Acquittal of defamation and libel claims related to land transfer investigative reportAbsolución de querella por difamación e injurias en reportaje sobre traspaso de tierras

III.The claims are not admissible. From the comprehensive examination of the judgment, as well as from the arguments raised by Dr. [Nombre1], it is established that the challenges brought against the acquittal judgment issued in favor of the respondent [Nombre2] are not receivable. This is because the judgment on the merits adequately substantiated the factual and legal reasons that resulted in the issuance of an acquittal judgment, in strict compliance with the provisions of articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as articles 142, 180, 181, and 363 of the Criminal Procedure Code. From the factual, descriptive, and intellective analysis of the judgment, the correct application of the rules of sound criticism is evident, as well as the proper application of the relevant criminal norms to resolve the merits of the matter, reaching the conclusion, with adequate grounds, that in this case, there was no criminal act, and that therefore, the acquittal of the respondent was appropriate, as was the inadmissibility of the civil action for damages. Throughout the appeal, it is evident that the appellant's objections are concentrated on what, from his own perspective, he considers the Trial Court should have decided, leaving aside the discussion of the central issue as to whether, from the journalistic report made by the respondent, the plaintiff's right to honor was affected, making it susceptible to criminal protection. In the first instance, as has been alleged by the appellant, that in this case, what occurred was the abusive exercise of the right to information by the respondent, and extensive reference has been made to national and international regulations on the subject; it is necessary to make an enunciation of the regulations related to the subject under study, in order to have a better understanding of whether such abuse effectively occurred in this case, as the appellant indicates, or on the contrary, there was a legitimate exercise of the right to information, as held in the judgment. In this regard, it must be noted that our Political Constitution places honor as a fundamental right, stating in article 41: “…By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered promptly, completely, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws…”, a norm that is complemented by article 28 of the Constitution, which states that: “…No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law. Private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are beyond the scope of the law…”. Likewise, and in close relation to the case at hand, article 29 of the same regulatory body is of special importance, as it elevates freedom of expression, information, and the press to the category of fundamental rights, by stating that: “…Everyone may communicate their thoughts by word or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law…”. Similarly, article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights stipulates the relevance of persons' honor and dignity by citing: “…Protection of Honor and Dignity. 1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, nor of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation…”. We also find the rights of freedom of expression and information regulated in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that: “…1. No one shall be molested on account of his opinions. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals…”. In this conventional regulatory recapitulation, we cannot ignore what is regulated in article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which states: “…1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law and be necessary in order to ensure: (a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions…”, as well as article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: “…Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers…”. In the case under examination, the plaintiffs attributed to the respondent the commission of the crimes of slander (injurias), calumny (calumnias), and defamation (difamación), as set forth in articles 145, 146, and 147 of the Criminal Code. In this regard, it must be noted that our regulations consider offenses against honor to be criminal, provided they are typical, unlawful, and culpable, without ignoring that when there are falsehoods in the statements, they must be encompassed by the author's criminal intent (dolo), an aspect that is of special relevance, since it was not proven that the content of the journalistic report regarding various questions about the sale of lands was false. Thus, article 145 of the Criminal Code defines the crime of slander (injurias) as follows: “... Whoever offends a person in their dignity or decorum by word or deed, whether in their presence or by means of a communication directed to them, shall be punished with ten to fifty days' fine. The penalty shall be fifteen to seventy-five days' fine if the offense was inflicted in public...”. The typical action in this crime consists of offending, as a synonym for disparaging, and requires, from a subjective point of view, the common criminal intent (dolo común) consisting of the author's knowledge that the expressions are harmful to the passive subject, as well as the will to cause that harm; the dignity or decorum of the passive subject is protected. In the same sense, the crime of defamation (difamación) states that: “...Whoever dishonors another or spreads claims capable of affecting their reputation shall be punished with twenty to sixty days' fine...”. This criminal type also requires the knowledge and will to spread defamatory expressions. And as for the crime of calumny (calumnias), this occurs when: “...Whoever falsely attributes to a person the commission of a criminal act shall be sanctioned with fifty to one hundred fifty days' fine...”; and it precisely consists of falsely attributing the commission of a crime to a person, for which the imputation to a specific person is required. In this manner, in the specific case, we find ourselves before two fundamental rights of special relevance. On one hand, there is the right to honor, which the plaintiffs consider was affected by the journalistic report, and on the other hand, the right to freedom of expression, to which the respondent party refers. But as indicated previously, to resolve the case under discussion, it is necessary to determine whether, in this instance, an abuse of rights (abuso del derecho) occurred, or rather the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Regarding the latter, article 25 of the Criminal Code states: “...Whoever acts in fulfillment of a legal duty or in the legitimate exercise of a right does not commit a crime...”. In turn, article 22 of the Civil Code refers to the prohibition of abuse of rights (abuso del derecho): “...The law does not protect the abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise thereof. Any act or omission in a contract which, due to the intention of its author, its object, or the circumstances in which it is performed, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of judicial or administrative measures to prevent the persistence of the abuse...”, norms on which it must be discerned whether, from the investigative report carried out by the respondent, the typical accused conducts were committed. In this sense, both the fundamental right to honor and the right to freedom of expression are relevant within our legal system, since it is precisely in the Political Constitution where important principles such as those indicated here, which constitute the basis of the democratic and social system of our State, are specially enshrined, as defined in article one of the Magna Carta. Based on the foregoing, it can be verified that the appealed judgment completely and with adequate grounds dismissed that, in the dissemination of the investigative work carried out by the respondent, the necessary criminal intent (dolo) to affect the plaintiffs' honor was present, and on the contrary, what occurred was the exercise of the right to inform and not an abuse of that freedom of expression, for it could not be concluded in any way that the publication of the report had the purpose of affecting the plaintiffs' honor, when said report referred to another topic, wherein it was necessary to address the plaintiffs' participation in the sale of lands subject to the aforementioned investigation. In any case, as the Constitutional Chamber has analyzed in various rulings, when there is a collision that may arise between the fundamental rights of honor and freedom of expression, the latter prevails, as long as there is no abusive exercise thereof. In this sense, this high Court has indicated that: “...the 'preferred position' of the right to information in matters of constitutional control, understood as that which affirms that when the right to inform freely conflicts with other rights, even fundamental rights, it tends to prevail over them, a position that explains why aspects of the right to privacy and honor of public persons must yield to the interest of information. The Spanish Constitutional Court has referred to the preferred position of freedom of expression over other fundamental rights in the following terms: Given its institutional function, when a collision occurs between the freedom of information and the right to privacy and honor, the former generally enjoys a preferred position, and the restrictions that may derive from said conflict on the freedom of information must be interpreted in such a way that the fundamental content of the right to information is not, given its institutional hierarchy, denatured or incorrectly relativized...” (Cf. Judgments numbers 106-1986 and 159-1986). It has also been indicated that: “... legally it is not possible to demand that everything published be true or exact, for as the Spanish Constitutional Court has pointed out, if truth were imposed as a condition for the recognition of the right, the only guarantee of legal certainty would be silence (Cf. Judgment number 28-1996). In the reasoning of the precedent from the Constitutional Chamber under study, emphasis is placed on the fact that one cannot previously demand from someone exercising their freedom of expression or press to verify the truth of what they publish beforehand, as this would be a situation that could degenerate into prior censorship as a way to limit such fundamental rights. However, the same Constitutional Chamber also reiterates that it is not possible to invoke freedom of expression to disseminate situations known to be false, or regarding which no effort was made by the publisher to try to ascertain some objective aspect that would rule out their falsehood, as well as the need to evaluate the specific case to disprove bad faith as the real objective of the publication. Also, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled regarding the possible collision between the right to honor and the right to freedom of expression, indicating that it is not sufficient to consider only the criminal law norms, but that constitutional and conventional norms, to which reference has already been made supra, are also of special relevance, leaning towards stating that freedom of expression prevails over the right to honor as long as the former is not exercised through an abusive exercise of the freedoms of information and press. In this regard, it is stated: “...The foregoing is due to the fact that the Costa Rican legal system contemplates, as a general rule (enshrined in article 22 of the Civil Code), not protecting the abuse of rights (abuso del derecho) nor the antisocial use thereof. This is precisely because if a right is abused, it implies that the scope of protection it contemplates has been exceeded or overstepped, so that such excess is not covered by it and lacks protection. Thus, if no abuse is incurred, but rather the freedoms of information and press are legitimately exercised, then there is no possibility whatsoever of criminally sanctioning the communicator, as they would not have committed any crime against honor...” (…)“[...] Only when the freedoms of information and press are abused (as could be the case when false data are divulged knowingly they are false, when one fails to try to obtain the official's version to offer balanced information, when the servant's rights of rectification and/or reply are denied, when purely private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position the person holds are dealt with, when it is affirmed to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial ruling to that effect, when the sole intention is to offend a person – an aspect that must be examined case by case and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which some information is divulged, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news or comments about it are presented, or similar situations) may the communicator be held liable, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding the scope of its protection. That abuse is not protected by the legal system (article 29 of the Constitution related to article 22 of the Civil Code), so that the communicator who engages in abusive conduct must answer for their acts (which could even eventually entail the liability of the media outlet that disseminated the information...)” (Cf. Resolution number 2002-01050, of 8:50 hours on October 25, 2002). Furthermore, as indicated by the cited vote of the Third Chamber, whether the information has a public interest or not is also relevant, an aspect the challenger denies by stating that the activities carried out by his represented party were not performed as a notary public, but as a lawyer. But contrary to what the appellant indicates, the public interest does not derive solely from the action being carried out by a public official, for it also arises when persons perform a public function. It is therefore not possible, in a democratic system like ours, to attempt to limit freedom of expression, as long as it is exercised responsibly and sensibly, because this would imply prior censorship, susceptible to being challenged through the established legal channels, given that, as the cited vote of the Third Chamber indicates, the determination of whether an abuse of rights (abuso del derecho) occurred is made not only based on the content of the disseminated information, but also taking into account other aspects such as the wording, the vocabulary, the photographs, and other aspects in order to determine whether the content of the information is or is not defamatory. And it is based on all this that in the case under study, it is determined in the appealed judgment that the investigative report referred to the legal transaction of the sale of a property that was segregated from the Playa Florida estate, a transaction in which the plaintiff [Nombre [Nombre3]] participated and which was carried out in nineteen ninety-four. It is regarding this transfer and with respect to subsequent legal acts that the respondent carries out an investigative report, and it is published by Televisora de Costa Rica on the dates of June 23 and 24, two thousand eleven, under the title “Fraude con Tierras” (Land Fraud), and where reference was made to a series of legal transactions whose purpose was the legalization of lands belonging to Playa Florida and for which purpose registry frauds have occurred, and where it was possible to determine the existence of irregularities carried out by the attorney [Nombre4], before whom Mr. [Nombre5] allegedly appeared to formalize minutes of an extraordinary assembly in which he had purportedly been appointed president of the corporation, and in which it is stated that shareholders [Nombre6] and [Nombre7] participated in the assembly, who at that time had already died, this among other irregularities that the respondent evidenced in his report. Another relevant aspect that was the subject of investigation was the fact that [[Nombre8]] attested that [[Nombre9]] had a special power of attorney (poder especial) granted by the Playa Florida corporation to sell more than fourteen hectares of the property to another corporation, and he executed the sale deed. The attorney indicated that, having seen the corporate minute book number two of the general shareholders' assembly, he attested to the referred power of attorney (poder) given to sell on behalf of Playa Florida. Despite this, the corporate books did not appear, so it was not possible for this attorney to refer to the minutes by which power (poder) was granted to [Nombre10]á [Nombre [Nombre11]] to sell. Furthermore, the report questioned that said assembly took place in the United States, and persons appear in the minutes as shareholders without it being clear whether they had that status. On this aspect, the appellant insists that, contrary to what the Trial Court indicated, it was not necessary for the assembly held in the United States to comply with a consular procedure for it to have legitimacy in our country, an aspect that, although it is certainly mentioned in the judgment, that circumstance, which is also addressed in the report, constitutes a part of a series of questions that the respondent tried to elucidate in his report and by the means available to him, but that in any case, the fact of whether or not the consular procedure was required did not imply that the respondent exercised his right to inform abusively to elucidate these and other questions, for on the contrary, he went directly to the primary sources, among them the interview presented in the report and conducted with the plaintiff [Nombre [Nombre12]] on aspects as relevant as the fact of having asked him directly how he determined that [Nombre13] was the representative of Playa Florida, a question that was left without an adequate answer, added to the fact that the corporate minute books of the corporation did not appear at that time in order to verify who the shareholders were. But also, regarding these transactions, to which reference was made in the journalistic investigation, the respondent went to the plaintiff [Nombre [Nombre3]] and asked him the same question, since for the respondent it was not clear how [Nombre14]ó obtained the power (poder) in the United States that allowed him to carry out the sales, a power (poder) granted by persons whose relationship with the corporation was also unclear. It is on these aspects, just as it is transcribed in the judgment, that Greivin [Nombre15] interviewed the plaintiff, all of which this Chamber considers, under the circumstances in which the report occurred and, as the Trial Court concludes, did not constitute an abusive exercise of rights (abuso del derecho). Regarding these aspects, the judgment states: “...In this report, at minute four and thirty-nine seconds, with the image of the plaintiff [Nombre [Nombre12]] on screen, a banner appeared reading as follows: 'PROTOCOLI MINUTES QUESTIONED'; likewise, at minute five and fifty-one, with the image of the plaintiff [[Nombre9]] on screen, a banner appeared reading what is now transcribed literally: 'SOLD WITH QUESTIONED POWER'. It can be observed here that there is a series of statements in the report broadcast by Channel Seven that directly concern the background set forth supra. Indeed, [Nombre16] touches on the topic of the sale that Playa Florida made to Paisaje Sereno by means of the document from which, according to [Nombre [Nombre3]], he derived power (poder) to hold the extraordinary general assembly that would, in turn, give him power (poder) to sell to Paisaje Sereno. Likewise, [Nombre16] refers to the fact that [Nombre [Nombre12]], having seen the minute book number two of the general shareholders' assembly, attests to the power (poder) to carry out the sale, a point the respondent refutes by asserting that the books of this corporation have either not appeared or do not exist, an argument that [Nombre16] complemented in the report by saying that the offended party [[Nombre8]] did not explain more clearly how that power (poder) was obtained and from whom to carry out the sale of the property. After that, the defendant says he located [Nombre [Nombre3]], who sold with a power (poder) originating from an assembly held in the United States by persons whose relationship with the corporation was unclear, after which [Nombre16] asks Mr. [Nombre [Nombre17]] if he had verified that the persons who had given him power (poder) were indeed partners, to which the plaintiff gentleman responded as follows: '...if they (sic) give us a power granted before the consul or all the procedures they have to do there, the power is supposed to be a legitimate power...' Having carefully studied the contents of the report, it is clear that the arguments of [Nombre16] regarding the actions of [[Nombre9]] and [[Nombre8]] in relation to the sale of Playa Florida's property to Paisaje Sereno revolve around the fact that the document from which [[Nombre18]] claims he derived power (poder) to hold the assembly would have been issued by persons whose status as partners was debatable, besides the fact that this document would have required its passage through the consulate of the country in the United States, among several other procedures, and that [[Nombre8]] attested that [[Nombre18]] had a special power of attorney (poder especial) to sell, this based on the minute book of the general shareholders' assembly, given that the books of Playa Florida either did not appear or did not exist. At first glance and without further analysis, one might think that the arguments of the accused had no basis whatsoever; however, upon studying the issue very carefully, it will be seen that [Nombre16] had reasons to think and, ultimately, to maintain that those doubts raised by him existed and that, therefore, their presentation in the report was not arbitrary but rather stemmed from the exercise of his work as a journalist for the legal entity sued herein. On this point, the accused detailed at trial that he conducted an investigation that the Court considers reasonable regarding the number and type of sources consulted; on the specific point of the document from which [Nombre [Nombre19]] claims he derived his mandate, [Nombre16] explained at trial that he had consulted the Dirección General de Tributación Directa on whether legal books for the Playa Florida corporation had been issued, having been informed that they had not, a circumstance that the Court considers was relevant for [Nombre16] to be able to argue that books had not appeared or had not existed regarding this legal entity; in relation to the topic of the books, [Nombre16]'s argument does not lose its strength in light of the fact that the books certainly existed (as can be deduced from the evidence added at folios three hundred ninety-eight to four hundred of the principal or three thousand three hundred eighty-six of the criminal case file brought to trial ad effectum videndi), since what matters here for the purposes of the analysis to be made later is that [Nombre15] investigated with the Dirección General de Tributación Directa whether they existed, and was informed that they did not ([Nombre15]'s version on the point is credible in light of the documentary evidence added at folio three hundred twenty-eight of the principal). * Another question raised by [Nombre16] has to do with the validity of the document through which [[Nombre9]] claims he received the mandate to conduct the assembly and subsequent sale; [Nombre16] maintained at trial that the apparent non-existence of books in the case suggested that there had been no changes in the representation of Playa Florida, besides the fact that, according to the respondent, the offended party [[Nombre9]] himself admitted in the interview he conducted that this document should have gone through the consulate: having listened to the recording countless times, the Court verifies that, indeed, Mr. [Nombre [Nombre3]] tells [Nombre16] that if they are given '...a power (poder) granted before the consul or all the procedures they have to do there, the power (poder) is supposed to be a legitimate power (poder)...' a phrase with which it becomes clear that, indeed, as [Nombre16] declared at trial, the plaintiff [[Nombre9]] himself certainly expressed, when he went to interview him, that this document should go through the consulate; during the trial, the plaintiff gentlemen and their legal counsel insisted that there is a series of norms from Civil Law, Commercial Law, and that pertaining to consular service, as well as cassation jurisprudence, to the effect that an instrument such as the one in question did not require a consular procedure, nevertheless, and without the Court having the intention of entering into the analysis of whether or not the document should have gone through that procedure in light of those branches of Law, the fact is that – and especially for the purposes of evaluating, for example, the issue of the subjective element of the offense – what must be evaluated is whether, with the elements that [Nombre16] gathered through the investigation he deployed, he could reasonably think that this procedure was necessary and that, having been omitted in this case, the analyzed document was dubious.

