Acquittal in MIVAH-BCIE Trust Case Due to Evidentiary DoubtAbsolución en caso de fideicomiso MIVAH-BCIE por duda probatoria

IV.Due to the interconnectedness of the issues raised for review in the three appeals filed, all related to the validity of the judgment due to the composition of the Tribunal at the time of reading the full judgment; the lawfulness of the admitted evidence; and the determination of the proven facts, they are resolved jointly, and in the order set forth herein, to provide coherence to the decision.

A. Regarding the composition of the Tribunal for the full reading of the verdict: The challenge concerning the violation of the principle of publicity and, specifically, Article 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), lacks valid support and, consequently, is dismissed. Indeed, this procedural rule provides in its last paragraph that the judgment shall be deemed notified upon its full reading and that the parties shall receive a copy thereof, which allows the inference that any notification carried out in breach of what is stated in said article would be inadmissible or would render the notification act void. However, this is not the case, because the reading of the judgment was to be carried out at the indicated time, with or without one of the judges who decided it, since, once signed, the Tribunal could well have been constituted with a different panel solely to fulfill the notification; but if it was not done, it was because the parties so accepted. As is evident from the printed proceedings and the record of the virtual case file, the reading of the operative part of the judgment was carried out at 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2014, by the three members of the Tribunal that conducted the trial (Franz Paniagua Mejía, [Name1], and [Name2]). Likewise, in the judgment-document, No. 031-2014, dated 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2014, the signatures of the same three judges who communicated the operative part appear. This being so, the guarantee of the judge's identity, which seeks to ensure that the judges who attended the hearing and had contact with the evidence inform the parties of the decision and issue the full judgment, after joint deliberation, has been fulfilled. Furthermore, even though it is alleged that one of the judges was absent on the day of the full reading, the truth is that, as extracted from the certification issued by the judicial technician [Name3], both attorney [Name4] and attorney [Name5], private defense counsel for [Name [Name6]] and [Name [Name7]], respectively, agreed to be given a copy of the judgment; therefore, if they did not require the full and oral reading of the verdict, they cannot take advantage of this situation to claim, just because, that the document was not read, as they themselves contributed to the Tribunal omitting that formality. In any case, the omission of that act caused no grievance, nor did it violate the right to defense or intervention, because the parties had timely access to the content of the judgment. The omission of that procedural step did not prevent knowledge of the decision issued, nor the exercise of control over it within the legal deadlines provided for each of those procedural acts (reading of the operative part, full reading of the verdict, and communication to the parties). Finally, it must be said that neither is there any record that a citizen, unrelated to the proceedings, appeared in the courtroom where the parties were summoned for the reading of the full judgment with an interest in knowing the content of the verdict, so the principle of publicity was not violated in that sense, nor was that of the citizenry in general, who through the media could learn of what occurred in this matter, as the status of public officials of the accused made the news transcend. So, from this point of view, control over the administration of justice could be exercised. As the appellants lack reason on these points, the claims are not admissible.

B. Illegality of the admitted documentary evidence: In various ways, at different stages, the parties have challenged the legitimacy of the documentary evidence incorporated into the proceedings, as in their view, the judicial authority should always have intervened. This objection, extensively addressed by the judges in Considerando I of the appealed judgment, is also unacceptable. In accordance with Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the facts and circumstances of interest to the case may be proven by any permitted means of proof, except for express legal prohibition. In this particular case, the documents supporting the prosecution's hypothesis, and the judgment, were provided, at the request of the same accused [ [Name8] ], by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (hereinafter BCIE) and by the Comptroller General of the Republic (hereinafter CGR), (cf. f. 22 of the report DFOE-SOC-DP-2-2008 issued by the Division of Operational and Evaluative Oversight of the Comptroller General of the Republic, f. 033 of the investigation file), apart from others recovered by judicial order, specifically the one issued at 11:45 a.m. on August 9, 2006 (which ordered the search of the Ministry of Housing and the seizure of all personal and employment information related to this case, regarding the accused [ [Name9] ]); the one at 8:45 a.m. on April 22, 2006 (waiver of bank secrecy); and the one at 10:49 a.m. on November 26, 2010 (cf. f. 101-143 of the investigation file). Such orders were requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), which holds the monopoly of criminal action, and ordered by the competent judge. Thus, both the actions carried out and the documentation seized on the occasion of both judicial resolutions are protected under Articles 1 and 2 of the Law on the Registration, Seizure and Examination of Private Documents and Interception of Communications No. 7425 (Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones Nº 7425) and Articles 193, 195, and 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, the nature of the information collected, both through the judicial authorities and from the natural and legal persons involved in this matter, is properly incorporated not only because the prescribed formalities were met, but also because, according to Article 7 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), information regarding public administration, investment, and expenditure, and any other information of public interest, is freely accessible, provided it does not involve private documents, which, in this case, were collected with a judge's order, specifically regarding the personal file of the defendant (as detailed in the order of 11:45 a.m. on August 9, 2006) and the banking information. Furthermore, even though it is ideal to have the original record where the documentation is preserved, the truth is that photocopies or printouts are not invalid, illegitimate, or inaccurate per se. Indeed, the defense of both accused has used the documentation to support their different strategies, and, as the Trial Court appreciated, they have not objected to them as false, so simple disagreement with the manner in which they were added to the file, without being correct in this for the stated reasons, is not admissible; the documentation offered by the Prosecution in its accusation, and those timely presented by the parties to support their theories on the case, must be considered legitimately incorporated.

C. Assessment of the evidence and determination of the proven facts: The appeals are upheld, and the accused are acquitted: In essence, the Trial Court held as proven that, as accused, the defendant [Name [Name6]], taking advantage of his position as Minister of Housing, proposed and appointed the accused [Name [Name7]] (his trusted secretary), as a consultant in the administration trust (fideicomiso de administración) among the Republic of China (Taiwan), the BCIE, and the MIVAH, of which he was the trust beneficiary (fideicomisario), and whose purpose was to allocate funds to the improvement of social conditions and housing in Costa Rica. A proposal he made knowing that she was an official of the Ministry, because between February 6 and March 15, 2007, she still worked in his office; consenting to her holding both positions during that period, while also authorizing a payment of $7,400, when she had not ceased her functions in the public sector. As well as that he favored her by proposing a payment of $50,600 for the contract, an amount that far exceeded the monthly income she had as a public servant. These facts were characterized against [ [Name8] ], as a crime of "influence against the public treasury (influencia en contra de la hacienda pública)" and a crime of "illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito)"; the first as a principal and the second as an accomplice. These are the same reasonings used by the Tribunal to maintain that [Name [Name7]] illicitly enriched herself, as she simultaneously held a public position and another on behalf of the administration trust among the Republic of China (Taiwan), the BCIE, and the MIVAH, and that for this reason she received a double payment, one for the functions performed in the public sector (as an official in the Minister's office) and another, as a consultant (in the trust). That the co-defendant [ [Name8] ] contributed to all this, as he facilitated the appointment and authorized payments for sums that widely exceeded the salary she earned at the Ministry of Housing, when in reality she performed the same functions. In this condition, the defendant [Name [Name7]] was sanctioned for a crime of illicit enrichment, and [Name [Name6]] as her accomplice. To refute such facts, maintained by the Prosecution and the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, and held as proven by the Trial Court, considering that the evidence proved the participation of the accused in the facts; the defense of both has alleged, in sum, that: (i) the trust assets (bienes fideicometidos) were of a private nature; (ii) despite the dates stated in the contract suggesting it began on February 6, 2007, it started to govern on March 16 of that year and that it was thus corrected by [ [Name8] ]; (iii) that [Name [Name7]] fulfilled the work entrusted by the trust contract, and for this reason she was economically remunerated; (iv) that the $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred United States dollars) constitute an advance payment, from the $50,600 (fifty thousand six hundred United States dollars) agreed upon in the contract signed by [ [Name9] ], and that in addition, this amount would be distributed over 24 months; (v) that the proposal for the appointment as a consultant was not the only one nor was it issued exclusively by [ [Name8] ]; and that (vi) they always acted in good faith and fulfilled the entrusted tasks. Examined, from this instance, the foundations of the verdict, the accusatory theses, and those presented by the accused; in light of the entirety of the incorporated evidence, it is considered that some aspects of the evidence, which were essential for the determination of the facts, were not analyzed in detail. It is true that some evidence was considered, but however, insufficient depth was given to the content and consequences of other evidence, which also formed part of the body of evidence, provided even by the accusing party. And, it is upon re-examining the entire body of evidence, that relevant doubts arise about how the events unfolded and whether, really, from each of the conducts deployed by [ [Name8] ] and [ [Name9] ], even accepted by them, the alleged illegality can be derived. This Chamber detects that the judges limited themselves to concatenating, without further analysis, part of the admitted evidence and the alleged facts; without setting out the reasons why: i) despite the contract dates not coinciding in all documents, it was held to have started on February 6, 2007, as per the accusation; ii) or, what led to sustaining the overlap of functions, if those performed by [ [Name9] ] from the office of the accused [ [Name8] ], at that time Minister of Housing, were similar to those she assumed as a consultant; iii) or, why if the trust contract granted [ [Name8] ] the possibility of proposing appointments and contracts for the project, he could not do so in the case of [ [Name9] ]? That is, to arrive at the appealed conclusion, the judges relied on documentary evidence that proved some events but omitted to analyze it jointly. They made an isolated analysis of each piece of evidence that supported the prosecution's thesis, but did not address, with the necessary breadth and detail, each of the documents related to them. This Chamber notes that they adhered to the document stating that the tasks of [ [Name9] ] began on February 6, 2006, with the BCIE, but did not review all the terms of reference or the modifications that comprised the contract which is, finally, what originated this process and from which the questions were formulated. Due to this, as alleged by the appellants, the basis of the decision is not sustainable, and the appeals must be upheld; and, under a complete and joint re-examination of the evidence, the judgment is revoked, and in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, [Name [Name6]] and [Name [Name7]] are acquitted of the crimes attributed to them. The discussion raised in the extensive appeals is the same one that allows, in light of the incorporated evidence, re-examining the terms of the trust contract, its reference or addenda, as well as matters related to the appointments, payments, and functions assigned to [ [Name9] ] on the occasion of the proposal made by [ [Name8] ]. To begin, it must be said that the criminal offenses of illicit enrichment, illegal recognition of benefits, and influence against the public treasury (influencia en contra de la hacienda pública), sanctioned respectively in Articles 45, 56, and 57 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment No. 8422 (Ley de Enriquecimiento ilícito Nº 8422), sanction those conducts that threaten the public treasury and the duty of probity in the exercise of public office. They suggest that every public servant is obliged to guide their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest, to attend to collective priority needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for all inhabitants of the Republic. They also oblige them to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law, and to ensure that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of their attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives of the institution to which they belong. Finally, to administer public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering satisfactory accounts (cf. Article 3, Ley 8422). For the specific case, the Trial Court considered that [Name [Name6]] was an accomplice to a crime of "illicit enrichment" (for which it imposed two years of imprisonment), which ideally concurs with that of "influence against the public treasury" (for which it imposed two years of imprisonment), and set the total sanction at three years of imprisonment. To [Name [Name7]], it imposed three years of imprisonment for a crime of illicit enrichment, as the principal. While it is true, as appreciated by the judges, that both were public officials and the actions deployed by each suggested that an irregular situation could have occurred in the appointment of [Name [Name7]] and the tasks she performed, to the point that the Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing intervened and the opinion of the Comptroller General of the Republic was required; these actions, in the opinion of this Appeals Chamber, are not sufficient to conclude, without a doubt, that they constituted a crime and meet the objective and subjective elements required by the applied criminal offenses, or any other. Let us remember that Article 45 (illicit enrichment) states that "He who, illegitimately taking advantage of the exercise of public office or the custody, exploitation, use, or administration of public funds, services, or assets, under any title or management modality, by himself or through an intermediary natural or legal person, increases his assets, acquires goods, enjoys rights, cancels debts or extinguishes obligations that affect his assets or those of legal entities, in whose share capital he has a participation either directly or through other legal entities, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment from three to six years." Thus, only any person who occupies or has occupied a position as a public official can be the principal, as it does not admit fault, and it also requires, for its typical adequacy, that there be a patrimonial enrichment without a licit cause. For its part, Article 57 (influence against the Public Treasury) sanctions "with imprisonment from two to eight years, the public official and other comparable subjects who, intervening by reason of their position, influence, direct, or condition in any way, so that a determined result is produced, harmful to the patrimonial interests of the Public Treasury or to the public interest, or who use any maneuver or artifice tending to that end." The typical action is taking advantage of the position to influence a certain decision, which will cause a result harmful to the public treasury. In this particular case, it has been maintained that the reported conducts are typical because [Name [Name6]] took advantage of his position and his political influence, both in the Ministry of Housing and before the BCIE, with the signing of the trust with Taiwan, to designate the co-defendant [ [Name9] ] as a consultant for the project, and thereby facilitated a multi-million-dollar payment, which she received into her accounts. However, a re-examination of the same evidence that the Tribunal had at its disposal, contrary to what was resolved, does not allow these circumstances to be held as proven, and therefore, due to doubt, the acquittal of both defendants is ordered. To arrive at this conclusion, from this instance, the following aspects have been evaluated:

(i) Nature of the trust funds (fondos fideicometidos). By virtue of the objections raised regarding the nature of the trust funds, it is pertinent to recall that a trust (fideicomiso) is an operation by means of which the trustor (fideicomitente) transmits assets or rights to the trustee (fiduciario) for the accomplishment of licit and predetermined purposes in favor of a third party (trust beneficiary-fideicomisario); in which the trustee (who receives an administration commission) is obliged and committed to administering the trust assets (bienes fideicometidos), in favor of one or several trust beneficiaries, following the conditions stipulated in the articles of incorporation. In the case under study, as held as proven by the a quo court and as is evident from the documentation incorporated into the proceedings, the trust was constituted on February 6, 2007, with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) acting as trustee, the Republic of China as trustor, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Settlements, under the command of the accused [Name [Name6]], as trust beneficiary. The object of the contract comprised two million four hundred eighty-eight thousand five hundred dollars, which would be allocated to support the social sector and the fight against poverty of the Government of Costa Rica; to provide the trust beneficiary with contracting services for the project "Barrial Improvement and Management of Innovative Social Programs"; and to administer, efficiently and transparently, the trust funds, on the understanding that the trustor would not assume any responsibility for the contracting of goods or services carried out with trust funds. The BCIE would limit itself to facilitating the structuring and design of trusts and third-party funds, in accordance with client requirements, such as administration, guarantees, investment, development of works, and implementation of special programs; in which, as a promoter of Central American integration, it has extensive experience in the administrative, financial, and technical management of trusts and funds from various sources. The assets, monies in this case, transferred in trust, constitute an autonomous estate, distinct from the estate of the settlor, the estate of the trustee, and the estate of the beneficiary or trust beneficiary, so none of them is the owner of the same; the trustee is a mere administrator and makes the trust assets available to the trust beneficiary for a benefit or third-party interest. In the case under study, the Trial Court held that such assets are of a public nature because they were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Housing, and for this reason they became part of the public treasury. Furthermore, it relied on the declaration of the auditor [Name10]. However, as indicated by the same Tribunal (f. 44 of the verdict) and the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, that was not the initial criterion of the Comptroller General of the Republic, but rather, in response to official communication No. 5018, on May 16, 2007, in report FOE-SOC-0387, addressed to [Name11], Internal Auditor of the MIVAH; it stated that "2. In accordance with Articles 1, 8 and 9 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), and by virtue of the nature, origin, and administration of the funds entrusted by the Government of China, they cannot be considered as 'public funds' belonging to the Costa Rican State, and consequently, it would not be within the competence of that Internal Audit unit to oversee them, with the exception of establishing controls in the planning and execution, which correspond to the MIVAH within its role in the project, for the effective fulfillment of the purposes for which said resources are intended. 3. By virtue of the nature and origin of the resources, the procedure of comptroller endorsement (refrendo contralor) is not required for the trust contract under consultation." This statement was supported by the fact that "The Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the juridical, administrative, and financial norms, relative to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials" (Article 8); and that " ... only those resources administered or disposed of by them, under any title, to achieve their purposes and that have been transferred or placed at their disposal, by means of a norm or budget item, by the Powers of the State, their dependencies and auxiliary bodies, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks, shall form part of the Public Treasury. Resources of origin other than those indicated do not form part of the Public Treasury; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special ordinances that regulate them. (...) The public estate shall be the universe constituted by the public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the component subjects of the Public Treasury. Component subjects of the Public Treasury shall be the State and the other public, state or non-state, entities and bodies, and public enterprises, as well as subjects of Private Law, insofar as they administer or guard public funds under any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph." (As amended by subsection d) of Article 126 of Law No. 8131 of September 18, 2001, Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets). That, "Public Funds are the resources, values, assets, and rights property of the State, of bodies, of enterprises, or of public entities." It was also said that, "Regarding the origin of the trust funds, it is the criterion of this comptroller body that they cannot be considered as public resources belonging to the Government of Costa Rica. In this case, we have that the Government of the Republic of China (Trustor), contributes and transfers the sum of two million four hundred eighty-eight thousand five hundred exact dollars, to the BCIE (Trustee) for it to administer said resources in support of the Social Sector and Fight Against Poverty, for the benefit of the Government of Costa Rica through the MIVAH (Trust Beneficiary). (...) "... Put another way, we have that from the moment the Government of China contributes the resources, until their administration by the BCIE, at no time do they become part of the public estate. In addition to the foregoing, it must be added that in this case, the party administering the trust funds is not a public entity, an aspect that, as will be stated later, helps to conclude definitively that the trust funds are not public, and that at most, what the MIVAH must guarantee as Trust Beneficiary, is that within the scope of its competence set forth in the trust contract and project document, the controls relating to planning and execution ensure that the resources are used for the intended purposes. In another order, and in accordance with the aforementioned regulations, it is clear that aspects such as receiving, administering, guarding, conserving, managing, spending, and investing such (public) funds, as well as the administrative and financial aspects, relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials, are substantial characteristics for the definition and determination of the nature of funds that are public and those that are not. Along this line, as stipulated in the fifth clause of the Trust contract, it is the BCIE in its capacity as Trustee who shall have the obligations to administer the trust estate (e.g., keeping it in accounts separate from its own and from any other trust under its responsibility); to render periodic or at least semi-annual reports to the Trustor, on the activities executed in fulfillment of the purposes of the Trust; to pay the expenses required for adequate administration; to carry out all necessary acts for the fulfillment of the previously established purposes, which include the realization, execution, and formalization of all types of acts and contracts, and on which it must previously request the opinion of the MIVAH (Trust Beneficiary), as the entity in charge of the Social Sector and Fight against Poverty and executor of the “Barrial Improvement” project; likewise, the Trustee shall respond with its own estate for any losses that the trust estate might suffer, among others. These characteristics of administration and responsibility over the trust estate granted to the BCIE (Trustee) are, apart from the origin of the resources, another aspect that leads this Comptroller General's Office to the conclusion that said resources are not of a public nature, because their origin and administration have not been under the charge of an entity of the Costa Rican State. In this regard, it is evident that said resources do not meet the characteristics provided for in Articles 1, 8, and 9 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, sufficient reason to affirm that this audit unit and this Comptroller General's Office would have no competence to audit the trust funds administered by the BCIE (Trustee). Notwithstanding the foregoing, and despite their nature, it is clear that said resources are intended and imbued with a public purpose, as is the case of supporting the Social Sector and Fight Against Poverty and the execution of the aforementioned project. In relation to the fulfillment of the purposes provided for in the Trust contract, it is where the Internal Audit Unit can and must take a preponderant role at the oversight level, referring to the controls in the planning and execution of the project that correspond to the MIVAH within its role in the project, and the corresponding contribution of 500,000 dollars that the MIVAH has allocated for said project, which are not incorporated as part of the Trust contract." Regarding this matter, it is necessary to indicate that, in the same line of thought that has been set forth, this Comptroller General's Office (Contraloría General), through official communication No. 00231 (DCA-0101), dated January fifteenth, two thousand seven, from the Administrative Contracting Division, and official communication No. 15106 (FOE-SO-436), dated December first, two thousand four, issued by the Social Services Area, states that it is the MIVAH that must establish and apply the necessary controls to guarantee adequate use of the resources administered by the BCIE, with criteria of effectiveness in fulfilling the objectives, under the responsibility of its hierarchy. By virtue of the foregoing, it is the criterion of this Comptroller General's Office that the competence of that Internal Audit unit and of this controlling body is circumscribed and must occur only with respect to the controls established in the planning and execution of the project as such, according to the role assigned to the MIVAH; and not regarding the resources provided by the Government of China and their administration by the BCIE (Trustee)." In the opinion of this Court of Appeals (Cámara de Apelación), even though this criterion could have been subsequently reversed, and it is considered that until the assets enter the State's coffers they retain their private nature; the truth is that, far from the position taken here on the point, it is considered that the specific determination of this aspect by the controlling body, as well as the unequivocal knowledge of it by the accused, was necessary and directly affected the criminal liability of both. Therefore, since there was neither clarity nor uniformity on the point, the possibility arose that, indeed, [Name [Name6]] and [Name [Name7]], supported by a legitimate basis such as the referred opinion, may have acted under the belief that these were private assets. And although the opinion was issued some time after the questioned contracting began, the fact of the case is that if a ruling was requested from the Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing, it was because no one had clarity on the nature, public or private, of the trust assets, and there is no evidence whatsoever—neither the Trial Court nor the accusers mentioned any—demonstrating that the accused did have that knowledge.

