Simple customs fraud is not a serious crime for money laundering purposesLa defraudación aduanera simple no es delito grave a efectos de legitimación de capitales

III.- For the reasons to be stated, the first and fifth grounds of the filed cassation appeal are dismissed: Due to the close relationship of the issues discussed, the first and fifth grounds of the appeal are addressed jointly. The facts of interest in this case, attributed to Howden Pascall, occurred between the years 2000 and 2007. The preceding illicit conduct corresponds to a criminal conviction handed down by United States courts against the brother of the accused here. These latter underlying or “preceding” facts allegedly occurred between 1999 and 2004, in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of the United States. As the Trial Appeals Court correctly reasons, an essential circumstance to consider is that before January 10, 2002, in our country, only those who laundered (legitimara) capital from drug trafficking activities were criminally sanctioned, so any action aimed at hiding the origin, transferring, or converting assets (valores) from crimes of any other nature was atypical. In this regard, Law number 7786 of April 30, 1998, called “Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas,” regulated in Article 72: “…Shall be sanctioned with a prison sentence of eight to twenty years whoever: a) Converts, transfers, or transports assets of economic interest that proceed, directly or indirectly, from the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, or related crimes, with the purpose of hiding or concealing their illicit origin, or of helping, through such conversion, transport, or transfer, any person who has participated in the commission of one of those crimes to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Hides or conceals the nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or true ownership of resources, assets (bienes), or rights related thereto, with knowledge that they proceed directly or indirectly from the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, or related crimes. The penalty shall be ten to twenty years when the above acts are committed by employees, officials, directors, owners, or other authorized representatives of financial institutions…” (the underlining is supplied). It is from the comprehensive reform of the Ley de Psicotrópicos, number 8204, of December 26, 2001 (effective as of its publication on January 11, 2002), that the wording of the criminal offense (tipo penal) varied substantially, to include the laundering of capital (legitimación de capitales) “that comes, directly or indirectly, from a serious crime (delito grave),” thereby eliminating the previous restriction according to which it was only possible to launder capital derived from the illicit trafficking of drugs. Thus, as of January 2002, the wording of the pertinent criminal offense is as follows: “…Shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of eight to twenty years: a) Whoever acquires, converts, or transmits assets of economic interest, knowing that these originate from a serious crime, or carries out any other act to hide or conceal the illicit origin, or to help the person who has participated in the infractions to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Whoever hides or conceals the true nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or rights over assets or the property thereof, knowing that they proceed, directly or indirectly, from a serious crime. The penalty shall be ten to twenty years of imprisonment when the assets of economic interest originate from any of the crimes related to the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, money laundering (legitimación de capitales), diversion of precursors or essential chemical substances, and related crimes…” (law number 8204, of December 26, 2001, effective as of January 11, 2002. The highlighting is supplied).

Having defined the normative framework under which the conduct attributed to Howden Pascall must be judged, it is necessary to analyze the prior criminal act required by the criminal offense of money laundering. This analysis is of crucial importance, as will be discussed later, because it must be determined whether the money received in the country by the accused originates from a “serious crime.” Following the line of argument of the appeals ruling, several situations must be elucidated for this purpose. On one hand, it must be clear whether, to establish the predicate offense (delito precedente), one can refer to the charges that the U.S. Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía estadounidense) accused Rodney Morrison, brother of Howden Pascall, of, or whether, on the contrary, it is necessary to abide by the criminal conduct for which he was found responsible abroad. Because this matter differs from the bulk of money laundering cases, in that there is a prior trial of Morrison in the United States, no other conclusion can be reached than respect for and adherence to the verification of facts carried out within the criminal proceedings developed in the foreign jurisdiction. It could not be otherwise, because the contrary would imply a violation of the principle of non bis in idem, since Morrison was tried in another country for the same facts that are of interest here to establish the preceding criminal act, and the evidence concerning that criminal process in the United States is precisely the evidentiary support used by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) to prove that aspect. From the documentary evidence provided, duly processed through the international criminal assistance procedure, it is established that Morrison was accused of the crimes of robbery, homicide, kidnapping, weapons possession, arson, and tax evasion, without the national accusatory document clarifying which offenses he was convicted of, since at that time there was only a final conviction (condena firme) for the crime of possession of illegal weapons. However, from the documentary evidence duly incorporated into the proceedings, and particularly that extracted from the judicial assistance with the United States, it is possible to conclude that at the time the trial for money laundering was conducted in this case, Morrison's judicial situation was as follows: A) He had a materially final conviction for the crime of possession of a prohibited weapon (see folio 1192 verso of the judgment of the ad quem court, which refers to proven fact number 7), and B) The conviction for the crime of cigarette tax evasion, handed down by a jury in May 2008, was reinstated against him. This latter conviction, at the time of the hearing, was final regarding the charges, but a new hearing for sentencing (imposición de la pena) still had to be held. (folios 1192 verso -1193 recto). C) “…final acquittal of Morrison for the crimes of extortion, homicide, arson, etc…” (folio 1193 recto). With respect to these latter offenses, it is necessary to clarify that, although the crimes of extortion and others are mentioned as factual background in the judgment, mainly by reference from the witness Dianne Leonardo (folio 1195 recto and verso), these charges cannot be used in our country to establish the preceding acts of money laundering, because the accused has a final acquittal by the jury for those charges, which was upheld, and the Public Prosecutor's Office has not alleged any error by the U.S. justice system in issuing that acquittal. Rather, the judgments handed down in the criminal case against Morrison in the United States are provided as evidence of the predicate offense, and for that reason we must adhere to them in that respect. Although the U.S. system allows the judge to consider certain conduct for which the jury acquitted when setting the penalty, such a situation is prohibited in our legal system, by reason of what is established in the first paragraph of Article 39 of our Political Constitution: “…No one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime (delito), quasi-crime (cuasidelito), or misdemeanor (falta), sanctioned by prior law and by virtue of a final judgment issued by a competent authority, after the accused has been given the opportunity to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of culpability…” (the underlining is supplied). The same guarantee is provided for in numeral 8.4 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Proceeding otherwise would therefore imply disregarding the principle of res judicata (cosa juzgada) (the ad quem refers, on this point, to folio 904 of proof dossier number 3, provided by the defense, whose official translation appears at folio 113). Of course, in accordance with the precedents of this Chamber (Sala), the existence of a judgment that identifies someone as responsible for the prior crime is not an unavoidable requirement for money laundering to be configured. On multiple occasions, it has been indicated that the criminal origin of the resources can be proven within the same process followed for money laundering, through circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria). But this matter differs from the bulk of cases, because a judicial process was followed and a judgment was issued, which the prosecuting entity itself provides as evidence of the preceding act, and, therefore, we must adhere to it regarding the specific acts for which Morrison was convicted in that country. By virtue of the foregoing, we must only start from the fact that Rodney Morrison was convicted of a crime of weapon possession and another of smuggling (contrabando), with the imposition of the penalty for this latter conduct pending at the time of the hearing. The conviction for the crime of weapon possession is not relevant, because for money laundering to be configured, the mere existence of a prior criminal act is not enough; it must be demonstrated that the money originates from that crime. Such a link does not exist between the questioned money and the charge of weapon possession.

Regarding the preceding act of smuggling, for which Rodney Morrison was convicted, and its legal classification for the purposes of determining the predicate offense (delito precedente): It remains to be explored, then, the conduct referred to as tax evasion (point B of the charges detailed above), in order to determine whether it is one of the crimes contemplated in numerals 211 to 216 of the Ley General de Aduanas (number 7559 of October 20, 1995, according to its wording before the entry into force of Law 8373 of August 18, 2003), or whether it is the offense provided for in numeral 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Law 4755 of May 3, 1971). For the purposes of delimiting the scope of the conviction, the Trial Appeals Court refers to the jury's pronouncement of 2008, which was reinstated by judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Second Circuit of the United States, of July 2010, as recorded in documents at folios 672 to 726, of volume II of the main case file, admitted as documentary evidence in the hearing (see point 42 of folio 883). Although this reference is correct, since the pronouncement of the U.S. Court is the starting point for elucidating the preceding criminal conduct, the appeals judgment mentions the norm that, in the legislation of the United States, sanctions the conduct accredited to Morrison (the equivalent of the criminal offense in our legal system), when in reality this data allows us to elucidate that the conduct in question is also a crime in the United States. But for the purposes of establishing whether the conduct is a crime and its classification in Costa Rica, we must adhere not to the nomen iuris, but to the specific conduct that the jury found proven. In this vein, we start from the fact that, indeed, the U.S. standard applicable to Morrison for the charge of interest here consists of “…the illegal possession – that is, without prior payment of taxes – of cigarettes, in the United States…”, which constitutes, in the United States, a crime punishable by up to twenty years in prison (appeals ruling, folio 1144 verso). But, for the purposes of interest here, the factual framework reinstated by the judgment issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals is the following: “…Morrison was managing partner of Peace Pipe Smoke Shop, which sold cigarettes on the Unkechauge Indian Nation`s Poospatuck Indian Reservation, in Mastic, New York. The income of Peace Pipe originates primarily from the sale of tax-free cigarettes. Morrison advertised his cigarette sales business throughout New York City. Morrison sold some of the tax-free cigarettes over the counter at Peace Pipe or through the Internet, and he also often made large wholesale transactions with individuals he called 'Big Customers'. These sales usually involved quantities of cigarettes exceeding 60,000. In total, the revenue from sales to Big Customers from the year 1999 to the year 2004 exceeded $138 million. Peace Pipe employees usually delivered cigarettes to Big Customers in large black plastic bags to conceal the items. The accounting ledgers in which Morrison recorded Peace Pipe's sales referred to his Big Customers only by pseudonyms. At least some of Morrison's Big Customers resold the cigarettes they bought from Peace Pipe at locations outside the reservation, and Morrison had knowledge of what they were doing…” (the “conduct of the crime,” official translation of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling, folio 706, volume II of the case file). This factual framework was reiterated by the foreign Court of Appeals judges, pointing out: “…Morrison's actions went far beyond this type of conduct that might be located in some area of ambiguity. He participated in a substantial wholesale business, with some 50,000 'Big Customers' that, jointly, bought more than $138 million in cigarettes from 1999 to 2004. He encouraged these sales by distributing flyers in New York City. Throughout this time, he knew that at least some of his 'Big Customers' were reselling the cigarettes outside the reservation…” (cfr. folio 722). From the statement of prosecutor Dianne Leonardo, which was weighed by the appeals judges, it is clear that at the time of the trial for the crime of money laundering, the new 'judgment' (in reality, it is the sentencing by the judge) for the charges reinstated against Morrison was pending. In the words of the witness, cited by the appeals judges: “…in July of this year the Court of Appeal annulled (sic) the verdict of Judge Hurley and the decision is obtained in the month of July 2012, the charges regarding smuggling were reinstated, he has not yet been given a new sentence, but he is going to receive this sentence for the acts of smuggling, this decision of the judge establishes Morrison as guilty of the crime of smuggling, this decision confirmed (sic) the jury's decision, there is not a new trial, what the jury established in May 2008 is simply reinstated, the sentencing has not yet been done…” (see transcript of the testimony of Dianne Leonardo, in appeals ruling, folio 1195 recto). Therefore, although the appeals ruling considers that there is no final conviction for the preceding act, we must disagree with this conclusion, because according to the judgment issued by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, just cited, and the statement of witness Leonardo, the determination of the existence of typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct was final at the time of the issuance of the judgment in this case, and only the sanction corresponding to that declaration of culpability remained to be determined.

Regarding the charges of illegal possession and sale of cigarettes, and their correct legal classification in the country, the ad quem reasons as follows: “…he is not charged (solely) with having sold cigarettes and not paying taxes on the sales, but with having obtained cigarette shipments without the seal (prior to those sales) showing that, in turn, the distributors had paid the prior taxes. This means that, for double criminality (doble incriminación), we are not talking about what in our system would be an evasion of sales tax, but about the taking possession of the object, without the payment, prior to the subsequent sale, of taxes. It is the equivalent, in our context, of import or customs duties. That conduct is provided for, in Costa Rica, in a special law that, therefore, prevails over that general regulation, even if they coincide with other tax transgressions regarding sales tax. It is the Ley General de Aduanas No. 7557 of October 20, 1995 (published in La Gaceta 212 of November 8, 1995, and in force on the date of the charged facts) which establishes: "ARTICLE 1.- Scope of application. This law regulates the entries and exits, from the national territory, of merchandise, vehicles, and transport units; also the customs clearance (despacho aduanero) and the facts and acts that derive from it or from the entries and exits, in accordance with the community and international standards, whose application is the responsibility of the Servicio Nacional de Aduanas" (the bold is supplied) adding numeral 223: "Relationship with crimes defined in other tax regulations. If the conducts defined in this law also constitute a crime or a contravention established in tax legislation, the special provisions of this law shall be applied provided that those conducts are related to the non-compliance with customs tax obligations or duties before the customs authority" (the highlighting is external). This regulation established customs crimes: initially, from its entry into force in 1995 until 2003, and then from that date, when a reform took place, until today. As the defendant here was attributed, improperly, with having received money from his brother, from the year 2002, which has already been said is atypical conduct as the capital arose from alleged crimes not related to drug trafficking, we must take into account, again, the legislative changes that occurred in customs legislation. Thus, in 2002 and until 2003, the original Ley General de Aduanas was applicable, and from this date until 2007 (when the cycle of the charged acts closes), the regulations currently in force would govern…” (appeals ruling, folios 1199 verso to 1200). At this point, a clarification is necessary, which is that due to the different tax collection systems in Costa Rica and the United States, plus the fact that the latter contains state and federal legislation regarding the issue of taxes, there are no absolute parallels when comparing the U.S. tax collection system and ours. This is a specificity of the case under examination, which makes the determination of whether we are facing one of the crimes provided for in the Ley General de Aduanas, or in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, even more complex. In the Costa Rican tax collection system, there is a clear difference between the taxes charged to “nationalize” the merchandise, that is, customs duties or import tariffs, and the tax obligations that may arise after said collection, when the goods are already legally possessed in the country. The former are regulated in the Ley General de Aduanas, and the latter, in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. In the U.S. system, for the purposes of interest, the legal possession of cigarettes exceeding 360,000 units (at the time of the commission of the preceding act), implied the prior payment of a fee that is considered, from then on, as sales tax, and which the seller later recovers by charging it to the final customer. Such payment is accredited by placing a stamp on each pack of cigarettes. Therefore, the crime attributed in this case to Morrison turns out to be a hybrid between our customs tariffs (established to legalize the possession of certain goods in the country) and sales tax. We are thus facing an apparent concurrence of offenses (concurso aparente de normas), but the dilemma of which rule to apply is resolved by our substantive law, in numeral 23 of the Penal Code. Said norm indicates: “…When the same conduct is described in several legal provisions that exclude each other, only one of them shall be applied, as follows: the special rule prevails over the general one, the one that completely contains another is preferred over the latter, and that which the law has not expressly or tacitly subordinated to another is applied instead of the accessory one…” Customs Law is a sub-specialty of Tax Law, therefore the rule of specialty, provided for defining apparent conflicts of regulations, is fulfilled. Additionally, the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios itself expressly subordinates its application to what is not contemplated by the Ley General de Aduanas. In this sense, the first article of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios provides: “…The provisions of this Code are applicable to all tributes (tributos) and the legal relationships derived from them, except as regulated by special legislation (…) the provisions of this Code are of supplementary application, in the absence of an express rule…” (wording according to Law number 7900 of August 3, 1999). As anticipated, customs legislation is a specialized branch of Tax Law, which deals with the regularization of merchandise in the country (its entry, stay, and exit). Without compliance with these “entry” rules into the national market, the goods could not be subject to trade legally. This is an important distinction, which allows establishing that the act prior to the laundering, according to our legal system, is a customs crime and not a tax crime in general. Uruguayan legislation, as in the case of Costa Rica, is characterized by containing general and customs tax rules of equal rank, which seem to overlap insofar as they prohibit tax evasion conduct, but faced with such a situation, just as occurs in our country, the principle of specialty is given primacy: “…the crime of smuggling (contrabando) itself contains fraud (defraudación) in its objective criminal offense (…). Our repressive customs regime includes both conducts, being bipartite: smuggling and fraud. The superimposition of both reproaches implies a hypothesis of bis in idem. By the principle of specificity —in any case— it would be appropriate to determine whether the crime of smuggling has been committed, but not tax fraud, which is already encompassed by smuggling. They are criminal offenses that mutually exclude each other and not a concurrence between various criminal classifications that apply to the same conduct. One must decide which is the alternative without adding some to others (smuggling or tax fraud), since —as GONZÁLEZ teaches— Customs Law is a set of legal norms that has individuality within Fiscal Law. That individuality is distinguished by its foundations and methods, in addition to other substantive and procedural assumptions that also differentiate it…” (ALLEN, Germán: “La superposición de los tipos penales de contrabando y defraudación tributaria en la ley uruguaya”, Published in Tribuna del Abogado, no. 180, Colegio de Abogados del Uruguay, Montevideo, October/December 2012, pp. 15-17).

Returning to the case under examination, it was determined that Rodney Morrison put up for sale cigarettes that were not suitable for commerce, because the tax established to legitimize their sale in the state of New York had not been previously paid. They were therefore goods outside of commerce, because the requirement set for the mere possession of said good by individuals in the State of New York to be legitimate was not met. Having defined the national legislation applicable to the conduct for which Morrison was found responsible, it is necessary to delve into the penalty applicable to the specific customs crime for which the facts qualify, depending on the moment of the commission of the facts. The Ley General de Aduanas, number 7557 of October 20, 1995, in its version in force until March 4, 2004, provided in numeral 214 the basic crime of customs tax fraud (defraudación fiscal aduanera): "…Article 214.- Basic crime. Shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the tributes not received, with their interests and surcharges, whoever, through simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deceit, eludes or evades totally or partially the payment of the customs tax obligation, provided that the customs value of the merchandise exceeds five thousand Central American pesos…”. The specific cases were provided for in numeral 215 eiusdem: “…Specific cases of customs tax fraud. Shall incur the penalties indicated in the previous article, provided that the customs value of the merchandise exceeds five thousand Central American pesos: a) Whoever, without authorization from the competent body, gives a purpose different from that provided in the authorizing rule to merchandise benefited with exemption or franchise or that has entered free of tributes. b) Whoever, using or declaring false information, requests or obtains preferential customs treatment. c) Whoever, using or declaring false information, justifies the fulfillment of their duties, obligations, or requirements in their condition as beneficiary or user of a customs regime or modality, to request or obtain preferential customs treatment. d) Whoever simulates, totally or partially, an export or import operation of merchandise or alters the description of some, with the purpose of illicitly obtaining a customs incentive or an economic benefit. e) The official, public employee, or notary public (funcionario de la fe pública) who falsely certifies or records that a tribute was totally or partially satisfied…” Finally, the aggravating factors were regulated in numeral 216 of the same Law: “… Aggravating factors. The penalty shall be three to five years and the fine equivalent to three times the amount of the tributes not received, with their interests and surcharges, when, in any of the two previous articles, any of the following circumstances occurs: a) Three or more persons intervene in the act, as perpetrators (autores). b) A public official, in the exercise of their functions, on the occasion of them, or with abuse of their office, intervenes as perpetrator, instigator, or accomplice…" (the highlighting is supplied). The appeals judges correctly point out that it is the simple modality of commission of the criminal offenses provided for in the Ley General de Aduanas that is applicable to the conduct attributed in the United States to Rodney Morrison. The “facts of the crime” are attributed to Morrison individually, and not as a co-perpetrator (coautoría). While it is true that on March 5, 2004, Law number 8373 of August 18, 2003 came into force, which modified the criminal offenses of interest, establishing, for the crime of simple customs fraud, higher penalties, which in some specific cases exceed four years of imprisonment, that regulation is not applicable to the facts that gave rise to Morrison's conviction, from which we must start.

Thus, even if we start from the material finality of the ruling issued by the United States Court of Appeals, the factual framework for which Rodney Morrison was tried is temporally located “from the year 1999 to the year 2004” (cf. f. 706). Furthermore, the charging instrument to which we must adhere for all purposes in this case, based on the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment, is the national accusation, on the basis of which the trial was conducted. The latter locates the predicate offense “…between the year 1996 and 2004…” (see f. 835), and in accordance with this delimitation, it is established in the proven factual framework that the execution of the prior criminal acts occurred “…Between the years 1996 and 2004…” (f. 846), without specification of dates. We must start from this temporal framework, then, to carry out the dual criminality analysis. In situations like this, where months or approximate parts of the year are not defined, and there are legislative reforms in the period of interest that force us to take a position on the applicable regulations, this Chamber has maintained a consistent position according to which, the interpretation most beneficial to the accused must be followed. Starting from the ranges of sanctions, the most beneficial legislation proves to be, without a doubt, Law number 7557 of October 20, 1995, and not Law number 8373 of August 18, 2003 (in force as of March 5, 2004). From everything stated so far, it follows that the predicate offense in this case corresponds to the crime of customs tax fraud, in its simple form, and for greater precision, it is the criminal offense set forth in Article 215 subsection a) (in relation to numeral 214) of the General Customs Law, in its wording according to Law 7557 of October 20, 1995. We are faced in this case, precisely, with the improper taking advantage of a tax exemption established to regularize the possession of cigarettes, according to the legislation in force in the State of New York. However respectable the legal criterion may be, based on which the Trial Court considered that the predicate acts were punishable under our legal system through numeral 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, that is not the interpretation endorsed by this Chamber. By virtue of the foregoing, the first and fifth grounds of the challenge filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are declared without merit.

