* (article 1 CPCA). If, in the exercise of this competence, legal violations are found, the jurisdiction has the duty to sanction them, as a way of restoring both the objective validity of the law and the enjoyment of the violated right, in accordance with the provisions of article 49 of the Political Constitution [CP], in relation to the guarantee of *justice* of article 41 ibidem, giving fullness to the system. These guarantees respond to what some Italian exponents call *secondary guarantee,* consisting of the legal protection regarding the also-called *primary guarantees* whose fundamental function is to ensure the justiciability of rights violations; these are compensatory guarantees aimed at eliminating or reducing the harm produced or at restraining or punishing those responsible. This new vision has the advantage of clearly establishing what the fundamental function of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in Costa Rica is, not only as an instrument for controlling administrative legality but also as a guarantee for the actuation of the Law. It implies abandoning the concept of justice as a *service* or a branch of public administration, which has actually been a tendency towards the devaluation of the jurisdiction and the exaltation of other alternative forms of conflict resolution. It equally denotes the application of the violated substantive norms, as a reaffirmation of the principle of strict legality or juridicity where the jurisdiction develops its proper function of substantial application and, therefore, of affirmation of the *law* (On these ideas, see: Constitutional Chamber, judgments #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, Considering X; #7006-94 of 9:24 a.m. on December 2, 1994, and #2000-878 of 4:12 p.m. on January 26, Considering II; from Ferrajoli, Luigi, PRINCIPIA IURIS, Teoría del Derecho y de la democracia, Teoría del derecho, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, pages 637 to 644; and LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, pages 28, and 45 to 52; Michele Taruffo, PAGINAS SOBRE JUSTICIA CIVIL, translation by Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pages 21 to 29; also, articles 152 to 155 CP).

**4.-** Pursuant to that article 115.3 CPCA, judicial approval (homologación) is appropriate provided that what was resolved by the Administration does not infringe the legal system; if it does, that is, if the agreed acknowledgment infringes the block of juridicity, the extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal) must be denied and the normal course of the procedure continued. This requirement imposes on the jurisdiction the exercise of a kind of negative balancing judgment, which is nothing more and nothing less than the obligation to control and determine that what was administratively resolved does not infringe the legal order, as a requirement for its own validity (article 49 CP), which requires a substantive legal analysis, considering that the Administration ordinarily must act subject to the law and the Law, as imposed by the principle of legality [or, better yet, of *juridicity*], in its positive and negative aspects (Cf. articles 11 CP, 8, 11 and 216.1 LGAP). It is precisely this exercise that must be addressed in each specific case, since any administrative action carried out outside the walls of the Law (Heraclitus imagined laws as “walls of the city”. Cf. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, *Una atormentada Apología de la Ley*, in the work FE EN EL DERECHO by Piero Calamandrei, edition by Silvia Calamandrei, translation and prologue by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, page 37), as a general rule, is null, invalid, and incompatible with said principle.

**5.-** The verification of whether what was resolved in the administrative venue *satisfies*, totally or partially, the *claims* of the plaintiff, is a question that consists of confronting, collating, or contrasting the administrative act or resolution against the claims formulated in the lawsuit. Strictly speaking, *satisfaction* is a requirement that has a strong subjective component; the scope of the agreed acknowledgment, vis-à-vis the plaintiff, will depend greatly on the position he assumes regarding the formal administrative conduct, without being able to ignore or sideline the underlying presence of the principle of party autonomy or principle of disposition. The conduct of the party within the process is an element worthy of consideration.

**6.-** It is appropriate to examine whether, in the specific case, the said requirements concur, in order to judicially approve (homologar) or not the extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal) alleged by the plaintiff himself. It is, first of all, timely to clarify that this form of procedural termination took place in April 2015, that is, long before the judgment; the ideal would have been for the intervention of the jurisdiction to have occurred contemporaneously with that moment. As it did not happen that way, in this specific case, the Tribunal has leaned towards and opted to resolve the question raised in the final judgment, given the state of the process; evident reasons of speed and concentration support this, in accordance with the constitutional maxim according to which when a person comes to the jurisdiction seeking redress for injuries or damages received, “*they must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*” (article 41 CP).