It is also true that Article 17 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422 (Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, Nº 8422), expressly states that "(…) Likewise, no public official, while on leave without pay, may serve as an advisor or consultant to organs, institutions, or entities, national or foreign, that are directly linked, by hierarchical relationship, by deconcentration, or by an agreement approved for that purpose, with the organ or entity for which they hold their position. (…)." However, it must be noted that this assumption applies to cases where the simultaneous holding of public positions is intended. Thus, if both [[Name8]] and [[Name9]] considered that the work entrusted in the trust was of a private nature, relying even on the aforementioned criterion of the Comptroller General's Office that stated as much; the truth is that, as long as there was no overlap of schedules or additional restrictions, such as the prohibition to freely practice a profession, or any other incompatibility of positions, she was authorized to opt for that other job. To this it must be added that the nature of the funds can never depend on the criterion of the Comptroller General's Office, nor correspond to a casuistic weighing of the circumstances, since the different pronouncements create legal uncertainty and, consequently, could lead to inequality in the application of the law which, in turn, creates injustice. Besides, how could the accused be required to have clear knowledge of something about which even the Comptroller General's Office was unclear? In that sense, the trial judges did not consider that the degree of enforceability for the defendants cannot reach such levels, when the controlling body itself lacks clarity, not a single line, to define when we are dealing with assets, or services, of a public or private nature.

Due to the foregoing, and the various technical and legal criteria issued regarding the nature of the trust assets, whose definition cannot be casuistic; it cannot be categorically ruled out that the accused may have acted under the belief that they were private. So this is another reason, added to what will be said below, to uphold the appeals and acquit them from this venue.

(ii) Regarding the influence that the accused [[Name8]] could have used to promote the appointment of [[Name9]] as a consultant. From the body of evidence, it cannot be inferred that [[Name8]] had any legal impediment to proposing the appointment of [[Name9]], since the trust contract permitted it in Clause FIVE (QUINTA), which provides that, prior to any contracting, the trustee must require the criterion of the trust beneficiary, and, even, that same clause contemplated the possibility that the trust beneficiary could be advised by its own officials. Furthermore, although the restriction "without charge to the trust" was set, in this specific case no incompatibility is observed because at a certain moment, as will be seen later, [[Name9]] left her position as a subordinate to the Ministry of Housing. Another aspect that the trial court (a quo) failed to analyze lies in the fact that [[Name8]] not only proposed the appointment of [[Name9]] but, as can be deduced from official communications DM-500-10-06 and DM-151-02-07, proposed processing several contracts for other people, and even quoted the amount to be earned for each consultancy, establishing that their contracts would take effect from the signing of the contract (pages 35 and 50 of the evidence file). Therefore, the examination of these documents allows us to point out that the defendant did not exclusively select [[Name9]] to favor her or bring her economic benefits, but rather, as recorded in those official communications, suggested various names for different contracts, as was authorized in Clause FIVE of the trust. Concluding otherwise would lead to questioning why [[Name8]] was not accused for the proposal of the other people, for whom he also set an economic benefit. Due to the foregoing, contrary to the resolution in the appealed judgment, it is not corroborated that [[Name8]], taking advantage of his position as Minister, unduly influenced or conditioned the appointment of [[Name9]] as a consultant in the project administered by the BCIE, much less that as a result of any maneuver on his part, damage was caused to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), since the trust assets did not belong to it. But even assuming that these became part of the state patrimony due to the intended purposes of their investment, the truth is that this patrimony was not diminished either, since both he and the accused fulfilled the entrusted tasks.

(iii) In a third issue, this Court of Appeals has reconsidered the terms of the contract, in order to verify start dates, so as to identify the existence or not of the simultaneous exercise of two positions by [[Name9]], and whether the economic benefit received from the questioned consultancy caused her illicit enrichment, orchestrated between her and the defendant. The judges took it as certain that the contract with [[Name9]] began on February 6, two thousand seven, and that by March 15 of that same year (when she ceased her work as a salaried employee of the Ministry of Housing), she had already received a salary from the Ministry, a payment of $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred US dollars), plus the agreed monthly amount of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars). But they reached this conclusion without even mentioning all the documentation that comprises the trust contract, so often referred to, even though it was provided to them for analysis; and from which the following can be extracted: a) That this legal transaction was signed in the city of San José, Costa Rica, on the sixth day of February, two thousand seven (2/6/2007), and in which the following persons appeared: Mr. [Name12], Ambassador of the Republic of China-Taiwan (Trustor/Fideicomitente); Mr. [Name13], Director of the BCIE, Costa Rica (Trustee/Fuduciario), and [[Name8]], Minister of Housing (Trust Beneficiary/Fideicomisario). b) That the start date has never been sufficiently clear to establish the period in which, supposedly, [[Name9]] performed both tasks (that of the public sector and that assigned in the trust). Regarding this extreme, it was not enough to read the contract that indicated it would begin on February 6, 2007 (page 56),—as the trial court did—to conclude that, because [[Name9]] was dismissed until March 15, 2007 (cf. official communication DAF/101-2007, page 76), and that [Name [Name6]] was aware of it, they incurred the illicit conduct attributed to them.

Firstly, there are several circumstances that cast doubt on the date the contract actually began: Let us see: a. The trust contract did not establish a date in this regard. b. In the document added to pages 47-49 of the evidence file, it was recorded that the consultancy concerning [Name [Name7]] would begin on November 1, two thousand six. So, why was this date not chosen or discarded? The Trial Court does not say. c. Official communications DM-396-09-06 and DM-500-10-06 (pages 32-37) merely state the period for which the contract is in force, and that it will run from the signing of the contract. d. The consultancy contract was signed by [Name [Name7]] on March 5, two thousand seven (page 61 of the evidence file). e. The first advance of the remuneration agreed upon in the agreement was requested and authorized on March 5, two thousand seven (page 57), and was deposited into her bank account at the Bank of Costa Rica on March 13 of that same year (cf. historical transactions of the account in the defendant's name, in the period 2007). f. The payment of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars) is recorded as authorized by [Name [Name6]] in May 2007, and credited on May 28, two thousand seven (cf. form added to the evidence file and bank transactions of the defendant's account).

Having specified those circumstances surrounding the contract, this Court determines that, if in official communications DM-500-10-06 and DM-151-02-07 it was proposed that the contract would take effect from the signing of the contract; that it was signed by [[Name9]] on March 5, two thousand seven; that the first payment (advance) of $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred US dollars) she would receive was agreed to be delivered on the day of signing (cf. "Article 4. remuneration," page 57), and that same day it was requested and authorized, to be credited only until March 13 of that year; and the first deposit for $1,800 dollars appears registered on May 28, two thousand seven; it could not be assured that the overlap of positions began on February 6, nor that the $7,400 or the $1,800 US dollars referred to corresponded to the first month, as the Trial Court argued.

Rather, linking the various dates indicated, with the evidence of monthly payments of $1,800 dollars, which begin dated May 2007 (cf. page 132 et seq. of the evidence file); everything seems to indicate that there could have been a variation of the contract, and that "that real contract" does not coincide with what was documented, nor with what the judges appreciated when they said that as of February 6, 2007, [[Name9]] had two jobs, with coinciding schedules or some overlap, and earning two incomes. Essentially, it can be detected that the contract start dates—according to the accusation—do not match what is extracted from the evidence, since several possibilities arise: That the alleged duplicity of functions may have been for a shorter period, and not from February 6 to March 15, two thousand seven, since some documents indicate it would begin on that date, others in November two thousand six, others upon the signing of the contract, and another, the one used by the defendants in their defense, which indicates that if the dismissal occurred on March 15, two thousand seven, the contract takes effect from the following day as corrected before the BCIE by [[Name8]]. Thus, the lack of precision in that sense, also fueled by certification C-09-2012 issued by the Administrative Financial Directorate of the MVAH, which documents the cessation of [[Name9]]'s work at the Ministry of Housing, as well as the cessation of payments as a trusted official assigned to the Office of the Minister [Name [Name6]]; suggests that the contract may well have begun on other dates, without implying the double function and double remuneration that is reproached; an aspect that was not duly weighed by the judges. Aside from the fact that none of the witnesses received could identify exact dates on the matter.

Feeding the indicated inconsistencies, and with it the doubt about when the execution of the contract began, an aspect that was essential to determine and that in a retrial would not be clarified or modified since it arises from the same evidence that was available at trial; is official communication DM-496-05-07, dated May 16, two thousand seven, signed by the accused, through which the variation of the contract start date was requested, the correct date—according to the note—being that it takes effect from March 16, two thousand seven, a modification that was addressed without delay or any contraindication by the BCIE (pages 83-87 of the evidence file). The accusing parties have attempted to show that this request signed by the defendant occurred once he realized he was being investigated or that his [Placa1] with which he favored his subordinate's interests was beginning to be discovered. However, such an appreciation finds no objective support. First, because the rectification was requested long before the complaint was filed. See that the challenged request is dated May 16, two thousand seven, and the complaint is dated November 20, two thousand eight, meaning it was filed approximately 18 months later. On the other hand, even though it is an incontrovertible fact that this situation came to the knowledge of the Comptroller General's Office and that the Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing began to investigate the real function that [[Name9]] performed in the office of Minister [Name [Name6]]; the actions deployed by the latter regarding the appointment of [[Name9]] were only classified as incorrect and common bad practices, but no criminal investigation was suggested. Even in the report of the Comptroller General's Office, when responding to the inquiry about the nature of the trust assets, official communication FOE-SOC-0387, it highlighted that, although it was not a correct practice, it was common to see how permits with pay are granted to officials, to go on to occupy another position related to the same administration.

Based on these aspects, it could not be assured, nor was it founded in the appealed judgment, why that modification could not be made, or why it constituted part of the illicit purposes that, according to the accusation, the accused had in proposing the appointment of [[Name9]] as a consultant and in the economic benefits she could obtain. What this report did show is that in the Public Administration, it is common for such (vertical or horizontal) changes of personnel or positions to be practiced, to place them in key or trusted points, or in other positions; without it being possible to conclude, without a doubt, that the actions of both accused were for illicit purposes, or to procure or obtain an illegal benefit and disrespect the duty of probity in the exercise of the entrusted function. Beyond that, what is revealed is administrative disorder and a lack of knowledge of the procedures to be followed in such cases. Also, the repetition of flawed practices that are not susceptible to correction at a criminal level. If the Comptroller General's Office in 2006 recognized that it was common to see these types of practices, then it was up to that controlling body to disseminate the policies and guidelines sufficient to eradicate and correct them.

(vi) From the same evidence that the trial court had at its disposal, it also cannot be inferred that the remuneration proposed by the accused [[Name8]], in favor of [[Name9]], increased her patrimony, nor that it was illegitimate; aspects that were omitted from in-depth analysis in the ruling. There is irrefutable evidence that the accused [[Name8]] was one of the people who proposed the contracting of [[Name9]] to the trustee, as a consultant for the project financed by the Government of China. Also, that the proposed payment reached $50,600 (fifty thousand six hundred US dollars). However, the judgment omitted to consider that that amount corresponded to the total she would earn over 24 months, so, although it might initially appear to be a significant sum, the truth is that that money had to be prorated over the number of months for which the contract was arranged. In the ruling, the amount of the contracts carried out by the accused was taken as an important parameter, considering that the salaries or fees paid for the questioned consultancy were excessively high; however, this Tribunal considers the appreciation to be subjective; because it is not acceptable to compare a contract with an international entity, as important as the BCIE, with the lower-ranking salaries paid in the public administration; from which the only thing derivable is an important difference, but one is an internal contract and the other is an international contract, which cannot be compared without considering that they are different parameters. Thus, the statements that supported this questioning in the judgment set aside the differences that exist between international and national quotes, starting with the currency in which they are set. In any case, even following the challenged criterion, simply making a comparison between what that payment implied over 24 months, with other proposals from [[Name8]] in document DM-151-02-07, shows that the cost of contracting [[Name9]] was not far removed from what had been suggested in the cases of other consultants. See that item "C. Contracting Subcode: MIVAH-TPE/CO-005" indicates that a base study on selective social policy, extending over 2 months, has a total cost of $8,500 (eight thousand five hundred US dollars). While in item "Ch. Contracting Code: MIVAH-TPE/CO-006," it is proposed that for a high-level advisory, extending over 8 months, $52,000 (fifty-two thousand US dollars) will be paid. Both proposals, not included in this process as criminal, far exceed what the defendant [[Name9]] would be paid for a contract that extended over 24 months. This reference reveals that the cost of the consultancy conformed to international parameters and did not imply a higher or excessive quote in relation to others that were not considered illicit and tending to favor the patrimony of their beneficiaries. Finally, it cannot be left unsaid that if what is sought is to punish someone who increases their patrimony as a result of income whose origin is illegitimate, how can it be assured that [[Name9]] actually obtained such benefits if no evidence was provided in this regard. Moreover, even if her income increased, it was the product of a contract whose existence has not been questioned.

(v) The other aspect on which the challenged conviction has been based is that the defendant was proposed and appointed as a consultant, yet she continued working in the Minister's Office and performing the same tasks, with the only difference that she would no longer earn a salary of around three hundred thousand colones, but instead began earning $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars) monthly; which reveals the benefit procured for her by the accused [[Name8]]. In the opinion of this Court, this statement also does not conform to a harmonious assessment of the incorporated evidence. As set forth in preceding lines, the documentation does not univocally prove when exactly the contracting of [[Name9]] as a consultant began; and this same circumstance, consequently, also prevents us from ensuring or discarding that, in the period between February 6 and March 15, both dates in 2007, the accused was appointed as a trusted secretary to [[Name8]]. That determination was extremely important, as it was the only way to define whether [[Name9]] could continue performing the tasks she held by reason of her position since 2006, as well as whether the income reported on the payroll until March 15 represented a double payment or the normal payment of her salary. That is, if with the documentary evidence re-examined here, the concrete and exact date on which the contracting for the project administered by the BCIE began could not be defined, and the testimonies also did not clarify from what date [[Name9]] became a consultant; this doubt also prevents determining whether the tasks performed in that period corresponded to her duties as secretary to [[Name8]], to those assumed as a consultant, or overlapped. Furthermore, it cannot be set aside that the bad administrative practices indicated,—which, as in this case, endorsed that a Minister's trusted secretary would become part of a contract related to the same Ministry,—can generate such types of confusion in management. In that sense, when contrasting the tasks that [[Name9]] normally performed from the ministerial office with those indicated in the "terms of reference" of the project, it is determined that she was entrusted with similar tasks, and even some identical to those she initially performed in the office of [[Name8]], so that in the absence of a concrete report and clear evidence delimiting them, it was perfectly viable for her to perform similar tasks, and for that reason her colleagues, other officials, and senior administrative managers of the Ministry could establish that she was doing the same thing for a much higher income. It has been verified, from this instance, that in the contract with Taiwan she was assigned the following tasks: "Coordinate the administrative and technical activities of the Office of the Minister and his advisors, both internally and externally to the institution, with national and international organizations involved in the work of the MIVAH and the social sector; Prepare the technical agenda and organize the work sessions held by the Minister, with internal and external, public and private, national and international bodies;" Prepare the technical reports produced from the meetings held by the Minister, as well as coordinate the execution and follow-up actions of the agreements made;" Coordinate the meetings of the Senior Ministerial Administration, as well as follow up and evaluate the topics discussed; (...) Plan, organize, and direct the technical and administrative work entrusted to the personnel working in the Office of the Minister, as well as render reports to the Minister on the results of their management (...)". (cf. CED1 of the evidence file). And, if these tasks are compared with those delegated by [[Name8]] and those that [[Name9]] may have performed previously, they do not differ much, almost not at all (cf. on the functions assigned in the Minister's Office, certification C-09-2012 issued by the Administrative Financial Directorate, Human Resources Department). On the other hand, it was perfectly possible to perceive that similarity, since as can be deduced from note DM-849-08-07, signed by [Name [Name6]], he had delegated to [Name [Name7]] the signing of documents related to the payment of overtime, travel expenses, processing of vacations for officials who depended on the Minister, fuel coupons, and petty cash procedures; with which he ensured that her work was respected and that she was approached in such cases, since she could perfectly well sign on his behalf.

In this way, notwithstanding the irregular situation that was evidenced by the judgment; it cannot be ignored that despite the coincidence between the attributions of [[Name9]] from her appointment before the Head of Human Resources of the Ministry of Housing in May 2006, with those delegated to her, and with those she assumed upon signing the contract, so much so that they were exercised in the same Ministry, with officials who belonged to it—since they were coordinated internally and externally—; it has not been proven that she failed to attend to one or the other, or that they occurred simultaneously. Thus, whether by the biweekly salary modality or by the payment of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars), she performed the entrusted tasks without it having been proven that she caused a loss or affected the public treasury. Additionally, the fact that she could have performed the same functions in one position or the other, does not in itself delegitimize her attributions or powers. Lastly, it is convenient to clarify that if the delegation of signature was formalized late or retroactively, it would in no way detract from the thesis of the de facto official, since even if an administrative agreement in that sense did not materially exist at the time, it is understood that such requirement was supplied, thereby coming to confirm and ratify entirely the management she had been carrying out, not on her own account but by an assignment, endorsed publicly, peacefully, continuously, and normally in accordance with the Law (cf. Article 115 of the General Public Administration Law - Ley General de Administración Pública). Definitely, this Tribunal observes that a series of inadequate, or inconvenient, administrative practices occurred, which have been treated in a contradictory manner by the Comptroller General of the Republic, even internally within the Ministry of Labor, which has led to doubt about the nature of the funds and the contracting procedures. Therefore, rather than crimes, it is proper to establish adequate protocols so as not to lead the rest of the public administration into error. In this sense, as stated, the evidence that has been incorporated is not clear, unequivocal, nor sufficient to establish criminal liability, nor to reveal a relevant harm to the public administration that requires sanctioning through criminal proceedings. Consequently, accepting the appeals filed, without the possibility of including more evidence in a retrial that could modify the situation of the defendants being foreseen; the appealed judgment is revoked, and an acquittal judgment is ordered in favor of [[Name8]] and [[Name9]].

D. Regarding the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria). The civil defendant [Name [Name6]], in his personal capacity, reproaches the insufficient reasoning of the ruling regarding the admissibility of the civil action for damages. In his view, the lack of determination of damage warrants allowing the appeal, annulling the judgment, and issuing an acquittal, condemning the private prosecutors and civil claimants to pay costs. For her part, the defendant [Name [Name7]], argued that no patrimonial or social damage occurred, and that this was evident in the report of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial). And that, for such reason, she requests that the civil action for damages be declared without merit, condemning the claimant to pay costs.

The claims are accepted; the civil action for damages is declared without merit; and the civil claimant is exempted from the payment of costs: In the judgment, the civil indemnity was set, based on the fact that the existence of a crime was demonstrated, and the causal link between it and the damage produced. The criminal ruling has been revoked, for the reasons set forth in the preceding considerandos. In relation to the civil matter, according to the preceding analysis, the production of damage to the civil claimant was not proven, which evidences the lack of right to be compensated. While an acquittal judgment does not necessarily affect the outcome of the civil claim, in this case, since the patrimonial and social damage was not proven, as it was not credibly shown that the defendant [[Name9]] was unduly favored with an illegal appointment by the co-defendant [[Name8]], in addition to which the former did perform all the tasks corresponding to her under the signed contract; the absence of the damage whose reparation is sought prevents allowing the pecuniary claim. It must be remembered that, regardless of whether the criminal act generating criminal liability was proven, the following must always be demonstrated: a) the existence of the damage or harm, which must be certain, real, and effective; b) the magnitude and extent of that damage; c) the person causing the damage; and d) the causal relationship between the damage suffered and the conduct displayed by the person who caused it; as well as, e) a criterion of imputation. None of these assumptions have been established, since the causation of damage was not demonstrated. A sum was claimed for material and social damage, however, despite the existence of an actuarial appraisal setting the amounts to be compensated; it was not derived from the incorporated evidence that the conduct of the civil defendants generated them; because it was established that the defendants were contracted for a service they performed and in which they fulfilled the tasks entrusted, which denotes the absence of damage to the public treasury and the consequent right to claim indemnity.

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling on the civil claims is revoked, and the civil lawsuit filed by the State against [Nombre9] and [Nombre [Nombre6]] is dismissed. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in its capacity as civil plaintiff, is exempted from the payment of costs, given that in this case there is a plausible reason for litigating or good faith (Articles 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure). This is reflected in the fact that an acquittal on grounds of doubt was issued in the criminal proceedings, which implies that the lawsuit filed by the State was not reckless; that is to say, it was reasonable to file the claims. In this regard, it should be noted that it was necessary to overcome several phases of the proceeding, and it was only at this stage that the acquittal was ordered, which demonstrates that the case was subjected to lengthy discussion and the situation of the defendants was not so clear; it was necessary to exhaust the trial phase, and even the appellate stage, to determine the existence of the act. Finally, notwithstanding that it has been proven that the civil defendant [Nombre [Nombre7]] fulfilled the assigned tasks, there was doubt regarding the matter of her appointment, that is, the overlap of functions, the illegitimacy of the designation, and the terms of the contract. Thus, as indicated, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to bring the civil action for damages to seek reparation for the pecuniary and social harm; therefore, it is appropriate to exempt this party from the payment of costs."