III.- Second ground of the cassation appeal filed by Licenciada Sarkis Fernández: Erroneous application of substantive law: Erroneous application of numerals 14 and 30 of the Civil Code, which entails an erroneous application of Article 1 of the Psychotropic Substances Law, number 7786 of April 30, 1998. Licenciada Sarkis Fernández points out that the ad quem orders the need to prove the existence of the foreign laws based on which Rodney Morrison was convicted in order to accredit the predicate offense, in accordance with what is stipulated in Article 30 of the Civil Code. By doing so, it disregards the principle of freedom of evidence that governs in criminal matters. The appellant indicates that “…to demonstrate the existence of foreign legislation, as in this particular case, one should not resort to Article 30 of the Civil Code (…) but rather, first, to the general rules provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure itself for bringing evidence from abroad and, secondly, and no less important, to the Treaties of mutual legal assistance between Nations such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention)…” (f. 1277). She states that it was by using international criminal assistance that documentary evidence was incorporated into this process that “…corroborates the existence of the criminal legislation and the process carried out against Rodney Morrison in the United States, as well as the charges for which he was accused and for which he was sentenced…” (ibid). She adds that another of the requirements found lacking by the Appeals Court of Judgment, with a view to the principle of dual criminality, is the accreditation of the minimum limit of the penalty corresponding to the crime in the Anglo-Saxon system. Regarding this aspect, the appellant states that from a reading of 18 USC 1963 RICO, which is the charge for which Morrison was convicted, “…it is denoted that United States law does not refer to a minimum limit for this type of crime, but rather only delimits the maximum limit of 20 years of imprisonment, for which reason the Appeals Court (…) seeks an impossibility, since the Anglo-Saxon criminal offense does not have a minimum limit for this crime, we reach the absurdity of demanding that the Trial Court would have established it as if a Costa Rican court of justice had the legislative power that corresponds to another State…” (f. 1280). The prosecutor proposes that to establish when a crime should be considered “serious”, one should resort to a teleological interpretation “…that integrates what is the meaning of national and international legislation against money laundering and the fight against organized crime, as well as the abstract penalty that can be imposed on the person who commits the predicate offense and, finally (…) the social harmfulness of the conduct…”. The ground is partially upheld, despite which, the conclusions of the a quo regarding the atypicality of the crime do not vary: The Public Prosecutor's Office must be granted reason, in that the principle of freedom of evidence allows proving the existence and content of international regulations through any legitimate means and in this case, the legal assistance processed by the prosecuting entity with the United States must be considered as a legal evidentiary source duly incorporated into the process. From said judicial assistance comes the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of that nation which, in fact, this Chamber has recognized in the preceding recital as constituting valid evidence in order to delimit the conduct for which Rodney Morrison was found guilty. However, this concession to the Prosecutor's Office's argument does not have the effect that the party assigns to it, since even starting from said evidentiary incorporation, as will be seen, we must conclude that in this instance a “serious crime” was not configured, because alongside the principle of freedom of evidence, the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment must also be respected. Starting from the wording of the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), in force at the time of the acts that interest us here, the funds that are converted, transferred, or concealed must come from a “serious crime” (Ley number 8204, published in La Gaceta number 8, of January 11, 2002). Hence the importance of establishing which rule, at the time of the acts, defined the concept of serious crime, and the implications that this has regarding respect for the principle of dual criminality, which must be respected when the predicate offense is committed abroad, as occurs in this case. As already stated, Article 1 of Law 8204 of January 11, 2002, defined a serious crime as “the conduct that constitutes a crime punishable by deprivation of liberty of four years, as a minimum…”. The subsequent reform to the Psychotropic Substances Law that eliminates the reference to “serious crime” does not come into force until March 16, 2009, so it is not applicable to these acts, by virtue of the rules that govern the application of criminal law over time. However, through Law number 8302, of September 12, 2002 – in force as of June 27, 2003 – the “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, better known as the “Palermo Convention”, was incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system. Said instrument provides in Article 2, subsection b): “…’Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or by a more serious penalty…”. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution, the Palermo Convention was incorporated into the block of legality as of June 27, 2003, and thus, being a later law, it partially repeals the definition of serious crime contained in numeral 1 of Law 8204 of December 26, 2001, at least for the cases to which said international regulation applies, according to the definitions contained in the same instrument. Despite the fact that the proven acts against Rodney Morrison cannot be deemed organized crime, because he was convicted individually in the United States, the referred instrument extends its scope of application to money laundering activities, as extracted from the relationship of what is indicated in Article 3: a) and Article 6 ejúsdem. Because the temporal location of the predicate offense, for the purposes that interest us here, ranges from the year 1999 to 2004 (without defined dates, according to the charging instrument and the proven facts), and the Palermo Convention is incorporated into the national block of legality as of June 2003, the indication made in the Appeals Court of Judgment ruling is not understandable, in that said instrument constitutes a later law “to the accusation” that is not more favorable to the interests of the accused and therefore is inapplicable due to the principle of non-retroactivity established in numerals 11 and 12 of the Penal Code, as well as Article 34 of the Constitution (see f. 1190 vto.). Rather, the entry into force of said Convention is clear, within the temporal range during which the predicate offense is considered perpetrated, since said instrument entered into force on June 27, 2003, and as we stated, the final temporal range from which we must start for the predicate acts is from 1999 to 2004. However, as indicated in the preceding recital, the applicable criminal offense for the predicate act corresponds to a specific form of tax fraud, contemplated in subsection a) of Article 215 of the Penal Code, in relation to Article 214, according to its wording in force in Law 7557 of October 20, 1995. The relevant rules are the following: “…Article 214.- Basic offense. Whoever, through simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deceit, evades or avoids totally or partially the payment of the customs tax obligation shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the taxes not collected, with their interests and surcharges, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos. Article 215: “…Specific cases of customs tax fraud. Shall incur the penalties indicated in the preceding article, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos: a) Whoever, without authorization from the competent body, gives a purpose other than that provided in the authorizing norm to goods benefited with exemption or franchise or that have entered free of taxes…” (the underlining is supplied). From which it follows that, even though as of January 27, 2003 (still within the temporal range of the predicate offense), any offense punishable by imprisonment – at its minimum or maximum limit – is considered a serious crime, said condition is not met in the present case, since the maximum penalty established for the predicate offense at the time of the acts corresponds to three years of imprisonment. The position of the Public Prosecutor's Office cannot be accepted, to the effect that it is feasible to depart from the definition of serious crime contained in our regulations, which, as already indicated, uses as a differentiator that the act be punishable by four years of imprisonment or more. The suggestion to resort to criteria such as the affected legal interest, or the social harm caused, may be subject to parliamentary discussion, for the purpose of generating reforms, but under no circumstance can the judicial operator arrogate exclusive powers of the legislator. Finally, the issue of dual criminality remains to be addressed, which is an obligatory reference when the predicate offense is committed abroad. In observance of said principle, it must be verified that the acts that serve as the basis for the predicate offense are provided for as criminal activity, both in the country where it was committed and in the country where the money laundering is being tried. Beyond said verification, this Chamber considers it excessive to demand that the conduct be considered a “serious” crime both in national legislation and abroad, since this would imply extending the parameters of one's own legal system to other jurisdictional systems that may contain parameters for measuring penalties very different from our own. Consider, for example, systems that do not have minimum penalties, but only regulate the maximum amount to be imposed, or those that classify the seriousness of crimes based on the affected legal interest. Regarding this aspect, the existence of debate in doctrine must be conceded, but we choose to consider that the principle of dual criminality is satisfied by verifying that the conduct that constitutes the predicate offense is a crime both in Costa Rica and abroad. For the classification of “serious”, one must adhere to national regulations, it being excessive for the crime to be serious both under the parameters of the Costa Rican legal system and in foreign legislation, since this forces the standardization of two penalty measurement systems that may have no points of coincidence. Spanish legislation is very similar to Costa Rican legislation, with respect to the objective requirements of the crime of money laundering, as well as in the evolution of the type. When analyzing in said legislation the requirements of the predicate offense and specifically, the requirement that the laundered funds come from a “serious crime”, it has been said: “…it would be (…) more logical to interpret that for the crime of money laundering typified in the Spanish Penal Code to exist, it is necessary that the underlying crime is also criminally punishable in the place where it was committed; this is the so-called principle of ‘dual criminality’ (doble incriminación), by virtue of which the prior crime must be punishable both in the place of execution and in Spain. One of the most interesting questions that arises in relation to this issue is the one concerning the legal classification of the underlying crime committed abroad, that is, whether it must be done based on the criminal regulations of the country where the crime was committed or the country where the money laundering was carried out. And the question becomes more difficult to resolve if the regulations of the country where the money laundering is committed require, as Article 301 of the CP did until LO 15/2003, that the crime from which the assets originate be a serious crime, because then the question would arise, in the event the crime is committed abroad, where it should be considered serious, whether in the national territory where the money laundering is carried out and tried or in the place where the crime was committed, that is, the determination of the regulations based on which the legal classification of the prior crime committed abroad must be made, whether the classification of the crime – serious then – should be made in accordance with the law of the place of commission or in accordance with Spanish criminal law. If the first solution is chosen, a material extension of national criminal law would occur, a possibility that the majority of doctrine rejects, mostly considering that the classification of the prior act must be made in accordance with the national legislation where the crime of money laundering was committed...” (García López, S. (2006). “Blanqueo de capitales. Evolución del delito subyacente”. Retrieved from http://www.ief.es/ documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/cuadernos_formacion/05_2008/Colab_05_08.pdf. The underlining is not from the original). According to the preceding assessments, which this Chamber endorses, it is excessive to demand that the foreign nation where the predicate offense was committed contain legislation similar to Costa Rican legislation regarding what is understood as a serious crime. What is required, as already indicated, is to demonstrate a concrete connection between the funds subject to money laundering and the predicate offense, and of course, that the conduct in question is provided for and punishable as a crime in both legislations. On the other hand, the Prosecutor's Office's claim of departing from the criterion established by the Costa Rican legislator to define what should be considered as a “serious crime” cannot be accepted. If Law 8204 of January 11, 2002, applicable to the acts examined here due to their time of commission, clearly defines a serious crime as one that provides as a penalty a term of imprisonment of four years “as a minimum”, it is this definition that must prevail for acts committed between January 11, 2002, and June 26, 2003. As of June 27, 2003, with the entry into force of Law number 8302 of September 12, 2002, the definition of “serious crime” from the Palermo Convention enters into effect, according to which it is sufficient that the crime contains within its range of imprisonment penalty four years, regardless of whether it is the minimum or maximum limit. What happens in the case under review is that neither with the first definition nor with the second do the acts achieve the characterization of “serious”, since as already indicated, the applicable criminal offense according to the time of commission of the predicate offense is the General Customs Law of 1995, which provided for the conduct imprisonment penalties ranging from one to three years. For all the foregoing, although reason must be given to the prosecuting representative regarding the principle of freedom of evidence and the possibility of extracting data from documents obtained through international criminal assistance, as well as regarding that the scope of the principle of dual criminality should not lead to the extreme of demanding that the conduct of the predicate offense must also be considered serious in foreign legislation, under our own standards, such clarifications do not have the consequence of changing the final result reached by the appellate judges. The predicate offense in this matter continues to not reach the classification of “serious” and therefore, an essential objective element is lacking for the configuration of money laundering, according to its wording in force from January 11, 2002, to March 15, 2009. In summary, this ground is partially upheld, despite which, the conclusions of the a quo regarding the atypicality of the crime being tried here do not vary.

IV.- Third ground of the challenge, for the existence of contradictory precedents of the Third Chamber, in relation to what was decided by the Appeals Court of San José: The Prosecutor's Office argues that the acquittal judgment being appealed, number 337 of 3:25 p.m., of February 19, 2012, is contradictory with the following precedents, issued by this Chamber: a) number 183, of 3:55 p.m., of March 6, 2006; b) 1105, of 12:25 p.m., of September 10, 2004; c) 765, of 10:50 a.m., of July 8, 2005; and d) 289, of 8:55 a.m., of April 4, 1997. She bases her objection on the fact that this Chamber, in the indicated votes, has repeatedly pointed out “…to demonstrate that the money subject to money laundering originates from a prior crime, said demonstration must be established even through circumstantial evidence, while in the acquittal judgment issued by the Appeals Court in favor of Howden Pascall, it considered necessary and essential that, to demonstrate that the assets have their origin in a crime, a final and conclusive conviction judgment is required…” (f. 1289). She states that by requiring a final conviction judgment for the predicate offense, undue requirements are being imposed for the configuration of money laundering, making the investigation of this type of crime practically impossible in our country. Fourth ground of the cassation appeal filed by Licenciada Sarkis Fernández: Erroneous application of substantive law, specifically, Articles 1 and 69 of Law 7786, amended through Law 8204 of December 26, 2001: Resuming the arguments of the third ground of cassation, this time from the perspective of an infraction of substantive law, the appellant considers that “…the Appeals Court completely errs in its substantive basis by demanding the demonstration of the prior crime to money laundering only through a final conviction judgment. We insist, it is not established in the criminal offense and neither has it been required, by jurisprudence, as an indispensable requirement a judgment of conviction for the prior crime, for example, drug trafficking or another serious crime…” (f. 1294). Based on varied Spanish doctrine, the appellant points out that the crime of money laundering is autonomous, multi-offensive, and that a final criminal judgment on the prior crime is not required for its verification, as demanded by the ad quem in this case. The objections are without merit: In the case under review, unlike what occurs in the bulk of investigations for money laundering, there is a judgment in relation to the predicate offense, which occurred and was tried abroad, which is provided by the Public Prosecutor's Office itself, in order to accredit said objective element of the offense. So the assessment of the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and specifically, its definition of the “conduct of the crime”, is not arbitrary. It is the evidence provided by the prosecuting entity itself, in order to accredit this point. As already indicated, upon resolving the first ground of cassation, the allusion made to crimes such as extortion, homicide, or organized crime could not be proven in this case, neither through the judgment nor through other circumstantial evidence. By excluding them from the definition of the predicate offense, then, the judges do not incur a requirement not provided for by the regulations, such as the existence of a prior judgment, but rather they consider that there are no elements of conviction that allow overturning the conclusions reached by the United States judicial system when it acquitted Rodney Morrison of said charges. The way in which the ad quem resolves is adjusted to what Professor Francisco Castillo points out regarding the principle of freedom of evidence in relation to the prior act: “…it is necessary for the Court to determine the existence of the prior act and its typical and unlawful character, without mere suspicion that the object comes from a punishable act being sufficient. The establishment of the proof of the prior act can be done by final judgment, if it was known by a competent authority. If this proof is lacking, the typical and unlawful character of the prior act, which is a normative element of the type of money laundering, can be proven. This proof must be made by the Judge hearing the crime of money laundering in the country in accordance with the criteria of freedom of evidence and free assessment of evidence. In any case, the establishment of the prior act by the national Judge as a normative element of the criminal type of money laundering does not imply issuing a judgment on national soil on the prior act that occurred abroad…” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco: El delito de Legitimación de Capitales, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1st edition, San José, 2012, pp. 93-94). As can be inferred, it is one thing for the principle of freedom of evidence to govern in Criminal Law, and quite another, to want to pass off the unproven United States charges (neither in the United States, nor in the process before us) as accredited data with a view to establishing what the predicate offense of interest is for money laundering. By respecting the factual framework defined by the United States Court of Appeals, therefore, it is not disregarded that the predicate offense could be accredited through evidentiary sources other than a judgment, such as circumstantial evidence, within the money laundering case itself, a criterion that this Chamber maintains. What happens is that in the situation under review, the evidence provided to accredit the predicate offense is the certified documentation on the judicial process followed in the United States against Morrison, and not other evidence. For all the above, the third ground of the challenge formulated by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office is declared without merit. [...]

VII.- Eighth ground of cassation: Failure to observe Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code, as well as numeral 87 of Law number 8204 of December 26, 2001: The appellant points out that the Appeals Court of Judgment does not refute the proven fact established by the Trial Court, consisting of the fact that Morrison, brother of the accused, “…transferred to the country, between 2002 and 2004, a little over sixteen million dollars, leaving some sums in his name and others in the accounts of the defendant here, to whom, on July 17, 2000, he granted an unlimited general power of attorney without limit of sum for the administration and disposition of his assets…” (f. 1329). From the above, the appellant derives that the ad quem takes as true that “…as a result of the illicit activities carried out by Morrison in the United States, he obtained large sums of money that are precisely those he sent via bank transfers to the Banco de Costa Rica (…) therefore they must be considered as assets derived from a crime for the purposes of Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code and 87 of Law 8204…” (f. 1330). Consequently, Licenciada Sarkis Fernández considers that, regardless of the circumstances related to the guilt of the defendant Howden Pascall, the seizure (comiso) order issued by the Trial Court in this case should have been maintained. The objection cannot be accepted: For the correct resolution of this complaint, several clarifications must be made. The first of these is that the rules of the Penal Code and the Psychotropic Substances Law that regulate seizure cannot be applied concomitantly or simultaneously, as the appellant proposes. The regulations provided in Law 8204 of December 26, 2001, are special and apply to crimes provided for in the Psychotropic Substances Law, among them, money laundering, the existence of which has been ruled out in this case. For this reason, it is only possible to examine whether or not numerals 103 and 110 of the Penal Code are applicable. Secondly, it is not true that the Appeals Court of Judgment takes as true that the entirety of the money sent to Howden Pascall by his brother via bank transfers, from the United States, comes from the commission of crimes. Precisely one of the reasons why, by way of exercise, the ad quem considers that it would not be possible to classify the acts as the crime contemplated in numeral 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (we already indicated that this would also not be possible, by virtue of the rules of apparent concurrence), is that no evidence was provided to the process that allows knowing which part of said money corresponds to the profits obtained by Morrison as a result of the sale of cigarettes under conditions of illegality. This is a topic widely discussed by the appellate judges in the acquittal judgment (cf. fs. 1196 front to 1198 vto.), which reflects the existence of a debate in doctrine on the proportion of the capital that becomes contaminated when the predicate offense constitutes a tax crime. Such discussion becomes more relevant when, as happens in this case, it would not be possible to affirm that the entirety of the money invested in the purchase of the cigarettes was illegally obtained, since only a part of it would be what the accused retained or failed to pay to the United States tax authorities, whereby the seizure of the entirety of the profits would appear to be excessive and unjustified.

Thus, it cannot be affirmed that all the profits obtained by Morrison come from the commercialization of cigarettes, and even if we focus on that activity, we would have to exclude the sales of cigarettes carried out under conditions that are considered legal or tolerated under United States law, namely: sales made within the reservation, and for consumption by the indigenous population, as well as the prior capital with which Rodney Morrison may have counted.

In this regard, the sentencing appeals judges reasoned: “…not only is there no reasoning, but, worse still, there is no evidence whatsoever, neither expert nor of any other kind, that refers to what was the amount left unpaid to the United States Government for taxes, which is the only illicit aspect of that money (and not the totality of the income arising from the sale of cigarettes), nor can it be presumed (…) that all the money transferred is illicit, since the sale of tobacco and cigarettes, like any commercial activity, generates some profit, once taxes are paid, in addition to the fact that, as was established through the same declaration of Dianne C. Leonardo (see folio 854) and of Eliécer Pascall Gordon (folio 872), the money transferred by Morrison also came from other diverse activities that he had in that country…” (f. 1196 front). Ultimately, under the reasoning derived from the appeals judgment, it is not possible to assert that the totality of the money transferred to Howden Pascall corresponds to capital originating from criminal activities. Despite this, the ad quem court points out that the Trial Court ordered the confiscation (comiso) of the entirety of the transferred money, without distinguishing between the amounts obtained before the atypicality of the acts, that is, before the entry into force of Law 8204, on January 11, 2002 (f. 1210 front). On this point, it indicates: “…the Court took all the money that entered the country, without making any division by period, which caused it to account for amounts that entered when that conduct was not a crime, that is, before 2002…” (f. 1198 front).

There is a second level of analysis, in order to provide a correct solution to the matter raised regarding the confiscation (comiso). This involves the manner in which said figure is defined in the Costa Rican Penal Code. Article 103 of the same provides: “Every punishable act has as a consequence civil reparation, which shall be determined in a conviction (sentencia condenatoria); this shall order: (…) 3) the confiscation (comiso).” This is related to article 110 of the same normative body: “The crime produces the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed and of the things or values originating from its commission, or that constitute for the agent a profit derived from the same crime, except for the right that the victim or third parties may have over them...” (the underlining is added). Note that the legislator makes express reference to the “crime,” which has been determined by a “conviction (sentencia condenatoria).” In this particular case, the jurisdiction of the Costa Rican judges to issue a judgment is limited to the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales). However, in relation to said illicit act, the acquittal issued is maintained. From this, we have that it could not be affirmed that the questioned funds originate from the commission of the crime on which the Costa Rican judges issued a judgment, but rather from another one (cigarette tax evasion), over which our jurisdiction lacks the power to rule.

The claim of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) thus entails assigning to an illicit act committed and sentenced abroad a consequence different from the penalty, without the Costa Rican judges possessing jurisdiction to try and punish the crime in question. Costa Rican regulations do not provide for the figure called “extended confiscation (comiso ampliado),” which constitutes the figure through which it is possible to seize, not only the assets originating from the crime tried in the country, but also “…the profits obtained by the criminal organization that are not directly related to the criminal activity being tried…” (VARGAS GONZÁLEZ, Patricia: “El comiso de las ganancias. Algunas deudas y excesos legislativos”, In: Derecho Penal y Constitución. Book in memory of Dr. Luis Paulino Mora Mora, volume I, collective work, San José, 2014, p. 323, the highlighting is added). As article 110 of the Penal Code is drafted—applicable to this matter because it does not involve a crime contemplated in the Law on Psychotropic Substances (Ley de Psicotrópicos)—it must be concluded that in our country, in accordance with the regulations in force at the time of the acts, confiscation (comiso) is tied to or limited to the assets directly related to the crime that is the object of the conviction in the case being heard. The efforts to correct this shortcoming have given rise to various legislative projects. One of the proposals approved as law entered into force on July 22, 2009 (Law against Organized Crime, number 8754 of July 24, 2009), which entails the seizure of assets whose lawful origin cannot be justified, even without any connection to a crime. Specifically, article 20 of the aforementioned Law states: “…The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), the ICD, or the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) may denounce, before the Civil Treasury Court for Summary Proceedings (Juzgado Civil de Hacienda de Asuntos Sumarios), the increase of capital without apparent lawful cause, with a lookback period of up to ten years, of any public official or private person, individual or legal. Once the complaint is received, the Court shall grant a hearing to the interested party for a term of twenty working days to respond and present evidence; in the same resolution, it shall order, as a precautionary measure, the seizure of assets, their registry immobilization, and of all kinds of financial products. Only an appeal without suspensive effect shall be admissible against the precautionary measure, which must be filed within twenty-four hours before the Administrative Contentious Collegiate Tribunal (Tribunal Colegiado Contencioso Administrativo), which shall resolve without further procedure and with priority over any other matter…”. However, its application in practice has not been possible, and in reality, it is not an expansive figure of confiscation (comiso), but rather a process of a nature different from criminal law, which must be followed in the administrative contentious jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa).