**7.-** In the opinion of the plaintiff, the administrative conduct of preparing and approving technical report DGIRH-0002-2015 of April 14, 2015, related to the study of reassignment of the position he holds, #047969 of Civil Service Manager 3, satisfies the claims of his lawsuit, identified as #1, #2, #3, and #4. In the first of those claims, it is requested that the absolute nullity be declared of the acts contained in official letters 2013-4135, 2013-4876, 2013-3305, and 2013-4694; the second claim partly involves a request of the same kind (point 2.3); the rest is merely declaratory, in the sense of declaring that upon the enactment of Laws #8696 and #9078, Laws #6324 (articles 3 and), #7331 (articles 3 and 5), and #7969 (articles 8, letter b]) were modified, regarding the [*non*] existence of the Transport Division; the third is a natural consequence of the previous ones, in that it is indicated that upon declaring the alleged [or effected] modification and elimination of the fundamental core of the tasks and responsibilities, competencies, and functions of position #047969 of Civil Service Manager 3, what is appropriate is, based on articles 109, 110, and 111 RESC, to carry out the study of the aforementioned position. And the fourth claim is of a negative, restrictive, or preventive nature, aimed at making possible or paving the way for the effectiveness of the third, by imposing obligations not to do, upon the Minister of MOPT and any other official.

**8.-** According to the foregoing, the Tribunal appreciates that the realization or preparation and approval of the technical study itself, is a faithful reflection of the exercise of a legally conferred competence, due to variations experienced in certain laws, regardless of the legal assessments or conclusions that the plaintiff derives from it. That study relating to the reassignment of the position held by the plaintiff here, conforms to what is sought in that sense, insofar as it is the driving force of his entire legal battle, as is evident from the prolegomena of the lawsuit brief (folios 7 and 8), and he ratified it *ab initio* in the discourse of oral conclusions; *it is the core aspect of this process*, just as Attorney Apuy Sirias expressed it when substantiating the appeal for reversal that he filed at the preliminary hearing against the rejection of the declaration of Mr. Cristian Méndez Blanco, offered as a witness, and the Attorney General's Office endorsed it when exercising its right of defense immediately thereafter; said study answers the designs of the plaintiff, to the extent that it defines and clarifies what the current and future situation of the position he holds is, after the changes occurred, according to the legal changes or reforms produced. Furthermore, it removes and overcomes the initial refusal of the head of MOPT to endorse its implementation, and strengthens the initiative that the holder of the position has in this regard. Of course, studies of reassignment of positions, unlike those of assignment, arise when their tasks and responsibilities vary substantially and permanently, with an impact on the classification, and they can be carried out at the request of the head or authorized chief or, in the face of the latter's refusal, at the request of the holder of the position (Cf. articles 105, letters a] and b] and 110 RESC). Claims #1, #2, and #3 (the latter, in the pertinent part), essentially boil down to describing the motive, the background that would justify carrying out the study. It is necessary to deem the case terminated to the suggested[…”] extent.

from the Administration. From this perspective, it is clear that that fact (the total or partial recognition of what was requested) causes a decay of the current interest and upon the disappearance of that procedural prerequisite, the process must conclude. Now, from an interpretation of the provisions in articles 115 and 197 of the CPCA, it can be established that for this form of termination of the process to occur with its respective consequences, the fulfillment of the following conditions is required: 1) That the Administration recognizes, within its own venue, totally or partially the claims outlined by the plaintiff. On this point, it should be noted that our legislator opted to allow not only the total satisfaction of the petitions (which was already established by the repealed Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) but also the partial one, it being the case that in the latter scenario the process must continue for that which was not granted by the Administration. 2) That either party informs the Court of the procedural satisfaction that has occurred. 3) That it occurs before the judgment is issued. This means that it can occur and be managed during the various phases of the process provided it is prior to the issuance of the ruling on the merits. 4) That a hearing be granted to the plaintiff so that they may argue what they deem necessary in relation to the conduct voluntarily adopted by the administrative authority. 5) That the extra-procedural satisfaction conforms to the legal system, an aspect in which the role of the Judge as guarantor of the legality of the administrative conduct becomes relevant. Finally, it must be pointed out that according to subsection 1) of article 197 of the CPCA, a proper consequence of the declaration of procedural satisfaction is that no order for costs shall be imposed (unless otherwise agreed by the parties) provided that this is managed before or during the preliminary hearing.” (Resolution # 300-2012-VI of 16:15 on December 20, 2012, file # 12-004553-1027-CA).