IV.Due to the interrelated nature of the issues proposed for examination in the three appeals filed, all related to the validity of the judgment due to the composition of the Tribunal at the time of reading the full judgment; the legality of the evidence admitted; and the determination of the proven facts, they are resolved jointly, and in the order established herein, to provide coherence to the decision. A. On the composition of the Tribunal for the full reading of the judgment: The challenge concerning the violation of the principle of publicity and, specifically, of Article 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, lacks valid foundation and, consequently, is dismissed. Indeed, that procedural rule provides in its last paragraph that the judgment will be deemed notified upon the full reading thereof and that the parties will receive a copy of it, which allows for the inference that any notification made in breach of what is set forth in that numeral would be improper or would render the notification act void. However, this is not the case, because the reading of the judgment would be carried out at the designated time, with or without one of the judges who decided the case, since, once signed, the Tribunal could well have been constituted with a different composition solely to fulfill the notification; but if it was not done, it was because the parties accepted it that way. As can be inferred from the printed proceedings and the record of the virtual case file, the reading of the operative part (parte dispositiva) of the judgment was carried out at 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2014, by the three members of the Tribunal who conducted the trial (Franz Paniagua Mejía, [Nombre1] and [Nombre2]). Likewise, in the judgment-document (sentencia-documento), No. 031-2014, of 9:30 a.m., January 24, 2014, the signatures of the same three judges who communicated the operative part (parte dispositiva) are recorded. This being the case, the guarantee of the identity of the adjudicator, which seeks to ensure that the judges who witnessed the hearing and had contact with the evidence inform the parties of the decision and issue the full judgment, after joint deliberation, has been fulfilled. Furthermore, even though it is alleged that one of the judges was absent on the day of the full reading, the truth is that, as extracted from the certification issued by the judicial technician [Nombre3], both Mr. [Nombre4] and Ms. [Nombre5], private defense attorneys for [Nombre [Nombre6]] and [Nombre [Nombre7]], respectively, agreed to be given a copy of the judgment; therefore, if they did not require the full, oral reading of the judgment, they cannot take advantage of that situation to claim, merely because of it, that the document was not read, since they themselves contributed to the Tribunal's omission of that formality. In any case, the omission of that act caused no grievance whatsoever, nor did it violate the right to defense or to intervene, because the parties had timely access to the content of the judgment. The omission of that procedure did not prevent knowing the issued decision or exercising control over it within the legal deadlines provided for conducting each of those procedural acts (reading of the operative part (parte dispositiva), full reading of the judgment, and communication to the parties). Finally, it must be stated that there is also no record that a citizen, unrelated to the proceeding, appeared in the courtroom to which the parties were summoned for the reading of the full judgment with an interest in knowing the content of the judgment, so the principle of publicity was not violated in that sense, nor was that of the general public, who could learn about what happened in this matter through the media, as the status of the accused as public officials made the news transcend. So, from this point of view, control over the administration of justice could be exercised. As the appellants are not correct on these points, the claims are not admissible. B. Illegality of the admitted documentary evidence: In various ways, at different stages, the parties have challenged the legitimacy of the documentary evidence admitted to the proceeding, as in their view, the jurisdictional authority should always have intervened. This objection, extensively addressed by the judges in recital (considerando) I of the appealed judgment, is also unacceptable. In accordance with Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the facts and circumstances of interest to the case may be proven by any permitted means of evidence, unless expressly prohibited by law. In the particular case, the documents on which the prosecutorial hypothesis and the judgment rely were provided, at the request of the same defendant [ [Nombre8] ], by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (hereinafter BCIE) and by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (hereinafter CGR), (cf. p. 22 of report DFOE-SOC-DP-2-2008 issued by the Division of Operational and Evaluative Oversight of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, p. 033 of the investigation file), apart from others that were recovered by judicial order, specifically the one issued at 11:45 a.m. on August 9, 2016 (which ordered the search of the Ministry of Housing and the seizure of all personal and employment information related to this case concerning the defendant [ [Nombre9] ]); the one at 8:45 a.m. on April 22, 2006 (lifting of bank secrecy); and the one at 10:49 a.m. on November 26, 2010 (cf. pp. 101-143 of the investigation file). Such orders were requested by the Public Prosecution Service (Ministerio Público), in which the monopoly of criminal action is vested, and ordered by the competent judge. Therefore, the actions taken and the documentation seized as a result of both jurisdictional resolutions are covered under Articles 1 and 2 of Law on the Registration, Seizure and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications No. 7425 and numerals 193, 195 and 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, the nature of the information collected, both through judicial authorities and from the natural and legal persons involved in this matter, is properly admitted not only because the prescribed formalities were fulfilled, but also because, according to Article 7 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service, information regarding public administration, investment, and expenditure, and any other information of public interest, is freely accessible, provided it is not private documents, which, in this case, were collected by judicial order, specifically regarding the personal file of the accused (according to the detail of the order of 11:45 a.m., August 9, 2006) and the banking information. On the other hand, even though the ideal is to have the record in which the original documentation is preserved, the truth is that photocopies or printed copies are not invalid, illegitimate, or inaccurate per se. Indeed, the defense of both accused has used the documentation to support their different strategies, and as found by the trial court (Tribunal de instancia), they have not objected to them as false; therefore, mere disagreement with the way they were added to the case file, without having a valid reason for it for the reasons stated, is not acceptable; accordingly, the documentation offered by the Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía) in its indictment, and that which the parties have timely presented to support their theories on the case, must be deemed legitimately admitted. C. Assessment of the evidence and determination of the proven facts: The appeals are upheld, and the accused are acquitted: In essence, the trial court (Tribunal de instancia) considered it proven that, as charged, the defendant [Nombre [Nombre6]], taking advantage of his position as Minister of Housing, proposed and appointed the indictee [Nombre [Nombre7]] (his trusted secretary) as a consultant in the administration trust agreement (fideicomiso de administración) among the Republic of China (Taiwan), the BCIE, and the MIVAH, of which he was the beneficiary (fideicomisario), and whose purpose was to allocate funds for the improvement of social and housing conditions in Costa Rica. A proposal he made knowing that she was an employee of the Ministry, because between February 6 and March 15, 2007, she was still working in his office; he consented to her holding both positions during that period, while also authorizing a payment of $7,400 when she had not ceased her duties in the public sector. As well as that he favored her by proposing a payment of $50,600 for the contract, an amount that far exceeded the monthly income she had as a public servant. These acts were classified against [ [Nombre8] ] as a crime of "influence contrary to public finances (influencia en contra de la hacienda pública)" and a crime of "illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito)"; the first as a principal perpetrator and the second as an accomplice. These are the same reasonings used by the Tribunal to maintain that [Nombre [Nombre7]] was illicitly enriched, since she simultaneously held a public position and another one on behalf of the administration trust agreement (fideicomiso de administración) among the Republic of China (Taiwan), the BCIE, and the MIVAH, and that for this she received a double payment, one for the functions performed in the public sector (as an employee of the Minister's office) and another as a consultant (in the trust agreement (fideicomiso)). That the co-defendant [ [Nombre8] ] contributed to all this, since he facilitated the appointment and authorized payments for amounts that widely exceeded the salary she earned at the Ministry of Housing, when in reality she performed the same functions. In that capacity, the indictee [Nombre [Nombre7]] was sanctioned for a crime of illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito), and [Nombre [Nombre6]] as her accomplice. To refute such facts, sustained by the Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía) and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), and considered proven by the sentencing Tribunal (Tribunal de sentencia), considering that the evidence proved the participation of the accused in the acts; the defense of both has alleged, in summary, that: (i) the trust assets were private in nature; (ii) despite the dates stated in the contract suggesting it began on February 6, 2007, it actually came into effect on March 16 of that year and that [ [Nombre8] ] had it corrected accordingly; (iii) that [Nombre [Nombre7]] fulfilled the work commissioned by the trust agreement (contrato de fideicomiso), and for this she was financially remunerated; (iv) that the $7,400 constitute an advance payment on the $50,600 agreed upon in the contract signed by [ [Nombre9] ], and furthermore, that this amount would be distributed over 24 months; (v) that the proposal for the appointment as a consultant was not the only one nor was it issued exclusively by [ [Nombre8] ]; and that (vi) they always acted in good faith and fulfilled the assigned tasks. Having examined, from this instance, the grounds of the judgment, the prosecutorial theories, and those presented by the accused; in light of the entirety of the evidence admitted, it is considered that some aspects of the evidence, which were essential for determining the facts, were not analyzed in detail. It is true that some pieces of evidence were considered, but the content and consequences of other evidence, which also formed part of the body of evidence, contributed even by the accusing party, were not sufficiently examined in depth. And it is when retaking the entirety of the evidentiary record that relevant doubts arise about how the events unfolded and whether, really, from each of the behaviors displayed by [ [Nombre8] ] and [ [Nombre9] ], even those accepted by them, the alleged unlawfulness can be derived. This Chamber detects that the adjudicators limited themselves to concatenating, without further analysis, part of the admitted evidence and the charged facts; without setting forth the reasons why: i) despite the contract dates not coinciding in all the documents, it was considered to have started on February 6, 2007, according to the indictment; ii) or, what led to sustaining the overlap of functions, if the duties performed by [ [Nombre9] ] from the office of the accused [ [Nombre8] ], at that time Minister of Housing, were similar to those she assumed as a consultant; iii) or, why if the trust agreement (contrato de fideicomiso) granted [ [Nombre8] ] the possibility of proposing appointments and hirings for the project, he could not do so in the case of [ [Nombre9] ]? That is, to reach the appealed conclusion, the adjudicators relied on documentary evidence that proved some events but omitted to analyze it jointly. They conducted an isolated analysis of each piece of evidence supporting the prosecutorial theory but did not address, with the necessary breadth and detail, each of the documents related to them. This Chamber notes that they adhered to the document stating that the duties of [ [Nombre9] ] began on February 6, 2006, with the BCIE, but did not review all the terms of reference or the modifications that made up the contract, which is, ultimately, the one that gave rise to this proceeding and from which the challenges were formulated. For this reason, as alleged by the appellants, the foundation of the decision does not hold, and the appeals must be upheld; and, under a complete and joint reexamination of the evidence, the judgment is revoked, and in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, [Nombre [Nombre6]] and [Nombre [Nombre7]] are acquitted of the crimes attributed to them. The discussion raised in the extensive appeals is the same one that allows, in light of the admitted evidence, for a reexamination of the terms of the trust agreement (contrato de fideicomiso), its references or addendums (adendum), as well as everything related to the appointments, payments, and functions assigned to [ [Nombre9] ] on the occasion of the proposal made by [ [Nombre8] ]. To begin, it must be stated that the criminal offenses of illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento lícito), illegal recognition of benefits, and influence contrary to public finances (influencia en contra de la hacienda pública), sanctioned respectively in Articles 45, 56, and 57 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment No. 8422, punish those behaviors that harm public finances and the duty of probity in the exercise of the position as a public official. They suggest that every public servant is obligated to orient their management toward the satisfaction of the public interest, to meet the priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for all inhabitants of the Republic. They also oblige them to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law, and to ensure that decisions adopted in fulfillment of their duties conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives. Finally, to administer public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily (cf. Article 3, Law 8422). In the specific case, the trial court (Tribunal a quo) considered that [Nombre [Nombre6]] was an accomplice to a crime of "illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito)" (for which it imposed two years of imprisonment), which ideally concurs with that of "influence contrary to public finances (influencia en contra de la hacienda pública)" (for which it imposed two years of imprisonment), setting the total penalty at three years of imprisonment. It imposed three years of imprisonment on [Nombre [Nombre7]] for a crime of illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito), as the principal perpetrator. While it is true, as found by the adjudicators, that both were public officials and the actions carried out by each of them suggested that an irregular situation could have occurred in the appointment of [Nombre [Nombre7]] and the duties she performed, so much so that the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing intervened and the criterion of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic was required; these actions, in the opinion of this Court of Appeals (Cámara de Apelación), are insufficient to conclude, without any doubt, that they constituted a crime and meet the objective and subjective elements required by the applicable criminal offenses, or any other. Let us recall that Article 45 (illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito)) states that: "Any person who, illegitimately taking advantage of the exercise of public office or the custody, exploitation, use, or administration of public funds, services, or assets, under any title or management modality, by themselves or through an intermediary natural or legal person, increases their patrimony, acquires assets, enjoys rights, cancels debts, or extinguishes obligations affecting their patrimony or that of legal persons in whose capital stock they have a participation either directly or through other legal persons, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment from three to six years." Thus, the perpetrator can only be held liable for intentional conduct because negligence is not admitted, any person who holds or has held a position as a public official, and the typical classification also requires that there be a patrimonial enrichment without a lawful cause. For its part, Article 57 (influence contrary to public finances (influencia en contra de la Hacienda Pública)) sanctions "with imprisonment from two to eight years, the public official and other equivalent subjects who, intervening by reason of their position, influence, direct, or condition, in any form, so that a specific result, harmful to the patrimonial interests of the public finances (Hacienda Pública) or the public interest, is produced, or any maneuver or artifice tending to that end is used." The typical action is to take advantage of the position to influence a specific decision that will cause a result harmful to public finances (hacienda pública). In the particular case, it has been maintained that the reported conducts are typical because [Nombre [Nombre6]] took advantage of his post, his political influence, both in the Ministry of Housing and before the BCIE, with the signing of the trust agreement (fideicomiso) with Taiwan, to designate his co-defendant [ [Nombre9] ] as a consultant for the project, and thereby facilitated a payment of millions, which she received in her accounts. Nevertheless, a reexamination of the same evidence that the Tribunal had at its disposal, contrary to what was decided, does not allow such circumstances to be considered proven; therefore, on grounds of doubt, the acquittal of both defendants is ordered. To reach this conclusion, the following aspects have been evaluated from this instance: (i) Nature of the trust funds. By virtue of the objections raised regarding the nature of the trust funds, it is relevant to recall that a trust agreement (fideicomiso) is an operation whereby the settlor (fideicomitente) transfers assets or rights to the trustee (fiduciario) for the fulfillment of lawful, predetermined purposes in favor of a third party (beneficiary (fideicomisario)); in which the trustee (who receives a commission for administration) is obligated and committed to administering the trust assets and/or rights, in favor of one or several beneficiaries (fideicomisarios), following the conditions stipulated in the articles of incorporation. In the case under review, as considered proven by the trial court (a quo) and inferred from the documentation admitted to the proceeding, the trust agreement (fideicomiso) was constituted on February 6, 2007, and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) acted as trustee (fiduciario), the Republic of China as settlor (fideicomitente), and the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements, under the direction of the accused [Nombre [Nombre6]], as the beneficiary (fideicomisario). The object of the contract consisted of two million four hundred eighty-eight thousand five hundred dollars, which would be allocated to support the social sector and the fight against poverty of the Government of Costa Rica; to provide the beneficiary (fideicomisario) with contracting services for the project "Neighborhood Improvement and Management of Innovative Social Programs"; and to administer, in an efficient and transparent manner, the trust funds, on the understanding that the settlor (fideicomitente) would assume no responsibility for the contracting of goods or services carried out with trust funds. The BCIE would limit itself to facilitating the structuring and design of trusts and third-party funds, according to client requirements, such as administration, guarantees, investment, project development, and implementation of special programs; in which, as a driver of Central American integration, it possesses extensive experience in the administrative, financial, and technical management of trusts and funds from various sources.

The assets, monies in this case, transferred in trust, constitute an autonomous patrimony, distinct from the patrimony of the settlor, the patrimony of the trustee, and the patrimony of the beneficiary or trust beneficiary, such that none hold title to them; the trustee is a mere administrator and makes the trust assets available to the trust beneficiary for the benefit or interest of another. In the case under study, the trial court held that such assets are of a public nature because they were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Housing, and for that reason they became part of the public treasury (hacienda pública). Furthermore, it relied on the declaration of the auditor [Name10]. However, as the same Court indicated (f. 44 of the judgment) and the Procuraduría General de la República did, that was not the initial opinion of the Contraloría General de la República; rather, in response to official communication No. 5018, on May 16, 2007, in report FOE-SOC-0387, addressed to [Name11], Internal Auditor of the MIVAH, it stated that "2. In accordance with Articles 1, 8, and 9 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, and by virtue of the nature, origin, and administration of the resources placed in trust by the Government of China, they cannot be considered as 'public funds' (fondos públicos) belonging to the Costa Rican State, and consequently, it would not be within the competence of that Internal Audit unit to oversee them, with the exception of establishing controls in the planning and execution, which are the responsibility of the MIVAH within its role in the project, for the effective fulfillment of the purposes for which said resources are intended. 3. By virtue of the nature and origin of the resources, the procedure of comptroller approval (refrendo contralor) is not required for the trust agreement under consultation." This statement was supported by the fact that "The Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend and invest such funds and the legal, administrative and financial rules relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials" (Article 8); and by the fact that "...only those resources that they administer or dispose of, under any title, to achieve their ends and that have been transferred or placed at their disposal, by means of a rule or budgetary allocation, by the Branches of the State, their dependencies and auxiliary bodies, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks shall form part of the Public Treasury. Resources of an origin different from those indicated do not form part of the Public Treasury; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special regulations that govern them. (...) The public patrimony (patrimonio público) shall be the universe constituted by public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the subjects that are components of the Public Treasury. The subjects that are components of the Public Treasury shall be the State and the other public entities or bodies, whether state or not, and public enterprises, as well as subjects of Private Law, insofar as they administer or hold in custody public funds under any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph." (As amended by subsection d) of Article 126 of Law No. 8131 of September 18, 2001, Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). That, "'Public Funds' are the resources, securities, goods, and rights owned by the State, by bodies, by enterprises, or by public entities." It was also stated that, "Regarding the origin of the trust resources, it is the opinion of this comptroller body that they cannot be considered as public resources belonging to the Government of Costa Rica. In this case, we have that the Government of the Republic of China (Settlor), contributes and transfers the exact sum of two million four hundred eighty-eight thousand five hundred dollars, to the BCIE (trustee) so that it administers said resources in support of the Social Sector and the Fight Against Poverty, for the benefit of the Government of Costa Rica through the MIVAH (Trust Beneficiary). (...) "...Stated another way, we have that from the moment the Government of China contributes the resources, until their administration by the BCIE, at no time do they become part of the public patrimony. In addition to the foregoing, it must be added that in the present case, the entity administering the trust resources is not a public entity, an aspect that, as will be discussed later, helps to definitively conclude that the trust resources are not public, and that at most, what the MIVAH as Trust Beneficiary must ensure, is that within the scope of its competence set forth in the trust agreement and project document, the controls relating to planning and execution guarantee that the resources are used for the intended purposes. In another order, and in accordance with the aforementioned regulations, it is clear that aspects such as receiving, administering, holding in custody, conserving, managing, spending, and investing such (public) funds, as well as the administrative and financial matters relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials, are substantial characteristics for defining and determining the nature of funds that are public and those that are not. Along these lines, as stipulated in the fifth clause of the Trust Agreement, it is the BCIE in its capacity as Trustee that shall have the obligations to manage the trust patrimony (e.g., keep it in accounts separate from its own and from any other trust under its responsibility); render periodic reports, or at least semi-annually, to the Settlor, on the activities carried out in fulfillment of the purposes of the Trust; pay the expenses required for proper administration; carry out all necessary acts for the fulfillment of the previously established purposes, which include the execution, implementation, and formalization of all types of acts and contracts, and on which it must previously request the opinion of the MIVAH (Trust Beneficiary), as the entity responsible for the Social Sector and the Fight Against Poverty and executor of the "Neighborhood Improvement" project; likewise, the Trustee shall answer with its own patrimony for any losses that the trust patrimony might suffer, among others. These characteristics of administration and responsibility over the trust patrimony granted to the BCIE (Trustee) are, apart from the origin of the resources, another aspect that leads this Contraloría General to the conclusion that said resources are not of a public nature, insofar as their origin and administration have not been in charge of an entity of the Costa Rican State. In this regard, it is evident that said resources do not meet the characteristics provided for in Articles 1, 8, and 9 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, sufficient reason to affirm that that audit unit and this Contraloría General would have no competence whatsoever to audit the resources placed in trust and administered by the BCIE (Trustee). Notwithstanding the foregoing, and despite their nature, it is clear that said resources are intended for and vested with a public purpose, such as supporting the Social Sector and the Fight Against Poverty and the execution of the aforementioned project. In relation to the fulfillment of the purposes provided for in the Trust Agreement, it is where the Internal Audit Unit can and must play a preponderant role in terms of oversight, referring to the controls that, in the planning and execution of the project, are the responsibility of the MIVAH within its role in the project, and the corresponding contribution of 500,000 dollars that the MIVAH has allocated for said project, which are not incorporated as part of the Trust Agreement. On this point, it is necessary to indicate that in the same line of thought that has been set forth, this Contraloría General, through official communication No. 00231 (DCA-0101), dated January fifteenth, two thousand seven, from the Administrative Contracting Division, and official communication No. 15106 (FOE-SO-436) dated December first, two thousand four, issued by the Social Services Area, it is the MIVAH that must establish and apply the necessary controls to ensure the adequate use of the resources administered by the BCIE, with criteria of effectiveness in the fulfillment of the purposes, under the responsibility of its hierarchy. By virtue of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Contraloría General that the competence of that Internal Audit unit and of this comptroller body is circumscribed and must only occur in the controls established in the planning and execution of the project as such, according to the role assigned to the MIVAH; and not concerning the resources contributed by the Government of China and their administration by the BCIE (Trustee)." In the opinion of this Court of Appeal, despite the fact that this opinion could have been subsequently reversed, and considering that as long as assets do not enter the State coffers, they retain their private nature; the truth is that far from the position assumed here on this point, it is considered that the concrete determination of this aspect by the comptroller body, as well as the unambiguous knowledge thereof by the defendants, was necessary and directly impacted the criminal liability of both. Therefore, since there was no clarity or uniformity on the point, the possibility arose that, indeed, [Name [Name6]] and [Name [Name7]], relying on a legitimate support such as the referred opinion, acted under the belief that they were private assets. And although the opinion was issued some time after the questioned contracting began, the truth of the case is that if a pronouncement was requested from the Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing, it was because no one was clear about the nature, public or private, of the trust assets, and there is no evidence whatsoever—nor did the Court or the accusers mention it—that demonstrates that the defendants did have such knowledge. It is also true that Article 17 of the Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422, expressly states that "(…) Likewise, no public official, during the enjoyment of a leave without pay, may serve as an advisor or consultant to bodies, institutions, or entities, national or foreign, that are directly linked, by hierarchical relationship, by devolution, or by an agreement approved for this purpose, with the body or entity for which they hold their position. (…)." But it should be noted that this scenario applies to cases where the simultaneous performance of public positions is sought. Such being the case, if both [Name8] and [Name9] considered that the work entrusted in the trust was of a private nature, even having the aforementioned opinion of the Contraloría that stated so; the truth is that, as long as there was no overlap of schedules or additional restrictions, such as the prohibition from freely practicing a profession, or any other incompatibility of positions, she was qualified to opt for that other job. To this it must be added that the nature of the funds could never depend on the opinion of the Contraloría, or correspond to a case-by-case weighing of the circumstances, because the different pronouncements create legal uncertainty and consequently could foster inequality in the application of the law, which, in turn, creates injustice. Furthermore, how could the accused be required to have clear knowledge of something that even the Contraloría does not have? In that sense, the trial judges did not consider that the degree of demandability for the defendants cannot reach such levels, when not even the comptroller body itself has clarity, nor a single line, to define when we are dealing with assets, or services, of a public or private nature. For the foregoing reasons and because of the various technical and legal opinions issued on the nature of the trust assets, whose definition cannot be casuistic; it cannot be categorically ruled out that the defendants could have acted under the belief that they were private. So this is another reason, which joins what will be said, to uphold the appeals and acquit them, from this venue.