From what has been said so far, we can conclude that, in accordance with the legislation in force at the time of the acts, it was not possible to separate confiscation (comiso) from the demonstration, through a judgment, of an act that is at least typical and unlawful. The situation regulated by article 110 of the Penal Code is confiscation (comiso) as a consequence of the wrongdoing; and not of just any wrongdoing, but of the one that is the object of the ruling in the specific criminal case, which corresponds, in this case, to money laundering (legitimación de capitales). Since there is no conviction (fallo condenatorio) for said crime, ordering the confiscation (comiso) is not possible. Consequently, the eighth ground of the appeal is declared without merit.” At least some of Morrison's Large Customers resold the cigarettes they purchased at Peace Pipe in locations outside the reservation, and Morrison was aware of what they were doing…” (“the conduct of the crime,” official translation of the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals, f. 706, volume II of the case file). This factual picture was reiterated by the judges of the foreign Court of Appeals, stating: “…Morrison's actions went far beyond this type of conduct that could be placed in some area of ambiguity. He engaged in a substantial wholesale business, with some 50,000 “Large Customers” who, jointly, purchased more than $138 million in cigarettes from 1999 to 2004. He encouraged these sales by distributing flyers in New York City. Throughout this time, he knew that at least some of his “Large Customers” were reselling the cigarettes outside the reservation…” (cf. f. 722). From the testimony of prosecutor Dianne Leonardo, which was weighed by the appellate judges, it is clear that at the time of the trial for the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), the new “sentence” (in reality, it concerns the imposition of the penalty by the judge) for the reinstated charges against Morrison was pending. In the words of the witness, cited by the appellate judges: “…in July of this year the Court of Appeals overturned (sic) Judge Hurley's verdict and the decision is obtained in the month of July 2012, the charges against him for contraband were reinstated, he has not yet been given a new sentence, but he will receive this sentence for the contraband acts, this judge's decision establishes Morrison as guilty of the crime of contraband, this decision confirmed (sic) the jury's decision, there is no new trial, simply what the jury established in May 2008 is reinstated, the sentence has not yet been handed down…” (see transcript of the testimony of Dianne Leonardo, in sentence appeal ruling, f. 1195 source). For this reason, although the appeal ruling considers that there is no firm conviction (sentencia condenatoria firme) for the prior act, we must dissent from such a conclusion, because according to the ruling issued by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, just cited, and the testimony of witness Leonardo, the determination of the existence of typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct was firm at the time the judgment was rendered in this case, and only the sanction corresponding to said declaration of guilt remained to be determined. Regarding the charges of illegal possession and sale of cigarettes, and their correct legal classification in the country, the ad quem reasons as follows: “…he is not accused (only) of having sold cigarettes and not paying the tax on the sales, but rather of having obtained the cigarette shipments without having the seal (prior to those sales) indicating that, in turn, the distributors had paid the prior taxes. This means that, for dual criminality (doble incriminación), we are not talking about what in our system would be a sales tax evasion, but about the entry into possession of the object, without the payment, prior to the subsequent sale, of taxes. It is the equivalent, in our context, of import or customs duties. That conduct is provided for, in Costa Rica, in a special law that, then, prevails over that general regulation, even if they concur with other tax violations regarding sales tax. It concerns the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas) No. 7557 of October 20, 1995 (published in La Gaceta 212 of November 8, 1995, and in force at the date of the accused acts) which establishes: "ARTICLE 1.- Scope of application. This law regulates the entries into and exits from the national territory of goods, vehicles, and transport units; also the customs clearance and the facts and acts deriving from it or from the entries and exits, in accordance with community and international norms, the application of which is the responsibility of the National Customs Service (Servicio Nacional de Aduanas)" (boldface supplied) adding numeral 223: "Relation with crimes defined in other tax regulations. If the conducts defined in this law also constitute a crime or a contravention established in tax legislation, the special provisions of this law shall apply provided that those conducts relate to the breach of customs tax obligations or duties before the customs authority" (highlighting is external). This regulation established customs crimes (delitos aduanales): in a first moment, from its entry into force in 1995 until the year 2003, and then from that date, when a reform took place, and up to the present. Since the individual charged here was unduly attributed with having received money from his brother since the year 2002, which has already been stated is an atypical conduct because the capital arose from alleged crimes unrelated to drug trafficking, one must take into account, again, the legislative changes effected in customs legislation. Thus, in 2002 and until 2003, the original General Customs Law was applicable, and from that date and until 2007 (when the cycle of the accused acts closes), the currently binding regulation would govern…” (sentence appeal ruling, fs. 1199 vto. to 1200). At this point, a clarification is necessary, which is that due to the different nature of the tax collection system in Costa Rica and the United States, compounded by the fact that the latter contains state and federal legislation regarding tax matters, there are no absolute parallels when comparing the North American tax collection system and our own. This is a specificity of the case under examination, which makes the determination of whether we are faced with one of the crimes provided for in the General Customs Law, or in the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) even more complex. In the Costa Rican tax collection system, there is a clear difference between the taxes collected to “nationalize” the goods, that is, customs duties or import tariffs, and the tax obligations that may arise subsequent to said collection, once the good is legally held in the country. The former are regulated in the General Customs Law, and the latter, in the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures. In the United States system, for the relevant purposes, the legal possession of cigarettes exceeding 360,000 units (at the time of the commission of the prior act) implied the prior payment of a fee that is deemed in advance as sales tax, and which the seller subsequently recovers by charging it to the final customer. Such payment is accredited by placing a seal on each pack of cigarettes. For this reason, the crime attributed in this case to Morrison turns out to be a hybrid between our customs tariffs (established to legalize the holding of certain goods in the country) and the sales tax. We find ourselves, thus, before an apparent conflict of laws (concurso aparente de normas), but the dilemma regarding which law to apply is resolved by our substantive law, in numeral 23 of the Penal Code. Said norm indicates: “…When the same conduct is described in several legal provisions that are mutually exclusive, only one of them shall be applied, as follows: the special norm prevails over the general, the one that fully contains another is preferred to it, and that which the law has not expressly or tacitly subordinated to another is applied instead of the accessory…” Customs Law is a subspecialty of Tax Law, therefore the rule of specialty, provided to resolve apparent conflicts of norms, is fulfilled. Furthermore, in an express manner, the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures itself subordinates its application to that which is not contemplated by the General Customs Law. In this sense, the first article of the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures provides: “…The provisions of this Code are applicable to all taxes and the legal relationships derived from them, except what is regulated by special legislation (…) the provisions of this Code are of supplementary application, in the absence of an express norm…” (wording according to Law number 7900 of August 3, 1999). As anticipated, customs legislation is a specialized branch of Tax Law that deals with the regularization of goods in the country (their entry, permanence, and exit). Without compliance with said norms for “entry” into the national market, the goods could not be subject to commerce legally. This is an important distinction that allows establishing that the prior act to the money laundering, according to our legal system, is a customs crime and not a tax crime in general. Uruguayan legislation, as in the case of Costa Rica, is characterized by containing general tax and customs norms, of equal rank, which seem to overlap in terms of prohibiting tax evasion conducts, but faced with such a situation, just as happens in our country, the principle of specialty is made to prevail: “…the crime of contraband in itself contains defraudation in its objective criminal definition (…). Our repressive customs regime encompasses both conducts, being bipartite: contraband and defraudation. The superimposition of both charges implies a hypothesis of bis in idem. By the principle of specificity —in any case— it would correspond to elucidate whether the crime of contraband has existed, but not tax defraudation, which is already covered by contraband. These are criminal definitions that are mutually exclusive and not a concurrence between various criminal classifications applied to the same conduct. It is necessary to resolve which is the alternative without adding one to another (contraband or tax defraudation), since —as GONZÁLEZ teaches— Customs Law is a set of legal norms that has individuality within Tax Law. That individuality is distinguished by its foundations and methods, in addition to other substantive and procedural aspects that also differentiate it…” (ALLEN, Germán: “La superposición de los tipos penales de contrabando y defraudación tributaria en la ley uruguaya”, Published in Tribuna del Abogado, No. 180, Colegio de Abogados del Uruguay, Montevideo, October/December 2012, pp. 15-17). Returning to the case under examination, it was determined that Rodney Morrison offered for sale cigarettes that were not suitable for commerce, because the tax established to legitimize their sale in the State of New York had not been previously paid. They were, therefore, goods outside commerce, as the requirement established for the mere holding of said good by private individuals in the State of New York to be legitimate was breached. Having defined the national legislation applicable to the conduct for which Morrison was found responsible, it is pertinent to delve deeper into the penalty applicable to the specific customs crime in which the facts are classified, according to the time of the commission of the acts. The General Customs Law, number 7557 of October 20, 1995, in its version in force until March 4, 2004, provided in numeral 214 the basic crime of customs tax defraudation (defraudación fiscal aduanera): "…Article 214.- Basic crime. Whoever, through simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deceit, eludes or evades totally or partially the payment of the customs tax obligation, provided the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the taxes not received, with their interests and surcharges…”. The specific cases were provided for in numeral 215 ejusdem: “…Specific cases of customs tax defraudation. Whoever engages in the following shall incur the penalties indicated in the preceding article, provided the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos: a) Whomever, without authorization from the competent authority, gives a different purpose than that provided in the authorizing norm to goods benefited by exemption or franchise or that have entered free of taxes. b) Whomever, using or declaring false information, requests or obtains a preferential customs treatment. c) Whomever, using or declaring false information, justifies compliance with their duties, obligations, or requirements in their condition as beneficiary or user of a customs regime or modality, to request or obtain a preferential customs treatment. d) Whomever simulates, totally or partially, an export or import operation of goods or alters the description of some, with the aim of illicitly obtaining a customs incentive or an economic benefit. e) The public official, the public employee, or the official of the public faith, who falsely certifies or records that a tax was totally or partially satisfied…” Finally, the aggravating circumstances were regulated in numeral 216 of the same Law: “… Aggravating circumstances. The penalty shall be three to five years and the fine equivalent to three times the amount of the taxes not received, with their interests and surcharges, when, in any of the two preceding articles, any of the following circumstances concur: a) Three or more persons intervene in the act, in the capacity of authors. b) A public official in the exercise of their functions intervenes in the capacity of author, instigator, or accomplice, on the occasion of those functions or with abuse of their position…" (the highlighting is supplied). The appellate judges correctly point out that it is the simple modality of commission of the criminal definitions provided in the General Customs Law that is applicable to the conduct attributed in the United States to Rodney Morrison. The “acts of the crime” are attributed to Morrison individually, and not in co-authorship (coautoría). Although it is true that on March 5, 2004, Law number 8373 of August 18, 2003, came into force, which modified the criminal definitions of interest, establishing greater penalties for the crime of simple customs defraudation, which in some specific cases exceed four years of imprisonment, said regulation is not applicable to the acts that motivated Morrison's conviction, from which we must start. Thus, even if we start from the material firmness of the pronouncement rendered by the United States Court of Appeals, the factual framework for which Rodney Morrison was judged is temporally located “from the year 1999 to the year 2004” (cf. f. 706). Furthermore, the indictment to which we must adhere for all purposes in this case, based on the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence, is the national accusation, on which the trial was based. The latter locates the predicate offense (delito precedente) “…between the year 1996 and 2004…” (see f. 835), and in accordance with such delimitation, it is established in the proven factual framework that the execution of the prior criminal acts occurs “…Between the years 1996 and 2004…” (f. 846), without specification of dates. We must start from this temporal framework, then, to carry out the analysis of dual criminality. In situations like this, in which approximate months or parts of the year are not defined, and there are legislative reforms in the period of interest that compel taking a stance on the applicable regulation, this Chamber has maintained a consistent position according to which one must adhere to the interpretation most beneficial to the accused. Starting from the ranges of sanctions, the most beneficial legislation proves to be, without a doubt, Law number 7557 of October 20, 1995, and not Law number 8373 of August 18, 2003 (in force from March 5, 2004). From all that has been stated so far, it follows that the prior act in this case corresponds to the crime of customs tax defraudation, in its simple modality, and for greater precision, it concerns the criminal definition contained in article 215 subsection a) (in relation to numeral 214) of the General Customs Law, in its wording according to Law 7557 of October 20, 1995. We find ourselves in this case, precisely, before the undue taking advantage of a tax exemption established to regularize the holding of cigarettes, according to the legislation in force in the State of New York. However respectable the legal criterion may be from which the Trial Court considered that the prior acts were sanctioned by our legal system through numeral 92 of the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures, that is not the interpretation that this Chamber endorses. By virtue of the foregoing, the first and fifth grounds of the challenge presented by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are declared without merit.

III.- Second ground of the cassation appeal filed by Ms. Sarkis Fernández: Erroneous application of substantive law: Erroneous application of numerals 14 and 30 of the Civil Code, which entails erroneous application of Article 1 of the Law on Psychotropic Substances (Ley de Psicotrópicos), number 7786 of April 30, 1998. Ms. Sarkis Fernández points out that the ad quem orders the need to prove the existence of the foreign laws based on which Rodney Morrison was convicted, in order to accredit the prior act, in accordance with what is stipulated in article 30 of the Civil Code. In doing so, it disregards the principle of evidentiary freedom that governs in criminal matters. The appellant indicates that “…to demonstrate the existence of foreign legislation, as in the particular case, one should not resort to article 30 of the Civil Code (…) but rather, firstly, to the general rules provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) itself for bringing evidence from abroad and, secondly, and no less important, to the Treaties on mutual legal assistance between Nations such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention)…” (f. 1277). She states that it was by using international criminal assistance that documentary evidence was incorporated into this process that “…corroborates the existence of the criminal legislation and the process carried out against Rodney Morrison in the United States, as well as the charges on which he was accused and on which he was sentenced…” (ibid). She adds that another of the requirements deemed lacking by the Sentence Appeals Court, with a view to the principle of dual criminality, is the accreditation of the minimum penalty threshold corresponding to the crime in the Anglo-Saxon system. On this aspect, the appellant states that from reading 18 USC 1963 RICO, which is the charge for which Morrison was convicted, “…it is denoted that United States law does not refer to a minimum threshold for this type of crime, but rather only delimits the maximum threshold of 20 years in prison, for which reason the Appeals Court (…) seeks an impossibility, since the Anglo-Saxon criminal definition not having a minimum threshold for this crime, leads to the absurdity of demanding that the Trial Court had established it as if a Costa Rican court of justice had the legislative power corresponding to another State…” (f. 1280). The prosecutor proposes that, to establish when a crime should be considered as “serious,” one should resort to a teleological interpretation “…that integrates what (sic) is the sense of national and international legislation against money laundering and the fight against organized crime, as well as the abstract penalty that can be imposed on the one who commits the predicate offense (delito determinante) and, finally (…) the social harmfulness (dañosidad social) of the conduct…”. The ground is declared partially with merit, despite which, the conclusions of the a quo regarding the atypicality of the crime do not vary: The Public Prosecutor's Office must be granted reason, insofar as the principle of evidentiary freedom permits accrediting the existence and content of international regulations through any legitimate means, and in this case, the legal assistance processed by the prosecuting entity with the United States must be taken as a legal evidentiary source duly incorporated into the process. From said judicial assistance comes the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit of that nation, which, in fact, this Chamber has recognized in the preceding recital as constituting valid evidence in order to delimit the conduct for which Rodney Morrison was found guilty. However, this concession to the argument of the Prosecutor's Office does not have the effect that the party assigns to it, because even starting from said evidentiary incorporation, as will be seen, we must conclude that in this case a “serious crime” did not materialize, for alongside the principle of evidentiary freedom, the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence must also be respected. Starting from the wording of the crime of money laundering, in force at the time of the acts of interest here, the funds that are converted, transmitted, or concealed must originate from a “serious crime” (Law number 8204, published in La Gaceta number 8, of January 11, 2002). Hence the importance of establishing which is the norm that, at the time of the acts, defined the concept of serious crime, and the implications this has regarding the respect for the principle of dual incrimination (doble imputación), which must be respected when the prior act is committed abroad, as occurs in this case. As already stated, article 1 of Law 8204 of January 11, 2002, defined serious crime as “the conduct that constitutes a crime punishable with a deprivation of liberty of four years, as a minimum…”. The subsequent reform to the Law on Psychotropic Substances that eliminates the reference to “serious crime” does not enter into force until March 16, 2009, and therefore is not applicable to these acts, by virtue of the norms that regulate the application of criminal law over time. However, through Law number 8302 of September 12, 2002 – in force from June 27, 2003 – the “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” better known as the “Palermo Convention,” was incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system. Said instrument provides in article 2, subsection b): “…’Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty…”.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution, the Palermo Convention was incorporated into the legal framework as of June 27, 2003, and as such, being a subsequent law, it partially repeals the definition of serious crime contained in numeral 1 of Law 8204 of December 26, 2001, at least for the cases to which that international instrument applies, according to the definitions contained in the instrument itself. Despite the fact that the proven facts against Rodney Morrison cannot be classified as organized crime, because he was convicted individually in the United States, the aforementioned instrument extends its scope of application to money laundering activities, as can be inferred from the relationship indicated in Article 3: a) and Article 6 *ejúsdem*. Because the temporal location of the predicate offense, for the purposes relevant here, runs from the year 1999 to 2004 (without defining specific dates, according to the accusatory document and the proven facts), and the Palermo Convention was incorporated into the national legal framework as of June 2003, the indication made in the Sentencing Appeal ruling—that said instrument constitutes a subsequent law "to the accusation" that is not more favorable to the interests of the accused and therefore is inapplicable due to the principle of non-retroactivity established in numerals 11 and 12 of the Penal Code, as well as Article 34 of the Constitution (see f. 1190 back)—is unintelligible. Rather, the entry into force of said Convention is clear, within the temporal range during which the predicate offense is considered to have been perpetrated, since said instrument entered into force on June 27, 2003, and as we stated, the final temporal range from which the predicate facts must be assessed runs from 1999 to 2004.

However, as indicated in the preceding consideration, the criminal offense applicable to the predicate fact corresponds to a specific modality of tax fraud, contemplated in subsection a) of Article 215 of the Penal Code, in relation to Article 214, according to its wording in force in Law 7557 of October 20, 1995. The relevant provisions are as follows: *"…Article 214.- Basic offense. Whoever, through simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deceit, evades or avoids, in whole or in part, the payment of the customs tax obligation, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the taxes left uncollected, with its interest and surcharges. Article 215: “…Specific cases of customs tax fraud. Whoever incurs the penalties set forth in the preceding article, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos, shall be punished: a) Whoever, without authorization from the competent body, gives a purpose different from that provided in the authorizing rule, to goods benefited with tax exemption or franchise or that have entered free of taxes…”* (the underlining is added). It follows that, even though as of January 27, 2003 (still within the temporal range of the predicate fact), any act punishable by a prison sentence—in its minimum or maximum extremity—is considered a serious crime, this condition is not met in the case at hand, because the maximum penalty established for the predicate offense at the time of the facts corresponds to three years of imprisonment. The position of the Public Ministry cannot be accepted insofar as it is feasible to depart from the definition of serious crime contained in our legislation, which, as already indicated, uses as a differentiator that the act be punishable by four years of imprisonment or more. The suggestion to resort to criteria such as the affected legal interest, or the social damage caused, may be submitted to parliamentary discussion, in order to generate reforms, but in no case may the judicial operator arrogate powers exclusive to the legislator.

Finally, the topic of dual criminality remains to be addressed, which is an unavoidable subject when the predicate fact is committed abroad. In observance of this principle, it must be verified that the facts forming the basis of the predicate offense are provided for as criminal activity, both in the country where it was committed and in the country where the money laundering is judged. Beyond that verification, this Chamber considers it excessive to demand that the conduct be considered a "serious" crime in both national and foreign legislation, as this would imply extending the parameters of our own legal system to other jurisdictional systems that may contain penalty measurement parameters very different from our own. Consider, for example, systems that do not have minimum sanctions but only regulate the maximum amount to be imposed, or those that classify the seriousness of crimes in attention to the affected legal interest. On this aspect, the existence of debate in the legal doctrine must be conceded, but we choose to consider that the principle of dual criminality is fulfilled when it is verified that the conduct constituting the predicate offense is a crime both in Costa Rica and abroad. For the "serious" classification, one must adhere to national legislation, it being excessive to require that the crime be serious both under the parameters of the Costa Rican legal system and in foreign legislation, as this would force a standardization of two penalty measurement systems that may not have points of coincidence. Spanish legislation is very similar to Costa Rican law, with respect to the objective requirements of the crime of money laundering, as well as in the evolution of the offense type. When analyzing in said legislation the requirements of the predicate offense and specifically, the requirement that the laundered funds proceed from a "serious crime," it has been stated: *"…it would be possible* (…) *to interpret, more logically, that for the crime of money laundering defined in the Spanish Penal Code to exist, it is necessary that the underlying offense is also penalized in the place of its commission; this is the so-called principle of 'dual criminality', by virtue of which the prior crime must be punishable both in the place of execution and in Spain. One of the most interesting questions raised in relation to this issue concerns the legal classification of the underlying crime committed abroad, that is, whether it should be made based on the criminal law of the country where the crime was committed or the country where the laundering was carried out. And the question is more difficult to resolve if the legislation of the country where the laundering is committed requires, as Article 301 of the Penal Code did until LO 15/2003, that the crime from which the assets originate be a serious crime, because then the question would arise of, if the crime is committed abroad, where it would have to be considered serious, whether in the national territory where the laundering is carried out and judged or in the place where the crime was committed, that is, the determination of the legislation based on which the legal classification of the prior crime committed abroad must be made, whether the classification of the crime—serious then—would have to be made according to the law of the place of commission or according to Spanish criminal law. If the first solution is chosen, a material extension of national criminal law would occur, a possibility that the majority of the legal doctrine rejects, considering, in the main, that the classification of the prior act must be made according to the national legislation where the money laundering crime was committed..."* (García López, S. (2006). “Blanqueo de capitales. Evolución del delito subyacente”. Retrieved from [http://www.ief.es/ documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/cuadernos_formacion/05_2008/Colab_05_08.pdf](http://www.ief.es/%20documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/cuadernos_formacion/05_2008/Colab_05_08.pdf). The underlining does not correspond to the original). According to the foregoing assessments, which this Chamber endorses, it is excessive to demand that the foreign nation where the predicate crime was committed contain legislation similar to Costa Rican law regarding what is understood as a serious crime. What is required, as already indicated, is to demonstrate a concrete connection between the funds subject to laundering and the predicate fact, and of course, that the conduct in question is provided for and sanctioned as a crime in both legislations.

Furthermore, the claim of the Public Ministry to depart from the criterion established by the Costa Rican legislator in defining what should be considered a "serious crime" cannot be accepted. If in Law 8204 of January 11, 2002, applicable to the facts known here due to their time of commission, it is clearly defined that a serious crime is one that provides for a penalty of deprivation of liberty of four years "as a minimum" as a sanction, it is this definition that must prevail for facts committed between January 11, 2002, and June 26, 2003. As of June 27, 2003, with the entry into force of Law Number 8302 of September 12, 2002, the definition of "serious crime" from the Palermo Convention comes into effect, according to which it is sufficient that the crime contains, within its range of deprivation of liberty, four years, regardless of whether it is the minimum or maximum extremity. What happens in the case under examination is that neither under the first definition, nor under the second, do the facts achieve the characterization of "serious," because, as already indicated, the applicable criminal offense according to the time of commission of the predicate fact is the General Customs Law of 1995, which provided for conduct with custodial sanctions ranging from one to three years. For all the foregoing reasons, although the prosecutorial representative must be given reason regarding the principle of freedom of evidence and the possibility of extracting data from documents obtained through international legal assistance, as well as in that the scope of the principle of dual criminality should not lead to the extreme of demanding that the conduct of the predicate crime must also be considered serious in foreign legislation under our own standards, such clarifications do not have the consequence of changing the final outcome reached by the appellate judges. The predicate crime in this matter continues without reaching the classification of "serious" and therefore, an essential objective element for the configuration of money laundering is missing, according to its wording in force from January 11, 2002, to March 15, 2009. In summary, this ground is declared **partially granted**, despite which, the conclusions of the *a quo* regarding the atypicality of the crime judged here do not vary.