**3.-** In light of the allegations raised by the plaintiff, it is fitting to delve into matters relating to: i) the prior verification of the alleged objective administrative recognition, and ii) the judicial approval (homologación judicial). In this regard, it is timely to recall that this jurisdiction operates as a negative Administration, whose intervention depends on the real appreciation of the existence of a legal infraction. The control of legality over the conduct of the Administration consists of determining whether the decision [resolution] was adopted within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system (articles 16.1 and 216.1 of the Ley General de Administración Pública [LGAP]), and that its acts are not the simple fruit of the bare will of the person who adopted it. Within the object and reason for being of this administrative-litigation jurisdiction is *to guarantee the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to administrative Law* (article 1 CPCA). If, in the exercise of this competence, legal violations are verified, the jurisdiction has the duty to sanction them, as a means to restore both the objective validity of the law and to restore the enjoyment of the violated right, in accordance with the provisions of article 49 of the Constitución Política [CP], in relation to the guarantee of *justice* in article 41 ibidem, giving fullness to the system. These guarantees correspond to what some Italian commentators call *secondary guarantee,* consisting of the legal protection regarding what are also called *primary guarantees* whose fundamental function is to ensure the justiciability of rights violations; these are reparatory guarantees aimed at eliminating or reducing the damage produced or at restraining or punishing those responsible. This new vision has the advantage of clearly establishing what the fundamental function of the administrative-litigation jurisdiction is in Costa Rica, not only as an instrument of control of administrative legality but as a guarantee for the operation of the Law. It implies the abandonment of the concept of justice as a *service* or a branch of public administration, which in reality has been a tendency toward the devaluation of the jurisdiction and the exaltation of other alternative forms of conflict resolution. It equally denotes the application of the violated substantive norms, as a reaffirmation of the principle of strict legality or juridicity where the jurisdiction develops its own function of substantial application and, therefore, of affirmation of the *law* (Regarding these ideas, one may consult: Constitutional Chamber, rulings #1739-92 of 11:45 on July 1, 1992, Consideration X; #7006-94 of 9:24 on December 2, 1994, and #2000-878 of 16:12 on January 26, Consideration II; by Ferrajoli, Luigi, PRINCIPIA IURIS, Teoría del Derecho y de la democracia, Teoría del derecho, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, pages 637 to 644; and LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, pages 28, and 45 to 52; Michele Taruffo, PAGINAS SOBRE JUSTICIA CIVIL, translation by Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pages 21 to 29; also, articles 152 to 155 CP).

**4.-** In accordance with that article 115.3 CPCA, judicial approval (homologación) is appropriate provided that what was resolved by the Administration does not infringe upon the legal system; if it does, that is, if the agreed recognition infringes upon the block of juridicity, the extra-procedural satisfaction must be denied and the normal course of the procedure must continue. This requirement imposes on the jurisdiction the exercise of a kind of negative judgment of weighting, which is neither more nor less than the obligation to control and determine that what was resolved administratively does not infringe the legal order, as a requirement for its own validity (article 49 CP), which demands a substantive legal analysis, in consideration that the Administration ordinarily must act subject to the law and to the Law, as imposed by the principle of legality [or, better yet, of *juridicity*], in its positive and negative aspects (Cf. articles 11 CP, 8, 11 and 216.1 LGAP). It is precisely this exercise that must be addressed in each specific case, because any administrative action carried out beyond the walls of the Law (Heraclitus imagined the laws as *<walls of the city>*. Cf. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, *Una atormentada Apología de la Ley*, in the work FE EN EL DERECHO by Piero Calamandrei, edition by Silvia Calamandrei, translation and foreword by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, page 37), is, as a general rule, null, invalid, and incompatible with said principle.