**(ii) On the influence that the accused [Name8] could have used to promote the appointment of [Name9] as a consultant.** From the evidentiary array, it is not extracted that [Name8] had any legal impediment to propose the appointment of [Name9], as the trust agreement allowed it in the FIFTH clause, which provides that, before any contracting, the trustee must request the opinion of the trust beneficiary, and, even, that same clause contemplated the possibility that the trust beneficiary could be advised by its own officials. Furthermore, although the restriction "without charge to the trust" was imposed, in the specific case, no incompatibility is observed because at a certain moment, as will be seen below, [Name9] left her position as a subordinate to the Ministry of Housing. Another aspect that was left unanalyzed by the a quo lies in the fact that [Name8] not only proposed the appointment of [Name9] but, as can be inferred from official communications DM-500-10-06 and DM-151-02-07, he proposed processing several contracts for other persons, and even quoted the amount to be earned for each consultancy, establishing that her contracting would be effective from the signing of the contract (f. 35 and 50 of the evidence dossier). Thus, the examination of these documents allows one to point out that the defendant did not exclusively choose [Name9] to favor her or bring her economic benefits, but, as stated in those official communications, suggested various names for different contracts, as he was authorized to do in the FIFTH clause of the trust. Concluding otherwise would then lead to questioning why [Name8] was not denounced for proposing other persons, for whom he also set an economic benefit? Therefore, contrary to what was resolved in the contested judgment, it is not corroborated that [Name8], taking advantage of his position as Minister, influence or conditioned in an illegitimate manner the appointment of [Name9] as a consultant in the project administered by the BCIE, even less that as a result of some maneuver on his part, harm was caused to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), since the trust assets did not belong to it. But even taking the position that these became part of the state patrimony due to the intended purposes of their investment, the truth is that this was not diminished either, because both he and the accused fulfilled the entrusted tasks.

**(iii)** In a third issue, this Court of Appeal has reconsidered the **terms of the contracting,** in order to verify start dates, so that the existence or not of the simultaneous exercise of two positions by [Name9] can be identified, and whether the economic benefit received for the questioned consultancy caused her illicit enrichment, orchestrated between her and the defendant. The judges held as true that the contract with [Name9] began on February 6, 2007, and that by March 15 of that same year (when she ceased work as a salaried employee of the Ministry of Housing), she had already received a salary from the Ministry, a payment of $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred US dollars), plus the agreed monthly amount of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars). But they reached this conclusion without even mentioning all the documentation that makes up the trust agreement so often referred to, despite the fact that it was provided to them for analysis; and from which the following is extracted: **a)** That this legal transaction was signed in the city of San José, Costa Rica, on the sixth day of the month of February, two thousand seven (2-6-2007), and that the following appeared before it: Mr. [Name12], Ambassador of the Republic of China - Taiwan (Settlor); Mr. [Name13], Director of the BCIE, Costa Rica (Trustee), and [Name8], Minister of Housing (Trust Beneficiary). **b)** That the start date has never been sufficiently clear to establish the period in which, supposedly, [Name9] performed both tasks (that of the public sector and that assigned in the trust). On this extreme, it was not enough to read the contract that indicated it would begin on February 6, 2007 (f.56)—as the a quo Court did—to conclude that, since [Name9] was not terminated until March 15, 2007 (cf. official communication DAF/101-2007, f. 76) and that [Name [Name6]] was aware of this, they incurred the illicit conduct attributed to them. Firstly, there are several circumstances that cast doubt on the date the contract actually began: Let us see: **a.** The trust agreement did not establish a date in this regard. **b.** In the document added at f. 47-49 of the evidence dossier, it was recorded that the consultancy regarding [Name [Name7]] would start on November 1, 2006. So, why was this date not chosen or discarded? The Court does not say. **c.** Official communications DM-396-09-06 and DM-500-10-06 (f. 32-37) merely provide for the period for which the contracting is effective, and that it will run from the signing of the contract. **d.** The consultancy contract was signed by [Name [Name7]] on March 5, 2007 (f. 61 of the evidence dossier). **e.** The first advance of the remuneration agreed upon in the agreement was requested and authorized on March 5, 2007 (f. 57), and was deposited in her bank account at the Banco de Costa Rica on March 13 of that same year (cf. historical movements of the account in the name of the accused, in the period 2007). **f.** The payment of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars) is recorded as authorized by [Name [Name6]] in May 2007, and credited on May 28, 2007 (cf. form added to the evidence dossier and bank movements of the defendant's account). Having specified those circumstances that surrounded the contracting, this Court determines that, if official communications DM-500-10-06 and DM-151-02-07 proposed that the contracting would be effective from the signing of the contract; that it was signed by [Name9] on March 5, 2007; that the first payment (advance) she would receive for $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred US dollars) was agreed to be delivered on the day of signing (cf. "Article 4. Remuneration," f. 57), and that same day it was requested and authorized, to be credited until March 13 of that year; and the first deposit for $1,800 dollars appears recorded on May 28, 2007; it could not be assured that the overlap of positions began on February 6, nor that the referred $7,400 or $1,800 US dollars corresponded to the first month, as the Court argued. Rather, when concatenating the different dates indicated with the proof of monthly payment for $1,800 dollars, which begin dated May 2007 (cf. f. 132 et seq. of the evidence dossier); everything seems to indicate that there could have been a variation of the contract, and that "that reality contract" does not coincide with what is documented, nor with what the judges appreciated when saying that from February 6, 2007, [Name9] had two jobs, with coinciding schedules or some overlap, and earning two incomes. Essentially, it can be detected that the start dates of the contract—as alleged—do not match what is extracted from the evidence, because various possibilities arise: That the alleged duplicity of functions was for a shorter period, and not from February 6 to March 15, 2007, since some documents indicate it would begin on that date, others in November 2006, others upon the signing of the contract, and another, the one used by the defendants in their defense, which indicates that if the cessation occurred on March 15, 2007, the contracting is effective from the following day, as it was corrected with the BCIE by [Name8]. Thus, the lack of precision in that sense, also fostered by certification C-09-2012 issued by the Administrative and Financial Directorate of the MVAH documenting the cessation of work of [Name9] at the Ministry of Housing, as well as the cessation of payments as a trusted official assigned to the Office of the Minister [Name [Name6]]; suggests that the contract could well have started on other dates, without implying the dual function and dual remuneration that is reproached; an aspect that was not duly weighed by the judges. Apart from the fact that none of the witnesses heard could identify exact dates on the subject. Fueling the indicated inconsistencies, and with it the doubt about when the execution of the contract began—an aspect that was essential to determine and that in a remanded trial would not be clarified or modified given that it arises from the same evidence that was seen at trial—is official communication DM-496-05-07, dated May 16, 2007, signed by the accused, through which the variation of the contract's start date was requested, it being correct —according to the note— that it is effective as of March 16, 2007, a modification that was addressed without delay or any contradiction whatsoever by the BCIE (f. 83-87 of the evidence dossier).

The accusing parties have sought to demonstrate that this request signed by the defendant occurred once he realized he was being investigated or that his [Placa1] was beginning to be uncovered, with which he favored the interests of his subordinate. However, such an assessment lacks any objective basis. First, because the rectification was requested long before the complaint was filed. Note that the challenged request is dated May 16, 2007, and the complaint is dated November 20, 2008, meaning the latter was filed approximately 18 months later. On the other hand, even though it is an undisputed fact that this situation came to the attention of the Contraloría and that the Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing began to investigate the actual role performed by [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] in the office of Minister [Nombre [Nombre6]]; the actions undertaken by the latter regarding the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] were only criticized as incorrect and common bad practices, but no criminal investigation was suggested. In fact, in the Contraloría's report, when it responded to the inquiry about the nature of the trust assets, official communication FOE-SOC-0387, it highlighted that, although it was not a correct practice, it was common to see how permits with pay are granted to officials to take up another position related to the same administration. Based on these aspects, it cannot be assured, nor was it substantiated in the contested judgment, why that modification could not be made, or why it constituted part of the illicit purposes that, according to the accusation, the accused had in proposing the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] as a consultant and in the economic benefits she might obtain. What this report did show is that in the Public Administration, it is common for these (vertical or horizontal) changes of personnel or positions to be practiced, to place them in key or trusted points, or in other positions; without being able to conclude, beyond any doubt, that the actions of both accused were for illicit purposes, or to procure for themselves or another an illegal benefit and to disrespect the duty of probity in the performance of the entrusted function. Beyond that, what is revealed is administrative disorder and a lack of knowledge of the procedures that must be followed in such cases. Also, the repetition of flawed practices that are not susceptible to correction at the criminal level. If the Contraloría in 2006 recognized that it was common to see this type of practice, then it fell to that oversight body to disseminate sufficient policies and guidelines to eradicate and correct them.

(vi) From the same evidence that the a quo had before it, it also cannot be inferred that the remuneration proposed by the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] in favor of [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] increased her assets, nor that it was illegitimate; aspects that were omitted from in-depth analysis in the verdict. There is irrefutable proof that the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] was one of the individuals who proposed to the trustee the hiring of [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] as a consultant for the project financed by the Government of China. Also, that the proposed payment amounted to $50,600 (fifty thousand six hundred US dollars). However, the judgment omitted to consider that this amount corresponded to the total she would earn over 24 months, so that, although it might initially appear to be a significant sum, the truth is that this money had to be prorated over the number of months for which the hiring was arranged. In the verdict, the amount of the contracts entered into by the accused was taken as an important parameter, considering that the salaries or fees paid for the questioned consultancy are excessively high; however, this Court considers the assessment to be subjective; because it is not possible to compare a contract with an international entity, as important as the BCIE, with the lower-ranking salaries paid in the public administration; from which the only derivable thing is a significant difference, but one is an internal contract and the other is an international contract, which cannot be compared without considering that they are different parameters. Thus, the statements that supported this challenge in the judgment set aside the differences that exist between international and national quotations, starting with the currency in which they are set. In any case, even following the contested criterion, simply making a comparison between what that payment implied over 24 months with other proposals by [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] in document DM-151-02-07 reveals that the cost of hiring [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] was not far from what had been suggested in the cases of other consultants. Note that item "C. Hiring Subcode: MIVAH-TPE/CO-005" indicates that a baseline study on selective social policy, which will last for 2 months, has a total cost of $8,500 (eight thousand five hundred US dollars). While in item "Ch. Its Hiring Code: MIVAH-TPE/CO-006," it is proposed that for high-level advisory services, which will last for 8 months, $52,000 (fifty-two thousand US dollars) will be paid. Both proposals, not included in this proceeding as criminal, far exceed what the defendant [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] would be paid under a contract that lasted for 24 months. This reference reveals that the cost of the consultancy was in line with international parameters and did not imply a higher or excessive quotation in relation to others that were not considered illicit and tending to favor the assets of their beneficiaries. Finally, one cannot fail to say that if what is sought is to sanction whoever increases their assets as a result of income whose origin is illegitimate, how can it be ensured that [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] actually obtained such benefits if no evidence whatsoever was added in this regard. Furthermore, even if her income increased, it was the product of a contract whose existence has not been questioned.

(v) The other aspect on which the contested conviction has been based is that the defendant was proposed and appointed as a consultant, yet she continued working in the Minister's Office and performing the same duties, with the sole difference that she would no longer earn a salary of around three hundred thousand colones, but instead started earning $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars) monthly; which reveals the benefit procured for her by the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">]. In the opinion of this Chamber, this statement also does not align with a harmonious assessment of the evidence presented. As stated in the preceding lines, the documentation does not unequivocally establish exactly when [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">]'s hiring as a consultant began; and this very circumstance, consequently, also prevents us from ensuring or ruling out that, in the period between February 6 and March 15, both dates in 2007, the accused was appointed as a trusted secretary for [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">]. That determination was extremely important, as it was the only way to define whether [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] could continue performing the duties she had held by virtue of her position since 2006, as well as whether the income reported on the payroll up to March 15 represented a double payment or the normal payment of her salary. That is, if with the documentary evidence re-examined here, the specific and exact date on which the hiring began for the project administered by the BCIE could not be defined, and the testimonies also did not clarify from what date [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] became a consultant; this doubt also prevents us from determining whether the duties performed during that period corresponded to her duties as secretary to [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">], to those assumed as a consultant, or whether they overlapped. Moreover, one cannot ignore that the poor administrative practices identified—which, as in this case, endorsed the trusted secretary of a Minister becoming part of a contract related to the same Ministry—can generate such confusion in management. In that sense, when contrasting the duties that [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] normally performed from the ministerial office with those indicated in the "terms of reference" of the project, it is determined that she was entrusted with similar duties, and even some identical to those she initially performed in the office of [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">], such that, in the absence of a concrete report and clear evidence delineating them, it was perfectly feasible for her to perform similar duties, and because of this, her colleagues, other officials, and senior administrative managers of the Ministry could establish that she was doing the same thing for a much higher income. It has been verified, from this instance, that in the contract with Taiwan, she was assigned the following duties: "Coordinate the administrative and technical activities of the Minister's Office and its advisors, both internally and externally to the institution, with national and international organizations involved in the work of MIVAH and the social sector; Prepare the technical agenda and organize the work sessions held by the Minister, with internal and external, public and private, national and international bodies;" Prepare the technical reports resulting from the meetings held by the Minister, as well as coordinate the execution and follow-up actions of the agreements reached;" Coordinate the meetings of the Senior Ministerial Administration, as well as provide follow-up and evaluation of the topics discussed; (...) Plan, organize, and direct the technical and administrative work entrusted to the staff working in the Minister's Office, as well as render reports to the Minister on the results of their management (...)." (cf. CED1 from the evidentiary file). And, if those duties are compared with those delegated by [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] and those that [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] may have performed previously, they do not differ much, almost nothing (cf. regarding the duties assigned in the Minister's Office, certification C-09-2012 issued by the Financial Administrative Directorate, Human Resources Department). On the other hand, it was perfectly possible to perceive that similarity, since, as evident from note DM-849-08-07, signed by [Nombre [Nombre6]], he had delegated to [Nombre [Nombre7]] the signing of documents related to the payment of overtime, travel allowances, processing of vacation for officials who reported to the Minister, fuel vouchers, and petty cash management; thereby ensuring that her work was respected and that others would go to her in those cases, as she could perfectly sign on his behalf. Thus, notwithstanding the irregular situation evidenced by the judgment; it cannot be ignored that although there was a coincidence between the duties of [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] from her appointment before the Head of Human Resources of the Ministry of Housing in May 2006, those delegated to her, and those she assumed upon signing the contract, so much so that they were performed in the same Ministry, with officials belonging to it—as coordination occurred internally and externally—it has not been proven that she ceased to attend to one or the other, or that they occurred simultaneously. As such, whether through the biweekly salary modality or through payment of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred US dollars), she performed the entrusted duties without it having been proven that she caused a loss or impacted the public treasury. Furthermore, the fact that she may have been able to perform the same functions in one position or another does not, in itself, delegitimize her duties or powers. Finally, it is appropriate to clarify that if the delegation of signature was formalized late or retroactively, it would in no way invalidate the thesis of the de facto official, because even if there was materially no administrative agreement to that effect at the time, such requirement was subsequently supplied, thereby fully confirming and ratifying the management that she had been carrying out, not on her own account but by an assignment, endorsed publicly, peacefully, continuously, and normally in accordance with Law (cf. Article 115 of the General Law of Public Administration). Definitively, this Tribunal observes that a series of inadequate or inconvenient administrative practices occurred, which have been treated contradictorily by the Contralora General de la República, even internally within the Ministry of Labor, leading to doubts about the nature of the funds and contracting procedures. Therefore, rather than crimes, the proper course is to establish adequate protocols so as not to mislead the rest of the public administration. In this sense, as stated, the evidence that has been presented is not clear, unequivocal, or sufficient to establish criminal liability, nor to reveal a relevant harm to the public administration that requires sanctioning through criminal channels. Consequently, upholding the appeals filed, without any possibility of including more evidence in a retrial that might modify the situation of the defendants, the contested judgment is reversed, and a judgment of acquittal is ordered in favor of [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] and [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">].

D. On the civil action for damages. The civil defendant [Nombre [Nombre6]], in his personal capacity, criticizes the insufficient reasoning of the judgment regarding the admissibility of the civil action for damages. In his view, the failure to determine harm warrants upholding the appeal, annulling the judgment, and issuing an acquittal, ordering the complaining parties and civil plaintiffs to pay costs. For her part, the defendant [Nombre [Nombre7]], alleged that no pecuniary or social harm occurred, and that this was evident in the report of the Judicial Investigation Agency. And that, for this reason, she requests that the civil action for damages be dismissed, with costs awarded against the plaintiff. These claims are upheld; the civil action for damages is dismissed; and the civil plaintiff is exempted from payment of costs: In the judgment, the civil compensation was set based on the fact that the existence of a crime and the causal link between it and the harm caused were demonstrated. The criminal verdict has been reversed, for the reasons set forth in the preceding recitals. Regarding the civil matter, according to the preceding analysis, the occurrence of harm to the civil plaintiff was not proven, which demonstrates a lack of right to be compensated. While an acquittal does not necessarily affect the outcome of the civil claim, in this case, since the pecuniary and social harm was not demonstrated, as it was not proven with certainty that the defendant [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] was unduly favored with an illegal appointment by the co-defendant [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">], to which is added that the former did perform all the duties corresponding to her under the signed contract; the absence of harm whose reparation is sought does not allow the pecuniary claim to be upheld. It must be remembered that, regardless of whether the criminal act generating criminal liability was proven, it must always be demonstrated: a) the existence of harm or injury, which must be certain, real, and effective; b) the magnitude and extent of that harm; c) the party causing the harm; and d) the causal relationship between the harm suffered and the conduct deployed by the one who caused it; as well as, e) a criterion for attribution. None of these prerequisites have been established, given that the causation of harm was not demonstrated. A sum was claimed for material and social harm; however, despite the existence of an actuarial expert report that sets the amounts to be compensated, it was not derived from the evidence presented that the conduct of the civil defendants generated them; since it was established that the defendants were hired for a service they performed and in which they fulfilled the entrusted duties, which denotes the absence of harm to the public treasury and the consequent right to claim compensation. Based on the foregoing, the provisions regarding the civil claims are reversed, and the civil lawsuit filed by the State against [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] and [Nombre [Nombre6]] is dismissed. The Procurauría General de la República, in its capacity as civil plaintiff, is exempted from the payment of costs, since in this case there is a plausible reason for litigating or good faith (arts. 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure). This is reflected in the fact that in the criminal sphere, an acquittal based on doubt has been issued, which implies that the lawsuit filed by the State was not reckless, that is, it was reasonable to make the claims. In this sense, it should be noted that it was necessary to go through several phases of the proceeding, and it was only at this appellate level that the acquittal was ordered, which shows that the case was subject to lengthy discussion and the situation of the defendants was not so clear; it was necessary to exhaust the trial phase, and even the appeal stage, to determine the existence of the act. Finally, notwithstanding that it has been proven that the civil defendant [Nombre [Nombre7]] fulfilled the entrusted duties, doubt existed regarding the issue of her appointment, that is, the overlap of functions, the illegitimacy of the designation, and the terms of the contract.

Thus, as noted, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to bring the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) to seek reparation for the patrimonial and social harm; therefore, it is appropriate to exempt this party from the payment of costs.

To refute such facts, sustained by the Prosecution and the Procuraduría General de la República, and held as proven by the trial court, in considering that the evidence accredited the participation of the accused in the acts; the defense of both has alleged, in sum, that: (i) the assets held in trust (bienes fideicometidos) were of a private nature; (ii) despite the dates recorded in the contract suggesting it began on February 6, 2007, it became effective on March 16 of that year and that it was thus corrected by [[Nombre8] ]; (iii) that [Nombre [Nombre7]] fulfilled the work entrusted by the trust agreement (contrato de fideicomiso), and was therefore financially compensated; (iv) that the $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred U.S. dollars) constitute an advance, from the $50,600 (fifty thousand six hundred U.S. dollars) agreed upon in the contract signed by [[Nombre9] ], and further, that this amount was to be distributed over 24 months; (v) that the proposal for appointment as a consultant was not the only one, nor was it issued exclusively by [[Nombre8] ]; and that (vi) they always acted in good faith (buena fe) and fulfilled the tasks entrusted to them.

Having examined, from this instance, the foundations of the judgment, the accusatory theses, and those set forth by the accused; in light of the totality of the admitted evidence, it is considered that some aspects of the evidence, which were essential for determining the facts, were not analyzed in detail. It is true that some evidence was considered, but nevertheless, there was no sufficient in-depth analysis of the content and consequences of other evidence, which also formed part of the body of evidence, even that provided by the accusing party. And it is at the moment of retaking the totality of the evidentiary body, that relevant doubts arise about how the events unfolded and whether, truly, from each of the behaviors displayed by [[Nombre8] ] and [[Nombre9] ], even those accepted by them, the alleged unlawfulness can be derived. This Chamber detects that the judges limited themselves to concatenating, without greater analysis, part of the admitted evidence and the accused acts; without setting forth the reasons why: i) despite the contract dates not coinciding in all documents, it was taken as beginning on February 6, 2007, in accordance with the accusation; ii) or, what led to sustaining an overlap of functions, if those performed by [[Nombre9] ] from the office of the accused [[Nombre8] ], at that time Minister of Housing, were similar to those she assumed as a consultant; iii) or, why if the trust agreement granted [[Nombre8] ] the possibility of proposing appointments and contracts for the project, he could not do so in the case of [[Nombre9] ]? That is, to arrive at the appealed conclusion, the judges relied on documentary evidence that accredited some events but omitted to analyze it jointly. They conducted an isolated analysis of each piece of evidence that supported the prosecutorial thesis, but did not address, with the necessary breadth and detail, each of the documents related to those. This Chamber notes that they adhered to the document stating that the work of [[Nombre9] ] began on February 6, 2006, with the BCIE, but did not review all the terms of reference or the modifications that made up the contracting which is, finally, what gave rise to this process and from which the questions were formulated. By reason of this, as has been alleged by the appellants, the basis for the decision is not sustainable, and the appeals must be upheld; and, under a complete and joint re-examination of the evidence, the judgment is revoked, and in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, [Nombre [Nombre6]] and [Nombre [Nombre7]] are acquitted of the crimes attributed to them. The discussion raised in the extensive appeals is the same one that allows, in light of the admitted evidence, a re-examination of the terms of the trust agreement, its references or addenda (adendum), as well as matters related to the appointments, payments, and functions assigned to [[Nombre9] ] on the occasion of the proposal made by [[Nombre8] ].