And the Court finds it is appropriate to admit that [Name16] acted reasonably in reporting that this document had not been processed through the consular office, as a dubious element of the matter, an argument in favor of which it can be stated that even such an important prosecution witness on this point, if we consider that she is a legal professional, as is evident from her own testimony, for many years, such as [Name20], mentioned that this type of document precisely required the consular processing whose omission [Name16] pointed out as an indication that the power of attorney that [[Name18]] said he had was problematic (Mrs. [Name21] affirmed at trial that “…powers of attorney (cartas poder) granted outside the country required authentication by a notary, the Department of State, the consul, and then the Casa Amarilla…”); to this must be added that the defendant said he had consulted with several people on the matter, among whom he cited three legal professionals (including his defense attorneys in this proceeding) and a Registry official, which provides elements to reasonably consider that [Name16] introduced this topic into the report not out of whim or a desire to damage the honor of the plaintiffs or to attribute an unlawful act to them, but because he considered—and this must be emphasized as necessary—reasonably that this was an element that introduced doubt about the document in question…” (Cf. Folios 907 to 911 of the judgment). Thus, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant, the defendant [Name16] went to the direct sources that could provide him information about the questions related to the sale under investigation, but he also went to other sources, from which his interest in conducting an exhaustive and complete investigation can be inferred. The sentencing Court is also correct in pointing out that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to have the status of accused persons regarding the irregular facts surrounding the legal transaction (negocio jurídico) under journalistic investigation, because said transactions did involve a public interest regardless of whether the plaintiffs acted as public officials, as indicated by the judges, which is not true, as the appellant claims, but they did perform a public function in their capacity as lawyers and as those who had in their hands the legal actions related to the sale of the property under investigation. The Court also dismissed, with adequate grounds, that the report in its context deliberately sought to affect the honor of the plaintiffs, stating in this regard: “…The plaintiffs also considered the fact that they were associated in the report, even without it being done explicitly, with conduct that would be criminal, or with persons who would be criminals or, at least, accused individuals, to be a criminal offense, for example, through the use of phrases, words (such as the word moreover) or, in general, language that the plaintiffs called connectives, that is, according to their explanation, that link unlawful acts of other persons with lawful acts of the plaintiffs. In this regard, the undersigned judges, having analyzed all the circumstances surrounding this matter globally, consider that it is not possible to consider this form of communication by the defendant as constituting the crimes investigated. Indeed, as is clear from the evidence, analyzed as a whole, the inclusion of the defendants in the same report in which reference was made, for example, to attorney [Name22], is a circumstance that is not due to the mere whim of the accused, but rather his conduct reflects one hundred percent what occurs in reality, verbi gratia, in the criminal case file brought to this trial ad effectum videndi, in which we find the investigation of both the facts attributed to the aforementioned notary [Name22]—who has been questioned and very clearly has the status of indictee—and the facts concerning the purchase-sale (compraventa) through which Playa Florida sold to Paisaje Sereno; it must be taken into account that there seems to be a link that naturally unites all these matters, so much so that the marginal notation (anotación marginal) that was analyzed in the preceding lines included both the legal transactions (negocios jurídicos) carried out by that mentioned legal professional (attorney [Name22]), and the one carried out by the plaintiff [Name [Name3]] as representative of Playa Florida with Paisaje Sereno, that is, the Court also does not see, for what has been explained, a special intent on the part of the defendant to, as they would popularly say, throw them all in the same basket, to harm [Name [Name3]] and [Name [Name12]], but rather that this results naturally from the criminal and administrative investigations that have arisen, which, as indicated supra, are reflected by the investigation that, in turn, [Name16] carried out in the exercise of his profession as a journalist. Another device from the communication sciences that the plaintiffs considered criminal was the use of the banners (cintillos) that appeared associated at some moments with the images of Mr. [Name [Name3]] and Mr. [Name [Name12]]. In this regard, it was proven that at some point in the report when the image of attorney [Name [Name12]] was shown, a banner was displayed that read literally as transcribed below: “PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA” (NOTARIZED A QUESTIONED ACT), while the same happened in the case of attorney [Name [Name3]] to whose image the banner “VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO” (SOLD WITH A QUESTIONED POWER OF ATTORNEY) was associated. In relation to this topic, it is useful to carry out a literal analysis of what is attributed by [Name2] to the plaintiffs, that is, that one notarized a questioned act, and that the other sold with a questioned power of attorney; looking at the definition that the latest edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language gives of the verb to question, it consists, according to the first meaning, of controverting a doubtful point “…proposing the reasons, evidence and grounds of one and the other party…” which is precisely what the defendant did in the case according to what he understood to be presented by the investigation he had carried out at that time; on this point, it is not superfluous to add, moreover – in relation to what the plaintiffs maintained in the final discussion of the debate – that such questioning did not exist because the plaintiffs did not have the status of accused persons in any criminal proceeding, something which, as indicated supra, is not an obstacle, in the Court’s opinion, for a journalist to exercise his right to inform in this regard. (Cf. Folios 921 to 923). The sentencing Court concludes, with adequate grounds, that in any case the actions attributed to the defendant are not typical `since the report was not disseminated with an animus injuriandi and furthermore there was a public interest and there was no intention to harm the defendants. And in this the judges are correct, because the existence of malice on the part of the defendant in terms of intending to affect the honor of the plaintiffs was not confirmed. In accordance with the foregoing, it can be appreciated that the sentencing Court did carry out a detailed and in-depth analysis of the entire body of evidence, reaching the conviction that the content and form in which the journalistic report was disseminated by the defendant was carried out as part of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, a report that did involve a public interest character since the transfer of properties under irregular conditions was at stake, where even to date, the property that gave rise to the investigation maintains a notation (anotación) in the National Registry, by virtue of the criminal proceeding whose investigation remains ongoing, which besides that public interest is current and relevant and that consequently, in the case, there was no abusive and disproportionate exercise of that constitutionally protected right. See that the proceeding revolved around whether or not the defendant [Name16] committed the crimes against honor that were attributed to him to the detriment of the plaintiffs, and not about whether the power of attorney (poder) granted to Mr. [Name [Name3]] in the United States complied with the legal requirements and whether or not the consular processing should have been carried out for it to be effective in our country. In this respect, the appellant deviates in his appeal from the thema probandum, placing special emphasis on this situation, which, as stated, was not the object of analysis in the ruling, but rather the journalistic report in which the defendant did not simply limit himself to reporting on the alleged irregularity in the transfer of lands, but sought out direct sources that could provide pertinent information, and hence he even interviewed the plaintiffs, due to their evident participation in the legalization processes of the transfers, but at no time, either directly or implicitly, attributed any criminal act to them. Furthermore, his observations on the need to legally consularize the CED1 given to the plaintiff [[Name9]] were not whimsical, but rather the product of the defendant’s own investigation and inquiry from legal professionals who indicated its necessity. It must therefore be reiterated that although it is true that the appellant insists throughout his appeal that the consular procedure was not necessary, this aspect was not what was being elucidated in the debate, but it was sufficient for the defendant, along with other doubts arising from the journalistic investigation, to emphasize this fact as dubious regarding the legal procedure in the granting of the power of attorney (poder), but this was only one of the questions, since the report also questioned who the shareholders of Playa Florida S.A. were in order to determine whether or not they were in a position to grant that power of attorney (poder). As can be seen, the journalistic investigation revolved around the fraudulent transfers of properties of Playa Florida S.A., and as part of a responsible inquiry, the defendant interviewed those, as in the case of the plaintiffs, who had had some participation in the legalization processes, with the sentencing Court indicating that it was not necessary for the purposes of the report for them to have the status of accused persons in the criminal proceeding still open within case file 07-8885-042-pe, since at best, the plaintiffs did carry out legal transactions (negocios jurídicos) that the court calls notarial acts (actuaciones notariales) and where, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (among others, resolution 2013-191 at 11:10 a.m. on February 15, 2013), as well as the first article of the Notarial Code, notaries public do hold the status of public officials, and rather, it is evident and necessary that the defendant went to the plaintiffs and questioned them about their participation in those legal transactions (negocios jurídicos), without this meaning, as it never happened, that he attributed any criminal act to them, with the judges establishing that [Name16], in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, never had the intention of harming the honor of the plaintiffs, a subjective element of the criminal types attributed to him and which was dismissed in the appealed judgment. Moreover, it was concluded in the ruling that even the banners (cintillos) that appeared in the journalistic report referring to “a questioned act” and “sold with a questioned power of attorney” were intended to highlight dubious aspects regarding the protocolization (protocolización) and sale of the property that was strictly the object of the investigation, but not the attribution of any criminal act to the plaintiffs. The sentencing Court also analyzed in detail the interview that took place in the office of plaintiff [Name [Name12]], where there were conflicting versions as to whether said interview occurred in an atmosphere of shouting as the plaintiff indicated or whether it was harmonious and respectful, as the defendant and his exculpatory witnesses claimed. On this aspect, the testimonies of [Name23], [Name24], [Name25], and [Name26] were analyzed by the judges, as indicated in the ruling: “…Hazel [Name27], for her part, stated at trial that she was also in [Name28]’s office when [Name16] arrived to interview him. The witness testified that she heard shouting from the defendant and that he told [[Name8]] to admit that he had ‘raised the dead’ (sic); she added that, upon leaving, [Name15] began to shout that the plaintiff was stealing some documents from him. [Name25] and [Name26] narrated that they accompanied the defendant at the time he interviewed the plaintiff [[Name8]], as they were at that time cameraman and assistant to [Name16]; both agreed that it was a normal interview, with respect. [Name29] said that he did not hear [Name15] shout and that when they left and the defendant was telling [Name30] to return some documents, but [Name29] implies without shouting, even though [Name16] speaks in a tone like [Name31], but it is not that he shouts, a specific topic to which [Name32] referred in the same terms. As can be seen, it is a situation in which there are two totally opposing versions, and in which the Court has no convincing elements that would allow it to discredit one version or the other, with it remaining evident only that the only objective evidence in this regard, which would be the filming, does not show absolutely anyone else in the room where the interview took place, so there is also no solid evidence that someone might have heard what was conversed between the defendant and plaintiff, apart from the fact that the exculpatory witnesses affirm that everything transpired in the most normal way, even upon leaving, the only moment when another person is observed, with a black striped shirt, but it is a shot already outside the house, so it also could not be known whether that person heard anything of the alleged disrespect and offenses that [Name15] would have uttered, but the truth is that it is not possible to reach the degree of conviction required for a repressive sentence, so what applies is the application of the first paragraph in fine of Article 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code, absolving the defendant of the defamation (injuria) and slander (difamación) attributed to him by [[Name8]] as committed on that occasion…” (Cf. Folios 930 to 932). From the foregoing it is clear that it is not true that an excessive and preponderant value was given to the testimony provided by [Name16] on this point, because contrary to what was indicated, the testimonial statements of both parties were analyzed, as well as excerpts from the video related to these facts, without it being possible to reach the conviction that the conduct attributed to the defendant occurred due to a lack of sufficient evidentiary elements to prove it, with the indictee being absolved of these facts. Regarding the lack of objectivity and impartiality of one of the judges who, according to the appellant, indicated that she had other, more important cases to resolve, the challenger does not prove that the proper attention was not paid to the trial in that case. In any case, the trial extended over several hearings, all the evidence was duly collected, and all parties had the opportunity to refer to all the aspects that were of interest to them, without it being appreciated that the objectivity of one of the judges was compromised in the present case. With respect to the claim relating to the dismissal of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), as well as the non-application of Law No. 7472 which refers to the promotion of competition and the effective defense of the consumer, the Court did analyze these aspects, as well as the claimed moral and psychological damage, indicating and based on jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that the threat of a civil sanction can also cause an inhibitory effect on the exercise of freedom of expression. In any case, what is relevant is that the Court dismissed the existence of a causal link between the accused facts, for which the defendant was absolved, and the civil claims of the plaintiff [Name [Name3]]. Although it is true that testimonial and expert evidence was received to the effect that the civil plaintiff [Name [Name3]] was affected in his mood and had feelings of sadness, shame, and guilt, the proof of damage is not sufficient, but rather the demonstration of the direct cause-effect relationship between the act attributed and the damage produced is also required, which legitimizes the payment of compensation as claimed, which did not occur in the present case because, as the sentencing Court indicates, a punishable act by the defendant that would have caused an impact on the honor of the plaintiffs was not proven, which in turn entails the rejection of the civil judgment against the co-defendant Televisora de Costa Rica S.A, as the judges well set forth in their ruling. Consequently, contrary to what is indicated in the appeal, the Court made a broad and detailed analytical exposition to establish that the defendant did not carry out an abusive and disproportionate exercise of his fundamental right to freedom of expression, that the journalistic report did involve the public interest that legitimized carrying out that investigation, with the content and form of the report limited to evidencing relevant facts, and no imputations were made that affected the honor of the plaintiffs, who considered it that way based on subjective assessments, which motivated the filing of this proceeding. It is for the foregoing that, this Chamber concludes, the comprehensive analysis of the judgment on the merits conforms to the precepts established in Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as the provisions stipulated in Articles 1, 142, 184, and 363 of the Criminal Procedure Code, complying with adequate reasoning, so that since the alleged defects are not appreciated, the appeal must be declared without merit.” In turn, Article 22 of the Civil Code refers to the prohibition of abuse of right: “… The law does not protect the abuse of right or its antisocial exercise. Any act or omission in a contract that, due to the intention of its author, its object, or the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding indemnification and the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence of the abuse…”, norms upon which it must be discerned whether, based on the investigative report carried out by the defendant, the accused typical conducts were committed. In this sense, both the fundamental right to honor and the right to freedom of expression prove to be relevant within our legal system, since it is precisely in the Political Constitution where important principles such as those indicated here are specifically enshrined, principles that constitute the basis of the democratic and social system of our State, as defined in Article 1 of the Magna Carta. Based on the foregoing, it can be verified that the appealed judgment completely dismissed, with adequate grounds, the claim that the dissemination of the investigative work carried out by the defendant acted with the required intent (dolo) to affect the honor of the plaintiffs; on the contrary, what occurred was the exercise of the right to inform and not an abuse of that freedom of expression, for it could not be concluded in any way that the publication of the report had the purpose of affecting the honor of the plaintiffs, when said report referred to another matter, in which it was necessary to address the plaintiffs' participation in the sale of lands that were the subject of the investigation at hand. In any case, as the Constitutional