**IV.- Third ground of the appeal, for the existence of contradictory precedents of the Third Chamber, in relation to what was decided by the San José Court of Appeals:** The Public Ministry argues that the appealed acquittal judgment, number 337 at 3:25 p.m., of February 19, 2012, is contradictory to the following precedents, issued by this Chamber: a) number 183, at 3:55 p.m., of March 6, 2006; b) 1105, at 12:25 p.m., of September 10, 2004; c) 765, at 10:50 a.m., of July 8, 2005; and d) 289, at 8:55 a.m., of April 4, 1997. It bases its objection on the fact that this Chamber, in the indicated rulings, has repeatedly stated *"…to demonstrate that the money subject to laundering originates from a prior crime, this demonstration must be established even by means of circumstantial evidence, while in the acquittal judgment issued by the Court of Appeals in favor of Howden Pascall, it was considered necessary and essential that, to demonstrate that the assets have their origin in a crime, a final and binding conviction is required…"* (f. 1289). It argues that by demanding a final conviction for the predicate crime, undue requirements are being imposed for the configuration of money laundering, making the investigation of this type of crime in our country practically impossible. **Fourth ground of the appeal of cassation filed by Attorney Sarkis Fernández: Erroneous application of substantive law, specifically, Articles 1 and 69 of Law 7786, amended by Law 8204 of December 26, 2001:** Returning to the arguments of the third ground of cassation, this time from the perspective of a violation of substantive law, the appellant believes that *"…the Court of Appeals completely errs in its substantive foundation, by demanding the demonstration of the crime prior to money laundering, only by means of a final conviction. We insist, it is not established in the criminal offense type and has also not been required, by case law, as an indispensable requirement, a sentence of conviction for the prior crime, for example, drug trafficking or another serious crime…"* (f. 1294). Based on various Spanish legal doctrine, the appellant states that the crime of money laundering is autonomous, *plurioffensive*, and that a final criminal judgment on the prior crime is not required for its verification, as the *ad quem* requires in this cause. **The objections are dismissed:** In the cause under examination, unlike what occurs in the majority of money laundering investigations, there is a judgment in relation to the predicate crime, which occurred and was tried abroad, which is provided by the Public Ministry itself, in order to accredit this objective element of the offense type. Therefore, the assessment of the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals for the Second District of the United States, and specifically, its definition of the "conduct of the crime," is not arbitrary. It concerns the evidence provided by the prosecutorial body itself, in order to prove the point. As already indicated, when resolving the first ground of cassation, the allusion made to crimes such as extortion, homicide, or organized crime could not be proven in this cause, either through the judgment or through other circumstantial evidence. By excluding them from the definition of the predicate crime, then, the judges do not incur an unforeseen requirement under the legislation, such as the existence of a prior judgment, but rather consider that there are no elements of conviction that allow overturning the conclusions reached by the U.S. judicial system, when it acquitted Rodney Morrison of said charges. The way the *ad quem* resolves conforms to what Professor Francisco Castillo has stated regarding the principle of freedom of evidence in relation to the prior fact: *"…it is necessary for the Court to determine the existence of the prior fact and its criminal and unlawful nature, without a simple suspicion that the object comes from a punishable act being sufficient. The establishment of proof of the prior fact can be made by a final judgment, if it was heard by a competent authority. If this (sic) proof is lacking, the criminal and unlawful nature of the prior fact, which is a normative element of the money laundering offense type, can be proven. This proof must be made by the Judge hearing the crime of money laundering in the country according to the criteria of freedom of evidence and free assessment of evidence. In any case, the establishment of the prior fact by the national Judge as a normative element of the criminal offense type of money laundering does not imply issuing a sentence on national soil regarding the prior fact that occurred abroad…"* (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco: *The Crime of Money Laundering*, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1st edition, San José, 2012, pp. 93-94). As can be inferred, it is one thing for the principle of freedom of evidence to govern in Criminal Law, and quite another, to try to pass off the unproven U.S. charges (neither in the United States, nor in the process before us) as accredited data with a view to establishing what the prior fact of interest is for the money laundering. By respecting the factual framework defined by the U.S. Court of Appeals, therefore, it is not ignored that the predicate crime could be accredited through evidentiary sources other than a judgment, such as circumstantial evidence, within the money laundering cause itself, a criterion that this Chamber maintains. What happens is that in the situation under examination, the evidence provided to prove the prior fact is the certified documentation on the judicial process followed in the United States against Morrison, and nothing else. For all the foregoing, the third ground of the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Ministry is declared **without merit**. [...]

**VII.- Eighth ground of cassation: Non-observance of Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code, as well as numeral 87 of Law Number 8204 of December 26, 2001:** The appellant points out that the Sentencing Court of Appeals does not disprove the proven fact of the Trial Court, consisting of the fact that Morrison, brother of the accused, *"…transferred to the country, between 2002 and 2004, a little more than sixteen million dollars, leaving some sums in his own name and others in the accounts of the defendant here to whom, on July 17, 2000, he gave an unlimited general power of attorney for the administration and disposition of his assets…"* (f. 1329). From the foregoing, the appellant derives that the *ad quem* considers it to be true that *"…as a result of the illicit activities carried out by Morrison in the United States, the latter obtained large sums of money that are precisely those he sent via bank transfers to the Banco de Costa Rica* (…) *therefore they should be considered as property deriving from a crime for the purposes of Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code and 87 of Law 8204…"* (f. 1330). Consequently, Attorney Sarkis Fernández considers that, regardless of the circumstances relating to the guilt of the defendant Howden Pascall, the confiscation order issued by the Trial Court in this case should have been maintained. **The objection cannot be upheld:** For the correct solution of this complaint, several clarifications must be made. The first of these is that the rules of the Penal Code and of the Psychotropic Substances Law that regulate confiscation cannot be applied concomitantly or simultaneously, as the appellant proposes. The regulations provided in Law 8204 of December 26, 2001, are special and apply to the crimes provided for in the Psychotropic Substances Law, among them, money laundering, the existence of which has been ruled out in this cause. For this reason, one can only examine whether or not numerals 103 and 110 of the Penal Code are applicable. Secondly, it is not true that the Sentencing Court of Appeals considers it to be true that the entirety of the money sent to Howden Pascall by his brother via bank transfers from the United States comes from the commission of crimes. Precisely one of the reasons why, by way of an exercise, the *ad quem* considers that it would not be possible to frame the facts as the crime contemplated in numeral 92 of the Tax Code of Provisions and Procedures (we already indicated that this would also not be possible, by virtue of the rules of apparent concurrence of offenses), is that no evidence was provided to the process allowing one to know what part of said money corresponds to the profits obtained by Morrison, as a result of the sale of cigarettes in illegal conditions. This is a topic widely discussed by the appellate judges in the acquittal judgment (cfr. fs. 1196 front to 1198 back), which reflects the existence of a debate in the legal doctrine on the proportion of capital that is contaminated when the predicate crime constitutes a tax offense. This discussion becomes more relevant when, as happens in this case, it would not be possible to assert that the entirety of the money invested in the purchase of the cigarettes was illegally obtained, because only a part of it would be what the accused retained or failed to pay to the U.S. tax authorities, whereby the confiscation of the entirety of the profits would seem to be excessive and unjustified. Thus, it could not be asserted that all the profits obtained by Morrison come from the commercialization of cigarettes, and even if we focus on said activity, we would have to exclude the sales of cigarettes made under conditions that are considered legal or tolerated according to U.S. legislation, namely: sales made within the reservation and for consumption by the indigenous population, as well as the prior capital that Rodney Morrison may have had. In this regard, the appellate judges reasoned: *"…not only is there no reasoning, but, worse still, no evidence whatsoever, neither expert nor of any other kind, that refers to what the amount left unpaid to the United States Government in taxes was, which is the only illicit thing about that money (and not the totality of the income arising from the sales of the cigarettes), without it being possible to presume* (…) *that it is the entirety of the money transferred, since the sale of tobacco and cigarettes, like any commercial activity, generates some profit, taxes paid, in addition to which, as established by the statement of Dianne C. Leonardo (see folio 854) and Eliécer Pascall Gordon (folio 872), the money transferred by Morrison also came from other diverse activities that he had in that country…"* (f. 1196 front). In short, under the reasoning derived from the appeal judgment, it is not possible to assert that the totality of money transferred to Howden Pascall corresponds to capital from criminal activities. Despite this, the *ad quem* notes that the confiscation was ordered by the Trial Court over the entirety of the transferred money, without distinguishing between the amounts obtained before the atypicality of the facts, that is, before the entry into force of Law 8204, on January 11, 2002 (f. 1210 front). On this point, it states: *"…the Court took all the money entering the country, without making any division by period, which caused it to account for amounts entered when that conduct was not a crime, that is, before 2002…"* (f. 1198 front). There is a second level of analysis, in order to give a correct solution to the issue raised of confiscation. This concerns the way in which this figure is defined in the Costa Rican Penal Code. Article 103 *ejúsdem* provides: *"Every punishable act has civil reparation as a consequence, which will be determined in a conviction judgment; this will order:* (…) *3) confiscation"*. This relates to Article 110 of the same legal body: *"The crime results in the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed and of the things or values deriving from its commission, or that constitute for the agent a profit derived from the same crime, except for the right that the victim or third parties may have over them..."* (the underlining is added).

It is noted that the legislator makes express reference to the “crime,” which has been determined by a “conviction (sentencia condenatoria).” In the particular case, the jurisdiction of Costa Rican judges to issue a judgment is limited to the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales). However, in relation to said illicit act, the acquittal issued stands. Therefore, it could not be affirmed that the questioned funds originate from the commission of the crime on which the Costa Rican judges issued a judgment, but rather from another (cigarette tax evasion), over which our jurisdiction has no authority to rule. The claim of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) representative therefore implies assigning to an illicit act committed and sentenced abroad, a consequence other than the penalty, without the Costa Rican judges having the jurisdiction to try and sanction the crime in question. Costa Rican legislation does not provide for the figure called “extended confiscation (comiso ampliado),” which constitutes the figure through which it is possible to seize not only the assets originating from the crime tried in the country, but also “…the profits obtained by the criminal organization *that are not directly related to the criminal activity subject to trial*…” (VARGAS GONZÁLEZ, Patricia: “El comiso de las ganancias. Algunas deudas y excesos legislativos”, In: *Derecho Penal y Constitución. Libro en memoria del Dr. Luis Paulino Mora Mora*, volume I, collective work, San José, 2014, p. 323, the highlighting is supplied). As Article 110 (numeral 110) of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) is drafted, applicable to this matter because it does not concern a crime contemplated in the Law on Psychotropic Substances (Ley de Psicotrópicos), it must be concluded that in our country, in accordance with the regulations in force at the time of the facts, confiscation (comiso) is linked to or limited to the assets directly related to the crime subject to conviction in the case being heard. Efforts to correct this deficiency have given rise to various legislative projects. One of the proposals approved as law came into force on July 22, 2009, (Law Against Organized Crime (*Ley Contra la Delincuencia Organizada*), number 8754 of July 24, 2009), which entails the seizure of assets whose lawful origin cannot be justified, even without any connection to a crime. Specifically, Article 20 (*Art. 20*) of the referred Law states: “…The General Comptroller of the Republic (*Contraloría General de la República*), the Ministry of Finance (*Ministerio de Hacienda*), the ICD, or the Public Prosecutor's Office may file a complaint, before the Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters (*Juzgado Civil de Hacienda de Asuntos Sumarios*), regarding the increase of capital without apparent lawful cause, with a retrospective period of up to ten years, of any public official or private person, whether natural or legal. Upon receiving the complaint, the Court shall give the interested party a hearing within a term of twenty business days to respond and present evidence; in the same resolution, it shall order, as a precautionary measure, the seizure of assets, their registry immobilization, and all types of financial products. Against the precautionary measure, only an appeal without suspensive effect may be filed, which must be filed within twenty-four hours before the Administrative Litigation Collegiate Court (*Tribunal Colegiado Contencioso Administrativo*), which will resolve without further procedure and with priority over any other matter…”. However, its application in practice has not been possible, and in reality, it is not an extended figure of confiscation (comiso), but rather a proceeding of a nature different from criminal law, which must be pursued in the administrative litigation jurisdiction. From what has been stated so far, we can conclude that, in accordance with the legislation in force at the time of the facts, it was not possible to detach confiscation (comiso) from the demonstration, through a judgment, of an act that was at least typical and unlawful. The situation regulated by Article 110 (*Artículo 110*) of the Criminal Code (*Código Penal*) is confiscation (comiso) as a consequence of the wrongdoing; and not just any wrongdoing, but that which is the subject of pronouncement in the specific criminal case, which corresponds, in this case, to money laundering (legitimación de capitales). Since there is no conviction (fallo condenatorio) for said crime, it is not possible to order confiscation (comiso). Consequently, the eighth ground of the appeal is declared **without merit**.

However, based on the documentary evidence duly incorporated into the process, and in particular, that which is extracted from the judicial assistance with the United States, it is possible to conclude that at the time the trial for capital legitimization (legitimación de capitales) was conducted in this case, the judicial situation of Morrison was as follows: **A)** He had a substantively final conviction (condena firme materialmente) for the crime of possession of a prohibited weapon (see page 1192 back of the ruling of the ad quem, in which reference is made to proven fact number 7), and **B)** His conviction for the crime of cigarette tax evasion, issued by a jury in May 2008, was reinstated against him. At the time of the hearing (debate), this latter conviction was final regarding the imputation of charges, but a new hearing for the imposition of the sentence still had to be held (pages 1192 back - 1193 front). **C)** *“…final acquittal (sentencia absolutoria firme) of Morrison for the crimes of extortion, homicide, arson, etc…”* (page 1193 front). Regarding these latter illicit acts, it is necessary to clarify that, even though the crimes of extortion and others are mentioned as factual background in the judgment, mainly by reference to the witness Dianne Leonardo (page 1195 front and back), these imputations cannot be used in our country to establish the predicate facts of the capital legitimization, because the accused possesses a final acquittal from the jury for those charges, which was upheld, and the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) has not alleged an error by the U.S. justice system in issuing said acquittal. Rather, the rulings handed down in the judicial case against Morrison in the United States are provided as evidence regarding the predicate offense (delito precedente), and for that reason, we must abide by them on that point. Although the American system allows the judge to consider certain conduct for which the jury acquitted when setting the sentence, such a situation is prohibited in our legal system, by reason of what is established in the first paragraph of Article 39 of our Political Constitution: *“…No one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime, quasi-crime, or misdemeanor, sanctioned by a prior law and by virtue of a final judgment (sentencia firme) issued by a competent authority, after prior opportunity granted to the accused to exercise his defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt…”* (the underlining is supplied). The same guarantee is provided for in numeral 8.4 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Proceeding to the contrary would, therefore, imply ignoring the principle of res judicata (cosa juzgada) (the ad quem refers, on this point, to folio 904 of evidentiary file (legajo de prueba) number 3, provided by the defense, whose official translation appears at folio 113). Of course, in accordance with the precedents of this Chamber, the existence of a judgment that designates someone as responsible for the prior crime is not an unavoidable requirement for capital legitimization to be configured. On multiple occasions, it has been noted that the criminal origin of the resources can be accredited within the same process followed for the legitimization, through circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria). However, this matter differs from the bulk of cases because a judicial process was followed and a judgment was issued, which the prosecuting entity itself provides as evidence regarding the predicate fact, and for that reason, we must abide by it regarding the specific facts for which Morrison was convicted in that country. By virtue of the foregoing, one must only depart from the fact that Rodney Morrison was convicted of a crime of weapon possession and another of smuggling (contrabando), with the imposition of the penalty for this latter conduct being pending at the time of the hearing. The conviction for the crime of weapon possession is not important, because for capital legitimization to be configured, the mere existence of a prior criminal fact is not sufficient; rather, it must be demonstrated that the money originates from that crime. Such a nexus does not exist between the questioned money and the charge of weapon possession. **Regarding the predicate fact of smuggling, for which Rodney Morrison was convicted, and its legal characterization (calificación jurídica) for the purposes of determining the predicate offense:** It remains to be explored, then, the conduct referred to as tax evasion (point **B** of the imputations detailed above), in order to determine if it is one of the crimes contemplated in numerals 211 to 216 of the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas) (number 7559 of October 20, 1995, according to its wording before the entry into force of Law 8373 of August 18, 2003), or if it is the illicit act provided for in numeral 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (Law 4755 of May 3, 1971). For the purposes of delimiting the scope of the conviction, the Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia) refers to the jury's pronouncement of 2008, which was reinstated by judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of the United States, of July 2010, as stated in documents from folios 672 to 726, of volume II of the main file (expediente principal), admitted as documentary evidence in the hearing (see point 42 of page 883). Although this referral is correct, because the pronouncement of the U.S. Court is the starting point for elucidating the predicate criminal conduct, the appeals judgment mentions the norm that, in the legislation of the United States, sanctions the conduct accredited to Morrison (the equivalent to the criminal type (tipo penal) in our legal system), when in reality, that information only allows one to elucidate that the conduct in question is also a crime in the United States. But for the purposes of establishing whether the conduct is a crime and its characterization in Costa Rica, we must adhere not to the nomen iuris, but to the specific conduct that the jury deemed proven. In this order of ideas, we start from the fact that, effectively, the U.S. norm applicable to Morrison for the charge of interest here consists of *“…the illegal possession—that is, without prior payment of taxes—of cigarettes, in the United States…”,* which constitutes in the United States a crime punishable by up to twenty years of imprisonment (sentence appeals ruling, page 1144 back). But, for the purposes of interest here, the factual framework (cuadro fáctico) that reinstated the ruling issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals is the following: *“…Morrison was the managing partner of Peace Pipe Smoke Shop, which sold cigarettes on the Unkechauge Indian Nation's Poospatuck Indian Reservation, in Mastic, New York. Peace Pipe's income originates mainly from the sale of tax-free cigarettes. Morrison advertised his cigarette sales business all over New York City. Morrison sold some of the tax-free cigarettes at the Peace Pipe counter or over the Internet, and he also frequently engaged in large wholesale transactions with individuals he called ‘Big Customers.’ These sales usually involved quantities of cigarettes exceeding 60,000. In total, the revenue from sales to Big Customers from the year 1999 to the year 2004 totaled more than $138 million. Peace Pipe employees usually delivered cigarettes to Big Customers in large black plastic bags to conceal the items. The accounting books in which Morrison recorded Peace Pipe's sales referred to his Big Customers only by pseudonyms. At least some of Morrison's Big Customers resold the cigarettes they bought from Peace Pipe in places outside the reservation, and Morrison was aware of what they were doing…”* (“the conduct of the crime,” official translation of the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeal, page 706, volume II of the file). This factual framework was reiterated by the judges of the foreign Court of Appeals, noting: *“…Morrison’s actions went far beyond this type of conduct that could be placed in some area of ambiguity. He participated in a substantial wholesale business, with some 50,000 ‘Big Customers’ who, jointly, purchased more than $138 million in cigarettes from 1999 to 2004. He encouraged these sales by distributing flyers in New York City. Throughout this time, he knew that at least some of his ‘Big Customers’ were reselling the cigarettes outside the reservation…”* (cf. page 722). From the statement of the prosecutor Dianne Leonardo, which was weighed by the appeals judges, it is clear that at the time of the trial for the crime of capital legitimization, the new “sentence” (in reality, it is the imposition of the penalty by the judge) for the charges reinstated against Morrison was pending issuance. In the words of the witness, cited by the appeals judges: *“…in July of this year the Court of Appeal overturned (sic) Judge Hurley's verdict and the decision is obtained in the month of July 2012, the charges made against him for smuggling were reinstated, he has not yet been given a new sentence, but he is going to receive this sentence for the facts of smuggling, this decision from the judge establishes Morrison as guilty of the crime of smuggling, this decision confirmed (sic) the decision of the jury, there is no new trial, what the jury established in May 2008 is simply reinstated, the sentencing has not yet been done…”* (see transcript of the testimony of Dianne Leonardo, in sentence appeals ruling, page 1195 front). Therefore, although the appeals ruling considers that there is no final conviction for the predicate fact, we must dissent from such a conclusion, because according to the ruling issued by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, just cited, and the statement of witness Leonardo, the determination of the existence of typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct was final at the time the judgment was handed down in this case, and only the sanction corresponding to said declaration of guilt remained to be determined. In relation to the charges of illegal possession and sale of cigarettes, and their correct legal characterization in the country, the ad quem reasons the following: *“…he is not imputed (only) with having sold cigarettes and not paying taxes on the sales, but rather with having obtained the shipments of cigarettes without having the seal (prior to those sales) indicating that, in turn, the distributors had paid the prior taxes. This means that, for the double incrimination, we are not talking about what in our system would be an evasion of the sales tax, but rather the entry into possession of the object, without the payment, prior to the subsequent sale, of taxes. It is the equivalent, in our environment, to import or customs taxes. That conduct is provided for, in Costa Rica, in a special law that, then, predominates over that general legislation, even if they concur with other tax transgressions referring to the sales tax. It concerns the General Customs Law No. 7557 of October 20, 1995 (published in La Gaceta 212 of November 8, 1995, and in force on the date of the accused facts) which establishes: ‘ARTICLE 1.- Scope of application. This law regulates the entries into and exits from the national territory of goods, vehicles, and transport units; also the customs clearance (despacho aduanero) and the facts and acts derived from it or from the entries and exits, in accordance with community and international norms, whose application is the responsibility of the National Customs Service’ (the bold text is supplied) with numeral 223 adding: ‘Relation with crimes typified in other tax norms. If the conduct typified in this law also constitutes a crime or a contravention established in the tax legislation, the special provisions of this law shall apply provided that such conduct relates to the non-compliance of customs tax obligations or duties before the customs authority’ (the highlighting is external). This regulation established customs crimes: at a first moment, from its entry into force in 1995 until the year 2003, and later from that date onward, when a reform was produced and up to the present date. Since the person charged here was improperly attributed with having received money from his brother, from the year 2002—which was already said to be atypical conduct since the capital arises from alleged crimes unrelated to drug trafficking—one must take into account, again, the legislative changes operated in the customs legislation. Thus, in 2002 and until 2003, the original General Customs Law was applicable, and from this date until 2007 (when the cycle of accused facts closes), the legislation currently in force would govern…”* (sentence appeals ruling, pages 1199 back to 1200). On this point, a clarification is necessary, and it is that due to the diversity of the tax collection system in Costa Rica and the United States, added to the fact that the latter contains state and federal legislation on the subject of taxes, there are no absolute parallelisms when comparing the American tax collection system and our own. This is a specificity of the case under examination, which makes the determination of whether we find ourselves before one of the crimes provided for in the General Customs Law, or in the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, even more complex. In the Costa Rican tax collection system, there is a clear difference between the taxes charged to “nationalize” the merchandise, that is, the customs taxes or import tariffs, and the tax obligations that may arise subsequent to said collection, when the goods are already legally possessed in the country. The former are regulated in the General Customs Law, and the latter in the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures. In the American system, for the purposes of interest, the legal possession of cigarettes exceeding 360,000 units (at the time of the commission of the predicate fact) implied the prior payment of a fee that is deemed beforehand as a sales tax, and that the seller subsequently recovers by charging it to the final customer. Such payment is accredited by placing a seal on each pack of cigarettes. Therefore, the crime attributed to Morrison in this case turns out to be a hybrid between our customs tariffs (established to legalize the possession of certain goods in the country) and the sales tax. We thus find ourselves before an apparent concurrence of norms, but the dilemma over which norm to apply is resolved by our substantive law, in numeral 23 of the Penal Code. Said norm indicates: *“…When the same conduct is described in several legal provisions that are mutually exclusive, only one of them shall be applied, as follows: the special norm prevails over the general one, the one that integrally contains another is preferred to the latter, and that which the law has not expressly or tacitly subordinated to another is applied in place of the accessory one…”* Customs Law is a sub-specialty of Tax Law, so the rule of specialty, provided for to define apparent conflicts of norms, is fulfilled. Furthermore, the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures itself expressly subordinates its application to what is not contemplated by the General Customs Law. In this sense, the first article of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures provides: *“…The provisions of this Code are applicable to all taxes and the legal relationships derived from them, except for what is regulated by special legislation (…) the provisions of this Code are of supplementary application, in the absence of an express norm…”* (wording according to law number 7900 of August 3, 1999). As anticipated, customs legislation is a specialized branch of Tax Law, which deals with the regularization of merchandise in the country (its entry, permanence, and exit). Without compliance with said “entry” norms to the national market, the goods could not be legally subject to commerce. This is an important distinction that allows establishing that the fact prior to the legitimization, according to our legal system, is a customs crime and not a tax crime in general. Uruguayan legislation, as in the case of Costa Rica, is characterized by containing general tax and customs norms, of equal rank, which appear to overlap by prohibiting tax evasion conduct, but faced with such a situation, just as occurs in our country, the principle of specialty is made to prevail: *“…the crime of smuggling in itself contains the defraudation in its objective criminal type (…). Our repressive customs regime comprises both conducts, being bipartite: smuggling and defraudation. The superposition of both reproaches implies a hypothesis of bis in idem. By the principle of specificity—in any case—it would be appropriate to elucidate whether a crime of smuggling has occurred, but not tax defraudation, which is already encompassed by the smuggling. They are criminal types that are reciprocally exclusive and not a concurrence between various criminal characterizations that apply to the same conduct. Which alternative is to be decided upon must be resolved without adding one to the other (smuggling or tax defraudation), since—as GONZÁLEZ teaches—Customs Law is a set of legal norms that has individuality within Fiscal Law. That individuality is distinguished by its foundations and methods, in addition to other substantive and procedural assumptions that also differentiate it…”* (ALLEN, Germán: “The superposition of the criminal types of smuggling and tax defraudation in Uruguayan law,” Published in Tribuna del Abogado, No. 180, Colegio de Abogados del Uruguay, Montevideo, October/December 2012, pp. 15-17). Returning to the case under examination, it was determined that Rodney Morrison offered for sale cigarettes that were not suitable for commerce, because the tax established to legitimize their sale in the state of New York had not been previously paid. They were, then, goods outside commerce, because the requirement set for the mere possession of said good by private individuals, in the State of New York, to be legitimate was not met. Having defined the national legislation applicable to the conduct for which Morrison was found responsible, it is appropriate to delve into the penalty applicable to the specific customs crime into which the facts are characterized, according to the moment of the commission of the facts. The General Customs Law, number 7557 of October 20, 1995, in its version in force until March 4, 2004, provided in numeral 214 the basic crime of customs tax fraud: *“…Article 214.- Basic crime. Whoever, by means of simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deceit, eludes or evades totally or partially the payment of the customs tax obligation, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the taxes left uncollected, with their interests and surcharges, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos…”* The specific cases were provided for in numeral 215 ejúsdem: *“…Specific cases of customs tax fraud. Shall incur the penalties set forth in the previous article, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos: a) Whoever, without authorization from the competent body, gives a purpose different from that provided in the authorizing norm to goods benefited with exemption or franchise or that have entered free of taxes. b) Whoever, using or declaring false information, requests or obtains preferential customs treatment. c) Whoever, using or declaring false information, justifies the fulfillment of their duties, obligations, or requirements in their capacity as a beneficiary or user of a customs regime or modality, to request or obtain preferential customs treatment. d) Whoever simulates, totally or partially, an export or import operation of goods or alters the description of some, with the aim of illicitly obtaining a customs incentive or an economic benefit. e) The official, the public employee, or the public attestor, who falsely certifies or records that a tax was totally or partially satisfied…”* Finally, the aggravating circumstances were regulated in numeral 216 of the same Law: *“…Aggravating circumstances. The penalty shall be three to five years and the fine equivalent to three times the amount of the taxes left uncollected, with their interests and surcharges, when, in any of the two previous articles, any of the following circumstances concur: a) Three or more persons intervene in the fact, in the capacity of authors. b) A public official intervenes in the capacity of author, instigator, or accomplice, in the exercise of their functions, on the occasion of them, or with abuse of their position…"* (the highlighting is supplied). The appeals judges correctly point out that it is the simple modality of commission of the criminal types provided for in the General Customs Law that is applicable to the conduct attributed in the United States to Rodney Morrison. The “facts of the crime” are attributed to Morrison individually, and not in co-authorship. Although it is true that on March 5, 2004, Law number 8373 of August 18, 2003, entered into force, which modified the criminal types of interest, establishing for the crime of simple customs fraud greater penalties, which in some specific cases exceed four years of imprisonment, said regulation is not applicable to the facts that motivated Morrison’s conviction, from which we must depart. Thus, even if we start from the material finality of the pronouncement issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals, the factual framework for which Rodney Morrison was judged is temporarily located *“from the year 1999 until the year 2004”* (cf. page 706). Furthermore, the accusatory document (pieza requisitoria) to which we must adhere for all purposes in this case, based on the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence, is the national accusation, on the basis of which the trial was conducted. This latter document places the predicate offense *“…between the year 1996 and 2004…”* (see page 835), and in accordance with that delimitation, it is established in the proven factual framework that the execution of the prior criminal acts occurred <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“:..Between the years 1996 and 2004…”</i> (f. 846), without specification of dates. We must proceed, then, from this temporal framing to carry out the analysis of double criminality. In situations such as this, where months or approximate parts of the year are not defined, and there are legislative reforms within the period of interest that force a decision on the applicable law, this Chamber has maintained a consistent position according to which, we must adhere to the interpretation most beneficial to the accused. Based on the ranges of sanctions, the most beneficial legislation proves to be, without a doubt, Law number 7557 of October 20, 1995, and not Law number 8373 of August 18, 2003 (effective as of March 5, 2004). From everything stated so far, it follows that the prior act in this case corresponds to the crime of customs tax fraud (defraudación fiscal aduanera), in its simple modality, and for greater precision, it concerns the criminal offense set forth in article 215 subsection a) (in relation to numeral 214) of the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas), in its wording according to Law 7557 of October 20, 1995. In this case, we are precisely faced with the improper use of a tax exemption established to regularize the possession of cigarettes, according to the legislation in force in the state of New York. However respectable the legal criterion may be, from which the Trial Court considered that the prior acts were sanctioned by our legal system through numeral 92 of the Tax Rules and Procedures Code (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), it is not the interpretation endorsed by this Chamber. By virtue of the foregoing, the first and fifth grounds of the challenge presented by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) are declared <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>without merit</b>.