To begin, it must be said that the criminal offenses of lawful enrichment, illegal recognition of benefits, and influence against the public treasury (influencia en contra de la hacienda pública), sanctioned respectively in Articles 45, 56, and 57 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment No. 8422 (Ley de Enriquecimiento ilícito Nº 8422), sanction those conducts that harm the public treasury and the duty of probity in the exercise of the position as a public official. They suggest that every public servant is obliged to orient their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest, to attend to priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for all inhabitants of the Republic. They also oblige them to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law, and to ensure that the decisions adopted in compliance with their attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives of the institution to which they belong. Finally, to administer public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, efficacy, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily (cf. Article 3, Ley 8422). In the specific case, the trial court (Tribunal a quo) considered that [Nombre [Nombre6]] was an accomplice to the crime of "illicit enrichment" (for which it imposed two years of imprisonment), which ideally concurs with that of "influence against the public treasury" (for which it imposed two years of imprisonment), and set the total sanction at three years of imprisonment. For [Nombre [Nombre7]], it imposed three years of imprisonment for the crime of illicit enrichment, as the principal. While it is true, as was observed by the judges, that both were public officials and the actions deployed by each of them suggested that an irregular situation may have occurred in the appointment of [Nombre [Nombre7]] and the work she performed, such that the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing intervened and the opinion of the Contraloría General de la República was required; these actions, in the opinion of this Appellate Chamber, are not sufficient to conclude, without a doubt, that they constituted a crime and meet the objective and subjective elements required by the criminal offenses applied, or any other. Let us recall that Article 45 (illicit enrichment) states that "Whoever, illegitimately taking advantage of the exercise of the public function or the custody, exploitation, use, or administration of public funds, services, or goods, under any title or management modality, for themselves or through an intermediary natural or legal person, increases their patrimony, acquires goods, enjoys rights, cancels debts, or extinguishes obligations that affect their patrimony or that of legal entities, in whose share capital they have a stake either directly or through other legal entities, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of three to six years." Thus, any person who holds or has held a position as a public official can only be a principal, on a fraudulent basis because it does not admit fault, and it requires for its typical adequacy, in addition, that there exists a patrimonial enrichment without a lawful cause. For its part, Article 57 (influence against the public treasury) sanctions "with imprisonment of two to eight years, the public official and other equivalent subjects who, upon intervening by reason of their position, influence, direct, or condition, in any way, so that a specific result harmful to the patrimonial interests of the Public Treasury or to the public interest is produced, or who uses any maneuver or artifice aimed at that end." The typical action is to take advantage of the position to influence a specific decision, which will cause a result detrimental to the public treasury. In this particular case, it has been maintained that the reported conducts are typical because [Nombre [Nombre6]] took advantage of his position, his political influence, both within the Ministry of Housing and before the BCIE, with the signing of the trust agreement with Taiwan, to appoint his co-defendant [[Nombre9] ] as a project consultant, thereby facilitating a multi-million-dollar payment, which she received in her accounts. However, a re-examination of the same evidence that was available to the Court, contrary to what was decided, does not allow these circumstances to be considered accredited; therefore, due to doubt, the acquittal of both defendants is ordered. To arrive at this conclusion, from this instance, the following aspects have been evaluated:

(i) Nature of the assets held in trust (fondos fideicometidos). By virtue of the questions proposed regarding the nature of the assets held in trust, it is relevant to remember that a trust (fideicomiso) is an operation through which the settlor (fideicomitente) transmits goods or rights to the trustee (fiduciario) for the realization of lawful and predetermined purposes in favor of a third party (beneficiary/fideicomisario); in which the trustee (who receives a commission for administration) is obliged and committed to administer the trust assets and/or rights, in favor of one or several beneficiaries, following the conditions stipulated in the articles of incorporation. In the case under study, as accredited by the lower court (a quo) and as is evident from the documentation incorporated into the process, the trust was constituted on February 6, 2007, with the Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica (BCIE) appearing as trustee, the Republic of China as settlor, and the Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Urbanos (MIVAH) as beneficiary, under the command of the accused [Nombre [Nombre6]]. The object of the contract consisted of two million four hundred eighty-eight thousand five hundred dollars, which were to be used to support the social sector and the fight against poverty of the Government of Costa Rica; to provide the beneficiary with contracting services for the project "Neighborhood Improvement and Management of Innovative Social Programs" (Mejoramiento Barrial y Gestión de Programas Sociales Innovativos); and to efficiently and transparently administer the trust assets, under the understanding that the settlor would assume no responsibility for the procurement of goods or services carried out with trust assets. The BCIE would limit itself to facilitating the structuring and design of third-party trusts and funds, in accordance with client requirements, such as administration, guarantees, investment, development of works, and implementation of special programs; in which, as a promoter of Central American integration, it has extensive experience in the administrative, financial, and technical management of trusts and funds from various sources. The goods, moneys in this case, transferred in trust, constitute an autonomous patrimony, distinct from the patrimony of the settlor, the trustee's patrimony, and the beneficiary's or fideicomisario's patrimony, such that none of them is the owner of the same; the trustee is a mere administrator and makes the trust assets available to the beneficiary for the benefit or interest of another. In the case under study, the trial court held that such goods are of a public nature because they were made available to the Ministry of Housing, and by reason of that, they became part of the public treasury. Additionally, it relied on the declaration of the auditor [Nombre10] . However, according to what the Court itself indicated (p. 44 of the judgment) and the Procuraduría General de la República, that was not the initial opinion of the Contraloría General de la República, but rather, in response to official communication No. 5018, on May 16, 2007, in report FOE-SOC-0387, addressed to [Nombre11] , Internal Auditor of the MIVAH; it indicated that "2. In accordance with Articles 1, 8, and 9 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, and by virtue of the nature, origin, and administration of the resources held in trust by the Government of China, they cannot be considered as “public funds” belonging to the Costa Rican State, and consequently, it would not fall within the competence of this Internal Audit unit to oversee them, with the exception of establishing controls in the planning and execution, which correspond to the MIVAH within its role in the project, for the effective fulfillment of the purposes for which said resources are intended. 3. By virtue of the nature and origin of the resources, the process of comptroller endorsement is not required for this trust agreement under consultation." This statement was supported on the basis that "The Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms related to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials" (Article 8); and on the basis that "... only those resources that they administer or dispose of, by any title, to achieve their purposes and that have been transferred or made available through a legal norm or budgetary allocation by the Powers of the State, their dependencies and auxiliary bodies, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks, shall form part of the Public Treasury. Resources of an origin different from those indicated do not form part of the Public Treasury; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special ordinances that regulate them. (...) The public patrimony shall be the universe constituted by public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the component subjects of the Public Treasury. The State and the other public entities or bodies, state or non-state, and public enterprises, as well as subjects of Private Law, shall be component subjects of the Public Treasury, insofar as they administer or guard public funds by any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph." (Thus amended by subparagraph d) of Article 126 of Law No. 8131 of September 18, 2001, Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). That, "Public Funds are the resources, valuables, goods, and rights owned by the State, by bodies, by enterprises, or by public entities.” It was also stated that, "Regarding the origin of the trust assets, it is the opinion of this comptroller body that the same cannot be considered as public resources belonging to the Government of Costa Rica. In this case, we have that the Government of the Republic of China (Settlor), contributes and transfers the exact sum of two million four hundred eighty-eight thousand five hundred dollars to the BCIE (trustee) to administer said resources in support of the Social Sector and Fight Against Poverty, for the benefit of the Government of Costa Rica through the MIVAH (Beneficiary). (...) "... Stated another way, we have that from the moment the Government of China contributes the resources, up to their administration by the BCIE, they at no time become part of the public patrimony. In addition to the above, it must be added that in the present case, the entity administering the trust assets is not a public entity, an aspect that, as will be discussed later, helps to definitively conclude that the trust assets are not public, and that at most, what the MIVAH as Beneficiary must guarantee is that, within the scope of its competence stated in the trust agreement and project document, the controls related to planning and execution guarantee that the resources are used for the intended purposes. In another vein, and in accordance with the regulations previously indicated, it is clear that aspects such as receiving, administering, guarding, conserving, managing, spending, and investing such (public) funds, as well as the administrative and financial aspects related to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials, are substantial characteristics for the definition and determination of the nature of funds that are public and those that are not. Along these lines, as stipulated in the fifth clause of the Trust Agreement, it is the BCIE, in its capacity as Trustee, that shall have the obligations to administer the trust patrimony (e.g., keeping it in accounts separate from its own and from any other trust under its responsibility); to render periodic reports, or at least semi-annually, to the Settlor on the activities executed in fulfillment of the Trust's purposes; to pay the expenses that an adequate administration demands; to perform all acts necessary for the fulfillment of the previously established purposes, which include the realization, execution, and formalization of all types of acts and contracts, and on which it must previously request the opinion of the MIVAH (Beneficiary), as the entity in charge of the Social Sector and Fight Against Poverty and executor of the “Neighborhood Improvement” project; likewise, the Trustee shall respond with its own patrimony for any losses that the trust patrimony might suffer, among others. These characteristics of administration and responsibility over the trust patrimony granted to the BCIE (Trustee) are, apart from the origin of the resources, another aspect that leads this Contraloría General to the conclusion that said resources are not of a public nature, because their origin and administration have not been the responsibility of an entity of the Costa Rican State. In this regard, it is evident that said resources do not meet the characteristics provided for in Articles 1, 8, and 9 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, a reason sufficient to affirm that this audit unit and this Contraloría General would have no competence whatsoever to audit the trust assets administered by the BCIE (Trustee). Notwithstanding the foregoing, and despite their nature, it is clear that said resources are intended for and vested with a public purpose, as is the case of supporting the Social Sector and Fight Against Poverty and the execution of the aforementioned project. In relation to the fulfillment of the purposes provided for in the Trust Agreement, it is where the Internal Audit Unit can and should play a preponderant role at the oversight level, referring to the controls concerning the planning and execution of the project that fall under the MIVAH's role in the project, and the corresponding contribution of 500,000 dollars that the MIVAH has allocated for said project, which are not incorporated as part of the Trust Agreement. On this matter, it is necessary to note that along the same line of thought that has been set forth, this Contraloría General, via official communication No. 00231 (DCA-0101) dated January fifteenth, two thousand seven, from the Administrative Contracting Division, and official communication No. 15106 (FOE-SO-436) dated December first, two thousand four, issued by the Social Services Area, states that it is the MIVAH that must establish and apply the necessary controls to guarantee an adequate use of the resources administered by the BCIE, with criteria of effectiveness in the fulfillment of the purposes, under the responsibility of its hierarchy. By virtue of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Contraloría General that the competence of this Internal Audit unit and of this comptroller body is circumscribed to, and must occur only in, the controls established in the planning and execution of the project as such, according to the role assigned to the MIVAH; and not in what concerns the resources contributed by the Government of China and their administration by the BCIE (Trustee)." In the opinion of this Appellate Chamber, despite the fact that this opinion could have been subsequently reversed, and that it is considered that as long as the goods do not enter the state coffers, they maintain their private nature; the truth is that, far from the position assumed here on the point, it is considered that the concrete determination of this aspect by the comptroller body, as well as the unequivocal knowledge of it by the accused, was necessary and directly affected the criminal responsibility of both. Therefore, as there was no clarity or uniformity on the point, the possibility arose that, effectively, [Nombre [Nombre6]] and [Nombre [Nombre7]], supported by a legitimate basis such as was the referred opinion, acted under the belief that they were dealing with private goods. And although the opinion was issued sometime after the questioned contracting began, the truth of the matter is that if a pronouncement was requested by the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing, it was because no one had a clear understanding of the public or private nature of the trust assets, and there is no evidence, neither the Court nor the prosecutors mentioned it, demonstrating that the accused themselves did have that knowledge. It is also true that Article 17 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, No. 8422 (Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, Nº 8422), expressly states that "(…) Likewise, no public official, while on leave without pay, may serve as an advisor or as a consultant to bodies, institutions, or entities, national or foreign, that are directly linked, through hierarchical relationship, deconcentration, or an agreement approved for that purpose, with the body or entity for which they exercise their position. (…)." But it must be noted that this supposition applies to the case where the simultaneous performance of public positions is sought. That being the case, if both [[Nombre8] ] and [[Nombre9] ] considered that the work entrusted in the trust was of a private nature, even having the referred opinion of the Contraloría stating so; the truth is that, as long as there was no overlap of schedules or additional restrictions, such as, for example, the prohibition on freely practicing a profession, or any other incompatibility of positions, she was qualified to opt for that other work.

To this must be added that the nature of the funds could never depend on the criterion of the Contraloría, nor correspond to a casuistic weighing of the circumstances, since the different pronouncements create legal uncertainty and, consequently, could foster an inequality in the application of the law that, in turn, creates injustice. Furthermore, how could the defendants be required to have a clear understanding of something about which not even the Contraloría has one? In that sense, the lower court judges did not consider that the degree of exigibility for the accused cannot reach such levels when not even the controlling body itself has clarity, nor a single line, to define when we are dealing with assets or services of a public or private nature. By reason of the foregoing and the various technical and legal criteria that were issued regarding the nature of the assets held in trust, the definition of which cannot be casuistic, it cannot be categorically ruled out that the defendants may have acted under the belief that they were private. So this is another reason, which joins what will be said, to uphold the challenges and acquit them, from this venue. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">(ii)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Regarding the influence that the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">] may have used to promote the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">] as a consultant. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">From the body of evidence, it cannot be deduced that [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] had any legal impediment to proposing the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">], as this was permitted by the trust agreement in clause FIVE, which provides that, before any contracting, the trustee must request the opinion of the trust beneficiary, and, even, that same clause contemplated the possibility that the trust beneficiary could be advised by its own officials. Furthermore, although the restriction "without charge to the trust" was imposed, in the specific case no incompatibility is observed because at a certain moment, as will be seen later, [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] left her position as a subordinate to the Ministry of Housing. Another aspect that the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">a quo</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> failed to analyze lies in the fact that [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] not only proposed the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] but, as can be inferred from official letters DM-500-10-06 and DM-151-02-07, proposed processing several contracts for other persons, and even quoted the amount to be earned by each consultancy, establishing that her contracting would take effect upon the signing of the contract (pages 35 and 50 of the evidence file). Thus, the examination of these documents allows us to point out that the accused did not exclusively choose [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] to favor her or bring her economic benefits, but rather, as recorded in those official letters, suggested various names for different contracts, as was authorized in clause FIVE of the trust agreement. To conclude otherwise would lead one to question, then, why was [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] not reported for proposing the other persons, for whom he also set an economic benefit? Based on the foregoing, contrary to what was decided in the challenged judgment, it is not corroborated that [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">], taking advantage of his position as Minister, illegitimately influenced or conditioned the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] as a consultant in the project managed by the BCIE, even less that as a result of any maneuver on his part harm was caused to the Public Treasury, since the trust assets did not belong to it. But even taking the position that these assets became part of the State's patrimony due to the proposed goals of their investment, the truth is that this patrimony was not impaired either since both he and the accused fulfilled the tasks entrusted to them. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">(iii)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> On a third topic, this Court of Appeal has re-examined the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">terms of the contract,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> in order to verify start dates, so that the existence or non-existence of the simultaneous exercise of two positions by [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] can be identified, and whether the economic benefit received from the questioned consultancy caused her an illicit enrichment, orchestrated between her and the accused. The judges held it as certain that the contract with [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] began on February 6, 2007, and that by March 15 of that same year (when she ceased her work as an employee of the Ministry of Housing) she had already received a salary from the Ministry, a payment of $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred United States dollars), plus the agreed monthly amount of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred United States dollars). But it reached that conclusion without even mentioning all the documentation that forms part of the trust agreement so often referred to, despite it having been provided for analysis; and from which the following is deduced: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">a)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> That this legal transaction was signed in the city of San José, Costa Rica, on the sixth day of the month of February 2007 (6-2-2007), and that appearing before it were Messrs. [Nombre12]- , Ambassador of the Republic of China -Taiwan (Trustor); [Nombre13]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, Director of the BCIE, Costa Rica (Trustee), and [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">], Minister of Housing (trust beneficiary). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">b)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> That the start date has never been sufficiently clear to establish the period in which, supposedly, [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] performed both tasks (that of the public sector and that assigned in the trust). On this point, it was not enough to read the contract indicating that it would begin on February 6, 2007 (page 56), -as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">a quo</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Tribunal did-, to conclude that, since [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] was terminated until March 15, 2007 (cf. official letter DAF/101-2007, page 76) and that [Nombre [Nombre6]] was aware of this, they incurred in the illicit conduct attributed to them. First of all, there are several circumstances that cast doubt on the date on which the contract actually began: Let us see: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">a.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> The trust agreement did not establish a date in this regard. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">b</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">. In the document added to pages 47-49 of the evidence file, it was recorded that the consultancy regarding [Nombre [Nombre7]] would begin on November 1, 2006. So, why was this date not chosen or discarded? The Tribunal does not say. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">c.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Official letters DM-396-09-06 and DM-500-10-06 (pages 32-37) are limited to stating the period for which the contract is in effect, and that it will run from the signing of the contract. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">d. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">The consultancy contract was signed by [Nombre [Nombre7]] on March 5, 2007 (page 61 of the evidence file). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">e. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">The first advance of the remuneration agreed in the agreement was requested and authorized on March 5, 2007 (page 57), and was deposited into her bank account at Banco de Costa Rica on March 13 of that same year (cf. historical movements of the account in the name of the accused, for the 2007 period). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">f. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">The payment of $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred United States dollars) is recorded as authorized by [Nombre [Nombre6]] in May 2007, and credited on May 28, 2007 (cf. form added to the evidence file and bank movements of the defendant's account). Having specified these circumstances surrounding the contract, this Chamber determines that, if in official letters DM-500-10-06 and DM-151-02-07 it was proposed that the contract would take effect upon signing; that it was signed by [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] on March 5, 2007; that the first payment (advance) she would receive for $7,400 (seven thousand four hundred United States dollars) was agreed to be delivered on the day of signing (cf. "Article 4. remuneration," page 57), and was requested and authorized that same day, to be credited only on March 13 of that year; and the first deposit of $1,800 dollars is recorded on May 28, 2007; it could not be asserted that the overlap of positions began on February 6, nor that the referred $7,400 or $1,800 United States dollars corresponded to the first month, as the Tribunal argued. Rather, upon concatenating the different indicated dates with the monthly payment vouchers of $1,800 dollars, which begin dated May 2007 (cf. pages 132 et seq. of the evidence file); everything seems to indicate that there could have been a variation of the contract, and that "this real contract" does not coincide with what was documented, nor with what the judges appreciated when stating that since February 6, 2007, [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] had two jobs, with coinciding schedules or with some overlap, and earning two incomes. Essentially, it can be detected that the contract start dates -according to the accusation- do not match what is extracted from the evidence, since several possibilities arise: That the supposed duplication of functions was for a shorter period, and not from February 6 to March 15, 2007, since some documents indicate it would begin on that date, others in November 2006, others upon the signing of the contract, and another, the one used by the defendants in their defense, states that since the termination occurred on March 15, 2007, the contract takes effect from the following day as corrected with the BCIE by [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">]. So the lack of precision in this sense, also fostered by certification C-09-2012 issued by the Financial Administrative Directorate of the MVAH documenting the cessation of work of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] at the Ministry of Housing, as well as the cessation of payments as an officer of trust assigned to the Office of the Minister [Nombre [Nombre6]]; suggests that the contract could well have begun on other dates, without implying the double function and double remuneration that is being reproached; an aspect that was not duly weighed by the judges. Aside from the fact that none of the witnesses received could identify exact dates on the matter. Feeding the noted inconsistencies, and thereby the doubt about when the execution of the contract began, an aspect that was essential to determine and that in a remand trial would not be clarified or modified since it is generated from the same evidence that was at hand at trial; is official letter DM-496-05-07, dated May 16, 2007, signed by the accused, through which the variation of the contract start date was requested, with the correct date -according to the note- being March 16, 2007, a modification that was addressed without delay or any contradiction on the part of the BCIE (pages 83-87 of the evidence file). The prosecuting parties have attempted to demonstrate that this request signed by the accused occurred once he realized he was being investigated or that his [Placa1] with which he favored the interests of his subordinate was beginning to be discovered. However, such an assessment finds no objective support whatsoever. First, because the rectification was requested long before the complaint was filed. Note that the attacked request is dated May 16, 2007, and the complaint November 20, 2008, meaning the latter was instituted approximately 18 months later. On the other hand, even though it is an undisputed fact that this situation came to the knowledge of the Contraloría and that the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Housing began to investigate the real function that [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] performed in the office of the Minister [Nombre [Nombre6]]; the actions carried out by him regarding the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] were only described as incorrect and common bad practices, but no criminal investigation was suggested. Even in the report of the Contraloría, when it responded to the consultation on the nature of the trust assets, official letter FOE-SOC-0387, it emphasized that, although it was not a correct practice, it was common to see how permits with salary benefits were granted to officials, to then occupy another position related to the same administration. From these aspects, it could not be asserted, nor was it substantiated in the challenged judgment, why that modification could not be made, or why it constituted part of the illicit purposes that according to the accusation the accused had in proposing the appointment of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] as a consultant and in the economic benefits that she could obtain. What this report did demonstrate is that in the Public Administration it is common to practice these (vertical or horizontal) changes of personnel or positions, to place them in key or trusted points, or in other positions; without it being possible to conclude, without a doubt, that the actions of both defendants were for illicit purposes, or to procure for themselves or procure an illegal benefit and disregard the duty of probity in the exercise of the entrusted function. Beyond that, what is revealed is administrative disorder and a lack of knowledge of the procedures that must be followed in those cases. Also, the repetition of corrupted practices that are not susceptible to correction at the criminal level. If the Contraloría in 2006 recognized that it was common to see this type of practices, then it is up to that controlling body to disseminate sufficient policies and directives to eradicate and correct them. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">(vi)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> From the same evidence that the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">a quo</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> had at hand, it cannot be deduced that the remuneration proposed by the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] in favor of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] increased the latter's patrimony, nor that it was illegitimate; aspects that were omitted from in-depth analysis in the ruling. There is irrefutable proof that the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] was one of the persons who proposed to the trustee the contracting of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">], as a consultant for the project financed by the Government of China. Also, that the proposed payment reached $50,600 (fifty thousand six hundred United States dollars). However, the judgment omitted considering that this amount corresponded to the total she would earn over 24 months, so that, although in principle it might appear to be a significant sum, the truth is that this money had to be prorated over the number of months for which the contract was arranged. In the ruling, the amount of the contracts made by the defendants was taken as an important parameter, estimating that the salaries or fees paid for the questioned consultancy are excessively high; however, this Tribunal considers the assessment to be subjective; because it is not permissible to compare a contract with an international entity, as important as the BCIE, with the lower-ranking salaries paid in the public administration; from which the only derivable thing is an important difference, but one is an internal contract and the other is an international contract, which it is not permissible to compare without considering that they are different parameters. Thus, the statements that supported this questioning in the judgment set aside the differences that exist between international and national quotes, starting with the currency in which they are set. In any case, even following the challenged criteria, simply making a comparison between what that payment implied over 24 months, with other proposals from [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] in the document DM-151-02-07, reveals that the cost of [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">]'s contract was not far from what was suggested in the cases of other consultants. See that the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">item</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> "C. Contracting Subcode: MIVAH-TPE/CO-005" indicates that a baseline study on selective social policy, to be carried out over 2 months, has a total cost of $8,500 (eight thousand five hundred United States dollars). While in the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">item</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> "Ch. Its contracting code: MIVAH-TPE/CO-006," it is proposed that for a high-level advisory, to be carried out over 8 months, $52,000 (fifty-two thousand United States dollars) will be paid. Both proposals, not included in this process as criminal, far exceed what would be paid to the defendant [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] for a contract that extended for 24 months. This reference reveals that the cost of the consultancy was in line with international parameters and did not imply a higher or excessive quote in relation to others, which were not considered illicit and intended to favor the patrimony of their beneficiaries. Finally, it must be said that if what is sought is to sanction anyone who increases their patrimony as a result of income whose origin is illegitimate, how can it be asserted that [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] actually obtained such benefits if no evidence whatsoever was added in this regard? Moreover, even if her income increased, it was the product of a contract whose existence has not been questioned. </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">(v)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">The other aspect on which the challenged conviction has been based is that the defendant was proposed and appointed as a consultant, yet she continued working in the Office of the Minister and performing the same tasks, with the only difference being that she would no longer earn a salary of around three hundred thousand colones, but instead went on to earn $1,800 (one thousand eight hundred United States dollars) monthly; which reveals the benefit procured for her by the accused [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">]. In the opinion of this Chamber, this statement also does not conform to a harmonious assessment of the incorporated evidence. As set forth in previous lines, the documentation does not unequivocally prove exactly when [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">]'s contract as a consultant began; and this same circumstance consequently also prevents confirming or ruling out that in the period between February 6 and March 15, both dates in 2007, the defendant was appointed as a trust secretary to [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">]. This determination was extremely important, as it was the only way to define whether [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] could continue performing the tasks she performed on the occasion of the position she held since 2006, as well as whether the income reported on the payroll until March 15 represented a double payment or the normal disbursement of her salary. That is, if the documentary evidence re-examined here could not define the concrete and exact date on which the contract in the project managed by BCIE began, and the testimonies also did not clarify from what date [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] became a consultant; this doubt also prevents determining whether the tasks performed in that period corresponded to hers as secretary to [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">], to those assumed as a consultant, or overlapped. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that the bad administrative practices noted - which, as in this case, endorsed that the trust secretary of a Minister become part of a contract related to the same Ministry - can generate that type of confusion in management. In this sense, upon contrasting the tasks that [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] normally performed from the ministerial office with those indicated in the "terms of reference" of the project, it is determined that she was entrusted with similar tasks, and even some identical to those she initially performed in the office of [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">], so that in the absence of a concrete report and clear evidence that separates them, it was perfectly viable for her to perform similar tasks and by reason thereof her colleagues, other officials, and senior administrative managers of the Ministry could establish that she was doing the same thing for a much higher income. It has been verified, from this instance, that in the contract with Taiwan she was assigned the following tasks: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"Coordinate the administrative and technical activities of the Office of the Minister and his advisors, both internally and externally to the institution, with national and international organizations involved in the work of the MIVAH and the social sector; Prepare the technical agenda and organize the work sessions held by the Minister, with internal and external, public and private, national and international bodies; Prepare the technical reports produced from the meetings held by the Minister, as well as coordinate the execution and follow-up actions of the agreements reached; Coordinate the meetings of the Superior Ministerial Administration, as well as provide follow-up and evaluation of the topics discussed; (...) Plan, organize and direct the technical and administrative work entrusted to the personnel working in the Office of the Minister, as well as render reports to the Minister on the results of her management (...)."</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> (cf. CED1</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">of the evidence file). And, if those tasks are compared with those delegated by [[Nombre8]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] and those that [[Nombre9]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">] may have performed previously, they do not differ much, almost not at all (cf. on the functions assigned in the Office of the Minister, certification C-09-2012 issued by the Financial Administrative Directorate, Human Resources Department.).