**5.-** The verification of whether what was resolved in administrative proceedings *satisfies*, totally or partially, the *claims* of the plaintiff, is a matter that consists of confronting, comparing, or contrasting the administrative act or resolution against the claims formulated in the lawsuit. Strictly speaking, *satisfaction* is a requirement that has a strong subjective component; the scope of the agreed recognition, vis-à-vis the plaintiff, will depend greatly on the posture they assume before the formal administrative conduct, without being able to ignore or sidestep the underlying presence of the principle of party autonomy or the dispositive principle. The conduct of the party within the process is an element worthy of consideration.

**6.-** It is fitting to examine whether, in the specific case, the aforementioned requirements are present, in order to approve (homologar) or not the extra-procedural satisfaction alleged by the plaintiff themselves. It is, first, timely to clarify that this form of procedural termination took place in April 2015, that is, long before the judgment; the ideal would have been for the jurisdiction's intervention to occur contemporaneously with that moment. As this did not occur, in this specific case, the Court has inclined toward and opted to resolve the question raised in a final judgment, in view of the state in which the process finds itself; evident reasons of speed and concentration support this, in accordance with the constitutional maxim according to which when a person comes to the jurisdiction seeking reparation for injuries or damages received, “*they must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws*” (article 41 CP).

**7.-** In the plaintiff’s opinion, the administrative conduct of preparing and approving the technical report DGIRH-0002-2015 of April 14, 2015, related to the reassignment study for the position they hold, # 047969 of Gerente de Servicio Civil 3, satisfies the claims of their lawsuit, identified as # 1, # 2, # 3, and # 4. In the first of these claims, they seek a declaration of absolute nullity of the acts contained in official letters 2013-4135, 2013-4876, 2013-3305, and 2013-4694; the second claim partly involves a request of the same kind (point 2.3); the rest is merely declarative, in the sense of declaring that upon the enactment of Laws #8696 and #9078, Laws # 6324 (articles 3 and), #7331 (articles 3 and 5) and #7969 (articles 8, letter b]), were modified, regarding the [*in*] existence of the División de Transportes; the third is a natural consequence of the previous ones, in that it points out that upon declaring the alleged [or operated] modification and elimination of the fundamental core of tasks and responsibilities, competencies, and functions of position # 047969 of Gerente de Servicio Civil 3, what is appropriate is, based on articles 109, 110 and 111 RESC, to conduct the study of the aforesaid position. And the fourth claim is of a negative, restrictive, or impeding nature, directed at making possible or paving the way for the effectiveness of the third, through the imposition of obligations not to do, upon the Minister of MOPT and any other official.

**8.-** Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the conducting or preparation and approval of the technical study itself is a faithful reflection of the exercise of a legally conferred competence, due to variations experienced in certain laws, regardless of the legal assessments or conclusions that the plaintiff derives from it. That study regarding the reassignment of the position held by the plaintiff herein conforms to what is claimed in that sense, as it is the driving force of their entire legal battle, as is evident from the preliminaries of the lawsuit brief (folios 7 and 8), and as was ratified *ab initio* in the oral closing arguments speech; *it is the central aspect of this process*, just as Mr. Apuy Sirias stated when substantiating the appeal for reversal he filed during the preliminary hearing against the rejection of the testimony of Mr. Cristian Méndez Blanco, offered as a witness, and as was seconded by the Procuraduría General de la República in exercising its right of defense, immediately thereafter; said study responds to the design of the plaintiff, to the extent that it defines and clarifies what the current and future situation of the position they hold is, following the mutations that have occurred, according to the legal changes or reforms produced. Furthermore, it removes and overcomes the initial refusal of the head of MOPT to endorse its execution, and strengthens the initiative that the holder of the position has in this regard. Of course, position reassignment studies, unlike assignment studies, arise when their tasks and responsibilities change substantially and permanently, with an impact on their classification, and may be conducted at the request of the head or authorized superior or, in the face of the latter's refusal, at the request of the position holder (Cf. articles 105, letters a] and b] and 110 RESC). Claims #1, #2 and #3 (the latter in so far as relevant), essentially boil down to describing the reason, the background that would justify the execution of the study. It is necessary to consider the case terminated in the suggested proportion […].”