<b style='mso-bidi-font-weight: normal'>III.- Second ground of the cassation appeal filed by Licensed Attorney Sarkis Fernández: Erroneous application of substantive law: Erroneous application of numerals 14 and 30 of the Civil Code, which entails erroneous application of article 1 of the Psychotropic Substances Law (Ley de Psicotrópicos), number 7786 of April 30, 1998.</b> Licensed Attorney Sarkis Fernández points out that the <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>ad quem</i> decrees the necessity of proving the existence of the foreign laws under which Rodney Morrison was convicted in order to accredit the prior act, in accordance with what is stipulated in article 30 of the Civil Code. In doing so, it ignores the principle of freedom of evidence (libertad probatoria) that governs in criminal matters. The appellant indicates that <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“…to demonstrate the existence of foreign legislation, as in this particular case, one should not resort to article 30 of the Civil Code </i>(…) <i style='mso-bidi-font-style: normal'>but rather, firstly, to the general rules provided in the Criminal Procedure Code itself for bringing evidence from abroad and, secondly, and no less important, to the Treaties of mutual legal assistance between Nations such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention)…”</i> (f. 1277). She states that it was by utilizing international criminal assistance that documentary evidence was incorporated into this process, which <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“…corroborates the existence of the criminal legislation and of the process carried out against Rodney Morrison in the United States, as well as the charges for which he was accused and for which he was sentenced…”</i> (ibid). She adds that another of the requirements found lacking by the Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), with a view to the principle of double criminality, is the accreditation of the minimum term of the penalty corresponding to the crime in the Anglo-Saxon system. Regarding this aspect, the appellant states that from a reading of 18 USC 1963 RICO, which is the charge for which Morrison was convicted, <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“…it is denoted that United States law does not refer to a minimum term for this type of criminality, but rather only delimits the maximum term of 20 years of imprisonment, and therefore the Appeals Court </i>(…) <i style='mso-bidi-font-style: normal'>seeks an impossibility, since the Anglo-Saxon criminal offense does not have a minimum term for this crime, we reach the absurdity of requiring that the Trial Court have established it as if a Costa Rican court of justice had the legislative power that corresponds to another State…” </i>(f. 1280). The prosecutor proposes that to establish when a crime should be considered “serious” (grave), one must resort to a teleological interpretation <i style='mso-bidi-font-style: normal'>“…that integrates what <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>(sic)</b> is the sense of national and international legislation against money laundering and the fight against organized crime, as well as the abstract penalty that can be imposed on one who commits the predicate crime and, finally </i>(…) <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>the social harmfulness (dañosidad social) of the conduct…”. </i><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>The ground is declared partially with merit, despite which, the conclusions of the <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>a quo</i> regarding the atypicality of the crime do not vary: </b>The Public Prosecutor's Office must be granted reason, in that the principle of freedom of evidence allows the existence and content of international regulations to be accredited through any legitimate means, and in this case, the legal assistance processed by the prosecuting entity with the United States must be taken as a legal evidentiary source, duly incorporated into the process. From said judicial assistance comes the sentence of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit of that nation which, in fact, this Chamber has recognized in the preceding considerando (Considerando), constitutes valid evidence for the purpose of delimiting the conduct for which Rodney Morrison was found guilty. However, this concession to the argument of the Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía) does not have the effect that the party assigns to it, for even starting from said evidentiary incorporation, as will be seen, we must conclude that in the present case a “serious crime” was not configured, since alongside the principle of freedom of evidence, the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence must also be respected. Based on the wording of the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), in force at the time of the facts that are of interest here, the funds that are converted, transmitted, or concealed must come from a “serious crime” (Law number 8204, published in La Gaceta number 8, of January 11, 2002). Hence the importance of establishing which is the norm that, at the time of the facts, defined the concept of serious crime, and the implications this has regarding respect for the principle of double criminality, which must be respected when the prior act is committed abroad, just as occurs in this case. As already stated, article 1 of Law 8204 of January 11, 2002, defined serious crime as <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“the conduct that constitutes a crime punishable by a deprivation of liberty of four years, at a minimum…”</i>. The subsequent reform to the Psychotropic Substances Law that eliminates the reference to “serious crime” did not enter into force until March 16, 2009, and therefore is not applicable to these facts, by virtue of the norms that regulate the application of criminal law over time. However, through Law number 8302, of September 12, 2002 – effective as of June 27, 2003 – the “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” better known as the “Palermo Convention,” was incorporated into the Costa Rican legal system. Said instrument provides in article 2, subsection b): <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“…‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty…”</i>. In accordance with the provisions of article 7 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), the Palermo Convention was incorporated into the body of law as of June 27, 2003, and thus, being a subsequent law, it partially repeals the definition of serious crime contained in numeral 1 of Law 8204 of December 26, 2001, at least for the cases to which said international regulation applies, according to the definitions contained within the instrument itself. Despite the facts proven against Rodney Morrison, cannot be deemed organized crime, due to the fact that in the United States he was convicted individually, the referenced instrument extends its scope of application to money laundering activities, as is drawn from the relation of what is indicated in article 3: a) and article 6 <span class=SpellE><i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>ejusdem</i></span>. Because the temporal location of the predicate crime, for the purposes that are of interest here, ranges from the year 1999 to 2004 (without defining dates, according to the accusatory pleading and the proven facts), and the Palermo Convention is incorporated into the body of national law as of June 2003, the indication made in the Sentence Appeals ruling, to the effect that said instrument constitutes a law subsequent “to the accusation” that is not more favorable to the interests of the accused and therefore, is inapplicable due to the principle of non-retroactivity established in numerals 11 and 12 of the Penal Code, as well as article 34 of the Constitution (see f. 1190 vto.), is not understandable. Rather, the entry into force of said Convention is clear, within the temporal range during which the predicate crime is considered perpetrated, since said instrument entered into force on June 27, 2003, and as we stated, the final temporal range from which we must proceed for the prior acts is from 1999 to 2004. However, as indicated in the preceding considerando, the criminal offense applicable to the prior act corresponds to a specific modality of tax fraud (defraudación fiscal), contemplated in subsection a) of article 215 of the Penal Code, in relation to article 214, according to its wording in force in Law 7557 of October 20, 1995. The relevant norms are the following: <i style='mso-bidi-font-style: normal'>"…Article 214.- Basic crime. Whoever, through simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deception, eludes or evades, in whole or in part, the payment of the customs tax obligation, provided the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the taxes left unreceived, with their interest and surcharges. Article 215: “…Specific cases of customs tax fraud (defraudación fiscal aduanera). Whoever engages in the following shall incur the penalties indicated in the previous article, provided the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos: a) Whoever, without authorization from the competent body, gives a purpose different from that provided in the authorizing norm, to goods benefited with exemption or franchise or that have entered free of taxes…”</i> (the underlining is supplied). From which it follows that, even though as of January 27, 2003 (still within the temporal range of the prior act), any crime punishable by a prison sentence—at its minimum or maximum term—is considered a serious crime, such condition is not met in the instant case, since the maximum penalty established for the predicate crime at the time of the facts corresponds to three years of imprisonment. The position of the Public Prosecutor's Office cannot be accepted, to the effect that it is feasible to depart from the definition of serious crime contained in our regulations, which, as already indicated, uses as a differentiator that the act be punishable by four years of imprisonment or more. The suggestion to resort to criteria such as the protected legal interest, or the social harm caused, may be subjected to parliamentary discussion, for the purpose of generating reforms, but in no case may the judicial operator arrogate to itself exclusive competencies of the legislator. Finally, it remains to address the issue of double criminality, which results in obligatory reference when the prior act is committed abroad. In observance of this principle, it must be verified that the acts that serve as the basis for the predicate crime are provided for as criminal activity, both in the country where it was committed and in the country where the money laundering is being judged. Beyond that verification, this Chamber considers it excessive to require that the conduct be considered a “serious” crime both in national legislation and abroad, since that would imply extending the parameters of one’s own legal system to other jurisdictional systems that may contain parameters for measuring penalties very different from our own. Consider, for example, systems that do not have minimum sanctions, but rather regulate only the maximum amount to impose, or those that qualify the seriousness of crimes in consideration of the protected legal interest. On this aspect, the existence of debate in the doctrine must be conceded, but we opt to consider that the principle of double criminality is satisfied upon verifying that the conduct that configures the predicate crime is a crime both in Costa Rica and abroad. For the classification as “serious,” one must adhere to national regulations, it being excessive that the crime be considered serious both under the parameters of the Costa Rican legal system and the foreign legislation, since this forces the standardization of two systems for measuring penalties that may not have points of coincidence. Spanish legislation is very similar to Costa Rican legislation, with respect to the objective requirements of the crime of money laundering, as well as in the evolution of the offense. When analyzing in said legislation the requirements of the predicate crime and specifically, the requirement that the laundered funds proceed from a “serious crime,” it has been stated: <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“…it would be fitting </i>(…) <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>to interpret, more logically, that for the crime of money laundering typified in the Spanish Penal Code to exist, it is necessary that the underlying crime also be sanctioned criminally in the place of its commission; it is the principle called ‘double criminality,’ by virtue of which the prior crime must be punishable both in the place of execution and in Spain. One of the most interesting questions that arises in relation to this topic is that concerning the legal classification of the underlying crime committed abroad, that is, whether it should be made based on the criminal law of the country of commission of the crime or the country where the laundering is carried out. And the question becomes more difficult to resolve if the law of the country where the laundering is committed requires, as Article 301 of the CP did until the Organic Law (LO) 15/2003, that the crime from which the goods proceed be a serious crime, since then the question would arise of, in case the crime is committed abroad, where it would have to be considered serious, whether in the national territory where it is carried out and the laundering is judged or in the place of commission of the crime, that is, the determination of the law based on which the legal classification of the prior crime committed abroad must be carried out, whether the classification of the crime —serious then— would have to be made according to the law of the place of commission or according to Spanish criminal law. If the first solution is chosen, a material extension of national criminal law would be produced, a possibility that the majority of the doctrine rejects, considering by and large that the classification of the prior act must be made according to the national legislation where the money laundering crime was committed...”</i> (García López, S. (2006). “Money Laundering. Evolution of the Underlying Crime.” Retrieved from <u><span style='color:blue'><a href="http://www.ief.es/%20documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/cuadernos_formacion/05_2008/Colab_05_08.pdf"><span style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"'>http://www.ief.es/ documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/cuadernos_formacion/05_2008/Colab_05_08.pdf</span></a></span></u><span style='color:black'>. The underlining does not correspond to the original). According to the foregoing assessments, which this Chamber adopts, it is excessive to require that the foreign nation where the predicate crime was committed contain legislation similar to Costa Rican legislation regarding what is understood as a serious crime. What is required, as already indicated, is to demonstrate a concrete connection between the funds being laundered and the prior act, and of course, that the conduct in question is provided for and sanctioned as a crime in both legislations. On the other hand, the claim of the Prosecutor's Office to depart from the criterion established by the Costa Rican legislator to define what should be considered a “serious crime” cannot be accepted. If in Law 8204 of January 11, 2002, applicable to the facts known here according to their time of commission, it is clearly defined that a serious crime is one that provides as a penalty a deprivation of liberty of four years “at a minimum,” it is this definition that must prevail for the acts committed between January 11, 2002, and June 26, 2003. As of June 27, 2003, with the entry into force of Law number 8302 of September 12, 2002, the definition of “serious crime” from the Palermo Convention begins to govern, according to which, it suffices that the crime contains within its range of deprivation of liberty four years, regardless of whether it concerns the minimum or the maximum term. What happens in the case under examination is that neither with the first definition nor with the second do the acts achieve the characterization of “serious,” since as already indicated, the criminal offense applicable according to the time of commission of the prior act, is the General Customs Law of 1995, which provided for the conduct deprivation of liberty penalties ranging from one to three years. For all the foregoing, although the prosecuting representative must be granted reason regarding the principle of freedom of evidence and the possibility of extracting data from the documents obtained through international criminal assistance, as well as regarding the fact that the scope of the principle of double criminality should not lead to the extreme of requiring that the conduct of the predicate crime must be considered serious also in the foreign legislation, under our own standards, such clarifications do not have the consequence of changing the final conclusion reached by the appellate judges. The predicate crime in this matter continues not to achieve the classification of “serious” and, therefore, an essential objective element is found lacking for the configuration of money laundering, according to its wording in force from January 11, 2002, to March 15, 2009. In synthesis, the present ground is declared <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>partially with merit</b>, despite which, the conclusions of the <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>a quo</i> regarding the atypicality of the crime judged here do not vary.