Chamber has analyzed in various rulings, when a collision may arise between the fundamental rights of honor and freedom of expression, the latter prevails, as long as there is no abusive exercise thereof. In this sense, this high Court has indicated that: “… the 'preferential position' of the right to information in matters of constitutional control, understood as that which affirms that when the right to freely inform conflicts with other rights, even fundamental rights, it tends to supersede them, a position which explains why aspects of the right to privacy and to the honor of public persons must yield to the interest of information. The Spanish Constitutional Court has referred to the preferential position of freedom of expression over other fundamental rights in the following terms: Given its institutional function, when a collision occurs between freedom of information and the right to privacy and to honor, the former generally enjoys a preferential position, and the restrictions that may derive from said conflict on freedom of information must be interpreted in such a way that the fundamental content of the right to information is not, given its institutional hierarchy, distorted or incorrectly relativized…” (Cf. Judgments numbers 106-1986 and 159-1986). It has also been indicated that: “… legally, it is not possible to require that everything published be true or exact, since, as the Spanish Constitutional Court has pointed out, if truth were imposed as a condition for the recognition of the right, the only guarantee of legal certainty would be silence (Cf. Judgment number 28-1996). In the reasoning of the precedent of the Constitutional Chamber under study, emphasis is placed on the fact that one who exercises their freedom of expression or freedom of the press cannot be previously required to verify in advance the truthfulness of what they publish, since this would be a situation that could degenerate into prior censorship as a way of limiting such fundamental rights. However, the same Constitutional Chamber likewise reiterates that it is not possible to invoke freedom of expression to disseminate situations that are known to be false or regarding which no effort was made by the publisher to try to verify some objective aspect that rules out their falsehood, as well as the need to assess the specific case to disprove bad faith as the real objective of the publication. The Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also ruled regarding the possible collision between the right to honor and the right to freedom of expression, indicating that it is not sufficient to appreciate only criminal norms, but that constitutional and conventional norms, which have already been referred to supra, are of special relevance, leaning towards stating that freedom of expression prevails over the right to honor as long as the former is not exercised through an abusive exercise of the freedoms of information and the press. In this regard, it is stated: “… The foregoing is due to the fact that the Costa Rican legal system contemplates as a general rule (enshrined in Article 22 of the Civil Code) not to protect the abuse of right nor its antisocial use. This is precisely because if a right is abused, it implies that the scope of protection it contemplates has been exceeded or overstepped, so that said excess is not covered by it and lacks protection. Thus, if no abuse is incurred, but rather the freedoms of information and the press are legitimately exercised, then there is no possibility whatsoever of criminally sanctioning the communicator, since they would not have committed any crime against honor…” (…)“ […] Only when the freedoms of information and the press are abused (as could be the case when false data is knowingly divulged, when no attempt is made to obtain the official's version in order to offer balanced information, when the public servant is denied their rights of rectification and/or reply, when purely private matters or sensitive information unrelated to the position held by the person are dealt with, when it is presented as certain to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial conviction to that effect, when the sole intention is to offend someone – an aspect that must be examined case by case and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which information is divulged, the way photographs or images are handled, the way the news or comments surrounding it are presented, or similar situations) can the communicator be held responsible, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding the scope of protection thereof. That abuse is not protected by the legal system (Constitutional Article 29 in relation to Article 22 of the Civil Code), so that communicator who engages in abusive conduct shall be held responsible for their acts (which could even potentially entail the liability of the medium that disseminated the information…” (Cf. Resolution number 2002-01050, of 8:50 hours on October 25, 2002). Furthermore, as indicated by the cited ruling of the Third Chamber, whether there is a public interest in the information is also relevant, an aspect the appellant denies by indicating that the activities carried out by their client were not performed as a notary public, but as a lawyer. But contrary to what the appellant states, the public interest does not derive solely from the action being performed by a public official, since it also arises when persons perform a public function. It is not possible then, in a democratic system like ours, to attempt to limit freedom of expression, as long as it is exercised responsibly and sensibly, since that would imply prior censorship, susceptible to being challenged through the established legal channels, given that, as indicated by the cited ruling of the Third Chamber, the determination of whether an abuse of right occurred is made not only based on the content of the disseminated information, but also by taking into account other aspects such as wording, vocabulary, photographs, and other aspects in order to determine whether the content of the information is defamatory or not. And it is from all of this that in the case under study, it is determined in the appealed judgment that the investigative report referred to the legal transaction of sale and purchase of a property that was segregated from the Playa Florida estate, a transaction in which the plaintiff [Name [Name3]] participated and which was carried out in nineteen ninety-four. It is regarding this transfer and with respect to subsequent legal acts that the defendant carries out an investigative report, and it is published by Televisora de Costa Rica on June 23 and 24, two thousand eleven, under the title “Fraude con Tierras” and where reference was made to a series of legal transactions aimed at the legalization of lands belonging to Playa Florida and for which purpose registry frauds have occurred and where it was possible to determine the existence of irregularities carried out by the lawyer [Name4] where Mr. [Name5] presumably appeared before him to formalize (protocolizar) a minute of an extraordinary assembly in which he had supposedly been appointed president of the company, and in which it is indicated that shareholders [Name6] and [Name7] participated in the assembly, who were already deceased at that time, this among other irregularities that the defendant evidenced in his report. Another relevant aspect that was subject to investigation was the fact that [[Name8] ] attested that [[Name9] ] had a special power of attorney (poder) given by the company *Playa Florida* to sell more than fourteen hectares of the property to another company, and he executed the sale deed (escritura). The lawyer indicated that, having reviewed the minute book number two of the general shareholders' assembly, he attested to the referred power given to sell on behalf of *Playa Florida*. However, the company's books did not appear, so it was not possible for this lawyer to refer to the minute by which power was granted to [Name10] [Name [Name11]] to sell. Furthermore, the report questioned that said assembly was held in the United States and persons appear in the minute as shareholders, without it being clear if they held that condition. Regarding this aspect, the appellant insists that contrary to what the Trial Court indicated, it was not necessary for the assembly held in the United States to have to comply with a consular procedure for it to have legitimacy in our country, an aspect that, although it is true is mentioned in the judgment, that circumstance, which is also addressed in the report, constitutes one part of a series of questions that the defendant tried to clarify in his report and through the means within his reach, but that in any case, the fact that the consular procedure was required or not did not imply that the defendant abusively exercised his right to inform in order to clarify these and other questions, since, on the contrary, he went directly to the primary sources, including the interview presented in the report and conducted with the plaintiff [Name [Name12]] on such relevant aspects as the fact of having directly asked him how he determined that [Name13] was the representative of Playa Florida, a question that remained without an adequate response, added to the fact that the company's minute books did not appear at that opportunity in order to verify who the shareholders were. But also regarding these transactions, which were referred to in the journalistic investigation, the defendant went before the plaintiff [Name [Name3]], whom he asked the same question, since for the defendant it was not clear [Name14] obtained the power in the United States that allowed him to carry out the sales, a power granted by persons whose relationship with the company was also unclear. It is regarding these aspects, as transcribed in the judgment, that Greivin [Name15] interviewed the plaintiff, all of which this Chamber considers that, under the circumstances in which the report occurred and, as the Trial Court concludes, there was no abusive exercise of the right. On these aspects, the judgment states: “…In this report, at minute four thirty-nine seconds, with the image of the plaintiff [Name [Name12]] on screen, a banner appeared stating the following: “PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA”; likewise, at minute five fifty-one with the image of the plaintiff [[Name9] ] on screen, a banner appeared stating what is now literally transcribed: “VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO”. It can be observed here that there are a series of statements in the report aired by Channel Seven that directly relate to the background set forth supra. Indeed, [Name16] touches on the topic of the sale made by Playa Florida to Paisaje Sereno through the document from which, according to [Name [Name3]], the power was derived to hold the extraordinary general assembly that would, in turn, give power to sell to Paisaje Sereno. Likewise, [Name16] refers to the fact that [Name [Name12]], having reviewed minute book number two of the general shareholders' assembly, attests to the power to execute the sale and purchase, a thing that the defendant refutes by maintaining that either the books of this company have not appeared or do not exist, an argument that [Name16] complemented in the report by saying that the offended party [[Name8] ] did not explain more clearly how that power was obtained and from whom to carry out the sale of the estate. After that, the accused says that he located [Name [Name3]], who sold with a power originating from an assembly held in the United States by persons whose relationship with the company was not clear, after which [Name16] asks Mr. [Name [Name17]] if he had verified that the persons who had given him power were indeed partners, to which the plaintiff responded as follows: “…if we (sic) are given a power granted before the consul or all the procedures they have to do there, the power is supposed to be a legitimate power…” Having carefully studied the contents of the report, it is clear that the arguments of [Name16] regarding the actions of [[Name9] ] and [[Name8] ] in relation to the sale of the Playa Florida property to Paisaje Sereno revolve around the fact that the document from which [[Name18] ] says the power was derived to hold the assembly would have been issued by persons whose status as partners was debatable, in addition to the fact that said document would have required passing through the consulate of the country in the United States, among various other procedures, and that [[Name8] ] attested that [[Name18] ] had a special power of attorney to sell, this with a view of the minute book of the general shareholders' assembly, given that the books of Playa Florida either did not appear or did not exist. At first glance and without further analysis, it might be thought that the defendant's arguments had no basis whatsoever; however, having studied the matter very carefully, it will be seen that [Name16] had reasons to think and, finally, to maintain that those doubts raised by him existed and that, therefore, the presentation of them in the report was not capricious, but rather obeyed the exercise of his work as a journalist for the legal entity sued here. On this point, the defendant detailed at trial that he carried out an investigation that the Court considers reasonable in terms of the quantity and type of sources consulted; on the specific point of the document from which [Name [Name19]] says his mandate derived, [Name16] explained at trial that he had consulted with the Dirección General de Tributación Directa as to whether legal books of the company Playa Florida had been issued, and was informed that they had not, a circumstance that the Court considers was relevant so that [Name16] could argue in the sense that books had not appeared or had not existed for what concerns this legal entity; regarding the issue of the books, the argument of [Name16] does not languish in the face of the fact that the books certainly existed (as deduced from the evidence added at folios three hundred ninety-eight to four hundred of the main file or three thousand three hundred eighty-six of the criminal case file brought to trial *ad effectum videndi*), since what matters here for the purposes of the analysis that will be made later is that [Name15] investigated with the Dirección General de Tributación Directa whether they existed, and was informed that they did not (the version of [Name15] on this point is credible in light of the documentary evidence added at folio three hundred twenty-eight of the main file). * Another question that [Name16] raises relates to the validity of the document through which [[Name9] ] says he received the mandate to hold the assembly and subsequent sale and purchase; [Name16] maintained at trial that the non-existence of books that seemed apparent in the case suggested that there had been no changes in the representation of Playa Florida, in addition to the fact that, according to the defendant, the same offended party [[Name9] ] accepted in the interview conducted with him that that document should have passed through the consulate: having listened to the recording countless times, the Court verifies that, in effect, Mr. [Name [Name3]] tells [Name16] that if they are given “…a power granted before the consul or all the procedures they have to do there, the power is supposed to be a legitimate power…” a phrase with which it is clear that, in effect, as [Name16] stated at trial, the same plaintiff [[Name9] ] did express, when he went to interview him, in the sense that that document should pass through the consulate; in the course of the debate, the plaintiffs and the person who sponsored them insisted that there are a series of norms of Civil Law, Commercial Law, and matters concerning the consular service, as well as cassation jurisprudence, to the effect that an instrument such as the one mentioned did not need consular procedure, despite which, and without the Court having the intention to enter into the analysis of whether or not the document should have passed through that procedure in light of those branches of Law, the truth is that – and above all for the purpose of assessing, for example, the issue of the subjective element of the criminal type – what must be assessed is whether, with the elements that [Name16] gathered through the investigation he deployed, he could reasonably think that that procedure was necessary and that, having been omitted in the specific case, the analyzed document was doubtful. And the Court considers it is appropriate to admit that [Name16] acted reasonably in informing that that document had not been the subject of a procedure at the consular level, as a doubtful element of the matter, an argument in favor of which it can be stated that even such an important prosecution witness on this point, if we assume she is a legal professional, as deduced from her own statement, for many years, such as [Name20], mentioned that this type of document precisely required the consular procedure whose omission [Name16] pointed out as an indication that the power [[Name18] ] said he had was problematic (Mrs. [Name21] affirmed at trial that “…powers of attorney granted outside the country required authentication by a notary public, by the Department of State, by the consul, and, subsequently, by the Casa Amarilla…”); to this must be added that the accused said he had consulted with several people on this matter, among whom he cited three legal professionals (including his defense attorneys in this process) and an official of the Registry, which provides elements to consider with basis that [Name16] introduced that topic into the report not out of caprice or with the intention of damaging the honor of the plaintiffs or attributing an illicit act to them, but because he considered – and it must be emphasized because it is necessary – reasonably that this was an element that introduced doubt about the document at hand…” (Cf. Folios 907 to 911 of the judgment). It is thus that, contrary to what the appellant stated, the defendant [Name16] went to the direct sources that could provide him with information about the questions related to the sale under study, but also went to other sources, from which his interest in carrying out an exhaustive and complete investigation can be deduced. The Trial Court is also right in pointing out that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to have the status of accused persons (imputados) regarding the irregular events surrounding the legal transaction under journalistic investigation, since those transactions were of public interest regardless of whether the plaintiffs acted as public officials, as the judges indicated, which is not true, as the appellant asserts, but they did fulfill a public function in their capacity as lawyers and as those who handled the legal actions related to the sale of the estate under investigation. The Court also dismissed, with adequate grounds, the claim that the report deliberately attempted to affect the honor of the plaintiffs, stating in this regard: “…The plaintiffs also considered it constitutive of a crime that they were associated in the report, even without it being done explicitly, with conduct that would indeed be criminal, or with persons who would indeed be criminals or, at least, accused, this, for example, through the use of phrases, words (such as the word 'además') or, in general, language that the plaintiffs called connectives, that is, according to their explanation, that link illicit acts of other persons with licit acts of the plaintiffs. In this regard, the undersigned, having analyzed the totality of the circumstances surrounding this matter in a global manner, consider that this form of communication by the defendant cannot be considered as constitutive of the crimes investigated.