“Quinto: Sobre la satisfacción extra procesal. Que en primer término cabe referirse al escrito presentado el 11 de mayo de 2015, por medio del cual la parte actora pone en conocimiento del Tribunal, de conformidad con el artículo 115, inciso 1, CPCA que en el presente caso “se ha dado una satisfacción extraprocesal parcial en vía administrativa de las pretensiones 1, 2, 3, y 4 de la demanda incoada por la parte actora, lo que se comprueba con la Certificación DGIRH-2978-2014 [sic] de las catorce horas cuatro minutos del día 08 de mayo del 2015 [sic], emitida por el Lic. Cristian Méndez Blanco, Director de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT), mediante la cual certifica lo siguiente …”. Dicho documento señala lo siguiente: “ … de conformidad con los artículos 109, 110 y 111 del Reglamento al Estatuto del Servicio Civil, elaboró y aprobó el Informe Técnico DGIRH-0002-2015 de fecha 14 de abril del 2015, relacionado con el Estudio de Reasignación del Puesto 047969 de Gerente del Servicio Civil 3, ocupado en propiedad por el servidor Rafael Chan Jaén, cédula número 5-134-539. Que de acuerdo con el oficio DGIRH-2975-2015 de fecha 07 de mayo de 2015, el Informe Técnico DGIRH-0002-2015 fue remitido a la Coordinadora, Oficina de Servicio Civil-Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para su trámite de refrendo.” (folio 463). Agrega el actor que el MOPT al terminar y aprobar el estudio de reasignación del puesto #047969 “no sólo se demuestra la satisfacción extraprocesal parcial de las pretensiones 1, 2, 3, y 4 de la demanda y en particular la pretensión 3, sino que con ello se demuestra la disconformidad de la conducta con el ordenamiento jurídico y nulidad absoluta de la conducta del Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, por incompetencia en materia de reasignación de puestos del Régimen del Servicio Civil y por violación expresa de la ley ...” (folio 458).

1.- El Título VI del CPCA, relativo a la <terminación del proceso>, en su capítulo I, bajo el epígrafe <otros modos de terminación>, regula la satisfacción extraprocesal, en los siguientes términos:

“1) Si, habiéndose incoado el proceso, la Administración Pública demandada reconoce, total o parcialmente, en vía administrativa las pretensiones del demandante, cualquiera de las partes podrá ponerlo en conocimiento del juez tramitador o del tribunal. 2) El juez tramitador o el Tribunal, luego de concedida audiencia al demandante por un plazo máximo de cinco días hábiles, y previa comprobación de lo alegado, declarará terminado el proceso en lo conducente. 3) Si lo resuelto por la Administración Pública infringe el ordenamiento jurídico, el juez tramitador o Tribunal denegará la satisfacción extraprocesal y continuará con el proceso hasta el dictado de la sentencia…” (artículo 115).