<b style='mso-bidi-font-weight: normal'>IV.- Third ground of the challenge, due to the existence of contradictory precedents of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), in relation to what was resolved by the San José Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelaciones de San José): </b> The Prosecutor's Office argues that the acquittal being appealed, number 337 of 3:25 p.m., of February 19, 2012, is contradictory with the following precedents, issued by this Chamber: a) number 183, of 3:55 p.m., of March 6, 2006; b) 1105, of 12:25 p.m., of September 10, 2004; c) 765, of 10:50 a.m., of July 8, 2005; and d) 289, of 8:55 a.m., of April 4, 1997. It bases its objection on the fact that this Chamber, in the indicated rulings, has repeatedly stated<i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'> “…to demonstrate that the monies being laundered originate from a prior crime, said demonstration must be established even through circumstantial evidence, while in the acquittal issued by the Appeals Court in favor of Howden Pascall, it considered necessary and essential that, to demonstrate that the goods originate in a crime, a final and binding conviction is required…” </i>(f. 1289). It states that by requiring a final conviction for the predicate crime, undue requirements are being imposed for the configuration of money laundering, making the investigation of this type of crime in our country practically impossible. <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>Fourth ground of the cassation appeal filed by Licensed Attorney Sarkis Fernández: Erroneous application of substantive law, specifically, articles 1 and 69 of Law 7786, amended by Law 8204 of December 26, 2001: </b>Resuming the arguments of the third ground of cassation, this time from the perspective of an infraction of substantive law, the appellant considers that <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>“…the Appeals Court completely errs in its substantive basis, by requiring the demonstration of the crime prior to the money laundering, only through a final and binding conviction. We insist, it is not established in the criminal offense and neither has it been required, by case law, as an indispensable requirement, a conviction for the prior crime, for example, drug trafficking or another serious crime…”</i> (f. 1294). Based on varied Spanish doctrine, the appellant indicates that the crime of money laundering is autonomous, <span class=SpellE>pluriofensive</span>, and that a final criminal sentence on the prior crime is not required for its verification, as the <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>ad quem</i> demands in this cause. <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>The objections are without merit:</b> In the cause under examination, unlike what occurs in the bulk of investigations for money laundering, there is a sentence in relation to the predicate crime, occurred and judged abroad, which is provided by the Public Prosecutor's Office itself, in order to accredit said objective element of the offense. Consequently, the assessment of the ruling of the Court of Appeals of the Second District of the United States, and specifically, its definition of the “criminal conduct,” is not arbitrary. It concerns the evidence provided by the accusing entity itself, in order to accredit the point. As already indicated, when resolving the first ground of cassation, the reference made to crimes such as extortion, homicide, or organized crime could not be proven in this cause, neither through the sentence nor through other circumstantial evidence. By excluding them, then, from the definition of the predicate crime, the judges do not incur a requirement not provided for by the law, such as the existence of a prior sentence, but rather consider that there are no elements of conviction that would allow the conclusions reached by the United States judicial system when it acquits Rodney Morrison of said charges to be overturned. The way in which the <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>ad quem</i> resolves it conforms to what was indicated by Professor Francisco Castillo regarding the principle of freedom of evidence in relation to the prior act: <i style='mso-bidi-font-style: normal'>“…it is necessary for the Court to determine the existence of the prior act and its typical and unlawful character, without mere suspicion that the object comes from a punishable act being sufficient. The establishment of the proof of the prior act can be done through a final and binding sentence, if it was heard by a competent authority. If this (sic) proof is lacking, the typical and unlawful character of the prior act, which is a normative element of the offense of money laundering, can be proven. <u>This proof must be made by the Judge hearing the country of the money laundering crime in accordance with the criteria of freedom of evidence and free evaluation of evidence</u>. In any case, the establishment of the prior act by the national Judge as a normative element of the criminal offense of money laundering does not imply handing down a sentence on national soil for the prior act that occurred abroad…” </i>(CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco: <u>El delito de Legitimación de Capitales</u>, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1st edition, San José, 2012, pp. 93-94).

As can be inferred, it is one thing for the principle of freedom of evidence to govern in Criminal Law, and quite another to attempt to pass off unproven U.S. charges (neither in the United States, nor in the proceeding before us) as accredited facts for the purpose of establishing what the predicate fact of interest for money laundering (legitimación de capitales) is. By respecting the factual framework defined by the U.S. Court of Appeals, therefore, it is not disregarded that the predicate offense could be proven through evidentiary sources other than a judgment, such as circumstantial evidence, within the money laundering case itself, a criterion this Chamber maintains. What occurs is that in the situation under review, the evidence provided to prove the predicate fact is the certified documentation of the judicial process followed in the United States against Morrison, and no other. For all the foregoing reasons, the third ground of the challenge filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is declared **without merit**. [...]

**VII.- Eighth ground of cassation: Disregard of Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code, as well as Article 87 of Law No. 8204 of December 26, 2001:** The challenger points out that the Sentencing Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia) does not refute the proven fact of the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio), consisting of the fact that Morrison, the defendant’s brother, *“…transferred to the country, between 2002 and 2004, a little over sixteen million dollars, leaving some sums in his name and others in the accounts of the accused herein, to whom, on July 17, 2000, he granted a general unlimited power of attorney (poder generalísimo sin límite de suma) for the administration and disposition of his assets…”* (f. 1329). From the above, the appellant derives that the *ad quem* holds as true that *“…as a product of the illicit activities carried out by Morrison in the United States, he obtained large sums of money which are precisely those he sent via bank transfers to the Bank of Costa Rica (…) therefore they must be considered as assets deriving from a crime for the purposes of Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code and 87 of Law 8204…”* (f. 1330). Consequently, Ms. Sarkis Fernández considers that, regardless of the circumstances regarding the guilt of the defendant Howden Pascall, the forfeiture (comiso) order issued by the Trial Court in this case should have been upheld. **The objection cannot be upheld:** For the correct resolution of this complaint, several clarifications must be made. The first of them is that the rules of the Penal Code and of the Psychotropic Substances Law (Ley de Psicotrópicos) regulating forfeiture cannot be applied concomitantly or simultaneously, as the appellant suggests. The regulations provided in Law 8204 of December 26, 2001, are special and apply to the offenses provided for in the Psychotropic Substances Law, among them, money laundering, the existence of which has been ruled out in this case. For that reason, it is only possible to examine whether or not Articles 103 and 110 of the Penal Code are applicable. Secondly, it is not true that the Sentencing Appeals Court holds as true that the entirety of the money sent to Howden Pascall by his brother via bank transfers from the United States comes from the commission of crimes. Precisely one of the reasons why, as an exercise, the *ad quem* considers that it would not be possible to fit the facts as the offense contemplated in Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (we already indicated that this would also not be possible, by virtue of the rules of apparent concurrence), is that no evidence was provided to the proceeding allowing one to know what part of said money corresponds to the profits obtained by Morrison from the sale of cigarettes under conditions of illegality. This is a topic widely discussed by the appellate judges in the acquittal ruling (cfr. fs. 1196 fte. to 1198 vto.), which reflects the existence of a debate in the doctrine on the proportion of capital that becomes tainted when the predicate offense constitutes a tax crime. This discussion gains greater relevance when, as happens in this case, it would not be possible to affirm that the entirety of the money invested in the purchase of cigarettes was illegally obtained, since only a part of it would be what the accused withheld or failed to pay to the U.S. tax authority, rendering the forfeiture of all the profits potentially excessive and unjustified. Thus, it could not be affirmed that all the profits obtained by Morrison come from the commercialization of cigarettes, and even if we focus on said activity, we would have to exclude the sales of cigarettes made under conditions that are considered legal or tolerated under U.S. legislation, namely: sales made within the reservation and for consumption by the indigenous population, as well as the prior capital that Rodney Morrison may have had. To this effect, the sentencing appeals judges reasoned: *“…not only is there no reasoning, but worse still, there is no evidence whatsoever, neither expert nor of any other kind, that states the amount of what was left unpaid to the United States Government for taxes, which is the only illicit part of that money (and not the totality of the income arising from cigarette sales), nor can it be presumed (…) that the entirety of the transferred money is illicit, since the sale of tobacco and cigarettes, like any commercial activity, generates some profit once taxes are paid, plus, as was established by the statement of Dianne C. Leonardo (see folio 854) and of Eliécer Pascall Gordon (folio 872), the money transferred by Morrison also came from other diverse activities he had in that country…”* (f. 1196 fte.). In short, under the reasoning derived from the appellate judgment, it is not possible to assert that the entirety of the money transferred to Howden Pascall corresponds to capital deriving from criminal activities. Despite this, the *ad quem* points out that the forfeiture was ordered by the Trial Court over the entirety of the transferred money, without distinguishing between the amounts obtained before the atypical nature of the facts, that is, before Law 8204 came into force on January 11, 2002 (f. 1210 fte.). On this point it notes: *“…the Court took all the money brought into the country, without making any division by period, which caused it to account for amounts brought in when that conduct was not a crime, that is, before 2002…”* (f. 1198 fte.). There is a second level of analysis, in order to give a correct solution to the issue raised regarding forfeiture. It concerns the way in which said figure is defined in the Costa Rican Penal Code. Article 103 *ejúsdem* provides: *“Every punishable act has civil reparation as a consequence, which shall be **determined in a condemnatory judgment**; this shall order: (…) 3) forfeiture (comiso)”*. This is related to Article 110 of the same normative body: *“**The crime** produces the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed and of the things or values deriving from its perpetration, or that constitute for the agent a profit derived from the same crime, except for the right that the victim or third parties may have over them...”* (the underlining is added). Note that the legislator makes express reference to the “crime,” which must have been determined by a “condemnatory judgment.” In this particular case, the jurisdiction of the Costa Rican judges to issue a judgment is limited to the crime of money laundering. However, regarding said offense, the acquittal issued is upheld. From which we have that it could not be affirmed that the questioned funds come from the perpetration of the crime on which the Costa Rican judges issued a judgment, but from another (cigarette tax evasion), over which our jurisdiction has no competence to rule. The claim of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office implies, then, assigning to an offense committed and sentenced abroad a consequence other than the penalty, without the Costa Rican judges having jurisdiction to judge and sanction the crime in question. Costa Rican law does not provide for the figure called *“extended forfeiture (comiso ampliado)”*, which constitutes the figure through which it is possible to seize not only the assets deriving from the crime judged in the country, but also *“…the profits obtained by the criminal organization **that are not directly related to the criminal activity being tried**…”* (VARGAS GONZÁLEZ, Patricia: “El comiso de las ganancias. Algunas deudas y excesos legislativos”, In: Derecho Penal y Constitución. Libro en memoria del Dr. Luis Paulino Mora Mora, volume I, collective work, San José, 2014, p. 323, the highlighting is added). As Article 110 of the Penal Code is drafted, applicable to this matter because it is not a crime contemplated in the Psychotropic Substances Law, it must be concluded that in our country, in accordance with the regulation in force at the time of the facts, forfeiture is linked or limited to the assets directly related to the crime subject to conviction in the case being heard. Efforts to correct this shortcoming have given rise to various legislative projects. One of the proposals approved as law came into force on July 22, 2009, (Law against Organized Crime, No. 8754 of July 24, 2009), which entails the seizure of assets whose lawful origin cannot be justified, even without any link to a crime. Specifically, Article 20 of the referred Law states: *“…La Contraloría General de la República, the Ministry of Finance, the ICD or the Public Prosecutor's Office may report, before the Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters, the increase of capital without apparent lawful cause, with a retrospective look of up to ten years, of any public official or private law person, whether physical or juridical. Upon receiving the report, the Court shall give a hearing to the interested party for a term of twenty business days to answer and present evidence; in the same resolution, it shall order, as a precautionary measure, the seizure of assets, their registration immobilization and that of all kinds of financial products. Against the precautionary measure, only an appeal without suspensive effect may be filed, which must be lodged within twenty-four hours before the Administrative Litigation Collegiate Tribunal, which shall resolve without further procedure and with priority over any other matter...”*. However, its practical application has not been possible, and in reality it does not involve an expanded forfeiture figure, but rather a process of a nature different from criminal law, which must be followed in the administrative litigation jurisdiction. From what has been said so far, we can conclude that, in conformity with the legislation in force at the time of the facts, it was not possible to detach forfeiture from the demonstration, through a judgment, of an act that is at least typical (típico) and unlawful (antijurídico). The situation regulated by Article 110 of the Penal Code is forfeiture as a consequence of the wrongful act; and not of any wrongful act, but the one that is the subject of a ruling in the specific criminal case, which corresponds, in this instance, to money laundering. In the absence of a condemnatory judgment for said crime, ordering forfeiture is not possible. Consequently, the eighth ground of the challenge is declared **without merit**.”