Indeed, as is clear from the evidence, analyzed as a whole, the inclusion of the defendants in the same report in which reference was made, for example, to attorney [Nombre22], is a circumstance that is not given by the mere whim of the accused, but rather his conduct reflects one hundred percent what occurs in reality, verbi gratia, in the criminal case file brought to this trial ad effectum videndi, in which we find the investigation both of the facts attributed to the aforementioned notary [Nombre22]—who has been questioned and very clearly has the status of defendant—and the facts concerning the sale through which Playa Florida sold to Paisaje Sereno; it should be taken into account that there seems to be a link that, naturally, connects all these matters, so much so that the marginal note that was analyzed in the preceding lines included both the legal transactions carried out by that aforementioned legal professional (attorney [Nombre22]), and that carried out by the plaintiff [Nombre [Nombre3]] as representative of Playa Florida with Paisaje Sereno, that is, nor, for the reasons explained, does the Court see any special intent on the part of the defendant in the sense of, as is popularly said, throwing them all in the same basket, in order to harm [Nombre [Nombre3]] and [Nombre [Nombre12]], but rather that this results naturally from the criminal and administrative investigations that have arisen, which, as indicated supra, are reflected by the investigation that, in turn, [Nombre16] carried out in the exercise of his profession as a journalist. Another communication science resource that the plaintiffs considered criminal was the use of the banners that appeared associated at some moments with the images of Messrs. [Nombre [Nombre3]] and [Nombre [Nombre12]]. In this regard, it was proven that at some point in the report in which the image of attorney [Nombre [Nombre12]] was shown, a banner was displayed that literally read as follows: “PROTOCOLIZED QUESTIONED MINUTES” (“PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA”), while the same happened in the case of attorney [Nombre [Nombre3]] whose image was associated with the banner “SOLD WITH QUESTIONED POWER OF ATTORNEY” (“VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO”). In relation to this topic, it is useful to make a literal analysis of what is attributed by [Nombre2] to the plaintiffs, that is, that one protocolized a questioned minute, and that the other sold with a questioned power of attorney; given the definition that the latest edition of the Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española gives of the verb to question, one finds that it consists, according to the first meaning, in controverting a doubtful point "...proposing the reasons, evidence and foundations of one and the other party..." which is precisely what the defendant did in the case according to what in his understanding was presented in accordance with the investigation he had carried out at that time; on this point, it is not superfluous to add, moreover—in relation to what the plaintiffs maintained in the final discussion of the trial—that such questioning did not exist because the plaintiffs did not have the status of accused in any criminal proceeding, a thing which, as indicated supra, is not an obstacle, in the Court's judgment, for a journalist to be able to exercise his right to report on the matter. (Cf. Folios 921 to 923). The sentencing Court concludes, with appropriate grounds, that in any case the actions attributed to the defendant are not typical `because the report was not disseminated with an animus injuriandi and furthermore there was a public interest and there was no intention whatsoever to harm the defendants. And in this the judges are right, since the existence of intent on the part of the defendant to affect the honor of the plaintiffs was not verified. In accordance with the foregoing, it can be appreciated that the sentencing Court did indeed carry out a detailed and in-depth analysis of the entire body of evidence, reaching the conviction that the content and form in which the news report was disseminated by the defendant, was carried out as part of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, a report which indeed had the character of public interest as the transfer of properties under irregular conditions was at stake where, even to date, the property that gave rise to the investigation maintains a notation in the National Registry, by virtue of the criminal proceeding whose investigation remains ongoing, which in addition to that public interest is current and relevant and that, consequently, in the case there was no abusive and disproportionate exercise of that constitutionally protected right. See that the process revolved around whether the defendant [Nombre16] committed or not the crimes against honor that were charged against him to the detriment of the plaintiffs, and not about whether the power of attorney granted to Mr. [Nombre [Nombre3]] in the United States complied with the legal requirements and whether or not the consular process had to be completed for it to have effect in our country. In this aspect, the appellant deviates in his appeal from the thema probandum, giving special emphasis to this situation, which, as stated, was not the object of analysis in the judgment, but rather the news report where the defendant did not simply limit himself to reporting on the alleged irregularity in the transfer of lands, but rather sought the direct sources that could provide him with the pertinent information, and hence he even interviewed the plaintiffs, due to their evident participation in the processes of legalizing the transfers, but at no time, neither directly nor implicitly, did he attribute any criminal act to them. Furthermore, his observations about the need to legalize consularly the CED1 given to the plaintiff [Nombre9], was not capricious, but rather the product of the defendant's own investigation and inquiry with legal professionals who indicated the need for it. It must then be reiterated that although it is true the appellant insists, throughout his appeal, that the consular procedure was not necessary, this aspect was not what was being elucidated in the trial, but it was sufficient for the defendant, along with other doubts arising from the journalistic investigation, to emphasize this fact as doubtful regarding the legal procedure in granting the power of attorney, but this was only one of the questions, for the report also questioned who the shareholders of Playa Florida S.A. were in order to determine if they were in a position or not to grant that power. As can be seen, the journalistic investigation revolved around the fraudulent transfers of properties belonging to Playa Florida S.A., and as part of a responsible inquiry, the defendant interviewed those like the plaintiffs, who had had some participation in the legalization processes, with the sentencing Court indicating that it was not necessary for the purposes of the report for them to have the status of accused in the criminal proceeding that is still open within case file 07-8885-042-pe, for in the best of cases, the plaintiffs did carry out legal transactions that the court calls notarial actions and where, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (among others resolution 2013-191 at 11:10 hours on February 15, 2013), as well as the first article of the Notarial Code, public notaries do hold the condition of public officials, and rather it is evident and necessary that the defendant went to the plaintiffs and investigated them about their participation in those legal transactions, without this meaning, for it never occurred that way, that he attributed any criminal act to them, with the judges establishing that [Nombre16], in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, never had the intention of damaging the honor of the plaintiffs, the subjective element of the criminal types attributed to him and which was discarded in the appealed judgment. On the other hand, it was concluded in the judgment that even the banners that appeared in the news report where reference is made to "a questioned minute" ("un acta cuestionada") and "sold with a questioned power of attorney" ("vendió con un poder cuestionado") had the purpose of emphasizing doubtful aspects regarding the protocolization and sale of the property that was strictly the object of the investigation, but not the attribution of any criminal act to the plaintiffs. The sentencing Court also analyzed in detail what relates to the interview that was conducted in the office of plaintiff [Nombre [Nombre12]], where there were conflicting versions regarding whether said interview took place in an atmosphere of shouting as the plaintiff indicated or whether it was harmonious and respectful, as the defendant and his defense witnesses affirmed. On this aspect, the testimonies of [Nombre23], [Nombre24], [Nombre25], and [Nombre26] were analyzed by the judges, stating in the judgment: "...Hazel [Nombre27], for her part, said at trial that she was also in the office of [Nombre28] when [Nombre16] arrived to interview him. The witness testified that she heard shouts from the defendant and that he told [[Nombre8]] to admit that he had raised the dead (sic); she added that, upon leaving, [Nombre15] began to shout that the plaintiff was stealing some documents from him. [Nombre25] and [Nombre26] narrated that they accompanied the defendant at the moment he interviewed plaintiff [[Nombre8]], since they were at that time the cameraman and assistant of [Nombre16]; both agreed that it was a normal interview, with respect. [Nombre29] said that he did not hear [Nombre15] shout and that when they left and the defendant was telling [Nombre30] to return some documents to him, but [Nombre29] implies without shouting, even though [Nombre16] speaks in a tone like [Nombre31], but it is not that he shouts, a specific topic to which [Nombre32] referred in the same terms. As can be seen, it is a situation in which there are two totally conflicting versions, and in which the Court has no elements of conviction that allow discrediting one version or the other, with it remaining patent only that the sole objective evidence in this regard, which would be the filming, absolutely does not show anyone else in the room where the interview took place, so there is also no solid evidence that anyone could have heard what was discussed between defendant and plaintiff, apart from the fact that the defense witnesses affirm that everything took place in the most normal way, even upon leaving, the only moment in which another person is observed, with a black striped shirt, but it is a shot already outside the house, so it could not be known either if that person heard something of the alleged disrespect and offenses that [Nombre15] would have proffered, but the truth is that it is not possible to reach the degree of conviction required for a repressive judgment, so what corresponds is the application of the first paragraph in fine of Article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acquitting the defendant of the injuria and defamation that were attributed to him by [[Nombre8]] as committed on that occasion..." (Cf. Folios 930 to 932). From the foregoing, it is clear that it is not true that excessive and preponderant value was given to the statement provided by [Nombre16] on this point, for contrary to what was indicated, the testimonial statements of both parties were analyzed, as well as extracts from the video related to these facts, without it being possible to reach the conviction that the conducts attributed to the defendant occurred in the absence of sufficient evidentiary elements to so accredit, with the accused being acquitted of these facts. Regarding the lack of objectivity and impartiality of one of the judges who, as the appellant points out, indicated that she had other more important cases to resolve, whoever challenges does not prove that the trial in this case was not given due attention. In any case, it extended over several hearings, the totality of the evidence was duly gathered, and all parties had the opportunity to refer to all the aspects that were of their interest, without it being appreciated that the objectivity of one of the judges was compromised in the present case. With respect to the claim relating to the declaration without merit of the civil action for compensation, as well as the non-application of Law No. 7472 that refers to the promotion of competition and effective consumer protection, the Court did analyze these extremes, as well as the moral and psychological damage claimed, indicating—based on jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights—that the threat of a civil sanction can also provoke an inhibitory effect on the exercise of freedom of expression. In any case, what is relevant is that the Court dismissed the existence of a causal link between the accused facts, for which the defendant was acquitted, and the civil claims of the actor [Nombre [Nombre3]]. Although it is true that testimonial and expert evidence was received regarding the fact that the civil actor [Nombre [Nombre3]] was affected in his mood and had feelings of sadness, shame, and guilt, the accreditation of damage is not sufficient, for what is also required is the demonstration of the direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact attributed and the damage produced, which legitimizes the payment of compensation as claimed, which did not occur in the present case because, as the sentencing Court indicates, a punishable act on the part of the defendant that would have caused an affectation to the honor of the plaintiffs was not proven, which in turn leads to the rejection of the civil condemnation of the co-defendant Televisora de Costa Rica S.A., as the judges well stated in their judgment. Consequently, contrary to what was indicated in the appeal, the Court carried out a broad and detailed analytical exposition to establish that the defendant did not make an abusive and disproportionate exercise of his fundamental right to freedom of expression, that the news report did indeed have the public interest that legitimized the conduct of that investigation, with the content and form of the report being limited to evidencing relevant facts, and no imputations were made that affected the honor of the plaintiffs, who did consider it that way based on subjective appreciations and which motivated the filing of this process.