2.- Sobre los requisitos exigidos para que opere esta figura jurídico-procesal, este Tribunal ha expresado en sus precedentes:

“II.- Sobre la satisfacción extraprocesal. La reforma procesal plasmada a través del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (en adelante CPCA) propugna por una justicia más ágil y eficiente, con plazos más cortos en el trámite y resolución de asuntos, sustentándose para ello en cuatro pilares ideológicos, todos ellos, de base constitucional, a saber: … Conforme a la norma, la satisfacción extraprocesal se produce cuando estando en curso un proceso, la Administración en su sede reconoce, sea total o parcialmente lo pretendido por el gestionante, lo cual incide directamente en aquél. Esto es, en acomodo al bloque de legalidad y ejercicio de sus potestades de autotutela, el ente público opta por reconocer en su propia sede, lo que la parte demandante acusa y reclama en la vía judicial. Se trata de un evento (la conducta administrativa que reconoce lo pedido) que si bien sucede fuera del proceso, tiene incidencia directa en éste en tanto reconoce y satisface en la vía administrativa una parte o la totalidad de la pretensión. En ese tanto, es evidente que para que se produzca la culminación debe haber correspondencia entre las pretensiones esbozadas por la parte actora y lo actuado por la Administración. Desde esta perspectiva, es claro que ese hecho (el reconocimiento total o parcial de lo pedido) provoca un decaimiento del interés actual y al desaparecer ese presupuesto procesal, el proceso debe concluir. Ahora bien, de una interpretación de lo dispuesto en los ordinales 115 y 197 del CPCA, puede establecerse que para que se produzca esa modalidad de terminación del proceso con sus respectivas consecuencias, se requiere el cumplimiento de las siguientes condiciones: 1) Que la Administración reconozca en su sede total o parcialmente las pretensiones esbozadas por la parte demandante. En este punto debe resaltarse que nuestro legislador optó por permitir no solo la satisfacción total de los pedimentos (que ya establecía la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) sino también la parcial, siendo que en este último supuesto el proceso debe continuar en lo no concedido por la Administración. 2) Que cualquiera de las partes ponga en conocimiento del Tribunal la satisfacción procesal acaecida. 3) Que ocurra antes del dictado de la sentencia. Esto significa que puede ocurrir y gestionarse durante las diversas fases del proceso siempre que sea con anterioridad al dictado del fallo sobre el fondo. 4) Que se otorgue audiencia al demandante para que alegue lo que estime necesario en relación con la conducta adoptada en forma voluntaria por la autoridad administrativa. 5) Que la satisfacción extraprocesal sea conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, aspecto en el cual toma relevancia la función del Juez como garante de la legalidad de la conducta administrativa. Finalmente, ha de señalarse que conforme al inciso 1) del numeral 197 del CPCA, una consecuencia propia de la declaratoria de la satisfacción procesal es que no se impondrá condenatoria en costas (salvo acuerdo en contrario de las partes) siempre y cuando ésta se gestione antes o durante la audiencia preliminar.” (Resolución # 300-2012-VI de 16.15 horas de 20 de diciembre de 2012, carpeta # 12-004553-1027-CA).