On the other hand, it was perfectly possible to perceive that similarity, since, as is evident from note DM-849-08-07, signed by [Name [Nombre6]], he had delegated to [Name [Nombre7]] the signing of documents related to overtime pay, travel allowances, processing of vacations for officials reporting to the Minister, fuel coupons, and petty cash management; whereby he ensured that his work was respected and that she be approached in those cases, since she could perfectly sign on his behalf. Thus, notwithstanding the irregular situation revealed by the judgment, it cannot be overlooked that despite the overlap between the attributions of [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] from her appointment before the Head of Human Resources of the Ministry of Housing in May 2006, those delegated to her, and those she assumed upon signing the contract, such that they were exercised in the same Ministry, with officials who belonged to it—since they coordinated internally and externally—it has not been proven that she neglected either set of duties, or that they occurred simultaneously. Consequently, whether through the biweekly salary modality or through the payment of $1800 (one thousand eight hundred United States dollars), she performed the assigned tasks without it being established that she caused a loss or harmed public funds. Furthermore, the fact that she may have been able to exercise the same functions in one position or the other does not, in itself, delegitimize her attributes or powers. Finally, it is worth clarifying </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">that</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> if the delegation of signature was formalized late or retroactively, it would in no way undermine the de facto official doctrine, since even if an administrative agreement in that sense did not materially exist at the time, it is understood that such requirement was supplied, thereby confirming and ratifying entirely the work she had been performing, not on her own account but through a commission, endorsed publicly, peacefully, continuously, and normally in accordance with Law (cf. Article 115 of the General Public Administration Act). Decisively, this Court observes that there was a series of inadequate or inconvenient administrative practices, which have been treated in a contradictory manner by the Comptroller General of the Republic, including internally within the Ministry of Labor, which has led to doubt regarding the nature of the funds and the contracting procedures. Therefore, rather than crimes, it is appropriate to establish suitable protocols so as not to mislead the rest of the public administration. In this regard, as stated, the evidence presented is not clear, unequivocal, or sufficient to establish criminal liability, nor to reveal relevant harm to the public administration requiring criminal sanction. Consequently, granting the appeals filed, without foreseeing the possibility of including more evidence in a retrial that could change the situation of the accused; the appealed judgment is reversed, and an acquittal is ordered in favor of [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] and [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">].

**D. On the civil action for damages.** The civil defendant [Name [Nombre6]], in his personal capacity, challenges the insufficient reasoning of the ruling regarding the admissibility of the civil action for damages. In his view, the failure to determine a harm warrants granting the appeal, annulling the judgment, and issuing an acquittal, ordering the complainants and civil plaintiffs to pay costs. For her part, the defendant [Name [Nombre7]] alleged that neither patrimonial nor social harm occurred, and that this was evident in the report of the Judicial Investigation Agency. And that, for that reason, she requests the civil action for damages be dismissed, with the plaintiff ordered to pay costs. **The claims are granted; the civil action for damages is dismissed; and the civil plaintiff is exempted from paying costs:** The judgment set the civil indemnity, based on the determination that a crime had been proven, and the causal link between it and the harm produced. The criminal ruling has been reversed, for the reasons set forth in the preceding recitals. Regarding the civil matter, according to the preceding analysis, the occurrence of harm to the civil plaintiff was not established, which demonstrates the lack of right to be indemnified. Although an acquittal does not necessarily affect the outcome of the civil claim, in this case, given that patrimonial and social harm were not proven, since it was not established with certainty that the defendant [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] was unduly favored with an illegal appointment by the co-defendant [[Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">], to which is added that the former did perform all the tasks corresponding to her under the signed contract; the absence of the harm whose reparation is sought does not permit granting the pecuniary claim. It must be remembered that, regardless of whether the criminal act giving rise to criminal liability was proven, it must always be demonstrated: *a)* the existence of the harm or damage, which must be certain, real, and effective; *b)* the magnitude and extent of that harm; *c)* the party who caused the harm; and *d)* the causal relationship between the harm suffered and the conduct carried out by the one who generated it; as well as *e)* a criterion of attribution. None of these prerequisites have been established, given that the causation of harm was not proven. A sum was claimed for material and social damages; however, despite the existence of an actuarial expert report that fixes the amounts to be indemnified, the evidence presented did not show that the conduct of the civil defendants generated them; since it was considered established that the defendants were contracted for a service they performed and in which they fulfilled the assigned tasks, which denotes the absence of harm to public funds and the consequent right to claim indemnification. Therefore, the provisions regarding the civil claims are reversed, and the civil lawsuit of the State against [[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">] and [Name [Nombre6]] is dismissed. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in its capacity as civil plaintiff, is exempted from paying costs, since in this case there is a plausible reason for litigating or good faith (Arts. 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code). This is reflected in the fact that, in the criminal sphere, an acquittal due to doubt has been issued, which implies that the lawsuit filed by the State was not reckless, meaning it was reasonable to assert the claims. In that sense, it should be highlighted that it was necessary to overcome several phases of the process, and it was only at this venue that the acquittal was ordered, which demonstrates that the case was subjected to lengthy discussion and the situation of the accused was not so clear; it was necessary to exhaust the trial phase, and even the appellate stage, to determine the existence of the act. Finally, notwithstanding that it has been established that the civil defendant [Name [Nombre7]] fulfilled the assigned tasks, doubt existed regarding the matter of her appointment, that is, the overlap of functions, the illegitimacy of the designation, and the terms of the contract. Therefore, as indicated, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to bring the civil action for damages, to seek reparation for the patrimonial and social harm; hence, it is appropriate to exempt this party from paying costs.”

IV.Por la conexidad de los temas propuestos para examen en los tres recursos de apelación formulados, todos relacionados con la validez de la sentencia por no la constitución del Tribunal al momento de dar lectura a la sentencia integral; licitud de la prueba incorporada; y la determinación de los hechos probados, se resuelven conjuntamente, y en el orden aquí dispuesto, para dar coherencia a la decisión.

A. Sobre la constitución del Tribunal para la lectura integral del fallo: El cuestionamiento que versa sobre la violación al principio de publicidad y, propiamente, al artículo 364 del Código Procesal Penal, carece de sustento válido y, en consecuencia, se declara sin lugar. En efecto, esa norma procesal dispone en su último párrafo, que la sentencia quedará notificada con la lectura integral y que las partes recibirán copia de ella, lo que permite inferir que toda aquella notificación que se realice incumpliéndose con lo consignado en dicho numeral, resultaría improcedente o tornaría en insubsistente el acto de la notificación. Sin embargo, este no es el caso, porque la lectura de la sentencia se realizaría en el momento señalado, con o sin una de las juezas que resolvió, pues ya firmada bien pudo haberse constituido el Tribunal con una integración diversa solo para cumplir con la notificación; pero si no se hizo fue porque las partes así lo aceptaron. Conforme se desprende de las diligencias que constan impresas y del registro del expediente virtual; la lectura de la parte dispositiva de la sentencia se realizó a las 9:30 horas, del 24 de enero de 2014, por parte de los tres integrantes del Tribunal que celebró el juicio (Franz Paniagua Mejía, [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] ). De igual manera, en la sentencia- documento, Nº 031-2014, de las 9:30 horas, del 24 de enero de 2014, constan las rúbricas de los mismos tres jueces que comunicaron la parte dispositiva. Siendo así, la garantía de identidad del juzgador, que busca que los jueces que presenciaron el debate y tuvieron contacto con la prueba, informen a las partes lo resuelto y dicten la sentencia integral, luego de la deliberación conjunta, se ha cumplido. Además, aun cuando se acusa que una de las juezas se ausentó el día de la lectura integral, lo cierto es que conforme se extrae de la constancia emitida por la técnico judicial [Nombre3] , tanto el licenciado [Nombre4] , como la licenciada [Nombre5] , defensores particulares de [Nombre [Nombre6]] y de [Nombre [Nombre7]], respectivamente, estuvieron conformes con que se les entregara una copia de la sentencia; por lo que si no requirieron la lectura íntegra y oral del fallo no pueden aprovechar esa situación para reclamar, solo porque sí, que no se dio lectura al documento, pues ellos mismos contribuyeron para que el Tribunal omitiera esa formalidad. En todo caso, el haberse omitido ese acto, no causó agravio alguno, tampoco vulneró el derecho de defensa ni de intervención, porque las partes oportundamente tuvieron acceso al contenido de la sentencia. La omisión de ese trámite no impidió conocer de la decisión emitida ni ejercer el control sobre la misma en los plazos legales previstos para la celebración de cada uno de esos actos procesales (lectura de parte dispositiva, lectura integral de fallo y comunicación de las partes). Finalmente, debe decirse que tampoco consta que en la sala de juicio a la que se convocó a las partes para la lectura de la sentencia integral se haya presentado un ciudadano, ajeno al proceso, con el interés de conocer el contenido del fallo, de manera que el principio de publicidad en ese sentido no se vulneró, como tampoco el de la ciudadanía en general, que por los medios de comunicación pudieron enterarse de lo ocurrido en este asunto, pues la condición de funcionarios públicos de los acusados hizo trascender la noticia. Así que desde este punto de vista el control sobre la administración de justicia pudo ejercerse. Al no asistir razón a los recurrentes sobre estos extremos, los reclamos no son atendibles.

B. Ilicitud de la prueba documental incorporada: De diversas formas, en distintas instancias, las partes han cuestionado la legitimidad de la prueba documental incorporada al proceso, pues en su criterio debió intervenir, siempre, la autoridad jurisdiccional. Este reparo, ampliamente abordado por los jueces en el considerando I de la sentencia recurrida, también es inaceptable. De conformidad con el artículo 182 del Código Procesal Penal, los hechos y circunstancias de interés para del caso, podrán ser probados por cualquier medio de prueba permitido, salvo prohibición expresa de ley. En el caso particular se tiene que los documentos en los que se apoya la hipótesis fiscal, y la sentencia, fueron suministrados, a petición del mismo imputado [[Nombre8] ], por el Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica (en adelante el BCIE) y por la Contraloría General de la República (en delante CGR), (cfr. f. 22 del informe DFOE-SOC-DP-2-2008 emitido por la División de Fiscalización Operativa y evaluativa de la Contraloría General de la República, f. 033 del legajo de investigación), aparte de otros que fueron recuperados mediante orden judicial, propiamente la emitida a las 11:45 horas, del 9 de agosto de 2016 (que dispuso el allanamiento del Ministerio de Vivienda y el secuestro de toda la información personal y laboral relacionada con este caso, respecto de la imputada [[Nombre9] ]); la de las 8:45 horas, del 22 de abril de 2006 (levantamiento de secreto bancario); y la de las 10:49 horas, del 26 de noviembre de 2010 (cfr. f. 101-143 de legajo de investigación). Tales órdenes fueron solicitadas por el Ministerio Público, en quien se deposita el monopolio de la acción penal, y ordenadas por el juez competente. De manera que tanto las actuaciones realizadas, como la documentación incautada con ocasión de ambas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, están amparadas bajo los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones Nº 7425 y numerales 193, 195 y 196 del Código Procesal Penal. Por otro lado, la naturaleza la información recopilada, tanto por medio de las autoridades judiciales como de manos de las personas físicas y jurídicas que intervienen este asunto, está bien incorporada no solo porque se cumplieron las formalidades prescritas, sino porque conforme el artículo 7 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, la información referente a la administración, inversión y gasto público, y cualquiera otra de interés público, es de libre acceso, siempre que no se trate de documentos privados, los cuales, en este caso, se recaudaron con la orden del juez, propiamente lo referente al expediente personal de la encartada (según detalle de la orden de las 11:45 horas, del 9 de agosto de 2006) y a la información bancaria. Por otro lado, aun cuando lo ideal es contar con el registro en el que se conserva la documentación original, lo cierto es que las fotocopias o impresiones no son inválidas, ilegítimas o inexactas de por sí. Incluso, la defensa de ambos acusados ha hecho uso de la documentación para apoyar sus distintas estrategias, y, conforme lo apreció el Tribunal de instancia, no las han objetado por falsas, de manera que la simple inconformidad con la forma en que se hicieron llegar al expediente, sin que les asista razón en ello por las razones dichas, no es de recibo; correspondiendo tener por legítimamente incorporada la documentación ofrecida por la Fiscalía en su acusación, y las que oportunamente han presentado las partes para apoyar sus teorías sobre el caso.