It is for the foregoing reasons that this Chamber concludes that the comprehensive analysis of the judgment on the merits conforms to the precepts established in Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política, as well as to the stipulations of Articles 1, 142, 184, and 363 of the Código Procesal Penal, fulfilling an adequate legal reasoning (fundamentación). Therefore, since the alleged defects are not observed, the appeal must be declared without merit." The Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also ruled on the possible collision between the right to honor and the right to freedom of expression, stating that it is not enough to consider only criminal law provisions, but that constitutional and conventional norms, to which reference has already been made supra, are also of special relevance, leaning toward indicating that freedom of expression prevails over the right to honor as long as the former is not exercised through an abusive exercise of the freedoms of information and press. In this regard, it is stated: “…</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">The foregoing is because the Costa Rican legal system contemplates as a general rule (enshrined in Article 22 of the Civil Code) not to protect the abuse of a right or its antisocial use. This is precisely because if a right is abused, it means that the scope of protection it contemplates has been exceeded or overstepped, so that said excess is not covered by it and lacks protection. Thus, if no abuse is incurred, but rather the freedoms of information and press are legitimately exercised, then there is no possibility whatsoever of criminally sanctioning the communicator, as they would not have committed any crime against honor…” (…)“[…] Only when the freedoms of information and press are abused (as could be the case if false data is knowingly disseminated, if no attempt is made to obtain the official's version to offer balanced information, if the public servant is denied their rights of rectification and/or reply, if it concerns merely private matters or sensitive information not related to the position the person holds, if it is stated as fact to the public that the servant's conduct is criminal without a judicial ruling to that effect, if the sole intention is to offend a person </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">–</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">an aspect that must be examined case by case and in which several factors could be relevant, such as the context in which information is disseminated, the way photographs or images are handled, the manner in which the news or comments about it are presented, or similar situations) can the communicator be held liable, since abusing a right (a situation that must be verified in each specific case) implies exceeding the scope of its protection. That abuse is not protected by the legal system (constitutional Article 29 in relation to Article 22 of the Civil Code), and therefore, any communicator who engages in abusive conduct must answer for their acts (which could even eventually entail the liability of the medium that disseminated the information…” </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(Cfr. Resolution n</span><span> ú</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">mber 2002-01050, of 8:50 a.m. on October 25, 2002). Furthermore, as indicated by the cited vote of the Third Chamber, it is also relevant whether or not there is a public interest in the information, an aspect the challenger denies by indicating that the activities carried out by his client were not performed as a notary public, but as a lawyer. But contrary to what the appellant indicated, the public interest does not derive solely from the action being performed by a public official, as it also arises when individuals perform a public function. It is not possible, then, in a democratic system like ours, to attempt to limit freedom of expression, as long as it is exercised responsibly and sensibly, because that would imply prior censorship, actionable through established legal channels, given that, as the cited vote of the Third Chamber indicates, the determination of whether an abuse of right was committed is made, not only based on the content of the disseminated information, but also taking into account other aspects such as the wording, vocabulary, photographs, and other aspects in order to determine whether or not the content of the information is defamatory. And it is from all of this that in the case under study, the appealed ruling determines that the investigative report referred to the legal transaction of the purchase and sale of a property that was segregated from the Playa Florida estate, a transaction in which the plaintiff [Name [Name3]] participated and which was carried out in nineteen ninety-four. It is about </span><span>this </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">transfer and regarding subsequent legal acts that the defendant makes an investigative report, and it is published by Televisora de Costa Rica on June 23 and 24, two thousand eleven, under the title </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“Fraude con Tierras”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> and where reference was made to a series of legal transactions aimed at legalizing lands belonging to Playa Florida and for which purpose registry frauds have occurred, and where it was possible to determine the existence of irregularities committed by lawyer [Name4]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">where Mr. [Name5]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">allegedly appeared before him to record the minutes of an extraordinary assembly in which he had been appointed president of the company, and in which it is indicated that shareholders [Name6]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and [Name7] participated in the assembly, who at that time were already deceased, this among other irregularities that the defendant evidenced in his report. Also under investigation was another relevant aspect, which was the fact that [[Name8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">] attested that [[Name9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">] had a special power of attorney granted by the company </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Playa Florida</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> to sell more than fourteen hectares of the property to another company, and he executed the deed of sale. The lawyer indicated that having seen minute book number two of the general shareholders' assembly, he attested to the referred power of attorney given to sell on behalf of </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Playa Florida. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Not</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">withstanding that, the company's books did not appear, which is why it was not possible for this lawyer to refer to the minutes by which power of attorney was granted to [Name10]</span><span>á </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">[Name [Name11]] to sell. Furthermore, the report questioned that said assembly was held in the United States and that persons appear in the minutes as shareholders, without it being established if they had</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">that status. On this aspect, the appellant insists that, contrary to what was indicated by the sentencing Tribunal, it was not necessary for the assembly held in the United States to have to comply with a consular procedure for it to have legitimacy in our country, an aspect that, although it is true it is mentioned in the ruling, that circumstance which is also addressed in the report, constitutes one part of a series of questions that the defendant tried to elucidate in his report and using the means at his disposal, but that in any case, the fact that the consular procedure was required or not did not imply that the defendant had abusively exercised his right to inform in order to elucidate these and other questions, because on the contrary, he went directly to the primary sources, among them the interview presented in the report and conducted with the plaintiff [Name [Name12]] on aspects as relevant as the fact of having directly asked him how he determined that [Name13] was the representative of Playa Florida, a question that was left without an adequate response, added to the fact that the company's minute books did not appear on that occasion in order to verify who the shareholders were. But also regarding these transactions, to which reference was made in the journalistic investigation, the defendant went to the plaintiff [Name [Name3]] whom he asked the same question, because for the defendant it was not clear [Name14]</span><span>ó </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">obtained the power of attorney in the United States that allowed them to carry out the sales, a power of attorney that was granted by persons whose relationship with the company was also unclear. It is on these aspects, as transcribed in the ruling, that Greivin [Name15] interviewed the plaintiff, all of which this Chamber considers, under the circumstances in which the report was made and, as the sentencing Tribunal concludes, there was no abusive exercise of the right. On these aspects, the judgment states: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">…In this report, at minute four and thirty-nine seconds, while the image of the plaintiff [Name [Name12]] was on screen, a banner appeared that read as follows: “PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA”; likewise, at minute five and fifty-one, while the image of the plaintiff [[Name9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] was on screen, a banner appeared that read what is now transcribed literally: “VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO”. It can be observed here that there are a series of statements in the report broadcast by Channel Seven that are directly related to the background set out supra. Indeed, [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">addresses the issue of the sale that Playa Florida made to Paisaje Sereno through the document from which, according to [Name [Name3]], power derived to hold the extraordinary general assembly which would, in turn, give power to sell to Paisaje Sereno. Likewise, [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">refers to the fact that [Name [Name12]], having seen minute book number two of the general shareholders' assembly, attests to the power to make the purchase-sale, something that the defendant refutes by maintaining that the books of this company either have not appeared or do not exist, an argument that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">complemented in the report by saying that the offended party [[Name8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] did not explain more clearly how that power of attorney was obtained and from whom, to carry out the sale of the estate. After that, the accused says that he located [Name [Name3]], who sold with a power of attorney originating from an assembly held in the United States by persons whose relationship with the company was unclear, after which [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">asks Mr. [Name [Name17]] if he had verified that the persons who had given him power of attorney were indeed partners, to which the plaintiff responded as follows: “…if we (sic) are given a power of attorney granted before the consul or all the procedures that have to be done over there, the power of attorney is supposed to be a legitimate power of attorney…” Having carefully studied the contents of the report, it is clear that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">'s arguments regarding the actions of [[Name9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] and [[Name8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] in relation to the sale of the Playa Florida property to Paisaje Sereno revolve around the fact that the document from which [[Name18]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] says power derived to hold the assembly would have been issued by persons whose status as partners was debatable, in addition to the fact that said document would have required processing through the country's consulate in the United States, among several other procedures, and that [[Name8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] attested that [[Name18]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] had a special power of attorney to sell, based on the minute book of the general shareholders' assembly, given that Playa Florida's books either did not appear or did not exist. At first glance and without further analysis, one might think that the defendant's arguments had no basis whatsoever; however, having studied the matter very carefully, it will be seen that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">had reasons to think and, finally, to maintain that those doubts he raised existed and that, therefore, the presentation of them in the report was not capricious, but rather stemmed from the exercise of his work as a journalist for the legal entity sued here. On this point, the defendant detailed at trial that he conducted an investigation that the Tribunal considers reasonable in terms of the quantity and type of sources consulted; on the specific point of the document from which [Name [Name19]] says his mandate derived, [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">explained at trial that he had consulted the Dirección General de Tributación Directa about whether legal books for the company Playa Florida had been issued, and that he had been informed that they had not, a circumstance that the Tribunal considers was relevant so that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">could argue that the books did not appear or had not existed as far as this legal entity is concerned; regarding the issue of the books, [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">'s argument does not languish in the face of the fact that the books certainly existed (as gleaned from the evidence added to folios three hundred ninety-eight to four hundred of the principal file or three thousand three hundred eighty-six of the criminal file brought to trial ad effectum videndi), because what matters here for the purposes of the analysis to be done later is that [Name15] investigated with the Dirección General de Tributación Directa whether they existed, and was informed that they did not ([Name15]'s version on the point is credible in light of the documentary evidence added to folio three hundred twenty-eight of the principal file). * Another question that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">raises has to do with the validity of the document through which [[Name9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] says he received a mandate to hold the assembly and subsequent purchase-sale; [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">maintained at trial that the apparent non-existence of books in the case suggested that there had been no changes in the representation of Playa Florida, in addition to which, according to the defendant, the offended party [[Name9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] himself accepted in the interview conducted with him, that this document should have passed through the consulate: having listened to the recording countless times, the Tribunal verifies that, indeed, Mr. [Name [Name3]] tells [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">that if they are given “…a power of attorney granted before the consul or all the procedures that have to be done over there, the power of attorney is supposed to be a legitimate power of attorney…” a phrase with which it is evident that, in effect, as [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">declared at trial, certainly the plaintiff [[Name9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] himself expressed, when he went to interview him, that this document had to pass through the consulate; in the course of the debate, the plaintiffs and the person sponsoring them insisted that there are a series of norms of Civil Law, Commercial Law, and matters concerning the consular service, as well as cassation jurisprudence, indicating that an instrument such as the one related did not need consular processing, notwithstanding which, and without the Tribunal having the intention of entering into the analysis of whether or not the document had to undergo that procedure in light of those branches of Law, the truth is that </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">–</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">and especially for the purpose of evaluating, for example, the issue of the subjective element of the offense</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">–</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">what must be evaluated is whether with the elements that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">gathered in the investigation he deployed, he could reasonably think that this procedure was necessary and that, having been omitted in the present case, the analyzed document was dubious. And the Tribunal considers it appropriate to admit that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">acted reasonably in reporting that this document had not been subject to processing at the consular level, as a dubious element of the matter, an argument in favor of which can be put forward that even such an important prosecution witness on the point, if we assume she has been a legal professional for many years, as is gleaned from her own testimony, such as [Name20]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, mentioned that this type of document precisely required the consular processing whose omission [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">pointed out as an indication that the power of attorney that [[Name18]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">] claimed to have was problematic (Ms. [Name21] affirmed at trial that “…powers of attorney granted outside the country required authentication by a notary, the State Department, the consul, and then, the Casa Amarilla…”); to this must be added that the accused said he had consulted with several people on the matter, among whom he cited three legal professionals (including his defense attorneys in this proceeding) and an official of the Registry, which provides elements to consider with grounds that [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">introduced this topic into the report not out of caprice or with the intent of harming the honor of the plaintiffs or of attributing an illicit act to them, but because he considered –and it must be emphasized as necessary– reasonably that this was an element that introduced doubt about the document in question…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(Cfr. Folios 907 to 911 of the judgment)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">It is thus that, contrary to what the appellant stated, the defendant [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">resorted to direct sources that could provide information on the questions related to the sale under study, but also resorted to other sources, from which their interest in conducting a thorough and complete investigation can be inferred. The sentencing Tribunal is also correct in pointing out that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to have the status of accused regarding the irregular facts surrounding the legal transaction subject to the journalistic investigation, because said transactions did possess a public interest regardless of whether the plaintiffs acted as public officials, as stated by the judges, which is not true, as the appellant claims, but they did fulfill a public function in their capacity as lawyers and as those who held in their hands the legal actions relating to the sale of the estate under investigation. The Tribunal also dismissed, with adequate grounds, that in the context of the report there was a deliberate intention to affect the honor of the plaintiffs, indicating in this regard: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…The plaintiffs also considered it to be a crime that they were associated in the report, even without it being done explicitly, with conduct that would indeed be criminal, or with persons who would indeed be criminals or, at least, accused, this, for example, through the use of phrases, words (such as the word 'además') or, in general, language that the plaintiffs called 'connectives', meaning, according to their explanation, language that links illicit acts of other persons with licit acts of the plaintiffs. In this regard, the undersigned, having analyzed all the circumstances surrounding this matter globally, consider that it is not possible to consider this manner of communicating by the defendant as constituting the crimes investigated. In effect, as is evident from the evidence, analyzed as a whole, the inclusion of the defendants in the same report in which reference was made, for example, to Licenciado [Name22], is a circumstance that is not due to the mere caprice of the accused, but rather that its proceeding reflects one hundred percent what occurs in reality, verbi gratia, in the criminal file brought to this trial ad effectum videndi, in which we find the investigation of both the facts attributed to the notary [Name22] mentioned –who has been investigated and very clearly has the status of accused–, as well as the facts concerning the purchase-sale through which Playa Florida sold to Paisaje Sereno; it should be taken into account that there appears to be a link that naturally joins all these matters, so much so that the marginal note that was analyzed in the preceding lines included both the legal transactions made by that legal professional mentioned (Licenciado [Name22]), as well as the one carried out by the plaintiff [Name [Name3]] as representative of Playa Florida with Paisaje Sereno, that is to say, nor, for the reasons explained, does the Tribunal see a special intentionality on the part of the defendant in the sense of, as is popularly said, throwing them all in the same basket, to harm [Name [Name3]] and [Name [Name12]], but rather that this arises naturally from the criminal and administrative investigations that have emerged, which, as indicated supra, are reflected by the investigation that, in turn, [Name16]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">deployed in the exercise of his profession as a journalist. Another resource of communication sciences that the plaintiffs considered criminal was the use of banners that appeared associated at some moments with the images of Messrs. [Name [Name3]] and [Name [Name12]]. In this regard, it was proven that at some point in the report in which the image of Licenciado [Name [Name12]] was projected, a banner was displayed that read what is literally transcribed below: “PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA”, while the same occurred in the case of Licenciado [Name [Name3]], whose image was associated with the banner “VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO”. In relation to this topic, it is useful to make a literal analysis of what is attributed by [Name2]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">to the plaintiffs, meaning that one protocolized a questioned act (acta cuestionada), and that the other sold with a questioned power of attorney (poder cuestionado); viewing the definition that the latest edition of the Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española gives for the verb 'cuestionar', the term consists, according to the first meaning, of controverting a doubtful point “…proposing the reasons, evidence, and grounds of one and the other party…” which is nothing other than what the defendant did in the present case according to what, in his understanding, was presented based on the investigation he had conducted at that time; on the point, it is not superfluous to add, furthermore </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">–</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">in relation to what the plaintiffs maintained in the final discussion of the debate</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">–</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, that such questioning did not exist because the plaintiffs did not have the status of accused in any criminal proceeding, a thing which, as indicated supra, does not prevent, in the Tribunal's judgment, a journalist from exercising their right to inform on the matter.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (Cfr. Folios 921 to 923 )</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The sentencing Tribunal concludes, with adequate grounds, that in any case the actions attributed to the defendant are not typical `because the report was not disseminated with an </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">animus injuriandi </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and furthermore there was a public interest and there was no intention to harm the defendants. And on this point the judges are correct, for the existence of intent (dolo) on the part of the defendant in terms of attempting to affect the honor of the plaintiffs was not verified. According to the foregoing, it can be appreciated that the sentencing Tribunal did indeed carry out a detailed and thorough analysis of the entire body of evidence, reaching the conviction that the content and manner in which the journalistic report was disseminated by the defendant was carried out as part of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, a report that did possess the character of public interest given that the transfer of properties under irregular conditions was at issue, where even to date, the estate that gave rise to the investigation maintains a notation in the National Registry, by virtue of the criminal proceeding whose investigation is maintained, which in addition to that public interest remains current and relevant and that consequently, in the present case, there was no abusive and disproportionate exercise of that constitutionally protected right.