3.- En atención a las alegaciones planteadas por la parte actora, conviene ahondar en lo relativo a: i) la previa comprobación del alegado reconocimiento administrativo objetivo, y ii) la homologación judicial. En este sentido es oportuno recordar que esta jurisdicción opera como Administración negativa, cuya intervención depende de que se aprecie realmente la existencia de infracción jurídica. El control de legalidad sobre la actuación de la Administración consiste en determinar si la decisión [resolución] se adoptó dentro del procedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento (artículos 16.1 y 216.1 de la Ley General de Administración Pública [LGAP]), y que sus actos no son el simple fruto de la voluntad desnuda de quien lo ha adoptado. Dentro del objeto y razón de ser de esta jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa está garantizar la legalidad de cualquier conducta de la Administración Pública sujeta al Derecho administrativo (artículo 1° CPCA). Si en ejercicio de esta competencia, se constatan violaciones jurídicas, la jurisdicción tiene el deber de sancionarlas, como forma de restituir tanto la vigencia objetiva de la ley, cuanto de restablecer en el goce del derecho violado, en atención a lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política [CP], en relación con la garantía de justicia del 41 ibídem, dando plenitud al sistema. Estas garantías responden a lo que algunos secundaria, consistente en la protección jurídica respecto de las también llamadas garantías primarias cuya función fundamental es asegurar la justiciabilidad de las violaciones de los derechos; se trata de garantías reparatorias dirigidas a eliminar o reducir el daño producido o a cohibir o a castigar a los responsables. Esta nueva visión tiene la ventaja de establecer claramente cuál es la función fundamental de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa en Costa Rica, no solo como instrumento de control de la legalidad administrativa sino como garantía de actuación del Derecho. Implica el abandono del concepto de la justicia como un servicio o una rama de la administración pública que en realidad ha sido una tendencia hacia la devaluación de la jurisdicción y exaltación de otras formas alternativas de solución de conflictos. Denota igualmente la aplicación de las normas sustantivas violadas, como reafirmación del principio de estricta legalidad o juridicidad en donde la jurisdicción desarrolla la función que le es propia de aplicación substancial y, por ende, de afirmación de la ley (Sobre estas ideas pueden consultarse: Sala Constitucional, sentencias #1739-92 de 11.45 horas de 1 de julio de 1992, considerando X; #7006-94 de 9.24 horas de 2 de diciembre de 1994, y #2000-878 de 16.12 horas de 26 de enero, considerando II; de Ferrajoli, Luigi, PRINCIPIA IURIS, Teoría del Derecho y de la democracia, Teoría del derecho, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, páginas 637 a 644; y LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, páginas 28, y 45 a 52; Michele Taruffo, PAGINAS SOBRE JUSTICIA CIVIL, traducción de Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, páginas 21 a 29; además, artículos 152 a 155 CP).

4.- Con arreglo a ese artículo 115.3 CPCA, la homologación procede siempre que lo resuelto por la Administración no infrinja el ordenamiento jurídico; de ser así, es decir, si el reconocimiento acordado, infringe el bloque de juridicidad, hay que denegar la satisfacción extraprocesal y continuar el curso normal del procedimiento. Este requisito impone a la jurisdicción el ejercicio de una especie de juicio negativo de ponderación, que no es ni más ni menos que la obligación de controlar y determinar que lo resuelto administrativamente, no infringe el orden jurídico, como requisito de su propia validez (artículo 49 CP), lo que exige un análisis jurídico substantivo, en atención a que la Administración ordinariamente debe actuar sometida a la ley y al Derecho, por imponerlo así el principio de legalidad [o, mejor aún, de juridicidad], en su vertiente positiva y negativa (Cfr. artículos 11 CP, 8, 11 y 216.1 LGAP). Es precisamente este ejercicio el que debe abordarse en cada caso concreto, pues cualquier actuación administrativa realizada a extra muros del Derecho (Heráclito imaginaba las leyes como <murallas de la ciudad>. Cfr. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, Una atormentada Apología de la Ley, en la obra FE EN EL DERECHO de Piero Calamandrei, edición de Silvia Calamandrei, traducción y prólogo de Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, página 37), por regla general es nula, inválida e incompatible con dicho principio.

5.- La comprobación de si lo resuelto en vía administrativa, satisface, total o parcialmente, las pretensiones del demandante, es una cuestión que consiste en confrontar, cotejar o contrastar el acto o resolución administrativa, contra las pretensiones formuladas en la demanda. En rigor, la satisfacción es un requisito que tiene un fuerte componente subjetivo; los alcances del reconocimiento acordado, frente al demandante, dependerán en mucho de la postura que este asuma ante la conducta administrativa formal, sin que pueda ignorarse u orillarse la presencia subyacente del principio de autonomía de la voluntad o principio dispositivo. La conducta de la parte dentro del proceso, es un elemento digno de consideración.

6.- Conviene examinar si en el caso concreto concurren los requisitos dichos, para homologar o no la satisfacción extraprocesal alegada por el propio demandante. Es, en primer término, oportuno aclarar que esta forma de terminación procesal, ha tenido lugar en abril de 2015, es decir, mucho antes de la sentencia; lo ideal habría sido que la intervención de la jurisdicción se diera contemporáneamente a ese momento. Como no ocurrió así, en este caso concreto, el Tribunal se ha inclinado y ha optado por resolver la cuestión planteada, en sentencia definitiva, en atención al estado en que se encuentra el proceso; se abonan en este sentido evidentes razones de celeridad y concentración, conforme a la máxima constitucional según la cual cuando una persona acude a la jurisdicción en busca de reparación para las injurias o daños recibidos, “debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes” (artículo 41 CP).