C. Valoración de la prueba y determinación de los hechos probados: Se acogen los recursos de apelación, y absuelve a los acusados: En esencia, tuvo por acreditado el Tribunal de instancia que, tal como se acusó, el encartado [Nombre [Nombre6]], aprovechando su condición como Ministro de Vivienda, propuso y nombró a la endilgada [Nombre [Nombre7]] (su secretaria de confianza), como consultora en el fideicomiso de administración entre la República de China (Taiwán), el BCIE y el MIVAH, del que él era el fideicomisario, y cuyo objeto era destinar los fondos al mejoramiento de las condiciones sociales y de vivienda de Costa Rica. Propuesta que realizó a sabiendas de que ella era funcionaria del Ministerio, porque entre el 6 de febrero y el 15 de marzo, de 2007, todavía laboraba en su despacho; consintiendo que ejerciera ambos cargos en ese período, a la vez que autorizó un pago de $7.400, cuando aquella no había cesado sus labores en el sector público. Así como, que la favoreció proponiendo un pago de $50.600 por el contrato, suma que superaba, por mucho, el ingreso mensual que tenía como servidora pública. Tales hechos fueron calificados contra [[Nombre8] ], como un delito de "influencia en contra de la hacienda pública" y un delito de "enriquecimiento ilícito"; el primero en calidad de autor y el segundo en grado de complicidad. Estos son los mismos razonamientos que utilizó el Tribunal para sostener que [Nombre [Nombre7]] se enriqueció ilícitamente, pues desempeñó, simultáneamente, un cargo público y otro a cuenta del fideicomiso de administración entre la República de China (Taiwán), el BCIE y el MIVAH, y que por ello recibió un doble pago, uno por las funciones desempeñadas en el sector público (como funcionaria del despacho del Ministro) y otro, como consultora (en el fideicomiso). Que a todo esto contribuyó el co-encartado [[Nombre8] ], pues le facilitó el nombramiento y autorizó pagos por sumas que superaban ampliamente el salario que devengaba en el Ministerio de Vivienda, cuando en realidad desempeñaba las mismas funciones. En tal condición, se sancionó a la encartada [Nombre [Nombre7]] por un delito de enriquecimiento ilícito, y a [Nombre [Nombre6]] como su cómplice. Para rebatir tales hechos, sostenidos por la Fiscalía y la Procuraduría General de la República, y tenidos por demostrados por el Tribunal de sentencia, al considerar que la prueba acreditó la participación de los acusados en los hechos; la defensa de ambos ha alegado, en suma, que: (i) los bienes fideicometidos eran de naturaleza privada; (ii) a pesar de que las fechas consignadas en el contrato sugieren que inició el 6 de febrero de 2007, este empezó a regir el 16 de marzo de ese año y que así se hizo corregir por parte de [[Nombre8] ]; (iii) que [Nombre [Nombre7]] cumplió con la labor encomendada por el contrato de fideicomiso, y por ello se le remuneró económicamente; (iv) que los $7.400 (siete mil cuatrocientos dólares amerianos) constituyen un adelanto, de los $50.600 (cincuenta mil seiscientos dólares americanos) pactados en el contrato firmado por [[Nombre9] ], y que además, ese monto se distriburía en 24 meses; (v) que la propuesta de nombramiento como consultora, no fue la única ni se emitió exclusivamente por parte de [[Nombre8] ]; y que (vi) siempre actuaron de buena fe y cumplieron con las labores encomendadas. Examinados, desde esta instancia, los fundamentos del fallo, las tesis acusadoras y las expuestas por los imputados; a la luz de la totalidad de la prueba incorporada se estima que no se analizó con detalle, algunos aspectos de la prueba, que resultaban esenciales para la determinación de los hechos. Es cierto que se consideraron algunas pruebas, mas sin embargo no se profundizó, en forma suficiente sobre el contenido y consecuencias de otras pruebas, que tambien formaban parte del elenco, aportado incluso por la parte acusadora. Y, es al momento de retomar la totalidad del acervo probatorio, que se generan dudas relevantes acerca de cómo se desarrollaron los acontecimientos y de si, realmente, de cada una de las conductas desplegadas por [[Nombre8] ] y [[Nombre9] ], incluso aceptadas por ellos, puede derivarse la ilicitud planteada. Detecta esta Cámara que se limitaron los juzgadores a concatenar, sin mayor análisis, parte de las pruebas admitidas y los hechos acusados; sin exponer las razones por las que: i) a pesar de que las fechas de contrato no coinciden en todos los documentos, se tuvo por iniciado el 6 de febrero de 2007 conforme la acusación; ii) ó, qué llevó a sostener el traslape de funciones, si las desempañadas por [[Nombre9] ] desde el despacho del acusado [[Nombre8] ], en aquel momento Ministro de Vivienda, eran similares a las que asumió como consultora; iii) ó, por qué si desde el contrato de fideicomiso se le otorgaba a [[Nombre8] ] la posibilidad de proponer nombramientos y contrataciones para el proyecto, no podía hacerlo en el caso de [[Nombre9] ]?. Es decir, para arribar a la conclusión recurrida, se apoyaron los juzgadores en prueba documental que acreditaba algunos acontecimientos pero omitieron analizarla conjuntamente. Hicieron un análisis aislado de cada prueba que sustentaba la tesis fiscal, pero no abordaron, con la ampitud y detalle necesario cada uno de los documentos que se relacionaban con aquellas. Nota esta Cámara, que se apegaron al documento que decía que las labores de [[Nombre9] ] iniciaban el 6 de febrero 2006 con el BCIE, pero no revisaron todos los términos de referencia ni las modificaciones que integraban la contratación que es, finalmente, la que originó este proceso y a partir de la cual se formularon los cuestionamientos. En razón de ello, conforme se ha alegado por los recurrentes, el fundamento de la decisión no se sostiene, y los recursos deben acogerse; y, bajo un reexamen completo y conjunto de la prueba se revoca la sentencia, y en aplicación del principio universal in dubio pro reo, se absuelve a [Nombre [Nombre6]] y a [Nombre [Nombre7]] de los delitos que se les atribuyeron. La discusión planteada en los extensos recursos de apelación, es la misma que permite, a la luz de las pruebas incorporadas, reexaminar los términos del contrato de fideicomiso, sus referencias o adendum, así como lo relacionado con los nombramientos, pagos y funciones asignadas a [[Nombre9] ] con ocasión de la propuesta realizada por [[Nombre8] ]. Para iniciar, debe decirse que los tipos penales de enriquecimiento lícito, reconocimiento ilegal de beneficios e influencia en contra de la hacienda pública, sancionados respectivamente en los artículos 45, 56 y 57 de la Ley de Enriquecimiento ilícito Nº 8422, sancionan aquellas conductas que atentan contra la hacienda pública y del deber de probidad en el ejercicio del cargo como funcionario público. Sugieren que todo servidor está obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público, a atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para todos los habitantes de la República. También, obligan a demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que confiere la ley, y a asegurarse de que las decisiones que se adopten en cumplimiento de las atribuciones se ajusten a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución a la que pertenece. Finalmente, a administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente (cfr. artículo 3, Ley 8422). Para el caso concreto, consideró el Tribunal a quo que [Nombre [Nombre6]] era cómplice de un delito de "enriquecimiento ilícito" (por el que le impuso dos años de prisión), que concurre idealmente con el de" influencia en contra de la hacienda pública" (por el que le impuso dos años de prisión), y fijó la sanción total en tres años de prisión. A [Nombre [Nombre7]], le impuso tres años de prisión por un delito de enriquecimiento ilícito, en calidad de autora. Si bien es cierto, conforme se apreció por los juzgadores, ambos eran funcionarios públicos y las acciones desplegadas por cada uno de ellos sugerían que pudo haberse dado una situación irregular en el nombramiento de [Nombre [Nombre7]] y las labores que desempeñaba, tanto que intervino la Auditoría del Ministerio de Vivienda y se requirió el criterio de la Contraloría General de la República; las mismas, en criterio de esta Cámara de Apelación, no alcanzan para concluir, sin lugar a dudas, que constituyeron delito y reúnen los elementos objetivos y subjetivos requeridos por los tipos penales aplicados, o cualquiera otro. Recordemos que el artículo 45 (enriquecimiento ilícito) señala que "Será sancionado con prisión de tres a seis años quien, aprovechando ilegítimamente el ejercicio de la función pública o la custodia, la explotación, el uso o la administración de fondos, servicios o bienes públicos, bajo cualquier título o modalidad de gestión, por sí o por interpósita persona física o jurídica, acreciente su patrimonio, adquiera bienes, goce derechos, cancele deudas o extinga obligaciones que afecten su patrimonio o el de personas jurídicas, en cuyo capital social tenga participación ya sea directamente o por medio de otras personas jurídicas." De tal forma que solo puede ser autor, a título doloso porque no admite la culpa, cualquier persona que ocupe o haya ocupado un cargo como funcionario público, y requiere para su adecuación típica, además, que exista un enriquecimiento patrimonial sin causa lícita. Por su parte, el artículo 57 (influencia en contra de la Hacienda Pública) sanciona "con prisión de dos a ocho años, el funcionario público y los demás sujetos equiparados que, al intervenir en razón de su cargo, influyan, dirijan o condicionen, en cualquier forma, para que se produzca un resultado determinado, lesivo a los intereses patrimoniales de la Hacienda Pública o al interés público, o se utilice cualquier maniobra o artificio tendiente a ese fin." La acción típica es aprovechar el cargo para influir en determinada decisión, que provocará un resultado lesivo a la hacienda pública. En el caso particular se ha sostenido que las conductas denunciadas son típicas porque [Nombre [Nombre6]] aprovechó su puesto, su influencia política, tanto en el Ministerio de Vivienda, como ante el BCIE, con la firma del fideicomiso con Taiwan, para designar a la coencartada [[Nombre9] ] como consultora del proyecto, y con ello le facilitó un pago millonario, el cual ella recibió en sus cuentas. No obstante, un reexamen de la misma prueba que el Tribunal tuvo a su disposición; contrario a lo resuelto, no permite tener por acreditadas tales circunstancias, por lo que, por duda, se dispone la absolutoria de ambos encartados. Para arribar a esta conclusión, desde esta instancia, se han evaluado los siguientes aspectos:

(i) Naturaleza de los fondos fideicometidos. En virtud de los cuestionamientos propuestos respecto de la naturaleza de los fondos fideicometidos, interesa recordar que el fideicomiso es una operación por medio de la cual el fideicomitente transmite al fiduciario bienes o derechos para la realización de fines lícitos y predeterminados en favor de un tercero (fideicomisario); en el que fiduciario (que recibe una comisión por administración) está obligado y comprometido a administrar los bienes y/o derechos fideicometidos, en favor de uno o varios fideicomisarios, siguiendo las condiciones estipuladas en la escritura social. En el caso en estudio, según lo tuvo por acreditado el a quo y se desprende de la documentación incorporada al proceso, el fideicomiso se constituyó el 6 de febrero de 2007, y figuró como fiduciario el Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica (BCIE), como fideicomitente la República de China, y como fideicomisario el Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Urbanos, al mando del acusado [Nombre [Nombre6]]. El objeto del contrato lo conformó dos millones cuatrocientos ochenta y ocho mil quinientos dólares, que se destinarían a apoyar al sector social y la lucha contra la pobreza del Gobierno de Costa Rica; proveer al fideicomisario los servicios de contratación para el proyecto "Mejoramiento Barrial y Gestión de Programas Sociales Innovativos; y a administrar, en forma eficiente y transparente, los recursos fideicometidos, bajo el entendido de que el fideicomitente no asumiría responsabilidad alguna por las contrataciones de bienes o servicios realizados con recursos del fidecomiso. El BCIE, se limitaría a facilitar la estructuración y diseño de fideicomisos y fondos de terceros, de acuerdo con los requerimientos de los clientes, tales como de administración, garantías, inversión, desarrollo de obras e implementación de programas especiales; en lo que, como impulsor de la integración centroamericana, cuenta con una amplia experiencia en el manejo administrativo, financiero y técnico de los fideicomisos y fondos de diversas fuentes. Los bienes, dineros en este caso, transferidos en fiducia, constituyen un patrimonio autónomo, distinto del patrimonio del constituyente, del patrimonio del fiduciario y del patrimonio del beneficiario o fideicomisario, de manera que ninguno es titular de los mismos, el fiduciario es simple administrador y pone a disposición del fideicomisario los bienes fideicomitidos en pro de un beneficio o interés ajeno. En el caso en estudio, el Tribunal de sentencia sostuvo que tales bienes son de naturaleza pública porque se pusieron a disposición del Ministerio de Vivienda, y en razón de ello pasaron a formar parte de la hacienda pública. Además, se basó en la declaración del auditor [Nombre10] . Sin embargo, según lo indicó el mismo Tribunal (f. 44 del fallo) y la Procuraduría General de la República, ese no fue el criterio inicial de la Contraloría General de la República, sino que, en respuesta al oficio Nº 5018, el 16 de mayo, 2007, en el informe FOE-SOC-0387, dirijido a [Nombre11] , Auditor Interno del MIVAH; señaló que " 2. De conformidad con los artículos 1, 8 y 9 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, y en virtud de la naturaleza, origen y administración de los recursos fideicometidos por el Gobierno de China, no pueden considerarse como “fondos públicos” pertenecientes al Estado costarricense, y por consiguiente no estaría dentro de la competencia de esa unidad de Auditoria Interna fiscalizarlos, con excepción del establecimiento de controles en la planificación y ejecución, que le corresponden al MIVAH dentro del rol en el proyecto, para el efectivo cumplimiento de los fines para los cuales están destinados dichos recursos. 3. En virtud de la naturaleza y origen de los recursos, no se requiere el trámite del refrendo contralor, para el contrato de fideicomiso en consulta." Esta afirmación se apoyó en que "La Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos" (artículo 8); y en que " ... únicamente formarán parte de la Hacienda Pública los recursos que administren o dispongan, por cualquier título, para conseguir sus fines y que hayan sido transferidos o puestos a su disposición, mediante norma o partida presupuestaria, por los Poderes del Estado, sus dependencias y órganos auxiliares, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la administración descentralizada, las universidades estatales, las municipalidades y los bancos del Estado. Los recursos de origen distinto de los indicados no integran la Hacienda Pública; en consecuencia, el régimen jurídico aplicable a esas entidades es el contenido en las Leyes que las crearon o los ordenamientos especiales que las regulan. (...) El patrimonio público será el universo constituido por los fondos públicos y los pasivos a cargo de los sujetos componentes de la Hacienda Pública. Serán sujetos componentes de la Hacienda Pública, el Estado y los demás entes u órganos públicos, estatales o no, y las empresas públicas, así como los sujetos de Derecho Privado, en cuanto administren o custodien fondos públicos por cualquier título, con las salvedades establecidas en el párrafo anterior." (Así reformado por el inciso d) del artículo 126 de la Ley N° 8131 de 18 de setiembre del 2001, Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). Que, "los Fondos públicos son los recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos.” También se dijo que, "En cuanto al origen de los recursos fideicometidos, es criterio de este órgano contralor, que los mismos no pueden ser considerados como recursos públicos pertenecientes al Gobierno de Costa Rica. En este caso, tenemos que el Gobierno de la República de China (Fideicomitente), aporta y traspasa la suma de dos millones cuatrocientos ochenta y ocho mil quinientos dólares exactos, al BCIE (fiduciario) para que administre dichos recursos en apoyo al Sector Social y Lucha Contra la Pobreza, en beneficio del Gobierno de Costa Rica a través del MIVAH (Fideicomisario). (...) "... Dicho de otra forma, tenemos que desde el momento en que el Gobierno de China aporta los recursos, hasta la administración de éstos por parte del BCIE, en ningún momento pasan a ser parte del patrimonio público. Aunado a lo anterior, debe agregarse que en el presente caso, quien administra los recursos fideicometidos, no es un ente público, aspecto que como se dirá más adelante, ayuda a terminar de concluir que los recursos fideicometidos no son públicos, y que a lo sumo, lo que deberá garantizar el MIVAH como Fideicomisario, es que en el ámbito de su competencia consignada en el contrato de fideicomiso y documento de proyecto, los controles relativos la planificación y ejecución, garanticen que los recursos sean utilizados para los fines previstos. En otro orden, y de conformidad con la normativa antes señalada, es claro que aspectos como, el percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos (públicos), así como las, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos, son características sustanciales para la definición y determinación de la naturaleza, de fondos que son públicos y aquellos que no lo son. En esa línea, tal y como lo estipula la cláusula quinta del contrato de Fideicomiso, es el BCIE en su condición de Fiduciario quien tendrá las obligaciones de administrar el patrimonio fideicometido (Ej: mantenerlo en cuentas separadas del suyo y de cualquier otro fideicomiso que tenga bajo su responsabilidad); rendir informes periódicos o al menos semestralmente al Fideicomitente, sobre las actividades ejecutadas en el cumplimiento de los fines del Fideicomiso; pagar los gastos que demandare una adecuada administración; efectuar todos los actos necesarios para el cumplimiento de los fines previamente establecidos, los cuales incluyen la realización, ejecución y formalización de todo tipo de actos y contratos, y sobre los cuales deberá requerir previamente el criterio del MIVAH (Fideicomisario), como encargado del Sector Social y Lucha contra lo Pobreza y ejecutor del proyecto de “Mejoramiento Barrial”; igualmente el Fiduciario responderá con su propio patrimonio, por aquellas pérdidas que pudiere sufrir el patrimonio fideicometido entre otras. Estas características de administración y responsabilidad sobre el patrimonio fideicometido que se le otorgaron al BCIE (Fiduciario) son, aparte del origen de los recursos, otro aspecto que lleva a esta Contraloría General a la conclusión de que dichos recursos no son de naturaleza pública, por cuanto su origen y administración no ha estado a cargo de un ente del Estado costarricense. Al respecto, es evidente que dichos recursos no cumplen con las características previstas en los artículos 1, 8 y 9 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, N°7428, razón suficiente para afirmar que esa unidad de auditoria y esta Contraloría General, no tendrían competencia alguna para auditar los recursos fideicometidos y administrados por el BCIE (Fiduciario). No obstante lo anterior, y a pesar de su naturaleza, es claro que dichos recursos están previstos y revestidos de un fin público, como es el caso de apoyar al Sector Social y Lucha Contra la Pobreza y la ejecución del proyecto antes señalado. En relación con el cumplimiento de los fines previstos en el contrato de Fideicomiso, es donde la Unidad de Auditoria Interna puede y debe tomar un papel preponderante a nivel de fiscalización, referidos a los controles que en la planificación y ejecución del proyecto le competen al MIVAH dentro de su rol en el proyecto, y el aporte correspondiente a 500.000 dólares que el MIVAH ha dispuesto para dicho proyecto, los cuales no están incorporados como parte del contrato de Fideicomiso. Sobre el particular, es menester indicar que en la misma línea de pensamiento que se ha expuesto, esta Contraloría General, mediante oficio N° 00231 (DCA-0101), de fecha quince de enero de 2007 de la División de Contratación Administrativa y oficio N° 15106 (FOE-SO-436) de fecha primero de diciembre de 2004, emitido por el Área de Servicios Sociales, es el MIVAH el que debe establecer y aplicar los controles necesarios para que se garantice una adecuada utilización de los recursos que Administra el BCIE, con criterios de efectividad en el cumplimiento de los fines, bajo la responsabilidad de su jerarquía. En virtud de lo antes expuesto, es criterio de esta Contraloría General, que la competencia de esa unidad de Auditoria Interna y de este órgano contralor, esta circunscrita y debe darse solamente en los controles establecidos en la planificación y ejecución del proyecto como tal, según el rol asignado al MIVAH; y no en lo concerniente a los recursos aportados por el Gobierno de China y su administración por parte del BCIE (Fiduciario)." En criterio de esta Cámara de Apelación, a pesar de que ese criterio pudo haber sido revertido posteriormente, y que se estima que hasta tanto no entren los bienes a las arcas del Estado mantienen su naturaleza privada; lo cierto es que lejos de la posición que aquí se asuma sobre el punto, se considera que la determinación concreta de este aspecto por parte del órgano contralor, así como el conocimiento unívoco de la misma por parte de los encausados, era necesaria e incidía directamente en la responsabilidad penal de ambos. Por lo que, al no haber existido claridad ni uniformidad sobre el punto, surgió la posibilidad de que, efectivamente, [Nombre [Nombre6]] y [Nombre [Nombre7]] apoyados en un soporte legítimo como lo era el dictamen referido, hayan actuado bajo la creencia de que se trataba de bienes privados. Y aunque el dictamen se emitió tiempo después de que inició la contratación cuestionada, lo cierto del caso es que si se requirió el pronunciamiento por parte de la Auditoría del Ministerio de Vivienda, fue porque nadie tenía clara la naturaleza, pública o privada, de los bienes fideicometidos y no existe, ni el Tribunal ni los acusadores la mencionaron, prueba alguna que demuestre que los acusados sí tenían ese conocimiento. Es cierto, además, que el artículo 17 de la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, Nº 8422, señala expresamente que " (…) Igualmente, ningún funcionario público, durante el disfrute de un permiso sin goce de salario, podrá desempeñarse como asesor ni como consultor de órganos, instituciones o entidades, nacionales o extranjeras, que se vinculan directamente, por relación jerárquica, por desconcentración o por convenio aprobado al efecto, con el órgano o la entidad para el cual ejerce su cargo. (…)." Pero, debe hacerse notar, que este supuesto aplica para el caso en que se pretenda el desempeño simultáneo de cargos públicos. Así las cosas, si tanto [[Nombre8] ] como [[Nombre9] ] estimaron que la labor encomendada en el fideicomiso era de naturaleza privada, contando incluso con el referido criterio de la Contraloría que así lo dijo; lo cierto es que, mientras no hubiese traslape de horarios o restricciones adicionales, como por ejemplo la prohibición de ejercer liberalmente una profesión, o cualquier otra incompatibilidad de puestos, ella estaba habilitada para optar por ese otro trabajo. A esto debe agregarse que, la naturaleza de los fondos nunca podrá depender del criterio de la Contraloría, ni corresponder a una ponderación casuística de las circunstancias, pues los diferentes pronunciamientos crean incertidumbre jurídica y en consecuencia podrían propiciar una desigualdad en la aplicación de la ley que, a su vez, crea injusticia. Además, cómo iba exigirse a los imputados un conocimiento claro de algo sobre lo que ni la Contraloría lo tiene?. En ese sentido no consideraron los juzgadores de instancia que el grado de exigibilidad para los encartados no puede alcanzar tales niveles, cuando ni el mismo órgano contralor tiene claridad, ni una sola línea, para definir cuándo nos encontramos ante bienes, o servicios, de naturaleza pública o particular. En razón de lo anterior y de los diversos criterios técnicos y jurídicos que se emitieron acerca de la naturaleza de los bienes fideicometidos, cuya definición no puede ser casuística; no puede descartarse categóricamente que los imputados haya podido actuar bajo la creencia de que eran privados. De manera que es esta otra razón, que se une a lo que se dirá, para acojer las impugnaciones y absolverlos, desde esta sede.

(ii) Sobre la influencia que pudo utilizar el acusado [[Nombre8] ] para promover el nombramiento de [[Nombre9] ] como consultora. Del elenco probatorio, no se extrae que [[Nombre8] ] tuviese impedimento legal para proponer el nombramiento de [[Nombre9] ], pues así se lo permitía el contrato de fideicomiso en la cláusula QUINTA que prevé que, antes de cualquier contratación, el fiduciario debe requerir del criterio del fideicomisario, e, incluso, esa misma cláusula contempló la posibilidad de que el fideicomisario pudiera hacerse asesorar por sus mismos funcionarios. Además, aunque se puso la restricción "sin cargo al fideicomiso," en el caso particular no se observa incompatibilidad alguna porque en determinado momento, como se verá más adelante, [[Nombre9] ] dejó su puesto como subordinada al Ministerio de Vivienda. Otro aspecto que dejó de analizarse por el a quo, estriba en que [[Nombre8] ] no solo propuso el nombramiento de [[Nombre9] ] sino que, conforme se desprende de los oficios DM-500-10-06 y DM-151-02-07, propuso tramitar varias contrataciones de otras personas, e incluso cotizó el monto a devengar por cada consultoría, estableciendose que su contratación regiría a partir de la firma de contrato, (f. 35 y 50 del legajo de prueba). Entonces, el examen de estos documentos, permite señalar que el encartado no eligió exclusivamente a [[Nombre9] ] para favorecerle o traerle beneficios económicos, sino que, conforme lo consignado en esos oficios, sugirió diversos nombres para distintas contrataciones, tal como le estaba autorizado en la cláusula QUINTA del fideicomiso. Concluir de otra manera, conllevaría a cuestionar, entonces, por qué no se denunció a [[Nombre8] ] por la propuesta de las demás personas, para quienes también fijaba un beneficio económico?. Por lo anteriormente expuesto, contrario a lo resuelto en la sentencia impugnada, no se corrobora que [[Nombre8] ], aprovechando su cargo como Ministro, haya influido o condicionado de forma ilegítima el nombramiento el [[Nombre9] ] como consultora en el proyecto administrado por el BCIE, menos aún que producto de alguna maniobra de su parte se haya causado un perjuicio a la Hacienda Pública, pues los bienes fideicometidos no le pertenecían a esta. Pero aún, tomando partido de que estos pasaron a formar parte del patrimonio estatal por los fines propuestos de su inversión, lo cierto es que tampoco se menoscabó este pues tanto él como la acusada cumplieron las labores encomendadas.