Note that the proceedings revolved around whether the defendant [Name16] committed or did not commit the crimes against honor with which he was charged to the detriment of the plaintiffs, and not around whether the power of attorney granted to Mr. [Name [Name3]] in the United States met the legal requirements and whether or not consular processing had to be completed for it to take effect in our country. In this regard, the appellant, in its appeal, deviates from the *tema probandum*, giving special emphasis to this situation, which, as stated, was not the object of analysis in the judgment, but rather the journalistic report in which the defendant did not merely limit himself to reporting on the alleged irregularity in the transfer of the lands, but instead sought out the direct sources that could provide him with pertinent information, and hence he even interviewed the plaintiffs, due to their evident participation in the processes of legalizing the transfers, but at no time, neither directly nor implicitly, did he attribute any criminal act to them. Furthermore, his observations on the need to legalize document CED1 consularly, given to the plaintiff [Name9], were not arbitrary, but rather the product of the defendant's own investigation and inquiry with legal professionals who indicated the necessity of doing so. It must therefore be reiterated that although it is true the appellant insists, throughout its appeal, that the consular procedure was not necessary, this aspect was not what was being elucidated in the debate, but it was enough for the defendant, along with other doubts arising from the journalistic investigation, to emphasize this fact as dubious concerning the legal procedure in the granting of the power of attorney, but this was only one of the questions, as the report also questioned who the shareholders of Playa Florida S.A. were in order to determine whether or not they were in a position to grant that power of attorney. As can be seen, the journalistic investigation revolved around the fraudulent transfers of Playa Florida S.A. properties, and as part of a responsible inquiry, the defendant interviewed those who, as in the case of the plaintiffs, had had some participation in the legalization processes, with the sentencing court indicating that it was not necessary for the purposes of the report that they have the status of defendants in the criminal proceedings that are still open within case file 07-8885-042-pe, since at best, the plaintiffs did carry out legal transactions that the court calls notarial actions and where, in accordance with the case law of the Third Chamber (*Sala Tercera*) (among others, resolution 2013-191 of 11:10 a.m. on February 15, 2013), as well as Article first of the Notarial Code, notaries public do hold the status of public officials, and rather it is evident and necessary that the defendant approached the plaintiffs and inquired about their participation in those legal transactions, without this meaning, as it never happened, that he attributed any criminal act to them, with the judges establishing that [Name16], in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, never had the intention of injuring the honor of the plaintiffs, a subjective element of the criminal charges attributed to him, which was ruled out in the appealed judgment. On the other hand, it was concluded in the judgment that even the banners that appeared in the journalistic report that refer to *“a challenged notarial certificate (*acta cuestionada*)”* and *“sold with a challenged power of attorney (*vendió con un poder cuestionado*)”* had the purpose of emphasizing dubious aspects regarding the protocolization and sale of the property that was strictly the object of the investigation, but not the attribution of any criminal act to the plaintiffs. The sentencing court also analyzed in detail everything related to the interview that took place in the office of the plaintiff [Name [Name12]], where there were conflicting versions as to whether said interview occurred in an atmosphere of shouting, as the plaintiff indicated, or if it was harmonious and respectful, as the defendant and his defense witnesses affirmed. On this aspect, the judges analyzed the testimonies of [Name23], [Name24], [Name25], and [Name26], indicating in the judgment: *“…Hazel [Name27], for her part, said at trial that she was also in [Name28]'s office when [Name16] arrived to interview him. The witness testified that she heard shouts from the defendant and that he told [Name8] to admit that he had raised the dead (sic); she added that, upon leaving, [Name15] began to shout that the plaintiff was stealing some documents from him. [Name25] and [Name26] narrated that they accompanied the defendant at the time he was interviewing the plaintiff [Name8], as they were at that time the cameraman and assistant of [Name16]; both agreed that it was a normal interview, with respect. [Name29] said he did not hear [Name15] shout and that when they left and the defendant was telling [Name30] to return some documents to him, [Name29] implies that it was without shouting, even though [Name16] speaks in a tone like [Name31], but it is not that he shouts, a specific topic to which [Name32] referred in the same terms. As can be seen, this is a situation in which there are two completely opposing versions, and in which the Court does not have elements of conviction that allow it to discredit one version or the other, with it remaining solely evident that the only objective evidence in this regard, which would be the filming, shows absolutely no one else in the room where the interview took place, so there is also no solid proof that anyone could have heard what was discussed between the defendant and the plaintiff, apart from the fact that the defense witnesses affirm that everything transpired in the most normal way, even upon leaving, the only moment when another person is seen, with a striped black shirt, but it is a shot already outside the house, so it also could not be known if that person heard anything of the alleged disrespect and offenses that [Name15] would have uttered, but the truth is that it is not possible to reach the degree of conviction required for a repressive judgment, so what is appropriate is the application of the first paragraph *in fine* of Article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acquitting the defendant for the slander (*injuria*) and defamation (*difamación*) that were attributed to him by [Name8] as committed on that occasion…”* (Cf. Pages 930 to 932). From the foregoing, it is clear that it is not true that excessive and preponderant value was given to the statement provided by [Name16] on this point, since, contrary to what was indicated, the testimonial statements of both parties were analyzed, as well as extracts from the video related to these events, without being able to reach the conviction that the conduct attributed to the defendant occurred, due to a lack of sufficient evidentiary elements to prove it, thus acquitting the accused of these acts. Regarding the lack of objectivity and impartiality of one of the judges who, according to the appellant, indicated that she had other more important cases to resolve, the person challenging does not prove that the trial in this case was not given due attention. In any case, it extended over several hearings, all of the evidence was duly gathered, and all of the parties had the opportunity to refer to all of the aspects that were of interest to them, without it being apparent that the objectivity of one of the judges was compromised in the present case. With respect to the claim concerning the dismissal of the civil action for damages (*acción civil resarcitoria*), as well as the non-application of Law number 7472, which refers to the promotion of competition and effective consumer protection, the Court did analyze these extremes, as well as the moral and psychological harm claimed, indicating and based on case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that the threat of a civil sanction can also cause an inhibitory effect on the exercise of freedom of expression. In any case, what is relevant is that the Court discarded the existence of a causal link between the accused acts, for which the defendant was acquitted, and the civil claims of the plaintiff [Name [Name3]]. Although it is true that testimonial and expert evidence was received indicating that the civil plaintiff [Name [Name3]] was affected in his mood and had feelings of sadness, shame, and guilt, the proof of harm is not sufficient, but rather the demonstration of the direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act being alleged and the harm caused is also required, which legitimizes the payment of compensation as claimed, which did not occur in the present case because, as the sentencing court indicates, a punishable act by the defendant that would have caused harm to the honor of the plaintiffs was not proven, which in turn entails the rejection of the civil judgment against the co-defendant Televisora de Costa Rica S.A., as the judges well set forth in their judgment. Consequently, contrary to what was indicated in the appeal, the Court carried out a broad and detailed analytical exposition to establish that the defendant did not engage in an abusive and disproportionate exercise of his fundamental right to freedom of expression, that the journalistic report did possess the public interest that legitimized carrying out this investigation, limiting the content and form of the report to evidencing relevant facts, and no imputations were made that affected the honor of the plaintiffs, who indeed considered it that way based on subjective appreciations that motivated the filing of this proceeding. It is for the foregoing reasons that this Chamber concludes that the comprehensive analysis of the judgment on the merits conforms to the precepts established in Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as to what is stipulated in Articles 1, 142, 184, and 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, fulfilling adequate reasoning, and therefore, as the alleged defects are not observed, the appeal must be declared without merit.”

“III.- Los reclamos no son procedentes. Del examen integral del fallo, así como de los alegatos planteados por el doctor [Nombre1] , se establece que los cuestionamientos incoados en contra de la sentencia absolutoria dictada a favor del querellado [Nombre2] , no son de recibo. Esto, por cuanto el fallo de mérito fundamentó de manera adecuada, las razones de hecho y de derecho que dieron como resultado el dictado de una sentencia absolutoria, en estricto apego de lo que señalan los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, al igual que los artículos, 142, 180, 181 y 363 del Código Procesal Penal. Del análisis fáctico, descriptivo e intelectivo del fallo, se desprende, la correcta aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica, así como la debida aplicación de las normas penales relevantes para resolver el fondo del asunto, llegando a la conclusión, con adecuados fundamentos, de que en la especie no se estaba en presencia de un hecho delictivo, y que por ende, correspondía la absolutoria del querellado así como la improcedencia de la acción civil resarcitoria. A lo largo del recurso se evidencia que, las objeciones del recurrente se concentran en lo que desde su propia perspectiva considera que debió resolver el Tribunal sentenciador, dejando de lado la discusión del tema central en el sentido de si, a partir del reportaje periodístico efectuado por el querellado, se produjo la afectación del derecho al honor del querellante, susceptible de tutela penal. En primera instancia, como se ha alegado por parte del recurrente, que en la especie, lo que se produjo fue, el ejercicio abusivo del derecho de información por parte del querellado, y se ha hecho amplia referencia a normativa nacional e internacional sobre el tema; resulta necesario, hacer una enunciación de la normativa relacionada con el tema objeto de estudio, a fin de tener una mejor comprensión de si en la especie efectivamente se produjo o no tal abuso, como lo indica el recurrente, o por el contrario, se dio un ejercicio legítimo del derecho de información, como se sostiene en el fallo. Al respecto, hay que señalar que, nuestra Constitución Política, coloca el honor como un derecho fundamental, indicando en el artículo 41 “…Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes…”, norma que se ve complementada con el artículo 28 constitucional, mediante el cual se señala que “…Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley. Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden públicos, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley…”. Igualmente, y en estrecha relación con el caso que nos ocupa, reviste especial importancia el artículo 29 del mismo cuerpo normativo, que eleva a la categoría de derechos fundamentales, la libertad de expresión, información y prensa, al señalar que: “… Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca…”. Del mismo modo, el artículo 11 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, estipula la relevancia del honor y la dignidad de las personas al citar: “…Protección de la Honra y de la Dignidad. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. 2. Nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en la de su familia, en su domicilio o en su correspondencia, ni de ataques ilegales a su honra o reputación…”., como también encontramos regulados los derechos de libertad de expresión e información en el artículo 19 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, que informa que “… 1. Nadie podrá ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones. 2. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión; este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideraci ón de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección. 3. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el párrafo 2 de este artículo entraña deberes y responsabilidades especiales. Por consiguiente, puede estar sujeto a ciertas restricciones, que deberán, sin embargo, estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para: a) Asegurar el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás; b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas…”. No puede dejarse de lado en esa recapitulación normativa convencional, lo regulado en el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en el cual se indica: “…1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección. 2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. 3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones…”, como también el artículo 19 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, en que se hace referencia a que: “…Todo individuo tiene derecho a la libertad de opinión y de expresión; este derecho incluye el de no ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones, el de investigar y recibir informaciones y opiniones, y el de difundirlas, sin limitación de fronteras, por cualquier medio de expresión…”. En el caso objeto de examen, la parte querellante, le atribuyó al querellado la comisión de los delitos de injurias, calumnias y difamación, contemplados en los artículos 145, 146 y 147 del Código Penal. Al respecto hay que señalar que nuestra normativa considera delictivas las ofensas al honor, siempre que sean típicas, antijurídicas y culpables, sin dejar de lado que cuando se está en presencia de falsedades en las afirmaciones, las mismas tienen que ser abarcadas por el dolo del autor, aspecto que resulta de especial relevancia, pues no se logró acreditar que el contenido del reportaje periodístico en torno a diversos cuestionamientos con la venta de tierras, resultara falso. Así pues, el artículo 145 del Código Penal tipifica el delito de injurias de la siguiente manera: “… Será reprimido con diez a cincuenta días multa el que ofendiere de palabra o de hecho en su dignidad o decoro a una persona, sea en su presencia, sea por medio de una comunicación dirigida a ella. La pena será de quince a setenta y cinco días multa si la ofensa fuera inferida en público..". La acción típica en este delito consiste en, ofender, como sinónimo de menospreciar, y requiere desde el punto de vista subjetivo, el dolo común consistente en el conocimiento del autor de que las expresiones son lesivas para el sujeto pasivo, así como la voluntad de realizar esa lesión; tutelándose la dignidad o decoro del sujeto pasivo. En igual sentido el delito de difamación indica que “ …Será reprimido con veinte a sesenta días multa el que deshonrare a otro o propalare especies idóneas para afectar su reputación". Este tipo penal también requiere el conocimiento y voluntad de difundir expresiones difamatorias. Y en cuanto al delito de calumnias, este se produce cuando: “… Será sancionado con cincuenta a ciento cincuenta días multa el que atribuya falsamente a una persona la comisión de un hecho delictivo…"; y precisamente consiste en atribuirle a una persona falsamente la comisión de un delito, para lo cual se requiere la imputación a una persona determinada. De esta manera, en el caso en concreto, nos encontramos ante dos derechos fundamentales de especial relevancia. Por un lado se encuentra el derecho al honor, el cual los querellantes consideran que les fue afectado con el reportaje periodístico y del otro lado, el derecho a la libertad de expresión, a que hace referencia la parte querellada. Pero como se indicó con anterioridad, resulta necesario para la solución del caso objeto de discusión determinar si, en la especie, se produjo un abuso del derecho, o bien el ejercicio legítimo de la libertad de expresión. Sobre éste último indica el artículo 25 del Código Penal: “…No delinque quien obrare en cumplimiento de un deber legal o en el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho…”. A su vez, el artículo 22 del Código Civil, hace referencia a la prohibición del abuso del derecho: “… La ley no ampara el abuso del derecho o el ejercicio antisocial de éste. Todo acto u omisión en un contrato, que por la intención de su autor, por su objeto o por las circunstancias en que se realice, sobrepase manifiestamente los límites normales del ejercicio de un derecho, con daño para tercero o para la contraparte, dará lugar a la correspondiente indemnización y a la adopción de las medidas judiciales o