“III.- Por las razones que se dirán, los motivos primero y quinto de la casación incoada se declaran sin lugar: Debido a la estrecha relación de los aspectos debatidos, se conocen de manera conjunta los motivos primero y quinto del recurso. Los hechos de interés en esta causa, que se atribuyen a Howden Pascall, ocurrieron entre los años 2000 y 2007. La conducta ilícita precedente, corresponde a una condena penal efectuada por los tribunales estadounidenses, al hermano del aquí imputado. Estos últimos hechos base o “precedentes”, habrían ocurrido entre 1999 y 2004, de conformidad con el fallo de la Corte de Apelaciones para el Segundo Circuito de los Estados Unidos. Como bien razona el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, una circunstancia esencial a tomar en consideración, es que antes del 10 de enero de 2002, en nuestro país, únicamente se sancionaba penalmente a quien legitimara capitales provenientes de la actividad de narcotráfico, por lo que toda acción tendente a ocultar el origen, trasladar o convertir valores provenientes de delitos de cualquier otra naturaleza, resultaba atípica. En este sentido, la Ley número 7786 de 30 de abril de 1998, denominada “Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas”, regulaba en el artículo 72: “…Será sancionado con pena de prisión de ocho a veinte años quien: a) Convierta, transfiera o transporte bienes de interés económico que procedan, directa o indirectamente, del tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas o delitos conexos, con objeto de ocultar o encubrir su origen ilícito, o de ayudar, mediante tal conversión, transporte o transferencia, a cualquier persona que haya participado en la comisión de uno de esos delitos a eludir las consecuencias jurídicas de sus actos. b) Oculte o encubra la naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o la propiedad verdadera de recursos, bienes o derechos a ellos relativos, con conocimiento de que proceden directa o indirectamente del tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas o delitos conexos. La pena será de diez a veinte años cuando los hechos anteriores sean cometidos por empleados, funcionarios, directores, propietarios u otros representantes autorizados de las instituciones financieras…” (el subrayado es suplido). Es a partir de la reforma integral a la Ley de Psicotrópicos, número 8204, de 26 de diciembre de 2001 (vigente a partir de su publicación, el 11 de enero de 2002), que la redacción de tipo penal varió sustancialmente, para incluir la legitimación de capitales “que provienen, directa o indirectamente, de un delito grave”, con lo que se elimina la restricción anterior según la cual únicamente era posible legitimar capitales derivados del tráfico ilícito de drogas. Es así que a partir de enero de 2002, la redacción del tipo penal de interés es la siguiente: “…Será sancionado con prisión de ocho a veinte años: a) Quien adquiera, convierta o transmita bienes de interés económico, sabiendo que estos se originan en un delito grave, o realice cualquier otro acto para ocultar o encubrir el origen ilícito o para ayudar, a la persona que haya participado en las infracciones, a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos. b) Quien oculte o encubra la verdadera naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o los derechos sobre los bienes o la propiedad de estos, a sabiendas de que proceden, directa o indirectamente, de un delito grave. La pena será de diez a veinte años de prisión cuando los bienes de interés económico se originen en alguno de los delitos relacionados con el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, legitimación de capitales, desvío de precursores o sustancias químicas esenciales y delitos conexos…” (ley número 8204, de 26 de diciembre de 2001, vigente a partir del 11 de enero de 2002. El resaltado es suplido). Definido el marco normativo bajo el cual debe juzgarse la conducta atribuida a Howden Pascall, es menester analizar el hecho delictivo previo que exige el tipo penal de legitimación de capitales. Este análisis tiene una importancia crucial, como se analizará posteriormente, pues debe definirse si el dinero recibido en el país por el imputado, tiene su origen en un “delito grave”. Siguiendo la línea argumentativa del fallo de apelación, para ello deben dilucidarse varias situaciones. Por un lado, debe tenerse claro si, para establecer el delito precedente, se puede hacer remisión a los cargos que la Fiscalía estadounidense acusó a Rodney Morrison, hermano de Howden Pascall, o si por el contrario, es menester estarse a las conductas delictivas por las que se le encontró responsable en el extranjero. Debido a que este asunto se diferencia del grueso de las causas de legitimación de capitales, el que existe un juzgamiento previo de Morrison en Estados Unidos, no puede concluirse otra cosa que el respeto y apego a la comprobación de hechos, realizado en el seno del proceso criminal desarrollado en la jurisdicción extrajera. No podría ser de otra forma, porque lo contrario implicaría la transgresión del principio de non bis in idem, ya que Morrison fue juzgado en otro país por los mismos hechos que interesan aquí para establecer el hecho delictivo precedente, y la prueba concerniente a dicho proceso penal en los Estados Unidos, es precisamente el sustento probatorio utilizado por el Ministerio Público, a fin de acreditar ese extremo. De la prueba documental que se aporta, debidamente diligenciada a través del procedimiento de asistencia penal internacional, se tiene que Morrison fue acusado de los delitos de robo, homicidio, secuestro, portación de armas, incendio y evasión de impuestos, sin esclarecerse en la pieza acusatoria nacional, por cuáles ilícitos se le condenó, pues para ese momento únicamente se contaba con una condena firme por el delito de posesión de armas ilícitas. Sin embargo a partir de la prueba documental debidamente incorporada al proceso, y en particular, la que se extrae de la asistencia judicial con Estados Unidos, es posible concluir que para el momento en que realizó el juicio por legitimación de capitales en esta causa, la situación judicial de Morrison era la siguiente: A) Contaba con condena firme materialmente, por el delito de tenencia de arma prohibida (ver f. 1192 vto. de la sentencia del ad quem, en el que se hace referencia al hecho probado número 7), y B) Se restableció en su contra la condena por el delito de evasión de impuestos de cigarrillos, dictada por un jurado en mayo de 2008. Esta última condena, al momento de realizarse el debate, se encontraba firme en cuanto a la imputación de cargos, pero aún debía hacerse una nueva audiencia para la imposición de la pena. (fs. 1192 vto. -1193 fte.). C)“…sentencia absolutoria firme de Morrison por los delitos de extorsión, homicidio, incendio, etc…” (f. 1193 fte.). Con respecto a estos últimos ilícitos, es menester aclarar que, aunque se mencione los delitos de extorsión y otros como antecedentes fácticos en la sentencia, principalmente por referencia de la testigo Dianne Leonardo (f. 1195 fte. y vto.), dichas imputaciones no pueden ser utilizadas en nuestro país para establecer los hechos precedentes de la legitimación de capitales, pues el sindicado posee una absolutoria firme del jurado por dichos cargos, la cual se mantuvo, y el Ministerio Público no ha alegado que un yerro de la justicia estadounidense, al dictar dicha absolutoria. Más bien las sentencias dictadas en la causa judicial contra Morrison en los Estados Unidos, se aportan como prueba sobre el delito precedente, y en tal razón a ella debemos atenernos en dicho extremo. Aunque el sistema norteamericano permita al juez considerar ciertas conductas por las que absolvió el jurado, a la hora de fijar la pena, tal situación se encuentra prohibida en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, en razón de lo que establece el primer párrafo del artículo 39 de nuestra Constitución Política: “…A nadie se hará sufrir pena sino por delito, cuasidelito o falta, sancionados por ley anterior y en virtud de sentencia firme dictada por autoridad competente, previa oportunidad concedida al indiciado para ejercitar su defensa y mediante la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad…” (el subrayado es suplido). La misma garantía se encuentra prevista en el numeral 8.4 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Proceder en contrario, implicaría, por lo tanto, desconocer el principio de cosa juzgada (el ad quem remite, en este punto, al folio 904 del legajo de prueba número 3, aportado por la defensa, cuya traducción oficial consta a folio 113). Por supuesto que, acorde con los precedentes de esta Sala, la existencia de una sentencia que señale a alguien como responsable del delito previo, no es un requisito ineludible para que se configure la legitimación de capitales. En múltiples oportunidades, se ha señalado que el origen delictivo de los recursos puede acreditarse dentro del mismo proceso seguido para la legitimación, a través de prueba indiciaria. Pero este asunto se diferencia del grueso de las causas, porque se siguió un proceso judicial y se dictó sentencia, la que el propio ente fiscal aporta como prueba sobre el hecho precedente, y por, ello, debemos atenernos a ella sobre los hechos puntuales por los que Morrison fue condenado en dicho país. En virtud de lo Morrison fue condenado por un delito de tenencia de arma y otro de contrabando, siendo que la imposición de la pena para esta última conducta, se encontraba pendiente al momento de realizarse el debate. La condena por el delito de tenencia de arma no tiene importancia, pues para que se configure la legitimación de capitales, no basta con la mera existencia de un hecho delictivo previo, sino que se debe demostrar que el dinero tiene su origen en ese delito. Tal nexo no existe entre el dinero cuestionado y el cargo de tenencia de arma. Sobre el hecho precedente de contrabando, por el que resultó condenado Rodney Morrison, y su calificación jurídica para efectos de la determinación del delito precedente: Queda por explorar entonces, la conducta a la que se hace referencia como evasión de impuestos (punto B, de las imputaciones detalladas arriba), a fin de determinar si se trata de alguno de los delitos contemplados en los numerales 211 a 216 de la Ley General de Aduanas (número 7559 de 20 de octubre de 1995, según su redacción antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley 8373 de 18 de agosto de 2003), o si se trata del ilícito previsto en el numeral 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Ley 4755 de 3 de mayo de 1971). Para efectos de delimitar los alcances de la condena, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia remite al pronunciamiento del jurado de 2008, el cual fue restablecido mediante sentencia de la Corte de Apelación del Segundo Circuito de los Estados Unidos, de julio de 2010, según consta en documentos de folios 672 a 726, del tomo II del 42 del f. 883). Aunque dicha remisión es correcta, pues pronunciamiento de la Corte norteamericana es el punto de partida para dilucidar la conducta delictiva precedente, la sentencia de apelación menciona la norma que, en la legislación de los Estados Unidos, sanciona la conducta acreditada a Morrison (el equivalente al tipo penal en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico), cuando en realidad dicho dato lo que permite dilucidar es que la conducta en cuestión es delito también en los Estados Unidos. Pero para efectos de establecer si la conducta es delito y su calificación en Costa Rica, debemos atenernos no al nomen iuris, sino a la conducta puntual que tuvo por demostrada jurado. En este orden de ideas, partimos de que, efectivamente, la norma estadounidense aplicable a Morrison por el cargo que aquí interesa, consiste en “…la tenencia ilegal, -es decir, sin pago previo de impuestos- de cigarrillos, en Estado Unidos…”, lo cual constituye en Estados Unidos, un delito sancionado con hasta veinte años de prisión (fallo de apelación de sentencia, f. 1144 vto.). Pero, para los efectos que aquí interesan, el cuadro fáctico que reinstaló el fallo dictado por la Corte de Apelaciones estadounidense, es el siguiente: “…Morrison era socio gerente de Peace Pipe Smoke Shop, la cual vendía cigarrillos en al Reserva Unkechauge Indian Nation`s Poospatuck Indian Reservation, en Mastic, Nueva York. Los ingresos de Peace Pipe se originan principalmente de la venta de cigarrillos libres de impuestos. Morrison publicitó su negocio de venta de cigarrillos por toda la ciudad de Nueva York. Morrison vendió algunos de los cigarrillos libres de impuesto en el mostrador de Peace Pipe o a través de Internet, así como él también realizó grandes transacciones al por mayor frecuentemente con individuos a quienes él llamó “Grandes Clientes”. Estas ventas usualmente involucraron cantidades de cigarrillos superiores a los 60.000. En total, los ingresos de las ventas a Grandes Clientes desde el año de 1999 hasta el año 2004 sumaron más de $138 millones. Los empleados de Peace Pipe usualmente entregaban cigarrillos a Grandes Clientes en grandes bolsas negras de plástico para ocultar los artículos. Los libros de contabilidad en los cuales Morrison registraba las ventas de Peace Pipe, hacían referencia a sus Grandes Clientes solo por medio de seudónimos. Al menos algunos de los Grandes Clientes de Morrison revendían los cigarrillos que ellos compraban en Peace Pipe en lugares fuera de la reserva y Morrison tenía conocimiento de lo que estaban haciendo…” (“la conducta del delito”, traducción oficial del fallo de la Corte de Apelación estadounidense, f. 706, tomo II del extranjera, al señalar: “…las acciones de Morrison fueron mucho más allá de éste tipo de conducta que pudiese ubicarse en alguna área de ambigüedad. Él participó en un negocio sustancial de ventas al por mayor, con unos 50 000 “Grandes Clientes” que, en forma conjunta, compraron más de $138 millones en cigarrillos desde 1999 hasta 2004. El alentó estas ventas mediante la distribución de volantes en la ciudad de Nueva York. Durante todo este tiempo, él sabía que, al menos algunos de sus “Grandes Clientes” estaban revendiendo los cigarrillos fuera de la reserva…” (cfr. f. 722). De la declaración de la fiscal Dianne Leonardo, la cual fue ponderada por los jueces de apelación, resulta claro que al momento del juicio por el delito de legitimación de capitales, estaba pendiente de dictarse la nueva “sentencia” (en realidad se trata de la imposición de la pena por parte del juez) por los cargos restituidos en contra de Morrison. En las palabras de la testigo, citada por los jueces de apelación: “…en julio de este año la Corte de Apelación anulo (sic) el veredicto del Juez Hurley y la decisión se obtiene en el mes de julio de 2012, se reinstauraron los cargos que se le hacen en el contrabando, todavía no se le ha dado una sentencia nueva, pero él va recibir esta sentencia en los hechos de contrabando, esta decisión del juez establece a Morrison como culpable del delito de contrabando, esta decisión confirmo (sic) la decisión del jurado, no hay un juicio nuevo simplemente se reinstala lo que el jurado estableció en mayo del 2008, todavía no se ha hecho la sentencia…” (ver transcripción del testimonio de Dianne Leonardo, en fallo de apelación de sentencia, f. 1195 fte.). Por ello, aunque el fallo de apelación estima que no existe sentencia condenatoria firme del hecho precedente, debemos disentir de tal conclusión, pues conforme al fallo dictado por la Corte de Apelaciones del Segundo Circuito, que se acaba de citar, y la declaración de la testigo Leonardo, la determinación de la existencia de una conducta típica, antijurídica y culpable se encontraba firme al momento del dictado de la sentencia en esta causa, y restaba por determinar únicamente, la sanción que corresponde a dicha declaratoria de culpabilidad. En relación con los cargos de tenencia y venta ilícita de cigarrillos, y su correcta calificación jurídica en el país, razona el ad quem lo siguiente: “…no se le imputa (solo) el haber vendido cigarrillos y no tributar sobre las ventas , sino el haber obtenido los embarques de cigarrillos sin tener el sello (anterior a esas ventas) de que, a su vez, los distribuidores habían pagado los impuestos previos. Eso significa que, para la doble incriminación, no estamos hablando de lo que en nuestro sistema sería una evasión del impuesto sobre ventas, sino de la entrada en posesión del objeto, sin el pago, previo a la venta ulterior, de tributos. Es el equivalente, en nuestro medio, a los impuestos de importación o aduanales. Esa conducta está prevista, en Costa Rica, en una ley especial que, entonces, predomina sobre aquella normativa general, aunque concurran con otras transgresiones fiscales referentes al impuesto de ventas. Se trata de la Ley General de Aduanas Nº 7557 del 20 de octubre de 1995 (publicada en La Gaceta 212 del 08 de noviembre de 1995 y vigente para la fecha de los hechos acusados) que establece: "ARTICULO 1.- Ámbito de aplicación. La presente ley regula las entradas y las salidas, del territorio nacional, de mercancías, vehículos y unidades de transporte; también el despacho aduanero y los hechos y actos que deriven de él o de las entradas y salidas, de conformidad con las normas comunitarias e internacionales, cuya aplicación esté a cargo del Servicio Nacional de Aduanas" (las negritas se suplen) agregando el numeral 223: "Relación con delitos tipificados en otras normas tributarias. Si las conductas tipificadas en esta ley configuran también un delito o una contravención establecidos en la legislación tributaria, se aplicarán las disposiciones especiales de la presente ley siempre que esas conductas se relacionen con el incumplimiento de obligaciones tributarias aduaneras o los deberes frente a la autoridad aduanera" (el destacado es externo). Esta normativa estableció delitos aduanales : en un primer momento, desde su vigencia en 1995 y hasta el año 2003 y luego desde esa data, en que se produjo una reforma y hasta la fecha . Como al aquí encartado se le atribuyó, indebidamente, haber recibido dineros de su hermano, desde el año 2002 , lo que ya se dijo que es una conducta atípica al surgir el capital de presuntos delitos ajenos al narcotráfico, hay que tener en cuenta, otra vez, los cambios legislativos operados en la legislación aduanal. Así, en el 2002 y hasta el 2003 resultaba aplicable la Ley General de Aduanas original y a partir de esta fecha y hasta el 2007 (en que se cierra el ciclo de los hechos acusados) regiría la normativa hoy vigente…” (fallo de apelación de sentencia, fs. 1199 vto. a 1200). En este punto es menester realizar una aclaración, y es que por lo diverso del sistema de recaudación de impuestos en Costa Rica y Estados Unidos, sumado a que el segundo contiene legislación estatal y federal en cuanto al tema de los impuestos, no existen paralelismos absolutos, a la hora de comparar el sistema de recaudación de impuestos norteamericano, y el nuestro. Esta es una especificidad de la causa bajo examen, que torna aún más compleja la determinación de si nos encontramos ante uno de los delitos previstos en la Ley General de Aduanas, o en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. En el sistema de recaudación de impuestos costarricense, existe una clara diferencia entre los impuestos que se cobran para “nacionalizar” la mercancía, es decir, los impuestos aduanales o aranceles de importación, y las obligaciones tributarias que pueden surgir con posterioridad a dicha recaudación, cuando ya se posee legalmente el bien en el país. Los primeros se encuentran regulados en la Ley General de Aduanas, y los segundos, en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. En el sistema estadounidense, para los efectos que interesan, la posesión legal de cigarrillos que superen las 360.000 unidades (para el momento de comisión del hecho precedente), implicaba el pago previo de una tarifa que se reputa de antemano como impuesto de ventas, y que el vendedor recupera posteriormente al cargarlo al cliente final. Tal pago se acredita con la colocación de un sello en cada cajetilla de cigarrillos. Por ello, el delito que se atribuyó en este caso a Morrison, resulta ser un híbrido entre nuestros aranceles aduaneros (establecidos para legalizar la tenencia de determinados bienes en el país), y el impuesto de ventas. Nos encontramos así, ante un concurso aparente de normas, pero la disyuntiva sobre cuál norma aplicar, la resuelve nuestra ley sustantiva, en el numeral 23 del Código Penal. Indica dicha norma: “…Cuando una misma conducta esté descrita en varias disposiciones legales que se excluyan entre sí, sólo se aplicará una de ellas, así: la norma especial prevalece sobre la general, la que contiene íntegramente a otra se prefiere a ésta y aquella que al ley no haya subordinado expresa o tácitamente a otra, se aplica en vez de la accesoria…” El Derecho aduanero, es una subespecialidad del Derecho Tributario, por lo que se cumple la regla de la especialidad, prevista para definir conflictos aparentes de normas. Además, de forma expresa el propio Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, subordina su aplicación a lo que no resulte contemplado por la Ley General de Aduanas. En este sentido, dispone el artículo primero del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios: “…Las disposiciones de este Código son aplicables a todos los tributos y las relaciones jurídicas derivadas de ellos, excepto lo regulado por la legislación especial (…) las disposiciones del presente Código son de aplicación supletoria, en defecto de norma expresa…” (redacción según ley número 7900 del 3 de agosto de 1999). Como se adelantó, la legislación aduanera es una rama especializada de Derecho Tributario, que se ocupa de la regularización de la mercadería en el país (su entrada, permanencia y salida). Sin el cumplimiento de dichas normas “de entrada” al mercado nacional, los bienes no podrían estar sujetos al comercio de forma legal. Esta es una distinción importante, que permite establecer que el hecho previo a la legitimación, según nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, es un delito aduanero y no un delito tributario en general. La legislación uruguaya, al igual que en el caso de Costa Rica, se caracteriza por contener normas tributarias generales y aduaneras, de igual rango, que parecen superponerse en cuanto prohíben conductas de evasión fiscal, pero ante tal situación, igual que ocurre en nuestro país, se hace primar el principio de especialidad: “…el delito de contrabando de por sí contiene a la defraudación en su tipo penal objetivo (…). Nuestro régimen represivo aduanero comprende las dos conductas, siendo bipartito: contrabando y defraudación. La superposición de ambos reproches implica una hipótesis de bis in idem. Por principio de especificidad —en todo caso— correspondería dilucidar si ha existido delito de contrabando, pero no la defraudación tributaria, que está ya abarcada por el contrabando. Son tipos penales que se excluyen recíprocamente y no un concurso entre varias calificaciones delictuales que se aplican a una misma conducta. Se ha de resolver cuál es la alternativa sin adicionarse unas a otras (contrabando o defraudación tributaria), ya que —como enseña GONZÁLEZ — el Derecho aduanero es un conjunto de normas jurídicas que tiene individualidad dentro del Derecho fiscal. Esa individualidad se distingue por sus fundamentos y métodos, además de otros supuestos de fondo y procesales que también lo diferencian…” (ALLEN, Germán: “La superposición de los tipos penales de contrabando y defraudación tributaria en la ley uruguaya”, Publicado en Tribuna del Abogado, n.º 180, Colegio de Abogados del Uruguay, Montevideo, octubre/diciembre de 2012, pp. 15-17). Retornando al caso bajo examen, se determinó que Rodney Morrison puso a la venta cigarrillos que no eran aptos para el comercio, pues no se había cancelado previamente el impuesto establecido para legitimar su venta en el estado de Nueva York. Se trataba entonces de bienes fuera del comercio, pues se incumplió el requisito fijado para que la mera tenencia de dicho bien por parte de los particulares, en el Estado de Nueva York, fuese legítima. Definida la legislación nacional aplicable a la conducta por la que se encontró responsable a Morrison, corresponde ahondar en cuanto a la penalidad aplicable al delito aduanero específico en el que califican los hechos, según el momento de la comisión de los hechos. La Ley General de Aduanas, número 7557 de 20 de octubre de 1995, en su versión vigente hasta el 4 de marzo de 2004, disponía en el numeral 214, el delito básico de defraudación fiscal aduanera: "…Artículo 214.- Delito básico. Será penado con prisión de uno a tres años y multa equivalente a dos veces el monto de los tributos dejados de percibir, con sus intereses y recargos, quien, mediante simulación, maniobra o cualquier otra forma de engaño, eluda o evada total o parcialmente el pago de la obligación tributaria aduanera, siempre que el valor aduanero de las mercancías supere los cinco mil pesos centroamericanos…”. Los casos específicos se encontraban previstos en el numeral 215 ejúsdem: “…Casos específicos de defraudación fiscal aduanera. Incurrirá en las penas señaladas en el artículo anterior, siempre que el valor aduanero de las mercancías supere los cinco mil pesos centroamericanos: a) Quien, sin autorización del órgano competente, dé un fin distinto del dispuesto en la norma autorizante, a mercancías beneficiadas con exención o franquicia o que hayan ingresado libres de tributos. b) Quien, utilizando o declarando información falsa, solicite u obtenga un tratamiento aduanero preferencial. c) Quien, utilizando o declarando información falsa, justifique el cumplimiento de sus deberes, obligaciones o requisitos en su condición de beneficiario o usuario de un régimen o modalidad aduanera, para solicitar u obtener un tratamiento aduanero preferencial. d) Quien, simule, total o parcialmente, una operación de exportación o importación de mercancías o altere la descripción de algunas, con el fin de obtener en forma ilícita un incentivo de carácter aduanero o un beneficio económico. e) El funcionario, el empleado público o el funcionario de la fe pública, que falsamente certifique o haga constar que se satisfizo total o parcialmente un tributo…” Finalmente, las agravantes se encontraban reguladas en el numeral 216 de la misma Ley: “… Agravantes. La pena será de tres a cinco años y la multa equivalente a tres veces el monto de los tributos dejados de percibir, con sus intereses y recargos, cuando, en alguno de los dos artículos anteriores concurra alguna de las siguientes circunstancias: a) Intervengan en el hecho tres o más personas, en calidad de autoras. b) Intervenga en calidad de autor, instigador o cómplice, un funcionario público en ejercicio de sus funciones, con ocasión de ellas o con abuso de su cargo…" (el resaltado es suplido). Los jueces de apelación hacen ver, de manera acertada, que es la modalidad simple de comisión de los tipos penales previstos en la Ley General de Aduanas, la que resulta aplicable a la conducta atribuida en los Estados Unidos a Rodney Morrison. Los “hechos del delito”, se atribuyen a Morrison de forma individual, y no en coautoría. Si bien es cierto, el 5 de marzo de 2004, entró en vigencia la Ley número 8373 de 18 de agosto de 2003, la cual modificó los tipos penales de interés, estableciendo para el delito de defraudación aduanera simple, penalidades mayores, que en algunos supuestos específicos superan los cuatro años de prisión, dicha normativa no resulta aplicable a los hechos que motivaron la condena de Morrison, de los cuales debemos partir. Es así que, aún si partimos de la firmeza material del pronunciamiento vertido por la Corte de Apelaciones estadounidense, el marco fáctico por el que se juzgó a Rodney Morrison se ubica temporalmente “desde el año de 1999 hasta el año 2004” (cfr. f. 706). Además, la pieza requisitoria a la que debemos atenernos para todos los efectos en esta causa, en función del principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia, es la acusación nacional, con base en la cual se realizó el juicio. Esta última, ubica el delito precedente “…entre el año 1996 y 2004…” (ver f. 835), y de conformidad con tal delimitación, se establece en el marco fáctico probado que la ejecución de los hechos delictivos previos, se da “:..Entre los años 1996 y 2004…” (f. 846), sin especificación de fechas. De este encuadramiento temporal debemos partir, entonces, para efectuar el análisis de doble incriminación. En situaciones como ésta, en la que no se definen meses o partes del año aproximadas, y existen reformas legislativas en el período de interés, que obligan a tomar partido sobre la normativa aplicable, esta Sala ha mantenido una posición consistente según la cual, debe estarse a la interpretación más beneficiosa para el inculpado. Partiendo de los rangos de sanciones, la legislación más beneficiosa resulta ser, sin duda, la Ley número 7557 de 20 de octubre de 1995, y no la Ley número 8373 de 18 de agosto de 2003 (vigente a partir del 5 de marzo de 2004). De todo lo dicho hasta ahora se obtiene, que el hecho precedente en esta causa, corresponde al delito de defraudación fiscal aduanera, en su modalidad simple, y para mayor precisión, se trata del tipo penal recogido en el artículo 215 inciso a) (en relación con el numeral 214) de la Ley General de Aduanas, en su redacción conforme a la Ley 7557 de 20 de octubre de 1995. Nos encontramos en este caso, precisamente, ante el aprovechamiento indebido de una exención fiscal establecida para regularizar la tenencia de los cigarrillos, según la legislación vigente en el estado de Nueva York. Por muy respetable que resulte el criterio jurídico a partir del cual, el Tribunal de Juicio estimó que los hechos precedentes los sancionaba nuestro ordenamiento a través del numeral 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, no es esa la interpretación que avala esta Sala. En virtud de lo expuesto, se declaran sin lugar los motivos primero y quinto de la impugnación presentada por la representante del Ministerio Público.