(iii) En un tercer tema, se ha replanteado esta Cámara de Apelación los términos de la contratación, a efecto de verificar fechas de inicio, de manera que pueda identificarse la existencia o no del ejercicio simultáneo de dos cargos por parte de [[Nombre9] ], y si el beneficio económico recibido por la consultoría cuestionada le provocó un enriquecimiento ilícito, orquestado entre ella y el encartado. Los juzgadores tuvieron por cierto que el contrato con [[Nombre9] ] inició el 6 de febrero de 2007, y que para el 15 de marzo de ese mismo año (cuando cesó en las labores como asalariada del Ministerio de Vivienda) ya había recibido salario por parte del Ministerio, un pago de $7.400 (siete mil ciuatrocientos dólares americanos), más el rubro mensual de $1.800 (mil ochocientos dólares americanos) acordados. Pero a esa conclusión arribó sin mencionar siquiera, toda la documentación que integra el contrato de fideicomiso tantas veces referido, a pesar de que le fue suministrada para análisis; y de la cual se extrae lo siguiente: a) Que este negocio jurídico se firmó en la ciudad de San José, Costa Rica, a los seis días del mes de febrero de 2007 (6-2-2007), y que al mismo comparecieron los señores [Nombre12]- , Embajador de la República de China -Taiwán (Fideicomitente); [Nombre13] , Director del BCIE, Costa Rica (Fuduciario), y [[Nombre8] ], Ministro de Vivienda (fideicomisario). b) Que la fecha de inicio nunca ha sido lo suficientemente clara para establecer el período en el que, supuestamente, [[Nombre9] ] desempeñó ambas tareas (la del sector público y la asignada en el fideicomiso). Sobre este extremo, no bastaba, dar lectura al contrato que indicaba que este iniciaría el 6 de febrero de 2007 (f.56), -como lo hizo el Tribunal a quo-, para concluir que, como [[Nombre9] ] fue cesada hasta el 15 de marzo de 2007 (cfr. oficio DAF/101-2007. f 76) y que [Nombre [Nombre6]] tenía conocimiento de ello, incurrieron en las conductas ilícitas que se les atribuye. En primer término, hay varias circunstancias que hacen dudar de la fecha en que realmente dio inicio el contrato: Veamos: a. En el contrato de fideicomiso no se estableció fecha al respecto. b. En el documento agregado al f. 47-49 del legajo de prueba, se consignó que la consultoría referente a [Nombre [Nombre7]] inciaría el 01 de noviembre de 2006. Entonces, por qué no se eligió o se descartó esta fecha? El Tribunal no lo dice. c. Los oficios DM-396-09-06 y DM-500-10-06 (f. 32-37) se limitan a disponer el periodo por el que rige la contratación, y que ésta correrá a partir de la firma del contrato. d. El contrato de consultoría fue firmado por [Nombre [Nombre7]] el 5 de marzo de 2007 (f. 61 de legajo de prueba). e. El primer adelanto de la remuneración acordada en el convenio, se solicitó y autorizó el 5 de marzo de 2007 (f. 57), y le fue depositada en su cuenta bancaria del Banco de Costa Rica el 13 de marzo de ese mismo año (cfr. movientos históricos de la cuenta a nombre de la encartada, en el período 2007). f. El pago de $1800 (mil ochocientos dólares americanos) se registra como autorizado por [Nombre [Nombre6]] en mayo de 2007, y acreditado el 28 de mayo de 2007 (cfr. fórmula agregada al legajo de prueba y movimientos bancarios de la cuenta de la encausada). Precisadas esas circunstancias que roderaron la contratación, determina esta Cámara que, si en los oficios DM-500-10-06 y DM-151-02-07 se propuso que la contratación regiría a partir de la firma de contrato; que el mismo fue firmado por [[Nombre9] ] el 5 de marzo de 2007; que el primer pago (adelanto) que ella recibiría por $7.400 (siete mil cuatrocientos dólares americanos), acordó ser entregado el día de la firma (cfr. "Artículo 4. remuneración," f. 57), y ese mismo día se solicitó y autorizó, para ser acreditado hasta el 13 de marzo de ese año; y el primer depósito por $1800 dólares aparece registrado el 28 de mayo de 2007; no podría asegurarse que el traslape de cargos inició el 6 de febrero, ni que los $7.400 o los $1800 dólares americanos referidos, correspondían al primer mes, como lo argumentó el Tribunal. Mas bien, al concatenar las distintas fechas indicadas, con las constancias de pago mensual por $1800 dólares, que inician fechadas mayo de 2007 (cfr. f. 132 y ss del legajo de prueba); todo parece indicar que pudo haber una variación del contrato, y que "ese contrato realidad" no coincide con lo documentado, tampoco con lo que apreciaron los jueces al decir que desde el 6 de febrero de 2007 [[Nombre9] ] tenía dos trabajos, con horarios coincidentes o con algún traslape, y devengando dos ingresos. Esencialmente, puede detectarse que no empatan las fechas de inicio del contrato -según lo acusado- con lo que se extrae de las probanzas, pues se derivan varias posibilidades: Que la supuesta duplicidad de funciones haya sido por un periodo menor, y no del 6 de febrero al 15 de marzo de 2007, pues unos documentos indican que inciaría en esa fecha, otros en noviembre de 2006, otros con la firma del contrato, y otro, el que utilizan los encausados en su defensa, que señalan que si el cese se dio el 15 de marzo de 2007, la contratación rige desde el día siguiente conforme se llevó a corrección ante el BCIE por parte de [[Nombre8] ]. De manera que falta de precisión en ese sentido, fomentada también por la certificación C-09-2012 extendida por Dirección Administrativa Financiera del MVAH que documenta el cese de labores de [[Nombre9] ] en el Ministerio de Vivienda, así como el cese de los pagos como funcionaria de confianza destacada en el Despacho del Ministro [Nombre [Nombre6]]; deja entrever que el contrato bien pudo iniciar en otras fechas, sin que implicara la doble función y doble remuneración que se reprocha; aspecto que no fue debidamente ponderado por los juzgadores. Aparte de que ninguno de los testigos recibidos pudo identificar fechas exactas acerca del tema. Alimenta las incongruencias señaladas, y con ello la duda acerca de cuándo inició la ejecución del contrato, aspecto que era esencial determinar y que en un juicio de reenvío no se aclararía ni modificaría dado que se genera de la misma prueba que se tuvo a la vista en juicio; el oficio DM-496-05-07, de fecha 16 de mayo de 2007, suscrito por el acusado, mediante el que se solicitó la variación de la fecha de inicio del contrato, siendo lo correcto -según la nota- que rige a partir del 16 marzo de 2007, modificación que se atendió sin dilación o contraindicación alguna por parte del BCIE (f. 83-87 del legajo de prueba). Las partes acusadoras han pretendido evidenciar que esta solicitud rubricada por el encartado se dio una vez que se percató de que estaba siendo investigado o que empezaba a descubrirse su [Placa1] con la que favoreció los intereses de su subalterna. No obstante, tal apreciación no encuentra sustento objetivo alguno. Primero, porque la rectificación se solicitó mucho antes de la formulación de la denuncia. Véase que la solicitud atacada tiene fecha 16 de mayo de 2007, y la denuncia 20 de noviembre de 2008, es decir ésta se instauró aproximadamente 18 meses después. Por otro lado, aun cuando es un hecho incontrovertido que esta situación llegó a conocimiento de la Contraloría y que la Auditoría del Ministerio de Vivienda empezó a indagar sobre la real función que desempeñaba [[Nombre9] ] en el despacho del Ministro [Nombre [Nombre6]]; las actuaciones por este desplegadas en cuanto al nombramiento de [[Nombre9] ], solo se tacharon de incorrectas y comunes malas prácticas, pero no se sugirió investigación penal alguna. Incluso, en el informe de la Contraloría, cuando dio respuesta a la consulta sobre la naturaleza de los bienes fideicometidos, oficio FOE-SOC-0387, destacó que, aunque no era una práctica correcta, era común ver cómo se otorgan permisos con goce de salario a funcionarios, para pasar a ocupar otro puesto relacionado con la misma administración. A partir de estos aspectos, no podría asegurarse, ni tampoco se fundamentó en la sentencia impugnada, por qué esa modificación no era posible realizarla, o por qué constituyó parte de los fines ilícitos que según la acusación tenía el acusado en la proposición del nombramiento de [[Nombre9] ] como consultora y en los beneficios económicos que esta pudiese obtener. Lo que sí evidenció este informe es que en la Administración Pública es común que se practiquen estos cambios (verticales u horizontales) de personal o de puestos, para ser colocados en puntos claves o de confianza, o en otros cargos; sin que pueda concluirse, sin lugar dudas, que las actuaciones de ambos acusados haya sido con fines ilícitos, o para procurarse o procurar un beneficio ilegal e irrespetar el deber de probidad en el ejercicio de la función encomendada. Más allá de eso, lo que se revela es un desorden administrativo y un desconocimiento de los procedimientos que deben seguirse en esos casos. También, la repetición de prácticas viciadas que no son susceptibles de corregir a nivel penal. Si la Contraloría en el 2006 reconoció que era común ver este tipo prácticas, pues es a ese órgano contralor a quien le correspondía divulgar las políticas y directrices suficientes para erradicarlas y corregirlas.

(vi) De la misma prueba que tuvo a la vista el a quo, tampoco se extrae que la remuneración propuesta por el acusado [[Nombre8] ], a favor de [[Nombre9] ], haya acrecentado el patrimonio de esta, ni que fuera ilegítima; aspectos que se omitió analizar a profundidad en el fallo. Existe constancia irrefutable de que fue el acusado [[Nombre8] ] una de las personas que propuso al fiduciario la contratación de [[Nombre9] ], como consultora del proyecto financiado por el Gobierno de China. También, que el pago propuesto alcanzaba los $50.600 (cincuenta mil seiscientos dólares americanos). Sin embargo, omitió considerarse en sentencia que ese monto correspondía al total que devengaría en 24 meses, por lo que, aunque en principio podría aparentar una suma importante, lo cierto es que ese dinero debía ser prorrateado entre el número de meses por los que se dispuso la contratación. En el fallo se tomó como parámetro importante, el monto de las contrataciones realizadas por los imputados, estimando que son excesivamente altos los salarios u honorarios que se pagaron por la consultoría cuestionada; sin embargo, este Tribunal considera que la apreciación es subjetiva; porque no es dable comparar un contrato con una entidad internacional, tan importante como el BCIE, con los salarios de menor rango que se pagan en la administración pública; de dónde lo único derivable es una diferencia importante, pero uno es un contrato interno y otro es un contrato internacional, que no es dable comparar sin considerar que son parámetros distintos. De manera que las afirmaciones que dieron sustento a este cuestionamiento en la sentencia dejaron de lado las diferencias que existen entre las cotizaciones internacionales y nacionales, empezado por la moneda en la que se fijan. En todo caso, aun siguiendo el criterio impugnado, solo realizar una comparación entre lo que implicaba ese pago entre 24 meses, con otras propuestas de [[Nombre8] ] en el documento DM-151-02-07, deja ver que el costo de la contratación de [[Nombre9] ] no estaba alejado de lo que se había sugerido en los casos de otros consultores. Veáse que el ítem "C. Subcódigo de contratación: MIVAH-TPE/CO-005" señala que un estudio base sobre política social selectiva, que se extenderá por 2 meses, tiene un costo total de $8.500 (ocho mil quinientos dólares americanos). Mientras que en el ítem "Ch. Su código de contratación: MIVAH-TPE/CO-006," se propone que por una asesoría de alto nivel, que se extenderá por 8 meses, se cancelará $52.000 (cincuenta y dos mil dólares americanos). Ambas propuestas, no incluidas en este proceso como delictivas, superan, por mucho, lo que a la encartada [[Nombre9] ] se le pagaría por un contrato que se extendió por 24 meses. Esta referencia revela, que el costo de la consultoría se ajustaba a los parámetros internacionales y no implicaba una cotización mayor o excesiva en relación con otras, que no fueron consideradas ilícitas y tendentes a favorecer el patrimonio de sus beneficiados. Finalmente, no puede dejar de decirse que si lo que se persigue es sancionar a quien aumente su patrimonio como producto de ingresos cuya procedencia es ilegítima, cómo asegurar que realmente [[Nombre9] ] obtuvo tales beneficios si no se agregó prueba alguna al respecto. Ademas aunque aumentara sus ingresos, fue producto de un contrato cuya existencia no ha sido cuestionada.

(v) El otro aspecto en el que se ha fundamentado la condena impugnada es en que a la encartada se le propuso y nombró como consultora, sin embargo se mantuvo laborando en el Despacho del Ministro y ejerciendo las mismas labores, con la única diferencia de que ya no devengaría un salario de alrededor de trescientos mil colones, sino que pasó a ganar mensualmente $1800 (mil ochocientos dólares americanos); lo cual revela el beneficio que se le procuró por parte del acusado [[Nombre8] ]. En criterio de esta Cámara, esta afirmación tampoco se ajusta a una valoración armónica de la prueba incorporada. Conforme se expuso en líneas anteriores, la documentación no acredita, unívocamente, cuándo fue que, exactamente, inició la contratación de [[Nombre9] ] como consultora; y esta misma circunstancia, en consecuencia, impide asegurar o descartar, también, que en el período comprendido entre el 6 de febrero y 15 de marzo, ambas fechas de 2007, la acusada haya estado nombrada como secretaria de confianza de [[Nombre8] ]. Esa determinación resultaba sumamente importante, pues era la única forma de definir si [[Nombre9] ] podía seguir realizando las labores que con ocasión del puesto ostentaba desde el año 2006, así como que, si los ingresos reportados en planilla hasta el 15 de marzo representaban un doble pago o la cancelación normal de su salario. Es decir, si con la prueba documental aquí reexaminada no pudo definirse la fecha concreta y exacta en que inició la contratación en el proyecto administrado por el BCIE, y los testimonios tampoco aclararon a partir de que fecha [[Nombre9] ] pasó a ser consultora; esta duda impide, además, determinar si las labores desempeñadas en ese lapso correspondían a las suyas como secretaria de [[Nombre8] ], a las asumidas como consultora, o se traslaparon. Además, no puede dejarse de lado que las malas prácticas administrativas señaladas, -que como en este caso avalaron que la secretaria de confianza de un Ministro pasara a formar parte de una contratación relacionada con el mismo Ministerio,- pueden generar ese tipo de confusiones en la gestión. En ese sentido, al contrastar las labores que normalmente realizaba [[Nombre9] ] desde el despacho ministerial con las indicadas en los "términos de referencia" del proyecto, se determina que a ella se le encomendaron labores similares, e incluso, algunas idénticas a las que inicialmente desempeñaba en el despacho de [[Nombre8] ], de manera que en ausencia de un informe concreto y de pruebas claras que las deslinde, resultaba perfectamente viable que ella ejerciera labores similares y en razón de ello sus compañeros, demás funcionarios y altos mandos administrativos del Ministerio pudieran establecer que ella estaba haciendo lo mismo por un ingreso mucho mayor. Se ha verificado, desde esta instancia, que en la contratación con Taiwán se le asignó las siguientes labores: "Coordinar las actividades administrativas y técnicas del Despacho del Ministro y sus asesores, tanto a lo interno como a lo externo de la institución, con organismos nacionales e internaciones involucrados en el quehacer del MIVAH y del sector social; Elaborar la agenda técnica y organizar las sesiones de trabajo que realice el Señor Ministro, con instancias internas y externas, públicas y privadas, nacionales e internacionales;" Preparar los informes técnicos que se produzcan de las reuniones realizadas por el Señor Ministro, así como coordinar las acciones de ejecución y seguimiento de los acuerdos tomados;" Coordinar las reuniones de la Administración Superior Ministerial, así como dar seguimiento y evaluación de los temas tratados; (...) Planificar, organizar y dirigir el trabajo técnico y administrativo encomendado al personal que labora en el Despacho del Señor Ministro, así como rendir informes al Ministro sobre los resultados de su gestión (...)". (cfr. CED1 del legajo de prueba). Y, si se enfrentan esas labores con las que fueron delegadas por [[Nombre8] ] y las que pudo haber realizado [[Nombre9] ] desde antes, no distan en mucho, casi en nada (cfr. sobre las funciones asignadas en el Despacho del Ministro la certificación C-09-2012 extendida por la Dirección Administrativa Financiera, Departamento de Recursos Humanos). Por otro lado, era perfectamente posible percibir esa similitud, pues según se desprende de la nota DM-849-08-07, suscrita por [Nombre [Nombre6]], él había delegado en [Nombre [Nombre7]] la firma de documentos relacionados con pago de horas extra, viáticos, trámite de vacaciones de funcionarios que dependían del Ministro, cupones de combustible, y gestiones de caja chica; con lo cual procuró que se respetara su labor y se acudiera a ella en esos casos, pues podía perfectamente firmar en su nombre. De esta forma, no obstante la situación irregular que se evidenció con la sentencia; no puede obviarse que pese a que existió coincidencia entre las atribuciones de [[Nombre9] ] desde su nombramiento ante la Jefa de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Vivienda en mayo de 2006, con las que le fueron delegadas, y con las que asumió con la firma del contrato, tanto que se ejercieron en el mismo Ministerio, con funcionarios que pertenecían a este -pues se coordinaban a lo interno y a lo externo-; no se ha comprobado que haya dejado de atender una u otra, o se dieran de manera simultánea. De manera tal que siendo por la modalidad de salario quincenal o por el pago de los $1800 (mil ochocientos dólares americanos), ella realizó las labores encomendadas sin que se haya acreditado que provocó una pérdida o afectado la hacienda pública. Además, el que hubiese podido ejercer mismas funciones en uno u otro puesto, no deslegitima, por sí, sus atribuciones ni facultades. Por último, conviene aclarar que si la delegación de firma se formalizó tardía o retroactivamente, no desvirtuaría de ningún modo la tesis del funcionario de hecho, pues aún cuando materialmente no existiera en el momento un acuerdo administrativo en ese sentido, se tiene que tal requisito se suplió, con lo cual se vino a confirmar y ratificar en un todo la gestión que aquella venía ejerciendo, no por cuenta propia sino por un encargo, endosado de forma pública, pacífica, continúa y normalmente ajustada a Derecho (cfr. artículo 115 de la Ley General de Administración Pública). Definitivamente, este Tribunal observa que se dio una serie de prácticas administrativas inadecuadas, o inconvenientes, que han sido tratadas en forma contradictoria por la Contralora General de la República, incluso a lo interno del Ministerio de Trabajo, lo que ha llevado a la dubitación sobre la naturaleza de los fondos y los procedimientos de contratación. Por ello, mas que delitos, lo propio es establecer protocolos adecuados para no llevar a error al resto de la administración pública. En este sentido, como se dijo, la prueba que se ha incorporado no es clara, unívoca, ni suficiente para establecer una responsabilidad penal, como tampoco para dejar ver un perjuicio relevante para la administración pública que requiera ser sancionado en la vía penal. En consecuencia, acogiéndose los recursos formulados, sin que se vislumbre la posibilidad de incluir más prueba en un juicio de reenvío, que pueda modificar la situación de los encartados; se revoca la sentencia impugnada, y dispone la sentencia absolutoria a favor de [[Nombre8] ] y de [[Nombre9] ].

D. Sobre la acción civil resarcitoria. El demandado civil [Nombre [Nombre6]], en su carácter personal, reprocha la insuficiente fundamentación del fallo con respecto a la procedencia de la acción civil resarcitoria. En su criterio, la falta de determinación de un daño, amerita acoger el recurso, anular la sentencia y dictar la absolutoria, condenando en costas a los querellantes y actores civiles. Por su parte la demandada [Nombre [Nombre7]], alegó que no se produjo daño patrimonial ni social, y que esto quedó patente en el informe del Organismo de Investigación Judicial. Y que, por tal razón, pide declarar sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria, condenado en costas a la actora. Se acogen los reclamos; se declara sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria; y se exime la actora civil del pago de las costas: En sentencia se fijó la indemnización civil, a partir de que logró demostrarse la existencia de un delito, y del nexo de causalidad entre este con el daño producido. El fallo penal ha sido revocado, por las razones expuestas en los considerandos anteriores. En lo relativo al tema civil, conforme al análisis precedente, no se acreditó la producción de un daño a la actora civil, lo que evidencia la falta de derecho para ser indemnizada. Si bien, la sentencia absolutoria no incide, necesariamente, en el resultado del reclamo civil, en este caso al no haberse demostrado el daño patrimonial y social, toda vez que no se acreditó, con certeza, que se favoreciera indebidamente a la demandada [[Nombre9] ], con un nombramiento ilegal, por parte del codemandado [[Nombre8] ], a lo que se suma que la primera sí realizó todas las labores que le correspondían conforme al contrato firmado; la ausencia del daño cuya reparación se pretende, no permite acoger la pretensión pecuniaria. Debe recordarse que, con independencia de si el hecho penal generador de la responsabilidad penal se acreditó, siempre debe demostrarse: a) la existencia del daño o perjuicio, los cuales deben ser ciertos, reales y efectivos; b) la magnitud y extensión de ese daño; c) el causante del daño; y d) la relación de causalidad entre el daño sufrido y la conducta desplegada por quien lo generó; así como, e) un criterio de imputación. Ninguno de estos presupuestos ha logrado establecerse, a partir de que la causación de un daño no se demostró. Se reclamó una suma por concepto de daño material y social, más sin embargo, a pesar de que existe un peritaje actuarial que fija los montos a indemnizar; de la prueba incorporada no se derivó que la conducta de los demandados civiles, los hayan generado; pues se tuvo por establecido que los demandados fueron contratados para un servicio que realizaron y en el que cumplieron las labores encomendadas, lo que denota la ausencia del daño para la hacienda pública y el consecuente derecho para reclamar la indemnización. Por lo anterior, se revoca lo dispuesto en cuando a los extremos civiles, y se declara sin lugar la demanda civil del Estado contra [[Nombre9] ] y [Nombre [Nombre6]]. Se exime del pago de costas a la Procurauría General de la República, en su condición de actora civil, toda vez que en este caso existe razón plausible para litigar o buena fe (arts. 267 del Código Procesal Penal y 222 del Código Procesal Civil). Ésta se refleja en que en lo penal se ha emitido un fallo absolutorio por duda, lo que implica que no era temeraria la demanda establecida por el Estado, lo que es lo mismo, era razonable formular los reclamos. En ese sentido, debe destacarse que fue necesario superar varias fases del proceso, y fue hasta en esta sede que se dispuso la absolutoria, lo que evidencia que el caso fue sometido a una larga discusión y la situación de los encausados no era tan clara, se requería agotar la fase de juicio, en incluso la etapa recursiva para determinar la existencia del hecho. Finalmente, no obstante que ha quedado acreditado que la demandada civil [Nombre [Nombre7]] cumplió con las labores encomendadas, existió duda sobre el tema de su nombramiento, es decir, del traslape de funciones, la ilegitimidad de la designación y los términos de la contratación. De tal manera que, como se indicó, resultaba razonable para la actora plantear la acción civil resarcitoria, para procurar la reparación del daño patrimonial y social, de ahí que procede eximir del pago de costas a esta parte.”