medidas administrativas que impidan la persistencia en el abuso…”., normas sobre las que se debe discernir si, a partir del reportaje investigativo realizado por el querellado, se cometieron las conductas típicas acusadas. En este sentido, tanto el derecho fundamental al honor como el de libertad de expresión resultan ser relevantes dentro de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, pues es precisamente en la Constitución Política en donde se recoge de especial manera, importantes principios como los aquí señalados y que constituyen la base del sistema democrático y social de nuestro Estado, tal y como se define en el artículo primero de la Carta Magna. A partir de lo anterior, se puede constatar, como en el fallo recurrido se descartó por completo y con adecuados fundamentos que en la difusión del trabajo investigativo efectuado por el querellado, se haya actuado con el dolo requerido para afectar el honor de los querellantes, y por el contrario, lo que se produjo fue, el ejercicio al derecho a informar y no un abuso de esa libertad de expresión, pues no podría concluirse de ninguna manera, que la publicación del reportaje llevara como finalidad el afectar el honor de los querellantes, cuando dicho reportaje se refería a otro tema, en donde resultaba necesario abordar la participación de los querellantes en la venta de tierras objeto de la investigación de marras. En todo caso, tal y como lo ha analizado la Sala Constitucional en diversos fallos, ante la colisión que puede derivarse de los derechos fundamentales del honor y el de la libertad de expresión, prevalece éste último, en tanto no se esté en presencia de un ejercicio abusivo del mismo. En este sentido ha indicado éste alto Tribunal que: “…la "posición preferente" del derecho a la información en materia de control de constitucionalidad, entendida como aquella que afirma que cuando el derecho a informar libremente entra en conflicto con otros derechos, aunque sean derechos fundamentales, tiende a superponerse a ellos, posición que explica por qué aspectos del derecho a la intimidad y al honor de las personas públicas deban ceder ante el interés de la información. El Tribunal Constitucional español se ha referido a la posición preferente de la libertad de expresión frente a otros derechos fundamentales en los siguientes términos: Dada su función institucional, cuando se produzca una colisión de la libertad de información con el derecho a la intimidad y al honor aquélla goza, en general, de una posición preferente y las restricciones que de dicho conflicto puedan derivarse a la libertad de información deben interpretarse de tal modo que el contenido fundamental del derecho a la información no resulte, dada su jerarquía institucional, desnaturalizado ni incorrectamente relativizado…” (Cfr. Sentencias números 106-1986 y 159-1986). También se ha indicado que: “… jurídicamente no es posible exigir que todo lo que se publique sea verdadero o exacto, pues como lo ha señalado el Tribunal Constitucional español, de imponerse la verdad como condición para el reconocimiento del derecho, la única garantía de la seguridad jurídica sería el silencio (Cfr. Sentencia número 28-1996). En el fundamento del precedente de la Sala Constitucional objeto de estudio, se hace hincapié en cuanto a que no se puede exigir previamente a quien ejerce su libertad de expresión o de prensa, que constate de antemano la veracidad de lo que publica, ya que se estaría en presencia de una situación que puede degenerar en la censura previa como forma de limitar tales derechos fundamentales. Empero, la misma Sala Constitucional, de igual forma, reitera que no es posible invocar la libertad de expresión para difundir situaciones que se sabe son falsas o respecto de las cuales no se hizo esfuerzo alguno por quien hace la publicación, para tratar de constatar algún aspecto objetivo que descarte su falsedad, así como la necesidad de valorar el caso concreto para desvirtuar la mala fe como objetivo real de la publicación. También la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia se ha pronunciado con relación a la posible colisión entre el derecho al honor con respecto al derecho a la libertad de expresión, indicando que no basta con apreciar únicamente las normas de carácter penal, sino que también resultan de especial relevancia las normas constitucionales y convencionales, de las cuales ya se ha hecho referencia supra, inclinándose por señalar que tiene prevalencia la libertad de expresión sobre el derecho al honor en tanto la primera no se haga mediante un ejercicio abusivo de las libertades de información y prensa. Al respecto se señala: “…Lo anterior obedece a que el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense contempla como regla general (consagrada en el artículo 22 del Código Civil) el no amparar el abuso del derecho ni el uso antisocial de éste. Ello se debe precisamente a que si se abusa de un derecho, eso implica que se ha excedido o extralimitado el ámbito de protección que el mismo contempla, de modo que dicho exceso no queda cubierto por éste y carece de tutela. Así, si no se incurre en abuso alguno, sino que se ejercen legítimamente las libertades de información y de prensa, entonces no hay posibilidad alguna de sancionar penalmente al comunicador, pues no habría cometido ningún delito contra el honor…” (…)“[…] Sólo cuando se abuse de las libertades de información y de prensa (como podría ser el caso de que se divulguen datos falsos a sabiendas de que lo son, que no se trate de obtener la versión del funcionario para ofrecer una información balanceada, que se le niegue al servidor sus derechos de rectificación y/o respuesta, que se trate de asuntos meramente privados o información sensible que no se relacionen con el cargo que ocupa la persona, que se dé por cierto ante el público que la conducta del servidor es delictiva sin que medie sentencia judicial en ese sentido, que se tenga como intención únicamente el ofender a alguna persona – aspecto que ha de examinarse caso por caso y en el que podrían tener relevancia varios factores, tales como el contexto en que se divulgue alguna información, la forma como se manejen fotografías o imágenes, la manera como se presente la noticia o los comentarios en torno a la misma, o situaciones semejantes) se podrá responsabilizar al comunicador, pues el abusar de un derecho (situación que habrá de verificarse en cada caso concreto) implica que se excede el ámbito de protección del mismo. Ese abuso no es amparado por el ordenamiento jurídico (artículo 29 constitucional relacionado con el 22 del Código Civil), por lo que aquel comunicador que incurra en una conducta abusiva habrá de responder por sus actos (lo cual podría incluso acarrear eventualmente la responsabilidad del medio que difundió la información…” (Cfr. Resolución n úmero 2002-01050, de las 8:50 horas del 25 de octubre de 2002). Además, conforme lo señala el voto de la Sala Tercera de cita, también resulta de relevancia si en la información existe o no un interés público, aspecto que niega el impugnante al indicar que las actividades realizadas por su representado no se hicieron como notario público, sino como abogado. Pero contrario a lo indicado por el recurrente, el interés público no se deriva tan solo de que la actuación sea realizada por un funcionario público, pues este también se produce cuando las personas cumplen una función pública. No es posible entonces, en un sistema democrático como el nuestro, pretender limitar la libertad de expresión, en tanto esta se efectúe de manera responsable y sensata, pues ello implicaría una censura previa, susceptible de ser reclamado por las vías legales establecidas, siendo que conforme lo indica el citado voto de la Sala Tercera, la determinación de si se efectuó un abuso del derecho se realiza, no solo a partir del contenido de la información difundida, sino también tomando en cuenta otros aspectos como la redacción, el vocabulario, las fotografías y otros aspectos con el fin de determinar si el contenido de la información resulta o no ser difamatoria. Y es a partir de todo ello que en el caso objeto de estudio, se determina, en el fallo recurrido que el reportaje investigativo se refería al negocio jurídico de compra venta de una propiedad que se segregó de la finca Playa Florida, negocio en que tuvo participación el querellante [Nombre [Nombre3]] y que fue realizado en mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. Es sobre éste traspaso y con respecto a actos jurídicos posteriores que el querellado realiza un reportaje investigativo, y es publicado por Televisora de Costa Rica en fechas 23 y 24 de junio de dos mil once, bajo el título “Fraude con Tierras” y en donde se hacía referencia a una serie de negocios jurídicos que tenían como finalidad la legalización de tierras que pertenecen a Playa Florida y que para tal efecto se han producido fraudes registrales y en donde se logró determinar la existencia de irregularidades efectuadas por el abogado [Nombre4] en donde presuntamente compareció ante él el señor [Nombre5] a protocolizar un acta de asamblea extraordinaria en la que se le habría nombrado presidente de la sociedad, y en la que se indica, participaron en la asamblea los accionistas [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] , quienes para ese momento ya habían fallecido, esto entre otras irregularidades que evidenció el querellado en su reportaje. También fue objeto de investigación otro aspecto relevante como fue el hecho de que [[Nombre8] ] dio fe de que [[Nombre9] ] tenía un poder especial dado por la sociedad Playa Florida para vender más de catorce hectáreas de la propiedad a otra sociedad, y él hizo la escritura de venta. Indicó el abogado que visto el libro de actas número dos de la asamblea general de accionistas, daba fe del referido poder dado para vender a nombre de Playa Florida. No obstante ello, los libros de la sociedad no aparecieron, por lo que no era posible para este abogado hacer referencia al acta mediante la cual se le otorgaba poder a [Nombre10]á [Nombre [Nombre11]] para vender. Además se cuestionó en el reportaje, que dicha asamblea se realizó en Estados Unidos y aparecen en el acta personas como accionistas, sin que conste si estas tenían esa condición. Sobre este aspecto el recurrente, insiste en que contrario a lo indicado por el Tribunal sentenciador, no era necesario que la asamblea realizada en los Estados Unidos tuviera que cumplir con un trámite consular para que tuviera legitimidad en nuestro país, aspecto que si bien es cierto se menciona en el fallo, esa circunstancia que también es abordada en el reportaje, constituye una parte de una serie de interrogantes que el querellado intentó dilucidar en su reportaje y por los medios a su alcance, pero que en todo caso, el hecho de que se requiriera o no el trámite consular, no implicaba que el querellado haya ejercido abusivamente su derecho a informar para dilucidar estas y otras interrogantes, pues por el contrario, acudió directamente a las fuentes primarias, entre ellas a la entrevista presentada en el reportaje y realizada al querellante [Nombre [Nombre12]] en aspectos tan relevantes como el hecho de haberle preguntado de manera directa de donde determinaba que [Nombre13] era el representante de Playa Florida, pregunta que quedó sin una adecuada respuesta, sumado al hecho de que los libros de actas de la sociedad no aparecieron en aquella oportunidad a fin de constatar quienes eran los accionistas. Pero además sobre estos negocios, a los que se hacía referencia en la investigación periodística, el querellado acudió ante el querellante [Nombre [Nombre3]] a quien le hizo la misma pregunta, pues para el querellado no estaba claro [Nombre14]ó obtuvo el poder en Estados Unidos que le permitió realizar las ventas, poder que fue otorgado por personas que tampoco se tenía claro que relación tenían con la sociedad. Es sobre estos aspectos, tal y como se transcribe en el fallo, que Greivin [Nombre15] entrevistó al querellante, todo lo cual estima esta Cámara, que en las circunstancias en que se dio el reportaje y, tal y como lo concluye el Tribunal sentenciador, no se dio un ejercicio abusivo del derecho. Sobre estos aspectos se indica en la sentencia: “ …En este reportaje, en el minuto cuatro con treinta y nueve segundos, estando en la pantalla la imagen del querellante [Nombre [Nombre12]], apareció un cintillo que rezaba lo siguiente: “PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA”; igualmente, en el minuto cinco con cincuenta y un minutos estando en pantalla la imagen del querellante [[Nombre9] ], apareció un cintillo que rezaba lo que ahora se transcribe literalmente: “VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO”. Puede observarse acá que hay una serie de manifestaciones en el reportaje difundido por Canal Siete que tienen que ver directamente con los antecedentes expuestos supra. En efecto, [Nombre16] toca el tema de la venta que Playa Florida le hiciera a Paisaje Sereno por medio del documento del cual, según [Nombre [Nombre3]], derivó poder para realizar la asamblea general extraordinaria que le daría, a su vez, poder para venderle a Paisaje Sereno. Igualmente se refiere [Nombre16] a que [Nombre [Nombre12]], visto el libro de actas número dos de la asamblea general de accionistas, da fe del poder para hacer la compraventa, cosa que refuta el querellado al sostener que o no han aparecido o no existen libros de esta sociedad, argumento que complementó [Nombre16] en el reportaje diciendo que el ofendido [[Nombre8] ] no explicó con más claridad cómo se obtuvo ese poder y de quién para llevar a cabo la venta de la finca. Luego de ello, el encartado dice que ubicó a [Nombre [Nombre3]], quien vendió con un poder originado en una asamblea realizada en Estados Unidos por personas cuya relación con la sociedad no estaba clara, tras lo cual le pregunta [Nombre16] a don [Nombre [Nombre17]] si había constatado que las personas que le habían dado poder en efecto eran socios, a lo que respondió el señor querellante de la siguiente manera: “…si nosotros (sic) nos dan un poder otorgado ante el cónsul o todos los trámites que tienen que hacer allá, el poder se supone que es un poder legítimo…” Estudiados con detenimiento los contenidos del reportaje, está claro que los argumentos de [Nombre16] respecto de las actuaciones de [[Nombre9] ] y [[Nombre8] ] en relación con la venta de la propiedad de Playa Florida a Paisaje Sereno giran en torno de que el documento del que [[Nombre18] ] dice derivó poder para realizar la asamblea habría sido emitido por personas cuya calidad de socios era rebatible, además de que ese documento habría requerido de su paso por el consulado del país en Estados Unidos, entre varios otros trámites, y de que [[Nombre8] ] dio fe de que [[Nombre18] ] tenía un poder especial para vender, ello con vista del libro de actas de la asamblea general de accionistas, siendo que los libros de Playa Florida o no aparecían o no existían. A primera vista y sin mayor análisis, podría pensarse que los argumentos del encausado no tenían fundamento alguno, sin embargo, estudiado el tema con mucho detenimiento se verá que [Nombre16] tuvo razones para pensar y, finalmente, para sostener que se daban esas dudas por él planteadas y que, por tanto, la presentación de las mismas en el reportaje no era antojadiza, sino que obedeció al ejercicio de su trabajo como periodista de la persona jurídica acá demandada. Sobre el punto, el justiciable detalló en juicio que realizó una investigación que el Tribunal considera razonable en cuanto a la cantidad y el tipo de fuentes consultadas; sobre el punto específico del documento del que [Nombre [Nombre19]] dice derivó su mandato, [Nombre16] explicó en juicio que había consultado en la Dirección General de Tributación Directa sobre si habían sido expedidos libros legales de la sociedad Playa Florida, siendo que se le había informado que no, circunstancia que el Tribunal considera fue relevante para que [Nombre16] pudiera argumentar en el sentido de que no aparecían o no habían existido libros para lo que a esta persona jurídica concierne; en relación con el tema de los libros, no languidece el argumento de [Nombre16] ante el hecho de que los libros ciertamente existían (según se desprende de la prueba agregada a folios trescientos noventa y ocho a cuatrocientos del principal o tres mil trescientos ochenta y seis del expediente penal traído a juicio ad effectum videndi), pues lo que cuenta acá a efectos del análisis que más adelante se hará, es que [Nombre15] investigó en la Dirección General de Tributación Directa si existían, y se le informó que no (la versión de [Nombre15] sobre el punto es creíble a la luz de la prueba documental agregada a folio trescientos veintiocho del principal). * Otro cuestionamiento que plantea [Nombre16] tiene que ver con la validez del documento mediante el cual [[Nombre9] ] dice recibió mandato para realizar la asamblea y posterior compraventa; [Nombre16] sostuvo en juicio que la inexistencia de libros que parecía darse en el caso, hacía pensar que no habían existido cambios en la representación de Playa Florida, además de que, según el querellado, el mismo ofendido [[Nombre9] ] aceptó en la entrevista que le hizo, que ese documento debería haber pasado por el consulado: escuchada infinidad de veces la grabación, el Tribunal constata que, en efecto, el señor [Nombre [Nombre3]] le dice a [Nombre16] que si les dan “…un poder otorgado ante el cónsul o todos los trámites que tienen que hacer allá, el poder se supone que es un poder legítimo…” frase con la cual queda patente que, en efecto, como declaró [Nombre16] en juicio, ciertamente el mismo querellante [[Nombre9] ] se expresó, cuando fue a entrevistarlo, en el sentido de que ese documento debía pasar por el consulado; en el curso del debate, los señores querellantes y quien les patrocinó insistieron en que hay una serie de normas del Derecho Civil, del Derecho Mercantil y de lo atinente al servicio consular, lo mismo que jurisprudencia de la casación, en el sentido de que un instrumento como el relacionado no necesitaba de trámite consular, no obstante lo cual, y sin que tenga el Tribunal el ánimo de entrar al análisis de si el documento debía o no pasar por ese trámite a la luz de esas ramas del Derecho, lo cierto es que – y sobre todo a efecto de valorar, por ejemplo, el tema del elemento subjetivo del tipo– lo que se debe valorar es si con los elementos que [Nombre16] recabó con la investigación que desplegó, podía pensar razonablemente que ese trámite era necesario y que, habiéndose omitido en la especie, el documento analizado era dudoso. Y el Tribunal estima que es procedente admitir que [Nombre16] actuó razonablemente al informar que ese documento no había sido objeto de trámite en sede consular, como elemento dudoso del asunto, argumento en favor del cual se puede exponer que incluso una testigo de cargo tan importante sobre el punto, si partimos de que es profesional en Derecho, como se desprende de su dicho mismo, desde hace muchos años, como lo es [Nombre20] , mencionó que ese tipo de documento exigía precisamente el trámite consular cuya omisión [Nombre16] señaló como indicio de que el poder que [[Nombre18] ] dijo tener era problemático (doña [Nombre21] afirmó en juicio que las “…cartas poder otorgadas fuera del país requerían autenticación de notario, del Departamento de Estado, del cónsul y, luego, de la Casa Amarilla…”); a ello hay que agregar que el encausado dijo haber consultado con varias personas al respecto, entre las cuales citó a tres profesionales en Derecho (incluidos sus defensores en este proceso) y a un funcionario del Registro, lo que da elementos para considerar fundadamente que [Nombre16] introdujo ese tema en el reportaje no por capricho o por ánimo de dañar la honra de los querellantes o de atribuirles un hecho ilícito, sino porque consideró –y hay que recalcarlo por ser necesario– razonablemente que ese era un elemento que introducía duda sobre el documento de marras…” (Cfr. Folios 907 a 911 de la sentencia). Es así que contrario a lo indicado por el recurrente, el querellado [Nombre16] acudió a las fuentes directas que le podían dar información sobre las interrogantes relacionadas con la venta objeto de estudio, pero además acudió a otras fuentes, de lo que se puede derivar su interés en realizar una investigación exhaustiva y completa. También lleva razón el Tribunal sentenciador al señalar que no era necesario que los querellantes tuvieran la calidad de imputados sobre los hechos irregulares en torno al negocio jurídico objeto de la investigación periodísticas, pues dichas transacciones si revestían un interés público con independencia de que los querellantes actuaran como funcionarios públicos, según lo indicaron los juzgadores, lo cual no es cierto, como lo afirma el recurrente, pero si cumplían una función pública en su calidad de abogados y quienes tuvieron en sus manos las acciones legales relativas a la venta de la finca objeto de investigación. También descartó el Tribunal con adecuados fundamentos que en el contexto del reportaje se haya querido deliberadamente afectar el honor de los querellantes, indicando al respecto: “…Los querellantes consideraron constitutivo de delito también el hecho de que se les asociara en el reportaje, aun sin que ello se hiciera de manera explícita, con conductas que sí serían delictivas, o con personas que sí serían delincuentes o, al menos, imputados, ello, por ejemplo, mediante el uso de frases, palabras (como el vocablo además) o, en general, lenguaje que los querellantes denominaron conectivos, es decir, según su explicación, que enlazan actos ilícitos de otras personas con actos lícitos de los querellantes. A este respecto, los suscritos y la suscrita, analizada la totalidad de las circunstancias que rodean a este asunto de manera global, consideran que no es posible considerar como configurativa de los delitos investigados esa forma de comunicar del querellado. En efecto, tal y como se desprende de la prueba, analizada en su conjunto, la inclusión de los querellados en el mismo reportaje en que se hizo referencia, por ejemplo, al licenciado [Nombre22], es una circunstancia que no viene dada por el mero capricho del imputado, sino que su proceder refleja en un ciento por ciento lo que se da en la realidad, verbi gratia, en el expediente penal traído a este juicio ad effectum videndi, en el cual encontramos la investigación tanto de los hechos que se le atribuyen al notario [Nombre22] mencionado –quien ha sido indagado y tiene muy claramente la calidad de encartado–, cuanto los hechos que atañen a la compraventa mediante la cual Playa Florida le vendió a Paisaje Sereno; tómese en cuenta que parece haber un lazo que, naturalmente, une a todos estos asuntos, tanto es así que la anotación marginal sobre la que hubo análisis en las líneas precedentes incluyó tanto los negocios jurídicos hechos por ese profesional en Derecho mencionado (el licenciado [Nombre22]), como el que realizara el querellante [Nombre [Nombre3]] como representante de Playa Florida con Paisaje Sereno, es decir, que tampoco, por lo explicado, ve el Tribunal una especial intencionalidad del querellado en el sentido de, como se diría popularmente, echarlos a todos en el mismo canasto, para perjudicar a [Nombre [Nombre3]] y a [Nombre [Nombre12]], sino que ello resulta naturalmente de las investigaciones penales y administrativas que han surgido, las cuales, como se indicaba supra, son reflejadas por la investigación que, a su vez, desplegó [Nombre16] en el ejercicio de su profesión como periodista. Otro recurso de las ciencias de la comunicación que los querellantes consideraron delictiva, fue el uso de los cintillos que aparecieron asociados en algunos momentos a las imágenes de los señores [Nombre [Nombre3]] y [Nombre [Nombre12]]. A este respecto, se tuvo por demostrado que en algún momento del reportaje en que se proyectó la imagen del licenciado [Nombre [Nombre12]], se desplegó un cintillo que rezaba lo que de seguido se transcribe literalmente: “PROTOCOLIZÓ ACTA CUESTIONADA”, mientras que lo mismo sucedió en el caso del licenciado [Nombre [Nombre3]] a cuya imagen se asoció el cintillo “VENDIÓ CON PODER CUESTIONADO”. En relación con este tema, es útil hacer un análisis literal de lo que se le atribuye por parte de [Nombre2] a los señores querellantes, es decir que uno protocolizó un acta cuestionada, y que el otro vendió con un poder cuestionado; vista la definición que la última edición del Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española da del verbo cuestionar, se tiene que ello consiste, según la primera acepción, en controvertir un punto dudoso “…proponiendo las razones, pruebas y fundamentos de una y otra parte…” que no es sino lo que hizo el querellado en la especie según lo que a su entender se presentaba de acuerdo con la investigación que en ese momento había realizado; sobre el punto, no huelga agregar, además – en relación con lo que los querellantes sostuvieron en la discusión final del debate – , que tal cuestionamiento no existía por cuanto no tenían los querellantes la calidad de imputados en ningún proceso penal, cosa que, tal y como se indicara supra, no es óbice, a juicio del Tribunal, para que un periodista pueda ejercer su derecho a informar al respecto. (Cfr. Folios 921 a 923 ). Concluye el Tribunal sentenciador, con adecuados fundamentos que en todo caso las acciones atribuidas al querellado no son típicas `pues el reportaje no se difundió con un animus injuriandi y además existía un interés público y no había ninguna intención en perjudicar a los querellados. Y en esto llevan razón los juzgadores, pues no se constató la existencia de un dolo por parte del querellado en cuanto a pretender afectar el honor de los querellantes. Conforme lo expuesto, se puede apreciar, que el Tribunal sentenciador, sí efectuó un análisis detallado y profundo de todo el elenco probatorio llegando a la convicción de que el contenido y la forma en que se divulgó el reportaje periodístico por parte del querellado, se realizó como parte del ejercicio de derecho de la libertad de expresión, reportaje que sí revestía el carácter de interés público por estar de por medio el traspaso de propiedades en condiciones irregulares donde incluso a la fecha, la finca que dio origen a la investigación mantiene una anotación en el Registro Nacional, en virtud del proceso penal cuya investigación se mantiene, lo cual además de ese interés público resulta actual y relevante y que por consiguiente, en la especie no medió un ejercicio abusivo y desproporcionado de ese derecho constitucionalmente tutelado. Véase que el proceso giró en torno a si el querellado [Nombre16] cometió o no los delitos contra el honor que le fueron achacados en perjuicio de los querellantes, y no sobre si el poder otorgado al señor [Nombre [Nombre3]], en los Estados Unidos cumplía con los requisitos legales y si debía o no cumplirse con el trámite consular para que el mismo surtiera efectos en nuestro país. En este aspecto, la parte recurrente, se desvía en su recurso del tema probandum, dándole especial énfasis a esta situación, que como se dijo, no era el objeto de análisis en el fallo, pero sí el reportaje periodístico en donde el querellado no se limitó simplemente a informar sobre la supuesta irregularidad en el traspaso de las tierras, sino que buscó las fuentes directas que le podían brindar la información pertinente, y de allí que incluso entrevistara a los querellantes, por su evidente participación en los procesos de legalización de los traspasos, pero en ningún momento, ni directa, ni implícitamente, les atribuyó algún hecho delictivo. Además sus observaciones sobre la necesidad de legalizar consularmente la CED1 dada al querellante [[Nombre9] ], no fue antojadiza, sino producto de la propia investigación y de la indagación del querellado en profesionales en derecho que le indicaron la necesidad de la misma. Debe entonces reiterarse que si bien es cierto la parte recurrente insiste, a lo largo de su recurso que el procedimiento consular no era necesario, este aspecto no era lo que se estaba dilucidando en el debate, pero si fue suficiente como para que el querellado junto con otras dudas surgidas a raíz de la investigación periodística, recalcara este hecho como dubitativo en torno al procedimiento legal en el otorgamiento del poder, pero esto fue solo una de las interrogantes, pues también se cuestionó en el reportaje quienes eran los accionistas de Playa Florida S.A a fin de determinar si estaban en condiciones o no de otorgar ese poder. Como puede verse, la investigación periodística giró en torno a los traspasos fraudulentos de propiedades de Playa Florida S.A, y como parte de una indagación responsable, el querellado entrevistó a aquellos como en el caso de los querellantes, que habían tenido alguna participación en los procesos de legalización, indicando el Tribunal sentenciador, que no era necesario para efectos del reportaje tuvieran la calidad de imputados en el proceso penal que aún se encuentra abierto dentro del expediente 07-8885-042-pe, pues en el mejor de los casos, los querellantes sí realizaron negocios jurídicos que el tribunal denomina actuaciones notariales y en donde conforme a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera (entre otras resolución 2013-191 de las 11:10 horas del 15 de febrero de 2013), así como el artículo primero del Código Notarial, los notarios públicos sí ostentan la condición de funcionarios públicos, y más bien resulta evidente y necesario que el querellado haya acudido ante los querellantes e indagarlos sobre su participación en esos negocios jurídicos, sin que ello signifique, pues nunca ocurrió así, que les haya atribuido algún hecho delictivo, dejando por establecido los juzgadores que [Nombre16] , en el ejercicio de su derecho de libertad de expresión, nunca tuvo la intención de lesionar el honor de los querellantes, elemento subjetivo de los tipos penales a él atribuidos y, que quedó descartado en la sentencia recurrida. Por otra parte, se concluyó en el fallo que, incluso los cintillos que aparecían en el reportaje periodístico en donde se hace referencia a “un acta cuestionada” y “vendió con un poder cuestionado” llevaban como finalidad hacer hincapié a aspectos dudosos con respecto a la protocolización y venta de la finca que era objeto estrictamente de la investigación, más no la atribución a los querellantes de algún hecho delictivo. El tribunal sentenciador, también analizó con detalle lo relativo a la entrevista que se hiciera en la oficina del querellante [Nombre [Nombre12]], en donde habían versiones contrapuestas en torno a si dicha entrevista se dio en un ambiente de gritos como lo indicó el querellante o si fue armónica y respetuosa, como lo afirmó el querellado y sus testigos de descargo. Sobre este aspecto se analizó por parte de los juzgadores los testimonios de [Nombre23] , [Nombre24] , [Nombre25] y [Nombre26] , indicándose en el fallo: “…Hazel [Nombre27] , por su parte, dijo en juicio que también estaba en la oficina de [Nombre28] cuando llegó [Nombre16] a entrevistarlo. La testigo depuso que oyó gritos del querellado y que le decía a [[Nombre8] ] que admitiera que había levantado muertos (sic); agregó que, al salir, [Nombre15] empezó a gritar que el querellante le estaba robando unos documentos. [Nombre25] y [Nombre26] narraron que acompañaron al querellado en el momento en que entrevistaba al querellante [[Nombre8] ], pues eran en ese momento camarógrafo y asistente de [Nombre16] ; ambos coincidieron en el sentido de que fue una entrevista normal, con respeto. [Nombre29] dijo que no oyó que [Nombre15] gritara y que cuando salieron y el querellado le decía a [Nombre30] que le devolviera unos documentos, pero da a entender [Nombre29] que sin gritar, aun y cuando [Nombre16] habla en tono como [Nombre31], pero no es que grita, tema concreto al cual se refirió [Nombre32] en los mismos términos. Como puede verse se trata de una situación en la que hay dos versiones totalmente contrapuestas, y en la que el Tribunal no tiene elementos de convicción que permitan desacreditar una versión o la otra, quedando patente únicamente que la única prueba objetiva al respecto, que sería la filmación, no muestra absolutamente a nadie más en el aposento donde se dio la entrevista, por lo que tampoco hay prueba sólida respecto de que alguien pudiera haber oído lo conversado entre querellado y querellante, aparte de que los testigos de descargo afirman que todo transcurrió de la forma más normal, incluso al salir, único momento en que se observa a otra persona, con camisa negra de rayas, pero se trata de una toma ya fuera de la casa, por lo que tampoco podría saberse si esa persona oyó algo de los presuntos irrespetos y ofensas que [Nombre15] habría proferido, pero lo cierto es que no es posible llegar al grado de convicción que se requiere para una sentencia represiva, por lo que lo que corresponde es la aplicación del párrafo primero in fine del artículo 9 del Código Procesal Penal, absolviendo al querellado por la injuria y la difamación que le fueran atribuidas por [[Nombre8] ] como cometidas en esa ocasión…” (Cfr. Folios 930 a 932 ). De lo anterior se desprende, que no es cierto que se le haya dado un excesivo y preponderante valor a lo declarado sobre este punto a la declaración brindada por [Nombre16] , pues contrario a lo indicado, se analizaron las declaraciones testimoniales de ambas partes, así como extractos del video relacionado con estos hechos, sin que se pudiera llegar a la convicción de que las conductas atribuidas al querellado se hayan producido a falta de suficientes elementos probatorios que así lo acreditaran, absolviéndose al encartado por estos hechos. En cuanto a la falta de objetividad e imparcialidad de una de las juzgadoras quién según señala el recurrente, indicó que tenía otros casos más importantes que resolver, quién impugna no acredita, que el juicio en ese caso no se le haya prestado la debida atención. En todo caso, el mismo se extendió por varias audiencias, la totalidad de la prueba fue debidamente recabada y todas las partes tuvieron oportunidad de referirse a todos los aspectos que les fueron de su interés, sin que se aprecie que la objetividad de una de las juzgadoras haya quedado comprometida en el presente caso. Con respecto al reclamo relativo a la declaratoria sin lugar de la acción civil resarcitoria, así como la no aplicación de la ley número 7472 que hace referencia a la promoción de la competencia y a la defensa efectiva del consumidor, el Tribunal, sí analizó estos extremos, así como el daño moral y psicológico reclamado, indicando y basado en jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que la amenaza a una sanción civil, también puede provocar un efecto inhibitorio en el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión. En todo caso, lo relevante es que el Tribunal descartó la existencia de un nexo causal entre los hechos acusados, por los cuales el querellado fue absuelto y los reclamos civiles del actor [Nombre [Nombre3]]. Si bien es cierto se recibió prueba testimonial y pericial en torno a que el actor civil [Nombre [Nombre3]] se vio afectado en su ánimo y tuvo sentimientos de tristeza, vergüenza y culpa, no es suficiente la acreditación de un daño, sino que además se requiere la demostración de la relación directa de causa-efecto entre el hecho que se imputa y el daño producido, que legitime el pago de una indemnización como la reclamada, lo cual no se produjo en el presente caso pues como lo indica el Tribunal sentenciador, no se acreditó un hecho punible por parte del querellado que hubiera causado afectación al honor de los querellantes, lo cual a su vez conlleva el rechazo a la condena civil a la codemandada Televisora de Costa Rica S.A, como bien lo expusieron los juzgadores en su fallo. En consecuencia, contrario a lo indicado en el recurso, el Tribunal efectuó una amplia y detallada exposición analítica para establecer que el querellado, no efectuó un ejercicio abusivo y desproporcionado de su derecho fundamental de libertad de expresión, que el reportaje periodístico si revestía el interés público que legitimaba a efectuar esa investigación limitándose el contenido y la forma del reportaje a evidenciar hechos relevantes y no se realizaron imputaciones que afectaran el honor de los querellantes, quienes sí lo consideraron de esa manera a partir de apreciaciones subjetivas y que motivó la presentación de éste proceso. Es por lo expuesto que, concluye ésta Cámara, el análisis integral del fallo de mérito, se ajusta a los preceptos establecidos en los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, así como en lo estipulado en los artículos 1, 142, 184 y 363 del Código Procesal Penal, cumpliendo con una adecuada fundamentación, por lo que al no apreciarse los vicios alegados, el recurso se debe declarar sin lugar.”