III.- Segundo motivo del recurso de casación interpuesto por la licenciada Sarkis Fernández: Errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva: Errónea aplicación de los numerales 14 y 30 del Código Civil, lo que conlleva errónea aplicación del artículo 1º de la Ley de Psicotrópicos, número 7786 de 30 de abril de 1998. Hace ver la licenciada Sarkis Fernández, que el ad quem dispone la necesidad de probar la existencia de las leyes extranjeras con base en las cuales fue condenado Rodney Morrison a efecto de acreditar el hecho precedente, de acuerdo con lo que estipula el artículo 30 del Código Civil. Con ello, desconoce el principio de libertad probatoria que rige en sede penal. Señala la recurrente que “…para demostrar la existencia de legislación extranjera, como en el caso particular, no se debe acudir al artículo 30 del Código Civil (…) sino, en primer lugar, a las reglas generales previstas en el propio Código Procesal Penal para traer prueba del extranjero y, en segundo lugar, y no menos importante, a los Tratados de asistencia judicial recíproca entre Naciones como lo es la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la delincuencia Organizada Trasnacional (conocida como Convención de Palermo)…” (f. 1277). Refiere que fue utilizando la asistencia penal internacional, que se incorporó a este proceso prueba documental que “…corrobora la existencia de la legislación penal y del proceso llevado a cabo contra Rodney Morrison en los Estados Unidos, así como los cargos por los que fue acusado y por los que fue sentenciado…” (ibid). Añade que otro de los requisitos echados de menos por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, con miras al principio de doble incriminación, es la acreditación del extremo mínimo de la pena correspondiente al delito en el sistema anglosajón. Sobre tal aspecto refiere la recurrente que de la lectura del 18 USC 1963 RICO, que es el cargo por el cual resultó condenado Morrison, “…se denota que la ley estadounidense, no refiere un extremo mínimo para este tipo de delincuencia, sino que únicamente delimita el extremo máximo de 20 años de prisión, por lo cual el Tribunal de Apelaciones (…) pretende un imposible, pues al no contar el tipo penal anglosajón con un extremo mínimo de este delito, se llega al absurdo de exigir que el Tribunal de Juicio lo hubiera establecido como si un tribunal de justicia costarricense tuviera la potestad legislativa que corresponde a otro Estado…” (f. 1280). Propone la fiscal, que para establecer cuándo un delito debe considerarse como “grave”, se debe acudir a la interpretación teleológica “…que integre cual (sic) es el sentido de la legislación nacional e internacional contra el blanqueo de capitales y la lucha contra el crimen organizado, así como la pena abstracta que se puede imponer al que comete el delito determinante y, finalmente (…) la dañosidad social de la conducta…”. El motivo se declara parcialmente con lugar, pese a lo cual, no varían las conclusiones del a quo en cuanto a la atipicidad del delito: Debe otorgarse razón al Ministerio Público, en cuanto a que el principio de libertad probatoria, permite acreditar la existencia y contenido de normativa internacional, a través de cualquier medio legítimo y en este caso, debe tenerse como fuente probatoria legal y debidamente incorporada al proceso, la asistencia legal tramitada por el ente acusador con los Estados Unidos. Proviene de dicha asistencia judicial, la sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones del Segundo Circuito de dicha nación que, de hecho, ha reconocido esta Sala en el considerando anterior, que constituye prueba válida a fin de delimitar la conducta por la cual se encontró culpable a Rodney Morrison. No obstante, esta concesión al argumento de la Fiscalía no tiene el efecto que la parte le asigna, pues aún partiendo de dicha incorporación probatoria, como se verá, debemos concluir que en la especie no se configuró un “delito grave”, pues a la par del principio de libertad probatoria, deben respetarse también el principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia. Partiendo de la redacción del delito de legitimación de capitales, vigente en el momento de los hechos que aquí interesan, los fondos que se convierten, transmiten u ocultan, deben provenir de un “delito grave” (Ley número 8204, publicada en La Gaceta número 8, de 11 de enero de 2002). De ahí la importancia de establecer cuál es la norma que, en el momento de los hechos, definía el concepto de delito grave, y las implicaciones que ello tiene en cuanto al respeto del principio de doble imputación, que debe respetarse cuando el hecho precedente es cometido en el extranjero, tal y como ocurre en este caso. Como ya se dijo, el artículo 1º de la Ley 8204 de 11 de enero de 2002, definía delito grave como “la conducta que constituya un delito punible con una privación de libertad de cuatro años, como mínimo…”. La reforma posterior a la Ley de Psicotrópicos que elimina la referencia a “delito grave”, no entra en vigencia sino hasta el 16 de marzo de 2009, por lo que no es aplicable a estos hechos, en virtud de las normas que regulan la aplicación de la ley penal en el tiempo. Sin embargo, mediante Ley número 8302, de 12 de septiembre de 2002 – vigente a partir del 27 de junio de 2003 – se incorporó al ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, la “Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional”, mejor conocida como “Convención de Palermo”. Dicho instrumento dispone en el artículo 2, inciso b): “…Por "delito grave" se entenderá la conducta que constituya un delito punible con una privación de libertad máxima de al menos cuatro años o con una pena más grave…”. Con arreglo de lo que dispone el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, la Convención de Palermo se incorporó al bloque de legalidad a partir del 27 de junio de 2003 y así las cosas, al ser ley posterior, deroga parcialmente la definición de delito grave contenida en el numeral 1º de la Ley 8204 de 26 de diciembre de 2001, al menos para los casos para los cuales aplica dicha normativa internacional, según las definiciones que contiene el mismo instrumento. Pese a que los hechos demostrados en contra de Rodney Morrison, no pueden reputarse como delincuencia organizada, en razón de que en Estados Unidos se le condenó de forma individual, el referido instrumento extiende su ámbito de aplicación, a las actividades de blanqueo de capitales, según se extrae de la relación de lo que indica el artículo 3: a) y el artículo 6 ejúsdem. Debido a que la ubicación temporal del delito precedente, para los efectos que aquí interesan, va del año 1999 al 2004 (sin definirse fechas, según la pieza acusatoria y los hechos probados), y la Convención de Palermo se incorpora al bloque de legalidad nacional desde junio de 2003, no es entendible la indicación que se hace en el fallo de Apelación de Sentencia, en cuanto a que dicho instrumento constituye una ley posterior “a la imputación” que no resulta más favorable a los intereses del inculpado y por lo tanto, es inaplicable por el principio de irretroactividad establecido en los numerales 11 y 12 del Código Penal, así como 34 constitucional (ver f. 1190 vto.). Más bien es clara la entrada en vigencia de dicha Convención, en el rango temporal durante el cual se tiene por perpetrado el delito precedente, pues dicho instrumento entró en vigencia el 27 de junio de 2003, y como dijimos, el rango temporal final que del que debe partirse para los hechos precedentes, es de 1999, al 2004. No obstante, como se indicó en el considerando anterior, el tipo penal aplicable al hecho precedente, corresponde a una modalidad específica de defraudación fiscal, contemplada en el inciso a) del artículo 215 del Código Penal, en relación con el artículo 214, según su redacción vigente en la Ley 7557 de 20 de octubre de 1995. Las normas de interés son las siguientes: "…Artículo 214.- Delito básico. Será penado con prisión de uno a tres años y multa equivalente a dos veces el monto de los tributos dejados de percibir, con sus intereses y recargos, quien, mediante simulación, maniobra o cualquier otra forma de engaño, eluda o evada total o parcialmente el pago de la obligación tributaria aduanera, siempre que el valor aduanero de las mercancías supere los cinco mil pesos centroamericanos. Artículo 215: “…Casos específicos de defraudación fiscal aduanera. Incurrirá en las penas señaladas en el artículo anterior, siempre que el valor aduanero de las mercancías supere los cinco mil pesos centroamericanos: a) Quien, sin autorización del órgano competente, dé un fin distinto del dispuesto en la norma autorizante, a mercancías beneficiadas con exención o franquicia o que hayan ingresado libres de tributos…” (el subrayado es suplido). De lo que se sigue que, aún y cuando a partir del 27 de enero de 2003 (aún dentro del rango temporal del hecho precedente), se considera como delito grave, cualquiera que se sancione con pena de prisión – en su extremo mínimo o máximo – dicha condición no se cumple en el caso de marras, pues la sanción máxima establecida para el delito precedente en la época de los hechos corresponde a tres años de prisión. No puede aceptarse la posición del Ministerio Público en cuanto a que es factible separarse de la definición de delito grave que contiene nuestra normativa, la cual como ya se indicó, utiliza como diferenciador, que el hecho sea punible con cuatro años de prisión o más. La sugerencia de acudir a criterios como el bien jurídico afectado, o el daño social causado, pueden resultar sometidas a la discusión parlamentaria, a efecto de generar reformas, pero en ningún caso el operador judicial, puede arrogarse competencias exclusivas del legislador. Finalmente, queda por abordar el tema de la doble imputación, el cual resulta de obligada referencia cuando el hecho precedente es cometido en el extranjero. En observancia de dicho principio, debe verificarse que los hechos que sirven de base al delito precedente, están previstos como actividad delictiva, tanto en el país donde se cometió, como en el país donde se juzga la legitimación de capitales. Más allá de dicha verificación, esta Sala estima que resulta excesivo exigir que la conducta sea considerada delito “grave” tanto en la legislación nacional como en el extranjero, pues ello implicaría extender los parámetros del propio ordenamiento a otros sistemas jurisdiccionales que pueden contener parámetros de medición de la pena, muy distintos al nuestro. Piénsese por ejemplo en los sistemas que no disponen de sanciones mínimas, sino que regulan únicamente el monto máximo a imponer, o los que califican la gravedad de los delitos en atención al bien jurídico afectado. Sobre este aspecto, debe concederse la existencia de debate en la doctrina, pero optamos por considerar que el principio de doble imputación se cumple, al constatar que la conducta que configura el delito precedente, es delito tanto en Costa Rica como en el extranjero. Para la calificación de “grave” debe estarse a la normativa nacional, siendo un exceso que el delito resulte grave tanto bajo los parámetros del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, como en la legislación extranjera, pues con ello se obliga a estandarizar dos sistemas de medición de las penas que pueden no tener puntos de coincidencia. La legislación española es muy similar a la costarricense, en lo que respecta a los requisitos objetivos del delito de legitimación de capitales, así como en la evolución del tipo. Al analizarse en dicha legislación, los requerimientos del delito precedente y en específico, la exigencia de que los fondos legitimados procedan de “delito grave”, se ha dicho: “…cabría (…) interpretar, de forma más lógica, que para que exista el delito de blanqueo de capitales tipificado en el Código Penal español, es preciso que el delito subyacente se encuentre también sancionado penalmente en el lugar de realización del mismo; es el denominado principio de "doble incriminación", en virtud del cual el delito previo ha de ser punible tanto en el lugar de ejecución como en España. Una de las cuestiones más interesantes que se plantean con relación a este tema, es el relativo a la calificación jurídica del delito subyacente cometido en el extranjero, es decir, si la misma debe hacerse con base en la normativa penal del país de comisión del delito o del país de realización del blanqueo. Y la cuestión resulta más difícil de resolver si la normativa del país donde se comete el blanqueo exige, como lo hacía hasta la LO 15/2003 el artículo 301 del CP que el delito del que procedencia de los bienes sea un delito grave, pues entonces surgiría la cuestión de, en caso de cometerse el delito en el extranjero, dónde habría de ser considerado grave el mismo, si en el territorio nacional donde se realiza y se juzga el blanqueo o en el lugar de comisión del delito, es decir, la determinación de la normativa con base en la cual ha de realizarse la calificación jurídica del delito previo cometido en el extranjero, si la calificación del delito –grave entonces– habría de hacerse de acuerdo con el derecho del lugar de comisión o de acuerdo con el derecho penal español. Si se opta por la primera de las soluciones se produciría una extensión material del Derecho penal nacional, posibilidad que la mayoría de la doctrina rechaza, considerando mayoritariamente que la calificación del hecho previo ha de hacerse de acuerdo con la legislación nacional donde se cometió el delito de blanqueo de capitales...” (García López, S. (2006). “Blanqueo de capitales. Evolución del delito subyacente”. Recuperado de http://www.ief.es/ documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/cuadernos_formacion/05_2008/Colab_05_08.pdf. El subrayado no corresponde al original). Según las anteriores apreciaciones, que prohíja esta Cámara, resulta excesivo exigir que la nación extranjera donde se cometió el delito precedente, contenga legislación similar a la costarricense en cuanto a qué se entiende por delito grave. Lo que resulta exigible, como ya se indicó, es demostrar una conexión concreta entre los fondos objeto de legitimación y el hecho precedente, y por supuesto, que la conducta en cuestión se encuentre prevista y sancionada como delito, en ambas legislaciones. Por otro lado, no puede aceptarse la pretensión de la Fiscalía de separarse del criterio establecido por el legislador costarricense para definir qué se debe considerar como “delito grave”. Si en la Ley 8204 de 11 de enero de 2002, aplicable a los hechos que aquí se conocen por su momento de comisión, se define con claridad que delito grave es el que prevé como sanción la pena privativa de libertad de cuatro años “como mínimo”, es esta definición la que debe privar para los hechos que se cometen entre el 11 de enero de 2002 y el 26 de junio de 2003. A partir del 27 de junio de 2003, con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley número 8302 de 12 de septiembre de 2002, entra a regir la definición de “delito grave” de la Convención de Palermo, según la cual, basta que el delito contenga dentro de su rango de pena privativa de libertad, cuatro años, sin importar si se trata del extremo mínimo o el máximo. Lo que sucede en el caso bajo examen, es que ni con la primera definición, ni con la segunda, los hechos alcanzan la caracterización de “graves”, pues como ya se indicó, el tipo penal aplicable según el momento de comisión del hecho precedente, es la Ley General de Aduanas de 1995, que disponía para la conducta sanciones privativas de libertad que iban de uno a tres años. Por todo lo principio de libertad probatoria y la posibilidad de extraer datos a partir de los documentos obtenidos mediante asistencia penal internacional, así como en cuanto a que los alcances del principio de doble imputación no deben llevar al extremo de exigir que la conducta del delito precedente deba considerarse grave también en la legislación extranjera, bajo nuestros propios estándares, tales precisiones no tienen la consecuencia de cambiar la consecuencia final a la que llegaron los jueces de apelación. El delito precedente en este asunto, continúa sin alcanzar la calificación de “grave” y por ello, se echa de menos un elemento objetivo esencial para que se configure la legitimación de capitales, según su redacción vigente del 11 de enero de 2002, al 15 de marzo de 2009. En síntesis, se declara parcialmente con lugar el presente motivo, pese a lo cual, no varían las conclusiones del a quo en cuanto a la atipicidad del delito que aquí se juzga.

IV.- Tercer motivo de la impugnación, por existencia de precedentes contradictorios de la Sala Tercera, en relación con lo resuelto por el Tribunal de Apelaciones de San José: Arguye la Fiscalía, que la sentencia absolutoria que se recurre, número 337 de 15:25 horas, del 19 de febrero de 2012, resulta contradictoria con los siguientes precedentes, dictados por esta Sala: a) número 183, de 15:55 horas, del 6 de marzo de 2006; b) 1105, de 12:25 horas, del 10 de septiembre de 2004; c) 765, de las 10:50 horas, del 8 de julio de 2005; y d) 289, de las 8:55 horas, del 4 de abril de 1997. Fundamenta su reparo, en que esta Cámara, en los votos indicados, ha señalado repetidamente “…para demostrar que los dineros objeto de legitimación se originan en un delito previo, dicha demostración debe establecerse incluso por medio de prueba indiciaria, mientras que en la sentencia absolutoria dictada por el Tribunal de Apelación a favor de Howden Pascall, consideró necesario y esencial que, para demostrar que los bienes tienen su origen en un delito, se requiere una sentencia condenatoria con calidad de firmeza…” (f. 1289). Refiere que al exigirse una sentencia condenatoria firme por el delito precedente, se están imponiendo requisitos indebidos para la configuración de la legitimación de capitales, haciendo prácticamente imposible la investigación de este tipo de delitos en nuestro país. Cuarto motivo del recurso de casación interpuesto por la licenciada Sarkis Fernández: Errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva, concretamente, los artículos 1 y 69 de la Ley 7786, reformada mediante Ley 8204 de 26 de diciembre de 2001: Retomando los argumentos del tercer motivo de casación, esta vez desde la óptica de infracción a la ley sustantiva, la impugnante estima que “…el Tribunal de Apelaciones yerra por completo su fundamento de fondo, al exigir la demostración del delito previo a la legitimación de capitales, solo por medio de una sentencia condenatoria firme. Insistimos, no está establecido en el tipo penal y tampoco ha sido exigido, por jurisprudencia, como requisito indispensable una sentencia de condena por el delito previo, por ejemplo, el tráfico de drogas u otro delito grave…” (f. 1294). Con base en variada doctrina española, la recurrente señala que el delito de legitimación de capitales es autónomo, pluriofensivo, y que no se requiere para su comprobación, que exista una sentencia penal firme sobre el delito previo, como lo exige el ad quem en esta causa. No ha lugar los reparos: En la causa bajo examen, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en el grueso de investigaciones por legitimación de capitales, existe una sentencia en relación con el delito precedente, ocurrido y juzgado en el extranjero, la cual es aportada por el propio Ministerio Público, a fin de acreditar dicho elemento objetivo del tipo. De manera que la valoración del pronunciamiento de la Corte de Apelaciones del Segundo Distrito de los Estados Unidos, y en específico, su definición de la “conducta del delito”, no es arbitraria. Se trata de la prueba aportada por el propio ente acusador, a fin de acreditar el punto. Como se indicó ya, al resolver el primer motivo de casación, la alusión que se hace a delitos como extorsión, homicidio o crimen organizado, no pudo comprobarse en esta causa, ni a través de la sentencia ni a través de otra prueba indiciaria. Al excluirlos de la definición del delito precedente, entonces, los juzgadores no incurren en una exigencia no prevista por la normativa, como es la existencia de sentencia previa, sino que estiman que no existen elementos de convicción que permitan derrumbar las conclusiones a las que arribó el sistema judicial norteamericano, cuando absuelve a Rodney Morrison por dichos cargos. La forma como resuelve el ad quem, se ajusta a lo señalado por el profesor Francisco Castillo en cuanto al principio de libertad probatoria en relación con el hecho previo: “…es necesario que el Tribunal determine la existencia del hecho previo y su carácter típico y antijurídico, sin que baste la simple sospecha de que el objeto proviene de un hecho punible. El establecimiento de la prueba del hecho previo puede hacerse por sentencia firme, si fue conocido por una autoridad competente. Si ésta (sic) prueba falta puede probarse el carácter típico y antijurídico del hecho previo, que es un elemento normativo del tipo de legitimación de capitales. Esta prueba debe hacerla el Juez que conoce en el país del delito de legitimación de capitales conforme a los criterios de libertad probatoria y de libre valoración de la prueba. En todo caso, el establecimiento del hecho previo por el Juez nacional como un elemento normativo del tipo penal de legitimación de lavado no implica dictar una sentencia en el suelo nacional sobre el hecho previo ocurrido en el extranjero…” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco: El delito de Legitimación de Capitales, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1ª edición, San José, 2012, pp. 93-94). Como puede inferirse, una cosa es que en el Derecho Penal rija el principio de libertad probatoria, y otra muy distinta, que se quiera hacer pasar los cargos estadounidenses no probados (ni en Estados Unidos, ni en el proceso que nos ocupa), como datos acreditados en miras a establecer cuál es el hecho precedente de interés para la legitimación de capitales. Al respetarse el cuadro fáctico definido por la Corte de Apelaciones estadounidense, por lo tanto, no se desconoce que el delito precedente podría acreditarse a través de fuentes probatorias distintas a una sentencia, como lo es la prueba indiciaria, en el seno de la propia causa de legitimación de capitales, criterio que mantiene esta Sala. Lo que ocurre es que en la situación bajo examen, la prueba aportada para acreditar el hecho precedente, es la documentación certificada sobre el proceso judicial seguido en los Estados Unidos contra Morrison, y no otra. Por todo lo dicho, se declara sin lugar el tercer motivo de la impugnación que formula la representante del Ministerio Público. […]

VII.- Octavo motivo de casación: Inobservancia de los artículos 103 y 110 del Código Penal, así como el numeral 87 de la Ley número 8204 de 26 de diciembre de 2001: Señala la impugnante que el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia no desvirtúa el hecho probado del Tribunal de Juicio, consistente en que Morrison, hermano del encartado, “…transfirió al país, entre 2002 y 2004, poco más de dieciséis millones de dólares, dejando algunas sumas a su nombre y otras en las cuentas del aquí endilgado a quien, el 17 de julio de 2000, le dio poder generalísimo sin límite de sumapara la administración y disposición de sus bienes…” (f. 1329). De lo anterior deriva la recurrente, que el ad quem tiene por cierto que “…producto de las actividades ilícitas realizadas por Morrison en Estados Unidos, éste obtuvo grandes sumas de dinero que son precisamente las que envió por medio de transferencias bancarias al Banco de Costa Rica (…) por lo que se deben considerar como bienes producto de un delito para efectos de los artículos 103 y 110 del Código Penal y 87 de la Ley 8204…” (f. 1330). En consecuencia, la licenciada Sarkis Fernández estima que, sin importar las circunstancias relativas a la culpabilidad del enjuiciado Howden Pascall, se debió mantener la orden de comiso dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio en este caso. El reparo no puede acogerse: Para la correcta solución de esta queja, deben realizarse varias precisiones. La primera de ellas, es que no puede aplicarse de manera concomitante o simultánea, como lo plantea la recurrente, las reglas del Código Penal y de la Ley de Psicotrópicos, que regulan el comiso. La normativa prevista en la Ley 8204 de 26 de diciembre de 2001, es especial y se aplica a los delitos previstos en la Ley de Psicotrópicos, entre ellos, la legitimación de capitales, cuya existencia se ha descartado en esta causa. Por tal razón, únicamente cabe examinar si resultan aplicables o no, los numerales 103 y 110 del Código Penal. En segundo lugar, no es cierto que el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia tenga por cierto que la totalidad del dinero enviado a Howden Pascall por su hermano por vía de transferencias bancarias, desde los Estados Unidos, proviene de la comisión de delitos. Precisamente una de las razones por las que, a modo de ejercicio, el ad quem estima que no sería posible encuadrar los hechos como el delito contemplado en el numeral 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (ya indicamos que ello tampoco sería posible, en virtud de las reglas del concurso aparente), es que no se aportó prueba al proceso que permita conocer qué parte de dicho dinero, corresponde a las ganancias obtenidas por Morrison, producto de la venta de cigarrillos en condiciones de ilegalidad. Se trata de un tema ampliamente discutido por los jueces de apelación en el fallo absolutorio (cfr. fs. 1196 fte. a 1198 vto.), que refleja la existencia de un debate en la doctrina sobre la proporción del capital que resulta contaminado cuando el delito precedente constituye un ilícito tributario. Tal discusión cobra mayor relevancia cuando, como sucede en este caso, no sería posible afirmar que la totalidad del dinero invertido en la compra de los cigarrillos fue ilegalmente obtenido, pues sería únicamente una parte del mismo el que retuvo o dejó de pagar al fisco estadounidense el inculpado, con lo cual el comiso sobre la totalidad de las ganancias, parecería ser excesivo e injustificado. De manera que no podría afirmarse que todas las ganancias obtenidas por Morrison provienen de la comercialización de cigarrillos, y aún si nos centramos en dicha actividad, tendríamos que excluir las ventas de cigarrillos efectuadas en condiciones que se estiman legales o toleradas según la legislación estadounidense, a saber: las ventas efectuadas dentro de la reserva, y para consumo de la población indígena, así como el capital previo con que pudo haber contado Rodney Morrison. Al efecto razonaron los jueces de apelación de sentencia: “…no solo no existe motivación, sino, peor aún, prueba alguna, ni pericial ni de otra índole, que refiere cuál era el monto de lo dejado de pagar al Gobierno de Estados Unidos por impuestos, que es lo único ilícito de ese dinero (y no la totalidad de los ingresos surgidos de las ventas de los cigarrillos), sin que pueda presumirse (…) que lo sea todo el dinero transferido, desde que al venta de tabaco y cigarrillos, como toda actividad comercial, alguna ganancia genera, pagados los impuestos, a más de que, según se estableció con la misma declaración de Dianne C. Leonardo (ver folio 854) y de Eliécer Pascall Gordon (folio 872) el dinero transferido por Morrison también provenía de otras diversas actividades que él tenía en tal país…” (f. 1196 fte.). En definitiva, bajo el razonamiento que deriva de la sentencia de apelación, no es posible aseverar que la totalidad de dinero transferido a Howden Pascall, corresponde a capital proveniente de actividades delictivas. A pesar de ello, hace ver el ad quem que el comiso lo ordenó el Tribunal de Juicio sobre la totalidad del dinero transferido, sin que se distinga entre los montos obtenidos antes de la atipicidad de los hechos, es decir, antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley 8204, el 11 de enero de 2002 (f. 1210 fte.). Sobre este punto señala: “…el Tribunal tomó todo el dinero ingresado al país, sin hacer división alguna por período, lo que hizo que contabilizara montos ingresados cuando esa conducta no era delito, es decir, antes de 2002…” (f. 1198 fte.). Existe un segundo nivel de análisis, a fin de dar una correcta solución al tema planteado del comiso. Se trata de la forma cómo se encuentra definida dicha figura en el Código Penal costarricense. Dispone el artículo 103 ejúsdem: “Todo hecho punible tiene como consecuencia la reparación civil, que será determinada en sentencia condenatoria; esta ordenará: (…) 3) el comiso”. Esta se relaciona con el artículo 110 del mismo cuerpo normativo: “El delito produce la pérdida a favor del Estado de los instrumentos con que se cometió y de las cosas o los valores provenientes de su realización, o que constituyan para el agente un provecho derivado del mismo delito, salvo el derecho que sobre ellos tengan el ofendido o terceros...” (el subrayado es suplido). Nótese que el legislador hace remisión expresa al “delito”, el cual ha sido determinado por “sentencia condenatoria”. En el caso particular, la competencia de los jueces costarricenses para dictar sentencia, se circunscribe al delito de legitimación de capitales. Sin embargo, en relación con dicho ilícito, se mantiene la absolutoria dictada. De lo que tenemos que no podría afirmarse que los fondos cuestionados, provienen de la realización del delito sobre el cual emitieron sentencia los jueces costarricenses, sino de otro (la evasión de impuestos de cigarrillos), sobre el cual nuestra jurisdicción no tiene competencia para pronunciarse. La pretensión de la representante del Ministerio Público, implica entonces asignar a un ilícito cometido y sentenciado en el extranjero, una consecuencia distinta a la pena, sin que los jueces costarricenses posean competencia para juzgar y sancionar el delito en cuestión. La normativa costarricense, no prevé la figura denominada “comiso ampliado”, que constituye la figura a través de la cual es posible incautar, no solo los bienes provenientes del delito juzgado en el país, sino también “…las ganancias obtenidas por la organización criminal que no se relacionan directamente con la actividad delictiva sometida a juzgamiento…” (VARGAS GONZÁLEZ, Patricia: “El comiso de las ganancias. Algunas deudas y excesos legislativos”, En: Derecho Penal y Constitución. Libro en memoria del Dr. Luis Paulino Mora Mora, volumen I, obra colectiva, San José, 2014, p. 323, el resaltado es suplido). Tal y como se encuentra redactado el numeral 110 del Código Penal, aplicable a este asunto por no tratarse de un delito contemplado en la Ley de Psicotrópicos, debe concluirse que en nuestro país, de acuerdo con la regulación vigente en el momento de los hechos, el comiso se vincula o limita a los bienes directamente relacionados con el delito objeto de condena en la causa que se está conociendo. Los esfuerzos por corregir esta falencia, han dado lugar a diversos proyectos legislativos. Una de las propuestas aprobada como ley, entró en vigencia el 22 de julio de 2009, (Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada, número 8754 de 24 de julio de 2009), la cual supone la incautación de los patrimonios cuyo origen lícito no sea posible justificar, incluso sin vinculación alguna a un delito. Concretamente, señala el artículo 20 de la referida Ley: “…La Contraloría General de la República, el Ministerio de Hacienda, el ICD o el Ministerio Público podrán denunciar, ante el Juzgado Civil de Hacienda de Asuntos Sumarios, acerca del incremento de capital sin causa lícita aparente, con una retrospectiva hasta de diez años, de cualquier funcionario público o persona de derecho privado, física o jurídica. Recibida la denuncia, el Juzgado dará audiencia al interesado por el término de veinte días hábiles para contestar y evacuar la prueba; en la misma resolución ordenará, como medida cautelar, el secuestro de bienes, su inmovilización registral y de toda clase de productos financieros. Contra la medida cautelar solo cabrá recurso de apelación sin efecto suspensivo, el cual deberá ser interpuesto en el plazo de veinticuatro horas ante el Tribunal Colegiado Contencioso Administrativo, que resolverá sin más trámite y con prioridad sobre cualquier otro asunto…”. Sin embargo, su aplicación en la práctica no ha sido posible, y en realidad no se trata de una figura ampliativa del comiso, sino de un proceso de naturaleza distinta a la penal, que debe seguirse en la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa. De lo dicho hasta ahora podemos concluir que, de conformidad con la legislación vigente en el momento de los hechos, no era posible desligar el comiso de la demostración, a través de sentencia, de un hecho al menos típico y antijurídico. La situación que regula el artículo 110 del Código Penal, es el comiso como una consecuencia del injusto; y no de cualquier injusto, sino el que es objeto de pronunciamiento en la causa penal en específico, lo que corresponde, en este caso, a la legitimación de capitales. Al no existir fallo condenatorio por dicho delito, no es posible el dictado del comiso. Consecuentemente, se declara sin lugar el octavo motivo de la impugnación.”