7.- En opinión de la parte actora, la conducta administrativa de elaborar y aprobar el informe técnico DGIRH-0002-2015 de 14 de abril de 2015, relacionado con el estudio de reasignación del puesto que ocupa, # 047969 de Gerente de Servicio Civil 3, satisface las pretensiones de su demanda, identificadas como # 1, # 2, # 3 y # 4. En la primera de esas pretensiones, se pide declarar la nulidad absoluta de los actos contenidos en los oficios 2013-4135, 2013-4876, 2013-3305 y 2013-4694; la segunda pretensión envuelve en parte una solicitud del mismo género (punto 2.3); el resto es meramente declarativa, en el sentido que se declare que al promulgarse las Leyes #8696 y #9078, se modificó las Leyes # 6324 (artículos 3 y), #7331 (artículos 3 y 5) y #7969 (artículos 8, letra b]), en lo relativo a la [in] existencia de la División de Transportes; la tercera es consecuencia natural de las anteriores, en cuanto se señala que al declararse la aducida [u operada] modificación y eliminación del núcleo fundamental de las tareas y responsabilidades, competencias y funciones del puesto # 047969 de Gerente de Servicio Civil 3, lo que procede es, con base en los artículos 109, 110 y 111 RESC, realizar el estudio del precitado puesto. Y la cuarta pretensión es de corte negativo, restrictivo o impeditivo, dirigida a hacer posible o allanar el camino para la efectividad de la tercera, mediante la imposición de obligaciones de no hacer, en cabeza del Ministro del MOPT y de cualquier otro funcionario.

8.- Conforme a lo expuesto, el Tribunal aprecia que la realización o elaboración y aprobación del estudio técnico en sí, es fiel reflejo del ejercicio de una competencia legalmente conferida, con motivo de variaciones experimentadas en determinadas leyes, al margen de las valoraciones o conclusiones jurídicas que de allí deriva la parte actora. Ese estudio relativo a la reasignación del puesto que ocupa el aquí actor, se ajusta a lo que en ese sentido se pretende, en tanto éste es la fuerza motriz de toda su batalla legal, tal y como se desprende de los prolegómenos del escrito de demanda (folios 7 y 8), y lo ratificó ab initio del discurso de conclusiones orales; es el aspecto medular de este proceso, tal cual lo expresó el Licenciado Apuy Sirias, al fundamentar el recurso de revocatoria que interpuso en la audiencia preliminar contra el rechazo de la declaración del señor Cristian Méndez Blanco, ofrecida como testigo, y lo prohijó la Procuraduría General de la República al ejercer su derecho de defensa, acto continuo; dicho estudio responde los designios del actor, en la medida que viene a definir y clarificar cuál es la situación actual y futura del puesto que detenta, luego de las mutaciones acaecidas, según los cambios o reformas legales producidos. Además viene a remover y superar la negativa inicial del jerarca del MOPT de avalar su práctica, y potencia la iniciativa que en este sentido tiene el titular del puesto. Desde luego que los estudios de reasignación de puestos, a diferencia del de asignación, surgen cuando varían sustancial y permanentemente sus tareas y responsabilidades, con incidencia en la clasificación, y pueden practicarse a gestión del jerarca o jefe autorizado o, ante la negativa de éste, a solicitud del titular del puesto (Cfr. artículos 105, letras a] y b] y 110 RESC). Las pretensiones #1, #2 y #3 (ésta en lo pertinente), en el fondo se reducen a describir el motivo, los antecedentes que justificarían la práctica del estudio. Se impone tener por terminado el caso en la proporción sugerida[…].”